The Occupy Movement in Hong Kong 9781138692299, 9781315532691

Table of contents :
Cover
Title
Copyright
Dedication
Contents
List of figures
List of maps
List of tables
Preface and acknowledgments
1 Sustaining social movements
2 Background of the Occupy Movement
3 Movement legitimacy and government response
4 Determined participants and movement sustainability
5 Leadership of the movement
6 Tactical escalation and its limitations
7 Sustained movement and the consequences
Appendix: Data collection
Selected bibliography
Index

Citation preview

The Occupy Movement in Hong Kong

The Occupy Movement in Hong Kong was sustained for about 80 days because of government tolerance, the presence of determined participants, and a weak leadership. The government tolerated the occupation because its initial use of force, in particular tear gas, was counterproductive and provoked large-scale participation. Unlike other social movements, such as the 1989 Tiananmen movement, the Occupy Movement reached its peak of participation at the very beginning, making it difficult to sustain the momentum. The presence of determined participants who chose to stay until the government responded was crucial to the sustaining of the movement. These self-selected participants were caught in a dilemma between fruitless occupation and reluctance to retreat without a success. The movement lasted also because the weak leadership was unable to force the government to concede or devise approaches for making a “graceful exit.” Consequently, site clearance became the common choice of both the government and the protestors. This book develops a new framework to explain the sustaining of decentralized protest in the absence of strong movement organizations and leadership. Sustained protests are worth research because they not only reveal the broad social context in which the protests arise and persist but also point out the dynamics of the escalation or the decline of the protests. In addition, sustained protests may not only lead to more dramatic action, but they may also result in the diffusion of protests or lead to significant policy changes. Yongshun Cai is Professor of Social Science at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.

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149 China’s Peasant Agriculture and Rural Society Changing paradigms of farming Jan Douwe van der Ploeg and Jingzhong Ye 150 China’s Changing Economy Trends, impacts and the future Edited by Curtis Andressen 151 China’s Energy Security A multidimensional perspective Edited by Giulia Romano and Jean-François Di Meglio 152 Chinese Muslims and the Global Ummah Islamic revival and ethnic identity among the Hui of Qinghai Province Alexander Blair Stewart 153 State Propaganda in China’s Entertainment Industry Shenshen Cai 154 Assessing the Balance of Power in Central–Local Relations in China Edited by John Donaldson 155 Television Regulation and Media Policy in China Yik Chan Chin 156 Space, Politics, and Cultural Representation in Modern China Cartographies of revolution Enhua Zhang 157 The Occupy Movement in Hong Kong Sustaining decentralized protest Yongshun Cai

The Occupy Movement in Hong Kong Sustaining decentralized protest

Yongshun Cai

First published 2017 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2017 Yongshun Cai The right of Yongshun Cai to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN: 978-1-138-69229-9 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-53269-1 (ebk) Typeset in Galliard by Apex CoVantage, LLC

For Chen and Xinyu

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Contents

List of figures List of maps List of tables Preface and acknowledgments

viii ix x xi

1

Sustaining social movements

1

2

Background of the Occupy Movement

17

3

Movement legitimacy and government response

44

4

Determined participants and movement sustainability

71

5

Leadership of the movement

99

6

Tactical escalation and its limitations

121

7

Sustained movement and the consequences

148

Appendix: Data collection Selected bibliography Index

162 163 168

Figures

2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 3.1 6.1 6.2

Unemployment rate in Hong Kong Tourists from the Chinese mainland Participants in the July 1 demonstrations in Hong Kong Anti-national education protests People’s attitudes toward the proposed Occupy Central Movement Anti-occupation demonstrations and rallies Number of protestors in Admiralty Newspaper coverage of the Occupy Movement (Apple Daily and Mingpao, September 28–November 25)

23 25 32 34 37 61 132 134

Maps

3.1 3.2

Occupied area in Admiralty (shaded area) Occupied area in Mong Kok (shaded area)

48 51

Tables

1.1 2.1 2.2 3.1 3.2 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 5.1 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4

Participants in movements Students’ attitudes toward government performance (N = 1,032) Income inequality between households in Hong Kong Number of people who indicated their support for the Occupy Movement Public attitudes toward the movement Types of participants in Admiralty (N = 182) Reasons for participating in the Occupy Movement Occupiers’ willingness to follow the two student organizations (N = 195) Occupation and assistance providers at the protest sites Answers to the question of “whether you support moving to Admiralty and having a concentrated occupation” Causes of sustained movements Basic statistics on the Occupy Movement Factors affecting the integration of Hong Kong into the Chinese mainland Changes in the views of the youth

8 18 22 53 54 73 73 76 82 108 149 152 154 154

Preface and acknowledgments

I had taught in Hong Kong for more than 10 years before the Occupy Movement occurred, and I had never thought about writing about the politics in the city. When the movement occurred on September 28, 2014, I did not believe that the protest would last for a long time. A few days later when I went to the protest site, I came to realize that it might last longer than I initially thought. But even by then, I still did not think that this movement could be a topic worth serious research, partly because the consequence was unlikely to be very influential. Some protests become important because of their consequences, whereas others are interesting because of their process. About two weeks after the movement commenced, I began to believe that it would be interesting to see how the movement could last for a long time. From that time, I began to collect news and reports about the movement on a daily basis and frequently went to the protest sites to observe and to talk to the participants. Protestors whom I talked to were overwhelmingly friendly, and they were frank about how they thought about their participation, the Hong Kong government, the Chinese government, and their movement’s claims. Such interviews allowed me to understand why people engaged in a seemingly fruitless movement and greatly inspired my interest in exploring why the movement sustained from the perspective of its participants. I owe the greatest debt to those participants who shared with me their views about the various issues I raised during our talks. It took more efforts to collect information about the movement’s leadership and the decision making because it was generally beyond the knowledge of the rank-and-file participants. I owe great debts to many people for their assistance in my data collection. They accepted my interviews, helped arrange interviews for me, or provided useful information in various ways. They are Chan King-chi, Ho Wing Chung, Chen Yun-chung, Chan Ka-lok, Ming Sing, Ma Ngok, Feng Chen, Zhu Yongxiao, May-yi Shaw, Samson Yuen, and Wai Cheng. Some other people who accepted my interviews preferred to remain anonymous. I owe a special debt to Chan King-chi, who not only helped me with data collection but also read part of the manuscript and provided comments and suggestions. Ho Wing Chung read part of Chapter 2 and provided very helpful

xii

Preface and acknowledgments

suggestions. I wish to thank Sing Ming, my colleague at the Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (HKUST), for his assistance in data collection. He also taught me Hong Kong politics by reading part of the manuscript and provided comments and suggestions. Ma Ngok, my former colleague at HKUST, kindly helped arrange interviews for me. I am grateful to the reviewer for the suggestions and comments. I also wish to thank Simon Bates, Yuvanes Yogaraja, and Tan ShengBin at Routledge for their assistance in the publication of this book.

1

Sustaining social movements

In mid-September 2014, People Power, a pan-democratic political coalition in Hong Kong, responded to the call for the Occupy Central Movement by purchasing four mobile toilets, 2,000 drainage bags, 1,000 raincoats, and 1,000 packs of bread from taobao.com to prepare for the long-planned occupation. People Power also organized an order-keeping team of roughly 50 members to maintain the peace during the coming movement. People Power estimated that the occupation would not last long after it started on October 1. The police would clear the site within a couple of days, which was the same approach they had employed to deal with protestors who carried out an occupation rally as a trial between July 1 and 2, 2014. In this rally, the police cleared the site by arresting more than 500 participants. In the forthcoming occupation, mobile toilets and drainage bags would be required because the protestors were believed to be surrounded by the police.1 Nevertheless, similar to People Power, very few people, including the founders of the Occupy Central Movement, the Hong Kong government, and the Chinese central government, expected that the movement would last for nearly 80 days after it started on September 28, 2014. The Occupy Movement, which is “the most severe political conflict” or “the largest mass movement” since the handover of the sovereignty of Hong Kong to China,2 was a direct response to the decision the Standing Committee of the Chinese National People’s Congress (NPC) made on August 31, 2014 (hereafter the 8.31 decision). The decision allows the direct election of the chief executive of Hong Kong but without a civil nomination of the candidates. In other words, the central government will retain its control over the selection of the chief executive. Protestors demanded direct universal suffrage with civil nomination and the resignation of Leung Chunying, the incumbent chief executive.3 The Chinese central government rapidly responded. Two days after the movement started, the State Council clearly stated that the central government supported Leung and the Hong Kong government. From October 1, the Chinese central government issued a series of statements about the Occupy Movement through the People’s Daily and Chinese Central Television, the mouthpieces of the central government. Beijing denounced the movement as illegal, criticizing it for breaking the rule of law in Hong Kong and jeopardizing its prosperity and stability. The editorial published in the People’s Daily on October 1 rejected

2

Sustaining social movements

the demand of protestors for civil nomination by stating that the 8.31 decision “has an unshakable legal status and effect.”4 The resolute standing of the central government boded ill for the movement, suggesting the movement was doomed to fail. People stage collective action not merely because of their grievances, but, more important, because of their faith in the effectiveness of the action. In discussing the social movement of weak groups, Piven and Cloward contend that people stage collective action not only because they believe in the diminished legitimacy of the existing system and the increased awareness of rights, but also because of their “sense of efficacy.” In particular, “people who ordinarily consider themselves helpless come to believe that they have some capacity to alter their lot.”5 Similarly, as Chong suggests, group members are enthusiastic about contributing to collective action or are pressured to do so only when such collective action has a realistic opportunity to achieve the desired public good. “When collective action is widely regarded as futile, or as an ineffective symbolic protest, these social and psychological incentives vanish.”6 Indeed, not long after the Occupy Movement started, many participants acknowledged that the chance for the central government to make concessions in the face of protest was slim.7 If people stage collective action because they believe that the action helps their cause, then the case of the Occupy Movement appears puzzling. Why and how did the protestors sustain a seemingly fruitless movement for such a long time? This book aims to address this issue by focusing on the factors that contributed to the standoff between the protestors and the movement target, or the government in this case. It argues that the sustained movement resulted from government tolerance and the decentralized movement structure. Sustained movements require research because they reveal not only the broad social context in which the movements arise but also the dynamics of the escalation or decline of the movements. In addition, sustained movements may not only lead to more dramatic action (e.g., the hunger strike in the 1989 Tiananmen movement) but may also result in the diffusion of protests or “a propensity for collective action from its initiators to both unrelated groups and to antagonists.”8 For example, the Occupy Wall Street Movement diffused from New York not only to other cities in the United States but also to cities in other countries. Furthermore, sustained movements may become the driving force for political or socioeconomic changes and lead to long-term consequences even if they fail.

Explaining the sustainability of social movements Social movements serve different functions, but they generally aim to induce changes, although their success is highly conditional. For example, Gusfield defines social movements as “socially shared activities and beliefs directed toward the demand for change in some aspect of the social order.”9 Social movements are distinguished from more anomic forms of “contentious episodes,” such as shortlived protests or demonstrations, because the former are sustained collective

Sustaining social movements 3 actions or have a continued presence of movement participants or symbols.10 Tarrow therefore defines a social movement as “collective challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interactions with elites, opponents and authorities.”11 Similarly, Tilly stresses that a movement is “a sustained series of interactions between power holders and persons successfully claiming to speak on behalf of a constituency lacking formal representation.”12 Movement participants are generally denied effective institutionalized channels to pursue their interests, and staging sustained collective action serves as a possible recourse. An important issue is what sustains a movement. In his research on the civil rights movement of black people in the United States, McAdam points out that political opportunities, organizational strength, and cognitive liberation are crucial for the rise of social movements; such factors, together with the social control response to the movements, also determine the development of a movement.13 The continual existence of political opportunities and the cognitive liberation influence the development of the movement in considerably similar modes as they did in the generation of the movement. Movement participants still believe that conditions are unjust and need to be changed through group efforts. Social control response is an important factor that affects the development of a movement because it reflects the relationship between the movement and its external environment. If the movement is to be sustained, then it must retain sufficient power to withstand the opposition. Existing studies have highlighted the role of organizational strength in the occurrence, success, and endurance of a movement. McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly argue that “would-be activists must either create an organizational vehicle or utilize an existing one and transform it into an instrument of contention.”14 Research on the relationship between organizations and protest outcomes suggests that organizations contribute to movement success. For example, Shorter and Tilly report that in France, strikes with the presence of unions were less likely to fail than strikes that lacked union backing.15 Similarly, organizations purportedly play important roles in sustaining movements.

Organizational strength and movement sustaining According to McAdam, indigenous organizational strength dictates the “structural potential” of challengers to mobilize and take advantage of political opportunities. Specifically, “insurgents must be able to create a more enduring structure to sustain insurgency. Efforts to do so usually entail the creation of formally constituted organizations to assume the centralized direction of the movement previously exercised by informal groups.”16 This also involves resource mobilization in that movement participants must be able to exploit the initial success of the movement to mobilize those resources required to facilitate the development of a more permanent organizational structure for sustaining the movement. The importance of organizations in sustaining social movements is therefore manifold. First, organizations are crucial in mobilizing the resources required for sustained movements. Scholars highlighting the importance of resources to

4

Sustaining social movements

social movements have assigned a pivotal role to organizations. McCarthy and Zald define a social movement organization as “a complex, or formal, organization that identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or a countermovement and attempts to implement those goals.”17 They point out that social movement organizations must possess resources, however few and of whatever type, to work toward goal achievement. These organizations “compete for resources with entertainment, voluntary associations, and organized religion and politics.”18 Second, organizations and leaders are important because they can coordinate collective action. As McLaughlin explains, “Over its life span the movement must develop an organizational structure. Diverse elements within the movement must be coordinated; principles must be surrendered to expediency.”19 Organizations can also facilitate collective action by overcoming the ever-present collective action problem because an organization can provide incentives or sanctions to enforce compliance and facilitate consensus building.20 Therefore, Oberschall indicates that without organizations, aggrieved people could only stage “shortterm, localized, ephemeral outbursts and movements of protest such as riots. For sustained resistance or protest an organizational base and continuity of leadership are also necessary.”21 Third, organizations facilitate movement because they help recruit participants and provide incentive for participation. Organizations are often viewed as the infrastructure that provides an organizational base and is used to link members of the angry population into an organized movement.22 McAdam identifies four factors that reflect indigenous organizational strength, namely, members, established structure or solidary incentives, communication network, and leaders.23 To a large extent, organizational strength is pertinent to an organization’s capacity to mobilize participants. Indigenous organizations are suggested as the primary source of participants. The solidary incentives provide the motivating force for participation, whereas the communication network is also meant to facilitate participation by, for example, strengthening the integration of people into the movement. Thus, Tarrow asserts that “the most effective forms of organization are based on autonomous and interdependent social networks linked by loosely coordinated mobilizing structure.”24 The role of leaders in sustaining movement is self-evident in that the leadership helps formulate movement strategies, coordinate action, and deal with movement targets. Popkin suggests that “the importance of the leader as a political entrepreneur – someone willing to invest his own time and resources to coordinate the inputs of others in order to produce collective action or collective goods – should not be underestimated.”25 Schmidt and Cohen, for example, argue that the rapid proliferation of revolutionary movements across newly connected societies (e.g., because of new information technologies) will not be as threatening to established governments as some people predict. New technologies limit the transformation of revolutions in ways that tip the balance in favor of the people. “Principal among them [these limitations] is the creation of firstrate leaders, individuals who can keep the opposition intact during tough times,

Sustaining social movements 5 negotiate with a government it if opts for reform, or run for office, win and deliver on what the people want if a dictator flees.”26 McAdam and Scott thus conclude: [T]hese theorists stress that movements, if they are to be sustained for any length of time, require some form of organizations: leadership, administrative structure, incentives for participation, and means for acquiring resources and support. Embracing an open systems perspective, the importance of the organization’s relation to its environment – social, economic, political – was underscored.27

Decentralized movements Although the aforementioned empirical research has borne out the importance of organizations, that importance may vary across contexts. For example, most of the studies that stress the importance of organizations are based on research on social movements that occurred in an era in which the recruitment of participants heavily relied on preexisting connections or networks, such as churches and other institutions.28 However, not all movements are mobilized by primarily relying on existing organizations. Voluntary participation without (considerable) mobilization is commonplace in social movements, especially those that have widely appealing claims (e.g., democracy, environmental protection). Large-scale movements tend to have a loose structure because of the lack of a strong or authoritative leadership or coordination body. This is attributed to the fact that participants in large-scale movements are from different groups, and some of them do not belong to any preformed groups. In movements with a decentralized structure, participants have the freedom to decide to accept or follow preexisting organizations or leadership and to determine which organization or leadership to accept. For example, during the 1989 Tiananmen movement in China, many citizens joined the movement without the mobilization of student activists. In addition, more than 200,000 students from other cities went to Beijing to participate in the demonstrations by themselves.29 Although the citizens and the students from other cities went to support the movement, they did not necessarily accept the organizations or leadership in the square. As a result, the decision the coordination group made was not binding to many participants. Individuals in movements may not be organized. One reason is the fewer opportunities for sustained interpersonal interaction than before, and another is the numerous alternatives for individuals in search of organizations to join.30 Indeed, decentralized movements appear to be common among those mobilized through new information communication technologies or new social media. The advent of new information technologies has significantly changed the dynamics of mobilization, although they do not negate the importance of preexisting networks in mobilizing participants. New information technologies, specifically the Internet, Internet-based forums, cell phones, and other communication platforms, such as Twitter, Facebook, and blogs, serve as powerful tools to facilitate

6

Sustaining social movements

offline protests.31 As Shirky points out, “social media have become coordinating tools for nearly all of the world’s political movements.”32 The advantage of new social media is their capacity to facilitate mobilization in a cheap, rapid, and effective manner, as demonstrated in the governmentthreatening protests in the Middle East in 2010 and 2011. New social media accelerated the mobilization process by helping the participants transmit their messages to the world and obtain international support. In the case of Tunisia, new social media allowed a “digital elite” to form personal networks and circumvent the national media blackout. New social media also facilitated the formation of a national collective identity that supported protest actions and transcended geographical and socioeconomic disparities.33 In the Egyptian revolution, “what bubbled up online inevitably spilled onto the streets.”34 Chander asserts that the “Internet is a revolutionary tool; it is a tool of revolution.”35 Traditionally, people tend to be drawn into mobilizations along with friends, classmates, neighbors, and those they know from previous mobilizations. “Social media are effective partly because they amplify such connections, not simply [serve] as a substitute for them.”36 However, this premise is not always true. Temporary online communities whose members have never met may take action by answering an online call. Perhaps more important, social movements mobilized or facilitated by new social media often have a more decentralized structure, which is more flexible, horizontal, or hybrid, different from the more hierarchical structure of traditional organizations. In the Occupy Wall Street Movement, for example, a so-called direct democracy was implemented. “There were no leaders in the movement, not locally, not nationally, and not globally. This was a fundamental principle that was enforced by the multitude of occupiers with utmost determination at any instance when someone tried to assume a prominent role.”37 The decision-making power for a given occupied site is exclusively in the hands of the General Assembly, which is a “horizontal, leaderless, consensusbased open meeting.”38 The decentralized structure has important implications for understanding the sustainability of movements with a weak authority. Existing research has paid inadequate attention to the role of the rank-and-file participants in sustaining movements. Indeed, it tends to assign a limited weight or a passive role to these participants. As previously discussed, existing literature has stressed how participants are recruited and how they are given incentive to participate. By contrast, the issue of how participants affect the formation and operation of movement organizations as well as the selection of leadership has not been thoroughly examined. In decentralized movements, some people participate without the mobilization of movement activists. Instead, they are self-motivated and self-mobilized, without belonging to any existing protest group. They have the freedom to decide to join an organization or a group and to determine which organization to join. Moreover, they can select a particular leadership to accept, follow, or ignore. This study does not negate the importance of movement organizations in providing resources or incentives to participants and in enhancing the solidarity

Sustaining social movements 7 among participants. Instead, it suggests that the absence or weakness of movement organizations or leadership does not necessarily result in short-lived movements. This study highlights that rank-and-file participants affect the operation of movement organizations or institutions. Participants accept supportive or facilitating organizations and reject hierarchical and order-giving organizations or groups. They decide to follow leaders whose views fit theirs and reject those whose preferences do not match theirs. In addition, resources do not have to be provided by movement organizations because self-motivated participants may come with their own resources. A hierarchical or authoritative organization may undermine the effectiveness of collective action. Piven and Cloward, for example, emphasize that formal organizations are not conducive to movement success because they tend to “blunt the militancy” that is the fundamental source of influence that the movements aim to exert.39 Their research on social movements in the United States indicates that mass defiance, not formal organizations, ensures the success of the movements. “In large part, organizers tended to work against disruption because in their search for resources to maintain their organizations, they were driven inexorably to elites, and to the tangible and symbolic supports that elites could provide.”40 Similarly, Kriesi points out that the integration of a social movement organization into established systems of interest intermediation may limit the mobilization capacity of the organization and alienate important parts of its constituency.41 Organizations may therefore weaken the effectiveness of movements because they prohibit behavior that deviates from the preference of movement organizations or the leadership. By contrast, participants in a decentralized movement are characterized by diverse backgrounds, mutually independent groups, diversified sources of resources, varying strategies, and sometimes multiple claims. Different from participants in centralized movements, the rank-and-file participants in decentralized movements enjoy more freedom. Their commitment can sustain a movement because determined and sometimes defiant participants opt to continue with the movement regardless of the decisions the movement organization or the leadership makes. Thus, when explaining the sustaining of social movements, much attention has been paid to those sustained by a combination of well-organized participants and the strong coordination of the leadership. In contrast, this current study explores sustained movements in which participants are not well organized and the coordination capacity of movement leaders is weak.

Sustaining decentralized movements Sustained movements result from the standoff between protestors and the movement target, such as the government, if a specific target exists. If the government is targeted in a movement, then it can resort to different modes of response, such as repression, concessions, ignorance, and tolerance.42 The feasibility of a mode of response is determined by the context that shapes the cost-benefit calculations of the government and protestors. Tolerance or ignorance on the part

8

Sustaining social movements

of the government is the precondition for sustaining a movement. Ignorance is not always the same as tolerance. Different from ignorance, tolerance involves government efforts (e.g., persuasion or negotiation attempts) to end the movement without using repression or making concessions. Tolerance becomes the choice of the government when neither repression nor concession is considered appropriate or feasible. A government tolerates protests also when government leaders are divided, as in the case of the 1989 Tiananmen movement. Tolerance also implies that the government can engage in a war of attrition with the protestors and wear them out. The government is better positioned if protestors face counter-movements or anti-movement activities by groups other than the government.43 From the perspective of protestors, the standoff with the government can be sustained because of a decentralized movement structure characterized by the coexistence of determined participants and a weak leadership that is incapable of enforcing policies deviating from the preference of determined participants. Determined participants sometime willingly carry on with the movement regardless of the small chance of success. Determined and self-selected participants have their own reasons to continue with their participation. Some simply believe in the need to achieve justice or the claims of the movement, whereas others decide to continue to support the determined participants. If movement leaders lack the capacity or coordination power to achieve the movement goal or fail to come up with a graceful exit, then the standoff persists.

Determined participants Individuals are likely to vary in terms of their willingness to participate (i.e., threshold of participation) and their propensity to exit (i.e., threshold of exit). For analytical convenience, Table 1.1 classifies the participants into four categories. Participants in Cells 1 and 2 are crucial to sustaining the movements. Participants in Cell 1 are highly committed to the movement, and they principally participate in the movement from the very beginning. Participants in this cell include movement leaders and activists. Participants in Cell 2 may join the movement for different reasons, but they become determined once they have participated. The number of such participants is likely to be smaller than that in Cell 1. Participants in Cell 3 are sympathetic to Table 1.1 Participants in movements Threshold of Participation

Low High

Threshold of Exit High

Low

(1) active and determined (2) converted and determined

(3) supportive but less committed (4) bandwagon or opportunistic

Source: Author’s summary.

Sustaining social movements 9 the movement and willingly join if the cost of participation (e.g., in terms of time, money, and risk) is low. However, they are less committed when the perceived cost increases. These participants may also return when they feel the need to do so. Finally, participants in Cell 4 are primarily bandwagon or opportunistic participants who may join the movement simply because everyone else takes part in it. Nevertheless, participants in Cell 3 and some participants in Cell 4 can contribute to the movement in two modes even after they have decided to exit. First, their participation, albeit short-lived, can help start the movement and increase the momentum. Second, these participants constitute a pool of supporters who can resume participation when necessary and contribute to the movement in other ways (e.g., donations and advocating the movement’s goals). The existence of a large pool of supporters, including the participants in Cells 3 and 4 and those sympathetic to movements, constrains the target of a movement. These people are off-site supporters who pose a threat to the movement target. The reason for individuals to participate in a movement also affects their decision to continue. The commitment of individuals to the movement goal varies. Although such “attitudinal differences” between participants have an inconclusive effect on participation,44 some people continue with participation or become determined because they highly value the goal, and the perceived cost in terms of time, energy, money, or risk is low or perceived as acceptable. In their research on a women’s movement in Brazil, Jeffrey Rubin and Emma Rubin suggest that some women became committed simply because achieving the goals – women’s economic rights and gender equality – required some time, and they refused to easily abandon their efforts. The desire of these women to fight for the goals sustained their activism.45 In the Occupy Movement in Hong Kong, some high school students went to the protest sites as individual protestors whenever they had time only to achieve “the real suffrage.”46 Other participants opt to stay because they are deeply embedded in their networks. In his research on the Freedom Summer project, McAdam reports that organizational affiliations and prior ties to other applicants are crucial in influencing the participation of individuals in “high-risk activism.”47 Individuals tied to organizations connected to protest activities are more likely to participate in movements. Interpersonal ties are another important factor that influences participation. “Participants [are] much more likely than withdrawals to have had ties – especially strong ties – to other volunteers.”48 Such ties can underlie the intention of individuals to continue with their participation because retreat proves difficult, although it is still possible. Leaders and activists continue with their participation because of both group pressure and reputational pressure, in addition to their commitment to the movement goal. This premise does not imply that leaders or activists do not withdraw from movements, but they need more justifications for such a choice. Some people become leaders precisely and primarily because of community pressure. As Chong explains, “There may be substantial community pressure on such individuals to lend their prestige and the leadership skills associated with their current roles to the new political enterprises, especially if it is perceived that collective

10

Sustaining social movements

action is impossible without the active involvement of these pivotal individuals.”49 Some people join the movement after it has occurred, and whether these latecomers can establish ties with other participants also affects their continual participation. People who participate in social movements also have self-respect and a sense of dignity. In the Occupy Movement in Hong Kong, for example, protestors erected a stand on a road with a poster declaring, “If we lose this battle, we lose dignity. Fight on.”50 This indeed reveals a dilemma that protestors in a sustained movement may encounter, which is the pitfall of committed participation, or the sunk cost of participation. As a movement sustains, less determined participants begin to retreat, whereas determined participants opt to continue. A longer period of participation means more reluctance to leave without success, and the reluctance to retreat is fueled by the lack of a meaningful government response. With increased resentment against the government, determined participants exclude retreat as an option, sometimes by correctly or mistakenly discounting the risks involved.

Leadership with limited authority Leaders, some scholars argue, are indispensable to movements or their endurance because they play multiple roles. As Oberschall writes, “The leaders are intensely concerned with the promotion and achievement of the goals of the movement.”51 They work out the strategy and tactics of confrontation, and need to convince their potential following that the movement can succeed. “They have to prove through personal sacrifice and example their commitment to the cause; they must create pride and faith among the rank and file.”52 Nevertheless, a decentralized movement dictates the limited influence or authority of the leadership primarily because the leaders face the issue of representation and legitimacy, in addition to their handicapped control over the resources that participants need. In decentralized movements, participants can be classified into three categories, namely, (1) ungrouped participants who join the movement as individual and independent participants; (2) participants from a circle of friends or acquaintances formed after they meet in the movement; and (3) members of preexisting groups independent of each other. An overlap can exist between the second and third categories. Given the composition of participants, if protestors sometimes “worry about their own representativeness,”53 then the leaders face the same issue. Leaders in social movements can be the movement organizers or initiators, and they can also be people who join the movement after it has occurred. In both cases, they face the issues of representativeness, legitimacy, and thereby authority. Leaders who start the movement may not be accepted by new participants, and new leaders may not be accepted by other participants. Although charisma can be a source of legitimacy as Weber explains,54 not many leaders have such a trait. In addition, charisma is conditionally accepted by the people. The charismatic property is an attribution of power and authority to the leader by the membership,55 and the leader can lose his charismatic appeal. Charismatic leaders can

Sustaining social movements 11 be determined by social situations, in which the message the leaders convey is relevant to a particular social group.56 Therefore, they lose charisma when their message does not appeal to the people. Participant preferences affect the selection or the influence of leaders in movements in which participants do not rely on leaders for resources or support. This phenomenon explains why leaders may be changed in movements at different stages or why movements may go beyond control. If participants constitute the “market” of protestors, then leaders whose views do not match the market will lose their influence. In a movement in which participation is voluntary, those who decide to continue with their participation are self-selected. These determined participants will support the continuation or even the escalation of the movement. If movement leaders persuade them to stop, then they are selling suggestions in the wrong market. By the same token, some people become new leaders or become more influential because their (aggressive) proposals are better received by the participants. Therefore, moderate leaders can be marginalized in a sustained movement. For this reason, Oberschall suggests that “The rank and file usually do know what they want, and they have a good idea of which leaders and activists represent their interests.”57 The minority may also dominate social movements. Sometimes, even if the majority of the movement’s leaders prefers to stop the movement, the collective decision can be vetoed by the minority who refuse to stop. When determined participants opt to continue, they create moral pressure for others who feel obligated to continue with participation and to share the responsibility and risk with determined participants. For example, during the 1989 Tiananmen movement, although the majority of the student leadership preferred to retreat from the square before the bloody repression, they could not convince the minority of the leaders and the occupiers on the square.58 Similarly, in the Occupy Movement in Hong Kong, proposals of retreating from the occupied streets were often rejected because of opposition from a minority of the leaders.59 Therefore, some movements sustain not because of their strong organizational strength characterized by strong networks or a strong leadership, but because of the powerlessness of the leadership. Such powerlessness arises from the lack of recognized legitimacy or representativeness of the leadership, its inability to devise effective strategies, or its lack of coordination power or resources to enforce strategies that can be effective if they are enforced. In these circumstances, determined participants sustain the movement in accordance with their own will that does not necessarily empower the movement.

Sustaining the Occupy Movement in Hong Kong The decentralized structure of a movement, characterized by the freedom rankand-file participants enjoy and the presence of a weak leadership, helps explain the sustainability of the Occupy Movement in Hong Kong. Government tolerance and participant insistence merged to sustain the movement. A standoff arose between the government and the protestors when the initial use of repression by

12

Sustaining social movements

the government failed to deter participants but provoked large-scale participation. The threat of the public compelled the government to change its strategy by tolerating the occupation and breeding grievances among the people who were affected by the occupation. On the other hand, despite the small likelihood of government concessions, self-selected determined participants opted to continue with the occupation. They were then caught in the trap of the sunk cost of participation – the longer they stayed in the protest sites, the more reluctant they became to leave without success. Retreating without success was believed to be a failure and a waste of participant efforts. The adamant refusal of determined participants to retreat caused their supporters to experience difficulty in withdrawing from the protest sites. Meanwhile, movement leaders were unable to reach a compromise with the government, to make the government accept their demands, or to devise approaches for making a “graceful exit.” As a result, similar to the Tiananmen movement, this Occupy Movement ended with government site clearance, but without a bloody repression. Gusfield points out that “Movements are more than expressive; they seek to change the society and thus put pressures on nonbelievers and opponents.”60 Sustained movements may not be sufficiently powerful to induce changes as in the Occupy Movement in Hong Kong. However, the Occupy Movement was expressive because it called attention to contested issues and enhanced public awareness of democracy. The Occupy Movement has also produced an enduring effect by training a large number of movement participants who are likely to continue with the fight for democracy in the city and by shaping the perceptions of the parties involved in the movement in terms of how they perceive each other and adjust their behavior accordingly.

Organization of this book Chapter 2 introduces the background of the 2014 Occupy Movement in Hong Kong by discussing the various issues that had engendered grievances among the population. Over the years, the demand for democracy, together with popular resentment tied to the livelihoods of people, has become an important factor leading people to take to the streets. Protest has become a common mode of political participation in Hong Kong. More important, social protests have sometimes wrested concessions from the central government and the Hong Kong government. Without other effective channels, some people advocated the proposal of the Occupy Central Movement to pursue democracy. This option was accepted by the pro-democracy camp and some other people in the city, although it was opposed by the Hong Kong government and the Chinese central government. Chapter 3 describes the occurrence of the Occupy Movement, explains the rationale behind government tolerance, and discusses the anti-movement activities by those who opposed the occupation. This chapter demonstrates the importance of legitimacy in social movements for both the government and protestors.

Sustaining social movements 13 The government lost its legitimacy when it used force to deal with the protestors, which triggered large-scale participation. Facing public disapproval, the government decided to tolerate the occupation, which shifted the pressure to the occupiers who had caused inconveniences for the people and businesses. The Occupy Movement gradually lost its legitimacy and public support, which paved the way for the site clearance by the police. Chapter 4 examines the approaches that the participants adopted to sustain the movement. The Occupy Movement reached its potential of participation at the very beginning of the movement, when more than 100,000 people took to the streets to support the protestors because of the police’s use of tear gas. However, after the Hong Kong government chose tolerance and the central government showed its strong support for the Hong Kong government, the momentum of the movement began to decrease. Numerous participants retreated, but determined participants stayed. Determined participants received assistance from their committed supporters. They also attempted to justify and rationalize their occupation that not only caused grievances, but also appeared futile. Chapter 5 discusses the causes of the weak leadership in the movement and explains how the leadership encountered constraints in coordinating the movement. The weak leadership contributed to the standoff between the government and the protestors. Given that the leadership was not representative enough, it had limited authority over the protestors. There was also a divide within the leadership regarding the movement strategy, which excluded retreating as an option. Throughout the movement, the leadership faced great difficulties in making decisions for the movement because of the lack of internal consensus and the inadequate communication between itself and the rank-and-file participants. Chapter 6 addresses protestors’ tactical escalation. When the student leaders’ dialogue with the government failed to satisfy protestors’ expectations, tactical escalation became the option of some radical protestors and the movement leadership. Yet the effectiveness of the escalation was conditional. Radical or aggressive action was helpful when it damaged the image of the police, but it was counterproductive when it damaged the movement’s legitimacy. The effectiveness of tactical escalation is also tied to timing. When the leadership attempted to escalate the action in the final stage of the movement, the number of people who answered the call was too small to instigate a forceful action. Consequently, waiting for the site clearance became the option of movement leaders and participants. Chapter 7 concludes by discussing the factors that contribute to sustained movements. It also examines the effect of the Occupy Movement and its implications for future interactions between Hong Kong people and the Chinese mainland. Although the movement failed to achieve its goal, the fight for democracy in the city will continue in different ways. The movement has trained a large number of participants, in addition to enhancing public awareness of the problems with the existing mode of elections of the legislators and the chief executive.

14

Sustaining social movements

Notes 1 Xie Mengyao, Jiang Yannan, Liu Xiang, and Zhu Yongxiao, “Zhanzhong shikong muhou: zhanlingqu shantou linli, quefa tuichang jizhi” (Behind the loss of control over the Occupation Movement: divided groups and a lack of exit mechanisms), Asian Weekly, October 26, 2014, pp. 22–32. 2 “Liu Zhaojia: Zhongyang huo yan qianghua zai gong quanwei” (Lau Siu-kai: the central government may think about how to strengthen its authority in Hong Kong), Mingpao, December 15, 2014. 3 As the movement continued, other demands were raised as well, such as the abolition of the functional constituencies. Also see Chapter 5. 4 “Zhenxi lianghao fazhan jumian, weichi xianggang fanrong wending” (Cherish the favorable situation of development and maintain the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong), People’s Daily, October 1, 2014. 5 Frances Piven and Richard Cloward, Poor People’s Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), p. 4. 6 Dennis Chong, Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), p. 11. 7 “Qi cheng liushou zhe bu xinren zhengfu rangbu” (Seventy percent of those who stay do not believe that the government will compromise), Mingpao, October 21, 2014. 8 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 156. 9 Joseph Gusfield, “Introduction: A Definition of the Subject,” in Joseph Gusfield (ed.), Protest: Reform, and Revolt (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1970), pp. 1–8. 10 Tarrow, Power in Movement, p. 6. 11 Ibid., p. 4. 12 Charles Tilly, “Social Movements and National Politics,” in Bright Charles and Susan Harding (eds.), State Building and Social Movements (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1984), pp. 297–317. 13 Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930– 1970 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999, second edition). 14 Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 47. 15 Edward Shorter and Charles Tilly, Strikes in France: 1830–1968 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974). 16 McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, p. 54. 17 John McCarthy and Mayer Zald, “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory,” in Mayer Zald and John McCarthy (eds.), Social Movements in an Organizational Society (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1987), pp. 15–47. 18 Ibid., p. 26. 19 Barry McLaughlin, “The Leader and the Members,” in Barry McLaughlin (ed.), Studies in Social Movements (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 203–206. 20 Mayer Zald and Michael Berger, “Social Movements in Organizations: Coup d’état, Bureaucratic Insurgency and Mass Movement,” in Zald and McCarthy (eds.), Social Movements in an Organizational Society, pp. 185–222. 21 Anthony Oberschall, Social Conflict and Social Movements (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973), p. 119. 22 Jo Freeman, “The Origins of the Women’s Liberation Movement,” American Journal of Sociology, vol. 78, no. 4 (1973), pp. 292–811. 23 McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, p. 45. 24 Tarrow, Power in Movement, p. 136.

Sustaining social movements 15 25 Samuel Popkin, “Public Choices and Peasant Organization,” in Clifford R. Russell and Norman K. Nickolson (eds.), Public Choice and Rural Development (Washington, DC: Resources for the Future, 1987), pp. 256–257. 26 Eric Schmidt and Jared Cohen, The New Digital Age (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2013), p. 129. 27 Doug McAdam and Richard Scott, “Organizations and Movements,” in Gerald Davis, Doug McAdam, Richard Scott, and Mayer Zald (eds.), Social Movements and Organization Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 4–40. 28 See, for example, Doug McAdam, Freedom Summer (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Tarrow, Power in Movement; Russell Curtis and Louis Zurcher, “Stable Resources of Protest Movement: The Multi-organizational Field,” Social Forces, vol. 52, no. 1 (1973), pp. 53–60. 29 The National Education Bureau, Jingxin dongpo de 56 tian (“A soul-stirring 56 days”) (Beijing: Dadi chubanshe, 1989), p. 145. 30 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 131. 31 Larry Diamond, “Liberation Technology,” Journal of Democracy, vol. 21, no. 3 (2010), pp. 69–83; Philip Howard and Muzammil Hussain, “Egypt and Tunisia: The Role of Digital Media,” in L. Diamond and M. F. Plattner (eds.), Liberation Technology: Social Media and the Struggle for Democracy (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012), pp. 110–123. 32 Clay Shirk, “The Political Power of Social Media: Technology, the Public Sphere, and Political Change,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 90, no. 1 (2011), pp. 28–41. 33 Anita Breuer, “The Role of Social Media in Mobilizing Political Protest: Evidence from the Tunisian Revolution,” Working Paper, 2012. 34 Jose Antonio Vargas, “Spring Awakening: How an Egyptian Revolution Began on Facebook,” New York Times, February 17, 2012. 35 Anupam Chander, “Jasmine Revolutions,” Cornell Law Review, vol. 97 (2012), pp. 1505–1531. 36 Craig Calhoun, “Occupy Wall Street in Perspective,” British Journal of Sociology, vol. 64, no. 1 (2013), pp. 26–38. 37 Manuel Castells, Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012), p. 179. 38 Ibid., p. 180. 39 Piven and Cloward, Poor People’s Movements, p. xv. 40 Ibid., p. xii. 41 Hanspeter Kriesi, “The Organizational Structure of New Social Movements in a Political Context,” in Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, and Mayer Zald (eds.), Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 152–184. 42 Yongshun Cai, Collective Resistance in China: Why Popular Protest Succeeds or Fails (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010). 43 Mayer Zald and Bert Useem, “Movement and Countermovement Interaction: Mobilization, Tactics, and State Involvement,” in Mayer Zald and John McCarthy (eds.), Social Movements in an Organizational Society (New Brunswick, NJ: Translation Books, 1987), pp. 247–272. 44 Doug McAdam, “Recruitment to High-Risk Activism: The Case of Freedom Summer,” American Journal of Sociology, vol. 92, no. 1 (1986), pp. 64–90. 45 Jeffrey Ruin and Emma Rubin, Sustaining Activism: A Brazilian Women’s Movement and a Father–Daughter Collaboration (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013). 46 Interview, Mong Kok 3.

16 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

Sustaining social movements McAdam, “Recruitment to High-Risk Activism.” Ibid., p. 80. Chong, Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement, p. 125. Author’s collection. Oberschall, Social Conflicts and Social Movements, p. 146. Ibid. Alison van Rooy, The Global Legitimacy Game (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p. 67. Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1947, translated by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons), pp. 358–373. Edward Shils, “Charisma, Order, and Status,” American Sociological Review, vol. 30, no. 2 (1965), pp. 199–213. William Friedland, “For a Sociological Concept of Charisma,” Social Forces, vol. 43, no. 1 (1964), pp. 18–26. Oberschall, Social Conflicts and Social Movements, p. 173. The National Education Bureau, A Soul-Stirring 56 Days, p. 153. Du Liangmou, “Shuangxue shang weidu zhengfu dalou” (The two student associations discuss surrounding government headquarters), Singtao Daily, November 28, 2014. Gusfield, “Introduction: A Definition of the Subject,” p. 3.

2

Background of the Occupy Movement

Grievances may be insufficient to drive people to stage collective action, but those who take action must have grievances. Gusfield explains, “Collective action implies discontent with an existent situation and some desire to create a new one. The idea of a demand for change indicates the element of discontent with the existent situation – a policy, a set of rules, values, or authorities. It is the expression of dissatisfaction.”1 Large-scale protests or social movements are usually triggered by both political and socioeconomic grievances shared by a large population. Oberschall writes, “Periods of social turmoil and political upheaval almost always result from combinations of economic and political grievances that are widely distributed but nevertheless centered in different social strata and groups.”2 For example, during the 1989 Tiananmen movement, protestors complained about corruption, a lack of political reform, and high inflation.3 The Jasmine Revolution in the Middle East from 2010 and 2011 was reputedly caused by the combination of poverty or economic crisis, the lack of democracy, and the humiliation provoked by cynicism and arrogance of those in power.4 The Sunflower Movement in Taiwan between March 18 and April 10 occurred partly because the economic stagnation had caused grievances among a large segment of the population on the island, especially the young people. In addition, resentment against the government’s poor performance and policy making was widespread. As a result, the dispute over the trade pact with the Chinese mainland became the trigger of the movement during which the students occupied the Legislative Chamber for 24 days. Because of widespread grievances, the initial small-scale action turned into a sustained protest that triggered a large rally, forcing the government to compromise.5 Hong Kong residents have pent-up grievances against a variety of political and socioeconomic problems. Many people, especially the youth who were the majority of the participants in the 2014 Occupy Movement, complain about the lack of democracy, high housing prices, the lack of good employment opportunities, and mainland visitors’ competition for resources. They blame the Hong Kong government and Chinese central government because they believe that the Hong Kong government is responsible for many of the problems, and that the Chinese central government has the final say in Hong Kong’s democracy.6

18

Background of the Occupy Movement

Although Hong Kong does not have direct democracy, the people enjoy the rule of law, the freedom of speech, and the right of protest and demonstration. Consequently, social protest has been an important mode of political participation ever since the handover of sovereignty in 1997.7 Residents have staged collective action to pursue both socioeconomic and political rights. The demonstration on July 1 has become an annual undertaking since 1997. More important, some of the protests have succeeded in generating pressure on and wresting concessions from the Hong Kong government and even Beijing. Because of previous successes and the lack of alternatives, when the three founders of the Occupy Central Movement proposed to demand democracy by occupying Central, a significant number of people in the city echoed this sentiment. The Occupy Central Movement thus triggered the large-scale democratic movement in the city in 2014.

Socioeconomic grievances In late November 2014, when the Occupy Movement was ongoing, a survey of 1,032 students from three high schools, eight colleges, and two community colleges in Hong Kong identified the students’ complaints. The survey showed that most students were disappointed with the government’s handling of the dispute over the political arrangements, which was also the issue of highest priority (Table 2.1).8 The issue of political arrangements naturally caught much attention because this survey was conducted in the middle of the movement. High housing prices and income inequality were also among the top five issues mentioned. High housing costs were the second most urgent issue, next to the dispute over political arrangements. The conflict between Hong Kong and the Chinese mainland also ranked among the top five issues that the students believed the government had failed to adequately address. Table 2.1 Students’ attitudes toward government performance (N = 1,032)

Dispute over political arrangements Self-governance and autonomy of Hong Kong High housing prices Conflict between Hong Kong and the mainland Income inequality Upward social mobility Incapable government officials Miscellaneous

The most disappointing issue (%)

The most urgent issue (%)

24 16

27 15

15 10

20 9

9 7 7 10

10 5 4 10

Source: Compiled from Mingpao, December 5, 2014.

Background of the Occupy Movement 19 When the Occupy Movement started, Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying acknowledged that many of the protestors were “angry over the lack of social mobility and affordable housing in the city.”9 He promised to provide more assistance to the poverty-stricken youths. However, some student participants denied that poverty was the reason for their participation, claiming that Leung’s explanation was a “stupid” account of the participation of the young people who were motivated by their demand for real democracy, not by a difficult life.10 Similarly, a survey of 1,562 people at three protest sites between October 20 and 26 shows that improving livelihood was considered the least important for protestors’ participation, far less important than other reasons for people’s participation. Most people participated because of their belief that real suffrage was important.11 There was thus a significant gap between government officials’ explanation for protestors’ motivation and participants’ own accounts. This gap does not imply that socioeconomic grievances are irrelevant in protestors’ participation. First, socioeconomic grievances undermine the government’s legitimacy because they indicate its inability to solve the issues. A government with a lower level of public approval is more likely to become the target of blame. Movements targeting a government with low legitimacy are more likely to win public sympathy or support. The Sunflower Movement in Taiwan in 2014 suggests that a government with low legitimacy makes the mobilization of participants to protest it easier.12 Therefore, socioeconomic grievances are important to understanding the context in which a movement arises and public reaction to the movement. Second, some protestors’ claims are interconnected, including both socioeconomic and political demands.13 In explaining participants’ motivations in the movement, a student leader said that “the true suffrage” was indeed an “umbrella” that covered various claims of the participants. Some people were driven purely by the desire to achieve democracy, whereas others complained about the high housing prices, depressed living space, and inequality.14 Some protestors admitted that the high housing prices, income inequality, the lack of democracy, and the government’s lack of response were all interconnected.15 Third, although socioeconomic problems may not be the direct cause of many protestors’ participation, a democratic government is seen as better able to address the problems. In other words, people fight for democracy in order to have a responsive, responsible, and accountable government that can better address the difficulties they confront. In addition, during the Occupy Movement, movement activists had used economic grievances such as inequality to criticize the government and justify occupation.16 Therefore, it is helpful to introduce the socioeconomic grievances in the city before the movement started.

The politics of high housing prices Hong Kong is well known for its high housing prices. According to a survey of 360 cities released in 2014 by the U.S.-based consultancy Demographia, Hong Kong ranks first in the world for “most unaffordable” housing. The survey reported that Hong Kong’s median home price was more than HKD

20

Background of the Occupy Movement

4.02 million, and the annual median household income of HKD 270,000 was nearly one-fifteenth of the home price.17 The high housing cost is also revealed by the phenomenon of “subdivided flats or subdivided units” in the city, which is a type of rental housing. A flat on the original approved plan of a building is subdivided into two or more individual rooms. The average size of a subdivided flat can be around 30 square feet per person. Most subdivided flats are located in old residential buildings, and the occupants are mainly unemployed citizens, lowincome families, and new immigrants. In 2013, 171,300 people lived in about 66,900 subdivided units in Hong Kong compared with about 100,000 people in 2008. The number of subdivided units increased to 86,400 in 2014.18 People in these subdivided units also face the pressure of increasing rent. For example, a flat was divided into three units with about 70 square feet each. In 2014, the owner decided to increase the rent from HKD 2,500 per month to HKD 3,000, or by 20 percent. The tenants who complained about this increase were told to feel free to leave. A new tenant moved in the following day after the original tenant moved out because the original tenant couldn’t afford the new rent.19 For a family of four who lived in a subdivided unit of 200 square feet, the rent increased from HKD 3,200 to HKD 7,000 in five years, with the latter accounting for half of the family income.20 These subdivided units are slums scattered in the city. The younger generation has bitterly complained about the high housing prices. The housing prices are tied to the limited supply, but solving the problem can involve more than increasing the supply. Hong Kong residents differ in their attitude toward high housing prices. Those who own homes or have invested in housing have little incentive to see a decline in housing prices, whereas potential home buyers feel tremendous pressure in purchasing homes. In Hong Kong, about 51 percent of the residents own homes and 16 percent are owner-occupiers in public-sector housing.21 Moreover, people in few cities rely on housing investment as much as those in Hong Kong. Apparently, many are reluctant to see government policies that lower housing prices. But in the long run, future generations can benefit from reasonable housing prices because they will be able to afford cheaper and larger apartments. The Hong Kong government is not ignorant about the high housing prices, and it has tried to limit external buyers to lower demand. For example, because many people from the Chinese mainland have come to Hong Kong to buy housing and contribute to the high housing prices, the government has imposed restrictions on external buyers. In 2003, when the Hong Kong government encouraged overseas people to invest in Hong Kong, it mandated that a person would be granted the right of residence if he invested no less than HKD 6.5 million in Hong Kong, and the investment could be housing. In 2010, the amended policy increased the amount of investment to HKD 10 million, and purchasing housing could not be treated as investment. In 2012, the Hong Kong government began requiring overseas people or local and foreign companies to pay an extra 15 percent as a stamp tax if they buy housing in Hong Kong.22

Background of the Occupy Movement 21 Increasing supply is a fundamental solution to the high housing prices. However, government policies aimed at lowering housing prices by increasing the supply may be political disasters. Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa announced in 1997 that 85,000 apartments would be built each year to increase the supply and lower the housing prices in the city. Moreover, the government proposed to shorten the application process for living in public housing from six years to three years. Between 2000 and 2002, about 252,710 units were completed. However, housing prices in Hong Kong after the Asian financial crisis dropped as much as 50 percent, and many homeowners incurred great losses, with their homes becoming negative assets. In June 2003, about 105,697 cases were reported in which home buyers’ assets became negative, accounting for 22 percent of the total buyers.23 Certainly, the dramatic decline in housing prices also occurred in other places like Singapore during the financial crisis; nevertheless, Hong Kong homeowners blamed the government for increasing the supply. Their grievances were one of the important reasons for the demonstration that involved 500,000 people on July 1, 2003. Tung’s policy was stopped and he resigned partly because of the mass grievances. Arguably, the government faces another issue in increasing the supply. The people oppose the use of certain lands because of environmental protection or preservation of wetland parks. In 2014, the government planned to increase the number of new homes over the next 10 years to 480,000 units: 200,000 of 480,000 homes would be public rental flats, 90,000 would be subsidized flats for sale, and 190,000 would be private homes. However, government officials admit that Hong Kong has difficulties finding enough land for residential development. “Local communities often worry about the impact of housing development on traffic, the environment and the provision of community facilities. . . . We have to accept that ‘zero’ impact is simply impossible in any housing project.”24 In addition, this plan seemed insufficient. The Hong Kong government provides public rental units for low-income people to improve their living conditions. By the end of September 2014, the government had received about 130,200 general applications for public rental housing, and about 133,600 non-elderly, one-person applications under the Quota and Points System. The average waiting time for general applicants was 3.1 years, whereas the average waiting time for elderly, oneperson applicants was 1.7 years.25 The government plans to increase unit provisions to non-elderly, one-person applicants from 2,000 to 2,200 per year. However, the waiting time remains very long as 133,600 applicants have sought housing. The people of Hong Kong blame both the government and the developers for the high housing prices. The government is blamed not only because it has failed to create and implement effective housing policies to lower the prices, but also because it is believed to be closely tied to big businesses. The term “developers’ hegemony” has become a popular phrase used to accuse some of the tycoons in the city after the book Land and the Ruling Class in Hong Kong was published in 2005 and then in 2010 (the Chinese version).26 The author, who had worked in the real estate sector in Hong Kong, states that “It is no secret that government policies have most of the time favored large developers.”27 Large businesses have

22

Background of the Occupy Movement

reaped profits by extending their businesses to various sectors in the city, such as supermarkets, industry, transportation, and telecommunication. “Unbridled, industrial and economic concentration which begets an oligarchy of enterprises would only mean that consumers, for lack of alternatives or bargaining power, are often forced to pay too much for all kinds of basic goods and services.”28

Income inequality and social mobility High housing prices are tied to the people’s relatively low income. Hong Kong is also well known for its income inequality. The small city has produced a number of tycoons; conversely, many more people face difficulties in life. The benefits of economic development are reaped by the rich instead of the poor. For example, the median household income of the bottom 10 percent of the households in 2001 was HKD 3,350 per month. However, it declined to HKD 2,290 in 2011 (adjusted for inflation) (Table 2.2). The medium household income of the top 10 percent increased from HKD 90,000 to HKD 96,480. As a result, the income gap between these two groups of households increased from 26.9 times in 2001 to 42.1 times in 2011. The poverty line the Hong Kong government set in September 2013 was a monthly income of HKD 11,500 for a family of three. About 20 percent of the households fell below the poverty line.29 The income gap between the rich and the poor is partly caused by employment limitations that contribute to income equality in the city. The unemployment rate in Hong Kong has been low in recent years. As shown in Figure 2.1, the rate was lower than 4 percent from 2009 after the financial crisis. However, the low unemployment rate failed to lower income inequality. Inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, remained high and has even increased in recent years. The Gini coefficient in Hong Kong has been higher than 0.5, which is indeed one of Table 2.2 Income inequality between households in Hong Kong The bottom 10 percent (A)

The top 10 percent (B)

Gap (B and A)

Median monthly income 2001 2006 2011

3,350 2,780 2,290

90,000 90,400 96,480

26.9 32.5 42.1

Income weight in the total household income 2001 2006 2011

0.9 0.8 0.7

15.3 15.6 16.1

Source: “The situation of poverty and income inequality in Hong Kong”; see the Web site of Oxfam, Hong Kong, www.cyberschool.oxfam.org.hk/res_search.php?s= 3&articles_id=91, accessed December 24, 2014.

Background of the Occupy Movement 23

unemployment rate

9

Gini coefficient

8 7 6 5.18

5

5.25

5.33

5.37

4 3 2

2013

2012

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1990

0

2011

1

Figure 2.1 Unemployment rate in Hong Kong Source: The Census and Statistics of the Hong Kong Government. www.censtatd.gov.hk/hkstat/ sub/sp200_tc.jsp?productCode=FA100095, accessed December 24, 2014.

the highest in the world. Worse, the coefficient increased from 0.518 in 1996 to 0.537 in 2011. The low unemployment and the high Gini coefficient imply that many are poorly paid and have become the working poor. The youth feel that they represent the working poor (qiong mang zu) because of their low salaries. A survey of 522 people between 15 and 34 years old in 2014 shows that about 30 percent attributed poverty to housing expenditure, more than 25 percent credited low education, and another 25 percent cited limited choice of employment. The respondents were commonly pessimistic about their career prospects. More than 72 percent claimed that upward social mobility was difficult or very difficult, and 77 percent complained that housing expenditure was unbearable. The young working poor also varied in their expectations of their future development. About 24 percent believed they could rise from poverty within five years; 15 percent believed they could rise in 10 years or longer, and 9.7 percent were not hopeful that they would rise.30 In another survey of 707 people aged 18 and above in February 2013, more than 60 percent believed that upgrading their standard of living was more difficult than doing so 10 years earlier. About 55 percent reported insufficient opportunities in Hong Kong for upward social mobility, and nearly 44 percent foresaw upward social mobility becoming more difficult in the next decade. Those under 31 years old with tertiary-level education were the most pessimistic about their prospects of upward mobility.31 That poorly educated people face fewer opportunities for upward mobility is in accordance with existing research. A study based on five-year census data from 1986 to 2011 suggests that upward mobility varies across age groups and education levels in Hong Kong. Upward mobility opportunities fell for those born in the mid-1970s and later, but remarkable improvement

24

Background of the Occupy Movement

has been observed for degree holders in recent years. Beginning in 2011, among the degree holders, upward mobility showed an improvement for cohorts on the higher income end but less so on the lower end. The improvement is likely linked to the end of the baby boom generation.32 Although people differed in who they blamed regarding income inequality, a significant number of people blamed the government. According to a survey of 522 people, about 42 percent of respondents blamed themselves for being the working poor, 37 percent believed that the government should have the greatest responsibility, and 9.5 percent blamed the employers or the industrial sector. Many people, especially those with less education, blamed themselves for the low income perhaps because of the market economy in the city, where the government has traditionally provided limited welfare to the public. Yet grievances against the government among these people are likely to grow if their situation remains unimproved.

Conflicts with mainlanders On January 15, 2012, as a child and his mother from the mainland took the subway in Hong Kong, the child ate food in the train. A Hong Kong resident told them that eating was not allowed in the subway. The trivial event caused an argument between a few Hong Kong residents and the tourists on the train. The incident attracted the attention of Hong Kong residents and mainlanders alike after it was posted online. A few days later, when a professor of Beijing University commented on this event in an interview on a Chinese news Web site, he said, “As far as I know, many Hong Kong people don’t regard themselves as Chinese. Those kinds of people are used to being the dogs of British colonialists – they are dogs, not humans.”33 His comments invited strong criticism from people in both Hong Kong and the mainland. This incident is indicative of the conflict between Hong Kong residents, tourists, and visitors from the mainland that results from the large influx of mainlanders. As shown in Figure 2.2, the number of tourists from the Chinese mainland increased from 3.79 million in 2000 to 40.7 million in 2013, or by 10.7 times. Tourists from the mainland accounted for an increasingly large portion of the total number of tourists coming to the city. In 2000, tourists from the Chinese mainland accounted for 29 percent of the total number of tourists in Hong Kong, and it increased to 75 percent in 2013. The conflict, to some extent, is caused by the unintended policy consequences of the Chinese central government. In 2003, the Chinese central government enacted a policy that encouraged people from the Chinese mainland to visit Hong Kong as individual tourists to revive its economy. That year, tourists from the mainland accounted for 54.5 percent of the total number of tourists visiting Hong Kong. However, the policy created a series of problems for local residents. Tourists burdened the public facilities and changed the business environment. The influx of tourists increased the rents of businesses, eradicating a number of less profitable small businesses. A resident explained how tourists affected locals’ daily lives. Two grocery stores in her neighborhood were later replaced by

Background of the Occupy Movement 25

tourists from the mainland (%)

80

tourists from the mainland (million)

75 71.8

70 60

56.2

54.5

50

62.9

60.7

57.3

55

54

53.7

67

41.2

40

40.7

32.4

28.1

29 30

34.9

20

12.54

10

22.68

8.47

6.83

4.45

3.79

17.95

15.49 16.9

13.59

12.25

13 20

12 20

11 20

10 20

09 20

08 20

07 20

06 20

05 20

04 20

03 20

02 20

01 20

20

00

0

Figure 2.2 Tourists from the Chinese mainland Source: The Tourism Commission of the Hong Kong Government, www.tourism.gov.hk/tc_chi/ statistics/statistics_perform.html, accessed December 20, 2014.

jewelry stores that could pay the high rent because of the tourists. However, the neighborhood needed the grocery stores more.34 Conflicts also emerged from the mainlanders’ competition for resources with local residents. For example, because of the problem with food safety on the mainland, mainlanders come to Hong Kong to buy milk powder; some make money by then selling it on the mainland. This situation created a problem, as some local residents faced difficulty in purchasing powdered milk for their babies. Consequently, in 2013, the Hong Kong government decreed that each person could buy only two cans of milk powder within 24 hours before leaving Hong Kong. This measure by and large addressed the problem.35 Another issue is that pregnant women from the mainland come to give birth in Hong Kong to obtain citizenship for their children. In 2001, children with mainland parents totaled 620, and the number increased to 32,000 in 2010. In 2009, among the 82,000 newly born babies, 37,000 of them were from the mainland. In 2011, among the 95,000 newly born babies, 44,000 were from the mainland. In 2012, one-third of the 91,000 new babies were from the mainland.36 The increasing number of pregnant women coming to Hong Kong became a heavy burden for the medical institutions in the city. These women also caused problems for local women and their families because women from the mainland competed for the limited medical resources in the city. When the Hong Kong government gave priority to local residents, pregnant women from the mainland began to force their way into the emergency rooms for delivery. In 2011, such cases reached 1,656 compared with 796 cases in 2010.37

26

Background of the Occupy Movement

A related issue is the competition for kindergarten and school spaces between local students and those with parents from the mainland. Given the grievances of the local residents, the Hong Kong government took measures to prevent the influx of pregnant women from the mainland. In 2011, of the 44,000 newly born babies whose parents came from the mainland, 33,000 were delivered in public hospitals, and the remaining 11,000 were delivered in private hospitals. In 2012, the Hong Kong government decided that public hospitals would not accept pregnant women from the mainland beginning in 2013; private hospitals eventually decided to take the same measure.38 Radical residents in Hong Kong launched the so-called anti-locust movement, which advocated treating visitors from the mainland as “locusts.” On February 1, 2012, Internet users raised money and published an advertisement in two local newspapers, the Apple Daily and the Sharp Daily, claiming that “It is enough for the Hong Kong people.” The statement criticized visitors from the mainland for coming to Hong Kong to compete for hospital resources, educational resources, and milk powder. In response, a person from Shenzhen published a statement in a Hong Kong newspaper, the Sun, saying, “Hong Kong people, thank you.” The statement thanked the Hong Kong people for what they had done for the mainland (e.g., disaster relief ), expressed hope that the people from both sides would have more self-discipline and tolerance, and urged the media not to overstate the conflict between Hong Kong and the mainland.39 The Hong Kong residents’ anti-mainland sentiment puzzled the mainlanders, who soon found an explanation. Mainlanders commonly believe that the Hong Kong residents treat the mainland tourists the way they do because Hong Kong people are losing their sense of superiority as a result of the fast economic development in the mainland. One Internet user from the mainland made the following comment, which reflects the view of a large number of people on the mainland: Hong Kong’s falling behind is inevitable, and this has to do with its base of development. Its geographic location cannot be compared with that of Shanghai. When Shanghai becomes developed, Hong Kong inevitably goes back to where it belongs. Hong Kong’s development is based on its historical opportunity, and its prosperity is its “luck” not its “destiny.”40 Hong Kong residents do not agree with the claim that their dissatisfaction with mainland people is due to their economic lag. Instead, they stress the direct competition for resources as the reason for their grievances. In addition, the behavior of some mainland visitors does not fit the local norms or culture. Despite the handover of sovereignty, many residents in Hong Kong do not know much about the mainland, and they seem to be exposed more often to negative news such as corruption, pollution, poor food safety, government abuse of power, and repression of political rights on the mainland. Schoolteachers in Hong Kong admitted that the students were more interested in the negative news about the mainland.41 Therefore, value convergence between the city and the mainland is lacking.

Background of the Occupy Movement 27

Political grievances and demand for democracy During the Occupy Movement, I asked a participant, who was a college student, if he believed that elections and democracy would solve the problems faced by the Hong Kong people, especially the young generation. He replied, “We have discussed this issue several times. It can be true that democracy may not solve all the problems, including high housing price[s], income inequality, and social mobility. But we believe that we will eventually be able to choose a person who is more willing to listen to the people in Hong Kong.” Similar to many others, he believed that the chief executive listened more to Beijing than to the people of Hong Kong and that the government often made policies without consulting and listening to the people. This belief seems to confirm the finding that a government’s efforts in pursuing transparent policy making, encouraging citizen participation, and using collaborative management affect citizen satisfaction.42 After the Occupy Movement started, a survey of 121 occupiers in Admiralty and Mong Kok showed that 59 percent of them were dissatisfied with the central government’s control over Hong Kong, and 38 percent wanted democracy because of income inequality. About 45 percent of the occupiers hoped that Hong Kong would become independent from China.43 This hope could be surprising to the Chinese central government because, after all, it has made various policies to support the city. Indeed, the Hong Kong people do not seem to have high trust in the Chinese central government. A survey of 1,006 people between September 10 and 17, 2014, reported that 48.5 percent of them did not trust the central government (i.e., gave a score between 0 and 4 out of 10), whereas 25 percent trusted the central government (i.e., gave a score between 6 and 10).44 These results stand as a striking contrast against the consistent finding that the mainlanders have a higher level of trust in the Chinese central government (i.e., giving a score of more than 80 out of 100) than in the local governments.45 The difference in the level of trust in the central government between the people from the two places is indeed not surprising given their political arrangements. Power means responsibility and blame. On the mainland, the Chinese central government enjoys significant space in shifting responsibility and blame to local governments.46 By contrast, the Hong Kong people clearly know that the central government makes the final decision for the city’s democracy, and they blame it if it fails to meet their expectations. The existing political arrangements in Hong Kong prove disappointing to a large segment of the population for a simple reason – they are not democratic enough. This is true for both the election of legislators and the election of the chief executive. The Legislative Council of Hong Kong has 70 seats. Thirty-five are elected through geographical constituencies and five through the District Council (Second) functional constituency. The remaining 30 are elected by 28 traditional functional constituencies. A functional constituency is a professional or a special interest group involved in the electoral process. Eligible voters in a functional constituency may include natural persons and other designated legal entities, such as organizations and corporations. Pro-democracy groups criticize the functional

28

Background of the Occupy Movement

constituency system for giving too much power and influence to the minority. Moreover, the right of corporations and legal entities to vote is controversial because it enables some individuals to cast multiple votes. The election system is designed to be representative, and it therefore allocates the seats to different sectors. However, the number of constituencies in some sectors is significantly smaller than in others. Legislators who are directly elected by citizens need more votes than those who are elected by functional constituencies. In 2012, for example, the number of eligible constituencies in the 28 traditional constituencies was 240,735. In comparison, directly elected legislators were elected by 3.47 million people.47 The 12 smallest constituencies had 5,500 voters, and in theory they can veto bills submitted by legislators who are elected by 3.47 million voters. The election of the chief executive is also seen as undemocratic. According to the Basic Law, the chief executive is elected by a representative election committee and appointed by the Chinese central government. The election committee shall be composed of members from different sectors. The first chief executive was elected in 1996 by an election committee consisting of 400 members, and the second chief executive was elected in 2002 by an election committee consisting of 800 members. According to the Basic Law, for the chief executives after 2007, a gradual approach would be adopted until universal suffrage. In 2007, the Chinese National People’s Congress (NPC) stated that the election of the fifth chief executive in 2017 might be implemented through the method of universal suffrage. After the chief executive is elected through universal suffrage, the election of all the members of the Legislative Council may also be conducted through the method of universal suffrage. In 2010, the Hong Kong government proposed to increase the members of the election committee to 1,200, and the Legislative Council approved the proposal. The election committee consists of members from four sectors (each with 300 members): (1) the industrial, commercial, and financial sectors; (2) professionals; (3) the labor, social services, religious, and other sectors; and (4) members of the Legislative Council, representatives of members of the district councils, representatives of the rural council, Hong Kong deputies to the NPC, and representatives of the Hong Kong members of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. As the chief executive is elected by a committee instead of the general population, it has been criticized as undemocratic or as a “small-circle election.” Many members of the election committee are considered pro-Beijing because they purportedly have ties with Beijing, although Beijing may not exercise direct pressure on these members. For example, on December 17, 2014, Jonathan Fenby, the South China Morning Post’s editor in chief from 1995 to 2000, gave a testimony to the British parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee. He admitted that the media in Hong Kong had been facing great internal pressure, although he did not see any of it coming from Beijing or from the Hong Kong government while he was the newspaper’s editor after the handover. The pressure mainly came from

Background of the Occupy Movement 29 the owner of the newspaper who had business ties with the mainland.48 In other words, because of the central government’s direct or indirect influence, businesses tend to abide by the will of the central government. A candidate who fails to win support from the central government is unlikely to be nominated and elected by the election committee. For this reason, pro-democrats have been demanding universal suffrage of the chief executive and legislators. The Hong Kong people’s demand for democracy appears to be puzzling to many people and officials on the mainland. A common question they have is: “Why had you [Hong Kong people] not demanded democracy from the British government during the past 150 years of colonial rule?” This question is not reasonable to the pro-democracy people in the city who have offered several explanations or justifications. First, the Chinese government was against Hong Kong’s moving toward democracy when it was still under British rule, perhaps for fear of Hong Kong becoming independent.49 Second, that the Hong Kong people did not fight for democracy during colonial rule is not true.50 Rather, the Hong Kong people never stopped their fight for democracy, although their efforts were not effective.51 Third, asking this question is wrong given the different political and historical conditions. If you ask why Deng Xiaoping did not propose to negate the Cultural Revolution when Mao was in power, you would know the answer.52 Finally, others argue that it was the problem of the old generation who did not fight for democracy, and the new generation has the legitimate right to demand free elections.53 Regardless of whether Beijing accepts such justifications, grievances against the central government remain as long as direct elections are denied to the Hong Kong people. No society is free from public grievances. The issue the government faces is the way people interpret, frame, or attribute their grievances and whether these grievances can translate into collective action. Individuals sometimes commit the so-called fundamental attribution error, which is the tendency to explain their situation as a function of the individual rather than situational factors.54 In other words, individuals can explain their troubles based on personal rather than on social or system factors. However, an opposite tendency can also exist in which people attribute the blame to particular targets that may not be primarily responsible for their problems. In most societies, the government becomes a convenient target of blame as it assumes power in resource distribution and policy making. More important, although grievances only conditionally translate into action, collective action is by no means rare when the population of aggrieved people is significantly large.

Protest as a mode of political participation Since the handover of sovereignty of Hong Kong to China in 1997, mass protests have been an important mode of political participation in the city, where demonstration is allowed. Non-institutionalized modes of action, such as protests or social movements, are usually considered an option by social groups who are “excluded or marginalized in the political order.”55 Precisely because these

30

Background of the Occupy Movement

groups lack power and resources, their success is often highly dependent on whether they can receive support either from the elite or other external parties. Yet the protests of weak groups can also be expressive such that they call attention to their grievances. Similar to people elsewhere, those in Hong Kong stage collective action both to send out messages and to aim for changes.

Socioeconomic grievances and protests Scholars of Hong Kong politics agree that the government in the city has been facing a governance challenge since 1997.56 Unlike the governor under British rule, the chief executive has limited power in Hong Kong since the handover. Worse, the lack of sufficient authority on the part of the government and citizens’ grievances seem to have been mutually reinforced. The government has been facing opposition not only in the Legislative Council but also in the streets. Protests have been common in the city since 1997, and people have protested for various reasons, including economic welfare, political demands, and environmental protection. For example, on June 25, 2000, five groups of people took to the streets in the city in a single day to protest government policies. More than 1,000 doctors protested the government’s reform plan, 1,300 social welfare workers were angered by funding issues, 300 residents opposed a construction project, 2,000 people marched because of asset depreciation, and 1,200 people demonstrated over the issue of the right of abode.57 Each of the three administrations faced challenges in their development plans because some of the plans were interpreted as pro-business or lacking consultation. For example, in 2006, the Hong Kong government decided to demolish the Star Ferry, which had a history of 48 years, shorter than the government’s protection threshold of 50 years. Protests occurred when some people believed that the government had not conducted enough consultation before dismantling the “cultural heritage.” After the pier ceased operation on November 11, a small protestors began their protest activities and attempted to occupy the site. While the pier was eventually dismantled on December 16, 2006, the government tried to address the public’s concern by modifying the city’s conservation policy and incorporating “collective memory” as a criterion for preservation. In 2007, people again protested the government’s plan to pull down the Queen’s Pier, and the government made concessions by promising to reconstruct the pier elsewhere in the future.58 Unlike these two protests, the protest against the express rail link had largescale participation. Between 2009 and 2010, some groups protested the proposed Hong Kong section of the Guangzhou–Shenzhen–Hong Kong Express Rail Link, a high-speed railway that would link Hong Kong with mainland China’s highspeed rail network. Different groups, including environmentalists and affected residents, opposed the project by citing various reasons, including environmental pollution (air and noise), sacrifice of the interests of the local residents, high cost, customs and border control complications, and problems with the project design.

Background of the Occupy Movement 31 The project was framed as one that sacrificed the interests of the common people in favor of a small minority of economic elites. The opposition was initiated by media activists already active in past protests, such as the fight for the preservation of the Star Ferry and Queen’s Pier in 2006 and 2007, respectively. Initially, these activists only focused on saving the village that would be affected by the project. However, when they were working on ways to solve the problem, they found many inconsistencies in the government plan and finally went out to oppose the rail link as a whole. On November 29, 2009, about 20 groups called for a demonstration opposing the project, with a claimed number of 3,000 participants.59 On January 16, 2010, when the groups who opposed the project learned that the Legislative Council had approved the budget, thousands of people went to the Legislative Council to protest, preventing government officials and pro-government legislators from leaving until the early morning of January 17.60 Such protests suggest that the government can be handicapped in governance because of its lack of sufficient authority and legitimacy. Indeed, Leung Chunying, the incumbent chief executive, is trying to addressing the problems faced by the city, such as the milk powder issue, pregnant women from the mainland, and housing. When asked why some people from Hong Kong pay little attention to the things Leung had done and why they require him to step down, a scholar explained that “people have a short memory” and that his integrity is what they remember the most.61 On the other hand, the people seem to have a justified reason for their grievances and action, that is, the government’s insufficient consultation in policy making. Therefore, a government with a weak authority and legitimacy faces constant challenges in governance even if its decisions are reasonable or beneficial to the whole society if enforced.

Political protests Protests with political demands, such as democracy, are also common in Hong Kong. An annual demonstration has been carried out every July 1 since 1997 (Figure 2.3).62 The issues protestors complain about are multiple, varying across years. However, the consistent theme of the demonstrations has always been about democracy and political rights.63 The demand for real elections and the abolition of the functional constituencies were themes the organizers (i.e., the Civic Human Rights Front) proposed 10 times between 2000 and 2013. Moreover, protestors demanded the resignation of all three chief executives. The annual demonstration on July 1 is also an occasion where different groups of participants make their claims. For example, between 2011 and 2014, organizers raised three to four political demands each year, such as democracy, universal suffrage, and the abolition of functional constituencies. Participants made many more claims, ranging from 10 to more than 20. These grievances included eroding press freedom, the Chinese government’s repression of political dissidents, selective law enforcement of the police, the government’s developmental plans, collective bargaining, gay rights, developers’ hegemony, increasing rents for small

32

Background of the Occupy Movement

participants (10,000)

98

99 20 00 20 01 20 02 20 03 20 04 20 05 20 06 20 07 20 08 20 09 20 10 20 11 20 12 20 13 20 14

19

19

19

97

50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0

Figure 2.3 Participants in the July 1 demonstrations in Hong Kong Source: The Public Opinion Program of the University of Hong Kong, http://hkupop.hku. hk/chinese/release/release1050.html; the number is the average of the highest and lowest estimations.

businesses, babies born by mainland women, shortage of milk powder, and even Hong Kong independence. “On July 1 of every year, one reason is enough for a person to take to the streets. The reason can be dissatisfaction with the government, declined quality of life, and low pay, among others.”64 Large-scale protests in Hong Kong since 1997 have been tied to the Chinese central government in one way or another. These protests tend to be reactive, in that the people feel that some of their rights are weakened or taken away because of the policies made or supported by the central government. As prospect theory suggests, people tend to be more aggressive or risk taking when they face losses,65 and thus they are more likely to take the risk to defend the things they have. In other words, people are more likely to be mobilized to take defensive action because perceived losses have a strong mobilization effect. An important demonstration is the one that opposed the enactment of Article 23, which is considered “the most serious crisis of governance” in Hong Kong after the 1967 pro-communist riots against the British colonial rule.66 According to Article 23, the Hong Kong government shall enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the central government, or theft of state secrets; to prohibit foreign political organizations or bodies from conducting political activities in the city; and to prohibit political organizations of the city from establishing ties with foreign ones. On September 24, 2002, the Hong Kong government released its proposal for the anti-subversion law. The proposal was strongly opposed by a large number of people who believed that the law would seriously limit freedom in Hong Kong. As a result, an estimated 500,000 people took to the streets on July 1, 2003, to protest the legislation of Article 23, the poor economy, and other issues. In the aftermath of the mass protest, two executive committee members resigned, and the bill was withdrawn after it became clear that it would not obtain the necessary support from the

Background of the Occupy Movement 33 Legislative Council. The bill was shelved indefinitely. This protest “also encouraged local participation, refueled an ailing democracy movement, and put democratic reforms onto the political agenda of Hong Kong.”67 Thus far, the longest protest movement is the anti-national education protest.68 On October 13, 2010, the Hong Kong government decided that moral and national education would replace the existing moral and civic education to strengthen national education. The government planned to introduce the new subject in primary schools in 2012 and in secondary schools in 2013; it carried out a four-month consultation in 2011. However, this decision was controversial from the beginning. The controversial textbook for the national education was written by scholars from the mainland, and it gave the impression that the course was to praise the communist and nationalist ideology of the Chinese communist government on one hand and to condemn democracy on the other. Not surprising, this decision, which was viewed as brainwashing, was strongly opposed by students and other social groups. The opposition movement lasted for about five months from May 13 to September 9, 2012, when the government decided to suspend the plan. An overwhelming majority of the social protests that took place in Hong Kong after 1997, including the July 1 demonstration in 2003, were short-lived, although some of them appeared to be effective because of the power in numbers. Unlike most protests, the anti-national education movement was characterized by its long time span and continual collective action. On May 13, 2012, answering the call of Scholarism, a student organization formed in 2011, about 100 people went to the government headquarters to protest the education plan. Afterward, various activities, including several large-scale protests, were organized to force the government to discard the plan (Figure 2.4). On July 29, 2012, an estimated number of 32,000 people (protestors claimed the number was 90,000) took to the streets to demand the government to abandon the plan.69 On August 30, about 50 students went to the government headquarters to stage a three-day occupation, and three of them began a hunger strike. On September 1, an estimated 8,100 people (protestors claimed this number was 40,000) went to the government headquarters to protest. Another 10 parents and retired teachers started a new round of hunger strikes after the first strike ended.70 Three days later, the Hong Kong Federation of Students (HKFS) called for a four-hour strike, and another nine people started a hunger strike. On September 7, about 36,000 people rallied in front of the government headquarters to protest (protestors claimed this number was 120,000).71 On September 9, when the government decided to suspend the plan, Scholarism announced the end of the occupation. However, about 100 people refused to leave.72 Protest activities continued after the government’s compromise because protestors wanted it to abandon the plan. On September 11, the HKFS held a rally at the Chinese University of Hong Kong to protest the government policy, and about 8,000 people attended.73 On September 19, about 400 students, students’ parents, and faculty members participated in a rally at City University.74 Similar to the July 1 demonstrations, this movement received support from a number of social groups. After the movement started, 23 organizations,

9

70

8100 9/6/2012, more hunger strikers

8/30/2012, occupy protest

Source: Mingpao (May–October); Apple Daily (May–October)

Figure 2.4 Anti-national education protests

5/13/2012, protest

100

32000

36000

100 9/9/2012, some continued

40000 35000 30000 25000 20000 15000 10000 5000 0 8000 400 9/19/2012, City University

400

Background of the Occupy Movement 35 including Scholarism, the Parents’ Concern Group, and the Hong Kong Professional Teachers’ Union, formed the Civil Alliance against National Education.75 Although Scholarism played an important role, other groups helped increase the scale and momentum of the movement. For example, the protest on May 13 was orchestrated by 13 organizations, including democratic parties, students’ organizations, and even environmental groups. The rally on September 11 received the support of 188 student organizations. This support is similar to that of the July 1 demonstration in 2003. The initiator of the July 1 demonstration is called the Civic Human Rights Front, which consists of 30 diverse social activist organizations such as human rights groups, political parties or groups, feminists, gay and lesbian groups, professional unions, labor groups, student groups, and other groups.76 Therefore, in large-scale protests, the backgrounds of participants are also diverse. In the anti-education movement, the participants were not limited to students or faculty members as students’ parents and other groups also took part. For example, on September 6, 2012, eight movement activists from the early generations aged 56 to 65 years joined the hunger strike to “protect the next generation.”77 An important consequence of these protests over the years is that they help citizens gain experience in participating in collective action. As Lee and Chan write, the demonstration on July 1, 2003 had significant impact on some of the participants. “They felt empowered by the experience and started to pay more attention to politics. They are attentive analysts of public affairs, and some of them have even become activists.”78 For example, a survey of 1,562 people at the three protest sites between October 20 and October 26 during the 2014 Occupy Movement shows that 85 percent of them had participated in protests or demonstrations before the movement.79 Among these people, 84 percent once participated in the annual July 1 demonstration, and 63 percent had participated in the anti-national education movement. Both the HKFS and Scholarism were leading organizations in the Occupy Movement in 2014 (Chapter 5). Some of the features of these earlier protests were also exhibited in the 2014 Occupy Movement. First, determined participants, such as members of Scholarism, joined in and sustained the anti-national education movement. Second, participants had diverse backgrounds. Third, protests tended to have a decentralized structure. Some groups may be regarded as the initiator, but no dominating group makes decisions binding to other groups and participants. Fourth, new information technologies are widely used in the protests for information dissemination, mobilization, strategy formation, and coordination. Equally important is the fact that the success of some of these protests targeting the central government makes some people believe that collective action can be a useful tool to pursue democracy. Protests contributed to the resignation of the first chief executive, and to the suspensions of the enactment of Article 23 and of the national education plan. Protests are staged also because the Hong Kong people have limited options when they face the central government in their fight for democracy. Against this background, occupying Central became the option of those who aimed to achieve the direct election of the chief executive.

36

Background of the Occupy Movement

Occupying Central as an option An occupation movement was organized in Hong Kong between October 2011 and September 2012, when some people answered the call of “Occupy Together” made by the Occupy Wall Street Movement in the United States. The protestors camped in a plaza beneath the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) headquarters in Central but were eventually evicted by the police.80 The movement targeted the major corporations considered responsible for inequality in society. Unlike the 2011–2012 movement, the new Occupy Movement in Hong Kong was launched to pressure the government to achieve democracy. On January 16, 2013, Tai Yiu-ting, an associate professor at the University of Hong Kong, published an article in the Hong Kong Economic Journal, a local newspaper, proposing civil disobedience and peaceful occupation of Central in Hong Kong. He believed that demonstrations, referendum, occupying the government headquarters, and even hunger strikes were not sufficient to force the central government to accommodate the Hong Kong people’s demand for democracy. When movements aim at proposing policy changes or become proactive, they must be more powerful. Therefore, he suggested that occupying Central and paralyzing the financial center might generate sufficient pressure on the central government, given the importance of the financial sector to the city and to the country.81 The initial proposed time was in July 2013 or the summer of 2014. The proposal was echoed by pro-democrats and their supporters. On March 27, 2013, Tai Yiu-ting, Chan Kin-man, an associate professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, and Chu Yiu-ming, a reverend, issued a statement titled “Occupying Central with Love and Peace” to call for citizens’ voluntary participation in this movement to achieve the suffrage of the chief executive of Hong Kong in 2017. The secretariat of the Occupy Central Movement (OCM) was formed in April and began mobilization and coordination activities.82 The first meeting regarding the Occupy Movement was held in June at the University of Hong Kong. About 700 people attended the meeting, discussing a wide range of issues, including the propaganda, issue framing, proposals to be negotiated with the government, timing and organizing of the movement, and measures to deal with the central government. Two more sessions of deliberation were held in March and May 2014. In June 2014, the Chinese central government issued a white book on the practice of “one country, two systems” in Hong Kong. The white book, written by Chinese scholars, stressed that the autonomy and self-governance of Hong Kong are subject to the authority of the central government. The “two systems” should be within “one country.” Candidates for the chief executive office “must love the country and Hong Kong,” and the election of the chief executive and legislators must be in accordance with “the interests of the national security.” External forces that attempt to intervene in China’s domestic matters through Hong Kong must receive serious attention. Those who attempt to undermine the enforcement of the policy of “one country, two systems” in Hong Kong with the support of external forces must also be prevented.83

Background of the Occupy Movement 37 The timing of the publishing of the white book was interpreted as the central government’s declaration of its stand on “one country, two systems” before the referendum of the OCM. In June 2014, the Occupy Movement commissioned the University of Hong Kong to conduct a poll on three proposals by different pan-democratic groups, all of which involved allowing citizens to directly nominate candidates. The voting outcome would be presented to the Beijing government. The referendum was conducted from June 20 to 29, 2014. A total of 792,800 people took part in the poll either by voting online or going to the designated polling stations. About 88 percent of the voters believed that if the government proposal did not satisfy the international standards that allow genuine choice by the people, the Legislative Council should veto it.84 However, as shown in Figure 2.5, the general public was not enthusiastic about the proposed OCM. The surveys conducted by the University of Hong Kong consistently suggested that more people opposed the proposal. Pro-government groups, business groups, the Hong Kong government, and the central government all condemned the proposed OCM, claiming that the occupation was illegal and would endanger the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong. The Alliance for Peace and Democracy, a pro-government group, organized a collection of signatures against the OCM from July 3, and claimed it had received more than 1.2 million signatures by August 11. On August 17, the pro-government camp staged a countermovement by organizing a demonstration against the OCM, which reportedly attracted about 111,800 participants.85 Despite the low public approval and the criticisms made by the Hong Kong government, the central government, and the pro-establishment camp, the proponents of the OCM and their supporters did not stop their pursuit of this option. When the annual demonstration took place on July 1, 2014, some participants tested this proposal by occupying a road in Central but were removed by

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Figure 2.5 People’s attitudes toward the proposed Occupy Central Movement Source: The Public Opinion Program of the University of Hong Kong, http://hkupop.hku.hk/ chinese/report/mpCEnOCCw6/index.html, accessed October 28, 2014. Note: the remaining reported “cannot tell.”

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the police, who made 511 arrests. Even then, the OCM founders did not specify the time for the occupation. The protest against the decision by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) of China directly triggered the Occupy Movement. On August 31, 2014, the Standing Committee of the NPC passed the resolution on the universal suffrage of the chief executive of Hong Kong in 2017. The resolution stipulates that for the 2017 chief executive elections, a nomination committee should be formed to nominate two to three candidates, each of whom must receive the support of more than half of the members of the nomination committee. After the popular election of one of the nominated candidates, the new chief executive will be appointed by the central government. This resolution excluded the possibility of a civil nomination and, as expected, aroused the resentment of the pro-democratic camp. The occupation movement became the choice. The initial plan of the OCM was to pressure the government to make concessions through civil disobedience around the National Day or October 1. Specifically, if 10,000 people occupied Central, which is the financial center, then the government would feel the pressure. The founders planned for each participant to sign an agreement that the resistance would be peaceful and that they would not resist if they were arrested by the police. Those who were not arrested would turn themselves in. The 10,000 participants occupied Central at the risk of imprisonment to create a moral shock in the society. The shock might trigger strikes in the city, leading to ineffective governance and thus to the concession on the part of the government. But Tai Yiu-ting was not optimistic about the number of participants and admitted that the number of participants could be between 3,000 and 5,000.86 As the next chapter discusses, however, how the government responded to the Occupy Movement led the movement to evolve in a way the founders of the movement, movement participants, or the government had not expected. None of them anticipated that the movement could attract a large number of participants and could last for that long. Once the movement started, it became a mass movement without effective leadership and coordination. The occupied areas were not in Central but in Admiralty, where the government headquarters are located, and in two business districts, Causeway Bay and Mong Kok.

Conclusion For a protest movement to arise from the trauma of daily life, people have to perceive the problems they experience as both wrong and subject to redress.87 In Hong Kong, both the government and the people have been facing challenges since 1997.88 The economic difficulties, such as high housing prices and high income inequality, have generated grievances among a large segment of the population, especially the youth. The economic stagnation in the city has much to do with its inability to develop new sectors of growth and its continual reliance on traditional industries. The demand for democracy has been raised since the handover, but it has not been accommodated. These grievances serve as the

Background of the Occupy Movement 39 background for the social protests in the city that target the Hong Kong government and the Chinese central government, which are seen as responsible for or tied to the grievances.89 In dealing with popular grievances and protests, the Hong Kong government and the central government have largely used tolerance and concession. Significant concessions were made when protests were staged to oppose the enactment of Article 23 and the national education. However, when pro-democracy groups proposed to generate pressure on the central government by occupying Central, the central government saw no room for concession. Instead, it believed that concessions could only worsen the governance in Hong Kong, and the autonomy given to Hong Kong only seemed to provide a chance for foreign forces to influence the people in the city. Against this background, the Occupy Movement could barely force the central government to concede. As the next chapter discusses, although the central government did not repress the movement, it made clear that the protestors’ demand for civil nominations in the election of the chief executive was not acceptable.

Notes 1 Joseph Gusfield, “Introduction: A Definition of the Subject,” in Joseph Gusfield (ed.), Protest: Reform, and Revolt (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1970), pp. 1–8. 2 Anthony Oberschall, Social Conflict and Social Movements (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973), p. 49. 3 The National Education Bureau, Jingxin dongpo de 56 tian (A Soul-Stirring 56 Days) (Beijing: Dadi chubanshe, 1989), p. 145. 4 Manuel Castells, Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012), p. 2. 5 Austin Ramzy, “Concession Offered, Taiwan Group to End Protest of China Trade Pact,” New York Times, April 7, 2014. 6 Ma Ngok, “Civil Society and Democratization in Hong Kong,” Taiwan Journal of Democracy, vol. 4, no. 2 (2008), pp. 155–175; Hsin-chi Kuan, “Power Dependence and Democratic Transition: The Case of Hong Kong,” China Quarterly, vol. 128 (1991), pp. 774–793. 7 Joseph Cheng (ed.), The July 1 Protest Rally: Interpreting a Historic Event (Hong Kong: City University Press, 2005). 8 Xiao Huihao, Zhou Zhanhong, Zheng Peishan, Lin Wanfei, Zhu Jiayi, and Li Mingzhi, “Jin banshoufang qingnian zui bu man zhengzhi” (Almost half of the surveyed youths are most dissatisfied with political arrangements), Mingpao, December 5, 2014. 9 Keith Bradsher and Chris Buckley, “Hong Kong Leader Reaffirms Unbending Stance on Elections,” New York Times, October 20, 2014. 10 “Zhanling qingnian tan fupin shangliu” (Occupiers talk about poverty alleviation and upward mobility), Mingpao, November 30, 2014. 11 The reasons included: real suffrage (87%), dissatisfaction with the government’s lack of response (68%), dissatisfaction with the police’s handling of the protest (51%), sharing the notion of civil disobedience (46%), dissatisfaction with the central government’s intervention in Hong Kong affairs (33%), fighting for participation in policy making, and improving livelihood (3%). Zheng Yi and Yuan Weixi, “Hou yusan yundong: gaobie zhengzhi lenggan niandai” (Farewell to a politically apathetic era), Mingpao, November 29, 2014.

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12 Boyu Chen, Da-chi Liao, Hisn-che Wu, and San-yih Hwan, “The Logic of Communitive Action: A Case Study of Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement,” Manuscript, 2014. 13 Some participants did cite socioeconomic grievances when talking about the causes of occupation. Interviews, Admiralty 31 and 32. 14 Conversation 7. 15 Interviews, Admiralty 17 and 21. Also see Ming Sing, “The Legitimacy Problem and Democratic Reform in Hong Kong,” Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 15, no. 48 (2006), pp. 517–532. 16 Movement leaders or activists commonly cited socioeconomic grievances in their speeches. Author’s site observation. 17 Yvonne Liu, “Hong Kong Ranks World’s No 1 for ‘Most Unaffordable’ Housing,” South China Morning Post, January 22, 2014. 18 Tan Jingwen and Cheng Junhua, “Dangfang bannian zeng sancheng” (Subdivided units increased by 30 percent within half a year), Apple Daily, December 17, 2014. 19 “Danghu liao 10 nian cai ke shanglou” (People living in subdivided units need to wait for 10 years to live in government-provided housing), Apple Daily, December 17, 2014. 20 “Dangfang zhuhu ‘yuezhu yueqiong’ ” (Occupants of subdivided units become poorer), Hong Kong Economic Journal, January 5, 2015. 21 The Census and Statistics Department, www.censtatd.gov.hk/hkstat/sub/sp150_tc. jsp?tableID=005&ID=0&productType=8. 22 Wang Ping, “Xianggang xia mengyao zhi chaofang” (Hong Kong takes strict measures to curb housing speculation), Renmin ribao, October 30, 2012. 23 Zhou Xian, “Shang Yang bianfa he Dong Jianhua de ‘bawanwu’ ” (Shang Yang reform and Tung Chee-hwa’s 85,000 plan), Economic Daily, May 2, 2014. 24 Fanny Fung and Phila Siu, “Hong Kong’s Supply Target of New Homes Raised to 480,000 over Next Decade,” South China Morning Post, December 17, 2014. 25 All elderly applicants must be 58 years of old or older at the time of filing their applications and must have reached the age of 60 by the time of flat allocation. See the Web site of the Hong Kong Housing Authority, www.housingauthority.gov. hk/en/about-us/publications-and-statistics/prh-applications-average-waitingtime, accessed December 20, 2014. 26 Alice Poon, Land and the Ruling Class in Hong Kong (Richmond, BC: Alice Poon, 2005). 27 Ibid., p. 15. 28 Ibid., p. 16. 29 Luo Qi, “Xianggang jini zhishu gaoqi, pinfu chaju lada” (Hong Kong Gini coefficient remains high, income gap widened), Diyi caijing ribao (Finance Daily), September 5, 2014. 30 Li Yingyi, “Jin yicheng ‘qiongmangzu’ gangqing you pin yishi” (About 10 percent of the working poor worry about being poor for their whole life), Wenweipo, November 19, 2014. 31 Kang-chung Ng, “Social Mobility in Hong Kong ‘Getting Harder,’ Poll Says,” South China Morning Post, March 5, 2013. 32 Lok Sang Ho, Kai Wai Huang, and Xiandong Wei, “Upward Earnings Mobility on the Decline in Hong Kong? A Study Based on Census Data,” Manuscript, 2013. 33 Jonathan Watts, “Chinese Professor Calls Hong Kong Residents ‘Dogs of British Imperialists,’ ” The Guardians, January 24, 2012. 34 Talk with a Hong Kong resident, August, 2014. 35 “Dangju 10 zhao wending bengang naifen gongying” (The government took 10 measures to stabilize the supply of milk powder in Hong Kong), Oriental Daily, February 2, 2013.

Background of the Occupy Movement 41 36 “Gang qunian dan 9.1 wan ying” (91,000 babies were born in Hong Kong last year), Sun, December 16, 2013. 37 Lin Yuhua, “Neidi yunfu chong jizhenshi chanzi qunian jinsheng yubei” (Mainland pregnant women who forced their way into emergency rooms to deliver doubled last year), Wenweipo, January 6, 2012. 38 “Xianggang gongli he sili yiyuan mingnian quanmian ting shou ‘shuangfei’ yunfu” (Public and private hospitals will not accept pregnant women from the Chinese mainland next year), Dongnan kuaibao, April 26, 2012. 39 Zheng Zhizhu, “ ‘Xianggangren xiexie ni,’ shenzhen jumin deng guanggao xie gangren” (“Thank you, Hong Kong people,” a Shenzhen resident publishes an advertisement to thank the Hong Kong people), Wenweipo, February 10, 2012. 40 See the Web site of sho.com, http://quan.sohu.com/pinglun/cyqemw6s1/ 401683729, accessed December 20, 2014. 41 Li Chengxin, “Zhanling qu xuezi keqiu ‘zhen jiaoliu’ ” (Students in the protest sites hope to have productive interaction with the mainland), Hong Kong Economic Journal, November 24, 2014. 42 Christopher Reddick and Sukumar Ganapati, “Open Government Achievement and Satisfaction in US Federal Agencies: Survey Evidence for the Three Pillars,” Journal of E-Governance, vol. 34, no. 4 (2011), pp. 193–202. 43 “87% shiwei zhe yuan liushou yinian” (87% of protestors were willing to stay for a year), Mingpao, October 30, 2014. 44 The Center for Communication and Public Opinion Survey of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, www.com.cuhk.edu.hk/ccpos/b5, accessed October 23, 2014. 45 For example, Meng Tianguang, “Zhuanxing shiqi de zhongguo zhengzhi xinren” (Political trust in China during the transitional period), Huazhong shifan daxue xuebao ( Journal of Huazhong Normal University), vol. 2 (2014), pp. 1–10. 46 Yongshun Cai, “Power Structure and Regime Resilience: Contentious Politics in China,” British Journal of Political Science, vol. 38, no. 3 (2008), pp. 411–432. 47 See the Web site of the Hong Kong government, www.voterregistration.gov.hk/ chi/statistic20141.html#1, accessed December 2, 2014. 48 “ ‘Nanzao’ qian laozhong: Beijing shao gangyu gang meiti” (The former editor in chief of South China Morning Post: Beijing rarely intervenes in Hong Kong media), Singtao Daily, December 18, 2014. 49 Tony Cheung and Joyce Ng, “China Was Very Much Against Democracy in Hong Kong Even before Handover, Says Chris Patten,” South China Morning Post, November 21, 2014. 50 Ma Ngok, Xianggang 80 niandai minzhu yundong koushu lishi (An oral history of the democratic movement in Hong Kong in the 1980s) (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2012). 51 See, for example, Sing Ming, Hong Kong’s Tortuous Democratization: A Comparative Analysis (London: Routledge, 2004). 52 Xu Yanling, “Xianggang weishenme fasheng daguimo kangzhen” (Why large-scale protests occurred in Hong Kong), Kaifang (Open Magazine), November 2014, pp. 38–39. 53 Posters in the protest sites had made such claims. 54 Lee Ross, “The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution Process,” in Leonard Berkowitz (ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 10 (New York: Academic Press, 1977), pp. 173–220. 55 Craig Jenkins, “Social Movements, Political Representation, and the State: An Agenda and Comparative Frameworks,” in Craig Jenkins and Bert Klandermans (eds.), The Politics of Social Protest: Comparative Perspectives on States and Social Movements (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), pp. 14–35. 56 Ming Sing (ed.), Politics and Government in Hong Kong: Crisis under Chinese Sovereignty (London: Routledge, 2009); Ngok Ma, Political Development in Hong

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Background of the Occupy Movement Kong: State, Political Society, and Civil Society (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2007); Ma Anthony Chueng, “The Hong Kong System under One Country Being Tested: Article 23, Governance Crisis and the Search for a New Hong Kong Identity,” in Joseph Cheng (ed.), The July 1 Protest Rally: Interpreting a Historic Event (Hong Kong: City University Press, 2005), pp. 33–70. Alvin So, “The Transformation of Social Movements in Hong Kong after 1997,” in Jeffrey Broadbent and Vicky Brockman (eds.), East Asian Social Movements: Power, Protest and Change (New York: Springer, 2011), pp. 365–384. Vaudine England, “Protesters Fight to Save Historic Hong Kong Pier,” The Guardian, June 18, 2007; Agnes Ku, “Re-making Places and Fashioning an Opposition Discourse – Struggle over the Star Ferry Pier and the Queen’s Pier in Hong Kong,” Environment and Planning D: Space and Society, vol. 30 (2010), pp. 5–22. “Qianren fan gaotie chongji zhengfu zhongbu” (Over a thousand people oppose the express link and assault the government headquarters), Oriental Daily, November 30, 2009. “Fan gaotie kun Zheng Luhua 6 xiaoshi” (Eva Cheng stayed for 6 hours because of anti-express link groups’ surrounding), Mingpao, January 17, 2010. Talk with a scholar in Hong Kong, November 2014. Jennifer Ngo, “July 1 Protest Is Hong Kong’s Taste of Democracy,” South China Morning Post, June 30, 2013. Francis Lee and Joseph Chan, Media, Social Mobilization, and Mass Protest in Postcolonial Hong Kong: The Power of a Critical Event (New York: Routledge, 2011); Joseph Cheng, “Introduction: Causes and Implications of July 1 Protest Rally in Hong Kong,” in Cheng (ed.), The July 1 Protest Rally: Interpreting a Historic Event, pp. 1–26. “Shiming suqiu, baihua qifang” (People’s claims are various), Oriental Daily, July 2, 2012. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk,” Econometrica, vol. 47, no. 2 (March 1979), pp. 263–291. Chueng, “The Hong Kong System under One Country Being Tested”; Lee and Chan, Media, Social Mobilization, and Mass Protest in Post-colonial Hong Kong. Ngok Ma, “Civil Society in Self-Defense: The Struggle against National Security Legislation in Hong Kong,” Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 14, no. 44 (2005), pp. 465–482. Ming Sing, “The Anti-national Education Movement in Hong Kong: A Struggle for Freedom of Thought and One Country, Two Systems,” Manuscript, 2015. “9wan ren shangjie wei hanting ‘xinao’ ” (900,000 protestors failed to stop the “brainwashing”), Mingpao, July 30, 2012. “Risai yulin, che ke sheng gengxiang” (Despite the sun and the rain, demand for the revoking of the educational plan was stronger), Mingpao, September 2, 2012. “Shiming xuju zhengzhong gaohu chehui” (Citizens continued to gather in front of the government headquarters to call for the revoking), Oriental Daily, September 8, 2012. “Bairen liushou zhengzhong” (100 people stayed near the government headquarters), Mingpao, September 9, 2012. “23nian shouci 8000 dazhuan shisheng bake” (8,000 students and faculty members had a first strike within 23 years), Mingpao, September 12, 2012. “400 chengda shisheng jihui fan guojiao ke” (400 students and faculty members rallied to protest against the national education plan), Mingpao, September 19, 2012. Ming, “The Anti-national Education Movement in Hong Kong.” Scholars of Hong Kong politics depict such protests as “postmodern” movements that are anti-bureaucratic, anti-authority, and loosely organized. See So, “Social Conflict in Hong Kong after 1997,” p. 241; Kin-Man Chan, “Civil Society and

Background of the Occupy Movement 43

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the Democracy Movement in Hong Kong: Mass Mobilization with Limited Organizational Capacity,” Korea Observer, vol. 36, no. 1 (2005), pp. 167–183. Liang Delun, Cai Langqing, Huang Tongshu, and Mai Zhirong, “Bei xuemin sichao ganran” (Influenced by the Scholarism), Apple Daily, September 7, 2012. Lee and Chan, Media, Social Mobilization, and Mass Protests in Post-colonial Hong Kong, p. 181. Zheng and Yuan, “Hou yusan yundong: gaobie zhengzhi lenggan niandai” (Farewell to a politically apathetic era). Lai Ying-kit, “Occupy Central Protesters Evicted from HSBC Building,” South China Morning Post, September 11, 2012. Dai Yaoting, “Gongming kangming de zuida shashang wuqi” (Civil disobedience as the most deadly weapon), Hong Kong Economic Journal, January 16, 2013. Eddie Luk, “Hot Talk Swirls on ‘Occupy Central’ Idea,” The Standard, March 25 2013. See the Web site of the Xinhua News Agency, http://news.xinhuanet.com/gangao/ 2014–06/10/c_1111067166.htm, accessed October 5, 2014. Tony Cheung, Jeffie Lam, Joyce Ng, and Gary Cheung, “Alliance for True Democracy Proposal Wins Occupy Central Poll as Nearly 800,000 Hongkongers Vote,” South China Morning Post, June 29, 2014. “Fan zhanzhong youxing 11.18 wan ren canjia” (111,800 people participated in the anti-occupation demonstration), Hong Kong Economic Journal, August 18, 2014. Xie Mengyao, Jiang Yannan, Liu Xiang, and Zhu Yongxiao, “Zhanzhong shikong muhou: zhanlingqu shantou linli, quefa tuichang jizhi” (Behind the loss of control over the Occupation Movement: divided groups and lack of exit mechanisms), Asian weekly, October 26, 2014, pp. 22–32. Frances Piven and Richard Cloward, Poor People’s Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), p. 12. Ma, Political Development in Hong Kong; Chueng, “The Hong Kong System under One Country Being Tested.” Ma, “Civil Society and Democratization in Hong Kong”; Kuan, “Power Dependence and Democratic Transition.”

3

Movement legitimacy and government response

A government often encounters a dilemma in dealing with large-scale protests because whichever mode of response it adopts may induce unintended consequences.1 The government can use concession, repression, and tolerance or ignorance to deal with protests, but each mode has its limitations. A government cannot always ignore protests, especially large ones. Repression sacrifices regime legitimacy, and ineffective repression can escalate the collective action, which can be disastrous or even fatal for the government. By contrast, concessions may trigger more demanding claims or encourage more protests. In a political system with different levels of government, the dilemma a higher-level government faces can be alleviated by delegating the power and responsibility to lower-level governments.2 However, not all of the protests are handled in a context in which shifting responsibility is possible. How can a government end large-scale protests without considerably sacrificing its legitimacy or making excessive concessions? This chapter suggests that the position of a government dealing with social protest is strengthened when the protesting group faces opposition or countermovements from groups whose interests are at odds with the claims or activities of the protestors. In social movements, both protestors and movement targets (e.g., the government) value legitimacy. Protestors need to shore up legitimacy because only legitimate movements can gain sympathy and resources and limit the government’s use of repression. In other words, governmental use of force, if perceived as illegitimate, may provoke public resentment and large-scale participation. On the other hand, if opposition or countermovements arise, the legitimacy of the social protest is undermined, which allows the government to enjoy more political space in dealing with the protestors. The Occupy Movement in Hong Kong points out the importance of both legitimacy and the government’s adjustment to the changing environment when considering how to respond to mass protests. In dealing with the movement, because the Hong Kong government’s initial use of force was counterproductive, it soon adjusted its response by discontinuing the use of perceived highlevel repression and by relying on the anti-movement grievances and protests and the shift of public opinion to weaken the movement’s legitimacy. This mode of response partly reduced the dilemma faced by the government. On one hand, as the movement continued, opposition voices and anti-movement protests

Movement legitimacy

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began to rise, partly delegitimizing the modes of action (i.e., occupying the streets) taken by the protestors and generating pressure on participants. They therefore alleviated the pressure the government confronted in taking measures to deal with the protestors. On the other hand, government tolerance did not amount to concessions. The lack of positive response by the government undermined the confidence and patience of a significant number of participants, which led to decline in the movement’s momentum and paved the way for clearing the protest sites.

Legitimacy and social movements The legitimacy of a movement consists of two dimensions, namely, the legitimacy of the movement’s goal and the legitimacy of the means employed to achieve that goal. Legitimacy is generally defined as conduct that obeys the rules or adheres to established values. For example, according to Max Weber, claims to legitimacy are based on rational grounds and adherence to rules and legal procedures. Specifically, the source of legitimacy can be traditional, charismatic, or rational-legal.3 For the sake of analytical convenience, the legitimacy of a movement in this study is defined as the legality or appropriateness of the goal and the means in light of the law and commonly accepted social values. Such legitimacy dictates, and is revealed by, the popular support for the movement. Useem and Zald suggest that a movement can achieve legitimacy in two ways.4 One is through the mobilization of a large number of internally disciplined people who are committed to seeking an alternative distribution of power to achieve the “legitimacy of numbers.”5 In this way, legitimacy is obtained by demonstrating that a large number of committed and mobilized citizenry supports the proposed change. The other way through which a movement achieves the legitimacy of means is by convincing the public that the adopted means are an appropriate vehicle for achieving the goals of the constituents. A movement must justify not only its goals, but also its modus operandi as a social movement. Legitimacy of means helps a movement recruit new members and gain access to the media, as well as reduces the likelihood and effectiveness of government repression. Therefore, legitimacy contributes to social movements in several ways. First, a movement with a high level of legitimacy enhances the confidence of participants in pursuing their rights. Participants need to believe in the reasonableness of their deed to take action. Second, a movement with a high level of legitimacy can create a public’s threat to the government. Zald and Ash write, “The attitudes in the larger society toward the movement . . . condition the readiness of potential supporters to become actual supporters.”6 If a movement obtains sympathy from a significant segment of the population, then the government faces a threat imposed by the population. One reason is that the sympathetic segment provides support to movement participants in the form of favorable public opinion or material support. More important, some members of the sympathetic segment may turn into participants. This threat limits government use of repressive measures.

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For example, during the Sunflower Movement in Taiwan, after the students and their supporters forced their way into the Legislative Chamber and began the occupation on March 23, the government initially attempted to use force to drive the occupiers away. But the police gave up the attempt when they were met with resistance from the occupiers, and further use of force was seen as inappropriate because of the public attention. On March 30, when 500,000 participants (estimated at 116,000 by the police) rallied in the street, the government became aware of the public’s support and excluded repression as an option.7 Yet a government will not hesitate to use repression if it believes that mass protests threaten its rule as in the case of the 1989 Tiananmen movement. On the other hand, if the claims or means of the movement participants are viewed as illegitimate, the government obtains legitimacy in undertaking measures to end the movement. Legitimacy is therefore important to both movement participants and the government. Achieving the legitimacy of means on the part of participants is certainly a difficult undertaking. If social movements are defined as “sustained collective challenges to power holders in the name of a disadvantaged population living under the jurisdiction or influence of those power holders,”8 the implication is that movement participants may be unable to use legal or legitimate means once they initiate the movement. Indeed, social movements are launched to induce socioeconomic or political disruptions to force the target to respond.9 Yet the illegality of means may damage the legitimacy of the movement and strengthen the position of the government. The claims of participants in social movements are generally reasonable or legitimate, and their legitimate claims justify their illegal means of action. The sympathetic public may also accept illegal modes of action based on legitimate claims. In these circumstances, if the government opts for a resentment-provoking response (e.g., excessive repression), protestors gain more legitimacy. For this reason, tolerance becomes the choice of the government when concessions and repression are not options. But tolerance does not automatically bring legitimacy to the government. It contributes to government legitimacy only when protestors undertake illegitimate means that either trigger public disapproval or provoke anti-movement activities. Challengers to the movement act as a third party that damages movement legitimacy and become allies of the government.10 Depending on the power of this third party, the government can be better positioned to deal with the movement. The 2014 Occupy Movement in Hong Kong was terminated when the police cleared the protest sites. The major claim of the Occupy Movement was the direct election of the chief executive of Hong Kong in 2017, with civil nomination being permitted. This goal appealed to a large population in the city, but not many people believed that it could be achieved by generating pressure on the central government through the occupation of Central. In fact, a large portion of the population did not support the movement before it started. However, the initial response to the movement by the police and the government severely delegitimized themselves because of the use of tear gas. Sympathetic citizens not only criticized the police and the government, but also went to the protest sites

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to support the protestors. Public sympathy prompted the government and the police to discontinue the use of high-profile forces and to tolerate the occupation. Nevertheless, the lasting occupation of protestors induced inconveniences for businesses and residents, resulting in increasing public disapproval of the occupation and rendering the feasibility of clearing the protest sites without provoking public reaction.

Occupation and the initial government response In retrospect, neither the government nor the protestors had expected that the movement occurred in the way it did and would last so long. The movement occurred in a manner that significantly deviated from what the three cofounders of the Occupy Central Movement (OCM) had planned. Similarly, the government did not anticipate that its initial response to the protests was counterproductive. Its use of tear gas became the direct reason that mobilized a large number of protestors who would not have participated had the government not used the tear gas.

Rise of confrontation and the police response The 8.31 decision made by the Chinese National People’s Congress (NPC) directly triggered the Occupy Movement. On September 14, 2014, approximately 4,000 people protested the 8.31 decision. College students launched a five-day strike from September 22. That afternoon, roughly 13,000 students from 25 universities and schools and some citizens gathered at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. The next day, the students moved to the area nearby the government headquarters. On the night of September 26, which was the final day of the strike, approximately 3,000 students began to occupy the streets after they were forced to leave the Civil Square.11 Student leaders of Scholarism and the HKFS came to believe that given the large number of participants, escalating the action to storm the government headquarters might prove a more effective approach. Roughly 100 students started the action, but the police blocked them. Approximately 40 students, including a few student leaders, were arrested.12 On the night of September 27, the HKFS and Scholarism called for another rally to demand the release of the students, and thousands of people answered the call. The police released most of the arrested students, except the three most recognizable student leaders in the Occupy Movement, Chow Yongkang, Shum Ngo-fai, and Wong Chifung. The three cofounders of the movement were under pressure. On the morning of September 27, a Saturday, when Tai Yiu-ting and Chan Kin-man went to the government headquarters, they were questioned and blamed by the protestors. With tears in her eyes, a female college student said to them, “The students have done so much for you, and now it is your turn. Over the past year, you have given the students hope, but you have now disappointed us. What have you done for the students?”13 The cofounders had long been blamed for putting

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Movement legitimacy

off the movement for too long by their followers. Against this background, the Occupy Movement began ahead of the scheduled October 1 start date. In the early morning of September 28, a large number of people rallied near the government headquarters, claiming to protect the students. Facing the crowd and the rising protest momentum, Tai Yiu-ting announced the start of the occupation, demanding that the NPC revoke its 8.31 decision and that the government submit a report that truly reflected the Hong Kong people’s demand to the central government.14 The initial intention of the police was to drive away the protestors and prevent them from occupying the roads (i.e., Harcourt Road, Tim Mei Avenue, etc.) around the government headquarters (see Map 3.1). Confrontations occurred between the police and protestors when thousands of protestors began to move to the roads and refused to leave. Police used pepper spray and batons to disperse the protestors, who then used umbrellas to protect themselves. Some protestors fought back against the police with umbrellas and water bottles. After that incident, the umbrella, and the yellow ribbon became symbols of the movement. Thus, the Occupy Movement was also known as an “umbrella movement” or an “umbrella revolution.” The participants clearly outnumbered the police; thus, the latter decided to use tear gas in an attempt to disperse protestors. Before 6 o’clock, the police issued a warning to demonstrators to stop charging at police and leave the protest sites peacefully. “Otherwise, the police would use a high level of force in order to restore public order and safeguard public safety.”15 Fifteen minutes later or shortly before 6 o’clock, riot police wearing helmets and gas masks and carrying

Map 3.1 Occupied area in Admiralty (shaded area) Source: Author’s drawing.

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49

tear gas launchers fired the first round of tear gas. They held a banner with the words “Warning – tear smoke” on one side and “Disperse or we fire” on the other side. When the protestors refused to leave, the riot police fired several additional rounds of tear gas while marching toward the government headquarters. In this confrontation, 87 canisters of tear gas were used. The use of tear gas triggered the large-scale and enduring protest beyond the expectation of the government and the protestors themselves. The tear gas appeared shocking to both the protestors and off-site citizens. It was shocking because most participants did not expect it, and it was anger provoking simply because the people did not see a legitimate ground for its usage. Chaos ensued when tear gas was fired into the crowd. Protestors felt pain in their eyes, throats, and noses. Adults who were taking their children to join the demonstrations were especially upset, and some young protestors were scared to tears. A young protestor recalled that when the police fired tear gas, everyone was trying to run away. While he breathed in smoke, he saw a man pass out after a convulsion because of the smoke.16 Some people said to the police, “The police are Hong Kong people, how can you attack your fellow citizens?”17 A 13-year-old boy said, “I have been here for the past two days and I can’t believe police would resort to tear gas. My eyes hurt so badly and my lungs are burning . . . police have used excessive force today.” A 25-year-old protestor said, “No one even guessed the police would be so violent. We are unarmed, we only have our hands.”18 Tear gas had not been used in Hong Kong for a long time or on such a large scale. On January 1, 1984, taxi drivers protested the increase in license fee, paralyzing traffic and inciting a riot during which a number of stores were looted. The government dispatched roughly 1,000 police officers, who repressed the riot with tear gas.19 A more recent incident involving the use of tear gas was the riot in 2005.20 From December 13 to 18, 2005, the Sixth Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization (WTO) was held in Hong Kong. Militant peasants from South Korea came to Hong Kong to protest, which instigated a riot during which more than 110 people, including 39 police officers, were injured. The government dispatched 2,000 police officers, used 34 canisters of tear gas, and detained more than 900 people. However, many of today’s young police officers did not participate because this incident occurred nine years ago.21 A person who also witnessed the use of tear gas during the WTO protests in 2005 said that the behavior of the police this time was very different. “Then, the police fired into the sky, but this time they fired into the ground. It’s very dangerous as it can land on protesters’ bodies.”22 A police official later explained the situation on the night of September 28. When scores of police officers were facing a large number of aggressive protestors, “it was essentially impossible to stop waves of charging by the protestors. Some protestors also used umbrella[s] as a weapon . . . How could the small number of police stop the protestors while avoiding hurting them?”23 The police claimed that the use of tear gas signified a minimum level of force.24 The police also believed that protestors were prepared as they had brought with them

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Movement legitimacy

umbrellas, goggles, and food wrap. In addition, the police felt pressure from the so-called unarmed action of protestors, that is, protestors raised their hands and approached and surrounded the police. As Castells writes, “At the individual level, social movements are emotional movements. Insurgency does not start with a program or political strategy . . . [T]he big bang of a social movement starts with the transformation of emotion into action.”25 The tear gas bred and released the power of grievances, thereby triggering large-scale participation. The protest momentum increased when more people came out to protect students and to protest. Facing the large, determined crowd, the police gave up their attempt to disperse the protestors.26 On the night of September 28, tens of thousands of protestors began to occupy the streets not only in Admiralty (see Map 3.1), but also in Mong Kok (see Map 3.2), Causeway Bay, and Tsim Sha Tsui. The short-lived occupation in Tsim Sha Tsui lasted for about three days because of insufficient occupiers, whereas the occupied area was small in Causeway Bay (i.e., less than 100 meters in Yee Wo Street). The mobilization effect of the tear gas was strong. A survey of 1,562 people at the three protest sites between October 20 and 26 shows that 40 percent had already participated in the strike starting on September 22, whereas more than 50 percent joined within a week after the police’s use of tear gas.27 Given that this survey was conducted three weeks after the commencement of the movement, many of those who had participated because of the tear gas were likely to have retreated. Hence, the tear gas might not be the only reason for people’s participation, but it did have a mobilization effect. The tear gas not only generated grievances against the government and the police but also made known the claims of protestors to the whole city, thereby attracting those who shared the movement’s claims. As a result, the Occupy Movement was no longer a student movement from the beginning, but a people’s movement with participants from all walks of life.28

Public reaction and movement legitimacy Although 26 protestors and 12 police officers were injured during the September 28 confrontation, no serious casualties occurred.29 However, images of protestor–police confrontations and the use of tear gas by the police were shown repeatedly on local TV and were spread through new social media, including the Internet and mobile phones. The police attempted to defend their actions by claiming that protestors had violently charged the police cordon outside the governmental headquarters. “After the police issued repeated warnings and protesters refused to leave, the police decided to escalate the use of force and teargas was used to stop those acts which endangered public safety and public order.”30 Nevertheless, the protestors and their supporters emphasized that protestors were “peaceful” and “unarmed,” although some of them also attacked the police with their umbrellas.31 A student participant was asked, “If the students were the police, what would they do in such a situation?” He replied that the situation was chaotic at the time. The sheer number of the participants and the refusal of

Map 3.2 Occupied area in Mong Kok (shaded area) Source: Author’s drawing.

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Movement legitimacy

the police to allow the students to move to the roads angered the students. He admitted that he could understand the use of the first few canisters of tear gas, but argued that additional canisters of tear gas could not be justified.32 The police and the government came under heavy criticism from protestors, protestors’ supporters, and other citizens. Pan-democracy legislators demanded the government and the police explain why they used tear gas. A number of social groups criticized the police for their use of force. On September 29, the next day after the use of tear gas, the Hong Kong Bar Association (HKBA) issued a statement criticizing the use of force by the police: There can be scope for disagreement on the underlying political debate or demands leading to the demonstration. Some demonstrators may have committed criminal offences during the course of the demonstration. However, none of the above matters can justify the use of excessive or disproportionate force by the Police against unarmed civilians as a matter of law and common decency . . . the HKBA still considers that there was plainly no justification to commence the use of CS gas against peaceful demonstrators, let alone repeated, systematic, indiscriminate and excessive use of CS gas [italics original].33 The police were not only criticized but also humiliated, causing demoralization among the ranks. Posters on the protest site vilified the police for being tools of politicians. Some posters even read, “The police are a dog.”34 Reportedly, some canteens and clinics did not welcome the police, and the relationship between the police and their friends or relatives soured. The police were even threatened. A member of the police force said, “From the first day of the occupation movement, we have been surrounded by the slogan ‘Shame on the police.’ This is an unprecedented painful feeling. . . . We are tired both mentally and physically.”35 He explained that he also felt very sorry because students were viewed as innocent when they pushed the police. “But we knew we had to face it. What makes us more frustrated is that our families are affected. How can Hong Kong People behave like this? They do not understand that the police do not oppose them. We do not mind that you want real election and want to voice your demands. But you should not manipulate the students.”36 Social groups began to call for strikes. Although the call was not widely echoed in the business sector, students participated in the strikes at all eight universities in the city. Approximately 10,000 college students participated in the protest activities on their respective campuses. Some faculty members joined the strike as well. Students claimed that they would continue the strike until the chief executive stepped down and apologized, the political reform group was dismantled, the secretary of security resigned, and the NPC revoked its decision.37 In addition, at least 5,000 high school students from 50 high schools heeded the call of the HKFS and Scholarism by participating in the strike.38 The police had been the target of blame and criticisms throughout the movement.39 Another incident that further damaged their image was the confrontation

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between protestors and anti-movement people in Mong Kok. On the afternoon of October 3, violent confrontations erupted when anti-movement people attempted to force pro-democracy protestors from the streets they were occupying.40 The anti-movement groups pulled down three of the four tents set up by the protestors, and confrontations ensued. A young protestor with a head injury appeared on TV and complained that he was beaten by anti-occupy protestors and that the police did not intervene. While bleeding from a cut in his head, he said that people continually beat him after he had fallen. The confrontation lasted late into the night, during which 18 people, including six police officers, were wounded. Nineteen people were arrested, eight of whom were found to be triad members. Movement participants and their supporters accused the police of failing to protect protestors and of collaborating with the triad members, which the police vehemently denied.41 The HKFS called on supporters to go to Admiralty to condemn the violence at 8 o’clock on the evening of October 4. A large number of movement supporters answered the call. Protest leaders and participants in the Mong Kok protests delivered speeches to the crowd; meanwhile, several participants who joined the Mong Kok protests reported their experience and blamed the police for failing to protect protestors and maintain order. Public attention and support maintained the momentum of the Occupy Movement. New social media, particularly Facebook, became an important source of information and a platform for exchanging opinions among the younger people.42 Media that supported the Occupy Movement published and updated news about the event on their Facebook accounts. Table 3.1 lists the number of people who replied with “Like” in the few major Facebook accounts created by organizations or media that supported the movement. Compared with the number of visits during the previous week, the new visits drastically increased after the movement started. In addition, most of these people were young. For example,

Table 3.1 Number of people who indicated their support for the Occupy Movement Facebook

Supporters a

New Supporters in the weekb

Increase (%)c

In-media Passion Times SocREC HKFS Scholarism D100 Radio Occupy Central

313,000 151,000 115,000 103,000 273,000 363,000 85,000

132,000 92,000 69,000 81,000 55,000 42,000 23,000

2,860 5,300 3,969 1,604 2,151 869 4,185

Source: Ma Jiahao, “Zhichi zhanzhong lianshu jiaojin” (Facebooks supporting the occupation movement are competing), Asian Weekly, October 12, 2014, p. 31. a

Supporters were those who replied with “like.” The number was by October 1, 2014. c The increase was compared with the number of fans of the previous week. b

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those who visited the Passion Times were mostly between 18 and 24 years old, and those who visited “In-media” were mostly between 18 and 34 years old. Against this background, the Occupy Movement gained further public support. A poll, conducted by the Chinese University of Hong Kong between October 8 and 15, surveyed by phone 802 people aged 15 and older. The poll results indicated that popular support for the Occupy Movement increased to 38 percent from 31 percent the previous month. Meanwhile, the disapproval rate decreased from 46 percent to 36 percent (see Table 3.2). Police behavior was believed to be the major factor in the change in public attitudes toward the movement. The poll reported that 42 percent of respondents considered the police handling of conflicts between movement supporters and opponents inappropriate, as opposed to 27 percent reporting it as appropriate. Nearly 54 percent said that the use of tear gas against protestors on September 28 was inappropriate, as opposed to 22 percent reporting it as appropriate.43 News about the Occupy Movement rapidly spread worldwide via social media. At the same time, the status of Hong Kong as an international city contributed to the extensive coverage of the event. The movement made front-page news around the world. Major foreign news agencies, including BBC, CNN, Financial Times, New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and Global Times, widely covered the protests. Protestors translated the news about the movement into foreign languages and used new social media such as Facebook in distributing the reports. Wong Chifung, a student leader and the convener of Scholarism, appeared on the cover of the Asian edition of Time published on October 8, 2014. The article titled “The Face of Protest” introduced Wong’s background and the movement. On October 13, another article, titled “The Umbrella Revolution,” also appeared on the cover of the Asian edition of Time. Several foreign politicians commented on the Hong Kong demonstrations, including British Prime Minister David Cameron and White House spokesman Josh Earnest. Cameron expressed his deep concern about the recent clashes between

Table 3.2 Public attitudes toward the movement

Supporting the movement Not supporting Supporting the movement Group aged 15–24 Pan-democrats Moderates Sample size

September

October

November

(%)

(%)

(%)

31.1 46.3

37.8 35.5

33.9 43.5

46.7 52.3 18.5 1,006

62.1 66.3 26.6 802

67.7 68.7 25.9 1,030

Source: Compiled for the survey reports by the Center for Communication and Public Opinion Survey of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, www.com.cuhk.edu.hk/ccpos/b5, accessed October 23, 2014

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riot police and thousands of pro-democracy protestors. On September 29, Earnest said that the U.S. government was monitoring the situation in Hong Kong and that the United States was urging the city authorities “to exercise restraint and for protesters to express their views peacefully.” He added, “The United States supports universal suffrage in Hong Kong in accordance with the Basic Law . . . and we support the aspirations of the Hong Kong people.”44 In addition, demonstrations and rallies had been organized in a number of cities around the world, such as Manchester, London, Sydney, New York, Los Angeles, and Taipei, to demonstrate their support for the Occupy Movement in Hong Kong.45

Tolerance as the government option The initial repression of the Occupy Movement proved a counterproductive response from the Hong Kong government. Strong public reaction pressured the government to withdraw the riot police the next day, on September 29.46 In dealing with this movement, the Hong Kong government had to align with the attitude of the central government that had paid attention to the Occupy Movement before it started.47 When the Hong Kong government failed to forcibly remove the protestors from the streets, the central government reportedly formulated a policy of “No compromise and no blood.” “No blood” means that the occurrence in Tiananmen Square in 1989 would not be repeated in Hong Kong, and additional force, especially the military, would not be used.48 In the 1989 movement, the government maintained its reputation but paid a high cost, although the protestors paid an even higher cost without achieving any success. The central government recognized that a bloody repression in Hong Kong was an unwise choice; the reason was that different from the students in Tiananmen Square, protestors in Hong Kong had not attempted to challenge the political regime in China. Bloody repression can always be a heavy political burden or a fatal responsibility faced by the leader who makes the decision. There was also an economic factor: mainland-controlled companies account for some 60 percent of Hong Kong’s stock market capitalization.49 “No compromise” means that the 8.31 decision of the NPC would not be revoked, and Hong Kong Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying would not step down. The central authority refused to make concessions because of its concern over the control in Hong Kong. The central government gave up the enactment of Article 23 when the Hong Kong people protested in 2003, and compromised once again in 2012 when students and other citizens protested the national education. A high-ranking NPC official thus pointed out that the protests arising from the dispute over the Hong Kong election were not truly about democracy. Instead, the battle was essentially about the right of rule in Hong Kong. The pandemocratic camp claimed that the 8.31 decision of the NPC denied the Hong Kong people the right to a real election. This official was forthright about the central government’s intention and stated: The pan-democratic camp claims that this is a fake democracy, and candidates are pre-chosen for public election. To be true, the central authority

56

Movement legitimacy has long seen through certain internal and external forces that intend to wrest the right to rule Hong Kong through election. For this reason, the central authority has set a threshold [for the election] to ensure that the right of governing Hong Kong resides with those who love the country and Hong Kong.50

Chen Zuo’er, a former deputy director of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council and now chairman of the Chinese Research Association of Hong Kong and Macao, issued a statement toward the end of the movement in which he explained the “no compromise” policy of the government: From the inception, the Occupy Central Movement targeted the central authority, demanding the National People’s Congress to revoke its decision and apologize, requiring the Chief Executive and major officials of the Hong Kong government to resign, and expanding the occupied area to the financial center in the Central and other areas where businesses and visitors concentrate. The Occupy Movement followed the exact procedures designed by some western powers to conduct “color revolution” in some other countries.51 The Chinese government has been highly sensitive to external or foreign intervention. In dealing with social protests, Chinese local officials sometimes claim the involvement of external intervention to primarily avoid being blamed by the upper-level authority for the occurrence of protests.52 The central government is reluctant to see foreign intervention because of its concerns about political stability. Using Hong Kong as the base for a “color revolution” in China is by no means acceptable to the central government. In addition, the government can delegitimize the movement by highlighting the ties of protestors with external forces. After all, the miserable history of China in the past few centuries was closely tied to foreign invasion or intervention, which is similarly unacceptable to the Chinese people. Against this background, international attention does not necessarily help the movement. Although the attention may help limit the government’s use of repression, it renders the government reluctant to make concessions. Therefore, a group of British members of parliament planned to visit Hong Kong in late November 2014 to look into the enforcement of the “one country, two systems” policy amid the pro-democracy protests; however, they were denied entry to Hong Kong by the Chinese government. Beijing claimed that Britain does not have the legal or moral obligations to intervene in Hong Kong affairs, which China avers is its domestic issue.53 Throughout the Occupy Movement, movement leaders and participants vehemently denied that foreign forces incited or sponsored the event.54 But the Chinese government seemed to have its own reasons to believe in the intervention of external forces. For example, roughly 1,000 people in Hong Kong had been reportedly trained by overseas supporters to carry out the occupation. Another

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piece of evidence provided by Chen Zuo’er was that the supplies for the protest camps “worth at least HK$200 million to HK$300 million” came from an American organization “hidden” in a local university.55 Lai Chee-ying, the former chairman of the Apple Daily, was reputedly an important funder of the Occupy Movement. He also allegedly had close ties with foreign forces. In addition, movement leaders, including Tai Yiu-ting and Wong Chifung, were suggested to have close ties with certain American organizations, in particular the National Endowment for Democracy and the National Democratic Institute.56 After Tai Yiu-ting proposed the Occupy Central Movement in 2013, he was asserted to have contacted consulates of the United States, Britain, Germany, Canada, and Japan to discuss with them the Hong Kong political situation and the preparations for the occupation, seeking the support of foreign governments. The New York Times and the Wall Street Journal were accused of publishing inciting reports, such as “overthrowing the Hong Kong government,” for the purpose of weakening the central government’s rule over the city. All this suggested that “the Occupy Movement is a Hong Kong version of [the] ‘Color Revolution’ plotted by the United States, the source of instability of Hong Kong.”57 Given the belief of the central government, its concessions became impossible. The initial reaction of the central government to the Occupy Movement was to introduce news censorship on the Chinese mainland and to reduce its repercussions on the mainland and thereby the possibility of the people raising the same democratic demands. However, blocking the news proved difficult because of the freer flow of information. More important, the central government gradually perceived that the people on the mainland were not very positive about the Occupy Movement in Hong Kong. The reaction of Internet users in the Chinese mainland was negative toward the movement. For example, when news about the Hong Kong government’s decision to clear the protest site in Admiralty was uploaded on sina.com, 835 comments were subsequently posted. Most of the messages supported the clearance, claiming that this movement was a “farce.”58 Messages that supported the movement were likely deleted, but discussions with people on the mainland generally suggested that the people supported the central government’s policy toward Hong Kong. The legitimacy of the new administration under Xi Jinping, which resulted from its anti-corruption campaign, was cited as an important reason.59 From October 1, the People’s Daily and Chinese Central Television began to cover the Occupation Movement in Hong Kong, consistently denouncing it as illegal and urging the Hong Kong government to handle the case as stipulated in the law and to duly punish the organizers. The editorial published on October 1 stated, “On the one hand, we firmly support the Hong Kong government handling the occupation in light of the law to uphold the core values of Hong Kong and the interests of the people. On the other hand, we urge the illegal occupiers to stop all the illegal activities and resume the order in Hong Kong.”60 But with tolerance as the response, Beijing’s criticisms of the movement became less harsh.61

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Movement legitimacy

The central government’s policy limited the political space the Hong Kong government enjoyed because the central government had to approve any concession regarding the election. Indeed, Beijing had dominant influence in dealing with the protest.62 Leung Chun-ying admitted that the Hong Kong government reported to the central government about the Occupy Movement on a daily basis during occupation.63 Thus, the Hong Kong government was not in a position to use concessions to end the protests. Meanwhile, the ineffective use of force at the very beginning of the movement suggested that repression was not an option either. Consequently, tolerance became the choice of the governments in Beijing and Hong Kong. As elsewhere, “the measures promulgated by government at times of disturbance may be designed not to conciliate the protestors, but to undermine whatever sympathy the protesting group has been able to command from a wide public.”64 By becoming tolerant, the Hong Kong government could avoid a further loss of legitimacy. The government recognized that the occupation was causing inconveniences for the people, and the legitimacy of the movement would be challenged and damaged if the occupation persisted. Therefore, tolerance suggested a war of attrition the government was willing to wage because it could “breed grievances” among citizens who faced the inconveniences of the occupation.65 The belief of the government that time was on its side was true given the occurrences in the subsequent days.

Rise of opposition to the movement Occupying public space is likely to trigger opposition or disapproval. The movements of weak people cannot be effective if they do not instigate social, economic, or political disruptions, but these disruptions may cause other groups’ grievances.66 In China, for example, protests in which participants block traffic or surround government buildings to pressure the government to respond are commonplace.67 However, limits to the disruptions exist in terms of the scope and the time span. In 1989, students occupied Tiananmen Square but did not extensively paralyze the traffic in Beijing. In the Sunflower Movement in Taiwan between March 18 and April 10, 2014, the students’ occupation of the Legislative Chamber paralyzed the state apparatus but did not cause inconveniences for the residents. In contrast, soon after the Occupy Movement, grievances against the occupation and anti-movement protests began to rise.

Grievances against the occupation The most effective means of undermining the legitimacy of a movement is through the rise of opposition and countermovements. The occupation harmed the interests of other people and roused their dissatisfaction. The Occupy Movement occurred in three areas, and its impact on traffic and business operation was particularly apparent in Admiralty and Mong Kok. After the commencement of the Occupy Movement, the routes of more than 270 buses and more than

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200 mini-buses were either blocked or affected; in addition, 27 buses and more than 200 mini-buses were stopped. More than 150 schools were closed for more than a week, affecting a large number of students. Both the residents and the businesses in the occupied areas felt the impact of the protests. A survey of more than 100 businesses found that after the movement started in Mong Kok, more than 70 percent reported their daily volume of business turnover decreased by more than 40 percent.68 Legislators began to receive complaints against the movement from bus drivers, taxi drivers, retailers, and residents. The impact of the protests on the daily lives of people was therefore direct. A lady, who was over 70 years old, denounced the occupation in a radio program by reporting her unfortunate experience. She recounted that on the night of September 28, she and her family were driving to the hospital to visit her daughter-in-law, who was afflicted with breast cancer. The normal time for the drive to the hospital was roughly 10 minutes. However, the traffic jam the occupation caused prompted them to seek other routes to the hospital; they ended up spending approximately five hours driving around before reaching the hospital. They finally arrived at the hospital late in the night, but her daughter-in-law had already passed away.69 The police gained sympathy as well. The heavy criticisms prompted the police to change their strategy by tolerating the occupation and maintaining order in the protest sites. Police tolerance encouraged protestors, who took action that damaged the legitimacy of the movement and induced support for the police, at least among some segments of the city population. On October 3, a police vehicle carrying food for the police who were guarding the government headquarters was prevented from passing through because the protestors believed that it was transporting equipment for repressing the protest. Consequently, scores of police officers had to manually carry the food. Moreover, when a police officer guarding the government headquarters needed to go to the hospital, the protestors refused to let the ambulance leave for half an hour. The police eventually forced their way out so that the ambulance could leave for the hospital.70 The behavior of protestors drew criticism. The following message posted online revealed the common denunciation of the protestors after the government and police exercised tolerance: What else do you [protestors] still need? You are already God. You decide which road to block and which exit of the MTR to stay open. The bus company needs your permission to get their property back. Police vehicles cannot pass before you conduct a check, and the ambulance cannot leave without your permission. You set a deadline for the Chief Executive to resign. . . . Anyone who does not accept your view is a dictator, whereas whatever you say is democratic.”71 Indeed, occupation as a means of social movement is controversial, similar to the case of Occupy Wall Street. According to a national survey of 1,521 adults in the United States released on December 15, 2011, 44 percent supported the

60

Movement legitimacy

movement, whereas 39 percent opposed it. With regard to the tactics (i.e., occupation, demonstrations), 49 percent disagreed, whereas only 29 percent agreed. “It seems that crossing the line towards non-institutional action is still a barrier for most citizens, even when they agree with the causes of the protest.”72 Protestors were certainly aware of the grievances the Occupy Movement caused. As discussed in the next chapter, students and protestors had tried to justify their occupation on various grounds. However, their justifications were unacceptable to some of the population. Even the supporters of the movement criticized the drawn-out occupation. On October 8, Zen Ze-Kiun, a retired bishop of Hong Kong and an initial supporter of the movement, held a press conference, claiming that the movement had gotten out of control. He contended that the students did not have a plan, nor did they set a time for stopping the action. He subsequently urged the students to leave the protest sites because the occupation prevented students from going to school and kept working people from making a living. If this situation persisted, the participants were hurting their own people. Zen Ze-Kiun also criticized the students because they hijacked the movement and became its representatives.73 Although the students dismissed his criticisms, they had to face the rise of anti-movement protests.

Anti-movement protests A social movement needs to neutralize, confront, or discredit its corresponding countermovement.74 But this can be difficult because social movements may encourage countermovement mobilization while advancing their own causes because of, among other things, the conflict of interest between movement participants and others.75 As Zald and Useem suggest, when a countermovement rises, it “attacks the movement leaders, bombs its sites of program action, and associates the movement with evil. It chooses its tactics in response to the structure and tactics of the movement.”76 In the Occupy Movement, conflicts between protestors and anti-movement people began to repeatedly occur soon after the movement started. Some resentful residents acted individually, whereas others took collective action. Frustrated residents confronted the occupiers in Mong Kok and Admiralty and engaged them in arguments. Verbal and physical violence frequently erupted between the occupiers and anti-movement people who attempted to remove the barricades in Mong Kok. When a confrontation occurred between these two groups, the police would intervene to keep them apart. Some anti-occupation people set up a forum called “Forums of the Victims of the Blocked Streets” on the streets and took turns in delivering speeches to voice their grievances. People and small businesses began to sue Tai Yiu-ting for compensation because they believed that the Occupy Movement caused them to incur losses.77 The behavior of occupiers provided ammunition for anti-movement people. Citizens who opposed the Occupy Movement and supported the government established the blue-ribbon group to support the police. This group organized a series of activities to demonstrate its support for the police and its opposition to

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the Occupy Movement. The group staged rallies, approached the protest sites to voice its opposition, collected anti-movement signatures, and went to the University of Hong Kong and the Chinese University of Hong Kong to present letters to the two universities, urging them to fire Tai Yiu-ting and Chan Kin-man.78 The Anti-Occupy Alliance for Peace and Democracy was another group who supported the government and the police and opposed the Occupy Movement. As discussed later, this alliance conducted a large-scale signature collection to oppose the Occupy Movement in November 2014. After the movement started, various groups, including women’s associations, residents’ groups, and children, began to show their support for the police by visiting the police stations or the police headquarters to present letters, cakes, and flowers as tokens of encouragement and support.79 Such activities lasted throughout the Occupy Movement, although protests against the police were common as well. Various groups staged protests or rallies against the Occupy Movement throughout the event, although the scale was generally small. On October 14, a group of residents went to the protest site in Admiralty to present an appeal letter to the students, hoping that they could stop the occupation of the roads and allow the residents to resume their normal lives. During the process, an 88-yearold man knelt down in front of Chow Yong-kang, the secretary of the HKFS, and other student representatives, pleading with them to leave. Student representatives were shocked and similarly dropped to their knees to accept the letter.80 Figure 3.1 reports some of the demonstrations and rallies by anti-movement groups. For example, on October 4, the blue-ribbon group held a rally of 3,000 participants to oppose the Occupy Movement. On November 3, approximately 3,000 people from industrial sectors participated in the anti-movement gathering, complaining about the economic losses the Occupy Movement caused. The next day, roughly 1,000 young people also held a gathering and claimed that the occupiers did not represent other young people in the city.81 Many of the participants in

participants

2-

O 4- ct O c 5- t O c 6- t O 9- ct O 10 ct -O 12 ct -O 13 ct -O 14 ct -O 17 ct -O 18 ct -O 19 ct -O 22 ct -O 25 ct -O 28 ct -O 3 - ct N o 4- v N o 7- v N o 9- v N 23 ov -N 29 o v -N o 3- v D ec

3500 3000 2500 2000 1500 1000 500 0

Figure 3.1 Anti-occupation demonstrations and rallies Source: Author’s collection. Note: If more than one demonstration occurred, the numbers of participants were added into one (i.e., October 4, 9, 12, 14, and 18).

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these oppositional protests were old people, and some of these anti-movement protestors were allegedly paid.82 Although there could be government-sponsored antimovement protests, the grievances the occupation wrought were beyond dispute. Some of the anti-movement protests are not necessarily countermovements as defined in the literature on social movements. A countermovement is viewed as “a movement that makes contrary claims simultaneously to those of the original movement.”83 Most of the anti-movement protests in the Occupy Movement in Hong Kong challenged not the claims of the movement but the means the movement participants had used, that is, occupying the streets. However, similar to countermovements, anti-movement protests undermine movement legitimacy. Occupation victims attempted to remove the barricades themselves when oppositional protests failed to force the occupiers to leave. Taxi drivers faced the direct impact of the Occupy Movement.84 Roughly 18,000 taxies operate in Hong Kong, with 50,000 registered taxi drivers. The income of some taxi drivers dropped by 30 to 50 percent after the occupation occurred. A taxi association comprising more than 8,000 taxi drivers reported that during the first week of the Occupy Movement, it received more than 100 complaints from its members every day. On October 10, taxi drivers protested by driving slowly and then submitted a letter to the police, urging them to clear the roads. On October 13, more than 200 people, including taxi drivers and other anti-movement people, proceeded to the protest site in Admiralty to remove part of the barricades. However, the protestors prevented their action by lying down on the ground. The next day, the police cleared a portion of the occupied area and restored part of the traffic.85 On October 18, people in the transportation sector took to the streets to protest. Hundreds of taxi drivers protested the Occupy Movement by driving slowly in the nearby area, and some minibus drivers did the same. More than 20 representatives of the drivers talked to the protestors and hoped they could leave the occupied roads; however, their efforts proved futile.86 Facing the drawn-out occupation, helpless businesses and people decided to turn to legal channels to fight the occupiers by approaching the court three weeks after the movement commenced. The intervention of the court highlighted the illegality of the movement, which challenged its legitimacy. The court granted three interim injunctions on October 20 to three applicants, namely, a minibus company, the taxi associations in the Mong Kok district, and the owner of a building in the protest site in Admiralty, prohibiting the continual occupation of certain parts of the streets. The court explained that a large-scale occupation movement could pose the risk of evolving into riots if it continued. Occupiers in Mong Kok impeded traffic arteries and affected the livelihoods of taxi drivers. Nevertheless, the protestors at all three protest sites ignored the court injunctions. A pan-democratic legislator told the protestors, “We do not need to pay much attention to the court injunctions. They are used only to intimidate people. They do not have the capacity to sue hundreds of protestors because it will take years to finish the lawsuit.”87 Members of the taxi association repeatedly attempted to remove the barricades in Mong Kok but failed because the protestors confronted them. On October 22, more than 100 taxi drivers answered the

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call to remove the barricades but did not succeed because the police stopped them for fear of inciting confrontations. Against this background, the HKBA issued a statement on October 28, criticizing the protestors’ ignorance of the court ruling: If any party believes that an order made by the Court ought not to have been made at all, he can challenge the court order either by applying to set it aside or appealing against it. . . . When deliberate defiance of a court order is committed en masse as a combined effort, a direct affront to the Rule of Law will inevitably result. For the same reason, open calls to the public to disobey a court order applicable to them would undoubtedly constitute an erosion of the Rule of Law.88 On November 3, roughly 50 lawyers rallied in front of the High Court to condemn occupation protestors who ignored court injunctions, criticizing them for disrupting the lives of people, causing immense losses, and ruining the rule of law.89 Other social groups similarly expressed their negative attitude toward the continual occupation. On October 28, 550 doctors in Hong Kong issued a statement in several local newspapers, asserting that the Occupy Movement had lasted for weeks and severely affected the lives of people, ruined the rule of law, and divided the city. Claiming that “Hong Kong is sick,” the statement urged protestors to respect the rights of other people and supported police efforts to maintain social order and resume traffic in light of the law.90 Opposition voices and anti-movement protests might not be sufficiently powerful to compel protestors to leave, but they affected the momentum of the movement. Some occupiers acknowledged that their occupation had caused inconveniences for the residents and the businesses, and they did feel sorry for that.91 Moreover, the continual occupation affected those who were neutral toward the movement. As discussed later, the support for site clearance was strong toward the end of the movement.

The standoff and its implications for the movement The government strategy of patience did generate pressure on the protestors. In this battle of patience, the government was better positioned for several reasons. First, the government could afford to be more patient. Its position was clear: If the citizens supported the occupation, then the government would tolerate it and wait. Nevertheless, when businesses and residents began to feel the direct brunt of the occupation as previously discussed, they became the opposition forces. Some businesses remained neutral or even supported the movement, but their attitude changed as the movement lasted because of the impact on their livelihoods.92 The emergence of opposition voices and the occurrence of antimovement protests challenged the legitimacy of the movement. Second, this war of attrition increased the cost of participation and discouraged continual participation. Movement momentum would weaken if movement

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leaders and activists failed to retain participants or recruit new participants.93 In the Occupy Movement, the potential of participation was maximized at the very beginning of the movement because of the use of tear gas. This implied a small possibility of maintaining the scale of the participation as the movement continued. Certainly, determined participants claimed that they would stay until the government responded, but their number decreased as the movement continued. The daily number of protestors in Admiralty dwindled from a few thousand to a few hundred toward the end of the movement.94 Meanwhile, the Chinese central government also attempted to generate pressure on participants. It warned protestors and their supporters by denying some participants permission to enter the mainland. Five hundred people were reportedly blacklisted, including members of the HKFS, Scholarism, and student unions of the universities, and past and current student leaders.95 On December 24, 2014, 20 college students attempted to enter Shenzhen to test the blacklist, and only three were allowed to enter.96 The central government also showed its intolerance with deviations from its policy. On October 24, Tien Pei-Chun, the leader of the pro-Beijing Liberal Party, called on Leung Chun-ying to resign, for the latter faced a governance crisis. Five days later on October 29, his membership in the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference was rescinded.97 Third, in this war of attrition, both the government and the protestors waited for the other party to commit missteps. Although both parties might commit mistakes in the sense that they might undertake legitimacy-damaging action (e.g., excessive use of violence), protestors were more likely to lose patience. Some protestors did lose patience when the government refused to make concessions, ceased the use of force, and continued the stalemate. Radical groups began to emerge, along with radical action. However, protestors damaged the legitimacy of the movement when they decided to undertake radical action. As discussed in Chapter 6, the attack on the Legislative Council building in the early morning of November 19 was a severe damage to the movement’s legitimacy.98 As a result, public opinion began to shift, with more people hoping to see the end of occupation. All this paved the way for the government to clear the site without provoking further opposition from the public.

Conclusion A few days after the Occupy Movement was terminated, Wang Guangya, director of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council, asked Hong Kong residents to ponder why a campaign that involved the illegal occupation of roads could last for nearly 80 days in a place known for its rule of law.99 This question is not a difficult one for the Hong Kong government and the police. The central government should know the answer as well. Immediately after their failure of using tear gas to disperse protestors, the police realized that if a high-level force was used to clear the site, the forced clearance could only provoke more criticisms and protests. The action they could undertake was to wait for change in public opinion or to shore up legitimacy for the site clearance.100

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The Occupy Movement highlights the importance of legitimacy for both movement participants and the movement target, the government in most cases. Both parties focus on the illegitimacy of the means the other party uses. The police’s use of tear gas provoked public disapproval and triggered large-scale participation. The government adjusted its strategy by tolerating the occupation and shifted the pressure arising from occupation to the residents and the businesses. As the occupation continued, public support for the movement diminished, and opposition voices began to swell. Zald and Useem argue that movements often create the conditions for the mobilization of countermovements. “By advocating change, by attacking the established interests, by mobilizing symbols and raising costs to others, they create grievances and provide opportunities for organizational entrepreneurs to define countermovement goals and issues.”101 Not long after the commencement of the movement, anti-movement voices and protests emerged, beginning to weaken movement legitimacy and momentum. After the Occupy Movement ended, the commissioner of the Hong Kong Police Force said that the movement “started with violence and ended with peace.”102 Yet this mode of government response was not preplanned. Instead, it was the government’s adjustment to the changing environment in which the government, the protestors, and the general public interacted. This movement suggests that the government’s adjustment of its response in light of the changing environment is both necessary and natural. The government promptly resorted to tolerance and began the war of attrition when repression proved ineffective. The effectiveness of the government response also had to do with the participants’ inability to sustain an increasing movement momentum. As discussed in the subsequent chapters, although self-selected determined participants had managed to sustain the movement, the movement’s leadership and participants had been unable to come up with effective strategies to generate enough pressure on the government or attract more participants, nor were they able to find graceful ways of exit.

Notes 1 Jack Goldstone and Charles Tilly, “Threat (and Opportunity): Popular Action and State Response in the Dynamics of Contentious Action,” in Ronald Aminzade, Jack Goldstone, Doug McAdam, Elizabeth Perry, William Sewell, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilley (eds.), Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 179–194. 2 Yongshun Cai, “Power Structure and Regime Resilience: Contentious Politics in China,” British Journal of Political Science, vol. 38, no. 3 (2008), pp. 411–432. 3 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), p. 215. 4 Bert Useem and Mayer Zald, “From Pressure Group to Social Movement: Organizational Dilemmas of the Effort to Promote Nuclear Power,” Social Problems, vol. 30, no. 2 (1982), pp. 144–156. 5 Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (New York: Random House, 1978), p. 125. 6 Mayer Zald and Roberta Ash, “Social Movement Organizations: Growth, Decay and Change,” Social Forces, vol. 44, no. 3 (1966), pp. 327–341.

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7 Kelly Ip, “Half a Million Take to Taipei Streets to Protest Trade Deal,” The Standard, March 31, 2014. 8 Charles Tilly, “From Interactions to Outcomes in Social Movements,” in Marco Giugni, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly (eds.), How Social Movements Matter (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), pp. 253–270. 9 Frances Piven and Richard Cloward, Poor People’s Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail (New York: Vintage Books, 1979). 10 Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution. 11 Bai Ling, “Jianding buyi, 13000 xuesheng bake kangyi zhongyang luozha” (To be persistent: 13,000 students protest against the central government’s refusal to grant real election), Apple Daily, September 23, 2014. 12 Xie Mengyao, Jiang Yannan, Liu Xiang, and Zhu Yongxiao, “Zhanzhong shikong muhou: zhanlingqu shantou linli, quefa tuichang jizhi” (Behind the loss of control over the Occupation Movement: divided groups and a lack of exit mechanisms), Asian Weekly, October 26, 2014, pp. 22–32. 13 Ibid. 14 “Zhanzhong qidong, you zhengzong kaishi” (Occupy Central started from occupying the government headquarters), Mingpao, September 28, 2014. 15 Clifford Lo, Samuel Chan, Amy Nip, Chris Lau, and Phila Siu, “Shock, then Anger, at Police Decision to Use Gas,” South China Morning Post, September 29, 2014. 16 He called for help. Some people stopped running and came to help carry the person to a medical station. Zhong Jianyi, “Yigong jianshou rendao yu zeren” (Volunteers uphold humanitarianism and responsibility), Hong Kong Economic Journal, November 3, 2014. 17 Chen Yingkai, Liang Delun, and Wang Jiawen, “Jing kuangfang cuilei dan, shiming dama wuci” (The police fired tear gas without hesitation and citizens accused the police of being shameless), Apple Daily, September 29, 2014. 18 Lo, et al., “Shock, then Anger, at Police Decision to Use Gas.” 19 “Gangying zhengfu niandai disi bashi ying saoluan” (Taxi drivers’ strike caused a riot in Hong Kong under British rule), Singpao, August 6, 2013. 20 Shiu-hing Lo, “The Politics of Policing the Anti-WTO Protests in Hong Kong,” Asian Journal of Political Science, vol. 14, no. 2 (2006), pp. 140–162. 21 Many of the frontline police officers were fresh college graduates. Conversation 5. 22 Zheng Zhizhu, “Han nong zhan wanchai, liang saoluan” (Korean peasants occupied Wan Chai and caused a riot), Mingpao, February 16, 2014; Bryan Harris, “Hong Kong Police ‘More Tolerant than those in US or Europe,’ ” South China Morning Post, October 25, 2014. 23 Jiang Yannan and Hou Zhengxin, “Zhengzhi xuanwo zhong de xianggang jingcha” (Hong Kong police in the political turmoil), Asian Weekly, October 19, 2014, pp. 24–26. 24 According to their work procedures, the police would not move forward after firing tear gas to deter the protestors. If the police wanted to clear out the site, then they would move forward after firing the tear gas. If the tear gas did not drive people away, then the police would use more force, such as rubber bullets. However, the police did not use rubber bullets. Ibid. 25 Manuel Castells, Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012), p. 13. 26 Some protestors quickly adapted and gradually learned how to deal with the tear gas. They ran away when the police fired tear gas, but returned after the smoke dissipated. Some protestors even picked up the canisters and threw them back to the police. 27 Zheng Yi and Yuan Weixi, “Hou yusan yundong: gaobie zhengzhi lenggan niandai” (Farewell to a politically apathetic era), Mingpao, November 29, 2014.

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28 “Wu ju zhengya, 6 wan ren zhanzhong jiao liang xiatai” (Fearless, 60,000 people occupiers demand Leung to step down), Apple Daily, September 29, 2014. 29 Xie Mengyao and Hou Zhengxin, “928 qiji de wu yu ye” (The miracle fog and the night of September 28), Asian Weekly, October 12, 2014, pp. 24–27. 30 “Gangjing ‘huanyuan 87 mei cuileidan’ zhenxiang” (The police explained the use of the 87 canisters), Wenweipo, October 6, 2014. 31 A police officer claimed that the mass media seemed heavily influenced by the pro-movement groups. Police officers themselves did not see problems with the use of tear gas, but the mass media vilified the police image. The frontline police officers were under tremendous pressure because they needed to enforce order while worrying about protestors’ complaints. He believed that protestors knew the police officers’ constraints and thus dared to insult and confront the police. Conversation 5. 32 Talk by a participant. October 7, 2014. 33 See the Web site of the Hong Kong Bar Association, http://hkba.org/whatsnew/ press-release/index.html, accessed October 20, 2014. 34 Author’s collection. 35 Jiang and Hou, “Hong Kong Police in the Political Turmoil.” 36 Ibid. 37 “Bada xueshenghui jueyi wu xianqi bake” (The eight student unions decide an infinite strike), Mingpao, September 30, 2014. 38 “50 zhongxue 5000 xuesi bake” (5,000 students from 50 schools staged strikes), Mingpao, September 30, 2014. 39 The number of complaints against the police reached 2,326 after the movement ended. “Zhanzhong yundong yansheng tousu” (Occupy Movement triggered complaints against the police), Mingpao, January 16, 2015. In the protest site in Admiralty, protestors set up a station that received protestors’ complaints against the police. Author’s site observation. 40 Xie Mengyao, Luo Yuexuan, and He Zhengxin, “Zhenduo Wangjiao de riri yeye” (The days and nights of confrontations in Mong Kok), Asian Weekly, October 19, 2014, pp. 28–32. 41 On the afternoon of October 4, the secretary of security came out to hold a press conference. He looked upset and angry, claiming that the accusation that the police collaborated with triad members was entirely unfounded and extremely unfair, especially to the hardworking police. “Li Dongguo: Jing hei hezuo niezao” (Lai Tung-kwok: the collaboration between police and triad members is a madeup accusation), Mingpao, October 5, 2014. 42 Li Lifeng, “Zhanling yundong xia xianggang shiming de xin meiti mulu” (Catalogue of media used by Hong Kong residents during the Occupation Movement), Mingpao, December 5, 2014. 43 Peter So, “Public Support for Occupy Movement Growing, Survey Shows,” South China Morning Post, October 23, 2014. 44 Austin Ramzy and Alan Wong, “Hong Kong Protesters Defy Officials’ Call to Disperse,” New York Times, September 29, 2014. 45 Aaron Walawalkar, “Hong Kong Democracy Protests Spread to Chinese Embassy in London,” The Guardian, October 2, 2014. 46 Ramzy and Wong, “Hong Kong Protesters Defy Officials’ Call to Disperse.” 47 Chris Buckley, “Chinese Vice President Warns Hong Kong Over Protests,” New York Times, April 25, 2014. 48 Liu Fufeng, “Butuoxie bu liuxue yao jijing kaoyan” (The policy of “no compromise and no blood” needs to be tested), Oriental Daily, October 11, 2014. 49 Lianyi Zheng, “Hong Kong’s Occupy generation,” New York Times, October 31, 2014. 50 Liu Silu, “ ‘Zhan zhong’ shizhi de sange tezheng” (The three features of the truth of the Occupation Movement), Mirror Monthly, November 2014, pp. 10–11.

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51 “Chen Zuo’er: weifa zhanzhong qishu yijing”) (Chen Zuo’er: the illegal occupation has lost its momentum), Taikungpo, December 11, 2014. 52 Yongshun Cai, State and Agents in China: Disciplining Government Officials (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014), p. 152. 53 Jane Perlez, “China Says It Will Deny British Parliament Members Entry to Hong Kong,” New York Times, December 1, 2014. 54 For example, on December 9, the last hunger strike participant, a college student, stopped the strike after nearly six days. She said she had devoted considerable time after she had participated in the democratic movement in the past two years. During the electronic referendum in June 2014, she slept for less than three hours per day and went home only once a month. She had not received a penny from anyone for her efforts. Instead, she spent her own money on frequent travel and explained, “Would I do all this because of the instigation of politicians or foreign forces?” “Aidao zuihou, xuemingnv ting jueshi” (Until the end, the female member of Scholarism stopped the hunger strike), Mingpao, December 10, 2014. 55 Cheung Chi-fai, Fanny Fung, Emily Tsang, and Tony Cheung, “ ‘Small Fixes’ Not Enough to Solve City’s Big Problems,” South China Morning Post, December 13, 2014. 56 Ye Lan, “Mei ‘dianfu xianggang’ jidi baoguang” (The subversion base of the United States in Hong Kong is disclosed), Huanqiu shibao (Global Times), September 25, 2014. 57 “Waili jieru tiezheng rushan” (Indisputable evidence on foreign intervention), Wenweipo, January 14, 2015. 58 For the comments, see http://comment5.news.sina.com.cn/comment/skin/ default.html?, accessed December 15, 2014. 59 Talks with professors in Chinese universities, October 18–22, 2014. 60 “Zhenxin lianghao fazhan jumian, weihu xianggang fanrong wending” (To cherish the good situation of development and protect the prosperity and stability in Hong Kong), People’s Daily, October 1, 2014. 61 “ ‘Zhanzhong’ doushi fan minzhu” (Occupiers are against democracy), Oriental Daily, October 7, 2014. 62 Keith Bradsher and Chris Buckley, “Beijing Is Directing Hong Kong Strategy, Government Insiders Say,” New York Times, October 17, 2014. 63 Sun Ling and Bu Xiaoxiao, “Liang Zhengying: gangfu meitian douxiang zhongyang huibao zhanzhong qingkuang” (Leung Chun-ying: the Hong Kong government reports to the central government about the Occupy Movement on a daily basis), Takungpo, November 10, 2014. 64 Piven and Cloward, Poor People’s Movements, p. 30. 65 Li Yi, “Shimin wuyuan wuhui, ‘yangyuan’ yang bu qilai” (Citizens did not complain or regret, breeding grievances is a failure), Apple Daily, December 17, 2014. 66 Piven and Cloward, Poor People’s Movements. 67 Kevin O’Brien and Lianjiang Li, Rightful Resistance in Rural China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Yongshun Cai, Collective Resistance in China: Why Popular Protests Succeed or Fail (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010). 68 “Shanghu tu kushui: ri sunshi wanyuan yinye’e” (The businesses complain because they lose 10,000 dollars in business turnover everyday), Singtao Daily, October 8, 2014. 69 “Cuguo bingxi zuihou yimian, laofu chi duluzhe zisi” (Failing to see her daughterin-law for the last time, an old lady accused the protestors of being selfish), Mingpao, September 30, 2014. 70 “Zhan zhong shiweizhe zu jingfang yunsong liangshui, bei che bu rendao” (Occupiers were criticized for stopping the police from transporting water and food), Mingpao, October 4, 2014.

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71 See http://news.discuss.com.hk/viewthread.php?tid=23875965&extra=&page=4. 72 Castells, Networks of Outrage and Hope, p. 193. 73 “Chen Rijun: Jiujing shuiyou daoli” (Zen Ze-Kiun: who exactly is reasonable?), Mingpao, October 8, 2014. 74 Anthony Oberschall, Social Conflict and Social Movements (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973), p. 49. 75 David Meyer and Suzanne Staggenborg, “Movements, Countermovements, and the Structure of Political Opportunity,” American Journal of Sociology, vol. 101, no. 6 (1996), pp. 1628–1660. 76 Zald and Useem, “Movement and Countermovement Interaction,” p. 248. 77 “Dai Yaoting shou zao shanghu suopei” (Tai Yiu-ting was sued by the businesses for compensation for the first time), Singtao Daily, October 9, 2014. 78 Xie Mengyao, “Fan zhanzhong xianfeng Li Siyan aihen qingchou” (The experience of Li Siyan, a vanguard of anti-occupation), Asian Weekly, November 9, 2014, 27–28. 79 “Duoge tuanti zhichi jingfang zhifa” (Many social groups supported the police’s law enforcement), Oriental Daily, October 4, 2014. 80 He Jiaqi, “Zhangzhe wu xuesheng tongchen ku zhuang, guiqiu ranglu” (An old man reports grievances to the students and begs for ending the occupation by going on his knees), Hong Kong Commercial News, October 15, 2014. 81 “Qingnian jihui ce ‘zhanzhong’ xuesheng bu daibiao taren” (Youths rallied, saying that protesting students do not represent others), Wenweipo, November 5, 2014. 82 “Shenzhen ren shouqian, yong gang fan zhanzhong” (People from Shenzhen were paid to come to Hong Kong to oppose the Occupy Movement), Apple Daily, October 7, 2014. 83 Meyer and Staggenborg, “Movements, Countermovements, and the Structure of Political Opportunity,” p. 1631. 84 I once asked a taxi driver whether he wanted to go to protest area in Admiralty; he replied that he did not want to go because a trip there could take three hours. 85 Jiang Yannan, “Bei zhanzhong zhongchuang de xianggang dishi ye” (Taxi business is severely affected by the Occupy Movement), Asian Weekly, November 9, 2014, pp. 58–59. 86 Chen Hui, “Zhiye siji dayouxing fan zhanzhong” (Drivers staged an anti-occupation demonstration), Takungpo, October 6, 2014. 87 Jiang, “Taxi business is severely affected by the Occupation Movement.” 88 See the Web site of the HKBA, www.hkba.org/whatsnew/misc/20141028, accessed November 23, 2014. 89 Thomas Chan and Joyce Ng, “Layers Say Occupy Protest Are Undermining Hong Kong’s Rule of Law,” South China Morning Post, November 3, 2014. 90 “Tongxin jishou” (Deep sorrow), Singtao Daily, October 28. 91 Interviews, Admiralty 12, 13, and 32; Mong Kok 3 and 6. 92 Zhang Jieshu, “ ‘Zhanzhong’ zhi xianggang chao 90 shanghu shengyi shou yingxiang” (Occupation affected 90 percent of business owners), Takungpao, November 10, 2014. 93 Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency: 1930– 1970 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999). 94 “Zhan wang zhe ‘wujiakegui,’ yijinzhong guoye” (“Homeless” occupiers in Mong Kok moved to Admiralty), Oriental Daily, November 28, 2014. 95 “Chuan zhongyang zao ding jinrujing wubai ren mingdan” (A list of 500 people prohibited to enter China has reportedly been made by the central government), Singtao Daily, November 16, 2014. 96 “Xuejie ceshi ‘heimingdan’ ” (The students tested the blacklist), Mingpao, November 25, 2014.

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97 Alex Ho, “James Tien Adds Insult to Injury over Call for Leung Chun-ying to Resign,” South China Morning Post, October 30, 2014. 98 Yang Kangqi, Zhang Yiming, Liang Zuoyi, and Zheng Peishan, “Zhanzhong hexin ren, quliu ge butong) (The core activists of the Occupation Movement make different choices), Mingpao, December 3, 2014. 99 Adrian Wan and Ng Kang-chung, “Beijing Official Tells Hong Kong Delegation to ‘Contemplate’ Relationship with Mainland,” South China Morning Post, December 18, 2014. 100 “3600 mi zhanxian chao guangmingding yuqi” (The 3,600 meters of occupied streets exceeded what the police expected), Mingpao, October 1, 2014. 101 Mayer Zald and Bert Useem, “Movement and Countermovement Interaction: Mobilization, Tactics, and State Involvement,” in Mayer Zald and John McCarthy, Social Movements in an Organizational Society (New Brunswick, NJ: Translation Books, 1987), pp. 247–272. 102 “Zhanling ju 955 ren” (955 arrests were made during the Occupy Movement), Mingpao, December 16, 2014.

4

Determined participants and movement sustainability

Social movements are sustained by the continual participation of protestors, be they organized or otherwise. Determined participants are particularly important in decentralized or spontaneous movements. For example, Calhoun suggests that Occupy Wall Street did not have a natural end point. “Determined protestors can prolong it indefinitely, with new arrivals compensating for the loss of some exhausted participants.”1 Determined protestors carry on with their activities for a simple reason – they have not achieved their movement’s goal. In the case of the Occupy Movement in Hong Kong, 40 days after the occupation in Admiralty, Wong Chifung, the convener of Scholarism, said that protestors had not expected to stay for very long during the first week when things happened so quickly. But by the second week, he was prepared to stay for more than a month. He admitted that protestors indeed wished to retreat because of the exhaustion of passion and physical energy. They chose to stay because of the reality that the Hong Kong government had no intention to solve the social conflict and to address popular grievances. He claimed that whether the protestors would retreat depended on whether they could come up with alternatives that would give them bargaining power after a retreat.2 In other words, at least some protestors would not retreat if they were unable to find such alternatives. On the other hand, a sharp decline occurred in the number of protestors in the occupied areas as time passed, although the smaller number then remained stable. In social movements, the threshold of exit varies across protestors. Protestors with a high threshold of exit are protest stalwarts or determined participants who make the sustaining of a movement possible. Determined participants become insistent because they highly value the movement’s goal or they are committed to other participants or other goals. Determined participants in a movement without strong or authoritative leadership are generally self-selected. The Occupy Movement lasted for nearly 80 days not only because of government tolerance but also because of the insistence of determined participants, including student leaders, movement activists, rank-and-file participants, and their committed supporters. Determined participants chose to stay because they gradually fell into the “plight of committed participation” in that they became reluctant to leave without any concrete success. Given the time and energy they had invested in the movement or the sacrifice they had made for it, retreating without a success amounted in their minds to acknowledging failure or a waste

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of time and energy. These determined participants were not alone. Throughout the movement, committed supporters had helped manage the daily operation of the protest sites and provided various support to the protestors. A community of protestors thus appeared at the protest sites, which reduced the difficulties individual protestors encountered in the occupation. All this contributed to sustain the standoff between the government and protestors, although a sustained movement is not necessarily powerful.

Determined participants Some movements can recruit participants because they do not tap all the pools of participants at the beginning, and recruiting new members based on existing networks is still possible.3 The Occupy Movement is different from many other social movements, such as the 1989 Tiananmen movement, in that its participation in terms of the number of participants reached its maximum potential at the very beginning because of the use of tear gas. Thousands of participants rallied at the protest site in Admiralty during the first week of the movement. The call for strikes in schools and universities echoed in the first two weeks after September 28. The initial large-scale participation created a problem in that it was unlikely to retain the movement’s momentum in the coming days. On the contrary, the number of participants continued to decline as the movement lasted. With the anger over the tear gas fading and the government showing tolerance, many participants left and resumed school and work. Against this background, the continual participation of determined participants was crucial to the sustaining of the movement.

The importance of determined participants After the movement started, it was no longer a student movement, but a mass movement with participants from all walks of life. Various surveys point out two important features of the movement’s participants. First, participants had diverse backgrounds, with the majority of them being working people. For example, one survey of 1,562 people at the protest sites between October 20 and 26 shows that students accounted for 26 percent of the participants, whereas working people and the self-employed accounted for 58 percent.4 Another survey, of 182 occupiers in Admiralty between November 5 and 6, found that students accounted for about 20 percent of the protestors, while other participants worked in various sectors, including schools, finance, advertisement design, arts, communication, industry, telecommunication, accounting, retail, trade, medical care, tourism, and insurance.5 Second, the majority of the participants consisted of young people. The survey of 1,562 people found that 61 percent were aged 29 years old or younger, and 24 percent were aged between 30 and 39. About 58 percent had received a college education or higher. Similarly, the survey of 182 people also showed that more than 64 percent of the participants were aged 30 or younger, and another 30 percent were between 31 and 45.

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That young people constituted the majority of participants posed a problem for the movement, for young people needed to go to school or work. As time passed, the cost of participation was higher for many participants, and stopping (frequent) participation became common. Social movements often need to recruit new participants in order to sustain or increase their momentum. But the recruitment of new participants was ineffective in this movement. The survey of 182 people, which was conducted 40 days after the movement started, pointed out the difficulty. As Table 4.1 suggests, 74 percent of the participants had stayed there for at least three weeks, and about 49 percent had stayed there for more than a month. In contrast, those who stayed for less than one week accounted for only about 6 percent. This implies that new participants constituted only a very small portion of the participants. The decline in participants suggests that protestors’ threshold of exit varied, and it was partly affected by their motivation for participating in the movement. The survey of 1,562 people showed that most of the participants believed that the real election was important (i.e., 87 percent) as far as the reason for their participation was concerned. Table 4.2 is based on my interviews with 54 participants (13 in Mong Kok, 4 in Causeway Bay, and 37 in Admiralty) and 24 cases Table 4.1 Types of participants in Admiralty (N = 182) Participation Period

Frequency (%)

From the first day More than one month Three weeks to a month Two to three weeks One to two weeks Less than one week

10.6 37.9 25.7 10.1 9.5 6.1

Source: Singtao Daily, November 12, 2014. Note: Three of the 182 people were missing in the reported data.

Table 4.2 Reasons for participating in the Occupy Movement Reasons

Number

Frequency

Real election (a) Police’s misbehavior, protecting students (b) a+b Dissatisfied with government polices Support students’ claims Miscellaneous Total

41 14 7 8 5 3 78

52.6 17.9 9.0 10.3 6.4 3.8 100

Source: Author’s interview; Apple Daily (October, November, and December 2014); Wenweipo (October, November, and December 2014); Singtao Daily (October, November, and December 2014).

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reported by the media. All the participants interviewed or reported had stayed at the protest site for at least three weeks. This small sample may not be representative, but it is suggestive of the major causes for individuals’ participation. The participants were not given a choice of answers. Instead, they themselves gave the reason for their participation. The table suggests that some 52.6 percent had a simple reason for participation, that is, to achieve real election of the chief executive.6 This is the most commonly cited reason among the students. A significant number of people participated because of the way the police treated the protesting students, particularly on September 28. This reason was likely the most important one for the large participation in the first few days.7 These people came out to protect the students. Others participated because they also wanted the real election and they were angry with the police’s use of tear gas and violence. Still others protested because they were dissatisfied with a wide range of government policies, including inadequate political reform. These people complained about unfairness in policy making and the government’s inability to address the problems people faced in the city. As the movement continued in a fruitless way, various constraints began to rise and discourage continual participation. Some participants left because they felt that the occupation had lasted too long and it was not effective. Confidence or the sense of efficacy is an important factor that affects individuals’ participation in collective action. As Weiss suggests, “the strength of belief or participation is decreased by non-reward.”8 For this reason, McAdam suggests that social movements do not arise automatically from favorable political opportunities, and they occur also because of people’s “cognitive liberation” in the sense that they believe in the shifting of political conditions and the “prospects for successful collective action.”9 One student, for example, reported that he retreated because it appeared useless to sit there and do nothing.10 Similarly, a college student said that she stopped her participation from late October because of both the split among participants and the ineffectiveness of the occupation.11 Another participant largely stopped after the dialogue between the students and the government because he believed that the dialogue was already a symbolic achievement and greater success was unlikely.12 Young people who participated because of their sense of a shared identity as the young generation or because of their sympathy for the students might have a low threshold of exit when they felt that participation was time-consuming and inconvenient. For example, one student claimed that he participated because he felt it was his moral responsibility to support his peers. But he went to the protest site only twice during the movement and spent most of his time at school. When asked why he retreated earlier than some others, he replied, “I share their goal, but I have too much work to do.”13 The colder weather and the inconveniences associated with living in tents were also a discouragement to some participants.14 In retrospect, the quick decline in the number of participants was not surprising. As the Occupy Movement started in an unexpected way, consensus building was lacking among participants. For example, when Tai Yiu-ting announced the beginning of the Occupy Movement on September 28, half of the protestors

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gathering in front of the government headquarters left. Some left because they believed that the demand the three cofounders raised was not what they wanted (i.e., civil nomination), whereas others thought that the Occupy Movement was illegal, contradicting the legality of the student movement.15 In this circumstance, a pan-democracy legislator went on his knees to plead with the students to stay.16 Indeed, the majority of the participants mobilized not through what Oberschall calls “bloc recruitments” – “Rapid mobilization does not occur through recruitment of large numbers of isolated and solitary individuals. It occurs as a result of recruiting blocs of people who are already highly organized.”17 Instead, many previous unconnected participants were mobilized by the tear gas. On the other hand, movement organizers’ efforts to retain participants and recruit new people were limited. With the number of participants at the protest site decreasing, some who stayed there felt worried. But others seemed to understand their peers’ choice. One protestor explained, “as long as they [other students] still pay attention to the movement, it is still a good thing.”18 Determined participants were self-selected. For example, one month after the Occupy Movement, a survey of about 300 occupiers in Admiralty showed that 16 percent would stay for another six months, 6.7 percent would stay for another year, and 52 percent would stay infinitely.19 Why were some participants more determined than others? Interviews with participants and media reports suggest that the reasons can be grouped into three categories. One is the participants’ strong faith in the fight for democracy and in receiving government response (i.e., 76 percent of the 54 interviewees), which is also tied to what can be called the plight of the sunk cost of participation. Second, some participants’ commitment to the students or other participants was strong (i.e., 15 percent), and they chose to stay as long as the students stayed. Third, there was expectation pressure (i.e., 9.3 percent).

The plight of committed participation Determined participants often have a simple goal – to achieve the movement’s goal – which is strong enough to motivate them to sustain their participation. As Castells suggests, “Individuals are enthusiastic when they are mobilized towards a goal that they cherish.”20 In the Occupy Movement, most high school students and college students continued with the occupation just for democracy or the real election. These participants seemed politically knowledgeable, knowing what was wrong with the political system and what should be done.21 Yet, no matter how determined they were, they could have felt frustrated because of the lack of response from the government. Their frustration, however, did not become the reason for their retreat. Instead, in addition to their demand for democracy, these protestors chose to stay because they felt that if they stopped without any concessions from the government, their retreat amounted to an acknowledgment of failure and a loss of dignity. As the occupation continued, some protestors became even more reluctant to leave without a success given the time and energy they had invested.

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Therefore, those who chose not to retreat mainly because they had not achieved any success or had not wrested any concessions from the government, and the government had not shown good faith in responding to protestors’ demands. Only if they chose to stay could they increase the bargaining power for the HKFS and place pressure on the government. For example, in the survey of 182 people mentioned earlier, 154, or 84.6 percent, replied that they did not support the retreat, 18, or 9.9 percent, reported that they supported the retreat, and 15, or 8.2 percent, reported that they had not decided.22 Those who supported the retreat believed that the continual occupation was not useful, and the movement should take other forms, such as promoting democratic values in residential communities. Others believed that long occupation might lead to the loss of public support, and some students claimed that they were tired. Similarly, another survey of 195 protestors in Admiralty on November 28 showed that protestors had different views about retreat. When asked whether they would end the occupation if the two student associations were forced to leave, 11 percent of the respondents said that they would also leave (see Table 4.3). But 76 percent reported that they would not. If the two student associations chose to retreat, 33 percent reported that they would also leave, but another 35 percent reported that they would not. Some respondents reported that they had protested for two months, and there was no reason to leave. They hoped to achieve at least some success. In addition, once they ended the occupation, it could be difficult to mobilize so many people the next time. But others believed that the occupation had caused inconveniences for people, and continual occupation could further damage the movement’s legitimacy.23 For this reason, staying until the government responded or the police cleared the site became the choice of the majority of the determined participants. On the early morning of November 16, or about 40 days after the occupation movement started, a high school student was doing her homework in the study area at the protest site in Mong Kok. She did not know other participants well because she did not always stay at the protest site and she came when she had time. When asked why she had kept coming, she replied, “to fight for real election.” Given that the government had not shown any sign of concession, when asked “when will you retreat?” she answered, when “the government respond[s].” She was not alone in terms of her persistence.24 In December, a college student at the protest site in Admiralty said that she had been busy with her final exams and had not returned to the protest site as Table 4.3 Occupiers’ willingness to follow the two student organizations (N = 195) Occupiers’ Attitude

Forced Retreat (%)

Voluntary Retreat (%)

Yes No Not sure

11 76 12

33 35 30

Source: Takungpao, December 4, 2014; Apple Daily, December 4, 2014.

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frequently as before. But she would come when she had time. When asked “why do you not retreat?” she replied, “We have not achieved anything; how can we retreat?” This was a commonly cited reason given by the protestors.25 Two female college students at the protest site in Admiralty gave the same answer to the question of why they chose to stay. They lived in the same tent and came to the protest site about three to four times each week, depending on the amount of their coursework. They participated to seek the real election, and they would stay until the government responded. They believed that retreat without any success was a waste of the longtime efforts of the participants. But as the standoff continued, they also felt lost.26 Some participants, though small in number, had quit their jobs to fully participate in the movement, and they were even more unlikely to retreat without a success.27 A male student stayed because the government did not respond. He blamed the government for its reluctance to show any sign of being willing to address the plight and to talk to students. I think it becomes unrealistic to demand the central government to revoke the 8.31 decision of the National Peoples’ Congress, but the government can still do something to solve the standoff or to show a good faith. But the government has not done anything. It refuses to have new rounds of dialogue. How can the protestors leave given the government’s irresponsiveness?28 He also complained about the police’s excessive use of force in dealing with protestors. In the past, he had believed that the police protected citizens. But he now believed that the police were a tool of their superiors. Participants like him might be willing to retreat if the government made some types of concessions. A female participant said, “If the government makes concrete concessions, we may leave. But the government has always told demonstrators to leave without any concessions. The government does not have a good faith.”29 Another occupier stayed for the same reason. He believed that the government had not made any concessions in political reform. “If we leave now, it amounts to unconditional surrender.”30 In addition, if they left without a success, it would be difficult to convince people to come out in the future. At the protest site in Admiralty, a poster said, “If we lose this battle, we lose dignity. Keep on.” As the occupation continued, some participants’ motivations for the protest grew more complex. Grievances against the police were common among occupiers, and such grievances were also a reason for some occupiers to choose to continue their occupation.31 A young working person said: I participate in the movement for a better future for myself. I have been here [Admiralty] since the first day, and I did not leave although I was sick. My parents are public servants and they do not support my participation because they are worried about my safety and health. When they said that it is too cold to stay here, I repl[ied] that I will wear more clothes. . . . I do not like any of the three Chief Executives because of their poor performance. . . . I

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Determined participants [have] never forgotten and forgiven what the police have done to the protestors during the movement. . . . I will not retreat until the government responds, but I will leave if the police clear the site. Still, I hope those [stronger] occupiers can resist the police’s site clearance.32

The cost some participants paid could be high. Several student leaders of the HKFS took a semester leave from school after the movement started.33 Similarly, a college student who had stayed at the protest site in Mong Kok since the movement began applied to postpone her graduation for one year. She stopped attending class after the movement started and continued her full-time participation. She admitted that as the time passed, the number of participants kept declining, and it was increasingly difficult to continue the occupation. But she still believed in the necessity of civil disobedience and that “the future of the society is more important than my study.” She was disappointed at her friends who “orally support the movement without taking any action.”34

Pressure of expectation Some participants chose to stay because of the pressure arising from the expectation of others. Such pressure faced by movement leaders was particularly strong. Once these people gained recognition among protestors, they faced higher expectations. Community pressure, for example, is an important reason for the emergence of leaders who are believed by others to be crucial to the occurrence of collective action.35 Not only leaders but also recognized activists faced such pressure. For example, a student at the protest site in Admiralty admitted a significant decline in the number of participants. Some participants wanted to leave when they discussed the occupation in private. But the HKFS wanted them to stay. In addition, they worried that their classmates would mock them if they retreated. For this reason, they chose to go there by turn to show their commitment.36 Rank-and-file participants also faced pressure arising from their peers. Participants can be divided into the following categories: (1) they belonged to groups before participation; (2) they formed informal groups or circles of friends or classmates at the time of participation; (3) they formed informal groups after participation; and (4) they remained independent participants after participation. Except for the last group of participants, personal ties established before or after participation contributed to group solidarity and friendship. Group solidarity gave rise to moral obligations. For example, a working girl in Admiralty became a determined participant and she formed a group with another nine young working people. During the weekdays, they sometimes took turns to attend when they were busy. But they were generally able to participate during the weekend. She admitted that she valued the collegiality and friendship within the group, which was an important reason for her continual participation.37 Some participants did not leave because they worried that their friends could be in danger if they were left alone.38

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Group members felt a moral obligation when they realized their participation was important to sustaining the movement against a background of declined movement momentum. They believed that given the already smaller number of participants who stayed, their retreat would directly and further weaken the movement. For example, one participant who had stayed at the protest site in Mong Kok said that she would stay until the clearance. They were reluctant to give up because the movement had not achieved any success. In addition, she admitted that the number of occupiers in Mong Kok was often very small, and her group of 10 people took turns in order to keep a minimum number of people there. Another participant knew about 50 participants and they took turns to stay in Mong Kok for a month. She acknowledged that continual occupation might not be helpful, but she participated in order to show her support.39 Certainly, the pressure of expectation or moral obligation was absent or weak for many participants who had retreated earlier in the process of the movement. It was not rare that participants went to the protest sites with their friends and classmates in small groups. For example, a college student went to the protest site in Admiralty with three of his high school classmates, two of whom were working. When he decided to stop going to the protest frequently, his classmates understood his choice. After all, as he said, “I need to go to class because I have to graduate this academic year.”40 In other words, these informal constraints may raise the threshold of exit, but they do not necessarily raise the threshold to a prohibitively high level for most participants. For example, Agnes Chow, a 17-yearold student, resigned as spokesman of Scholarism on October 10 because, as she claimed, the movement made her extremely tired and she was unable to stand the pressure any longer.41

Committed supporters After the movement started, a cleaner quit his job and participated in the Occupy Movement because he did not want to see students get hurt. Similarly, a taxi driver took part in the protest for the same reason because he thought that the police used excessive force at the beginning.42 Such cases suggest that people participate in collective action for different reasons, including those that may not be directly tied to the movement’s goals. As discussed in the previous chapter, the tear gas on September 28 had a great mobilization effect and prompted a large number of people to take to the streets to show their support for the students and their grievances against the government and the police. Sympathy could have been the reason for some residents to turn into participants and strong supporters of students. A 34-year-old participant said that he had not been home from the start of the movement because he worried that something might happen to students if he left. When asked whether he was tired, he replied, I once wanted to leave, but I decided to continue to stay. Because we have not achieved anything, we do not want to give up like this. . . . In addition,

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Determined participants we need to protect the students. They are fighting for us, and we will enjoy the benefit in the future. How can we leave them alone? I will stay here as long as the students stay.43

Another participant who had stayed at the protest site in Admiralty since September 28 said that she chose to stay because she was sympathetic to the students who were helpless, and she did not expect to stay for that long. She thought that the government was too irresponsive. “The government did not make any concessions and tolerated triad members. The blue-ribbon group came out to stir up troubles.” She said that many people left when it was raining. But she chose to stay because she thought that she might not come back again if she left. In a few nights, the number of occupiers was very small, and they worried that the police were likely to clear out the site given the small number of participants.44 In the afternoon of December 7, I was at the protest site in Admiralty and saw a woman in her 40s cleaning the garbage. She said she had been there from the very beginning of the movement after the police used the tear gas. She had a flexible job and therefore had time to come to the protest site. But her home was far away from the protest site, so she had a tent there. She often helped to tidy the protest site to keep the environment clean. When asked when she would retreat, she said she would leave when the students left. Her reason was a simple one: “I am older than the students, so I have to take care of them.”45 Such willingness to offer help and protection was indeed common among the adult participants in the movement. Some of these people were less motivated by the movement’s goal than by their desire to protect the students. An old lady came to the protest site in Mong Kok almost every day. She said that the students were very helpless, and she wanted to help them. Every day after she finished her breakfast, she would buy some food for the students at the protest site.46 Some parents also joined because they wanted to protect their children. Because of the occupation, participants sometimes had conflict with their family members. When parents failed to persuade their children to stop participating in the occupation, some became frustrated. But others chose to come to help and protect their children. As they participated, they became more committed to the participants. Some 20 parents formed a group called “Parents under the Umbrella” to help protect their children who participated in the Occupy Movement.47 Moreover, as discussed later in this chapter, many of the resource stations at the protest sites were managed by volunteers who were also committed supporters of the participants. During the daytime at the protest sites, students and other people went to school or work; most of those who stayed there, including those who managed resource stations, were retired people or adults who did not need to go to work. These elder people were thus crucial to the Occupy Movement because of their physical presence during the daytime. In Causeway Bay, about 15 to 20 people stayed during the daytime in the late stage of the movement, and about 50 to 80 in Mong Kok.48 In Admiralty, the number was around 200, and most of them were not students. Some old people aged 65 or older stayed

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at the protest sites throughout the movement. In Admiralty, a 69-year-old man stayed at the protest site to help build the study room and make wooden stairs. An 82-year-old lady also stayed until the clearance of the protest site in Admiralty.49 Committed supporters provided both encouragement and assistance for the participants, but they might have also unintentionally created pressure of expectation for the participants. Although committed supporters understood that protestors might not achieve concrete success in the end, some protestors did not want to disappoint their supporters by leaving earlier.50

Protest site as a supportive community When the democratic movement became an occupation movement, the physical space was important to participants and the movement. Castells points out that occupying public space creates a community based on togetherness, and occupied spaces are usually charged with the symbolic power of invading sites of state power, or financial institutions. By constructing a free community in a symbolic place, “social movements create a public space, a space for deliberation.”51 In the 2014 Sunflower Movement in Taiwan, the students’ occupation of the Legislative Chamber was a direct challenge to the state they believed was making policies without sufficient caution. In Chile, when students staged continual protests from 2011, they saw the streets as a stage for democracy.52 The occupied area is also a place where protestors interact with each other and with external parties, such as media and visitors. There is thus an issue of the management of the occupied space and community building. The management of the occupied area involves logistical issues and security. This section discusses how protestors managed these issues and built the protesting communities in terms of resource provision, security, and publicizing grievances and claims. It suggests that the efforts the protestors and their supporters made helped create an environment that contributed to the sustaining of the Occupy Movement.

The assistance system at the protest sites After protestors began their occupation, various parties offered logistical help.53 When Tai Yiu-ting announced the beginning of the Occupy Movement, he said, “All the resources, the marshal team, the volunteer team, and supplies will be sent to the protest site.”54 Each of the three protest sites hosted resource stations and first-aid stations run by volunteers who were mostly recruited through new social media. These people communicated with each other often through WhatsApp and the Internet to arrange their shifts, and the coordination was thus simple and effective. Some occupiers said that the protest site had developed organically without a main organizer, but distinct teams took charge of areas like security, medical care, recycling, artwork, and legal issues.55 Some team members broke into three shifts, morning, afternoon, and night. Many of these people who worked for the various teams were volunteers. For example, after the Occupy Movement started, 3,500 people registered on Facebook to serve as

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volunteers in the medical stations at the protest sites, as compared with the initial 300 registered volunteers.56 The resource stations provided a range of supplies, such as water, food, fruits, shower gel, tissues, umbrellas, masks, eye covers, goggles, helmets, and so on. The resource stations also provided or lent tents and mattress to occupiers. From mid-October, student leaders called for the use of tents because of the colder weather. Gradually, tents were established at all three protest sites. It was estimated that the initial number of tents in Admiralty was more than 2,000.57 On November 16, I counted the number of tents, supply stations, and first-aid stations at the three protest sites. There had been a decline in the number of tents and resource stations by then. As Table 4.4 shows, there were more tents, supply stations, and first-aid stations in Admiralty. The tents not only helped occupiers to deal with cold weather but also made the occupation more effective. What is perhaps unusual about the Occupy Movement is that the mode of occupation was, to some extent, energy-saving. Because of the use of tents, the occupation became tent occupation during the daytime when students and working people went to school or work. The physical presence of the tents suggested that the Occupy Movement was persisting. The many tents at the protest sites seemed to indicate a large number of participants, but most of the tents were often empty during the daytime.58 The government accused the movement of receiving support from external forces partly because of the influx of supplies into the protest sites after the movement started. An environmental association estimated that the supplies consumed during the first month of occupation were worth HK$250 million. The supplies included water (an estimated 11.57 million bottles of water), plastic cuffs, cling wrap, trash bags, lunch boxes, biscuits, fruits, drinks, medical supplies, and others. Citizens’ donations were estimated to account for 20 percent of the supplies, and the remaining might be provided by unknown organizations.59 In addition, people who worked in the supply stations generally posted a notice saying, “Do not take pictures for the sake of protecting the volunteers.” Such notices also made people doubt the sources of supplies. But protestors explained that these volunteers came to help manage the supply stations, not as protestors. It was therefore reasonable to protect them.60 Protestors disagreed with the government’s assertion of foreign support. When the three cofounders planned the Occupy Central Movement, they had purchased supplies for the occupation. In addition, the HKFS had provided some Table 4.4 Occupation and assistance providers at the protest sites

Admiralty Mong Kok Causeway Bay

Tents

Supply Stations

First-Aid Stations

Study Area

1,846 337 63

24 5 2

7 2 1

1 1 1

Source: Author’s field collection, November 16, 2014.

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of the supplies.61 When the movement started, the number of participants far exceeded what was anticipated. The demand for supplies increased as a result. Protestors claimed that the supplies came from themselves, citizens, sympathetic businesses, and other organizations or groups willing to make donations. New social media had been used to seek donations and to coordinate the distribution of the supplies at the protest site. Citizens who wished to make donations contacted the volunteers operating the resource stations directly. A participant said, “Everyone can bring supplies. . . . Even (airline) staff have been bringing hand wash and toilet paper.”62 One protestor said that he bought five tents for other protestors,63 and another person bought medicines worth HK$4,000 and donated them to the first-aid stations.64 In Admiralty, the largest supply station was run by scores of volunteers, some of whom asked for leave from their work or school. One person working for this largest resource station explained that most of the supplies were provided by those who were unable to participate directly in the occupation, such as civil servants and flight attendants. These donors treated the donation as compensating for their absence. After the citizens raised a certain amount of money, they would purchase the needed supplies after consulting with the resource station. Not many rules guided the operation of these stations, but one rule was that the stations did not accept cash donations. When facing the shortage of certain goods, resource stations would inform citizens. For example, when some people knew that the occupiers needed pillows and quilts, they raised HK$10,000 to purchase them and sent them to the resource station.65 The Hong Kong government and Beijing were concerned about the sources of supplies also because the supply system seemed to be effective or well coordinated, given the large amount of supplies. For example, on November 10, when the High Court issued a ruling that allowed the police to arrest protestors who obstructed bailiffs responsible for the clearance, about 300 helmets were transported to the protest site in Causeway Bay although that was not the area where the court injunction applied.66 Donors became fewer as the movement lasted. In Mong Kok, for example, five resource stations were left by November. Some of these stations posted notices indicating the supplies they needed, such as water, electricity, blankets, quilts, and food. People of the resource stations criticized some protestors for not returning what they had borrowed from the stations, such as helmets and chargers.67 Some protestors did not seek help from the resource stations in that they believed that the stations should provide help to those who needed the assistance more.68 Medical stations and first-aid stations provided medical help to participants at the protest sites. In Admiralty, a medical station provided medical service around the clock. The medical team, made up of more than 200 people at one time, worked across the medical station and first-aid stations. During the daytime, the medical station was managed by students from the medical schools of the two local universities and other volunteers. During the night, the station was mainly operated by volunteer medical staff. The medical station served as a clinic that protestors approached for curing fever, cold, and headache, in addition to injuries

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tied to pepper spray or batons.69 The people of the medical station promised to provide medical service until the students left or the police cleared the site. In addition to this medical station, first-aid stations served all three protest sites. As discussed in the next chapter, violent confrontations had taken place between the police and protestors. These medical stations offered help to the wounded protestors. For example, on the night of November 30, the student leaders called for an escalation of action by surrounding the government headquarters. The action turned into a violent confrontation between protestors and police, during which many protestors were injured (Chapter 6). A volunteer of the medical team in Admiralty said that she alone helped take care of more than 20 injured protestors.70 As many participants were students, study areas were arranged at the protest sites in Mong Kok and Admiralty. In Mong Kok, the study area was relatively small, and it had about 10 desks and tables. In Admiralty, the study area was much larger, and it had about 40 tables and desks. At the peak time of protest, it held about 200 students. Three foot-driven generators, which looked like bicycles, and a wind generator were installed to provide electricity. It was said that the facilities in the study area, donated by some businesspeople, was worth about HK$100,000. One of the students managing the study area said that they had told the donors that these facilities would not be returned to them.71 By December 11, the study area had been there for 61 nights. It was estimated that 15,000 people had used this study room, some of whom were not students.72 Students who stayed there were impressed by the mutual help among themselves. A college student said, “The mutual help and support in the study room may not be found among neighbors who have known each other for decades.”73 Protestors also established a security system at the protest sites. In Admiralty, the marshal team consisted of about 200 volunteers initially, but the number dropped by more than half as the movement continued.74 There was a division of labor among the team members and occupiers. Some were responsible for protecting iron fences used as road barriers. Barricades were set at four checking points at the site; each of the points was guarded by several people. These people carried walkie-talkies to communicate with and reported the situation at different blocking points.75 When the police or anti-movement people removed the fences, this group of people would get them back. A second group was responsible for monitoring the police and refuting rumors for occupiers. Occupiers often became worried and nervous because of the frequent rumors about the police’s removing the road barriers and clearing out the site. This group of people provided information to occupiers by closely watching the police’s action. A team member said, “We have a defense line checking how many cops there are. If someone whistles, we can help direct people where to go.”76 Some other participants dealt with plain clothed police who might walk on the protest site and take pictures or cut a few yellow ribbons to see whether occupiers paid attention to such actions.77 Members of the marshal team patrolled the protest site sometimes by riding a bike. Partly because of these efforts, protestors felt safer at the protest site in Admiralty than at the protest site in Mong Kok.

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In Mong Kok and Causeway Bay, the order-keeping teams were dismantled in the middle of the movement. But people still helped protect the protestors. In Mong Kok, where arguments and confrontations between protestors and antimovement groups were common, some volunteers went to protect the occupiers. For example, some people formed a fleet of 10 vehicles and stayed there to protect the protestors, with the vehicles numbering about 30 at the beginning of the movement. Every night these people went to the protest site by riding cars, motorcycles, and vans to prevent the police or triad members from dispersing the students. They claimed that they came out because the students fought for democracy with their bodies, future, and freedom.78 Some people slept during the daytime and would go to the protest site in Mong Kok during the night to see whether the police would take any action. If they saw an increase in the number of police officers deployed, they would caution the occupiers.79

Presenting claims and opinions A feature of the Occupy Movement was that participants created widely accepted symbols of the movement – the yellow umbrella and the yellow ribbon. The movement had also come up with a widely accepted slogan – “I want real universal suffrage.” This slogan became the most popular one also because of the promotion of a group of people who unfurled a large yellow banner saying “I want real universal suffrage” on a mountain known as Lion Rock Mountain on October 23.80 Protest sites were full of this slogan, and it was also widely posted on university campuses. Compared with the 1989 Tiananmen movement in Beijing, the participants of the Occupy Movement in Hong Kong seemed better at coming up with movement symbols and slogans. In contrast, students in the 1989 protests had used many different slogans, such as “Long live democracy,” “Down with the official speculators,” “Freedom of speech,” and “Support the students,” without a concise and ear-catching slogan.81 The lack of a widely accepted slogan could be because the students did not have a clear goal during that movement. What also characterized the Occupy Movement was the way protestors presented their views about the movement. Decentralized collective action creates space for individuals’ innovative or creative ideas, thoughts, and modes of action. Certainly, these new ideas and modes of action can be both constructive and destructive, depending on whether they can arouse people’s attention and sympathy. The rank-and-file participants engaged in various activities to express their views about aspects of the movement through writings, caricatures, and other formats. As elsewhere, “in the face of continued resistance and the frustration of shared goals, a distinct subculture may emerge with distinct dress, speech, lifestyles, heroes, history, and traditions.”82 At the three protest sites, in particular Admiralty, protestors created numerous posters, post-its, slogans, caricatures, banners, drawings, sculptures, and paintings. The walls of the protest site in Admiralty were full of posters and post-its. These messages suggested that participants protested with grievances and seriousness, but they also protested with self-respect and sometimes a sense

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of humor. Participants’ expressions can be roughly divided into the following categories: (1) claim making; (2) explanations of or justifications for the movement; (3) criticisms of, accusations toward, and vilification of the government, the police, and individual officials; (4) suggestions on movement strategies; (5) sympathy-winning statements; (6) support or encouragement from visitors; and (7) others. In social movements, issue framing is common. Framing is aimed to “mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists.”83 The most common claims of the Occupy Movement included: “I want real universal suffrage” and “Civil nomination,” “Leung Chunying steps down,” and “Abolish the Functional Constituencies.” There was also “diagnostic framing” in the sense that protestors tried to identify the cause of problems and the responsible parties.84 Posters explained the unreasonable policies the Chinese central government made. Posters and caricatures that blamed, mocked, and humiliated the chief executive, pro-Beijing legislators, and police officials were commonly seen at the protest sites. Police were indeed an important target of blame and mocking. Some posters said, “Shame on the police,” and “Police are like dogs, and they are the tools of the politicians.” Some posters explained the necessity of their action in detail, whereas others were much shorter. For example, some posters said, “If we have [an]other choice, we will not block the road,” “If we do not stand up today, we will have to kneel down tomorrow,” “One cannot care only about interests and not conscience,” “For the sake of [the] next generations, please be tolerant toward the inconveniences,” and “How can you be a human being without human rights?” Other posters were posted to win sympathy: “My parents are crying for me, and I am crying for the future,” “I am tired and scared, but can I retreat to give up the children’s future?” and “You may say I am a dreamer, but I am not the only one.” Interestingly, at the protest sites in both Mong Kok and Admiralty, there was a big picture of Xi Jinping holding a yellow umbrella. These postings and art products were not limited to the purpose of issue framing. They also became a channel through which protestors made known their views about movement strategies. One poster said, “If you use violence, you lose,” “Please stay calm and do not fall into the trap [of the government].” The pictures of Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr., and Aung San Suu Kyi on the wall suggested that nonviolence was the principle the Occupy Movement should follow. The protest site in Mong Kok included a shrine for Guan Yu, a god of war, and a picture of Jesus. The initial purpose of establishing the shrine was to warn anti-movement people against harming the protestors.85 The protest sites attracted large numbers of visitors and sightseers during weekends. Some local residents who did not come to the protest sites during workdays would come to show their support over the weekends or during the evenings. Many overseas tourists, including mainland visitors, visited these protest sites. At the protest sites, especially the one in Admiralty, the walls were teeming with layers of post-its that conveyed messages encouraging and supporting protestors, such as “Go for it,” “Do not give up, Hong Kong,” “You are not alone,”

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“Democracy will prevail,” “Thank you because you let the world know how much the Hong Kong people like the city,” “Cannot be more proud of you,” and “You should not despair even if you are disappointed.” Many of these messages were posted by the visitors. These postings not only served as a medium that conveyed the messages of the protestors and their supporters to a wide audience, but they also strengthened the identity of the protestors. They enhanced the sense of community at least among some of the occupiers. In the evening, when more occupiers and supporters returned to the protest sites after work, a range of activities was carried out. Some delivered speeches to explain the necessity of the democratic movement; others sang songs to voice their demands or show their determination and support. As Tarrow suggests, “movements define, crystallize, and construct collective identities (italics original).86 All this helped create a community of protestors. Partly for this reason, some occupiers saw the site as a village and called themselves “villagers.”87 Cultural activities seem to have become common in sustained protests. For example, in the lasting student movement in Chile in 2011 and 2012 (see Chapter 5), massive demonstrations routinely ended with a “cultural event” featuring popular artists. Big concerts and artistic exhibitions were commonly organized to promote public education. “Likewise, marches generally included various ingredients such as percussion samba, elaborate costumes, painted faces, live music and dancing, puppets, artistic exhibitions and ingenious slogans to stage political propositions.”88 Making a protest more joyful and creative helps create a more relaxed environment for sustained participation.

Participants and self-justifications During the Occupy Wall Street Movement, protestors stayed in Zuccotti Park, whereas protestors during the Occupy Movement in Hong Kong occupied streets. Hence, although the movement had legitimate claims, it was illegal from the very beginning. The strong reaction of the public to the tear gas forced the government to give up its attempt to clear the protest sites with force (Chapter 3). Instead, the government began to wait for the rise of the opposition voices in the society. Gradually, public support for the movement began to decline. Meanwhile, it was impossible for the central government to revoke the 8.31 decision of the National People’s Congress. The stiff standing of the government made people doubt the usefulness of the movement. In this situation, protestors had to justify their occupation to convince the people or themselves of the legitimacy of their action or to find the meaning of their illegal occupation.

Justifications for the illegal occupation In his research on the history of labor protests in Britain and Germany, Rimlinger writes, “The effectiveness of a protest movement . . . depends on its ability to overcome the widespread disapproval and opposition it engenders.”89 This is

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because those who are affected by the movement can rise to challenge the movement as discussed in the previous chapter. In the Occupy Movement, protestors were not ignorant of the inconveniences their occupation caused. On October 5, the HKFS posted an apology letter on its Facebook account to explain the reasons for occupying the streets. The Hong Kong people had fought for democracy for 30 years, and they used to believe that negotiation, demonstrations, and protests could prompt the government to honor its promise of democracy. But the decision of the central government ruined that hope. Democracy comes with a price in any place in the world. The Occupy Movement was intended to wrest concessions from the government by sacrificing the occupiers’ time, energy, and safety. It would also sacrifice citizens’ right to use the roads and cause inconveniences in people’s daily lives. All this is not intended to achieve selfish interests but to achieve public interests. By doing this, the future generations will not make more sacrifice[s] in their fight for democracy. . . . We hope friends of various social strata would tolerate protestors who are fighting for their ideal. The HKFS sincerely apologizes for the inconveniences caused.90 Many citizens could certainly tolerate the inconveniences for a short time, but they became reluctant as the occupation lasted. On October 25, Chow Yong-kong, the secretary-general of the HKFS, was interviewed by a TVB host regarding the Occupy Movement. When asked why the participants ignored the inconveniences the occupation caused, Chow replied that the short-term sacrifice on the part of the city’s people was necessary for the long-term benefits democracy brought. In addition, the occupiers also had the right to use the roads. Participants and their supporters had accused the police of selective enforcement of the law. When anti-occupation people obtained court injunctions prohibiting the occupation of the roads and tried to remove the road barriers, the participants required the police to protect them. But when protestors occupied the roads, they did not allow the police to enter. When Chow was asked whether this was also selective enforcement (favoring protestors) on the part of the police, he answered that participants sought protection because their lives were under threat. When asked whether one could ignore the law as long as the claimed goal was legitimate, his answer was ambiguous.91 Chow’s defense may not be convincing to some of the population, but it partly reflected how occupiers defended their occupation. Some protestors claimed that they were not legislators and did not need to pay much attention to the public approval rate, and they would continue to do what they thought was correct. Most protestors justified their occupation on several grounds. First, their claims or movement goals were legitimate. A poster said, “It is natural for citizens to obey the law. But it is also a crime if the citizens tolerate and obey the wrong decision made by the government. It is the citizens’ right and obligation to raise different views and criticisms and to resist.”92 Second, protestors justified their occupation by claiming they had no other options. As Chow said, the occupation was for the better future of Hong Kong.

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As mentioned earlier, many participants upheld the nonviolent approach of Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr. But civil disobedience in those countries was not conducted at the expense of other people. A college student said that protestors knew that the occupation had caused inconveniences, but they had no choice. “Even though we have occupied the road and paralyzed the traffic, the government has not responded. What else can we do?”93 Another protestor said, The movement was illegal from the very beginning. We have exhausted all the legal means, but they are ineffective and the government does not listen to the people. In addition, many citizens seem not to care about the demand for democracy. The occupation can make the people aware that we are fighting for justice, not our personal interests.94 That was also the reason that some posters said, “Today we block your road in order for the road of democracy to be open tomorrow.” Another poster said, “Sorry for the inconveniences; the road now serves democracy.” Third, participants simply ignored unfavorable public opinion. A college student said that the support rate for the movement had never exceeded 50 percent even before the movement started.95 A female participant in her 30s had stayed at the protest site in Admiralty for about a month by November 16. She joined because the police’s use of tear gas angered her. When asked about the opposition voices, she seemed to have a sense of moral superiority, saying that those people were “selfish and short-sighted.” She went to work during the day and returned during the night and the weekend. When asked how she justified the occupation that made some people incur losses while she could still go to work, she said that the loss incurred by those people was not unbearable.96 Another participant said, “What I need is the real election, not the citizens’ support. If we can succeed eventually, I do not mind [that] I am treated as a demon.” He said that he was willing to pay the cost of being injured and jailed for the true suffrage. He would not leave unless the true suffrage and the abolition of the functional constituencies were achieved. “If the true suffrage is not achieved, we can move to other places if this site is cleared out. There is no difference [to protest in another place].”97 A young working person gave his reason for ignoring negative public opinions. He came to the protest site in Admiralty three to four times a week after work, and he claimed that the major reason for his participation was seeking real election. When asked about the opposition to the movement, he said that protestors did not need to pay much attention to public opinion or surveys because the Occupy Movement had never received a high approval rate. He believed that the majority of the people in a society were trend followers and could be easily swayed. They only supported the party that was likely to succeed.98 His response was based on the same logic explained by a poster on a wall in the protest site in Mong Kok and perhaps in Admiralty. The poster read: In this world, there are always 10 percent [of] people who support revolution and another 10 percent who support the government. The remaining

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Determined participants 80 percent support whomever . . . succeeds. When the government succeeds, they support the government. If you (anti-government forces) succeed, they would support you. If you conducted a survey before the Xinhai Revolution (1911) in China, it must be the Qing dynasty that enjoyed more support. Can you believe in the 80 percent? You must win the battle yourself first.99

Apparently, these protestors were not aware of the fact that they were not launching a revolution, and external support is often crucial to the weak people’s movement. Such support was the reason for some protestors to believe in the legitimacy of their movement. Despite the opposition to the movement, some citizens still offered support. Although donations declined during the late stage of the movement, some residents and businesses continued to show support by making donations. People working for the supply stations said that when they posted the shorted supplies, some citizens still responded. High school students at the protest site in Admiralty still received free food.100 At one time, a restaurant provided about 300 box lunches to the protestors in Admiralty every day, although it was unclear whether it was the restaurant that provided the food or someone else who provided the food through the restaurant.101 Such support convinced occupiers that at least a segment of the population still supported them. Nevertheless, although protestors had tried to rationalize their occupation, they did realize the inconveniences it caused. On the evening of December 9, protestors had known that the government had decided to clear the protest sites in Admiralty and soon in Causeway Bay. At the protest site in Causeway Bay, scores of protestors bowed to the residents, shops, and a bus company to apologize to them for the inconveniences their occupation had caused during the previous two months.102

Defining the usefulness of participation A survey of 285 protestors at the three protest sites between November 16 and 17 showed that about 70 percent felt pessimistic about the concessions by the central government or the Hong Kong government.103 This implies protestors were fighting a fruitless war. In addition, although protestors and volunteers had extended great efforts to build orderly communities at the protest sites, the sites were not a utopia, at least for some protestors. Occupiers faced other difficulties. It was indeed not easy for participants to stay at the protest sites, especially in Mong Kok. One student who had stayed in Mong Kok said that it was a tiresome experience. Occupiers in Mong Kok had to face harassment from the blue-ribbon people, triad members, and the police who might come to remove barricades and to argue or even fight with occupiers. Protestors also worried about the possible clearance by the police in the early morning. One could barely sleep well. In order to protect the occupiers, some people did not sleep during the night and served as guards for others.104 Another participant who moved from Mong Kok to Admiralty said that when he stayed in Mong Kok, he woke up almost every 30 minutes because of actual or imagined harassments.105

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In addition, occupiers had to overcome the inconveniences they faced in their daily life. Sleeping was an uncomfortable experience, even in the tents. A 19-yearold determined protestor admitted that “It is not fun [to stay there]. . . . Who wants to sleep on the street when you have a home to return to and [a] bed to sleep in? Here, when it’s hot it’s killing you, when it’s cold it’s killing you, when it rains it’s miserable too, and you have to walk such a long distance just to have a shower.”106 This appeared puzzling in that people took part in a movement that was doomed to fail. One explanation is that some people were driven by their passion or emotion, and their participation was meant to show their grievances against the government or the police. But protestors participate in collective action not always because of their emotions, such as hatred or anger, but also because of their belief in the usefulness of their action.107 By the same token, people who lack confidence in their action are unlikely to take action. An extreme case is Nazi concentration camps where despair silenced the inmates, and “conformism reached the point of inmates cooperating with guards even when the inmates were told to lie down so that they could be shot.”108 A sense of efficacy and movement success can be mutually reinforcing. The occurrence and development of social movements are reportedly determined by political opportunities.109 But political opportunities can be perceived to exist or they can be created. During the Iranian Revolution in 1979, for example, a mismatch developed between the structure of political opportunities and popular perceptions of political opportunities. If opportunity is like a door, some suggest, movements start when people realize the door is open and walk on through. The Iranian Revolution may be a case in which people saw that the door was closed, but felt that the opposition was powerful enough to open it.110 This was also the belief of some protestors in the Occupy Movement in Hong Kong. During the movement, although the Chinese central government and the Hong Kong government made clear that the movement’s demands would not be met, protestors still believed in the usefulness of the movement. They had a reason to think this way. In 2003, a large-scale protest forced the government to stop the legislation of Article 23. In 2012, student protests also stopped the national education. Therefore, it occurred to some protestors that they had a possibility of success. When asked what they would do if the movement did not achieve any success, one participant said that “If you do not try, how will you know whether it will be useful?” In other words, some people still believed that their power might be enough to open the door to democracy, especially given the large number of supporters when the movement started. Other participants expected that the government might make certain types of concessions, although significant concessions were less likely. A high school student admitted that it was difficult to force the government to revoke the 8.31 decision. But he said that staging protests was just like taking an exam. “You aim at scoring 100 points, but you will feel satisfied if you score 80.”111 Certainly, the perceived opportunities may prove false, and a sense of self-justified efficacy is insufficient when dealing with an uncompromising government. This is why

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people in authoritarian regimes generally stage fewer protests because the government renders “the cost of anti-regime protest prohibitive for all but a small minority.”112 Although protestors may fail to achieve the movement’s stated goal, their participation is not necessarily meaningless. Participation changed some participants’ previous perception that Hong Kong was a hopeless city where people were shortsighted “economic animals.” In other words, the movement revealed the hope in the eyes of pro-democracy people, and the hope came from the many devoted rank-and-file participants.113 Some participants got to know other people who shared the same political orientation and offered friendship and unselfish help. Some participants believed that the movement created new opportunities for themselves to pursue democracy in ways that they were unaware of in the past. A college student interpreted the usefulness of participation in the following way: When you participate in the movement, you will find new opportunities. I began to know more people and more groups after I participated in the movement and therefore I have more opportunities to participate in the activities organized by others. If I stay at home, I will achieve nothing. This movement at least reveals the possibilities and opportunities that we can explore in the future.114 What she said was true in that protestors had explored new ways of expressing their grievances and demands. As discussed in subsequent chapters, protestors in Mong Kok had found new ways of protest by using so-called shopping tours after the police removed their encampment in late November. A movement activist also pointed out another consequence of the movement, that is, the continual occupation trained participants, some of whom would not only take part in future movements but who would also become movement leaders.115 Moreover, social movements are also expressive in that they call public attention to certain issues in society. As Gusfield writes, “collective action involves advocacy for action . . . [and] movements are focal points of conflict in society and usually generate public issues.”116 The Occupy Wall Street Movement did not raise specific policy goals, and it achieved no major policy changes. But some occupiers believed that “the process is the message,”117 or “the Journey is the Destination.”118 Similarly, in the Occupy Movement, some participants believed that the movement was helpful if it enhanced the people’s awareness of the democracy issue in the city. The movement is expressive if participants can send their message out. One participant said, “It is not right that we accept whatever the central government offers. If we do not voice our demand, we will keep losing what we have.”119 The protest site in Causeway Bay was the smallest one and rarely made headline news in the media. Indeed, it was so quiet that it looked isolated. But occupiers there believed that occupation was useful because it at least made people pay attention to the movement and to its claims. Protestors there believed that “if [the movement] can change 10 or 20 people and make them think about the society, it is enough.”120 Hence, some protestors said that the purpose of

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the movement was not to wrest concessions from the central government but to wake up the Hong Kong people.121

Conclusion This chapter shows that the Occupy Movement was sustained partly because of the presence of determined participants who chose to continue with the occupation despite the many difficulties they encountered. In a decentralized movement, the majority of the participants have the freedom to stop their participation without facing serious pressure because they have not been recruited along existing networks. In the Occupy Movement, the momentum in terms of the scale of participation reached its peak at the very beginning. Given that most participants did not belong to “bloc recruitments,” they faced limited pressure from retreating. The rising cost of occupation resulted in the sharp decline in the number of participants. As a result, sustaining the movement depended on the presence of a group of determined participants. Determined participants continued with their participation because they had a faith in the need of the movement or because they felt a moral obligation to support those who had chosen to stay. Facing an uncompromising government, determined participants were caught in the trap of their committed participation – the longer they stayed, the more reluctant they became to retreat without a success. In addition to this sunk cost of participation, some participants stayed also because they had to meet the expectation of others. When occupying the streets, the protestors had extended efforts to build the protesting communities, making it not only a place for protest, but also a site for presenting grievances and claims and a place for living. Nevertheless, sustained movements are not necessarily powerful movements. It takes great effort to sustain a movement, but it takes even more to make a movement successful. As the standoff between protestors and the government lasted, the government felt that time was on its side (see Chapter 3). Protestors began to realize that occupation was not sufficient to force the government to compromise. However, an important factor – the weak leadership – that sustained this movement was also the factor that reduced its chance of success. While the lack of a strong leadership had given participants sufficient freedom in the movement, it also failed to promote the movement’s momentum. The movement’s leadership was not only unable to coordinate protestors’ activities, but it also failed to come up with effective tactics to pursue the movement’s goal or to find graceful ways of exit.

Notes 1 Craig Calhoun, “Occupy Wall Street in Perspective,” British Journal of Sociology, vol. 64, no. 1 (2013), pp. 26–38. 2 “Huang Zhifeng ren zhanling zhe qinggan tili shang dou xiangtui” (Wong Chifung admits that occupiers want to retreat because of the exhaustion of passion and physical energy), Oriental Daily, November 7, 2014.

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3 Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930– 1970 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999, second edition). 4 Zheng Yi and Yuan Weixi, “Hou yusan yundong: gaobie zhengzhi lenggan niandai” (Farewell to a politically apathetic era), Mingpao, November 29, 2014. 5 Yang Yaodeng, Lin Ziya, and Liang Yongsi, “Jinzhong zhanling zhe 85 jutui” (85 percent of the occupiers in Admiralty refused to leave), Singtao Daily, November 12, 2014. 6 Seeking democracy was also an important reason for Hong Kong people to participate in the annual July 1 demonstration in the city. See Francis Lee and Joseph Chan, Media, Social Mobilization, and Mass Protest in Post-colonial Hong Kong: The Power of a Critical Event (New York: Routledge, 2011), p. 170. 7 For example, like many others, one young person said that when he saw on TV that the police escalated the use of force, he rushed to the protest site in Admiralty with first-aid supplies. Zhong Jianyi, “Yigong jianshou rendao yu zeren” (Volunteers uphold humanitarianism and responsibility), Hong Kong Economic Journal, November 3, 2014. 8 Robert Weiss, “Defection from Social Movements and Subsequent Recruitment to New Movements,” in Barry McLaughlin (ed.), Studies in Social Movements (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 328–348. 9 McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, p. 48. 10 Interview 2. 11 Interview 1. 12 Interview 3. 13 Interview 4. 14 Interview, Admiralty 7. 15 Xie Mengyao, Jiang Yannan, Liu Xiang, and Zhu Yongxiao, “Zhanzhong shikong muhou: zhanlingqu shantou linli, quefa tuichang jizhi” (Behind the loss of control over the Occupation Movement: Divided groups and a lack of exit mechanism), Asian Weekly, October 26, 2014, pp. 22–32. 16 “Zhanzhong qidong changmao xiagui qiu xuesheng buyao likai” (After the Occupy Movement started, “Long Hair” went on his knees to plead with the students to stay), Apple Daily, September 28, 2014. 17 Anthony Oberschall, Social Conflict and Social Movements (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973), p. 125. 18 Interview, Admiralty 14. 19 Bai Lin, Cheng Xueling, Peng Maifang, and Zhang Tingting, “Yuban zhanzhong zhe cheng wuxianqi liushou” (Over half of the occupiers supported infinite occupation), Apple Daily, November 3, 2014. 20 Manuel Castells, Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012), p. 14. 21 Interviews with participants consistently showed it. 22 Yang et al., “85 Percent of the Occupiers in Admiralty Refused to Leave.” 23 Wen Shen, “Mingdiao: ‘shuangxue’ sangtui, 33% yuan gen” (Survey shows that 33% would follow the two student organizations if they choose retreat), Wenweipo, December 4, 2014. 24 Interview, Mong Kok 3. 25 Interview, Admiralty 3. 26 Interviews, Admiralty 5, 6. 27 Interview, Admiralty 21. 28 Interview, Admiralty 12. 29 “ ‘Da huangshan’ wei liushou renshi daqi” (“Big Yellow Umbrellas” encouraged occupiers), Apple Daily, November 8, 2014. 30 “Huang Zhifeng: zhengfu wuyi jiejue maodun” (Joshua Wong: The government is unwilling to solve the conflict), Apple Daily, November 8, 2014.

Determined participants 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52

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Interview, Admiralty 23. Interview, Admiralty 27. Conversation 7. “Chengda sheng wuhui ting xue chi yinian biye” (City University student does not regret stopping her study and postponing her graduation for a year), Apple Daily, November 19, 2014. Dennis Chong, Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), p. 125. “ ‘Zhan’ lengqing, peng kong ban” (The number of occupiers decrease and half of the tents are empty), Wenweipo, November 10, 2014. Interview, Admiralty 34. Interview, Admiralty 8. Wen Shen, “‘Zhanwang’ zhe duo cheng yuan che, you ren mou zai zhan” (Most occupiers in Mong Kok are willing to retreat, and some want to return), Wenweipo, November 25. Interview, Admiralty 18. “Nandi yali, Zhou Ting ciren xueming fayanren” (Unable to face the pressure, Agnes Chow quits as spokesman of Scholarism), Apple Daily, October 13, 2014. “Dan che you youxing cheng puxuan” (Bikers’ suffrage-supporting demonstration), Apple Daily, October 26, 2014. “Wuzizhan huashi ren, aizi shengri bu huijia” (A responsible person working for the resource station did not go home for his son’s birthday), Singtao Daily, November 12, 2014. Wang Jiawen, Zhu Juanyin, Han Yaoting, and Yuan Leting, “Liang qian zhangpeng, 7 qian ren lushu, pa ‘lang’lai” (7,000 people stayed in 2,000 tents, worrying about “wolves” coming), Apple Daily, October 26, 2014. Interview, Admiralty 31. Interview, Mong Kok 5. “Sanxia bama liushou zuo zinv houdun” (Parents under the umbrella stay to back up their children), Apple Daily, November 9, 2014. I counted the numbers in November and December. “82 shui popo jianshou” (A 82-year-old lady stayed), Hong Kong Economic Journal, December 12, 2014. Interviews, Admiralty 3 and 7. Castells, Networks of Outrage and Hope, p. 193. Maisha Fabliha Shahid, “Adelante, con todas las Fuerzas de la Historia”: An Exploration of the Chilean Student Movement for Education Reform within Its National and International Contexts,” Manuscript, May 2014, http://surface. syr.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1814&context=honors_capstone. Tai Yiu-ting estimated that the Occupy Central Movement raised about HK$7 million, but most of it had been spent. The electric referendum on June 22, 2014, was the largest expenditure. Guo Hongli, “Zhanzhong Dai Yaoting: gang you fazhi, daya you ge pu” (Tai Yiu-ting: Hong Kong has law, and repression has a limit), Mingpao, December 15, 2014. “Zhanzhong qidong, you zhengzong kaishi” (Occupy Central started from occupying the government headquarters), Mingpao, September 28, 2014. Interviews, Admiralty 27, 31, and 35. “Zhanzhong yiliao dui 3500 ren” (The medical team of the Occupy Movement has 3,500 members), Mingpao, October 1, 2014. “ ‘Zhan’ lengqing, peng kong ban” (The number of occupiers decreases, half of the tents are empty), Wenweipo, November 10, 2014. My estimation was that at least 50 percent were empty during the night toward the end of the movement.

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59 “Hong Kong Protests: Instant Architecture and the Occupy Central ‘Village,’ ” Straits Time, October 23, 2014. 60 Interviews, Admiralty 15, 22, and 31. 61 Conversation 7. 62 “Hong Kong Protests,” Straits Time. 63 Interview, Admiralty 33. 64 Zhong Jianyi, “Volunteers Uphold Humanitarianism and Responsibility.” 65 Zheng Yingying and Xiao Huihao, “Zhan zhong qu zijizizu, wuzi gou guodong” (At the protest site in Admiralty, supplies are enough for the winter), Mingpao, November 2, 2014. 66 But the police stopped the transportation. “Zhanling zhe yangyan bu chezou bola” (Occupiers say they will not leave unless the police drag them away), Oriental Daily, November 11, 2014. 67 “Shiweizhe youjie wuhuan, wuzizhan que liang shui” (Protestors did not return what they borrowed; protest sites lack food and water), Oriental Daily, November 1, 2014. 68 Interviews, Admiralty 37, 39. 69 Zheng and Xiao, “At the protest site in Admiralty, supplies are enough for the winter.” 70 “Jing luangun da shangzhe, jiuhu bian jiuren bian tui” (Police beat people randomly, medical volunteers took care of the injured while retreating), Mingpao, December 2, 2014. 71 Occupiers had decided that if the government came to clear out the site, they would simply walk away and leave all the facilities there. Interview, Admiralty 2. 72 For example, during lunch time, some working people took lunch to the study area for a gathering. 73 “61 ge zhouye” (61 days and nights), Mingpao, December 11, 2014. 74 Talks with movement participants and journalists. 75 Xie Mengyao, “Jiucha duizhang Guo Shaojie jianzheng zhanling qu bianhuan” (Guo Shaojie, the head of the marshal team, witnesses the changes in the occupied area), Asian Weekly, November 23, 2014, pp. 46–47. 76 “Hong Kong Protests,” Straits Time. 77 She Jinghong, “Jinzhong zhandui fengong, zhouye shouwei qianxian” (Labor division among the occupiers in Admiralty, guarding the protest site around the clock), Apple Daily, October 28, 2014. 78 Zhang Jiawen and Cai Yuangui, “Huoyaowei yue nong, renxin yue jianding” (Protestors become more determined as the situation becomes more risky), Apple Daily, November 14, 2014. 79 Interview, Mong Kok 4. 80 Clifford Lo, Peter So, and Emily Tsang, “Pro-democracy banner hung from Lion Rock has officials scrambling,” South China Morning Post, October 24, 2014. 81 The National Education Bureau, Jingxin dongpo de 56 tian (“A soul-stirring 56 days”) (Beijing: Dadi chubanshe, 1989), p. 153. 82 Oberschall, Social Conflicts and Social Movements, p. 144. 83 David Snow and Robert Benford, “Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization,” International Social Movement Research, vol. 1, no. 1 (1988), pp. 197–217. 84 Ibid. 85 “Nvgong bai guandi xiang, zi tao qianyuan zheng puxuan” (A female worker put a picture of Guan Yu, spending a thousand dollars on finding for democracy), Mingpao, October 10, 2014. 86 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 143.

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87 He Xueying, “Zhanling qu de kongjian zhengzhi” (The political space in the occupied area), Mingpao, November 9, 2014. 88 Ines Pousadela, “Student Protest, Social Mobilization and Political Representation in Chile,” Manuscript, http://paperroom.ipsa.org/papers/paper_11698. pdf, accessed January 12, 2015. 89 Gaston Rimlinger, “The Legitimation of Protest: A Comparative Study in Labor History (1960),” in Joseph Gusfield (ed.), Protest: Reform, and Revolt (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1970), pp. 363–376. 90 See the Web site of Apple Daily, www.appledaily.com.tw/realtimenews/article/ new/20141005/482253, accessed October 7, 2014. 91 TVB news, October 25, 2014. http://news.tvb.com/local/544b2e576db28cf 723000001, accessed October 28, 2014. 92 Author’s collection. 93 Interview, Admiralty 11. 94 Interview, Admiralty 3. 95 Interview, Admiralty 8. 96 Interview, Admiralty 28. 97 “Qian duiyuan: jiucha zhuren qianjin xu jiesan” (Former member: The marshal team prevented action and should be dismantled), Apple Daily, November 21, 2014. 98 Interview, Admiralty 27. 99 Author’s collection. 100 Interview, Admiralty 10. 101 See the Web site of Radio Television Hong Kong, http://rthk.hk/rthk/news/ expressnews/20141106/news_20141106_55_1051485.htm, accessed November 8, 2014. 102 Yang Weiheng, “Zhanzhong shiweizhe xiang shanghu jugong zhixie” (Occupiers in Causeway bow to shops to apologize), Singtao Daily, December 10, 2014. 103 “Qi cheng liushou zhe bu xinren zhengfu rangbu” (70 percent of those who stay do not believe that the government will compromise), Mingpao, October 21, 2014. 104 Interview, Mong Kok 7. 105 Interview, Admiralty 18. 106 Shirley Zhao, “ ‘It’s Not Fun’: Occupy Protester Tells of Sacrifices in the Name of Democracy,” South China Morning Post, October 30, 2014. 107 Frances Piven and Richard Cloward, Poor People’s Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), p. 4. 108 James Davis, “Toward a Theory of Revolution,” American Sociological Review, vol. 27, no. 1 (1962), pp. 5–19. 109 McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency; Tarrow, Power in Movement; Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (New York: Random House, 1978). 110 Charles Kurzman, “Structural Opportunity and Perceived Opportunity in Social-Movement Theory: The Iranian Revolution of 1979,” American Sociological Review, vol. 61, no. 1 (1996), pp. 153–170. 111 Interview, Admiralty 5. 112 Susanne Lohmann, “The Dynamics of Information Cascades: The Monday Demonstration in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989–1991,” World Politics, vol. 47, no. 1 (1994), pp. 42–101. 113 Interview, Admiralty, 14, 22, and 34. 114 Interview, Admiralty 13. 115 Zhong Jianyi, “Shao Jiazhen: yao ba zhanling yundong dai chu guangchang” (Shiu Ka Chun: Extending the Occupy Movement to communities), Hong Kong Economic Journal, November 3, 2014.

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116 Joseph Gusfield, “Introduction: A Definition of the Subject,” in Joseph Gusfield (ed.), Protest: Reform, and Revolt (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1970), pp. 1–8. 117 Meredith Hoffman, “Protesters Debate What Demands, if Any, to Make,” New York Times, October 16, 2011. 118 “The Rise and Fall of Occupy Wall Street, Part 2: The Journey Is the Destination,” see http://avery.morrow.name/blog/2011/10/, accessed December 20, 2014. 119 Interview, Admiralty 36. 120 Zhong Jianyi, “Tongluowan zhanling zhe duo buman fanming” (Occupiers in Causeway Bay are generally not satisfied with the pan-democratic camp), Hong Kong Economic Journal, December 8, 2014. 121 Interview, Causeway Bay 3.

5

Leadership of the movement

Participants can end a sustained movement in several ways. First, they achieve their claims sometimes through negotiation with the movement’s target (i.e., the government). For example, high school and college students and other social groups in Hong Kong stopped their protests against the government after the government suspended the national education plan in 2012 (Chapter 2). Second, movement participants can claim that they have achieved (some of ) their goals. Students in the 2014 Sunflower Movement in Taiwan stopped occupying the Legislature Chamber after receiving assurance that the trade pact with the Chinese mainland would not pass without due process.1 Third, participants can force the government to respond by making concessions or using repression (Chapter 6). Ending a movement through negotiation or self-made justifications is feasible only if the decision is binding to the majority of participants. A collective decision is either impossible or infeasible without a consensus within the leadership or between the leadership and most of the participants. For example, some student leaders during the 1989 Tiananmen movement proposed to stop the occupation of the square before the bloody repression. Student leaders of the Autonomous Union of Colleges in Beijing held a meeting on May 21 to discuss whether the students should retreat. The leaders eventually made a decision through voting when the discussion proved inconclusive. A total of 32 (67 percent) voted for retreat, 14 opposed it, and two abstained from voting. The majority of the participants supported the retreat. But the decision was not binding to the occupiers in the square, especially those who came to Beijing from other cities. The continual occupation eventually resulted in a bloody repression.2 The leadership of the Occupy Movement faced the same challenge in decision making and coordination of action because of its lack of representativeness and authority. This chapter explains the causes and implications of the weak leadership in the occupation movement by discussing the emergence of leaders in the movement and the modes of decision making. The weak leadership contributed to the standoff between the government and the protestors. On one hand, the leadership had difficulty achieving consensus regarding movement strategies among themselves and among the rank-and-file participants. The leadership never agreed to retreat. Those who favored retreating were unable to persuade others to do the same. Although the three cofounders and pan-democrats

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wanted the protestors to retreat, the students did not agree. On the other hand, the leadership failed to create strategies that would help end the movement or would be accepted by the leadership members and the rank and file, such as those determined participants discussed in the previous chapter.

Movement leaders and decision making The importance of leaders to social movements is manifold. Oberschall writes, “Leaders, in sum, are the architects of organization, ideology, and mobilization for the movement.”3 A movement may not need strong leadership if its participants have staged it only to make their claims known. However, movements that bring about changes often require leadership because it helps frame grievances, formulates strategies, obtains external support, inspires and attracts participants, and negotiates with the targeted authority. Killian holds that mass dissatisfaction in the absence of leadership leads only to “sporadic crowd behavior” through which “people give vent to their feelings, but do not really attempt to change the social order.”4 Oberschall argues that, although riots and precipitating incidents can be leaderless, “a continuous movement of protest that seeks to obtain wide reforms . . . presupposes both leaders and considerable organization.”5 Therefore, a movement may be sustained but is not necessarily powerful without a strong leadership or coordination body.

Emergence of movement leaders Leadership emerges from movements in several ways. First, some movements are initiated by preexisting organizations (i.e., labor unions), and organization leaders become movement leaders. Second, leaders are elected after the movement commences. The leaders or coordinators in the Chilean student movement, as discussed later, were elected by the participants. This mode of leader selection grants more legitimacy to the leaders, but it is feasible only if the participants, to some degree, are organized to make the election outcome binding. Third, movement activists emerge as leaders after the movement starts without being elected by participants or a majority of the participants. They may organize an election among some of the participants to form a leadership. Some activists become leaders because they have more media exposure and therefore gain influence among the participants, and others form a leadership by themselves and gain recognition because of the lack of competition. In movements that are not preplanned, the emergence of activists and leaders is indispensible to sustaining the movement, which requires coordination. For example, informal organizations emerged from the 2010–2011 Tunisian revolution after the movement started without leaders. The responsibilities of these organizations included taking care of logistics and enforcing rules about engaging in debates at the square. Discussions should be polite, respectful, and free from shouting. Everybody was entitled to express an opinion but had to follow a time limit for others to have a chance to speak.6 Students and other social groups

Leadership of the movement 101 in Taiwan carried out the Sunflower Movement between March 18 and April 10, 2014, to oppose the passing of the trade pact with the Chinese mainland by occupying the Legislative Chamber. Leaders of preexisting civil organizations began to appear before the media after the commencement of the movement. These activists then formed a nine-member decision-making committee using the criterion that all members had substantial experience as movement leaders. Students and groups without such experience were all at the outermost periphery of the decision-making process, although the number of participating groups and nongovernmental organizations exceeded 50.7 The leaders of the 1989 Tiananmen movement emerged in various ways. Student activists formed the Beijing University Autonomous Student Union Preparatory Committee on April 19. “Anyone who had the courage to get up, give his name, his major, and what class he was in” automatically became a leader of the organization.8 The Beijing Students’ Autonomous Union Preparatory Committee was established on April 23, and more than 40 students from 21 universities participated, electing five standing members of the committee. This organization became the Beijing Students’ Autonomous Union on April 28. Nevertheless, new leadership groups kept emerging as the movement continued, resulting in the shift of power or influence among competing leadership groups. The sources of legitimacy and authority of the leaders differ because of the manner in which the leadership emerges. Elected leaders derive legitimacy from popular support, and self-proclaimed leaders must control resources or face weak rivals. Leaders also need to have charisma, which can help overcome weak organizations in the movement. Oberschall argues that “a charismatic leader can build a cohesive movement by directly orienting the loyalties and commitments of members to himself personally rather than through the groups and group leaders that were in existence at the time of the creation of the movement.”9 Movement leadership becomes weak if it does not have enough representativeness, resources, or charisma. Individuals become leaders for different reasons: personality, personal benefits, policy preferences, and community pressure. Perhaps the true reason is known only to the leaders themselves. Assuming leadership in a collective action brings material or nonmaterial benefits to the leaders. Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Young believe that “a leader might derive some pleasure simply from being the head of the administrative apparatus required to make collections and supply collective goods.”10 However, leaders may also confront anticipated and unanticipated risks while failing to benefit more from the movement than participants do. Oberschall points out a series of difficulties faced by leaders: They cannot invoke institutionalized sanctions to have their decisions implemented. . . . Their positions are continuously open to challenge by lesser leaders who seek to replace them. They are often persecuted, arrested, killed, or have to spend a good part of their life in exile or in hiding, making it difficult for them to conduct an orderly personal and family life. . . . Often their best friends and early associates later turn against them over the questions of strategy and ideology.11

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For example, some activists fled China and others were jailed after the 1989 Tiananmen movement was defeated. Leaders of the Occupy Movement in Hong Kong faced harassment and threats. Tai Yiu-ting and Chan Chin-man received a number of death threats because they initiated the Occupy Movement. Chan said, “Once I participate in the movement, I understand that they will attack me and treat me as an enemy.”12 Therefore, altruism is one of the reasons for the emergence of leaders. Chong suggests that “what is typically required is a core of highly dedicated, extremely moral – some might say extremely ‘irrational’ – individuals who are willing to assume leadership roles and to constitute in effect the critical mass that instigates the growth of collective action.”13 Therefore, individuals may have to make sacrifices when they become leaders of movements that do not bring them greater benefits.

Decision making An important issue related to leadership in social movements is decision making. A democratic decision can be made by widely involving the leaders and participants or their representatives. This method is legitimate but can be slow. Alternatively, the leadership can make decisions with or without consulting the participants or their representatives. Without the participation of participants, the decision may lack legitimacy, which usually elicits resentment and initiates separation among the participants. Nevertheless, this mode can be more efficient than the others in a fast-changing environment. For example, the nondemocratic process caused grievances in the Sunflower Movement because the leadership made decisions without consulting the majority of the participants. About 20 student participants refused to accept the leadership and established a “Liberation Zone of the Untouchables” outside the legislature to represent the “deprived” or the “unheard voices” at the bottom of society.14 However, the movement’s leaders claimed the need to make quick decisions to address adversarial attacks and prevent leaks.15 Opposition to the elite’s dominance in movements was also a reason for the refusal of the Occupy Wall Street Movement to accept leaders. Nevertheless, democratic and effective decision making is not always impossible. The case of student protests in Chile between 2011 and 2012 is an illuminating example of how a strong organization, a democratic mode of decision making, and a capable coordinating group can create a sustained and effective movement. This case is a striking contrast to the Occupy Movement in terms of organizational strength and decision making. These cases are worth comparing. The direct cause of this student movement was the undesirable consequences of the government’s marketization of education in Chile from the 1980s. First, the poor quality of the new secondary and tertiary institutions, some of which were profit driven, was partly due to poor supervision. As a result, employers were reluctant to hire their graduates, which caused the graduates to harbor strong grievances. Second, the decrease in public funds and the increase in education fees became a heavy burden on students, “making Chilean education one of the most expensive ones in the world (relative to its population’s income).”16

Leadership of the movement 103 Secondary school students started a protest campaign as early as 2006. The protest was called a “penguin protest” because the colors of the students’ high school uniforms were similar to those of penguins. The campaign demanded an end to the municipal administration of schools and changes in school curricula. This protest was short-lived and less successful. One reason for the failure was that the government made small concessions and created a divide among protestors. “With a seat at the table, the students grew complacent and divided, and contentiousness within the group overrode the propensity to unite under common causes and demands.”17 This outcome confirms Piven and Cloward’s suggestion that the presence of certain organizers could weaken the militancy of the movement.18 The students learned this lesson in their protests from 2011 onward. A new round of protests started in April 2011, with about 8,000 students taking to the streets. Large demonstrations, strikes, and university occupations with a significant number of participants continued throughout May. Protests then spread to the whole country and were joined by primary and secondary schoolteachers. The mobilization of university students, teachers, high school students, and workers grew by July, which was after the government’s promise of increased educational investment was considered inadequate. Protestors called for significant changes within the Ministry of Education. The minister of education faced increasing pressure from the protests and was removed in July.19 However, the students did not cease their protests because they perceived the government’s concessions as insufficient, and the progress toward honoring the promise was slow. This movement’s scale and frequency of collective action appeared to be unusual. At least 18 demonstrations or strikes were recorded, and six of them each had more than 200,000 participants.20 Existing research has identified several major causes that sustained the movement. First, the movement’s organizational strength was characterized by the strong mobilization and coordination capacity of the organizations. Student participants were recruited through campus networks. Moreover, the movement attracted teachers and workers who also belonged to “bloc recruitments”; that is, they were recruited through networks or memberships in existing organizations.21 Thus, the participants were mobilized by their associations. The students managed to maintain the movement’s momentum because of civil society organizations that served as important peripheral supporters of the movement. Therefore, the movement successfully established horizontal linkages to other social groups and had the ability to recruit new participants from many universities and high schools.22 Students collaborated with teachers’ unions, labor unions, and environmentalists, and expanded movement goals, that is, the broad criticisms of the social costs of neoliberalism.23 Second, the coordinating organization of the movement was effective. The movement was coordinated by the Confederation of Chilean Students, which included representatives of student associations from about 30 public and private universities. Representatives were elected in periodical elections by the corresponding student population to enable fluid rotations in leadership positions.24

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The students were able to use an established and effective mobilization structure in the confederation, and the structure enabled strong leadership and democratic decision making. Third, the decision making of the movement was legitimate and could maintain the movement’s momentum. Elections granted legitimacy to student representatives, and the legitimacy of the decision making in relation to movement development came from the wide participation of participants. Instead of making decisions on mobilization efforts and political actions in a top-down manner, the various universities, campuses, and even departments are all involved. Each department within each participating university has its designated leaders who are responsible for collecting input and feedback from students, and concerns or proposals are discussed in meetings among leaders. Instead of passing decisions down a chain of command, ideas and initiatives are collectively discussed and brought forth for the grassroots level.25 Campus referendums and student representative meetings were common tools that movements used for organization and mobilization. Therefore, major decisions had to be supported by the rank-and-file student bodies. Movement representatives summoned students to regional and national assemblies after meeting with government authorities. The representatives presented and discussed proposals until a decision was made. Democracy created “highly participative environments.”26 When decisions were made, planned actions were disseminated largely through the use of new social media (i.e., Twitter). Democratically made decisions were also enforceable because of their legitimacy. Thus, the movement’s scale of participation was sustained and appeared powerful. Nationwide protests and strikes were common throughout the movement, with some of the protests and strikes involving a significant number of participants. In contrast, the Occupy Movement differed from the Chilean case in terms of leadership, organizational strength, mobilization of participants (Chapters 3 and 4), and decision making. The Occupy Movement was sustained not because the coordination group was strong and effective but because it was weak, unlike that of the Chilean student movement.

Leadership of the Occupy Movement The Occupy Movement featured a leadership group with limited authority and coordination power. Some participants claimed that the occupation had been “a mass movement without leaders.”27 However, the emergence of the coordination group was inevitable because of the need to manage logistics and to negotiate and interact with the government or other parties. The coordination or leadership group of the Occupy Movement comprised of five parties: the three cofounders, the pan-democratic parties, the HKFS, Scholarism, and the representatives from approximately 18 social groups.28 The leadership of the Occupy Movement was not elected, unlike that of the Chilean case, and it came from the

Leadership of the movement 105 preexisting organizations. The three cofounders who proposed and prepared to occupy Central were supposed to be the movement’s leaders. The HKFS and Scholarism started the strike that triggered the earlier commencement of the Occupy Movement. Social groups helped the student leaders toward the end of the strike in late September when they were arrested.29 The pan-democratic parties and social groups were supposed to have two representatives, and the students were supposed to have three to four representatives. However, the number of meeting attendants was not fixed. The representatives of the pan-democratic parties were usually the party leaders or legislators. A large number of pan-democrats attended the meetings because they did not want others to represent them. This phenomenon was also observed in the HKFS. Some meetings were attended by a larger number of student leaders, whereas other meetings were attended only by its secretary-general.30 However, the number of participants increased when these parties became aware that more attendees meant more influence.31 The loosely organized coordination group of the Occupy Movement was determined by its self-assigned role. This group served as a platform for communicating and exchanging views about the movement instead of serving as a decision-making body.32 Therefore, the group had not made pre-agreed decision-making rules. However, the movement’s decisions had some influence because some participants still perceived this group as the representative of the movement. Consensus building was the decision-making method among the group. A proposal had to be agreed upon by most or all people involved in the discussion. Therefore, the leadership never promoted the proposal to retreat because that option was not agreed upon by everyone who attended the discussion.33 The HKFS increased its influence as the movement continued. The Occupy Movement was initially planned by its three cofounders, but the protestors did not occupy Central. The students became more influential than the three cofounders partly because of the decision of the latter to retreat. Some people from the political circle had a meeting with the three cofounders after September 28. One of the three cofounders, Chiu Yiu-ming, said that Leung Chun-ying should step down from office to end the protest. The three cofounders were subsequently invited to attend a dialogue with the government. However, the students had written an open letter to Carrie Lam, the chief secretary of the Hong Kong government, asking for a dialogue. Thus, the three cofounders decided to assist the movement and allow the students to have a dialogue with Carrie Lam on behalf of the other participants.34 The dialogue that occurred on October 21 is discussed later. The pan-democratic parties had a small leadership role during the movement. Unlike the students, the politicians focused on public opinion and constituent support. The pan-democrats had a weak influence on the student representatives, similar to the three cofounders. A pan-democratic legislator admitted that their camp had limited influence on decision making. The camp was not deeply involved in decision making because it wanted to make the movement purely a student movement. “In order to avoid the impression that the pan-democratic

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camp wants to reap political benefits [from the movement], the camp instead assumed a supporting role in the movement. Therefore, the contribution of pandemocratic parties to the movement is unknown to the public.”35 The legislator claimed that the student leaders played important roles in the movement but were sometimes unwilling to accept suggestions. Therefore, people from the democratic camp complained that they “had no influence in the decision making, but were still responsible for the consequences of the movement.”36 Nevertheless, student leaders encountered problems while assuming the leadership role. A student leader said that they were not fully prepared to lead the movement.37 Another student leader admitted that a significant mistake the students committed was failing to form a large alliance of leadership at the beginning of the movement. The absence of this alliance turned the HKFS into the actual leading body of the movement. This role overburdened the student leaders and drastically slowed down the decision-making process, as the students engaged in time-consuming consultations with pan-democrats and social groups after making a decision. Moreover, decision making within the student leadership was also based on consensus, which took time and implied a minority to reject the preference of the majority.38 A student leader indicated that the students became the target of blame by both the radical and moderate protestors after the retreat of the three cofounders. These protestors were dissatisfied with the movement, but the HKFS could not please everyone. Student leaders were under great pressure after they became the focus of the media and public attention.39 The leadership group faced a series of challenges throughout the movement in achieving representativeness or legitimacy, building an internal consensus, coordinating the activities of protestors, and formulating strategies. The leadership group was unable to exercise sufficient influence on the protestors because of its limited authority. But the group still needed to face the expectations of some participants to sustain the movement and achieve success despite the constraints.

Limited authority A major problem with the five-party leadership was its lack representativeness and authority. A large number of political and social groups had joined the movement, including pro-democracy groups, environmentalists, trade unions, labor groups, groups opposing the development plans of the government, and groups fighting for retirement welfare.40 However, not all were represented in the five-party leadership group or were publicly visible.41 Many of these protestors also self-mobilized after the police used tear gas. They did not feel obligated to follow the leadership because they did not have any ties with the movement’s organizers or organizations. Therefore, the legitimacy of the leadership group was questioned. After the Occupy Movement, the claim “you do not represent me” became common among some occupiers who disagreed with the peaceful approach of the moderators. According to a survey of 285 participants at the three protest sites on October 16 and 17, about 75 percent felt that the movement did not have a leadership

Leadership of the movement 107 group and less than 20 percent reported that the movement was led by the two student associations or its three cofounders. More than 50 percent of the participants believed that a leadership group should exist, and 25 percent reported that they did not accept the leadership of the two student associations or the three cofounders.42 Thus, neither the three cofounders nor the student leaders had sufficient authority to deal with the participants, especially the non-student protestors. The pan-democratic parties faced the same difficulty. A former legislator from the pan-democratic camp admitted that some protestors did not trust political parties and believed that these parties were motivated only to reap benefits for themselves.43

Defiant participants Protestors were not well coordinated after the movement commenced. For example, some protestors blocked an entrance to the government headquarters and prevented civil servants from going to work. The police successfully persuaded a group of protestors rallying near the office of the chief executive to retreat, but the place was soon re-occupied by another group who claimed that the previous group did not represent them. The influence of leaders is limited in decentralized movements. Conservative leaders often lose their appeal among participants because they face self-selected participants who prefer highly aggressive or radical proposals. The three cofounders in the Occupy Movement lost their authority after the movement began. After the government agreed to have a dialogue with the students on October 4, Tai Yiu-ting believed that the protestors should open one of the occupied roads to show their faith in the government. However, the road was occupied by protestors from People Power and scores of students from a political group from City University. Both groups were beyond the influence of the HKFS. These protestors ignored the persuasions of Tai Yiu-ting and a pan-democratic legislator to open the road. Tai’s request was declined when he approached the leader of People Power for mediation.44 The leadership group had limited influence over some of the protestors even in Admiralty, where the protestors came from different political groups or backgrounds and had their own respective bases at the protest site.45 Chan Chin-man admitted on October 1 that the participants occupying certain areas in Admiralty had self-mobilized and were not influenced by the movement organizers or the leadership. The HKFS acknowledged on October 9 that the students were unable to lead the movement, although they were the main force of the movement. A student leader of the HKFS announced that it was up to the protestors themselves to decide whether to stay, and that the HKFS would not urge occupiers to retreat.46 The leadership’s weak influence was more apparent at other protest sites, particularly in Mong Kok. The Occupy Movement deviated from what the three cofounders had planned because the participants occupied the streets in Mong Kok and Causeway Bay. The cofounders hoped that the occupiers in these places would stop and move to the protest site in Admiralty, as the occupation of the

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Table 5.1 Answers to the question of “whether you support moving to Admiralty and having a concentrated occupation”

Admiralty Mong Kok Causeway Bay

Number

Agree (%)

Do not agree (%)

Cannot tell (%)

215 38 32

34.9 13.2 12.5

48.8 57.9 62.5

16.3 28.9 25.0

Source: Mingpao, October 21, 2014.

streets in Mong Kok and Causeway Bay caused residents and businesses much inconvenience. However, they had no authority or influence over the occupiers in these two places (see Table 5.1).47 The occupiers claimed to have fought hard to gain these territories and thus had no reason to retreat.48 Indeed, the protest site in Causeway Bay was a forgotten area because of its small size.49 The protestors in Mong Kok came from a number of different groups, including Civic Passion and People Power. These two groups are considered aggressive or radical. These protestors were not interested in being represented by the students and did not welcome the students to their protest site in Mong Kok.50 Civic Passion was formed in 2012 and consisted of members with a strong sense of local identity and a hostile attitude toward the mainlanders. The group has become known for its radicalism due to its philosophy, strategy, or both. Unlike the students and many other participants in Admiralty who were seen as moderate, this group did not believe in the effectiveness of a peaceful or nonviolent action. Thus, these radical groups were unlikely to accept moderate leaders and their nonviolent approach.51 Many participants in Mong Kok were not members of the two radical groups but seemed to be under their influence.52 The coordination between the students in Admiralty and the protestors in Mong Kok was limited because of their differences. The protestors in Mong Kok claimed that the “HKFS does not represent us” and had no interest in cooperating with the student leaders. The HKFS planned to hold meetings on October 12 at the three protest sites to discuss how the movement should proceed. However, they were refused by the protestors in Mong Kok, who believed that the protest site was their territory. They announced that they would treat the students who came to hold the meeting in Mong Kok the way they treated the police, and claimed that “3 o’clock in the afternoon is the death time for the HKFS.” HKFS leaders had been surrounded by scores of people before they began the meeting in Mong Kok. These people held a banner saying, “The peaceful dismantling of the HKFS is warmly welcomed.” Arguments ensued between these two groups.53 The student leaders harbored grievances against the radical protestors (i.e., members of Civic Passion) because they weakened the movement’s leadership and damaged the movement’s image. The radical protestors accused the movement’s leaders of being an undemocratic leadership that claimed to be democratic or being an incapable leadership that started a movement without achieving anything. These challenges to and labeling of the leadership were “highly detrimental

Leadership of the movement 109 to the umbrella movement.”54 Other student leaders blamed the radical protestors for being irresponsible.55 Defiant participants are common in loosely organized or spontaneous movements. Both movement leaders and supportive intellectuals in the 1989 Tiananmen movement failed to stop the hunger strike. When a few student activists decided to stage the hunger strike, the Beijing Students’ Autonomous Union tried to stop them. A union leader blamed a few activists for abusing the name of the Union, but an activist “jumped with the rejoinder ‘Do you still believe that the autonomous union has authority over students?’ ”56 Movement organizations had decreasing capacity to control the movement since the rise of the strike. Supportive intellectuals similarly failed to persuade the students to retreat. A total of 12 intellectuals made an urgent appeal to the protestors on May 14 and sincerely hoped that the students would uphold their rational approach in the movement and temporarily retreat from the square to work for the long-term interests of the country, to prevent unnecessary sacrifices, and to make the summit between the Soviet Union leader and the Chinese leaders possible.57 However, their appeal was also ignored. Defiant participants often create difficulties for both movement leaders and movement targets. On one hand, they make it difficult for movement leaders to coordinate a collective action or make a compromise. On the other hand, they also increase the difficulty for the movement target to deal with protestors. Therefore, the consequence of defiant participants’ behavior is uncertain. For example, the hunger strike in the 1989 Tiananmen movement generated significant pressure on the Chinese government, but “it also sowed the seeds for martial law and the final military crackdown.”58

Attempts to abolish the movement’s authority The protest site in Admiralty was different from those in Mong Kok and Causeway Bay. A main stage was set up at the Admiralty protest site where movement leaders and participants could deliver their speeches. A stage and an order-keeping team were established in Causeway Bay when the movement started but were dismantled in mid-October after a discussion. The occupiers in Causeway Bay held irregular gatherings instead to discuss the direction of the movement and record the views of the people for open reference. The stage in Mong Kok was also taken down. Both sites had more “democracy,” that is, the participants had more opportunities to engage in a free discussion on various issues.59 The main stage in Admiralty was considered a symbol of leadership and power, and it was challenged as the movement continued. This stage was primarily criticized for representing authority instead of democracy. Speakers on the stage were selected or perceived as controlled by certain groups, particularly by the students and pan-democratic parties.60 Other participants felt that they were denied the chance to give free speeches on that stage. Thus, some of them assumed that the people who controlled the stage in Admiralty monopolized the discourse. One young protestor said that different groups in Mong Kok could formulate their

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own views, which they would discuss together. Conversely, the stage in Admiralty was similar to an imperial forum. The protestor said, “Each one has his or her way of protesting. If you do not agree, you just do not join. How can you stop others from going? How can you use a speaker to accuse others? The stage should be a place to disseminate information about the movement rather than a place where you could sing songs and win applause for yourselves.”61 The challenge to the leadership was partly attributed to the stalemate the occupation caused, which depressed some of the participants. The radical protestors began to criticize the movement’s leadership for preventing action. The online discussion forum hkgolden.com is a platform for radical people. The following comment on this forum reflects their view: The Umbrella Revolution was initially passion-provoking, but is now riddled with internal conflicts. The participants claim no leadership, but this revolution is actually controlled by the leadership. The marshal team helps make the movement drag on and is helping the Chinese government repress people with different opinions. Therefore, the members of this team are traitors. These people do not understand the current situation in Hong Kong, which is similar to a village in the Yuan Dynasty where a few soldiers killed thousands of villagers who were lined up and waited to be killed. I do not pity those weak-hearted people who deserve natural elimination.62 Attempts were made to dismantle the main stage in Admiralty, especially when the movement suffered setbacks that caused grievances among the radical protestors. Dozens of protestors, some of whom wore masks, answered an online call on the night of November 20 to confront the leadership of the movement and marched to the main stage at 8 o’clock. The radical protestors carried placards stating, “You do not represent us,” and, “If the stage remains, the marshal team must be disbanded.” They also shouted at the speakers on the stage. One person said, “We have not been allowed to express our views freely on stage. . . . If we say something that the emcees do not like, they then add their comments later to ‘correct’ our speech.”63 The radical participants also protested the marshal team in Admiralty. The team was considered unnecessary or even a hurdle to the protest activities. Some people began to attack the Legislative Council building on November 19 (see Chapter 6). The supporters of these protestors went to the main stage to seek help. However, they were stopped by the marshal team members and were injured during the confrontation. Radical protestors claimed that no one should have the right to overrule others in a social movement, especially as the marshal team was not elected by the participants.64 However, the moderators saw the radicals as irresponsible and destructive “troublemakers.” They filmed those who caused trouble and later held them accountable.65 Others believed that the stage was a symbol of solidarity and should not be dismantled. According to a member of the marshal team in Admiralty, “No movement can be carried out without organization. That would be

Leadership of the movement 111 anarchy where you cannot prevent conflict, and you will see more arguments.”66 He believed that the establishment of the stage was useful, and that everyone had the freedom to join the discussion. Those who wanted to listen could go to the stage. Those who disliked the stage could hold a forum nearby. He admitted that the marshal team had to deal with the drunken, anti-movement people, the Chinese mainlanders who would tear apart their posters, and the triad members, all of whom could be easily dealt with because they were identifiable. The protestors who were difficult to deal with were those who claimed to be supporters of the movement. These people claimed that they were attempting to escalate the action. “However, the escalation has damaged, rather than promoted, the movement because the attack [on the Legislative Council building] weakened the public support for the movement.”67 The leaders and legislators of the pan-democracy parties generally believed that the lack of a strong coordinating group was a major weakness of the Occupy Movement. A former pan-democracy legislator said, “If a movement does not have a coordination group, a stage, a marshal team, or an organization, how can it be sustained?”68 Others believed that the lack of a coordinating group “impeded consensus building, induced internal attrition, and increased difficulty to continue and end the movement.”69 The dispute over the main stage largely reflected the protestors’ division due to the movement’s strategies and the frustration from the lasting but fruitless occupation. Some protestors were reluctant to radically escalate the action, whereas others believed that the occupation was futile and that more radical approaches should be taken. The challenges to the main stage generally occurred after an escalated action failed. Some protestors again attempted to dismantle the stage in Admiralty after the escalated action the student leaders initiated on November 30 failed. The internal conflict among the protestors damaged the solidarity and image of the movement and undermined the morale of the participants.

Problems with decision making Very few influential events had been coordinated by the five-party leadership during the movement because of its limited authority to enforce decisions and the difficulty in making decisions. While consensus building within the leadership group proved difficult, communication between the leadership and the rank and file was rough. The democratic procedures in decision making used in the Chilean student movement were never tried in the Occupy Movement partly because this movement was initially not well organized.

Lack of consensus on retreating The divide among the students, the three cofounders, and the pan-democracy legislators was an open secret throughout the Occupy Movement.70 The three cofounders and the pan-democracy legislators were more moderate and paid attention to public opinion. The two student associations and the representatives

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of social groups were more insistent.71 The leadership group lacked consensus on the movement’s strategies and did not agree to the conditions for retreating from the occupation unless the government compromised. The minority could overrule the preferences of the majority because the decision making of the group was based on consensus.72 A student leader admitted that the proposal to retreat could not be passed if a single member of the leadership group opposed such action. Thus, retreating was never enforced in the latter stage of the movement, although the majority of the five-party leadership group supported the proposal to retreat.73 The students refused to retreat for complex reasons. First, the evolution of the movement excluded retreating as an option. Right after the movement started, the students focused on the dialogue with the government to be held on October 21. Thus, retreating was not an option before the dialogue.74 Second, the students and other determined protestors believed that retreating without any success was considered a failure. Some student leaders reportedly set a bottom line, in which the Hong Kong government would submit a supplementary report to the central government and publish a timeline on the real suffrage of the chief executive.75 After the unsuccessful dialogue, the students’ priority was to find other ways to put pressure on the government. They had tried to formulate other strategies, such as appealing directly to the central government in November. After their trip to Beijing was stopped, the protestors became frustrated and became even more unlikely to retreat.76 Third, the two student associations needed to pay significant attention to the attitude of the determined participants to maintain their representativeness, legitimacy, and leadership role in the movement, because the determined participants were considered the protest stalwarts.77 The student leaders were also under moral pressure. They did not want to disappoint the people who had come out to support and protect them.78 Some occupiers still refused to follow even if the two student associations had been willing to retreat.79 Moreover, some people considered the students’ retreat an unfavorable option if the determined participants refused to retreat, as the radical forces would take the place of the students. If the radical groups had become the movement’s leaders, “the consequences could be disastrous for Hong Kong.”80 Student leaders themselves admitted the likely radicalization of protest if they had retreated.81 The student leaders, the three cofounders, and the pan-democracy parties also differed in their views about the direction and strategies of the movement. Chiu Yiu-ming admitted that some students proposed to storm the office of the chief executive on October 2 and asked the three cofounders to join after the movement commenced. Chiu was upset by this proposal and believed that such an activity violated their intention of a peaceful occupation.82 However, the students claimed that they should escalate their actions because the timing was good.83 The student leaders and the three cofounders had difficulty persuading each other throughout the movement. The three cofounders initially planned to turn themselves in one week after the commencement of the movement. This plan did not materialize because the students and the government were willing to have a

Leadership of the movement 113 dialogue, and the cofounders believed that they could reach a compromise. But consensus was never achieved between the students and the government. The three cofounders wanted the student leaders to consider retreating, but they were powerless in persuading the latter. The student leaders also admitted that a generation gap existed between them and the three cofounders. The three cofounders gave up after a series of failed attempts to persuade the student leaders. “Let them try, and they will know [the need for a compromise] after the trial.”84 Chan Kin-man said, “You have to learn how to face a situation that is out of control . . . this airplane has no pilots. Sometimes, the movement has pilots, but at other times, it does not. Other people believe that you [i.e., the three co-founders] are one of the pilots [i.e., which is not true].”85 Sometimes, when Chan informed the student leaders about his opinions on the movement through cell phone messages, the student leaders did not even bother to reply. The student leaders admitted the difference between them and the three cofounders. One student leader said that the interaction between the students and the three cofounders became less common after the unproductive dialogue with the government. Some student leaders became upset when the three cofounders and the pandemocrats repeatedly urged them to retreat. Thus, the communication between the students and these two parties became less effective and frequent.86 Against this background, the three cofounders began to gradually retreat from the movement. Tai and Chan resumed their teaching duties in their respective universities a month after the movement started and announced that the management of the marshal team, the medical team, and the resource stations at the protest site would be left to the students. Chan Kin-man said that many of the members of these teams were adults who had jobs and needed to resume their normal lives. “Given that the students assumed leadership . . . [they] need to be responsible for more management work. We cannot sustain our energy for any longer.”87 He said that he felt pessimistic about the movement’s direction one month after the occupation. “I resumed the teaching duty because I wished to urge the students to stop the occupation at a right time. By then, I did not see that the students had a better strategy that could force Beijing to respond.”88 Chan claimed that the initial plan was to launch a movement that would make the public aware of the political reform. However, the nature of the movement had changed, as the protestors attempted to change the political institutions in the city. “To be frank, we have no idea about how to lead this movement in this plight.”89 Their decision to resume their teaching duties signaled that the leadership role had shifted to the students.

Disagreement on other movement strategies The five-party leadership group also faced significant difficulties in formulating other movement strategies. The student leaders proposed to the pan-democrats a plan on a de facto referendum on political reform after the dialogue between the student leaders and the government proved unproductive. The plan was to ask the pan-democratic legislators to resign to prompt a by-election.90 The government

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would have to hold a territory-wide by-election if the lawmakers resigned. The byelection would serve as a de facto referendum that would give citizens an opportunity to express their stance on the constitutional reform proposal they were facing (i.e., the 8.31 decision of the NPC) or to decide whether functional constituencies should be maintained or abolished. Chow Yong-kang said that the by-election would allow the people to express their views on the constitutional reform package, which would be unveiled by the government for the 2016 and 2017 elections. After rounds of discussion with the leadership group for a few weeks, this “bizarre” proposal was eventually tabled91 because of the lack of consensus on the issues arising from the resignation of the pan-democratic legislators.92 The complex reasons for abandoning such a plan revealed varying preferences and considerations among the groups involved in the discussion. First, the student leaders claimed that they would remain to oppose the idea of linking the referendum to ending the ongoing protests, although the pan-democracy legislators hoped to link the referendum to the retreat of the students. The pan-democracy legislators were willing to resign as long as the student leaders would call the participants to retreat, regardless of whether the protestors accepted the call. The pan-democrats were reluctant to resign when they learned about the firm stance of the students. Second, the pan-democrats disagreed among themselves. The pan-democrats had to discuss the topics for the referendum and the issue of whether the resignation (if it were to occur) should transpire at the super district council or at the geographical constituency level. Third, the pan-democrats were at risk of losing in the election, which would jeopardize their veto power in the Legislative Council.93 The decision-making processes in the movement were inadequately inclusive because the rank-and-file participants were generally uninvolved in the decision making. The communication between the leadership group and the rank-andfile participants was lacking or ineffective partly because neither the leadership nor the participants perceived the leadership group as the decision maker of the movement. Many rank-and-file participants were unaware of the operations and decision-making processes of the leadership group.94 The suspension of the square referendum revealed the shortcomings in the decision making of the leadership group. The five-party leadership group discussed a square referendum between October 26 and 27 during a three-hour meeting. Tai Yiu-ting announced the plan of a referendum and the two issues to be voted on. First, the report that the Hong Kong government would submit to the central government should suggest that the NPC revoke its 8.31 decision. Second, the platform for political reform should confirm the abolishment of the functional constituencies in 2016 and the adoption of civil nomination of candidates for the chief executive office in 2017. All of the protestors at the three protest sites would be eligible to vote. This referendum aimed to clarify the claims of the protestors and pressure the government but without the intention to decide whether or not the protestors should retreat. Nevertheless, the movement’s leaders decided to cancel the referendum and apologized to the protestors in the afternoon of October 26. The plan was abandoned because the members of the leadership failed to reach a consensus, and

Leadership of the movement 115 the decision was not well received by the rank and file. Student leaders believed that Tai’s announcement of the referendum was premature because no internal agreement on the details had been established. Social groups also believed that the plan needed to be discussed more. A student leader admitted that the decision making was not democratic enough because of the lack of consultation with the rank and file.95 The movement’s participants and supporters opposed the referendum for several reasons. One was that the anti-movement league was collecting signatures at that time to oppose the occupation. The legitimacy of the movement would be damaged if the number of signatures exceeded the number of protestors who participated in the referendum. Some posters at the protest sites claimed that Tai intended to help the government through the referendum, and that the referendum would provide the anti-movement people with the opportunity to enter the protest site and cast their votes. The protestors would be criticized as undemocratic if the anti-movement people were prohibited from entering the site. They would likely cause trouble and create opportunities for external intervention if they were allowed to enter. The police could divide the occupied area according to the differences in opinions. The anti-movement people could use a democratic method (i.e., voting) upon entering the protest site to pass the decision to remove the barricades and resume traffic.96 These aborted plans indicated the difficulties the leadership faced when formulating movement strategies. The participants were aware of the problems concerning the weak leadership. The League of Social Democrats of Hong Kong admitted the lack of an effective coordinating organization in the movement in a handbill distributed approximately 20 days after the occupation. “For the time being, the movement lacks a unified organization, which has severely hindered collective decisions. As a result, the movement is unable to come up with a common movement principle and movement direction. There is even internal attrition.”97 When a student leader was asked why the movement leadership failed to organize influential events during the long occupation, he replied that the leadership had difficulty in creating initiatives. They sometimes simply ran out of ideas.98 Another student leader was asked whether the movement’s leaders had considered an election of leaders after the movement started to enhance the leadership legitimacy (similar to what happened in the Chilean student movement) and said that the election was considered but not pursued because of the fast changes in the movement dynamics and the mistrust among the political parties.99 Another student leader said that they had been too busy to conduct an election after the movement started. Student leaders were also exhausted, as they had worked around the clock to mobilize the strike before the Occupy Movement.100

Conclusion Strong leadership and effective coordination are crucial to the success and sustainability of movements.101 Some participants and supporters of the Occupy Movement believed that the lack of a strong coordination group was a major

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weakness of the movement. A pan-democracy legislator asserted that the lack of a coordination group weakened the influence of the Occupy Movement. This deficiency and the “collaboration between the police and the triad members” in Mong Kok on October 3 made many people wary of the risks involved in large-scale gatherings, and thus participation was diminished.102 A weak leadership is a common feature of decentralized movements whose participants are generally self-motivated. Therefore, the leadership often faces serious challenges because of its lack of representativeness, legitimacy, and authority. Moreover, the decision-making process becomes both ineffective and difficult, as decisions are made through consensus instead of following the majority rule. The leadership of the Occupy Movement was also plagued by lack of experience. Therefore, a movement can be sustained not because of its strong indigenous organizational strength but because of its decentralized structure that is characterized by a weak leadership. A weak leadership cannot lead the movement toward the desired direction. The three cofounders wanted to end the Occupy Movement but were unable to persuade the other leadership group members or the participants to agree. The leadership group members were busy with numerous meetings throughout the movement. However, from the perspective of the participants and the public, very few collective actions were undertaken or coordinated during the long standoff arising from the occupation.103 A sustained movement is not necessarily powerful because the factors that sustain a movement do not always equate to the factors that empower the movement. The standoff during the occupation partly resulted from government concerns over the public’s reaction to a forceful eviction and from the lack of consensus among the participants over the option to retreat. This phenomenon is similar to what occurred during the 1989 Tiananmen movement. In the Occupy Movement, the participants and the student leaders were caught in a dilemma between an unproductive occupation and retreating without achieving success. As discussed in the next chapter, when the student leaders attempted to escalate the action, their efforts failed because of the declining momentum.

Notes 1 Austin Ramzy, “Concession Offered, Taiwan Group to End Protest of China Trade Pact,” New York Times, April 7, 2014. 2 The Ministry of Education, Jingxindongpo de 56 tian (The Soul-Stirring 56 Days) (Beijing: Dadi chubanshe, 1989), p. 153. 3 Anthony Oberschall, Social Conflict and Social Movements (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973), p. 146. 4 Lewis Killian, “Social Movements,” in Robert Faris (ed.), Handbook of Modern Sociology (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), pp. 426–455. 5 Oberschall, Social Conflict and Social Movements, pp. 147–148. 6 Manuel Castells, Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012), p. 24. 7 Boyu Chen, Da-chi Liao, Hsin-Che Wu, and San-Yih Hwan, “The Logic of Communitive Action: A Case Study of Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement,” Manuscript, 2014.

Leadership of the movement 117 8 Dingxin Zhao, The Power of Tiananmen: State–Society Relations and the 1989 Beijing Student Movement (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), p. 154. 9 Oberschall, Social Conflict and Social Movements, p. 144. 10 Norman Frohlich, Joe Oppenheimer, and Oran Young, Political Leaders and Collective Goods (Princeton, NJ: University of Princeton Press, 1971), p. 43. 11 Oberschall, Social Conflict and Social Movements, p. 148. 12 “Zhan zhong lingxiu shoudao dadie siwang weixie” (Leaders of the Occupy Central Movement received piles of letters of death threats), Apple Daily, October 1, 2014. 13 Dennis Chong, Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), p. 122. 14 Jason Pan, “Breakaway Protest Group Calls for Greater Diversity,” Taipei Times, April 4, 2014. 15 Chen et al., “The Logic of Communitive Action.” 16 Nicolas Somma, “The Chilean Student Movement of 2011–2012: Challenging the Marketization of Education,” Interface: A Journal for and about Social Movements, vol. 4, no. 2 (November 2012), pp. 296–309. 17 Henry Edelstein, “Contentious Mobilization in a Demobilized Democracy: Exploring Reasons for the Advent and Duration of the 2011 Chilean Student Movement,” http://people.carleton.edu/~amontero/Henry%20Edelstein.pdf. 18 Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, Poor People’s Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail (New York: Random House, 1977), p. xv. 19 Maisha Fabliha Shahid, “ ‘Adelante, con todas las Fuerzas de la Historia’: An Exploration of the Chilean Student Movement for Education Reform within Its National and International Contexts,” Manuscript, May 2014, http://surface. syr.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1814&context=honors_capstone. 20 Ines Pousadela, “Student Protest, Social Mobilization and Political Representation in Chile,” http://paperroom.ipsa.org/papers/paper_11698.pdf; Cristian Bellei and Cristian Cabalin, “Chilean Student Movements: Sustained Struggle to Transform a Market-Oriented Educational System,” http://files.eric.ed.gov/ fulltext/EJ1016193.pdf. 21 Oberschall, Social Conflict and Social Movements, p. 125. 22 Edelstein, “Contentious Mobilization in a Demobilized Democracy,” p. 19. 23 Somma, “The Chilean Student Movement of 2011–2012,” p. 305. 24 Ibid., p. 303. 25 Shahid, “Adelante, con todas las Fuerzas de la Historia,” p. 33. 26 Somma, “The Chilean Student Movement of 2011–2012,” p. 303. 27 “Tuanti geju shantou bu ting zhihui” (Groups have respective bases, refusing to be coordinated), Headlines Daily, October 13, 2014. 28 The five-party group convened the first meeting on September 30, or two days after the movement commencement. Conversation 1. 29 Conversation 7. 30 Conversation 1. 31 This was particularly true after Tai Yiu-ting prematurely announced the square referendum on October 24. 32 Conversation 2. 33 Conversation 3. 34 “Zhumu bei yao canyu chongji gan fenkai” (Chiu was upset when being invited to join the storming), Hong Kong Economic Journal, December 5, 2014. 35 Luo Yixi, “Li Zhuaoren: zhanling que ‘dahui’ shoufang nan” (Lee Cheuk Yan: A lack of a coordination group increases the difficulty in continuing and ending the movement), Hong Kong Economic Journal, December 22, 2014. 36 “Wenhe fanming zhichi xiahua” (Support for moderate democrats declines), Hong Kong Economic Journal, November 26, 2014.

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45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66

Leadership of the movement Conversation 7. Conversation 5. Conversation 7. Xie Mengyao, Zhu Yongxiao, and Hou Zhenxin, “Zhanling zhe he fan zhanling zhe” (Occupiers and their opponents), Asian Weekly, January 3, 2015, pp. 68–75. For example, labor unions and labor groups were active organizations in the movement but were not visible to the public. Conversation 1. “Yuban tongyi xuyou lingdaozhe” (Over half of the occupiers agree to the need for leadership), Mingpao, October 20, 2014. “Tuidong minzhu buneng kao zifa” (Promoting democracy cannot rely on spontaneous action), Apple Daily, December 29, 2014. Xie Mengyao, Jiang Yannan, Liu Xiang, and Zhu Yongxiao, “Zhanzhong shikong muhou: zhanlingqu shantou linli, quefa tuichang jizhi” (Behind the loss of control over the Occupation Movement: Divided groups and a lack of exit mechanisms), Asian Weekly, October 26, 2014, pp. 22–32. “Groups have respective bases, refusing to be coordinated.” “Xue lian: shiwei zhe zixing jueding shifou liushou” (The HKFS: It is up to the protestors to decide whether to stay); see the Chinese Web site of the South China Morning Post, www.nanzao.com/tc/hk/39788, accessed October 15, 2014. “Qi cheng liushou zhe bu xinren zhengfu rangbu” (Seventy percent of those who stay do not believe that the government will compromise), Mingpao, October 21, 2014. Conversation 3. The police cleared some of the previously occupied streets in October. Xie et al., “Behind the Loss of Control over the Occupation Movement.” Other main groups include the Proletariat Political Institute and Left 21. Conversation 3. Conversation 1. Bai Lin, Peng Meifang, Du Shebing, and Zheng Qiyuan, “Chengbangpai caichang, xuelian yu tongzhougongji” (The city-state group attacks, and the HKFS calls for mutual help), Apple Daily, October 13, 2014. Conversation 6. Conversation 7. Zhao, The Power of Tiananmen, p. 163. National Education Bureau, The Soul-Stirring 56 Days, p. 114. Zhao, The Power of Tiananmen, p. 274. Li Zixin, “Zhanling zeng guishugan” (Occupation enhances the sense of belonging), Mingpao, December 15, 2014. Interview, Admiralty 22. “Qian duiyuan: jiucha zhuren qianjin xu jiesan” (Former team member: The marshal team prevented action and should be dismantled), Apple Daily, November 21, 2014. See the Web site of Hong Kong Golden, http://m3.hkgolden.com/view.aspx? message=5513173 &type=CA, accessed December 1, 2014. Emily Tsang, Timmy Sung, and Samuel Chan, “Split within Occupy Deepens as Splinter Group Challenges Leadership,” South China Morning Post, November 21, 2014. Lian Jiani, “Wangming yaoqiu che datai” (Internet users demand dismantling the stage), Takungpo, November 22, 2014. Tsang et al., “Split within Occupy Deepens.” “Jinzhong jiucha: zui pa mengmian tonglu ren” (A member of the marshal team in Admiralty: Masked protestors are the most difficult to deal with), Apple Daily, November 21, 2014.

Leadership of the movement 119 67 Ibid. 68 “Tuidong minzhu buneng kao zifa” (Promoting democracy cannot rely on spontaneous action), Apple Daily, December 29, 2014. 69 Luo Yixi, “Li Zhuaoren: zhanling que ‘dahui’ shofang nan” (Lee Cheuk Yan: The lack of a coordination group increases the difficulty in continuing and ending the movement), Hong Kong Economic Journal, December 22, 2014. 70 I wish to thank Chan Chin-man for reading what is presented in this section. Also see Xie et al., “Occupiers and their opponents.” 71 Song Ligong, “Jijing pai zhudao zhanyun” (The radical group determines the Occupy Movement), Oriental Daily, December 4, 2014; interview. 72 Conversation 1. 73 Hu Ping, “Qite de bu tuichang jizhi” (A strange mechanism of refusing to retreat), Apple Daily, November 26, 2014. 74 Conversation 7. 75 See Xie et al., “Occupiers and their opponents.” 76 Conversation 7. 77 Conversation 1. 78 Conversation 3. 79 Lai Ying-kit, Jeffie Lam, and Alan Yu, “Half of Occupy Central Protestors Ready to Pack It in if Asked by Organizers,” South China Morning Post, November 20, 2014. 80 Conversation 1. 81 Conversation 7. 82 Chiu was upset when being invited to join the attack, Hong Kong Economic Journal. 83 Interviews with the movement participants; Conversations 5 and 7. 84 “Sanzi xuelian you daigou” (There is a generational gap between the three cofounders and the students), Hong Kong Economic Journal, November 3, 2014. 85 Xie et al., “Occupiers and their opponents.” 86 This was also because pan-democracy representatives did not sleep at the protest sites, which reduced the chance of communication. Conversation 7. 87 “Chen Jianming Dai Yaoting jiang hui daxue jiaoshu” (Chan Kin-man and Tai Yiu-ting are going back to their universities to resume teaching), Mingpao, October 28, 2014. 88 Yu Wei, “Chen Jianmin: Bu zai gao sheyun, yong bi kangzheng” (Chan Chinman: No more participation in social movements, using the pen as a weapon), Mingpao, December 9, 2014. 89 Ibid. 90 Fanny Fung, “Occupy Students Call for Pan-Democrats’ Resignation to Trigger Referendum,” South China Morning Post, October 25, 2014. 91 This strategy was viewed as bizarre because some people believed that it was an unwise move. Alex Lo, “Hong Kong Protest Calls Are Becoming Ever More Bizarre,” South China Morning Post, November 4, 2014. This proposal was also opposed by supporters of the movement, notably, Lai Chee-ying, then the chairman of Apple Daily. 92 Conversation 1. 93 “Fanmin foujue wuqu cizhi gongtou” (Pan-democrats rejected referendum through their resignation), Apple Daily, November 6, 2014. 94 Interviews with movement participants generally show that they did not know how the leadership group operated. 95 Conversations 6 and 7. 96 Site observation. October 26, 2014. 97 Author’s collection.

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Conversation 7. Conversation 6. Conversation 7. Doug McAdam and Richard Scott, “Organizations and Movements,” in Gerald Davis, Doug McAdam, Richard Scott, and Mayer Zald (eds.), Social Movements and Organization Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 4–40. 102 “Liang Guoxiong cheng zhanling mei ‘dahui’ hen cuo” (Leung Kwok-hung claimed that the lack of a coordination group was a weakness of the Occupy Movement), Hong Kong Economic Journal, December 17, 2014. 103 Interviews, Admiralty 18, 32, and 33.

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Tactical escalation and its limitations

Movement participants are motivated to achieve their goals, but the movement’s outcome is by and large determined by the nature of their demands and the power of their action.1 Protestors’ demands dictate the cost the targeted authority pays if it makes concessions, whereas the power of collective action bears directly upon the authority’s willingness to pay the cost. Groups who take to the streets to pursue their interests often lack effective and institutionalized channels to achieve their claims, and they are thus politically weak. One method through which a weak group achieves success is creating great disruptions in the socioeconomic and political systems, with the power of disruption being determined by the importance of the institutions. Protesting activities are more likely to be ignored “when the disrupted institution is not central to the society as a whole, or to other more important groups.”2 But when important institutions are disrupted, protestors are better positioned to bargain with the targeted authority. Alternatively, a weak group may achieve success if it manages to receive extra or external support. Weak groups lack both the leverage and resources to force a powerful target to make concessions. Jenkins and Perrow point out that “For a successful outcome, movements of the ‘powerless’ require strong and sustained outside support.”3 Outside support may come from different parties or allies, such as political groups or legislators within the political system, social groups, and public opinion. Tarrow suggests that allies are not only important in shaping political opportunity for collective action, but they also help protestors achieve success. “Challengers are encouraged to take collective action when they have allies who can act as friends in court, as guarantors against repression or as acceptable negotiators. . . . Allies are an external resource that otherwise resourcedeficient social actors can sometimes depend upon.”4 The Occupy Movement failed to achieve its stated goals, despite the protestors’ long occupation. The failure does not appear surprising. The central government’s uncompromising stance determined the slim chance of success on the part of the protestors (Chapter 3). Although the protestors did disrupt the social order, they created more problems for the businesses and residents than for the government. Occupation was thus insufficient for the protestors to wrest concessions from the government through negotiations. Also, when the protestors escalated their action to gain leverage, the action was not powerful enough.

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The effectiveness of escalated action is conditional upon its creating more powerful disruptions or receiving sympathy and support from outside allies. During the Occupy Movement, the protestors faced a series of issues in tactical escalation. The decentralized movement inevitably created a coordination problem for participants who were divided in terms of their preferred mode of action. Unlike moderate protestors, radical protestors were more inclined to take radical action. But radical action can be counterproductive when it damages the legitimacy of the movement. In addition, the movement’s leaders faced the issue of timing when considering tactical escalation. When the movement’s momentum had declined to a significantly low level because participants lost their confidence or public support, an escalation of action was unlikely to succeed. Short of effective tactics, determined participants and the movement leadership were left with only one choice – waiting for the site clearance.

The fruitless dialogue with the government When the HKFS and Scholarism staged the strike in late September, their initial demands included the following: (1) civil nomination in the election of the chief executive, (2) the abolition of the functional constituencies, (3) the resignation of Leung Chun-ying and the political reform group, and (4) an apology from the NPC to the Hong Kong people. After the Occupy Movement started, the students changed their demands to the following: (1) civil nomination, (2) the revocation of the NPC decision, (3) the resignation of Leung Chun-ying, and (4) the reopening of the Civic Square. As the movement continued, the students tended to focus more on the first two demands.5 Nevertheless, none of these claims could be easily achieved, regardless of the tactics the protestors used. As Tilly finds, movement activists tend to choose tactics based on efficiency and familiarity deriving from a population’s standards of rights and justice, routines, prior experience, and patterns of repression.6 Like their counterparts in the 1989 Tiananmen movement, student leaders of the Occupy Movement first sought dialogue with the government. But the protestors’ demands dictated that the dialogue was unlikely to satisfy the students’ expectation. While some participants believed that past protests had forced the government to make concessions, those concessions could be the very reason that the central government refused to concede any more.7

Seeking dialogues with the Hong Kong government On October 1, the HKFS issued a statement claiming that if Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying did not resign within 48 hours or by midnight on October 2, its members would escalate their actions by blocking and storming the headquarters of the government and the office of the chief executive. However, the People’s Daily published an article that rejected such demands, stating that the NPC would never rescind its decision on the election of the chief executive in Hong Kong and that the central government firmly supported the Hong Kong

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government and the police. The article also accused the protestors of breaking the law in Hong Kong and jeopardizing Hong Kong’s stability and prosperity.8 The HKFS participants faced a dilemma in which they would lose their credibility if they opted not to escalate their actions, but would face unpredicted consequences if they decided otherwise. On the night of October 2, the HKFS issued an open letter to Carrie Lam, Chief Secretary for Administration, requesting a dialogue. Around 11:40, Leung Chun-ying and Carrie Lam held a news conference to confirm that they received and studied the open letter and that Lam had permission to negotiate with the HKFS on behalf of the government. Yet the students discontinued their plan for dialogue because of the violent confrontation between protestors and the anti-movement people in Mong Kok on October 3. The HKFS claimed that the government and police tolerated violence taken by the anti-movement people, some of whom were triad members. Therefore, the HKFS decided to shelve its negotiations with the government. The HKFS also claimed that it would only resume the dialogue if the government thoroughly investigated the violent confrontations and the failure of the police to protect the protestors; however, they would only convene with the three members of the Political Reform Group headed by Lam.9 The government dismissed these conditions, but the communication between both parties continued. On October 6, the HKFS and the government reached an agreement on the following principles of dialogue: (1) More than one round of dialogue would take place, (2) both parties must respect and treat each other as equals, and (3) if anything was achieved in the dialogue, the government would implement the items that both parties had agreed upon.10 Although disagreement remained, both parties agreed to have a public dialogue on the afternoon of October 10. On October 9, however, the government decided to postpone the dialogue because the students had announced a noncooperation movement while preparing for the dialogue.11 The government believed that using noncooperation as a bargaining tool was inappropriate because such activity would affect the welfare of the people. The student leaders were surprised and called for a rally in Admiralty to protest and to show that the momentum of the movement had not decreased. On October 10, tens of thousands of participants and their supporters answered the call of the student leaders and proceeded to the evening gathering in Admiralty to show their resentment toward the government. Nevertheless, the students realized that time was on the side of the government, whose decision to remain patient had become increasingly clear. On October 14, a leader from the HKFS admitted that, It is difficult for the protestors to leave without a dialogue. We need to find a graceful way for both parties [protestors and the government] to end the movement. However, we have not found the way yet, which is a heavy blow to us. We hope that we can gracefully exit the movement. We believe that holding a dialogue is the most appropriate way, so we are trying to re-open our dialogue with the government.12

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The dialogue was eventually conducted on October 21 between five government officials headed by Carrie Lam and five representatives of the HKFS. Prior to the dialogue, with the help of mediators, the government agreed to present a report to Beijing that reflected the voices of the Hong Kong people and to hold a forum for discussing political reform. During the two-hour dialogue, the government proposed the following suggestions: (1) the government is considering presenting an informal report to the State Council, which will reflect the views the people expressed during the democracy protest; (2) the next round of reform consultation will focus on how the nominating committee for the 2017 chief executive poll can be made more representative of the general populace; (3) the election framework for 2017 is not final; and (4) a platform will be established to gauge views on future constitutional changes after 2017.13 In retrospect, this dialogue and the suggestions of the government could have served as a base for further discussion and as a means of graceful exit. However, the students quickly dismissed these suggestions as unsubstantial and insisted on a civil nomination. They felt that the government was not sincere in making any substantive concessions and it was pointless to have another round of negotiation.14 The students claimed that the earlier report of the Hong Kong government to Beijing about the 2017 election inaccurately reflected the views of the public on numerous aspects of electoral reform. The NPC Standing Committee needed to revoke its electoral framework for Hong Kong, and the government should amend the Basic Law to allow public nomination because the existing nominating committee was not representative of the general populace. However, Chiu Yiu-ming was puzzled about the students’ negative reaction toward the dialogue and felt “very pessimistic about the movement and exhausted.” After the dialogue, government representatives approached Chiu to talk about what could be done. Chiu proposed to organize a dialogue group. However, he was told that if the protestors insisted on the revocation of the 8.31 decision of the NPC, no further dialogues were required. Chiu admitted that “At the time, I felt useless. I also felt that I had no role in the movement. The only thing that I could do every day was to convene a coordinating meeting to discuss the operations at the protest site and the distribution of supplies. . . . I had no clue about the direction of the movement.”15 He believed that few people were willing to listen to and help the students because of their unwillingness to compromise. Chiu criticized the students for their lack of a plan to retreat. “If you drag on and wait for the clearance, the movement looks weak. If you can retreat when the movement momentum is at [its] peak, you can feel its power, which is the greatest threat to the government.”16

Seeking dialogues with Chinese central leaders The students initially claimed that the issues concerning Hong Kong should be resolved within Hong Kong. On October 10, the two student organizations issued an open letter to Xi Jinping to emphasize the self-governance of Hong Kong.17 In the letter, they argued that Hong Kong government officials should

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be accountable to the Hong Kong people. In addition to the demand for civil nomination and the abolition of the functional constituencies, they demanded that Hong Kong should establish a democratic system that promoted equal rights. Under the principle of “One Country, Two Systems,” the problems of Hong Kong should be settled within the region. The letter also claimed that Leung Chun-ying blemished the grand “Chinese dream.” Understandably, the Chinese central government did not respond to their letter. As the movement evolved, the students changed their stance by seeking dialogues with the Chinese central leaders. After the dialogue on October 21, the Hong Kong government said that the door for dialogue remained open and it wished to have a second round, but the HKFS replied that holding a second dialogue was not ideal at the time. However, the students soon changed their attitude. On October 28, the HKFS issued an open letter to Carrie Lam, listing the conditions for the second round of dialogue. First, the Hong Kong government should include in its report to the State Council the suggestion that the NPC revoke its 8.31 decision. Second, the proposed platform should outline the timeline and procedures for achieving civil nomination and abolishing the functional constituencies. If the government would reject these conditions, the HKFS hoped that the government could arrange a direct dialogue among the students, Premier Li Keqiang, and officials of the State Council.18 When the Hong Kong government rejected such a request, the HKFS approached Tung Chee-hwa, the first chief executive of Hong Kong, on November 7, hoping that he could arrange for them a meeting with central government officials. However, the HKFS’s request was refused. The students subsequently approached the Hong Kong deputies of the NPC, including Fan Hsu Lai Tai, with the same request, but failed again. The government seemed to have lost confidence in resolving the stalemate through dialogue. On November 11, Carrie Lam claimed that the door for dialogue with the students remained open. During the previous dialogue, the government had shown its faith by promising to address the stalemate. However, the students did not reciprocate such faith, and their stand became firmer. Therefore, both parties found no space for dialogue at the time. The students were running out of tactics. As a final attempt, three student representatives, including Chow Yong-kang, went to the Hong Kong airport on November 15 to fly to Beijing and directly appeal to the central leaders. However, the airline informed them that the mainland Chinese authorities had canceled their travel permits.19 Such a cancellation was unsurprising because several movement participants, including a flight attendant, had been denied entry to mainland China.20 In retrospect, a student leader admitted that the students should have retreated when the three students’ trip to Beijing was stopped.21 By that time, the students had exhausted all of the possible channels of dialogue with the Hong Kong government and the central government. Ending the movement with negotiations was no longer an option. Although the students continued to uphold their nonviolent approach in the movement, other participants began to lose their patience and attempted to escalate their actions to force

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the government to respond or draw public attention to the movement. However, escalated action requires considerable effort. In the 1989 Tiananmen movement, the movement momentum reached its peak between May 17 and 18 after a largescale hunger strike on May 13. In the Sunflower Movement in Taiwan, the peak of the movement occurred on March 30 when hundreds of thousands of participants occupied the streets after the government refused to stop pursuing the pact on March 23.22 Different from these two movements, the Occupy Movement reached its peak of momentum at the very beginning and required significant effort for such momentum to resurge.

Tactical escalation and its effect Protestors tend to turn to new tactics when their protests fail to generate sufficient pressure on the targeted authority. As McAdam writes, “Lacking institutional power, challengers must devise protest techniques that offset their powerlessness” although such innovations only “temporarily afford challengers increased bargaining leverage.”23 Tactical escalation aims to both inspire participants and make the movement target more vulnerable. O’Brien and Li suggest that tactical escalation offers a means to regain momentum when established techniques of protest no longer create the sense of crises and excitement they once did. “As the effectiveness of familiar methods wanes, enterprising activists sometimes turn to even more disruptive acts to demonstrate their commitment, leave their opponents rattled, and mobilize supporters.”24 Tactical escalation involves the innovation of new tactics, disruptive or otherwise, but its effectiveness is conditional. Effective tactical escalation either places unprecedented pressure on the movement’s target or garners significant sympathy and support from third parties or both. But not all tactics can have such an effect. Indeed, as DeNardo points out, “no simple relationship necessarily exists between tactics and concessions.”25 Take the use of violence as an example. Research on the effectiveness of violence has presented mixed findings that show violence does not necessarily increase the odds of success.26 For example, Gamson’s research on the social protests in the United States suggests that protestors who used violence “have a higher-than-average success rate.”27 By contrast, Snyder and Kelly indicated that the violent strikes by Italian workers had a higher tendency to fail than peaceful stoppages.28 Research on the protests in China similarly suggests that the use of violence could be counterproductive.29 Radical action does not help movements when the participants are believed to have overused violence. Tarrow writes that “when violence occurs or is likely to occur, the authorities are given a mandate for repression and turn away the non-violent sympathizers.”30 Thus, violent collective action tends to attract fewer participants. As Chenoweth and Stephan find, “The moral, physical, informational, and commitment barriers to participation are much lower for nonviolent resistance than for violent insurgency.”31 Therefore, escalated action can be a double-edged sword, depending on how the action affects the legitimacy of protestors and the movement’s target

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and on whether it discloses the vulnerabilities of the movement’s target. Radical action helps a movement when it creates moral shocks by exposing the government’s excessive use of force; it damages the movement when it creates moral backlash by, for example, overusing violence. In the Occupy Movement, violent confrontations between protestors and the police had recurred. The decentralized structure of the movement created space for more radical groups to take dramatic action without being constrained by the movement’s leadership. Protestors’ aggressive action helped the movement when it damaged the image of the police or thwarted police efforts to remove protestors. But it was counterproductive when it damaged the movement’s legitimacy.

The contributing role of aggressive action Some protestors had long contemplated escalating their actions by targeting police officers or by expanding the occupied area. A police official believed that the protestors were tactical. He said: Protestors understood very well the constraint faced by the frontline police officers who were under great pressure. The police officers were worried about being complained [about] by protestors because complaints affected their performance assessment and their superiors were similarly required to be accountable. . . . Protestors also singled out individual officers and publicized their personal and family information to put pressure on the frontline police.32 He pointed out that protestors recurrently took provocative action to taunt, humiliate, or insult the police. His assertion seemed true of some protestors. One radical protestor stated on his Facebook account the rationale for confronting the police by, for example, collectively flashing the light from the cell-phone camera at the police: “The police . . . are emotionally unstable, and they will soon be pressured to open fire. By that time [when the police open fire], we will win. Even if they do not open fire, the police may still commit mistakes. If that occurs, the protests will again make front-page news.”33 Protestors had also attempted to escalate action in order to expand the occupied area. For example, on November 9, roughly 30 people answered an online call and went to Admiralty to block the entrance to the government headquarters to pressure the government. However, their plan failed because of the small number of participants. The next day, radical people accused the occupiers in Admiralty of being a “stability-maintenance army” or of “encouraging occupiers to leave.” They even claimed that some occupiers were sent by the government. Radical protestors averred that they would reproduce the anarchy of Mong Kok in Admiralty, but other occupiers rejected their suggestion. Wong Chifung stated that occupation per se was not what this movement was about, and that the occupation of a road would prompt the public to reject the movement.34 Yet the aggressive actions of some protestors unintentionally damaged the image of the government and the police. On October 14, a few hundred protestors

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suddenly occupied a road (i.e., Lung Wo Road) to block a tunnel leading to the office of the chief executive. The occupation plan had been discussed online for a few days before the action.35 The HKFS did not participate in the planning of the occupation, but offered its assistance. When the police used pepper spray to deter the protestors, the students mobilized approximately 1,000 people to assist the protestors. By 11 o’clock, roughly 2,000 protestors rallied on the road and a few hundred occupied the tunnel. The following morning, more police officers came to clear the site and to make 45 arrests.36 This action could have severely damaged the image of the protestors who claimed to be peaceful had the police not been exposed for beating a protestor. In the early morning, seven police officers arrested a protestor and brought him to a corner. Believing that they were out of public sight, the police officers began to kick and hit the protestor.37 However, a TVB news reporter videotaped the beating. The public was angered when the tape was released online and broadcast on television. The pan-democratic camp called for an investigation. Given that the arrested person was a social worker, approximately 100 social workers went to the police headquarters in Wan Chai to protest. The case also caught international attention. The United States and Amnesty International urged the Hong Kong government to investigate the case, which resulted in the suspension of the seven police officers involved in the beating. A poll conducted by the Chinese University of Hong Kong showed that the distrust of residents toward the police increased from 27 percent to 37 percent after the beating was made public. The movement gained more support, especially among the young people. The support for the movement among respondents aged between 15 years and 24 years increased from 47 percent to 62 percent, the support from pan-democrats for the movement increased from 52 percent to 66 percent, and the support from moderates for the movement increased from 19 percent to 27 percent.38 Aggressive actions also helped the protestors continue their occupation of the streets in Mong Kok. The initial occupation of the streets in Mong Kok was unplanned. On September 28, when fewer than 100 protestors occupied the streets of Mong Kok, they did not expect to occupy the area for a long time. After the government failed to disperse the protestors in Admiralty, the protest site in Mong Kok became a protest base that had witnessed the most frequent and violent confrontations among the occupiers, the police, and the anti-movement groups. The occupation in Mong Kok also convinced some protestors that confrontation was the only choice to deal with the police and the anti-movement groups as well as to prevent site clearance. In the early morning of October 17, approximately 300 police officers raided the protest site in Mong Kok where they pulled down tarpaulins and cut the tents that had become the makeshift sleeping quarters of the protestors. The police claimed that they were simply removing barricades. The raid surprised the occupiers. What they had built within their encampment over three weeks was turned into rubbish within an hour. Part of the traffic on Nathan Road (see Map 3.2) was resumed after the raid.39 However, in the evening of the same day, roughly 3,000 people

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returned to the streets to protest the clearance, and this number continued to grow as time passed. When eventually 2,000 police officers were outnumbered by 9,000 protestors, the situation became uncontrollable. After failed attempts to dispel the protestors via batons and pepper spray, the police gave up. But violent confrontations recurred on the night of October 18 and the early morning of October 19 when the protestors regained their lost territories. During these confrontations, more than 30 people were arrested and more than 20 people were injured.40 The aggressive action of protestors in Mong Kok was seen as a boost to the morale of the movement. Protest movements commonly have internal divisions in that people differ in their priorities and strategies. Some protestors are more moderate than others. Gamson, for example, points out that “factionalism” is common among protest groups, especially decentralized groups, and that there can be a “two-way causality between factionalism and failure.”41 But others suggest that a “radical flank effect” can occur in the sense that “the bargaining position of moderates can be strengthened by the presence of more radical groups.”42 In the Occupy Movement, the police realized the power of protestors through their continual occupation of the protest site in Mong Kok and the regaining of the raided streets; such power compelled the government to rethink the timing of clearance.43 Yet radical action becomes counterproductive when it damages the legitimacy of the movement.

The counterproductive effect of escalated action Radical groups did not always help the movement when they took action by discounting its impact on public perception. The most severe damage to the legitimacy of the Occupy Movement was the attack on the Legislative Council building in the early morning of November 19. The attack was mobilized by Internet users who claimed that the Legislative Council would discuss and pass a copyright amendment bill, which was labeled as the online version of the Article 23 anti-subversion law tabled a decade previously after mass protests. However, such an issue was not on the agenda of the meeting scheduled for November 19. Although the message was false, scores of masked people came to the Legislative Council building. Many of these protestors appeared to be teenagers who used metal barriers and other objects, including bricks, to crack open the glass doors outside the canteen in the Legislative Council building complex. After the glass doors were smashed, none of the protestors entered the building and some attackers attempted to leave the site. Tens of shielded police officers arrived at the scene and used pepper spray to fend off the attackers. Six participants aged from 18 years to 24 years were detained by the police, and none of them were local students. More participants were arrested over the next few days. Such clashes reflected the frustration of some protestors. One participant said that if protestors continued to stay at the protest site, the movement would lose its focus and would no longer attract people’s attention. Compared with the abusive use of force by the police, smashing a few pieces of glass was not very serious. The government has now tolerated the

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He also criticized those peaceful occupiers who enjoyed public praise, but were hostile toward radical protestors. Similarly, another participant said, “We want to use this action to pass on our voices, across onto those over [on] the other side of the glass.”45 A female protestor who had been staying at the protest site in Admiralty since September said that those who organized the Occupy Movement were not doing anything, but waiting for the site clearance. “At least we need to fight to abolish functional constituencies. . . . Universal suffrage is a far-off dream, but we need to fight as a first step of realizing such a dream.”46 She believed that not all “pushing-forward” actions were unwanted. Another female participant shared a similar view. “We need to let them [the government] know that we need real suffrage, not that we sit here singing. . . . Sitting here and waiting to be removed is passive. We should take action. We have enough people for action in Admiralty, but we do not have a consensus [on action].”47 The attack on the Legislative Council building severely damaged the legitimacy of the movement. First, the attack was based on a fake claim, which denied the legitimate ground for the action. Second, the attackers wore masks and attempted to escape from the site after smashing the glass doors. Therefore, these attackers were viewed as irresponsible. After their attack was repeatedly shown on television, the perpetrators were widely criticized by the government, the police, and various social groups, including pan-democracy groups. A participant said that the attack on the Legislative Council building was a turning point in the Occupy Movement. “When protestors use violence, the government smirks.”48 The pan-democrats publicly criticized the radical protestors and claimed that they would make a clean break with such protestors. Other participants also opposed the use of violence. A 23-year-old participant said, “Our aim is to attract occupiers in Admiralty who still insist that peace can change everything.”49 Radical protestors were perceived as irresponsible by other occupiers because the former often opted to leave the site after they had taken radical action.50 The volunteers who managed medical stations and resource stations agreed that they would provide support for protestors, including those they did not know, if they took action. However, as far as the Legislative Council attack was concerned, radical protestors did not inform the volunteers of their actions beforehand. Despite the lack of communication, volunteers rushed to provide helmets, goggles, and first-aid kits to the protestors. They also took out self-made shields that could be used to resist the police and to bring back injured protestors when necessary. The volunteers’ support for these radical protestors made them the target of the police, who believed that these volunteers were attacking them. Another volunteer said that these radical protestors had done the same thing in the past when they attempted to occupy other streets. They led the attack and then left after the police arrived. Those volunteers who went to the streets to

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support these radical protestors were left to face the police. Therefore, radical protestors were accused of lacking moral responsibility.51 The Occupy Central Movement (OCM) established a group of legal professionals who offered help to those arrested during the movement. However, this group refused to help those radical protestors who had always resisted the coordination of the OCM.52 Criticisms of the radical protestors caused conflicts among protestors. A legislator from People Power commented that, “If someone organized the attack and refused to give an explanation for this attack, we believe that such a person is a coward.”53 He even believed that those protestors who launched the attack indeed opposed the occupation movement. His comments angered the radical protestors. In the morning of November 24, approximately 100 radical protestors surrounded the tents of members of People Power in Mong Kok and demanded the occupiers leave the protest site. A confrontation between the two groups commenced. Some people who came to argue with the occupiers also had participated in the earlier protest against the students who opposed radical action in Admiralty. Nevertheless, both the HKFS and Scholarism were reluctant to denounce the attack as illegal. The HKFS issued a statement saying that it could understand the frustration of those who had participated in the movement for more than 50 days yet had not received any positive response from the government.54 However, the student leaders realized the damage arising from the attack. Wong Chifung said, “These radicals neither planned nor explained to the other protesters and the public what they were trying to achieve. Therefore, some people hold negative perceptions toward the entire umbrella movement.”55

Declined momentum and ineffective tactical escalation The standoff continued after the attack on the Legislative Council building, and the leadership group was still unable to reach a consensus on the direction of the movement. Although Tai Yiu-ting and Chan Kin-man began to resume their teaching duties, they did not stop participating in the movement. They urged the student leaders to think about how to end the occupation. However, the HKFS and Scholarism were neither willing to accept the suggestion nor able to devise a “graceful exit.” Against this background, on November 23, the three cofounders decided to persuade the student leaders to seriously think about retreating by announcing that they would turn themselves in to the police on December 5, which would signal the end of their participation in the movement. Afterward, the secretariat of the Occupy Movement would cease to operate, and various groups of volunteers would also disperse. The protest site would be left entirely to the students.56 During the meeting on November 26, the five leadership parties discussed how the movement should proceed. The majority of the attendants supported the proposal of retreating instead of waiting indefinitely for their arrest by the government. Leaders of the HKFS and Scholarism were reluctant to retreat. They did not plan to follow the three cofounders by turning themselves in to the police because such an action would signify their “acceptance of their failure” and “surrender to the government.”57 A student leader admitted the difference between

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the students and both the three cofounders and the pan-democratic parties. He said that the decision of the three cofounders to turn themselves in did not signal the end of the movement, yet still caused confusion among the participants.58 At that time, the HKFS had to decide how to carry on with the movement. A decision was eventually made to escalate the action to block and paralyze the government headquarters. Yet the escalation was unsuccessful, as was the hunger strike that followed. Tactical escalation occurs when the tactics previously used fail to achieve protestors’ goals. While tactical escalation aims to increase movement momentum, it has to be inspiring enough. Tactical escalation becomes difficult if the movement’s momentum has declined to a significantly low level because of the participants’ weak sense of efficacy, the rising cost of action, or the loss of public support. By the time the student leaders decided to escalate the action, public opinion toward the movement had become less favorable. In addition, some participants had lost confidence although radical protestors supported the escalation. As Meyer suggests, the use of tactics is situational and “the savvy activist tries to match the tactic with the resources of the constituency.”59 Participants and public support were crucial resources that the movement needed.

Declined momentum The student leaders were pressured by the diminishing momentum of the movement indicated by the number of participants, the amount of public attention, and the degree of public support. Because of the small number of occupiers, all three protest sites were quiet during the daytime. For example, in Admiralty, only 100 to 200 people remained in their positions during the daytime, the majority of whom were adults or retirees.60 This movement witnessed its largest number of participants at the beginning (130,000 to 180,000; Figure 6.1) on September 29.61 Since then, more participants showed up only on special occasions. On October 9, when Carrie Lam said that the government decided to postpone the dialogue because the students called for noncooperation, she also claimed that the number of occupiers had decreased. As a response, the movement’s leaders appealed to their supporters to stage a rally on October 10 140,000 120,000

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Figure 6.1 Number of protestors in Admiralty Source: Author’s collection.

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to show that the movement still had momentum. Tens of thousands of people reportedly responded to the call and showed up in Admiralty.62 On October 28, or a month after the commencement of the movement, thousands of people rallied in Admiralty to condemn the use of tear gas.63 About 10,000 people came to the protest site on the night of December 10 because it was the last night of occupation.64 As discussed later, when the two student associations called for an escalation of action to surround the government headquarters on November 30, only about 4,000 people showed up, but not all of them participated in the action.65 Meanwhile, although the Occupy Movement remained an important issue in the city, media attention began to decline. For example, the number of reports on this event published by Mingpao and Apple Daily, two important local newspapers, showed a decline before the government’s clearance of the protest site in Mong Kok on November 25 and 26, 2014 (Figure 6.2). By late November, the public view toward the Hong Kong government and the central government became less negative.66 Meanwhile, public opinion began to favor the retreat of the protestors. Although Hong Kong citizens were generally sympathetic to the demands of the movement participants, many of them did not agree to the lasting occupation of the streets. Between October 25 and November 2, the Anti-Occupy Alliance for Peace and Democracy supported the police by launching a campaign that called for the restoration of public order. The Alliance collected 1.83 million signatures as part of the campaign. Representatives of the Alliance submitted the petition to the Hong Kong government.67 Surveys consistently showed that the majority of the general public wished that the protestors would end the occupation and that they supported the clearance of the protest sites by the government. According to a telephone survey of 554 people conducted between November 1 and November 2, 73.2 percent of the respondents supported the retreat of occupiers and the ending of the occupation, which was particularly true among the elderly.68 Another survey of 513 people conducted between November 17 and November 18 showed that 55 percent of the respondents opposed the occupation, whereas 83 percent believed that protestors should end the occupation. More than 68 percent of the respondents supported the clearing of the protest sites.69 A survey of 1,077 people between December 6 and December 10 showed that 75 percent of the respondents supported the site clearance.70 Another poll in the same month indicated that 76 percent of the respondents suggested that the protestors should retreat, which was higher than the 67 percent of the respondents who had suggested the same action in November.71 Some participants were willing to retreat if the leadership group asked them to. A survey of 2,183 occupiers in Admiralty and Mong Kok between November 14 and November 16 showed that 44 percent (958) of the participants would retreat if the leadership group asked, whereas 44 percent (963) of the participants would ignore such a request and continue with their protest.72 Supporters of the retreat believed that they should change their strategy to reach out to the wider public because public support for the occupation was dwindling and the occupation

Source: Mingpao Web site, http://specials.mingpao.com/cfm/Category. cfm?SpecialsID=137&CategoryID=4408&Page=6, accessed January 20, 2015. Apple Daily Web site, http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/archive/index/20141002, accessed January 5, 2015.

Figure 6.2 Newspaper coverage of the Occupy Movement (Apple Daily and Mingpao, September 28–November 25)

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was ineffective. Those who opposed the retreat claimed that retreating without any concessions from the government would amount to an admission of failure. The three cofounders attempted to convince the protestors that retreating did not constitute a failure. Chan Kin-man said that the students had achieved more than expected and that they should not have any “sense of failure” in calling for a retreat. The protestors also felt the diminishing public support for the movement. On November 23, the protestors left their occupied areas and set up 21 posts on the streets to collect public opinion and promote real elections. However, these protestors were criticized or blamed by some residents who accused the protestors of causing inconveniences by occupying the streets.73 The participants could ignore the public, but the unfavorable public opinion toward the movement allowed the government to adopt aggressive measures. Against this backdrop, the clearance of the protest site in Mong Kok did not provoke public action. On November 25 and November 26, the police cleared the protest site in Mong Kok despite the refusal of protestors to give up.74 The student leaders also went to the protest site to support the protestors. Facing the resistance, the government sent 7,000 police officers who used pepper spray to disperse the resisters and arrest 148 protestors, including two student leaders.75 Within two days, the police successfully removed the encampment in Mong Kok and resumed traffic. Although the protestors in Mong Kok were uninterested in collaborating with the protestors in Admiralty, the clearance of their protest site was a setback for the movement.

Failed escalation of action In late November, Chan Kin-man said, “Many people in the crowd are waiting for the student leaders to make their next move and to find their way out of this situation.”76 Despite the diminished public support for the movement, the student leaders refused to retreat. In response to one of the aforementioned surveys, Wong Chifung said that they should not yet pack up and go home. An alternative way to push for universal suffrage should be devised before stopping the Occupy Movement.77 By the time the government decided to clear the protest site in Mong Kok, Chow Yong-kang admitted that the student leaders had received a number of suggestions on escalated action.78 The student leaders eventually decided to escalate the action in response to the demands of some participants.79 On the evening of November 28, the HKFS used its Facebook account to call for people to stage a rally in Admiralty on November 30 and to bring masks and helmets. However, details about the action were not announced. On the night of November 30, the HKFS again issued a statement on its Facebook account, declaring that “Peaceful resistance is a notion of action, not just a ‘sit-in.’”80 The statement also said that the movement was in its third month and that the situation was becoming severe. The government had been avoiding the demand of citizens for a real election, which considerably angered the protestors. Given the irresponsiveness of the government, the legal department becoming a tool of the

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government, and the police’s abuse of power, the protestors had to respond. The protestors would surround the headquarters of the government. But their actions should be conducted in peace to prevent the police from using excessive force. In retrospect, the escalated action was poorly planned and coordinated.81 The plan was made by the HKFS leaders and representatives of social groups without consulting most of the participants. The plan was also based on the assumption that the movement could mobilize a sufficient number of participants, but this assumption proved false. In other words, the student leaders overestimated their capacity to mobilize participants and public support.82 Although thousands of people answered the call and went to the protest site in Admiralty, not all of them participated in the action. At 9 o’clock, the student leaders announced the start of the action and instructed the participants to approach the government headquarters to paralyze its operations and to force the government to respond. While shouting their slogan, “Civil disobedience, defying misfortune” (kangming bu renming), the protestors, who wore goggles and masks and held self-made shields, circled the government headquarters and Tamar Park as well as attempted to breach the police lines at various points. The key areas of confrontations included Lung Wo Road, which was located near the government headquarters, and the walkways from Harcourt Road to the government headquarters (see Map 3.1).83 Beforehand, the student leaders claimed that this action was meant to be peaceful. However, neither the participants nor the police expected that such action would become the most violent confrontation in Admiralty since the beginning of the Occupy Movement. Instead of using tear gas that was believed to provoke the anger of the public, the police used pepper spray and their batons to repel the protestors. The protestors reported that the police were in a killing frenzy, whereas the police perceived the protestors as outlaws. This seesaw battle lasted until the morning of December 1. The protestors successfully blocked Lung Wo Road but only for a short while, because the police removed the barricades early the following morning. During the repeated confrontations, scores of protestors and 17 police officers were injured. In the end, 40 protestors were arrested and roughly 60 were hospitalized. The government also decided to close its headquarters and the Legislative Council building in the morning of December 1. The escalation of action indicated not the power of the movement but its decreasing momentum. In the morning of December 1, Chow Yong-kang said that the action of the protestors on the night of November 30 had some effect because government offices were closed for half a day. However, in the afternoon of the same day, he admitted that the action was a failure because it failed to paralyze the government operations. He said, “We believe that the occupation has its strengths and limits, but what we have underestimated is the strength of [the government’s] political power.”84 He attributed such failure to the limited number of participants, which hindered the protestors from surrounding the government headquarters. In retrospect, he believed that the action should have been escalated at the end of September, during which the movement witnessed its highest momentum.85

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The failed escalation of action created multiple tensions among the protestors. First, the two student associations had initiated this action without support from the three cofounders and the pan-democratic parties. When the pan-democrats learned about the students’ intention to escalate their action, they attempted to dissuade them, to no avail. After the action, the pan-democrats urged the students not to call for any more escalation of action.86 Second, the student leaders were blamed for the ill-planned action because of their failure to provide clear guidance. Despite the smaller number of participants, the student leaders did not adjust their plan. When the student leaders announced the start of the action, some protestors went to the government headquarters, whereas others attempted to occupy the roads. Therefore, the action was loosely coordinated.87 Student leaders said that they made some preparations for the escalation, but the preparations proved insufficient because of the fast changes after the action started. The communication with the participants was also inadequate. In addition, the police became more tactical than before.88 Third, the absence of highly identifiable student leaders in the action caused grievances. As the student leaders who participated in the action on the site were not easily recognizable, the protestors believed that the student leaders were absent.89 A participant complained, “On September 26 when the students were protesting outside of the government headquarters and were arrested by the police, Wong Chifung asked ‘Where are the adults?’ I came out to join the movement without hesitation from that night. When the citizens [participants] were bleeding last night, where were the student leaders?”90 The student leaders later explained that they had a division of labor among themselves, and that not all of them were expected to participate in the rally.91 In addition, the protestors were ill prepared for the violent confrontation because they claimed that this action was meant to be peaceful. One participant said that she saw some protestors being beaten by the police, and that instead of helping them, the other protestors pleaded with their comrades not to retaliate. Another adult participant said that the action was supposed to surround the government headquarters in a peaceful manner. Although the participants had expected a clash with the police, they did not anticipate such a clash to be extremely violent and bloody. Some protestors did not dare to walk on Lung Wo Road where the police were deployed. Participants at the front line were placed in great danger because of the absence of student leaders and the lack of coordination.92 Student leaders also admitted that the biggest challenge or source of pressure they faced was the possible or actual injuries of movement participants.93 On the evening of December 1, the aggrieved protestors who disagreed with the so-called peaceful and rational approach that student leaders had proposed rallied at the protest site in Admiralty and asked the student leaders to explain the failure of the action. They also wanted to dismantle the main stage, which they perceived as the symbol of the leadership group who had made the wrong decisions. Conflict arose between the angry protestors and the other protestors who were trying to protect the stage. The student leaders, including Chow Yongkang, Wong Chifung, and Shum Ngo-fai, came out to the stage and apologized

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to the protestors for the failed action.94 In retrospect, Chow Yong-kang admitted that a radical action might not have been.95 He believed that several factors should be considered when taking action, such as the timing, the mode of action, the opinion and support of the public, the power of the government, the patience of the participants, and the use of force by the government.96 Unlike the protest on the evening of September 28, the escalation of action failed to generate public sympathy. On the contrary, television showed not only the police using pepper spray and batons to drive away the protestors, but also scenes of protestors assaulting the police officers. In the morning of December 1, the protestors surrounded and attacked three off-duty police officers, one of whom passed out on the spot.97 The behavior of the protestors drew criticisms from the police and some of the public.

Short-lived hunger strike After the failed action, the student leaders admitted that they had not made any plans for future action, and by that time, some student activists indeed wanted to retreat.98 However, on the night of December 1, Wong Chifung announced that he and two other members of Scholarism would stage an indefinite hunger strike to call for open talks with Chief Secretary Carrie Lam on political reform, and they were later joined by two more people. They hoped that their hunger strike could mobilize more participants to rejoin the movement. However, this decision was made unilaterally without the prior knowledge of the HKFS, which upset the federation.99 A student leader of the HKFS said that Wong had told the HKFS leaders several times that Scholarism would not stage a hunger strike, so it appeared sudden that he announced the strike.100 Chow Yong-kang said that his group refused to join the hunger strike because “it may not be an effective way to pursue a dialogue with the government.”101 After the hunger strike started, a few pro-establishment legislators went to the protest site to promise the students that they would urge the chief executive to have a dialogue. However, the government responded that the demand to launch or resume a dialogue about political reform was infeasible because such a dialogue would negate the actions of the central government. Prior to the hunger strike, another protestor staged a 40-day hunger strike that did not produce significant effects. The hunger strike of Wong Chifung, together with four other participants, did not last long. Four days later, a participant quit the strike because of her poor health. By December 6, the first three people who started the strike, including Wong Chifung, quit the hunger strike because of their health conditions. The last student in the strike stopped three days later on December 9. Therefore, the hunger strike did not substantially contribute to the progress of the movement. Some people commented, “Everybody, including the students themselves, knows that the hunger strike of the students will not help the democratic movement. The hunger strike is helpful only if the target of your action is your mother.”102 Compared with the one in the 1989 Tiananmen movement, the hunger strike in the Occupy Movement had a very limited effect on

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the mobilization of protestors. By contrast, the hunger strike in the Tiananmen movement created the peak of the movement. Zhao points out, “The hunger strike was arguably the single most important form of protest during the 1989 Movement. The strike led to the success of the movement, both in terms of mobilization and worldwide attention.”103 One reason for the ineffectiveness of the hunger strike during the Occupy Movement was that it took place at a time when the movement had lost its momentum. The failed escalation undermined many protestors’ sense of efficacy. Another important reason is the small number of participants. In the 1989 Tiananmen movement, the hunger strike team had more than 300 members from 13 universities who were escorted by another 2,000 students when they went to Tiananmen Square. This move immediately attracted 30,000 to 40,000 onlookers.104 In the subsequent days, the number of students who joined the hunger strike reached 3,000. Within five days, approximately 2,000 of the participants in the strike passed out and were hospitalized because of their poor health.105 A few days after the hunger strike, the movement’s momentum reached its peak when roughly a million people went to Tiananmen Square to show their support for the students.106

End of the Occupy Movement On December 1, the High Court granted All China Express, a cross-border bus company, an interim injunction to clear a section in the Admiralty–Central protest area. On the same day, Leung Chun-ying claimed that citizens’ tolerance for the occupation had reached its limit. The participants, especially the students, should not view the tolerance of the police as their powerlessness or inability to clear the site.107 On December 2, the three cofounders of the movement announced that they would turn themselves in to the police on the following day, which was ahead of the scheduled date (December 5), mainly because they disagreed with the escalation of action by the students and they failed to convince the students to consider retreating.108 Tai said in a news conference: The government that uses police batons to maintain its authority is a government that is beyond reason. . . . For the sake of the occupier[s’] safety and the for the sake of the original intention of love and peace, as we prepare to surrender, we three urge students to retreat, to put down deep roots in the community and transform the movement to extend the spirt of the umbrella movement.109 On December 3, the three cofounders, together with more than 60 other participants, turned themselves in to the police. In an open letter, the cofounders stated, “Our young people have used their bodies to withstand the blows of police batons, their blood and broken bones have brought us the deepest sorrow. . . . For the sake of the occupiers’ safety . . . we three urge the students to retreat.”110 The three cofounders also criticized the government for its

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irresponsiveness and use of force. They urged the students to stop the occupation because continual occupation could increase resentment and damage the legitimacy of the movement, which would induce counterproductive actions. The decision of the three cofounders to turn themselves in to the police signaled the end of their participation in the Occupy Movement. The remaining participants and supporters of the movement reacted differently to this decision. Some protestors respected the decision of the cofounders, whereas others did not. Some occupiers believed that the other participants might follow the example of the three cofounders, which would end their participation in the movement. In this case, the Occupy Movement would attract fewer supporters. Therefore, the three cofounders were accused of betraying the students.111 The failed escalation of action also reduced the scale of participation in the movement.112 Prior to the escalation of action, the HKFS did not seriously consider retreating, which, according to a student leader, was an important reason for the standoff.113 After the three cofounders turned themselves in to the police on December 3, Chow Yong-kang admitted that many occupiers began to believe that continual occupation did not help generate pressure on the government. Therefore, the student leaders discussed the idea of retreating with the occupiers.114 However, no consensus was reached among the protestors. Some regarded retreating as an option because the movement had caused inconveniences for the people for a long time. In addition, continual occupation could not generate pressure on the government. But other protestors still refused to leave without achieving any success and were even willing to risk being arrested by the police.115 Against this background, most protestors, including the student leaders, opted to stay in their position until they were cleared by the police. When the police began the site clearance on December 11, the movement’s leaders and some participants stayed at the protest site to show their determination to fight for democracy. The police warned the protestors that they would be arrested if they refused to leave within half an hour. More than 900 people left without being arrested after the police recorded their personal information. The police arrested 249 people, including student leaders and 15 pan-democratic legislators, thus ending the 75-day occupation in Admiralty.116 Four days later on December 15, the police cleared the protest site in Causeway Bay, and the 79-day occupation of the site came to the end.

Conclusion Protestors are strongly motivated to achieve their claims, but their chance of success is determined by their interaction with the targeted authority and sometimes other parties. In the Occupy Movement, participants realized the difficulties in achieving their movement’s goals. The demands the students brought to the government left the government with little room to compromise, which dictated the fruitlessness of the dialogue and the government’s reluctance to solve the standoff through negotiation. Certainly, the students had their own reasons to dismiss the suggestions the government raised during the dialogue. Some participants

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claimed that the government had traditionally consulted people but with predetermined policies, rendering the consultation meaningless.117 Against this background, both radical protestors and the student leadership turned to tactical escalation in order to show their determination and to place pressure on the government. But the effectiveness of tactics of social movements is conditional. For example, Meyer suggests that the tactics of a social movement have to embody the movement’s demands that “need to appear actionable enough to avoid being dismissed, yet challenging enough to inspire attention.”118 Perhaps more important, the use of tactics is situational and participants need to have resources and a sense of efficacy. During the Occupy Movement, radical protestors had attempted to extend the occupied areas, including the Legislative Council. But their actions were ineffective because they created divide among protestors, lost sympathetic or neutral bystanders, or failed to mobilize participants. The attack on the Legislative Council building points out the limitations of violent action in that it tends to reduce the scale of participation largely because “non-violent campaigns have a participation advantage over violent insurgencies, which is an important factor in determining campaign outcomes.”119 A movement may sustain because a weak leadership is unable to coordinate powerful action or come up with ways of graceful exit, resulting in a standoff between movement participants and the targeted authority. The Occupy Movement was sustained partly because the leadership group was unable to devise effective strategies that forced the government to compromise. Meanwhile, the momentum of the movement decreased as the stalemate persisted. When the student leaders decided to escalate their protest to block and paralyze the government headquarters, they found that the number of participants was not as large as expected. As a result, the determined participants and movement leaders had no choice but to be cleared by the police, as in the cases of Occupy Wall Street and the 1989 Tiananmen movement. The Occupy Movement thus suggests that while tactical escalation often aims to increase movement momentum, it cannot be carried out when the momentum has declined to a significantly low level.

Notes 1 Yongshun Cai, “Power Structure and Regime Resilience: Contentious Politics in China,” British Journal of Political Science, vol. 38, no. 3 (2008), pp. 411–432. 2 Frances Piven and Richard Cloward, Poor People’s Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), p. 27. 3 Craig Jenkins and Charles Perrow, “Insurgency of the Powerless: Farm Worker Movements (1946–1972),” American Sociological Review, vol. 42, no. 2 (April, 1977), pp. 249–268. 4 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 88. 5 Xie Mengyao, Jiang Yannan, Liu Xiang, and Zhu Yongxiao, “Zhanzhong shikong muhou: zhanlingqu shantou linli, quefa tuichang jizhi” (Behind the loss of control over the Occupation Movement: Divided groups and a lack of exit mechanisms), Asian Weekly, October 26, 2014, pp. 22–32; “Celue pengbi, kan

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8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

Tactical escalation xuelian jintui shiju” (Tactics fail, and the Hong Kong Federation of Students is at a loss), Oriental Daily, November 11, 2014. Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978), pp. 151–171. “Chen Zuo’er: weifa zhanzhong qishu yijin” (Chen Zuo’er: The illegal occupation has lost its momentum), Taikungpo, December 11, 2014; Keith Bradsher and Chris Buckley, “Beijing Is Directing Hong Kong Strategy, Government Insiders Say,” New York Times, October 17, 2014. “Zhenxi lianghao fazhan jumian, weichi xianggang fanrong wending” (Cherish the favorable situation of development and maintain the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong), People’s Daily, October 1, 2014. “Xuelian: zhengfu zongrong xiji, xuangao gezhi duihua” (The HKFS: Dialogue suspended because the government encouraged the attack), Hong Kong Economic Journal, November 4, 2014. “Zhengfu ji zhounei yu xuelian duihua” (The government hopes to have a dialogue with the students within this week), Takungpao, October 7, 2014. “Lin Zheng gezhi yu xuelian duihua” (Carrie Lam postpones the dialogue with the students), Singtao Daily, October 10, 2014. Xie et al., “Behind the Loss of Control over the Occupation Movement.” “Talks Fail to Narrow Gap between Student Leaders and Hong Kong Government,” South China Morning Post, October 22, 2014. Similar to other protestors, the students believed that the platform was not helpful because the government had a reputation for not listening to the people. Conversation 6; Interviews, Admiralty 2, 3, and 14. Si Jiawen, “Zhu Yaoming: Yundong shiqu fangxiang, ganjue beigan pibei” (Chu Yiuming: The movement has no direction, and he feels pessimistic and tired), Mingpao, November 23, 2014. Ibid. See the HKFS Web site, www.hkfs.org.hk/2014/10/12/letter-to-xi-jinping/? lang=en, accessed October 12, 2014. “Xuelian gongkaixin yaoqiu yu Li Keqiang zhijie duihua” (The HKFS has issued an open letter and hopes to have a direct dialogue with Li Keqiang), Singtao Daily, October 29, 2014. Joyce Ng, Amy Nip, and Stuart Lau, “Beijing Bans Student Leaders from Taking Trip to Mainland to Press for Democracy,” South China Morning Post, November 16, 2014. Student leaders were still surprised. They thought that they might not be denied entry to Beijing, but they did not anticipate that they would be unable even to leave Hong Kong. Conversation 7. Conversation 6. Kelly Ip, “Half a Million Take to Taipei Streets to Protest Trade Deal,” The Standard, March 31, 2014. Doug McAdam, “Tactical Innovation and the Pace of Insurgency,” American Sociological Review, vol. 48, no. 6 (1983), pp. 735–754. Kevin O’Brien and Liajiang Li, Rightful Resistance in Rural China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 67. James DeNardo, Power in Numbers: The Political Strategy of Protest and Rebellion (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 202. Marco Giugni, “Was It Worth the Effort? The Outcomes and Consequences of Social Movements,” Annual Review of Sociology, vol. 24 (1998), pp. 371–393. William Gamson, The Strategy of Social Protest (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1990). David Snyder and William Kelly, “Industrial Violence in Italy, 1878–1903,” American Journal of Sociology, vol. 82, no. 1 (1976), pp. 131–162.

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29 Yongshun Cai, Collective Resistance in China: Why Popular Protests Succeed or Fail (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010). 30 Tarrow, Power in Movement, p. 104. 31 Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Non-violent Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), p. 10. 32 Such information was obtained through online searches or from people within the police department. Conversation 5. 33 This person was named Nakade Hitsujiko on his Facebook account. Reportedly, he belonged to a group who advocated the independence of Hong Kong. www. discuss.com.hk/viewthread.phd?tid=24003462&extra=&page=4, accessed November 5, 2014. Also see, Ma Jiahao, “Chengbangpai shaoming gongzhu bei weijiao” (Prince Shaoming was criticized), Asian Weekly, November 2, 2014, p. 46. 34 Bai Lin, Yu Jinghong, Lu Jinye, and Du Shbing, “Liangpai gongkai duizhi ao zhanling luxian” (The two groups openly debated on the direction of the occupation), Apple Daily, November 10, 2014. 35 The police were unable to prevent such action because there could be tens of online calls for action and the police did not know which one would really lead to an action. Conversion 5. 36 Xie et al., “Behind the Loss of Control over the Occupation Movement.” 37 Some police officers believed that this was a trap set up by the protestors. Conversation 5. 38 In comparison, only 28.4 percent of those respondents aged between 40 years and 59 years supported the movement, whereas 44.7 percent did not support the movement. Peter So, “Public Support for Occupy Movement Growing, Survey Shows,” South China Morning Post, October 23, 2014. 39 “300 jing qingchen chai luzhang qu zhan wang zhe” (300 police officers cleared the barricades and dispersed occupiers in Mong Kok in the morning), Mingpao, October 18, 2014; “Violent Clashes in Mong Kok Cast Doubt on Government’s Plans to Break Occupy Impasse,” South China Morning Post, October 18, 2014. 40 “Zhanzhong yiliaodui: feibaoli shi zuihao wuqi” (Medical team of the Occupy Movement: Non-violence is the most effective weapon), Mingpao, October 20, 2014. 41 Gamson, The Strategy of Social Protest, p. 102. 42 Herbet Haines, “Black Radicalization and the Funding of Civil Rights: 1957– 1970,” Social Problems, vol. 32, no. 1 (1984), pp. 31–43. 43 “Li Dongguo che jijing zhe sandong chongji” (Lai Tung-kwok condemns radical protestors), Mingpao, December 19, 2014. 44 “Chongji renshi zhichi shengji” (Attackers support escalation of action), Apple Daily, November 20, 2014. 45 Eddie Lee, Jennifer Ngo, and Danny Mok, “Violent Clashes between Protesters, Police, as Masked Crowds Attempt Legco Break-in,” South China Morning Post, November 19, 2014. 46 Ibid. 47 “Attackers Support Escalation of Action.” 48 Yang Kangqi, Zhang Yiming, Liang Zuoyi, and Zheng Peishan, “Zhanzhong hexin ren, quliu ge butong” (The core activists of the Occupation Movement make different choices), Mingpao, December 3, 2014. 49 Chris Lau, “Rumor of Copyright Vote May Have Led to Storming of Legislative Council Building,” South China Morning Post, November 20, 2014. 50 Conversations with movement participants. “Yigong: jijingpai gong wan jiu zou ju feze” (Volunteers: radical groups left after the attack, refusing to take any responsibility), Apple Daily, November 20, 2014.

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51 Ibid. 52 “Heping zhanzhong qianze chongji” (The Occupy Movement denounced the attack), Apple Daily, November 20, 2014. 53 “Nao lifahui mengmian nan yi wangjiao wei renli” (The masked man who attacked the Legislative Council building is suspected of having surrounded the tents of the People Power group), Mingpao, November 25, 2014. 54 “Fanming huaqing jiexian shuangxue cheng bu xu qianze” (Pan-democratic camps distance themselves from the attack; the two student organizations claim no condemnation), Hong Kong Economic Journal, November 20, 2014. 55 Lai Ying Kit, “Joshua Wong Says Occupy Protests Should Not End Yet Despite Mass Opposition,” South China Morning Post, November 20, 2014. 56 “Sanzi cheli guangchang, yiwu lvshi xucheng” (The three cofounders retreat from the protest site and volunteer lawyers will continue to provide help), Mingpao, November 25, 2014; Zheng Zhizhu, “San chou tu duan shui liang, bi ‘shuangxue’ tuichang” (The three founders intend to stop the supplies in order for the students to stop the occupation), Wenweipo, November 24, 2014. 57 Du Liangmou, “Shuangxue shang weidu zhengfu dalou” (The two student associations discuss surrounding the government headquarters), Singtao Daily, November 28, 2014. 58 “Zhang Xiuxian zhi bixu jinkuai jueding xiayibu” (Tommy Cheung says students have to decide the next move as soon as possible), Hong Kong Economic Journal, November 25, 2014. 59 David Meyer, The Politics of Protest: Social Movements in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 86. 60 Author’s site observation. 61 “Zhanzhong renshu tupo 13 wan” (The number of protestors exceeded 130,000), see the Sanlih Television Web site, www.setn.com/vote/News.aspx? NewsID=41866&PageGroupID=1, accessed November 5, 2014. 62 “Xianggang zhanzhong di 13 ri, zhonghuan zaixian shu yi wan ji renchao” (Tens of thousands of people gathered in Admiralty on the 13th day of the Occupy Movement), www.voacantonese.com/content/hk-reactions, accessed December 2, 2014. 63 Peter So, Alan Yu, Chris Lau, and Danny Mok, “Resolute Occupy Protesters Raise Umbrellas to Commemorate Firing of Tear Gas,” South China Morning Post, October 29, 2014. 64 Xie Mengyao, “Zhanling Jinzhong de zuihou yiye” (The last night of occupying Admiralty), Asian Weekly, December 28, 2014, pp. 90–91. 65 Danny Mok, Tony Cheung, Phila Siu, and Shirley Zhao, “Occupy Supporters and Police Clash as Hong Kong Protests Escalate,” South China Morning Post, December 1, 2014. 66 Between November 20 and November 24, the Chinese University of Hong Kong conducted a survey of 800 people before the clearance in Mong Kok. The survey showed that the approval rate for the Hong Kong government and the central government had not increased, but the disapproval rate for the Hong Kong government and the central government decreased from 50.2 percent to 43 percent and from 45.6 percent to 37 percent, respectively. “Zhengfu minwang huisheng” (The approval rate for the government increases), Singtao Daily, November 28, 2014. 67 Thomas Chan and Joyce Ng, “Lawyers Say Occupy Protest Is Undermining Hong Kong’s Rule of Law,” South China Morning Post, November 3, 2014. 68 The survey was conducted by the Polytech University of Hong Kong. Variations are observed across different age groups. Roughly 41 percent of respondents aged between 18 years and 29 years, 76 percent of respondents aged between 30 years and 59 years, and 98 percent of respondents aged 60 years above all

Tactical escalation

69

70 71

72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79

80 81

82 83 84

85 86

145

supported retreating. “Mindiao: 73% ren zhichi jishi jieshu nzhanling” (73% supported a timely end of the occupation), Hong Kong Economic Journal, November 5, 2014. This survey was conducted by the University of Hong Kong. “Gangda mindiao: ba chen san ren chu tingzhi zhanling” (Survey by the University of Hong Kong: 83 percent urge the end of the occupation), Hong Kong Economic Journal, November 20, 2014. Feng Hanlin, “Qi cheng ban shimin cheng qingchang” (75 percent of the citizens support clearance), Takungpao, December 12, 2014. This poll was conducted by the Chinese University of Hong Kong without reporting the sample sizes. Su Yaoji, Li Lifeng, Li Shaonan, and Liang Yongzhi, “Zhenggai mindiao 9 dian zongjie” (Nine conclusions of the surveys on political reform), Mingpao, December 20, 2014. Lai Ying-kit, Jeffie Lam, and Alan Yu, “Half of Occupy Central Protestors Ready to Pack It in If Asked by Organizers,” South China Morning Post, November 20, 2014. Zheng Zhizhu, “Luoqu chuchu bei gan” (Occupiers were driven away when promoting elections in communities), Wenweipo, November 24, 2014. Samuel Chan, “Occupy Protesters in Mong Kok Take to the ‘Shopping Tour,’ ” South China Morning Post, December 11, 2014. The two leaders were Wong Chifung and Shum Ngo-fai. “Qingchang yanbian qusan jubu” (Clearance turns into dispersing and arresting protestors), Mingpao, November 26, 2014. Lai et al., “Half of Occupy Central Protestors Ready to Pack It in If Asked by Organizers.” He also admitted that that the Occupy leaders were thinking about how to continue the pro-democracy campaign beyond street protests. Lai Ying Kit, “Joshua Wong Says Occupy Protests Should Not End Yet Despite Mass Opposition.” “Zhou Yongkang huyu shimin chongfan jinzhong zhanlingqu” (Chow Yongkang urges people to return to Admiralty), Apple Daily, November 26, 2014. Student leaders admitted the multiple pressures arising from the continual occupation: the irresponsiveness of the government, the attempts of radical protesters to dismantle the main stage, and the disappointment with the movement revealed by online public opinion. “Zai meiyou yingxiong de xingdongli” (Action without heroes), see https://thestandnews.com/politics, accessed December 10, 2014. “Wei zhengzong tu tanhuan zhengfu” (Surrounding the government headquarters to paralyze government operation), Mingpao, December 1, 2014. Some participants opposed this plan because of the high risks involved, whereas others believed that the plan was infeasible because of the insufficient number of participants. Adults believed that the student leaders had no experience in leading such actions. Some participants remained in the protest because they did not want to lose the occupied area that they had guarded for days. See “Action without heroes.” Conversation 6. Mok et al., “Occupy Supporters and Police Clash as Hong Kong Protests Escalate.” Danny Lee, Danny Mok, Shirley Zhao, Chris Lau, Alan Yu, Ernest Kao, Tony Cheung, and Emily Tsang, “DAY 64: Joshua Wong Announces Hunger Strike to Call for Talks with Government,” South China Morning Post, December 1, 2014. Zhou Yongkang, “Siqian suohou, cuileidan hou de fengyu piaoyao” (Rethinking the developments after the teargas attacks), www.inmediahk.net/node/ 1029993, accessed December 30, 2014. “Fanming yu bu zai haozhao shengji” (Pan-democrats urge the students not to call for any escalation of action), Mingpao, December 2, 2014.

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87 “Shiwei zhe: shuangxue celue songsan” (Protestors: The two student organizations did not have effective strategies), Oriental Daily, December 2, 2014. When the violent confrontation occurred, some people urged the protestors to withdraw, whereas others urged more people to go to the site to lend their support. Those who had not participated in the action at the beginning refused to join the escalated action despite the call of student leaders. See “Action without heroes.” 88 Conversation 7. 89 Some of the student leaders of the HKFS joined the rally, but were not recognized by many protestors. 90 “ ‘Shuangxue’ mangdong haozhao wei zhengzhong” (The two student organizations irrationally called for surrounding the government headquarters), Mingpao, December 2, 2014. 91 “Shuangxue lingxiu wei xianshen qianxian” (Student leaders did not show up in the frontier of protests), Mingpao, December 1, 2014. 92 “The two student organizations irrationally called for surrounding the government headquarters.” 93 Conversation 6. 94 “Shiwei zhe hong qian chengdan” (Protestors accused student leaders of being irresponsible), Oriental Daily, December 2, 2014. 95 “Zhou Yongkang cheng wei zhengzong zhengming jijing wuxiao” (Chow Yongkang admitted that surrounding the government headquarters showed the ineffectiveness of radical action), Hong Kong Economic Journal, December 23, 2014. 96 Zhou, “Rethinking the Developments after the Teargas Attacks.” 97 “Chongji xijingli zhenxiang” (The truth about assaulting the police), Takungpo, December 2, 2014. 98 Conversation 3. 99 “Shuangxue fengdao yangbiao,” (The two student organizations choose different paths), Mingpao, December 2, 2014. 100 The student leader thus believed that Scholarism staged the strike to avoid blame for the failed escalated action. Conversation 7. 101 Chris Lau, “There Is no Rift with the Federation of Students over Hunger Strike, Says Joshua Wong,” South China Morning Post, December 2, 2014. 102 “Jueshi xingdong wei zheng mianzhi” (The hunger strike is to save face), Hong Kong Economic Journal, December 8, 2014. 103 Dingxin Zhao, The Power of Tiananmen (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), p. 274. 104 The Ministry of Education, Jingxin dongpo de 56 tian (A Soul-Stirring 56 Days) (Beijing: Dadi chubanshe, 1989), p. 112. 105 Zheng Zhi, “Muqin, zai liulei” (Mother is crying), The People’s Daily, May 18, 1989. 106 “Shoudu shang baiwan ren youxing” (Over a million people took to the streets in Beijing), People’s Daily, May 18, 1989. 107 “Xianggang teshou: ren wu keren” (The chief executive of Hong Kong: Enough is enough), Takungpo, December 2, 2014. 108 “Dai: jixu zhanling huo daoshi” (Tai: Continual occupation could be counterproductive), Mingpao, December 4, 2014. 109 Michelle Chen and James Pomfret, “Hong Kong Occupy Founders Tell Students to Retreat amid Fears of Violence,” www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/02/ us-hongkong-china-idUSKCN0JE0KI20141202, accessed December 5, 2014. 110 Jeffie Lam, Clifford Lo, Joyce Ng, and Peter So, “Police to Probe More than 200 Occupy Protesters as Leaders Prepare to Surrender,” South China Morning Post, December 2, 2014.

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147

111 Xi Guoqiang, “Luba yuan zao chumai beipan” (Road occupiers felt betrayed), Takungpao, December 3, 2014. People Power believed that the surrender of the three cofounders amounted to the desertion of depressed participants. 112 The number of participants who stayed at the protest site in Admiralty decreased to a few hundred during the night also because of the cold weather. Author’s site observation and interviews, Admiralty 17, 32, 33. 113 “Sanzi yu cheli zhanlingqu” (The three cofounders urged retreat from the occupied area), Mingpao, December 3, 2014. 114 “Zhou Yongkong: jiang yu changqi zhanling zhe shang tuijin” (Chow Yongkang: will discuss with occupiers about the retreat), Mingpao, December 3, 2014. 115 Xi, “Road occupiers felt betrayed.” 116 Some of the arrested people were criticized by the other participants for “coming at the last moment” rather than “staying until the last moment.” Gong Xueming, “Fanduipai jie qingchang choushui” (Opposition parties took advantage of site clearance), Takungpo, December 14, 2014. 117 Interviews, Admiralty 14, 22. 118 Meyer, The Politics of Protest, p. 83. 119 Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works, p. 10.

7

Sustained movement and the consequences

Sustained social movements reveal broad social grievances and bring about the potential for political or socioeconomic changes. Sustained movements reflect the dynamic interaction among protestors, the targeted authority (if any), and other groups or the public. Although some sustained movements eventually fail, they may still produce significant influence on society. A sustained movement presents a challenge for the movement’s target, such as the government, as neither concession nor repression is an easy option. Concessions are difficult because meeting the demands of protestors, who may become more insistent, is costly. However, the government cannot use repression either because of the power of protestors, the disapproval of the public, or both. Tolerance then becomes the option of the government. A sustained movement also reveals the constraint and power of protestors as the standoff continues. Although protestors can carry on with their protesting activities, they cannot force the target to concede. Movement organizations, which can assume different forms, including social networks, are crucial in sustaining a movement because they can be used to retain and recruit participants. This study does not negate the importance of organizations in sustaining a movement. Instead, it highlights the role of the rank-andfile participants in decentralized movements. The Occupy Movement in Hong Kong was sustained because of government tolerance, the presence of determined participants, and the divided and weak leadership. Certainly, a sustained movement is not necessarily powerful enough to wrest concessions from the targeted authority. But a failed movement does not equate to its lack of influence. Sustained movements can be expressive, as they reveal the causes of people’s grievances and their likelihood of engaging in or retaking disruptive action, in addition to challenging the legitimacy of the targeted authority. Therefore, even failed movements can produce long-term or enduring effects. This chapter discusses the conditions for sustained movements and examines the direct and indirect consequences of such movements. Although the mechanisms through which social movements produce long-term or indirect consequences are usually difficult to identify,1 this book focuses on how movements reshape the perceptions of the parties involved, that is, how the parties view one another in the post-movement period based on their respective activities

Sustained movement and the consequences 149 during the movement. Such perceptions will inevitably influence future interactions between the parties.

Causes of sustained movements Indigenous organizational strength, as indicated by members, established structures, communication networks, and leaders, is crucial to the continuance of a movement.2 Organizational strength is important because it determines the recruitment of participants, a precondition for sustaining any movement. According to Tarrow, “The most effective organization of collective action draws on social networks in which people normally live and work, because their mutual trust and interdependence can easily be turned into solidarity.”3 Moreover, a strong leadership is considered a requirement for a sustained movement because a movement needs coordination. A sustained movement thus involves two important dimensions: the degree of organization among participants and the strength of coordination of the leadership group. Whereas existing research has focused on movements that are sustained because of a combination of a high degree of organization among participants and a well-accepted or strong leadership (Cell 1 in Table 7.1), this research examines sustained movements in a situation in which the degree of organization among participants is low and the leadership is weak or only partly accepted by the participants (Cell 2). The case of the Chilean student movement presented in Chapter 5 strongly supports the importance of organized participants and coordination in sustaining a powerful collective action. By contrast, this study shows that a movement can also be sustained because of a decentralized structure characterized by the presence of determined participants and a weak leadership. Unlike their counterparts in the Chilean student movement, many of the protestors in the Occupy Movement were previously unconnected with one another. They were mobilized not through preexisting networks but through the use of tear gas by the police. The lack of preexisting ties was not conducive to the strengthening of group

Table 7.1 Causes of sustained movements Organization of participants

Leadership Well accepted (strong)

High

Low

Source: Author’s summary.

Partly accepted (weak)

1. Sustaining based on consensus (e.g., the Chilean student movement) 2. Sustaining due to difference or consensus (e.g., the Occupy Movement)

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solidarity.4 For this reason, the movement’s momentum was difficult to maintain, as evidenced by the significant decline in the number of participants as the movement lasted. Against this background, the presence of determined participants who were willing to sacrifice their time and energy to continue their participation proved crucial in sustaining the movement. Determined participants were motivated to stay because they were caught in the trap of committed participation and were reluctant to retreat without any success given the time and effort they had invested. Others chose to stay because of their commitment to the determined participants or the expectation of others. Determined participants are crucial to movement survival in decentralized or unorganized movements. Occupy Wall Street in the United States, which was based on voluntary participation, was sustained because of determined participants who had no plans of retreating.5 A weak leadership also contributed to the standoff between the government and the protestors in the Occupy Movement. Movement leaders are considered important in sustaining collective action. According to Oberschall, “It has been quite common to stress the charismatic qualities of some leaders in order to account for their success in mobilizing a following and in maintaining a high degree of commitment and loyalty among them.”6 Movement leaders sustain the movement by coordinating collective action, wresting concessions from the movement’s target, and inspiring participants. However, the leadership of the Occupy Movement was not effective or strong enough because of its lack of sufficient representation, legitimacy, and authority. Challenges to movement leadership seem to be common in decentralized movements, especially when the leaders are not democratically elected. In the Occupy Wall Street Movement that “famously refused to authorize a set of leaders,”7 participants adopted a democratic and consensus-based approach to decision making. As Calhoun argues, “In the case of the OWS, the absence of any centralized leadership made it hard to negotiate any departure. Even more, there was no next big tactic to take the place of occupation.”8 In the Sunflower Movement in Taiwan, some participants challenged the movement’s leaders by leaving the Legislative Chamber and occupying another area. The leaders of the Occupy Movement came from preexisting organizations, such as the Occupy Central Movement and the HKFS. They were not elected by participants from diverse backgrounds and thus faced the issue of representativeness. Some participants, especially radical participants, claimed that the leaders did not represent them. Defiant participants made coordinated action difficult. The Occupy Movement was also plagued by difficulties in formulating movement strategies. A consensus on movement strategies was lacking among the leadership members themselves. Despite their initiation of the movement, the three cofounders were marginalized after the movement started. Although the cofounders wanted to end the movement much earlier, they failed to persuade the students to do so. Moreover, compared with the decision making in the Chilean student movement, decision making in the Occupy Movement was considerably less inclusive because of the lack of a bottom-up approach among the

Sustained movement and the consequences 151 participants. In the Chilean student movement, although the movement involved effective and articulate student coordinators, these coordinators did not make decisions for the participants. A lasting movement is not necessarily a powerful one. A sustained movement is powerful only if it manages to maintain or increase the momentum when necessary. Although it is an important mode of social protest, occupation has its limitations. First, anti-movement grievances and activities arise if the occupation affects the interests of other people. Second, occupation requires the strong commitment of a considerable number of people. During the first few days, the Occupy Movement attracted a large number of participants. However, maintaining the momentum was difficult. By contrast, in the anti-national education movement in Hong Kong in 2012, protestors did not rely on occupation but instead organized continuous protests over a period of about six months (Chapter 2). The Chilean student movement also used this approach. Compared with movements based on repeated protests, occupation requires more resources and energy from determined participants. Third, occupation without tactical innovation reduces the power of the movement. Even when the number of participants remains constant, the movement becomes less powerful as time passes partly because the targeted authority and the public begin to accept or become accustomed to the movement. According to Meyer, “A tactic sends a message to authorities about a group’s commitment, size, claims, and potential to disrupt. A tactic also sends a message to activists about the same things. And a tactic sends a message to bystanders about a group’s concerns, intentions, and worthiness.”9 A movement becomes weak when the power of the movement revealed by its message remains the same or declines. The leadership group of the Occupy Movement was ineffective in staging tactical escalation during the long occupation mainly because of its weakness. The movement leadership faced difficulty not only in formulating strategies but also in choosing the right timing. The “square referendum” the leadership proposed in October was rejected because of the opposition from the participants. In addition, the proposed referendum based on legislators’ resignations was given up because of the disagreement within the leadership group. Tactical escalation is meant to increase movement momentum, win public support, inspire participants’ confidence, and expose the vulnerability of the movement’s target. However, tactical escalation paradoxically becomes difficult when the movement momentum declines to a significantly low level. Meyer suggests that the influence of any collective action is a function of many things, “but the match of tactics to resources is critical.”10 These resources include participants and public support. A significant decline in movement momentum reflects the important disadvantages movement participants face. The shrinking number of participants may be caused by the participants’ diminishing sense of efficacy, increased repression by the authorities, public disapproval, loss of resources, or discontinued support of allies. In these circumstances, tactics that fail to create moral shocks are unlikely to create a strong mobilization effect. This failure

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explains the unsuccessful escalation of action taken by students on November 30. At that moment, movement momentum had clearly declined after the government cleared the protest site in Mong Kok. Nevertheless, even a failed movement can have enduring influence because it usually implies the persistence of grievances that may again translate into action or take new forms of action in the future. Moreover, movements influence the behavior of the parties involved in that they learn from their experience and adjust their strategies accordingly in their future actions.

Movement influence If the success of a movement is defined by “whether it has achieved its goals,”11 then the Occupy Movement is a failure. Despite the movement, the Chinese central government rejected the demand for direct election of the chief executive with a civil nomination. The participants also paid a high cost. Throughout the movement, the police made 955 arrests, excluding those arrested after the site had been cleared (Table 7.2). Although 130 police officers were injured, a higher number of participants were wounded. The participants and their supporters believed that the police used excessive force during the movement. As a result, the citizens filed 1,972 complaints against the police, although most of the complaints were made by those who did not directly confront the police.12 Social movements have both direct and enduring consequences. The direct consequences are the direct outcomes of a movement. The enduring consequences, which can be political, socioeconomic, or cultural, are not necessarily anticipated by the protestors or the movement’s target. In other words, the influence of a movement may go beyond its actual success or failure.13 However, indirect movement outcomes are usually difficult to assess. In his study of civil rights movements in Mississippi, Andrews examines the relationship between movements and social change using a three-part movement infrastructure model, which evaluates leadership, organizational structure, and resources, to explain the enduring effects of movements.14 His study finds that the movement infrastructures in different counties in Mississippi during the earlier years influenced several Table 7.2 Basic statistics on the Occupy Movement Category Arrests People who turned themselves in Police officers injured Protestors arranged by the police for medical treatment Complaints against the police Complaints to investigate and report

Number 955 75 130 221 1,972 106

Source: Hong Kong Economic Journal, December 16, 2014.

Sustained movement and the consequences 153 local issues in subsequent years, including voter registration, poverty alleviation, and school segregation. Therefore, organizational strength is an important indicator of the enduring effect of a movement. This present study suggests another important mechanism through which a movement produces enduring consequences: the movement’s influence on the perception of the involved parties. This perception leads participants and the movement’s target to reflect on their behavior and view one another in a new light, particularly when the movement fails. Participants reflect on their claims and movement strategies, whereas the movement target considers the strengths and weaknesses of its reaction. Participants reexamine the political will, power, and strategies of the target, whereas the target reflects on the intention, power, and potential of the participants. Both parties are likely to adjust their strategies when dealing with each other in the future.

Participants and the movement Participants learn lessons from their experiences in social movements. Successful movements enhance participants’ sense of efficacy, whereas failed ones create disappointment, a sense of powerlessness, and frustration among the participants. Therefore, frustrated participants strengthen their negative view about the targeted authority. Participants of failed movements may continue the pursuit of their claims by retaking collective action at proper times or by taking other measures, such as noncooperation in governance. Therefore, failure does not necessarily stop participants’ action. Instead, it leads participants to think about new strategies or new modes of action. After the Occupy Movement in Hong Kong ended, a student leader stated that the students did not lose, and the government did not win.15 Nevertheless, the frustration among some of the participants was apparent. On the night of November 10, or one night before site clearance, thousands of people returned to the protest site in Admiralty to take a last look. The reluctance of some participants to retreat was evident.16 The front-page picture of the Apple Daily published on December 16 showed that on December 15, before the government began to clear the last protest site in Causeway Bay, a young protestor cried in the arms of a young woman; this picture reflected the disappointment, frustration, and reluctance of some protestors.17 However, this failed movement would likely have a long-term effect on the participants and their supporters. Facing the uncompromising central government that decides democracy in the city, the disillusioned younger generation could develop a stronger sense of local identity. If the integration of Hong Kong into the mainland is based on the alignment of (tangible) interest and value convergence (Table 7.3), the slow integration of the city is not surprising. First, the economic integration of Hong Kong into the Chinese mainland does not seem to have benefited the low-income groups. Large businesses have apparently fared much better than many individual residents. Moreover, city residents believe that competition from the mainland has disadvantaged local residents.

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Table 7.3 Factors affecting the integration of Hong Kong into the Chinese mainland Value Convergence

High Low

Alignment of Tangible Interests High

Low

Some of the businesses Some of the businesses

Some of the old generation Many of the young generation

Source: Author’s summary.

Table 7.4 Changes in the views of the youth

Hoping to migrate Having a Chinese identity Democracy is more important than economic development. Corruption is severe in Hong Kong.

2009 (%)

2012 (%)

2014 (%)

35.3 88.1 36.5

43.2 71.6 47.9

62.3 62.6 60.4

32.9

50.5

65.0

Source: Hong Kong Economic Journal, January 13, 2015.

Second, value convergence between the city and the mainland is difficult to achieve. Hong Kong residents have read much negative news about the mainland.18 This perception implies that the authoritarian rule of the mainland contradicts the freedom Hong Kong residents enjoy. That many young people do not share the values of the Chinese mainland or believe that they have benefited from economic integration with the mainland is not an overstatement. After the Occupy Movement, mainland government officials observed an enhanced awareness of local identity in the city.19 For example, a survey of 531 people aged between 15 and 39 in August and September 2014 before the Occupy Movement revealed the change in the attitude of young people. The survey showed that 62.3 percent of young people hoped to migrate to other countries, in contrast to 35.5 percent in 2009 (Table 7.4). In the 2009 survey, about 88 percent indicated a Chinese identity, but the percentage declined to 62.6 in 2014. The political awareness of young people seemed to have increased. In the 2014 survey, more than 60 percent believed that democracy was more important than economic development, in contrast to 36.5 percent in 2009.20 The disappointment the Occupy Movement caused may have further strengthened the local identity of residents. For example, in a survey of 810 residents aged 18 or older in October 2014, less than 9 percent reported that they were Chinese; this percentage was 4.3 for people born in the 1980s or later.21 Nevertheless, the identity issue should not be exaggerated. First, most locals still believe that they are both Hong Kong residents and Chinese (i.e., 69 percent in the 2014 survey). Second, in consideration of the degree of integration of the city into the mainland, identity-based claims or actions (e.g., the independence of

Sustained movement and the consequences 155 Hong Kong) have little chance of success. However, a strong awareness of local identity can create pressure on the government with regard to policy making. The failure of the movement prompted the movement’s leaders and participants to reflect on their actions. As discussed in the previous chapters, some people primarily attributed the failure to the lack of a strong leadership in the movement. A decentralized movement structure grants a high level of autonomy to participants, but decentralization does not necessarily imply an ineffective leadership. In the Chilean student movement, the combination of elected leaders and the democratic manner of policy making made the movement more effective. In the Occupy Movement, the lack of coordination among participants proved a serious weakness, as the action on November 30 suggested. In that incident, a pre-agreed or pre-informed plan, backup plan, coordination group or persons, or authority in place was absent. Thus, participants sometimes took action for entirely different purposes (i.e., peaceful versus violent).22 Furthermore, the movement’s leaders admitted their lack of experience in leading protests. While claiming that he was not qualified to fight in the streets, Tai Yiu-ting explained the problem with the movement as follows: “It was like playing football. Now everybody wants to play as the vanguard, and there is no reason to win the game. There is a need for role adjustment.”23 Chan Chin-man asserted that the movement failed in terms of fighting for changes in the political arrangement but succeeded in promoting awareness of democracy. Moreover, he said that he would not organize any more social movements, as it was not his area of expertise as a scholar. Instead, young people should carry out this task. Chan believed that more street movements should be led by young people.24 Similarly, the HKFS admitted its lack of experience in the movement. About two weeks after the occupation movement ended, Chow Yong-kang wrote an article that reflected on the activities of the HKFS during the movement. He acknowledged that the many rumors about the HKFS undermined the public’s trust in the association. The HKFS achieved limited success from the movement and committed “too many mistakes.”25 Nevertheless, some other people saw the movement as a “sped-up political training class” for many participants and a call to attract public attention to political issues in the city.26 One possible important consequence of this movement is the training of a large number of movement participants through the long-term occupation. Most of the participants were young people, who would remain the main force fighting for democracy as long as democratic development failed to satisfy their expectations. The failed movement has not discouraged all the pro-democracy forces. Instead, the failure urges them to devise new approaches to pursue their claims. A 35-year-old protestor who participated in the protest from its early days in Admiralty said, ‘We fought and we made trouble but without any successed. We held hunger strikes, and we even pleaded [with] the government. But the government is entirely irresponsive.” For this reason, the protestor believed that new approaches are necessary. He said, “As long as the sentence ‘I want real suffrage’ does not disappear from the media, I am willing to do all I can.”27

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Street protests continued after the site clearance. For example, although the police cleared the encampment on November 25 and 26, determined protestors in Mong Kok developed a new mode of protest called the “shopping tour.” This group, which usually consisted of 100 or more people, would walk crowded footpaths back and forth or walk slowly on the street, thus launching the so-called mobile occupation.28 Noncooperation continues in the Legislative Council. In June 2015, the Hong Kong government submitted the political reform proposal based on the 8.31 decision made by the National People’s Congress. However, pan-democracy lawmakers in the Legislative Council vetoed the proposal as expected. The stalemate between the government and those fighting for democracy remains, and it is likely to affect governance in the city. However, pro-democrats also face challenges as not all participants currently believe in the effectiveness of protests. On February 1, 2015, the Civil Human Rights Front initiated the first major pro-democracy demonstration after the Occupy Movement. The turnout ranged between 8,800 and 13,000, which was far below the expected 50,000. The low turnout could be attributed to different reasons, such as the people’s weak sense of efficacy or fatigue.29 If a weak sense of efficacy was the major reason, then the pro-democracy groups now face the challenge of finding new tactics or mobilization methods. On September 28, 2015, more than 1,000 people held a gathering in Admiralty to mark the first anniversary of the Occupy Movement. Again, the turnout was small.30 Another outcome is the radicalization of localism among some local residents, although the number is not large for the time being. These radical groups have a strong sense of local identity and are strongly resentful against the mainland and the Hong Kong government. Violence becomes their common option when they confront the police. A recent example is the 10-hour riot that occurred in Mong Kok between February 8 and 9, 2016, during which radical residents violently confronted the police, turning the dispute between the police and the hawkers into a bloody confrontation. More than 120 people, including police officers, were sent to hospitals because of the violent confrontation, and the police arrested 61 people by February 9.31

Movement target and movement consequence On January 21, 2015, Vice President of China Li Yuanchao delivered a speech at a meeting in Beijing to more than 400 delegates of the All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese. Li declared that the occupiers and their behindthe-scenes supporters failed to achieve their goals after the two-month turmoil in Hong Kong. Thus, the central government, the Hong Kong government, and the forces that supported the country and Hong Kong won this stage. Nevertheless, the central government believed that the anti-movement struggle had not ended, and “the really interesting part of the show is yet to come.”32 The Chinese central government also seemed to have realized the problems with its policies toward Hong Kong in the past 17 years. First, the central

Sustained movement and the consequences 157 government came to believe that the autonomy granted to the city had been taken advantage of by the pan-democratic camp and foreign forces to pursue their interests, which were at odds with those of both Hong Kong and the Chinese mainland. Chen Zuo’er, a former deputy director of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council, made the following comment on the Occupy Movement toward the end of the movement: This is a battle over the right of governance in Hong Kong. Its importance is not next to the handover of the sovereignty. It is even more complicated. . . . In the future, the people in Hong Kong not only need to face the legacies of the Occupy Movement, but they also have to deal with the forces that harm Hong Kong. Those forces may turn away from the streets to the court, the legislature, the media, and universities or even high schools. That will be a long battle.33 Chinese officials believed that the movement was a “Hong Kong version of the color revolution” that external forces, particularly the United States, supported; according to them, these forces intend to use Hong Kong as a base to create instability in China.34 When dealing with an issue, a common practice of Beijing is to define its nature and then make the corresponding policies. If the central government believes in the complex motivations of movement participants and their (external) supporters, then concessions will not be an option. Thus, the central government strongly supported the chief executive, the police, and the Hong Kong government during this movement. Second, the autonomy or self-governance granted to Hong Kong failed to strengthen the city residents’ sense of belonging to China. In December 2014, an official of the National People’s Congress stated that some residents still lacked a sense of belonging to China, despite the sovereignty of Hong Kong and Macao having been under the authority of China for 17 years and 15 years, respectively. “It is therefore an important task to form the notion of the nationstate among the people in Hong Kong and Macao, especially to make them share the national identity and accept the central government and the national development path.”35 The official further stated that some Hong Kong residents held an entirely different view of the policy of “one country, two systems” and the Basic Law from that of mainland residents. These differences deserve serious attention. Therefore, the people of Hong Kong should be re-enlightened about the “one country, two systems” policy. Furthermore, Chen Zuo’er said that the Occupy Movement revealed problems with the youth and education in Hong Kong. Chen was puzzled by the fact that the young movement participants were only children when Hong Kong was handed over to China. However, they now waved the British national flag and had become vanguards attacking the military camp of the People’s Liberation Army in Hong Kong, the Legislative Council, and the government headquarters. All these events presented the need to consider sovereignty, national security, and development when making curricula and policies in school management. Chen

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believed that the youth were brainwashed by Western influences and should thus be reeducated. He emphasized the necessity for the Education Bureau to provide correct guidance to educational institutes and for these institutes to be under the supervision of the central government and the society.36 Chinese government officials were not pleased that the central government had little influence on education in a place over which it has jurisdiction. The failure of enacting Article 23 of the Basic Law and the suspension of national education became increasingly unacceptable to some people, including mainland government officials. The connections between foreign forces and the activists of the Occupy Movement strengthened the belief of the central government in Western political ambition in the city.37 In addition, the central government was disappointed with large businesses that were believed to have benefited the most from the handover since 1997. After the movement started, public opinion and the media in the city generally favored the movement, except for the newspapers that were funded by the Chinese government but had a considerably small audience. The tycoons in the city refused to comment on the movement. At noon on October 25, 2014, Xinhua News Agency published an article titled “Hong Kong tycoons reluctant to take sides amid Occupy turmoil.” The article, which singled out Li Ka-shing and three other magnates, was removed in the evening of the same day.38 Similarly, reliance on large businesses has proven to be an ineffective integration strategy the Chinese central government used to deal with the Taiwan issue. Particularly, the 24-day Sunflower Movement in Taiwan is a reflection of the people’s disapproval of economic collaboration across the straits. These people believed that large businesses, instead of ordinary people, reaped the economic benefits of the cooperation. As a Taiwanese scholar stated, “Mainland China has tried very hard to buy Taiwan, to win the support of Taiwan’s people economically. But I don’t think that strategy really works.”39 Thus, when the government refused to stop the trade pact on March 23, a large number of people took to the streets on March 30. The mass protest boded ill for the KMT, which won only 6 of the 22 seats for the city and county heads in the elections in November 2014, significantly low compared with its 16 seats four years before.40 In 2016, the KMT met its Waterloo in the presidential election and the legislative election. The Occupy Movement alerted the Hong Kong government and the central government of the necessity for increased efforts to address the socioeconomic issues and the demand for democracy in the city. Some government officials in Hong Kong and Beijing believed that a major cause of the Occupy Movement was the grievances of young people against high housing prices, high inequality, and limited upward mobility. However, as discussed in earlier chapters, movement participants tended to stress their demand for democracy instead of socioeconomic grievances as the major cause for their participation. Although socioeconomic grievances could be the reason for some people’s participation, the demand for democracy remains an issue that the Chinese government has yet to face. A core issue the Chinese government encountered is the handicapping of the Hong Kong government because of the current political arrangements.

Sustained movement and the consequences 159 Although the existing political arrangements fail to grant full democracy to the city, they have created a political space for anti-government forces or the prodemocracy camp to carry out protest activities both in the Legislative Council and on the streets. These activities are likely to persist as long as democracy is not achieved. However, if the pro-democracy groups fail to dispel the suspicion of the Chinese central government on their overseas connections and their perceived non-constructive role in city governance, these groups will face immense difficulties in obtaining concessions from the central government. This deadlock and the economic stagnation are likely to create space for radical groups to grow.

Notes 1 See, for example, Marco Giugni, “Was It Worth the Effort? The Outcomes and Consequences of Social Movements,” Annual Review of Sociology, vol. 24 (1998), pp. 371–393. 2 Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930– 1970 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999, second edition), p. 54. 3 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 136. 4 Anthony Oberschall, Social Conflicts and Social Movements (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973), p. 125. 5 Craig Calhoun, “Occupy Wall Street in Perspective,” British Journal of Sociology, vol. 64, no. 1 (2013), pp. 26–38. 6 Oberschall, Social Conflicts and Social Movements, p. 172. 7 Calhoun, “Occupy Wall Street in Perspective,” pp. 29–30. 8 Ibid. 9 David Meyer, The Politics of Protest: Social Movements in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 87. 10 Ibid., p. 86. 11 Paul Burstein, Rachael Einwohner, and Jocelyn Hollander, “The Success of Political Movements: A Bargaining Perspective,” in Craig Jenkins and Bert Klandermans (eds.), The Politics of Social Protest: Comparative Perspectives on States and Social Movements (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), pp. 275–323. 12 Of the 1,972 complaints, 137 of them were submitted by those people who claimed to be mistreated by the police themselves. Later the number of complaints increased to 2,326. “Zhanzhong yundong yansheng tousu” (Occupy Movement triggered complaints against the police), Mingpao, January 16, 2015. 13 Annulla Linders, “Victory and Beyond: A Historical Comparative Analysis of the Outcomes of the Abortion Movements in Sweden and the United States,” Sociological Forum, vol. 19, no. 3 (2004), pp. 371–404. 14 Kenneth Andrews, Freedom Is a Constant Struggle: The Mississippi Civil Rights Movement and Its Strategy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), p. 25. 15 “Cen Aohui: shuangxue mei shu, zhengfu wu ying” (Shum Ngo-fai: The two student associations did not lose and the government did not win), Apple Daily, December 13, 2014. 16 Author’s site observation. 17 This picture appeared on the front page of the Apple Daily, December 16, 2014. 18 Li Chengxin, “Zhanling qu xuezi keqiu ‘zhen jiaoliu’ ” (Students at the protest sites hope to have productive interaction with the mainland), Hong Kong Economic Journal, November 24, 2014.

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19 “Zhen Zuo’er: gang qingnian que guojia yishi xu ‘bunao’ ” (Chen Zuo’er: Hong Kong youth lack a sense of national identity and need to be educated), Hong Kong Economic Journal, January 9, 2015. 20 Ji Xiaofeng, “Guomin shenfen rentong jiang, gang qing yimin yiyu sheng” (The sense of national identity declines, and Hong Kong youths are more willing to migrate), Hong Kong Economic Journal, January 13, 2015. 21 “8.9% gangren ren ‘zhongguo ren’ xindi” (8.9 percent of the Hong Kong residents report a Chinese identity, hitting a new low level), Mingpao, November 11, 2014. 22 “Zai meiyou yingxiong de xingdongli” (Action without heroes), see the Standnews Web site, https://thestandnews.com/politics, accessed January 24, 2015. 23 “Dai Yaoting: zishou hou zhanzhong tuandui sui chetui” (Tai Yiuting: The teams at the protest site will be dismantled after they turn themselves in), Hong Kong Economic Journal, November 21, 2014. 24 Yu Wei, “Chen Jianmin: Bu zai gao sheyun, yong bi kangzheng” (Chan Chinman: No more participation in social movements, using pen as the weapon), Mingpao, December 9, 2014. 25 Zhou Yong-kang, “Siqian suohou, cuileidan hou de fengyu piaoyao” (Rethinking about the developments after the tear gas), www.inmediahk.net/node/1029993, accessed December 30, 2014. 26 Chen Peishui and Zhang Tingting, “He Yunshi chang zu xinshidai zhengdang” (Ho Wan-si proposes to form a new generation party), Apple Daily, December 13, 2014. 27 Qu Bing, “Cunming: huigu suiyue xin hen shang” (Villager: It is a discouraging memory), Singtao Daily, December 11, 2014. 28 They sometimes gathered in front of shops or went into the shops, especially those that complained about this group, to pretend to do some shopping. While such “mobile occupation” was criticized by the government, some citizens, and the business, protestors themselves felt that “it is a pleasant change from camping on the tarmac . . . [and] is proving even more effective as a strain on police manpower.” Samuel Chan, “Occupy protestors in Mong Kok take to the ‘shopping tour,’ ” South China Morning Post, December 5, 2014. Certainly, it might not be pleasant to others because the police made a number of arrests. One protestor in Admiralty said that this type of mobile occupation was not suitable to the students in Admiralty because they were not physically strong enough to resist the police. Interview, Admiralty 17. 29 Tony Cheung, Phila Siu, Ernest Kao, and Samuel Chan, “Hong Kong Democracy Movement Back on Road, but Turnout Down,” South China Morning Post, February 1, 2015. 30 Jeffie Lam and Stuart Lau, “Hong Kong Activists Mark Occupy Protest Anniversary and Set Sights on Next Battleground,” South China Morning Post, September 28, 2015. 31 Jennifer Ngo and Stuart Lau, “Mong Kok Riot: How Hong Kong’s First Night in the Year of the Monkey Descended into Mayhem,” South China Morning Post, February 10, 2016. 32 Minnie Chan, Stuart Lau, and Li Jing, “Chinese Vice-president Li Yuanchao Hits Back at Rumors He Is Target of Looming Graft Probe,” South China Morning Post, January 23, 2015. 33 “Chen Zuo’er: Weifa zhan zhong qishu yijing” (Chen Zuo’er: The illegal occupation has come to the end), Takungpao, December 11, 2014. 34 Liu Su, “Liang Zhenying licuo ‘zhan zhong’ ying guanjian yiju” (Leung Chunying defeated the Occupy Movement and won a critical success), Mirror Monthly, January 2015, pp. 6–11.

Sustained movement and the consequences 161 35 Li Wangxian, “Zhang Rongshun: Gang xu ‘yiguo liangzhi’ zai qimeng” (Zhang Rongshun: Hong Kong needs a re-enlightenment of “One country, two systems”), Wenweipo, December 15, 2014. 36 Chen Zuo’er: Hong Kong youths lack a sense of national identity, Hong Kong Economic Journal. 37 Liu Silu, “ ‘Zhan zhong’ shizhi de sange tezheng” (The three features of the truth of the Occupation Movement), Mirror Monthly, November 2014, pp. 10–11. 38 Shirley Yam, “Beijing Wants Tycoons to Take Action, Not Just Pay Lip Service,” South China Morning Post, November 1, 2014. 39 Austin Ramzy, “Concession Offered, Taiwan Group to End Protest of China Trade Pact,” New York Times, April 7, 2014. 40 Aries Poon, Jenny W. Hsu, and Fanny Liu, “Taiwan Election Results Likely to Complicate Relations with China,” Wall Street Journal, December 1, 2014.

Appendix Data collection

This book is based on both secondary reports and the author’s interviews with movement participants, activists, leaders, police, and journalists. I interviewed 54 movement participants at the three protest sites in Admiralty, Mong Kok, and Causeway Bay during the movement. These interviewees stayed at the protest sites for at least three weeks. Of the 37 participants interviewed in Admiralty, interviewees 1 to 18 (i.e., Interviews Admiralty 1–18) were high school or college students, whereas interviewees 19 to 37 (i.e., Interviews Admiralty 19–37) were working people. Of the 13 interviewees in Mong Kok, interviewees 1 to 8 were high school or college students (i.e., Interviews Mong Kok 1–8), and interviews 9 to 13 were working people (i.e., Interviews Mong Kok 9–13). The four interviewees in Causeway Bay were all students (i.e., Interviews Causeway Bay 1–4). These interviews usually lasted about 15 minutes, with open-ended questions. In addition, I also interviewed 10 college students (Interviews 1–10) who were not determined participants and retreated earlier than the 54 participants I interviewed at the protest sites. I also talked to five movement activists and leaders, a legislator, a police official, and two journalists after the movement through face-to-face interviews and e-mail communications. These interviews were conducted to gain information about decision making during the movement and to verify media reports on some of the issues addressed in this book. Another important source of materials is the local newspapers that had intensively covered the movement. These newspapers differ in their political orientation, and I verified the information by cross-checking the reports of different local newspapers and my interviewees. Local newspapers used in this study include: Apple Daily, Hong Kong Economic Journal, Mingpao, Singtao Daily, South China Morning Post, Oriental Daily, Takungpo, and Wenweipo.

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Selected bibliography 167 Sing, Ming, Hong Kong’s Tortuous Democratization: A Comparative Analysis, London: Routledge, 2004. ——— “The Legitimacy Problem and Democratic Reform in Hong Kong,” Journal of Contemporary China, 2006, vol. 15, no. 48, 517–532. ——— Politics and Government in Hong Kong: Crisis under Chinese Sovereignty, London: Routledge, 2009. ——— “The Anti-national Education Movement in Hong Kong: A Struggle for Freedom of Thought and One Country, Two Systems,” Manuscript, 2015. Snow, David, and Benford, Robert, “Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization,” International Social Movement Research, 1988, vol. 1, no. 1, 197–217. Snyder, David, and Kelly, William, “Industrial Violence in Italy, 1878–1903,” American Journal of Sociology, 1976, vol. 82, no. 1, 131–162. So, Alvin, “The Transformation of Social Movements in Hong Kong after 1997,” in Jeffrey Broadbent and Vicky Brockman (eds.), East Asian Social Movements: Power, Protest and Change, New York: Springer, 2011, pp. 365–384. Somma, Nicolas, “The Chilean Student Movement of 2011–2012: Challenging the Marketization of Education,” Interface: A Journal for and about Social Movements, 2012, vol. 4, no. 2, 296–309. Tarrow, Sidney, Power in Movement, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011. Tilly, Charles, From Mobilization to Revolution, New York: Random House, 1978. ——— “Social Movements and National Politics,” in Bright Charles and Susan Harding (eds.), State Building and Social Movements, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1984, pp. 297–317. ——— “From Interactions to Outcomes in Social Movements,” in Marco Giugni, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly (eds.), How Social Movements Matter, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999, pp. 253–270. Useem, Bert, and Zald, Mayer, “From Pressure Group to Social Movement: Organizational Dilemmas of the Effort to Promote Nuclear Power,” Social Problems, 1982, vol. 30, no. 2, 144–156. Weber, Max, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, Glencoe: The Free Press, 1947, translated by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons. ——— Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978. Weiss, Robert, “Defection from Social Movements and Subsequent Recruitment to New Movements,” in Barry McLaughlin (ed.), Studies in Social Movements, New York: The Free Press, 1969, pp. 328–348. Xu, Yanling, “Xianggang weishenme fasheng daguimo kangzhen” (Why large-scale protests occurred in Hong Kong), Kaifang (Open Magazine), 2014, vol. 11, 38–39. Zald, Mayer, and Ash, Roberta, “Social Movement Organizations: Growth, Decay and Change,” Social Forces, 1996, vol. 44, no. 3, 327–341. Zald, Mayer, and Berger, Michael, “Social Movements in Organizations: Coup d’état, Bureaucratic Insurgency and Mass Movement,” in Mayer Zald and John McCarthy (eds.), Social Movements in an Organizational Society, New Brunswick, NJ: Translation Books, 1987, pp. 185–222. Zald, Mayer, and Useem, Bert, “Movement and Countermovement Interaction: Mobilization, Tactics, and State Involvement,” in Mayer Zald and John McCarthy (eds.), Social Movements in an Organizational Society, New Brunswick, NJ: Translation Books, 1987, pp. 247–272. Zhao, Dingxin, The Power of Tiananmen: State–Society Relations and the 1989 Beijing Student Movement, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001.

Index

Page numbers in italic format indicate figures and tables.

Basic Law 28, 55, 124, 157, 158 bloody repression 11, 12, 55, 99 blue-ribbon group 60–1, 80, 90 British rule 29, 30

of 2; reasons for participation in 79; scale and frequency of 103; see also grievances; social movements colonial rule 29, 32 “color revolution” 56, 57, 157 communication technologies see social media concessions: central government and 55, 57, 64, 76, 77, 91; for dealing with grievances 39; as mode of response 7–8, 148; OCM and 38 countermovements: anti-movement protests and 60, 62; by progovernment camp 37; protests’ legitimacy and 44, 58 court injunctions 62, 63, 88

Chilean student movement 102–3, 149, 155 Chinese central government: concessions and 55, 57, 64, 76, 77, 91; dissatisfaction with 27; foreign intervention issues 56–7; grievances against 31–2; movement consequences and 156–9; policy consequences of 24–5; response by 1–2; seeking dialogues with 124–6; white book issues 36–7; see also Occupy Movement citizens’ donations 82, 83 Civic Passion 108 civil disobedience 36, 38, 78, 89, 136 civil nomination 1–2, 38–9, 122, 124–5 cognitive liberation 3, 74 collective action: advocacy for action and 92; effectiveness of 7; leadership issues 101; organizations’ importance for 4, 7; protests and 35; purpose

decentralized movements: elements of 5–6; government and 7–8; leadership issues 107, 116, 150; participants in 8–10; sustaining 7–11; see also Occupy Movement decision making: introduction to 99–100; leaders and 100–4, 106; legitimacy of 102; problems with 111–15 de facto referendum 113, 114 democracy: demand for 27–9, 36, 38–9; direct 6, 18; fight for 19 demonstrations: about democracy 31; by anti-movement groups 61–2; introduction to 2, 5; participants in 32; see also protests determined participants see participants developers’ hegemony 21, 31 direct democracy 6, 18 donations: decline in 90; through citizens 82, 83

Admiralty protest site see protest sites aggressive actions 13, 127, 128, 129 anti-movement people 53, 84, 85, 115, 123 anti-movement protests 44, 58, 60–3 anti-national education movement 33, 34, 35, 151 Anti-Occupy Alliance for Peace and Democracy 61, 133 Article 23 (anti-subversion law) 32, 39, 91, 129, 158

Index education see national education program 8.31 decision 1–2, 47–8, 55, 124–5 election system 28 environmental protection 21, 30 escalated action: conclusion about 140–1; dialogue with government and 122–6; effectiveness of 122, 126–31; end of Occupy Movement and 139–40; failure of 135–8; introduction to 121–2; movement momentum and 125–6, 131–9, 151; occurrence of 132; poorly planned 136; role of 127–9; as a twoedged sword 126–7 Facebook see social media first-aid stations 81, 82, 83, 84 foreign government support 56–7 functional constituencies 27–8, 31, 114, 125, 130

169

handicapping of 158–9; mainlanders and 25–6; OCM and 36–9; seeking dialogues with 122–4 Hong Kong residents: competition for resources with 25–6; democracy demand by 27–9, 36, 38–9; distrust toward police and 128; grievances of 17–29; identity issues 154, 156 housing prices, decline in 21 hunger strikes 33, 36, 109, 138–9, 155 ignorance as mode of response 7, 8, 44 income inequality 18–19, 22–4 information technologies see social media July 1 demonstrations 32, 33, 35

Gini coefficient 22, 23 government: cooptation strategy 103; decentralized movements and 7–8; dialogue with 122–6; under heavy criticism 52; with low legitimacy 19, 31; mode of response by 7–8, 44–6; repression and 56, 148; standoff with 7–8, 63–5, 150; see also Occupy Movement grievances: against Chinese government 31–2; concessions for dealing with 7–8, 39; against housing prices 19–22; against income inequality 18–19, 22–4; introduction to 17–29; against mainlanders 24–6; against the occupation 58–60; against police 77–8; political 27–9; against protestors 108–9; against Sunflower movement 102; see also protests

labor unions 100, 103 large businesses 21, 153, 158 large-scale movements see decentralized movements; social movements leaders/leadership: collective action and 101; conclusion about 115–16; decentralized movements and 107, 116, 150; decision making and 100–4, 111–15; difficulties faced by 101–2; emergence of 100–2; importance of 100; legitimacy of 101, 106; with limited authority 10–11, 106–11; of Occupy Movement 93, 99, 104–6; participation by 9–10; role of 4–5; selection of 11; of Sunflower Movement 101, 150; of Tiananmen movement 99, 101, 102, 109, 116; weak 93, 99, 116, 141 Legislative Council: attack on building of 64, 110, 111, 129–30, 141; composition of 27–8, 30; noncooperation in 156; see also protests

high housing prices 19–22, 158 Hong Kong: governance issues 30, 124, 157; high housing prices in 19–22; income inequality in 22; influx of tourists in 24–6; integration of 153–5; Legislative Council 27–8, 30; protests in 32; use of tear gas in 49 Hong Kong Federation of Students (HKFS) 33, 35, 105–6, 122–5, 131–2, 155 Hong Kong government: Article 23 and 32; concern about source of supplies 83; education program and 33;

mainlanders, conflicts with 24–6 mass protests 29, 32, 46, 129, 158 medical stations 82, 83, 84, 130 mobilization: participation without 5; through campus referendums 104; through social media 6 Mong Kok see protest sites movement legitimacy: damage of 130; defined 45; illegality of movement and 62; importance of 45–6, 65; public reaction and 50, 52–5; Sunflower Movement and 46; ways to achieve 45

170

Index

movements see decentralized movements; social movements movement sustainability: decentralized movements and 7–11; Occupy Movement and 11–12; organizational strength and 3–5, 149; of social movements 2–7, 71–2 national education program 33, 35, 39, 91, 157–8 National People’s Congress (NPC): 8.31 decision by 1–2, 47–8, 55; election system and 28; HKFS and 125; OCM and 3 “No compromise and no blood” policy 55 occupiers see participants; protestors; students Occupy Central Movement (OCM) 1, 18, 36–8, 56, 57 Occupy Movement: attempts to abolish authority of 109–11; background of 12, 17–39; basic statistics on 152; coordination issues 105–9, 111, 115–16, 136–7, 149–51, 155; data collection for 162; declined momentum of 131–9; democracy issue awareness through 92–3; description of 1; end of 139–40; government response and 47–55, 65; grievances against 58–60; illegal occupation and 87–90; impact of 62–3; inconveniences caused by 88; ineffectiveness of 74; influence of 152–9; major claim of 46; movement strategies and 112–15, 150; movement target and 156–9; newspaper coverage of 134; occupying public space at 81–2; occurrence of 12–13; opposition to 58–63; posters, symbols and slogans 85–6; protests against 60–3; public opinion toward 44, 45, 64, 89, 132–3; reaction to 57–8; reasons for participation in 9, 73, 74; September 28 confrontation 49–50; social groups and 103–6, 115; spread of news about 54; standoff during 63–5, 116; supplies donation for 82–3; support for 53–4, 56–7, 79–81, 135; sustaining 11–12; trigger for 47–8; use of tear gas for 46–50, 52, 64–5; use of tents at 82; violence at 53; see also decision making; leaders/ leadership

Occupy Wall Street Movement 2, 6, 87, 92, 150 “one country, two systems” policy 36–7, 56, 125, 157 organizations/organizational strength: of Chilean student movement 103–4; collective action and 4, 7; importance of 3–4; movement sustainability and 3–5, 149; participants recruitment by 4 pan-democrats 54, 99, 105–6, 113–14, 137 participants: approaches adopted by 13; categories of 10; change in perception of 92; claims and means of 46; conclusion about 93; coordination issues 155; decline in number of 73, 74, 75; defiant 107–9; in demonstrations 32; dignity issues 10, 75; diverse backgrounds of 72; frustrations among 153; importance of 72–5; in July 1 demonstrations 32; largest number of 132; leaders’ election and 100; long-term effect on 153–4; movement legitimacy and 45–6; preferences of 11; pressure of expectation and 78–9; providing incentives to 6–7; recruitment of 4, 5, 72, 73, 103; self-justifications and 87–93; self-selected 8–10, 12, 75; social movements and 153–6; types of 73; see also protestors; retreating participation: continuation with 93; defining the usefulness of 90–3; due to shared sense of identity 74; by leaders 9–10; plight of committed 75–8; potential of 64; reasons for 9, 73, 74, 79; voluntary 5, 36, 150; without mobilization 5 “penguin protest” 103 People Power 1, 107, 108, 131 pepper spray 48, 84, 128, 129, 138 police: blue-ribbon group for 60–1; distrust toward 128; escalated action by targeting 127; excessive use of force by 49, 77, 79, 136, 152; grievances against 77–8; under heavy criticism 52–3; pepper spray used by 48, 128, 129, 135, 136; public sympathy for 59; raid by 128–9; tear gas used by 47–50, 89 political arrangements 18, 27, 155, 158, 159

Index political demands 19, 30, 31 political grievances 27–9 political opportunities 3, 74, 91, 121 political participation 12, 18, 29–35 political protests 31–5 political rights 18, 26, 31 pro-democracy groups: anti-movement people and 53; challenges faced by 156; demand for democracy by 29; political grievances and 27–8 protestors: at Admiralty 48; antimovement people and 60; conflicts among 131; coordination between students and 108; court injunctions and 62, 63; criticism of 59–60; decline in number of 71; demands of 122; difficulties faced by 90–1; frustrations of 129–30; grievances against 108–9; ill prepared 137; leadership’s limited influence over 107; at Mong Kok 51; occupied area expansion and 127; police response to 47–8; standoff with government and 7–8, 63–5, 150; survey of 72, 76, 90; tensions among 137; threshold of exit 73; use of tear gas at 49; see also escalated action protests: anti-movement 60–3; in Chile 102–3; collective action and 35; common occurrence of 30; consequences of 35; effectiveness of 87–8; on express rail link 30, 31; grievances and 30–1; in Hong Kong 32; impact of 59; participation through 18, 29–35; political 31–5 protest sites: assistance system at 81–5; attempts to destroy stage at 110; clearance of 133, 135, 140; confrontations at 60, 61; influx of supplies into 82; management of 80–1; messages posted at 86–7; occupied area at 48, 51; police raid at 128–9; posters and banners at 85–6; security system at 84; as a supportive community 81–7; survey of occupiers at 72; type of participants at 73; violent confrontations at 136 public housing 20, 21 public opinion 44, 45, 64, 89, 132–3 public reaction, movement legitimacy and 50, 52–5 public sympathy 19, 47, 138 Queen’s Pier preservation 30, 31

171

radical protestors see protestors rank-and-file participants 6–7, 78, 85, 114, 148 recruitment: of participants 4, 5, 72, 73, 103; of volunteers 81 repression: bloody 11, 12, 55, 99; government’s use of 56, 148; as mode of response 7–8, 11, 44–6 resource stations 81, 82, 83 retreating: determined participants and 10, 12, 93; lack of consensus on 111–13; pressure of expectation and 78–9; reason for choosing not to 76–7; support for 99, 133, 135; without success 71 rule of law 1, 18, 63, 64 Scholarism 33, 35, 47, 131 security system at protest sites 84 self-justifications, participants and 87–93, 99 shopping tours protest 92, 156 social groups 52, 103–6, 115 social media 5–6, 53–4, 81, 83, 104 social mobility 18, 19, 22–4 social movements: consequences of 152–3, 156–9; cultural activities at 87; defined 2–3; effectiveness of 141; as emotional movements 50; introduction to 1–2; issue framing in 86; legitimacy of 45–7; movement leaders and 100–2; participants and 72, 73, 153–6; political opportunities and 91; support for 121; sustainability of 2–7, 71–2; threshold of exit 71; see also decentralized movements social networks 4, 148, 149 social protests see protests socioeconomic grievances see grievances square referendum 114, 151 Star Ferry preservation 30, 31 State Council 1, 56, 124, 125 street movements/protests 155, 156 strikes: call for 52, 72; by Chilean students 103, 104; hunger 33, 36, 138–9, 155; violent 126; see also protests students: committed participation by 75–8; five-day strike by 47–8; grievances of 18–19; hunger strikes by 138–9; negative reaction of 124; refusal for retreating 112–13; study area set up for 84; see also leaders/ leadership; protestors

172

Index

subdivided units 20 Sunflower Movement: decision making issues 99; grievances against 102; introduction to 17; leadership issues 101, 150; movement legitimacy and 46 supplies, donation of 82–3 supporters: committed 79–81; at protest sites 81–7 surveys: about end of occupation 133; of protestors 72, 76, 90 sustained movements: causes of 149–52; decentralized movements and 7–11; movement momentum and 151; see also movement sustainability; Occupy Movement tactical escalation see escalated action taxi drivers, impact of movement on 62–3 tear gas: mobilization effect of 50; use of 46–50, 52, 64–5, 89 Tiananmen movement: background of 17; decision making about 99; introduction to 2, 5, 8, 11; leadership issues 99, 101, 102, 109, 116

tolerance: for dealing with grievances 39; as mode of response 7–8, 44–6, 55–8, 148 tourists from Chinese mainland 24, 25, 26 triad members 53, 85, 90, 116, 123 umbrella movement 48, 54, 109, 131, 139 unemployment rate 22, 23 universal suffrage 27–8, 31, 38, 85–6, 135 upward mobility 23, 24, 158 violence: by anti-movement groups 123; effectiveness of 126; at Occupy Movement 53; opposing the use of 130 voluntary participation 5, 36, 150 volunteers: recruitment of 81; resource stations managed by 80, 81, 83, 130 war of attrition 63–5 weak groups 2, 30, 121 working poor 23, 24 yellow umbrella symbol 85, 86 youth see students