The North Korean Regime under Kim Jong-un 9819985242, 9789819985241

Table of contents :
Acknowledgments
About This Book
Introduction
Contents
Notes on Contributors
List of Figures
List of Tables
1 Making Sense of the North Korea’s Suryeong System
North Korea as a Socialist Dynasty
North Korea as a Totalitarian State
Kim Jong-un, the Third Suryeong
Where Next for North Korea?
Notes
References
2 North Korea’s Nuclear Armament and the Triad of Denuclearization
North Korea’s Nuclear Armament
Existential Insecurity after the September 11 attacks
Nuclear Advancement While No Hope of Deal
Triad of Denuclearization
Restoration of the NPT Regime and the Security Assurance Issue
Nuclear Arms Control and the Verification Issue
Ending the Nuclear Deterrence
Challenges to Denuclearization
Power Politics Obstructing the Nonproliferation Regime
North Korea’s Unchanged Motivation for a Nuclear Path
South Korea’s Dilemma in the US Extended Deterrence
Conclusion
Notes
References
3 Marketization during Kim Jong-un’s Era
Kim Jong-un’s Policies on Markets before 2019
Data
Types of Market Activities
Impact of Sanctions on Market Activities
The Recent Change in Kim Jong-un’s Policies on Markets
Conclusion
Notes
References
4 Normal State and Social Requisite in North Korea
Meaning of a Normal State
Aspiration for a Normal State by Kim Jong-un Leadership
Demilitarization: From Military-First to People-First Politics
Economic Performance
Globalization
Social Requisite and Challenges
Market Reforms
Social Capability
Mindset and Values
Conclusion and Prospects
Notes
References
5 Popular Religion in North Korea
Religion in the Early Cold War Korea
The Return of Popular Religiosity
Concluding Remarks
Notes
References
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

The North Korean Regime under Kim Jong-un Edited by Byung-Yeon Kim

The North Korean Regime under Kim Jong-un

Byung-Yeon Kim Editor

The North Korean Regime under Kim Jong-un

Editor Byung-Yeon Kim Department of Economics Seoul National University Seoul, Korea (Republic of)

ISBN 978-981-99-8524-1 ISBN 978-981-99-8525-8 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-8525-8 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore Paper in this product is recyclable.

Acknowledgments

This book is the outcome of a research project initiated in 2019 by Kyung Hoon Leem, who was then the Director of the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies (IPUS) at Seoul National University (SNU). He motivated us to write the most updated and comprehensive account of the Kim Jong-un regime. Without his leadership, this book would not have been published. For the last four years, the authors have revised the draft several times due to unexpected changes in North Korea’s policies and external circumstances. The Editor would like to thank the authors for their diligent scholarship. This book is a part of the project “Laying the Groundwork for Unification and Peace” funded by IPUS at SNU. The authors are deeply grateful to IPUS, which financially supported this project. We are also thankful to Bumsoo Kim, Director of IPUS, for his encouragement and support. IPUS was established in 2006 and has become one of the major research institutes in the world within the fields of peace and North Korean studies. The Editor would like to recognize excellent editorial assistance from Seho Son and administrative support from Mi Sug Jang, Seon-hye Kwon, and Jeonghee Lee.

v

About This Book

This book, which is one of the most updated accounts of the North Korean regime, covers not only nuclear policies but also “inside North Korea” including politics, the economy, society, and religion under Kim Jong-un’s era. In this book, we ask the following questions to comprehend North Korea as a whole. How has Kim Jong-un managed the socialist regime? What external and internal policies have been used to keep the regime alive? What conditions should be met to induce North Korea to start denuclearization? To what extent have the economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations and the United States been successful? What social conditions are necessary for North Korea to become a normal state? What implications can be drawn from the explosive growth of fortune-telling? What kind of future lies ahead for North Korea? Answering to these questions is vital to understanding “real North Korea” and to designing appropriate policies for denuclearization and improving human rights.

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Introduction

More than ten years have passed since Kim Jong-un assumed power in North Korea. In spite of an initial prediction of possible instability, he has proved himself to be a competent leader at least for maintaining the socialist regime. Indeed, socialist North Korea, which continues to exist for 75 years since 1948, surpasses the Soviet Union in that it became the longest-surviving country based on central planning and state ownership. Nevertheless, the North Korean economy, which has significantly changed from the 1990s, is not a traditional Stalinist-type economy any longer. A majority of households engage in various types of market-related activities such as commerce and smuggling. Moreover, despite that the regime still adheres to the socialist economic principles, de facto privatization of smallscale businesses occurred as a result of the collusion between the rich and government officials. The former pays bribes to the latter in order to protect their illegal businesses. Kim Jong-un’s surprise does not end with the longevity of the regime. A series of tests of nuclear weapons and the intercontinental ballistic missiles from 2016 to 2017 shocked the international community, which led to the strong economic sanctions adopted by the international community including the United Nations Security Council, the United States, and the European Union. However, a dramatic turnaround occurred during 2018–2019 when Donald Trump, President of the United States, held two summits with Kim Jong-un in Singapore and

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INTRODUCTION

Hanoi and discussed how to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. Nevertheless, they failed to achieve the objective of denuclearization, and North Korea criticized that the United States should bring “a new way of calculation” to further discussions on the objective with North Korea. Subsequently, North Korea announced a new policy line of self-reliance and stopped to respond to calls of the United States for continued talks. An unexpected event pushed North Korea further into economic isolation. To prevent the spread of Covid-19, North Korea forbade foreign trade starting from the end of January 2020 and engaged with much smaller international transactions when compared to the previous period. However, it appears that economic self-reliance does not apply to the military sphere. In 2021, North Korea launched cruise missiles three times. Such military aggressions became much more frequent in 2022. In every month, North Korea fired missiles from January to October. Especially, in October and November 2022, North Korea resumed a series of military provocations against South Korea, Japan, and the United States by firing several types of missiles and artillery shells. Some claim that there will be heightened tension in the Korean Peninsula similar to the one we observed during 2016–2017. Outside watchers tend to focus on North Korea’s nuclear weapons, military aggression, and the abuse of human rights. Although these issues deserve to attract attention, North Korea’s other dimensions, especially its inside features and dynamics, should be equally investigated. North Korea is a country where 25 million people live with their experiences and social norms, possibly different across actors and across time. Particularly, changes in society affected by marketization, which intensified under Kim Jong-un’s rule until 2018, should not be underestimated. Without understanding “inside North Korea” together with its external policies, it would be difficult to design appropriate policies for denuclearization and improving human rights. Hence, we ask the following questions to understand North Korea as a whole. How has Kim Jong-un managed the socialist regime? What external and internal policies have been used to keep the regime alive? What conditions should be met to induce North Korea to start denuclearization? To what extent have the economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations and the United States been successful? What kind of future lies ahead for North Korea? This book introduces such multi-dimensional aspects of North Korea, explains how they have evolved, and predicts how they will proceed. It covers not only nuclear policies but also the political regime, the economy,

INTRODUCTION

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society, and religion under Kim Jong-un’s era. It further investigates the extent to which his policies are different from his father’s and whether and why they have changed during the course. Chapter 1 by Kyung Hoon Leem and Sun-Woo Lee looks at the basis of North Korea’s political system, the Suryeong system from the perspective of comparative politics on dictatorships. Among the models of comparative autocracies, the Suryeong system can be best conceptualized as a totalitarian socialist dynasty. The Suryeong system has been firmly consolidated and now displays enormous durability despite the crisis-driven marketization and loosening of its socio-cultural grip on the population. In the Kim Jong-un era, there has been neither instability in the autocratic regime nor symptoms of relaxing repression under North Korea’s miserable economic conditions. Underlying this stasis is the persistence of the Suryeong system, the very core of the North Korean autocracy. Since the Suryeong system is so formidably entrenched, even the Suryeong himself cannot revise it without undermining the very foundation of his rule itself. An attempt to revise the system will undermine the legitimacy of the Baekdu descendants’ rule and create enormous institutional pandemonium. Kim Jong-un and the hard-liners’ obsession with developing nuclear and missile programs at the cost of anything whatsoever including the economic welfare of people should be judged as a rational one in terms of their political survival and monopoly of power. Hence, this chapter maintains that the expectation for North Korea’s denuclearization and opening as well as a softening of totalitarian repression is unlikely in the foreseeable future. In Chapter 2, Sung Chull Kim reviews the history of North Korea’s nuclear weapons development and the strenuous international efforts to solve the issue. The official use of the term “denuclearization” can be traced back to the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which was signed by South Korea (Republic of Korea, ROK) and North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, DPRK) in December 1991. The effect of the document was virtually nullified by North Korea’s nuclear development and the failures of the negotiations to solve this issue, but the term has continued to be used for three decades without clarification of the meanings and implications. This chapter analyzes the three elements of denuclearization in relation to the North Korean nuclear issue: restoring the nonproliferation regime on the Korean Peninsula, achieving verifiable arms control, and ending North Korea’s nuclear deterrence. This analysis also helps to identify the

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INTRODUCTION

roadblocks that impede the negotiation processes. From the nonproliferation perspective, restoring the nonproliferation regime must address the security assurance of North Korea and South Korea. From the arms control perspective, denuclearization needed verifiable procedures, failure of which resulted in the breakdown of all negotiations with North Korea. The United States’ emphasis of verification and North Korea’s unilateral approach originated from the distrust between them. Thus, cumulative interactions through small deals seem the only way to progress. From the deterrence perspective, North Korea should demonstrate the intention to give up the strategy of nuclear deterrence. In reality, Kim Jong-un expresses his determination to develop a nuclear doctrine and to strengthen nuclear deterrent forces. Also, Pyongyang’s coercive behavior, backed by nuclear armament, toward Seoul raises South Korea’s security concern, thus stimulating their pro-nuclear public opinion. In Chapter 3, Byung-Yeon Kim evaluates Kim Jong-un’s economic policies on markets, outlines the economic activities of North Korean households in markets, and analyzes the effects of economic sanctions on such activities. First, the chapter argues that Kim Jong-un has adopted a pragmatic approach to utilize markets for an economic recovery from 2012 to 2018. Nevertheless, such an approach is still within the boundaries of socialism and not a transition toward a market economy. Second, the chapter confirms that marketization is prevalent in North Korea in terms of participation rates and earnings. Indeed, the participation rate in market activities was over 70% and the share of market income in total household income exceeded 90% in 2012–2019. Third, the economic sanctions imposed against North Korea in reaction to its nuclear and ICBM tests diminished average household income by 25%, with households belonging to the top and bottom 20% income quintiles hit particularly hard. Fourth, Kim Jong-un abruptly switched his policy from utilization of markets to its repression in 2019. Policies aiming to establish state monopoly in the distribution of foods and consumer goods intend to weaken and eliminate private market activities, if possible. However, the success of these new policies is doubtful. Philo Kim investigates changes in the decade of Kim Jong-un’s reign with the concept of a “normal state” in Chapter 4. North Korea has long been referred to as a rogue state and an axis of evil. Kim Jong-un, well aware of these criticisms from the outside world, attempted several times to transform North Korea into a normal state during his tenure. He tried to return his father’s Military-First Politics to People-First Politics. He

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attempted to normalize the economy by declaring a new strategic line to end the parallel development and to concentrate all efforts on economic development. He also attempted to cultivate a more globalized mindset and worldview among North Koreans. However, the normalization of a country cannot be realized without a fundamental change in the system. A country needs to create the social capacity to drive change. Nevertheless, it appears that North Korea currently lacks the human resources necessary to progress significantly toward “normalization.” This chapter examines what social conditions are necessary for North Korea to become a normal state. Heonik Kwon analyzes spirit fortune-telling practices prevalent in the current North Korea in Chapter 5. It is widely regarded that religious freedom does not exist in North Korea. The country’s early state-building process involved a vigorous political struggle to achieve the ideal of a radically enlightened society without religion and superstitions, as in Soviet Russia and other revolutionary polities under the Soviet influence. However, this does not mean that religiosity and spirituality are absent from North Korea’s social space. Notable are spirit fortune-telling practices that are now an intimate part of everyday life decision-making among many North Koreans. Extremely popular at the grassroots level, the return of this traditional popular religious culture at the turn of the twenty-first century, if properly understood, can provide interesting insights into North Korea’s society and politics in transition. As the five authors discuss, North Korea is a multifaceted country. Some sectors of the state are interconnected and mutually reinforcing, while others are disjointed and may even conflict with one other. Specifically, the political system and nuclear development are closely intertwined. North Korea’s political system might have affected to acquire nuclear weapons, which are viewed as an important instrument to support the regime. Kyung Hoon Leem and Sun-woo Lee assert that North Korea is highly unlikely to undergo fundamental change given its rigid political system rooted in Suryeong ideology. In line with this assessment, Kim Sung-chull suggests that the possibility of reaching a comprehensive denuclearization agreement is remote even if negotiations were to resume, and that pursuing gradual denuclearization through the accumulation of small deals is a more realistic strategy. The most recent revision of North Korea’s constitution in September 2023 reinforces these views, as it frames the advancement of the state’s nuclear force as a right that is necessary for both its survival and development.

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While North Korea’s political system remains rigid, its economy and society have undergone major changes. The socialist economic system was heavily damaged during the Arduous March, which triggered a strong wave of grassroots marketization. According to Byung-Yeon Kim, market activities now account for more than 70% of household income. Heonik Kwon points out that marketization is one reason why fortune-telling and shamanism have increased in in North Korea since such practices are often combined with the pursuit of commercial interests. Likewise, the everyday life of North Koreans has undergone significant change. From 2012 to 2018, Kim Jong-un aimed to transform North Korea into a “normal” state while utilizing market activities to stimulate economic growth. However, this attempt to revive the economy experienced a major setback due to the international economic sanctions levied in response to North Korea’s nuclear weapon and ICBM tests, as well as the breakdown of the Hanoi negotiations between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un. Philo Kim points out that North Korea’s fixation on its nuclear program, rigid political system, and lack of capacity prevented Kim Jong-un’s from realizing his vision of a “normal” state. Can North Korea be integrated into the global community without giving up its nuclear program? Can bottom-up change undermine the political system based on Suryeong ideology? Can the rigid political system endure even when it is clearly misaligned with economic or societal realities? North Korea stands at a critical juncture, and thus, it is an important time to pay careful attention to these questions. Byung-Yeon Kim

Contents

1

Making Sense of the North Korea’s Suryeong System Kyung Hoon Leem and Sun-Woo Lee

2

North Korea’s Nuclear Armament and the Triad of Denuclearization Sung Chull Kim

1

29

3

Marketization during Kim Jong-un’s Era Byung-Yeon Kim

59

4

Normal State and Social Requisite in North Korea Philo Kim

93

5

Popular Religion in North Korea Heonik Kwon

123

Bibliography

139

Index

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Notes on Contributors

Byung-Yeon Kim is Distinguished Professor in the Department of Economics at Seoul National University. He published a number of articles in international journals and wrote an influential book on the North Korean economy (Unveiling the North Korean Economy, Cambridge University Press, 2017). He was awarded with Excellence in Academic Achievements granted by the National Academy of Sciences of Republic of Korea and T. S. Ashton Prize by the Economic History Society. He has served as a member of various government committees including the Policy Advisory Committee for the Ministries of Unification and Foreign Affairs. He is a regular columnist on North Korean issues in a South Korean newspaper, The JoongAng. Philo Kim is Associate Professor at the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies, Seoul National University. His main research areas include development and political ideology of North Korea as well as unification issues and peace studies. He had formerly served as a Senior Fellow and Director of North Korean Studies Division at a government-funded research institute, Korean Institute for National Unification, and also served as President of the Korean Association of North Korean Studies. He is currently serving or served as advisory committee members in Ministry of Unification, Ministry of Defense, National Intelligence Service, National Unification Advisory Council, Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation, etc.

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Sung Chull Kim is Visiting Research Fellow at the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies, Seoul National University, where he previously held the position of Humanities Korea Professor until his retirement in 2021. His primary research interests encompass North Korea, alliance politics, nonproliferation, the nuclear environment, and peace studies. He has authored several recent books, including China and Its Small Neighbors: The Political Economy of Asymmetry, Vulnerability, and Hedging (2023) and Partnership within Hierarchy: The Evolving East Asian Security Triangle (2017). His scholarly articles have been featured in numerous academic journals, such as Systems Research and Behavioral Science (formerly Behavioral Science), Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics. Currently, he serves as the editor of the Asian Journal of Peacebuilding. Heonik Kwon is Senior Research Fellow of Social Science and Distinguished Professor of Social Anthropology, Trinity College, University of Cambridge. A Fellow of British Academy, he is also a member of the Mega-Asia research group in Seoul National University Asia Center. Author of prize-winning books on the social history of the Vietnam War and Asia’s Cold War, his After the Korean War: An Intimate History (2020) received the 2022 James B. Palais prize from the Association for Asian Studies. His other works include North Korea: Beyond Charismatic Politics (2012), co-authored with Byung-Ho Chung, and Spirit Power: Politics and Religion in Korea’s American Century (2022), co-authored with Jun Hwan Park that explores Korea’s Cold War experience from a religious cultural angle. Sun-Woo Lee is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science and Diplomacy at Jeonbuk National University. His research interests include comparative regime types, comparative political institutions (presidentialism in particular), and South and North Korean politics. He published several academic papers on North Korea and Korean Peninsula in English as well as in Korean, for example, “A Subtle Difference between Russia and China’s Stances toward the Korean Peninsula and Its Strategic Implications for South Korea” (Journal of International and Area Studies (2018) co-authored with Hyungjin Cho, “MilitaryFirst Politics’ and ‘North Korean’ Economic Reform” (Review of North Korean Studies, 2009) and so forth.

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Kyung Hoon Leem is Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University. His research interests cover democratization and economic reform, comparative postcommunist transitions, Russian politics, and political and economic change in North Korea. He previously held various positions including Director of the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies, and now serves as the Chair of the Governance Reform Commission at Seoul National University. He currently leads the Democracy Research Cluster at Seoul National University’s Institute for Future Strategy, focusing on the global trend of democratic erosion and autocratization.

List of Figures

Fig. 1.1

Fig. 1.2 Fig. 3.1

Fig. 3.2 Fig. 4.1

Changes in the Suryeong System Source Kim (2014: 58) (with minor modifications) *Thickness of lines indicates the relative intensity of influence from respective institutions Evolution of socialist regimes Source Park et al. (2013: 22) (with minor modifications) Income Shock to Jobs related to the External Economy and Trade. (a) Income shocks to jobs in the external economy (b) Income shocks to market trade jobs Income Shock to Jobs unrelated to the External Economy and Trade Key Elements of the Concept of a Normal State (Source Min et al. (2009: 68))

5 22

80 80 97

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List of Tables

Table 2.1 Table 3.1 Table 3.2 Table 3.3 Table 3.4

Table 3.5

US-North Korea Standoff, 2001–2017 North Korean defectors in South Korea: total number and number of samples Main economic variables Jobs that were the largest source of income Participation Rate and Income: Comparison between the Official and Market Sectors using Resampled Data Changes in total income between the pre-sanction period and post-sanction period according to income quintile

34 66 68 72

78 79

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CHAPTER 1

Making Sense of the North Korea’s Suryeong System Kyung Hoon Leem and Sun-Woo Lee

More than 10 years have passed since Kim Jong-un took power after Kim Jong-il, his father, died in December 2011. The Economist, reflecting on North Korea’s past decade, assesses that “North Korea is more North Korean than ever” (The Economist December 13, 2021). This evaluation rings true more than ever. Kim Jong-un has not turned out to be the enlightened and reform-minded young leader who would change the inexplicably anachronistic and closed country into a “normal” state as expected. Neither has there been instability in the autocratic regime nor symptoms of relaxing repression under the country’s miserable economic conditions. North Korea has been concentrating on the development of

K. H. Leem (B) Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University, Seoul, South Korea e-mail: [email protected] S.-W. Lee Department of Political Science and Diplomacy, Jeonbuk National University, Jeonju, South Korea e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 B.-Y. Kim (ed.), The North Korean Regime under Kim Jong-un, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-8525-8_1

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its nuclear and missile capabilities instead of opening and reforming the country. Underlying this stasis is the persistence of the Suryeong system, the very core of the North Korean autocracy. The word “Suryeong ” means “charismatic head” or “supreme leader.” Kim Jong-un, following his father, did not claim the title of Suryeong , as a way of displaying his filial piety and deep respect to Kim Il-sung, his grandfather. But, in 2021 North Korean media began to call Kim Jong-un the Suryeong . The elevation of Kim Jong-un as the Suryeong confirms not only his consolidated power but also the solidity of North Korea’s political system where both the Suryeong and the ruling elites are entrenched. How can we explain the nature and resilience of the Suryeong system and make a reasonable prediction about the paths North Korea is likely to take in the foreseeable future? In our view, studies of comparative politics on dictatorships and transitions provide heuristic yardsticks for understanding the Suryeong system and the behaviors of its major supporters. Among the models of comparative autocracies, the Suryeong system can be best conceptualized as a totalitarian socialist dynasty. It has been firmly consolidated and now displays enormous durability despite the crisis-driven marketization and loosening of its socio-cultural grip on the population. Given the growing contradictions between the rigid political regime and the changing socioeconomic infrastructure, it is not unreasonable to expect the current North Korean political system to change. But, since the Suryeong system is so formidably entrenched, even the Suryeong himself cannot revise it without undermining the very foundation of his rule itself. This leads us to a pessimistic forecast regarding the prospects of North Korea’s denuclearization and opening, as well as a softening of totalitarian repression.

North Korea as a Socialist Dynasty While North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, DPRK) is officially declared to be a republic, it is a de facto hereditary monarchy. Hereditary succession itself is not a rare phenomenon, even in the modern political world; there have been more than 250 hereditary successions worldwide since World War II. What distinguishes North Korea from others is that it is the only socialist country that has achieved hereditary succession (Brownlee 2007).1 Hereditary succession tends to be more

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MAKING SENSE OF THE NORTH KOREA’S SURYEONG SYSTEM

3

difficult to achieve where the ruling party predates the ruler. It was neither attempted nor realized in the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party)’s Mexico or Communist China. Despite the presence of a communist party, three generations of Kim Il-sung’s family have ruled the country for more than 70 years. Kim Il-sung’s son, Kim Jong-il, was designated as the heir in the early 1970s, and then Kim Il-sung’s grandson, Kim Jong-un, was chosen as the official next leader in 2008, and took over as the supreme ruler just after his father died in 2011.2 It was the socialist system, the Stalinist system more exactly, that was initially implanted in North Korea. At first, Kim Il-sung alone neither founded nor fully controlled the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK). Various political factions, including the pro-Soviet and pro-China groups and so forth, took part in forming the party together with Kim Il-sung’s Partisan clique. North Korea’s evolution toward the Suryeong system began in the early 1960s, hand in hand with further centralizing the management of its command economy. Since then North Korea has evolved along a unique path which substantially differentiates itself from other socialist countries. It refused de-Stalinization and has never seriously implemented marketoriented experiments. To the contrary, it tried to make its command economy more “refined and perfect” in the 1960s and 1970s, exactly when its East European brothers relaxed their rigid plan economies by adopting a considerable number of market elements, however partial they were. In early 1970s Kim Il-sung and his son finally removed all the potential challengers and installed the unique Suryeong system that would institutionally warrant the Kim family’s monopoly of power. Accordingly, the state formation of North Korea substantially diverged from other socialist countries. North Korea ceased to be a conventional socialist party-state as early as the beginning of the 1970s despite the leading role of WPK in society. Instead, it became a Suryeong -state, in which the Suryeong is located at the top of the state and even possibly outside of the party (See Fig. 1.1). In other words, the status of the North Korean Suryeong is above all the major pillars of the state, i.e., party, military, and government. In particular, the second Suryeong , Kim Jong-il, even marginalized the party structures including the Politburo and placed his position far above the WPK. The Suryeong as such, it is asserted, purports to unify all the people and the institutions into a permanent “sociopolitical organism.” The emergence and consolidation of the Suryeong system eventually transformed this socialist republic into a subtype of

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neo-patrimonial dynasties based on the extremely centralized socialist system. The Suryeong system indeed is an innovative solution to the dilemma that every dictatorship cannot avoid, that is, uncertainties inherent in succession. Charismatic leadership by its nature is an extraordinary and impermanent talent, which is hardly routine or replaceable. North Korea’s astonishing innovation, as Kwon and Chung (2012) show, is that it has successfully routinized the supreme leader’s charismatic persona into an institutionalized hereditary succession and thereby solved the fundamental dilemma of the irreplaceability of charismatic leadership, creating a “theater state.” That is how Kim Il-sung’s son and grandson have been able to act as the de facto Suryeong, even if the title of Suryeong was permanently reserved only for the late Kim Il-sung leadership. After Kim Jong-un’s takeover of power, even the core norms and code of conduct supporting the Suryeong system were reinforced.3 As a matter of fact, differently from other socialist regimes, North Korea abandoned Marxism-Leninism a long time ago and instead created Juche Ideology (now Kim Il-sung-Kim Jong-il-ism) as its unique official ideology underpinning the Suryeong system. Now, so-called Ten Principles, as revised in 2013, emphasize the absolute authority of both Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il and the “Kim Il-sung-Kim Jong-il-ization” of North Korean politics and society as a whole. An interesting point is that, compared with the previous version, the WPK’s authority has been somewhat elevated as well. Nonetheless, the very core of the new Principles is still the urge to “keep the Party and Revolution through the Baekdu bloodline (meaning Kim Il-sung’s descendants),” which would permanently absolutize the authority of Kim’s family. To use Kantorowicz’s analogy, Kim Il-sung’s political body became an immortal one through the Baekdu bloodline (Armstrong 2005). In a nutshell, the party, state, and official ideology all have been extremely tightly woven into the Suryeong system completely appropriated by Kim’s family and its closest aides.4 In this way, North Korea became the first country where a dynasty grew out of an originally socialist republic, a dream not even Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong could realize.

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Fig. 1.1 Changes in the Suryeong System Source Kim (2014: 58) (with minor modifications) *Thickness of lines indicates the relative intensity of influence from respective institutions

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Fig. 1.1 (continued)

North Korea as a Totalitarian State The Suryeong system as such is the closest to totalitarianism among the existing models of dictatorships. As we all know, the totalitarianism model is a porous and blurry one. The origins, core properties, and dynamics of totalitarianism are still subject to never-ending academic and ideological scrutiny and debates. However, compared with other available categories of dictatorship, the totalitarianism model is the most appropriate in capturing the gist of the North Korean Suryeong -state. Indeed, the North Korean political system displays all the core elements of totalitarianism observed by Linz (2000) as well as Friedrich and Brzezinski (1965).5 More than anything else, we need to understand how totalitarianism completely differs from authoritarianism and other types of autocracy. Linz (2000) stresses that the ultimate focus of the totalitarianism model as a distinctive ideal type is laid on the regime form for “completely organizing political life and society.” He accepts Furet’s definition of totalitarianism as “the atomized regimes of societies made up of individuals systematically deprived of their political ties and subject to the ‘total’ power of an ideological party and its leader.” Linz (2000) goes on to highlight Furet’s argument that “there would be no reason why these regimes

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must be identical or even comparable in every way; nor need the characteristic in question be equally prominent throughout the history of such regimes.” The very same totalitarian mythology Furet noted is the key of the Suryeong system; that is, “the mythology of the unity of the people in and by the party-state under the leadership of infallible guide” (cited from Linz 2000: 4). In this regard, the Suryeong system is a perfect candidate for the totalitarianism model which may take various forms. While much criticism has been raised in arguing that the totalitarianism model exaggerates the capacity of totalitarian regimes, the ubiquitous failure of totalitarian states does not necessarily undermine the validity of the totalitarianism model. Contrary to its omnipotent image, totalitarianism has in fact failed to completely conquer, penetrate into, and control society and individuals. Totalitarianism cannot help but fail; the fanatic utopian aspirations of a total state are doomed to crumble. But totalitarian power and dominance persist in all “failed totalitarian” states (Walzer 1983). Here it is worthy to mention the words of Malia (1990) who reminded us of this when criticizing the revisionist Sovietologists’ sanitization of totalitarianism into post-totalitarianism or authoritarianism. Totalitarianism does not mean that such regimes in fact exercise total control over the population; it means rather that such control is their aspiration. It does not mean they are omnipotent in performance, but instead that they are institutionally omnipotent. It is not the Soviet society that is totalitarian, but the Soviet state. This conceptual confusion results from taking as the defining criterion of regime the degree or quantity of repression, not its nature or quality. (Malia 1990: 300–301)

Malia’s warning against the hasty adoption of a post-totalitarianism perspective should be taken very seriously when we try to understand North Korea. As it is commonly known, post-totalitarianism as a distinctive regime type was included in Linz and Stepan’s typology of nondemocratic regimes (Linz and Stepan 1996). Typically, it refers to the de-Stalinized communist regimes in the Soviet Union and East European countries. The waves of de-Stalinization changed those totalitarian states into milder ones, with weakened ideology, limited (though not political) pluralism, and/or dissident groups, and the absence of utopian aspiration and terror. Mass mobilizations still persisted but became more ritualized, and the initial revolutionary fanaticism was gradually replaced by cynicism,

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consumerism, and acquiescent “living within the lie” (Havel 1985).6 Personality cults subsided and instead the leadership became collective and bureaucratic, often “gerontocratic” within the political leadership like in Leonid Brezhnev’s period of the Soviet Union. And the ruling elites became more secure as they were no longer subjected to purges and terror. Thus, post-totalitarian societies saw the “stability” (or stagnation in a negative sense) of a “mature Stalinist system” (Bialer 1980). North Korea now displays some post-totalitarian features, especially the changes forced on the regime in the face of chronic economic difficulties. Most of all, the crisis-driven marketization has led to the loosening of the Suryeong ’s control over society in this country (Smith 2015). The Suryeong cannot resort to massive mass mobilization in the economy as before. Marketization has forced people to prioritize family and private activities over public duties. And official institutions’ direct involvement in businesses as well as spontaneous marketization from below has transformed the Suryeong ’s society as a whole into a giant rent-seeking patrimony where the population at large, including state officials, should engage in bribery and illegal or semi-legal market activities to do businesses or just survive. The Suryeong has become a Sisyphus who has to resist stealing and hollowing out his state. In addition, the North Korean regime can no longer monopolize information about the outside world, including South Korea. Before the outbreak of Covid-19, it was not able to restrict illegal or semi-legal traders’ contacts with their Chinese partners. Millions of people now use mobile phones and have come to gain more information about the outside world than ever before. The surveys from the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies (IPUS) report that ideological indoctrination has become ineffective and materialistic consumerism is now widespread among North Koreans (Kim et al. 2020). The Suryeong ’s revolutionary discipline is now being replaced by what Havel witnessed, that is, cynicism, consumerism, and acquiescent “living within the lie.” In this sense, North Korea reveals typical symptoms of post-totalitarian societies. Still, it should be remembered, the dividing line between a totalitarian and a post-totalitarian regime, and among different post-totalitarian stages, cannot easily be drawn if the conceptualizations include political, social, and cultural dimensions altogether. Therefore, we would suggest not to stretch the category of post-totalitarianism, which is already quite encompassing, too far. As Malia argued, “it is not the Soviet society that is totalitarian, but the Soviet state” (Malia 1990: 300–301); the distinction

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between totalitarianism and post-totalitarianism is more related to political aspects of a regime rather than social or cultural characteristics. In this view point, North Korea still obviously belongs to the category of totalitarianism, not post-totalitarianism. Just compare the case of North Korea with post-totalitarian regimes in Eastern Europe that actually existed. In Poland, beginning in 1956, universities and research institutes could enjoy some autonomy in studies on political economy, philosophy, history, and so forth (Borowski 1975: 70–76; Bugajski and Pollack 1989). And in Czechoslovakia, pluralist potential gradually emerged in the 1970s. Under the international influence of the famous “Helsinki Process,” a human rights group, the “Chart 77,” was organized and continued to work for liberalization despite the party-state’s brutal oppression (Huntington 1991: 89–94). All these changes are simply not imaginable in North Korea. Related with this issue, Thompson (2002) provides a comparative yardstick for understanding North Korea’s system, using Linz and Stepan (1996)’s classification of post-totalitarianism: “early,” “frozen,” and “mature” ones. Employing these subtypes, Thompson persuasively accounts for the patterns in the path-dependent nature of various postcommunist transitions. If we follow this sort of categorization, North Korea has yet to move to even the “early” stage of post-totalitarianism because, more than anything else, the emergence of collective leadership heralding the advent of a new era is simply impossible as long as the Suryeong system firmly holds out. Although McEachern (2010) presented the Kim Jong-il regime as “post-totalitarian institutionalism,” noting different policy orientations within the North Korean bureaucracies, this pattern could never be regarded as a result of this kind of collective leadership. All the party and state apparatuses competed with each other to prove their unshakable loyalty toward the Suryeong . As a matter of fact, McEachern himself admits that the institutional pluralism itself was only an outcome of Kim Jong-il’s deliberate “divide and conquer” strategy to fortify his rule. Now there is no political faction challenging Kim Jong-un in North Korea. Indeed, Kim Jong-un has boldly removed several influential figures, who had accumulated strong career capital from the Kim Jong-il era, in the form of a purge, and consequently consolidated his own authority and power. The young Suryeong has also consistently increased the loyalty of high-ranking elites toward himself, promoting and degrading their ranks and positions frequently and suddenly (Lee and Park 2018: 231–238).

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The Suryeong system as totalitarianism may also be understood as a subtype of the sultanism model that Linz and Stepan (1996) treat as a distinctive type of modern dictatorship.7 In a sultanist regime, no individual or organization in the state and society can ever be free from the dictator’s tyrannical or arbitrary exercise of power. In addition, this regime type has not only carried out symbolic manipulation for the dictator but even stimulated the masses to endlessly admire him or her. This model seems to adeptly capture conspicuous features of the personalist autocracy in three Kims’ North Korea and Nicolae Ceaus, escu’s Romania. An interesting aspect of the sultanism model is that, unlike other types, it can be compatible with and thus be used as an add-on to other types of undemocratic regimes.8 Sultanism by itself lacks ideological goals for society, mobilization of the population into a mass single party, a high level of bureaucratization, and commitment to the impersonal purposes of the regime.9 Therefore, Linz and Stepan (1996) also count Ceaus, escu’s Romania as a case of totalitarianism combined with sultanism. Thus, North Korea’s Suryeong system can be another case of totalitarianism-cum-sultanism. A caveat here is that the exceptionalism of North Korea is even more apparent when we compare it with Ceaus, escu’s Romania where the equivalents of the Suryeong system or Juche Ideology were missing. Compared with Ceaus, escu’s clan, the Kim family’s astonishing success in institutionalizing an ultra-neotraditional rule has been aided by perceived security threats from the Korean Peninsula’s division and the Cold War geopolitics in the Northeast Asian region (Leem 2005). It embodies an unprecedented systematic combination of the highest level of institutionalization, ideological legitimization, and neo-sultanist rule, which can be best conceptualized as a totalitarian socialist dynasty (also see Choi 2001: 33–40; Park 2004: 103–104).

Kim Jong-un, the Third Suryeong Initially, there was some speculation that Kim Jong-un might be an “avatar” Suryeong . There have been observations that Kim Jong-un’s power was not the result of automatic hereditary succession but the outcome of a compromise between Kim Jong-il and the ruling elites including the military (Schäfer June 8, 2021). Indeed, unlike his father, Kim Jong-un had only three years of training as the official heir, so he seemed to lack enough career capital and solid autonomous political

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power. But, surprisingly enough, Kim Jong-un swiftly purged his patrons in the party as well as the armed forces his father lined up before his death. He has steadily consolidated his power base for the past decade, and eventually began to be called the Suryeong , the title long reserved for his grandfather. The Suryeong has always held a position above all the state pillars, i.e., party, military, and government since Kim Il-sung’s personalist dictatorship was established in the late 1960s. However, as Fig. 1.1 visualizes, the relationships between the ruler and those pillars, and among the latter, have changed to a significant extent during the rule of each of the three Kims. In the Kim Il-sung era, the party’s superiority over the military and government was unquestionable, and the latter’s role was much less autonomous than the former. The first Suryeong shared a significant part of power and authority with the party. And, as a result, the party apparatuses immoderately encroached on the functional areas of government, which sometimes led to significant policy failures (Kim 2014: 57–58). In the Kim Jong-il era, in contrast, the status of the party was no higher than the military and government. In particular, the division of labor among the three pillars was underscored via the introduction of the “Military-First Policy” and the “Cabinet Responsibility System” (Kim 2014: 58). Though there have been different observations and interpretations of the power relationship between the WPK and the Korean People’s Army (KPA), Kim Jong-il’s role as the Chairman of National Defence Commission directly steered the Secretariat of the WPK, incapacitating the key decision-making bodies of the party such as the Politburo, Central Committee, and Party Congress. As a matter of fact, he became the General Secretary even without a formal election in the Central Committee of the WPK. Relying mainly on the National Defence Commission, he ruled the country without official approvals from the party’s central decision-making body. Kim Jong-un has sought several political and institutional changes since he took power. He abolished the National Defence Commission and strengthened the role of WPK. In the Kim Jong-un era, the party’s leading role, vis-à-vis the military in particular, now seems to be more prioritized than ever. In the early stage of his rule, he abandoned his father’s “Military-First Policy,” and instead began to urge the “Parallel Policy of Economic and Nuclear Development.” The monolithic leading role of the WPK was emphasized in the revised “Ten Principles” along

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with the Suryeong ’s authority. He now calls for meetings of the Politburo, Central Committee, and Party Congress more often than during his father’s rule. In particular, unlike his father, he chose to be officially elected by the Politburo of the WPK to the post of Supreme Commander of the KPA. This means that Kim Jong-un has been attempting to control the military and government by making full use of the party (Koo et al. 2016).10 As a consequence, under Kim Jong-un’s rule, the WPK has now recovered an equal or even superior position vis-à-vis the military, not solely the government. Having seen these changes, some specialists expected North Korea to move to a more or less “normal party-state” (Lee 2011; Wada 2014). Especially, Wada (2014: 302–304), judging that Kim Jong-il strategically arranged the institutional superiority of the party over the other two pillars before his death, evaluated this as a signal of the return to a normal party-state. However, even with this significant change, it does not mean a transition to a normal party-state or a model of Soviet collective leadership has taken place. In fact, the WPK is still completely subordinated to the Suryeong within the North Korean party-state. For instance, the Bureau of Secretariat, to which the most powerful Organization and Guidance Department and other offices of the WPK belong, continues to work only in support of Kim Jong-un’s absolute rule. This was particularly evident at the 8th Party Congress where Kim Jong-un was elected as General Secretary of the WPK, the position he had not claimed because his father, Kim Jong-il, had been called the “eternal General Secretary.” Kim Jong-un, since his rise to power at the age of only 27, has surprisingly and successfully protected the totalitarian system in spite of political uncertainties in the wake of rapid power succession as well as a continuing economic crisis. Thus nobody is able to more or less have a horizontal relationship with the Suryeong , and no plural factions are allowed in the regime. Needless to say, the emergence of dissents, another symptom of posttotalitarianism, is absolutely unthinkable in North Korea. North Korea’s political system can be more aptly called the “Suryeong ’s party-state” rather than a normal party-state as it is commonly called. Kim Jong-un has skillfully monopolized power, utilizing a “divide and conquer” strategy to command the top echelons of the regime. More than anything else, Kim Jong-un boldly purged his father’s closest allies who his father had strategically stationed to support him. The most conspicuous executed figures include Ri Young-ho, the Chief of Staff of the KPA, and Hyon Yong-chol, the Minister of People’s Armed Forces, as

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well as Jang Song-thaek, Kim Jong-un’s uncle and the Vice-Chairman of the National Defence Commission, the second highest leader of the state. Kim Jong-un still continues to execute, punish, and rotate his top officials, preventing anybody from developing an autonomous base of political assets and making them wholly and individually dependent on the Suryeong . The ruling elites are subjected to permanent insecurity as seen under the rule of Stalin in the Soviet Union. They only compete with each other for a seat next to the Suryeong and for relatively more economic rents. Kim Jong-un made it clear that there would be no second-in-command in the Suryeong ’s country by staging a series of unpredictable and ruthless “show trials,” public humiliation, and executions of his inherited old vassals. And he replaced them with younger aides, promoting second-tier elites. Personnel reshufflings of second-tier high-ranking cadres and officers are also frequently carried out in the same context.11 So far there has been no significant symptom of change in the Suryeong system, and it is too early to call North Korea a post-totalitarian party-state as Lee (2011), Wada (2014), and other experts do.12 Kim Jong-un has inherited a society enormously transformed over the previous two decades in socioeconomic and cultural terms. Indeed, since the mid-1990s, the continued famines and economic crises have certainly undermined the extremely centralized command economy which was inseparably fused with the Suryeong system. Thus the North Korean regime could not but lose some control over the population. Now in North Korea, the state and party can no longer provide the population with basic necessities including food and medicine. Ordinary people have been forced to rely on “self-help” market activities. The party, military, government, and state enterprises have transformed themselves into major agents of marketization as well. A number of party cadres, government bureaucrats, and military officers have been increasingly involved in illegal and semi-legal market activities (Smith 2015). As a case in point, local governments’ bureaucrats often obtain daily necessities, such as food or medicine, through bribes from illegal traders who cross the border to China, and subsequently earn some extra money by putting them on the market again. Officials and party cadres can easily extract bribes in exchange for conspiring with people’s informal market activities, even exempting them from the officially required burden of ideological education programs. Military officers behave similarly. In a sense, such “self-help” marketization tendencies can be more advantageous to the military than the party or government sides. For example,

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the military can gain more chances to accept “presents” from the illegal traders because of its sentry duty patrolling the border. In addition, the military has been provided with relatively more resources, including daily necessities, due to logistics supplies. Above all, while both the party and military organizations themselves have created their own trading firms, such as Daesung Trading Company, in order to earn foreign currency, the military firms have relative advantages. Thanks to the available labor force in army units, military firms get business orders such as construction contracts from various government departments as well as foreign companies. Though, with the end of the “Military-First Policy,” the illegal and semi-legal market activities involving the military have recently seen restrictions. In this process of crisis-driven marketization, the regime’s capacity to effectively inculcate ideological fervor and enforce the so-called organizational life has now been severely curbed, though the party’s ideological education and revolutionary discipline are still emphasized in official terms. According to a survey by the IPUS, about 68 percent of North Korean defectors said that they had preferred capitalism more than socialism already when living in North; about 90 percent of them had thought that freedom of economic activities such as commercial transaction and establishing businesses would be necessary for North Korea as well (Lee 2021: 114–117). More than 80 percent of all respondents thought the ruler’s improper policies such as overspending for national defense and an absence of economic reform were the main causes of North Korean economic failure. That is, the majority of North Korean people think that Kim Jong-un, rather than external factors such as Western sanctions and natural disasters, has been mostly liable for the economic failure. About two-thirds of respondents had evaluated Kim Jong-un’s performance negatively when they were living in North Korea (Kim 2021: 106–114, 122–124). But, at the same time, the majority of North Koreans still keep their loyalty to the regime. Certainly, Kim Jong-un is not able to initiate sweeping mass mobilization like his grandfather or father. Nevertheless, he seems to have sufficiently monopolized power, repeatedly purging and brutally punishing members of the core class as well as ordinary people as his father did during his succession in the early 1970s. Violations of human rights such as public executions, torture, and prison camps are still the main instruments of his rule (Oh et al., 2021). Every year for the past decade, the IPUS surveys report, about 60 to 70 percent of new

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North Korean defectors surveyed guessed that Kim Jong-un seemed to enjoy support from at least more than half of the population. Similarly, those defectors judged that about 50 to 60 percent of the North Korean population would have pride in the official Juche Ideology (Kim 2021: 104–105).13 Wintrobe (1998: 337)’s observation that “the use of repression doesn’t mean that dictators aren’t popular” applies to North Korea as well. Moreover, Kim Jong-un’s success in developing nuclear weapons seems to have boosted the legitimacy of the Suryeong system. At the 8th Party Congress in 2021, Kim showed off the strong national defense potential of his country, mentioning the word “nuclear” no less than 36 times and even holding a large-scale military parade displaying high-end weapons, despite his self-reflection on the economic failure at the beginning of the meeting. North Korea has made significant advances in developing not only a sizable number of nuclear bombs but also upgrading weapon arsenals like hypersonic missiles, on top of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). According to the IPUS annual surveys, more than half of North Korean defectors supported Kim Jong-un’s development of nuclear weapons while they lived in North Korea (Kim 2021: 115–116). Kim Jong-un has also been trying to raise his popularity in various ways among the population at large, particularly with the younger generation. He seeks to display a new style of Suryeong , creating an image of a friendlier and more accessible leader. Recently, Kim Jong-un expressed his wishes to be the Suryeong with human charm rather than a mystified object of awe.14 Kim Jong-un has indeed remarkably increased direct contact with the people, much more frequently conducting “field guidance” over local governments, companies, factories, construction sites, farms, mines, schools, and research institutes, etc., than his predecessors. And, when finding any flaws or corruption in the units during the “field guidance,” he immediately reproves or even punishes their officers or senior managers (Lee and Park 2018: 247). The Suryeong ’s “field guidance” as such proceeds according to a detailed plan that is undeniably intended to boost his pro-people image. At the 75th anniversary of WPK in October 2020, Kim Jong-un repeatedly thanked “public people” for their dedication to the country, particularly in the difficult situation of the Covid-19 pandemic. He even apologized to the people at the 8th Party Congress, humbly admitting his failure in achieving economic development goals, all of which was unimaginable during his predecessors’ rule.

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At the 8th Party Congress, most of all, Kim strongly emphasized his deep affection for the general public, highlighting the “Public PeopleFirst Policy” once again as one of the new core national strategies. But, this does not mean that the essence of the Suryeong system has changed, while the Suryeong ’s style has become more colorful than ever.

Where Next for North Korea? It is hard to tell for sure which direction North Korea’s leadership intends to head, given its extremely secretive nature. But it seems reasonable to predict that for the foreseeable future North Korea is likely to hold out as it is. The pessimistic prediction as such is based on implications of the comparative transition literature, which shows that the survival of dictatorships and modes of transition tend to be closely related to the regime type. In this context, theories and comparative studies on dictatorship provide us with useful clues on how to approach the case of North Korea. For instance, Geddes and her colleagues (Geddes 1999; Geddes et al. 2018) classify the authoritarian regimes into three subtypes (military, personalist, and one-party dictatorships) and argue that different characteristics of regime types and different incentives facing the ruling elites explain many diverging experiences of democratization.15 Wintrobe (1998), assuming the rationality of dictators and other actors, offers insightful models explaining the behaviors of dictatorships according to the different combinations of the variables “loyalty” and “repression.” These studies attribute prime importance to the configuration of incentive structures the dictator and top elites face and their strategic calculations. Taking into account these factors, we would argue below that Kim Jongun’s utmost priority is to monopolize power by maintaining a high level of repression and distributing private goods to his close allies which would secure loyalty and raise risks of defection on the part of the ruling elites. Compared with military and single-party regime types, Geddes and her collaborators observe, personalist dictatorships are relatively immune to internal splits except for calamitous economic disasters and exogenous shocks. Insiders of patrimonial regimes usually lack incentives to support reforms and have little option but to cling to the regime. Hence, they are least likely to negotiate a political transition. In other words, the beginning of a more or less smooth transition, mostly led by political elites in other types of dictatorships, is difficult to materialize in personalist regimes. Instead, these regimes tend to end with shocks such as war or

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death of the ruler, because the dictator wants to rule as long as he or she wishes and because those in the ruling class have little incentive to defect and compromise with the opposition. In the end, violent overthrow such as a coup, assassination, or insurgency is the more likely trigger for a transition, but such events typically lead to extreme uncertainty and instability even if they succeed. These regimes can rarely survive long after the death of the ruler because this type of dictator eliminates all the competent potential rivals during his or her life in most cases. But, conversely, as Brownlee (2007), Tullock (1987), and others imply, the personalist autocracies may enjoy the stability if they succeed in institutionalizing hereditary succession. The Suryeong system is indeed very well equipped with the features that, as Geddes and her colleagues find, significantly contribute to regime durability. The personalization and concentration of power in a party-led dictatorship usually tend to decrease its durability because it is difficult to sustain the personalized rule after the dictator passes away. But, in the case of North Korea, the consolidated Suryeong system substantially reduced the uncertainties arising from succession struggle by institutionalizing hereditary succession, which explains much of the stability the North Korean regime showed in the wake of power successions. The “monolithic rule of Baekdu bloodline successors” has been systematically legitimized by the nationalist ideology, the main function of which is to promote a cult for the Kim family’s anti-imperialist heroism. More importantly, Kim Jong-un also inherited the long-lasting party as well, which, as Wintrobe (1998: 64) observes, functions as an institutional mechanism that builds “a core of loyal supporters whose relationship with the regime is primarily one of exchange rather than coercion.” The party’s extensive networks aid the ruling elites to distribute privileges to those most essential for their survival while effectively shifting the burden of the crisis to weaker parts of the population (Geddes et al. 2018: 186–190). Kim Jong-un’s choice to reduce his dependence on the military and instead strengthen the role of the WPK is a rational strategy which is likely to enhance the longevity of his rule. The North Korean rulers have also developed diverse social control systems and elaborate surveillance mechanisms to preempt challenges including coups (Ahn 2016: 164–170). The North Korean regime still keeps dividing the people into three categories depending on their loyalty to the regime: basic (core), complex (wavering), and hostile. It also classifies these categories further into more than 50 subgroups called

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Seongbun, literally meaning constituents, in order to monitor the population effectively. Therefore, Kim Jong-un can easily localize and repress mass protests even if they occur as long as the ruling elites including the military are not internally divided. The Kim family has also created various policing forces to prevent the possible unity of the security forces and their defection (Byman and Lind 2010). More specifically, for example, the task of domestic intelligence activities is divided into the jurisdiction of two major agencies, the Ministry of People’s Security as the police force and the Ministry of State Security as the secret intelligence service. In addition, the Security Command of the KPA has been in charge of military intelligence, which is not controlled by the Chief of Staff of the KPA but directly supervised by the President of State Affairs Commission, Kim Jong-un himself. As for foreign intelligence activities, such a division of tasks is also systemized as the United Front Department of the WPK and the General Bureau of Reconnaissance under the Ministry of People’s Armed Forces, which compete as well as cooperate with each other. Furthermore, the Organization and Guidance Department of the WPK officially administers all security structures via its powers of ideological verification and personnel reshuffling (You 2018). Such a complex system of “checks and balances” has prevented any apparatus from monopolizing the security or surveillance capacity and made each of them subordinate solely to the Suryeong . Thus, incentive structures embedded in the Suryeong system have made it extremely risky to betray or challenge the ruler. Both elites and the people are much too atomized and, if they have discontents, cannot but exit individually rather than raise their voices collectively. North Korea’s ruling elites in particular simply conform to the incentive structure of the system that motivates them to prefer sustaining status quo to pursuing extremely risky options. The top elites within the ruling circle, lacking independent political assets and incentives to take risks, would prefer “to sink or swim” with the regime as Bratton and van de Walle (1997: 86) observed in many other personalist regimes. The Suryeong on his part has also little incentive to relax repression. As Wintrobe (1998: 58–64) emphasizes, unlike “tinpot” dictators, totalitarian leaders tend to increase rather than reduce repressions even when their economic performance improves; and the use of repression tends to increase the supply of loyalty to the dictator to the point where an increase in repression begins to reduce the supply of loyalty. Totalitarian

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dictators employ this strategy in order to raise the risks and costs of defection, particularly on the part of the ruling elites, who cannot help but rely on the privileges granted by their notoriously capricious ruler. All this means is that, more than anything else, the expectation for North Korea’s “soft-landing” is simply unrealistic. The Suryeong system indeed has well proven its robustness, persevering economic and international shocks. However, fatal flaws lurk behind its achievements; the system is too inflexible to be reformed smoothly from within, either from the top or from below. The genetic code of the Suryeong system renders nearly impossible even a transition to the “early” stage of posttotalitarianism. If Kim Jong-un intends to change his regime into a post-totalitarian one, he needs to move to a normal socialist party-state first; he should give up the brutal purges as an instrument of rule and allow the emergence of collective political leadership, limited pluralism of factions, and maybe even dissident intellectuals. These measures cannot help but destroy the cornerstones of the Suryeong system. History reminds us that there has been no case of a totalitarian regime voluntarily transforming itself into a post-totalitarian or authoritarian regime without internal or external shocks. It has turned out to be a wishful thinking that North Korea would engage in negotiations for complete denuclearization and move on to “reform and opening.” Kim Jong-un consecutively had summits with South Korean President Moon Jae-in (April 27, 2018), and the US President Donald Trump twice in Singapore (June 12, 2018) and Hanoi (February 27, 2019). The two summits between the US and North Korea did not produce any meaningful deal, not to mention the so-called big deal, that is, an exchange of a comprehensive denuclearization program for sanction relief and economic aid. It became clear that North Korea wanted to extract the most from the US in diplomatic and economic cooperation, while procrastinating progress toward denuclearization for as long as possible. On the surface, Kim Jong-un has expressed his strong commitment to the country’s economic development. This has been shown in the significant policy changes of North Korea since he began to have a firm grip on the party, military, and government altogether in 2016. Firstly, on April 20, 2018, the Plenary Session of Workers’ Party Central Committee decided to revise the “Parallel Policy of Economic and Nuclear Development” into the “All-out Concentration Policy for Economic Building” as a new national strategy. Surprisingly, the words such as “nuclear” or

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“defence” were deleted from North Korea’s grand strategy, which could be interpreted as a significant shift in North Korea’s foreign and domestic policy lines. The slogan “Public People-First Policy,” which appeared for the first time in 2013, has also been increasingly emphasized up until the 8th Party Congress in 2021, and was even described as fully replacing Kim Jong-il’s “Military-First Policy” (Kang and Ahn 2021). This series of policy rhetoric in the Kim Jong-un era seemed to demonstrate the new Suryeong ’s wish for North Korea’s economic development and the improvement of the US-North Korea relationship. This led to an expectation that this time Kim Jong-un might seriously engage in denuclearization negotiations with the US for the goals of lifting sanctions needed for its economic development. But the expectation was based on a shallow understanding of the nature of the Suryeong system. Kim Jong-un and the hard-liners’ obsession with developing nuclear and missile programs at the cost of anything whatsoever including the economic welfare of people should be judged as a rational one in terms of their political survival and monopoly of power. Seemingly bad policies chosen by a dictator, as Bueno de Mesquita and his colleagues (2003) argue, are usually good decisions for the dictator and his winning coalition. North Korea has long aspired, ever since the Kim Il-sung era, to have nuclear weapons as protection against their perceived security threats, and has achieved the status of a de facto nuclear state that is also equipped with missile capabilities. Now it is not only irrational but also almost impossible for Kim Jong-un to give up the nuclear-weapons program that has been the only vehicle for sustaining the legitimacy of the Suryeong system since the economic collapse in the early 1990s. For Kim Jongun and his inner circle, the regime’s survival and monopoly of power are best warranted by nuclear weapon capability. They witnessed how Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi were killed. Perhaps they now judge the Russian invasion of Ukraine as an example of their strategy to become a nuclear-weapons state as being correct. On the other hand, economic incentives such as sanction relief and economic aid are of secondary importance for the survival of Kim Jongun and his allies (Schäfer June 8, 2021). As the probability of challenging collective actions either from within the regime or from below is minimal, economic incentives are not a critical variable in their strategic calculations regardless of whether the already devastated economic conditions worsen further or not. A comprehensive “reform and opening” of the economy cannot but weaken the Suryeong ’s grip on society and eventually pose a

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fundamental threat to the Suryeong system itself. Therefore, Kim Jongun’s seeming commitment to economic development should be seen as one narrowly focused on rewarding a small group of ruling elites, not as one oriented toward the Chinese or the Vietnamese type of economic reforms (Fields 2021). In our final analysis, it is evident that the solidity of the Suryeong system that enabled it to persevere with a series of catastrophes has made the system untouchable. An attempt to revise it will undermine the legitimacy of the Baekdu descendants’ rule and create enormous institutional pandemonium. This is why it is reasonable to expect North Korea’s top leadership to walk a unique path once again as shown in Fig 1.2. Still, we cannot completely exclude a possibility of sudden leadership change. As Svolik (2012: 7, 77) points out, established personalist, neo-patrimonial dictators tend to lose power in ways that are unrelated with their inner circle, for instance, due to external shocks such as sudden death, foreign intervention, and popular uprising. If that happens, it will be an insurmountable challenge for any potential successors to persuasively claim their legitimacy to govern; the North Korean elites will be unable to find consensus among themselves about who will govern the country excluding the Baekdu bloodline, given that the ideological support for the Suryeong system is so deeply rooted in society.16 Subsequent severe strife among the elites, if it happens, will not only create instability and violence within North Korea but also seriously threaten the security of the Northeast Asian region as a whole. This is a frightful scenario and something we all want to avoid.

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Fig. 1.2 Evolution of socialist regimes Source Park et al. (2013: 22) (with minor modifications)

Notes 1. Brownlee (2007) distinguished hereditary succession from other forms of leadership change by the following three criteria: (1) transfer of top governing authority from father to son; (2) preparation or initiation of power transfer prior to the ruler’s death; (3) absence of formal democratic procedures (electoral democracy) or legal stipulation of familiar rule (traditional monarchies). He counted the case of North Korea before the death of Kim Jong-il as one of nine non-monarchical modern autocracies. 2. See Kim (2015) for a detailed history of hereditary succession in North Korea. 3. “The Ten Principles of Establishing the Monolithic Ideology System of the Party” was adopted in 1974 when Kim Jong-il was officially announced to be the successor to Kim Il-sung. It was revised and renamed the “Ten Principles of the Monolithic Guidance System of the Party” in 2013 after Kim Jong-un took power. The “Ten Principles” are deemed to be more important than the North Korean Constitution and Code of the WPK (Song 2019). 4. The changes in the Constitution and the Party Code have also clearly reflected the appropriation of the party and the state by the Kim family. The word “Juche Ideology” was first introduced

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into the Constitution of 1972. 20 years later, the word “MarxismLeninism” was deleted in the Constitution of 1992. Then, after the death of Kim Il-sung, the Constitution of 1998 was named the Kim Il-sung Constitution. The Constitution of 2009 deleted the word “communism.” After the death of Kim Jong-il, the new Party Code defined the WPK as the Kim Il-sung-Kim Jong-il Party. The Constitution of 2012 was even declared as the Constitution of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il. 5. The well-known six components of Friedrich and Brzezinski’s model are as follows: (1) An elaborate ideology, consisting of an official body of doctrine covering all vital aspects of men’s existence to which everyone living in that society is supposed to adhere; (2) A single mass party typically led by one man, the “dictator,” and consisting of a relatively small percentage of the total population; (3) A system of terror, whether physical or psychic, effected through party and secret-police control, supporting but also supervising the party for its leaders, and characteristically directed not only against demonstrable “enemies” of the regime, but also against more or less arbitrarily selected classes of the population; (4) A technologically conditioned, near-complete monopoly of control, in the hands of the party and of the government, of all means of effective communications; (5) A technologically conditioned, near-complete monopoly of the effective use of all weapons of armed combat; (6) A central control and direction of the entire economy through the bureaucratic coordination of formerly independent corporate entities (Friedrich and Brzezinski 1965: 22). Linz revised Friedrich and Brzezinski’s model by removing the terror, monopoly of combat weapons, and central control of the entire economy through the bureaucratic coordination, thus reducing the main pillars of the model to the following three: (1) A monistic but not monolithic center of power; (2) An exclusive, autonomous, and more or less intellectually elaborate ideology with which the ruling group or leader, and the party serving the leaders identify and which they use as a basis for policies or manipulate to legitimize them; (3) Citizen participation in and active mobilization for political and collective social tasks are encouraged, demanded, rewarded, and channeled through a single party and many monopolistic secondary groups (Linz 2000: 70).

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6. For Havel, post-totalitarianism was still totalitarian in a way different from Stalinist totalitarianism (Havel 1985: 27). 7. Linz (2000) initially did not count sultanism as a separate category of nondemocratic regimes. Later in the book co-authored with Stepan (Linz and Stepan 1996), he proposed it as a separate category along with totalitarianism, post-totalitarianism, and authoritarianism. 8. It is tricky differentiating the sultanist regime type from totalitarianism or authoritarianism. So, Chehabi and Linz (1998: 9) find “sultanist tendencies” in both totalitarianism and authoritarianism while, at the same time, they differentiate sultanist regimes from either totalitarian or authoritarian type. 9. See Linz (2000: 151–155), for his persuasive observation of the fundamental difference between sultanist regimes and totalitarianism. 10. At the 8th Party Congress meeting in January 2021, Jo Yong-won, a senior party official who often accompanied Kim Jong-un during his “field guidance” in 2020, was extraordinarily promoted to a member of the Presidium of the Politburo of the WPK, a position held by only five people including the Suryeong himself. This confirms that the party apparatus has become the main vehicle of Kim Jong-un’s rule. 11. Although Kim Yo-jong has been regarded as the de facto “person standing next” since 2017, even the sister of supreme leader seems not free from his personnel policy pattern in that she was first elected to the Politburo in 2017 but then dismissed in 2019, and later appointed back to the alternative member of this body in April 2020 but removed again at the 8th Party Congress in January 2021. 12. This will probably be one of the most controversial questions among North Korean specialists in the foreseeable future. See Lee (2011) for Kim Jong-il’s turn to the party before his death. Also see Cheong (2014) for Kim Jong-un’s consolidation of power and regression to a personalist regime. 13. Even if Kim Jong-un’s regime loses some legitimacy, it is not likely to be a critical factor in the survival of the dictatorship. The dictatorships, even if they lose legitimacy, can remain stable as long as no feasible alternatives would be politically organized in society (Przeworski 1986: 50–53).

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14. An additional interesting point is that Kim has often exposed his wife, Ri Sol-ju, to the public. Considering that the wives of his father and grandfather were barely officially disclosed to the public, he seems to have an intention to emphasize that he is a leader of normal state. 15. Their typology, however, has a flaw that these subcategories are neither mutually exclusive nor collectively exhaustive; there is substantial overlap among military, personalist, and single-party dictatorships (Svolik 2012: 28–29). North Korea’s autocracy represents such a fusion of the three regime types, which resists falling into only one cell. Their research was also made mainly with regard to the transition from authoritarianism, so their single-party regime type refers to authoritarianism by a hegemonic party like the PRI in Mexico, which fundamentally differs from communist one-party rule. Therefore, we need to be cautious in applying their findings directly to the case of North Korea. 16. About 70 percent of the defectors surveyed by the IPUS in 2019 reported that North Korean people were proud of Juche Ideology and supported Kim Jong-un’s rule (Institute for Peace and Unification Studies 2019).

References Ahn, Hee-Chang. North Korean System of Rule: Domination Structure and Social Control [북한의 통치체제: 지배구조와 사회통제]. Seoul: Myungin Moonhwasa, 2016. Armstrong, Charles K. “Familism, Socialism and Political Religion in North Korea.” Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 6, no. 3 (2005): 383–94. Bialer, Seweryn. Stalin’s Successors: Leadership, Stability and Change in the Soviet Union. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980. Borowski, Karol. “Secular and Religious Education in Poland.” Religious Education 70, no. 1 (1975): 70–6. Bratton, Michael, and Nicolas van de Walle. Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Brownlee, Jason. “Hereditary Succession in Modern Autocracies.” World Politics 59, no. 4 (2007): 595–628.

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Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow. The Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2003. Bugajski, Janusz, and Maxine Pollack. East European Fault Line. New York: Routledge, 1989. Byman, Daniel, and Jennifer Lind. “Pyongyang’s Survival Strategy: Tools of Authoritarian Control in North Korea.” International Security 35, no. 1 (2010): 44–74. Chehabi, Houchang E., and Juan J. Linz (eds.). Sultanistis Regimes. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998. Cheong, Seong-Chang. “Assessment of the Kim Jong-un Regime Stability After the Purge of Jang Song-thaek [장성택 숙청 이후 김정은 체제의 안정성 평가].” Journal of National Defense Studies 57, no. 1 (2014): 1–25. Choi, Wan Kyu. A Study on the Changes in the Characteristics of the State in North Korea: The Consolidation of an Exceptional State [북한의 국가성격 변 용에 관한 연구: 예외국가의 공고화]. Seoul: Hanul, 2001. Fields, David. “What ‘Economic Development’ Means to Kim Jong Un.” NK News, October 18, 2021. Friedrich, Carl J., and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski. Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy. London: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. Geddes, Barbara, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz. How Dictatorships Work. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018. Geddes, Barbara. “What Do We Know about Democratization After Twenty Years.” Annual Review of Political Science 2, no. 1 (1999): 115–44. Havel, Vaclav. The Power of the Powerless. Citizens against the State in Central Eastern Europe. New York: Abingdon, 1985. Huntington, Samuel. P. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991. Institute for Peace and Unification Studies. “Unification consciousness survey 2018 [2018 통일의식조사].” 2019. Kang, Hyesuk, and Kyungmo Ahn. “From the Military First Policy and the People: The Changes of Ideology in the Kim Jong Un Era [김정은 시대 통치 이데올로기(2012-2021)-‘선군’에서 ‘국가와 인민’으로].” World Politics, no. 34 (2021): 65–120. Kim, Byung-ro. “Perception of the Actual State of North Korea [북한실태 인 식].” In “Unification Perception of North Korean Population 2020 [북한주 민 통일의식].” Institute for Peace and Unification Studies, 2021. Kim, Keum-hwa. The shaman Kim Kum-hwa ˘ [만신 김금화]. Seoul: Gungli, 2014. Koo, Bon Sang, Jun Young Choi, and Junseok Kim. “Analyzing Kim Jong-un’s Survival Strategy from Comparative Authoritarian Perspective.” Pacific Focus 31, no. 2 (2016): 211–231.

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Kwon, Heonik, and Byung-Ho Chung. North Korea: Beyond Charismatic Politics. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012. Lee, Jongmin. “Marketization, Income Differentiation, and Economic Perception [시장화, 소득분화, 경제인식].” in “Social Change in North Korea [북한 사회변동 2020].” Institute for Peace and Unification Studies, 2021. Lee, Jung Chul. “The Third Conference of the Korean Workers’ Party and Its Succession Process: A Comparison with the Chinese Succession Experience in the 1970s [조선 로동당 3차 당 대표자회와 김정일 후계 체제: 개혁 개방기 덩샤 오핑의 후계전략과 비교를 중심으로].” The Journal of Eurasian Studies 8, no. 1 (2011): 187–205. Lee, Su-Seak, and Eun-joo Park. “The Political Characteristics of the Kim Jongun Regime and Its Domestic Policies [김정은 정권의 정치적 특성과 대내정 책].” Journal of North Korea Studies 4, no. 1 (2018): 229–53. Leem, Kyung Hoon. “The Formation of the ‘Economic Management System’ and Suryongje in North Korea: The Extreme Case of Neotraditionalism [ 북한식 경제관리체제와 수령제의 형성: 신전통주의의 극대화].” North Korean Studies Review 9, no. 3 (2005): 103–25. Linz, J. Juan, and Alfred Stepan. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. Linz, J. Juan. Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000. Malia, Martin. “To the Stalin Mausoleum.” Daedalus 119, no. 1 (1990): 295– 344. McEachern, Patrick. Inside the Red Box: North Korea’s Post-Totalitarian Politics. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010. Oh, Gyeong-seob, Suk-hoon Hong, Jea-hwan Hong, Eun-mee Jeong, and Ji-son Wee. “White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2021 [북한인권백서 2021].” Korea Institute for National Unification, 2021. Park, Hyeongjoong. Reform and Opening of North Korea: The Present and Future of North Korea in Light of Comparative Socialism [북한의 개혁·개방과 체제변화: 비교사회주의를 통해 본 북한의 현재와 미래]. Seoul: Haenam, 2004. Przeworski, Adam. “Some Problems in the Study of Transition to Democracy.” In Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives edited by Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1986. Smith, Hazel. North Korea: Markets and Military Rule. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Song, In-Ho. “A Study on the Ten Principles of the Monolithic Guidance System of North Korea [북한의 ‘당의 유일적 영도체계 확립의 10대 원s칙’에 대한 고 찰].” Dankook Law Review 43, no. 1 (2019): 145–76.

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Svolik, Milan W. The Politic of Authoritarian Rule. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. Thompson, M. R. “Totalitarian and Post-Totalitarian Regimes in Transition and Non-transitions from Communism.” Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 31, no. 1 (2002): 79–106. Tullock, Gordon. Autocracy. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1987. Wada, Haruki. Contemporary History of North Korea [북한 현대사] (Korean version of Kitachosen Gendaishi). Pajoo: Changbi, 2014. Walzer, Michael. “On ‘Failed’ Totalitarianism.” In 1984 Revisited: Totalitarianism in our Century edited by Irving Howe. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1983. Wintrobe, Ronald. The Political Economy of Dictatorship. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. You, Dong-ryul. “A Study on the Changes and Current Status of the National Intelligence System in North Korea.” Journal of National Intelligence Studies 11, no. 1 (2018): 153–87.

CHAPTER 2

North Korea’s Nuclear Armament and the Triad of Denuclearization Sung Chull Kim

“Military strategy, whether we like it or not, has become the diplomacy of violence.” Thomas C. Schelling in Arms and Influence, 1966. “[The US demand for denuclearization] was motivated by an impure heart to impose Libya or Iraq-like fate to our dignified country.” North Korean First-Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye-gwan at the editorial of the Korean Central News Agency, May 16, 2018. “The achievement of the Five-Year National Economic Development Plan… fell awfully short of the goal in most sectors.” The North Korean leader Kim Jong-un at the 8th Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea, January 5, 2021.

S. C. Kim (B) Institute for Peace and Unification Studies, Seoul National University, Seoul, South Korea e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 B.-Y. Kim (ed.), The North Korean Regime under Kim Jong-un, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-8525-8_2

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In the past three decades, North Korea has taken various forms of provocations, muddled through subsequent international sanctions, and eventually succeeded in advancing nuclear deterrent capability. With expanded nuclear arsenal and a diversified missile system, Pyongyang has continued to raise the level of threats to neighbors, particularly South Korea and Japan, and rendered the United States concerned about further nuclear proliferation as well as national security. North Korea is unlikely to abandon de facto nuclear-weapons-state status, although none of the countries in the world recognizes it. While watching the War in Ukraine that began in February 2022, Kim has apparently believed the nuclear deterrent to be the only way for preserving his regime and North Korea. Furthermore, the current international relations complicate the North Korean nuclear issue. Kim Jong-un, the unchallenged leader in Pyongyang, is taking advantage of the intensified US-China rivalry. The history of North Korea’s nuclear-weapons development has been paired with the strenuous international efforts to solve the issue, namely denuclearization. The official use of the term “denuclearization” can be traced back to the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which was signed by North Korea and South Korea in December 1991. The effect of the document was virtually nullified by North Korea’s nuclear development and the failures of the negotiations to solve this issue, but the term of denuclearization has continued to be used for more than three decades without clarification of the meanings and implications. Does denuclearization differ from dismantlement? Or, does it actually mean an arms control negotiation? Is there any agreement on the consequential outcome of denuclearization among all engaging parties? Perhaps, absence of clarification on a complex issue is sometimes convenient for the relevant parties. However, it is convenient only until the moment they forward hidden agendas to eventually break down the negotiations. The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the three objectives of denuclearization in relation to the North Korean nuclear issue: restoring the nonproliferation regime on the Korean Peninsula, arms control in kind, and ending North Korea’s nuclear deterrence. This analysis may help identify the roadblocks that impede the negotiation processes. These elements can be called a triad because of their interconnectedness in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. First, from the nonproliferation perspective, restoring the nonproliferation regime must address security concerns of the relevant states. Specifically, security assurance of

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North Korea and South Korea is an essential component of denuclearization. Second, from the arms control perspective, the crucial element of denuclearization is verification, although failure of it has resulted in the breakdown of all negotiations. The conflict between the United States’ emphasis of verification and North Korea’s unilateral approach originated from distrust between them. Thus, a staged approach, making small deals through cumulative interactions, seems the only way to progress. Third, from the deterrence perspective, North Korea should demonstrate the intention to give up the strategy of nuclear deterrence. Pyongyang’s coercive behavior, backed by its nuclear deterrent, toward Seoul contributes to solidifying the alliance between Washington and Seoul and the trilateral partnership which Tokyo joins. In accordance with these points, this chapter, first, summarizes the history of North Korea’s nuclear armament particularly since the September 11 attacks that led a drastic change in the US security policy, second, delves into the triad of denuclearization one by one, third, shows challenges that obstruct the efforts to achieve the three objectives, and finally, concludes with some suggestions for future negotiations to make progress, if not a full achievement of denuclearization.

North Korea’s Nuclear Armament In 1956, North Korea established a treaty on the peaceful use of nuclear energy with the Soviet Union, and six years later introduced an experimental reactor, the IRT-200 with a two-MWe capacity, from Moscow (Korea Institute for National Unification 2009). In view of that North Korea came under American sanctions following the Korean War, the North Koreans, with the technology, could have dreamed of producing atomic bombs sometime in the future. However, because of technological backwardness and weak industrial basis, coupled with the treaty obligation to peaceful use, North Korea could not afford the bombs for the coming decades. Existential insecurity must have been the main reason for North Korea’s nuclear-weapons development. The end of the Cold War did not ease tensions surrounding the Korean Peninsula. Despite the simultaneous entry of South Korea and North Korea into the United Nations in September 1991, North Korea remained isolated. South Korea normalized relations with Russia and China in 1991 and 1992, respectively.

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But the revelation of the North Korean nuclear program and the disclosure of the abduction of Japanese citizens hampered improvements in Pyongyang’s relations with Washington and Tokyo. The old subject of cross-recognition of the two Koreas during the Cold War—recognition of Seoul by Beijing and Moscow and recognition of Pyongyang by Washington and Tokyo—has not been realized equally for the South and the North. North Korea, feeling betrayed by China and Russia, has taken the path of self-reliance in an effort to survive the hardship such as international isolation, compounded by the death of the regime’s founding father, Kim Il-sung, and the famine of the mid-1990s. The North Korean nuclear crisis that has rumbled on over the past three decades is closely associated with Pyongyang’s thwarted attempts to approach the United States and Japan and to overcome existential insecurity. Existential Insecurity after the September 11 attacks What expedited North Korea’s nuclear program as a deterrent was the September 11 attacks and the ensuing changes in US security policy. The Bush administration shifted the focus of policy to targeting terrorist organizations and rogue states, emphasizing preemptive strikes as a means of dealing with the source of the threat. George W. Bush branded North Korea, along with Iraq and Iran, the “axis of evil” by which the doctrine of preemptive attacks was justified. The key US security policy documents, such as the Nuclear Posture Review, the National Security Strategy, and the Quadrennial Defense Review, mentioned that North Korea was a threat and thus under the American contingency plan for the use of nuclear weapons. Once the United States launched the war on terror, North Korea’s responses to the US documents and statements began to display a combination of fear and resolve. Some months after the US toppling of Saddam Hussein in April 2003, North Korea for the first time declared that it was entitled to possess a nuclear deterrent. As North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)’s war in Libya overthrew the Gaddafi regime in 2011, North Korean propaganda reiterated that Pyongyang’s decision to develop nuclear weapons was the right one. In Pyongyang’s eyes, Hussein and Gaddafi had fallen precisely because they had not possessed a nuclear deterrent. In a sense, what made North Korea expedite its nuclear-weapons program was an unintended consequence of Washington’s new security policy concentrating on the war on terror (Roehrig 2006).

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Table 2.1 shows the US-North Korea standoff regarding the nuclear issue stretched from the September 11 attacks in 2001 to a peak of North Korea’s nuclear development in 2017. North Korea’s nuclear development reached a peak in 2017 with the 6th nuclear test on September 3 and three tests of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) on July 4 and 28 and November 29. These tests brought North Korea’s nuclear program to a level that threatened the security of the United States as well as Asian allies. While international efforts for denuclearization had apparently failed, it was obvious that a military solution, such as a preemptive attack, was not only unworkable but likely to generate a catastrophic result due to North Korea’s possession of substantial firepower in terms of conventional and nuclear weapons. For Washington, the North Korean crisis in 2017 was basically a missile crisis. In the opinion of the US military, the bomb that was tested on September 3 “equates to a hydrogen bomb” with “at least 100 kilotons” yield.1 This did not come as a surprise, as the previous five tests had already proven that North Korea had a bomb with huge explosive power. However, the tests of the ICBM showed that the entire US mainland was within the range of North Korea’s missile attack. Right after the November ICBM test, North Korea declared that it had “completed its historic mission” to possess a nuclear deterrent and missile capability. Indeed, the United States became seriously concerned about Pyongyang’s rapidly advancing ICBM capability. Amid this crisis, Donald Trump finally held a summit meeting with Kim Jong-un in Singapore in June 2018. The historic summit resulted in a general agreement on improving their relations, building a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and the repatriation of POW/ MIA remains. However, the 2nd summit in February 2019, held in Hanoi, ended with no deal on denuclearization or the building of a peace regime. The Trump-Kim meeting in June that year at Panmunjeom, on the border between the two Koreas, and the working-level talks failed to progress on the nuclear issue. What should be noted is that the advances in North Korea’s nuclearweapons program were accompanied by the development of its nuclear doctrine. In April 2012, the Supreme People’s Assembly revised the constitution whose preamble depicted North Korea as a nuclear-weapons state. A year later, the Assembly adopted the Nuclear Weapons State Law, which was virtually a nuclear doctrine. Just as nuclear doctrines of

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Table 2.1 US-North Korea Standoff, 2001–2017 United States

North Korea

• December 31, 2001: Publication of Nuclear Posture Review (North Korea, one of the states under contingency plans for use of nuclear weapons) • January 29, 2002: Bush’s State of the Union address mentions the “axis of evil” and West Point speech suggests preemptive attacks in the war on terror • September 20, 2002: National Security Strategy’s inclusion of preemptive attack • March 20, 2003: US invasion of Iraq

• September 22, 2002: Rodong Sinmun’s special note on US policy shift, particularly on preemptive attack and proliferation among rogue states

•February 6, 2006: Quadrennial Defense Review mentions tailored deterrence and North Korea’s nuclear capability as a threat • March 16, 2006: White House National Security Strategy mentions need for regime change in North Korea, Iran, Syria, and four other countries • January 2009: Obama administration indicates willingness to normalize if North Korea chooses denuclearization • April 2009: Obama’s emphasis on China policy and China’s role in the North Korean issue (repeated on March 1, 2011, in Kurt Campbell’s statement at Senate Foreign Relations Committee)

• June 6, 2003: Foreign ministry spokesperson for the first time mentions right to possess a “nuclear deterrent” • June 18, 2003: Rodong Sinmun reports refusal to accept US denuclearization demand; argues that Iraq was invaded because it had no nuclear deterrent • October 2, 2003: Foreign ministry states that nuclear deterrence is the only way • October 9, 2006: 1st nuclear test • January 2008: North Korea starts using the term “nuclear war deterrence”

• January 13, 2009: Foreign ministry spokesperson, “not normalization through denuclearization, but denuclearization through normalization” • April 2009: Six-Party Talks (2003–2008) collapse as North Korea declares that it will pull out • May 25, 2009: 2nd nuclear test

(continued)

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Table 2.1 (continued) United States

North Korea

• April 6, 2010: Nuclear Posture Review notes “negative security assurance”; United States will not use nuclear weapons on those complying with nonproliferation (Iran and North Korea were exceptions) • October 2010: US-South Korea Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) agrees on Extended Deterrence Policy Committee • October 2013: SCM signs on tailored deterrence • December 2014: US, South Korea, and Japan sign the Trilateral Information Sharing Arrangement for information sharing

• April 21, 2010: Foreign ministry memorandum, “The Korean Peninsula and Nuclear Weapons,” an embryonic form of nuclear doctrine (Four points: peace treaty, nuclear deterrent, conditional no first use, and nonproliferation and denuclearization efforts)

• April 2015: US and South Korea establish Deterrence Strategic Committee • November 2016: South Korea and Japan sign on General Security of Military Information Agreement for bilateral information sharing • April 2017: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) installed in South Korea • April 2017: Trump administration adopts “maximum pressure and engagement” • August 8, 2017: Trump warns “fire and fury” • September 23, 2017: B-1B bombers fly over waters east of North Korea

• February 12, 2013: 3rd nuclear test • April 1, 2013: Supreme People’s Assembly adopts Nuclear Weapons State Law, an official nuclear doctrine • October 1, 2013: Pak Kil-yon at United Nations General Assembly demands nuclear arms control • January 6, 2016: 4th nuclear test • September 9, 2016: 5th nuclear test

• July 4 & 28, 2017: ICBM test • September 3, 2017: 6th nuclear test • September 21, 2017: Kim calls Trump a “dotard” • November 29, 2017: ICBM test

Source Compiled by author

other nuclear powers, the Nuclear Weapons State Law included strategic objectives: the nuclear deterrent’s retaliatory purpose, the final order by the commander-in-chief, conditional no first use, and cooperation for nonproliferation (Kim 2017). What is more, the Supreme People’s Assembly passed the Law of Nuclear Forces Policy in September 2022, which was an updated and revised nuclear doctrine. With this doctrine, North Korea made it clear that Pyongyang would not abandon the nuclear weapons and that the

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weapons’ primary purpose is to preserve the Kim Jong-un regime. The revised nuclear doctrine adopts the first-use policy, which is not officially adopted by the major nuclear powers. The revised doctrine states that “if the command and control (C2) system is in danger due to enemy’s attack, then the nuclear forces are automatically and immediately launched to wipe out the origin of the attack and the commandership of the enemy.”2 As a result of the first-use policy, North Korea’s doctrine of deterrence has become little different from a doctrine of actual use. While the doctrine of deterrence aims to demonstrate the country’s determination to prevent enemy’s use of nuclear weapons and its capability of retaliation in case of an attack, the doctrine of actual use puts the nuclear forces on a hair-trigger alert.3 Nuclear Advancement While No Hope of Deal After the breakdown of the 2nd Trump-Kim summit in Hanoi in 2019, Kim Jong-un seemed to conclude that pursuing nuclear advancement was the only viable policy choice. After a two-year hiatus, he translated his determination into action by focusing on advancing the nuclear-weapon system. During the 8th Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea held in January 2021, he presented a report that served as the foundation of the five-year plan (2021–2026) aimed at developing national defense science and weapons system (Korea Institute for National Unification 2021). The weapons mentioned by Kim include supersize nuclear warhead, solid-fuel ICBMs, hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs), multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles and submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLBMs and SLCMs), long- and medium-range cruise missiles, and military intelligence satellites. It is noteworthy that these capabilities are typically possessed only by the great powers such as the United States, China, and Russia.4 Kim’s words were followed by corresponding actions. During the Self-Defence Exhibition held in October 2021, North Korea began showcasing some of the weapon models that Kim mentioned at the Party Congress earlier that year. They were ICBMs, SLBMs, and HGVs.5 Within a span of just a few years, North Korea has made advancements in these weapons, despite in varying degrees, aligning with Kim’s objectives outlined in the 2021 Party Congress report.

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Regarding the solid-fuel ICBMs, North Korea conducted a combustion engine test in December 2022. Also, during a parade celebrating the 75th anniversary of the Korean People’s Army held at midnight on February 8, 2023, North Korea showcased a model of a solid-fuel ICBM. If successfully developed, this missile would enhance mobility, concealment, and survivability, and contribute to neutralizing adversary missile defense systems. North Korea has also demonstrated a certain degree of progress in the development of HGVs, which are sophisticated missiles that have sparked competition among China, Russia, and the United States. North Korea began testing an alleged HGV in September 2021 and conducted two follow-up tests in January 2022. Moreover, North Korea’s official news organ, the Korean Central News Agency, provided details of the test flights’ trajectories. While some reservations remain regarding the credibility of these advancements, experts in South Korea and the United States have assessed that North Korea has made continued efforts to improve the weapons.6 In terms of underwater missile systems, North Korea has demonstrated a significant progress. In March 2023, North Korea conducted multiple rounds of firing tests, which included the long-range cruise missile (referred to as the North Korean Tomahawk type) and the SLCM. Notably, the two SLCM firings in March 2023 were launched from the same submarine, named 8.24 Yeongung, which also conducted a SLBM firing in August 2021. Once again, the North Korean media released details about the firing tests on the following day, seemingly aimed at showing the completion of relevant technological capability for submarine-launched missiles.7 Additionally, in April 2023, North Korea conducted nuclear torpedo underwater explosion tests three times.8 While doubts remain about the accuracy of these weapons, it is evident that North Korea is translating Kim’s policy line about nuclear advancements into actions. North Korea has made its nuclear arsenal exceed the capability of minimum deterrence. In terms of scale, North Korea is effectively an ambitious nuclear power. According to an article by a team of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, North Korea maintains the capacity to annually process uranium ore at the

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Pyongsan facility, which is enough to fuel one load of the five MWe reactors in Yongbyon and three metric tons of low enriched uranium or one hundred kilograms of highly enriched uranium.9 In sum, since the breakdown of the US-North Korea summit in Hanoi in 2019, North Korea has demonstrated remarkable progress in advancing its nuclear deterrent, as previously pledged by Kim. Consequently, North Korea seems to have succeeded in developing the two elements out of the nuclear triad that the major nuclear powers possess: ICBMs and SLBMs/ SLCMs. One remaining deficiency is a strategic bomber system. Even without the latter, however, North Korea’s nuclear weapons far exceed the capability of minimum deterrence to deter enemy attacks.

Triad of Denuclearization Parallel to the history of North Korea’s nuclear-weapons development, there were continued attempts, in the name of denuclearization, to resolve this increasingly dangerous issue. However, the vicious cycle of negotiations, provocations, and sanctions has characterized the North Korean nuclear issue. The US-North Korea bilateral talks (1993–1994), the Six-Party Talks (2003–2008), and the US-North Korea summit in Singapore (2018) progressed to some extent. And the results of the talks were the Geneva Agreed Framework in 1994, the Joint Statement in 2005, and the Joint Statement of Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un in 2018, respectively. However, these agreements eventually collapsed with accusations between the adversaries, which in turn were followed by North Korea’s provocations including nuclear tests and missile firings. In response, the United States initiated punitive measures against North Korea: the United Nations Security Council resolutions and the United States’ unilateral sanctions. However difficult the negotiations might be, all the countries involved, except for North Korea, were loath to acknowledge it as a bona fide nuclear-weapons state. This section deals with the triad of denuclearization, which include restoration of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) regime on the Korean Peninsula, nuclear arms control, and ending nuclear deterrence. There are three critical questions parallel to the triad: first, how do we assure security on the Korean Peninsula; second, why is the verification issue the top agenda item in the negotiations; and third,

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what are the problems involved in the credibility of the US extended deterrence. Although the answers to these questions are not realistically optimistic, they contribute to highlighting the requirements indispensable for peace on the Korean Peninsula and international security more broadly. Restoration of the NPT Regime and the Security Assurance Issue The North Korean nuclear issue is to be understood in the context of nuclear proliferation. The reinstatement of the NPT regime on the Korean Peninsula not only involves restoring the relevant international norm but also resolving existential insecurity. Nuclear proliferation in North Korea, that is, Pyongyang’s nuclear armament, is a typical example of the combination of demand-side and supply-side proliferation. The term of demand and supply in explaining the nuclear proliferation is an analogy of the demand and supply in economics. On the demand side, North Korea’s nuclear program was motivated by a security dilemma and unique nationalistic anti-Americanism, both of which were consequences of the Korean War.10 The nuclear armament now contributes to legitimizing the Kim Jong-un regime that claims to have achieved a strategic state status. On the supply side, North Korea’s nuclear armament has not been possible without importing uranium enrichment technology from the black market. Whereas most of the technology of reprocessing, extracting plutonium from spent fuel, was mastered by the North Koreans, technology for enriching uranium to the weapons-grade level was clandestinely transferred by the Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan’s assistance.11 Also, North Korea’s assistance for building a Syrian nuclear facility occurred within Khan’s networks.12 As for the missile technology, it is suspected that experts of the former Soviet Union supplied the technology for North Korea. According to Joby Warrick of The Washington Post, North Korea allowed Russian engineers to enter the country in the 1990s for the development of the Hwasong-15, an ICBM. The missile parts and blueprints that the Russians brought in contributed to the development of the ICBM in Pyongyang faster than the international community suspected. Evidently, the North Korean ICBM resembled the appearance of a former Soviet SS-19 with a range of 10,000 km.13 Even after the 2017 crisis, North Korea has continued efforts to secure missilerelated items from Russia for the improvement of the missile system. Thus, in January 2022, the US Department of State newly designated

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Russian, Chinese, and North Korean individuals and companies for their clandestine proliferation activities. Of them, O Yong Ho worked with the Russians for the procurement of precision milling machines, aramid fiber, stainless steel tubes, and ball bearings between at least 2016 and 2021.14 Efforts for denuclearization, as opposed to North Korea’s development of the nuclear program, can be traced back to the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, signed by both South Korea and North Korea in 1991. The joint declaration for the first time officially used the term “denuclearization” referring to the entire Korean Peninsula, whereby South Korea and North Korea not only vowed to ban the development of atomic bombs but also promised no possession of reprocessing and uranium facilities. This was a timely event in that it happened right after the United States’ pulling out of all tactical nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula.15 The joint declaration had two different implications. On the one hand, the joint declaration envisioned a kind of a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) on the Korean Peninsula, just as the five regions of the world already established the NFWZs (Mongolia as a single state retains a nuclear-weapon-free status).16 On the other hand, the joint declaration did not have any element of negative security assurance of the two Koreas. Thus, the joint declaration has remained a document affirming their goodwill to the international community. The two Koreas’ joint declaration was reported to the United Nations, but neither was approved by the UN General Assembly nor sanctioned by the UN Security Council.17 To be a legally binding authority, the document should have a protocol that assures the security of the two Koreas aspiring nuclear-free status. Negative security assurance of the participants of the NWFZ is to be guaranteed that the five nuclear-weapons states would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the participating partners. For example, Mongolia is the most recent case of its security being assured by the nuclear-weapons states. Ulaanbaatar successfully negotiated into effect the parallel statements in which Ulaanbaatar solemnly stated the commitment to nonproliferation and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (P5) collectively signed the negative security assurance of Mongolia. In contrast, the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, despite the symbolic significance of the two Koreas’ commitment to nonproliferation, failed to induce the nuclear-weapons states’ security assurance of the two Korean signatories. In particular, the isolated North Korea could not gain any kind of assurance from the

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United States other than the official support for the joint declaration to be implemented. Probably, North Korea intended to use the two Koreas’ joint declaration to approach the United States subsequently. In response to the subsequent North Korean nuclear crises, “denuclearization” appeared repeatedly as the objective of the negotiations between North Korea and other parties: the Geneva talks in 1994, the Six-Party Talks from 2003 to 2008, and the two Trump-Kim summits in 2018 and 2019. The Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula was the reference point of these negotiations. However, North Korea was apparently not pleased with the terms, because the agreements, resulting from the negotiations, did not specifically stipulate security assurance of Pyongyang. At best, the agreements mentioned the normalization of relations with the United States and Japan and building of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. In early 2018, Kim Jongun seemed to have suggested his hope of security assurance to Mike Pompeo, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, who was visiting Pyongyang. At the nomination hearing at the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, Pompeo stated: “What are the tools, what are the assurances that can be put in place that aren’t reversible? He is going to be looking for something more than a piece of paper.”18 The “assurances” here mean security assurance of the Kim regime and North Korea, if not the negative security assurance mentioned above. What Pompeo meant by “the something more than a piece of paper” was a resolution or act that Congress of the United States should adopt. This legal procedure will not allow security assurance reversible. To sum up, from the nonproliferation perspective, the nuclear-free Korean Peninsula requires security assurance of the two Koreas. North Korea apparently intended to obtain an irreversible legally binding security assurance, that is, something other than a paper document. To fully realize a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, South Korea also needs security assurance as it suspended its possession of reprocessing of spent fuels and enriching uranium facilities. Based on the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, South Korea have joined all denuclearization negotiations. Also, as far as the assurers of the security of the Korean Peninsula are concerned, not simply the United States and China but extra-regional nuclear powers such as the UK, France, and Russia should become partners. This is particularly true when the rivalry between the United States and China seriously hampers international cooperation regarding the North Korean nuclear issue.

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Nuclear Arms Control and the Verification Issue The second element of denuclearization deals with freeze, reduction, and dismantlement of nuclear capability. The denuclearization negotiation with North Korea has focused on the de facto arms control, although the participants have not wanted to use the term on the ground that it would admit North Korea’s nuclear-weapons-state status. In this negotiation, the compensation is not reciprocal or symmetrical. The United States tries to obtain North Korea’s concession regarding nuclear capability whether freeze, reduction, or dismantlement, but North Korea wanted to get rid of the shackles that strangle its neck, for instance, the sanctions. This situation significantly differs from that of the arms control negotiations during the Cold War, which aimed at mutually symmetrical reduction of nuclear capability. The stark difference regarding the method between North Korea and the United States is an obstacle to the denuclearization process. North Korea not only has maintained a staged approach or an actionto-action approach but also has endeavored to maintain a unilateral approach. North Korea wants to declare what it can offer: site and magnitude of freeze, reduction, or dismantlement. In contrast, the United States, particularly the Trump administration, reiterated that the process should be a complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement (CVID) or a final, fully verified denuclearization (FFVD), which is meant to achieve Washington’s thorough control of the processes, from declaration or reporting, to inspection, verification, and dismantlement. The Biden administration’s business-style approach seems open to the staged approach, which North Korea insisted and China supported. Should both North Korea and the United States sit together at the table, the denuclearization negotiations would become nuclear arms control negotiations. All the more difficult to draw an agreement between North Korea and the United States is the issue of verification. North Korea believes that verifiable nuclear dismantlement, or disabling of the nuclear program at least, would eventually pose a security threat to itself. North Korea is trying to maintain nuclear capability as long as possible. Even if North Korea accepts irreversible dismantlement of one of the nuclear sites, it will commit the best effort to maintain the operation of other sites. For this reason, Pyongyang has adhered to the unilateral approach in offering site and extent of denuclearization. In contrast, verification is a centerpiece

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of the US strategy regarding the denuclearization, whether or not the United States uses such terms as CVID and FFVD. The past denuclearization efforts faced difficulties in the issue of verification. The first nuclear crisis in 1993 occurred as a result of North Korea’s refusal of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s request of a special inspection to check the discrepancy between Pyongyang’s declaration and the agency’s assessment. Also, the Six-Party Talks broke down in 2008 as North Korea’s declared reporting was not verifiable or transparent enough to clear US suspicion but raise more suspicions of Pyongyang’s connection with the Syrian nuclear facility via Iranian assistance. A recent case also suggests the difficulty in the verification issue. Right after the breakdown of the Trump-Kim summit held in Hanoi in 2019, North Korea’s Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho suggested the nuclear facility at Yongbyon to be a subject of negotiations in exchange of lifting part of the UN sanctions in the name of improving the socalled people’s economy. North Korea must have intended to maintain the nuclear potential elsewhere in the event of abandoning the Yongbyon facility. However, the United States was not confident that North Korea would dismantle or disable the Yongbyon facility in a verifiable way. Additionally, Washington was worried that North Korea would use economic gains from the lifting of sanctions to strengthen other nuclear programs, such as the uranium processing facility and missile launching systems. That is, US officials believed that the Yongbyon deal would become an incentive for North Korea to bolster nuclear forces, not an incentive for denuclearization. Verification is related to trust. Verification ensures trust, but at the same time verification is necessary when trust is unsure. When former US President Ronald Reagan quoted a Russian proverb “trust but verify” at the negotiation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty which was finally signed in December 1987,19 he seemed to believe that the “trust” approach could induce Moscow’s interest in the negotiation and the “verify” approach was the core element that would ensure success of the treaty. The United States and the Soviet Union (later Russia) largely succeeded in negotiating agreements on the issue of verification. For example, the New START Treaty, or Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed in 2010, not simply limited the number of missiles, bombers, warheads, and launchers but also allowed 18 on-site inspections per year to ensure transparency and verification.20

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In the North Korean case, the issue of verification is particularly important since there is no trust in the US-North Korea relations. Given this, Pyongyang practiced an approach of unilateral denuclearization. By this approach, North Korea apparently intended to decide the site, extent, and method of dismantlement, as it suggested the Yongbyon facility for a deal. It is worth noting that as South Africa’s denuclearization process has already demonstrated, the unilateral approach is highly likely to deceive inspectors about covert nuclear programs.21 Ending the Nuclear Deterrence The third element of denuclearization is the end of nuclear deterrence, which is related to will of the leader of the country that possess nuclear weapons. Owing to North Korea’s adoption of nuclear deterrence, the Korean Peninsula has already entered a new era of deterrence. With mastering the technology of nuclear weapons and ICBM, North Korea’s means to preclude the enemy’s invasion are nuclear deterrent forces. In this circumstance, denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula means the ending of nuclear deterrence from both North Korea and the United States. While denuclearization in terms of nuclear arms control and dismantlement, as stated above, is about material capability, the end of nuclear deterrence is about intention regarding the operation of the forces. However, North Korea has never suggested the intention to end nuclear deterrence ever since the 1st nuclear test in 2006. Conversely, North Korea under Kim Jong-un has boasted of nuclear-weapons statehood, promoting that the weapons are a “treasure sword.”22 Furthermore, just as other nuclear-weapons states, North Korea has possessed a nuclear doctrine of how to strategically use the weapons. The doctrine first appeared in the Nuclear Weapons State Law, which was adopted by the Supreme People’s Assembly in 2013. The law stated that the weapons would be a self-defensive means of coping with the hostile policy of and nuclear threat from the United States and that they would serve the purpose of deterring and repelling aggression and retaliating against enemies. One noteworthy point is that the law contained an element that penetrated the weakness of the US nuclear umbrella, by stating that North Korea “rules out nuclear strikes or threats against non-nuclear states unless they join a hostile nuclear-weapons state in an invasion or attack on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.” To be sure, North

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Korea tried to drive a wedge between South Korea and Japan, on the one hand, and the United States, on the other. What makes matters worse is that North Korea updated this nuclear doctrine in September 2022. The Supreme People’s Assembly passed the Law of Nuclear Forces Policy, which essentially serves as a revised version of the 2013 doctrine. Through this updated doctrine, North Korea unequivocally stated its refusal to abandon nuclear weapons and emphasized that their primary purpose is to safeguard the Kim Jong-un regime. Moreover, North Korea adopts a first-use strategy, which even major nuclear powers do not officially adopt. In response to North Korea’s reckless advancement of nuclear capability and the adoption of its revised nuclear doctrine, the United States and South Korea have expressed their firm resolve. The top defense authorities of both countries have stated that if North Korea intends to use nuclear weapons, it will lead to the end of the Kim regime. Furthermore, during the US-South Korea summit held in Washington, DC in April 2023, President Joe Biden emphasized his determination to counter any potential use of nuclear weapons by North Korea. He stated that “a nuclear attack by North Korea against the United States, its allies or partners is unacceptable and will result in the end of whatever regime were to take such an action.”23 An important point to consider is that North Korea’s nuclear weapons would not only serve as a means to deter US invasion but also as a way to reshape its relations with non-nuclear-weapons states, particularly South Korea. Theoretical perspectives on the behavior of nuclear-weapons states vary, with one being the nuclear coercion theory that emphasizes their inclination toward coercion, and the other being the nuclear skepticism theory that questions the effectiveness of nuclear coercion.24 In the context of inter-Korean relations, it seems that the coercion theory has been at play. South Korea, under the US nuclear umbrella, is susceptible to the North Korean coercive approach, which in turn means that South Korea has no choice but to bear the costs inflicted by a nuclear North Korea. There are numerous examples demonstrating North Korea’s use of coercion toward South Korea. In recent years, Pyongyang has blamed the US-South Korea military exercises and South Korea’s acquisition of F-35 stealth fighter jets. Meanwhile, it has developed and tested missiles such as the KN-23, a North Korean version of the Iskander, as well as SLBMs and hypersonic missiles. Also, Pyongyang has accused Seoul of violating the

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9.19 inter-Korean military agreement, a pact for tension reduction signed during the inter-Korean summit between Kim Jong-un and Moon Jae-in in Pyongyang in 2018. Furthermore, North Korea destroyed the interKorean liaison office in Kaesong, a symbolic and physical link between the two Koreas. In 2022, a North Korean short-range missile fell on the east coast of South Korea, prompting the South Korean military to conduct its own missile tests in response. In sum, North Korea’s nuclear weapons serve not only to deter a potential US invasion but also to coerce South Korea into acting according to Pyongyang’s preferences. This nuclear coercion undermines, to some extent, the effectiveness of the US extended deterrence, which South Korea has benefited from for seven decades.

Challenges to Denuclearization Power Politics Obstructing the Nonproliferation Regime The growing US-China rivalry, compounded by Beijing’s alignment with Moscow amid the War in Ukraine, makes denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula prohibitively difficult. Evidently, after North Korea’s ICBM test on March 24, 2022, the United States failed to initiate a new resolution at the UN Security Council under the circumstances that China downplayed the US pursuit as “pressure only” and Russia blamed it as the “lack of farsightedness.”25 Until the US-China rivalry intensified in 2018, China supported the United States’ lead to draft resolutions at the UN Security Council (UNSC) to punish the defiant North Korea. China, as a permanent member, intended to maintain international standing, and as a nuclear state in the NPT regime, shared with the United States the nonproliferation cause. In 2017, as North Korea escalated the nuclear crisis by carrying out a hydrogen bomb test and three ICBM tests, the United States initiated the drafting of UNSC Resolutions 2375 and 2397, the toughest ones to limit the influx of energy sources and foreign currency to North Korea. China agreed to most of the US proposals for sanctions and Russia gave consent. UNSC Resolution 2397, built on 2375, included the limiting of supplies of refined petroleum products to 500,000 barrels per year and 4 million barrels on annual supplies of crude oil. UNSC Resolution 2397 called on UN member states to repatriate North Korean

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workers to their home. Along with previous financial sanctions, the new resolutions aimed to punish Pyongyang’s defiant behavior.26 However, the collaboration between the United States and China over the nonproliferation broke down in 2018 at the latest. As PyongyangWashington interactions heightened, China played as a guardian of North Korea. On the one hand, Beijing supported Pyongyang’s engagement with the United States, particularly Kim Jong-un’s summit meeting with Donald Trump. On the other hand, Beijing appeared to actively exert influence on the denuclearization of and the peacebuilding on the Korean Peninsula, thus counterbalancing the US initiatives in these issues. With close Pyongyang-Beijing relations, Kim intended to reduce potential risks involved in his meeting with Trump and to obtain security assurance of his regime from Beijing. In this regard, Kim Jong-un held five meetings with Xi Jinping in 2018 and 2019, four of which occurred in China and one in Pyongyang. This was unusual in the history of their bilateral relations. Moreover, the timing of the summits was significant in that they occurred amid the intensification of the US-China trade war. As the war extended to cyberspace and technology, as exemplified in the US restrictions on Huawei, the strategic utility of North Korea was apparently increased. All in all, the close tie between North Korea and China amid the US-China rivalry and the division between the United States and China over the North Korean nuclear issue must be detrimental to denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. While closely monitoring the War in Ukraine, the United States has issued warnings to China, urging it not to provide military assistance to Russia or aid circumventing the financial sanctions imposed on Russia.27 This attempt by the US appears to be somewhat effective. However, the US pressure on China to influence North Korea regarding denuclearization has shown no signs of success. Considering that North Korea serves as an example for other potential nuclear aspirants, the aforementioned discord between the United States and China poses an unprecedented and significant challenge to the nonproliferation regime as well as the international security. North Korea’s Unchanged Motivation for a Nuclear Path As explained earlier, North Korea’s nuclear armament is a prime example of internal proliferation for which both the demand side and the supply side were perfectly worked out. As in the demand side, North Korea’s

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armament was motivated by both security concern and nationalistic identity. In the supply side, China tacitly approved, or did not care about at least, Pakistan’s technological assistance for Pyongyang’s uranium enrichment, while the Russians provided Pyongyang with the ICBM technology. Additionally, the North Korean hackers contributed to the development of hypersonic missiles by stealing related technology in cyberspace. The nuclear advancement apparently reinforces Pyongyang’s motivations for nuclear statehood and the confidence of surviving international sanctions. Where political logic prevails over economic logic, the North Korean authorities believe that they must bear the costs of nuclear advancement for survival of the existing regime. Moreover, North Korea is likely to believe that the backdrop of the War in Ukraine was Kiev’s abolition of nuclear weapons and related facilities in the Ukraine territory, abolition which happened after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, activated by the 1991 Nunn-Lugar Act, provided the former Soviet republics with financial assistance and security arrangement in compensation of the entire relinquishment of the nuclear programs. Ukraine was one of the countries. Perhaps the lesson Kim Jong-un learned from the War in Ukraine is that relinquishing nuclear weapons would leave North Korea vulnerable to invasion by the United States. Given this context, Kim Jong-un appears to view nuclear deterrent forces as essential for ensuring North Korea’s existential security. As a result, it is highly improbable that North Korea will pursue a path to denuclearization in the foreseeable future. South Korea’s Dilemma in the US Extended Deterrence The South Korean factor is no less important than those challenges mentioned above. Alarmed by North Korea’s nuclear-weapons development, concerned politicians have already questioned whether the status quo is viable in the midst of North Korea’s nuclear advancement. As early as June 2012, Chung Mong-joon, then a member of the National Assembly in South Korea, stoked the debate about nuclear armament. Chung argued that South Korea must possess nuclear weapons to strike a balance of terror on the Korean Peninsula, that is, a nuclear balance there.28 Although he intended the nuclear option to eventually lead to a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, he was the first South Korean politician who advocated the possession of nuclear weapons.

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As an undercurrent of the debate on the nuclear option in the political circle, there is public opinion in South Korea that is supportive for nuclear armament. According to a survey publicized in February 2022, many South Koreans feel the need of nuclear weapons: some 71 percent of respondents for development of weapons and 56 percent for deployment of US weapons. When asked to choose one of the two options, more respondents support the development of the weapons (67 percent) than the deployment of US weapons (only 9 percent). The survey also shows that as a backdrop of such a high support for nuclear development, there is a deep suspicion of North Korea’s intention. Some 82 percent of the respondents believe that North Korea would not denuclearize.29 The debate surrounding South Korea’s nuclear option occurred among the American experts as well—one is the inevitability of the nuclear option, and the other is doubts on utility of the nuclear option. While arguing that nuclear armament of South Korea is indispensable, Lind and Press (2021) demonstrate that Seoul’s security is under stress because of the pressures arising from China and the United States. On the one hand, Beijing continues to check the strengthening of Seoul’s alliance with Washington, particularly in missile defense cooperation. On the other hand, should Seoul resist the US security initiatives, Seoul will likely experience a risk in terms of Washington’s commitment. In addition, the typical problem of credibility of the extended deterrence compounds the security dilemma faced by Seoul. For Lind and Press, nuclear armament is a solution for South Korea.30 To this, Sukin and Dalton (2021) show that should South Korea adopt the nuclear option, it will intensify the arms race in the Asia Pacific and raise tensions on the Korean Peninsula. They continue to argue that China, modernizing nuclear forces, will apply coercion toward South Korea, economically and politically. Thus, for Seoul, consolidation of the alliance with the United States and bolstering the US assurance of the security of South Korea should be a feasible, alternative way.31 Despite differences of the two sides, these American experts commonly point out that the China factor complicates the North Korean nuclear issue. In other words, the North Korean issue resides in the US-China rivalry, and Beijing limits Seoul’s policy options. In this circumstance, there emerged an idea of “nuclear sharing,” which originated from NATO’s nuclear deterrence policy that allows non-nuclear members to participate in decision-making for the use of nuclear weapons. Ryan W. Kort et al. (2019), in an article of the Joint Force Quarterly, have brought about the concept of “custodial sharing

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of nonstrategic nuclear capabilities” for Japan and South Korea. What they mean by this is a kind of sharing of tactical bombs with these US allies in Asia, despite neither sharing ownership nor deploying the bombs in their territories.32 The idea of nuclear sharing aroused special attention in South Korea and Japan. In Japan, as Vladimir Putin mentioned the nuclear option during the War in Ukraine, former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo ignited a debate about nuclear sharing.33 In South Korea, the Yoon Suk Yeol administration, bearing in mind nuclear sharing, has pursued a strengthened US nuclear umbrella since taking office in May 2022. A result of the South Korean efforts was the Washington Declaration in April 2023, in which President Joe Biden and President Yoon Suk Yeol pledged to establish the US-South Korea Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG). The NCG will serve as a platform for discussing nuclear and strategic planning, although it will not strictly involve nuclear sharing. Given the existence of an analogous organization in NATO, it is natural to expect that the functions and practices of the US-South Korea NCG will mirror those of NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group and the US-chaired High Level Group.34 The impact of the Washington Declaration on South Korea’s dilemma remains to be seen in the future. However, considering North Korea’s continuous advancements in nuclear capability and doctrine, it is unlikely that the Washington Declaration alone will significantly alleviate South Korea’s perception of nuclear threats.

Conclusion For the observers, denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula seems a failing story. The branding of North Korea as the axis of evil after the September 11 attacks and a lesson from the War in Ukraine must have reinforced Pyongyang’s determination to remain a nuclear-weapons state. As the nuclear capability has advanced, North Korea is unlikely to abandon the nuclear-weapons program at any time in the future. North Korea is under unprecedentedly harsh sanctions, but it would not entirely trade nuclear deterrent forces with a lift of sanctions or any paper document of agreement on Pyongyang’s security concern. One thing is clear: Pyongyang wants existential security of the Kim Jong-un regime, and it is in a desperate need of external resources. In terms of future prospects, several suggestions can be made. From a nonproliferation standpoint, any future negotiations, if resumed, must

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address the issue of providing security assurance to North Korea and the Kim Jong-un regime. It is evident that security assurance requires more comprehensive measures beyond the current agenda, such as considering the replacement of the existing Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty. Drawing from the example of Mongolia in 2012, where security assurance was provided through a joint declaration sanctioned by the UNSC, a similar approach could be explored for North Korea. A legally binding pledge from the UNSC P5 states, along with normalized relations between the United States and North Korea, could serve as mechanisms to ensure North Korea’s security. To establish the necessary legal binding, the joint declaration would need to undergo domestic processes in both North Korea and the United States, and ideally in all P5 states. This would entail North Korea revising its constitution and abolishing the law that designates it as a nuclear-weapons state, while the US Congress would need to pass legislation specifically addressing North Korea and its security assurance. The success of these domestic processes will truly test the commitment of these adversaries to resolving the nuclear standoff on the Korean Peninsula. Since this legal solution for security assurance is unlikely to happen in the near future, the United States, from the arms control perspective, must enter negotiations with North Korea for a deal, which ranges from freeze to partial elimination, and to entire abolishment. There are two points. First, all denuclearization processes and the entire process of security assurance should be on the table, and exchanges between the two processes should occur in a staged manner. Second, any unilateral approach should be discouraged. As shown in the case of South Africa, unilateral denuclearization is accompanied by deceiving and cheating. Even if unilateralism is permitted for any reason, the verification mechanism should be ready to scrutinize it. From the deterrence perspective, the international community should encourage North Korea to abandon its current nuclear doctrine, which includes the provision of first use. However, in the meantime, the consolidation of US-South Korea alliance remains the primary means to deal with a nuclear-armed North Korea. The Washington Declaration in 2023 appears to have bolstered the United States’ determination to deter North Korea from using nuclear weapons. Additionally, one of the most pressing issues is to constrain North Korea’s inclination to employ coercive diplomacy toward South Korea. As Schelling (1966) has noted, the nuclear

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strategy today is a form of “diplomacy of violence.”35 With its power to inflict nuclear annihilation, North Korea demonstrates, and will likely continue to demonstrate, an art of coercion and intimidation toward South Korea.

Notes 1. For the assessment by Air Force General John Hyten, Chief of US Strategic Command, see Lamothe (2017). 2. For the full text, see “About the Nuclear Forces Policy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” [in Korean], Minplusnews.com, 13 September 2022. http://www.minplusnews.com/ news/articleView.html?idxno=13083. 3. For the difference, see Delpech (2012). 4. O (2023). https://www.kinu.or.kr/pyxis-api/1/digital-files/db1 7dd01-a3da-4134-8b1b-7825e47b7ea9. 5. Korea Institute for Military Affairs, “North Korea’s Self-Defense 2021 Exhibition” [in Korean], KIMA Newsletter, October 14, 2021. https://www.kima.re.kr/3.html?Table=ins_kima_news letter&s=11&mode=view&uid=1144. 6. Jang (2022). https://www.spnews.co.kr/news/articleView.html? idxno=47971. 7. Jeong and Lee (2023). https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/251 46864#home. 8. Kim Seung-wook (2023). https://m.yna.co.kr/view/AKR202304 08006751504. 9. Park et al. (2023). 10. Hymans (2006a); Hymans (2006b). 11. See Corera (2009). 12. Kerr et al. (2016). 13. Warrick (2017). 14. US Department of State (2022). https://www.state.gov/uni ted-states-designates-entities-and-individuals-linked-to-the-democr atic-peoples-republic-of-koreas-dprk-weapons-programs/.

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15. For the document, see “Joint Declaration on The Denuclearization of The Korean Peninsula,” January 20, 1992. https://www. mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5476/view.do?seq=305870&srchFr=& srchTo=&srchWord=&srchTp=&multi_itm_seq=0&itm_seq_1= 0&itm_seq_2=0&company_cd=&company_nm=&page=6&tit leNm . 16. There are five nuclear-weapon-free zones and one nuclear-weaponfree status in the world. The Treaty of Tlatelolco, 1967/ 2002, two protocols (Latin America and the Caribbean); The Treaty of Rarotonga, 1985/1986, three protocols, no US assurance (South Pacific); The Treaty of Bangkok, 1995/1997, no protocol (Southeast Asia); The Treaty of Pelindaba, 1996/ 2009, three protocols, no US assurance (Africa); Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, 2006/2009, one protocol, no US assurance; and Mongolian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status, 2000/2012, parallel declarations. See Arms Control Association. https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nwfz; US Department of State (2012). https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ ps/2012/09/197873.htm. 17. United Nations Peacemaker (1992). https://peacemaker.un.org/ korea-denuclearization92. 18. US Senate (2018). https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/ doc/S.%20HRG.%20115%20339%20Pompeo1.pdf. 19. See Reagan (1987). https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/spe ech/remarks-signing-intermediate-range-nuclear-forces-treaty 20. See US Department of State. https://www.state.gov/t/avc/new start/. 21. See Albright and Stricker (2018); Gordon (2015). 22. Park (2017). https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/21914918# home. 23. Baker and Sanger (2023). https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/ 26/us/politics/biden-south-korea-state-visit.html. 24. On this theoretical debate, see Foot (1988/89); Asal and Beardsley (2007); Sechser and Fuhrmann (2017). 25. Jewell (2022). https://www.nknews.org/2022/03/us-pursuesnew-sanctions-as-security-council-fails-to-condemn-dprk-missiletest/.

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26. United Nations Security Council (2017). https://www.un.org/sec uritycouncil/s/res/2397-%282017%29. 27. Boffey and Sabbagh (2022). https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2022/mar/18/ukraine-war-joe-biden-to-warn-xi-jinpingchina-will-face-costs-if-it-helps-russia. 28. Dong-A Ilbo, “South Korea Should Get Nuclear Weapons: Rep. Chung,” The Dong-A Ilbo, June 4, 2012. https://www.donga. com/en/article/all/20120604/403956/1. 29. Dalton et al. (2022). https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/res earch/public-opinion-survey/thinking-nuclear-south-korean-attitu des-nuclear-weapons. 30. Lind and Press (2021). 31. Sukin and Dalton (2021). https://warontherocks.com/2021/ 10/why-south-korea-shouldnt-build-its-own-nuclear-bombs/. 32. Kort et al. (2019). 33. Tobita (2022). https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Senior-Japaneselawmakers-eye-nuclear-sharing-option-with-U.S. 34. Panda (2023). https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/05/01/ washington-declaration-is-software-upgrade-for-u.s.-south-koreaalliance-pub-89648. 35. Schelling (1966).

References Albright, David, and Andrea Stricker. Revisiting South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Its History, Dismantlement, and Lessons for Today. Washington DC: Institute for Science and International Security Press, 2018. Arms Control Association. “Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zones at a Glance.” Asal, Victor, and Kyle Beardsley. “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior.” Journal of Peace Research 44, no. 2 (2007): 139–55. Baker, Peter, and David E. Sanger. “In Turn to Deterrence, Biden Vows ‘End’ of North Korean Regime if It Attacks.” New York Times, April 26, 2023. Boffey, Daniel, and Dan Sabbagh. “Ukraine War: Joe Biden to Warn Xi Jinping China Will Face ‘Costs’ If It Helps Russia.” The Guardian, March 18, 2022. Corera, Gordon. Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of A. Q. Khan Network. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

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Dalton, Toby, Karl Friedhoff, and Lami Kim. “Thinking Nuclear: South Korean Attitudes on Nuclear Weapons.” The Chicago Council of Global Affairs and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 21, 2022. Delpech, Thérèse. Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century: Lessons from the Cold War for a New Era of Strategic Piracy. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2012. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Republic of Korea. “Joint Declaration on The Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” January 20, 1992. Foot, Rosemary J. “Nuclear Coercion and the Ending of the Korean War.” International Security 13, no. 3 (1988/89): 92–112. Gordon, Brian. “Fact and Fiction: Assessing Denial and Deception in South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program.” American Intelligence Journal 32, no. 2 (2015): 94–101. Hymans, Jacques E. C. The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions and Foreign Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006a. Hymans, Jacques E. C. “Theories of Nuclear Proliferation.” Nonproliferation Review 13, no. 3 (2006b): 455–65. Jang, Young-geun. “Analysis of North Korea’s Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV) Test Launch.” SPN [Seoul Pyongyang News], January 10, 2022. Jeong, Young-gyo, and Geun-pyeong Lee. “North Korea launches first cruise missile from submarine... More difficult to detect and intercept.” The JoongAng, March 14, 2023. Jewell, Ethan. “US Pursues New Sanctions as Security Council Fails to Condemn DPRK Missile Test.” NK News, March 26, 2022. Kerr, Paul K., Steven A. Hildreth, and Mary Beth D. Nikitin. “Iran-North Korea-Syria Ballistic Missile and Nuclear Cooperation.” Congressional Research Service, February 26, 2016. Kim Seung-wook. “North Korea tests improved ‘Nuclear Torpedo Haeil-2.’” Yonhap News Agency, April 8, 2023. Kim, Sung Chull. “North Korea’s Nuclear Doctrine and Revisionist Strategy.” In North Korea and Nuclear Weapons: Entering the New Era of Deterrence, edited by Sung Chull Kim and Michael D. Cohen. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2017. Korea Institute for National Unification. “Chronology of the North Korean Nuclear Issue [북핵일지].” 2009a. Korea Institute for National Unification. “International Relations and Changes in North Korea After the Cold War [탈냉전 이후 국제관계와 북한의 변화].” 2009b. Korea Institute for National Unification. “Analysis of the Eight Congress of the Korean Workers’ Party [북한 조선노동당 제8차 대회 분석].” 2021.

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Kort, Ryan W., Carlos R. Bersabe, Dalton H. Clarke, and Derek J. Di Bello. “Twenty-First Century Nuclear Deterrence Operationalizing the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review.” Joint Force Quarterly 94, no. 3 (2019): 74–79. Lamothe, Dan. “US General Says Size of Most Recent North Korean Test ‘Equates to’ a Hydrogen Bomb.” The Washington Post, September 14, 2017. Lind, Jennifer, and Darly G. Press. “Should South Korea Build Its Own Nuclear Bomb?” The Washington Post, October 7, 2021. O, Gyeong-seop. “The Paradox of Nuclear Weapons State and the Future of the Nuclear-Economy Parallel Strategy [핵 보유의 역과 병진 노선의 미래].” Korea Institute for National Unification, 2023. Panda, Ankit. “The Washington Declaration Is a Software Upgrade for the U.S.South Korea Alliance.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 1, 2023. Park, Sang-uk. “North Korea, ‘We Possess Strong Nuclear Treasure Sword,’ Celebrating the Sixth Nuclear Test by Holding One-Hundred-Thousand Mass Rally.” The JoongAng, September 7, 2017. Park, Sulgiye, Terry McNulty, Allison Puccioni, and Rodney C. Ewing. “Assessing Uranium Ore Processing Activities Using Satellite Imagery at Pyongsan in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.” Science & Global Security 29, no. 3 (2021): 111–44. Reagan, Ronald. “Remarks on Signing the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.” December 8, 1987. Roehrig, Terence. From Deterrence to Engagement: The US Defense Commitment to South Korea. Lanham: Lexington, 2006. Schelling, Thomas C. Arms and Influence. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1966. Sechser, Todd S., and Matthew Fuhrmann. Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. Sukin, Lauren, and Toby Dalton. “Why South Korea Shouldn’t Build Its Own Nuclear Bombs.” War on the Rocks, October 26, 2021. Tobita, Rintaro. “Senior Japanese Lawmakers Eye ‘Nuclear Sharing’ Option with US.” Nikkei Asia, March 12, 2022. United Nations Peacemaker. “Document Retrieval: Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” January 20, 1992. United Nations Security Council. “S/RES/2397 (2017).” December 22, 2017. US Department of State. “New START Treaty.” US Department of State. “Five Permanent UN Representatives Support Mongolia’s Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status.” September 12, 2012. US Department of State. “United States Designates Entities and Individuals Linked to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) Weapons Program.” January 12, 2022.

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US Senate. “Nomination of Hon. Mike Pompeo to Be Secretary of State: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate.” April 12, 2018. Warrick, Joby. “The Secret to Kim’s Success? Some Experts See Russian Echoes in North Korea’s Missile Advances.” The Washington Post, July 8, 2017.

CHAPTER 3

Marketization during Kim Jong-un’s Era Byung-Yeon Kim

Socialism is aimed at constructing an economy without markets, ‘the root of all evil.’ According to socialist economic principles, markets should be replaced by central planning, and individual market transactions should be abolished upon the establishment of a socialist economy. However, history shows that such the ideal socialism has never existed: there has always been some form of market-related informal activity in, for example, the Soviet Union, former East European socialist countries, China, etc. Hence, it may not be surprising that markets are also an important element of the North Korean economy. What is surprising is the extent to which North Korean households relied on markets for survival and prosperity. Economists working on North Korea agree that marketization is one of the most important

An earlier version of this chapter appeared as working paper at Korea Development Institute (2022), entitled “Marketization during Kim Jong-un’s Era.” B.-Y. Kim (B) Seoul National University, Seoul, South Korea e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 B.-Y. Kim (ed.), The North Korean Regime under Kim Jong-un, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-8525-8_3

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phenomena exhibited by the North Korean economy since the 1990s. Numerous works find that more than 70% of North Korean households participate in market activities. Indeed, some households hold multiple jobs in both the official and unofficial sectors while others work only in the latter (Kim and Song 2008; Haggard and Noland 2010; Kim and Yang 2012; Institute for Peace and Unification Studies 2015; Kim 2017a). The average share of income from such activities is known to be far higher than 70% of total household income. Such a reliance on markets in a socialist country is unprecedented. For comparison, Kim (2003) finds that Soviet households earned 16% of total income from the informal economy on average from 1969 to 1990. These phenomena demonstrate the sheer dominance of markets over official socialism, at least in North Korea’s household sector. The main reasons behind the strong market presence in North Korea are the collapse of the public distribution system (PDS) and the famine in the 1990s. Both were the outcome of a long-running decline in growth rates aggravated by the disintegration of the Soviet Union and natural disasters which resulted in over 500,000 deaths from starvation (Lee 2004; Park 2012). During this time, a growing number of households began trading in markets to obtain food despite the fact that it was illegal. This was the beginning of North Korea’s ‘marketization from below.’ Initially, the authorities appear to have turned a blind eye, as otherwise, the famine would have been much worse. The marketization phenomenon continued throughout the 2000s, although policies adopted by Kim Jong-il were inconsistent in dealing with markets. There are three main reasons as to why marketization attracted so much attention from policymakers and scholars alike. Firstly, there is an expectation that it would contribute to North Korea’s gradual shift from a socialist economy to a market economy. One can argue that a socialist economy disintegrates by the expansion of markets from below as it destroys central planning, demoralizes bureaucrats, and dilutes social ideologies. Given that there is still little indication that Kim Jong-un chose to transition to a market economy, it can be determined that this is the only path to North Korea’s long-term economic development. Indeed, contemporary literature finds that, in North Korea, central planning has been greatly damaged, bureaucrats have economically aligned with market

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participants, and social norms have changed. Specifically, working at the market has impelled North Koreans to support a market economy (Kim and Kim 2018), and has proven to improve human capital (Kim and Kim 2017a, b), increase social trust (Kim and Kim 2019), and reduce egalitarianism (Choi et al. 2020). Moreover, the incentives of bureaucrats as the main bribe-takers have aligned with those of market participants, creating a collusion between them to protect the markets (Kim 2017a). Secondly, there are questions on why the North Korean authorities have frequently changed policies on markets. In 2002, Kim Jong-il implemented “the July 1st Economic Management Improvement Measures” that partially liberalized the decision making of firms and accepted the market mechanism to some extent. However, he reversed the course of policies and began to repress market activities in 2015 (Kim and Yang 2012; Kim 2017a). Similarly, Kim Jong-un abruptly shifted his policies from utilizing markets to repressing them in 2019. In more detail, Kim Jong-un adopted policies to implicitly accept market activities and to utilize efficiencies and resources provided by markets during 2012–2018. As a result, the marketization process appears to have continued until the economic sanctions began to be implemented in 2016. However, two interrelated policies were carried out after 2019 to undermine such a process. The first policy was adopted as a measure of anti-Covid-19. The North Korean authorities had closed the border to prevent it from spreading into its territory in January 2020 and have maintained such a policy for more than three years. Given the fact that foreign trade increases both demand and supply at domestic markets, it is likely that market activities reduced due to the anti-Covid-19 measure. At the same time, movements of people and goods across and within regions have been restricted. The second policy, which was implemented from 2019 onwards, aimed to strengthen the role of the state in distribution and thus to weaken household market activities. In 2019, Kim Jong-un changed his policy on markets and announced that the state sector should have a dominance in the provision of food and consumer goods. This was implemented more forcefully from 2022 by restricting the sale of grain by individuals at markets. The above discussion indicates that both Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un held not only positive expectations on markets but also anxiety on them. It is possible that such anxiety is related with the effects of markets on various aspects of North Korean society as we discussed above.

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Thirdly, it has become increasingly important to understand the effects of economic sanctions on markets. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted five resolutions imposing economic sanctions against North Korea during 2016–2017 in reaction to a series of nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) tests. The sanctions were intended to pressurize the North Korean regime into giving up its nuclear development. Although the primary targets of the sanctions are foreign trade and hard currency earnings, they could also negatively affect market activities through supply and demand channels. Having said that, some argue that markets are able to boost the economy through import substitution, and thus, can mitigate such repercussions. In fact, the North Korean authorities claim that self-reliance will defeat these “barbaric sanctions.” Are markets bulletproof to sanctions? Or, are they North Korea’s Achilles’ heel as they amplify the shocks of the sanctions on the economy? This chapter sets out to examine the marketization process and policies on markets in Kim Jong-un’s era. First, it discusses North Korea’s policies on markets under Kim Jong-un during the pre-2019 period. Second, it presents the types of market activities and their changes over time. Moreover, it empirically evaluates to which extent the economic sanctions adopted during 2016–2017 affected household market activities. Third, it discusses the recent change in policies on markets from 2019 onwards, analyzes why such a change occurred, and whether it will be successful. This paper uses a dataset compiled by the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies (IPUS) at Seoul National University to understand the extent to which the economic sanctions affected North Korean market activities. The IPUS has conducted an annual survey of over a hundred North Korean defectors newly arriving in South Korea since 2011. A unique aspect of this dataset is that these defectors did not reside in a third country for any substantial period of time before arriving in South Korea. For instance, all of the defectors surveyed in 2019 escaped North Korea in either 2018 or 2019. This helps them recall their experiences and perceptions while they were in North Korea more accurately, and thus, mitigating any biases arising from retrospective memory and the process of adapting to life in South Korea. Given that it is impossible to survey North Koreans inside North Korea, this dataset provides an important opportunity to understand the evolution of household market activities in North Korea, and to compare the extent of these activities post-sanction vis-à-vis the pre-sanction period.

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Kim Jong-un’s Policies on Markets before 2019 Kim Jong-un’s policies on markets before 2019 stand in stark contrast to his father’s.1 Indeed, rather than enforcing market shutdowns, attempts have been made to formalize the markets. According to Hong et al. (2016) and Cha and Collins (2018),2 there are over 400 official markets, known as jonghapsijang (universal market),3 where traders are obliged to pay market fees to the authorities. It is estimated that the revenue from markets totals US$0.7 billion when the jangmadang (market) exchange rate is applied. As a result, the formal and informal markets have come to coexist under the new name, jangmadang . However, even the former has yet to be fully legalized as neither the constitution nor civil law have fundamentally changed to accommodate the role of marketization.4 These policies appear to be aimed at utilizing markets to increase production in the state sector, which includes collective farms and state-owned enterprises (SOEs), in the following ways. Firstly, market incentives are capitalized on. In agriculture, the household responsibility system (Pojeondamdangje) was introduced in 2012. Land is divided into small plots for which a few farming households hold collective responsibility. The land is cultivated and the produce is shared with the state at a predetermined ratio. The North Korean system differs from that of China as the latter allowed individual farming households to cultivate the designated land and to claim the residuals after meeting the planned output target which was set at the same level as before the agricultural reform. In other words, the Chinese system is based on de-collectivization while that of North Korea adheres to collectivism, albeit a significant decrease in the size of the production unit. In addition, the incentives are stronger for Chinese farmers because, unlike North Korean farmers, they are also the claimants of the residual. Nonetheless, the production incentives for households strengthened in both countries because they were able to sell their own products at the market. The North Korean authorities introduced a similarly spirited reform called the Responsibility System in Socialist Enterprise Management in the enterprise sector gradually starting from 2012. In this reform, a typical enterprise, which is required to operate on the basis of self-accounting and management autonomy, has two output targets: one is set by the state institution and the other by the enterprise itself. The former is a planned indicator while the latter is based on a demand contract with other firms and institutions. Such a contract allows market principles to

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operate in transactions, and thus, boosts the incentives for production. Like the aforementioned agricultural reform, markets, which were introduced as an incentive, began to operate as a coordination mechanism in addition to plans. Secondly, the public’s financial resources can be used for enterprises. For this purpose, the law on state enterprises, which was revised in 2014, specifies that “enterprises are allowed to receive loans from banks and to mobilize or use idle financial resources held by the public to supplement insufficient resources for management.” This indicates that individuals or a group can make a loan to SOEs, or invest in them in the form of a loan or lease of state assets. This law aims at improving the performance of enterprises by relaxing the financial constraints. The socialist system designates state banks to be responsible for lending to firms, but this role remains virtually unfulfilled in North Korea mainly because households are reluctant to make bank deposits, which has, in turn, left state banks lacking in financial resources.5 This revised law seems to have enabled enterprises to directly mobilize financial resources from the public without relying on the unworkable banking sector.6 The above reforms suggest that, with a view to increasing production and efficiency, Kim Jong-un intends to maintain socialist ownership while also allowing a certain degree of market coordination to play. They also indicate that markets may have expanded and households have become further dependent on market activities if all other conditions remain the same. However, economic sanctions are likely to alter such conditions in one way or another.

Data There were questions raised about the effects of the sanctions on the marketization process in North Korea. Have sanctions become a significant obstacle to the marketization of North Korea, or have markets become strong enough to overcome them, and have even been facilitated by them? The IPUS has conducted annual surveys of North Korean defectors settled in South Korea since 2008. The objective of the surveys changed in 2011 from recruiting a sample from all defectors living in South Korea to targeting those that escaped from North Korea in the preceding year or the same year as the survey.7 This modification reflects the need to consistently understand the changes in the experiences and perceptions

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of defectors while they were in North Korea. Moreover, it contributes to minimizing the biases in retrospective memory when one recalls events or experiences that took place a long time ago. The survey includes a broad range of questions on the participants’ perceptions of South Korea, unification, and the main countries influencing the Korean peninsula as well as on their experiences in the North and South including those from an economic perspective. The questions on economic experiences in North Korea include those on main jobs, market activities, and consumption including food. From 2011, the surveys began using the snowballing sampling method. The initial sample was collected by interviewing some of the defectors at the re-education facility, Hanawon, via contact with associations for North Korean defectors, and by using personal connections. The initial sample was subsequently used as the basis for further recruitment. The surveys were conducted face-to-face at the IPUS or at facilities near the residence of the sample defectors. Although this method may be the only feasible way to recruit the sample in a given year, we are aware of two sources of selection bias: one caused by the decision of the defectors to escape from North Korea; the other one due to the non-random selection of the sample from total defectors arrived in South Korea in a given year. We will attempt to deal with the sample selection issue at the second stage. Table 3.1 shows the total number of North Korean defectors who came to South Korea and the number of respondents of the IPUS surveys as well as the gender composition of the two groups. The total number of defectors ranges from nearly 3000 in 2011 to less than 1000 in 2017– 2019. Such a decline can be partially explained by the fact that the North Korean authorities implemented tougher policies on defections. More than 70% of the defectors are women, and 8% of the total number of defectors who entered South Korea during the same year, on average, participated in the surveys.8 Table 3.2 shows the descriptive statistics of the main economic variables. In regard to the monthly nominal income, the mean ranges from ₩220 thousand in 2011 to ₩1.05 million in 2014. Interestingly, informal income accounts for the lion’s share of total income, posting almost 100% in 2014 and 96% in 2019. In order to make yearly comparisons easier, we converted the nominal incomes in the North Korean won to US dollar using the jangmadang exchange rate.9 The mean of total monthly income ranged from US$49 in 2013 to US$129 in 2014, which

591 1811 2402 75 36 69 105 66 4.4

Total number of defectors arriving in South Korea

795 1911 2706 71 56 71 127 56 4.7

2011 404 1098 1502 73 58 74 132 56 8.8

2012 369 1145 1514 76 50 99 149 66 9.8

2013 305 1092 1397 78 57 89 146 61 10.5

2014 251 1024 1275 80 53 85 138 62 10.8

2015

302 1116 1418 79 70 62 132 47 9.3

2016

188 939 1127 83 38 49 87 56 7.7

2017

168 969 1137 85 41 75 116 65 10.2

2018

202 845 1047 81 37 72 109 66 10.4

2019

Source IPUS surveys of North Korean defectors (2011–2020); Ministry of Unification (https://www.unikorea.go.kr/unikorea/business/NKDefectorsP olicy/status/lately/)

Male Female Total Share of female (%) Number of respondents of Male the IPUS surveys Female Total Share of female (%) Share of the number of sample in total defectors (%)

2010

North Korean defectors in South Korea: total number and number of samples

Year of Arrival in South Korea

Table 3.1

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may reflect a large selection bias. The median total monthly income is much lower at less than 50% of the mean for most years except 2018, indicating a large income inequality driven by the differences in informal income. The average monthly income that can satisfy respondents’ households also fluctuates across the years although it is more stable from 2013 to 2019 than the period before 2013. The first reason for this is inflation. Although there is no official publication of the consumer price index for North Korea, there is some consensus that the inflation rate was high until 2012 but substantially declined thereafter, which is reflected by the fairly stable exchange rates at informal markets from 2013 to 2019. According to Kim (2017a), it is estimated that prices increased by 36 folds in 1996– 2009. The exchange rate in the informal market was roughly ₩1500 to the dollar in the last quarter of 2010 but sharply increased to ₩7285 in the last quarter of 2012. After exceeding ₩8000 in 2013, the rate regained some stability until the late 2020 when the North Korean won abruptly appreciated against the US dollars and the Chinese yuan. The second reason could be found in the changes in the annual sample. High variations in the proportion of average income in the satisfied average income, which ranges from 26% to 96%, also indicate a selection bias, caused especially by outliers.10 Hence, one should be cautious when interpreting trends from these statistics because they are affected by the sample selection problems varying across years. The third reason is the genuine changes in income and living standards which should serve as the basis for further analysis. A possible sample selection is more clearly reflected in the responses on ‘perceived economic class’ while the respondents resided in North Korea. The perceived economic class was high in the samples surveyed in 2014, 2015, and 2018 but the lowest in 2011 and 2013. Presumably, the lower monthly income (in dollars) in 2013 compared to 2012 was affected by such a selection of the sample. Also a sharp increase in total monthly income in 2018 compared to 2017 may be caused by the selection of more affluent households during the year either in the form of all defectors settled in South Korea in 2018 or the selection of the sample from the defector population for that year. Hence, we need to control the bias effect arising from the selection of the sample from the defector population for more accurate analysis.

Informal nominal income 78 100

104 75

0 0

0 0 313

2

2

214

10

101 25

80 39 5

80

107

Official nominal income

323

220

Mean (thousand won) Mean (US dollars) Median (thousand won) Median (US dollars) Mean (thousand won) Mean (US dollars) Median (thousand won) Median (US dollars) Mean (thousand won) Mean (US dollars) Median (thousand won)

Total monthly nominal income

2012

2011

Main economic variables

Year of Departure from North Korea

Table 3.2

100

49

329

0 0

0

1

100 15

49

329

2013

500

129

1055

0 0

0

2

500 61

129

1055

2014

300

75

611

0 0

0

4

300 37

75

615

2015

340

104

858

0 0

1

11

342 41

106

870

2016

200

60

490

0 0

2

16

250 31

62

506

2017

300

85

690

0 0

1

12

400 49

87

703

2018

100

69

563

0 0

2

18

200 25

72

581

2019

68 B.-Y. KIM

Total income/satisfied income

Satisfied monthly income

Median (US dollars) Mean (thousand won) Mean (US dollars) Median (thousand won) Median (US dollars) Mean (%) Median (%)

Year of Departure from North Korea

500 124

200 97 43 20

187

217

49 40

753

25

2012

447

36

2011

26 20

500 75

186

1244

15

2013

96 67

750 92

135

1104

61

2014

41 43

700 86

182

1484

37

2015

86 42

815 99

122

1010

41

2016

38 31

800 98

164

1330

25

2017

39 20

1000 123

186

1508

12

2019

(continued)

50 44

900 111

173

1398

37

2018

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2.23 1.26 2.24 – 131

2012 2.31 1.40 2.31 – 146

2013 2.15 1.18 1.78 1.81 134

2014 2.13 1.13 2.00 1.87 132

2015 2.20 1.17 2.02 1.93 129

2016 2.20 1.14 2.31 2.09 87

2017 2.13 1.13 1.68 1.77 112

2018

2.18 1.21 1.51 1.83 107

2019

Source IPUS surveys of North Korean defectors (2011–2020) 1. Questions on income were not included in the 2011 survey (most respondents departed from North Korea in 2010). Hence, incomes are reported from surveys conducted in 2012 and onwards 2. We cleaned the sample by deleting income-related variables if the responses were inconsistent. Hence, the total number of the sample fell from 1140 to 1105 3. The responses for satisfied monthly income are based on the following question: “What amount of monthly income do you think would be sufficient for a satisfactory life?” 4. For the question “What was your standard of living during the previous year of your departure from North Korea,” the respondents were asked to choose from one of the following: 1. High; 2. Middle; 3. Low. The figures represent the average of these choices. Hence, the lower the average, the more respondents perceived that they belonged to a higher economic class 5. Respondents were asked to choose one of the following to the question on the number of meals per day prior to leaving North Korea: 1. At least three meals; 2. Two meals; 3. One meal; 4. Less than one meal. In regard to the ratio of rice and corn, the respondents had to choose from: 1. Almost all rice; 2. Half and half; 3. 30% rice 70% corn; 4. Almost all corn. For the question on the quality of meals, there was a choice from: 1. All family members were able to sufficiently eat a variety of food; 2. All family members were able to sufficiently eat but the variety was limited; 3. Food was sometimes insufficient for our family; 4. Food was often insufficient for our family. The figures represent the average of these answers. Hence, the lower the average, the better meals the average respondent had in North Korea 6. The conversion of the won to the dollar was based on the market exchange rate compiled by Daily NK. We computed the annual average using data provided by Daily NK and applied the average exchange rate for the previous two years and that for the previous year before the respondents’ departure. For example, most of the defectors surveyed in 2012 are those who escaped in 2011. Hence, their reported income could have been based on that in 2010 and 2011. Accordingly, we used the average exchange rate for 2010–2011 to convert the reported income

No. of samples

2.31 1.36 2.30 – 127

Economic class Meals No Ratio Quality

2011

(continued)

Year of Departure from North Korea

Table 3.2

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Types of Market Activities The questionnaire includes questions on the main source of income, most of which is related to market activities. Specifically, it asks “What job provided you with the largest source of income in North Korea?” The respondents were able to choose from nine examples or write down his/ her job. We further classified nine other jobs from the list of jobs they filled in. Hence, 18 market-related jobs together with official jobs from this question were identified. Table 3.3 shows the types of jobs through which respondents earned the most income in North Korea, and the total share of participants in the respective jobs. The first column shows that 44% of respondents earned most of their income through trade. The second popular job (as a major income source) is activities related to the external economy in which 27% were involved. Subsequently, private employees and services were also popular at 8% and 7%. The second column shows more detailed categories of jobs. Jobs related to retail trade had the biggest share of respondents in terms of the most income followed by arbitraging trade, at 28% and 15%, respectively. Subsequently, 12% of respondents replied that they had jobs earning foreign currencies (Oihwabeoligun). Meanwhile, 8% replied that they were smugglers (milsoo), and another 8% reported that they were private employees (Sakbeoligun) which includes fishermen, farmers, and trestlemen. Foreign currency exchange and services such as hairdressing and repair took a 5% and 4% share, respectively. Less than 3% of respondents chose other jobs including agricultural worker, cattle feeder, restaurant/shop manager, household product manufacturer, broker, and dispatched worker. It is interesting that most of the jobs bringing in high income in North Korea are related to market activities. In fact, only 2% of respondents replied that they made the most money from official jobs. If agricultural activities and cattle feeding are regarded as official jobs, 5% of respondents worked in non-market activities from which the largest income derived. In contrast, 95% of respondents chose market activities as their main source of income. This corroborates the findings in current literature on North Korea’s marketization (Kim and Song 2008; Haggard and Noland 2010; Kim 2017a).11

39 11 1 51 2 2 0 4 5 2 0 1 8 3 2 8 7 11 4 1

28 15 1 44 3 1 1 5 4 1 1 1 7 3 2 8 5 12 8 2

Retail trade Arbitration trade Other trade Sum Agricultural and Agriculture/cattle feeding extractive activities Collecting herb, honey, etc. Gold mining Sum Services Individual services Transportation Private teaching Brokerage (money transfer, mobile phones) Sum Household product manufacturing Management of restaurants, shops, etc. Private employees Activities related to the Exchanging foreign external economy currencies Earners of foreign currencies Smuggling Dispatched workers in foreign countries

Trade

2011

Total

Jobs that were the largest source of income

Type of job/year of Departure from North Korea

Table 3.3

3 2

13

6 2 3 4 6

44 7 0 51 2 0 0 2 6 0 0 0

2012

3 2

8

7 5 0 11 3

33 17 1 51 6 0 0 6 6 1 0 0

2013

9 0

16

7 3 3 8 8

28 14 2 44 2 2 1 5 2 1 2 2

2014

13 1

9

5 2 5 2 3

23 23 2 48 5 0 1 6 3 0 0 2

2015

18 4

12

11 0 3 7 6

15 12 0 27 4 2 3 9 6 2 1 2

2016

10 4

10

10 3 0 8 4

12 8 0 20 4 1 1 6 7 0 3 0

2017

1 1

15

10 7 3 21 6

26 24 2 52 2 0 0 2 4 4 0 2

2018

11 0

13

7 1 2 6 4

25 13 0 38 5 0 0 5 6 1 0 0

2019

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Sum

27 1 2 100 916

Total 23 2 2 100 100

2011 24 2 3 100 103

2012 16 0 1 100 120

2013 33 2 4 100 126

2014 26 2 0 100 115

2015

Source: IPUS surveys of North Korean defectors (2015–2020) 1. The most popular individual services job includes repairer (electronics, automobiles, houses, etc.) and hairdresser 2. Private employees include trestlemen and temporary employees at farms, fishing boats, etc. 3. Other jobs include services in health care, the self-employed, fishing, private loan service, etc.

Other jobs Official jobs Total (%) No of sample (persons)

Type of job/year of Departure from North Korea 40 2 3 100 112

2016 28 2 0 100 71

2017 23 1 4 100 86

2018 28 1 3 100 83

2019

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It appears that jobs related to working in foreign countries increased over time. The share of earners of foreign currencies increased from 8– 13% in 2011–2013 to 9–16% in 2014–2019. Smuggling also seems to have become more popular over time although it dropped to 1% in 2018. The share of dispatched workers in foreign countries increased from 0–2% in 2011–2015 and to 4% in 2016–2017 before declining to 0–1% in 2018–2019. As for trade in markets, there was a downturn until 2018. Indeed, the average share of related jobs posted 49% in 2011–2015 before plunging to 34% in 2016–2019, on average, despite a sharp increase to 52% in 2018. In other words, trends show an increase in jobs that earn foreign currency but a decrease in those related to trade in domestic markets until 2016–2017. This phenomenon could be affected by the deepening economic relations between North Korea and foreign countries including China. At the same time, Kim Jong-un’s policies to formalize informal trade through the expansion of jonghapsijang where traders have to pay market fees may have crowded out households’ informal trade at jangmadang . An alternative interpretation is that economic sanctions specifically targeting activities that earn foreign currencies, including foreign trade, smuggling, and working in foreign countries, contributed to reducing the number of those involved in such activities and to their decision to escape North Korea to settle in the South. In other words, they decided to leave North Korea due to the combined effects of diminishing income and the pressure from the authorities to pay the ‘loyalty fund’ in spite of their economic difficulties. Yet, we cannot rule out the possibility that the sample selection of North Korean defectors could vary from one year to another.

Impact of Sanctions on Market Activities Economic sanctions were imposed by the UNSC to counter North Korea’s testing of nuclear weapons and ICBMs in 2016–2017. In total, five resolutions were adopted during the period, and their strength and coverage have been gradually reinforced. The main purpose of the sanctions is to pressurize Kim Jong-un into denuclearization by increasing the economic cost of developing and holding weapons of mass destruction. In regard to economic instruments, the sanctions are aimed at foreign trade and activities related to hard currency earnings. When fully enforced, it is expected that North Korea’s export and import will contract by a staggering 90% and 30%, respectively, compared to 2015. Dispatched workers

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in foreign countries who are one of the main sources of hard currency earnings, especially in Russia and China, had to return by the end of 2019, and ceilings on the export of crude oil and refined petroleum by foreign countries to North Korea were introduced to reduce industrial production. Although it has become clearer that sanctions have had a significant effect on the North Korean economy, particularly through North Korea’s acknowledgment at the Hanoi Summit in February 2019, there were initially two views. The first view was that the sanctions will substantially reduce GDP (Kim 2017b, 2018; Korea Institute for International Economic Policy 2017) as they deliver hard direct and indirect blows to foreign trade and market activities, the two pillars of economy. Foreign trade and foreign currency earnings will be negatively affected, which will, in turn, diminish market supply and demand. That is, purchasing power in the markets will recede as revenue from foreign trade and hard currency earnings decline. At the same time, supply will fall because the import of market-bound consumer goods will decrease as hard currency earnings to import such goods dwindle. By contrast, the second view argued that domestic demand will shift from imported goods to local products, and thus, boost domestic production (Lee 2017, 2018). Hence, the negative impact of sanctions on the economy through foreign trade will be mitigated, or even neutralized by the positive effects on domestic production. In particular, it was expected that domestic markets, which are not directly affected by sanctions, would contribute to the economy via efficient resource allocation. North Korea’s foreign trade, excluding inter-Korean trade, decreased by 15% from 2016 to 2017, and by 50% from 2017 to 2018. The fall in exports was particularly large, receding by a stunning 91% in 2015– 2018. Indeed, although there was a slight increase in 2019, the amount of exports was even smaller than that during the Arduous March in the midto late 1990s. South Korea’s central bank, the Bank of Korea (BOK), estimated the growth rates in 2017, 2018, and 2019 to be −3.5%, −4.1%, and 0.4%, respectively. Hence, one can claim that the BOK’s estimates corroborate the first view rather than the second. However, the question still remains over whether market activities are negatively affected by sanctions or whether they are immune. In fact, the BOK’s estimates fail to directly take North Korea’s marketization into consideration because of the lack of data. Thus, they could have under- or over-estimated North Korea’s growth rates depending on whether market activities increased or

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decreased even though they are assumed to be more or less accurate in measuring production in the official sector.12 We use the IPUS data to look at whether market activities decreased or increased post-sanction compared to the pre-sanction period. The data are unique in that it allows us to exploit the time dimension of the surveys. As we discussed, however, the selection of the sample is likely to bias the results which prevents us from obtaining reliable findings. We aim to overcome this problem in the following ways. First, we divide the sample into two periods in terms of the year of departure from North Korea, 2014–2016 and 2017–2019, to investigate the effects of sanctions on market activities during the latter period. Given the lack of reliable data on inflation, the estimates will be biased if we use a period with high inflation, i.e. until 2013. By contrast, it is relatively safe to use the sample from 2014 to 2019 since inflation during this period is believed to have been low.13 Second, in order to mitigate the selection bias of the sample across years, we make the sample comparable between the two periods using the resampling technique. The indicators of market activities include the participation rate in market activities and the income from them. Yet, these variables may be affected by economic class, working status (working vs. non-working), region of residence, and education level, which vary across years. Hence, we use the resampling technique to make such characteristics of the sample equal in terms of these four variables between the two periods. In other words, we aim to reduce the bias arising from the fact that defectors arriving in a certain year could be richer, working, more educated, and residents in Pyongyang (or vice versa) than other years. We randomly resampled the data from 2014 to 2016 to make the characteristics of the above four variables equivalent to those of the data from 2017 to 2019. As a result, the number of samples in 2014–2016 dropped from 395 to 300. We compared the summary statistics of the four variables between the two samples and confirmed they are fairly equivalent.14 Table 3.4 shows the income from both the official and market sectors as well as the participation rates. The participation rate declined by 5.8 percentage points in the official sector between the two periods. Most of the official jobs are in state institutions and SOEs. It is understandable that some SOE jobs may have been lost, especially in sectors hit by sanctions; miners are one example. Yet, it is unlikely that the majority of jobs in such institutions and enterprises disappeared. By contrast, the decline

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in the market sector is more pronounced, tumbling from 83% in 2014– 2016 to 73–76% in 2017–2018. In other words, the participation rate in market activities shrank by 7.3–10.5 percentage points during the sanction period depending on which measure is used. Although one cannot identify what factors contribute to such a decrease, it is difficult to rule out the effect of the sanctions as the most likely cause. Similarly, there was a significant contraction in the monthly income from market activities during the post-sanction period. The average and median monthly income decreased by 28.3% and 25.0% in 2014–2016 and 2017–2019, respectively. Given that income from market activities occupies a dominant share in total income, the respective fall in the average and median total income between the two periods was 27.2% and 25.2%. Yet, this comparison may not be valid if the changes in consumer prices are substantial. In order to take inflation into account to some extent, we converted figures in the won into dollars.15 We found that there is only a small difference between the percentage changes in the won and dollar since the jangmadang exchange rate was quite stable during the period. The average and median income from market activities in US dollars decreased by 27.0% and 24.5%, respectively.16 Our findings suggest that the effects of sanctions, identified as the income gap between the two periods, were substantial. Indeed, both the participation rate in market activities and ensuing income declined to a large extent. Kim (2019) finds that the participation rate during 2012– 2015 increased by 10 percentage points in Kim Jong-un’s era compared to the 2007–2011 period. The sanctions appear to have reversed the participation rate back to what it was during Kim Jong-il’s rule. At the same time, a fourth of the income from market activities has decreased since sanctions were enforced, suggesting that trade and markets have a complimentary relationship rather than one that is substitutive. A closer examination was conducted to identify classes that were most affected by sanctions. Accordingly, Table 3.5 suggests that the distribution of the impact on household income was uneven with households in the bottom 20% and top 20% hit hardest between the pre-sanction and post-sanction periods.17 Specifically, the income of the bottom 20% and top 20% declined by 27% and 24.5% while that of other income groups decreased by 7–11%. Amid an economic crisis, it is unusual that the fall in income is more substantial for the top income quintile than the lower income groups, except the bottom 20%. However, this can be explained by the fact that a significant portion of households belonging

33.3 83.0 83.0 7 0 916 400 923 401 1 0 111 49 113 49 300

27.5 72.5 75.7 15 0 657 300 672 300 2 0 81 37 83 37 306

2017–2019

−5.8%p −10.5%p −7.3%p 114% 0% −28.3% −25.0% −27.2% −25.2% 100% 0% −27.0% −24.5% −26.5% −24.5%

Changes

Source: IPUS surveys of North Korean defectors (2015–2020), Daily NK for exchange rates 1. The participation rates of Market 1 and Market 2 are based on the share of respondents who replied that they had positive income from their secondary jobs, and the share of respondents who replied that they had a job that was listed in the question as explained in Table 3.3 2. The conversion of income from the North Korean won to US dollar was done using the jangmadang exchange rate as reported by Daily NK (https://www.dailynk.com/). Refer to Note 6 under Table 3.2 for more details

Official (%) Market 1 (%) Market 2 (%) Nominal monthly income (current, North Official (average, thousand won) Korean won) Official (median, thousand won) Market (average thousand won) Market (median, thousand won) Total (average, thousand won) Total (median, thousand won) Nominal monthly income (current, US dollar) Official (average, US dollars) Official (median, US dollars) Market (average, US dollars) Market (median, US dollars) Total (average, US dollars) Total (median, US dollars) Number of samples

2014–2016

Participation Rate and Income: Comparison between the Official and Market Sectors using Resampled Data

Participation rate

Table 3.4

78 B.-Y. KIM

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to this group worked in sectors that are vulnerable to external shocks. In other words, they were usually involved in foreign trade, smuggling, and earning foreign currencies abroad, which are all targets of the economic sanctions as aforementioned. The bottom 20% of households were also hit hard perhaps because, given their constraints in resources, they were not able to adapt their work to different market conditions resulting from the sanctions. The finding that the lowest income groups suffer more from negative economic shocks is in line with the pattern observed during most economic crises. We use the job categories in Table 3.3 to investigate whether income shocks are heterogeneous across different categories. The economic sanctions are aimed at the external sector, which suggests a more severe income loss for jobs related to these sectors compared to other jobs. A substantial income shock is also expected to be delivered to market because of the decline in both demand (lower purchasing power) and supply (decrease in imported food and consumer goods). By contrast, jobs including those in agricultural and extractive activities, household product manufacturing, services, and private employment may be less vulnerable to sanctions. We classify the jobs in Table 3.3 into three categories, (related to the external economy, trade, and others), and look Table 3.5 Changes in total income between the pre-sanction period and postsanction period according to income quintile Income category

Pre-sanction (average)

Post-sanction (average)

Changes (%)

0–20% 20–40% 40–60% 60–80% 80–100%

44,699 239,097 497,207 900,694 3,593,986

32,645 220,969 445,206 829,619 2,711,758

−27.0 −7.6 −10.5 −7.9 −24.5

Source: IPUS surveys of North Korean defectors (2015–2020) Note Unlike the sample we used for Table 3.4, the sample whose income is zero is excluded in this table. The reason is that income belonging to bottom 20% of income category is affected much more than those belonging to other income categories. The number of the sample whose income is zero increased from 34 in the pre-sanction period to 59 in the post-sanction period. This may be caused either by worsening economic conditions faced particularly by low income group households or by the sample selection bias. The exclusion of the sample whose income is zero is to eliminate the effect of the latter on income change in bottom 20% of income category

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at whether there are differences in income shocks across these job categories during the post-sanction period.18 Figure 3.1 and Fig. 3.2 show the results.

(a) Income shocks to jobs in the external economy

(b) Income shocks to market trade jobs

Fig. 3.1 Income Shock to Jobs related to the External Economy and Trade. (a) Income shocks to jobs in the external economy (b) Income shocks to market trade jobs

Fig. 3.2 Income Shock to Jobs unrelated to the External Economy and Trade

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According to Fig. 3.1 (a), the average and median income of those with jobs related to the external economy substantially decreased. In fact, the former dropped by 35% and the latter by 21%, suggesting that those who used to earn a larger income than others during the pre-sanction period suffered more from sanctions than those who earned a smaller income. This may be caused by the fact that the UNSC sanctions are intended to directly restrict foreign trade and activities related to foreign currency earnings which are important sources to high-income earners in North Korea. Figure 3.1 (b) also shows severe income shocks experienced by traders at domestic markets. Their average and median income decreased by 17% and 20%, respectively. One reason why the average income of traders declined less than that of those who participated in external economic activities may be because market trade has not been directly affected by sanctions and thus, traders have been able to adjust to some extent. Figure 3.2 presents the magnitude of the income shock to holders of jobs related to neither the external economy nor domestic trade. It is relatively smaller than those related to both sectors in terms of the average of income as it nearly unchanged. Overall, our findings indicate that income shocks measured by the average monthly income are the largest among those with jobs in the external sector followed by domestic traders. In terms of median income, the incomes of both domestic traders and external-sector job holders were hit hard while those of other jobs little changed between the two periods. These results are consistent with our expectations.19

The Recent Change in Kim Jong-un’s Policies on Markets In 2019, Kim Jong-un abruptly switched his policy from utilization of markets to its repression. He emphasized in his State of the Union Address in April 2019 that the hot wind of self-reliance and self-help should dispel the gust of the sanctions. At the Plenary Session of Workers’ Party Central Committee in December 2019, this stance was further clarified by highlighting the necessity of restoring the socialist commercial system. At the Party Congress in January 2021, he provided more details on the socialist commercial system by arguing that the state should have a dominant role in controlling the economy and in the entire commercial service because a development of the socialist commerce was such an urgent issue.

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It appeared that such speeches resulted in the installation of state-run grain shops in 2019.20 The shops aimed to purchase grains directly from collective farms and to sell them at lower prices at markets. However, they lacked money to pay for grains and thus were not active until 2021. The North Korean authorities implemented this new policy more forcefully from 2022 by forcing collective farms to sell grains only to the state which subsequently sold them to households through the state-run shops. At the same time, the authorities attempted to prevent private individuals from selling grains at markets. This policy seemed to cause severe shortages of food in some areas where the supply by the state-run grain shops was not able to meet demand to a large extent. There were some reports on the death of people due to starvation in early 2023.21 Due to the closure of the North Korean border, the number of defectors drastically decreased from 1047 in 2019 to 229 in 2020, and further to 63 in 2021. Hence, the IPUS was not able to conduct the surveys of the North Korean defectors as we did for the period until 2019. This means that the shocks of Covid-19 and the policy of restricting market activities cannot be analyzed using such data. Nevertheless, one can argue that the economy has been further damaged by both Covid-19 and restricting market activities. Closure of the border resulted in a sharp decline in foreign trade. North Korea’s foreign trade decreased from 3.2 billion US dollars in 2019 to 0.9 billion US dollars in 2020, leading to decreases in supply of food and consumer goods for markets. At the same time, household purchasing power might have been reduced because they were not able to earn money through smuggling and dispatched works abroad. Reductions in both supply and demand undermined market activities, which shrank household income further. This conjecture is in line with Kim et al. (2023). Nighttime lights data found that North Korean regions of market activities had been more prevalent hit harder than other regions during the period of economic sanctions and Covid-19. Change in policy on markets is abrupt given Kim Jong-un’s earlier reform policies as outlined above. This was also in contrast to the contents of his speech on facilitating foreign economic relations outlined at the address at the Party Congress in 2016. He maintained that North Korea should provide favorable environments and conditions for investment in economic development zones and keep credit, and thus expand and develop foreign economic relations. Why did such a sudden change take place? What was in his mind when he pushed for these new policies?

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The fact that such policies were first announced in April 2019 indicates that a failure at the Summit between Donald Trump and Kim Jongun, at Hanoi, Vietnam, was behind the decision. Kim Jong-un may have thought that it would be important for the state to control the economy given little hope of the relief of the sanctions given that, without lifting the sanctions, economic recovery would be a remote possibility. The dominance of market activities in such circumstances would be perceived as more dangerous for the regime because the state is not able to control the economy in deep troubles. A chaotic feature of markets would also amplify shocks on the economy, causing dissatisfaction of the public with the regime. Furthermore, weakening discipline caused by market activities would endanger the stability of the regime. This explanation is in line with the recent introduction of other laws banning the use of South Korean style of speaking or writing. All of these policies intend to strengthen the power of the state in controlling the economy and the society. However, there could be strong resistance of the public against the monopoly of the state in distribution of food and consumer goods. This can explain why restoring the socialist commercial system had not been actively pursued for a while. Covid-19 turned out to provide an ideal situation in which state-led commerce was introduced although the pandemic itself was a large shock to the economy. In January 2020, the North Korean authorities closed its borders to prevent Covid-19 from spreading into its territory, and thus stopped all foreign trade including smuggling. In addition, they implemented strict restrictions on movements of people and goods across and within regions. These circumstances might have been viewed as good opportunities for promoting the role of the state in providing food for households, which had been largely occupied by private entities. The pursuit of state monopoly in the distribution of foods and consumer goods implies Kim Jong-un’s anxiety and concern over marketization of the North Korean economy. He aimed to weaken and eliminate private market activities, if possible, and to exploit conditions that became available because of Covid-19. However, it is uncertain whether these new policies will be successful. A report on the local famine indicates such policies are not successful.22 The authorities will face a more serious challenge when foreign trade resumes and thus markets begin to vigorously operate. When the pandemic disappears and people participate in market activities more actively, these policies may face strong resistance from the public who rely on markets for survival and prosperity.

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Conclusion The current North Korean economy is an unusual blend of socialism and markets. Markets spontaneously grew as a result of the great famine in the mid- to late 1990 and now has a dominant role in household economic activities. Kim Jong-il tried to repress market activities from 2005 to 2009 but to no avail. Although North Korea continues to adhere to socialist economic principles during Kim Jong-un’s era, he has accepted market forces and attempted to utilize them for an economic recovery until 2019. However, he abruptly shifted this policy from 2019 onwards and began to promote the role of the state vis-à-vis the private in the distribution of foods and consumer goods. North Korea’s marketization is unprecedented in the economic history of socialism. Using data from the surveys of North Korean defectors conducted by the IPUS since 2011, we found that the participation rate in the official economy was about 30% while that in market activities was over 70%. The share of market income in total household income, defined as the sum of official income and income from market activities, exceeds 90% in 2012–2019. North Korean households are involved in various market activities such as trade, smuggling, working abroad, managing shops and restaurants, repair, private employment, etc. This indicates how prevalent marketization currently is in North Korea. In this regard, one can argue that North Korea is a ‘nation of shopkeepers’ and profoundly deviates from socialist economic principles. The future of the North Korean economy, or even North Korea itself, may depend on whether this fragile coexistence of markets and the official economy is sustainable or whether the balance skews toward one of the two. We found that the economic sanctions implemented in 2017–2019 significantly reduced household income from market activities. The extent of the decline in household income from such activities ranged from 7% to 27% depending on which income category the households belonged to. In particular, households belonging to the top 20% and bottom 20% suffered the largest income loss while that of households in other income groups was less than 11%. In addition, the income shocks were heterogeneous across different quintiles. In all, job holders in the external sector experienced the biggest loss followed by traders at domestic markets. By contrast, participants in agricultural and extractive activities, household product manufacturing, services, and private employment suffered less.

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These findings have the following implications for the future development of the North Korean economy. First, sanctions have put significant pressure on Kim Jong-un. Although it is not certain that they will lead to denuclearization, one can claim that they have contributed to the initiation of negotiations on denuclearization and halting further tests of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, by generating a trade-off between nuclear weapons and the economy, they opened up the possibility for denuclearization. If complete denuclearization can be achieved, and the North Korean economy is integrated with other economies without restrictions, this will present the opportunity for rapid growth. Secondly, sanctions hinder marketization, which is beneficial to not only public welfare but also the future of North Korea. Existing works find that marketization improves human capital (Kim and Kim 2016), increases a sense of private ownership (Choi et al. 2020), shifts public support from socialism to capitalism (Kim and Kim, 2018), increases social trust (Kim and Kim 2019), and disintegrates the official socialist economy (Kim and Koh 2011; Kim and Shida 2017; Kim 2017a). Better human capital, together with social norms aligned with a market economy are expected to contribute to economic growth and transition to a market economy. Hence, it is a loss that sanctions have prevented further marketization. An important question is whether the current anti-market policy will be permanent or transitory. One can argue that Kim Jong-un’s anxiety on the effects of markets on his control on society is behind such policy and thus it will be carried out continuously even when foreign trade resumes. By contrast, one can maintain that such a policy has been implemented only for the period when foreign trade is halted and when market transactions are less active because of the measures against Covid-19. Moreover, the trend of marketization is already too strong for the state to reverse it. Perhaps the policy emphasizing state dominance in the distribution of foods and consumer goods indicates the ongoing battle between the state and markets or between Kim Jong-un and the public on markets. Kim Jong-un’s summit with Russian President, Vladimir Putin, in September 2023, may be viewed as an attempt to obtain economic resources such as energy and food from Russia with further repressing markets.

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Notes 1. For more detailed discussion on North Korea’s economic policies from 2012 to 2018 refer to Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade (2018). However, there have been indications that North Korea’s policies have become less favorable to markets especially since the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic. For example, the international border has been shut down from January 2020, smugglers are permitted to be shot, and movement of people and commodities across regions in North Korea has been repressed. It is not yet clear that these changes are temporary measures to protect people from the infectious disease but will to return to the previous policies regarding markets upon the end of the pandemic. Given that our dataset is available until the 2020 survey that includes the defectors escaped from North Korea mostly in 2019, this recent change in policies is not discussed in this paper. 2. Hong et al. (2016) estimates that the number of universal markets in 2016 was 404, while Cha and Collins (2018) shows it was 436 in 2017–2018 (https://beyondparallel.csis.org/markets-private-eco nomy-capitalism-north-korea/). This difference could be caused by the fact that new universal markets had been established between the two periods. There are also claims that the number of universal markets increased to 480 in 2018 (Curtis 2018, http://www.nke conwatch.com/2018/02/05/north-korean-market-update/). 3. In 2003, the North Korean authorities allowed the establishment of universal markets which had to be located inside a building and equipped with necessary facilities. Following this measure, traditional farmers’ markets changed to universal markets where not only food but also consumer goods were allowed to be traded. However, Kim Jong-il began to repress these markets as well as the informal ones from 2005 via restrictive measures such as shortening business hours and banning traders who belonged to a certain age group. For a more detailed discussion on North Korea’s marketization, refer to Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade (2014), Kim and Yang (2012), and Yang (2010). 4. Specifically, the constitution and civil law, which are still based on socialist ownership, restricts individual ownership to individual consumption, and lists consumer and cultural goods, products

3

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6.

7.

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from private plots, automobiles, and income from other legal economic activities as objects of individual ownership. Among these, the latter three were included during the numerous revisions to the constitution and civil law. However, traders are recognized as individual sellers who trade in consumer goods, not a corporation, and thus, they are not allowed to be corporatized and to individually own a trading company. By contrast, China amended the constitution in 1982 to recognize the private economy as a complement to the socialist economy, and further revised it in 1992 to label the Chinese economy as a socialist market economy. A survey of North Korean defectors suggests that the bank savings of North Korean households amounted to only US$1 per household. By contrast, the stock of cash holdings from 2012 to 2018 was US$1310 on average (Lee and Mun 2020). The North Korean authorities attempted to revitalize banks by introducing a two-tier banking system instead of the socialist mono-bank system where the central bank also takes deposits from firms and households and lends to firms. They revised the law on central banks in 2002 and adopted a new law on commercial banks in 2004. Recently, there have been reports that regional banks were established with the purpose of lending to firms. However, the details on whether they are active are still unknown. In addition, Kim Jong-un mentioned the national commerce system in 2019 but without much detail. This can be understood to be an attempt to formalize markets, and thus, have state shops instead of individual sellers distribute goods and services. This is similar to the Soviet commercial system wherein consumer goods and services were distributed not through rationing but through state shops. The success of this attempt is expected to contribute to the normalization of the banking sector because financial resources from state shops can be used as loans through state banks. Most of the defectors surveyed in a given year are those who escaped from North Korea in the preceding year. For instance, of the 2019 survey participants, 114 left in 2018 and two left in 2019. North Korean defectors arriving in South Korea as a population in a given year is not directly comparable with the defector sample in our dataset for the same year. The former is based on the number of defectors in terms of year of arrival in South Korea while the latter measures the number of defectors both in terms of year of

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9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

departure and that of arrival. In other words, the IPUS sample of defectors is restricted to North Korean defectors who departed North Korea in the previous year or the same year as the year of their arrival. The most important reason for possible discrepancies between the number measured upon entry and that on departure is that some defectors spend a considerable period in a third country, mainly China, following their escape. Another source of discrepancy is that there are a small number of defectors in the IPUS sample whose arrival year in South Korea is the same as the departure. The jangmadang exchange rate is determined by supply and demand. By contrast, the North Korean official exchange rate is fixed at a certain level. Given that the jangmadang exchange rate is unofficial, it is reasonable to assume that the rates underestimate the true value of the North Korean won against the US dollar. The share of median income in satisfied income changes less than that of average income. It is the lowest in 2012, 2013, and 2019 at 20%, and the highest in 2014 at 67%. For other years, it was between 31 and 44%. A difference between the finding in this paper and those in previous literature is that the former uses data on the main source of income while the latter utilizes the rate of participation in market activities. However, the two measures may be highly correlated because the main source of income is derived mostly from market activities, as discussed in the text. Kim (2019) suggests that the Bank of Korea underestimated North Korea’s annual growth rate from 2012 to 2015 by 1.19% at maximum due to the failure to include the increases in market activities during this period. Another reason for dividing the sample into two periods instead of annual data is to keep a sufficient number of samples after resampling. This is expected to increase the reliability of the findings when we make the samples comparable between the periods. The means of economic class, working status, residence in Pyongyang, and high to middle-level education in the resampled data from 2014 to 2016 are 2.16%, 78.7%, 1.7%, and 27%, respectively. Those in the data from 2017 to 2019 are 2.16%, 75.1%, 1%, and 25.2%, respectively.

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15. Although the figures in US dollars are still nominal, one can argue that inflation from 2014 to 2018 was taken into account by the changes in the exchange rate, and thus, the comparison of nominal income between the two periods is unlikely to distort the main finding. 16. Adopting a similar method in Kim (2017a), we computed a consumer price index from 2016 to 2018 using the prices of rice, corn, pork, and gasoline with the respective weights of 0.3, 0.3, 0.3, and 0.1. The index shows that prices increased by 19% compared to 2016. Hence, one can argue that a comparison based on nominal income between 2014–2016 and 2017–2018 underestimates the shock of sanctions on household income rather than overestimates it. In addition, there is some information that consumer prices in North Korea increased by 8.8% and 8.4% in 2017 and 2018, respectively. Increases in consumer prices, excluding agricultural products, coal and oil, were larger than those in the overall consumer prices: they soared by 12.7% and 11.0% in 2017 and 2018. 17. Differences in the log of income between the two periods are statistically significant at least at the 10% level except in bottom 20%. Although the difference in the bottom 20% is marginally insignificant, it is likely to be significant with more samples. 18. The respective share of jobs in the three categories is 28% (jobs related to the external economy), 44% (trade in domestic markets), and 28% (other job categories). The main reason for not further dividing other job categories is that biases can arise due to the small sample size. 19. One can criticize that a sample selection in the decision to escape North Korea can affect heterogeneity in income shocks across different income groups. In particular, sanctions may have caused bigger income losses in some households within the same job category, for example, participants in external economic activities, which could increase the probability of leaving North Korea. We cannot completely rule out such a possibility. However, the decision to escape North Korea because of economic hardship accounts for less than one third of the reasons for leaving according to a survey conducted in 2011 (Kim, 2017a). When we excluded individuals who were involved in external economic activities and were not able to eat three meals per day prior to their departure from

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North Korea, there was little change in our main findings: average and median income decreased by 58% and 32%, respectively. 20. Radio Free Asia reported that state-run grain shops were introduced in 2019 and began to operate from 2021 in the whole country. (https://www.rfa.org/korean/in_focus/food_internatio nal_org/nkagriculture-02072023101623.html ). 21. A source from South Korean intelligence reported that more than 10 people died of starvation every day in some areas such as Kaesong but a spokesman at the Ministry of Unification argued that it was not like mass starvation that occurred in the Arduous March in the 1990s. 22. On the basis of secrete interviews with North Korean residents, the BBC reported that some of their neighbors starved to death (https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-65881803 as of 20 September 2023).

References Cha, Victor, and Lisa Collins. “The Markets: Private Economy and Capitalism in North Korea?” CSIS, August 26, 2018. Choi, Syngjoo, Byung-Yeon Kim, Jungmin Lee, and Sokbae Lee. “A Tale of Two Koreas: Property Rights and Fairness.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 170 (2020): 112-30. Curtis, Melvin. “North Korea Economy Watch.” February 5, 2018. Haggard, Stephan and Marcus Noland. “Reform from Below: Behavioral and Institutional Change in North Korea.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 73, no. 2 (2010): 133-52. Hong, Min, Moonseok Cha, Eunlee Joung, and Hyuk Kim (2016), “The Current State of North Korean Official Markets and Social Changes [북한 전국 공식시장 현황과 사회변화].” Presented at Korea Institute for National Unification. December 9, 2016. Institute for Peace and Unification Studies. “Social Changes in North Korea: Marketization, Informationization, Social Stratification Studies [북한 사회변 동 2015: 시장화, 정보화, 사회분화].” 2015. Kim, Byung-Yeon. “Informal Economy Activities of Soviet Households: Size and Dynamics.” Journal of Comparative Economics 31, no. 3 (2003): 532-51. Kim, Byung-Yeon. Unveiling the North Korean Economy: Collapse and Transition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017a.

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Kim, Byung-Yeon. “Truth and Fallacy on Sanctions against North Korea.” The JoongAng, August 11, 2017b. Kim, Byung-Yeon. “Strong Sanctions are a Necessity to North Korea’s Denuclearization.” The JoongAng, January 22, 2018. Kim, Byung-Yeon. “North Korean Economy in Kim Jong-un’s Era [김정은 체 제의 북한 경제].” In Today’s North Korea II [북한의 오늘 II], edited by Youngkwan Yoon. Seoul: Neulpoom Plus, 2019. Kim, Byung-Yeon, and Dongho Song. “The Participation of North Korean Households in the Informal Economy: Size, Determinants and Effect.” Seoul Journal of Economics 21, no. 2 (2008): 361–85. Kim, Byung-Yeon, and Seong Hee Kim. “Effects of Human Capital on the Economic Adjustment of North Korean Defectors.” Seoul Journal of Economics 29, no. 4 (2016): 505–28. Kim, Byung-Yeon, and Dawool Kim. “Informal Economic Activities and Support for a Market Economy of North Korean Refugees [북한이탈주민의 비공식경 제활동과 자본주의 지지도].” Comparative Economic Studies 25, no. 1 (2018): 1–28. Kim, Byung-Yeon, and Seong Hee Kim. “Market Activities and Trust of North Korean Refugees.” Asian Economic Policy Review 14, no. 2 (2019): 238–57. Kim, Byung-Yeon, and Yumi Koh. “The Informal Economy and Bribery in North Korea.” Asian Economic Papers 10, no. 3 (2011): 104–17. Kim, Byung-Yeon. “Marketization during Kim Jong-un’s Era.” Korea Development Institute Working Paper, 2022. Kim, Byung-Yeon, and Yoshisada Shida. “Shortages and the Informal Economy in the Soviet Republics: 1965–1989.” Economic History Review 70, no. 4 (2017): 1346–74. Kim, Byung-Yeon, and Moonsoo Yang. Markets and the State in the North Korean Economy [북한 경제에서의 시장과 정부]. Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 2012. Kim Jihee, Kyoochul Kim, Sangyoon Park, and Chang Sun. “The Economic Costs of Trade Sanctions: Evidence from North Korea,” Journal of International Economics 145, November 2023. Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade. “Analysis of North Korean Markets [북한 시장실태 분석].” 2014. Korea Institute for International Economic Policy. “An Analysis of Operation Mechanism of Foreign Exchange Acquisition Project in North Korea: Focusing on the Mineral Sector [북한 외화획득사업 운영 메커니즘 분석: 광물 부문(무연탄ㆍ철광석)을 중심으로].” 2017. Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade. “A Study on Economic Reform in North Korea under Kim Jong-un: Focusing on “Our Style of Economic Management [김정은 시대 북한 경제개혁 연구: ‘우리식 경제관리 방법’을 중심으로].” 2018.

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Lee, Suk. “North Korean Famine: Occurrence, Impacts and Characteristics [1994 - 2000년 북한 기근: 발생, 충격 그리고 특징].” Working Paper, Korea Institute for National Unification, 2004. Lee, Jong-seok. “The Sanctions against North Korea is not effective but only hopeful torture.” The Hankyoreh, December 4, 2017. Lee, Il-young (2018), “How effective are the Sanctions?” Kyunghyang Shinmun, February 8, 2018. Lee, Jooyung and Sungmin Mun. “Study of Informal Finance in North Korea: Analysis and Evaluation [북한 비공식금융 실태조사 및 분석·평가].” Bank of Korea, 2020. Park, Kyungsook. “Food Crisis, Famine and Population Changes in North Korea [북한의 식량난 및 기근과 인구변동].” Study on Unification Policy 21, no. 1 (2012): 127–56. Yang, Moonsoo. Marketization of the North Korean Economy [북한경제의 시장 화]. Seoul: Hanul Academy, 2010.

CHAPTER 4

Normal State and Social Requisite in North Korea Philo Kim

Significant renovations and changes have been underway in North Korea since Kim Jong-un took power in 2012. The actual changes taking place in North Korea go far deeper than what is observed from the outside. One aspect of such changes was revealed at the 8th Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea in January 2021. The portraits of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il were removed from the podium of the convention hall, and the Internationale, regarded as the socialist national anthem, was recalled. Socialism was introduced in the name of the Youth League, abolishing Kim Il-sung-Kim Jong-il-ism in its name. The names of the general secretary and president were also restored instead of chairman. It’s not easy for Kim Jong-un to take these measures and carries considerable risks. How was this possible in North Korea? It reflects, above all, the desire for a normality that the Kim Jong-un regime has been pursuing since taking office. President Kim Jong-un expressed his intention to upgrade

P. Kim (B) Institute for Peace and Unification Studies, Seoul National University, Seoul, South Korea e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 B.-Y. Kim (ed.), The North Korean Regime under Kim Jong-un, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-8525-8_4

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North Korea immediately after taking office. In his first public speech in 2012, President Kim Jong-un declared that he will never let the people tighten their belts again, and then embarked on series of economic reforms to improve people’s living standards. It intends to break away from the extremely closed and abnormal society and to steer the North toward a future as a more normal state. However, the development of a normal state cannot be achieved with just a few measures. Although the concept of a normal state should be defined and examined in more detail, the attempt to normalize the country cannot be realized without a fundamental change in the system. The reality of constantly criticizing the newly announced FiveYear National Economic Development Strategy in North Korea shows that transformation into a normal state is difficult. A normal state is a matter of changing the organization and practices of members of society, and ultimately, it is intertwined with the question of whether members of society have the will, attitude, and capacity to change themselves. Even if you have the will, you cannot change on your own without the capacity. In this context, this chapter attempts to connect the topic of normalization with the social structure. In other words, we would like to evaluate whether the vision of a normal state that the North Korean authorities aspire to has the social capacity to drive change. To do this, it is necessary first to examine the contents of a normal state that Kim Jong-un envisions, assess how much has changed toward a normal state in the past 10 years since Kim Jong-un took office, and identify what conflicts and problems are lurking in society. Based on this, it seeks the social conditions necessary to become a normal state. Societies are characterized by patterns of relations between individuals who share a distinctive culture and institution. In other words, society distinguished from the state or market can be said to be an unforced set of shared interests, purposes, and values. Sociologists use the concept of ‘civil society’ to look into the unique research subjects of ‘society’ within the macrostructure of politics, economy, society, and culture. Since civil society exists only formally in North Korea, and not in practice, it is not appropriate to apply this concept simply as it is. However, society here can be seen from the perspective of how it is affected by the state and market. This is because, by observing how a society is affected by the various policy activities, laws, and institutions of the state, and market, it is possible to examine the changes in the behavior and consciousness of resident members. From this point of view, this study examines how state

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policies and markets affect the lives and consciousness of the members in a given society, and how they may promote changes in the overarching social structure as a whole. The data used in this paper are the annual surveys of defectors conducted during 2011–2020 by the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies (IPUS) of Seoul National University. The data used in this paper are derived from Unification Consciousness Survey published by IPUS. They are obtained from the in-depth surveys done on those North Koreans who left their country in the previous year and settled down in South Korea, so that it reflects recent realities in the North more accurately than the earlier surveys. The surveys are usually performed in June every year and the sample size is around 100–150, which covers about half of the entire North Korean defectors who left the North and settled down in the South in less than 16 months.

Meaning of a Normal State It is not easy to define what is a normal state in one word. Historically, the concept of a normal state has been discussed in terms of comparison with a country that is slightly different from what one would generally imagine. Anthony Lake, who served as national security adviser to the Clinton administration in 1994, referred to Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Cuba as ‘rogue states’ and argued that they should be reestablished as healthy members of the international community through a strategy of containment or neutralization. The term ‘normal states’ is used in contrast to ‘rogue states.’ A rogue state is judged based on three criteria: (1) the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, (2) support for terrorism, and (3) a regional threat to American interests. Rogue states are internally oppressive and externally aggressive. They are countries that oppress human rights, countries that support terrorism (countries that support terrorist groups), and countries that proliferate nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction.1 However, this realistic concept of a ‘rogue state’ established by the progressive Clinton administration was revised in a greatly relaxed form in the late 1990s. In 2000, the Clinton administration described it as a ‘concerned state,’ considering that it was an overly strong statement. The Bush administration took a hard turn to the position that it could launch a preemptive attack by naming these rogue states as the ‘axis of

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evil’ countries (US White House 2002). Various pressure policies have been proposed against such countries: appeasement policy, engagement, strategic patience, containment, and roll-back—an active pressure policy aimed at facilitating regime change and collapse of the regime—were proposed. Criticism is also raised that the concept of a rogue state is biased. This is because, despite having the characteristics of a rogue state, large countries are not called rogue states. China, Russia, India, and Pakistan are not called rogue states. Even if large countries have similar characteristics to rogue states, the Western world has a weakness that it cannot touch them. Rogue states are usually small or medium-sized countries that have succeeded in challenging US policy. In this sense, North Korea, which possesses nuclear weapons, was also called a rogue state by the Bush administration. Conservative groups such as the Hansun Foundation have come up with the banner of normalization of North Korea. A normal state at this time was defined as a country that keeps international norms and promises, a country that pursues reform and openness, and a country that values human rights and peace as important values (Hansun Foundation 2014). Weak states and failed states are defined broadly and include most of the elements outside the framework of the normal state used in the international community. This includes not only cases where the rule of law is difficult to achieve due to insufficient political authority and capacity of the government, but also cases where crime and violent conflicts are rampant, humanitarian crises are widespread, and the stability of neighboring countries is threatened. In addition, cases of promoting international and domestic terrorist acts are also characteristically included in the category of state failure.2 The concept of a failed state has been frequently discussed as an expression of the lack or weakness of political capacity, while weak states are constantly receiving attention from the international community due to civil wars or economic failures, and in fact, they are the targets of foreign aid or military support.3 Weak states and failed states refer to problems in the domestic political, economic, and social system, and rogue states refer to external problems (Fig. 4.1). A normal state can be said from two aspects. One is domestic political change, that is, transparent and predictable politics. The other is international norms compliance and exchanges with the international community. Therefore, a comprehensive interpretation of a normal state

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authority, human rights violations weak state

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intervention •state

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Fig. 4.1 Key Elements of the Concept of a Normal State (Source Min et al. (2009: 68))

is reform and openness, but in a narrow sense, it can be called internationalization. At the level of a weak state or a failed state, it will be related to the extent to which the North Korean economy and welfare have been reformed, while a rogue state is related to the development of weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear weapons. Why is North Korea referred to as a normal state, a weak state, a failed state, or a rogue state? In the end, it means that, similar to other countries in the international community, the domestic system should be reformed and exchange and openness should be promoted in accordance with international norms. What would be the normal state in socialist world then? It can be defined as a country with the universal characteristics of a socialist system. Judging from these standards, it is true that North Korea has

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deviated from universal socialism a lot. Of course, they share the universal characteristics of socialism, but it is true that North Korea’s unique characteristics such as the Military-First Politics, the economy-defense parallel line, and the social policy based on family background are unique. It means that North Korea is out of the world’s universal system. China and Vietnam are also changing the concept of socialism in the process of reform and opening up. From a historical point of view, socialism is a system whose core contents are state ownership of the means of production and a planned economy. However, the concept of socialism itself is changing as the scope and concept of the means of production gradually change during system reform and the nature of the planned economy changes. In order to pursue international solidarity with socialism, several socialist countries would have to be defined as socialism, and in that case, we would have to seriously think about what socialism really is. In the past, North Korea would criticize revisionism when introducing reform and opening elements outside the orthodox socialist system like China or Vietnam. However, in a situation in which external isolation is gradually deepening and it is difficult to survive alone, it is necessary to exchange with socialist countries such as China, Vietnam, and Russia. In addition, it is a situation in which it is necessary to seek solidarity with socialist countries that can unite against the United States. Under this circumstance, there is no choice but to define a very broad definition of socialism, recognizing various forms of socialism. Kim Jong-un’s desire to be treated as a normal state was clearly revealed in March 2018 when a South Korean special delegation visited Pyongyang to meet with Chairman Kim Jong-un. Chairman Kim Jong-un expressed his uneasy feelings to the North Korean special envoy, saying, “The US should treat North Korea as a normal state.”4 He also expressed his hope that North Korea would be “treated as a normal state and a partner for dialogue.” For Chairman Kim Jong-un, the lifting of North Korea’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism and the easing or lifting of sanctions against North Korea are more meaningful to break away from the image of a rogue state and enter a normal state than economic assistance itself. At this meeting, Chairman Kim Jong-un also expressed his will to “turn North Korea into a normal state.” As for the inter-Korean summit or North Korea-US dialogue, it is worth noting that the summit country has expressed its will without suggesting any other requirements. It is

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difficult to say that there is any standard for judging a normal state, but it will mean a normal state that can communicate and exchange as an equal member of the international community. North Korea and the international community may not have exactly the same concept, but North Korea’s movement to transform itself into a normal state was found throughout the 8th Party Congress.

Aspiration for a Normal State by Kim Jong-un Leadership Demilitarization: From Military-First to People-First Politics In a word, the national strategy of the 10 years of Kim Jong-un’s regime can be characterized as a transition from a Military-First Politics to a People-First Politics that aims to improve the economy and people’s living standards. As soon as he came to power in April 2012, in his public speech on the 100th anniversary of Kim Il-sung’s birthday, he expressed his determined will, “I will never tighten the people’s belt again,” and reformed economic-related laws such as the Enterprise Law and Farm Law, and established economic development zones. The economic reform and pro-China line of the Kim Jong-un regime, which began under the guardianship of Jang Song-thaek, the party’s executive director, have come to the fore. However, this economic line was immediately counterattacked by the military. The military forces, which had been in control of their interests through the Military-First Politics for a long time, could not agree with economic reforms that had to hand over trade and economic powers to the cabinet. Ri Young-ho, who expressed dissatisfaction with this, was dismissed by a sudden dismissal of the military commander, and general Hyon Yong-chol was also purged. But Kim Jong-un could not ignore the security reinforcement demanded by the military and hardline forces, so that Jang Song-thaek, who led the policy change, was sacrificed for a conspiracy to overthrow the regime, and the economy vs. security conflict was resolved through the ‘Parallel Policy of Economic and Nuclear Development.’ Just as Kim Il-sung did right after the Korean War, in a situation of a tight confrontation between economy and security, or between pragmatists and hardliners, the only way to rectify the situation was Byungjin, or taking both. On April 20, 2018, after meeting the demands of the hardliners through the advancement of nuclear development and the

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creation of ICBMs, the transition to the all-out line of socialist economic construction was declared. However, this also soon overshadowed the declaration of a change in the national strategic line as the US-North Korea negotiations in Hanoi were frustrated. However, the hastily sealed policy of Byungjin could not overturn the economic line and people-oriented policy originally envisioned by Kim Jong-un. Kim Jong-un put the people as the banner of his regime as he defined the essence of Kim Il-sung-Kim Jong-il-ism as the ‘Public PeopleFirst Policy’ at the 4th Convention of Party Cell Secretary in January 2013. The military-first emergency system was restored to a party-state system led by the party and to a normal socialist state in which the people were the main agents of revolution and construction. At the 8th Party Congress in January 2021, ‘People-First Politics’ was stipulated in the Party Code, and it is being made into the brand of the Kim Jong-un regime. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is continuing his quest to tighten his grip on his country and to create an image of it as a ‘normal state.’ His new title as of 2021, President of the State Affairs Commission (SAC) of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, reflects this. On June 29, 2016, Kim was named chairman of the newly established SAC, the regime’s top branch of government, and policymaking. The SAC replaced the National Defence Commission (NDC), the all-powerful organ during the tenure of his predecessor and father, Kim Jong-il. It represented the third-generation leader’s ambition for the North to be seen as a ‘normal state’ in the international community. That dream is still in the making. The leader started to look outward and consider how to look like a modern leader of a normal state. In this regard, observers view the year 2016 as a symbolic starting point in Kim’s quest to make North Korea a normal state. In 2016, the SAC was established as a main governing body of the country, putting an end to the NDC, which symbolized the songun—the Military-First Policy—where military officials were in charge of all the decision-making process and ruled the country,” “With the new title as the SAC head, Kim was declaring that he will rule his country like a normal state by institutionalizing the system, centering on the party-state system.” Various meetings such as the Politburo meeting, the Plenary Session of Workers’ Party Central Committee, and the Supreme People’s Assembly have been held regularly to restore normality. At the 8th Party Congress, it was stipulated that the Party Congress should be held every five years

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through amendments to the party rules. It officially explains the reason for this is to ‘normalize’ party tasks in accordance with the speed of change in a situation. The Ministry of People’s Armed Forces was renamed to the Ministry of Defence in November 2020, and the Kim Il-sung-Kim Jong-il-ism Youth League was also renamed to Socialist Patriotic Youth League in April 2021. The title of Kim Jong-un was also changed from the chairman of the party to the general secretary, and the organization system was changed from the committee to the secretariat one. The title of the supreme leader Kim Jong-un was also changed from chairman to president. Early in February, 2021, the North’s state media outlet changed Kim’s English title from ‘chairman’ to ‘president,’ apparently to follow the practice of other countries such as China and Russia, whose heads of state are called presidents. Kim’s new position and new title served as an occasion to lighten up his image to be shown as a leader of a normal state to the outside world, who takes care of all state affairs. It was the chairman title of SAC that gave him a seat among world leaders—especially in 2018, when he held an unprecedented summit with former US President Donald Trump and met South Korean President Moon Jae-in three times. Despite the stalled diplomacy since the collapse of the US-North Korea summit in Hanoi, and the deepening isolation of the North due to the Covid-19 pandemic and consequent strict border lockdown, Pyongyang has not stopped its efforts to present the country as a normal state. Kim’s increasing focus on the North Korean people, especially during major political events, is also seen as an effort to show that he is the leader of a normal state who cares about his people. At a military parade in October, 2021, Kim made a rare emotional speech to his people, thanking them and apologizing for the adversity as the country faces economic difficulty following widespread flooding, the Covid-19 pandemic, and international sanctions against the regime. These changes are closely related to the trend in which North Korea has defined the current situation as an ‘era of state-first policy.’ Since the release of the song Our National Flag in January 2019, it has continuously expanded its distribution and made efforts to arouse patriotism. The song was actively promoted in the performance commemorating the 6th Party Cell Secretaries Congress in 2021 and the performance of Band of the SAC. As a member of the United Nations, the national character of Chosun, or the official name of North Korea was greatly strengthened as national identity has been reformed, and the people became

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a force directly influencing the state and politics from a simple object of being ruled. Now, the people have become aware of the fact that they have changed into citizens with a sense of the republic, rather than subjects who unilaterally obey the orders of the party, the leader, and the military. The fact that ‘People-First Politics’ was stipulated in the party rules at the 8th Party Congress and presented as a ruling slogan of Kim Jong-un’s People-First Politics in contrast to Kim Jong-il’s Military-First Politics is a change that suits the current trend of building a nation-state. Economic Performance The second key to becoming a normal state that President Kim Jongun seeks is to get the economy back on track. Most of the weak states, failed states, and rogue states are countries that have failed to achieve national economic performance. In this regard, President Kim Jong-un must produce tangible economic results in order to transform North Korea into a normal state. Surprisingly, in this context, North Korea proclaimed a new strategic line by declaring that it allows the most power to the socialist construction for the new high-high level demands of the revolutionary development at the 3rd Plenary Session of the 7th Party Central Committee held on April 20, 2018. It closed the economydefense parallel line established for 60 years. To this end, North Korea declared that it would concentrate its national capabilities to develop the economy and dramatically improve the lives of its residents by mobilizing all its human and material resources. North Korea called this a ‘new strategic line’ and emphasized that the direction of national policy had changed.5 On April 20, 2018, Kim Jong-un’s image as a pragmatic leader was further enhanced by his declaration of a new national strategic policy line focusing on economic development. Like his father, Kim Jong-il, who initiated his first political duty with an economic policy in February 1984 by announcing a policy on “Improving the People’s Lives,” Kim Jong-un also began his era with large-scale construction projects closely centered on the improvement of ordinary citizens’ lives, such as Future Scientist Street and Ryomyong Street. The ‘all-out concentration line of socialist economic construction’ is a ‘new’ development strategy that goes beyond the thinking of the existing Byungjin line. The national development strategy was shifted from the ‘economy-defense parallel line’ to the all-out economic construction line. In other words, it goes beyond

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the system of Byungjin established over the past 60 years. This shift in the strategic line, of course, presupposes the national defense power of possessing nuclear weapons. This is because the logic is that since there are nuclear weapons, it is no longer necessary to expend national power to strengthen national defense power, but to pour it into economic construction. Nevertheless, in North Korea, which has long been accustomed to the economy-defense parallel line, it is by no means easy to formally break the frame of the parallel line. In this regard, the all-out economic construction line that was drawn up in the seventh year of Kim Jongun’s reign is an epochal change with a great significance in North Korea’s national development strategy. The goal of the new strategic line announced in April 2018 was ‘normalization of production by 2020.’6 It is said that existing factories and enterprises should be ‘normalized’ during 2016–2020, the period of implementation of the Five-Year National Economic Development Strategy. The Five-Year National Economic Development Strategy decided at the 7th Party Congress in May 2016 also mentioned ‘normalization’ as the goal. In order to promote full-scale economic development after 2021, it is necessary to lay the foundation for long-term development by normalizing existing production facilities by 2020.7 Efforts for economic performance generally proceeded in three directions. First, the cabinet’s authority over economic management was strengthened so that the cabinet could execute economic plans in a unified way. Second, the nation pursues a strategy to improve the lives of residents by further strengthening the regional self-reliance system, which is a characteristic of North Korea’s economic system, and, for this purpose, it strengthens the link between the central and local areas. Third, the Responsibility System in Socialist Enterprise Management and farm responsibility management system should be actively implemented to ensure that the market functions smoothly under the national plan. The Enterprise Law and the Farm Act was prepared, and the powers exercised by the factory-party committees in the past were converted to a nonstanding organization, and the manager and technicians were completely responsible for the operation of the company. At the 5th Plenary Session of the 7th Party Central Committee, the 10 major economic development goals were presented, and the 2nd Five-Year Economic Development Plan was announced at the 8th Party Congress. Under the goal of a normal state, innovation for the normalization of production in the economic sector was emphasized.

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One of the epochal changes for economic performance has been the conversion of military facilities to civilian use. It is a policy to revitalize the people’s economy by converting military facilities built on the economydefense parallel line for the past 60 years into civilian use. The policy was implemented so that the military industry, which had become bloated by the Byungjin policy, was converted to produce civilian goods, and industrial facilities that had partially produced military goods were completely reorganized to produce the people’s consumer goods. In his 2019 New Year’s address, President Kim Jong-un mentioned, “we have received our party’s militant appeal to concentrate all our efforts on economic construction with our heart, and have produced various agricultural and construction machinery, cooperative products and consumer goods in the field of military industrial facilities in 2018.”8 It was a policy to normalize the economy by producing civilian products instead of producing military goods at defense factories. Another way to increase economic performance is to develop advanced science and high technology. It was intended to develop into a system with international competitiveness by scientifically modernizing old facilities and systems. Scientificization and modernization were promoted in all sectors of the economy, including transportation and telecommunications. Although the results were not great, the direction and goal of economic reform were clear. As the slogan “Let’s leap with science and secure the future with education!” implies, science and technology are operating as keywords in boosting economy. North Korean authorities claim that the market economy has been revived and the lives of residents have become reenergized by the operation of the Responsibility System in Socialist Enterprise Management’s work team and sub-team units. According to Voluntary National Review of North Korea, the per capita national income of North Korea in 2019 is estimated at US$ 1316 (DPRK 2021: 7). North Korean government announced that the GDP in 2015 was US$ 27,412 million and US$ 33,504 million in 2019, so that the GDPs per capita were US$ 1068 and US$ 1316 in respective years.9 The government has focused its efforts to constantly rehabilitate and perfect a self-supporting economic structure capable of satisfying, through domestic production, the material demands of the economic development, and people’s livelihood. It is important for the factories, enterprises, and cooperatives to properly establish management strategies in line with the requirements of the Responsibility System in Socialist Enterprise Management, to run the business on active and

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creative basis, and to modernize production processes based on science and technology and own resources. However, there are many structural limitations to the functioning of these plans and strategies to normalize the economy. At the 2nd Plenary Session of the 8th Party Congress held in February 2021, President Kim Jong-un bitterly criticized state agencies and organizations, using harsh language against such people and institutions, saying “should be smashed.” North Korean authorities admitted the failure of the 1st FiveYear National Economic Development Strategy. In the meetings of the 8th Party Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea held in January 2021, Kim Jong-un remarked, “As the harsh international situation persisted and unexpected challenges arose, there have been failures to improve economic tasks to meet the nation’s economic goals, as well as failures to achieve clear progress in improving the people’s living standards.”10 In fact, the North Korean economy was severely damaged by the sanctions. After the strengthening of sanctions against North Korea, the growth rate of the North Korean economy showed a clear decline to −3.5 per cent and −4.1 per cent in 2017 and 2018, respectively, and recorded −4.5 per cent in 2020, when border closure due to Covid-19 pandemic began.11 Globalization The most striking part of the transformation to a normal state pursued by the Kim Jong-un regime is its exchanges with the international community. In April 2012, as well as Chairman Kim Jong-un’s bold move on public guidance with First Lady Ri Sol-ju, Disney cartoon characters appeared on the stage of the new Moranbong Band and were broadcast on TV. It was intended to show the aspect of a normal state that North Korea is no different from any other country. First appearing on the political scene alongside his wife Ri Sol-ju in 2012, Kim Jong-un has managed to foster an outward image as the top leader of the country by promoting successive summit meetings with China, South Korea, and the United States in 2018, despite his initial image as a cruel ruler capable of the brutal execution of Jang Song-thaek and the continuation of nuclear and missile tests. The Singapore summit between the United States and North Korea on June 12, 2018, was recognized as an opportunity for North Korea to end hostilities with the United States which span more than 70 years and to take the first steps in establishing new diplomatic relationships.

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The Kim Jong-un regime for the past 10 years has tried to normalize the North Korean system, which had been moving toward extreme closure and isolationism. For the first time since the Korean War, the historic Singapore summit was held with the United States, and summits were also held with China, Russia, and South Korea to break free from diplomatic isolation and further elevate its international status. It fulfilled the obligation to submit reports of international organizations, removed the portrait of Kim Il-sung that had been hung at an external gateway of Pyongyang (Sunan) International Airport, and showed a resolution to remove the portraits of senior Kims from the podium of the Plenary Session of Workers’ Party Central Committee and Party Congress. The removal of the portraits of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il is one of the big changes. Following the removal of the portrait of Kim Il-sung hanging at Sunan International Airport in 2015, the portraits of father and grandfather Kim were removed at the Plenary Session of Workers’ Party Central Committee in 2019, and finally removed at the 8th Party Congress. Such a decision is not an easy decision even for the supreme leader of North Korea. The Internationale, called the anthem of socialist bloc, was summoned to show off socialist international solidarity and to strengthen its international status. The closing ceremony with the song, the Internationale, symbolizes international solidarity with socialism, which intended to show that North Korea is no different from socialism in China or Vietnam. All the socialist countries of the world have been used as important symbol for solidarity since the beginning of socialist countries. The Soviet Union adopted and sang the national anthem from 1922 to 1944 along with the founding of the country, and it is still used as ceremonial music in all socialist countries. It was also used in the closing ceremony of the 19th Party Congress in October 2017 in China. All of the measures taken at the 8th Party Congress had a strong intention to show the outside world that North Korea is a perfectly normal socialist country. They are also thinking about Kim Il-sung-Kim Jong-il-ism for socialist international solidarity. At the 10th Congress of the Youth League, the name of Kim Il-sung-Kim Jong-il-ist Youth League was changed into Socialist Patriotic Youth League, removing Kim Il-sung-Kim Jong-il-ism. It is not easy task even for the supreme leader since Kim Il-sung-Kim Jong-il-ism is specified as a state ideology in the North Korean constitution. But, for President Kim Jong-un, who is well aware of the reality of the international community, it is a very worrying part. The Juche

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Ideology, which started as a universal ideology, was formalized into Kim Il-sung-ism and now Kim Il-sung-Kim Jong-il-ism. Kim Il-sung-Kim Jong-il-ism, reminiscent of Marxism-Leninism, may have legitimacy in North Korea’s internal logic, but at a global level, it falls far short of normal standards. Even in socialist countries, a small number of political parties and some people who follow North Korea organize and operate such things as the Juche Ideology Institute or Research Society. Recently, there are cases where the Kim Il-sung-Kim Jong-ilism Research Institute abroad is mentioned, but it is mentioned only in exceptional cases. It is usually referred to as the International Institute of the Juche Idea. It is too unreasonable for North Korea to spread Kim Il-sung-Kim Jong-il-ism globally from an international level. The Juche Ideology, which has been used externally, is a language that can be used universally. When the Juche Ideology is organized into Kim Ilsung-Kim Jong-il-ism, many groups follow. Inside North Korea, however, there are many groups devoted to Kim Il-sung-Kim Jong-il-ism, it is inevitable to lead toward Kim Il-sung-Kim Jong-il-ism in terms of loyalty and personal idolatry. There is no one who can reverse these currents and trends. It’s dangerous. The supreme leader is probably the one who seriously considers this aspect. As a supreme leader who is anticipating international exchanges and cooperation, he will want to communicate with the international community in a universal language. Even if it only exchanges with socialist countries, it needs to form a consensus on the things that are universally shared by other socialist countries in Europe and Asia. In this context, President Kim Jong-un has consistently shown his aspiration and commitment to becoming a global North Korea since taking power. He appeared with his wife Ri Sol-ju, highlighting his normal image just like the leaders in Western countries. “Set your feet on your own land and see the world with your eyes” is the slogan of representing the North Korean discourse for internationalization. It was presented at Kim Il-sung University in December 2009. Even in the era of Kim Jong-un, with this slogan at the fore, they are promoting internationalization with the goal of ‘development to a worldclass level.’ It has the will and aspiration to develop the reality of North Korea, which is extremely closed and isolated, not only in the economic, scientific, and technological sectors, but also in the educational, cultural, and political domains to the international level.

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The gloomy atmosphere created by the purge of the elites who resisted Kim Jong-un’s rule was markedly improved by the 7th Party Congress in 2016 and subsequent efforts which followed. Such a changed atmosphere can be readily witnessed in the attitudinal shift of North Korean scholars who participated in conferences abroad. Immediately after Kim Jong-un came to power, North Korean scholars were nervous to stand up when citing the directions of Kim Il-sung or the words of Kim Jong-il, but after the Party Congress, their hesitation disappeared and they have taken on a much more confident attitude. They do not, even, feel the need to cite the teachings or words of their leaders in the papers anymore. All of these are strong indications that the Kim Jong-un regime not only stabilized, but began to make a meaningful change.

Social Requisite and Challenges Market Reforms In order to develop into a normal state, the most important task is to improve the lives of people through economic growth. This can be achieved through extensive market reform. The market is none other the space where the economic policy of the Kim Jong-un regime and the Public People-First Policy are publicly realized. Through these policies, markets across the country have been expanded and the economy has been revitalized. North Korea’s General Markets, which numbered approximately 300 at the time of the July 1st Measures in 2002, have increased to 486 as of December 2018, with around 200 new markets emerging after Kim Jong-un came to power. The market has become a living space inseparable from the survival of the residents. Marketization has progressed not only in commodities but also in finance, labor, housing, and other sectors. Residents purchase more than 60 per cent of food and consumer goods from the market, and more than 70 per cent of the residents earn income from the market. Marketization has led to many changes in the social structure over the past 20 years. With the growth of market activity, the number of people engaged full-time in market-based businesses has increased, and the market has now penetrated quite deeply into the lives of North Koreans. Over the past 20 years, the number of manufacturing and construction workers decreased by about 17.0 per cent or 2 million people, while the agricultural workers increased by 11.1 per cent and the

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commercial and service workers by 5.9 per cent. It can be inferred that during the marketization of the past two decades, as many as 2 million workers who engaged in the manufacturing industry left for the agricultural sector or to work in service activities such as their own businesses. In the recent decade, 1.2 million workers left the manufacturing industry and moved to agriculture and service industries by 600,000 each (Central Bureau of Statistics of DPRK 1995, 2009; Central Bureau of Statistics of DPRK and United Nations Population Fund 2015: 46).12 According to interviews with North Korean defectors published by IPUS at Seoul National University, North Korean defectors with business experience has maintained a steady level at just above or below 70 per cent over the past year for which survey responses were collected (2012–2020). This means that most people, from ordinary workers to school teachers, have experienced direct engagement in private economic activities. Most of the business people, regardless of occupation, such as workers, farmers, clerks, experts, students, and soldiers, do business in the form of side jobs. It shows that while housewives and foreign currency earning occupations are actively participating in business, students, farmers, and soldiers are in an environment where it is difficult to actively participate in business activities. It is interesting to note that most people working in small businesses are women. Some have argued that it is because of the Confucian cultural tradition in North Korea, that men are hardly engaged in small business ventures directly. In order for North Korea to promote economic performances, it will need to secure national finances and revitalize the economy through the expansion of privatization of nationalized or cooperative ownership. One of the ways the socialist system can revitalize the economy in the long term is privatization. In this regard, it is worth paying attention to reports of recent housing privatization measures in North Korea. According to media reports, the privatization of housing in Rajin-Sonbong Economic Special Zone is in full swing. If the government sells houses to individuals, the state can secure significant finances. These measures will be experimentally implemented at Rajin-Sonbong area and then gradually expanded to Pyongyang. Although these measures have not yet been confirmed by official documents, the possibility seems high. Market reform must be carried out extensively in order to develop into a normal state. However, the current situation in North Korea faces many challenges in further economic reform. This is because many conflicts and problems are being produced due to market expansion. As the

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market expands, individuals who specialize in private business activities, often termed as the ‘merchant class,’ are rising on a considerable scale. According to IPUS, Seoul National University, the number of people participating in business activities full-time is estimated to be 11.8 per cent of the economically active population, saying that at least 1 million have established themselves as a new merchant class citizens working. The emergence of an independent merchant class causes serious challenges and conflicts to the upper class, because most of the merchant class grew up in the middle class. Polarization of income caused by market developments has become a serious problem in North Korean society. Based on North Korean defector surveys of IPUS, 60 per cent of people have no official income at all, and even if they supplement their income through private economic activities, the bottom 20–30 per cent have no real income. As the market revitalized, the overall state’s wealth increased, but the wealth gap between the rich and the poor has gradually widened, and, if continued, this polarization of income could lead to social conflict and would likely undermine the legitimacy of the socialist system as a whole. As the market expands, residents are gradually shifting their behavior and mindset to adapt to the market exchange system. Merchants who do business in the general markets are demonstrating the power of money because they pay taxes according to the size of the sales stand, and naturally, there has been a growing consensus that one must do business to earn a living. Nevertheless, these market activities still maintain the framework of the socialist economic system of state ownership and planned economy, and the state-led welfare system remains prominent in the minds of citizens. Residents still struggle to adapt to a market economy. From this point of view, it is expected that North Korea may face considerable difficulties in the process of system transformation. Social Capability Another necessary basis for the development of a normal state is social capabilities. Human resources to mediate social conflict and to navigate reforms are essential. Reinforcing organizational life in order to control the negative consequences of solidarity among residents is an interesting characteristic of daily life in North Korea. After Kim Jong-un came to power, the Kim Il-sung-Kim Jong-il-ist Youth League, the General Federation of Trade Unions of Korea (GFTUK), the Socialist Women’s Union

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of Korea (SWUK), and the Union of Agricultural Workers of Korea (UAWK), which form the basis of social control, were reorganized and renamed, and after the 8th Party Congress, a series of meetings was held to strengthen the unity of each group. The Youth League, which is in charge of ideological armament of the young generation, held its 10th Congress on April 27–29, 2021, and was renamed from the Kim Il-sungKim Jong-il-ist Youth League to the Socialist Patriotic Youth League, with the deletion of the names of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il. Organizations such as the GFTUK, SWUK, and UAWK are also scheduled to meet sequentially for social solidarity and unity. President Kim Jong-un, who is arguably still a young leader himself, seems to be particularly interested in the next generation, giving attention to such organizations as the Korean Children’s Union (KCU). On June 6, 2013, at the beginning of his reign, Kim Jong-un attended the 7th Congress of the KCU in person, and he also participated in the 8th Congress on June 6, 2017. He has also emphasized the role of nursing homes and orphanage, saying that all childcare centers and nursing homes across the country should be organized at the high standard of a revolutionary school that raises children to be revolutionaries. Boarding schools for orphans were established in Pyongyang and other provinces at both the elementary and middle school levels in 2016 and 2017. Such efforts demonstrated to take care of orphans reveal that not only was there a great loss of human life during the Arduous March, but also many children were orphaned, losing parents and extended family members to the countrywide starvation which occurred. The reason Kim Jong-un has shown such interest in the new generation since coming to power is most likely due to the fact that the KCU and the orphaned children are the forces who will most sincerely support him in the future. Just as his grandfather who accepted war orphans into the Revolutionary School and was respected and revered as a ‘parent’ to those children, Kim Jong-un likes to gain the support and love as a ‘father’ to these children and youth he’s choosing to focus on. In addition, efforts are being made to reinforce learning by creating a discourse around Kim Jong-un’s brand such as the ‘Gangwon Province Spirit’ Movement. However, according to a survey of North Korean defectors by IPUS, the response to the question of whether or not “social control has been maintained” mainly stated that it has been decreasing down to 30.3 per cent in 2020. It is estimated that considerable government control over the society was restored after the inauguration of the

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Kim Jong-un regime in 2012, but since 2015 it seems to have returned to the level it was before the Kim Jong-un era. Political indoctrination continues in an authoritarian environment so that ideological cohesiveness is maintained to some extent. To what extent North Korea’s official policies are being properly accepted by its citizens is an important question to ask, especially in relation to social capacity. In 2020, 54.2 per cent of North Koreans were found to take pride in the Juche Ideology. This is a major decrease after surveyed ratings reached the highest point at 73.4 per cent in 2018, which was the highest since the inauguration of the Kim Jong-un regime. When analyzing citizens’ pride in the Juche Ideology, it is worth paying attention specifically to those with a strong pride, which is about 30–40 per cent. In addition, since coming to power, it seems that Kim Jong-un has maintained an average support level of about 60–70 per cent, which is not low by Western standards. North Korea has developed its official Juche Ideology and promoted systematic activities for the study of it since 1974. As a result, the Juche Ideology has progressed beyond a mere thought or a sheer ideology and been elevated to a religious dimension (Kim 2002). North Koreans hold worship services at meetings and study in, what they call, ‘Study Rooms for Kim Il-sung-Kim Jong-il-ism’ like a church for Christians or a mosque or temple for Muslims and Buddhists, respectively. Buildings devoted to worship and study have been constructed everywhere in North Korea. Estimates place the number of such ‘rooms’ at over 100,000 nationwide. These places are regarded as solemn and sacred, distinguished from ordinary or profane locations because they are believed to be deeply related to Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il. Thanks to the North Korean government’s social policy of compensating war victims in the post-war reconstruction period, all the descendants of wartime veterans were promoted to the upper class. This occurred to such an extent that the upper class in North Korea is composed mainly of Korean War veterans. Within this social structure of recognized war veterans which dominates the upper class, society has become highly dominated by a battle spirit rhetoric and security-minded politics. Thus, the sentiment of antagonism and enmity, emotions passed down within the family over the years, remain very strong among the upper class. Due to this family heritage, people in upper class have had an extremely hostile sentiment toward the United States ever since the

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Korean War. These militaristic spirit and values hinder the change of consciousness of the people and keep the ideological cohesiveness. However, the social capacity to reconcile and resolve the gap between the rich and the poor and class conflict formed by the spread of the market is markedly lacking. The growth of a new merchant class, which constitutes the middle class, is creating serious friction with the upper class. The upper class has considerable dissatisfaction with merchants who monopolize the benefits of markets. The North Korean government authorities are trying to solve the problem through housing supply and allow the party and state agencies to take advantage of certain benefits from merchants in order to resolve the dissatisfaction of the upper class. Nevertheless, the merchants have a serious resentment with the state’s exploitation, and the discontent and feelings of unfairness of both merchants and upper classes are causing serious social conflict, so that these complaints and conflicts will not be sufficiently resolved. The most urgent task is to strengthen the development of human resources to lead and manage economic reform and social integration. A few experts who have acquired knowledge from China and Canada are leading economic reform, but the most bureaucrats who should lead this reform lack the knowledge and capacity. Even in universities, students do not learn the management and finance necessary for market reform since the curriculum reform has not been carried out extensively. Few human resources are fully aware of what needs to be done for overall economic reform and globalization. In this respect, the capacity building of human resources is very urgent and important in North Korea. Mindset and Values The most important requisite for becoming a normal state is a renovation mindset and values. When President Kim Jong-un came to power, it seemed that he was actively promoting cultural openness by introducing Disney characters and establishing a modern Moranbong Band. Kim Jongun, who is well aware of the problem of the extreme closedness of North Korean society, was trying to show that it is a normal state to the international community by showing his will to open up culturally. The removal of the portrait of Kim Il-sung at Sunan International Airport and the removal of the portrait of Kims at Party Congresses and Plenary Session of Workers’ Party Central Committee gave rise to speculation whether it was an attempt to open up culture.

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Serious problems facing progressive change in North Korea are the rigidity, passivity, and general withdrawal from reality that North Korean society has in general. The economy is gradually reviving due to massive national policy and market expansion, and consciousness and values are changing due to cultural contact, but, despite these progresses, the uniformity and passivity of civil society are still pointed out as being serious problems. Although this does not appear serious on the surface, such passivity highlights a societal structure, which unconditionally enforces the policies dictated by the state and the government and demands individual sacrifice for the whole. From a positive point of view, this societal structure can be said to embody the spirit of individuals who boldly sacrifice themselves for the betterment of groups and organizations as a whole; but, from a negative point of view, it can be criticized as creating puppet citizens who are passive, lack autonomy, and do without question what is directed by the state. The point is that they have been accustomed to the socialist system for a long time and are obsessed with past glories, so that they are not willing to accept changes properly. In particular, the more powerful institutions are, the more they are clinging to the vested interests of the existing system, making it less attractive to adapt to the market system. Although President Kim Jong-un vehemently rebuked such institutions and executives at the Plenary Session of Workers’ Party Central Committee, saying that they “should be crushed,” it is not easy to break the practices and structures. The reality of North Korea returning to the past by adopting the ‘City/County Development Act’ without changing the old system, which has been maintained for decades, despite Kim Jong-un’s instructions, reveals how difficult it is to change the structure. This social reality, which was formed during the communist period, remains a serious obstacle to social development and growth in the process of system transformation in the former Soviet Union and Eastern European socialist countries. In particular, civil society did not develop at all under these socialist systems, and it hardly formed advanced ideas such as entrepreneurship, management mind, freedom of consciousness, or, even, environmental protection awareness. Such communist legacy has become a serious problem for these societies and one that is not easily revealed by economic data and statistics (Casaba 2017). Since the longer the period of socialist rule is the more these qualitative parts become obstacles, it is imperative that efforts are made to develop civil society

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in North Korea and to equip North Korea with open, active, and resilient social capabilities. What is most important about the marketization process is the changes it has brought to the worldviews and attitudes of North Korean citizens. Fundamentally, markets are based upon the notion of free trade and exchange of capital, commodities, and labor. Markets operate on the premise of free trade between places and nations beyond the borders of a particular region. In such a process, new private, discursive spaces are formed around trade activities. Networks of traders operating between different regions and states, at different market levels, and through different market positions (i.e., retailers and wholesalers) have been developed. Although there are still many inefficiencies, these networks are personal and maintained through private connections, and thus are both confidential and bring high levels of solidarity. Openness to the outside world and cultural contact are essential for change of mindset and values. Values have changed a lot due to market expansion and contact with the Korean Wave. As the market develops and contacts with South Korean culture increase, the values of materialism and individualism are spreading. According to a survey conducted by the IPUS, Seoul National University, more than 40 per cent of the residents have already been exposed to South Korean music, movies, and dramas, so the flow cannot be reversed. Kim Jong-un knows the Korean Wave best among North Koreans. Those who have used South Korean goods are also about 65 per cent and 70 per cent of the individuals surveyed. Survey data also show that news and products from South Korea are spreading mainly in urban areas. Even though collectivism is emphasized nationally, only 15 per cent of the residents prefer collectivism while 84.8 per cent of people prefer individualism, indicating that individualism is dominant. Looking at the trend over the past 10 years, individualism has been dominant over collectivism by 8 to 2 or 9 to 1. Changes in the cultural aspect tend to appear first in the trends of women’s attire and fashion. As the economy developed and the standard of living increased, there were more women in major cities such as Pyongyang, Chongjin, and Wonsan, who ventured out in highly fashionable outfits and hairstyles and, even, switched to wearing high heels. Mobile phones play a significant role in spreading this culture. The number of mobile phone users and the number of contacts with South Korean culture are increasing, affecting the social consciousness and

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values of residents. The remarkable increase in the use of mobile phones in North Korea is one of the most important social changes to take place in the past decade. In December 2008, the mobile communication company ‘Koryolink’ was launched in as a joint venture with Orascom, an Egypt’s telecom company, and since the start of the mobile phone business in North Korea, the number of subscribers has increased exponentially. According to a report titled “Digital 2019: North Korea” (Kemp 2019), 4.28 million North Koreans have signed up for mobile phone service as of January 2019, which shows a sharp increase from the initial 1.7 million in January 2014. Unlike general mobile phone subscribers, there are a registered 300,000 elite class members who use a separate communication network, and most of these individuals are party members, military officers, and government officials. The North Korean authorities are conducting counter-cultural activities to block such cultural changes. The activities of the Moranbong Band and Chongbong Band, founded by the direct suggestion of President Kim Jong-un in July 2012 and July 2015, respectively, played an important role to announce the advent of the Kim Jong-un era. North Korea is making full use of the so-called music politics that uses music to raise socialist consciousness and promote solidarity among the people. The Rejection Act was enacted in December 2020, actively blocking the inflow of foreign cultures, especially the Korean Wave. Even though Kim knows the Korean Wave better than anyone else, Kim fiercely criticizes it as “malignant cancer” and “perverted” and try to reject the Korean Wave. Although Kim Jong-un is known to be a person who prefers the South Korean Wave, he has recently expressed serious caution about it. To guard against the cultural spread of the Korean Wave, the ‘Reactionary Thought and Culture Rejection Act’ was enacted and enforced. Despite international sanctions, human exchange between North Korea and China continued without major difficulty until the border was blocked in order to limit spread of the Covid-19 in early 2020. The number of North Koreans who legally visited China, those with permission from the government, continued to increase prior to the breakout of the virus. While the number of North Koreans visiting China remained steady at around 100,000 until 2010, the number eventually rose to approximately 188,300 in 2015. In time from 2016 to 2020, additional sanctions against North Korea by the United Nations and other international communities have made it difficult for North Koreans to travel as easily into China and Russia, but human traffic has tended to be

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rather frequent as individuals with short-term visa briefly leave North Korea in order to secure insufficient financial resources. Official trade has been severely contracted, but expedient foreign currency earning is still ongoing. However, as North Korea completely closed all borders on its own due to Covid-19 from early 2020, the contraction of human and commercial exchanges is causing a huge blow to North Korea.

Conclusion and Prospects President Kim Jong-un’s will for a normal state has changed North Korea in many ways over the past decade. He tried to normalize the extremely biased practices in the political field, reformed the economic structure, and made efforts to globalize mindsets and worldview. However, the poor economic conditions are holding back. Markets have spread across the country and more than 70 per cent of the people depended on the market in North Korea today. The vast majority of North Koreans utilize markets, and much of the state sector is now reliant on market transactions. As a result, the employment structure of industry as a whole has changed; workers in secondary industries have decreased, moving instead to agricultural and commercial sectors. Marketization has led to the growth of small business owners and even new capitalists. And the gap between the rich and the poor has widened due to the expansion of market, creating a class conflict. In addition, foreign cultural exposure in North Korea continues to increase through trade activities, overseas workers, family visitors, international students, diplomats, and human and material traffic, such as South Korean tourists and North Korean defectors, between the two Koreas. Marketization and economic opening of North Korea will continue, structural changes will accelerate, socio-cultural opening will continue to occur, and North Korean defectors will continue to seek new lives abroad. In comparing the current development of information and communication systems and the trend of economic reform and opening in China with North Korea’s experience, the social changes in North Korea, due to cultural exchange and exposure, will progress much faster than the current pace in the future. At present, nevertheless, the human resource has not developed enough to bring about significant change toward a normal state. It is true that the instability factors of the regime are increasing; but, considering the current situation in which the pride of the Juche Ideology and the support for President Kim Jong-un are also maintained to some extent,

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the internal challenges are not enough. Rather, it is more likely to be challenged by external forces such as international sanctions against North Korea. However, the sanctions also depend on the attitude of China, since one of the important factors supporting the North Korean economy is China. It is true that the ‘China factor’ is important in understanding why the North Korean economy has grown in recent years despite a strong sanction blockade by the United States. In an environment where trade conflict and hegemonic competition between the United States and China are intensifying, the wiggle room North Korea needs for survival is growing, and there is a possibility that North Korean leaders will actively attempt to strengthen the China-North Korean alliance to guarantee China’s interests align with North Korea’s in the process of peace negotiation on the Korean Peninsula. Under the current sanction regime, goal of a normal state is not likely to be met. Furthermore, Covid-19 also will cause enormous difficulties in bringing North Korea to a normal state. In a situation where economic sanctions are difficult to lift in near future, the aspiration to realize a normal state will not come easily. North Korea, in the long term, will need to pursue reform measures including privatization of the national ownership in order to secure state finances and promote economic growth. The housing market has already undergone a great deal of privatization in real term. To do so, they must seek the support and assistance of international financial institutions. However, it is difficult to expect such a possibility under the current sanction regime. The most urgent task for further development of a normal state in North Korea is to open up this currently extremely closed society. Whether it is through demilitarization, renovation, or world-class development, the most urgent task for a normal state is to increase North Korea’s contact with the outside world. For this, so-called globalization and internationalization are needed, which will help to provide an opportunity for North Korea to act in accordance with international norms and standards. In this context, the removal of the portrait of Kim Ilsung and Kim Jong-il in international airport and in the party meetings is a good signal for North Korea to develop into a normal state. North Korea needs such an opportunity to accept not only the necessary and advanced technology, but also international norms and culture if it is to pursue a truly normal state. Cultural cooperation in areas such as the arts, sports, religion, and academic affairs as well as economic cooperation

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should be promoted in the medium term to help North Korea expand its international economic, cultural, and diplomatic networks. For this, communication and mutual understanding is needed on a fundamental level, and development of universal values such as democracy, market economy, and openness is essential. It needs to promote social change through marketization and opening of North Korea. Cultural exchange opportunities, such as through sports and music, are very important in this aspect. Education is also important to help prepare knowledgeable and effective human capital capable for a longterm change. Education on the market economy, public sector reform, and trade are, in particular, highly meaningful for present-day North Korea. It is necessary to build a competent, well-educated society which can take charge in market reform and openness policies within North Korea. In this context, knowledge sharing can be powerful in assisting North Korea to develop the know-how necessary for reforming the system. For this, it is inevitable for North Korea to engage in cooperation with neighboring countries including South Korea, who may be called to take the lead. Because there are serious limitations to North Korea’s internal resources when it comes to strengthen its human capabilities, assistance from countries such as South Korea will be paramount.

Notes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

6.

7. 8. 9. 10.

Dueck (2006: 224–230). King and Zeng (2001: 623). Min et al. (2009: 58–59). “Kim Jong-un, ‘treat as a normal country’” Dong-A Ilbo, March 8, 2018. Kim Jong-un, “Report of the 7th Third Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea,” The Korean Central News Agency, 2018.4.21. Kim Jong-un, “On the task of our Party to more vigorously accelerate socialist construction to meet the demands of a new high stage of revolutionary development,” Report of the 7th Third Plenary Meeting of the Workers’ Party of Korea, April 20, 2018. Rodong Sinmun, June 27, 2019. Kim Jong-un, “2019 New Year’s Address.” January 1, 2019. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (2021). Rodong Sinmun, January 9, 2021.

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11. Bank of Korea (2021: 1) 12. Agricultural workers here include cooperative farm workers classified as farmers in North Korea, and the state farm workers are classified as workers in North Korea. Cooperative farm workers accounted for 23.5 per cent and state farm workers accounted for 7.2 per cent so that the total number of farmers is about 30.7 per cent in 1993.

References Bank of Korea. “Estimates of North Korea’s Economic Growth Rate in 2020.” July, 2021. Casaba, Laszlo. “Comparative Transition Studies: Past, Present, Future.” Presented at Conflict and Integration as Conditions and Processes in Transitioning Societies of Eastern Europe and East Asia. November 8–9, 2017. Central Bureau of Statistics, DPRK. “Tabulation on the Population Census of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.” 1995. Central Bureau of Statistics, DPRK, and United Nations Population Fund. “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Socio-Economic, Demographic and Health Survey 2014.” 2015. Central Bureau of Statistics of DPR Korea. “DPR Korea 2008 Population Census National Report.” 2009. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. “DPRK Voluntary National Review on the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda for the Sustainable Development.” June, 2021. Dueck, Colin. “Strategies for Managing Rogue States.” Orbis 50, no. 2. (2006): 223–241. Hansun Foundation. The Road to Unification: Normalization of North Korea [ 통일의 길: 북한의 정상국가화]. Hansun Foundation, 2014. Kemp, Simon. “Digital 2019: North Korea.” 2019. Kim Jong-un, “On the Task of Our Party to More Vigorously Accelerate Socialist Construction to Meet the Demands of a New High Stage of Revolutionary Development.” Report of the 7th Third Plenary Meeting of the Workers’ Party of Korea, April 20, 2018. Kim Jong-un, “Report of the 7th Third Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea.” The Korean Central News Agency, April 21, 2018. Kim Jong-un, “2019 New Year’s Address.” January 1, 2019.

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Kim, Philo. “An Analysis of Religious Forms of Juche Ideology in Comparison with Christianity.” International Journal of Korean Unification Studies 11, no. 1 (2002): 127–44. King, Gary, and Langche Zeng. “Improving Forecasts of State Failure.” World Politics 53, no. 4 (2001): 623–658. Min, Byung-won, Dong-joon Cho, and Chi-wook Kim. International Relations and Changes in North Korea after the Cold War [탈전 이후 국제관계와 북한 의 변화]. Korea Institute for National Unification, 2009. US White House. “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America.” September 2002.

CHAPTER 5

Popular Religion in North Korea Heonik Kwon

North Korea today is not the same place as the North Korea of the twentieth century. The formal structure of its state system remains largely unchanged—notably the centrality of the paramount leadership. This is irrespective of the fact that some shift has taken place since the current third-generation leadership took over power in 2011, especially in the balance of power between the party and the army in favor of the former. Some new developments are observed also in the country’s diplomatic terrain. Notable in this sphere is the escalating contest of power between the United States and China, which observers argue is enforcing on Asia and beyond a divisive international solidarity. The phenomenon has critical ramifications especially in the Korean Peninsula, considering the fact that the two great powers were principal international actors in the 1950– 1953 war in Korea. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Pyongyang has been making active gesture of rhetorical support for its old Cold War-era ally. There are rising concerns in the international community now as to the ways in which this gesture is developing to incorporate a material form. These are significant developments; however,

H. Kwon (B) Seoul National University Asia Center, Seoul, South Korea e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 B.-Y. Kim (ed.), The North Korean Regime under Kim Jong-un, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-8525-8_5

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great changes are observed also in relations between the state and society. Most prominent would be the general collapse of the social economic order, especially that of the state-distribution system of food and other basic subsistence goods commonly referred to as the baegeup system. The Korean society north of the 38th Parallel is no longer dependent on the state for its physical survival today. The state has long stopped being the paternalistic caretaker of its citizens’ material survival and wellbeing, although in the rhetorical sphere, it has never been anything short of an all-encompassing political pater familias throughout its 75 years of existence. Prominent observers explain the situation in terms of a precarious marketization of socioeconomic lives, ongoing in the country (Kim 2017; Smith 2015). The marketization in this context is a somewhat unique process, distinct from what is familiar to us in relation to Asia’s other existing socialist nations. The process in North Korea began primarily as a bottom-up development in reaction to the generalized meltdown of the state’s public distribution system in the second half of the 1990s, following the disintegration of the international socialist politicoeconomic order in the beginning of that decade. This is distinct from the initially top-down, state-driven economic reform as is the case with China or Vietnam. A number of observers have examined North Korea’s transition from the state-commanded political economy to the so-called era of nonbaegeup (bi-baegeup sidae). Some deal with the painful reality of extreme economic hardship and humanitarian crisis of the late 1990s, whereas many others concentrate on the ensuing marketization of social economy and related contest of power between the state and the market. Nearly all of them take note of derivative changes found within social milieus, such as in the gender relations, observing that women are by far the most active participants in North Korea’s new informal economy and its many new local marketplaces. However, one notable outcome of the precarious marketization of the North Korean socioeconomic life has not received the attention that it deserves. This is the return of a genre of traditional popular religion—in particular, the explosive growth of fortune-telling and related cultural practices in North Korean citizens’ everyday lives since the late 1990s and especially since the beginning of the 2000s. Nominally an outlawed practice and punished (sometimes severely) if discovered, fortune-telling is, nevertheless, a highly familiar aspect of everyday life decision-making and life-cycle rituals in today’s North Korea. Information on this phenomenon is limited (as religion and religious

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culture continue to be a vehemently guarded subject in the country); hence, this essay is nothing more than a preliminary inquiry into North Korea’s popular religiosity based on scattered and fragmented evidence and reports. It will first consider the question of religion, broadly defined, in North Korea’s political genesis, before moving on to the specific issue of popular religion, past and present.

Religion in the Early Cold War Korea The question of religion, in both political societies of the Korean Peninsula, is inseparable from the experience of the Korean War. The partition of Korea and the following civil war in 1950–1953 “played a central role in shaping the attitudes of Koreans toward religion,” according to KyungKoo Han, South Korea’s prominent cultural anthropologist (Han 2010). Of several issues relating to how the experience of war affected Korea’s religious social landscape, Han highlights the reality of mass population displacement, especially the dislocation of the northerners to the south of the 38th Parallel. Most notable was the exodus of northern Presbyterians, who subsequently exerted a huge influence on the traditionally weaker southern Protestant community. However, Han urges the reader not to ignore other less institutionalized religions, such as the many shamanism traditions of northern Korea, and how these locally-grounded religious forms came to terms with the war-caused deracination from their long-familiar locales. The partition of Korea “devastated the Christian community,” according to Donald Clark (2003: 301), for it trapped a great number of Christians in the Soviet-occupied North. South Korea’s church history scholarship describes the exodus to the South by the northern Christians during this period to be a pivotal episode leading to the ensuing monumental growth of Protestantism in the Cold War-era South Korea. Korea’s northern regions, especially those in the northwest where Pyongyang is located, were the original stronghold of Protestant missions, primarily those from America’s northern Presbyterian society, to the extent that before the 1940s the city of Pyongyang used to be referred to as the Jerusalem in the East (Clark 2003: 116–141). Between 1945 and 1953, a large number of these Northwest Christians, as they were called, left their homeland, threatened by the revolutionary campaigns, first during

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the Soviet occupation and later by the North Korean state (Clark 2003: 301–304; Hoare and Pares 2005; Kim and Kim 2015: 162–168). An estimated 7–10 thousand of them, nearly half of the total number of Korean Protestants at that time, joined the exodus to the US-occupied South. Once in the South, these Northwest Christians quickly rebuilt their house of worship, as did the renowned cleric Reverend Kyungchik Han, who opened a small church in central Seoul, consisting of several dozen northern refugees. In less than two years, his church had grown to a ten-thousand-strong establishment, which some observers today consider to be the first megachurch in Korea. Other northernorigin settler or refugee churches also appeared in Incheon, a port to the west of Seoul, where many refugees from the northern Hwanghae and Pyongan regions found their first new home before some of them moved on to Seoul and elsewhere. The largest exodus took place during the time of the Korean War, especially amid the chaos at the end of 1950 and at the beginning of 1951. This was when the United Nations forces, having pushed the North Korean People’s Army (KPA) to Korea’s frontier with China, had to retreat following the intervention of China in the theater of the Korean War at the end of October 1950. During the war, the refugeed Northwest Christians rebuilt their houses of worship in Pusan, Daegu, and in other places that had escaped occupation by the communist forces during the latter’s rapid southward advance from June to September 1950. Reverend Han’s church, Youngnak Presbyterian Church in Seoul, for instance, established its chapters in Daegu, Pusan, and on the island of Jeju at the time. The Korean War caused great suffering to the Koreans, and Korea’s Christian population was no exception on this. During the North Korean occupation, and especially their hurried retreat from southern territory from late September to October 1950, the KPA and their local recruits committed a number of atrocities directed against civilians they believed harbored hostility to their revolutionary agenda and war efforts. Although the victims were primarily people associated with South Korea’s state administration and its military (and their families), and those classified as class enemies, in a number of localities the so-called revolutionary violence was also waged against members of local churches. Some of the places where civilian massacres took place are now sites of pilgrimage, recognized as historical sites of religious martyrdom. Institutionally, however, the war also provided a great momentum for vitality and growth to Korea’s Protestant movement. In her recent book,

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The Korean War and Protestantism, the church historian Jeongran Yoon delves into this milieu of religious revival amid the destruction of war, asking why, in some church circles of South Korea, the experience of the Korean War is propagated as the revelation of Grace (Yoon 2015, 2017: 233–258). The way in which the 1950–1953 war becomes an event of Grace has many facets to it—most notably, the mystical understanding that the suffering and destruction caused by the war were part of a divine plan to realize a Kingdom of God in Asia—that is, to turn Korea into a Christian nation. As a graduate of Soongsil University, which Reverend Han helped to establish in Seoul to replace the defunct Soongsil Academy of Pyongyang, Yoon is familiar with the history of the Christian movement in the Northwest region that was strong, in the early twentieth century, not only with Presbyterian missions but also with the modernizing elite. These two factors, cultural and economic, may speak closely to how Max Weber explained the relationship between the Protestant ethic and the logic of capitalism. Yoon depicts how these God-fearing, educated, politically moderate, and entrepreneurial Christians, who were also the economic elite and opinion leaders in Pyongyang and its environs, on encountering and suffering the heavy-handed revolutionary politics in their northern home, especially the sweeping land reform that shattered not only their own but also their churches’ economic basis, transformed into some of the most fervent and militant anti-communist warriors in the postcolonial era. The experience of the Korean War further radicalized their politically charged religious commitment. The war was a radical existential crisis for the Christian refugees from northern Korea, understood as a possible permanent loss of a secure home after the loss of their original homes in the North. This existential status, both religious and political, however, was also hugely advantageous on the south side of the 38th Parallel in the early Cold War. According to Sebastian Kim and Kirsteen Kim (2015: 176– 177): [The] influx from the north energised churches in the south and encouraged them to grow. [In] the Presbyterian Church, which made up 70 per cent of Korean Protestants in 1954, refugees from the north-west had taken over the church structure, purged what they perceived as a liberal church and deeply divided it as a result of disputes which originated in the north. Other Protestant churches also were subject to similar pressures, although not to the same extent. Now the majority

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of the churches in the south adopted the north-west style of Christianity—conservative, self-supporting, self-propagating, hard-working and vehemently anti-Communist.

The US Military Government saw the Northwest Christian refugees as the natives it could work with. These were people who shared with Americans Christian values and enmity against God-denying communism—in contrast to many other native political leaders they encountered in Korea whom that government regarded as too left-leaning or too nationalistic (meaning, in this context, putting the ideal of national liberation ahead of the imperative of struggle against international communism). Some of these native Christian leaders were educated in America and therefore spoke their language. These included the Princeton-educated nationalist leader and Methodist Elder Syngman Rhee, who became the first President of independent South Korea in August 1948. A vastly disproportionate number of Christian leaders joined Rhee’s cabinet, and Rhee kept the Northwest group as a close collaborator (and instrument) for his rule (1948–1960)—as did the US Military Government before him (1945–1948)—although in the later years of his rule, the Northwest Christians came to fall out of Rhee’s favor. It also happened that the establishment of the US Military Government meant the return of the American mission activity to Korea, which had been discontinued during the Pacific War (Clark 2003: 291–301). Some members of the Military Government were children (or grandchildren) of the early American missionaries in Korea, and these people helped to provide the Korean church leaders with a privileged access to the Military Government. This connectivity between American missionaries and Korean church leaders was not limited to the sphere of postcolonial Korean society and politics but increasingly took on an international character. Church leaders in nascent South Korea fast resumed and strengthened their ties to their religious counterparts in the United States and, through it, developed access to public opinion and the policy circles. In this regard, Yoon discusses, in length, the international network forged in the 1950s between some of South Korea’s church leaders and groups, on the one hand, and, on the other, Carl McIntire and his strongly anti-communist, religiously fundamentalist movement (whose frequent street-march slogan was: “God-Yes, Communism-No”)—a political religious movement whose legacies continue to reverberate in both the

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United States and South Korea today (Yoon 2015: 115–148; 2017: 245–246). On the other side of the Cold War frontier, North Korea waged an aggressive assault against religion and religious communities during the war and its postwar reconstruction era, especially against those communities that challenged their political mandate (Hoare and Pares 2005: 88–89; Park 2003: 158–170). In the early postcolonial era, the North Korean revolution initially did have elements of pragmatism, seeking to bring these communities to a united front for state-building. The Soviet power that supported this process also applied a more conciliatory approach to Christian communities in Korea than it did in the East European or Baltic regions. According to Charles Armstrong, this was due to the fact that the Soviets realized that the Protestants, despite their relatively small numbers, had a forceful voice in the northern society and tremendous organizational capacity in the space of decolonization (Armstrong 2004). Byung-ro Kim also defines North Korea’s pre-war approach to religious groupings broadly as politics of assimilation and selective exclusion (into and from the political sphere), distinguishing it from the generalized, eliminationist anti-religion politics in the postwar years (Kim 2020). After the Korean War, however, as Kim mentions, the North Korean revolution began to define religious questions increasingly in a dogmatically Soviet way—ignoring the immense difference between a pre-revolutionary Russia, where the Orthodox Church exerted enormous political influence, and postcolonial situations in Korea, which traditionally is a predominantly secular and religiously pluralist society having no such state-church collusion. The civil war in 1950–1953 radicalized the fault line between the revolutionary state and what it regarded as counterrevolutionary religions, in part because of the intervention in the war by a “Protestant” country, the United States, that frustrated North Korea’s ambition for national unification. Added to the northern state’s association of Korean Protestantism with America’s imperial power (and hence, as the enemy of the Korean revolution) was the historical fact that Protestantism was introduced to Korea, at the end of the nineteenth century, primarily by American missionaries (Park 2003: 166). Earlier I noted Kyung-Koo Han’s remark on the war-caused changes in Korea’s religious sphere, both in the institutionalized religions and in the “little tradition” of diffused traditional popular religious customs and ideas (see also Kang 2020). In contrast to the relatively well-documented

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accounts of the place of institutional religion (e.g., northern Protestantism) during the Korean War and Korea’s turbulent early Cold War more broadly, what the political crisis meant to traditional popular religions and their practitioners remains a scarcely researched topic. The memoirs of Keum-hwa Kim, a prominent South Korean shamaness of northern Korean origin who recently passed away, offer glimpses to this question (Kim 2014). Kim’s memoirs highlight two historical periods as times of great hardship. One was during the Korean War, especially during the early days of the war, when her home region of Hwanghae, like other places of North Korea, was briefly occupied by the South Korean and other United Nations forces. By October 1950, the KPA was in disarray and in hurried retreat to the north of the 38th Parallel and then on to the country’s border with China. This followed their swift and triumphant takeover of nearly the whole of South Korea, from July to September 1950. This change of tide was facilitated by the successful amphibious landing of US and South Korean forces in Incheon harbor in mid-September 1950. Evidence suggests that during this brief and turbulent time, which led to another reversal of the tide following China’s intervention in the Korea conflict at the end of October 1950, the retreating northern military and political forces conducted a clean-up action against people whose loyalty to the revolutionary regime and war efforts they doubted. These allegedly subversive elements included people who held religious beliefs or practiced “superstitions.” By that time, Keum-hwa Kim was an established ritual actor in her village area on the western coast, having been chosen by the village to conduct the important dong-je, a communitywide ritual on behalf of the village’s guardian spirits. Facing the prospect of being publicly labeled as a believer in superstition, and trying to escape persecution, Kim volunteered to join the local revolutionary Women’s League. In another episode, Kim underwent an intense ordeal of interrogation (including sessions of self-criticism) in the hands of the local party cell, after a modest healing rite she held in a neighbor’s house had been caught by the party’s security network and its webs of neighborhood selfsurveillance system. Fortunately for her, a long-time client intervened and rescued her from captivity. The woman’s son was in a position of considerable authority in the local Workers’ Party, and she and her family had benefitted from Kim’s curative ritual before. Political repression against shamanism and other related traditional cultural customs did not only come from North Korea’s revolutionary

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state authorities, however. Kim’s testimony makes it clear that the brief occupation of her northern homeland by the southern police and paramilitary forces during the Korean War, at the end of 1950, was an equally terrifying time, and the intimidation she underwent during this time was in some ways more menacing than any she had experienced earlier in the hands of the northern revolutionary vanguard and youth groups. In her memoirs, she recalls a life-threatening moment during the occupation, in the presence of a South Korean state security officer (whom she calls a CID officer), to whom communism and shamanism were indistinguishable and belonged in the same pit of abominable superstitions (Kim 2014: 113–121). The CID stands for the “criminal investigation department,” ununiformed personnel in the British police forces. In the American system, it refers to the United States Army Criminal Investigation Command, whereas in South Korea, during the Korean War, the same acronym was used for the special branch of the military specializing in anti-communist surveillance and counterinsurgency combat activities. The organization carried out sweeping arrest and summary killings against alleged communist suspects during the very early days of the Korean War in areas of South Korea that were in risk of being run over by the rapidly advancing northern communist army. It is known that about 200,000 civilians, who were citizens of South Korea, fell victim to this generalized state terror against society, whose rationale was to prevent these individuals from aiding and collaborating with the enemy (Kwon 2020: 21–36). The assault against civilian lives continued throughout the war, later changing in character to a punitive action, directed against those who were suspected of having collaborated with the northern communist forces during their occupation of the South. It is no surprise then that the so-called CID was an object of great fear for numerous families and communities in South Korea during the war. What we learn from Kim’s memoirs—she is not alone in testifying to the brutality of South Korea’s CID—is that this organization’s terror against society also extended to places in northern Korea. We also learn that the state violence such as that committed by the South Korean CID was not merely against ideological and political suspects but also could be against any individuals and social groups that the state machinery regarded as not conforming to the specific form of political modernity that it aspired to realize. Shamanism was under pressure from the state-driven anti-superstition politics on the other side of the Cold War border, too, and during the time of state-building in southern part of Korea, although this does

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not appear in Kim’s testimony as it was not part of her life experience. In his report on “The US Military Government’s religion policy,” the historian of religion Don-ku Kang explores the strong institutional favoritism shown toward Christian leaders and groups by the US Military Government in Korea (1945–1948), and again under South Korea’s first postcolonial government headed by Syngman Rhee, who the Military Government helped bring to power (Kang 1993: 15–42). This favoritism was manifested in a number of ways, including the introduction of a disproportionate number of Christian leaders to key state administrative positions, legislations of the so-called recognized public religions (thus excluding other social religious sectors), and the empowerment of northern-refugee Protestant leaders and youth groups as part of the militancy against communism. It also involved the introduction of the institution of (Christian-only) Chaplaincy into the nascent Republic of Korea army, a measure whose significance in the history of Korean Protestantism was later manifested in the aftermath of the Korean War when the number of church attendees began to explode in South Korea. When the country’s Parliament first opened on May 31, 1948, Rhee asked a parliamentarian and Methodist priest to open the historic event with a prayer. The prayer lasted for about 10 minutes, at the end of which all the parliamentarians stood up and collectively joined it. This extraordinary happening was irrespective of the fact that at that time only about 2 percent of the southern Korean population identified themselves as protestants. The imposition of this radically affirmative policy, which privileged the Church in such a predominantly secular and religiously diverse society as Korea, evolved in the southern half in parallel with the emergence of a broadly Soviet-style anti-Church and anti-religion politics in the northern half. The North’s postwar anti-religion politics eventually crushed on all religions, as they were all considered superstitious and counter-revolutionary beliefs; the South’s Christianity-privileging politics might be considered pro-religious freedom, but only in a highly selective and distorted way, thereby creating its own derivative moral hierarchy of what constitutes the true worldview versus what makes a superstition. In 1947, the Seoul Metropolitan Police (of the US Military Government) declared a “war against superstition” with an astonishingly belligerent message1 :

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Nowadays superstitious deeds such as mudang ’s kut-plays and pudakgeori [derogatory reference to shamanic rituals] are prospering, thereby exerting grave evil influences in the domain of social re-education. This situation cannot be ignored. Acknowledging that it is difficult to obliterate longinherited customs at a single stroke, the Metropolitan Police has chosen fifteen sites in different parts of the city and issued a stern directive that, from now on, all prayer activities must be held only within these designated places. If, despite our directive, we discover any noisy pudakgeori and kut plays are held in private homes or mudang ’s own houses within the city boundary, these will be punished severely and we shall thoroughly purge them.

The above demonstrates that popular religions were under considerable political pressure on both sides of partitioned postcolonial Korea. The ensuing Korean War was a life-changing experience for Keum-hwa Kim, not only with the changing waves of violence it involved, but also because it meant the loss of the communal basis on which her vocational and existential being as a practitioner of indigenous religious form depended. In her memoirs, Madame Kim describes the latter as the most painful and irrevocable consequence of her war-induced dislocation from home.

The Return of Popular Religiosity Now, let us return briefly to the old Jerusalem of the East and its environs to see how conditions are today in the northern half of the Korean Peninsula. There has been an explosive growth of fortune-telling in North Korean citizens’ everyday lives since the beginning of the 2000s. Nominally an outlawed practice, fortune-telling is now a highly familiar aspect of everyday life decision-making in the country. This phenomenon clearly relates to the generalized radical crisis of economic meltdown and related collapse of the state’s food distribution system in North Korea with the end of the Cold War, in the second half of the 1990s, which, referred to as the Arduous March in the country’s media, caused unimaginable pain to ordinary North Koreans and numerous loss of life to hunger and malnutrition. Long-distance traders consult local fortune-tellers before deciding on the date and direction of their journeys, often employing other modest improvised ritualistic gestures such as throwing handful of salt behind one’s back in the hope of avoiding bad lucks. Some carry a pouch with a

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handful of dried black beans in it for the same purpose. People who are expected to visit their relatives in Northeast China seek help from fortunetellers—to determine the auspicious date and also to do small rituals in the hope of augmenting the chance for a successful visit, which usually involves some form of business activity or short-term overseas employment. One middle-aged woman went to see a fortune-teller in her town along North Korea’s border with China shortly after her husband passed away and while her family was undergoing severe economic hardship. She was told that should she move to a land in the south, new economic prosperity and personal security are to be found. She eventually decided to try a new life in South Korea, after consulting again with the fortuneteller about her two children, who would actually benefit, so she was told, from their mother’s being away in the southern land. A number of these local fortune-telling actors themselves took the difficult decision to move to South Korea, hoping to practice their trade openly and without fearing punishment. In deciding to do so, some were also driven by the commanding desire of their guardian or tutelary spirits, according to an informant now settled in a northern suburb of Seoul, “to play in an open space”—that is, to exhibit their power and efficacy, rather than in secretive divination sessions, in the entertaining public space of a kut , which is not available in the north of the 38th Parallel yet. One of the challenges these actors face in their new home is how to acquire the traditional knowledge and techniques of the kut —a tradition that has discontinued in their northern home since the 1950s. Testimonial evidence by these migrant actors suggests that engagement with fortune-telling is closely intertwined with questions of mobility at the grassroots level. Moreover, the practice is far from restricted in the lower or outer circles of social hierarchy. Party elites and their families also take part in the particular cultural religious practice as a way of countering the reality of uncertainties that is now deeply embedded in their status security and social mobility prospects. It is also the case that the fortune-telling practices are grounded in a broader milieu of shared moral sentiments. A good example would be an incident that took place in the beginning of 2000s at a community close to North Korea’s border with China. In this incident, a middle-aged local man was on his way to visit his parents’ grave, carrying a bottle of rice wine and some cooked meat that he had prepared, with difficulty, for an offering to his deceased parents. He encountered two army sentinel on the way, who forced him to hand over to them his food and drink. The man was sorry to pay a

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tomb visit without any food offerings and cried when doing so. Shortly afterward, the two soldiers began experiencing swollen lips and distorted facial muscles. The story ends with these two soldiers recovering their health after making a gesture of apology to the man’s parents’ graves. This act of reparation was orchestrated by a local fortune-teller, after she was approached by the family of one of the soldiers. Evidence also suggests that similar episodes involving spirits’ power existed in parts of North Korea throughout the post-Korean War era, at least since the 1970s when the earlier struggle against anti-revolutionary or feudal cultural elements became relatively moderated (or was considered to have been completed). Carefully sheltered within circles of trusted relatives and friends only, these episodes typically involve an intervention by a local actor who practices some improvised forms of spirit possession and communication. The current revival in fortune-telling should probably be seen in light of such a pre-existing habitat of informal spirit practices. Although much more has to be known about the revival of these traditional practices before making an analytical judgment as to the place of this particular cultural form in today’s North Korean socioeconomic condition, it is safe to make the tentative observation that the return of this traditional cultural form relates closely to the retreat of the state as the guarantor of social security and the related empowerment of nonstate institutions, such as the family, as an alternative decision-maker in life trajectories. We can even make the somewhat functionalist point that the magical practice of fortune-telling fills the vacuum left by the demise of the previously encompassing, rhetorically magic-performing state (on the idea of the state as a magic-performer, see Buck-Morss 2000 and Taussig 1997)—that is, in terms of the breakdown of the state as a guarantor of basic subsistence and as part of the society’s desperate search for an alternative way to imagine and generate minimal human security. Fortune-telling practices may appear to be fairly individuated acts. Those who seek such assistance must bring to the consultation an individual’s authentic information (e.g., year and date of birth in the lunar calendar) as well as her or his specific wishes. In actuality, however, such practices are rarely individual matters but rather involve the integrity of an intimate relational milieu such as the family. People consult about their specific futures not necessarily for their own sake but instead in view of their shared collective futures. Considering this, we can conclude that the rise

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of fortune-telling in North Korea entails a decisive shift in the balance of power between the family and the state in terms of their agency in future-making.

Concluding Remarks 70 years after the Korean War and the onset of a militant revolutionary struggle against religions and “superstitions” in the northern half, therefore, it appears that religion and religious practice are finding their way back in North Korea. Some Christian groups in South Korea and the United States might like to see this returning religion to be the power of the Kingdom of God and this only—the evangelization of North Korea has been a vital agenda in the advent of Korea’s Protestantism after the Korean War and continues to be so to the present day. Concerns about conditions in North Korea where “the denial of religious freedom is absolute [and] the state enforces the absolute denial of religion through the active mobilization of the organs of the government” also continue to be voiced.2 The “denial of religious freedom” is true; however, it is also true that in the grassroots reality of today’s North Korea, there are developments that are oblivious of this long-held political truism. Religion is back in the north of the Korean Peninsula, and what is returning is, for now, not yet the message of the Gospel but a host of the so-called gibok sinang (meaning literally, “making good luck” religions)—the very old tradition of Korea’s spiritual life that had long been considered incompatible with the diffusion of this message. For the purpose of this essay, one can add that in this religious cultural sphere, certain commonality is found between today’s North Korean society and its southern counterpart where fortune-telling remains a familiar part of life-cycle rituals. In both societies, moreover, albeit in distinct ways, the ideology of a disenchanted and enlightened modern society coexists with the proliferation of magical or even superstitious customs (that is, seen from the perspective of disenchantment). In this context, modernity involves a non-alignment between a powerful ideology of disenchantment and a forceful continuity and reinvention of magical practices—a condition that is found elsewhere in East Asia (Taylor 2007). The return of the art of “making good luck” is a notable phenomenon in North Korea. It takes up a marginal place in the scholarship of North Korean studies, however, compared to the much-discussed retreat of the

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state from the economic sphere and related commodification and monetization of socioeconomic life. Evidence for this phenomenon remains limited and scattered. Despite these limitations, the returning “making good luck” practices are worth an attention, as they may entail that irrevocable and powerful changes are indeed taking place in North Korea at the grassroots level. This change is both practical and moral in implication, and, if properly understood, can say much about the balance of power between state and society. We may also take the return as showing that today’s North Korea, contrary to the state’s tireless political rhetoric, is no longer a revolutionary society but rather a fairly mature post-revolutionary society. The last is in view of what we witnessed in Asia’s other formerly revolutionary political societies such as Vietnam and China, which experienced a forceful revival of popular religious sentiments and passions during their transition to market socialism.

Notes 1. Seoul Sinmun (Seoul Daily), November 20, 1947. 2. Cited from Organized Persecution: Documenting Violations of Religious Freedom in North Korea, special report by the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (2021), p. 5.

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Index

A “All-out Concentration Policy for Economic Building”, 19 Anti-religion politics, 129, 132 Arduous March, 75, 133 Armistice Agreement, 51 Arms control, 30, 31, 35, 38, 42, 44, 51 Axis of evil, 96

B Baegeup, 124 Baekdu bloodline, 4, 17, 21 Bank of Korea (BOK), 75, 88 Biden, Joe, 45, 50 Bureau of Secretariat of WPK, 12

C “Cabinet Responsibility System”, 11 Central planning, 59, 60 China, 59, 63, 74, 75, 87, 88, 123, 124, 126, 130, 134, 137 Christianity, 128, 132

Code of the WPK, 22 Cold War, 123, 125, 127, 129–131, 133 Commodification, 137 Communism, 128, 131, 132 Complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement (CVID), 42, 43 Constitution, 22, 23 Covid-19, 8, 15, 82, 83, 85, 86, 101, 105, 116–118

D Daily NK, 70, 78 Decolonization, 129 Demilitarization, 118 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), 2 Denuclearization, 29–31, 33–35, 38, 40–44, 46–48, 50, 51 Deterrence, 30, 31, 34–38, 44, 49, 51 end of nuclear deterrence, 44 triad of, 38 Disenchantment, 136

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 B.-Y. Kim (ed.), The North Korean Regime under Kim Jong-un, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-8525-8

149

150

INDEX

E Economy-defense parallel line (Policy of Byungjin), 98, 100, 102–104 Enterprise Law, 99, 103

F Factory-party committee, 103 Failed state, 96, 97, 102 Families of war veterans, 112 Family, 130, 134–136 Famine, 60, 83, 84 Farm Law, 99 Field guidance, 15, 24 Foreign trade, 61, 62, 74, 75, 79, 81–83, 85 Fortune-telling, 124, 133–136

G General Bureau of Reconnaissance, 18 General market, 108, 110 General Secretary of the WPK, 11, 12 Gibok sinang , 136 Globalization, 105, 113, 118 Growth rates, 60, 75, 88

H Han Kyung-chik, 126 Hanoi Summit, 75 Households, 59–64, 67, 71, 72, 74, 77, 79, 82–84, 87, 89 Hwanghae, 126, 130 Hyon Yong-chol, 12

I Income shocks, 79–81, 84, 89 Institute for Peace and Unification Studies (IPUS), 60, 62, 64–66, 76, 82, 84, 88

Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), 15, 62, 74, 100 International sanction, 101, 116, 118

J Jangmadang , 63, 65, 74, 77, 78, 88 Jang Song-thaek, 13, 99, 105 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, 30, 40, 41 Jonghapsijang , 63, 74 Jo Yong-won, 24 Juche Ideology, 4, 10, 15, 22, 25, 107, 112, 117 July 1st Economic Management Improvement Measures, 61

K Kim Il-sung, 2–4, 11, 20, 22, 23 Kim Il-sung-Kim Jong-il-ism, 4, 93, 100, 101, 106, 107, 112 Kim Il-sung-Kim Jong-il-ist Youth League, 106, 111 Kim Il-sung-Kim Jong-il-ization, 4 Kim Jong-il, 1, 3, 4, 9–12, 20, 22–24, 60, 61, 77, 84, 86 Kim Jong-un, 1–4, 9–22, 24, 25, 59–64, 74, 77, 81–85, 87 Kim Keum-hwa, 130, 133 Kim Yo-jong, 24 Korean People’s Army (KPA), 11, 12, 18 Korean War, 125–127, 129–133, 136 Koryolink, 116 Kut , 133, 134

L Loyalty fund, 74

INDEX

M Market income, 84 Marketization, 59–64, 71, 75, 83–86, 108, 109, 115, 117, 119, 124 Market reform, 108, 109, 113, 119 Markets, 59–64, 67, 74, 75, 77, 81–87, 89 Merchant class, 110, 113 “Military-First Policy”, 11, 14, 20 Military-First Politics, 98, 99, 102 Ministry of People’s Security, 18 Ministry of State Security, 18 Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces, 12, 18 Mobility, 134 Monetization, 137 Monthly income, 65, 67, 69, 70, 77, 78, 81 Moon Jae-in, 19 Moranbong Band, 105, 113, 116 Music politics, 116

N National Defence Commission (NDC), 11, 13, 100 New strategic line, 102, 103 Normal party-state, 12 Normal state, 94–103, 105, 108–110, 113, 117, 118 North Korea existential insecurity, 31, 32, 39 Law of Nuclear Forces Policy, 35, 45 nuclear armament, 31, 39, 47 nuclear tests, 33, 38, 44 Nuclear Weapons State Law, 33, 35, 44 sanctions, 30, 31, 38, 43, 50 UNSC resolutions, 46 North Korean defectors, 62, 64–66, 74, 82, 84, 87, 88

151

Northwest Christians, 125, 126, 128 Nuclear coercion, 45, 46 Nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ), In Mongolia, 40 Nuclear weapons, 62, 74, 85

O Official jobs, 71, 73, 76 Organization and Guidance Department of the WPK, 18

P Pacific War, 128 “Parallel Policy of Economic and Nuclear Development”, 11, 19 Partisan clique, 3 Party Congress, 81, 82 Pompeo, Mike, 41 Popular religion, 124, 125, 130, 133 Presbyterians, 125, 127 Privatization, 109, 118 Proliferation, 30, 34, 39, 40, 47 demand side, 39, 47 supply side, 39, 47, 48 Public distribution system (PDS), 60 “Public People-First Policy”, 16, 20, 100, 108 Pyongan, 126 Pyongyang, 76, 88

R Rajin-Sonbong Economic Special Zone, 109 Refugees, 126–128 Regional self-reliance system, 103 Religion, 124, 125, 129, 130, 132, 136 Responsibility System in Socialist Enterprise Management, 63 Restoration of NPT regime, 38, 39

152

INDEX

Six-Party Talks, 34, 38, 41, 43 verification issue, 38, 43 Revolutionary School, 111 Ri Sol-ju, 25 Ri Young-ho, 12 Rogue state, 95–98, 102 Russia, 75, 85 S Sanctions, 61, 62, 64, 74–77, 79, 81–85, 89 Schelling, Thomas, 29, 51 Security assurance, 30, 35, 40, 41, 47, 51. See also Nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ), In Mongolia Security Command of the KPA, 18 Self-reliance, 62, 81 Seongbun, 18 75th anniversary of WPK, 15 Shamanism, 125, 130, 131 Shortages, 82 Singapore summit, 105, 106 Smuggling, 72, 74, 79, 82–84 Socialism, 59, 60, 84, 85 Socialist Patriotic Youth League, 101, 106, 111 Socialist system, 97, 98, 109, 110, 114 South Korea opinion on nuclear development, 30 Soviet Union, 59, 60 Spirit possession, 135 State Affairs Commission (SAC), 18, 100, 101 State of the Union Address, 81 State-owned enterprises (SOEs), 63, 64, 76 State-run grain shops, 82, 90 Study Rooms for Kim Il-sung-Kim Jong-il-ism, 112 Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), 15

Superstition, 130–132, 136 Suryeong , 2–13, 15–21, 24 T “Ten Principles”, 4, 11, 22 The 8th Party Congress, 12, 15, 16, 20, 24, 99, 100, 102, 103, 105, 106, 111 The City/County Development Act, 114 The great famine, 84 The Internationale, 106 The Korean War, 99, 106, 113 The socialist commercial system, 81, 83 The (South) Korean Wave, 115, 116 The War in Ukraine, 30, 46–48, 50 Totalitarian socialist dynasty, 2, 10 Traders, 63, 74, 81, 84, 86, 87 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (or Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty: NPT), 38 denuclearization, 38 Trump, Donald, 19, 33, 35, 38, 42, 47, 83 U United Front Department of the WPK, 18 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 62, 74, 81 United States (US), 30–38, 40–49, 51 extended deterrence, 39, 46, 48 US Military Government, 128, 132 US-North Korea relations, 44 axis of evil, 32, 34, 50 Trump-Kim summits, 41 US-South Korea relations alliance, 51 Biden-Yoon summit, 50

INDEX

US-ROK Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), 50 W Weak state, 96, 97, 102 Weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 95, 97 Weber, Max, 127

153

Workers’ Party Central Committee’s Plenary Session, 81 Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), 3, 4, 11, 12, 15, 17, 18, 23, 24

Y Yoon Suk Yeol, 50