The New Islamic State: Ideology, Religion and Violent Extremism in the 21st Century 9781317022770, 1317022777, 9781317022787, 1317022785

Table of contents :
Chapter 1: IntroductionTom Lansford and David HoltChapter 2: The Rise of the Islamic StateWayne LesperanceChapter 3: Ideology and TheologyRobert Pauly and R. Alan KingChapter 4: The Use of Propaganda and Social MediaRachel Yon Chapter 5: IS and Al Qaeda-Affiliated GroupsPeter Dean Chapter 6: Islamic State: Redefining the World StageR. Alan King Chapter 7: IS in SyriaMark Sedgwick Chapter 8: Those Who Face Death: An Examination of the Relationship between Kurdistan and the Islamic StateCharlie Carlee Chapter 9 Regional Powers and the Islamic StateJorge BrownChapter 10: The Obama Administration and ISRichard Yon and James L. Long, Jr.Chapter 11: The European Response to ISRobert Pauly and Kelly M. RobertsChapter 12: Islamic State Recruitment Strategies and TacticsBrian CarriereChapter 13: Canada, Australia, New Zealand and ISDara Conduit, David Malet and Levi WestChapter 14: Conclusion: Future ChallengesRobert Pauly, Tom Lansford and Jack Covarrubias

Citation preview

The New Islamic State

For the victims of the Islamic State.

The New Islamic State Ideology, Religion and Violent Extremism in the 21st Century

Edited by Jack Covarrubias, Tom Lansford and Robert J. Pauly, Jr. The University of Southern Mississippi, USA

first published 2016 by Routledge 2 Park square, milton Park, abingdon, oxon oX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third avenue, New york, Ny 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2016 selection and editorial matter, Jack Covarrubias, Tom Lansford and Robert J. Pauly, Jr.; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Jack Covarrubias, Tom Lansford and Robert J. Pauly Jr to be identified as the authorS of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Names: Covarrubias, Jack, editor. | Lansford, Tom, editor. | Pauly, Robert J., 1967- editor. Title: The new Islamic State : ideology, religion and violent extremism in the 21st century / [edited] by Jack Covarrubias, Tom Lansford and Robert J. Pauly, Jr. Description: Farnham, Surrey, UK ; Burlington, VT : Ashgate, [2016] | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2015035586| ISBN 9781472465849 (hardback) | ISBN 9781472465870 (pbk) | ISBN 9781472465856 (ebook) | ISBN 9781472465863 (epub) Subjects: LCSH: IS (Organization) | Terrorism--Religious aspects--Islam. | Terrorism--Middle East--History--21st century. | Terrorism--United States--Prevention. Classification: LCC HV6433.I722 I8564 2016 | DDC 322.4/20956--dc23 LC record available at http://lccn. loc.gov/2015035586 ISBN 9781472465849 (hbk) ISBN 9781472465870 (pbk)

Contents Acknowledgements List of Contributors 1

Introduction: The Geography of the Islamic State   Tom Lansford and David Holt

vii ix 1

Part I  Origins of the Islamic State 2

The Rise of the Islamic State (IS) Wayne F. Lesperance, Jr.

15

3

Ideology and Theology R. Alan King and Robert J. Pauly, Jr.

29

4

The Use of Propaganda and Social Media Rachel Yon

43

5

IS and al-Qaeda Peter R. Dean

61

Part II  IS and the Middle East and Persian Gulf 6

Islamic State: Redefining the World Stage R. Alan King

79

7

IS in Syria Mark Sedgwick

93

8

Those who face Death: An Examination of the Relationship between Kurdistan and the Islamic State   Charlie Carlee

9

Regional Powers and the Islamic State   Jorge Brown

113 129

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vi

Part III  IS and the West 10

The Obama Administration and IS  Richard Yon and James L. Long, Jr.

145

11

The European Response to IS  Robert J. Pauly, Jr. and Kelly Roberts

163

12

Islamic State Recruitment Strategies and Tactics  Brian Carriere

179

13

Canada, Australia and New Zealand and the Islamic State  Dara Conduit, David Malet, and Levi West

195

14

The New Islamic State Conclusions  Robert J. Pauly, Jr.

213

Index219

Acknowledgments Collectively, the authors would like to thank our editors at Ashgate, Kirstin Howgate and Brenda Sharp, for the opportunity to publish this timely, important volume and for their encouragement and support throughout the editorial process. We are also appreciative of our colleagues at The University of Southern Mississippi and elsewhere for supporting a professional environment conducive to the planning and completion of the project. Additionally, we have the following words of thanks to express individually: Jack Covarrubias thanks Crystal Stinson for her assistance with the editing process. Tom Lansford thanks Gina, Ella, and Kate for their love and support. Robert J. Pauly, Jr. thanks his students and colleagues in the International Development Doctoral Program and Political Science Master’s and undergraduate programs at Southern Miss, Steve Taylor and Mike Mankiewicz of the Gulf Coast Mornings Radio Show and his colleagues at Wikistrat for the opportunity to discuss and share perspectives on and sharpen his analytical skills with respect to the Islamic State, and to Phyllis, Brittany, Julien, Mark, Chris, John, Jeremy, Mom, Dad and the dogs and cats for their perpetual love and support of all his endeavors.

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List of Contributors Jorge Brown is an Associate Professor in the University of Southern Mississippi Libraries and serves as Access Services Librarian at the Gulf Coast Library. His research interests include library science, international copyright, constitutional law, and global political economy. Charlie Carlee is a graduate student within the Department of Political Science, International Development, and International Affairs at the College of Arts and Letters located at the University of Southern Mississippi Gulf Park. He is pursuing a Master’s of Arts in Political Science with an emphasis in International Relations. His research interests include conflict and resolution within the sectors of the Middle East. Brian Carriere is an instructor of history and political science at Mississippi Gulf Coast Community College. He teaches courses in American and world history, as well as American government. Brian holds master’s degrees in history from Delta State University and political science from the University of Southern Mississippi. He is currently a doctoral student at the University of Southern Mississippi in international development. Brian and his wife, Meredith, have three children and live in Gulfport, MS. Dara Conduit is a Visiting Scholar at the University of Cambridge and a PhD candidate at Monash University working on the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood’s role in the Syrian uprising. She works as an Iran researcher at Deakin University, co-convenes the Australian Terrorism & Political Violence Research Network and has provided advice on foreign fighters and human rights to the UN OHCHR’s Working Group on Mercenaries. She is the co-editor of Iran in the World: President Rouhani’s Foreign Policy and has had work published in journals including Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, the Middle East Journal and Ortadoğu Etütleri. She also holds a M. Litt in Middle East and Central Asian Security Studies from the University of St. Andrews. Jack Covarrubias is the Director of the Center for Policy and Resilience and a member of the governing board of the National Social Science Association. His experience bridges academia and the military where he has focused on the American foreign policy experience and homeland security. His most recent works include the edited volume The Obama Presidency: A Preliminary Assessment (2012) and the co-authored work Fostering Community Resilience: Homeland Security and Hurricane Katrina (2010). Peter R. Dean is an Associate Professor and tenured reference librarian at the University of Southern Mississippi. His research interests include the Middle East. Dean earned an MLIS from Simmons College and a BA in Psychology from Quinnipiac University. David Harms Holt is a tenured associate professor of Geography in the Department of Geography and Geology at the University of Southern Mississippi. He teaches courses covering cartography, regional geography, comparative religions, sustainable development, and social behaviors. Dr. Holt coordinates the IVN geographic information technology lab on the coast and teaches the

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honors college courses. Dr. Holt’s research focuses on environmental impacts of climate change, dendrochronology, land use change, and necrogeography. He has published seven articles and presented at 43 conferences including organizing the Mississippi Geospatial Conference held on campus each October. R. Alan King is an award winning author of Twice Armed: An American Soldier’s Battle for Hearts and Minds in Iraq. He is a retired US Army Civil Affairs colonel and is currently an adjunct professor at Norwich University instructing in National Security, Terrorism, Counterinsurgency, Culture and Anthropology. He served as the Deputy Director of the Office of Provincial Outreach under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) where he was responsible for Sunni and tribal outreach programs from 2003–2004. His work and success with Iraqi tribes has been widely profiled in the international media. He has advised Congressional leaders and senior Defense and State Department officials, as well as having testified before the House of Representatives, Subcommittee for National Security concerning the security situation in Iraq. Tom Lansford is a Professor of Political Science. His research interests include foreign and security policy, and the US presidency. Dr. Lansford is the author, coauthor, editor, or coeditor of more than 40 books, and the author of more than 100 essays, book chapters, and reviews. His books include A Bitter Harvest: U.S. Foreign Policy and Afghanistan (2003), The Historical Dictionary of U.S. Diplomacy Since the Cold War (2007), and 9/11 and the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq: A Chronology and Reference Guide (2011). His more recent edited collections include America’s War on Terror (2003; second edition 2009), Judging Bush (2009), and The Obama Presidency: A Preliminary Assessment (2012). Wayne F. Lesperance, Jr. holds the rank of Professor of Political Science at New England College in Henniker, New Hampshire. His teaching and research interests run the gamut from international security issues to civic education. In addition to his teaching responsibilities, Wayne is the director of the Center for Civic Engagement and the director of the Master of Arts in Public Policy program. James L. Long, Jr. is an Infantry Officer with the US Army and currently serves as a Rifle Platoon Leader. He was deployed from 2014–2015 in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Resolute Support in Southern Afghanistan and holds a B.S. in International Relations from the United States Military Academy. David Malet is Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Melbourne. Previously he was Assistant Professor of Political Science at Colorado State University-Pueblo, where he served as the founding Director of the Center for the Study of Homeland Security. His research concerns transnational security issues, the transformation of warfare, identity politics, and US foreign policy. His 2009 dissertation Foreign Fighters, (published by Oxford University Press, 2013) examines transnational recruitment and mobilization by insurgent groups. His research in this area has been incorporated in programs implemented by the United Nations, United States, and Australia. He is also regularly interviewed by national and international media on events related to political violence and international security. Robert J. Pauly, Jr. is Tenured Associate Professor of International Policy and Development at The University of Southern Mississippi and Senior Analyst at Wikistrat, the world’s first crowdsourced consultancy. His research interests focus broadly on the fields of US foreign policy,

List of Contributors

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national security, and homeland security, with emphasis on American policy toward the states of the Greater Middle East. He is the author of five books and nearly 40 academic articles, essays, and book chapters, including, most recently, the Ashgate Research Companion to US Foreign Policy (2010). He analyzes US foreign policy and national security issues for a range of media outlets. Kelly M. Roberts is a graduate student within the Department of Political Science, International Development, and International Affairs at the College of Arts and Letters located at the University of Southern Mississippi Gulf Park. She is pursuing a Master’s of Arts in Political Science with an emphasis in International Relations. Her research interests include conflict and resolution within the Middle East. Mark E. Sedgwick is an independent scholar whose research and published work focuses on international security issues—concentrating specifically on Europe and the greater Middle East. His most recent publications concern the domestic politics of Egypt, Yemen, Lebanon, and Syria. Levi J. West is the Director of Terrorism Studies at the Australian Graduate School of Policing and Security at Charles Sturt University. He is a graduate of the National Security College at the Australian National University, and the Centre for Policing, Intelligence, and Counterterrorism at Macquarie University. Levi has undertaken research, lectured and consulted across the Middle East, South and South East Asia, and the United States, including at the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation, the Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel National Police Academy in India, and a researcher at the Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress in Washington DC. Levi consults widely with the military, intelligence, and law enforcement communities in Australia, and internationally, and is regularly sought after for media comment. He is currently completing his PhD at the Australian National University. Rachel Yon is an Assistant Professor and Executive Officer in the Combating Terrorism Center at the United States Military Academy where she currently runs the Center’s multi-million dollar budget and teaches classes in the Combating Terrorism Center’s Terrorism Minor, the American Politics stem of the Department of Social Sciences, and in the Law Department. Her research concentrations are in the fields of Public Policy, American Government, and Methodology. Her current research interests include the public policy making process with a concentration on legislation that has been passed on the juvenile justice system and disproportionate female and minority contact. She completed a J.D. at the University of Florida Levin College of Law in 2004 with a specialization in Family Law and was admitted to the Florida Bar that same year. She completed her Ph.D. in Political Science at the University of Florida in the summer 2015. Richard M. Yon is an instructor in American Politics at the United States Military Academy and coordinates the Center for the Study of the Presidency & Congress fellowship program and the domestic Academic Individual Advanced Development program for the Department of Social Sciences. Yon’s recent research examines the role of the Vice President where he has interviewed Vice Presidents, chiefs of staff, cabinet secretaries, national security advisors, and other members of presidential administrations as part of this research. He has written several book chapters and articles on the presidency and vice presidency to include topics ranging from national security doctrines, executive orders, and healthcare initiatives to the Obama presidency. Yon’s most recent work which examines the vice presidency will appear in an updated edition of “Triumphs and Tragedies of the Modern Presidency.” Yon also serves on the editorial board of the journal White House Studies.

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Chapter 1

Introduction: The Geography of the Islamic State Tom Lansford and David Holt

The rise of the Islamic State (IS) has dramatically forced a recalculation of security in the Middle East and Persian Gulf by the United States, other Western nations, and regional powers such as Iran or Saudi Arabia. In spite of its initially small size, Western intelligence put its strength at 10–12,000 in 2013, the Islamic State was able to alter the military balance in the Syrian Civil War and launch an offensive that resulted in the capture of significant strategic areas within Iraq. By summer 2015, the organization controlled half of Syria, including all of the major border crossings with Iraq. The military success of the group attracted a growing number of foreign fighters, drawn in some cases by an increasingly sophisticated recruitment strategy that effectively combined a jihadist message with a social media outreach program targeting vulnerable populations in the region and Western nations. Estimates in fall 2014 affirm the growth of the organization with some analysts suggesting 30–40,000 fighters. The Islamic state has prompted renewed US and allied military intervention in Iraq and Syria, and brought the United States into an uneasy relationship with Iran. However, the legacy of the Iraq War has constrained policy options for the United States and other Western powers and resulted in a strategy of over-the-horizon strikes designed to prevent defeat and stabilize the region, as opposed to achieving victory and defeating the IS. Politicians, security officials, scholars, and pundits have struggled to explain the rise of the Islamic State and develop coherent policy options to address the threat posed by the group. The New Islamic State seeks to contribute to efforts to understand the IS by exploring its origins, ideology, tactics, and the impact of the group on both the people and governments of the region. The introduction begins an examination of the Islamic State by analyzing the role of geography in the formation and rise of the organization. What’s in a Name? Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS), the Islamic State (IS), and al-Dawla al-Islamiyya al-Iraq al-Sham (Daesh), the Islamic State has already carried many monikers, but it is not “entirely a creation of the United States’ behavior in Iraq” as suggested by Angela Keaton from antiwar.com and other opponents of the US intervention in Iraq. The reality of the IS is that it developed, not as an Allah-ordained caliphate, but a politically-motivated organization desiring power and control that has managed to create a rhetoric suggesting it is an Allah-ordained caliphate. As Kahled Abou el-Fadl, Islamic scholar from UCLA suggests, they are largely political, originating in a region of conflict in Iraq and Syria, and are trying to make God a co-conspirator to genocide.1 Sheikh Hamadah Nassar, a Salafi cleric, points out that the Islamic State adopted violence first and is now attempting to justify it though the Quran and Hadith.2 The reality is that the IS wants attention, needs attention, and will do anything to broaden its reach using whatever means necessary. They have managed

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The New Islamic State

to get themselves on the Western media radar and seem desperate to remain in the spotlight. But where did they come from and how do they operate? We will examine that question and many others in the chapters to come. The origins of the Islamic State can be traced to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s al-Qaeda splinter group formed in Iraq in the early 2000s known as either al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) or the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). Zarqawi, who was Sunni, ignited sectarian violence against the Shia in Iraq which ultimately led to his death in a US airstrike on June 7, 2006. Abu Ayyub al-Masri subsequently took control of AQI. In October 2006, Masri announced the first Islamic State with Abu Omar al-Baghdadi as the leader. It is important to note that the organization adopted the now familiar black flag most associated with the Islamic State and Boko Haram. Almost four years later on April 18, 2010, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and Masri were killed in an airstrike. In April 2010, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi became the leader of IS after organizing smaller groups just north of Baghdad in the Salah-aldeen and Daila Provinces. Baghdadi, who reportedly earned a doctorate in Islamic Studies from the University of Baghdad, remained in control of ISI for three years then on April 8, 2013 declared they were absorbing a Salafist, militant group founded in Syria back in 2012, al-Nusra Front, or Jabhat al-Nusra. The new grouping was group was titled ISIL. However, this merger was not universally accepted. The Al-Nusra Front’s leader, Abu Mohammed alJawalani rejected the merger and infighting ensued. Meanwhile, on February 3, 2014, al-Qaeda renounced its affiliation with ISIL. ISIL ultimately took control of the al-Nusra Front and changed its name again to the Islamic State. On June 29, 2014, Baghdadi announced the formation of the caliphate, the elimination of all state borders, and declared himself the “Commander of the Faithful” implying his authority over every Muslim in the world. By this time, the West has been forced to take a greater interest in the growth of IS, while people around the world have become quite curious about the real identity of the Islamic State. The group has a history of developing through military action and seizing control of territory which supports Sheikh Nassar’s claims, but the culture and internal operations of the group remain convoluted, because the IS has focused heavily on information control. Geographers like to evaluate cultures beyond placement on the map and try to understand human behavior and physical setting. Culture ultimately is a Latin term that translates roughly as “to care for” and culture can be divided into subgroups, cultural expression, cultural landscape, cultural area, cultural history, and cultural ecology. Cultural expression is a combination of place, the feelings of where you are (space), and behavior, how you associate with other humans (internal and external). Cultural landscape is the evidence of a culture as it manifests itself through artifacts. Cultural area is the spatial component the culture inhabits. Cultural history is the longevity and common experiences a culture shares. Cultural ecology is the manifestation of the culture’s association with the environment where a group exists. To understand a group, it is necessary to evaluate each of the aspects of culture. Research on the Islamic State is problematic because they control information very well; however, even their propaganda provides clues to the identity of the group. In terms of cultural expression, the Islamic State is a group, but how homogenous is this group from an ideological, even theological, standpoint? Cultural expression can be real or manufactured and internalized or manifested. Culture is evaluated through artifacts, things made or produced; sociofacts, ways people organize and relate to each other; and mentifacts, underlying ideas, beliefs, and values. Ultimately, a group of people will develop opinions of belonging or exile and either assimilate or become pariahs or any stage in between. The Islamic State has gone through great lengths to portray itself as a homogenous, perfect society through press releases, self-published journals, videos, and social media outlets, but, this façade is suspect without free exchange of information and evaluation.

Introduction: The Geography of the Islamic State

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Political power and influence are extremely important to the Islamic State. A boy was shown being flogged 40 times for using the pejorative term Daesh, instead of the approved term, Islamic State.3 Clearly, the lesson is that the Islamic State wants to be called a certain thing and any other terms are not allowed. Lieutenant-General James Terry, the US commander of Operation Inherent Resolve (the anti-IS operation in Iraq and Syria) likes the term Daesh because the use of ISIL is an attempt to justify the caliphate.4 Australian Prime Minister, Tony Abbott, likes to use Daesh just because IS does not like it. So, what is in a name? Daesh is similar to a word, Daes, that means “one who crushes something underfoot,” and another word, Dahes, which translates as “one who sows discord.” Daesh is considered an abbreviation for al-Dawla al-Islamiyya al-Iraq al-Sham, but the Islamic State considers it the term as a false label used by their enemies so they disallow its use. Clearly, the establishment of rules and strict adherence is the message communicated. The restriction of the term, Daesh, is beyond Sharia law and only a construct of the leadership. Two of the most prevalent artifacts presented to the West by the Islamic State as cultural indicators, are the black flag and the use of black masks. The black flag known as the Black Banner or Black Standard adopted by Islamic State is the same as several other radical-Islamic groups, Boko Haram before they swore allegiance for example. The text on the top of the flag is part of the mandatory profession of faith or the shadada for Islam, “there is no god, but God.” The bottom circle is a probable representation of the Seal of Mohammad that translates, “Mohammad is the messenger of God.” The literal translation is three words: “God,” “Messenger,” and “Mohammad.” In both cases, the capitalization of the word “God” means “Allah,” so the name of God is on the flag. Muslims are not allowed to destroy anything with the name of God on it, so if you damage or desecrate the flag, you are breaking tenants of Islam. Further, the Prophet Mohammad’s name is on the flag with the same protection. The Black Banner had its origins in eighth century Islam and the flag used by the Islamic State is a replication that streamer even to the use of an ancientlooking, script font, unlike, for instance, the modern font of the Saudi Arabian flag with the same inscription. The flag symbolizes the effort of the group to associate itself with the earliest period of Islam in an attempt to establish legitimacy with the expectation that Muslims will respect the message of the flag even if they do not support the Islamic State. Appearances, respect, legitimacy, and pedigree are culturally important to groups, as evidenced by the Islamic State’s use of the black flag to represent its self-declaration as a caliphate. Masks The use of masks, specifically the black ski mask, is another cultural indicator. Here we see a continuing tradition, as Professor Kevin McDonald of Middlesex University, described it, the grammar of violence.5 Mass killings have often been secret affairs, witness, for instance, the Holocaust or the purges of the Soviet Union under Stalin, or more recently, the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia during the 1990s. But the Islamic State is interested in maximum visibility, especially utilizing social media, so why does the group wear masks? The mask represents unseen power and a separation from the normal. The mask is a tool of fear, suggesting that the masked individual could be anyone. Conversely, the victim is never masked. In fact, if you examine the videos and photos, every effort is made to identify the victim and detail their experience. The focus of the Islamic State videos is to make the victim an individual. There is an intimacy with the victim generated in these macabre scenes while the masked individuals remaining mysterious. There is another interesting point with these executions: the victims do not resist. Evidence suggests that the victims are taken to multiple mock

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executions where the process is played out without a killing, numbing the victim into a false sense of hope. The effect is a created sense of power with the victims seeming to cooperate or agreeing with their own death, all on video. Power, authority, and control, along with an impression that the group is above the authority and scope of existing institutions, are all manifested through the Islamic State’s use of the black mask. The single most significant moniker of the IS from a cultural expression standpoint is the term Islamic. Is the Islamic State Islamic? How does one validate if a movement is “true” to the broader tenets of organized religion? Could the Ku Klux Klan, the Nazi Party of Germany in the 1930s and 1940s, or the contemporary Westboro Baptist Church be considered “true” Christian organizations based on their use of Christian rhetoric and symbolism? At what point does society draw the line, or can it? The Islamic State tightly controls the information it disseminates, it is an easy inference to presume they control information internally, so what can we base our judgment on? The Islamic State is predominantly Arab Muslim, which does not fit the modern demographics of Islam, since four of five global adherents are non-Arabs. The Islamic State claims their interpretation of Islam is correct, yet, they only represent a small minority of even Arab Muslims. There is widespread condemnation of the Islamic State from Islamic leaders. Joas Wagemaker, Assistant Professor of Islamic Studies at Radboud University in Nijmegen says, “it would be a mistake to conclude ISIS’s extremism is the “true” Islam that emerges from the Quran and Hadith.”6 Caner K. Dagli calls the group’s teachings, phony Islam.7 The Islamic State claims to be the only true caliphate. Quoting a translation of the prophet Mohammad, “if a man says to his brother, ‘you are an infidel’, then one of them is right.”8 With various members of the Islamic community committing to judgment, the commitment game is now official. The IS has to stand by its claim, if they are incorrect, they join the infidels. Obviously, if the Islamic State is not true to Islam as critics assert, the entire foundation of the organization is undermined. Evidence is strong that the group is not a homogenous jihadist movement, let alone a successor to al-Qaeda, so how can it claim to be a true caliphate?9 Perhaps an examination of the cultural history of the organization can shed light. Cultural History Cultural history involves more than an exploration of the history of the Islamic State, it is the use of the past to define the group’s modern behavior and explain its definition of contemporary culture. As aforementioned, the Islamic State clearly draws on the symbolism and traditions of the past to legitimize itself. Concurrent with this effort to attach itself to an early era, evidence about the Islamic theology suggests a medieval approach to the Quran, which speaks of itself as both muhkam, clear in meaning, and mutashabih, symbolic in meaning. Understanding the Quran has been the goal of the followers of Islam for centuries, as is the case with most world religions and their respective texts. But the Quran is not the only source of guidance and authority, the Hadith, the records of the sayings and doings of Mohammad, are also used by the Islamic State to justify their actions. The focus on the Quran and the Hadith is the very definition of conservative fundamentalism, eschewing modern interpretations as categorically in error and misguided. The very attitude serves as the foundation for the self-righteousness that exudes from the Islamic State. The violence justified by some interpretations of Islam is contextualized through theological interpretation, many of these texts are used by the Islamic State as a connection to the early history of the religion. Sheikh Hussein bin Mahmoud’s heavy-handed interpretation argues that the beheaders are not the ones who are perverting Islam, but the ones who are trying to live a

Introduction: The Geography of the Islamic State

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peaceful life with their neighbors with no killing, no fighting, and no striking of necks. He believes that Islam is the religion of shedding blood.10 Is the fundamentalist interpretation of the Islamic State unique within modern Islam? The Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia believe in direct action with a strict interpretation of the Quran and Hadith, including gender inequality and beheading for certain crimes. Salafists see themselves as followers of the “pious forefathers” and emulate models of the original tribes, including a literal enforcement of everything Mohammad said, on issues such as slavery, rape, beheadings, etc.11 Remember that the ISI originally incorporated from a group of the Salafist, al-Nusra Front. It is possible that the early infighting between IS and al-Nusra Front that caused al-Qaeda to denounce IS could have been over literal interpretation differences of the Quran. The Islamic State is following the concept of Salafism, but are they selectively choosing from the Quran and Hadith to justify their actions, even past actions? The Islamic State could have a theological approach rivaling a confirmation bias, but the intentions are clear. Connecting with the origins and earliest concepts of Islam shows that the Islamic State is desperate to connect with those extreme fundamentalists who reject the “modern.” It has become one of their recruiting tools. The Islamic State is attempting to prove that it is the “old guard,” an uncorrupted form of Islam that rejects contemporary influences that debase and undermine the religion. This is particularly true in regards to the role and status of women. The group advocates for a male-centric culture in which women have few rights and in which gender discrimination is inherent. Early IS pamphlets accept rape, forced marriages and sex slavery under certain conditions, arguing for instance, that Islam permits rape with “non-Muslim ‘slaves’.”12 Indeed sexual violence has emerged as a principle tactic of the Islamic State. In a 2015 report on the Islamic State, the UN’s Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Zainab Bangura of Sierra Leone noted that the IS has “institutionalized sexual violence and the brutalization of women as a central aspect of their ideology and operations, using it as a tactic of terrorism to advance their key strategic objectives.”13 In the same document Banguri described: how women were promised to fighters and how ISIL raised funds through trafficking, prostitution and ransoms. Sexual violence was used to displace populations, to punish, humiliate and demoralize dissenters, to extract information for intelligence purposes and to dismantle social, familial and community structures in order to construct a new “Caliphate.”14

Recapturing the Past Early Islam spread rapidly in the seventh century, and the Islamic State endeavors to show the world that they are expanding equally quickly. IS mimicry of early Islam extends beyond symbols such as flags. For instance, the group forces conquered people to pay jizya, or protection money, because early Islam did. The Islamic State has also looked to more modern fundamentalist influences. For instance, the organization has mirrored the Taliban’s destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas in a variety of actions, including what the IS described as the clearing of the “false gods” at the Shrine of Ka’aba. It did not matter that many of these sites are of gods that pre-date Islam or are gods that no one worships or acknowledges anymore or are just part of history, the IS targets them to show “action” and a connection to the earliest of Islam. Another component of the effort to cast the group as a modern manifestation of early, fundamentalist Islam has been a zealous interpretation and application of Sharia Law. The group routinely and publically executes for rape, murder, armed robbery, witchcraft, and homosexuality

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are part to the display. From December 2014 to January 2015, the Islamic State’s interpretation of Sharia Law was used to justify executions ranging from the stoning of adulterous women, to throwing homosexuals from rooftops, crucifying those convicted of theft, and beheading for witchcraft.15 However, according to Amnesty International, Saudi Arabia legally beheaded 38 people from January 1 to March 5, 2015, after previously executing 87 in 2014, with little to no interest from Western media.16 One major difference between the IS and Saudi Arabia’s approach toward executions is exposure. While the Saudis minimize the publicity surrounding executions, the Islamic State trumpets its grisly killings as part of their larger effort to connect with early Islam. The Islamic State has attempted to tie itself to the cultural traditions of early Islam, however, its actions run counter to the tenets of the religion. The IS has now introduced immolation, which is not supported in Islam. The cremation of the dead is not allowed. On February 3, 2015, Royal Jordanian Air Force pilot Muath al-Kasasbeh was burned alive by the Islamic State following his capture after his plane crashed in Syria. The immolation meant more than a murder, it showed that IS considered the pilot an infidel and did not warrant proper burial rites. The IS Cultural Landscape The cultural landscape, or landschaft, of IS is the result of the combination of the existing physical geography and the impact of the Islamic State on that area. The problem with appreciating the cultural landscape of IS is the information control barrier that the organization has imposed. The IS is an easy target for airstrikes and military operations when they are in columns or on the move, but inside the cities, they blend with the population. Their masks keep the combatants secret and create a freedom of action that empowers IS members to engage in a wide range of activity outside of the bounds of accepted behavior. Typically, landschaft tells a story beyond Black Banners and military equipment, and the Islamic State has attempted to show “normalcy” inside their controlled areas showing schools, hospitals, and everyday life. Currently, the cultural landscape of the areas under IS control is difficult to adequately evaluate, but cultural area is another thing altogether. The cultural area, or where the culture exists, is of utmost importance to IS, even in the traditional geography sense. Within Islamic tradition, there are significant changes that occur when a caliphate if formed. A caliphate by definition requires territory or a cultural area. Baghdadi has stated that “our goal is to establish an Islamic State that does not recognize borders, on the Prophetic Methodology.”17 The modern system of state borders in the Middle East is a Western concept and the legacy of post-World War I colonialism. Writing in the Wall Street Journal, Yaroslav Trofimov notes that: Having joined the losing side in the Great War … the Ottomans saw their empire summarily dismantled by European statesmen who knew little about the region’s people, geography and customs. The resulting Middle Eastern states were often artificial creations, sometimes with implausibly straight lines for borders.18

Further complicating the geography of the region is the fact that many of these borders remain ill-defined and disputed. For instance, Yemen, the eastern border of Jordan, and parts of Oman do not have cartographically defined borders, but are borders of convenience enforced by who has more power in the region. The Allied Forces in the Gulf Wars had difficulty with defining the eastern border of Jordan because of this tradition. In addition, borders tended to remain porous as

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various groups regularly crossed national boundaries as part of trade patterns or to escape conflict or repression. The Islamic State has refused to acknowledge exiting borders as it has expanded and acquired territory. Yet, concurrently, the organization has endeavored to be recognized as a state and has adopted many of the functions of a national government. Territorial definition is important, a nation is defined as a group of people with a similar history and culture but without a defined border; a state is defined as a nation with a recognized border. The Kurds or the Rom are good examples of nations without states. Baghdadi’s drive to establish caliphate was motivated by the desire to create a theocratic state and to reinforce the religious authority of the Islamic State. An IS Calipahte? While there are differences in interpretation of the meaning of a caliphate, one Salafist cleric was quoted by Radwan Mortada in a June 2014 article as stating that “It means that borders and barriers among Islamic countries are now invalid. There will be a single Islamic economic system and currency, and an army to defend it… . It also means there will no longer be any subservience to any country.”19 The caliphate system is designed to help fulfill the prophecies to bring an end to the Earth and a triumph for Islam. Mainstream Sunni’s believe there will be 12 caliphates total, but Baghdadi’s is only number 8.20 The last accepted caliphate was the Ottoman Empire which was proclaimed a caliphate in 1453. The caliphate ended with the creation of the modern Turkish state in 1923. The Islamic State leader declared a caliphate on June 29, 2014, and in his Ramadan sermon of July 5, Baghdadi announced he was the “commander of the Faithful” of the new caliphate.21 By proclaiming a new caliphate, Baghdadi asserted that he was the caliph, the direct descendent of Mohammad and the spiritual leader of all Muslims. Baghdadi’s claim to be the commander of the caliphate was bolstered since he was a descendent of the tribe, Quraysh, the same as the prophet Mohammad.22 Leaders of other Islamic extremist groups such as al-Qaeda or Boko Harem did not have the same claim to legitimacy. Many groups subsequently challenged Baghdadi’s declaration, while others, including Boko Harem pledged allegiance to the IS. Meanwhile, the group’s desire to control territory devoid of peoples, or nations, that do not ascribe to the same beliefs, parallels earlier episodes of ethnic cleansing and has been manifested in IS actions against the Yazidis and Kurds, for example. Critics within Islam have challenged Baghdadi’s proclamation of a caliphate. For instance, many scholars argue that while a caliphate may be created through military action, it is supposed to represent “all Muslims” and therefore should be established through elections by Islamic clerics.23 In a 2014 interview, Jocelyne Cesari, the director of Harvard University’s “Islam in the West” initiative and Georgetown University’s “Islam in World Politics” program, argues that “The caliphate in historical times for Muslims was a political organization, symbolically organized for Muslims, but not only for Muslims … . Non-Muslims were not religiously or civically equal, but they were also not exterminated simply for being non-Muslims.”24 The establishment of a cultural area is a game changer for IS. Not only can they now recruit and require people to come to the caliphate, because it the duty of the Muslims to go to protect the caliphate and it is a sin otherwise, but once these people arrive IS must provide for them. As a result, the group has increasingly adopted the tasks typically undertaken by a state, overseeing the economy, education, healthcare, and so forth. When the Islamic state captures territory it often issues a new charter for the area that details how Sharia law will be implemented but also established

The New Islamic State

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new governmental services, including new court systems and social services. An Atlantic article on describes how after the Islamic State conquered al-Raqqa in Iraq: The militants fix potholes, bus people between the territories they control, rehabilitate blighted medians to make roads more aesthetically pleasing, and operate a post office and zakat (almsgiving) office (which the group claims has helped farmers with their harvests). Most importantly for Syrians and Iraqis downriver, ISIS has continued operating the Tishrin dam (renaming it alFaruq) on the Euphrates River. Through all of these offices and departments, ISIS is able to offer a semblance of stability in unstable and marginalized areas, even if many locals do not like its ideological program.25

These actions are manifestations of the Islamic State’s effort to transition from a terrorist, fighting force to a government. Iraq provides a telling example of the IS attempt to erase prior borders through the caliphate. Culturally, Iraq was an artificial state made up of three distinct nations. The 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement divided up the Ottoman Empire, the last caliphate, and Iraq was divided into the Vilayet of Mosul in the north, mostly Kurdish; the Vilayet of Baghdad, mostly Sunni; and the Vilayet of Basra in the south, mostly Shia.26 In the contemporary period, Iraq was ruled by the Sunni minority of central Iraq and the Ba’ath party under Saddam Hussein. The 2003 U.S-led invasion of Iraq toppled the Saddam regime and redistributed political power, enhancing the autonomy of the Kurds and allowing the Shia majority control of the central government following a series of elections. The rise of Shia political power and the concurrent decline in Sunni influence was one of the factors in the Iraq insurgency during the US occupation and continues to be a destabilizing factor in the contemporary politics of the nation. As aforementioned, AQI, a Sunni organization originated in the regions just north of Baghdad, and was the precursor of the Islamic State, transitioning first into ISIL, then ISIS, and finally, IS. The Kurds are Sunni, but not Arab, while the Shia cannot support IS because the organization views them as infidels. Consequently, most of the political and military leadership of the Islamic State is from the Sunni and Ba’ath portion of Iraq. Hence, the Sunni regions of Iraq serve as the main cultural area of the group. The Caliphate and the End of Times Various figures in the Islamic State have argued that the establishment of the caliphate is an important event in Islamic eschatology. Dabiq, Rome, and Jerusalem all play a role in the end of the world and the final judgment of God, and all factor into the ideology of the Islamic State. Dabiq is a small town near Aleppo in Syria. A farming village surrounded by open fields, the community is important because it is prophesied that the “armies of Rome” will set up camp to attack the true caliphate in Dabiq. The Islamic State has taken a range of actions to tie itself to Dabiq and the prophecy. For instance, IS chose the name “Dabiq” for their online journal. In November 2014, when IS executed Peter Kassig, the masked executioner stated, “Here we are, burying the first American crusader in Daqib, eagerly waiting for the remainder of your armies to arrive.”27 Various leaders in the organization and IS publications have repeatedly declared the Islamic State’s intent to be present in Daqib to fight a foe from “Rome,” or the armies of Rome. IS even has a twitter hashtag “#We_Are_Coming_O_Rome.” However, there is considerable debate over what is meant by “Rome,” with some arguing that it means Europe or the United States, others Turkey,

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and still others a neo-Roman Empire. Too often prophesies are subject to the confirmation bias and those desiring it to be true will latch onto anything that is even close. For example, the prophecy also says that the armies of Rome will amass and fight on horseback with swords. Is this likely? Or will predator drones and tanks suffice? This acceptance of variance is where the argument of IS hardliners falls apart, why be willing for one part of the prophecy to be misinterpreted and not any other possibility for the text to be incorrect? In any case, the battle is supposed to occur in Dabiq and the caliphate will lose and be driven to Jerusalem, also known as Yerusalayim or al-Quds. In Jerusalem the caliphate will be reduced to less than 5,000 soldiers. The Dajjal, or anti-messiah, will then come to destroy the remaining fighters. Jesus, a respected prophet in Islam, will then emerge to save the pure. For the prophecy to play out, the Islamic State has to suffer losses. They have to be driven from the Dabiq area and subsequently flee to Jerusalem to attempt to usher in the end of days. The result has been a bold strategy to fight any and all opponents, since the caliphate ultimately wins, and fulfills the prophecy, whether it wins or loses. IS and the Control of Information The Islamic State has been highly adept at utilizing Western media and social media. The IS has differentiated itself from other terrorist and extremists groups in the region by its ability to control information and its image. And the group has gone to great lengths to control its message. For example, between December 2014 and January 2015, IS killed over 120 of its own members because they wanted to quit IS.28 Leaders could not allow it to become known that there was internal dissention or dissatisfaction among its followers. Instead, the Islamic State typically justified killing dissidents through assertions that the condemned had turned against the true caliphate. The result has been a very disciplined and consistent message. The Islamic State has also embarked on a highly effective, in terms of its objectives, social media campaign. It has made extensive use of camera phones and other electronic devices. IS has also taken its message to cyberspace through Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, Tumblr, Instagram, and other similar social media platforms. One of the Islamic State’s first social media campaigns was through the use of the Twitter hashtag, #WorldCup, and showing IS members using a decapitated head as a soccer ball. The grisly video brought the group extensive attention and conveyed its willingness to reject conventional standards and norms. IS subsequently began to spread its message through the Twitter hashtag, #GenerationKhalifah, spreading its message “we are the true Islam.” This and other efforts led to a substantial rise in recruitment. Twitter ultimately restricted IS accounts. The first online publication of the journal Dabiq was titled, “The Return of the Khilafah” and marked the maturation of the effort to establish the Islamic State as a legitimate caliphate. One major difference between the Islamic State and groups, such as al-Qaeda, has Baghdadi’s decision to remain off-camera. His aloofness was a marked contrast with Osama bin Laden or Ayman alZawahiri. The strategy appeared to be designed to reinforce the sense that Baghdadi was the true leader of the caliphate and distinguish him from other officials of the organization. The Islamic State’s main media strategy has been an ever escalating series of executions. This violence feeds into the 24-hour news cycle of the West. IS has even used a “Cub of the Caliphate,” or child soldier, to execute someone on film. It gains attention. It shows power. It feeds into what IS desires. Concurrent with the announcement of the caliphate, the Islamic State also published a detailed vision of its intent to extend its reach into Europe, Africa and South Asia.29 Despite airstrikes by an international coalition, led by the United States, the Islamic State has been able to retain the

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The New Islamic State

majority of its conquered territory, and to even expand. In May 2015, the group seized control of the key Iraqi city of Ramadi and continued to make gains in Syria. Meanwhile, various governments, ranging from the United States to Turkey to Iraq, were unable to develop an effective counterstrategy to contain or defeat the organization. Our Framework The Islamic State has emerged as the most potent challenge to security and stability in the Persian Gulf since the 1988 Iran-Iraq War. Our brief examination of the geographic approach to the IS clearly reveals the need to better understand the group. The following essays seek to analyze the rise of the Islamic state, its tactics, and the public and policy reactions around the world. The book is divided into three main parts: “Origins of the Islamic State”; “IS and the Middle East and Persian Gulf”; and “IS and the West”; in addition to a conclusion—“Future Challenges.” Part I examines the birth and evolution of the Islamic State. The part begins with the chapter, “The Rise of IS,” a history of the groups that led to IS and the organization’s development. The next chapter, “Ideology and Theology,” discusses the religious dimensions of the group and its efforts to interpret Islam, while “Propaganda and Social Media” explores the Islamic State’s recruitment and message development. The part’s final chapter, compares the Islamic State and al-Qaeda and analyzes the interactions between the two extremist formations. Part II, “IS and the Middle East and Persian Gulf,” discusses the impact of IS on regional states and groups, including Iraq, Syria, Kurdistan, then the remainder of the regional states. The chapters explore how the individual states have reacted to the growth of IS and the long-term ramifications of the group on regional politics and security. Part III, “IS and the West,” analyzes the interaction between the Islamic State and the West. The section begins with an overview of the response of the administration of Barack Obama to the Islamic State and the challenges the group poses to broader US policy in the region. This is followed by a chapter on Europe’s response to IS amid the EU’s complicated relationship with its growing Muslim population. The Islamic State’s recruiting efforts in Western nations is explored in Chapter 11, “Recruitment of IS in the West.” The final chapter of the section examines the policy response of major non-European Western states, including Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. The final chapter, “Future Challenges,” analyzes possible IS strategy and details the policy options available to contain the group. The rise of the Islamic State is a cautionary tale for policymakers on the potential challenges of extremists groups and their ability to both adapt and utilize contemporary resources, including electronic communications to fuel their growth and influence. The power of the Islamic State also highlights the fragile nature of the contemporary security system in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. Finally, the case of IS reveals the dangers of ignoring instability in the region and reinforces the need for proactive policies, ranging from preventative security measures to economic development efforts, to reduce the potential growth of extremism. Notes 1 “Erdogan: ISIS Aims to Destroy All Aspects of Islamic Civilization, Culture,” Daily Sabah/Associated Press (March 4, 2015). http://www.dailysabah.com/diplomacy/2015/03/04/erdogan-isis-aims-to-destroy-allaspects-of-islamic-civilization-culture.

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2 Jennifer Newton, “How Islamic is the Islamic State? Not Very Say Experts,” Daily Mail (March 3, 2015). http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2976916/How-Islamic-Islamic-State-Not-say-expertsgroup-hand-picks-wants-Quran-accounts-Muhammad-s-actions-wage-jihad.html. 3 Khaleda Rahman, “Corporal Punishment ISIS-Style: Boy Flogged 60 Times in Town Square for Calling Terror Group the Wrong Name,” Daily Mail (February 12, 2015). http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/ article-2951016/Child-receives-60-lashes-town-square-referring-ISIS-hated-Daesh-term-Iraq.html. 4 Jessica Chasmar, “U.S. General Leading Task Force Against Islamic State to Call Group ‘Daesh’,” The Washington Times (December 18, 2014). http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/dec/18/genjames-l-terry-to-call-islamic-state-daesh-movi/. 5 Kevin McDonald, “ISIS Jihadis Aren’t Medieval—They are Shaped by Modern Western Philosophy,” The Guardian (September 9, 2014). http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/sep/09/isis-jihadishaped-by-modern-western-philosophy. 6 “Erdogan.” 7 Caner K. Dagli, “The Phony Islam of ISIS,” The Atlantic (February 27, 2015). http://www.theatlantic. com/international/archive/2015/02/what-muslims-really-want-isis-atlantic/386156/. 8 Graeme Wood, “What ISIS Really Wants,” The Atlantic (March 2015). http://www.theatlantic.com/ features/archive/2015/02/what-isis-really-wants/384980/. 9 Ibid. 10 See Jonathan Vankin, “‘Islam is a Religion of Beheading’: James Foley Killing Gets Thumbs Up From Jihadi Cleric,” Inquisitr (August 31, 2014). http://www.inquisitr.com/1444719/islam-religion-ofbeheading/. 11 Bruce Everiss, “ISIS Are Very Misunderstood,” Bruce on Politics (September 8, 2014). http://www. bruceonpolitics.com/2014/09/08/isis-are-very-misunderstood/. 12 Yaron Steinbuch, “ISIS Militants Committing ‘Organized Rape’ of Women, Girls: Rights Group,” New York Post (April 15, 2015). http://nypost.com/2015/04/15/isis-militants-committing-organized-rape-onwomen-girls-rights-group/. 13 UN, “Senior UN Official Warns of ‘Widespread and Systemic’ Sexual Violence in Syria, Iraq,” UN News Center (May 7, 2015). http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=50794#.VWM-APlVhBe. 14 Ibid. 15 Rahman. 16 Adam Corré, “Saudi Arabia Reportedly Beheading Prisoners at an ‘Unprecedented Rate’,” Inquisitr (March 5, 2015). http://www.inquisitr.com/1899274/saudi-arabia-reportedly-beheading-prisoners-at-anunprecedented-rate/. 17 Wood. 18 Yaroslav Trofimov, “Would New Borders Mean Less Conflict in the Middle East?” The Wall Street Journal (April 10, 2015). http://www.wsj.com/articles/would-new-borders-mean-less-conflict-in-the-middleeast-1428680793. 19 Radwan Mortada, “What Does ISIS’ Declaration of a Caliphate Mean?” Al Akhbar (June 30, 2014). http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/20378. 20 Wood. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. 23 Jack Jenkins, “Why ISIS’s ‘New Caliphate’ Claim is Kind of Ridiculous,” ThinkProgress (July 2, 2014). http://thinkprogress.org/world/2014/07/02/3455885/why-isiss-claim-to-a-new-caliphate-is-kind-ofridiculous-but-also-kind-of-scary/. 24 Ibid.

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25 Aaron Zelin, “The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Has a Consumer Protection Office,” The Atlantic (June 13, 2014). http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/06/the-isis-guide-to-building-anislamic-state/372769/. 26 For more on the Sykes-Picot Agreement, see Patrick Coburn, “Is it the End of Sykes-Picot?” London Review of Books, 35.1 (June 6, 2013). http://www.lrb.co.uk/v35/n11/patrick-cockburn/is-it-the-end-of-sykespicot. 27 Wood. 28 Rahman. 29 John Hall, “The ISIS Map of the World,” The Daily Mail (June 30, 2014). http://www.dailymail. co.uk/news/article-2674736/ISIS-militants-declare-formation-caliphate-Syria-Iraq-demand-Muslims-worldswear-allegiance.html.

Part I Origins of the Islamic State

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Chapter 2

The Rise of the Islamic State (IS) Wayne F. Lesperance, Jr.

Introduction June 2014 was an especially important month in the history of the Islamic State (IS). It was a month which heralded the arrival, on the global stage, of a group which was largely unnoticed and understandably lost among a collection of other insurgent groups in Iraq and Syria. The Islamic State was, literally, formed in June 2014; and while precursor organizations were instrumental in its founding, it was the brazen and shockingly successful attacks in early June that elevated the Islamic State (IS) to be among the first viewed as equals in the community of Islamic extremist organizations. In the pages that follow, the Islamic State’s origins will be considered in some detail. This chapter will examine the evolutionary arc of IS from an anti-US insurgency, to emphasis on ancient enmities with Iraq’s Shi’ite population, and then leading to the current form, which President Barack Obama referred to as a ‘death cult’ because it focused on the restoration of the Caliphate and ushering in the end of days.1 What we find in this study is an organization within the Islamic State that is the beneficiary of circumstance, fortuitous policy decisions making by rivals and an organization that has been chronically underestimated in both Middle Eastern and Western capitals. When the world took notice of the Islamic State, it had amassed a sophisticated and successful fighting force and was on the march to Baghdad in summer 2014. The Northern Offensive In this study of the Islamic State we begin in summer 2014. It was well into the organization’s evolution when the Islamic State with its current leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi emerged on the international stage and across global media outlets. Later sections will return to the nascency of the organization and then close the loop with a discussion of its current form. Beginning on June 5, 2014, The Islamic State launched a series of offensives on the Iraqi cities of Samarra, Mosul, Tikrit and Kirkuk. Each victory was occasioned by dismal performances by the US-trained Iraqi military who found themselves rolled back towards Baghdad with IS fighters advancing. In the weeks that followed, the Islamic State’s new name was formally announced replacing the insurgency’s former name, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. A caliphate was declared and the leader of IS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was declared Caliph; a title that carries absolute political and religious power and is usually reserved for a descendent of Mohammed.2 As the month of June drew to a close, the insurgents were gaining more ground and marching towards Baghdad. Iraq had lost the ability to control its border with Syria to the Islamic State’s forces.3 The government in Baghdad was in crisis as Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki called for a national state of emergency. The Parliament in Iraq failed to grant al-Maliki’s request when Kurdish

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and Sunni Arab legislators boycotted the session.4 Dissatisfaction with al-Maliki had grown so high with both groups that they were unwilling to grant expanded powers to the Prime Minister, which would have come with the emergency declaration. The Islamic State was on the move while the government of Iraq was unraveling and the American trained Iraqi army was proving inept in responding to the growing threat. Ultimately the success of the Islamic State, which would later be called the Northern Offensive, led to the fall of the al-Maliki government.5 Eventually, the Northern Offensive was countered and Islamic State fighters pulled back from their positions outside of Baghdad. However, a lasting impression was left in the Middle East and around the world. The ominous black flags of the Islamic State filled media coverage and the group emerged as the pre-eminent jihadist threat in the region. Arguably, after the Northern Offensive, the Islamic State and its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi eclipsed al-Qaeda in importance. The Islamic State controls an area extending from Northern Syria through Northwestern Iraq, which is roughly the size of Maryland. It is the wealthiest terrorist group ever, and holds assets estimated at about $2 billion and growing; fueled by revenues from oil fields that it controls with ransom payments, among other revenue sources.6 Estimates place 6–8 million people under the direct control of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.7 Intelligence estimates vary in terms of the total number of fighters the Islamic State can field. Initial estimates of 10,000 soldiers have grown to approximately 35,000, according to the US Central Intelligence Agency.8 Other sources place the total number of IS forces much higher. According to Fuad Hussein, Chief of Staff to Kurdish President, Massoud Barzani, the CIA estimate underestimates IS forces by seven or eight times. Hussein claims the Islamic State can field closer to 200,000 men because Baghdadi gathered troops by mobilizing “Arab young men from the territory they have taken.”9 Whatever the actual number of troops the Islamic State can field, it is clear that the total number is greater than early US estimates. Furthermore, the success of operations such as, the Northern Offensive, had a direct impact on recruiting efforts. The rapid defeat of Iraq’s second largest city, Mosul, along with the declaration of the Caliphate led to a significant spike in recruits in the month that followed. According to one estimate, over 6,000 recruits joined the Islamic State in July 2014.10 And while the bulk of recruits came from among the Sunni and other disaffected Arab populations in Syria and Iraq, another significant stream of new IS recruits came from abroad. In fact, several months after the Northern Offensive and after the US and allied attacks began on the group’s positions, approximately 1,000 foreign fighters a month made their way from some 50 countries including the United States, Canada, and numerous states in Western Europe.11 The Islamic State is now well known across the globe. Beginning with their successes in summer 2014 in Iraq, the ubiquitous black flag with white Arabic script is now part of the collective image of IS. How this force emerged and, perhaps more importantly, evolved as first among equals is less well known. Origins of the Islamic State The available literature regarding the origins of the Islamic State offers conflicting narratives about the individuals and organizations involved in the improbable emergence of IS. Still, there is a documented series of important events along a timeline that leads to the current formation of the jihadist organization. This section will take the reader through that evolution and highlight key points that were critical to the emergence of the Islamic State. Here we will see the founding father of the organization in the form of a Jordanian militant named Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. His

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success as a leader of a small insurgent group earned the notice and accolades of al-Qaeda, which ultimately led to a merging of their organizations. After his death, the organization underwent a rebranding and incorporated the Islamic State of Iraq. Their goal was to lay the groundwork for an Islamic Caliphate. Circumstances on the ground were, initially, quite unfriendly to insurgencies in general and the ISI in particular. Nearly defeated, new life came as the result of poorly conceived policies by the Nouri al-Maliki government in Baghdad, and the igniting of historical animosities between the Sunni and Shi’ite communities. This opening along with the civil war in Syria fueled a resurgence of what is known today as the Islamic State. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi If the Islamic State has a founder it must be Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Most who focus on the global war on terror will recognize Zarqawi from his time with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. But, early in his career he began with a much smaller insurgency group called Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (JTJ) which was founded under his leadership in 2000.12 Zarqawi’s group was largely inactive in those early years settling in Herat, the third largest city in Afghanistan, where he ran an Islamic militant training camp. When the United States invaded Afghanistan in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, Herat was one of the first cities under Taliban control to fall to the US and its coalition allies. Prior to the battle for Herat, Zarqawi relocated to Iraq where his group, JTJ joined other insurgent fighters. The 2003 invasion of Iraq and the subsequent demise of Saddam Hussein ended Sunni minority rule by the regime and control over the country’s Shi’ite majority. The dismissal of Ba’athists and others loyal to the regime, along with the democratization process that brought to power the Shi’ite majority, led to a growing dissatisfaction among the Sunni population. It is this population, many of whom served in Iraq’s military, who found a home among the various insurgent groups in Iraq, and who over time were radicalized members of the Islamic State. Abu Musa al-Zarqawi’s JTJ stood out from the other insurgency groups for a number of reasons. Not the least of these was the blending of Iraqi Sunnis and foreign fighters – many of whom had been with Zarqawi in Afghanistan. Their goals were straightforward and appealed to disaffected Iraqis: • • • • •

Force a withdrawal of coalition forces from Iraq; Topple the interim government in Baghdad; Target collaborators with the regime and the US; Target the Shi’ite population, their leaders and militias; Establish an Islamic state under Sharia law.13

Many of these Sunnis, along with their tribal leaders, blamed Washington for the elevation of Shi’ites to power, the de-Ba’athification process, and what they believed was the hostile marginalization of Sunnis in a post-Saddam Iraq. So, the opportunity to join an insurgency that focused on attacking Americans became more appealing. Zarqawi’s goals were not the only factor setting JTJ apart from other groups, however. While tactics primarily focused on hit-and-run attacks on Iraqi government officials and sites, the JTJ introduced suicide bombings and beheadings in addition to more traditional guerilla tactics. Eventually, they would become known for the brutality of their tactics to the point that it became a source of concern to future partners in Al-Qaeda command. Additionally, the JTJ chose from a much more diverse target list that included Iraqi officials and government sites, but also foreign

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aid workers, Shi’a shrines and temples, and other religious leaders whose interpretation of Islam differed from Zarqawi’s own.14 The targeting of Shi’ites at this point in the evolution of the insurgency was something relatively novel. Other groups did not focus on sectarian rivals to the Sunnis the way Zarqawi and the JTJ did. In fact, shifting from a focus primarily on US forces to one that included Shi’ites and other groups represents an evolution in the insurgency – one very much a part of the Islamic State’s tactical portfolio. For Zarqawi the decision to target Shi’ites was as much about religious differences and ageold sectarian rivalry as it was about graining more support from a Sunni population, which was growing increasingly frustrated with the loss of power following Saddam Hussein’s fall from power. Zarqawi’s calculation was simple. He counted on Sunni resentment against the Shi’ites to recruit members, build alliances, and find safe haven for his group. These disaffected Iraqi Sunnis were then sent by the dozens as suicide bombers to target mosques, schools, cafes, and markets in Shi’ite neighborhoods.15 The JTJ and Zarqawi became infamous in the aftermath of operations that targeted civilians and high profile religious targets. For example, in late August 2003, the Shrine of Imam Ali, one of the holiest Shi’ite temples in Iraq, was attacked with two car bombs. The significance of the target was not lost on the Shi’a community of Iraq. Nor was the fact that the Shrine bombing led to the greatest number of casualties in a single attack by insurgents that year. Many point to this and subsequent attacks on Shi’ites and their holy sites as having led to the formation of local militias tied to religious clerics.16 Another example of JTJ’s tactics surfaced online in early 2004 when a video was posted depicting Nick Berg, an American civilian contractor working in Iraq, being beheaded by Zarqawi and other members of his organization.17 In this case both the tactic and publicity associated with it represented new wrinkles in the organization’s practices. Beheadings had happened before, but targeting an American contractor for being an American working in Iraq and then posting a video of the act online was a new development then. Clearly, it is a tactic that has found new infamy with the more recent beheadings by the Islamic State. Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) Ironically, the tactics Zarqawi’s JTJ employed both endeared him to al-Qaeda and ultimately led to a severing of relations with the group. There is no question that the successful insurgent operations in 2003 and 2004 elevated Zarqawi and the JTJ’s status among jihadists in the region. al-Qaeda’s leadership, including Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, praised Zarqawi and his group. The mutual admiration between both groups led, in October 2004, the JTJ and al-Qaeda joined forces to create Al Qaedi in Iraq. That month Zawahiri publicly released a copy of a letter announcing the merger of the two groups in Iraq: It should bring great joy to the people of Islam, especially those on the front lines, and it was with good tidings of support during this blessed month that Tawhid wal-Jihad’s leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (God protect him) and his followers announced their allegiance to the Sheikh alMujahideen of our time, Abu Abdullah Osama bin Laden, God protect him.18

For Zarqawi, this new relationship served as recognition of his success with the JTJ and affirmation of the organization’s activities. Joining al-Qaeda raised his status among jihadists and provided access to new recruits, resources and support.

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Bin Laden’s decision to join with Zarqawi appears to have been motivated by strategic considerations as well. First, the focus of the jihadist front had shifted from post-Taliban Afghanistan to Iraq in the aftermath of the US invasion in 2003. Second, bin Laden, and one of his primary advisors Ayman al-Zawahiri, who was principally involved in working with Zarqawi, may have seen this alliance as a way to keep the JTJ’s efforts from eclipsing those of al-Qaeda. According to one analyst, “bin Laden may have also hoped to limit Zarqawi’s ability to challenge al-Qaeda’s leading role by accepting him as a subordinate.”19 Whatever the motivations behind the merger, the tactics, targets and ideology employed by Zarqawi’s Al-Qaeda in Iraq were largely unchanged from those of JTJ. Once merged, the al-Qaeda command found managing Zarqawi a challenge. It became clear that he would not be a subordinate in the sense they had hoped. Tensions arose between the al-Qaeda leadership and Zarqawi in the months that followed. A public criticism of AQI by Zawahiri, then al-Qaeda’s second in command, were made public in October 2005, just one year after the merger. At issue was not the ideology or goals of the two organizations, but rather their employed tactics. Speaking on behalf of al-Qaeda, Abu Muhammed al-Maqdisi urged Zarqawi to “stop targeting civilians, churches, and Shia … ” and instead focus on the American “occupiers.”20 Zawahiri echoed the same sentiments in a prior letter to Zarqawi in July 2005 where he expressed “grave reservations” about AQI’s tactics of targeting civilians and Shi’ites.21 That letter, intercepted by US military forces was later made public, deepening the divide between the two organizations by fueling resentment and embarrassment. It is not altogether clear if the differences between Zawahiri and Zarqawi had an impact on the day to day operations of AQI. Between the release of the letter in 2005 and summer 2006 there is no indication of an organizational split or change of activities by the AQI. That summer, the calculus was changed. On June 7, 2006, a US military strike killed Zarqawi.22 The death of the leader of alQaeda in Iraq came at a time when the organization was feeling greater pressure to make significant changes that ultimately would have implications on AQI long after its leader’s death. First, the brutality of the tactics employed by AQI took a toll on support from Iraqi Sunnis. Defections from AQI became more common, and their stories were shared with intelligence officials and the media. These stories also served to further isolate Zarqawi and his organization from support he needed in Iraq among the tribal leaders. Second, increased scrutiny by Iraqi Sunnis was placed on the number of foreign nationals who were in leadership and who constituted the membership of Iraq. With the war now in its fourth year, there is some suggestion that Iraqi Sunni tribal leaders were thinking ahead to post-war Iraq and the likelihood, or not, that they would have a role to play if they continued to support the AQI and its brutal tactics. Finally, in the months before his death, Zarqawi began to think of himself as less than an insurgency leader and more of a spiritual leader. He insisted on the application of Sharia law in areas under his control including; veiling of women, execution of apostates, and beheadings for criminals. Local leaders who did not agree to fully implement Zarqawi’s interpretation of the law were executed.23 Such a strict application of Islamic jurisprudence was a break with past practices and creates, at a minimum, social strife among the Sunni towns where AQI held sway. The growing tension between Iraqi Sunnis and AQI was not lost on American commanders looking for a way to diminish the insurgents in Western Iraq. General David Petraeus exploited what he believed to be erosion in AQI’s base of support and oversaw policies that encouraged an ‘Awakening’ among tribal, Sunni leaders to resist Zarqawi’s AQI. The focus of the policies was to emphasize the presence of non-Iraqis in the AQI leadership rank and file, including Zarqawi himself. For their support, tribal leaders were given financial and material support and, perhaps most importantly, they were promised amnesty for past insurgency activity, integration into the

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regional and national security structure, and favorable consideration for government contracts and aid.24 With his death, the personal rivalry between Zawahiri and al-Qaeda’s command structure in general, and Zawahiri in particular, came to an end. Still, the Sunni insurgency remained intact and would, as it had in the past, evolve into a new form called the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) Following Zarqawi’s death Abu Ayub al-Masri took over the leadership of the AQI. His style would prove to be very different from that of his predecessor. Al-Masri is described as having been far less charismatic than Zarqawi and more interested in operations than public relations.25 He never achieved the same level of notoriety as leader of AQI as his predecessor. In fact, questions began to emerge as to whether al-Masri was in fact in charge of the organization. These same questions must have surfaced among American commanders as well. In 2008, the Pentagon reduced the reward for al-Masri’s capture from $25 million to $100,000, without offering an explanation.26 In the aftermath of Zarqawi’s death and, perhaps, because of the absence of another charismatic leader in al-Masri, the AQI announced the establishment of the Islamic State of Iraq under the leadership of Abu Omar al-Baghdadi.27 In their announcement, the ISI said the organization brought together in confederation six Sunni insurgent groups including al-Qaeda and was created to, “ … lay the first cornerstone of the Islamic Caliphate project and revive the glory of religion.”28 Interestingly, the ISI was created to carry forward the religious vision of Zarqawi instead of redirecting the organization’s goals. What’s more, it allowed al-Masri to remain in his post as leader of AQI while introducing an Iraqi spiritual leader in al-Baghdadi. The targeting of Shi’ites continued, along with the other practices that had so incensed local Iraqis. Furthermore, religious declarations and ultimatums were threatening the wealth and power of tribal leaders, who were feeling the pushback from local Iraqis bristling at the imposition of Sharia law. All told, the net effect of implementing a more stringent religious dogma served to push many of these Iraqi Sunnis towards the United States. It was not long before the leaders of the Islamic State of Iraq found themselves in a difficult position. An eroding base of support because of the American led ‘Awakening’ was making it difficult for ISI to recruit, to operate and to maintain the level of success it had enjoyed in the past. By 2008, the ISI described itself as being in a state of “extraordinary crisis.”29 What followed through the end of 2009 was a nearly complete defeat of the ISI. By June 2010, 80 percent of the ISI’s 42 leaders had been killed or captured. Two months earlier, al-Masri and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi were killed in a joint US-Iraqi raid in Tikrit.30 The organization’s leadership then shifted to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the current leader of the Islamic State. If not for the confluence of three unrelated factors, it is difficult to imagine the ISI continuing its operations in a meaningful way. The regional political landscape was shifting and created an opening for the failing ISI to find new life. Between 2010 and 2013, the ISI regained its footing. Three factors help to explain its rebirth: 1. New leadership throughout the organization, 2. The Syrian civil war, and 3. Nouri al-Maliki’s failure to manage the Sunni-Shi’a divide. Each factor is considered in some detail.

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Camp Bucca In the aftermath of the 2003 Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal, US military officials sought to create a set of prison camps that could be held up as a model for future incarceration efforts. Camp Bucca was created for this purpose in late 2003, and remained open until 2009. The Camp itself was known for representing a new approach to managing prisoners taken in Iraq. By all accounts, its novel approach was successful in terms of the treatment of a growing population of detainees. It was certainly quite a departure from the scandalous treatment of prisoners associated with Abu Ghraib.31 What is less known about Camp Bucca is that it also served as ground zero for the radicalization of a cadre of prisoners who would later lead the Islamic State. One such prisoner was an otherwise quiet, bookish Islamic scholar named Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri, also known as Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the current leader of the Islamic State. Prior to his arrest and detention from February to December 2004, Baghdadi was not considered a significant player in jihadist circles.32 In fact, his arrest appears to have been more for association with jihadists than active participation, though he is rumored to have been responsible for smuggling foreign fighters into Iraq to join AQI. According to Col. Kenneth King, Camp Bucca’s commanding officer during Baghdadi’s incarceration, ““He was a bad dude but he wasn’t the worst of the worst.”33 Admittedly, there are some competing narratives about the radicalization of the future leader of ISIS. But, most differ only to the degree that he was radicalized prior to being imprisoned or as a result of the prison experience. It is clear he was engaged in insurgent activity which led to his arrest. It is also clear that his time at Camp Bucca led to further radicalization, networking with future IS members and leaders, and to a leadership role in the prison and jihadist communities. The importance of Camp Bucca is less on whether he was radicalized during his time there and more on the relationships developed and the leadership role he came to play. While Baghdadi may have been the most famous detainee to have served time at Camp Bucca, he is far from alone. According to Iraqi sources, 17 of the 25 leaders of ISIS today served time at Camp Bucca.34 In an interview with the Guardian World News, one former detainee describes the access these future ISIS leaders had with one another: We could never have all got together like this in Baghdad, or anywhere else. It would have been impossibly dangerous. Here, we were not only safe, but we were only a few hundred metres away from the entire al-Qaeda leadership.35

The source, Abu Ahmed, went on to describe al-Baghdadi’s relationship with the prison guards. According to the interviewer, Martin Chulov, “Abu Ahmed recalled, the jailers had a very different impression of Baghdadi – they saw him as a conciliatory and calming influence in an environment short on certainty, and turned to him to help resolve conflicts among the inmates.”36 Perhaps that is why his period of incarceration was relatively short. Nevertheless, that level of trust in an inmate afforded al-Baghdadi the opportunity to meet with inmates from both the Jihadist and ex-Ba’athist elements. Both groups would prove critical to the future success of the Islamic State. The characterization of Camp Bucca as an alma mater for Islamic State leaders has been reported in numerous periodicals, though not so colorfully as provided in an October 2014 New York Times piece about Camp Bucca: Their time in prison deepened their extremism and gave them opportunities to broaden their following … The prisons became virtual terrorist universities: The hardened radicals were the

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professors, the other detainees were the students, and the prison authorities played the role of absent custodian.37

It is clear that one of the unintended consequences of the detention of insurgents was to create opportunities for radicalization. What few expected: however, was how Camp Bucca also served to bring together former adversaries like Islamists and disaffected Ba’athists from Saddam’s regime. And yet, this too took place during their internment at Bucca. According to a report by the Soufan Group, a marriage of convenience took place among formerly hostile parties. They found in their rivals characteristics, traits and abilities often lacking in their own groups. Among the Ba’athists, jihadists found individuals who were disciplined, organized and who had military training. And for the jihadists, the Ba’athists found ideological purpose. According to the Soufan Group’s report: “In Bucca, the math changed as ideologues adopted military and bureaucratic traits and as bureaucrats became violent extremistis.”38 It is no surprise then, that the relationships developed while at Camp Bucca among jihadists and Ba’athists translated into operational activity and leadership once prisoners were released. As has been mentioned, more than half of the leadership of the Islamic State is filled by other prisoners who were held at Camp Bucca. And the operations of the Islamic State reflect the martial experience of the former Ba’athist military members also radicalized during their time in prison. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi returned to the insurgency after his release, joining the Islami State of Iraq in 2006. In 2010, following the deaths of Zarqawi and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was named head of the ISI. There was no pause in operations as ISI continued its insurgent attacks on targets friendly to the Iraqi government and the United States. For example, following the death of Osama bin Laden on May 2, 2011, the ISI announced it would launch a series of retaliatory strikes to avenge the al-Qaeda leader’s death. In the months that followed, dozens of attacks were launched featuring suicide bombings and hit-and-run strikes leaving hundreds dead. Police stations, recruiting offices and religious sites were targeted. And as the US completed its withdrawal of troops from Iraq in December 2011, the violent missions by the Islamic State increased. Baghdadi ordered a series of coordinated bombings in over a dozen Iraqi neighborhoods leading to nearly 100 deaths and 200 wounded.39 The Syrian Civil War The Syrian civil war began in early spring 2011, when protests associated with the broader Arab Spring erupted across Syria. Syria’s President, Basher al-Assad, ordered the use of military force to put down the largely peaceful protests which were occurring nationwide. In the aftermath of the violent crackdowns on protests groups, an armed resistance emerged. By late summer 2011, Baghdadi began to send experienced Syrian and Iraqi members from ISI to recruit fighters and establish anti-government cells in Syria. In January 2012, the Al-Nusra Front was formed as an affiliate of the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Qaeda.40 Al-Nusra grew rapidly, filling its ranks with recently released Syrian jihadists, foreign fighters, and veterans of Iraq’s insurgencies. On April 8, 2013, Baghdadi, buoyed by the success of Al-Nusra, issued a statement outlining the role of the ISI as the organization responsible for founding, arming, and supporting the Nusra Front in Syria. He subsequently announced that the ISI was formally expanding its area of operations to include Syria and renamed the ISI the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham (ISIS) to reflect the union of ISI and Al-Nusra.41 Baghdadi’s announcement generated significant controversy if, for no other reason, the leadership of Al-Nusra claimed to have not been told in advance of the merger plans. What’s more,

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Zawahiri and Al-Qaeda had their own concerns about this announced merger. First, Zawahiri was not interested in publicly revealing Al-Qaeda’s connection to the Nusra Front for fear Syrians, who had not been particularly supportive in the past, would reject Al-Nusra for its association with al-Qaeda. More importantly, perhaps, Zawahiri was growing more concerned that the ISI with this move would eclipse Al-Qaeda in importance and reputation among jihadists. Immediately following Baghdadi’s announcement, Zawahiri declared the merger null and void.42 Baghdadi was undeterred by Zawahiri’s announcement. Supporters of Baghdadi and the new Islamic State of Iraq and Syria opened up fronts throughout eastern Syria, in addition to those in Iraq. They met with rapid success. Again Zawahiri attempted to reclaim control of the subordinate organization led by Baghdadi. His attempts failed. The split with Al-Qaeda was formalized after Zawahiri ordered the disbanding of ISIS in October 2013. Again, Baghdadi refused to comply and continued to press his attacks in Syria winning over supporters and taking large swaths of territory. In February 2014, Al-Qaeda’s command structure ended its relationship with ISIS. By summer 2014, ISIS had eclipsed Al-Nusra and all other resistance groups in Syria. It controlled about 35 percent of the total territory in Northeastern Syria including large cities like Raqqah, which would later be declared the capital of Baghdadi’s Islamic State Caliphate. The group controls nearly all of the oil fields in Syria and is capable of pumping 75,000 barrels of oil per day, a significant source of the organization’s wealth.43 What began as a means for exporting the ISI’s influence into a fragile Syrian political landscape has evolved into the Islamic State, and has emerged as the most prominent resistance group in Syria. Controlling one-third of Syrian’s Northeastern territory, not to mention the areas controlled along the border in Western Iraq, has provided Baghdadi with a stable base of operations, the ability to govern a territory and an ease of moving recruits from Turkey across its 500 mile border with Syria and into Iraq for training and deployment. Al-Maliki and the Sunni-Shi’ite Divide The experiences in Camp Bucca to radicalize and organize the future leaders of the Islamic State, along with the battlefield experience and expansion of operations that came with the civil war in Syria, are two of the three confluent factors that helped the Islamic State to achieve its current prominence. The third factor that led to the rise of the Islamic State is the rapid decline of relations between Iraq’s Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki, a Shi’ite, and the Sunni population. The success enjoyed by the United States with its Sunni ‘Awakening’ policy was predicated on the notion that Sunnis who worked against the insurgencies would be granted clemency for prior crimes, would be integrated into the Iraqi national security structure and would be the beneficiaries of Baghdad’s largesse. Up until the US left Iraq, the ‘Awakening’ policy was considered a success. However, almost immediately following the American withdrawal from Iraq, al-Maliki began to renege on those promises, leading initially to frustration among the Sunnis. Eventually, frustration became open hostility and support for insurgencies like the Islamic State. Complaints emerged from Sunni leaders in 2010 that Maliki was not fulfilling his promise to integrate Sunnis into the national security framework of the Iraqi government. Previously, Iraqi Sunnis were forced from the military as part of the de-Ba’athification process instituted by the US in the aftermath of the 2003 invasion. While allowed to rejoin the military under al-Maliki, advancement was limited to enlisted ranks and non-commissioned officers.44 Civil Service positions were similarly restricted along sectarian lines. Al-Maliki’s marginalization of Sunnis extended to elected officials as well. Political opponents of the regime were targeted for harassment and arrested. In what may have been the most publicized

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incident of al-Maliki-Sunni strife, the Prime Minister accused the Vice President, Tareq al-Hashemi, a Sunni, of plotting bombings and organizing assassination missions. Vice President al-Hashemi was tried in absentia and found guilty after fleeing to Kurdistan.45 The charges against Hashemi, the highest ranking Sunni in Iraq, followed a decision by the Sunni bloc, in Iraq’s parliament, to boycott future legislative proceedings. Their decision came, they claimed, as a result of al-Maliki’s refusal to honor commitments made during the ‘Awakening’ to expand government positions open to Sunnis.46 Matters devolved further after the arrest warrant for the Vice President was issued. Sunni members of al-Maliki’s cabinet resigned leaving very few Sunni voices in Baghdad. Harassment of Sunnis was not limited to government officials and military personnel under al-Maliki. Erin Evers of Human Rights Watch, describes an Iraqi law enforcement establishment that targets Sunnis: The government consistently carries out mass arrests and home invasions of Sunni neighborhoods. Around big Shia religious holidays there seems to be a pattern of Sunni being arrested and put in preventative detention.47

Since the US withdrew from Iraq, there is at least a perception of Shi’ite discrimination and harassment of Sunnis. Whether it is the Vice President or the average Sunni citizen targeted in a police raid, a crisis of confidence in al-Maliki’s leadership emerged. Indeed, while al-Maliki considered a third term as Prime Minister it became clear that others in his government, including Shi’ite leaders, were looking to move on from his administration. When Haidar al-Badi, the current Prime Minister of Iraq was nominated by the President, al-Maliki found himself isolated in Baghdad. The reaction by the international community who greeted news of al-Badi’s nomination positively complicated matters for the embattled Prime Minister. Iran and the United Stated both described the nomination as a positive step for Iraq. United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon went so far as to applaud the selection of an Iraqi leader, “acceptable to all components of Iraqi society.”48 On August 14, 2014 Nouri al-Maliki resigned foregoing any attempts to remain in power or in government in Iraq. Nouri al-Maliki managed, in a relatively short time, to undermine the gains made as a result of the Sunni ‘Awakening.’ Sunni tribal leaders found themselves once again turning to the insurgents in response to what they perceived were the broken promises of the Iraqi leadership. Baghdadi capitalized on this discontent to fill his ranks with new troops and support from Iraqi Sunnis. By the time of al-Maliki’s resignation, the Islamic State had made impressive gains throughout Iraq and Syria. Operation Northern Offensive concluded with Iraqis fearful that the IS might lay siege to their capital, Baghdad. Conclusion The Islamic State began modestly as an organization dedicated to resisting US intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. Early on, Abu Musa al-Zarqawi imbued his organization with a religious perspective that targeted non-Muslims, and Muslims who differed in their interpretation of Islam, for some of the most horrific and public attacks. What passes for the shocking mainstay of IS tactics were first implemented by Zarqawi and his jihadist precursor organization the JTJ. Zarqawi’s insurgency gained notoriety and was quite successful. When the leadership of alQaeda’s main organization approached him about merging and growing the insurgent efforts in Iraq, the Islamic State evolved further. Now with access to the al-Qaeda brand, the al-Qaeda in Iraq

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group, led by Zarqawi, was able to better recruit, fundraise, and publicize their work against the regime in Iraq and its American benefactors. The path to the current Islamic State was not without its setbacks, however. The split with alQaeda was public and set back the organization briefly. So, too, did the deaths of Zarqawi, the ISI’s Baghdadi and al-Masri in a relatively short time frame. By 2008, it appeared the Islamic State’s evolution was coming to an end, in what one member described as an organizational crisis. Nevertheless, a new leadership was forming in Camp Bucca. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi took the relationships he had while in detention and used them to rebuild the Islamic State. He expanded the scope of the organization to include Syria, and then returned to Iraq to launch a shockingly successful series of attacks on major Iraqi cities like Mosul. Following these military victories in summer 2014, Al-Baghdadi declared formally the founding of the Islamic State as a Caliphate. Using his alleged lineage to the Prophet Mohammed, he declared himself Caliph of the new Islamic State and then proceeded to spread his brand of Islam throughout the region. Both the Caliphate and his role as its leader are new features of the ongoing struggle with militant Islam.49 Today, the Islamic State holds considerable territory in Iraq and Syria and they continue to wage war to expand their holdings. The IS is the wealthiest terrorist organization in recorded history and, perhaps, the most well-armed. It is an organization that has developed an extensive bureaucracy for governing, taxing, and providing social services in addition to enforcing its strict interpretations of Islam in the areas over which it rules. In the first quarter of 2015, the United States has launched over 2,000 air strikes. Growing anger at IS tactics has pushed other states to commit to fighting al-Baghdadi’s forces. As of this writing, Egypt, Jordan, and Iran have committed troops in support of other coalition partners to fight the Islamic State. President Obama has requested an Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) from the US Congress which allows for the limited use of ground forces under specific conditions. If approved, this AUMF could bring the United States military back to Iraq in more significant numbers. In the meantime, there is no indication that the Islamic State is in decline. Despite some military setbacks and the ongoing coalition strikes led by the United States, the Islamic State continues to inspire confidence. Throughout the Muslim World those black flags with white Arabic calligraphy are popping up. IS now enjoys pledge support from groups in 11 countries and with transnational groups like Boko Haram, an Islamist organization based in Nigeria but with operations in North Central Africa. Claims of attacks by individuals or small groups inspired by the Islamic State were made related to the January 7, 2015 Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris. Attacks in Australia and Europe along with a recently foiled attack by an Ohio man against the capital in Washington, DC all had ties to the Islamic State. The breadth of the Islamic State’s reach is breathtaking. From conventional military strikes to abductions and beheadings to lone wolf attacks in far-away western capitals, the Islamic State represents a very real threat to regional peace and security. Notes 1 “Remarks by the President at National Prayer Breakfast,” February 5, 2015. EBSCOhost (accessed March 4, 2015). 2 Daragahi, Borzou, Sam Jones, and Simeon Kerr. 2014. “Isis Declares Mideast Caliphate,” Financial Times, June 30, 4.

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3 Abi-Habib, Maria. “Sunni Militants Seize Iraqi Border Post; Mahdi Army Forces Hold Rally in Sadr City,” (June 21, 2014), p. n/a, (n.d.). EBSCOhost (accessed December 31, 2014). 4 “Iraq: Maliki’s Call for State of Emergency Splits Politicians,” Asharq Al-Awsat, June 12, 2014, English ed. http://search.proquest.com/docview/1535132025?accountid=42685. 5 Bradley, Matt. “Iraq’s Besieged Maliki Quits; as Leader Resigns, U.S. Counts on Successor to Unite Factions to Fight Jihadists,” Wall Street Journal (Online), August 14, 2014. http://search.proquest.com/docvi ew/1553206593?accountid=42685. 6 “The Rise of the Islamic State – How Jihadi Group Conquered Territory in Iraq and Syria in 90 Seconds,” The Telegraph (Online), October 7, 2014. 7 Fantz, Ashley. “How ISIS Makes (and Takes) Money,” CNN Wire Service, February 19, 2015. http:// search.proquest.com/docview/1656150965?accountid=42685. 8 “House Financial Services Committee Hearing,” (November 13, 2014), p. n/a: EBSCOhost (accessed January 11, 2015). 9 Cockburn, Patrick. “War With Isis: Islamic Militants Have Army of 200,000, Claims Senior Kurdish Leader,” The Independent (Online), November 16, 2014. 10 Reuters. “Syria: Monitor: Islamic State Recruits at Record Pace in Syria,” Asia News Monitor, August 22, 2014. http://search.proquest.com/docview/1555023254?accountid=42685. 11 Foster, Peter. “1,000 foreign fighters a month are joining Isil, claim UN and US,” November 1, 2014, p. 18, (n.d.). EBSCOhost (accessed January 21, 2015). 12 For a more complete history of JTJ see: Farrel, Leah. “How Al Qaeda Works,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2011, 90.2. 13 Hashem, Ahmed. “The Islamic State: From Al-Qaeda Affiliate to Caliphate,” Middle East Policy, xxi, no. 4, Winter 2014, p. 70. 14 Ibid. 15 Ghosh, Bobby. “ISIS: A Short History,” The Atlantic, August 14, 2014. http://www.theatlantic.com/ international/archive/2014/08/isis-a-short-history/376030/. 16 Ghosh, Bobby. “Terror at a Shrine,” Time, August 31, 2003. http://content.time.com/time/magazine/ article/0,9171,480283,00.html. 17 Jeffrey, Terence. “Zarqawi Sends Murderous Reminder,” Human Events, 60.17, May 17, 2004, p. 5. 18 Pool, Jeffrey. “Zarqawi’s Pledge of Allegiance to Al-Qaeda: From Mu’Asker al-Battar, Issue 21,” Terrorism Monitor, vol 2, Iss 24, December 15, 2004. http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_ news%5D=27305&no_cache=1#.VQIcePnF9qW. 19 Barrett, Richard. “The Islamic State,” A report for The Soufan Group, November 2014, p. 11. 20 Hashim. “From Al-Qaeda Affiliate to Caliphate,” p. 71. 21 Brian, Fishman. “Using the Mistakes of Al Qaeda’s Franchises to Undermine Its Strategies,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, July 1, 2008, 618, pp. 46–54. EBSCOhost (accessed February 10, 2015). 22 Quinn, Patrick. “Al-Zarqawi Killed; Iraq’s Most Wanted Found Thanks, in Part, to his Videos,” The Associated Press. June 8, 2006, p. A.1. 23 Ghosh, Aparisim. “Face to Face With Terror,” Time, 167.19, May 8, 2006, p. 14–15. 24 Byman, Daniel L. and Kenneth M. Pollack. “Iraq’s Long-Term Impact on Jihadist Terrorism,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 618.1, July 2008, p. 57. 25 Gannon, Kathy. “Shadowy Trail of al-Masri, al-Qaida Leader in Iraq, A Journey through Radical Hotbeds,” Associated Press, May 2, 2007. EBSCOhost (accessed February 14, 2015). 26 Mount, Mike. “Reward for Wanted Terrorist Drops,” CNN, May 13, 2008. http://www.cnn.com/2008/ WORLD/meast/05/13/pentagon.masri.value/index.html.

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27 Abu Omar al-Baghdadi should not be confused with the current leader of the Islamic State, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Both names are aliases with the surname reflecting both men were Iraqis. 28 Roggio, Bill. “The Rump Islamic Emirate of Iraq,” The Long War Journal, October 16, 2006. http:// www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2006/10/the_rump_islamic_emi.php#. 29 Hashim, “The Islamic-State,” p. 72. 30 Lyons, James. “Al-Qaeda Iraq Leaders ‘Killed in Raid by US.’’ May 2, 2007, The Times (United Kingdom), p. 1. 31 Khalil, Ashraf. “Camp Bucca Turns 180 Degrees From Abu Ghraib,” Los Angeles Times. January 10, 2005. http://articles.latimes.com/2005/jan/19/world/fg-bucca19. 32 There are conflicting reports about the length of Baghdadi’s incarceration. The dates provided reflect official Department of Defense data. 33 Daly, Michael. “ISIS Leader: ‘See You in New York.’” The Daily Beast, June 14, 2014. http://www. thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/06/14/isis-leader-see-you-in-new-york.html. 34 Greene, David. “Islamic State Leadership,” National Public Radio, December 12, 2014. http://www. npr.org/2014/12/12/370264886/time-in-a-u-s-run-detention-center-helped-islamic-state-leadership. 35 Chulov, Martin. “ISIS: The Inside Story,” The Guardian, December 11, 2014. http://www. theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/11/-sp-isis-the-inside-story. 36 Ibid. 37 Thompson, Andrew and Jeremi Suri. “How America Helped ISIS,” New York Times, October 1, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/02/opinion/how-america-helped-isis.html?_r=0. 38 “From Bucca to Kobani: The Hybrid Ideology of the Islamic State,” The Soufan Group Intelligence Brief, October 24, 2014. http://soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-from-bucca-to-kobani-the-hybrid-ideologyof-the-islamic-state/. 39 Roggio, Bill. “Al Qaeda in Iraq Claims Baghdad Suicide Attack, Bombings,” The Long War Journal, December 27, 2011. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/12/al_qaeda_in_iraq_cla_1.php. 40 Abouzeid, Rania. “The Jihad Next Door: The Syrian Roots of Iraq’s Newest Civil War,” Politico, June 23, 2014. http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/06/al-qaeda-iraq-syria-108214.html#.VQX-z454on5. 41 “ISI Confirms That Jabhat Al-Nusra Is Its Extension in Syria, Declares ‘Islamic State of Iraq And Al-Sham’ As New Name of Merged Group,” MEMRI. April 8, 2013. http://www.memri.org/report/ en/0/0/0/0/0/0/7119.htm. 42 Atassi, Basma. “Qaeda Chief Annuls Syrian-Iraqi Jihad Merger,” Al Jazeera, June 9, 2013. http:// www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/06/2013699425657882.html. 43 Karam, Zena. “A Look at the Islamic State Militants in Syria,” Associated Press News Service, August 28, 2014. 44 Daragahi, Borzou. “Sunni Sense of Injustice Grows as Sectarian Spirit Spreads—IRAQ CRISIS Discrimination,” Financial Times, June 27, 2014, p. 4. 45 “Iraq’s Vice-President Rejects Death Sentence,” Al Jazeera, September 10, 2012. http://www. aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/09/201291085639667993.html. 46 “Iraq President Criticizes Treatment of Sunni VP,” Associated Press News Service, December 20, 2011. http://infoweb.newsbank.com.nec.gmilcs.org/resources/doc/nb/ news/13BC1ADCB2346EA8?p=AWNB. 47 Daragahi, p. 4. 48 Salama, Vivian and Sameer N. Yacoub. “Iraq’s Incumbent PM Nouri Al-Maliki Grows More Isolated as He Clings to Power,” Associated Press in The Huffington Post, August 12, 2014. http://www.huffingtonpost. com/2014/08/12/iraq-maliki-isolated_n_5671154.html. 49 Osama Bin Laden spoke of the eventual founding of a caliphate but did not believe it would happen in his lifetime.

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Chapter 3

Ideology and Theology R. Alan King and Robert J. Pauly, Jr.

Introduction The world is closer today than during any previous period in history. Multinational corporations, foreign military sales, alliances, economic ventures, illegal immigration, historical migration, international flight, the internet, social media and trade have expanded, and even erased historical borders. In the past 18 months, the Islamic State (IS) has vaulted onto the world stage, upset the hope for stability in the Middle East and now threatens to disrupt historical alliances around the globe. The information age has caused an overload of data to analyze and interpret; today’s abrupt political decisions, unsystematic and appear pursued without concern for the incidental and tertiary effects, or how the outcome will affect the intended target audience. The West encountered the pinnacle of anticipation waiting for political change in the Middle East during the sunrise of the Arab Spring in late 2010 and early 2011. Yet, hope faded in the sunset of the Arab Fall as one government after another collapsed and the region has remained in an unpredictable pattern of chaos since. Plans for a tidal wave of change have crashed down as one hopeful democracy after another face marked security threats, not only from the virulent strains of anti-Islamic extremism that pervert the religion Muslims practice, but also the cultures and political institutions that have evolved over millennia. Pundits continue to raise concerns about the growing Muslim communities around the world, but the West generally and United States in particular, fail to realize that Islam is not a homogeneous religion and Islamism is not the preferred political system for many Muslims today. The beliefs of Islamic adherents are not pluralistic toward an end state, as they are not necessarily accepting of the practices of others within their own faith. This is the point where one must begin to understand the apparent phenomena within the Middle East, particularly the rise of IS, and the likely effects it will have, or not have, on all nations and all religions. Since the onset of the Arab Spring, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt had dictators fall from power as cheers of exhilaration and high expectations were felt by the citizens of the respective countries shedding the chains of tyranny; this was done as the West looked on with optimism at the prospects of a democratic future in the region. In January 2011, the United States chose democracy over its longtime ally, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, with American President Barack H. Obama stating, “ … the status quo is not sustainable, and that an orderly and peaceful transition must begin immediately.”1 Israeli and political pundits were shocked at the United States, and its European allies, as they discarded a reliable and strategic partner of three decades while submitting to the tide of political correctness.2 The events that unfolded in the months after January 2011 resulted in the United States and its European allies seemingly displaying a naïveté and severe lack of understanding of the evolution of history, culture and human nature in the Middle East. In less than two years, two of the four countries affected by the Arab Spring found their democratically elected Islamist parties either overthrown by coup d’état, or stepping down under pressure from secular opposition groups. The

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third country, Libya, remains divided and is in a state of conflict and chaos, and the fourth, Syria, remains in the midst of a civil war that has spilled over into Iraq and is moving into Northern Africa, erasing borders and establishing new political barriers in the Middle East. There is little hope for cessations of hostilities in the near future, as the US-led bombing campaign creates the belief among Sunnis in the region that the strategy offers Iran an opportunity to expand its influence in the Middle East, particularly in the area of the Shia Crescent. From the outset of its evolution, beginning as al-Qaeda in Iraq into IS, punctuated by its reemergence as a powerful and influential actor in the heart of the Middle East, amid the anarchy of intra-state conflict in Syria from 2011–13, IS has cast extreme, perverted interpretations of the Islamic religion. This is central to its identity and appeals to prospective recruits across the world. Most significantly, the group has been effective in packaging that message in a tech-savvy manner that appeals to often marginalized younger generations of Muslims born and raised in the West. The origins of IS date to its emergence under the leadership of the Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, in response to America’s intervention and prosecution of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in spring 2003. Under Zarqawi’s leadership, and after his elimination via a US airstrike in June 2006, the organization that eventually evolved into IS was known as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). This group was also an affiliate of core al-Qaeda, headed by Osama bin Laden, who perished under broadly comparable circumstances in an American SEAL team raid at a complex in Abbottabad, Pakistan in May 2011. Despite Zarqawi’s death, AQI remained a significant military, political and religious player in Iraq from 2006–08, wielding considerable power and influence, especially in the northern and western parts of the country, where it used both anti-American and anti-Shia Muslim sentiments to its advantage in gaining and maintaining support from Sunni tribal leaders in Anbar Province in particular. Ultimately, however, AQI alienated those tribes with its emphatic imposition of the same types of perverted interpretations of Islam on the population. The Sunni tribes’ growing dissatisfaction with AQI, in turn, created a window of opportunity, which the United States took advantage of during its 2007–08 military “surge” of 30,000 forces in Baghdad and the turbulent provinces to the west and northwest. That surge provided greater capabilities on the ground for the United States to improve the security situation and rally tribal leaders to America’s side to an extent that left AQI weakened and marginalized, if not defeated altogether by late 2010. As Rand Foundation scholar Rick Brennan, who served as a senior advisor to the US military in Iraq from 2006–11, explains, “The additional U.S. troops, diplomats and funding, along with a number of other factors—including the so-called Sunni Awakening, which saw Sunni tribes turn on AQI—pulled Iraq back from the brink of disintegration.”3 Regrettably, for the United States and its allies in Persian Gulf and broader Greater Middle East, AQI took advantage of a fortuitous chance for rebirth and resurgence through a 2010–11 political reform process turned armed revolt, branded by some scholars and policymakers as the Arab Spring and others as the Arab Awakening. Touched off by the self-immolation of a Tunisian fruit stand vendor in December 2010, revolts spread across the region, leaving Syria embroiled in a brutal intra-state conflict by summer 2011, one that continues today. The withdrawal of all remaining US military forces from Iraq in December 2011 contributed to an environment in which the Shia majority government led by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki felt free to marginalize the minority Sunnis generally and their tribal leaders specifically. Such marginalization left most, if not all, Sunnis angry, largely detached from, and certainly by no means, loyal to the Iraqi national government in Baghdad. In 2012–2013 when IS emerged as one of the most powerful anti-government actors in the intra-state conflict in Syria, they began to maintain control over substantial swaths of territory, and neighboring Iraq became a natural target for expansion for multiple related reasons. AQI’s

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experience there, of course was important, but of greater significance was the opportunity to establish an Islamic caliphate in the heart of the Middle East. In addition, it was to model after those that controlled the region, but also parts of Europe to the north, and Central and South Asia to the east, in the centuries after the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 CE. Central to IS’ vision for the development and eventual enlargement of such a caliphate is its extreme, perverted interpretations of Islam and that faith’s principal documents, the Qur’an, Sunna and hadith. That misuse of Islam is the focal point for this chapter. With these observations providing a necessary contextual foundation, the balance of the chapter divides into six related sections that unfold in the following manner. The first section reviews the religious and political origins of Islam during the Muhammadan era and the intra-communal conflict that produced the division between Sunni and Shia strains of that faith. The second section presents an overview of the diversity of the Islamic religion, with emphases on Sunni and Shia Islam and the divisions within each of those principal denominations of that faith; one that specifies the Islamic State’s location on the periphery of the Sunni side of that interpretive equation. The third section explains where the Islamic State fits in with the interpretive tapestry of Islam, relative to other Muslim majority states, the Muslim communities in Western states and non-state actors that use extreme interpretations of Islam. The fourth section explains the theological, geopolitical and security implications of the Islamic State’s interpretive extremity, and behavior in the Greater Middle East and the West. The fifth section assesses the ways to use Islam, itself, to counter the Islamic State’s message in the Greater Middle East and the West. The concluding section assesses the prospects for the future of IS, with respect to the threats it presents in the Greater Middle East, the West and at the global level. Religious and Political Origins of Islam Islam’s origin dates to the year 610 when a merchant named Muhammad ibn (son of) Abdullah began to receive what he perceived as revelations from God (Allah in Arabic) in a cave just outside of the Western Arabian city of Mecca, a major trading hub linking the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean Sea and surrounding regions. Muhammad, a member of the powerful Quraisyh tribe, was an astute and trusted manager of the trade interests of the wealthy, and when he married a local widow, named Haditha he began sharing those revelations with others. This eventually developed a group of followers who described themselves as Muslims or as, those who submit to God’s will.4 Muhammad, who could neither read nor write, instead articulated verbally the revelations he received from God, through the Angel Gabriel, from 610 until his death in 632. The content of those messages to his followers ultimately serving as the content of the Holy Qur’an. Muhammad also led by example in building the norms for a religious community of believers (the ummah) in Islam, which quickly joined Christianity and Judaism among the world’s most significant monotheistic faiths. However, building and, ultimately, expanding that community did not come without daunting challenges. The existing polytheistic religious system was favorable to the elites of the Quraisyh, who understandably and correctly viewed the nascent Islamic community as a potentially existential threat. As John L. Esposito, a scholar of Islam in both the Muslim world and the West notes, For the powerful and prosperous Meccan oligarchy, the monotheistic message of this would be reformer, with its condemnation of the socio-economic inequities of Meccan life, constituted a

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direct challenge not only to traditional polytheistic religion but also to the power and prestige of the establishment, threatening their economic, social and political interests.5

Ultimately, the confrontation with the Quraisyh to which Esposito refers forced Muhammad and his followers to flee Mecca for the neighboring city of Medina in 622. There, they continued to develop the original Islamic society that set the theological and practical standards to which Muslims have aspired since. They also developed plans to overcome their opponents through whatever means necessary, whether it be economic, military, political, religious or otherwise. Muhammad then set into motion the initial enlargement of the territory controlled by the community of adherents to Islam—known then and since as the ummah—through a series of military battles with his Quraisyh opponents from 624–30, which culminated in the capitulation of Mecca. In the first of those conflicts, the Battle of Badr in 624, a badly outnumbered force under Muhammad’s command, prevailed over the Quraisyh, giving needed credibility to (and, ultimately, an increased base of support for) the blossoming Islamic movement. However, that triumph prompted a substantial counter-offensive by the Meccans, who defeated the Muslims in the Battle of Uhud in 625 and attempted to achieve a resounding final victory by laying siege to Medina in 627.6 Ultimately, Muhammad’s forces withstood the Meccan siege, leading many of the coalition partners that had aligned themselves with the Quraisyh to abandon the cause. After striking a truce with the Quraisyh in 628, a condition of which permitted Muslims to make an annual pilgrimage to Mecca, where Muhammad’s revelations began. When the Quraisyh violated the agreement by prohibiting the pilgrimage in 630, an army of 10,000 Muslims marched on Mecca, seizing the city, most of whose citizens converted to Islam and thus joined the ever-expanding ummah. Muhammad presided over that community from Mecca until his death in 632, which left the prophet’s followers to choose a successor. The choice that, Muhammad’s father-in-law, Abu Bakr, launched was the inaugural “caliphate” in Islamic history. This has provided inspiration and also served as a model for IS’ vision for the maintenance of its own caliphate, which straddles Iraq and Syria, as much as it has for other extremist groups and/or terrorist organizations that try to justify their actions on the basis of extreme, perverted, illegitimate interpretations of Islam.7 What Sunni Muslims refer to as the period of the Rightly Guided Caliphs lasted from 632–61 and spanned the regimes of Abu Bakr (632–34), Umar ibn al-Khattab (634–44), Uthman ibn Affan (644–56) and Ali ibn Abi Ṭalib (656–61). Known by Muslims generally and Sunnis specifically as a classical period of Islamic theological development and implementation, it was during this span that Muhammad’s followers recorded the Qur’an based on the revelations the prophet passed along during his lifetime and then began to enlarge the territory the caliphate controlled and the membership in the ummah. Regrettably, tensions between factions loyal and opposed to Ali led to that caliph’s assassination in 661 and the division of the ummah into Shia and Sunni denominations. The original cores of membership of those two strains of the faith were composed of those Muslims who supported the late Ali and those who did not.8 Religious Diversity of Islam To examine the threat to Western and mainstream Islamic interests, it is necessary to begin probing the threat by dissecting the religion of Islam and defining it by its parts. It is the lack of understanding of the differing Islamic practices adhered to by competing groups that creates the greatest threat for the United States as well as, the states of Europe and the Greater Middle East in the near future, which offers IS an avenue to promulgate its depraved form of anti-Islamic

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ideology. After over a decade at war for al-Qaeda’s atrocities of September 11, 2001 (9/11), the United States and most of Europe still identifies Islam as Sunni and Shia. These Western countries do this in many ways just as some see Christianity, as simply Protestant, Catholic, or Eastern Orthodox. In the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq, the United States viewed the two Islamic sects as political separations within the country, Shia (majority) were Republican and Sunni (minority) Democrat. The West continues to view the divided Christian denominations as simply Catholics and Protestants, but fails to see the greater division of belief between the Calvinists and Wesleyan interpretations of salvation. There are inflexible differences between conservative and liberal beliefs in the Christian Church, even within the same denomination, just as there too are similar divisions within the Islamic religion. Today, the West still fails to understand that the Sunni sect has four dominant schools of jurisprudence. The Hanafiyyah, which is less strict than the other schools of jurisprudence, allows worship in one’s native language and the adoption of other cultural practices into worship; it is usually practiced in Turkey, Iraq, South Asia, Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Balkans. The Malikiyyah has secular laws that are authorized and added to those derived from hadiths, and is practiced usually by those in North Africa, West Africa, areas of India, and several Middle Eastern countries; including areas of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Oman. The Shafiyyah holds religious guidelines which are not as strict as the other schools of jurisprudence, and is practiced by those from Jordan, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Hejaz region of Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Syria, Palestinian territories, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Somalia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, North Caucasus, Kurdistan and Maldives. Lastly, Hanbaliyyah, which is the strictest interpretation of the Quran and found predominantly in Saudi Arabia and Qatar, with minority groups in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. The Shia sect is divided as well between sub-sects such as the Imamiyyah, or Twelvers, which is prominent in Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, and Afghanistan. The Alawites, in Syria, are a sub-branch from the Imamiyyahs, the Ismailiyyah, or Seveners are found in Pakistan, India, Afghanistan and Central Asia—with minorities in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Syria, Jordan, East Africa, Angola, Lebanon, South Africa, and recently emigrated to Europe, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the United States, Trinidad, Tobago and the Zaidiyyah. Alternatively, the Fivers are prominent in Yemen and communities in Saudi Arabia, and these are just to name a few. The activities most frequently reported on by the media come primarily from the Wahhabiyyah and Salafiyyah movements, which are from the Sunni sect. While many Salafiyyah trace their ideology from the Wahhabiyyah movement, Salafiyyah followers the other Sunni schools of jurisprudence are also found, but are usually identifiable by their dress and physical appearance. It is necessary to point out that the Salafiyyah believe that they alone adhere to pure Islam as directed by God and they alone practice the faith as God intended. Within this limited line of reasoning, all others, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, who do not believe as the Salafiyyah followers, are then apostates and legitimate targets for termination in the movement to create a true Islamic caliphate. This is the starting point of the IS movement. Each of the branches have movements, or sub-branches, and among those, even differing views at the level down to local mosques. None of these includes the distinct and separate sect of the Ibadis in Oman. With shortcomings in the understanding of Islam, the West is unprepared to identify and confront the threats posed by IS and the religious beliefs the followers adhere to. Because of this, the West does not find itself prepared for something it does not understand, nor does it attempt to learn what it does not know. In their current policy of containment, or confrontation, Western policy makers create active enemies, supporters and sympathizers from those who would probably never have believed the extremist movements as legitimate, but because flawed Western policy

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see these groups as defending the fundamental Islamic beliefs. Worse yet, are those policies, or activities that are so counter to actuality, that the actions are seen as laughable propaganda. IS and the Interpretation of Islam in the Greater Middle East and the West To create a mental picture of the cost effectiveness of the American bombardment campaign compared to an IS jihadist attack, the United States spends over $720,000 a day to fly a single B-1 bomber in Afghanistan, or Syria. Yet, the insurgents send a suicide bomber with 20 pounds of explosive on a $200 motorcycle to carry out an attack, killing the same number of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) troops as the plane flying all day. If the United States, the members of NATO, or greater Europe, intend to deal with the growing threat of Islamic extremism, then it is necessary to learn, define, understand, and know how to interpret and separate the parts of the threat, the intent of the differing ideologies, and only then, develop a comprehensive plan for offensive kinetic and non-kinetic engagement. There are an estimated 1.6 billion Muslims in the world9 and growing at a rate of 1.84 percent a year.10 The issue with these statistics is the unidentified growth by sub-sect, i.e. Hanafiyyah verses Hanbaliyyah. In fact, reviewing the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Fact Book, 2014, of the almost 50 countries with majority Muslim populations, only sub-sects Shafiyyah and Zaidiyyah identify Yemen. As mentioned, there is a distinct difference between the practices, scholarly religious interpretations, the implementation of jurisprudence, views towards a caliphate, and even in some cases, various sub-sects look at the consideration given to their eschatologies when determining the strategies of engagement towards the West by the various sub-sects. Within Islamic majority countries, there are those who practice strict interpretation and the implementation of sharia law, for example the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), which is theoretically 100 percent Muslim and whose state religion is Islam based on the Wahhabiyyah movement from the school of Hanbaliyyah. In fact, carrying a symbol of the Cross-in the KSA, is reason enough to go to prison. Though the KSA is one of the strictest Islamic nations in the world, it too has its division of Islam with most of the two million Shia Muslims adhering to the practices of the Imamiyyah sub-sect, and representative minorities from the Ismailiyyah and Zaidiyyah. This division of faith has led to reports of discrimination against the Shia communities and a perceived threat by the KSA government that Iran will use the Shia communities, mostly located in the Eastern province near the refineries, to create instability within the country. Appreciating the Islamic adherence in the KSA is important as it serves as the keepers of the Islamic holy sites and the self-appointed overseers of the Sunni population. There are those in the KSA, and other countries in the Middle East, who view the actions of IS as necessary to counter the Iranian influence throughout the Shia Crescent. IS is not a movement toward an Islamic caliphate, but a desire to create an Arab caliphate that adheres to the strict interpretation of Quran. Although the Quran provides exceptions to practice Christianity and Judaism, the IS desires to eradicate all other religions, and Muslims, who do not adhere to its form of Islam. The hope for limiting the expansion of IS is to look to the other end of the Islamic spectrum, at countries such as Bangladesh, where almost 90 percent of the population is Muslim, the majority following the Hanafiyyah sub-sect, and those who practice secular law within a unicameral parliament. How then can the West analyze and properly intervene against a threat with the marked religious diversity, a recognizable and inherent distrust between the sects and an extremist movement that threatens to destabilize, not just the West, but also the apostate Islamic nations and Muslims who do not adhere to the extremist views of Islam. The ability to confront,

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engage and suppress those who threaten security and stability is easier than the West has been able to appreciate, or to act on. A review and investigation of these points are necessary to appreciate that, those who create fear by attempting to make unsubstantiated normative and invalid statements about Sunni and Shia and their potential threat to the West, are a threat in and of themselves because they distract the focus on the real dangers and necessary methods of engagement. There are unquestionably threats of violence heralded by extremist voices within the Islamic sects, but being able to identify and materialize the threats without creating sympathizers and supporters from the majority of the Islamic world, as stated earlier, is an inherent responsibility that the West has not successfully learned, nor has it established the policy to do so. A Pew Research poll found that of 39 Muslim majority countries, most of the individuals surveyed stated that they believed there is only one true interpretation of the Quran and the teachings of Islam, yet the view on what is the true interpretation is far from unanimous.11 This is a point that the media and political pundits fail to explain to the uninformed, and this is the single point that the West has unsuccessfully demonstrated in the War on Terror. By failing to identify and segregate the misguided believers from the mainstream followers, the West has essentially attempted to turn 1.6 billion Muslims into the enemy. While there will always be a “lone wolf” actors who conduct a terrorist act in the name of God, this person, or persons, while a terrorist, cannot easily be identified prior to the act, which has the same general characteristics as the common criminal who kills for profit, emotions, mental instability, or pleasure. To analyze the threats created by IS it is necessary to understand the threat Iran poses against the Arab Middle East. For instance, some contend that Iran can take Islam to war against the world as portrayed in the documentary, Iranium, yet it is also reasonable to suggest that Iran can take Islam to war with itself—but that it cannot take Islam to war against the world. While Islamic nations may stand with Iran if attacked by Israel, if Iran attacks Israel, the rest of the Muslim world is not likely to support the act. The current policy towards Iran may gain a tactical victory, it is more likely to be a strategic failure as one very senior administrator from a Sunni majority country stated, “Today you embrace your enemy and slap your friends, and we will not turn for you to slap the other cheek.”12 While there are historical accounts where Sunni and Shia have fought together for a mutual cause, the differences between the sects is such that the Civilization of Islam13 is extremely unlikely to rise in a cooperative struggle against the world. It is more likely that Iran will do what is has done for the last three and a half decades; agree to a process such as disarmament, and when the West proceeds with the agreed plan, Iran will state that the West misunderstood, and then it will take a position that the deal must be reinterpreted. Iran has repeatedly used this tactic since 1981. Failing to effectively confront and prevent Iran from obtaining an offensive nuclear capability will likely lead to an arms race in the Middle East between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The ideology of IS will lead it to attempt to confront Iran, even if it meant doing so by obtaining its own equivalent mass casualty capability, either chemically, or biologically. To appreciate this assertion, in three countries surveyed—Tunisia, Jordan and the Palestinian territories—there were closely divided opinions on whether Shias are even Muslims. In Egypt and Morocco, the prevailing view (52 percent and 51 percent, respectively) was that Shias are not Muslims.14 This is an unmistakable point, that Islam is not a homogeneous religion with all of the adherents determined to ally together to destroy the West, or to create a single Islamic caliphate. A further examination of the eschatologies of Sunnis and Shias makes it easier to understand the methodology of forcing the adherence to a particular ideological belief. For example, the suicide bomber is a predominately-Sunni phenomenon because, generally, Sunnis believe that hell is a temporary stop on their way to paradise. One spends time in, Barzakh (Purgatory) and with their

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sins accounted for; they enter into paradise. In the Salafiyyah belief, one who martyrs themselves for God enters directly into paradise along with 70 of their closest relatives without having to spend time in Barzakh as they receive forgiveness for their sins for their selfless act for God. The suicide tactic is less common within the Shia sect, as they traditionally believe that suicide is a greater sin and there is no means of intercession; therefore, one spends eternity in hell. This should not be interpreted as meaning a Shia militant would not place a bomb on a building and kill civilians, as this is not a greater sin and the attacker lives to ask for intercession. Recently, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah has attempted to convince followers that committing suicide in the name of God is allowable and one will find their reward in heaven, very similar to the words of Pope Urban II during the First Crusade when he stated that those who “ … battle against the pagans, shall have immediate remission of sins.”15 To conclude the overview of the divisiveness within Islam, it is necessary to dispel the myths surrounding the understanding of sharia law, the Arabic meaning the right path. Classic sharia is not a code of laws, but a body of religious and legal opinions that continue to develop.16 Although basic sharia is the same, its interpretation, implementation and practices are different from one Muslim country to the next based on culture, schools of Islamic thought, and adherence to the general following of the scholar who presents the fatwa (judgment or decision). For Muslims, sharia guides the aspects of their lives. This includes daily routines, familial and religious obligations, and financial dealings, but is based on the traditions and beliefs of the individual, and their adherence to their teachings and upbringing. It is simply the guidance within the Quran, the Sunna, the sayings, practices, and teachings of the Prophet Mohammed,17 and the scholarly opinions from Islamic scholars, which makes up sharia law. While there is a belief that sharia is applicable to all Muslims in their entirety, it is not. Whereas general sharia is applicable to Muslims, most notably issues such as marriage and divorce, there are still differences observed by Muslim majority states and communities based on their beliefs and the school of jurisprudence followed. Local Islamic scholars may interpret the teachings and apply Quranic guidance based on local culture, norms, values, precedents, analogy and even personal opinion, as they are applicable to address new issues. For instance, in 2013, a Saudi scholar passed a fatwa that air conditioning was not allowed on during the day because men worked, and if the air conditioning was on, others would know that a women was home alone. Adhering to this fatwa is not consistent throughout the Muslim world, and is an observance of sharia only within the confines of the country, or by those Muslims observing the guidance of the particular school of thought. Evidence of another partition within sharia is points to the observance and application of criminal law that is very different from one Muslim country to another and this partition is most controversial. In sharia, there are different categories of offenses: there are those that warrant a specific punishment in the Quran, known as hadd punishments, those that are at a judge’s discretion, and those resolved through measures of reprisal and compensation (i.e., blood money paid to the family of a murder victim). In the Quran, there are five hadd crimes: unlawful sexual intercourse (sex outside of marriage and adultery), false accusation of unlawful sexual intercourse, drinking wine (sometimes extended to include all alcohol drinking), theft, and highway robbery.18 Punishments for hadd offenses include flogging, stoning, amputation, exile, or execution. When these crimes occur, the punishment receives the media coverage, but often, these sentences are not prescribed,19 according to Ali Mazrui of the Institute of Global Cultural Studies, “In reality, most Muslim countries do not use traditional classical Islamic punishments.”20 While hadd prescribes punishments within sharia, which remain on the books in some countries, lesser penalties are often imposed, though there are exceptions, such as Sudan, Iran and Saudi Arabia. These countries use the criminal provisions of sharia that include amputation for stealing and flogging, or stoning for adultery.21

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In the 19th century, many Muslim countries were under the control or influence of Western colonial powers. As a result, Western-style laws, courts, and punishments began to appear within sharia interpretation.22 Despite the reluctance to impose hadd punishments by most Muslim countries today, under the guise of honor, it still takes place in many areas of the world, particularly by certain families. Though hadd is carried out for crimes committed, or perceived, it is done so more from cultural practices than from adherence to Islamic sharia dictates. Honor killings, reprisal murders for dishonoring one’s family, are a worldwide problem, but it is a characteristic of specific ethnic groups and their cultural practices, such as those found in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. The issue of sharia law versus secular law rose to the forefront of the debate in 2011, in the aftermath of the uprisings in the Arab countries, such as Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt, which resulted in the ousting of longtime autocrats. The Arab Spring, as it was labeled, afforded Islamist political parties to gain prominence in the region and an attempt to impose their ideological platforms. A Pew poll conducted in 2010, in seven countries, including Egypt, found strong support for Islam in politics and for harsh punishments for crimes such as theft, adultery, and conversion away from Islam. Yet, at the same time, a majority of those polled in every country except Pakistan believed democracy was the best form of governance.23 Religious, Geopolitical and Security Implications of IS’ Behavior The barbaric behavior IS consistently exhibits toward all who oppose it, whether Muslims, nonMuslims, states, inter-governmental and/or non-governmental organizations, has implications in a range of issue areas, the most significant of which fall in the theological, geopolitical and security contexts. This section examines the implications of IS’ actions in each of those areas, from the perspectives of the United States and its allies, both within (and outside of) the Greater Middle East. With respect to religious theology, as the previous sections of the chapter illustrate quite clearly, IS threatens the global image of Islam most by perverting the tenets of the faith; whether drawn from the Qur’an, Sunna and hadith of the Prophet Muhammad, or the myriad interpretations of the range of schools of Sunni and Shia, Islamic law remains vigorous topics for debate across the world. At the core of IS’ religious motivation is a profound determination to develop and preside over a pure Islamic caliphate modeled after those of the aforementioned Rightly Guided Caliphs, one it intends to expand beyond its present scope in Iraq and Syria. Further, as is the norm for extremist groups that use religion to spread their message, IS allows no room for dissent. Those who dare to criticize IS interpretations of the Qur’an are simply branded infidels for their failure to accept those interpretations and eliminated. Regrettably, to date, the religious messages IS crafts for recruitment purposes have been quite effective across the globe, whether in the Muslim majority, Greater Middle East, Africa or Asia and the West. Those messages feature slick, professionally produced videos of the brutal killing of adversaries—soldiers and civilians, men, women and children alike—on behalf of an expanding caliphate that uses a perversion of Islam to justify its actions under illegitimate religious cover. Yet, unfortunately, its vision resonates with marginalized younger generations of Muslims in economically weak, politically unstable and generally insecure developing Middle Eastern states such as Iraq, Libya, Nigeria, Somalia and Yemen, but also those in the West. Most notably Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and United States. As Audrey Kurth Cronin, a scholar of terrorism and foreign and national security policy implications at George Mason University, notes, IS “attracts followers yearning for not only religious righteousness

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but also adventure, personal power, and a sense of self and community. Of course, some people just want to kill—and ISIS welcomes them, too. The group’s brutal violence attracts attention, demonstrates dominance, and draws people to the action.”24 The appeal in which Cronin refers is evident in an April 2015 United Nations Security Council report that estimates more than 25,000 foreign fighters from 100 countries are in IS ranks.25 Of that number, intelligence estimates suggest that thousands have origins in the West, most in Western European member states of the European Union (EU) but also hundreds in Australia, Canada and the United States.26 As is the case with many, albeit not all, extremist groups that attempt to use Islam to justify actions, which repulse the vast majority of Muslims and non-Muslims alike. IS leaders generally lack religious legitimacy, particularly when drawing on documents such as the Qur’an, Sunna and hadith to explain its rationale for killing civilians, including, in myriad cases, men, women and children. Beheadings of captured members of the media and aid workers with Western origins have the greatest “shock value.” These acts are broadcasted by IS via social media outlets like Facebook and Twitter for the dual purposes of terrorizing adversaries while motivating recruits to join its ranks and commit violent acts on its behalf (especially within the United States and EU member states); however, they represent just a marginal fraction of its victims. Most are other Muslims born and raised in the heart of the Middle East whose only offense is to advocate and practice mainstream versions of Islam that clash with IS’ extreme viewpoints. In particular, IS defines the term, infidel, as a Muslim who does not follow the group’s perverted interpretations of Islam to the letter. Such individuals can be either Sunni or Shia Muslims, although the denomination is emphasized only where most advantageous, as is the case in Iraq, whose Shia majority governments of the past several years have marginalized Sunnis to an extent that has driven many to either join IS or, at the least, offer no resistance. This is true primarily because of the world’s most populous and powerful Shia majority state—Iran, which provides support for Iraqi government forces on the ground in Iraq, and a continued longtime backing of President Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria. Geopolitically, the threats IS presents are primarily, if not exclusively, regional in scope, above all in the Persian Gulf, but also more broadly across the Greater Middle East. Those threats grow out of two interconnected sets of issues, one related to the accumulation and expression of power and influence and another rooted in sectarian religious distinctions between Sunni and Shia Islam. First, as explained in depth previously, IS has developed what it views (although few others, Muslims or non-Muslims across the world do not) as a credible Islamic caliphate modeled after the one established by Muhammad’s followers in the aftermath of his death in 632. Second, IS’ now proven ability to seize and maintain control over a swath of territory in Iraq and Syria, roughly equivalent in size to the United Kingdom, presents challenges to the governments technically, but by no means, practically in control of those states—the largely secular Assad regime in Syria and the Shia majority government of Iraq. Connecting these sets of issues is a broader geopolitical struggle pitting Shia majority Iran against Sunni majority Saudi Arabia. That struggle, in turn, has drawn other state and non-state actors to one side or the other, or, in some cases, both, as circumstances and interests dictate over the course of a particular temporal period. The most notable manifestations of the Iranian-Saudi rivalry associated with the efforts of IS, al-Qaeda and other affiliated groups to date have transpired in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen. In Iraq, Iran has its forces on the ground supporting the Shia majority government of Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi in the ongoing conflict against IS; although, it also relies on US support in that struggle, primarily in the form of airstrikes and training and logistical assistance for the Iraqi National Army. In Syria, Tehran continues to support longtime ally Assad, in part by using Hezbollah forces based in Lebanon against both IS and the al-Nusra Front. And in Yemen, Iran has provided military and political support to the Houthi rebels, who are adherents to the Zaydi

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sect of Shia Islam. The Houthis overtook the Yemeni capital, Sana’a, in spring 2015, sending President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi fleeing south to the port of Aden, and eventually into exile in Saudi Arabia. Riyadh responded by assembling a coalition of nine Sunni majority Muslim states to conduct air strikes against the Houthis. Collectively, these events have only rendered the existing insecurity and instability in Yemen even more pronounced, which benefits the already dangerous al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula headquartered in that state. With respect to security, the threats IS presents are concentrated principally in the Greater Middle East, but do extend far beyond as a result of the support of its perversion of the Qur’an, which has generated among economically, ideologically, politically and socially marginalized Muslims of variegated backgrounds in the West—generally within communities in which they were born and raised in EU member states such as France, Germany and the United Kingdom in particular. The astonishingly rapid growth of IS, from several thousand to 30–40,000 in just over a year between 2014 and 2015 is a testament to its appeal among the young, even, in some cases, those whose families are relatively well off, if not affluent Using Islam to Counter the Influence of IS Though Islamic parties rose to prominence in the wake of the Arab Spring, their hard-line Islamic practices did not fare well with the populaces. It took just over one year for a coup d’état to oust the elected Muslim Brotherhood president after granting himself unlimited powers, his attempt to compel strict Islamic provisions in a new constitution and imposing sharia law. It did not take long for the people of Egypt to call his actions an Islamic coup and to take to the streets in demonstrations. In Tunisia, Islamists stepped down in the face of rising public anger, as the country’s religious and secular constituencies remain deeply divided.27 These events seem to indicate that not all Muslims view the extremist views of Islamists and the imposition of sharia law with the same favor. Sharia law has increased its presence in the West, and its advocate’s desire for its formal acceptance. This is becoming the main social, political and legal challenge of the 21st century. The ousting of the Islamists from Islamic countries is indicative of the West’s distorted idea of multiculturalism and the culture of political correctness among politicians, academia and journalists, which goes hand in hand to exacerbate the sharia problem in the West.28 The questions that the West should seek majority consensus on is whether the sharia-based tribunals, mediation, counseling and dispute resolution that function in some countries infringes on the rule of law and whether those forced to adhere to these shadow legal systems actually desire to do so. Politicians may desire for harmony between the rule of law and new multiculturalism, but they should remain mutually exclusive.29 Rather than politicians following the path of those who claim to speak for the majority of Muslims, politicians should determine if the desires of the Muslim populations they represent yearn for the oppressiveness, which sharia imposes on its adherents. It is somewhat surprising that the Muslim Brotherhood has achieved political power and acceptance in Germany more than anywhere else in Europe, and its influence in the US is on the rise. In the 1950s, Muslim students traveled to Germany to take advantage of the education in German universities as well as, to escape political persecution by secular, military leaders such as Gamal Abdel Nasser focused on eradicating Islamist groups back home.30 One of the exiled individuals who traveled to Europe was anticommunist, Sayid Ramadan, son-in-law of Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna, and father of European Muslim Network President Tariq Ramadan, a proponent of the development of a European variant of Islam. Sayid Ramadan was granted asylum in Switzerland, where he worked on behalf of the Muslim Brotherhood and later

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exported his extremist Islamic ideas to Munich.31 The trend gained momentum through the 1980s and 1990s, as Islamist activists escaped from domestic crackdowns in Syria, North Africa, and Egypt. However, unlike other asylum seekers seeking to flee oppression, these refugees sought to replicate it, plotting the replacement of secular dictatorships with religious dictatorships.32 These individuals were not interested in the values offered by liberal democracy, which they only sought to utilize for their own nefarious purposes. As the immigrants practicing other religions, Hindus, Buddhists, South Asians, Africans attempt to assimilate in their new countries, some Muslims come as immigrants to the West determined to replace Western government and social structures with Islamic ones.33 In Europe, some officials, perhaps for reasons of moral authority, granted some activists asylum without regard to the consideration of what instigated the persecution against them in the first place. Using the access to their newly accessed European base, many of the Islamist activists perpetuated their struggle for regime change in their homelands, creating networks that eventually became the basis for today’s European Muslim terrorist networks. As one senior Egyptian official said, “European countries like Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, England and others, which give sanctuary to these terrorists should now understand it will come back to haunt them where they live.”34 The concept of refugee status has become so distorted that British officials have granted asylum to Taliban fighters.35 Failure to implement strict guidelines which ensures a comprehensive background check on those seeking asylum, will allow IS ideologues and other anti-Islamic extremists to enter Europe and the United States and conduct their activities, including recruiting, to advance their misguided ideology. In 1933, National Socialist German dictator Adolf Hitler rose to power through the democratic process and within 30 days, he took away freedom of speech, freedom to assemble and freedom of thought. Through the hope of nationalism, the German people freely surrendered their rights and an estimated 4.2 million German military and civilians lost their lives for their cowardice.36 The rise and fall of Nazi Germany provides some parallels that analyzes the probability of future success for democracy in the Middle East, and how the issue of Arab migration in the West can cause religious rifts caused by the political motives promulgated through the liberties afforded in an open and democratic society. The social tension caused by those Muslim activists seeking equality through forced religious acceptance, and the fear of political leaders being called racist or suffering from Islamophobia for not adhering to the protocols of political correctness are creating long-lasting effects that their respective societies many not be able to recover. The Muslim activists in the West should be advocating social acceptance of other religions in their countries of origin and then, and only when that is achieved, should they then ask for a reciprocal policy in their host country. Conclusions This chapter intended to achieve five related objectives. First, it reviewed the religious and political origins of Islam during the Muhammadan era and the intra-communal conflict that produced the division between Sunni and Shia strains of that faith. Secondly, it presented an overview of the diversity of the Islamic religion, with emphasis on Sunni and Shia Islam and the divisions within each of those principal denominations of that faith, one that specifies the Islamic State’s location on the periphery of the Sunni side of that interpretive equation. Thirdly, it explained where the Islamic State fits in the interpretive tapestry of Islam, relative to other Muslim majority states and non-state actors that use extreme interpretations of Islam. Fourthly, it explained the theological, geopolitical and security implications of the Islamic State’s interpretive extremity and behavior in the Greater

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Middle East and the West. Lastly, it assessed the ways to use Islam itself to counter the Islamic State’s message in the Greater Middle East and the West. Above all, the issues addressed in the chapter are illustrative of the ethnic, religious and tribal diversity and resultant political complexity at the heart of the Arab world and broader Greater Middle East. Despite the fact that the vast majority of inhabitants of the Persian Gulf and surrounding Greater Middle East are Muslims, the region has never been a monolithic one, even if one only considers religion, let alone the ethnic, political, socio-economic and tribal factors driving the behavior of the individuals, communities and states (internal as well as external ones), interacting therein. Above all, a nuanced approach is essential for Western leaders if they are to develop and implement an effective strategy to mitigate the threats IS poses to their interests at home and abroad moving forward. If the United States and its European allies in NATO and the European Union fail to appreciate the fact that most of the Middle East is governed through tribal hierarchy or autocratic oppression, which has existed for millennia in some cases, and is changing the psyche of over 370 million Arabs,37 complimentary goals are not going to happen in days, or even months. A former US senior administration official once explained, one cannot look at where they have been, or where they are, but where they are capable of going. That is a grandiose theoretical conceptualization, but it is not applicable in the present, as there are too many variables to calculate and the United States traditionally only chooses the variables it believes are pertinent, excluding the ones that will bring theory into applicable reality. Simply, Western thought cannot envisage Eastern action and in most cases, the West is left dumbfounded trying to interpret the unexpected results. As Western leaders continue down their paths of politically correct and heartening changes for their citizens, they must understand the day will come when the positions of power are reversed, and only then will they understand the objectives of the political opponents are not reciprocated. Notes 1 Dan Robinson (2011), “Obama Tells Mubarak that Transition Must Begin Now,” Voice of America, February 25, 2014. http://www.voanews.com/content/obama-tells-mubarak-that-transition-must-beginnow-115068399/134370.html. 2 Reuters (2011). 3 Rick Brennan (2014), “Withdrawal Symptoms: The Bungling of the Iraq Exit,” Foreign Affairs 93–6 (November/December): 27. 4 For in-depth examinations of the origins of Islam, see John L. Esposito (1991), Islam: The Straight Path, revised 3rd edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 1–67; and Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), pp. 5–37. 5 Esposito, Islam: The Straight Path, p. 7. 6 Ibid., pp. 9–11. 7 Ibid. 8 “Rightly Guided Caliphs,” Oxford Islamic Studies Online. http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/ article/opr/t236/e0687. 9 Pew Research Religion & Public Life Project [PRRPLP] (2012), “The World’s Muslims: Unity and Diversity,” accessed February 21, 2014. http://www.pewforum.org/2012/08/09/the-worlds-muslims-unityand-diversity-executive-summary/. 10 Gordon Adams (2007), “The List: The World’s Fastest-Growing Religions,” Foreign Policy (May 14), accessed February 21, 2014. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2007/05/13/the_list_the_worlds_ fastest_growing_religions.

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11 PRRPLP, 2012, Chapter 5. 12 Anonymous (2012), meeting between the author and a senior government official in an undisclosed Muslim country. 13 Samuel P. Huntington (1993), “Clash of Civilizations,” Foreign Affairs 73.3 (Summer): 24. 14 PRRPLP, 2012, Chapter 5. 15 Paul Halsall, ed. (2015), “Fulcher of Chartres’ Account of Urban’s Speech, Urban II: Speech at Council of Clermont, 1095, Five Versions of the Speech,” retrieved from Medieval Sourcebook April 2. http://legacy. fordham.edu/halsall/source/urban2-5vers.html. 16 Constitutional Rights Foundation [CRF] (2014), “The Origins of Islamic Law,” February 23. http:// www.crf-usa.org/america-responds-to-terrorism/the-origins-of-islamic-law.html. 17 Toni Johnson (2011), “Europe: Integrating Islam,” Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), October 4, 2013. http://www.cfr.org/religion/europe-integrating-islam/p8252. 18 Toni Johnson and Lauren Vriens (2013), “Islam: Governing Under Sharia,” CFR, February 22, 2014. http://www.cfr.org/religion/islam-governing-under-sharia/p8034. 19 Ibid. 20 GlobalSecurity.org. 2000 (2014), Voice of America interview with Ali Mazrui of the Institute of Global Cultural Studies, January 6, 2014. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2000/03/000314nigeria1.htm. 21 Ibid. 22 CRF, “Origins of Islamic Law.” 23 Johnson and Vriens, “Governing Under Sharia.” 24 Audrey Kurth Cronin (2015), “ISIS is not a Terrorist Group: Why Counterterrorism Won’t Stop the Latest Terrorist Threat,” Foreign Affairs 94.2 (March/April). 25 “UN Says ‘25,000 Foreign Fighters’ Joined Islamist Militants” (2015), BBC World Service (April 2). http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-32156541. 26 Joshua Berlinger (2015), “The Names: Who Has Been Recruited to ISIS From the West,” CNN (February 26). http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/25/world/isis-western-recruits/. 27 Carlotta Gall (2014), “Tunisia’s Premier Resigns, Formally Ending His Party’s Rule,” The New York Times, accessed March 2: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/10/world/middleeast/tunisias-leader-resigns.html?_ r=0. 28 Hellen Parra Florez (2013), “Sharia Law: No Place in Europe,” LLM Public International and European Law, University of Manchester. 29 Randall Peerenboom (2005), “Human Rights and Rule of Law: What’s the Relationship?” Georgetown Journal of International Law 36, UCLA School of Law, Research Paper No. 05‐31. 30 Lorenzo Vidino (2005), “The Muslim Brotherhood’s Conquest of Europe,” Middle East Quarterly 12–1 (Winter): 25–34. 31 Ian Johnson (2010), A Mosque in Munich: Nazis, the CIA, and the Rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in the West (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt). 32 Vidino, “Muslim Brotherhood’s Conquest of Europe,” 26. 33 Pamela Geller (2014), “The Effects of Mass Muslim Immigration,” accessed March 2, 2012. http:// www.breitbart.com/Big-Peace/2014/01/14/The-Effects-of-Mass-Muslim-Immigration. 34 Youssef Ibrahim (1995), “Egypt Says Militant Muslim is Seized in Croatia,” New York Times. 35 Tom Bateman (2014), “Suspected Foreign War Criminals Able to Stay in UK,” BBC News UK, accessed March 3: http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-26145293. 36 War Chronicle (No Date), March 2014. http://worldwar2.org.uk/how-many-people-died-in-worldwar-2. 37 World Bank, 2015. “Arab World,” April 22, 2015. http://data.worldbank.org/region/ARB.

Chapter 4

The Use of Propaganda and Social Media1 Rachel Yon

With the desire to have the whole world under its control, as evidenced by its slogan baqiya wa tatamaddad which translates to “remaining and expanding,”2 the Islamic State is the quintessential terrorist group of the 21st century, and this is evidenced by its desire to use all beneficial modes of technology in disseminating its message to the world. From the individual level, to the regional level, to the state level, to the globe; the Islamic State has proven itself to be far more adept and advanced than any other terrorist organization in regards to the breadth, presentation, and dissemination of their propaganda. Its ability to use all forms of social media to its advantage has been something aweinspiring, yet horrifying to watch. Its constant ability to adapt to all aspects of technology continues to attract societies’ disenfranchised youth. Of course, the use of propaganda is one of the oldest methods of war-fighting enemies have been using against each other from time in memoriam. During times of conflict, both sides use whatever technology is available at the time in order to try and win the hearts and minds of those they are fighting for, the unaffiliated populations of other countries, and those whose countries they may be entering in order to conduct their mission. On the other hand, the “enemy” is also using propaganda for the same purposes and, often, there is a portion of propaganda that is directed towards the “invaders” in an attempt to lower their morale and to encourage their own people to rise up against those who have entered their land uninvited. Another favored tactic is demonization of both the leaders and supporters found in the enemy camp.3 The goal is often to dehumanize the enemy, to make them appear as though they are not on the same plane as the justified warriors in this battle, to ensure those who are fighting for the cause recognize why it is so important to rid the world of the plague, which is a result of these infidels, and to inform the infidels as to why they are going to die in this war. In order to accomplish all of these goals, the truth is not always well represented, as both sides tend to use partial facts and selective stories that paint them and their goals in the best light possible. However, it should also be clear that not all propaganda is based on deception. We must recognize that the side of a conflict one affiliates with will impact the way one views and interprets relative actions and statements. This will cause different groups to interpret the same facts differently—resulting in dissimilar, and possibly polar opposite accounts, but each will view their interpretation as the unassailable truth and disseminate as such. The viewpoints of a group must be taken into account when considering how and why they are using the tools and techniques of propaganda they are choosing to use. Using this backdrop, the following will discuss the use of propaganda by the Islamic State beginning with a consideration of the name they have most recently chosen to be identified by. It is important to understand how the name “Islamic State” divides the world (at least how they see global divisions) into fence sitters (possible recruits), supporters, citizens, and enemies. Then the discussion shifts to focus on the Islamic State’s media apparatus, the products they and their supporters have created, and the tools the Islamic State uses in order to disseminate this information. The impact these campaigns have on the people their material reaches on a daily basis will be considered throughout this discussion.

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The Islamic State A state can be defined as “an organized body of people usually occupying a definite territory” or it can simply refer to a particular territory which is recognized to be sovereign.4 Regardless of how one defines a state, it is a legally and politically recognized term that gives gravitas to an area and the people that inhabit it. It also means, to other countries, respect should be given to the borders and the governmental structure which has been put into place. To be able to take on the moniker of a “state,” a legally recognized entity, the Islamic State is attempting to be recognized as more than a mere terrorist organization. They want to be viewed as an entity that wields true power, with the authority to speak for a large and powerful group of people. According to Joseph Blank, former staffer on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and current RAND Corporation employee, the use of the term Islamic State shows that the group is claiming to “represent all Muslims everywhere—they have declared the establishment of a new caliphate.”5 However, it should be noted, that since the Islamic State is based upon a “strict interpretation of Sunni Islam,”6 it only claims dominion over Sunni Muslims around the world, and, in reality, it is only interested in those Sunni Muslims who see religion exactly as the Islamic State sees it. Therefore, this desired dominion over Muslims truly only extends to a relatively small population. The Islamic State has campaigned against Shia Muslims and the “unfaithful” Sunnis (for example, Sunni Sufis) as idolaters and apostates. Numerous Shia and Sufi shrines and mosques have been destroyed and its people have been terrorized, forced out of their homes, and/or slaughtered by the Islamic State in “justified” retribution for their disbelief.7 For the Islamic State to distance itself from the designation of a terrorist organization and to sell itself as the founder of a new caliphate is highly important for the success of its propaganda campaign even if it is only currently working on it followers. According to Joseph Blank: That’s a very potent area of propaganda, because ISIS has attracted potentially thousands of foreign fighters, and none of these foreign fighters see themselves as terrorists. They see themselves as knights. They see themselves as mujahedeen. They see themselves as freedom fighters. So they’re very interested in fighting for the Islamic State, and they do not regard what they are doing as in any way an act of terrorism.8

To date, it does not appear that the terminology has had a great deal of success in the greater Muslim world because “it means the caliphate—it means a universal, legitimate, Islamic rule. And very few Muslims anywhere see this group as legitimate.”9 The use of the term “Islamic State” as noted by the authors of The Group that Calls Itself a State: Understanding the Evolution and Challenges of the Islamic State, “does not elevate the organization to that of a legitimate state or hide the many flaws that separate the IS from other legitimate states” nor is its use meant to empower to legitimize it.10 However, for the purposes of this piece, the use of this term is important as it is an essential foundation of the propaganda campaign run by the organization. The Islamic State and its Media Arm The Islamic State is able to produce and distribute such an efficient and well-run propaganda campaign as a result of the significant infrastructure that it has been built up. If one considers the media organization the Islamic State of Iraq was able to develop and utilize back in December 2008, it would not be surprising that the Islamic State has been able to take this framework and improve upon it to its current status.11 The figure below is reproduced from The Group that Calls Itself a State: Understanding the Evolution and Challenges of the Islamic State and represents the multilayered structure the Islamic State of Iraq was able to create back in 2008:

Figure 4.1 Multi-layered Structure

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This figure represents the different sections of the media’s organization which included four main sections: internet and technology, preaching and guiding, filming and documenting, and, finally, its media section. Each of these different sections had their own organizational structure based on military hierarchy from commanders to brigades to regiments to companies to platoons which were all given their own levels of responsibility. This was to ensure that the lower ranks involved in the important jobs of creation and dissemination of propaganda were properly trained and educated.12 According to this report, the structure as it was in 2008 was “designed to exercise central control over the organization’s external messaging, while also doing the best it can to harvest important content from all different geographic areas of its operations.”13 Today, the Islamic State sends its message over the internet, radio broadcasts, television broadcasts, and hard copy publications in a variety of different languages tailored to a variety of different audiences. The current media environment in which the Islamic State acts from the abovediscussed report is also reproduced below14:

Figure 4.2 The Media Arms of Islamic State The Ministry of Media is made up of four different official components and is supported by a variety of social media outlets and forums intended to reach a vast array of consumers. These outlets ensure that they tailor their messages to their intended recipients. The media arms of the Islamic State have robust and varied ways of getting their messages out to their members, supporters, enemies, and the general population. It is clear from this graph that there is a significant unofficial social media component producing material and distributing it across the globe. This unofficial component is made up of those members or supporters who are creating their own videos, blogs, posts, etc. to encourage others to come and join the Islamic State as they did—to show how much of a difference they are making in the effort towards a

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new Caliphate. This, of course, cannot be fully controlled by the Ministry of Media, which is something that the Islamic State will more than likely want to attempt to reign in to ensure that the message that is being portrayed to the world is as consistent and unanimous as possible. Of course, unanimity in this particular playing field is going to be very difficult to police and maintain—the Islamic State will more than likely have to settle for as much consistency as possible with the teachings of its leaders and admonish and remove those who fail to follow these overarching goals. This is where the credibility nodes (generally anonymous members of the Islamic State) come into play as they will speak up if there are significant postings or videos which do not portray the group in a light that its leaders agree with or would do significant harm to the vision it is attempting to portray.15 Nevertheless, the fact that the Islamic State has attracted individuals who are interested in and able to further disseminate its material alongside their own creations has played a part in “magnifying the reach of the IS’s media content … this network of online supporters is larger than anything that has been seen before in terms of an insurgent organization.”16 The above focus on the unofficial component of the media arm has been purposeful as it appears that the Islamic State has recently largely abandoned its distribution of content through its former official social media channels. This is partially due to the fact that its official channels keep getting taken down by hackers and various government counterterrorism efforts but it is probably also likely because the Islamic State has been able to get its message distributed far and wide without the efforts it was making through these means of distribution.17 Products Videos Propaganda films have been used for decades in order to frame wars. During World War II, Germany, the United States, and the United Kingdom produced videos that demonized their respective enemies and called for the support of their allies. Germany’s Triumph des Willens18 (translated as Triumph of the Will) was produced in 1935. Every frame of its 105 minute length is made up of images of the awesome power Adolf Hitler wielded, the might of the German army, the support and fortitude of the German people, and the ability that Germany had to take this war machine and turn it against the United States and its allies. Frank Capra, a Hollywood director who produced propaganda films for the United States, after watching the Triumph des Willens, stated that “it scared the hell out of me … it fired no gun, dropped no bombs, but as a psychological weapon aimed at destroying the will to resist, it was just as lethal.”19 In an effort to respond to Germany, Capra was asked to make propaganda videos in support of the United States. Instead of making one video, he made a seven series documentary in which images of the Constitution and the United States’ just war fighting effort were contrasted against the images found in Triumph des Willens. The United States used these films not only to indicate to Germany that the United States and its allies were more than ready for the German army, but also to help the United States’ fighting forces to see what they were fighting for, who they were fighting against, what they could expect when they went overseas, and to instill in the fighting forces that they were more than capable of meeting and defeating the Nazi threat.20 One final example are the anti-Japanese propaganda films created by the United States War Department from 1943 to 1945, which allowed citizens of the United States (especially the military) to come to know their enemy—the Japanese people, military, and leadership.21 These videos were created to show the strange ‘otherness’ of the Japanese people, their unending desire to defeat the American people indicated by the fact that every man, woman, and child in Japan was working

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on feverishly day in and day out, and they relied heavily on racist stereotypes that were to become ingrained in the way Americans viewed the Japanese race. Of course, while American propaganda dehumanized the Japanese, it was countered with Japanese propaganda of Americans as “hairy, demonic mongrels” who were part of a weakening and vulnerable nation—they were far from the formidable enemy and could be easily defeated.22 Japan portrayed itself to its people, to other Asian countries it was looking to conquer, and to the United States and its allies as a strong country which would “bring light to the world, ridding it of the Allied forces.”23 This constant cycle of propaganda and counter propaganda are present in all significant conflicts throughout history. In a continuation of this tradition, the Islamic State has made an effort to produce similar films in its own propaganda campaign. Flames of War: Fighting has just Begun produced by the AlHayat Media Center was released to the world on September 19, 2014 (the second such creation from the Islamic State—the first being The Clanging of Swords IV). It is 55 minutes long and is narrated in English with Arabic subtitles (there are other versions of the movie with subtitles in other languages, including Russian). While clearly intent upon bringing new recruits into the fold of the Islamic State, it also consists of threats to the United States, and threats to its enemies within the Muslim world. According to Kayla Ruble and Murtaza Hussain: This film employs sophisticated videography in an attempt to glamorize the group’s operations. Slow-motion footage, filtered lenses and sound effects all combine to give the film distinctly professional production values … . Combined with freeze frames and visual effects, the scene seems more intended to mimic a first-person shooter video game than anything resembling actual combat.24

It is clear that the sophistication found in this and other Islamic State produced videos is far beyond anything that has ever been produced by al-Qaeda and its affiliates. This indicates an ability to master new techniques and create videos that will have an impact on a wide range of different people (supporters, adversaries, fence sitters, etc.) across the world. The Islamic State seems to have realized very early that it “is in competition with western news channels, Hollywood movies, reality shows, even music video, and it has adopted their vocabulary.”25 The first video produced by Al-Hayat was entitled “There is No Life Without Jihad” and featured “Western jihadis explaining why they left their homes to fight with ISIS and encouraging other Muslims to join them.”26 There have also been a significant number of videos portraying the beheadings of a variety of captives and hostages. The beheadings of Steven Sotloff and James Foley (both US journalists), Alan Henning and David Haines (both aid workers), and Peter Kassig (medical assistant providing care to Syrians in need) all brought outrage from the United States. These videos have been used by the Islamic State to reiterate their opposition to President Barack Obama (as they have included clips of his speeches in them), and in the case of British citizens, Prime Minister David Cameron (for his support and continuation of the United States-United Kingdom coalition), and they also include statements by the condemned which indicate (clearly under duress27) that they blame their respective governments, the actions of their military, and the decisions of their leaders for their death as well. The videos make clear that the Islamic State is taking a stand against these governments who are acting against its interests, a stand which it claims is supported by a large number of Muslims around the world. Emphasis is placed on the fact that they are not a mere terrorist organization, but an Islamic Caliphate not to be treated as though they have no authority. The beheading videos which feature single named individuals have become almost “to be continued” sitcoms as they indicate the next individual to be featured—they are providing encouragement to keep tuning in for the next installment. There have also released

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videos documenting the beheadings of numerous Syrian soldiers and civilians, Egyptian civilians, Kurdish soldiers and civilians, Afghani citizens, Iraqi citizens.28 The Islamic State has also been using John Cantlie, a British journalist and long-term detainee of the Islamic State, as their mouthpiece in a series of videos in which he criticizes those working in opposition to the Islamic State. From the United States, to the United Kingdom, to the Syrian government and military, the Islamic State has used John Cantlie to rebuff all claims of successful operations against the Islamic State that these governments have made. The goal is to show that nothing these governments are doing is making any difference. Their message is clear: the Islamic State is adaptable, agile, and powerful and the foolish attempts made by its enemies will only end in failure and the deaths of their citizens.29 Of course, these videos have not always worked out exactly as the Islamic State would like them to. For example, the Cantlie video that was made in Kobani has him describing, in the manner of a foreign correspondent, the fact that the city is about to fall to the Islamic State despite the attempts being made by the United States’ military.30 However, not that long after the video was made, the Islamic State was ejected from the city making the video a failed propaganda attempt. Finally, a rather gruesome addition to the propaganda videos was the graphic burning and death of Moaz al-Kasabeth, a Jordanian pilot.31 The video was distributed around the world very quickly, and as they have done in the past with their other videos, there were public screenings put on by the Islamic State for its supporters as part of its local outreach.32 The world expressed its outrage over this event which the Islamic State addressed in the seventh issue of Dabiq: In burning the crusader pilot alive and burying him under a pile of debris, the Islamic State carried out a just form of retaliation for his involvement in the crusader bombing campaign which continues to result in the killing of countless Muslims who, as a result of these airstrikes, are burned alive and buried under mountains of debris.33

All of these violent actions continue to be conducted underneath religious justifications and with the goal of continuing the establishment of the Islamic Caliphate—this is the message that continues to be distributed around the world. The Magazine of the Islamic State—Dabiq The Islamic State has released seven issues of their propaganda magazine “Dabiq” to date. Glossy and full of bright pictures and stirring words, the magazine, is published in a variety of languages including English. Even a cursory review of these issues reflects that the Islamic State is using the magazine as more than just a shiny, attractive propaganda tool. It is its way of spreading its message to those who would come to fight for the Islamic State as well as a way to indicate to its enemies that its mission is serious and should not be ignored. The fact that the Islamic State puts so much effort into creating such an impressive English-language propaganda tool which discusses its “Caliphate vision” and is “investing significant resources to explain why it is religiously justified and superior to rival organizations” indicates the importance it is placing on obtaining mujahedeen from across the globe and how seriously it is taking the framing of its global goals.34 It is clear that the focus of this publication is on the West and the intent is to use it to bring recruits to its cause—to lure the disenfranchised and disillusioned youth to jihad. The magazine is used to explain the vision of the Islamic State which is to continue the centuries’ long battle against those who would attempt to corrupt the true Muslims and those who would stand in the way of the world domination that it seeks.35 It uses this tool to explain why the violent beheadings and the

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burning of a pilot are required parts of its vision and are approved of by God. When considering its mission, it is essential that it is able to prove that such violence and destruction of life is necessary to create their new world order and that all of these acts are religiously acceptable and a duty by true Muslims who believe in the vision of the Islamic State. Dabiq is “a place in Syria that is supposed to be the location for one of the final battles according to certain Muslim myths about a final apocalypse. Choosing such a name for the magazine highlights the caliphate’s goals.”36 The region also was the scene of the “seminal battle of 1516 between Ottomans and the Mamluks that the Ottomans ultimately won, solidifying the last recognized Islamic caliphate.”37 The choice of Dabiq as the name for the publication has allowed for Abu Bakr al-Baghadi’s desire of a forum to display the Islamic State’s “commitment to theological study.” It also portrays a visually captivating and intriguing image to those who would join the fight from overseas. The focus on the strength of the Islamic State, the excitement and importance of joining such a worthy and noble cause, provides disaffected youth with a powerful message that is couched in full color, gory images that look like they have been taken straight from a violent and visually captivating movie or video game. The first issue of the Dabiq states that it is going to be a “periodical magazine focusing on issues of tawhid,38 manhaj,39 hijrah,40 jihad,41 and jama’ah42.”43 These themes play out vividly. Throughout the seven issues of the magazine, there are images of the violently killed surrounded by the rubble of buildings, of Islamic State fighters in front of the backdrop of roaring flames, of the grateful welcome of the people that the mujahedeen have “liberated,” and of the thrill of battle and killing the infidels and the unfaithful. Part of the third issue discusses the beheading of James Foley, an American journalist and video reporter, and, the most recent issue, has four full color pages of text and pictures of the burning of Moath al-Kasasbeh, the Royal Jordanian Air Force pilot. Returning briefly to the third issue, “A Call to Hijrah,” the magazine makes it clear through images and words on its introductory pages that the execution of James Foley was a direct result of the Obama Administration and its interference with the Islamic State in its sacred religious mission. Throughout the magazine the themes of unity, community, and truth-seeking are clearly represented with the ultimate goal being the recognition that in order for the Islamic State to become the beacon for Muslims, Holy War will be a requirement and a duty of each of the faithful. This justification can be found, according to “A Call to Hijrah,” in the fact that: There are countless accounts of American soldiers executing families and raping women under the sanctity of the US military and Blackwater. Muslim families were killed under the broad definition of “collateral damage,” which the US grants itself alone the right to apply. Therefore, if a mujāhid kills a single man with a knife, it is the barbaric killing of the “innocent.” However, if Americans kill thousands of Muslim families all over the world by pressing missile fire buttons, it is merely “collateral damage.”44

Everything that the Islamic State has published to date has shown that it aims to be “the sole legitimate representative of Muslims and inevitable enemy of the Western world.”45 The fact that it has been able to do this in a form that reaches so many—both friend and foe—is a testimony to its understanding of how to display and communicate its messages. Musical Propaganda Music can, without using words, forge a connection not only for those in battle but can also send a message to those regarded as enemies. It is a tool of propaganda which can permit individuals

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who have little else in common to share and communicate with one another, despite differences on other fronts proving that it is exceptionally functional as a “means of communication and as a psychological weapon.”46 From biblical times, instruments were used to correspond during times of war both on and off the battlefield and while the technology of the 20th and 21st centuries made such methods of communication obsolete, music has “remained an effective means by which states could manipulate the morale, energies, and attitudes of armies and indeed entire populations.”47 The large appropriations for music in the armed services reflect the notion that it can effectively inspire patriotism and bravery. Marches and anthems have been used to instill both courage and conformity. They help individuals see themselves as part of a unified whole … .During the last 200 years, music has been viewed variously, as the mere abstract play of sounds; as the immediate and direct expression of inner consciousness and will, and as the quintessential language of human emotion and feeling and perhaps even of religious faith. In each case, music’s universality as an art is vindicated.48

Over the course of both World War I and World War II we saw the Soviet Union, Germany, and the United States use a variety of forms of music to advance their causes and to encourage others to join their side of the fight and way of thinking:49 What works to whip a regiment of soldiers into a fighting frenzy can be made to work on a national level, to a greater or lesser degree, depending on the skill and persuasiveness of the manipulation. Even the horrors of modern warfare have proved easier to bear when their struggles are identified and ennobled by great music.50

This grand tradition has been continued on the jihadi battlefields as well. Nasheeds are religious songs which have existed for over 1000 years but they have only been used for political purposes since the 1970s. Almost all of these songs are done “a Capella, the only accompaniment being an array of sound effects from horses’ hooves to bombs.”51 They not only deliver the jihadi message sans instruments but they also “conform to strict interpretations of the use of music in Islam.”52 In this grand tradition, the Islamic State created its own national anthem: “Dawlat al-Islam Qamat” (which translates to “My Ummah, Dawn Has Appeared”). It spells out everything they stand for: “the Islamic State has arisen, we’ve defeated so many enemies, we’re going to keep on doing so. And it also sounds good … it invigorates certain spirits.”53 The songs have proven to be central to the organization as they are used for a variety of different purposes from providing the “soundtrack to all the IS videos [to being played] from cars in towns they control, rather like US gangs use rap songs to demarcate their territory; they are even played on the battlefield.”54 They have also created songs specifically targeted at those people who live in the areas that they are taking by force in order to provide them with a list of all of the benefits they will experience under Islamic State rule—the security and the peace that will soon be a part of their lives.55 The Islamic State uses its media wing, the Ajnad Media Foundation, to produce songs, which unlike other jihadi groups that tend to recycle songs, are new and unique and have brought this form of musical propaganda into the 21st century.56 They are used in order to get their message to the masses about the change that they are going to bring to the world.57 Despite the creativity and effort that are put into these nasheeds, from poets to musicians to singers, modernity has its limits and it is unlikely that instrumentation, Auto-Tune, and dancers will ever be added as they look down on the Shia groups who do so.58 Although some foreign fighters have attempted to make their

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name by creating more modern nasheeds, these have not been well received by the leaders of the Islamic State, and it is unlikely that this will become a trend.59 The videos produced by the Islamic State almost always have a soundtrack which gives “fighters an almost messianic quality … .The nasheed is meant to have universal appeal: To impressionable ears, even those which do not understand Arabic, the nasheed appears to give a religious authenticity to even the most brutal videos. It’s a frightening reminder that IS believes even its most heinous acts are supported by a higher power.”60 As discussed above, organizations, countries, and terrorist organizations have used music in order to rally people to support a variety of causes. The Islamic State uses them as the soundtrack for all of their activities from videos to the battlefield to attempting to win the hearts and minds or at least forcing the hearts and minds of those they are trying to recruit or control or warn of their power. Distribution Channels YouTube While these products have been made available in a variety of locations, an easy location for anyone around the world to view Islamic State videos, music, and collections of pictures is on YouTube which, along with Netflix, accounts for “almost half of North American downstream traffic during peak hours.”61 The site has become a central location for Islamic State videos which are uploaded by various individuals, organizations, and media entities from around the world. Dissemination is literally at the mere touch of a button and the message of the Islamic State can be across the globe instantly. Besides simply uploading videos, supporters can also create YouTube channels where individuals can subscribe in order to receive updates whenever new videos are uploaded. This feature, which YouTube added in 2005, allows it to serve more of a social network function rather than simply being a storage location for millions of videos. In this way it is easy to “find users who like the same kinds of videos you do and find out what they are watching.”62 Such channels make connection incredibly easy and since “YouTube is all about sharing”63 it certainly allows for rapid relationships to be formed. Although pro-Islamic State videos tend to be removed from YouTube relatively quickly, it still has a significant presence on the site. From videos created and released by the Islamic State itself (beheadings, triumphant entrances into cities they are taking over, interacting benevolently with the citizenry, and John Cantlie reports) to videos put on the site by members and supporters to display the just calling of joining the Islamic State to media organizations around the world (for example, VICE News and BBC America) who, in their reporting, replay clips of these videos and create new video content, the Islamic State has thousands of videos of its activities or at least mentioning them. Facebook Facebook was created as a tool to bring the world together—for individuals to be able to connect across thousands of miles with little to no effort. Such ease of connection has made the world feel smaller than ever before. However, this advantage has also been used to widen cleavages between groups, societies, countries, and religions. The Islamic State has used Facebook to connect itself to its followers and to share its message. Of course, such attempts have received a great deal of scrutiny from Facebook and many of its pages have been shut down. However, the existence or lack thereof of “official” pages should not be a great deal of concern for the Islamic State.

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There are many more Facebook pages by activists, supporters, and curious fence sitters who are getting its message out to millions of people. The beauty of Facebook is the ability to share ones thoughts and ideas with anyone willing to listen, to post pictures and videos, to possibly share passages of religious texts and explain to the ignorant what they mean, and to encourage people from thousands of miles away to join a just cause—to explain to them how it is their duty. The impact of this messaging can be significant on its intended targets. Despite Facebook continually taking down Islamic State pages, this does not deter the Islamic State from continuing to use the resource as a method of propagating its message and attracting new recruits.64 It is an easy and accessible way to reach out to millions of disenfranchised youth around the world. Twitter J.M. Berger conducted a study which looked at millions of Twitter accounts. Approximately 46,000 of these were used by supporters of the Islamic State. He states that while “extremists of all stripes are increasingly used social media to recruit, radicalize, and raise funds … ISIS is one of the most adept practitioners of this approach.”65 The author found that ISIS-supporting accounts had more than 1,000 followers which is much higher than an average Twitter user and he also found that these accounts tended to be much more active than an average Twitter user. The importance of Twitter is apparent as the Islamic State has used it to send out some of its most important speeches made to date in seven different languages. Last year, an “Arabic-language Twitter app called The Dawn of Glad Tidings” was launched and promoted as the best way to keep up-to-date with the group.66 The app received hundreds of downloads very soon after its creation. Once the user has provided the Islamic State with a great deal of personal information and has given permission for it to send tweets from the users’ phone, it allows tweets (including links or hashtags or videos or pictures) to be posted directly to your account. This method of social media allowed the Islamic State to generate so many tweets surrounding its movement towards Baghdad, that when anyone searched for “Baghdad” on Twitter the images that appeared were those put out by the Islamic State indicating their advance.67 The Islamic State is also well-known for its organized hashtag campaigns. According to Berger: The group enlists hundreds and sometimes thousands of activists to repetitively tweet hashtags at certain times of day so that they trend on the social network. This approach also skews the results of a popular Arabic Twitter account called @ActiveHashtags that tweets each day’s top trending tags. When ISIS gets its hashtag into the @ActiveHashtags stream, it results in an average of 72 retweets per tweet, which only makes the hashtag trend more. As it gains traction, more users are exposed to ISIS’s messaging. The group’s supporters also run accounts similar to @ActiveHashtags that exclusively feature jihadi content and can produce hundreds of retweets per tweet.68

The ability to promote its strength and the connectivity among its members and potential recruits shows a level of media savvy not seen before in terrorist organizations. It is clearly outperforming all other groups at this time with regard to getting its message in front of people on a repetitious basis. Finally, the use of memes has become a central component of the Islamic State’s daily propaganda campaign from #catsofjihad (which shows mujahedeen with their pet cats often playing with guns and grenades) to images of the cities they have “freed” and are now under their benevolent control to images of their leaders providing their wisdom to the use of violent video games like Grand Theft Auto to attract vulnerable youth to the fold. These memes are transmitted

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via a wide variety of outlets including Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter in hopes to reach as any potential recruits as possible. Such media has proven useful for the Islamic State as it has allowed it to show the importance of its mission, the normalcy of the life of the mujahedeen as they relax with their pets, and the excitement that will come with joining such a just mission. Jihadi Forums While a complete examination of jihadi online forums is not possible in this piece, a discussion of propaganda would be incomplete without at least mentioning the important role they have played in the dissemination of information. Before the Islamic State came on the scene there were very few online forums where individuals could go and post messages; however, that has greatly changed and the Islamic State has been seen as having a transformative impact on the traditional online jihadi landscape.69 According to Zelin, these jihadi forums first came to light in the mid-2000s and created an interactive area in which individuals, generally with passwords, would be able to post information, news, and allow for conversation to occur among “like-minded individuals across a wide geographic area.”70 Note that while these forums may have a public face, they do not allow all content to be seen by those individuals they have not determined to be certified users with login accounts.71 These forums are controlled by administrators who “help facilitate and disseminate content on behalf of jihadi organizations … they post important news and have the power to delete threads and ban users, allowing them to help steer the online community in a certain direction by preventing users from being exposed to particular content or dissent.”72 While these traditional jihadi forums tend to be closed networks in which only certain individuals can have private conversations and then choose which information they would like to disseminate to a wide audience, more nontraditional jihadi forums, ensure messages reach the widest audience possible from the start. While Zelin may be correct that Twitter does not have the “sense of authenticity and exclusivity created by the forums,”73 it may be an incorrect assumption that Twitter will not come to rival these forums as an important arena in which to share ideas, images, and as a “meeting place” for discussion. This is especially true when considering the significant grass roots support for the Islamic State, which is made up of individuals who are unlikely to be invited into this inner sanctum. The Islamic State has, from its inception, diversified its portfolio of online activities using message boards as the “primary place where ISIS members (and more importantly, potential recruits) can inconspicuously communicate and distribute full-length ISIS-produced propaganda films.”74 Nevertheless, the Islamic State continues to have a strong presence in the forums and it will, most likely, continue to form an important part of what it does. Other Tools of the Islamic State Instagram has been a useful vehicle for the Islamic State as it has allowed it to share videos and pictures taken by its members and supporters with individuals around the globe as well. On top of sharing through the free app itself, it is most often pictures and videos taken with it that are uploaded to different Facebook and Twitter accounts. While those accounts may be subject to censorship and removal, there are many third party websites that will host the products of Islamic State Instagram users. One example is the Polish born site—justpaste.it. The Islamic State started using this site in 2014 to post their graphic pictures and images. The creator of this site has removed thousands of these images since they started appearing on his site. However, they continue to pour in.75 This is just one

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example of a site that is being used—there are many, many more platforms that have become homes for Islamic State propaganda as they get chased off of the ones they have been on. It is clear that as the larger social networking sites remove them, they will move on and find smaller sites and so on. It shows an adaptability and a willingness to use whatever forum is currently available to get the message out—there may be frustration but no one is giving up. This fight will continue. The Response The United States has acknowledged it falls short when it comes to countering the propaganda campaign that the Islamic State has been putting out to the world. Part of the plan is to begin proper organization against this threat by empowering the State Department’s Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications to “harness all the existing attempts at counter messaging by much larger federal departments, including the Pentagon, Homeland Security, and intelligence agencies.”76 The messages would not only come from the United States government but would also represent “foreign allies and nongovernment agencies, as well as … prominent Muslim academics, community leaders and religious scholars who oppose the Islamic State … and who may have more credibility with ISIS’ target audience of young men and women.”77 The volume of tweets, likes on Facebook, support on Instagram, etc. produced by the Islamic State and its supporters is massive—sometimes as many as 90,000 per day. This is difficult to combat but not impossible. It will require the use of all of the available Twitter accounts at the State Department and it will have to follow a similar path that the Islamic State has with regard to retweeting and re-sharing all forms of content (pictures, videos, hashtags, and tweets) that are representative of the counter message they are trying to get across to those considering a life inside the Islamic State.78 It will be key for the government not to be the face of this counter messaging, as the likelihood that these individuals will be interested in listening to anything distributed by the government is very slim. They are disenfranchised and while they may not be 100 percent ready to join the Islamic State, this could easily change if they perceive the United States government as attempting to take control over their lives. The State Department has a ThinkAgainTurnAway Twitter site which provides links to news stories on the Islamic State and, at times, releases its own videos. That said, to date they have not lived up to the production quality of those produced by the Islamic State nor is their message as captivating or excitingly told. In an attempt to create counter propaganda against the Islamic State’s coopting of the Grand Theft Auto video game, the State Department put out its own: “Grand Theft Innocence: Don’t Let ISIS be Your Controller.”79 Unfortunately, this just caused a counter propaganda response from the Islamic State rather than a positive impact on its intended audience. As the above attempts did not seem to work as well as the American government hoped, there has been new focus paid to exposing the hypocrisy of the Islamic State. Their message represents them as a truth-seeking entity which is based upon the strict Sunni interpretation of Islam and therefore, anything that they are found to be doing that does not fall into these restrictions could damage their reputation with their devotees and potential recruits. To this end, the State Department is operating three Twitter accounts (@DOT Arabic, @DSDOTAR, and @DigitalOutreach) which it uses on a daily basis to respond to Islamic State activities, to post memes that bring the mission and leadership of the Islamic States into question, and to ridicule the attempts the Islamic State is making to force itself upon unwilling citizenry.80 Besides this governmental response, the Islamic State has also faced their Twitter accounts being shutdown,81 their YouTube videos being taken down, and their Facebook pages being monitored

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and removed. While these companies do not always routinely monitor their sites and also may not have total authority to remove all videos, pictures, and pages related to the Islamic State and its activities, they have been able to recently make a significant impact on the Islamic State ability to propagate its message. In fact, as of March 8, 2015, as a result of “facing a ban from mainstream online social networks Facebook and Twitter,” the Islamic State launched 5elafabook.com (the caliphate book). By March 9, 2015 the website was offline with the excuse that before reentering the online environment, it needed to ensure that its members would be protected. The banner message stated that while it was not sponsored by the Islamic State, its purpose was to prove “to the whole world that we do not only carry guns and live in caves as they imagine … we are fighting the enemies of Allah’s religion … we want advancement to become Islamic.”82 The message appears to be written by supporters of the Islamic State as it justifies all of the Islamic State’s actions as having been done under the Quran and the supervision of Allah. However, not everyone is convinced that this new forum is to be trusted. Without verification the fear of some mujahedeen is that it could be an enemy intelligence gathering site. As the site is currently not live, it is difficult to determine how this will play out for the Islamic State as Facebook and Twitter continue to work hard to shut them down. Of course, it is difficult to shut down the multitude of individuals who express their support for and allegiance to the Islamic State—this will be to the benefit of the Islamic State in continuing to get its message out during this time of reduced communication outlets. Conclusion The Islamic State has proven itself quite adept at taking all of the tools created to bring the world closer together as platforms to spread a message meant to overtake the world and bend it to its will in order to create its caliphate– to set apart and destroy those who fail to follow its call. It has taken the basis on which al-Qaeda built its media campaigns and has so greatly expanded it that it is unrecognizable. While they may be currently challenged with regard to access to social media networks, “IS’s narrative and messages are simple, they resonate because they are coherent, idealistic, and fill a void. But most of all, they promise, and appear to deliver, tangible and striking political and military success so far.”83 While the Western world will continue its efforts to remove the Islamic State’s social media capabilities, media arms, and propaganda machines, the Islamic State has shown itself to be adaptable and ready to mold its campaign to the tools available. Such an adversary will require a great deal of agility and quick thinking by Western governments and a willingness to be as accepting of the need for multiple shifts in strategy as the Islamic State has proven itself to be. Notes 1 The views expressed here are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the US Government. The author would like to thank Dr. Daniel Milton for his support, advice, and expertise, during the writing of this chapter. 2 Aaron Y. Zelin, “Colonial Caliphate: The Ambitions of the ‘Islamic State,’” The Washington Institute, July 8, 2014, accessed March 2, 2015. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/colonialcaliphate-the-ambitions-of-the-islamic-state. 3 Anup Shah, “War, Propaganda, and Media,” Global Issues, March 31, 2005, accessed February 11, 2015. http://www.globalissues.org/article/157/war-propaganda-and-the-media.

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4 Definition provided by: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/state, accessed March 9, 2015. 5 NPR Staff, September 12, 2014 (3:36 AM), “ISIS, ISIL or Islamic State: What’s in a Name?,” Parallels, accessed January 25, 2015. http://www.npr.org/blogs/parallels/2014/09/12/347711170/isis-isil-orislamic-state-whats-in-a-name. 6 Faisal Edroos, July 5, 2014 (12:48 GMT), “Islamic State claims Shia mosque destruction,” Aljazeera: War and Conflict, accessed March 10, 2015. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/07/islamicstate-claims-shia-mosque-destruction-20147414533266331.html. 7 Irfan Al-Alawi, July 20, 2014 (4:00 a.m.), “Sunni Muslims Must Reject ISIS ‘Caliphate,’” Gatestone Institute International Policy Council, accessed March 8, 2015. http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/4461/ sunni-muslims-isis-caliphate. 8 NPR Staff, “ISIS, ISIL or Islamic State.” 9 Ibid. 10 Muhammad al-‘Ubaydi et al. The Group that Calls Itself a State: Understanding the Evolution and Challenges of the Islamic State (Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, NY, 2014). 11 al-‘Ubaydi et al., Group that Calls Itself a State, p. 48. 12 The English translation of this chart is found at: ibid., p. 102. 13 Ibid., p. 48. 14 Ibid., p. 49. 15 al-‘Ubaydi et al., Group that Calls Itself a State. 16 Ibid., p. 50. 17 For a more detailed discussion see al-‘Ubaydi et al., Group that Calls Itself a State. 18 Riefenstahl, Lien, Triumph des Willens, YouTube video, 105 minutes, 1935. https://www.youtube. com/watch?v=GHs2coAzLJ8. 19 Steve Rose, October 7, 2014 (1747 EDT), “The ISIS Propaganda War: A Hi-Tech Media Jihad,” The Guardian, accessed January 25, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/07/isis-media-machinepropaganda-war. 20 All seven documentaries in the Why We Fight series are available on YouTube for viewing. 21 The videos Our Enemy—the Japanese and Know Your Enemy can be found at the following URLs respectively: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y7DsFEwh2k4 and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IlQ3BrzQO4.s. 22 Anthony v. Navarro, “A Critical Comparison between Japanese and American Propaganda during World War II,” accessed March 13, 2015. https://www.msu.edu/~navarro6/srop.html#Japan. 23 Navarro, “A Critical Comparison.” 24 Kayla Ruble and Murtaza Hussain, September 21, 2014 (8:42 PM), “Flames of War: Islamic State’s Feature Length Propaganda/Recruitment Film,” LeakSource, accessed March 7, 2015. http://leaksource. info/2014/09/21/flames-of-war-islamic-state-feature-length-propaganda-recruitment-film/. 25 Rose, “ISIS Propaganda War.” 26 Olivia Becker, July 12, 2014 (12:35 PM), “ISIS Has a Really Slick and Sophisticated Media Department,” accessed March 4, 2015. https://news.vice.com/article/isis-has-a-really-slick-and-sophisticatedmedia-department. 27 For a discussion of the torture, mock executions, and false hopes that the hostages were made to endure which supports the argument that the statements they made on video were made under duress see: Rukmini Callimachi, “The Horror before the Beheadings: ISIS Hostages Endured Torture and Dashed Hopes, Freed Cellmates Say,” New York Times, October 25, 2014, accessed March 1, 2015. http://www.nytimes. com/2014/10/26/world/middleeast/horror-before-the-beheadings-what-isis-hostages-endured-in-syria.html. 28 These videos can be located and viewed on YouTube. 29 These videos can be found on YouTube or the Huffington Post.

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30 See “John Cantlie seen in New Islamic State Video,” October 27, 2014, accessed February 27, 2015. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QBnxP78N2iw. 31 This video can be found and viewed in a variety of places including YouTube, the Mirror, and FOX News. 32 Alex Wellman, March 6, 2015 (11:57 PM), “ISIS Holds Popular Public Screenings of Brutal ‘Burned Alive Murder’ of Jordanian Pilot Muath al-Kasaesbeth,” accessed March 11, 2015. http://www.mirror.co.uk/ news/world-news/isis-hold-popular-public-screenings-5284409. 33 “The Burning of the Murtadd Pilot,” Dabiq: From Hypocrisy to Apostasy: The Extinction of the Grayzone, 1436 Rabi’ Al-Akhir (2014): 6, accessed February 15, 2015. http://media.clarionproject.org/files/ islamic-state/islamic-state-dabiq-magazine-issue-7-from-hypocrisy-to-apostasy.pdf. 34 Harleen K. Gambhir, “Dabiq: The Strategic Messaging of the Islamic State,” Institute for the Study of War, August 15, 2014, accessed February 20, 2015. http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ Dabiq%20Backgrounder_Harleen%20Final.pdf, p. 10. 35 Terrence McCoy, “The Apocalyptic Magazine the Islamic State Uses to Recruit and Radicalize Foreigners,” Washington Post, September 16, 2014, accessed February 18, 2015. http://www.washingtonpost. com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/09/16/the-apocalyptic-magazine-the-islamic-state-uses-to-recruit-andradicalize-foreigners/. 36 “The Islamic State’s (ISIS, ISIL) Magazine,” The Clarion Project, September 20, 2014, accessed February 16, 2015. http://www.clarionproject.org/news/islamic-state-isis-isil-propaganda-magazine-dabiq#. 37 McCoy, “Apocalyptic Magazine.” 38 English translation: Unity. 39 English translation: Truth-seeking. 40 English translation: Migration. 41 English translation: Holy War. 42 English translation: Community. 43 See Dabiq: The Return of Khilafah, 1435 Ramdan (2014), accessed February 15, 2015. http://media. clarionproject.org/files/09-2014/isis-isil-islamic-state-magazine-Issue-1-the-return-of-khilafah.pdf. 44 “Foreword,” Dabiq: A Call to Hijrah, 1435 Shawal (2014): 3, accessed February 15, 2015, http:// media.clarionproject.org/files/09-2014/isis-isil-islamic-state-magazine-Issue-3-the-call-to-hijrah.pdf. 45 Ella Lipin, September 10, 2014, “Understanding ISIS’s Apocalyptic Appeal” Council on Foreign Relations: Middle East Matters, accessed January 15, 2015. http://blogs.cfr.org/danin/2014/09/10/ understanding-isiss-apocalyptic-appeal/. 46 William R. Trotter, “The Music War,” Military History 22 (2005): 58. 47 Ibid. 48 Leon Botstein, “Why Music in a Time of War?,” New York Times, March 3, 1991, accessed February 2, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/1991/03/03/arts/classical-music-why-music-in-a-time-of-war.html. 49 Trotter, “Music War.” 50 Ibid. 51 Alex Marshall, November 9, 2014 (12:59 PM), “How ISIS got its Anthem,” The Guardian, accessed February 3, 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/music/2014/nov/09/nasheed-how-isis-got-its-anthem. 52 The Islamic State Produced the most Influential Song of the Year. December 30, 2014. By Simon R. Gardner. http://www.newrepublic.com/article/120665/islamic-states-dawlat-al-islam-qamat-mostinfluential-song-2014. 53 Marshall, “How ISIS got its Anthem.” 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid. 56 Ibid.

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57 Ibid. 58 Ibid. 59 Ibid. 60 Simon R. Garder, December 30, 2014, “The Islamic State Produced the Most Influential Song of the Year,” The New Republic, accessed February 10, 2015. http://www.newrepublic.com/article/120665/islamicstates-dawlat-al-islam-qamat-most-influential-song-2014. 61 Felix Richter, November 24, 2014, “Netflix and YouTube are America’s Biggest Traffic Hogs,” Statistica, accessed March 5, 2015. http://www.statista.com/chart/1620/top-10-traffic-hogs/. 62 Jonathan Strickland, “How YouTube Works,” How Stuff Works, accessed March 10, 2015, http:// money.howstuffworks.com/youtube4.htm. 63 Strickland, “How YouTube Works.” 64 See Kiernan Guilbert, February 23, 2015 (1:23 PM), “Islamic State Uses Social Media to Groom British Muslim Girls: Think Tank,” Reuters, accessed March 16, 2015. http://www.reuters.com/ article/2015/02/23/us-britain-islamicstate-girls-idUSKBN0LR1T720150223. 65 J.M. Berger, June 16, 2014 (2:00 PM), “How ISIS Games Twitter,” The Atlantic, accessed March 11, 2015. http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/06/isis-iraq-twitter-social-mediastrategy/372856/. 66 Berger, “How ISIS Games Twitter.” 67 Ibid. 68 Ibid. 69 See al-‘Ubaydi et al., Group that Calls Itself a State. 70 Aaron Y. Zelin, January 2013, “The State of Global Jihad Online: A Qualitative, Quantitative, and Cross-Lingual Analysis,” New America Foundation, accessed March 5, 2015. http://www.newamerica.net/ sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/Zelin_Global%20Jihad%20Online_NAF.pdf, p. 4. 71 Zelin, “State of Global.” 72 Ibid., p. 4. 73 Ibid. 74 Daniel N. Abramson, September 23, 2014, “Islamic State Online: Jihadist Propaganda 2.0,” Geopolitical Monitor, accessed March 10, 2015. http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/islamic-state-onlinejihadist-propaganda-2-0/. 75 Mike Wendling, last updated March 12, 2015 (2015 ET), “Islamic State go Niche on Social Media,” BBC News, accessed March 14, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-31854755. 76 Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Intensifies Effort to Blunt ISIS’ Message,” New York Times, February 16, 2015, accessed March 10, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/17/world/middleeast/us-intensifies-effort-toblunt-isis-message.html?_r=0. 77 Schmitt, “U.S. Intensifies.” 78 Ibid. 79 Rose, “ISIS Propaganda War.” 80 Paul Donoughue, 2015, “Twitter Wars: How the US is Fighting Islamic State Propaganda through Internet Memes,” ABC News Australia, accessed March 15, 2015. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-03-12/ state-department-counter-radicalisation-twitter/6290436. 81 As a result of this, Jack Dorsey (Twitter co-founder) and other employees of Twitter have received death threats from the Islamic State. 82 The website is located at: http://5elafabook.com/. 83 Thomas Elkjer Nissen, “Terror.com—IS’s Social Media Warfare in Syria and Iraq,” Military Studies Magazine: Contemporary Conflicts 2(2014).

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Chapter 5

IS and al-Qaeda Peter R. Dean

To understand the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria [IS], one must first understand the relationship between IS and al-Qaeda. This chapter will outline the basic structures of these organizations, discuss the history behind the existence of both groups, discuss their ideological similarities and differences, funding, recruiting methods, and why the two groups split apart. Beginning of al-Qaeda Terror The minutes of al-Qaeda’s first few meetings were as notable for what they did not mention, as for what they did. The minutes, which were seized by Bosnian authorities in 2002,1 describes a three-day meeting at Osama bin Laden’s house. Al-Qaeda was founded in August 18, 1988, during the time of the Afghan war against the Soviet invasion.2 Bin Laden’s meeting took place with two other militants: Abu Ubaidah al Banjshiri, al-Qaeda’s military commander, and Abu Hajir, al Iraqi, al-Qaeda’s religious expert.3 The meeting minutes describe the al-Qaeda organization in vague terms as an “organized Islamic faction” whose goal is to “lift the word of God, to make His religion victorious.”4 The document goes on to refer to wording of the pledge to join al-Qaeda. But, the meeting minutes also describe the following goals of the newly formed al-Qaeda: spreading the sentiment of the Jihad in the Islamic world, training the Islamic soldiers, backing and supporting jihad movements in the world, and the coordination between jihad movements in the world.5 It was also known that bin Laden helped create al-Qaeda, not as a revolutionary group, but as a military unit for Arab Islamists still fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan.6 Bin Laden helped finance alQaeda with his own money. Bin Laden’s extremely religious father, Mohammed bin Awad bin Laden was the owner of a giant construction company, which at one time in the 1990s was estimated to be worth $5 billion.7 The younger bin Laden inherited some of that money and funded al-Qaeda with it. It was not until after the Soviet forces fought Afghanistan that bin Laden’s outlook was changed dramatically. Bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia—his birthplace—after the Soviets left Afghanistan, but the Saudis refused his offer of help to expel the Iraqi army out of Kuwait.8 Bin Laden witnessed firsthand how the Saudi government allowed the United States, using Saudi military bases, to rescue Kuwait.9 As time went on, bin Laden’s call for a war against the United States was based on Americans being part of a “Judeo-Crusader alliance.”10 Bin Laden based his hatred on American troops on many reasons; however, a more prominent reason was the presence of American military troops in Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden even went on to support overthrowing the Saudi government—an obsessive thought for bin Laden.11 “Our main problem is the U.S. government … by being loyal to the U.S. regime, the Saudi regime has committed an act against Islam,” bin Laden said.12 To make matters worse for bin Laden, the Saudi Arabian government revoked his citizenship in 1994, as they were bombarded with complaints about his terrorist activities in Yemen, Algeria, and Egypt.13 Bin Laden decided to move his terrorist operations to Sudan.14 Not only was bin Laden

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obviously angry with the Saudis, he agreed with others who felt the Saudi’s rulers were “false Muslims,” which needed to be overthrown and replaced by a true Islamic state.15 Al-Qaeda had a presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but when bin Laden moved to the Sudan some al-Qaeda militants moved back to their native countries, not joining him in Sudan. The Sudanese government opposed al-Qaeda training camps.16 Eventually, al-Qaeda’s ideology evolved into an agenda with several components. Those components included Salafist Islamic Reform.17 This group advocated for a strict interpretation of Sharia, or Islamic law, based on teachings of the Koran. Al-Qaeda also believed in a defensive jihad.18 Al-Qaeda militants are told to engage in armed resistance against the West. Attacks on the distant enemy to further eliminate the threat of foreign influences was part of their philosophy. These attacks combined with advocating for the removal of apostate regimes, governments not based on Sharia law, was what made al-Qaeda famous. Al-Qaeda is also known to advocate for the removal of apostate regimes from Arab lands. Economic warfare was also part of al-Qaeda’s methodology.19 This plan meant that bin Laden’s followers would attack economic targets to weaken the US. They ultimately hoped the attacks on oil in the region would deny the West access to oil, as well as attacks on non-Sunni Muslim religious groups. Al-Qaeda considered Shia Muslims to be apostates, and not adhering to their religious principles at all.20 Furthermore, al-Qaeda was and is more tolerant of the Shia Muslims than the Islamic State. Some al-Qaeda leaders had encouraged attacks against Shia populations while other al-Qaeda leaders felt attacking Shia could alienate the Muslim at large.21 Additionally, bin Laden made terrorism a truly globalized endeavor. “While bin Laden transferred his millions from Saudi Arabia to Sudan to Afghanistan, his followers enthusiastically embraced the artifacts of globalization. They communicated by American satellite phones … bin Laden’s fatwas … were faxed to other countries … thus was bin Laden able to create a truly global network.”22 Although most people associate the Islamic State’s Abu Umar al-Baghdadi with the concept of an Islamic caliphate, bin Laden also had hopes for establishing such an entity, as did other Muslim organizations over time: Bin Laden aimed to create the conditions for the rebirth of the Khalifa, where the umma would live under the rule of the Prophet Muhammad in a continuous swath of green from Tunisia to Indonesia … [but] the restoration of the Khalifa had about as much of a chance as the Holy Roman Empire suddenly reappearing in Europe, but as a rhetorical device the call for its return exercised a powerful grip on bin Laden and his followers.23

As for al-Qaeda’s membership numbers, in 1988, al-Qaeda had about 30 members—probably far from the goal bin Laden set for his own organization.24 However, it was the year the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda would go on to execute a series of attacks against Americans, including bombing its embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998; and attacking the USS Cole in 2000.25 The infamous attack on the United States on September, 2001 by al-Qaeda almost back-fired on bin Laden’s group. Intense counterattacks by the United States led to al-Qaeda being divided into three separate divisions of a new version of al-Qaeda: 1) al-Qaeda Central, containing the leadership and immediate advisors to provide direction and promote the organization; 2) the system of al-Qaeda branches that engaged in regional warfare; and 3) widely disseminated secretive cells and lone terrorists acting alone against al-Qaeda’s enemies.26 The backlash against al-Qaeda for their September 11 attacks by the United States and others inflicted “severe losses” and “disrupted it to a great degree.”27 Al-Qaeda’s terrorist successes notwithstanding, the Brookings Doha Center, asserts that the Islamic State has been more successful in its goals than al-Qaeda ever was.28

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But one also has to address the false perception that the Islamic State came from out of nowhere and rose to be one of the power players in the Middle East in just two years. In fact, the Islamic State itself wanted to form a Caliphate in 2006.29 Because the Islamic State leaders knew their claim would be controversial among other jihadists, it chose an ambiguous name that indicated it was an adherent of al-Qaeda principles; the Islamic State in Iraq. Bin Laden Letter The actions of bin Laden and others of September 11 changed the political landscape between the United States and the Middle East forever. The unexpected attacks compelled people to ask why they were attacked. Osama bin Laden wrote a “letter to the American people” explaining alQaeda’s motives for the terrorist attacks, giving insight into al-Qaeda’s philosophy. Bin Laden claimed al-Qaeda perpetrated the attacks because the United States attacked the Middle East first. “The British handed over Palestine, with your help and support, to the Jews … years overflowing with oppression, tyranny, crimes, killing, expulsion, destruction and devastation.”30 Bin Laden also reached out to convert Americans in that letter. “The first thing that we are calling you to is Islam … we also advise you stop supporting Israel … we also advise you to pack your luggage and get out of our lands … if you fail to respond to all these conditions, then prepare for fight with the Islamic Nation.”31 al-Qaeda Today al-Qaeda today is a very different organization than it was when it was founded. Ayman Zawahiri, bin Laden’s successor, has struggled to impose his leadership over al-Qaeda affiliates.32 The terrorist organization now poses more of a threat to the United States, as Middle Eastern and African affiliates adopt al-Qaeda’s philosophy; although, they operate independently of the main group.33 Al-Qaeda affiliates often concentrate on disputes with local governments. al-Qaeda today also consists of the following factions: al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula; al-Qaeda in Iraq; and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. All three of these groups expanded their operations because of Arab Spring.34 al-Zawahiri also created two new al-Qaeda affiliates: al Shabbab in Somalia and Jabhat al Nusra in Syria.35 It is thought by intelligence officials that even as the al-Qaeda network becomes decentralized, the core group continues to control the al-Qaeda network. Yet decentralization of the al-Qaeda network has not made it weaker.36 Islamic State Name Changes It is important to explain the various names of the Islamic State before talking at length about the organization itself. Besides being known as the Islamic State in Iraq, the group also was known as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham [ISIS]. The group seems to prefer the name “Islamic State” giving themselves a nod as being the caliphate they have declared themselves to be.37 The United States and the British have referred to the organization as ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant]. However, the name “ISIS” is used more commonly.38

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In addition to the above names, the word “Daesh” has been used to describe the organization. It appears the term was coined by the French government, stating that other names “blur the lines between Islam, Muslims, and Islamists.”39 Daesh means “to tread underfoot” or “crush.”40 Some US government officials feel that if you use the term “Islamic State” to refer to the terrorist organization, you are legitimizing a self-declared caliphate.41 IS vs. al-Qaeda Al-Qaeda and IS have had a strained relationship for years. Al-Qaeda’s discontent with IS goes back to 2005. Ayman al-Zawahiri, the man who is now the head of al-Qaeda, wrote a letter to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who was then Zawahiri’s top Qaeda leader in Iraq, and the founder of al-Qaeda in Iraq.42 It was clear early on that there were major differences between al-Qaeda and the group Zarqawi controlled under the al-Qaeda banner—the group that would one day become ISIS. Zawahiri and bin Laden wanted al-Qaeda to focus its terrorist efforts on targets in the United States. Yet Zarqawi (and his successors) wanted to encourage sectarian wars and attacks on Muslims who allegedly collaborated with the Shia-led regimes.43 Several jihadist groups—including al-Qaeda affiliates—publicly expressed support for the Islamic State.44 One of the major disagreements between IS and al-Qaeda is whom they see as their primary foe.45 al-Qaeda sees the United States as its main enemy. Yet, al-Qaeda does believe that Shia Muslims are apostates, but thinks killing other Muslims is too severe.46 Al-Zawahiri’s letter to al-Zarqawi also protested ISIS’ brutal televised decapitations of its enemies. Though al-Qaeda has also videotaped decapitating foes in the past, Zawahiri’s letter warned Zarqawi that their enemies should be killed “by bullet.”47 Brutal decapitations have become the way in which IS publicizes its anger towards its perceived enemies. These decapitations and other factors have led to al-Qaeda severing its ties with IS in February 2014. At one point, IS even posted long videos of the decapitation of dozens of Syrian soldiers.48 Al-Zawahiri made it clear, the order not to publicize decapitations was straight from the top. “Therefore, I assert that whoever does such actions … he had violated the command of Sheikh Osama.”49 al-Zarqawi Years Before Baghdadi became the leader of the Islamic State, former al-Qaeda in Iraq commander Abu Musab al-Zarqawi helped form the group in its early years. He became a radical militant while in prison for being convicted of weapons possession.50 Zarqawi’s sentiment was seemingly no less radical than al-Qaeda. He wrote of the Shia population, “They are the enemy. Beware of them. Fight them. By God, they lie.”51 After US forces invaded Iraq in 2003, Zarqawi played a major role in the insurgency. al-Zarqawi learned the strict rules of Jihadi Salafism in a mentorship with Abu Muhammad alMaqdisi when both of them participated in the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan.52 It was from his friendship with Maqdisi that Zarqawi learned the strict beliefs of Jihad Salafism.53 The major ideological differences between bin Laden and al-Zarqawi are the differences between al-Qaeda and Islamic State today: al-Zarqawi wanted to target “near enemies such as Israel and the Jordanian government.”54 Al-Qaeda wanted to target the United States, but al-Zarqawi had a strong hatred for Shiites that bin Laden did not share.55

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In 2013, Baghdadi declared that AQI would operate in Syria also, and changed the name to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.56 After al-Zarqawi died, the Islamic State stopped expanding temporarily. In 2007, local Sahwa (Awakening) councils combated Islamic State in Sunni areas of Iraq, mainly in the Anbar province.57 The councils were backed by US forces and were effective at counterinsurgency. By 2008, the Islamic State was under pressure to survive in Iraq.58 From 2009 to 2011, the US withdrew from Iraq, increasing IS’ confidence and local support.59 Even the Sahwa militias were unhappy with Nouri al-Maliki’s Shia-led government, as it did not provide support or pay. IS was paying bigger salaries than the Syrian government as well as, recruiting its former enemies—the Sahwa.60 The past four years has been a dramatic growth period for the Islamic State, a consequence of the civil war, and subsequent expansion into Syria.61 Al-Qaeda/Islamic State Mindset At this point, it should be noted that both the Islamic State and al-Qaeda share the philosophy of Jihadi Salafism. Jihadi Salafism, according to the Brookings Institution, is an “ideological movement in Sunni Islam.”62 It is based on an extreme interpretations of Islamic scripture. The Islamic State claims this philosophy gives its soldiers the religious justification for committing the acts they do. The Salafist/tafiri interpretation of Islam states that anyone who protests its rules is therefore an apostate.63 More specifically, Islamic State believes Shi’ism and Sufism does not conform to the Islamic State’s interpretation of Islam and must be destroyed and eradicated,64 giving the Islamic State the appearance of legitimacy for its violence. Debating the Islamic State With the exception of military action against the Islamic State, not too many groups are stating that IS is not the absolute authority of Muslims worldwide. But, at least one group of scholars has done just that. In “Open letter to al-Baghdadi,” 120 Muslim scholars from around the world wrote an 18-page letter on September 2014. That letter, originally written in Arabic, debated the Islamic State’s treatment of people relying heavily on the Koran for its reasoning. It is not the only letter by Muslim scholars taking Islamic State to task. But this letter is considered a complete, thorough rebuttal of all of Islamic State’s practices. It also chides the Islamic State for not being as educated about Islam as it claims to be. It says, among other things, the following: “After the death of the Prophet [Mohammed], Islam does not require anyone to emigrate anywhere … it is forbidden in Islam to declare people nonMuslim unless he (or she) open declares disbelief … it is obligatory to consider Yazidis as People of the Scripture … it is forbidden in Islam to kill emissaries, ambassadors, and diplomats; hence it is forbidden to kill journalists and aid workers.”65 Islamic State Beginnings Regardless of who is in control of al-Qaeda today, it is clear that Zawahiri’s disavowal of IS has led to al-Baghdadi declaring himself the caliphate. To grow his organization, al-Baghdadi sent a small number of fighters into Syria in 2011 to build an organization, trying to capitalize on the chaos in Syria.66

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The situation in Syria has led to 92,901 “unique killings” that took place between March 2011 and April 2013, according to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.67 The fighting in Syria is due partly to corruption and repression by 42 years of the Assad family regime.68 IS promoted the idea that Abu Omar al-Baghdadi had membership in the Quraysh tribe—which according to Islamic custom, will result in the next caliph69 (the prophet Mohammed belonged to the Quraysh tribe.) Abu Omar al-Baghdadi was the commander of the Islamic State of Mosul until he was killed in 2010. He was replaced by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi—who supposedly is also of the Quraysh tribe, just as Abu Omar al-Baghdadi was reported to be.70 The caliph must be from the Quraysh tribe, according to Islamic tradition.71 But, the years 2011–2014 were crucial for the expansion of the Islamic State. The Syrian civil war started and IS’ expansion into Syria helped strengthen the organization.72 To understand an organization one must first learn something about the group’s leader; however, little is known about Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader, or self-proclaimed “Caliph,” of IS. Some facts about him are controversial. It is widely believed his hometown was Samarra, Iraq,73 and two of his uncles worked for Saddam Hussein’s security detail. His real name was Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri.74 Born in 1971, al-Baghdadi does not come from a wealthy family, and The Islamic State’s propaganda machine asserts he is a pious man. Some former neighbors of his claim he even has a doctorate in religious studies, though there is not much evidence of that.75 It also needs to be said that at press time, it was reported that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was no longer in daily control of ISIS, as he reportedly was recovering from injuries sustained from a March 2015 airstrike.76 Sources in Iraq told The Guardian that Baghdadi suffered injuries during an US-led coalition attack.77 Two different sources told The Guardian that the strike took place in the al-Baaj, a district of Nineveh, in close proximity to the Syrian border.78 Baghdadi had one previous scare in December 2014 when US jets attacked a convoy outside Mosul. The convoy killed his close aide, Auf Abdul Rahman al-Efery, but Baghdadi was unharmed in the incident, as he was in the second car.79 An Iraqi official, Hisham al-Hashimi, who advises Baghdad on ISIS, told The Guardian that Baghdadi was indeed wounded on March 18, 2015, though a Pentagon spokesman would not confirm it at the time.80 Ruthless Caliph Some speculate that the origin of al-Baghdadi’s ruthlessness lies in the turmoil caused by the 2003 US invasion of Iraq.81 The US invasion sent many Iraqi’s into hiding; however, some Sunnis stayed and fought the invading military. Al-Baghdadi was one of those who fought. He is thought to have established the terrorist group Jamaat Jaish Ahl al-Sunnah wal Jamaa. He was captured by US forces in either 2004 or 2005,82 and sent to a prison facility in Southern Iraq, Camp Bucca.83 How long he was in prison there is not known. But, it is widely believed it was at Camp Bucca that Al-Baghdadi met many former Sunni Baathists and jihadists who would eventually swear allegiance to him as Caliph—becoming soldiers for the Islamic State.84 It is important to note that it is doubtful that al-Baghdadi was an active militant prior to the United States invading Iraq. London-based Iraqi analyst Sajad Jiyad states that Camp Bucca changed Al-Baghdadi.85 While at Camp Bucca, Al-Baghdadi met Abu Muhammad al-Adnanin, the current spokesman for the Islamic State, and the person he relies on.86 Once released from prison, Al-Baghdadi went on to join the Islamic State of Iraq in 2006. He was appointed leader of IS in May 2010.87

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IS’ military strategy is that of invoking sectarian conflict.88 IS targets urban areas, including both Shia and Alawi Muslims, usually located in civilian areas. The Shia-dominated government in Iraq and the Alawi-led government in Syria are both perceived as oppressive to Sunnis. Yet, IS has attacked Syria in Sunni-dominated areas that are considered hostile to IS. Caliph’s Motivation One of the reasons Iraq and Syria are in such a state of conflict is because of the split between Sunni and Shiite Muslims. There are 1.57 billion Muslims in the world—about 23 percent of the world’s population.89 About 90 percent of all Muslims are Sunnis—and 10 percent are Shia. Most Shias live in just four countries: Iran, Pakistan, India and Iraq.90 About 20 percent of Muslims in Syria are Shia, and about 70 percent of Muslims in Iraq are Shia. Both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State are run by Sunni Muslims. Allegiance Pledge to Caliph Baghdadi has verbally demanded that Muslims worldwide pledge allegiance to him. Though many have not, the Nigerian group, Boko Haram, did in March 2015. Abubakar Shekau is the leader of Boko Haram, which is believed to have about 6,000 fighters and moderate control over about 20,000 square miles of northeast Nigeria.91 The Islamic State accepted Boko Haram’s pledge shortly after it was made, making it one of several Islamic State affiliates. The Islamic State’s spokesperson, Abu Mohammed al-Adnanin, claimed that now the caliphate has been expanded to West Africa.92 The Boko Haram pledge came seven months after Boko Haram declared its own Islamic Caliphate in the Christian town of Gwozq in August 2014.93 That declaration, which was rejected by the Nigerian military, happened after Boko Haram invaded Gwozq and murdered more than 100 civilians.94 Human Rights Watch reported in July 2014 that Boko Haram killed at least 2,053 civilians in more than 95 attacks.95 Those civilians included Christians, moderate Muslims, law enforcement officers, and military personnel; according to International Christian Concern Regional Manager for Africa Cameron Thomas, as reported in The Christian Post.96 Recruitment: al-Qaeda Al-Qaeda recruits for “the base” and its sister groups unmarried males 17–25.97 Al-Qaeda uses scouts to do this—teachers in madrassas. They also talk to emirs of Mosques to identify potential members. The attacks of September 2001, and the American invasion of Afghanistan encouraged extremely successful recruitment into al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda’s method of replacing soldiers killed in action was to anger potential recruits by showcasing the United States’ perceived interference in the Arab world and its support for Israel.98 Also, the late Osama bin Laden would routinely recruit soldiers to training camps in Afghanistan. Once he had trainees at the camp, he would make sure the training experience radicalized young soldiers into viewing the United States as the enemy and global warfare as the goal.99 It is thought that the intentions of al-Qaeda’s recruitment is to exploit perceived racial, economic and religious inequities in American society, just as they do in every other culture they target for recruitment.100

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Now is an ideal time for recruiting Arab youths via social media for military service—be it in terrorist organizations or other types of service. According to one source, youths born between 1977 and 2000—the millennial generation—make up more than a third of all 400 million Arabs.101 It also should be noted that despite the flaws of the Islamic State, it is believed that there is a “complete lack of confidence” in rulers of the Arab world.102 This is thought to be the case far beyond Syria and Iraq, and throughout the Middle East and Africa, where governance by Sharia law is thought to be ideal.103 Al-Qaeda also recruits via the internet, just as ISIS does. For two decades now, al-Qaeda has used the internet to publicize its group.104 Al-Qaeda’s online magazine, Inspire, provided the Boston Marathon bombers with the directions to build bombs that killed three people and injured 264 more.105 Governance The “caliphate” al-Baghdadi refers to exists in Mosul, Iraq, Raqqa and Syria. It encompasses 423 miles of land from Iraq to Syria. The Islamic State built a system of governance that includes administration and Muslim services.106 But al-Baghdadi has done something no Muslim has done in years. On June 2014, he stepped into the pulpit of the Great Mosque of al-Nuri in Mosul to deliver a Ramadan sermon as the first caliph in generations. According to Dr. Usama Hasan, a Senior Fellow at the Quilliam Foundation and an expert on Islam, a Sunni Islamist caliphate covers the entire Muslim world.107 A caliphate, according to Hasan, is a situation where Muslim masses willingly pledge allegiance to a Muslim leader—in this case, al-Baghdadi.108 Al-Baghdadi made a speech in Mosul in 2014, quoting Abu Bakr al-Siddiq, the first caliph of Sunni Islam:109 I have been appointed to rule over you, though I am not the best among you, though I am not the best among you … if you see that I do right, help me, and if you see that I do wrong, set me right. And obey me so long as I obey God touching you. If I disobey Him, no obedience is owed me from you.110

Once al-Baghdadi did this, al-Qaeda responded by calling for reconciliation between the ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria.111 Central al-Qaeda also proposed Assan alternative caliph: Afghanistan Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad ‘Umar.112 Ideology of Islamic State The Islamic State has released audio statements between 2007 and 2014 that elaborate on its ideology.113 It includes 19 edicts of what is expected of its disciples.The first edict believes in the necessity of destroying and eliminating all types of idolatry. The second states that the Shi’a are a group of “idolatry and apostasy.”114 The third seems to be justification of the many killings the IS has committed; stating the belief in the “necessity” of killing the “sorcerer” after he has been “apprehended.” There are 19 practices, or “fundamentals,” as al-Baghdadi calls it, outlined in this document. It also includes the rejection of Shi’a, stating they do not perform many of Islam’s rituals.115

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Chaos in Iraq Part of the rise of the Islamic State can be attributed to the abuses committed during former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s regime in Iraq.116 Maliki was eventually ousted from office and replaced by Haider al-Abadi, a moderate Shia leader, in September 2014. Al-Abadi became the new leader after the loss of Mosul to Isis,117 and he promised a more inclusive form of government in Iraq.118 Though some reports claim IS can “govern,” the Human Rights Watch report indicates otherwise. Human Rights Watch reports that government security forces and pro-government militias carried out attacks on civilians in Sunni and mixed Sunni-Shia areas, as well as kidnapping and summary executions. IS took over the northern part of Iraqi city of Mosul on June 10, killing many captured Shia security officers. IS, Iraq, and Treatment of Women, Girls Earlier this year, the Human Rights Watch issued a report stating how authorities—presumably IS—illegally detained women in Iraq subjecting many to torture and sexual abuse. In February, Iraq’s Council of Ministers passed discriminatory legislation which limited women’s rights in matters of divorce, inheritance. This legislation also permitted men to marry girls at age nine. In Mosul, IS took control and kidnapped hundreds of Yezidi women and children forcing them to marry IS members. In October 2014, IS confirmed they were indeed enslaving women, but attempted to justify it on religious grounds. IS Recruitment and Structure IS had as many as 31,000 fighters on their side by mid-October, 2014.119 The top two ranking officers of IS are former Baathists, Abu Muslim al Afari al-Turkmani and Abu Abli al-Anbari. Abu Muslim al Afari al-Turkmani is thought to have been a senior Special Forces officer and a member of military intelligence in Saddam Hussein’s army. He now supervises IS operations in Iraq.120 Abu Abli al-Anbari oversees operations in Syria. Both are thought to serve on IS’ Shura Council, the main governing body. Although IS has concentrated on working in Syria and Iraq, there is the potential that foreign fighters might return home to carry out a terrorist attack. According to 1990–2010 data, about 11 percent of foreign fighters become active threats after returning home.121 As stated before, IS relies on foreign fighters. About half of the 15,000 foreigners who joined IS since 2011 come from 90 different countries: Tunisia (3,000); Saudi Arabia (2,500); Morocco (1,500); Jordan (1,300); and Turkey (1,000).122 The Soufan Group believes the struggle for prominence between al-Qaeda and Islamic State will rest on two things: the ability (or lack thereof) of IS to consolidate its territorial gains and keep those gains, and the ability of IS leadership to prevent their militants from deserting IS.123 If these militants stay loyal to IS, but leave Iraq and Syria, IS will “certainly be the dominant force in ‘global jihad’ for some years to come.’”124 It is also believed that there are some defectors joining the Islamic State from al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.125 AQAP is considered to be the biggest threat of the al-Qaeda affiliates based on previous attacks on the United States.126 Regardless of how many defections take place, an AQAP leader encouraged the success of IS. “I congratulate all the Mujahideen on all battlefronts and all Muslims on the victories of our brothers in Iraq have achieved against the puppets of the (Iranians),” stated the AQAP leader.127 AQAP; however, still maintains their loyalty to Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of al-Qaeda.128

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In 2014, US spy agencies determined that soldiers from al-Qaeda affiliates in Yemen and Africa were defecting from terrorist organizations to join the Islamic State, which at that point had seized territory in Iraq and Syria.129 US officials who spotted that trend noted that defectors to IS were coming mainly from the Yemen-based al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. According to Georgetown University Professor John Esposito, most people who decide to fight for IS are not very religious.130 Esposito said it is “social and political grievances that radicalize individuals.” Esposito noted that IS militants rarely refer to religion when they are videotaped and about to behead someone; but rather they refer to moral outrage. Much has been said of IS’ online recruitment of future members. What has not been talked about much is the alleged forced recruitment and use of children.131 United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, Human Rights Office [UNAMI/OHCHR] reported that IS is recruiting children as young as 13 in Mosul and Tal Afar to be soldiers. Witnesses have seen children armed and wearing similar garb as IS fighters. More strikingly, reports were made of children going willingly with IS patrols inside both cities. Some children are used for publicity purposes by IS, pictures of children wearing IS uniforms were posted on social media. UNAMI/OHCHR states that the majority of IS soldiers patrolling the streets of Mosul were underage children—between 13 and 16 years old.132 Also, an unnamed UNAMI/OHCHR source states that IS imposed mandatory military service on single men aged 17–37 in Mosul—though there are reports which contradict that.133 Regarding the structure of IS itself, it became a very bureaucratic organization intent on making a steady income by acquiring financial independence—unlike al-Qaeda’s method of relying on outside donors. By September 2014, IS’ multiple sources of income included: gas, taxation in the caliphate, extortion, kidnapping, etc., and was earning $2 million daily.134 Part of IS’ success is attributed to its military. Baghdadi’s deputies are former officers of the Iraqi militia.135 Abu Ali al-Anbari, chief of Syria operations, was a major general in the Iraqi Army and Fadl Ahmad Abdullah al-Hiyali (Abu Muslim al-Turkmani), was chief of Iraqi operations and a lieutenant colonel in the Iraqi Military Intelligence as well as, a former officer in the Iraqi Special Forces.136 The specific structure of IS is as follows: There is a military council headed by Abu Ahmad al ‘Alawani along with 3 other members appointed by Baghdadi forming the Shura (Consultative) council. This council supervises the affairs of the state of the Caliph. The Judiciary Authority, headed by Abu Mohammad al-Ani, deals with all judicial matters. This authority also is intended to spread the message of IS via recruitment and preaching. The Defense, Security and Intelligence Council is responsible for the personal security of Baghdadi. It also is responsible for the collection and dissemination of intelligence. This group is headed by Abu Bakr al-Anbari. Lastly, there is the Islamic State Institution for Public Information, which is headed by Abu Al Athir Omru al Abbassi. According to documents seized from a former IS general in early 2014, this group has about 1,000 commanders highly trained in extensive military and security experience. A small percentage of IS recruits are coming from the United States. US officials believe more than 150 American citizens traveled or attempted to travel to Syria as “foreign fighters,” according to the National Counterterrorism Center, as quoted in the Huffington Post.137 Some Americans have joined al-Qaeda’s Syrian branch, Jabhat al-Nusra. Others have joined the moderate Free Syrian Army, CBS reported in 2014.138 American Intelligence officials have also learned that some Americans—perhaps 6–12—went to Syria to fight the Assad regime, but have since returned to the United States.139 Aaron Zelin, a senior official at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, states that the problem may be worse than it appears. “It’s not just Americans who are going to Syria, but there are up to 3,000 European

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Citizens from countries that have visa waivers with the United States who have also joined the jihad in Syria,” he said.140 “It’s much easier to get into our country with a foreign passport.” The Islamic State gets a majority of its money from selling oil illegally on the black market. The Iraq Energy Institute estimates that IS currently produces 30,000 barrels per day in Iraq and 50,000 in Syria,141 making about $2 million daily to fund its goal of the Caliphate. Near Tikrit, IS set oil fields on fire in March 2015 in order to prevent Shi’ite militias and Iraqi soldiers from trying to force IS out of Sunni territory.142 Prior to IS taking over the Ajjil oil field last June, the field produced 25,000 barrels of crude oil as well as, 150 million cubic feet of gas daily.143 Experts noted that IS fighters were producing smaller volumes of oil from Ajil because they lacked the expertise to produce more gas, safely.144 At press time, the offensive had the largest Iraqi forces mounted against IS.145 Having access to that oil plays an important role in funding IS’ activities, even if their fighters do not have the technical know-how to run them at full capacity. IS tactics The Ba’athists who have risen to leadership positions in IS have brought with them tactics of insurgency, terrorism, and guerrilla warfare.146 And the striking differences between IS and alQaeda are the methods used to achieve their goals. In the process of establishing the Caliphate, IS clashed with Iraqi Security Forces, leading to a harsh toll on civilians. 8,493 civilians were killed and 15,782 were wounded147 causing 1.8 million Iraqis to be “displaced” from their homes. The Ottoman Caliphate dissolved in 1924. But the Muslim Brotherhood was148 supportive of the idea of a Caliphate in 1928—yet showed an “indifference” to working to restore the Caliphate.149 Caliphate Facts The fact that Baghdadi’s claim to be the Caliph indicates that the schism between Sunnis and Shiites is still brewing. And it all started with the death of the Prophet Mohammed in 632 AD (CE.)150 Shiites believe that Mohammed should have been succeeded by Ali-his cousin and son-inlaw; 151 however, the Sunnis disagreed. What has affected politics in the Middle East now is when the US overthrew Saddam Hussein—a Baath Party in 2003. The Shiite groups gained power because of this—and carried out a “de-Baathification” in which tens of thousands of Sunni Arabs were fired from government jobs. Sunni Arabs, Shiite Arabs, Sunni Kurds and Shiite Kurds is who remains in place after the “deBaathification.152 The Future of the Caliph It is difficult to determine what may happen in the future, but the Islamic State has already verbalized what is happening in the present, given the fact that the US Military campaign against IS has not been too successful. IS official Abu Muhammad al-‘Adnani called on followers to “kill Westerners arbitrarily throughout the world—Americans, Canadians, Australians, and their allies, both civilians and military personnel.

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Notes 1 Bergen, Peter and Cruickshank, Paul. “Revisiting the Early al Qaeda: An Updated Account of its Formative Years,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 35.1(2012), p. 3. 2 Ibid., p. 3. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid., p. 8. 6 Ibid., p. 7. 7 Bergen, Peter L. Holy War Inc. Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003, p. 49. 8 Ryan, Michael W.S. Decoding Al Qaeda’s Strategy. The Deep Battle Against America. New York: Columbia University Press, 2013, p. 53. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 Bergen, Peter L. Holy War Inc. Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden, p. 19. 13 Ibid., p. 53. 14 Ibid. 15 Gunaratna, Rohan. Inside Al Qaeda. New York: Columbia University Press, 2002, p. 29. 16 Bergen, Peter L.; Cruickshank, Paul. “Revisiting the Early Al Qaeda: An Updated Account of its Formative Years,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 35.1: 1–36. 17 Congressional Research Service. Al Qaeda-Affiliated Groups: Middle East and Africa. October 10, 2014, p. 2. 18 Ibid., p. 2. 19 Ibid., p. 3. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 Bergen, Peter. Holy War Inc, p. 20. 23 Ibid. 24 Ryan, Michael S. Decoding Al-Qaeda’s Strategy. The Deep Battle Against America. New York: Columbia University Press, 2013, p. 51. 25 Ibid., pp. 51–2. 26 Ibid., p. 52. 27 Ibid. 28 Byman, Daniel L. and Williams, Jennifer R. “ISIS vs. al Qaeda: Jihadism’s Global Civil War,” Brookings Institutions. February 24, 2015 (Unpaginated document). 29 McCants, William. Five Myths about the Islamic State. Brookings Institution. August 2014, p. 1. 30 “Bin Laden’s ‘Letter to America.’” The Guardian, November 2002. 31 Ibid. 32 Congressional Research Service. Al Qaeda-Affiliated Groups: Middle East and Africa. October 10, 2014. p. 4. 33 Ibid. From summary (unnumbered page). 34 Zimmerman, Katherine. “The al Qaeda Network. A New Framework for Defining the Enemy,” American Enterprise Institute. September 2013, p. 2. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid.

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37 Dearden, Lizzie. “ISIS vs. Islamic State vs. Isil vs. Daesh: What do the Different Names Mean—and Why Does it Matter?” The Independent, September 2014. 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid. 41 Schartz, Felicia. “One More Name for Islamic State: Daesh,” The Wall Street Journal. December 23, 2014. 42 Rukimini, Callimachi. “Qaeda Commander Denounces Decapitations as Used by Islamic State,” New York Times. December 2014. 43 Byman, Daniel L. and Williams, Jennifer R. “ISIS vs. al Qaeda: Jihadism’s Global Civil War,” Brookings Institution. February 24, 2015 (unpaginated document). 44 Ibid. 45 Ibid. 46 Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. Zawahiri’s Letter to Zarqawi (English Translation). 47 Rukimini, Callimachi. “Qaeda Commander Denounces Decapitations as Used by Islamic State.” 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid. 50 Lister, Charles. “Profiling the Islamic State,” Brooking Institution. November 13, 2014, p. 7. 51 Bunzel, Cole. “From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State,” The Brookings Institution, 19, March 2015, p. 8. 52 Ibid., p. 13. 53 Ibid. 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid., p. 50. 56 Ibid., p. 9. 57 Ibid., p. 10. 58 Ibid. 59 Ibid., p. 12. 60 Lister, Charles. “Profiling the Islamic State,” p. 10. 61 Barrett, Richard. “The Islamic State,” The Soufan Group. November 2014, p. 19. 62 Bunzel, Cole. “From Paper State to Caliphate,” p. 7. 63 Ninad Awad et al. “Open Letter to al-Baghgdadi,” International Council of Muslim Scholars. 64 Byman, Daniel L. and Williams, Jennifer R. “ISIS vs. al Qaeda: Jihadism’s Global Civil War,” Brookings Institution. February 24, 2015. 65 Ninad Awad et al. “Open letter to Al-Baghdadi,” International Council of Muslim Scholars. 66 Lister, Charles. “Profiling the Islamic State,” p. 11. 67 Hashemi, Nader and Postel, Danny, editors. “The Syria Dilemma,” Cambridge: MA: MIT Press, 2013, p. 3. 68 Ibid., p. 6. 69 Lister, Charles. “Profiling the Islamic State,” p. 11. 70 Ibid., p. 11. 71 Ibid. 72 Ibid. 73 Giovanni, Janine Di. “Who is ISIS Leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi?” Newsweek. December 8, 2014. 74 Ibid. 75 Ibid.

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76 Chulov, Martin and Shaheen, Kareem. “ISIS Leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi ‘seriously wounded in air strike.’” The Guardian, April 21, 2015. 77 Ibid. 78 Ibid. 79 Ibid. 80 Ibid. 81 Giovanni, Janine Di. “Who is ISIS Leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi?” 82 Ibid. 83 Ibid. 84 Ibid. 85 Ibid. 86 Ibid. 87 Ibid. 88 Lister, Charles. “Profiling the Islamic State.” 89 Pew Research Center, Religion and Public Life, October 7, 2009. 90 Ibid. 91 Callimachi, Rukmini. “Boko Haram Generates Uncertainty with Pledge of Allegiance to Islamic State,” Times. March 7, 2015. 92 “ISIS Accepts Pledge from Boko Haram,” Associated Press. March 13, 2015. 93 Zaimov, Stovan. “Boko Haram Declares ‘Islamic Caliphate’ in Captured Town in Nigeria.’” The Christian Post. August 25, 2014. 94 Ibid. 95 Ibid. 96 Ibid. 97 Williams, Paul L., Al Qaeda: Brotherhood of Terrorism. Alpha, 2002, p. 10. 98 Ibid., p. 260. 99 Ibid., p. 225. 100 Ibid., p. 263. 101 Cole, Juan. How the Millennial Generation is Changing the Middle East. The New Arabs. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014, p. 1. 102 Barrett, Richard. “The Islamic State,” The Soufan Group. November 2014, p. 6. 103 Ibid., p. 6. 104 Ryan, Laura. “Al-Qaida and ISIS Use Twitter Differently. Here’s How and Why. Islamic State’s Online Efforts Reveal How Extreme the Group is, Even Among Extremists,” National Journal. October 9, 2014. 105 Ibid. 106 Caris, Charles C. and Reynolds, Samuel. “ISIS Governance in Syria,” Middle East Security Report 22, July 2014. p 14. 107 Lister, Charles. “Profiling the Islamic State,” Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper, Number 13, November 2014, p. 14. 108 Ibid. 109 Bunzel, Cole. “From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State,” The Brookings Project on US Relations with the Islamic World. Analysis Paper. No. 19, March 2015, p. 31. 110 Ibid., p. 31. 111 Ibid., p. 32. 112 Ibid., p. 33. 113 Ibid., Appendix 38.

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114 Ibid. 115 Ibid., Appendix 38. 116 Human Rights Watch, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/wr2015_web.pdf. “Tyranny’s False comfort. Why Rights Aren’t Wrong in Tough Times,” By Kenneth Roth. 117 Ibid. 118 Ibid. 119 Lister, Charles. “Profiling the Islamic State,” p. 2. 120 FRONTLINE. BY JASON M. BRESLOW. “How Saddam’s Former Soldiers are Fueling the Rise of ISIS,” October 28, 2014. 121 Lister, Charles. “Profiling the Islamic State,” p. 34. 122 Barrett, Richard. “The Islamic State,” The Soufan Group. November 2014. P. 16. 123 Ibid., p. 16. 124 Ibid. 125 Pomerleau, Mark. “The Islamic State is Troublesome Even for Other Terrorist Groups,” Red and Blue Politics. August 14, 2014. 126 Ibid. 127 Ibid. 128 Ibid. 129 The Washington Post. August 9, 2014. “Militants leaving al-Qaeda Affiliates to Fight for Islamic State, U.S. Officials Say,” August 9, 2014. 130 WRMEA.ORG. Sprusansky, Dale. “Understanding Isis: Frequently Asked Questions,” October 2014, p. 19. 131 Human Rights Office of the High Commission for Human Rights; United Nation’s Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), Human Rights Office. “Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq,” July 6–10, 2014. 132 Ibid., p. 17. 133 Ibid. 134 Lister, Charles. “Profiling the Islamic State,” p. 2. 135 Ibid., p. 21. 136 Ibid. 137 Alfred, Charlotte. “How Many Americans Have Traveled to Syria to Join Isis?” The Huffington Post. February 25, 2015. 138 Ibid. 139 Lake, Eli. “Exclusive: Al Qaeda’s American Fighters are Coming Home—and US Intelligence Can’t Find Them,” The Daily Beast, May 20, 2014. 140 Ibid. 141 WRMEA.ORG. Sprusansky, Dale. “Understanding Isis: Frequently Asked Questions,” October 2014, p. 19. 142 Hameed, Saif and Evans, Dominic. “Islamic State Torches Oil Field Near Tikrit as Militia Advance,” Reuters, March 5, 2015. 143 Ibid. 144 Ibid. 145 Ibid. 146 Lake, Eli. “Exclusive: Al Qaeda’s American Fighters are Coming Home—and US Intelligence Can’t Find Them.”

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147 Human Rights Office of the High Commission for Human Rights; United Nation’s Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), Human Rights Office. “Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq,” July 6–10, 2014. 148 Bunzel, Cole. “From Paper State to Caliphate,” p. 8. 149 Ibid., p. 36. 150 Cole, Juan. “Informed Consent. What are Iraq’s Sunni Arabs and What Did We Do to Them?” Informed Comment (Blog). 151 Ibid. 152 Ibid.

Part II IS and the Middle East and Persian Gulf

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Chapter 6

Islamic State: Redefining the World Stage R. Alan King

Introduction The meteoric rise in prominence of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (IS), also known pejoratively by the Arabic term Daesh, since late 2013 provides a unique opportunity to analyze the evolution of a distinctive brand of extremism that draws on distorted interpretations of Islam in the heart of the region where that religion was born. The deceptively rapid advance of IS in Iraq surprised many around the globe, including Americans, but the current situation was predictable and in fact should have been expected. The US intelligence community (IC), for example, warned that a full troop pullout from Iraq in December 2011 would cause unrest in the country and require the United States (US) to commit military forces in the future.1 To win against IS, it is imperative that Muslim majority states take a stand against the antiIslamic extremist ideology waged by the group. The US, and its Western allies, must begin accurately defining what the group is, rather than constantly explaining what the group is not. Simply describing IS, or other similar extremist movements as not Islamic, without any additional explanation, provides fanatical followers of the misguided ideology the ability to identify with, and gain a sense of belonging to, something larger than themselves. In an attempt to avoid the creation of sympathizers and supporters from the greater Muslim community, who would not otherwise deem the philosophy of IS as legitimate, it is necessary to define the movement for what it is. In this case, the term anti-Islamic extremists is offered to provide an understanding that the ideology is not within the greater mainstream Islamic community, but based instead on IS’ deliberate perversions misrepresentation of Islamic principles. The use of nuanced descriptions of IS is essential to challenge and defeat its ideology. In February 1997, during an address to Maryland Legislators, then President William J. Clinton stated, “It is hard when you are not threatened by a powerful foreign enemy to whip allies and people up to a fever pitch of common, intense, sustained, disciplined endeavor.” Today, there is a common enemy for the US and its allies. It is not a, “J.V. team,” as President Barack H. Obama described it in January 2014, it is well financed, trained in advanced military tactics and conducts military operations with skill and precision. These facts position IS to threaten and further destabilize an already fragile Middle East and Northern Africa; and extend its violence and flawed ideology into other regions of the world as well. The present US strategy to degrade and defeat IS is too vague and nondescript to provide a clearcut, well-defined approach for achieving a desired end-state. It does not take into consideration the capabilities, and specifically, the ideological motivation of the group. The most probable objective of the despicable acts perpetrated by IS is to cause a response from Western, Christian-majority countries in a belief that it will cause Muslim majority states to unite in a 21st century war of civilizations and faiths, led by IS. To defeat IS, it is necessary to emasculate the anti-Islamic ideology, without creating enemies of the other 1.5+ billion Muslims who do not sympathize, or support the anti-Islamic principles of IS. Failing to engage IS in this manner, will only empower

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the movement, providing opportunities for robust recruiting and enlargement of the areas affected by the violence, death and destruction it leaves in its wake. It is also necessary for the West to recognize that the fight against IS and anti-Islamic extremism more broadly will not be a short one. The West has already been in the fight for over 14 years, dating to al-Qaeda’s terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001 and will continue to be challenged by the IS movement for the foreseeable future. This ongoing ideological fight, like that of the Shia Assassins in the eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth centuries, is a multigenerational conflict. The West must realize that Islam has been in a constant struggle among the differing factions since the death of the Prophet Mohammad in 632 AD. Violence has been a standard norm accepted to achieve the ideological goals within Islam since the murder of the third caliph, Uthman, in 656 AD. Challenges to the rightful leader within Islam essentially began with the ascension of Ali, Mohammad’s cousin and son-in-law, as caliph because he did not seek reprisal against those who murdered the third caliph, Uthman.2 Murder from within the ranks continues today as accounts of competing IS emirs (commanders) are leaked. Reports of internal dissent from within the leadership of IS describe it as a “crisis of hypocrisy” and suggest that “disputes are not among individuals but are much deeper.” One example was the killing of a prominent commander by the name of Banyasi.3 The advent of the internet enables the anti-Islamic extremist message to reach (and resound within) every corner of the globe. This is the difference between IS today and the extremist movements that have confronted Islam since the seventh century. Without a well-defined, clear and comprehensive strategic communications strategy, particularly within social media conduits, leveraged through respected Islamic scholars, there is little chance of a convincing countercampaign to the IS message. When asked why he does not challenge the hijacking of his faith, one prominent Islamic scholar responded fearfully, “I cannot speak out against these criminals, they will kill me.”4 Although IS will enjoy alliance with like-minded movements in the future, as each of the independent groups establish footprints in their areas of operations, differences will arise that require distinct and distinguishing strategies to defeat each movement. There are differences in recruiting, cultural nuisances, local political systems, tribal and familial relationships, disenfranchisement within the civil society of local populations, the adherence and local interpretation of Islamic practices. These differences cause the diverse movements to take on distinctive and dissimilar characteristics, creating the need for patently different strategies to confront and defeat each of them. The distinctions between groups demands comprehensive, yet unique and wide-ranging approaches in military engagement, strategic communications exploitation, civil-military encounters, political and economic incentives in order to appropriately engage and defeat the anti-Islamic ideological extremists from the different groups. It is important to point out that there are nine principles of warfare observed in military operations. They are as follows: objective, unity of command, simplicity, economy of force, offensive, surprise, maneuver, security and mass.5 The objectives in confronting IS are blurred and fail to establish a defined end-state based on measureable and clear goals. The engagement against IS cannot be based on arbitrary timelines, or body counts. Achieving success in an asymmetric war against different movements and motivations require a comprehensive approach to defeating the ideology, not the voices of the movement. Failure to characterize the end-state accurately, coupled with a complex struggle to achieve a common military objective, will ultimately lead to failure in the execution of the other eight principles and overall failure of the goals as a whole. Yet, despite a genuine threat to US and European interests, the Western allies are exhausted from the wars of the 2000s and 2010s to date in Afghanistan and Iraq. Some members of the

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European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), along with regional allies in the Middle East, are distrustful of American resolve and are anxious about the US “Strategic Patience Strategy,” which is viewed as an indecisive foreign policy approach. Likewise, they collectively are in disagreement with the US and its national objectives, which do not align with the national objectives of the respective allies’ political agendas. These reasons, among others, have strained relations and caused the US and its allies to pull against one another and, therefore, the US is not whipping the allies into a fevered pitch to pursue the common goal of defeating the Islamic State (IS). Instead, the US and its allies are providing a Petri dish on a global stage that allows the philosophy of IS to incubate and further cultivate the self-proclaimed caliphate into something viewed as more than a regional threat. This jeopardizes not only nation states with Christian values, or Muslims who do not share in the anti-Islamic ideology, but also the monarchies within the greater Middle East, along with an instability and schism within the greater Islamic community. The military victories of IS are not surprising, but it is still noteworthy how quickly the group progressed through the northern area of Iraq and the immediate collapse of the Iraqi forces, which numbered over 30,000, against a militant force with intelligence estimates from 800–3,000 IS fighters. One tribal sheikh from Mosul indicated that there were only 330 fighters in the initial assault on the city.6 Regardless of the actual number of IS fighters, the fact that a more capable and better-equipped military force withdrew to avoid engagement against an inconsequential force in comparison, speaks volumes to the hostility, disenfranchisement and contempt that the Iraqi Sunni population holds against the Shia-dominated government in Iraq and why IS is enjoying the tacit support of the Sunni tribes. IS has the potential to polarize global politics in the West and should be considered a grave danger to the US, as it is capable of threatening the general security of American interests abroad and domestically in public areas such as shopping malls, tourist attractions, public meeting areas and schools. Although it is a valid and genuine concern that policymakers must address, IS is not currently the existential threat to the US that some suggest. IS does, however, have the potential to expand its ideology through a propaganda campaign taken on by the group’s central leadership, which will likely allow it to expand its recent successes outside the current areas of occupation. This will happen until regional regimes ally themselves fully against IS and the ideological threat they represent. It is this ideological threat to longtime US regional allies in the Middle East that has the potential to endanger US strategic interests. As IS continues to further destabilize the Middle East, its presence in the region creates the conditions for a proxy war between regional powers. While writing this chapter, prominent leaders within Iraq reported that conditions of a proxy war were evident within the Baghdad Sunni belt where Shia militias, backed by Iran, were assassinating Sunnis to ensure they never have the opportunity to support IS. As the ideology grows within the region, it will invariably lead to a clash of civilizations within the Islamic community that will ultimately extend to the Western powers. If the IS presence and its caliphate continues to prevail, the group’s ideology is likely to resound with similar factions, and lone actors. Affiliates of the group will conduct operations in Africa as a potential fertile recruiting pool. Outcrops will likely spring up in Central Asia, Europe, Asia, Central America and even the United States. While the occurrences of like-minded groups and individual actors will espouse the extremist ideology of IS in the initial foundation, or acts of violence, in the case of actual movements, groups will quickly find their differences in approach and motivation that will lead them to work independently from IS, or only loosely affiliated. Since September 11, 2001, as one anti-Islamic extremist group after another sprouted up, they quickly discovered that they do not want to take orders from other leaders of separate, yet similar,

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factions. This discord and divisions between the groups actually makes the anti-Islamic extremist threat more challenging for military, information, economic and political engagement since there cannot be a single strategy to defeat the opposing movements. However, it also provides the West an opportunity to exploit the divisions to gain a military and political advantage. With these introductory observations providing a necessary foundation for a deeper examination of the threats IS poses to the interests of the United States and its allies in the Greater Middle, the West and globally through the presentation of five related sections that unfold in the following fashion. First, the chapter examines the rise of IS. Second, it examines the ways in which IS can be viewed as a terrorist organization and an insurgent movement. Third, it examines the ways in which both cultural and religious factors contribute to IS’ ideological motivations and recruitment strategies. Fourth, it examines the likely path forward for IS. And, fifth, it closes with a set of concluding observations on the threats IS poses and the best ways to counter such dangers moving forward. Rise of IS IS is not a new phenomenon. A better explanation of IS is to describe it as a phoenix that has risen from the ashes in the aftermath of the Arab Spring of 2011. The details of IS’ ideology and its military success leads many in the general public to form an opinion, based on media reports, that the group rose to power in Syria, when in fact its actual predecessor has been in existence in Iraq since 2006, and the group traces its roots to Afghanistan as early as 1999. This fact is indispensable to properly analyze the group and explain its expansion and ability to control areas upwards of 16 of the 32 provinces in Syria and Iraq,7 roughly an area the size of Kansas. It is not widely known outside of the intelligence community (IC) that Jordanian born, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, formed Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (Unity and Jihad Group) in Afghanistan in late 1999, while he was the head of an al-Qaeda-linked training camp in Herat province in Afghanistan, where he trained Jordanian activists, Jund al-Sham (Soldiers of the Levant).8 Upon al-Zarqawi’s arrival to Iraq in March 2003, he formed the group known as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), with the ultimate intent to lead a jihad (religious war) against Jordan. Zarqawi was ruthless in his approach to jihad, similar to the approach of IS today. He alienated tribal leaders within Iraq and attacked Shias for being apostates, earning him admonishment in a letter from the number two leader in al-Qaeda at the time, Ayman al-Zawahiri, in the context of which Zarqawi was advised to gain the support of tribal leaders and not to attack Shias. The tactics of al-Zarqawi led eventually to the Sunni Sahwa (Awakening), otherwise known as the Sons of Iraq, who opposed AQI and its followers.9 After al-Zarqawi’s death in June 2006, his successor, Egyptian born Abu Ayyub al-Masri formed the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) in mid-October 2006, and al-Qaeda began to claim its attacks under the ISI flag that year. According to the US IC at that time, it was the plan of ISI to seize power in Iraq and turn the country into a Sunni Islamic State. Today, the intention of the group is to create a caliphate as it claims spiritual and religious authority over the global ummah of Muslims.10 When IS speaks of its caliphate, it is not limiting the control to the current areas of occupation in Iraq and Syria, but all areas that were ever within the greater Muslim community. As an Arab Sunni caliphate, IS considers its caliphate more pure than the Sunni Ottoman Empire, 1299–1922, which was Turkish. Although IS finds recruits to the movement from around the world, it is in reality an Arab-centric movement.

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Pundits of IS provide insights to its history, goals and stated objectives, and how by capturing oil fields in Syria, it has virtually self-funded its caliphate-building activities since 2012. Yet, few can credibly explain how this group was able to exist for 12 years, survive, albeit just barely, against the US military-led Sunni tribal Sahwa of 2007–09, and sustain its control over such a wide area against a stated coalition of over 60 countries in 2014–15. IS continues to attract Muslims from around the world, increasing its manpower to an estimated 31,000 fighters in 2014, and receiving an average of 50 new recruits a day. It has done this while taking on state like attributes and erasing historical nation state boundaries. Aaron Zelin, an analyst at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, located a map produced by IS in 2006, which outlined the areas the group intended to control and oil sources available within the area. When the city of Mosul in Iraq and the surrounding areas was seized in spring 2014, it immediately outlined how it intended to govern the newly acquired dawla (state). Soon after its surprising victory, the group released its wathiqat al-madina (charter of the city) to the Moslawis.11 The predominantly Sunni residents of the city, many from the prestigious Al Tai confederation and the Al Jarba branch of the prominent transnational Al Shammar tribe, initially appeared to welcome the liberation of IS from the al-Maliki’s Shia-dominated government. The Moslawis had justifiable and long-running grievances against the Maliki regime, but it did not take long for the Moslawis to realize the startling reality of living in an IS-controlled territory. After processing the jihadists’ interpretation of shari’a law, the Moslawis found that they had traded a corrupt regime for one that was merciless. The jihadists’ policies give emphasis to the stark realities of everyday life within an IS territory. Unlike other militant insurgent groups, IS also attempts to implement a, “soft-power governing strategy that includes social services, religious lectures, and da’wa (proselytizing) to local populations, including parts of the northwestern Iraqi province of Anbar, which it also seized.”12 IS—Terrorists vs. Insurgents The Western media, as well as many in the US government, continue to analyze and evaluate events in the Middle East through Western paradigms. This misguided approach, after 14 years of war with an anti-Islamic ideologically driven enemy, leads to misinterpretation and failed analysis of the events formed by Eastern action.13 It is unfortunate that many Americans form their opinions based on 30-second sound bites delivered by news anchors reading a teleprompter with their scripts written and edited by individuals with an ostensibly limited understanding of the historical global issues involved, and in some cases, promoting their own partisan political agendas. Among the non-traditional threats confronting the US and its allies, terrorism has received the most attention from scholars and policy makers. However, current literature and general posits are sometimes misguided by current media hype and are often too shallow to draw reliable conclusions. The press espouses what terrorism is and is not, but fails to understand what is necessary to defeat IS. From a military and political strategic position, it is necessary to accurately define the group’s ideology and desired end-state in order to confront IS with the appropriate elements of national power. For example, a senior military officer from a regional Middle Eastern military stated that most people would not understand, or be concerned with an insurgency in a foreign land when it does not directly threaten the borders of their nation. Consequently, although IS is an insurgent movement, it is imperative that governments place the label terrorist on groups to raise a sense of concern and elevate the fear of immediate threat upon populations to ensure support by Western societies.14

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The simple fact is that IS remains engaged in an insurgency determined to overthrow political systems of nation states. The organization only uses terrorist tactics to achieve its political objectives, which is a recognized tactic in an Open Insurgency Phase. While IS uses terrorist tactics to advocate its ideology, it is more than just a terrorist group. The IS is not a terrorist group trying to undermine, or change political and social policies through terror such as an abortion clinic bomber. In this case, when the desired change is achieved, the terrorist activist goes on to the next cause. In the case of IS, it has created an environment that allows it to impose its own political and social agendas on those either misguided or unfortunate enough to be confined in the territory it controls. The desired end-state is not social change, its objectives is an Islamic caliphate that imposes its version of Islamic political dominance on those governed by its own government entity. This essential element of possession, rather than ideation and hopefulness is imperative to recognize, understand and then use to identify the movement. Failing to view the elements of possession and control in context will lead to miscalculations, tactical and strategic failures, because military actions against a group occupying an area requires a different set of tactics, techniques and procedures necessary to fight and defeat the political motivations of the group, as opposed to the terror tactics it uses to achieve its objectives. To suggest the current war is against terror is like defining World War II as a war against the Japanese Kamikazes. Terror is only a method to advance an ideology; it is not the motivation for the ideology.15 More than just terror, IS has a cult following whose ideology has hijacked selected tenets of Islam to advance its desire for a global caliphate. As an insurgency, it is necessary to view IS in a proper military context in order to appreciate the timelines for success. A study of asymmetric warfare shows that modern insurgencies last about 10 years and a government’s chances of winning increases slightly over time.16 Historically, insurgencies adhere to a hierarchical organization and utilize terrain and sympathizers’ sanctuary to further the cause, as IS has done since 2003. Connable and Libicki point out that the use of terrorism often backfires, and withdrawal of state sponsorship can cripple an insurgency, typically leading to its defeat.17 Yet, IS poses a different state of affairs as it has the capability of self-funding its movement. This presents a separate set of issues for military, political and economic engagement. The US-led airstrikes in Syria and Iraq against IS have actually widened the sectarian and ethnic divides among representative groups in the region. The, no boots on the ground policy exacerbates the sectarian partition, providing the opportunity for Iran to increase its influence in Iraq and throughout the region. With that said, the US should not commit conventional forces to confront IS. Doing this will provide IS with a greater recruiting theme and expand its ranks. As stated previously, a long-term objective of IS is to pull Western, Christian, states into the fight with hopes that it will unite the Muslim world. The more appropriate strategy is to deploy special operations force, along with regional military forces, who are trained to interact and engage with the local populous in order to overthrow the IS regime. The airstrikes by Iran into Iraq against IS amplifies the Sunni belief that current US strategy against IS only strengthen the Shias’ ability to expand the Shia Crescent and this alienates the Sunni regimes in the Middle East. The questionable alliances with Iran, buttressed by superficially common goals is making the likelihood of a unified Iraq unlikely in the future, and the entrance of Russian troops into Syria emboldens the Assad regime in Syria. This Sunni belief of Iran expansionism, coupled with the Shia and Kurdish exploitation of US bombardments to expand the territory they control and strengthen their influence in traditionally Sunni areas, creates a conspiratorial atmosphere among Sunnis advanced through social media. Sunni living under the rule of regimes within the Middle East view the current US strategy as bolstering Shia interests within the region and are very disturbed by the US outreach to Iran. A senior government advisor

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within the region summed up the sentiment within the greater Sunni Arab community best when he stated, “You embrace your enemies, and slap your friends. How do you expect us to trust you [the US]?”18 Culture or Religious Ideology? The seemingly sudden rise to prominence of IS and its self-declared caliphate catapulted the group into the international media, allowing it to sustain intrigue by the misguided. It has heightened the ill-informed public concern, mainly because the media, left the greater Islamic ummah and the Western allies debating how to confront and degrade the group’s growing attractiveness. Explaining the apparent manifestation of IS, the late Samuel P. Huntington’s, “Clash of Civilizations” thesis provides thought provoking insight as a starting point to understanding the magnetism of IS ideology. In the aftermath of the Cold War, Huntington proposed that adherents to Islam represented one of nine civilizations in the world. He hypothesized that the fundamental source of conflict in the world would not be “ideological or economic,” but that the divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict would be “cultural.”19 While Huntington’s assertion was insightful, it failed to take into consideration the ideological divides within the Islamic religion, as well as the diverse cultural differences in the almost 50 countries worldwide with majority Muslim populations. Yet, Huntington was correct about future clashes being based on cultural differences and IS lends credibility to Huntington’s assertion. Although IS attracts Muslims followers from around the world, the self-proclaimed caliphate does not see itself as inclusive of the greater Islamic ummah and, in fact, on December 29, 2014, in the sixth addition of its magazine titled, Dabiq, IS laid out a graphic account of its split with al-Qaeda and its criticism of the Taliban.20 The publication focuses on IS’s interpretation of tawhid (unity), manhaj (truth-seeking), hijrah (migration), jihad (holy war) and jama’ah (community).21 The interpretation of these elements of faith does not include anyone who does not believe in its exclusive view of shari’a and the respective tenets of Islam. The IS interpretation of shari’a provides evidence that the concept of a global Islamic ummah is unlikely to ever occur, not only because of the differences between Sunni extremist movements, but because of the differences between Sunnis, Shia, Ibadis and the sub-sects of each sect. It is IS’s declaration that any Muslim that does not adhere to its Islamic ideological brand is an apostate and in order to preserve the group’s divine direction from God, members behead, crucify and murder unbelievers in ways not scripturally condoned by the Quran, or hadiths. In the Quran, sura (chapter) 2 titled Al-Baqarah (The Cow) ayah (verse) 62 states: Surely they that believe [People of the Book], those of Jewry, and the Christians, and those Sabaeans, who so believe in God and the Last Day, and works righteousness—their wage awaits them with their Lord, and no fear shall be on them, neither shall they sorrow.22

While there are those within the IS movement that claim there are progressive revelations from God, the actions of IS are still in direct violation of what the majority of Muslims believe God’s guidance was to them within the Quran. For instance, in sura 9 titled at Tawbah (Repentance), ayah 29: Fight those who believe not in God or the Last Day and do not forbid what God and His Messenger [Mohammad] have forbidden—such men as practise [sic] not the religion of truth, being of those

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who have been given the Book, until they pay the tribute [jizyah (tax)] out of hand and have been humbled [with willing submission and feel themselves subdued].23

Essentially, this passage means that Christians, Jews and Sabaeans (People of the Book, sura 2, ayah 62) should be allowed to pay jizyah and be permitted to practice their faith. Although ayah 30 indicates that believing Jesus Christ, the Messiah, is the Son of God, is simply conforming to unbelievers, there is still divine guidance to Muslims that they must allow Christian believers to practice their faith if jizyah is paid. Huntington, as a realist, believed nation states would remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but he surmised that the principal conflicts of global politics would occur between states and groups of different civilizations. He suggested that the conflict between civilizations would be the future evolution of conflict in the modern world. While the rise of IS lends some credibility to Huntington’s thesis, his model falls short of identifying the types of conflicts extremist groups such as IS would create within the Islamic civilization. In particular, IS’ ability to take on state like attributes and its creation of deeper divisions between Sunnis, Shias, Christians and any Muslim who does not adhere to Islam within the distorted terms and conditions outlined by IS’ wathiqat al-dawla (charter of the state). The most significant shortcoming of Huntington’s hypothesis is that Islam is not a monolithic, unified religion with all Muslims belonging to an Islamic ummah (nation), or adhering to the faith in the same way. Like Christianity, it is diverse in the practices of its adherents. In order for IS to claim it is the caliphate for all Muslims, the 1.5+ billion Muslims of all sects and sub-sects would have to agree on the caliph; this is highly unlikely to take place, since there has been a disagreement among the sects on the rightful caliph since the seventh century. Simply, IS cannot cause Islam to go to war against the world, but it can cause an internal war within Islam and this will have a devastating effect on the Middle East and create divides in the rest of the world as leaders attempt to confront the movement’s ideology. While Huntington is credited with turning the phrase, clash of civilizations, into a cliché within the English vernacular, it was actually first coined in the publication, Young Islam on Trek: A Study in the Clash of Civilizations, written in 1926, by Basil Mathews. In the shadows of the fall of the Ottoman Empire, he forewarned of a future threat, “Western civilization may destroy the old in Islam, but it cannot fulfil [sic] the new.”24 Eighty-nine years after Mathews’ prediction, the old Islam is being replaced by a new purist form of Political Islam, and this has to cause Muslims, Christians and Jews to examine the obvious question of what is God’s will? “If the fighters in the war for Islam, the holy war in the path of God, are fighting for God, it follows that their opponents are fighting against God.”25 The early and swift victories by IS fighters have led to a progressive narcissism within the IS’ leadership that will eventually only be accepted by the most devout sycophants and hardened ideologues. This will in due course offer Western allies and Middle Eastern states a window to infiltrate and destroy IS. Nevertheless, the West cannot continue to formulate the problems posed by the rela­tions between religion and politics, and the possible solu­tions to those problems, which arise from the ideas based in Christianity and the desire for democratic concepts, which are not univer­sal principles, or experiences familiar to the East.26 This is significant because the West continues to view IS through a Christian prism and Western paradigms, without a simple understanding that Western thought achieves Western action and Eastern thought brings Eastern action, failing to learn this lesson has caused the US to continue to misinterpret Eastern action because policy is halfheartedly created in a Western vacuum.27 A senior US official once stated in a private conversation that when the US establishes foreign policy in relation to a specific state, it does not look at where the country is currently, or where it has been historically, policy is

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established by projecting where the country is capable of going in the future. This was concerning Iraq and the democratic design the US brought to the country after the invasion in 2003. The comment by the official was correct in part, but failed to take into consideration where a country stands, or particularly where it has been historically, is critical to where a nation is capable of going in a designated period of time. As the past three years have shown, democracy in principle may be present, but democracy in action is far from being achieved in Iraq.28 Max Weber’s advocacy for plebiscitarian democracy provides another window to view, and in some ways interpret, the rise of IS. As the US withdrew from Iraq and left it to be shaped through intimidation, corruption, violence and vindication of the Shia against the former Sunni regime, the legitimacy of the state based on the principles of electoral law was challenged after the second election.29 The outcome of the democracy in Iraq did not represent the actual federal, or regional demographics, as the US withdrawal left behind a centralized and totalitarian state, which created a deeply divided sectarian state and an opening for the extremist Islamic ideology to be cultivated as a counter to the sectarian policies. The US and its European allies also failed to appreciate the Sunni’s reality of the enveloping Shia Crescent, and the belief that the current US bombing strategy designed to increase Shia influence in the region was a very real concern for the greater Sunni Islamic adherents. A senior military officer from a Middle Eastern regional military stated that his government had to view the IS movement as a counterbalance to the expansion of the Shia Crescent. This sentiment was witnessed the day of the Hezbollah rocket, attack in January 2015, against an Israeli patrol that killed two Israeli soldiers. The attack was not viewed as a success for an Islamic movement against Jews, instead, a displaced Syrian Sunni said, “I hope we see Israel destroy Hezbollah, Iran and Assad.”30 Max Weber’s radical nominalism focuses on legitimacy claimed, rather than legitimacy believed. His assertion that there is a probability that social action will be guided by a belief in the existence of a legitimate order, to the degree an order may be viewed as valid, is evident in the IS movement. Validity rests on voluntary obedience and compliance, or consent. That actual consent may rest on different motives, including fear, coercion and expectations of material benefits, habit, convention, or the lack of an alternative.31 IS has, in essence, achieved consent as it imposes its despotic and punitive shari’a laws on unwilling victims and reports from some areas occupied by IS indicate that at least some in the occupied areas are pleased with the enforcement of laws, which provide a sense of security, as long as the rules are followed. When Americans form opinions, or react to the 30-second sound bites by media commentators and their guest experts who often advance their uniformed, or biased, personal opinions to the mesmerized viewers, it becomes a dangerous way to enlighten the uninformed in an attempt to influence, or shape US foreign policy. It is imperative for policy makers to recognize the sectarian differences within Islam in order to appreciate that an Islamic caliphate—while seemingly in existence by the proclamation of IS—is nothing more than the dream of less than one-half, of one percent, of the greater Islamic ummah. Furthermore, allowing Iran to expand its influence in the region is as dangerous as the IS movement. Simply, IS is more likely to cause the nations of Islam to go to war with themselves, rather than an all-out Islamic war against the US. The Future of IS When IS catapulted onto the World Stage with the assault on Mosul, Iraq in spring 2014, the initial fear by regional powers was that the group would remain a formidable force as it advanced from one city to the next through northern and western Iraq. The IS victories have been impressive, and

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its affiliates in Libya and Nigeria provide evidence the group’s attractiveness is on the rise and will certainly provide opportunities for a rich recruitment base. Whether the diverse groups build and sustain a force large enough to depose the Iraqi, Syrian, or Jordanian governments depends on the ability of Western states and their Middle Eastern partners to counter IS ideology. The air campaign waged by the West and the regional powers against IS will prove to be ineffective at destabilizing the upstart regime. That shortcoming, coupled with the fact that the group is enforcing its politico-religious governance through extreme oppression and tyranny, leaves the question whether the group will be able to demonstrate an ability to manage the expectation of civil society and state building. Until those occupied rise up and revolt, it makes the near future of IS one of destabilization, annoyance and insecurity throughout the region. The swift and early military victories, and the seeming ease with which IS defeated the Iraqi military led to what will eventually be interpreted by historians as hasty celebration as the group learns that success on the battlefield does not translate to managing expectations of societies. The telling sign will be when the caliphate has to fulfill the expectations of public services, including the provision of trash removal, electricity, drinking water, communications, transportation, health, public safety, public finance, education, food and agriculture, product distribution, economic development, facilities and infrastructure, along with the other activities of public administration for villages, local townships, or a major cities. Like the lessons learned in the aftermath of the US-led invasion into Iraq in 2003, when the military won the war, the US and its allies soon found they had failed to secure the victory with a comprehensive reconstruction, stability and governance strategy.32 With the stated IS grand plan to achieve a global jihad to expand the caliphate to the caliphate of antiquity, failure of the West and regional powers to engage the ideology aggressively will leave the citizens of those states’ victims to the fanatical cruelty directed toward the group’s enemies. To punctuate this point, there is mounting evidence that the group intends to advance its tactics to cause mass casualties. Members of the Free Syrian Army found an IS laptop in Syria in 2014, that contained documents indicating that the owner was learning how to use biological weaponry, in preparation for a potential attack that would have shocked the world. It also included a 26page fatwa (Islamic ruling, judgment, or edict) on the usage of weapons of mass destruction. “If Muslims cannot defeat the kafir (unbelievers) in a different way, it is permissible to use weapons of mass destruction,” states the fatwa by Saudi jihadi cleric Nasir al-Fahd, currently imprisoned in Saudi Arabia. “Even if it kills all of them and wipes them and their descendents off the face of the Earth.”33 Although, the evidence of the laptop, the fatwa, and the indication that members of IS are pursuing methods to inflict mass casualties against Western targets cause alarmists to claim IS is an existential threat to the US, IS will not cause the collapse of the American government in the foreseeable future. The exaggerated outcries and continued deception by the media will persist and create an unsettling mood within the US, which will propagate a general Islamophobia among Americans, or worse, cause desensitization of the issue. In 2015, US-led airstrikes may seriously have constrained income revenue from the oil IS used to fund its activities, but the group is still acquiring assets through donors, affiliates and other activities. The group will likely find that it faces challenges, not only on the battlefield, but from the exodus of technocrats and professionals who, although devout Muslims, also have the financial wherewithal to escape to an area that allows them to practice their religion and professional skills without the draconian tenets of a group mired in a seventh century existence. A Syrian from Aleppo stated that his family took refuge in a village away from the city and that the villagers

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were providing security for the area. This will only last as long as the IS does not perceive it as a tactical resource.34 As time passes, the public services IS is able to provide are likely to collapse and demands for additional services will not come to fruition, causing the caliphate’s assertion that it can deliver a perfect form of governance for the Islamic ummah to deteriorate into utter failure from incompetency. If the history of the region is any indication of the future, the failure of IS will leave the residences of the occupancy wanting and disillusioned, and shortly thereafter, prepared to take their homes and government back, by force. The boasted IS currency will never materialize, nor will the group ever deliver passports as pledged, both because it does not have the necessary infrastructure, nor the international recognition necessary to make passports, or currency practical anywhere except within the IS-controlled territories. Schools will likely close, or be offered to males only and, or become immersed with religious ideology, rather than the subjects needed to advance a viable, if not vibrant, civil society. An exodus of doctors, the inability to educate the numbers of health professionals needed to care for the areas under IS control, exacerbated by open sewage and uncollected garbage, will likely cause many to succumb to disease. The inability to attract the number of technocrats, professionals and service industry workers required to administer the government will cause staple items such as potable water and electricity to become scarce. As the IS-controlled areas become governed by unqualified and unskilled officials, corruption will become widespread as people find ways to circumvent the established procedures in order to acquire the products and services not easily obtained through legitimate channels. The inequality created by the corruption, and the likely parallel economy that evolves, will cause resentment by the majority of the population, giving rise to instability and more violence. As corruption and unrest increases, IS will undoubtedly expand its ranks through forced conscription and strengthen the responsibilities of its ubiquitous security forces as other autocratic regimes do to maintain control. This will take place, especially for the role of the infamous hisbah (the IS religious, morality police), which will intensify the aggressive enforcement of the group’s ruthless interpretation of shari’a law. As casualties mount with battles drawn out and more challenging than a year ago, IS leaders will find that they must overcome poor morale and fewer willing recruits whose expectations are crushed by the US-led airstrikes and the increased support to the Iraqi military and Syrian opposition rebels. Like the Ottoman Empire, IS will learn that the area it controls and the lack of qualified technocrats will force the group’s leadership to empower local sheikhs, or install emirs, thus reducing the group’s influence and stature among the people, as well as creating opportunities for competing leaders to kill one another. The question remains, how long can IS endure after the death of the current leadership? Like the iniquitous regimes before it in history, IS will make its way into the history books, but it is doubtful the group will sustain the areas and influence it exerts control over currently for an extended period. With Iran taking direct action against the group and IS influence declines, a civil war will become the next concern for the US, the West and the regional allies, as Sunnis renounce and rise up against the Shia governments of Iran, Syria and the proxies of Iran. Conclusions Success and failure against IS cannot be measured by the body count of the jihadists. This measure of success, and this linear way of approaching war is both shortsighted and archaic. The fight

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against IS is an unconventional war, one cannot be fought and won with a conventional mindset, “ … or we are bound for failure, as proven many times in the past.”35 While the entrance of Russia into the conflict has changed the dynamics of the goals within the region and which have yet to be fully understood, the most noteworthy consideration policymakers must take into account is the length of time IS, and its predecessor groups, have been in existence, along with the soft-power projection plans the group espouses, both of which are unlike other modern jihadist movements. The schism between IS and the contempt the group has for the Taliban and al-Qaeda will challenge all of the groups seeking funding from global donors sympathetic to the different causes. Although IS has been able to fund its activities through the sale of oil, US-led airstrikes will seriously constrain income from this activity in the foreseeable future. Regrettably, the same airstrikes will likely increase the funds to IS coming from wealthy sympathetic donors concerned about the expansion of the Shia Crescent. There are several policy implications that standout as the evolution of IS is considered within the context of the Iraq invasion in March 2003. The first and foremost is that the US and the Western allies must recognize that the Middle East has developed at a different pace and in divergent directions from the West. These facts cause states in the Greater Middle East to approach situations from a different perspective and usually contrary to considerations from those of the West. Failing to consider the Eastern approach will continually lead to policy mistakes. The second is whether Russia’s strategy is to defeat the Western backed factions opposing the Assad regime in Syria, with the intent of leaving no option for the West but to fight IS while admitting failure in the attempt to topple the Assad regime. The appearance of IS on the world stage created a stir among policy makers from both sides of the debate, and their determined intransigence about opposing positions only gives IS a sense of empowerment. The acrimony IS has created among policy makers, bureaucrats, scholars and pundits, along with its rise to power and the ability to erase nation-state boundaries as a non-state actor in the 21st Century, is more than noteworthy. Today, IS has become like any other state with its leaders accumulating as much power as possible to pursue, and defend, their transnational interests. The US and the Western allies must consider how the opposing forces from the Shia and Kurds, are and will use the US bombardments to expand their ethnic and sectarian territory, while exploiting the Russian presence in the conflict. Iran’s, and its proxies’, involvement in the conflict, will further the resentment and feelings of disenfranchisement experienced by the Sunnis. The actions of the opposing forces will form the basis of the militant actions Sunnis will take to regain their honor, self-respect and what they believe as their right to self-governance. As Shia militias take territory back from IS, though the area has been historically Sunni, reports from those living in Iraq state that the Shia are refusing to allow the former Sunni occupants to return to their homes stating, “They [Sunnis] will not have another chance to support IS.”36 While the ideology of IS will linger for an interminable period after the fall of its regime, the ideology is not the prevalent belief of the majority, which is 1.5+ billion Muslims worldwide. The US and its Western allies will continue to find Islamic groups, replacing IS, calling for jihad as they have since the 1300s, and the West will continue to struggle to implement a cohesive strategy to defeat the ideological zealots, and yet, this will not be the most significant threat to the US. The potential to seriously destabilize the Middle East, the transition of influence within the region to the Russians, and a real cause for serious economic concerns to the US is the most significant threat for the next generation. For those who want to disbelieve and attempt to discredit this assessment, one simply needs to analyze the state of affairs since 2001, and then ask if the anti-Islamic extremist movement espoused by al-Qaeda is better or worse in 2015.

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Notes 1 King, R. Alan. “When Can Iraqis Assume Full Internal Security Responsibilities?” Congressional Testimony Before the House Government Reform Committee, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations. 2006a. http://nobsopus.blogspot.com/2006_09_01_archive.html. 2 Waterson, James. The Ismaili Assassins: A History of Medieval Murder. [Kindle Edition] London: Frontline Books. 3 Ali, Abdullah Suleiman. Translator Steffi Chakti. “IS’ leader assassinated from within,” Al-Monitor. com. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2015/02/qalaoum-is-emir-ousted.html#. 4 Author interview with anonymous source (April 2015). 5 Army Field Manual FM-3 Military Operations. 6 Author interview with anonymous source (April 2015). 7 Spark, Joseph. ISIS Taking Over the Middle East: The Rise of Middle Eastern Supremacy-ISIS/ISIL [Kindle Edition]. Conceptual Kings, 2014. 8. GlobalSecurity.Org. “Jamaat al-Tawhid wa’l-Jihad/Unity and Jihad Group; Tanzim Qa’idat Al-Jihad in Bilad al-Rafidayn (Organization of Jihad’s Base in the Country of the Two Rivers). http://www. globalsecurity. org/military/world/para/zarqawi.htm. 9 Ibid. 10 Kirkland, Joe. A Short Introduction to the Islamic State [Kindle Edition]. Didactic Press, 2014, and Spark, Joseph. ISIS Taking Over the Middle East: The Rise of Middle Eastern Supremacy-ISIS/ISIL [Kindle Edition]. Conceptual Kings, 2014. 11 Zelin, Aaron. “The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Has a Consumer Protection Office: A Guide to How the Militant Group Overrunning Iraq Wins Hearts and Minds,” The Atlantic. http://www.theatlantic. com/ international/archive/2014/06/the-isis-guide-to-building-an-islamic-state/372769/. 12 Ibid, xvii 13 King, R. Alan. Twice Armed: An American Soldier’s Battle for Hearts and Minds in Iraq. Zenith Press. Minnesota: Minneapolis, 2006b. 14 Author interview with anonymous source (April 2015). 15 King, Twice Armed, p. 249. 16 Connable, Ben and Martin C. Libicki. “How Insurgencies End,” Rand Corporation, 2010. 17 Ibid., p. xvii. 18 Author interview with anonymous source. 19 Huntington, Samuel P. “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 72: 22–49 (1993), p. 22. 20 “The Islamic State’s ‘ISIS, ISIL’ Magazine,” http://www.clarionproject.org/news/islamic-state-isisisil-propaganda-magazine-dabiq. Dabiq is an area in Syria where one of the final battles of the apocalypse is supposed to take place according to some Muslim myths. The name of IS’s magazine highlights the caliphate’s ultimate goals. 21 Stewart, Scott. “Jihadism in 2014: Taking Stock of the al Qaeda Core,” Stratfor.com. http://www. stratfor.com/sample/weekly/jihadism-2014-taking-stock-al-qaeda-core. 22 Arberry, Authur J. The Koran: Interpreted. A Translation. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964, p. 8. 23 Arberry, 1964, p. 182. 24 Mathews, Basil. Young Islam on Trek: A Study in the Clash of Civilizations. Literary Licensing, LLC, 1927, p. 217. 25 Lewis, Bernard. 1990. “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” The Atlantic Monthly, Sep, 47–60 (1990), p. 49. 26 Ibid., p. 48. 27 King, 2006b, p. 12.

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28 Author conversation with anonymous source (October 2013). 29 Kilker, Ernest. “Max Weber and the Possibilities for Democracy,” Glassman, Ronald M. and Vatro Murvar, eds. Max Weber’s Political Sociology. Greenwood Press. CT: Westport, 1984, pp. 55–6. 30 Author conversation with anonymous source (April 2015). 31 Kilker, “Max Weber and the Possibilities for Democracy.” 32 King, 2006a. 33 Doornbos, Harald and Jenan Moussa. “Found: The Islamic State’s Terror Laptop of Doom,” Foreign Policy. http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/08/28/found-the-islamic-states-terror-laptop-of-doom/. 34 Author conversation with anonymous source (April 2015). 35 King, 2006b, p. 268. 36 Author conversation with anonymous source (June 2015).

Chapter 7

IS in Syria Mark Sedgwick

Introduction Islamic State (IS) is a transnational insurgency group—animated by radical Sunni Islamic ideology relying heavily on the use of terrorism—that since 2013 has fought to occupy a substantial amount of territory in both Iraq and Syria. As of late 2014, IS controlled approximately 30 percent of Syrian territory containing 2–3.5 million people. It begrudgingly shares with Kurds and other opposition groups—some sectarian and some secular—the approximately 45 percent of Syrian territory that the Syrian government has unwillingly relinquished to rebel forces. The majority of the territory held by IS in Syria is desert, and is concentrated in the northeastern and eastern provinces. However, it has control over water and energy resources from which it derives significant influence and revenue. In Iraq, IS insurgents confront an array of opponents: the Iraqi government and its armed forces; Kurdish tribes; Shia militias trained and supported by Iran; and the airpower resources of an international coalition led by the United States. In Syria, IS insurgents face military forces loyal to Syrian president Bashar al-Assad; Kurdish militias; secular opposition groups such as the Free Syrian Army (FSA); some Sunni tribes; Iranian-trained and supported militias, such as Hezbollah and the National Defense Forces; and the only al-Qaeda affiliate operating in the Levant, Jabhat al-Nusra (JN). The goal of Islamic State’s insurgent activities is to rid Syria and Iraq—and eventually, the world—of the extant political order, and create an autonomous Muslim caliphate­­—exclusive to Sunnis­­—meant to fulfill the dream of Salafi millennialism: The millennial vision in contemporary Islam … is of ‘return’ to the pristine Islam of the time of the Prophet’s reign. This is conceived of as a golden age of unity (tauhid), harmony, lawfulness, economic prosperity and peace. In this latter sense, it is also often imagined as the moment when Islam will become the only and final universal religion and will prevail globally as a total way of life.1

By calling its statist project a caliphate, IS hopes to popularize an idealized vision of Islam’s past, while also playing upon global jihadist sentiments to garner both psychological and material support. Inspired by religious fervor, IS nonetheless follows rational political and military strategies aimed at controlling territory (the sine qua non for a legitimate caliphate), attracting recruits, establishing governing capacity, and continuing its expansion into new areas. For instance, in Syria the group’s military strategy is based upon sowing divisions within the broad anti-Assad opposition—and especially within other jihadist movements. At the same time, one aspect of its political strategy is to seek alliances with tribal groups in order to expand its territorial reach.2 This chapter investigates the Islamic State project as it exists in Syria, but since this nascent statebuilding movement rejects national borders both in principle and practice, it is necessary to look

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beyond national borders. For instance, since IS operates in both Syrian and Iraqi territory, analysis of the group’s ideological underpinnings is not specific to its members in Syria. What distinguishes IS in Syria versus IS in Iraq is the greater level of instability in the former country. Years of civil war in Syria have so weakened the institutions of the Assad government that IS has been able to capture and hold territory—as well as establish a de facto capital in Raqqa province—with relative ease and without significant opposition from the Syrian army. Analysis reveals that the regime in Syria is partly responsible for the flowering of IS on its territory, since during the Second Iraq War (2003–2011) Bashar al-Assad allowed Syria to become a conduit of foreign fighters streaming to Iraq, where they joined jihadists groups affiliated with al-Qaeda—such as the forerunner to IS, the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI). The actions of external state actors—especially the Gulf monarchies, Iran, and the United States—have influenced the character and the duration of the civil war in Syria, thereby shaping the milieu in which IS has been able to bring its vision of a new Islamic caliphate to life.3 Since its official—and acrimonious—split from core al-Qaeda in 2014, IS is now an independent facilitator of global jihad—in essence competing with al-Qaeda for the loyalty of the world’s Islamic extremists. However, this role brings it into direct confrontation with al-Qaeda’s Syrian franchise Jabhat al-Nusra over the disposition of Syrian territory, the hearts of indigenous Syrian jihadists, and the loyalty of foreign recruits. IS must also navigate the political minefield of Syria’s tribal affiliations, as well as battle against the FSA and other secularist militias that were the first to fight back against the Assad regime’s vicious crackdown on civil dissent in 2011 and 2012. Since fall 2014, IS has been in the crosshairs of a coalition of states—some from the region, most from the West—intent upon “degrading and destroying” its proven ability to capture territory, hold it, and establish varying degrees of governance. Sometime in 2015, IS will also have to contend with a militia force—trained and supported by the US and its allies in the region—dedicated to its destruction. Even though the extent of the territory IS holds in Syria is certain to remain in flux (it appears over the long term that contraction is more likely than expansion), it is eager to establish governance in those areas it controls, as governance in accordance with sharia law is a key element in its quest to solidify territorial control, legitimize its vision of a caliphate, and prepare the way for an eschatological showdown with the perceived “enemies” of Islam. Ideology of the Islamic State The religious ideology that ostensibly drives and sustains both the architects and foot soldiers of IS is rooted in a rejectionist strain of Sunni Islamic thought that can be traced to an 18th century Islamic scholar, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, and was summed up in the modern era by Osama bin Laden’s stark dictum that Islam offers only three choices to the disbeliever: “conversion, subjugation, or death.”4 Generally, this form of Sunni thought has been labeled Islamic extremism because of its insistence that Islam cannot be constrained by the political structures imposed by mankind; rather, all Earthly sovereignty belongs to God. Only a rejection of temporal notions such as democracy and constitutional government, coupled with strict adherence to sharia law, can provide the community of Muslims (the ummah) with the proper framework for a just and pious society. Islamic extremists call all Muslims to defend this totalitarian form of Islam from “apostates” (broadly, Shia and Sufi Muslims, Alewites, and any Muslim leaders that engage with Western states or Western political ideals) and “Crusaders and Zionists” (broadly, all Western states and others with a Judeo-Christian tradition—especially the United States and Israel).5

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Islamic extremism receives its ideological grounding from two rigid forms of Islam: Wahabbism and Salafism. Wahabbism today is actually a corruption of the tenets established in the eighteenth century by Muhammad al-Wahhab, who—in a role similar to Martin Luther’s vis-à-vis the Roman Church two centuries earlier—sought primarily to reform and purify Islam, which he believed had fallen prey to human fallacies and accreted distortions such as the veneration of saints and tomb worship. Though al-Wahhab insisted that a return to an originalist, literal interpretation of the Koran would allow the Muslim ummah to recover lost power and prestige, Islamic scholars have noted that his insistence upon ridding Islam of mystical Sufism and Twelver Shiism violated the explicit Koranic revelation “that religious pluralism was God’s will.”6 Followers of Wahhabist thought gave greater credence to the concept of takfir—whereby one Muslim was allowed to condemn another as an apostate, or kafir—than did Wahhabi himself. This literalist acceptance of takfir, coupled with a new interpretation of jihad, gave rise to a violent form of Islam that has been used to sow sectarian divisions and terrorize large populations.7 According to Islamic scholarship, jihad (the Arabic word meaning “struggle” or “strife”) has two distinct forms: greater jihad and lesser jihad. Greater jihad is the province of the individual believer who struggles to live a righteous life in a sinful world. Lesser jihad normally referenced defensive warfare, and was considered of secondary importance to greater jihad. For most of Islam’s history, the call to jihad referred to lesser jihad; although, during Islam’s early years jihad often was used to justify expansionist military campaigns, Islamic extremists of the last 100 years have fully reversed the ordering of jihad.8 Arabian Bedouins, organized by the House of Saud in the early twentiethcentury and indoctrinated in Wahhabi principles, married aggressive jihad with the practice of takfir to the detriment of Arabian tribes they routinely slaughtered as apostates. Many analysts note that in the acts of these Bedouins, referred to as the Ikhwan (the “Brotherhood” in Arabic), one sees the type of violence commonly used by IS today.9 Encouraged by Western states in the wake of the Iranian revolution in 1979, Wahhabi doctrine became the primary intellectual export of the Saudi kingdom as a counterweight to the expansion of Shia extremism. Even today, Saudi-funded mosques and schools (madrassas) from California to Bali feature a thorough Wahhabist curriculum. Ironically, IS members and other jihadists who share a Wahhabist orientation accuse the Saudi kingdom of being kafir. The Saudi government now fears that Wahhabism, as made manifest by global jihadists, is a security threaten to the kingdom.10 Another extreme variant of Islam that calls for return to strict, literalist adherence to the Koran is Salafism. Salafis base their beliefs on the teaching of the nineteenth-century Egyptian Islamic scholar, Mohammed ‘Abduh, and though they are far from a monolithic group, their austere take on Islam has spread throughout the Muslim world. Also emanating from Saudi Arabia, Salafism is associated often with Wahhabism because both are puritanical, define jihad as an offensive form of holy war, reject both Shiism and Sufism, and are highly misogynistic.11 Al-Qaeda attacks against the West—especially 9/11—spurred the diffusion of Salafist ideology across the Middle East and the Maghreb. Both Wahhabism and Salafism call on Muslims to change the status quo, allowing them to employ violent methods against a wide array of aggressors who stand in the way of their triumphalist goal of uniting the Islamic ummah. These ideologies require individuals to submit to a collectivist form of behavior, not unlike that experienced under the Nazi regime in 1930s Germany. As a political concept, National Socialism was built upon the Volkish movement—a creation of the Romantic period in German literature that tended to glorify the expression of brute force.12 Comparing Nazis to those whose actions are driven by Wahhabist and Salafist doctrine, one source has surmised, “Like the Nazis, jihadists espouse a culture of war and death.”13

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IS advertises the caliphate it is trying to establish as an Islamic utopia, where justice prevails and God’s will is done—just like in the golden age of Islam. In addition, it depicts the caliphate as an ideal form of governance that unites all believers regardless of ethnic background or nationality—the latter being a discredited concept anyway. However, the historical caliphate (632– 1924 CE) fell far short of the description produced by the founders of IS. As one source notes, with this narrative IS is constructing: an imagined Caliphate … [an] inspirational Caliphate… . All of this is done, however, at the expense of truth. What Islamists are discussing when they refer to the historical Caliphate simply did not exist. They have built a fantasy Caliphate, one that embodies all that was positive about the institution and ignores all of its problems and complications.14

Nonetheless, IS has been able to sustain itself—and to expand—by trumpeting its jihadist ideology to a global audience, placing itself at the lexis of a new Islamic project promising ultimate victory over a lapsed, anti-Muslim world order. The confidence of IS recruits soars when they are told that their mission is blessed by God, that they are the chosen ones—the anointed—waging a war with a preordained outcome, and that their martyrdom is the greatest possible achievement a Muslim can realize. Through consistent allusions to apocalypse—what in Islamic discourse is called Malhamat al-Kubra, and which IS insists culminates in an epic battle in Dabiq, near Aleppo, Syria—the group stresses the urgency of immediate and definitive action. One analyst notes, “Theirs is a zero-sum game: either they fight to try to help a Muslim utopia now, or they die in pursuit of it.”15 Though Wahhabi and Salafi jihadists who subscribe to the use of takfir and offensive jihad have been given ample justification to wage war on behalf of an imagined ummah, the fact that IS leadership subscribes to the advice found in the 2004 book The Management of Savagery indicates the extent to which the group is willing to go in order to fulfill the establishment of its new caliphate.16 The book, which has been described as a jihadist how-to manual, calls for the creation of areas of instability (“regions of savagery”) through the use of random and excessively brutal violence that terrifies target populations and steals the resolve of those perpetrating the savagery. This campaign is intended to deliver a fearful population into the hands of the group that promises to restore order out of chaos. Conveniently, IS puts this methodology into action by playing both roles: savage and savior. One researcher suggests: [For the] … propagators of … [Islamic State] doctrine, violence is not limited to the war which is being waged within their territories. They are envisioning a constant cosmic war which requires the use of violence by every Muslim against anyone considered non-Muslim—simply put, there are no non-combatants and no method too brutal.17

The Appeal of Ideology IS uses a variety of media platforms—detailed in a later section—to broadcast its ideological message to both domestic and foreign jihadists and would-be jihadists. Its own promotional efforts—when combined with global news broadcasts—has given IS significant reach. What messages resonate best with its target audience of potential recruits, and what aspects of IS ideology do individuals in this group find most appealing? Some recruits who support the goals of global jihad hope to receive training and battlefield experience so they can undertake jihad in their home country (especially true of Chechen members of IS),18 while a large majority seek fulfillment of

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what they perceive is a religious duty. Others—particularly foreigners—are drawn by the thrill of the fight, as well as the opportunity to battle against “agents” of Washington, Tel Aviv, or Tehran. A small subset of Kurds who treasure their Sunni identity more than their Kurdish identity gravitate to IS because it presents itself as a pan-Sunni movement, in contrast to the pan-Arab orientation of Jabhat al-Nusra and many of the other Islamist groupings in Syria.19 (However, most Kurds are wary of IS, seeing it as the tip of the spear in an existential Arab-Kurdish war.) Some Turkomen are likewise drawn to IS, since their people have suffered under the weight of Arab autocrats for many decades. For Syrian jihadists, or those who have jihadist leanings, IS might be the only available option if their local militia was overrun or subsumed. Others are impressed with Islamic State’s military efficiency and effectiveness—especially in contrast with the many ragtag militias at work in Syria. The brutish reality of life in a war zone leads many young Syrians to pledge their allegiance to IS because their future in the new caliphate looks brighter than in Assad’s Syria.20 While these “pull” factors may illuminate the appeal of IS to front line jihadist fighters, it does not explain fully the allure of non-combatants to the new caliphate. After IS’s caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi formally announced the establishment of the new caliphate in June 2014, he issued a call to all Muslims to settle there, specifying the need for doctors, engineers, and other professionals. Analysts presume that individuals who have heeded al-Baghdadi’s call are guided primarily by acceptance of Islamic State’s millennial vision, and seek to fulfill their duty as pious Sunni Muslims.21 However, just as political rhetoric and political reality often fail to coalesce, a gap exists between the ideology presented by IS and the way that ideology is reflected in the lives of some of its adherents. As researchers note, as IS proved its competence as an insurgent force in Syria, religious fervor played a diminished role in convincing people to support the caliphate. For instance, many highly educated Syrians have come to the conclusion that their country is the pivotal battleground between Shia and Sunni Muslims, and have chosen to align with IS in order to counter Iran’s goal of Shiite hegemony. Further analysis indicates a significant percentage of lower echelon IS supporters and militia members prefer the group’s political objectives to its religious aims.22 In addition, though they may have shared Salafist doctrine, some individuals whose primary allegiance was to competing jihadist militias subsequently merged into IS gave their loyalty to IS for purely pragmatic reasons. In such cases, bandwagoning is the most rational choice, even if those individuals do not share the same level of religious fervor or commitment to brutality espoused by IS.23 For the many foreigners who have immigrated to IS and represent half of its membership, an often-hazy understanding of Salafi doctrine is the primary appeal. However, as one researcher concludes: In all likelihood, few of the young [IS] recruits are motivated either by Wahhabism or by more traditional Muslim ideals. “Far from being religious zealots, a large number of those involved in terrorism do not practice their faith regularly. Many lack religious literacy and could … be regarded as religious novices.”24

In Iraq, IS has a close relationship with outlawed Baathists who were loyalists to the regime of former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein. Now members of the Army of the Order of the Naqshbandi Men, many in this confusing confederation of staunch secularists, Sufis, supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood—and even some Kurds and Shia—have pledged support to IS.25 In turn, IS has placed former Baathists in the highest levels of its military command in both Iraq and Syria, and former Baathists occupy important offices in the Syrian branch of the caliphate’s administrative hierarchy.26 Does the religious doctrine of IS exercise significant influence over these men formerly

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devoted to the tenets of Arab Socialism? One source notes the irony that a group such as the Naqshbandis which: … once had a reputation for being outspoken and often militantly secularist is fighting alongside a group that is the most outspoken and militantly Islamist of its kind… . [Here] is a sober reminder that this conflict is not simply a zero-sum game of jihadists versus non-jihadists.27

If these former Baathists and other pragmatists who have allied with IS are animated less by extremist Islamic ideology and more by rational objectives—such as a permanent, autonomous rump state in the Sunni provinces of Iraq—that significantly fall short of building a global caliphate, how much energy can they be expected to spend in order to force an eschatological showdown with Iran, the West, and the rest of the non-Sunni world? Though Syria is of tremendous importance to IS for its considerable resources (a population and commerce for taxing, and sources of both water and energy), one researcher has speculated that for the more pragmatic members of IS, “Syria is only a sideshow.”28 If this is true, the prognosis for an ever-expanding caliphate as envisioned by al-Baghdadi is grim. The Rise of IS in Syria The immediate forerunner to IS was the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI), which had devolved from al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). In allegiance to Osama bin Laden’s core al-Qaeda organization in Pakistan—and under its authority—the Jordanian Salafist Abu Musab Zarqawi established AQI in 2004 in order to take part in the Baathist-Sunni insurgency following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the institution of a provisional government in Iraq. Though bin Laden and al-Qaeda’s chief strategist Ayman al-Zawahiri provided substantial material support to Zarqawi, they were not pleased that his primary tactic was to inflame existing sectarian tensions. Bin Laden and Zawahiri preferred Sunni-Shia unity that would allow all Muslims to focus on the “far enemy”—the United States and its Western allies. They also found fault with Zarqawi’s use of indiscriminate violence against any group that challenged its authority. Eventually, AQI overplayed its hand in Iraq, and faced an uprising of Sunni tribes—the Sunni Awakening, or sahwa—funded and coordinated by the United States and its allies.29 Renamed after the death of Zarqawi and the losses exacted by the Awakening movement, ISI withdrew from active insurgency to regenerate and devise a new strategy. By 2010, it had promoted a new leader in al-Baghdadi, and developed a plan for territorial expansion under the guidance of Saddam Hussein’s former military strategists.30 When Syria became engulfed by civil war in 2012, ISI sponsored a Sunni insurgent group led by Abu Mohammed al-Jowlani to set up operations there. This group, Jabhat al-Nusra, was the first jihadist organization in Syria allied with al-Qaeda, as well as one of the fiercest. As JN’s reputation grew, it began making direct overtures to new core al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, pledging its allegiance (bay’ah in Arabic) to him and his organization. Baghdadi sought to rein in Jowlani by suggesting JN be merged with ISI into a new organization, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (al-Shams in Arabic), known as ISIL or ISIS. As a result, al-Zawahiri intervened, and expressed his desire for al-Baghdadi to cease talk of expanding his operation to Syria, though ISIS had already established a military presence there.31 In early 2014, at time when rapid battlefield success—accompanied by brutal violence—had elevated the stature of ISIS over JN and all other jihadist forces, al-Zawahiri and al-Baghdadi announced a permanent split between the two organizations. By then IS was the dominant insurgent force on the

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ground in both Syria and Iraq, and in June al-Baghdadi announced the establishment of the new caliphate under his leadership—though renamed Islamic State.32 Complicity of the Assad Regime Out of the confusion of Syria’s jihadist environment—at one point in 2013 the number of independent jihadist factions was estimated at over 1,00033—IS built a formidable organization with branches specializing in light infantry, insurgency, and terrorism. Such rapid progress in the face of competition from JN and some of the larger jihadist groups such as Ahrar al-Sham was made possible by the far-reaching “logistic networks” previously establish by AQI and ISI during the period from 2004–2007 when Syria was used as a de facto transit corridor34 for foreign fighters entering Iraq: … some of which appear to have operated with the tacit acceptance of the Assad regime. In short, [IS] was already in Syria when the uprising against Bashar al-Assad began in the summer of 2011.35

In an ironic twist, Syria had embarked upon a policy of quiet acceptance of Islamic extremism in the later years of Hafez al-Assad’s rule, a policy continued to degrees by his son and successor, President Bashar al-Assad. The policy was premised on the rational assumption that by allowing the incubation, then export, of Islamists to other countries in the region Syria’s regional stature would rise. That such a policy carried great risk of blowback is now obvious. After the international coalition led by the US invaded Iraq in 2003, Bashar al-Assad covertly abetted the many AQI support networks established in Syria (at the very least by ignoring their existence), while simultaneously appearing to help Washington with its prosecution of the War on Terror. Analysis indicates … al-Assad sometimes acceded to Washington’s demands, lending the impression that he was dismantling the jihadist networks on his soil. It was all a feint … part of the strategy to use Syria’s facilitation of terrorism as a bargaining chip [with Washington].36

Research reveals that it was Bashar al-Assad’s brother-in-law, Assef Shakat, who helped coordinate the network that transported jihadists through Syria and into Iraq during the Iraqi insurgency. The question is, why would Assad allow such activity? Analysts speculate that Assad’s acquiescence to ISI was part of an attention-seeking strategy: through covert creation of a problem—the proliferation of radical Sunni extremism—he could offer to “oh-so-magnanimously” solve the problem, thereby keeping policy makers in Washington continuously engaged. As Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan speculate, even in as protests against his rule had begun in 2012: … al-Assad was always desperate to win the attention and cooperation of the West, even while suborning terrorism against it. Faced with revolution, and blaming the West for the very crimes he himself had long committed, he sought to ensure his political longevity through self-fulfilling prophecy. His regime undertook several measures to bring violent Islamism home to Syria.37

As IS successfully expanded its control of territory in northeastern Syria during 2013 and 2014, Assad’s forces focused most of their efforts on fighting the FSA and other groups opposing the regime—particularly in the northwest and the crucial Aleppo-to-Damascus corridor. Voices in the Arab world questioned why it appeared the only “safe haven” in all of Syria was the de facto IS capital in Raqqa.38 One Syrian official hinted that allowing the world to see images of jihadist

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parading through Raqqa, while performing crucifixions and beheadings, was good PR that helped to substantiate Assad’s claim that his regime was a bulwark against Islamic extremism.39 The reality is that the Assad regime has displayed a pragmatic approach toward IS, and has been buying oil from the group ever since they captured Syrian wells in Deir Ezzor province. Through 2015, cooperation between the Syrian government, state-supported telecom companies, and IS has kept the cell phone service in Raqqa province operational—with technicians regularly traveling from regime controlled areas to IS-held territory in order to service cell towers.40 Sources indicate that a gas facility under IS control near the town of Tabqa was being operated by a combination of IS workers and employees of the Syrian government—with the latter still receiving their pay from the central government in Damascus. Oil produced by IS in mobile refineries has been sold to the Syrian government, then distributed to areas under regime control. In a few cases, the Assad government has paid for these oil shipments by providing state-generated electricity to towns in IS territory.41 The Role of Civil War IS has benefited from civil war in Syria, which has been driven in part by external state actors—especially Saudi Arabia and Iran. As the chief antagonists of a geopolitical struggle that preys upon sectarian division between the two main branches of Islam, the Saudis and Iranians have provided both direct and indirect support to various factions involved in the Syrian conflict. The Saudi government has provided monetary aid (in excess of $2 billion) to elements of the Syrian opposition, while Iran has delivered billions of dollars and the talents of the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) to defend the Assad regime—which is a principal ally of the Islamic Republic. Iran has encouraged its Lebanese proxy—Hezbollah—to fight both Sunni insurgents and the FSA inside the Syrian border, while high ranking members of Iran’s armed forces have led brigades of the Iranian-trained National Defense Forces in clashes with alNusra, the FSA, and IS.42 Iran’s efforts have certainly born more fruit than those of the Saudis, partly because the Iranians have invested more (as much as $19 billion by one estimate), but also because Saudi allies in the Gulf Cooperation Council—the UAE and Qatar in particular—have pursued divergent and often contradictory strategies in order to support the insurgency in Syria. In general, the Saudis tended to support the FSA and its government in exile, while the Qataris favored groups with a Salafist orientation. In addition to aid directly from the Gulf monarchies, uncontrolled donations from wealthy Saudis, Qataris, and Emiratis sent to smaller, unaffiliated rebel groups most likely helped al-Nusra and IS more as those two groups began to dominate the Sunni rebellion—capturing weapons and cash from the groups they often overran.43 As Islamic State grew in strength, the Gulf States realized their actions had created a grave threat to regional security. Meanwhile, Iran was able to use the existence of IS as evidence of the global threat posed by Sunni extremism, and to bolster their argument that the first step in minimizing that threat was supporting the Assad regime. However, many Syrian jihadists came to view the conflict as an existential battle between Sunnis and Shiites, a sentiment that tended to increase support for the new caliphate as the “shield and sword” defending the Sunni ummah.44 Another important external state actor is the United States, though it has pursued a pragmatic and cautious course regarding both the Syrian civil war and the threats posed by IS. In 2014 the US articulated a strategy to defeat IS that would neither antagonize Iran, nor directly attack Assad’s forces.45 The policy envisioned the assembly of an international coalition of states that would rely on US air power to reduce Islamic State’s range of movement, and follow with a ground force

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composed of regional troops—assisted by various tribal and Kurdish militias—to roll back the territorial gains made by the group in 2013 and 2014.46 Since assembling the ground force was a non-starter, the US proposed arming and training Syrian opposition groups on a large scale, thereby producing an indigenous military force tasked with first defending vulnerable parts of Syria, then going on the offensive against IS strongholds. With their towns defended and IS on the run, members of this rebel force would then help engineer a political solution to end the Syrian crisis.47 Under this plan, 5,400 Syrian fighters would be trained by the US in Turkey and Jordan over the course of three years at a cost of approximately $500 million. Many have expressed concern about this rebel force tasked with fighting IS. One criticism is its size: though military strategists suggested a force of 15,000 for such a mission, the lesser figure of 5,400 fighters ensures that once in the field this force will be outmanned and outgunned. They will also enter the field with big targets on their backs; they will either be enticing bait for IS kidnappers, high value prisoners should they be captured, or “trophy” kills whose bodies will be prominently displayed for maximum shock value.48 In addition, critics believe $500 million is far too little an investment to expect mission fulfillment. As one analyst surmised, “Aid to any rebel group should be structured so that it can be sustained. Better not to provide military assistance at all then drop significant weaponry into a shifting battlefield and then withdraw.”49 Some have questioned whether it is a rational expectation that formerly untrustworthy individuals who have displayed a proclivity for sudden shifts in allegiance—such as members of the so-called moderate Syrian opposition—will steadfastly adhere to US strategic directives after they return to the field. Even if the vetting process yields a pool of recruits who can be counted on not to deviate from the mission, to what extent is the US willing to provide close ground support? US military leaders have switched positions on the answer to that question at least once, with an affirmative answer from top military officials in September 2014, and an equivocating “maybe” during Congressional testimony five months later.50 Writing about the prospects for this new force, respected Middle East analyst Anthony Cordesman drily commented, “Virtually no one really believes that the United States can create a meaningful moderate rebel force in Syria in time to deal with the Islamic State.”51 Indeed, US efforts in 2014 and 2015 to support two specific opposition groups working in Syria ended poorly. The first group, the Syrian Revolutionary Front, fell after a few days of fighting JN forces in Idlib province. The group claimed to have mustered 20 separate opposition groups with one express purpose: “to fight IS.”52 Al-Nusra also routed a second US-supported group, Haraket Hazm, in early March 2015, and liberated a large cache of weapons and munitions provided by Washington.53 The bombing campaign undertaken by the US-led coalition in Syria has enjoyed the support of the Jordanian, Saudi, Bahraini, and Emirati air forces, with the latter flying the most missions from September 2014 through February 2015. However, The UAE ended its participation in February 2015 after a Jordanian pilot taking part in the mission was captured and burned alive by IS. Critics have argued that without ground troops to gather strike target information, make poststrike assessments, and launch clear and hold operations, the use of air power in Syria is of limited benefit. IS has embedded itself more deeply in urban terrain, which—although it does restrict the movement of large troop formations—makes it hard to strike without risking collateral damage.54 However, US officials reported in January 2015 that airstrikes in Syria and Iraq had killed half of IS’ leadership. In addition, coalition missions targeting oil production facilities under IS control in Deir Ezzor province had achieved moderate success, reducing the caliphate’s revenue generating potential significantly. However, two issues hamper the coalition’s future targeting of oil facilities: first, eliminating these facilities may be a violation of international law;55 second, IS has resorted to mobile refineries that can be moved easily to avoid detection.

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Military and Political Strategies of Islamic State The world witnessed a remarkable sight when Islamic State defeated an array of competitors to occupy and control a landmass approximately the size of the United Kingdom in less than a year. In order to realize such an achievement, IS has implemented a variety of sophisticated—yet harsh and brutal—military and political strategies. Militarily, it prefers to use small units on multiple fronts that attack without warning and with great ferocity. By shifting the point of attack often, it keeps opponents off balance and reactive.56 However, the IS experience in attempting to hold the Kurdish stronghold of Kobane in early 2015 revealed that it is easier to be on offense than on defense. There, it was forced into reacting rather than setting the initiative. Politically, IS has used brutal violence to subjugate some populations—especially religious minorities—but it has tended toward modification of the vicious model of control that prompted the Sunni Awakening against AQI-ISI during the second Iraq war.57 Within its territorial domain, IS establishes authority by building institutions of civil and religious governance.58 For instance, just as its insistence on the imposition of sharia law necessitates installation of a religious police force and Islamic court system, Islamic State’s trust in the Islamic principle of zakat encourages development of social services such as aid for the poor and elderly, bus transportation, and limited healthcare in the form of vaccinations.59 Since civil war conditions in Syria allowed the spread of corruption and warlordism, IS attempts to end such practices—with varying degrees of success—in the areas where it establishes control.60 Negotiations and Alliance Building Though adherence to literalist interpretations of the Quran and hadiths (actions and sayings attributed to the Prophet Muhammad) prevents IS from entering into long-term treaties, it does not prevent the group from negotiating with villages in areas where it seeks to expand. Though IS has relied on crushing brutality to subdue much of the territory it holds, it also uses negotiation to overcome resistance to its rule. By promising to spare villages and towns from armed intrusion and forced subjugation, IS adds to its territory while reducing drain on its military resources.61 It often follows the same technique in dealing with Syria’s tribes, though in this case Islamic State’s strategy is to keep the tribes from forming alliances that could balance against it. Whether it obtains control of tribal allegiance by force or by negotiation, IS gains by controlling rural geography, which is very conducive to insurgent activity. Many of the tribes allied with IS exhibit bandwagoning behavior, a rational decision given their weakened state after years of civil war. They may not agree with IS regarding its ideology or methodology, but the tribes understand their options are severely limited, and hope that IS is only a temporary phenomenon.62 Though IS has also proven adept at mediating disputes between tribes and tribal factions, one source contends: Where it hasn’t scared or tempted tribesmen into submission … [IS] has inserted itself as a buffer between feuding clans, relying, no doubt, on the experience and hard-won knowledge of its former Baathist leadership.63

Inter-Jihadist Rivalry In order to implement preferred military and political strategies in its new caliphate, IS faces competition from rivals both in Syria and the wider world of global jihad. On the global front, it competes with al-Qaeda and its many franchises, such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic

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Maghreb (AQIM) and al-Qaeda in the Arabia Peninsula (AQAP). In Syria competition comes from Jabhat al-Nusra. Both IS and al-Qaeda—and by extension, al-Nusra—share a common objective: restoration of political Islam and a sharia-ordered society in the Middle East and—eventually—the entire world. Both see the West and modernism as the greatest obstacles to this objective, but they differ in terms of when and how to overcome them. Al-Qaeda prefers the strategy of attacking and subduing the West first, a necessary pre-condition for the eventual restoration and enlargement of the caliphate. IS and its ideological devotees believe in building the caliphate first, then expanding in order to subjugate the West.64 Their eschatology prophesizes that the West will come to them, attacking the new caliphate in the plains of Dabiq (Syria) before being lured into ultimate defeat in Jerusalem. Even though JN closely follows the directives emanating from core al-Qaeda and its leader al-Zawahiri, they have directed most of their focus toward attacking the Assad regime—a clear deviation from the “West first” strategy. In contrast, IS has rarely engaged Syrian forces, preferring instead to expand to areas where regime influence is minimal.65 JN and IS have also clashed over recruitment, as jihadists coming from North Africa and Europe have been attracted to the meteoric rise of Islamic State. In this contest over new recruits, IS has triumphed most often. As a result, IS has a much higher percentage of foreign members than JN, a factor that has caused many native Syrians to reject IS as a foreign occupation force.66,67 Resentment of the ruthless way IS established control of areas in Idlib and Raqqa provinces in late 2013 and early 2014 led a coalition of jihadist forces—including the Islamic Front, Aurar al-Sham, and the Syrian Revolutionary Front—to initiate a sahwa against Islamic State during January and February 2014. IS quickly countered this affront in Syria at the same time it launched its successful attack on Fallujah in Iraq, proving the worth of its nimble military strategy.68 Undoubtedly IS will continue to face resistance from other insurgent groups operating in Syria—whether they are sectarian, secular, or a mixture of both. Shortly after al-Baghdadi announced the establishment of the caliphate in June 2014, a consortium of Sunni rebel groups associated with the FSA tried to balance against the overtly Islamist IS and JN, though the effort produced no gains. The only groups that joined the so-called Watasimo Initiative were irrelevant when compared to IS.69 Six months later, during Islamic State’s unsuccessful attempt to capture and hold the Kurdish stronghold of Kobane (Ayn el-Arab) in northern Aleppo province, Sunni FSA forces temporarily merged with Kurdish resistance fighters to fight the group.70 Successful pairing of groups with a history of enmity that nonetheless band together to face a common foe in IS will likely become common over the medium term. At the same time, evidence suggests IS has made pragmatic alliances with other jihadist groups—even some groups that have secular members. As analysis indicates: IS would not be where it is today without … closely colluding with other political actors in Syria … . It is a common misconception that those living under the rule of al-Baghdadi are one homogenous entity. It is not even true to say that those fighting to expand the rule of al-Baghdadi are all IS ideologues … the insurgents also include unaffiliated jihadists and even secularists.71

Governance of Islamic State Territory in Syria Because IS views its territorial gains in Syria as vital to the sustenance of the caliphate, it has placed a high priority on instituting systems of governance there. Just as the group has built a centralized system for military control relying on bottom-up administration—where field commanders report

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to provincial commanders who then report to the War Council—so has IS organized the areas it governs.72 Using a wilayat system of independent provinces analogous to the existing Syrian provinces, Islamic State appoints provincial governors to act as overseers. Like Persian satraps, these leaders do not live in the region they administer, and many of the provincial governors in IS’s Syrian territory are Iraqis.73 IS divides governing into two distinct areas: administration and (Islamic) public service. The most important part of the administrative sector is often referred to as the Sharia Department, and consists of primary outreach programs known as da’wah (“call” or “invitation” in Arabic) and sharia enforcement in the form of religious police (Al-Hisba) and sharia courts. This department forms the backbone of governance in Islamic State’s jurisdiction, as there are far more Sharia Department offices in IS territory than those tasked with other aspects of governing.74 Da’wah is the first program implemented by IS when taking control of new territory, and allows IS leaders to disseminate both its Salafist ideology and its vision for the caliphate. Often informal and inclusive of children, da’wah meetings have been described as analogous to “tent revivals” in the evangelical Christian tradition—an irony in that they have been held in churches commandeered by IS or left vacant by fleeing Christians. The imposition of sharia courts comes after the da’wah meetings have run their course, and is closely followed by the establishment of al-Hisba: the effect is a steady strengthening of rules and restrictions that demand strict obedience to sharia.75 Some analysis has posited that by instituting harsh sharia-guided measures early in its occupation of new areas, IS engages in high-risk behavior—since a probable reaction is alienation of subject populations. Evidence reveals that many Syrians under IS governance have chafed at the imposition of strict sharia—especially with the added component of religious policing. However, reports also indicate that the level of alienation caused by living under strict sharia has been moderated by two factors: that IS has re-imposed order in areas where chaos previously dominated, and that it has displayed competence in basic governance.76 Most of the inhabitants of northern and eastern Syria could be characterized as religiously conservative Muslims, so for many the fact that IS has replaced immoral lawlessness with an effective moral order lessens their concerns about the group’s dictatorial and aggressive methodology. The other key administrative duties performed by IS regard education and communication. In the more densely populated areas under its control, Islamic State has opened a limited number of schools, all with an Islamic curriculum based on Koranic memorization. Some of these classes are conducted in former school buildings, while others are held in mosques.77 Anecdotal evidence suggests that many of these schools are provided exclusively for the children of foreign IS members—specifically, Chechens—while others serve Syrian children, including girls.78 Based upon the narrowly focused curriculum, it appears IS is intent upon using education in order to produce the next wave of the caliphate’s inhabitants.79 As one source surmises, “[IS] sees itself not as a terrorist organization indoctrinating children, but as a sovereign state educating its citizens.”80 The sophisticated, multi-media, and multi-lingual communication produced by Islamic State is aimed at both internal and external audiences—an impressive output one researcher has called the “gold standard” in global jihad propaganda.81 The goal of its communication is two-pronged: one strand “sells” an idealized image of life in the caliphate to sympathetic, would-be recruits, while the other strand is designed to threaten and intimidate its adversaries. Using a slick format, Islamic State’s al-Hayat Media simultaneously solicits and threatens in its online magazine, Dabiq, while also issuing a range of official communiqués and commentaries that are timely and targeted. Al-

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Furqan Media is the division that produces video content for Internet distribution—including the barbaric beheadings that caused Western publics to demand a response to IS provocation.82 By using various social media platforms as virtual battlegrounds, IS pushes out its message in real time, thereby helping to shape the news environment. Additionally, it encourages lower-ranking members to provide a steady stream of information to hundreds of Twitter accounts, providing an instantaneous narrative about defense of the caliphate.83 IS encourages the use of social media and blogs to target women who are sympathetic to its cause. For instance, the female counterpart to the Hisba religious police in Syria, al-Khansa Brigades, has produced weblogs aimed at foreign women who wish to marry IS fighters and give birth to the caliphate’s next generation.84 Other websites and social media pages feature idealized descriptions of the role women play in the new caliphate, and even provide logistical information such as preferred travel routes for passage to Syria via Turkey.85 Islamic State’s public service effort in Syria consists of direct aid disbursement (helping to secure public acceptance), provision of subsidized or discounted consumer items (especially bread), bus transportation, regular law enforcement (that which falls outside of al-Hisba’s jurisdiction), oil and gasoline distribution, some limited infrastructure projects, and even delivery of healthcare.86 IS has even operated Syrian dams with electrical generating capacity, as well as a thermal power facility near Aleppo. To run these plants the groups relies on foreign engineers and managers with specialized skills who often threaten indigenous workers if they attempt to quit.87 Reports indicate a Tunisian Ph.D. has been running the telecom service in Raqqa, the same place where a former Assad regime official has managed the flour mills.88 Financing the Islamic State in Syria In order to finance the administrative and distributive system of government it has established, IS must generate significant revenue. While it is true the group has received millions of dollars in direct donations from private individuals in Kuwait and other Gulf countries, this money covers only a small fraction of its operating expenses. To augment the donations, IS condones confiscating private property; kidnapping and extortion; taking of war spoils (ghanima); taxing all commerce (including exports and imports); collecting the jizya poll tax from non-Muslims (as part of the dhimma or “protection pact”); forcing direct payment of zakat (the obligatory Muslim act of charity) to the IS treasury; selling antiquities; and—most lucratively—producing and selling oil and oil by-products.89 Though IS controls a number of oil wells in Syria, it only has the technical ability to extract 20 percent of potential capacity. Oil is processed in small-scale refineries, then distributed to areas under IS control, smuggled into Turkey or Jordan, or sold to the Assad regime for cash—or in return for assurances not to attack.90 Oil smuggling is fairly easy to accomplish, as smuggling routes between Syria and its porous border with Turkey have been operating since the first Gulf War. Most of the oil trade—and, indeed, the bulk of Islamic State’s revenue generating activities—are cash-based, a factor that greatly increases the incidence of internal corruption. Reports indicate IS members have been executed as punishment for “skimming” or otherwise cheating the caliphate.91 Despite the ability to generate as much as $1.5 billion annually from its mix of revenue sources,92 Islamic State’s reliance on taxing and confiscating existing wealth has severe limitations. Without economic activity to regenerate wealth, these revenue sources will dry up. In addition, US-led coalition airstrikes that began in September 2014 have likely diminished oil revenues significantly. As one analyst summed up the financial dilemma facing IS, “[IS] is a formidable fundraiser … [but] to its disadvantage, the group is also a formidable spender.”93 Another source suggested:

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… [IS] may suffer from a sharp drop in its revenue well before the U.S. is able to defeat it. [IS]controlled areas are slowly cycling downward economically, because you can’t steal from people indefinitely …94

Public Reaction to Islamic State Governance As previously noted, some Syrians living in areas administered by IS have acquiesced to the group’s rule because they value order—such as it is—above the chaotic civil war environment prior to the arrival of Islamic State.95 Syrians who have emigrated rather than live under IS governance report that many people profess acceptance of the group—and even pledge allegiance to it—because they fear reprisals if they do not. Others embrace IS authority in order to fulfill ambitions for power, status, and wealth.96 Some voices from inside Syria indicate that ever since IS vanquished FSA warlords, places like Raqqa are safer than before the civil war began, and that bribery and corruption are no longer widespread. In addition, some report that IS pays well, a sentiment likely shared by IS infantrymen who receive regular wages, free rent, and medical care.97 Despite some indication of public acceptance of IS, a larger body of evidence points to significant animus between the Syrian public and members of the caliphate. Reports suggest that an IS-controlled society has devolved into a system of haves and have-nots, with IS members living in segregated enclaves in the most desirable neighborhoods while ordinary Syrians continue to suffer from war-ravaged conditions. Resentment has grown as more and more foreign IS members assume positions of authority within the administrative framework.98 The cruelty displayed by IS toward the caliphate’s prisoners—more than 1,000 are incarcerated in Raqqa province alone—reminds many Syrians of the pervasive malice and vindictiveness shown by agents of the Assad regime.99 Equally disconcerting to many Syrians is the way IS uses so-called “lion cubs” camps to indoctrinate children in extreme Islamist doctrine. Claims one sheikh who rejects Islamic State’s ideology, the result of camp programming is children who are able to kill “without batting an eye.”100 In order to show the world that IS is neither fair, equitable, nor moral, a group calling itself Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently has been documenting what it describes as war crimes perpetrated by agents of the new caliphate. Prognosis for IS in Syria Any attempt to predict the future for IS in Syria is difficult, since a multitude of factors are at play. For instance, continued stalemate in the Syrian civil war would tend to favor IS in the same way it would favor other insurgent groups such as JN and the FSA. If the Assad regime were to achieve victory; however, then IS would be forced into a defensive posture that could lead to abandonment of its Syrian territory. As of spring 2015, a total regime victory seems unlikely. Though Iranian backed militias and the US-led air power coalition have successfully eroded some of Islamic State’s territorial holdings in Iraq, it is doubtful the same combination of actors could achieve a commensurate level of success in Syria. The US is loath to use its air power in a way that advantages the Assad regime, but Washington also would not countenance the presence of significantly more Shiite militia activity in Syria than already exists. Notwithstanding the potential ramifications of choices made by external state actors, IS faces pervasive weaknesses in Syria that are quite daunting. First, it faces a fragmented environment featuring an array of adversaries that would be almost impossible to defeat or subsume entirely.

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With its strong ties to al-Qaeda, Jabhat al-Nusra will continue to thwart IS, and since it can draw on external funding it is less susceptible to the vagaries of indigenous revenue streams. Second, the borders of its current land holdings in Syria are too large to defend should the regime—or another insurgent actor—decide to go on the offensive. Given the loss of revenue it has experienced since coalition airstrikes began in late 2014, Islamic State’s ability to go on the offensive has been significantly diminished—though evidence of attempts in early 2015 to expand its territory in eastern Damascus and the Qalamoun mountain region near the Lebanese border may indicate otherwise. Third, despite the fact IS was able to attract approximately 6,000 recruits during the last half of 2014, the US-led coalition claimed that over 6,000 IS fighters had been killed by the end of January 2105. Even if IS is able to continue replacing fallen fighters, most new recruits have no significant training and end up becoming cannon fodder. However, through the establishment of sympathetic relationships with groups such as Ansar al-Sharia in Libya and Boko Haram in Nigeria, IS may be able to replenish its Syrian brigades with more experienced fighters. At the same time, if IS continues to have its expansionary efforts halted, as occurred in Kobane in January 2015, its appeal as an unstoppable force ordained by God will be tarnished. The result could be a rally-roundthe-flag surge in support from foreign jihadists, or a dampening of enthusiasm that would lead to fewer recruits. If IS in Syria suffers the type of territorial degradation its adversaries in the West intend, it may resort to adopting the strategy favored by al-Qaeda’s al-Zawahiri: attacking Western interests first and foremost. Al-Baghdadi’s call in November 2014 for all Muslims to rise up against the enemies of Islam may have indicated a change in strategy based upon a realistic self-assessment of the group’s future in the face of concerted efforts to roll back IS gains. In early 2015 terrorists claiming allegiance to IS killed Europeans and Yemeni Shiites in dramatic and brutal fashion, signaling what may become an increasingly important facet of the IS campaign on behalf of global jihad. Notes 1 Pinna Werbner, “The Predicament of Diaspora and Millennial Islam: Reflections in the Aftermath of September 11,” Social Science Research Council (2002), accessed March 12, 2015. http://essays.ssrc.org/ sept11/essays/werbner.htm. 2 Charles C. Caris and Samuel Reynolds, “ISIS Governance in Syria,” Institute for the Study of War: Middle East Security Report no. 22, accessed February 22, 2015. http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/ default/files/ISIS_Governance.pdf. 3 Emile Hokayem, “Iran, the Gulf States and the Syrian Civil War,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 56.6 (2014), 59–86. 4 Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi, “The Dawn of the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham,” Current Trends In Islamist Ideology, 16 (2014), p. 11. 5 Erin Marie Saltman and Charlie Winter, “Islamic State: The Changing Face of Modern Jihadism,” Quilliam Foundation (November 2014), accessed March 7, 2015. http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wpcontent/uploads/publications/free/islamic-state-the-changing-face-of-modern-jihadism.pdf. 6 Karen Armstrong, “The Deep Roots of Islamic State,” The New Statesman, November 21–27, 2014, p. 26. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid.

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10 Hayat Alvi, “The Diffusion Of Intra-Islamic Violence And Terrorism: The Impact Of The Proliferation Of Salafi/Wahhabi Ideologies,” MERIA Journal 18.2 (2014), 38–50. 11 Alvi, “The Diffusion Of Intra-Islamic Violence And Terrorism: The Impact Of The Proliferation Of Salafi/Wahhabi Ideologies.” 12 Dwight Murphy, “German Youth, Volkish Ideology and the Nazi Phenomenon,” http:// dwightmurphey-collectedwritings.info/UMP16-2-Volkish.htm. 13 Anthony N. Celso, “Cycles of Jihadist Movements and the Role of Irrationality,” Orbis 58.2 (2014), p. 233. 14 R. Bennett Furlow, Kristin Fleischer, and Steven R. Corman, “De-Romanticizing the Islamic State’s Vision of the Caliphate,” Center for Strategic Communication, October 27, 2014, accessed March 10, 2015. http://csc.asu.edu/wp-content/uploads/pdf/csc1402-deromanticizing-islamic-state-caliphate.pdf. 15 Saltman and Winter, “Islamic State: The Changing Face of Modern Jihadism,” p. 14. 16 Sohaira Siddiqui, “Beyond Authenticity: ISIS and the Islamic Legal Tradition,” Jadaliyya Journal, February 24, 2015, accessed March 7, 2015. http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/20944/beyondauthenticity_isis-and-the-islamic-legal-tra. 17 Siddiqui, “Beyond Authenticity: ISIS and the Islamic Legal Tradition.” 18 Emil Souleimanov and Megan Ouellette, “The Participation of North Caucasian Jihadists In The Syrian Civil War And Its Security Implications,” MERIA Journal 18.4 (Winter 2014), accessed March 7, 2015. http://www.rubincenter.org/2015/02/the-participation-of-north-caucasian-jihadists-in-the-syriancivil-war-and-its-security-implications/. 19 Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror, Regan Arts: New York, 2015. 20 Weiss and Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror. 21 Saltman and Winter, “Islamic State: The Changing Face of Modern Jihadism,” p. 43. 22 Weiss and Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror. 23 Saltman and Winter, “Islamic State: The Changing Face of Modern Jihadism,” p. 35. 24 Armstrong, “The Deep Roots of Islamic State,” p. 28. 25 Hassan Hassan, “More Than ISIS, Iraq’s Sunni Insurgency,” Sada Journal-Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 17, 2014, accessed March 9, 2015. http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2014/06/17/ more-than-isis-iraq-s-sunni-insurgency/hdvi. 26 Hans Krech, “How Stable Is The Caliphate of the Islamic State?” Estonian National Defense College Proceedings, 19 (2014), 148–63. http://www.ksk.edu.ee/wpcontent/uploads/2014/12/KVUOA_ Toimetised_19_08_krech.pdf. 27 Saltman and Winter, “Islamic State: The Changing Face of Modern Jihadism,” p. 35. 28 Krech, “How Stable Is The Caliphate Of The Islamic State?” p. 161. 29 Weiss and Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror. 30 Prem Mahadevan, “The Neo-Caliphate of the Islamic State,” CSS Analyses in Security Policy, Volume 166 (December 2014), accessed March 10, 2015. http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/CSSAnalyse166EN.pdf. 31 Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi, “The Dawn of the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham,” Current Trends In Islamist Ideology, 16 (2014), 5–15. 32 Mahadevan, “The Neo-Caliphate of the Islamic State.” 33 James Lister, “Assessing Syria’s Jihad,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 56.6 (2014), 87–112. 34 Celso, “Cycles of Jihadist Movements and the Role of Irrationality,” p. 246. 35 Brian Fishman, “The Islamic State: A Persistent Threat,” Prepared Testimony to the House Armed Services Committee, July 29, 2014, accessed February 20, 2015. http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/ AS00/20140729/102590/HHRG-113-AS00-Wstate-FishmanB-20140729.pdf. 36 Weiss and Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror, Kindle location 1551.

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37 Ibid., Kindle location 1984. 38 Amir Taheri, “ISIS’s Syrian Haven Safe from US bombs—For Now,” Asharq Al-Awsat, February 17, 2015, accessed March 3, 2015. http://www.aawsat.net/2015/02/article55341559/isiss-syrian-haven-safeus-bombs-now. 39 David Blair, “Oil Middleman Between Syria and Isil is New Target for EU Sanctions,” The Telegraph, March 7, 2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11455602/Oil-middlemanbetween-Syria-and-Isil-is-new-target-for-EU-sanctions.html. 40 Aryn Baker, “Why Bashar Assad Won’t Fight ISIS,” Time, February 26, 2015. 41 Blair, “Oil Middleman between Syria and Isil is New Target for EU Sanctions.” 42 Hokayem, “Iran, the Gulf States and the Syrian Civil War.” 43 Ibid. 44 Weiss and Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror. 45 Ahmed S. Hashim, “The Islamic State: From al-Qaeda Affiliate to Caliphate,” Middle East Policy 21.4 (Winter 2014), 69–83. 46 Kenneth Katzman, Christopher M. Blanchard, Carla Humud, Rhoda Margesson, and Matthew C. Weed, “The ‘Islamic State’ Crisis and U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Service Report, February 11, 2015, accessed March 1, 2015. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R43612.pdf. 47 Micah Zenko, “Obama’s Bay of Pigs,” Foreign Policy, March 2, 2015, accessed March 9, 2015. http:// foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/02/obamas-bay-of-pigs-islamic-state-isis-syria-iraq-special-forces/. 48 Richard Lim, “Terrorists, Insurgents and the Lessons of History,” National Security Watch 14.2 (December 2014), accessed March 7, 2015. http://www.ausa.org/publications/ilw/DigitalPublications/ Documents/nsw14-2/offline/download.pdf. 49 Fishman, “The Islamic State: A Persistent Threat.” 50 Zenko, “Obama’s Bay of Pigs.” 51 Anthony Cordesman, “The Real Center of Gravity in the War Against the Islamic State,” The Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 30, 2014, accessed March 2, 2015. http://csis.org/files/ publication/The%20War%20Against%20the%20Islamic%20State_0.pdf. 52 Liz Sly, “The Rise and Ugly Fall of a Moderate Syrian Rebel Offers Lessons for the West,” Washington Post, January 5, 2015. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/the-rise-and-ugly-fall-of-a-moderatesyrian-rebel-offers-lessons-for-the-west/2015/01/04/3889db38-80da-4974-b1ef-1886f4183624_story.html. 53 Isabel Hunter, “Meet the Syrian Sheikh Battling Islamic State Ideology One Mind at a Time,” Globalpost.com, March 6, 2015, accessed March 10, 2015. http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/ regions/middle-east/syria/150305/meet-the-syrian-sheikh-battling-islamic-state-ideolog. 54 Hashim, “The Islamic State: From al-Qaeda Affiliate to Caliphate.” 55 Kenneth Watkin, “Targeting Islamic State Oil Facilities,” International Law Studies, 90 (2014), accessed March 2, 2015. https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/4d347403-c433-4f63-838b-351ef2c79827/ Targeting--Islamic-State-Oil-Facilities.aspx. 56 Lister, “Assessing Syria’s Jihad.” 57 Hassan, “Islamic State in Syria, Back With a Vengeance.” 58 al-Tamimi, “The Dawn of the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham.” 59 Lister, “Assessing Syria’s Jihad.” 60 Hassan, “Islamic State in Syria, Back With a Vengeance.” 61 Ibid. 62 Weiss and Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror. 63 Ibid., Kindle location 3008. 64 Saltman and Winter, “Islamic State: The Changing Face of Modern Jihadism.” 65 Hashim, “The Islamic State: From al-Qaeda Affiliate to Caliphate.”

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66 al-Tamimi, “The Dawn of the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham.” 67 Hashim, “The Islamic State: From al-Qaeda Affiliate to Caliphate.” 68 Caris and Reynolds, “ISIS Governance in Syria.” 69 Aron Lund, “The Political Geography of Syria’s War: An Interview with Fabrice Balanche,” Syria in Crisis-Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 30, 2015, accessed March 6, 2015. http:// carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=58875. 70 “Kurds’ Syrian Offensive Threatens Islamic State’s Main Access Point to Turkish Border but not Militant Group’s Capital,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 23, 2015, accessed March 6, 2015. http:// www.janes.com/article/49624/kurds-syrian-offensive-threatens-islamic-state-s-main-access-point-to-turkishborder-but-not-militant-group-s-capital. 71 Saltman and Winter, “Islamic State: The Changing Face of Modern Jihadism,” pp. 34–5. 72 Lister, “Assessing Syria’s Jihad.” 73 Caris and Reynolds, “ISIS Governance in Syria.” 74 Weiss and Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror. 75 al-Tamimi, “The Dawn of the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham,” and Caris and Reynolds, “ISIS Governance in Syria.” 76 Weiss and Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror. 77 Caris and Reynolds, “ISIS Governance in Syria.” 78 “In Depth with Abu Ibrahima-Raqqawi: How Children Learn to Kill ‘Without Batting an Eye,’” Syriadirect.org, March 3, 2015, accessed March 7, 2015. http://syriadirect.org/main/36-interviews/1894-indepth-with-abu-ibrahim-a-raqqawi-how-children-learn-to-kill-without-batting-an-eye. 79 al-Tamimi, “The Dawn of the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham.” 80 Caris and Reynolds, “ISIS Governance in Syria,” p. 18. 81 Saltman and Winter, “Islamic State: The Changing Face of Modern Jihadism,” p. 38. 82 Dalia Ghanem-Yazbeck, “The Islamic State: The Fear of Decline?” Carnegie Middle East Center, December 15, 2014, accessed February 27, 2015. http://carnegie-mec.org/publications/?fa=57522. 83 Haroro J. Ingram, “Three Traits of the Islamic State’s Information Warfare,” RUSI Journal 159.6 (December 2014), accessed March 7, 2015, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2014.990810. 84 Mallory Shelbourne, Islamic State al-Khans’aa Brigade Publishes Manifesto for Women,” The Long War Journal, February 10, 2015, accessed March 7, 2015. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/02/ islamic_state_al-kha.php. 85 Brenda Stoter, “Islamic State’s Female Bloggers Draw European Women to Syria,” Al-Monitor, December 23, 2014, accessed March 2, 2015. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/12/europeanwomen-join-jihad-motives.html. 86 Krech, “How Stable Is The Caliphate Of The Islamic State?” 87 Caris and Reynolds, “ISIS Governance in Syria,” p. 18. 88 Simon Speakman Cordall, “How ISIS Governs Its Caliphate,” Newsweek Global, December 12, 2014, accessed March 6, 2015. http://www.newsweek.com/2014/12/12/how-isis-governs-its-caliphate-288517. html. 89 Janine di Giovanni, Leah McGrath Goodman, and Damien Sharkov, “The Money Behind the Terror,” Newsweek Global, November 11, 2014, 26–41. 90 Saltman and Winter, “Islamic State: The Changing Face of Modern Jihadism,” p. 50. 91 di Giovanni, et al., “The Money Behind the Terror.” 92 Mona Alami, “The Islamic State and the Cost of Governing,” Sada Journal-Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (September 4, 2014), accessed March 9, 2015. http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/ index.cfm?fa=show&article=56534&solr_hilite=.

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93 Howard J. Shatz, “How ISIS Funds Its Reign of Terror,” The RAND Blog, September 8, 2014, accessed March 9, 2015. http://www.rand.org/blog/2014/09/how-isis-funds-its-reign-of-terror.html. 94 di Giovanni, et al., “The Money Behind the Terror,” p. 41. 95 Thanassis Cambanis and Rebecca Collard, “How ISIS Runs a City,” Time, February 26, 2015. 96 Dominque Soguel, “Heard at Syria’s Border: Life in the Islamic State is Orderly, but Brutal,” Christian Science Monitor, September 21, 2014, accessed February 26, 2015. http://www.csmonitor.com/ World/Middle-East/2014/0921/Heard-at-Syria-s-border-Life-in-the-Islamic-State-is-orderly-but-brutalvideo. 97 Shatz, “How ISIS Funds Its Reign of Terror.” 98 Cordall, “How ISIS Governs Its Caliphate.” 99 Weiss and Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror. 100 “In Depth with Abu Ibrahima-Raqqawi.”

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Chapter 8

Those who face Death: An Examination of the Relationship between Kurdistan and the Islamic State Charlie Carlee

In this chapter, the reader will examine the tenuous relationship between the Islamic State and the ethnic group known as the Kurds. The chapter largely focuses on geographic and military history, militia and military analysis, and major combat operations. The combat operations examined are those which serve to best showcase the IS rise within the area and subsequent Kurdish resistance; they are Sinjar, Kobani, and al-Hasakah. Finally, the reader will observe the impact which the IS rise has had on the Kurdish autonomy and independence movements. In general, the reader will see that even though IS has risen and taken ahold within the Middle East, the Kurds have stepped-up and broken many IS offensives giving them a revived sense of nationalistic pride and a credibility on an international stage. The Kurds are located within the central conflict between the Islamic State (IS) and the governments of Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. The IS wish to deem their self-proclaimed caliphate legit, and the Kurds are a blockade with whom the IS must eradicate if their goal is to ever be achieved. The Kurdish peoples and their armed militias and military arms have stopped the IS within their tracks. Though the IS still possess an armed stranglehold in the area, the Kurds have lessened the IS’s grip and weakened their foothold. The question remains: how are the Kurds able to deal with this new local menace? To understand the Kurdish advantage against the IS threat, one must first look towards history and understand who exactly are the Kurds, what they bring to the fight, and the tactics in which they deal with the IS. Brief History of the Kurds The ethnic group known as the Kurds are of Iranian ancestry who speak a collective dialect known simply as Kurdish. As such, they are a non-Arab people who possess a great nationalistic pride in their heritage and ethnicity.1 Originally, the Kurdish population was centrally located in what was known as Kurdistan—located on the borders of modern-day Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. In the Medieval period, several independent Kurdish principalities were established. Over time, these principalities pledged allegiance to controlling parties in the region. Though, later wars between the Safavid and Ottoman empires in the 15th and 16th centuries left Kurdistan split.2 Finally after World War I, after the demise of the Ottoman Empire, the controlling British regime split the regional territories further with the introduction of the Peace Treaty of Sevres3 and the Treaty of Lausanne,4 effectively splitting Kurdistan into the four quadrants which are still present to this day: Turkish Kurdish, or Northern Kurdistan; Iranian Kurdistan, or Eastern Kurdistan; Iraqi Kurdistan, or Southern Kurdistan; and Rojava, or Western Kurdistan located in Syria.

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Although the Kurdish population was split geographically, it still held onto its individualism; the differing populations soon adopted its respective banners which now were in control, but still held tight to the traditional Kurdish community as a whole. Due to this reasoning, arguments for independent Kurdish States have been fervent since the treaties which broke them apart. This argument has been quieted within recent years since the upstart of the IS; although, autonomy and independence are still a main concern for the Kurdish populations, the protection of their homelands and people from an outside threat are of more importance. The strength of Kurdish resistance to the IS militants has since proven the spirit and tenacity of this oppressed people. Militarized Arms of the Kurds The most important piece within the Kurdish arsenal in defense of the IS insurgency is its militarized arms belonging to its various governments: the Peshmerga in Iraqi Kurdistan, the People’s Protection Units of Rojava, and the People’s Defense Units of Turkish-Kurdistan. These three particular units have proved vital in the operations against the IS. They are the barrier between the IS and total domination of the area. Where the state-led militaries have failed, the Kurds have prevailed. Though the histories of the Kurdish militaries are full of corruption, controversy, and battle against their local states, they have managed to push past those issues and evolve into a formidable opponent to face the menace of the IS. Peshmerga The Peshmerga is the military arm of Iraqi Kurdistan. Its name literally means “those who face death.”5 It is responsible for the defense of the land, people, and institutions of Iraqi Kurdistan. Due to the laws of Iraq forbidding any Iraqi Army from entering Iraqi Kurdistan controlled-areas, it is the responsibility of the Peshmerga, along with other Kurdish security units, to protect the interests of Iraqi Kurdistan.6 Its loyalties lie with both major political parties within Iraqi Kurdistan: the Democratic Party of Kurdistan (KDP or Partî Dêmokiratî Kurdistanî—PDK) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).7 The formal head of the Peshmerga is the President of Iraqi Kurdistan.8 The result of these mixed loyalties among Peshmerga members is that much of the power within the Peshmerga is decentralized; there is little to no inter-coordination of Peshmerga forces by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, Kurdistan Democratic Party, and the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs.9 The Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs controls 15 brigades of Regional Guards. The Democratic Party of Kurdistan controls ten regular brigades, the Zeravani or military police, the Hezakani Gulan, and the Hezakani Barzan—the latter of the two are those which are deemed elite groups tasked with presidential protection. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan are in command of 15 regular brigades, two presidential protection brigades, the Dizha Tiror or Counterterrorism Group, and the Hezekani Kosrat Rasul which is tasked with the protection of the Vice President of Iraqi Kurdistan.10 Though its loyalties are convoluted, the Peshmerga have proved themselves in battle multiple times over history. With its birth originating from the guerilla tactics used by organizations battling the Persian, Ottoman, and British Empires, the Peshmerga was borne of conflict in the name of defense of its people. More recently are its efforts against the oppressive Iraqi government during such anti-Kurdish operations as the Iraqi-Kurdish Wars and the Anfal Campaign.11 Most notably, however, are its efforts in conjunction with US forces during Operation Iraqi Freedom and its key role in the capture of Saddam Hussein and the downfall of his regime.12

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The People’s Protection Units and the Women’s Protection Units (YPG/YPJ) The People’s Protection Units, locally known as the Yekîneyên Paristina Gel (YPG), is the main armed wing of Rojava, the Kurdish area of Syria. It is tasked to ensure the regional security of Rojava. Though it is technically under the command of Rojava’s Kurdish Supreme Committee, much of its loyalties still remain with its originator, the Kurdish Democratic Union Party, or Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat (PYD).13 What is especially particular about YPJ is its inclusion of women as combat troops, specifically the Women’s Protection Units. The Women’s Protection Units, locally known as the Yekîneyên Paristina Jinê (YPJ), consists of exclusively women conducting various roles, but most important is their role within combat operations. The YPJ is lauded as a contemporary feminist movement within a land of repression. As photographer Erin Traub describes: There is a sense among the women that the YPJ is in itself a feminist movement, even if it is not their main mission. They want ‘equality’ between women and men, and a part of why they joined was to develop and advance the perceptions about women in their culture—they can be strong and be leaders.14

Both the YPG and YPJ work in coordination to complete all combat operations. If one were to hear about YPG fighting, most likely YPJ brigades are right by their side. Though this organization is young—with its foundation in 2004 and its first activation during the recent Syrian Civil War15—it has proven itself in its short lifespan. It has proved vital to the operations in defense of the IS incursions in Syria. The People’s Defense Force (HPG) The People’s Defense Force, or Hêzên Parastina Gel (HPG), is the armed wing of the Kurdish government group, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party—Partiya Karkarên Kurdistan (PKK)—in Turkey. It is formerly known as the People’s Liberation Army of Kurdistan, or Arteshen Rizgaria Gelli Kurdistan (ARGK). Often times the names of the HPG and the PKK are synonymous within news reports.16 This Kurdish organization, in conjunction with its overseer PKK, has a long history of combat operations under the auspices of demoralizing and deconstructing the Turkish government which instituted anti-Kurdish legislation. Although a strong core belief is present within the ranks of the HPG, its tactics of brutal armed conflict on Turkish and tourist alike have been criticized by many international communities, including Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. Although the HPG has a bloodied past within the Turkish borders, within recent years it has contributed to the fight against the IS alongside the other international Kurdish communities. It has contributed forces to a number of armed conflicts against the invading forces of the IS including operations in Sinjar and Kobani.17 It was also instrumental in the pressuring of the Turkish government in condemning the actions of the IS and retaliating.18 Foreign Recruiting Though, like most combat forces around the world, the Kurds rely of local volunteers to fill the ranks of the several combat brigades to counter the IS scourge, Kurdish forces also incorporate foreign volunteers to revitalize the fight against the IS. Although there is some hesitation to send

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state-mandated combat troops from international foreign entities, individuals from around the globe are discovering different ways to volunteer to fight side-by-side with Kurdish forces. Some organizations have taken note from IS recruiting strategies and have integrated social media and the recruitment process to attract a widespread audience to their cause. Most notable of the social media organizations is the Lions of Rojava. The Lions of Rojava is, in its basic roots, a Facebook group created by Jordan Matson, an American who is now a Kurdish foreign fighter.19 This group accepts applicants from around the globe to integrate in the lines of the YPG. Its Facebook page invites anyone interested to “Join YPG/YPJ The Lions Of Rojava Unit and send isis terrorists to Hell and save Humanity [sic].”20 Similar groups have sprouted up across Facebook with intentions of recruiting individuals with the sole mission to help curb the IS threat. Groups such as the 1st North American Expeditionary Force21 are calling for citizens with prior knowledge in military and first responder fields to dedicate their time and service in the cause of helping the Peshmerga, while groups like the 1st Battalion British Volunteers22 are calling for prior service veterans or other at-need specialties to take on unmentioned roles in the fight against IS. There are also organizations like the Peshmerga FRAME which boast application processes to informally induct participants into the ranks of the Kurdish military. FRAME—which stands for Foreign Registration Assessment Management Extraction—states that its intentions are not to recruit, but to allow a clear path for volunteers who wish “volunteer for Peshmerga and assist[s] them in getting over [to Iraq] safely.”23 However legitimate these previous organizations might be, many of the foreign fighter recruitment organizations do not use such strict guidelines when civilians proposition themselves for foreign service on the battlefront opposite of the IS. Though the foreign fighters who do possess prior skills associated with combat and emergency operations are being praised for their action among the Kurdish military communities,24 those who do volunteer on a whim with no prior experience in these specific fields are increasing in number which has proved quite controversial on many fronts. Multiple reports have surfaced condemning these recruitment processes among the international and Kurdish governments alike. Among other criticisms of the foreign fighter movement is those which look toward Kurdish law within Iraqi Kurdistan which expressly states the illegality of admitting foreigners into the Peshmerga.25 Though this law has been ignored at times before, allowing certain foreign fighters to fight alongside the ranks of Peshmerga, a concern for safety is still apparent among the opinions. Ministry of Peshmerga spokesman Helgurd Hekmat said in regards to the safety concerns, “[T]hey are volunteers, but we have to guarantee their lives and we can’t do that.”26 Even foreign fighters already involved in the operations against IS have voiced their concerns about the controversial recruitment processes. Among them is Alan Duncan, a former British soldier and Gulf War veteran, now serving alongside the Peshmerga, who stated: The vast majority of people who come don’t last here and only come because they want some extra likes on Facebook and get their 15 minutes of fame. To join the Peshmerga is like applying for any job. You have to have a skill. You can’t just be an Xbox warrior.27

The 1st North American Expeditionary Force has even spoken out against the lack of oversight within foreign recruitment. The creator, Ian Bradbury, spoke out in opposition to the practices by stating:

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The influx of individual, uncoordinated, fighter volunteers does not address this need … in some cases complicates scenarios by diverting precious manpower and resources towards ensuring the protection of those individuals.28

These concerns have caught the attention of international communities and have resulted in action on the part of US intervention in the foreign fighter movement. Reports have surfaced which have shown Western involvement in the careers of foreign fighters, including that of Canadian Dillon Hillier. Hillier is said to have been on the frontlines alongside Peshmerga forces until Canadian and US military advisors compelled the Peshmerga to remove foreign fighters from the frontlines of combat.29 Coalition Backing The rise of the IS has resulted in increased attention on an international scale. Especially since the recent attacks in the name of IS on civilian targets outside the sectors of the Middle East, many citizens in foreign states across the globe are worried about the IS spreading outside and overseas. This worry is coupled by the fact that the IS has effectively declared war on a global scale. This is echoed through the words of warning from Iraqi Foreign Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari, essentially stating that the IS threat is World War III: Economic markets, schools and all sorts of places frequented by human beings are under threat, therefore this is a world war. I believe the main concern for western countries and the European Union in particular is to prepare for this danger since the danger has already begun in some of the European capitals.30

Noticing the need for foreign involvement to curb the IS overgrowth, but lacking the motivation to go into yet another ground war, the United States government concluded to use strategic airstrikes to combat the IS threat. The US formed a coalition with other international entities to directly support the efforts of the battle against the IS. They called this coalition the Combined Joint Task Force. The US later added the operation name Inherent Resolve, which according to a United States Central Command news release: The name INHERENT RESOLVE is intended to reflect the unwavering resolve and deep commitment of the U.S. and partner nations in the region and around the globe to eliminate the terrorist group ISIL and the threat they pose to Iraq, the region and the wider international community. It also symbolizes the willingness and dedication of coalition members to work closely with our friends in the region and apply all available dimensions of national power necessary— diplomatic, informational, military, economic—to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL.31

The US-led coalition forces consisted of dedicated help from 17 different countries, including: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Jordan, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. The coalition airstrikes proposed soon turned the tide of battle for the Kurdish forces on the ground standing against the IS. However, soon, as supplies started to run low, the front lines became increasingly dependent on the airstrikes, making minimal headway on their own.32 Many pleas were heard from the Kurdish governments to the internal communities for support both financially and logistically. The Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government’s intelligence and security chief, Masrour

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Barzani, stated that the forces standing defense against the IS threat were “overstretched” and without logistical aide from outside sources.33 Listening to the pleas of the Kurdish resistance, the US dispatched 750 American troops to act as security for US facilities and military advisors, but even that did not suffice the need for logistical and financial support.34 Although the need was seen for more ground support for the Kurdish troops, the US was reluctant to provide such supplies. This was for many reasons, but the most apparent was the lack of US support of an independent Kurdistan—a reason which stems from the US interest of maintaining a unified Iraq. As Anthony Cordesman states, “The United States not only has to worry about the Islamic State, but it also needs to worry about the future unity of Iraq … If you make a mistake, essentially you can trigger a new form of civil conflict.”35 Much to the reluctance of many in Washington whom fear the tightrope-like walk needed to aid the Kurdish resistance, the US government approved legislation to send arms and ammunition to those fighting against the IS; also a number of ground troops would be dedicated to the mission of training Kurdish fighters. President Obama committed US troops to “support Iraqi forces on the ground as they fight for their own country against [the IS].”36 Major Combat Operations Though the operations in which the Kurds are against the IS are far too many to cover in just one chapter, for the purposes of this study, only three operations are selected: Sinjar, Kobani, and alHasakah. These particular operations showcase just how quickly and efficiently the IS can take over a given area and the subsequent retaliation and reoccupation of Kurdish forces within the areas. These three operations are perfect examples of the tactics and strategies used on both sides of the battlefield. The Rise of the Islamic State in Kurdistan Sinjar During the night of August 2, 2014, a band of Peshmerga fighters stationed in the town of Sinjar, which is situated near the Syrian border in Iraq, left the city in preparation of an incoming raid of IS troops.37 However, the Peshmerga troops left without giving warning to the Yazidi civilians who resided in Sinjar. This resulted in IS troops easily advancing, and ultimately, capturing Sinjar without much resistance.38 Unfortunately for the citizens of Sinjar, nothing stood in the way of IS troops who demanded allegiance under the threat of death.39 The IS assault on Sinjar resulted in at least 2,000 deaths40—with reports totaling as much as 5,000.41 According to a Yazidi member of the Iraqi Parliament, Vian Dakhil, men were slaughtered, women either killed or sold into slavery, and children were forced to limits of suffocation and dehydration.42 Although the IS troops captured some of the Sinjar locals, almost 200,000 civilians managed to escape from the destruction in Sinjar.43 About one-quarter of that number fled to the north-adjacent Sinjar Mountains.44 However much reprieve this location gave the escaped civilians, they lacked any food, water, or much-needed medical attention.45 The plight of the Yazidi escapees trapped in the Sinjar Mountains came into worldview soon after, and by August 8, Coalition forces began to conduct air strikes on IS locations and ration drops to the huddled refugees. By August 9, a safe passage was established by Kurdish fighters from the

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Peshmerga, YPG, and HPG.46 The Kurdish forces used heavy-duty machinery from way of Turkey to carry the feeble into Syria resulting in the evacuation of 35,000—of the original 50,000.47 YPG, PKK, and Coalition forces officially announced on August 13, that the siege of Sinjar was broken.48 However, IS troops still held control of Sinjar and some Yazidi refugees still remained in the Sinjar Mountains.49 The refugees left behind in the mountains believed it to be home and did not want to leave, so in the coming months after the siege had broken they were supplied by Iraqi airdrops.50 Kobani In mid-September 2014, the IS started their march upon the Kobani Canton.51 Within one week from the start of the offensive, they had already captured 60 Kurdish villages and surrounded the city of Kobani with a cordon of about 20 kilometers.52 Kobani, however was not encircled completely; due to its strategic geography, Kobani lay on the Turkish border. As IS troops continued their advance toward Kobani, refugees of the inhabited areas were evacuated across into Turkey while Kurdish reinforcements crossed the border toward Syria to help stalemate the IS advance.53 Despite an attempt to stall the IS forces by the YPG, by September 25, IS troops came within two kilometers of Kobani and controlled over 75 percent of the total Canton.54 Over the next oncoming weeks, continuing the IS offensive against Kobani, IS militants overran the suburbs outside Kobani proper, despite Kurdish reinforcements from the Turkish border and coalition airstrikes.55 As Kurdish troops retreated from their defensive positions within the Kobani outskirts, it allowed the IS troops to take control of the southern and eastern entrances of Kobani. However, despite the increased fighting surrounding Kobani, civilian withdrawal plans by the Kurdish forces were a relative success, resulting in almost 90 percent of the area’s population to be evacuated by October 4.56 Once stationed right outside Kobani Canton, IS forces were able to regroup and begin a surge upon Kobani. IS militants began attacking a strategic hill named Mistanour Hill on the southern side of the city. By late afternoon October 5, they had completely seized control of Mistanour Hill,57 giving them easy access to Kobani.58 Wasting no time, IS forces began entering Kobani’s southeastern and eastern edges, accompanied by artillery and gun fire from the strategic post on Mistanour.59 As the IS militants began penetrating more into Kobani, YPG fighters began setting-in to conduct ambushes and house-to-house fighting against the IS offensive.60 Although the Kurdish defensive was successful throughout the eastern corridor, the southern area, as well as some parts of the west, were still under IS control.61 With the help of coalition airstrikes, Kurdish fighters were able to completely rid Kobani of apparent IS troops by October 8. Though this victory was shortlived; IS troops were able to reinforce, regroup, and resupply,62 and by October controlled more than one-third of Kobani proper.63 Despite efforts by IS militants to blend in to their opponents—IS members resorted to flying Kurdish flags and wearing Kurdish uniforms to counter Kurdish opposition and coalition airstrikes64—both coalition airstrikes and YPG resistance led to failed attempts of an IS takeover of Kobani’s center.65 Though IS attempts were futile at the center of the city, they had still managed to successfully secure both the administrative and security districts, rendering almost half of Kobani proper under IS control by October 11.66 Al-Hasakah Beginning in February 2014, IS forces set their sights onto territory within the al-Hasakah Governorate in Syria. Over the course of the next ten months, several hundred towns and villages

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came under IS occupancy, including much of the Jazira Canton and the major cities of Tel Brak and al-Hasakah proper.67 To respond to this particular area of threat from the IS, in December 2014, the YPG and the Syrian Army conducted several raids to recapture villages held by the IS; however, the IS subsequently took the counter-offensive which resulted in ever more newly acquired territory. Regaining Ground Sinjar In December 2014, an offensive was established to retake Sinjar by Peshmerga forces backed by Coalition airstrikes. On the night of December 16, US-led airstrikes began to be carried out, with Peshmerga forces beginning to march on Sinjar the next morning of December 17.68 Peshmerga forces, totaling as many as 8,000, moved westward from Zumar toward the Sinjar area. By December 18, the Peshmerga already managed to recapture 700 square kilometers of area opening a clear path toward the Sinjar Mountains.69 As IS troops began fleeing from approaching Peshmerga resistance, Coalition airstrikes targeted key IS-held buildings and vehicles, further advancing the upper-hand of the Peshmerga ground troops.70 Beginning on the morning of December 19, Peshmerga forces initiated a three-pronged attack to further push the IS occupants from the Sinjar Mountains. The plan consisted of three Peshmerga units simultaneously attacking different fronts of IS troops threatening Sinjar: 1) from the Rabia border south of the Sinjar Mountains71; 2) from Tal Afar, which connects Mosul to Sinjar72; and, 3) northward to the town of Snuny, which connects to Rabia.73 On the same day as the three-pronged Peshmerga advance, the YPG announced that they held plans to march southward toward the Iraqi border to once again reopen the passage from the Sinjar Mountains to Syria.74 Although original plans for the Sinjar Offensive did not involve actually retaking the city of Sinjar, the Peshmerga broke resistance and entered on December 20.75 By December 21, Peshmerga forces, along with rejuvenated local militias, drove the IS troops from the center of the city. Also on December 21, the YPG had reportedly been successful on reopening safe passage from the Sinjar Mountains to the Syrian border after recapturing territory on both the Syrian and Iraqi border from the IS.76 Kobani Turning their sights from their unsuccessful attempts on Kobani’s center, IS forces looked to now control the main entrance for Kurdish reinforcements: the Syrian-Turkish border. Efforts included: a suicide bomb on October 13,77 an overrun on the border on October 13,78 an assault from the east on October 18,79 an attack at the border gate in the al-Jamrok neighborhood on October 26,80 and a final attempt on October 28.81 According to an YPG fighter that was stationed at the border crossing, if the IS took control of this key point “it [would be] over,” and if the IS continued this assault, it would be “impossible” for the YPG to hold their ground.82 However, the suicide bomb detonated prematurely83 and the four subsequent attacks were all repelled by Kurdish forces.84 With the IS’s attention focused on the Syrian-Turkish border, Kurdish forces were able to begin to take the offensive against IS forces still inside Kobani’s inner sectors. Kurdish fighters, along with coalition airstrikes, were able to recover about one-third of the city from IS control.85 Though an IS threat was still present within Kobani borders, it was cordoned to just the east and south sectors of Kobani.86 Continuing the assault against the IS onslaught, on October 31, 2014, the Turkish government allowed Peshmerga reinforcements to cross the border into Syria, signaling the first time Turkey

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allowed troops external of Syria to reinforce the YPG in Kobani.87 The arrival of the Peshmerga reinforcements proved vital to the Kobani defensive, resulting in the halt of several IS advances.88 With the resurgence of the Kurdish spirit after the fresh reinforcements from the Turkish border, the YPG were able to start an offensive against the IS, successfully weakening the IS foothold in Kobani. Within the next weeks of fighting, the YPG had successfully regained the once lost ground from the IS. By November 8, they had advanced through two neighborhoods of the Kobani Canton—alHaj Rashad and al-Baladia—inflicting heavy casualties upon the IS forces.89 Four days later, the YPG had successfully regained a footing within the southern district of Kobani and Mistanour Hill. The capturing of Mistanour proved invaluable to the Kurdish resistance as it also cut off a major IS supply line which led to the IS’s capital city of al-Raqqah.90 As the YPG continued their advance against the IS stranglehold over Kobani proper, they managed to progress from al-Baladia into the security district which held the main municipal offices within Kobani on November 16.91 Though the IS did not just retreat from the Kurdish advance, it proved disastrous for their resistance, as it resulted in many IS casualties including two top IS commanders, Abu Ali al-Askari and Abu Mohammed al-Masri.92 From the security district, the YPG began to take hold within the governmental district and by November 28, IS resistance had weakened as most militants were pulled from the areas to deter even more heavy casualties.93 Though the IS retreat was only feigned, as the IS once again conducted a counterstrike the following day against the YPG located within the newly acquired security and governmental districts, successfully recapturing both.94 Although setbacks were incurred in the northern districts, on the southern front of the fight for Kobani, YPG forces had managed to repel several IS advances. In the month of December, the YPG began operations to take back the neighborhood of Botan Gharbi.95 By the first of the year in 2015 the YPG completed their Botan advance and recaptured the neighborhoods of Boton Gharbi and Mishtanour. To complement their successes in the south, the northern YPG forces had once again recaptured the governmental and security districts. By January 5, 2015, the YPG controlled 80 percent of Kobani proper, almost rendering the IS onslaught futile.96 Over the next month, YPG forces began to conduct house-to-house and street-to-street operations to completely rendered the IS threat within Kobani proper obsolete. Although clashes still continued, IS resistance began to slowly dissipate. By January 26, 2015, the YPG successfully drove out the last remnants of IS forces from Kobani proper, fully recapturing the city.97 Al-Hasakah To accurately neutralize the IS threat within the al-Hasakah Governorate, the YPG began an offensive upon the IS-held territory. The offensive began on February 21, 2015, backed by Coalition air support.98 In conjunction with Peshmerga artillery strikes from across the Iraqi border and Coalition airstrikes on key IS positions, the YPG were able to quickly advance upon the city of Tel Hamis, capturing several tens of farms and villages previously held by the IS.99 Over the next week, the YPG established a foothold in the area, successfully cutting the main IS supply line from Iraq—a road between Tel Hamis and al-Hawl—as well as recapturing over 100 hamlets, villages, and Tel Hamis proper.100 The Kurdish offensive was not without resistance from the IS, however; soon after the alHasakah Offensive took root, the IS began to take route along the Khabur River toward the town of Tel Tamer, starting on February 23.101 During this attack, the IS was reported to have around 3,000 troops, including the use of multiple tanks, which helped them secure multiple small villages.102

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After successfully recapturing the Jazira Canton, the YPG began to clash with IS forces remaining among the outskirts of major cities, such as Ras al-Ayn and Tel Tamir.103 The fighting continued between these two forces until March 17, when the YPG were able to seize IS positions on the outskirts of Tel Tamer.104 Kurdish Independence Movements Perhaps the biggest outcome of the struggles against the IS, is the revitalized sense of nationalistic pride among the Kurdish communities. Indeed, the successes of the Kurdish forces on the battlefield have given them credibility on an international scale for their discussion for autonomy and independence. As the Obama administration’s diplomatic advisor on Iraq, Brett McGurk, told the House Foreign Affairs Committee, “I think the heart of every Kurd wants an independent state.”105 The dream of much of the Kurdish community is to one day regain control of an independent Kurdish state, much like the one which existed centuries ago. This dream has resonated within many of the Kurdish uprising throughout history, including the Anfal campaign within Iraq and the clashes between the PKK and the Turkish government. A completely unified and independent Kurdistan is still, however, a far-off thought for most realist thinkers among the Kurdish communities. Many realize that the closest the Kurds may get to an independent state within their lifetime is only autonomous rule. Autonomy is used by the state governments to placate the masses heralding for independence within the Kurdish regional governments. It is enjoyed by those within Rojava to some measures; however, true autonomous rule lies within Iraqi Kurdistan, with addendums made to the Iraqi constitution permitting self-rule in the interest to maintain a unified Iraq. Placation is not the only tool used by state governments, however. Instances of oppression to repress the Kurdish citizenry have been seen within recent years, like the action taken by the Turkish government. This is the reason for the uprising of the PKK in the region and the growing number of Kurdish independence proponents. Most recently, however, the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) put forth a referendum to vote on independence from the Iraqi government. This push for independence was constructed by the KRG and its President, Massoud Barzani.106 Preparations for the referendum began on July 3, 2014, and by July 7 he publicly announced that he would no longer “hide that the goal of Kurdistan is independence.”107 However, the direct impact of the IS incursions was that the KRG and Barzani would have to put a hold on the race for independence. On August 13, the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Hoshyar Zebari, stated that “priorities have changed” for the Kurdish regime. He continued to say that while the end goal of Kurdish independence was not “abandoned,” it had been “put aside” for the time being.108 Although this announcement of the discontinued Kurdish independence movement had demoralized some within the Kurdish community, the recent victories and advances against the IS threat has revitalized the nationalistic spirit within the respective Kurdish centers. The prowess that has been seen throughout the entire conflict on behalf of the Kurdish forces has given them credence and confidence to resume their struggle for independence once the IS has been removed from their territories.

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Continuing the Fight Though the previous examples of combat are only excerpts from the entire conflict within the areas of operations of the IS and the Kurds, it can give the reader a certain sense of the evolution from IS uprising to subsequent Kurdish defense. It is important to note, however, that victories are short-lived during this series of conflicts, either with the IS or the Kurds; when one area seems to be secured, another offensive will take its place deeming the victory in vain. Though the fruitlessness of the victories seem to demoralize much of the participating forces, it is necessary for operations to continue to relieve the area of the IS insurgency. If defensive and offensive operations subside on the side of anti-IS forces, then a wave of oppression will follow by the hands of IS militants. Until the IS is completely decimated by the hands of a formidable opponent, then operations are needed to continue to keep the IS advance at bay. However, the truest weapon of the IS is the ideals which it instills within its potential proponents. The idea of an IS caliphate and the foundation of principles on which it stands is the strongest deterrent it possesses to protect against a complete eradication by outside forces. The only defense to place in front of this ever-increasing wave of IS attacks is a ground troop which can match the IS potential. In an area with a less than ideal state-led military prowess, the Kurdish forces are the last bastion against the IS threat. The continued operations in which the Kurds clash against the IS insurgency within this specific sector of the Middle East are enough to keep complete IS control at bay. Notes 1 David N. Mackenzie, “The Origin of Kurdish,” Transactions of Philological Society, 60.1 (November 1961), 68–86. 2 Kevin McKiernan, The Kurds, a People in Search of Their Homeland (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 35–43. 3 The Peace Treaty of Sevres, August 10, 1920: This Treaty was later superseded by the Treaty of Lausanne. 4 Treaty of Lausanne, July 24, 1923, Section I, Article III, Line 2. 5 C.J. Chivers and David Rhode, “In Iraq’s Kurdish Zone, Anti-Hussein Forces Wait for U.S.,” The New York Times, March 21, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/21/international/worldspecial/21FRON.html. 6 “Information about Kurdistan,” Heevie Kurdistan Development Organization, http://heevie.org/ aboutkurdistan. 7 Nawzad Mahmoud, “Sources: Barzani Orders Peshmerga Forces Reformed, United,” Rudaw, August 25, 2014, http://rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/250820142. 8 Ibid. 9 Fazel Hawramy, “Kurdish Peshmerga Divisions Hamper War Effort,” Al-Monitor, January 13, 2015, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/01/iraq-kurdish-peshmerga-division-islamic-state.html# 10 Michael Knights, Policy Focus 137: The Long Haul—Rebooting U.S. Security Cooperation in Iraq, Washington: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2015. 11 Human Rights Watch, Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds—A Middle East Watch Report, Washington: Human Rights Watch, 1993, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/iraqanfal/. 12 Agence France-Presse, “Operation Red Dawn’s eight-month hunt,” The Sydney Morning Herald, December 15, 2003, http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/12/15/1071336860245.html.

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13 Wladamir van Wilgenburg, “Conflict Intensifies in Kurdish Area of Syria,” Al-Monitor, April 5, 2013, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/04/conflict-intensifies-syrian-kurdish-region.html# 14 Elizabeth Griffin, “These are the Women Battling ISIS,” Esquire, October 3, 2014, http://www. esquire.com/news-politics/news/a30270/these-are-the-women-battling-isis/. 15 Danny Gold, “Meet the YPG, the Kurdish Militia that Doesn’t Want Help from Anyone,” Vice, October 31, 2012, http://www.vice.com/read/meet-the-ypg. 16 John Beck, “Meet the PKK ‘ Terrorists’ Battling the Islamic State on the Frontlines of Iraq,” Vice News, August 22, 2014, https://news.vice.com/article/meet-the-pkk-terrorists-battling-the-islamic-state-onthe-frontlines-of-iraq. 17 Joe Parkinson, “Iraq Crisis: Kurds Push to Take Mosul Dam as U.S. Gains Controversial Guerilla Ally,” The Wall Street Journal, August 18, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/kurds-with-u-s-aid-push-totake-mosul-dam-1408322338 ; Agence France-Presse, “PKK joins battle against ISIL,” Gulf News Syria, July 15, 2014, http://gulfnews.com/news/mena/syria/pkk-joins-battle-against-isil-1.1360183. 18 Dorian Jones, “Turkish Kurds Want Ankara to Declare Stance on ISIL,” VOA News, July 25, 2014, http://www.voanews.com/content/turkish-kurds-want-ankara-to-declare-stance-on-isil/1965256.html. 19 Adam Taylor, “How Western ‘Foreign Fighters’ are Being Recruited Online to Join Kurds Against Islamic State,” The Washington Post, November 24, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ worldviews/wp/2014/11/24/how-western-foreign-fighters-are-being-recruited-online-to-join-kurds-againstislamic-state/. 20 “The Lions of Rojava,” Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/TheLionsOfRojava. 21 “1st North American Expeditionary Force,” Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/1stNorthAmeric anExpeditionaryForce. 22 “1st Battalion British Peshmerga Volunteers,” Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/1stBPV. 23 “Kurdish Peshmerga FRAME,” Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/KurdishPeshmergaFRAME. 24 “EXCLUSIVE: American Peshmerga Volunteers Praise Kurdish Fighters,” Rudaw, May 19, 2015, http://rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/190520154. 25 Adam Taylor, “Iraq’s Kurds Tell Foreign Fighters: We Don’t Want Your Help,” The Washington Post, February 17, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2015/02/17/iraqs-kurdstell-foreign-fighters-we-dont-want-your-help/. 26 Ibid. 27 John Hall, “Meet the Peshmerga’s International Brigade: From IT Workers to Ex-soldiers, the Men from the West Teaming up with the Kurdish Forces to Fight ISIS,” Daily Mail, April 21, 2015, http://www. dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3049019/Peshmerga-s-foreign-legion-fighting-alongside-defeat-ISIS-workersex-soldiers-brave-men-world-teaming-Kurdish-forces.html. 28 Campbell MacDiarmond, “Peshmerga Frown on Foreign Volunteers,” Rudaw, February 16, 2015, http://rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/16022015. 29 Stewart Bell, “Canadian Veteran Who Fought ISIS in Iraq Reveals His Near-death—and Surprise Return Home,” National Post, February 6, 2015, http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/canadianveteran-who-fought-isis-in-iraq-reveals-his-near-death-and-surprise-return-home. 30 “Fight against Islamic State is World War 3,” Reuters, February 1, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/ video/2015/02/01/fight-against-islamic-state-is-world-war?videoId=363066236. 31 “Iraq and Syria Operations Against ISIL Designated as Operation Inherent Resolve,” U.S. Central Command, October 15, 2014, http://www.centcom.mil/en/news/articles/iraq-and-syria-ops-against-isildesignated-as-operation-inherent-resolve. 32 Patrick Cockburn, “War with ISIS: The Kurdish Tiger’s Roar is Worse than its Bite—the Peshmerga Have Come to Rely on US Air Strikes,” The Independent, March 8, 2015, http://www.independent.co.uk/

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voices/war-with-isis-the-kurdish-tigers-roar-is-worse-than-its-bite--the-peshmerga-have-come-to-rely-onus-air-strikes-10093497.html. 33 Loveday Morris, “Iraq’s Kurds Want U.S. Help to Hold off Islamic State Extremists,” The Washington Post, July 24, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/iraqs-kurds-want-us-help-to-hold-off-islamicstate-extremists/2014/07/24/3b98895c-128f-11e4-8936-26932bcfd6ed_story.html. 34 Ibid. 35 Richard Engel, “Analysis: Why the Kurds are Losing Patience with US Over ISIS,” National Broadcasting Corporation (NBC) News, February 10, 2015, http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/ analysis-why-kurds-are-losing-patience-u-s-over-isis-n303481. 36 Associated Press, “House Grudgingly Approves Arms for Syrian Rebels,” The New York Post, September 9, 2014, http://nypost.com/2014/09/17/house-grudgingly-approves-arms-for-syrian-rebels/. 37 Tracey Shelton, “’If it wasn’t for the Kurdish Fighters, We Would Have Died Up There,’” Global Post, August 28, 2014, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/middle-east/140827/if-it-wasn-tthe-kurdish-fighters-we-would-have-died-there. 38 Tim Arango, “Sunni Extremists in Iraq Seize 3 Towns From the Kurds and Threaten Major Dam,” The New York Times, August 2, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/04/world/middleeast/iraq.html?_r=0. 39 Ibid. 40 Josh Levs, “Will Anyone Stop ISIS?” Cable News Network (CNN), August 7, 2014, http://www.cnn. com/2014/08/07/world/meast/stopping-isis/. 41 Steve Hopkins, “Full Horror of the Yazidis Who Didn’t Escape Mount Sinjar: UN 5,000 Men were Executed and 7,000 Women are Now Kept as Sex Slaves,” The Daily Mail, October 14, 2014, http://www. dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2792552/full-horror-yazidis-didn-t-escape-mount-sinjar-confirms-5-000-menexecuted-7-000-women-kept-sex-slaves.html. 42 Laura Smith-Spark, “Iraqi Yazidi Lawmaker: ‘Hundreds of my People are Being Slaughtered’,” CNN, August 6, 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/06/world/meast/iraq-crisis-minority-persecution/. 43 Arango, “Sunni Extremists in Iraq.” 44 “UN Security Council Condemns Attacks by Iraqi Jihadist,” British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), August 7, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28699832. 45 Smith-Spark, “Iraqi Yazidi lawmaker.” 46 “10,000 Yezidis Rescued through Safe Corridor, as ISIL ‘Fire on Aid Helicopters’,” Hürriyet Daily News, August 9, 2014, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/10000-yezidis-rescued-through-safe-corridor-asisil-fire-on-aid-helicopters.aspx?pageID=238&nID=70199&NewsCatID=352. 47 Shelton, “‘If It Wasn’t for the Kurds’.” 48 Ibid. 49 Dexter Filkins, “An Early Success for the Kurds in Sinjar,” The New Yorker, December 19, 2014, http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/early-success-kurds-sinjar. 50 Helene Cooper and Michael D. Shear, “Militants’ Siege on Mountain is Over, Pentagon Says,” The New York Times, August 13, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/14/world/middleeast/iraq-yazidirefugees.html. 51 “Islamic State Wages Assault on Syrian Border Town,” USA Today, October 6, 2014, http://www. usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/10/06/islamic-state-syria/16829997/. 52 Gul Tuysuz and Mariano Castillo, “Syrian Kurds Warn of Mounting Crisis as ISIS Advances, Takes More Villages,” CNN, September 19, 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/19/world/meast/isis-threat/; Seyhmus Cakan, “Kurdish Leader Urges world to Protect Syrian Town from Islamic State,” Reuters, September 19, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/19/us-syria-crisis-turkey-idUSKBN0HE0RR20140919. 53 Agence France-Presse, “45,000 Syrian Kurds Enter Turkey after IS Advance: Deputy PM,” Ekurd Daily, September 20, 2014, http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2014/9/syriakurd1350.htm.

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54 “Clashes Continue Around Kobane,” Aljazeera, September 25, 2014, http://live.aljazeera.com/ Event/Syria_Live_Blog/128067758. 55 “Coalition forces interrupts ISIL attacks to Kobani,” Cihan, September 27, 2014, http://en.cihan.com. tr/en/coalition-forces-interrupts-isil-attacks-to-kobani-1544262.htm?language=en ; Jan Ali, “ISIS Militants Behead Three Kurdish Civilians in Northern Syria,” Ajansa Rojnamevaniya Azad (ARA) News, October 2, 2014, http://aranews.net/2014/10/isis-militants-behead-three-kurdish-civilians-northern-syria/. 56 Agence France-Presse, “Kurdish Forces Continue Fight in Syria, Regain Control of Some Iraqi towns,” Alakhbar, October 3, 2014, http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/kurdish-forces-continue-fight-syriaregain-control-some-iraqi-towns. 57 Selcan Hacaoglu and Benjamin Harvey, “Islamic State Takes Hill Over Kurdish Border Stronghold,” Bloomberg Business, October 4, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-10-04/kurdishfighters-hold-out-against-islamic-state-in-syria. 58 Daren Butler, “Kurds Battle Islamist Militants Closing in on Syrian town,” Reuters, October 5 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/05/us-mideast-crisis-idUSKCN0HU07N20141005. 59 Ryan Lucas, “In Grinding Battle for Kobani, Syria’s Kurds Hold Out—For Now—Against IS Militants,” Fox News, October 12, 2014, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2014/10/12/in-grinding-battle-forkobani-syria-kurds-hold-out-for-now-against-is-militants/. 60 Agence France-Presse, “20 Jihadists Dead in Bid to Enter Syria’s Kobane Overnight,” Naharnet, October 6, 2014, http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/149941. 61 Lefteris Pitarakis and Basem Mroue, “Turkey: Syrian Border Town About to Fall to Jihadists,” Las Vegas Sun, October 7, 2014, http://lasvegassun.com/news/2014/oct/07/turkey-syrian-border-town-about-falljihadists/. 62 “Islamic State Jihadists Advance on Syrian Border Town Kobane despite US-led air strikes,” News. com.au, October 9, 2014, http://www.news.com.au/world/islamic-state-jihadists-advance-on-syrian-bordertown-kobane-despite-usled-air-strikes/story-fndir2ev-1227084446438. 63 Daren Butler and Oliver Holmes, “Islamic State Seizes Large Areas of Syrian Town Despite Air Strikes,” Reuters, October 10, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/09/syria-crisis-kobaniidINKCN0HY0IC20141009. 64 “The Killing of 10 Members of the Organization ‘ Islamic State’ in the Eyes of the Arabs,” Syrian Observatory of Human Rights, October 12, 2014, http://www.syriahr.com/index.php?option=com_news&nid =24802&Itemid=2&task=displaynews#.VDgYPPmUeyE. 65 “Kurds Holding Line as ISIL Push on Town,” Aljazeera, October 12, 2014, http://www.aljazeera. com/news/middleeast/2014/10/isil-bid-storm-syrian-town-repelled-20141011122119400795.html. 66 Suleiman al-Khalidi and Mariam Karouny, “Three suicide attacks hit Kurdish town on Syria-Turkey border,” Reuters, October 13, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/13/us-mideast-crisis-bombingidUSKCN0I20RI20141013. 67 Ammar Hamou, Mohammad al-Shamdin, and Brent Eng, “YPG Units Reportedly Burn Arab Villages,” Syria:direct, March 2, 2015, http://www.syriadirect.org/news/ypg-units-reportedly-burn-arabvillages/. 68 Agence France-Presse, “Kurdish Peshmerga Forces Launch Offensive to Retake ISIS held Areas,” The Guardian, December 17, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/17/kurds-peshmergaoffensive-isis-sinjar-territory-mosul. 69 Victoria Richards, “ISIS Latest: Kurdish Forces ‘Break’ the Siege of Mount Sinjar,” The Independent, December 19, 2014, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-latest-kurdish-forces-breakthe-siege-of-mount-sinjar-9934934.html.

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70 Tim Arango, “Backed by U.S. Airstrikes, Kurds Reverse an ISIS Gain,” The New York Times, December 18, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/19/world/middleeast/backed-by-us-airstrikes-kurdsregain-ground-from-isis.html. 71 Agence France-Presse, “Kurds Press Sinjar Operation in North Iraq,” Gulf News: Iraq, December 20, 2014, http://gulfnews.com/news/mena/iraq/kurds-press-sinjar-operation-in-north-iraq-1.1429595. 72 Ibid. 73 Isabel Coles, “Iraqi Kurds Claim More Territory After Breaking Siege of Sinjar,” Reuters, December 19, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/19/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-sinjar-idUSKBN0JX20G20141219. 74 Agence France-Presse, “Kurds Press Sinjar Operation.” 75 Kadhem al-Attabi and Ramadan al-Fatash, “Iraq’s Kurds press offensive against Islamic State in Sinjar,” DPA International, December 21, 2014, http://www.dpa-international.com/news/international/iraqskurds-press-offensive-against-islamic-state-in-sinjar-a-43622773.html?-title=Iraq. 76 “Kurdish Fighters Move on ISIL’s Mosul Hub,” Aljazeera, December 22, 2014, http://www.aljazeera. com/news/middleeast/2014/12/kurdish-fighters-move-isil-mosul-hub-2014122154534724406.html. 77 Suzan Fraser and Ryan Lucas, “Fierce Fighting Resumes Against ISIS in Kobani,” The World Post, October 13, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/13/kobani-isis-bombing_n_5975818. html?ncid=txtlnkusaolp00000592. 78 Al-Khalidi and Karouny, “Three Suicide Attacks Hit Kurdish Town.” 79 Fulya Ozerkan and Rita Daou, “Kurds Thwart New Jihadist Bid to Cut off Syria Town,” Business Insider, October 18, 2014, http://www.businessinsider.com/afp-kurds-thwart-new-jihadist-bid-to-cut-offsyria-town-2014-10. 80 “7 ISIS Killed During Clashes Against the YPG South of Ein al-Arab,” Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, October 26, 2014, http://syriahr.com/en/2014/10/7-isis-killed-during-clashes-against-the-ypgsouth-of-ein-al-arabkobane/. 81 “Iraq Peshmerga Fighters Head to Kobani,” Voice of America (VOA) News, October 28, 2014, http:// www.voanews.com/content/fighting-continues-in-kobani/2498916.html. 82 Susannah Cullianane, “Battle for Syria’s Kobani Intensifies; ISIS Takes Iraq Base,” CNN, October 14, 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/13/world/meast/isis-threat/. 83 Fraser and Lucas, “Fierce Fighting Resumes Against ISIS.” 84 Al-Khalidi and Karouny, “Three Suicide Attacks Hit Kurdish Town,” ; Ozerkan and Daou, “Kurds Thwart New Jihadist Bid,” ; “7 ISIS killed during clashes against the YPG,” Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. ; “Iraq Peshmerga Fighters Head to Kobani,” VOA News. 85 “Fighting Rages for Control of Syria’s Kobane,” Aljazeera, October 18, 2014, http://www.aljazeera. com/news/middleeast/2014/10/syria-kobane-isil-20141017141317370535.html. 86 “Fighting Rages for Control,” Aljazeera. 87 Humeyra Pamuk and Raheem Salman, “Kurdish Peshmerga Forces Enter Syria’s Kobani after further air strikes,” Reuters, October 31, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/31/us-mideast-crisisidUSKBN0IK15M20141031. 88 Ayla Albayrak, “Iraqi Kurds Make First Dent in Kobani,” Wall Street Journal, November 6, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/iraqi-kurds-boost-battle-for-syrian-city-but-no-breakthrough-yet-1415308109. 89 “About 20 Fighters Fell in Ein al-Arab ‘Kobane’ and the YPG Advances in the Area,” Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, November 8, 2014, http://www.syriahr.com/en/2014/11/about-20-fightersfell-in-ein-al-arabkobane-and-the-ypg-advances-in-the-area/. 90 Johnlee Varghese, “Kobani Kurdish Fighters Capture Strategic Hill, Cutting off Supply Route from Raqqa,” International Business Times, November 13, 2014, http://www.ibtimes.co.in/kobani-kurdishfighters-capture-strategic-hill-cutting-off-isis-supply-route-raqqa-613919.

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91 “Violent Clashes Since 84 Hours in Ein al-Arab ‘Kobane’, 28 ISIS killed,” Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, November 16, 2014, http://www.syriahr.com/en/2014/11/violent-clashes-continue-since-84hours-in-ein-al-arabkobane-28-isis-killed/. 92 Redwan Bazar, “Islamic State’s Commanders Killed in Kobane,” ARA News, November 17, 2014, http://aranews.net/2014/11/islamic-states-commanders-killed-kobane/. 93 “Frontline of Syrian City of Kobani in Rubble after Two Months of Fighting,” Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, November 29, 2014, http://www.syriahr.com/en/2014/11/frontline-of-syrian-city-ofkobani-in-rubble-after-two-months-of-fighting/. 94 “Violent Clashes in Ein-al-Arab ‘Kobane’ and No Less than 90 Shells on the City,” Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, November 29, 2014, http://www.syriahr.com/en/2014/11/violent-clashes-inein-al-arabkobane-and-no-less-than-90-shells-on-the-city/. 95 “YPG Fighters Advance in the City of Ayn al-Arab,” Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, December 2, 2014, http://www.syriahr.com/en/2014/12/ypg-fighters-advance-in-the-city-of-ayn-al-arab-kobani/. 96 Agence France-Presse, “Kurds Push Back ISIS in Syria’s Kobani,” The Daily Star Lebanon, January 5, 2014, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2015/Jan-05/283114-kurds-push-back-isis-insyrias-kobani-activists.ashx. 97 “Syrian Kurds ‘drive Islamic State out of Kobane’,” BBC, January 26, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/ news/world-middle-east-30991612. 98 Agence France-Presse, “Kurdish Forces Capture Key IS Syria Bastion: Monitor,” Ahram Online, February 27, 2015, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/2/8/124095/World/Region/Kurdish-forcescapture-key-IS-Syria-bastion-Monito.aspx. 99 Tom Perry, “Syrian Kurds Attack Islamist State in Northeast,” Reuters, February 22, 2015, http:// www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/22/us-mideast-crisis-syria-idUSKBN0LQ0RG20150222. 100 Tom Perry and Suleiman al-Khalidi, “Syrian Kurds Cut ISIS Supply Line Near Iraq,” al-Arabiya, February 25, 2015, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2015/02/25/Syrian-Kurds-cut-ISISsupply-line-near-Iraq.html. 101 Erica Wenig, “Coalition Air Strikes Push Back ISIS In Northeastern Syria,” The Daily Caller, February 26, 2015, http://dailycaller.com/2015/02/26/coalition-air-strikes-push-back-isis-in-northeastern-syria/. 102 Agence France-Presse, “ISIS Attacks More Christian Villages in Northeastern Syria,” The Daily Caller, March 8, 2015, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Arts-and-Ent/Culture/2015/Mar-07/289983-isis-attacksmore-christian-villages-in-northeastern-syria.ashx. 103 Agence France-Presse, “Kurds Hold Off IS Attack on Syria Border Town,” The Daily Mail, March 12, 2015, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-2992033/Kurds-hold-IS-attack-Syriaborder-town.html. 104 “YPG and Allied Forces Advance in al-Hasakah, and the Regime Warplanes Attack Areas in Deir Ezzor,” Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, March 16, 2015, http://www.syriahr.com/en/2015/03/ypgand-allied-forces-advance-in-al-hasakah-and-the-warplanes-attack-areas-in-deir-ezzor/. 105 Morris, “Iraq’s Kurds want U.S. help.” 106 Craig Bonfield, “Kurdish Push for Independence Derailed by ISIS,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 28, 2014. 107 Ibid. 108 Ibid.

Chapter 9

Regional Powers and the Islamic State Jorge Brown

Introduction On June 29, 2014, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was declared the caliph by his group, the Islamic State. With this declaration, the group claimed 1.5 billion Muslims were now under his authority and nation states in which they resided were void. In that moment the Islamic State went from a resistant militant movement fighting a foreign invader to that of a conquering force, using foreign fighters to aid in its own conquest of the Arab world. The regional powers discussed in this chapter will include Saudi Araba, Egypt, Turkey, Iran, Israel, and Jordan. Those selected share a border with the affected area or tend to be the policy makers for the region. Each regional power has reacted to IS in their own way and each has been affected differently. With the exception of Israel, these countries can be grouped together by the Muslim denomination, Sunni or Shiite, which dominates the political structure of each country. The Sunni-dominated countries include Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt. The Shiite countries are Iran and Turkey. Most regional powers have responded to the recent turmoil with humanitarian aid for the displaced, as well as military support in attempts to contain and destroy the Islamic State within its current territories in Iraq, Syria, and Libya. The humanitarian efforts have not necessarily been a direct result of IS, rather they arose from the civil strife that has engulfed Syria and Iraq since 2012. The displaced increase in numbers as civil wars and Islamic State take over territories and decrees Sharia law. At the start of the conflict between the Syrian government and rebel groups, refugees numbered in the hundreds. As IS started acquiring control of areas, those numbers climbed to the thousands. Reports state that in 2014 refugees from Syria were crossing the border into neighboring countries at 5,000 a day. As of March 2015, there were close to 4 million registered Syrian refugees among the participating countries of Turkey, Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, and Iraq. This has taxed the host countries such as Jordan, who only have limited resources for their own citizens. The general appeal for funding for the refugee is 4.5 billion dollars. The largest appeal for aid in history.1 The number of Iraqi refugees number just over 1.1 million, according to the United Nations.2 The Islamic State has used the civil wars in these three countries to gather greater influence over the region. By their account, they do not intend to stop their expansion in Iraq and Syria, but will continue to acquire as much territory as they are able to hold, through the core Islamic State group and affiliate militant groups, which have pledged their allegiance to the Islamic State and the caliph. Besides Iraq and Syria, IS forces laid claim to areas in Libya and on several occasions have led raids into Lebanon with the hope of securing a foothold there. How affiliate groups and their alliances have quickened the spread of the Islamic State’s influence, which extend beyond the regional confides will be discussed in this chapter. The Islamic State seeks to question the legitimacy of other Muslim states. Ross Harrison observes, “ISIS poses not only a military challenge to Iraq and Syria, and terrorist threats to the United States, but also strains the legitimacy of political boundaries of the region, potentially posing threats to Lebanon, Jordan, and even Egypt.”3 Its current focus appears to be that of a

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religious cleansing of Shiite Muslims in occupied areas, as well as the cultural destruction of anything non-Sunni. Yet, actions against Sunni majority countries suggest that it also hopes to destabilize those governments by encouraging supporters to join their cause either by creating internal conflicts in their home country or joining the fight in the current occupied territory. While countries like Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt are dominated by Sunni Muslims, IS still seeks to abolish all forms of government that oppose the caliphate, be they secular dictatorship or monarchy supported by the Sunni clerics. The Islamic State’s greatest asset is the discord currently in Syria and Iraq. In other areas it has capitalized on those dissatisfied with the government in place such as Sinai Peninsula and Libya. By establishing a Caliphate, IS has created a focal point where groups that share similar goals can pledge their allegiance and take up the name of the Islamic State. This branding has allowed IS to grow outside the confines of Iraq and Syria. Since IS has declared all nation states void, thus making every government in the region an enemy, the best way to deal with them is through a unified effort. That is to say, all countries working together to defeat a common enemy. As Harrison observes, “the threat that ISIS poses to the region creates an opportunity for collaboration between Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Egypt.”4 However, political and religious rivalries are the preexisting obstacles to the idea of a collaborative front against IS. Hillel Frisch summarized the root cause for this regional division: Worse still, instead of a unity of purpose between “the Arab masses and Arab governments,” Arab states and political movement have clustered into two rival blocs headed by foreign powers. The Iranian bloc consist of Syria; Hizballah in Lebanon; Shiite groups like Muqtada al-Sadr’s army of the Mahdi in Iraq; and Hamas. The other bloc, nestling under American protection, consists of Egypt; Jordan; Saudi Arabia; the Gulf States; Muhammad Abbas and his security forces in the Palestinian area; the Maronite, Sunni, and Druze political forces in Lebanon; and the Kurds in Iraq.5

Each country has taken a different stance on dealing with IS. The United States government, in order to protect its own interest in the region and protect the interest of its allies, created a military coalition to eliminate IS and restore order in the region. The main tactical strategy was to use airstrikes to eliminate IS targets and train moderate Syrian rebels and the Iraqi army. Saudi Arabia has taken the lead as the regional partner, and Jordan served as host to military training. Ten Arab nations joined the coalition along with 30 other countries throughout the world. Of the regional powers discussed two were not invited to join the US-Led Coalition, Israel and Iran. As of 2015, Israel has chosen to stay out of the fight due to the security risk posed by other terrorist groups, which pose a greater threat. Israel also has added pressure from the US government to stay neutral, similar to the request by the previous administration during the US-Iraq War, because Israel’s actions against an Arab nation, even as a coalition partner, creates more discord in the region than the value added from its military support. Iran is often considered a threat to the region and to the United States. This makes it unsuitable for a direct partnership between Iran and the US’ regional allies; however, this has not stopped Iran from backing Shiite and Kurd militants with weapons, tactical support and training.

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Iran As a Shiite Muslim majority nation, the Islamic State poses a direct threat to Iran. IS also threatens Iran’s interests in the region. Iran is a strategic ally with the Assad government in Syria. Iran also prefers the Shiite backed government in Iraq. Both have been placed under threat by the occupation of Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. In order to support their allies and their interests, Iran supplies Kurdish resistant with weapons. In addition, Iran has provided military leadership to the Kurds and Shiite militant, fighting IS. According to reports from BBC’s correspondent, Nafiseh Kohnavard, military leadership with the Islamic Republican Guard Corp have been coordinating with top level operators of Shiite militant groups to retake IS’ stronghold, the city of Tikrit.6 One such military leader is General Qasem Soleimani, the commander of (IRGC) Quds Force. Iran is no stranger to backing rebel and insurgent groups. The Quds Force is noted for its training of the Hezbollah in Lebanon. Hezbollah have already been deployed in the fight against IS, but as part of Iran’s support of the Assad Regime against all rebel groups involved in that conflict. Iran’s involvement in Iraq and Syria is important so as to protect its interests in the region and possibly expand them. While not officially involved with the US-led coalition, Iran’s involvement is necessary to the containment of an IS threat. One scholar compared Iran to a spoke on a wheel in dealing with the IS threat. The US is the center which leads the coalition along with Saudi Araba, according to another scholar.7 The US State department has encouraged Iran to participate against the mutual enemy. The relationship between Washington and Tehran has warmed due to their mutual interest in containing the IS threat. This much improved US-Iranian relationship could not come at a better time for Tehran, especially in the wake of nuclear negotiations. The conflict with IS gives Tehran another bargaining chip. As predicted by the Political Risk Services group, “Iran’s assistance in helping to protect an Iraqi political structure put in place by the US will not go unnoticed in Washington, and could reap benefits if the effort to beat back the offensive by Islamic State jihadist proves to be successful.”8 Iran has taken full advantage of this as it has negotiated for ease of economic sanctions. Iran has much to gain from this conflict, and it comes at a time when Iran’s leadership seeks to revive the economy. As the Political Risk Service comment, “Rouhani’s motives are purely pragmatic; his conciliatory gestures are aimed at easing pressure on Iran’s economy which has been badly hobbled by the sanctions”9 The easing of sanctions could result in 7 billion dollars in relief from the unfreezing of Iranian assets currently held in foreign banks.10 Iran’s backing of the Shiite militias may be one motivation behind negotiations with the Obama administration to move forward with Iran’s nuclear program. Michael Sakbani gives a clear example of Iran’s commitment to the region and why, Iran sent its Revolutionary Guard and al-Quds force into Syria and unleased its militia clients in Iraq and Hizbollah in Lebanon to defend al-Assad in his critical hours. Iran’s intervention in Syria has not been that of Islamic revolution; in reality it is an intervention by the Iranian state to serve its strategic interest through sectarian means, which splits the societies vertically and thereby tears the national tissue.11

Yet, other US allies in the region may disagree on the easing of Iranian sanctions and the possibility of an Iranian nuclear program. Scholars agree that it was the proxy wars between Saudi Araba and Iran that helped incubate IS’s growth through the civil wars in Syria and Iraq.12 As events in Yemen developed, it appeared that whatever reluctant cooperation exists between the two in combating IS could be shattered in the name of self-interest.

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On a more cultural side, Iranians, Shiite Iraqis and Kurds have a shared bond by possessing similar Shiite traditions. Iran also has a vested interest in supporting the Shiite backed Iraqi government that share similar political aims. In addition, during summer 2014 several popular mobilization units, including the Saraya-Khorasani, pledged their allegiance to Ayatollah Ali Khameneci. These pledges spelled out a potential division in Iraq—similar to the division of Germany following World War II. As Iran backed Kurds and Shiites pushed IS back into the Sunnidominated Anbar Peninsula, further action by the military force was met with resistance. Iraqi and coalition members felt the presence of Shiite militia in their area would spark culture clashes between the Sunni, fearing that the militia would use this opportunity to loot and exact revenge. However, the Iraqi government and loyal Sunni tribe do not have the military force necessary to dislodge IS from their area. Furthermore, it may be a necessary tool to allow the participation of Iranian backed forces; even if it comes at a high price, as Rod Nordland relays on behalf of an American official’s concerns, “Relying heavily on those forces [Shiite irregulars] in Anbar would outrage the Sunni population there … and might further alienate people who are still on the fence about whether the Islamic State or Shiite Iraqi government is the greater evil.”13 The only other alternative would be a ground force, which would be made up of coalition forces from Sunnidominated countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, or Jordan. Israel Israel is the only regional power, besides Iran, that was not asked to participate in the US-led coalition. This is the not the first time Israel was excluded from coalition forces in this region. Israel has stayed out of direct opposition of the Islamic State to reduce the possibility of retaliation. This reluctance included not responding to the killing of an Israeli hostage by the Islamic State on March 10, 2015. The main reason Israel has not engaged the Islamic State is because it does not see the Islamic State as an immediate threat. However this is in comparison to Hamas in Palestine, where they just finished a 50 day war during summer 2014. A ceasefire in August 2014 followed, but following this conflict tensions were still high along the Gaza Strip. Israel’s perceived primary threat is Lebanese Hezbollah’s presence in Syria. This adds to its continuous concerns about the Assad Syrian government being viewed as a major threat to its borders even prior to the Syrian civil war. Israel has done what it can to shore up its defenses against this conflict. It sealed entry into its territory to ensure that neither the Syrian government nor rebel forces, including IS, could use chaos from fighting to launch operations against Israel’s interest, especially in the Golan Heights.14 As stated before, Israel’s response to the Islamic State, at this time, has been indirect in attempts to secure its borders; however, this does not mean Israel has been passive in this conflict. Israel retaliated against Syrian forces following a missile attack that killed an Israeli teenage on the border in June 2014. While there is concern about the Islamic State, the Assad government joined forces with Iran-backed Hezbollah and the rebel group al-Nusra Front. The Syrian branch of al-Qaeda remains Israel’s chief security issue. Al-Nusra Front has been engaged with government forces in the Southern area of Syria, which is close to the Israeli-Syrian border. This places Al-Nusra Front in a better strategic location threatening Israeli borders. This led to Israel’s renovation and modernization of its border’s fortification.15 The majority of the Islamic State controlled territory is to the north. Israel’s position would change if the countries, serving as buffers states such as Jordan, were to become destabilized and embedded in direct fighting with the Islamic State. Sources in the Israeli government stated that if the Islamic State were to enter Jordan it would use military action against

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the group in order to protect Jordan, which it considers an important ally in the region.16 This could be a clear sign that IS will attempt to use an internal strategy against Jordan rather than an external to prevent such intervention from Israel. Further, the concern could become more real as the Islamic States influence moves towards Damascus, which is facilitated by IS affiliate groups. This will require Israel to reexamine its current strategy. As a regional partner with those affected by the Islamic State, the Israeli government has come forward in support of an independent Kurdish state in Iraq17 This is counter to the US and the international community, which supports the Iraqi government in Baghdad and continues to encourage a unified Iraq.18 Indirectly, Israel has been affected by the nuclear negotiations between the UN Security Council, Germany (G5+1) and Iran. Israel sees Iran as more of a threat to its interests than the Islamic State. A potential threat to Israel’s security that would move the Islamic State from a remote threat to a chief threat is IS’s recruitment of Hamas members who feel the current group is too moderate in its dealings with Israel, and are seeking a more extremist movement against Israel. There are reports stating this is already taking place. Rather than join the fighting, these new recruits are staying in Gaza Strip, developing cells that could be used to attack Israel from the inside. One such cell was discovered in Hevon.19 There was also a declaration, made in Gaza, announcing a new Salafi jihadi organization, and calling itself Supporters of the Islamic State in Gaza.20 If IS uses this strategy in dealing with affiliates to expand its influence and territory, it is only a matter of time before IS has cells which actively target Israel. Saudi Arabia In the Islamic State’s birthplace of the ideology, Wahhabism, there are mingling levels of support for IS. The Saudi government is a member of the US-led coalition; however, private citizens are assisting the group through funding, as well as providing fighters. The International Center for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence estimates that 1,500–2,500 Saudi citizens have joined the Islamic State. Encouraged by the United States government, the Saudi government has attempted to reduce their contributions of funds and fighters from entering the conflict. The Saudi government has gone as far as to make it illegal for citizens to leave the country to join terrorist groups. While this is in support of its allies, the Saudi government has more direct reasoning for creating these new laws. The government wants to curb the number of citizens exposed to radical ideas and given military training and then returning to Saudi Arabia. The royal family does not want the same radical movements in their own country. This was evident during the Arab Spring, where Saudi Arabia took an active stand against protests and other demonstrations that could lead to civil unrest. This includes any movement that is counter to the royal family. The government has used the IS threat as a reason to discredit the clerics in the Sahwa movement, the Saudi branch of the Muslim Brotherhood.21 The Saudi government sees the Muslim Brotherhood politicization of religion as a possible threat to the stability of the country. Another effort includes the use of royal sponsored clerics to speak out against the Islamic State, claiming it is the principal threat to the kingdom.22 Saudi Araba has invested considerable sums of money in hopes of maintaining stability in the region. This includes the financial backing of the new Egyptian regime and their support of the Egyptian economy. This was done by a joint venture with the United Emirates and Kuwait to loan Egypt 12 billion dollars.23 Saudi Arabia also contributed regional partners for defense, and humanitarian aid in the region along with the United Emirate.

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While the Saudi government is partnered with the US, it has a Sunni majority and has the closest ideological ties to IS. This is seen most presently in the youth of the country, who feel that the Islamic State is right in its interpretation of Islam.24 Furthermore, Saudi Araba, despite its position to the contrary, may not perceive IS as the biggest threat in the region, but rather Iran. There is some concern that attacking the Islamic State would benefit Iran and the Syrian government. Wehrey sums up the Saudi government’s challenge concerning Iran, “Riyadh’s attempts at containment of Iran are further complicated by intra-Gulf differences about the nature of the Iranian threat and how to deal with it.”25 Assisting Saudi Arabia in its quest to stabilize the Gulf region is the United Arab Emirates. It is a member of the US-led Coalition and has been an active member in airstrikes against IS targets. Only during the time when Jordan was attempting to negotiate the release of Lt. Muath alKasasbeh, did the UAE suspend airstrikes. It resumed airstrikes upon learning of the execution of Lt. al-Kasasbeh, in support of Jordan’s efforts. The UAE is also engaged in a battle of ideology led by Mohammed bin Rashid al Maktoum, ruler of Dubai and vice president of the UAE. He believes this is the only way to truly beat back IS and secure a lasting peace.26 Both, Saudi Arabia and UAE, seek to support neighbors in the fight against the Islamic State. However, their main objective is not the elimination of IS, but the stability of their own governments, and this prompted their financial investment in Egypt. Egypt Egypt is still recovering from its own participation in the Arab Spring. Since February 11, 2011, the stability of Egypt has been uncertain. Following the demise of President Hosni Mubarak’s 30 year reign, Muslim Brotherhood backed Mohammed Morsi, becoming the first democratically elected president of Egypt. However, tensions between Islamists and secularists resulted in several deadly clashes. There was concern that Morsi and his supporters were attempting to create an Islamic government and shore up their power. Many of the clashes revolved around the suspicion that Morsi was passing laws that would make his position a dictatorship. With this new constitution many feared it would usher in an Islamic government along with a disparaging economy, resulting in the call for Morsi’s removal. During summer 2013, the Egyptian military removed President Mohammed and the Muslim Brotherhood backed government from power. It was suggested that the Islamic government was causing civil tension that could lead Egypt to be embroiled in a civil war of its own. The military held a general election, and the new president, Abel Fattah el-Sisi, former commander of the military which led the coup to oust Mohammed Morsi and his supporters, was elected. The military has since began purging the Muslim Brotherhood from the political influence. Muslim Brotherhood supporters have staged several protests against the new government claiming it is a military dictatorship. Most of these protests have ended in violence. This has given the el-Sisi government the excuse to target the group. It has further begun to persecute the group, charging its members with war crimes. In September 2013, Egyptian courts declared the Muslim Brotherhood an illegal organization in Egypt. This included the seizures of the organization assets which resulted in the group being driven underground.27 The majority of high level members of the former government were detained on a variety of charges. Among those detained was former President Morsi, who was charged with inciting his supporters to attack and kill opposition during a protest outside the presidential palace in Cairo. Another verdict handed down against the Muslim

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Brotherhood included a death sentence against 524 members of the group. The majority were convicted in absentia. Ross Harrison suggests that this may not be the best strategy to combat IS or any extremist threat. Pushing the Muslim Brotherhood to the outside of the political sphere will make it susceptible to the Islamic State, as seen with many other groups. The Egyptian government should be attempting to build up relationships with the Muslim Brotherhood; otherwise, it is just another group that must be monitored for being a potential threat. There is clear evidence that the military is behind major changes and the crackdown on Muslim Brotherhood. One of the provisions of the constitution submitted by Morsi would have limited the military control, in contrast, the constitution submitted by the interim government following the coup solidified the military power over the Defense Ministry. In this same instance, there is clear notable fear of an Islamic government—including provisions—forbidding any political party with strong religious ties.28As Harrison concludes, it is better to have them as participators of the government process rather than outsiders, “to threaten the country if the Brotherhood is part of the opposition, rather than underground where it can plan attacks on the regime with ISIS.”29 This is similar to the Ba’ath party members of Iraq, which were disenfranchised following the fall of the Saddam regime. Due to the political purge, many of them went on to fill the ranks of the Islamic State. The Political Risk Services echoed this sentiment, “In light of growing gulf between Islamist and secularist political factions, and the high potential for the marginalization of the Muslim Brotherhood to radicalize the mainstream Islamist movement, a complete breakdown in law and order cannot be ruled out.”30 IS courts particular groups that have been pushed out of their societies and turns them against it. If Egypt continues on its current path with the Muslim Brotherhood, it is very likely that members of that group will be enticed to join IS, or the group as a whole will become an affiliate of the Islamic State. It appears that most attacks against Muslim Brotherhood are meant to discredit the organization. There is a fear that the Muslim Brotherhood share ideology with that of the Islamic State and other Sunni based jihadist groups. It is true that the Muslim Brotherhood seek the establishment of a caliphate; however, the organization as a whole shows no sign of supporting IS. The terrorist acts that are connected to the group are unsubstantiated. These accusations are usually followed by another organization claiming responsibility. Such as the case of an Egyptian police station bombing which was initially pinned on the Muslim Brotherhood; however, the Sinai Province has since claimed responsibility. This did not satisfy Egyptian authorities who continue to accuse the Muslim Brotherhood of the attack.31 With its own internal concern, Egypt offered its support to the US-led coalition, but remained reluctant to participate in military operations. Following the beheading of 21 Coptic Christians in February 2015, Egypt launched airstrikes against IS interests in Libya. Up to this point Egypt maintained limited participation in coalition airstrikes, focusing on internal security matters. Adding to security concerns, Egypt had an Islamic State affiliate begin operation in its territory. The Sinai based group, Ansar Beit El-Maqdis pledged their allegiance to IS and took on the name ISIS Sinai Province.32 Egypt borders Libya to west, with IS-controlled areas and the Sinai Province, which have pledged allegiance to IS in the East. Egypt is limited in its military options regarding the Sinai Peninsula due to the 1974 treaty with Israel following the Arab-Israeli War. Under the treaty Egypt may only have lightly armed law enforcement within the peninsula. There are reports of Egypt unofficially moving in heavy armament to better combat threatening situations. An example of Egypt attempting to stop terrorists groups in the Sinai was an Army operation that took place

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in September 2014, which included 22,000 soldiers, and heavy armament including a helicopter and tanks.33 Yet, despite this measure, the end result has yielded mixed results, and depending on the escalation in the area, it may be necessary for Egypt to work with Israel to allow so that the proper level of response is received from the Egyptian military. There will likely be a pushback from Israel for bringing heavy armament so close to it borders. It would be in Israel’s best interest to consider an exception to this treaty, so as to ensure the region is able to stabilize. The Egyptian government’s stability may be in question as the Islamic State attempts to attack Egypt from both sides, but their military is still one of the strongest in the region and it will take a large effort by IS to make headway there. Turkey On September 11, 2014, Arab nations met in Saudi Arabia to agree on a strategy for dealing with the Islamic threat. Ten of the nations present made a commitment to a US-led coalition; however, Turkey was not able to take direct action or fully endorse the actions of its Arab neighbors. On June 12, 2014, IS militants overran Mosul, taking possession of the city. Militants captured 49 Turkish citizens from the Turkish embassy. While IS held these hostages, Turkey was cautious in displaying outward support of coalition activities. Turkey went so far, as to be the only US ally that would not sign the September 11 communiqué. In addition to taking a stance against military support for the US-led coalition, the Turkish government also forbade the launching of any military operation from military bases in Turkey.34 On September 20, 2014, the hostages were released. Turkey gave no official word on exactly what compromise was reached to secure the release of the hostages. Several potential deals were made public, though denied by the Turkish government. The first potential deal to be reached was the withdrawal of Turkish forces, which were guarding the tomb of Suleyman Shah, the grandfather of the founder of the Ottoman Empire. Had the Turkish military guarding the Ottoman emperor’s tomb withdrawn, it would have allowed IS forces to take control of the grave site; however, to be on the safe side, the government created a new grave site outside the control of the Islamic State. Turkey claimed this was to remove any leverage by terrorist organizations,35 but it is more likely that this was done as part of a deal brokered with the Islamic State, as it would appear the relocation of the grave would remove it as a future bargaining chip. The removal violated an agreement which allowed Turkish presence on Syrian soil. If order is ever reestablished in Syria this land exchange could cause conflicts between Syria and Turkey. The other deal, which was alluded to earlier, was the event in which Turkey conducted a prisoner release of militants that were being detained at the time, although unconfirmed at this point. Reports stated that small groups were released at the Syrian border. It is estimated that 180 prisoners were released in this fashion.36 The Turkish government is not the only one receiving attention for their support of the Islamic State, but according to, The International Center for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence, an estimated 600 Turkish nationals have joined the Islamic State fighting force.37 Turkey is protected from the possibility of direct attack by the Islamic State as an invading force due to Turkey’s membership in NATO. Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen issued a statement on August 11, 2014, “We are very much concerned about activities of the so-called Islamic State … If any of our allies, and in this case of course particular Turkey, were to be threaten from any source of threat, we won’t hesitate to take all steps necessary to ensure effective defense of Turkey or any other ally,” 38

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The Turkish government has also experienced the indirect effects of the Islamic State. The Iranian support of the Kurdish forces in Iraq have prompted concern of the Kurds in Turkey. “Turkey’s reluctance stems in from its desire not to do anything that might strengthen the Kurdish populist movement in the region. The defense of Kobani is being led by the People’s Protection Units, or YPG. an affiliate of PKK., which is officially listed as a terrorist organization.”39 Considered by Turkish officials as rebels, the strength of the Kurds in Iraq will increase the position of Kurds elsewhere. “Turkey sees the PYD [Syrian Kurd’s Democratic Union Party (PYD)] as the Syrian wing of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and has designated it a terrorist organization.”40 The fear of a strong Kurdish movement even triggered the Turkish to launch airstrikes on Kurdish target in Syria.41 It was feared by many, after a 30 year fight between the PKK and Turkey ended by a ceasefire agreement in 2013, fighting would reignite.42 Additionally, an oil deal between Turkey and Iraq’s Regional Government may have been the incentive for a peaceful relationship with the PKK. However, while a deal of this magnitude may facilitate stability, it would put a strain on the Turkish Iraqi relationships, as the Iraqi government seeks to keep a unified Iraq by attempting to dissuade ties which would encourage Kurdish’s independence from a war torn nation.43 Despite the economic benefit to Turkey, there is no desire on its part to encourage Kurdish independence, and this deal could indirectly influence that. Turkey has also profited by the Islamic State. There are reports that Turkey served as a broker or, at the least, turned a blind eye to the smuggling of illegal diesel produced at IS-controlled refineries.44 The smuggling became so common that, unlike Kobani, the Turkish border was enforced with mine fields and equipped with a heavy armored division. Conversely, other areas of the border were weak enough for smugglers to build crude pipelines to transport the diesel to buyers. The Hatay province of Turkey, which was once part of Syria but annexed by Turkey in 1939, had been an area of conflict. This area was heaviest with smuggling, primarily across the Orontes River. Smuggling included, but was not limited to black market oil, and also served as a gateway for foreign fighters into Syria. Possible reasons for the Turkish government’s blind eye to operations could be linked to the 49 Turkish hostages. Following international pressure, Turkey obtained a more aggressive stance in decreasing smuggling into the province.45 It is estimated that during the height of the oil smuggling operation, the Islamic State earned two million dollars a day with revenue of 800 million.46 At the same time, it blamed its allies for not providing timely intelligence in order for Turkish forces to intercept smugglers.47 One more struggle for securing Turkey is the fact that petitioning members of the European Union, citizens of EU, cannot be blocked from entry into Turkey. Turkey is one of the only countries in the region to tolerate Muslim Brotherhood. This has not been appreciated by other states, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, who feel the group is a threat to regional stability. Jordan While a key US regional ally, Jordan, would not normally be considered a regional power, and events surrounding the beginning of 2015 pushed it to the forefront of the conflict with IS. “Jordan, part of the US-led coalition, has already faced pressure from its own Muslim Brotherhood, which is opposed to the government role in air raids in Syria and Iraq.”48 In its current state, the Islamic State does not have a chance to go head to head with the Jordanian military. Jordan’s military is well trained and equipped, thanks to the funding provided by the United States. It is also as, David Schenker of the Wall Street Journal observes, “The Jordanian Armed Forces is cohesive, competent,

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nonsectarian and loyal to King Abdullah.”49 The Islamic States’ best chance for expanding its sphere of influence in Jordan is through the recruitment and development of cells in that can work internally to bring down government. There have been staged protests by IS supporters against King Abdullah’s pro-west government. On June 20, 2014, there was a protest in support of the Islamic State in the city of Mann. It should be pointed out that this is an economically depressed area of Jordan, and these types of areas are known to be of great recruitment. Those looking for a better life see the Islamic State as the answer.50 The International Center for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence estimates that 1,500 Jordanians have joined the Islamic State as foreign fighters.51 This is second in number only to Saudi Arabia. On January 3, 2015, Moath al-Kasasbeh, a Jordan fighter pilot was burned alive in a cage. Prior to the execution, the Jordanians interest in the conflict with the Islamic State was lukewarm. It is reported that many questioned the Jordan’s level of support and involvement in the US-led coalition. The country also occupied large numbers of Islamic State sympathizers. During Lt. alKasasbeth imprisonment, there was a strong opposition calling for Jordan’s withdrawal from the coalition. Many of those who called for a withdrawal lived in Jordan, primarily in the southern part of the country where Lt. al-Kasasbeth’s tribe is based.52 Following the execution of Moath al-Kasasbeh, national outrage was directed towards the Islamic State. The execution prompted air strikes against IS’ training facilities and the execution of political prisoner, Saijda al-Rishawi, who had been part of the ransom demands to Jordan.53 King Abdullah of Jordan vowed to the nation, following the execution of Lt. al-Kasabeh that they would fight to eliminate IS until Jordan ran out of fuel or ammunition.54 King Abdullah became a spokesman against IS, calling on the UN and other bodies to support the fight against the Islamic State. Many feel the US government cannot provide what King Abdullah can for the region. “As a Muslim of the highest religious lineage, his argument that IS does not represent Islam is much more important than any such claims from the president of the United States. As an Arab leader, his military objectives are less vulnerable to anti-colonial conspiracy theorists.”55 The Islamic State’s action against Jordan changes the focus of their attack. Regarding the conflict in Syria and Iraq, the focus was on Shiite Muslims as well as, non-Sunni Muslims. The capture and execution of the Jordanian pilot constitutes a direct attack against Sunni Muslims. Some analysts see this as a calculated move by the Islamic State to polarize those in Jordan who may support the Islamic State.56 It was their intention to weaken the government in US-friendly government in Jordan, and one example was the timing of the execution. Reports show that Lt. alKasabeth was executed in January; however, the Islamic State did not release the tape until King Abdullah arrived in Washington, a month later in February. For the time being, it appears that the Islamic State has unified the Jordanian population rather than divided it. There are those that feel this united front will not last. Emotions from the execution will start to fade and the grim reality of war will begin to effect the psyche of the country as more and more Jordan soldiers lose their lives in the conflict.57 Sharing a border with both Syria and Iraq, Jordan has become a host for refugees fleeing from violent conflict. Syrian refugee numbers in Jordan soar over 600,000.58 The Jordanian government has fortified its borders against the Islamic State as well as, the civil war between Syrian government forces and rebel forces. This required a huge investment from the government, which in 2013 spent 1 billion dollars, a third of its budget to increase border security. Following territory loss of the Islamic State in Iraq, IS forces have expanded their front in Syria to the outskirts of Damascus prompting the Jordanian government to close the last major trade border. Jordan still maintains limited access, making way for refugees fleeing the conflict. Economically, the Syrian Civil war and the Islamic State have placed a strain on trade between the regional powers and Syria and Iraq.

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William Booth of the Washington Post comments on the value and estimated loss by the closing of this border crossing, “Billions of dollars in goods once passed through the gates here, a crucial link in what was a vital trade network that ferried vegetables, electronics, marble and steel between Europe and the Middle East via Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Iraq and Saudi Arabia.”59 While the closing is damaging to the trade industry in Syria and Jordan, its greatest impact is felt by Lebanese farmers with 65 percent of agricultural exports to other countries in the region going through this area.60 Lebanon Lebanon has its own complicated internal troubles with the Syrian civil war, but they begin with increased pressure from the Islamic State. Lebanon is a country racked with internal struggles and IS looks to aggravate those contentions with its own gain in mind. Scholars contemplate the possibilities of the current state of Lebanon as follows, “Likewise, in Lebanon, sectarianism is extremely potent, especially with the ever-present potential of a civil war pitting most Christians, Sunnis and Druze against the Hizballah-dominated Shiite community”61 The International Center for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence estimates that 900 Lebanon nationals have joined the Islamic State.62 The Islamic State attempted, on several occasions, to invade Lebanon near the Northeast portion of the Lebanon-Syrian border; main targets included military bases around the town of Arsal. In August 2014, IS militants captured Lebanese soldiers in a raid within the vicinity of Arsal. A similar clash took place on February 3, 2015. Lebanese military ensured the media the border around this area was secure, making it impossible for further incursion.63 In response to earlier attacks, Saudi Arabia gave the Lebanese army 1 billion dollars to improve security around the area.64 Aided by Iran, the Hezbollah have actively supported the Syrian government against the rebel forces including IS. This has made the country a target for revenge and possible expansion. Iran will continue to support the Hezbollah in this conflict because of their political interest in Iran. Saudi Arabia’s contribution to the Lebanese army may be an attempt to sway Lebanon’s allegiance. Yemen Like Jordan, Yemen would not be considered a traditional regional power. However, events occurring in Yemen could usher in the necessary responses to IS, or expose the sectarian fighting between the regional powers. This would prevent them from unifying against IS. It was believed their political agendas to stop the Islamic State were pushed aside; but regional ambition has prompted reaction. In a move that clearly showed who instilled fear in the Arab world the most, the Arab League went forward with the creation of a military force, which was made up of member states, to fight under the Arab League. Other than the suspension of Syrians from the league, no other major proclamations came out against the Islamic State. However, the military force was not created for the purpose of fighting IS, but rather to deter possible Iranian support of Houthis rebels in Yemen. Houthis rebels are in favor of the recently ousted President Al Bardita, who forced the current government into exile. The rebels went further and routed the current government out of the capital. This led to Saudi led coalition airstrikes against the rebels. The formation of the military force by the Arab League was a good idea, but with the wrong target. Iran’s actions in Yemen could undo all of the goodwill fostered during the Iran-backed Shiite militia, which helped to drive the Islamic State out of Tikrit. Unlike the conflict with IS, clear

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battle lines have been drawn between the Arab states and Iran. Rather than trying to curb Iran’s ambitions, it should consider these forces as a tool to better deal with the IS in the Sunni-dominated Anbar Peninsula. Conclusion The momentum concerning the writing of this chapter is focused on military action. The Islamic State is surrounded by governments that declare null and void, for fear of retaliation of supporting any coalition. However, after events provoked by the Islamic State took place in opposition of Jordan and Egypt, it is clear it is an enemy of the region’s nation states. The Islamic State executed their citizens with unjust cause, devastated the region’s economy, and stayed clear in their goal; to destroy the fabric of the current regional government in favor of Caliphate. For these nations to expel the Islamic State as a threat, a more constrained military effort must be implemented. This will be difficult, as the Islamic State continues to fuel sectarian fighting that targets Shiites and other Muslim sects because it feels they are apostolates. As the Islamic State makes it way to Damascus, there is real potential for complete loss for Syria. In Egypt and elsewhere the continued persecution of the Muslim Brotherhood potentially increases the presence of the Islamic State, which opens up the opportunity for destabilization of the country. Old political rivalries have gotten in the way of a united stand against IS. And while scholars and politicians understand it is the ideology that must be fought, it is also the realization that, if left unchecked, the Islamic State will continue to grow. Ross Harrison sums up the cost of such a mistake, “Failure to address the question of political identity in the Arab world could mean leaving it to ISIS and the broader jihadist movement to answer.”65 Political and economic interests govern the action of a country. For some governments, the Islamic State has provided a source of revenue, but for others it has created an economic burden by destroying trade and creating millions of displaced refugees. Individuals faced with decisions to support IS must carefully weigh what the bigger threat is. However, with disenfranchised populations and economies wrecked by armed conflicts, the Islamic State will have a place for them. It is time for resolution. The Islamic State will continue to wage war against those perceived as traitors to the Caliphate. It wages this war externally and internally until the offending government are no more. If the regional powers wish for stability which extends past their borders, they must consider the region’s best interest of their own. A complete regional strategy is the only means to this end. Notes 1 UNHCR, Stories from Syrian Refugees: Discovering the Human Faces of a Tragedy, Updated March 24, 2015, Accessed March 25, 2015. http://data.unhcr.org/syrianfrfugees/syria.php. 2 Richard Allen Greene, “Current Fighting Pushes Iraqi Refugee Population Past 1 Million,” CNN US Edition, June 19, 2014, Accessed March 10, 2015. 3 Ross Harrison. “Towards a Regional Strategy Contra ISIS,” Parameters: Journal of the US Army War College 44.3 (2014): 42. 4 Harrison. “Towards a Regional Strategy,” 45. 5 Hillel Frisch. “Pan-Arabism and Its Competitors: Islamic Radicals and the Nation State,” Critical Review 22, no.1: 3. DOI 10.1080/08913811003625455.

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6 Nafiseh Kohnavard, “Tikrit: ‘Iran Key in Fight to Wrest City from IS,’” BBC News Middle East, March 3, 2015, Accessed March 4, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-31705600. 7 Frederic Wehrey, “The Saudi Thermidor,” Current History 113.7 (December 2014): 345. 8 PRS Group. Iran Country Report August 2014. U-2. 9 Political Risk Services, Iran Country Forecast, (March 31, 2014), 12. 10 Ibid., p. 13. 11 Michael Sakbani, “The Spring That Has Not Flowered: What Went Wrong with the Arab Spring, Contemporary Arab Affairs 8.2 (March 2015): 245. 12 Harrison. “Towards a Regional Strategy,” 44. 13 Rod Nordland, “After Victory in Tikrit, A New Plan of Attack; Sunni Leaders Reject Use of Shiite Militias to Clear ISIS from Anbar Province,” International New York Times News (April 9, 2015). 14 Jonathan Spyer. “Proceeding with Caution: The Current Balance of Forces in the Syrian Civil War and Israeli Concerns,” Middle East Review of International Affairs 18, No. 2, 51. 15 Ibid., p. 52. 16 “Israel says, ‘would not hesitate’ to Intervene if ISIS Attacks Jordan’ Ammun News Website in English translated by BBC Monitoring Middle East-Political, September 16, 2014. 17 Frida Ghitis. “Emotional Bond, Strategic Interest Link Israel and Iraqi Kurds,” World Politics Review 1. Political Science Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed March 11, 2015) 18 Ibid. 19 Ari Yashar, “Hundreds of Hamas terrorists in Israel Switching to ISIS,” Arutz 7 Radio website translated BBC Monitoring Middle East-Political, January 10, 2015. (Accessed March 10, 2015) 20 Yoram Schweitzer and Sani Avita, “Jihadi War in Sinai” translated BBC Monitoring Middle East, September 28, 2014. Accessed February 21, 2015. 21 Wehrey, “The Saudi Thermidor,” 346. 22 Frederic Wehrey, “The Saudi Thermidor,” Current History 113.7 (December 2014): 347. 23 PRS Group, Egypt County Report, 20; Wehrey, Saudi Thermidor, 345. 24 Wehrey, Saudi Thermidor, 346. 25 Ibid., p. 348. 26 PRS Group, United Arab Emirates Country Report, October 31, 2014, 11. 27 PRS Group, “Egypt Country Report” January 2014, 13. 28 Ibid., p. 22. 29 Harrison. “Towards a Regional Strategy,” 42. 30 PRS, “Egypt Country Report,” 25. 31 Muslim Brotherhood blamed for attack conducted by Sinai Provience. 32 Ismail Alexandrani, Center for Applied Policy Research, Lugwig Maximillans-Univesitat Munich No. 1 (February 2015). 33 PRS Group. Egypt Country Report, 14. 34 Richard Spencer. “10 Arab States Join the US in Battle against Isil,” Telegraph Sept. 11, 2014. 35 Louisa Loveluck, “Turkish Military Enters Syria to Evacuate Soldiers from Enclave,” Telegraph, February 22, 2015. 36 Huseyin Ozay. “Turkey swapped 180 IS Militants for 49 Hostages,” Taraf, trans. Timur Gӧksel, Almonitor: The Pulse of the Middle East, October 2, 2014, Accessed March 24, 2015, http://www.al-monitor. com/pulse/security/2014/10/turkey-iraq-syria-isis-hostages.html. 37 “Foreign Fighter Total in Syria/Iraq Now Exceeds 20,000; Surpasses Afghanistan Conflict in the 1980s,” International Center for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence January 26, 2015. (Accessed February 9, 2015). http://icsr.info/2015/01/foreign-fighter-total-syriairaq-now-exceeds-20000surpasses-afghanistan-conflict-1980s.

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38 “NATO Says Would Help Defend Turkey if Threaten by Islamic State” Journal Of Turkish Weekly (August 18, 2014): 14 Political Source Complete, EBSCOhost (assessed March 11, 2015). 39 Russ Wellen, “Branding Turkey’s Dealing With Islamic State with the ‘A’ Word,” Foreign Policy in Focus (2014). 40 “Turkey Denies Cooperation with PYD, Calls it a Terrorist Organization,” Journal of Turkish Weekly (Feburary 23, 2015): 43. Political Science Complete, EBSCOhost (Accessed March 11, 2015). 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid. 43 PRS, Turkey Country Report. 44 Benoit Facon and Ayla Albayrak, “Islamic State Funds Push Into Syria and Iraq With Labyrinthine Oil-Smuggling Operation,” Wall Street Journal World News Sept 16, 2014. 45 Ibid. 46 Ravender Sembhy, “$2 Million-a-day sales fund ISIS,” Sunday Express October, 26, 2014. 47 “Turkey Denies Cooperation with PYD,” 43. 48 Harrison. “Towards a Regional Strategy,”42. 49 David Schenker, “Countering the ISIS Threat to Jordan,” Wall Street Journal Eastern Edition, July 14, 2014. Accessed from http://search.proquest.com/docview/15447213647. 50 Ibid. 51 International Center for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence. 52 Maria Abi-Habib and Suha Ma’a yeh, “Jordanian Opposition to Fight Against Islamic State Grows More Vocal,” Wall Street Journal (Middle East News) February 2, 2015 (Accessed March 10, 2015) http:// www.wsj.com/articles/jordanian-opposition-to-fight-against-islamic-state-grows-more-vocal-1422917314. 53 “Jordan Executes Convicted Jihadists after Pilot’s Death,” BBC World Report Middle East (February 4, 2015) Accessed March 4, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-31124900. 54 Frida. Ghitis, “Jordan’s Abudall Gambles on Charge against the Islamic State,” World Politics Review (February 12, 2015): 1. 55 Ibid. 56 Schenker, “Countering the ISIS Threat to Jordan.” 57 Ghitis, “Jordan’s Abudall Gambles.” 58 The UN Refugee Agency, UNHCR Jordan. http://www.unhcr.jo. 59 William Booth, “Ancient Trade Route between Jordan and Syria is Now Closed,” Washington Post (April 8, 2015), A09. 60 Ibid. 61 Frisch, “Pan-Arabism and Its Competitors,” 4. 62 International Center for Study of Radicalization and Political Violence. 63 Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, “Lebanon’s Army Clashes with Militants in Arsal” 64 Samia Nakhoul Reuters, “Saudi gives $1bn to Lebanese Army,” Cape Times (South Africa) August 7, 2014. 65 Harrison. “Towards a Regional Strategy,”43.

Part III IS and the West

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Chapter 10

The Obama Administration and IS1 Richard Yon and James L. Long, Jr.

­­­­Introduction The Islamic State (IS) sparked America’s hunt for a strategy, nimble and strong enough, to meet the challenge of terrorist states in a brewing conflict with extremist elements of Islamic civilization. This “civilization” conflict was foreseen by scholars like Huntington; however, innovations in social media and advances in insurgent tactics have created unprecedented threats to American security. The threat from Islamic terrorists at the onset of the War on Terror came in the form of a “far reaching network of violence and hatred”2 and while 9/11’s employment of civilian aircraft was a novel tactic; their structure had precedents among “fascism and communism.”3 IS’s ambition of establishing a caliphate, coupled with their success in exploiting rifts among Sunni groups and their ability to hold territory, far exceeds the achievements of al-Qaeda’s decentralized approach, making them “unlike any threat we have ever seen.”4 Their mastery of hybrid warfare and skillful leveraging of deep seated sectarian divisions that defy state boundaries has exploited a gap in American response capabilities, unresolved as of this writing. IS’s initial success owed much to the legacy of al-Qaeda in Iraq, as many of their fighters, leaders, and tactics had been perfected by opposing America’s conventional capabilities.5 The bloody Syrian Civil War acted as a finishing school for their leaders, allowing them to emerge as pre-eminent practitioners of hybrid warfare. While their military competency, hard won from years of war, is noteworthy; their skill in information operations poses unique threats to the United States. IS’s strategic employment of social media tools, like twitter and their own apps including The Dawn of Glad Tidings,6 allow them to draw foreign funding and recruits while plotting attacks in Europe and North America. So sophisticated are their efforts that the Obama administration, at the time of this writing, is increasing the United States’ own presence on social media in order to counteract the propaganda promulgated by IS since the administration recognizes “the terrorist group has been far more effecting in attracting new recruits, financing and global notoriety than the United States and its allies have been in thwarting it.”7 Defeating IS’s efforts to win the Islamic narrative is something that even American allies in the region, such as Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, feel is critical to success. America is “looking for legitimacy that they don’t have inside of Islam.”8 Therefore, the best hope in winning this fight is relying on our Arab partners to counter IS propaganda and its skewed narrative of Islam in the region. Andrew Pocock, Britain’s Nigerian high commissioner, recognizes IS’s ability to inspire other Islamic terrorist groups like Boko Haram to “be seen by their peers as grown-up jihadis” with the ability to “control territory” and establish a caliphate.9 Samuel Huntington foresaw the conflict with elements of Islamic extremists. He stated, “future wars would erupt over differences in religion, history, language and tradition”; especially given “the continuing and deeply conflictual relation between Islam and Christianity.”10 President Obama recognized America’s role in stabilization when he stated, “no one has a greater stake in a peaceful world than its most powerful nation;”11

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however, victory in hybrid sectarian conflicts require an as yet undiscovered balance of hard, soft and smart power. NATO defines hybrid threats as “adversaries with the ability to simultaneously employ conventional and non-conventional means adaptively in pursuit of their objectives.”12 Mao’s three stages of revolutionary warfare speak to hybrid tactics; and, adroit employment of those three stages put conventional militaries at significant disadvantage. IS has demonstrated this capability through conventionally seizing Mosul while employing insurgent tactics and melting into population centers to avoid coalition air strikes; and, solidifying their information operations while providing civil services in their conquered territory. This presents American leadership with an amorphous enemy resistant to existing defense strategies, such as a reliance upon air strikes. The Obama administration has struggled to formulate a comprehensive strategy that checks IS’s fluid threat in a way that “expands our reach without sending forces that stretch our military too thin, or stir up local resentments.”13 Success requires addressing a myriad of issues ranging from ethnic grievances to insurgent tactics and their narrative by learning from the War on Terror and empowering regional allies. All this must be done while recognizing power and political will are finite resources. The tangible goal of destroying the caliphate is enticing; however, failure to address these contributing factors may create yet another quagmire as America withdraws from Afghanistan. Overwhelming firepower and superior technology have proven itself ineffective for America in similar conflicts; as cultural barriers hinder engagement with local political and social structures. The decisions made by the Bush administration during the War on Terror put American defense structures and theories up to a trial by fire that largely resulted in failure. In an attempt to avoid getting burned a second time, President Obama has challenged fundamental national defense assumptions to deal with the IS challenge. The high cost of insurgent wars and demonstrated shortcomings of existing strategies ranging from “shock and awe” to Counterinsurgency (COIN) has led to the employment of a new strategy to check the Islamic threat.14 Inheriting the War on Terror Historically, war has been an ally of Presidents since legislators tend to defer to their President, which allows them to centralize power during crisis, trading debate for greater security and expediency. The downside for a President is that long wars tend to be both financially and politically costly; and, centralized power comes with increased responsibility. The War on Terror initially won public support for intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq and gained support for expansive homeland defense reformations, including the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and the passage of the Patriot Act. The parallels between September 11 and Pearl Harbor convinced Americans that aggressive action was required and won President Bush 90 percent approval ratings.15 The Bush administration’s conviction that Islamic extremism must be denied sanctuary through aggressive military response justified invading Afghanistan to check al-Qaeda and invading Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein, given his “WMDs” and “unrelenting hostility towards the United States.”16 The toppling of the Taliban marshaled support from over 90 percent of Americans in 2001 and a majority supported invading Iraq to defeat Saddam Hussein in 2003; all while enhancing the power of the executive branch.17 America was confident of winning decisive victories against the Taliban and Saddam Hussein, especially given that American force structures were designed for fighting two simultaneous regional conflicts. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Colin Powell had developed this approach

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following Desert Storm and it was employed during his tenure as Secretary of State.18 The plan relied on fast surgical victories through technological superiority and overwhelming firepower; and, success in the opening campaigns of the War on Terror seemingly validated this approach and set up the premature “mission accomplished” speech.19 In the years following President Bush’s declaration of “mission accomplished” faith in rapid victory and superior firepower’s omnipotence were abandoned, replaced with the recognition that success requires securing the human terrain. Gross mismanagement plagued civilian-military coordination throughout the conflict, a manifestation of the United States’ tendency to separate military and political processes, highlighted by the absence of effective post-conflict planning.20 The descent into sectarian quagmires revealed senior leaders, like Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, were unaware of Iraq’s history of ethnic infighting and expected to be welcomed as liberators.21These underlying tensions would spark the development of IS from a rather small and innocuous group affiliated with al-Qaeda to an organized entity wreaking havoc in the region with dreams of establishing a caliphate. By President Obama’s inauguration in January 2009, the war in Iraq had “lost thousands of American lives, spent nearly a trillion dollars, alienated allies and neglected emerging threats-all in the cause of fighting a war for well over five years in a country that had absolutely nothing to do with the 9/11 attacks.”22 America, and the “democratic” governments it supported, was drowning amid increasingly violent insurgencies whose price tag approached $1 trillion.23 American prestige suffered abroad, a strong departing from when “old allies, new friends, and even longtime adversaries stood by our side.”24 26 of 33 major nations’ respect for America plummeted from 2002 to 200725 and Middle Eastern states saw the United States’ presence as a bigger risk to regional instability than Iran’s Mahmoud Ahmadinejad or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.26 America was seen not only as illegitimate but ineffectual, as 70 percent of those polled internationally believed that the American military was inept and would fail to win the war in all forms—directly assaulting America’s long-standing military superiority.27 Military Limitations—Lessons Learned The failure in destroying al-Qaeda, or their Taliban patrons, despite superior fire power, technology, and logistics prompted an aggressive strategic reevaluation. While the President maintained “our nation is at war against a far-reaching network of violence and hatred”; he cautioned that “our power alone cannot protect us, nor does it entitle us to do as we please.”28 This shift rejected notions that success was possible given minor tactical refinements. Instead, it would require a more comprehensive security overhaul. This involved reclaiming American power, prestige and position by increasing reliance on diplomacy and recognizing the finite nature of national power.29 The War on Terror, Iraq especially, showcased the limitations of conventional forces against hybrid enemies and the absence of cost effective methods for building democratic states. While governance was established in Iraq, it came at a massive cost, high casualty rates, and failed to resolve underlying sectarian tensions. All of which would confront the Obama administration head on in dealing with IS. Counterinsurgency doctrine (COIN) was the Bush administration’s fallback to Iraq’s insurgent nightmare; however, its limitations led to criticism that “everyone realizes counterinsurgency is a losing proposition for U.S. combat troops.”30 Even COIN’s hero, General David Patreaus, only claimed in Congressional testimony that “the military objectives of the surge, in large measure, are being met”31, seemingly implying these objectives did not address the political problems.32 Thus, confirming the fear that military capabilities, no matter how great,

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would not be sufficient on their own in addressing the sectarian violence and insurgencies that still plagued the region. The limited ability for American forces to address fundamental political problems in isolation is highlighted when one considers that the Sunni Awakening, which denied al-Qaeda much needed Iraqi sanctuaries, occurred simultaneously.33 The Sunni community shifted from siding with al-Qaeda, to working with coalition forces. This was instrumental in effectively rooting out insurgent fighters and stabilizing communities throughout the Anbar region.34 These movements had combined to offer temporary stability enabling the United States’ withdrawal; however, failure to fully incorporate Sunnis into the Iraqi national government made that stability temporary. COIN experiments in Afghanistan yielded comparable results and security was temporarily enhanced, but it did not endure in the absence of addressing underlying political issues. COIN’s failure, and the former failure of “shock and awe,” led President Obama to recognize that “US military action cannot be the only—or even primary—component of our leadership in every instance. Just because we have the best hammer does not mean that every problem is a nail.”35 This philosophy governed the President’s reevaluation of the military and operational strategies in search for a new approach that would produce greater stability and would go beyond solely relying upon the Department of Defense.36 Developing a New Strategy Initial hints that President Obama was searching for a new strategy appeared during the 2008 presidential election, as he stated his strategic ends: leaving Iraq, defeating the Taliban, checking nuclear proliferation, improving energy security, and strengthening regional alliances.37 These goals were accompanied by an underlying desire to avoid involvement in costly military expeditions with uncertain outcomes. The President’s emerging strategy has deftly maneuvered the complex web of insurgencies and terrorists while still accomplishing victories such as killing Osama bin Laden and leveraging unique American technological capabilities.38 President Obama’s desire to avoid repeating the Bush administration’s invasion-centric response led him to state “we shouldn’t spend too much time trying to figure out how to do this sort of thing better, because we’re never going to do it well and it will rarely be vital to our overall security.”39 This disdain for conflicts of choice was evident since he was an Illinois State Senator. In October 2002, then State Senator Obama stated, I know that an invasion of Iraq without a clear rationale and without strong international support will only fan the flames of the Middle East and encourage the worst, rather than best, impulses in the Arab world and strengthen the recruitment arm of al-Qaeda. I am not opposed to all wars. I’m opposed to dumb wars.40

Conflicts can empower national defense agendas; however, the application of military force comes at the cost of degrading capabilities and finances in a manner that diminishes national power in the short term.41 The best means of avoiding this deficiency was developing a well formulated approach to employing force that took into consideration more than mere military objectives, but political objectives as well. Limiting options to the use of military force for the pursuit of military objectives only addresses half of the problem. The use of diplomacy and regional coalitions assists in addressing the political objectives and the problems associated with sectarian violence. The sentiment that military force was used too freely, and translated into complex quagmires, led President Obama to

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attest that while he had no aversion to conflict, political leaders were required to set their generals up for success. The danger of over application of military force was not something that only President Obama concerned himself with, Colin Powell shared his fear as well. When the political objective is important, clearly defined and understood, when the risks are acceptable, and when the use of force can be effectively combined with diplomatic and economic policies, then clear and unambiguous objectives must be given to the armed forces. These objectives must be firmly linked with the political objectives. We must not, for example, send military forces into a crisis with an unclear mission they cannot accomplish.42

The pursuit of American security interests requires the use of force; however, imprudent entry to foreign conflicts is just as likely to cause calamity as inaction. The balance that President Obama wished to strike was outlined during a speech at the University of Cairo seeking to open constructive dialogue with the Muslim world. Let me also address the issue of Iraq. Unlike Afghanistan, Iraq was a war of choice that provoked strong differences in my country and around the world. Although I believe that the Iraqi people are ultimately better off without the tyranny of Saddam Hussein, I also believe that events in Iraq have reminded America of the need to use diplomacy and build international consensus to resolve our problems whenever possible Today, America has a dual responsibility: to help Iraq forge a better future—and to leave Iraq to Iraqis… Iraq’s sovereignty is its own. And that’s why I ordered the removal of our combat brigades by next August. That is why we will honor our agreement with Iraq’s democratically elected government to remove combat troops from Iraqi cities by July, and to remove all of our troops from Iraq by 2012. We will help Iraq train its security forces and develop its economy. But we will support a secure and united Iraq as a partner, and never as a patron.43

This emphasis on consensus building won attention from the Nobel Peace Prize Committee. “Obama has, as President, created a new climate in international politics. Multilateral diplomacy has regained a central position, with emphasis on the role that the United Nations and other international institutions can play. Dialogue and negotiations are preferred as instruments for resolving even the most difficult international conflicts.”44 The reliance upon coalition efforts and the primacy of diplomacy would play a vital role in his emerging response to Iraq. Nonetheless, the approaching deadline to withdraw from Iraq presented President Obama with its own challenges. Critics of the administration argued that his insistence on removing American troops from Iraq, combined with the Iraqi government’s failure to develop diplomatic and politically feasible responses to sectarian discord, led to further instability and a power vacuum that was easily filled by IS. Withdrawal from Iraq President Obama did recognize that a simultaneously expedient and successful withdrawal by the United States required addressing political divisions. His strategy indirectly addressed sectarianism by forcing Iraqi politicians to cooperate in order to maintain security after America departed.45 Although the overall success of this approach is still questionable, it did represent a clear departure from President Bush’s own philosophy and belief—that expedient withdrawals jeopardized long

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term security by offering insurgents respite and an opening.46 President Obama accepted these risks on the grounds that permanent presence was “not a strategy for success—it is a strategy for staying that runs contrary to the will of the Iraqi people, the American people and the security interests of the United States.”47 Though the Obama administration had made campaign promises desiring to disengage, the Iraqi military was not confident that they could take full responsibility for their internal security.48 Critics argue that the consequences of these actions precipitated and intensified the growing strength of IS. Syrian Civil War After Iraq, avoiding entangling ground interventions weighed heavily in Middle Eastern policy and prevented intervention when Syrian democratic protests devolved into a humanitarian crisis. While Bashar al-Assad’s oppression of the Syrian people was met with international condemnation, the absence of core United States’ interests negated involvement. President Obama’s reluctance to employ American ground troops in Syria was not only grounded in the belief that America’s national strategic interests were not in play, but also by his unwillingness to be forced into a similar quagmire as President Bush found in Iraq, one in which no strategic exit was imminently apparent. Furthermore, his new approach focused on utilizing other means beyond a pure military strategy. That we have an interest in pursuing peace and freedom beyond our borders is not to say that every problem has a military solution. Since World War II some of our most costly mistakes came not from our restraint, but from our willingness to rush into military adventures without thinking through the consequences—without building international support and legitimacy for our action.49

Though it was clear that the President desired no significant intervention or ground war, the door was left open to consider military options. This was made apparent by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, in a letter to Senator Carl Levin in July 2013 in which General Dempsey laid out the military strategy for Syria which included training, advising, and assisting the opposition; limited standoff strikes; a no-fly zone; buffer zones; and securing Syrian chemical weapon sites.50 General Dempsey caveated these options by stating effective follow-on planning was essential for regional stability as removing Bashar al-Assad could exacerbate regional conflict through the subsequent proliferation of fighters and arms. “Should the regime’s institutions collapse in the absence of a viable opposition; we could inadvertently empower extremists or unleash the very chemical weapons we seek to control.”51 Iraq had demonstrated the need for ensuring that effective stability and post-conflict plans were in place to prevent a descent into sectarian violence; therefore, acting without these mechanisms in place needed to be avoided. The Obama administration recognized the need to prevent massive shifts in the balance of power that could empower extremists by employing a more comprehensive strategy in Syria that relied on regional allies, diplomacy, and political tools.52 Nonetheless, the developments in Syria remained a challenge for the long-term stability of Iraq. Syria’s porous border with Iraq meant that insurgents, including IS, had freedom of movement between both countries and provided ample opportunity for IS to gain ground in both Iraq and Syria, further destabilizing Iraq and contributing to a rise in sectarian violence. Syrian intervention was further complicated by the lack of international diplomatic and legal support, something President Obama prized. The lack of an authorization by the United Nations, given Chinese and Russian objections, and a comparative disinterest among NATO members,

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prevented the development of a coalition similar to the one created to deal with Libya. The lack of a multilateral coalition, and uncertainty over rebel identities, intensified the Obama administration’s disinterest in utilizing unilateral intervention. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton led the effort by requesting greater “efforts by the opposition to come together to organize [in Syria and against Bashar al-Assad] to articulate a political agenda.”53 Despite America’s moral stake in the issue, the absence of key security interests and legal support led to a comparatively lackluster response: When issues of global concern do not pose a threat to the United States, when such issues are at stake—when crises that stir our conscience or push the world in a more dangerous direction but do not directly threaten us—then the threshold for military action must be higher. In such circumstances, we should not go it alone. Instead we must mobilize allies and partners to take collective action. We have to broaden our tools to include diplomacy and development; sanctions and isolation; appeals to international law; and, if just, necessary and effective, multilateral military action. In such circumstances we have to work with others because collective action in these circumstances is more likely to succeed, more likely to be sustained, less likely to lead to costly mistakes.54

The restrained approach of the Obama administration, given the desire to avoid regional entanglement, fueled critics who accused him of doing little more than “repeat[ing] this formulation that Mr. Assad ought to lead political reform ‘or get out of the way’.”55 This aversion to American ground forces did not bar all rebel aid as the Central Intelligence Agency funneled weapons bought by Gulf States through Turkey and the State Department supplied $15 million in nonlethal aid.56 This was supplemented by diplomatic efforts to stop arm sales to Bashar al-Assad from Russia and other states. As mentioned previously, this reserved approach avoided entangling ground forces in another quagmire, but it came with opportunity costs. Iran exploited the lack of foreign involvement to aid Syria with weapons and trainers so Bashar al-Assad could reconsolidate control.57 President Obama’s critics, and even administration officials, lamented that “the US has now effectively dithered for a year and a half. The momentum of rebel success has been reversed, and a lack of outside support has weakened Syrian moderates and strengthened Sunni Islamic extremists.”58 American aversion to involvement inhibited moderate Syrian rebels from developing the strength required to be a significant political force; and, in the absence of strong moderates the extremists were able to rapidly expand. The Tipping Point By the middle of 2014, IS erupted from the rubble of the Syrian Civil War and seized vast swaths of Sunni territory in Syria and Iraq. Despite attempts from other rebel groups to check their rise, including an alliance among 12 rebel battalions, they succeeded in launching a blitzkrieg that seized nearly half of Syria and eventually took Mosul.59; Free Syrian Army Brigadier General Abdulellah al-Basheer had made clear “we are at a crucial juncture in our fight against violent extremism and hope that the UK and US can shrug off their fear of supporting us”; however, inaction by western states enabled IS’s expansion.60 IS employed hybrid tactics by layering conventional capabilities and asymmetric strategies, like softening defenses with artillery barrages and suicide bombers and following with infantry

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and armor assaults. The successful overwhelming of Iraqi’s military caused panic in the region and alarmed the White House. “Given the rapidness in which it is able to maneuver, and given its ability to direct indirect fire attacks followed by direct assaults with heavy weapons, it is a proficient military organization.”61 Prime Minister al-Maliki, despite attempts to dodge responsibility by blaming others—including the United States, had paved the way for IS’s success through disenfranchising the Sunnis, a refusal to absorb Sunni militias into security forces, and his use of open sectarian patronage. America’s response to IS, an admittedly evolving process, began taking public form during President Obama’s 2014 West Point commencement address. He stated, I would betray my duty to you and to the country we love if I ever sent you into harm’s way simply because I saw a problem somewhere in the world that needed to be fixed, or because I was worried about critics who think military intervention is the only way for America to avoid looking weak.62

American military forces could not directly win Sunni loyalty to the Iraqi government; and, their defection had given IS the support essential to maintain control over its territory. “As President, I made a decision that we should not put American troops into this increasingly sectarian war … But that does not mean we should not help the Syrian people stand up against a dictator.”63 America’s response emphasized “diplomacy and development; sanctions and isolation; appeals to international law; and, if just, necessary and effective, multilateral military action.”64 First steps included $500 million to train and equip the “moderate” Syrian elements65 for “more effective and durable [results] than what would have been accomplished through the use of [American] force.”66 President Obama desired to avoid employing United States’ ground troops, drones and precision strikes as seen against al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, despite the value of hard power in successful counterterrorism strategy. America’s military commitment rapidly materialized in August 2014 when the dire circumstances of 40,000 Yazidis stranded atop Mount Sinjar offered an opportunity to engage American power in the conflict along a humanitarian basis.67 First, I said in June—as the terrorist group IS began an advance across Iraq—that the United States would be prepared to take targeted military action in Iraq if and when we determined that the situation required it … At the request of the Iraqi government—we’ve begun operations to help save Iraqi civilians stranded on the mountain … As Commander-in-chief I will not allow the United States to be dragged into fighting another war in Iraq. And so even as we support Iraqis as they take the fight to these terrorists, American combat troops will not be returning to fight in Iraq, because there’s no American military solution to the larger crisis in Iraq. The only solution is reconciliation among Iraqi communities and stronger Iraqi security forces.68

This military action was accompanied by diplomatic pressure on the Iraqi government to grow more inclusive, leading to a new Iraqi President and Speaker of the Parliament to address “the needs and grievances of all Iraqi people.”69 Iraqi movement towards inclusion was reciprocated through expanded American military presence, with American forces serving as a carrot motivating political progress and Sunni inclusion. This ratcheting approach sent several hundred American advisers to aid Iraqi forces with more following in late 2014 and early 2015 with clear guidelines on the rules of engagement.70 The momentum that was built through the Mount Sinjar rescue mission led to air strikes against IS targets around Erbil, the Kurdish capital and location of an American consulate, just two days

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later. These strikes were coordinated to support Kurdish and Iraqi ground forces and were able to stop the IS advance and marked an increased American commitment to the region.71 President Obama’s military objective was “protecting American citizens, providing advice and assistance to Iraqi forces as they battle these terrorists, and joining with international partners to provide humanitarian aid” under the caveat that “there is no American military solution to the larger crisis in Iraq.”72 The use of air assets to support local ground fighters proved effective against IS conventional maneuvers and succeeded in halting their offensive momentum and forced them to consider moving away from conventional tactics.73 Despite these successes, America drew condemnation for its delayed entrance from Baghdad, highlighting the cost of the slowly measured approach. “They should have made this decision when hundreds of Shiites and Sunnis were being killed every day … Iraqis must rely on their genuine friends, like Iran and Russia, who have supported Iraq in its battle against ISIS.”74 IS condemned American tactics on the grounds that “getting others to fight on your behalf will not do for you in Syria and it will not do for you in Iraq. And soon enough you will be in direct confrontation—forced to do so God willing.”75 Notwithstanding minor critics, American involvement expanded via United States Central Command to over 96 air strikes by August 24 in the vicinity of Mosul.76 IS responded by beheading American journalist James Foley, which garnered assurances from the President that America would “continue to do what we must to protect our people, we will be vigilant and we will be relentless.”77 While military operations increased in intensity, President Obama still struggled to develop a comprehensive strategy to defeat IS, something he openly admitted was lacking. Folks are getting a little further ahead of where we’re at. … The suggestions seems to have been we’re about to go full-scale on some elaborate strategy for defeating ISIL and the suggestion has been we’ll start moving forward imminently and somehow with Congress still out of town, they’ll be left in the dark. That’s not going to happen.78

This statement by the President further fueled the perception that the Obama administration lacked a clear strategy and the government’s response to IS was merely reactionary. The Beginnings of an IS Strategy The rapid expansion of IS into the borderlands between Syria and Iraq owed much to the support of the disenfranchised Sunni community there, whose shared ethnic roots eased integration. Drawing on the lessons of the Anbar Awakening, the Obama administration recognized that the Sunni population was the key terrain required to defeat IS as their support gave IS their base of power. Secretary of State John Kerry was given the challenge of courting regional allies and forming “a global coalition using political, humanitarian, economic, law enforcement and intelligence tools to support military force.”79 Coalition success required integrating efforts seeking political inclusion, Kurdish and Iraqi ground forces, enablers like air strikes, financial attacks, and the myriad other tools President Obama wished to employ. The President stated, “Airstrikes alone won’t defeat this enemy. A much fuller response is demanded from the world. We need to support Iraqi forces and the moderate Syrian opposition, who are facing ISIS on the front lines. We need to disrupt and degrade ISIS’ capabilities and counter its extremist message.”80 In early September 2014 Secretary Kerry and Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel increased coalition formation efforts at a NATO summit in Britain as ten nations began aligning to “attack

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them [IS] in ways that prevent them from taking over territory, to bolster the Iraqi security forces and others in the region who are prepared to take them on, without committing troops of our own.”81 The desire to avoid the development of an insurgent dilemma was shared by all states present; therefore, they pursued the cultivation of responses that would be strategic in impact while minimally committal on the ground.82 Following the conference, President Obama announced his intent to “degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL through a comprehensive and sustained counterterrorism strategy.”83 By this point United States’ forces had conducted 150 airstrikes while working to increase the capabilities of Iraqi and regional security forces. These efforts were supplemented by increased aid to Iraqi ground forces and 475 additional American service members. “This counterterrorism campaign will be waged through a steady, relentless effort to take out ISIL wherever they exist, using our air power and support for partner forces on the ground.”84 While these efforts were significant, IS proved resistant, forcing officials like former Defense Secretary Robert Gates to admit “the reality is, they’re not gonna be successful against IS strictly from the air, or strictly depending on the Iraqi forces, or the Peshmerga, or the Sunni tribes acting on their own. So there should be boots on the ground if there’s to be any hope of success in the strategy.”85 This was echoed by Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham in an op-ed in the New York Times in which they stated, … ultimately, ISIS is a military force, and it must be confronted militarily. Mr. Obama has begun to take military actions against ISIS in Iraq, but they have been tactical and reactive half measures. Continuing to confront ISIS in Iraq, but not in Syria, would be fighting with one hand tied behind our back. We need a military plan to defeat ISIS, wherever it is.86

What the administration and their critics in Congress can agree upon is that the solution to IS must be comprehensive. Senators McCain and Graham stated, It is a truism to say there is no military solution to ISIS. Any strategy must, of course, be comprehensive. It must squeeze ISIS’ finances. It requires an inclusive government in Baghdad that shares power and wealth with Iraqi Sunnis, rather than pushing them toward ISIS. It requires an end to the conflict in Syria, and a political transition there, because the regime of President Bashar al-Assad will never be a reliable partner against ISIS. … A strategy to counter ISIS also requires a regional approach to mobilize America’s partners in a coordinated, multilateral effort.87

President Obama’s order to Secretary Kerry to strengthen the coalition by integrating regional powers is both essential and difficult given the complex web of competing state motivations. Part of this challenge comes from the instability and violence that followed 2011’s NATO intervention into Libya where success in toppling COL Qaddafi, in the absence of significant efforts to build infrastructure, culminated in violent instability.88 The key for Secretary Kerry and the administration will be winning over regional Sunni states, like Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates, whose resources and desire to check Iranian influence make them natural allies. These efforts have proven successful since Jordan and Saudi Arabia are part of the United States’ led coalition and IS has emboldened Jordan’s response by putting to death a Jordanian fighter pilot.89 Turkey, a longtime ally and NATO country, is ideally located to facilitate logistical concerns provided they can balance their efforts with a desire to check Kurdish nationalism. And while regional states understand “there must be a comprehensive plan that will be seen through to the end, not limited to military operations to recapture IS territory, you cannot tackle IS without resolving the conflict in Iraq and Syria.”90 Efforts to synchronize their capabilities will be challenging.

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Despite the divergent motivations for defeating IS, over 30 states attended the Paris conference on September 15, 2014 in a setting marked by urgency.91 One of the unique diplomatic challenges for the emerging coalition was that the strongest military in the region, Iran, had a long-standing antagonistic relationship with the United States that checked coordination. In America’s absence, Iran had aided Iraq and in doing so, won significant influence and political support. America’s reliance on regional powers to win the ground war allowed Iran to gain political capital by supplying weapons, advisers and intelligence to both Iraqis and Assad,92 under the guidance of Quds force commander Qassem Suleimani, a bitter enemy of the United States during the Iraq War. Iran’s response won allies in Kurdistan, a key ally of the United States, who praised their rapid support. “The Islamic Republic of Iran was the first state to help us.” The strength of Iranian influence opened the door for Shiite militias to remain loyal to them and create spheres of Iranian influence.93 Given these factors, Secretary Kerry’s spokesperson admitted, “there may be another opportunity on the margins in the future to discuss Iraq.”94 Iraq First As the coalition began to work, it employed the “Iraq First” strategy focused on dislodging IS from Iraq by building Iraqi security force capacity, before pursuing IS sanctuaries in Syria. This made Baghdad responsible for securing their sovereign territory and avoided massive foreign troop commitments. It further emphasized the need for Baghdad to win Sunni support much like during the Sunni Awakening. Though Syrian sanctuaries must eventually be eliminated to defeat IS, Syria’s complicated relationship with Western states means that coalition operations at this stage are challenging to coordinate.95 The coalition, since the Paris Crisis Convention, had grown into a 40 state Combined Joint Task Force Operation, Inherent Resolve, commanded by LTG James L. Terry. America’s role in the Joint Task Force, in keeping with President Obama’s desired emphasis, is to pursue IS “to degrade and destroy its capabilities and defeat their efforts” (largely through air strikes); and, empowering regional partners through the employment of “diplomatic, intelligence, military, and economic effort, the coalition will enable regional partner security.”96 The coalition’ reversal of IS momentum and denial of freedom of maneuver through over 1,300 air strikes and the efforts of nearly 3,000 American advisors demonstrated marked progress.97 The initial success of coalition efforts within the region has caused IS to shift from their expansionist mindset to a strategy of consolidating the territory they currently hold.98 The Iraqi security forces, moderate rebels, and Pershmega remained the primary ground forces; however, improved coordination between ground elements, air power, and intelligence assets greatly enhanced their effectiveness. The Iraqi government built on these gains through legitimacy building efforts with the Sunni tribes. Even with these gains LTG Terry admitted the fight would likely take several years. While the White House maintains that it does not desire to see American ground forces actively engaged against IS, General Dempsey indicated during testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee that the current strategy could be modified. “If we reach the point where I believe our advisers should accompany Iraqi troops on attacks against specific ISIL targets, I’ll recommend that to the President.”99 The goal of the Obama administration has long been avoiding unnecessary entanglement on the ground; and, successes like retaking Kobane, which Secretary Kerry called a “big deal”100 indicates that this coalition based movement may well succeed.

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Conclusion While coalition efforts had a marked impact in Iraq, IS operations within Syria were much harder to disrupt given the gap in cooperation between the Joint Combined Task Force and the Bashar alAssad regime. President Obama, during much of 2014, demanded that Assad step down given his loss of political legitimacy in favor of moderate rebel elements. This stance contrasted with Iranian intentions to see Assad remain in power, despite their shared desire to defeat IS. This diplomatic gap compounded the long-standing mistrust between both states and prevented meaningful coordination. This gap between the desires of the Syrian and Iraqi governments led to markedly different relations and strategic options as Obama officials noted in Syria “we’re lucky we can find a few hundred on our side.”101 This further exacerbates finding a coherent, comprehensive, and singular strategy to defeat IS in both Iraq and Syria due to the unique circumstances each state faces on the ground. The lack of effective diplomatic cooperation with Assad did not prevent the United States from engaging in military operations against IS sanctuaries in Syria though. President Obama justified this incursion by invoking Article 51 of the UN Security Charter letting other states intervene if a country “is unwilling or unable to handle a threat itself.” This article was used on the grounds that “the Syrian regime has shown that it cannot and will not confront these safe havens effectively itself … Accordingly, the United States has initiated necessary and proportionate military actions in Syria.”102 The demand for Assad’s removal, prominent throughout 2014, changed to reform requests by 2015 as it became clear moderate rebels were unable to replace Assad, making his removal more apt to exacerbate chaos. The point where moderate rebel forces would be prepared to take control of the Syrian government seemed increasingly distant. “Washington now believes that if Mr. Assad is ousted, there will be nothing to check the spreading chaos and extremism.”103 The desire to improve military operations in Syria led to the emerging understanding that American warplanes would peacefully share the skies with Syrian planes during operations. The other sticky issue for the Obama administration remains, its tenuous relationship with Iran. While the two states face a common enemy, and are growing towards a more compatible vision for the futures of Iraq and Syria, the underlying animosity remains. The challenge of balancing Iranian influence in the region and preventing them from becoming a hegemonic state has become a central focus of the Gulf Cooperation Council.104The Council, whose centralized military command is modeled after NATO and based in Riyadh, focuses on running “a military alliance … to divide the labor of which states are responsible for what … we should be at the forefront of fighting IS, our values are at stake.”105 The Council seeks expansion to Morocco, Jordan and Egypt and fits President Obama’s goal of empowering regional alliances. Diplomatic and coordination issues aside, the destruction of IS remains an elusive target, given their adaptability. Though the United States’ drawdown in Afghanistan during the transition towards long term support and advising has freed resources, the impact they will have on a hybrid foe is uncertain. Initial success combining American air strikes and intelligence assets in support of local ground forces were devastating because conventional weaponry does well against conventional tactics. Success when combining American military capabilities and regional ground troops against a conventional IS “might be slow. It might be painful. But it’s inevitable.”106 As the Obama administration continues to garner pressure from regional allies and critics on Capitol Hill to do more, the use of ground troops might be inevitable. The strategy for IS is far from static and continues to evolve in reaction to new developments, both strategically and politically, in the region.

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American strategy is challenged as IS abandons conventional operations and adopts the insurgent and terrorist tactics they perfected over the last decade. These well-honed skills allow them to melt into the population and exploit the complexity of population centers to inflict massive casualties upon liberating forces. LTG William Mayville readily admitted it is “an adaptive and learning force.” Just as US strategy evolves so does the adaptive nature of IS making the development of a comprehensive strategy all the more difficult. The current approach of the Obama administration appears to resemble what is employed by Assad rebels in cities like Aleppo—surround them and let them slowly starve.107 The containment of IS reaches past denying their forces the ability to maneuver and includes denying them oil revenue with the cooperation of regional powers such as Turkey, thus making funding increasingly challenging as they seek to provide governance.108 IS’s endurance owes much to their status as the best financed terrorist organization in the world, with income derived from a variety of sources including oil revenues, ransoms, and seized bank vaults. The scale of their income is believed sufficient enough to generate a $2 billion surplus that feeds their operations and pays for the provision of services in their territories.109 The efforts to deny IS continued financial resources has taken the shape of a three-pronged approach under Treasury Secretary Cohen. It includes, “cutting off ISIL’s access to revenue, restricting IS’s access to the international financial system, and targeted sanctions against ISIL’s leadership and facilitators.”110 The Obama administration’s response to the threat of IS is not without critics; however, its comprehensive nature has allowed for a wide variety of tools to be employed without having to use American ground forces. As the conflict evolves, and IS leverages their full array of hybrid warfare tools, the United States will likely grow increasingly reliant on regional powers like Jordan to conduct operations. This approach will either mark the development of a new style of unconventional warfare credited to President Obama, or demonstrate the shortcomings of a Western civilization seeking to check the threat of Islamic extremism. Notes 1 The views expressed here are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the US Government. 2 Obama, Barack. “President Barack Obama’s Inaugural Address,” The White House Blog. 3 Ibid. 4 “Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel Interview and Audience Q&A at Naval War College in Newport, RI,” CNN. http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1409/03/se.01.html. 5 Axe, David. “Under Assault by US-led coalition, Islamic State may shift tactics,” Reuters. http://blogs. reuters.com/great-debate/2014/10/13/islamic-state-proves-flexible-as-its-tactics-evolve-in-fight-against-thewest/. 6 Berger, JM. “How IS Games Twitter,” The Atlantic. http://www.theatlantic.com/international/ archive/2014/06/isis-iraq-twitter-social-media-strategy/372856/. 7 Schmitt, Eric. “U.S. Intensifies Effort to Blunt ISIS’ Message,” The New York Times, February 16, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/17/world/middleeast/us-intensifies-effort-to-blunt-isis-message. html?_r=0. 8 Zakaria, Fareed. “An Ideological War America Must Watch, Not Fight,” Washington Post. http://www. washingtonpost.com/opinions/an-ideological-war-america-must-watch-not-fight/2015/02/26/6290938cbdf8-11e4-bdfa-b8e8f594e6ee_story.html.

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9 Blair, David. “Boko Haram is Now a Mini-Islamic State, with its Own Territory,” The Telegraph. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/nigeria/11337722/Boko-Haram-is-nowa-mini-Islamic-State-with-its-own-territory.html. 10 Holly, Joe and Martin Weil. “Obituary: Political Scientist Samuel P. Huntington,” Washington Post, December 28, 2008. 11 Obama, Barack. “President Obama’s Second Inaugural Address,” The White House Blog. 12 Miklaucic, Michael. “NATO Countering the Hybrid Threat,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization. http:// www.act.nato.int/nato-countering-the-hybrid-threat. 13 Obama, Barack “Remarks Made by the President at the United States Military Academy Commencement Ceremony,” White House Office of the Press Secretary. http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2014/05/28/remarks-president-united-states-military-academy-commencement-ceremony. 14 Record, Jeffrey. “The American Way of War, Cultural Barriers to Successful Counterinsurgency,” CATO Institute, Policy Analysis No. 577. 15 “Presidential Approval Ratings—George Bush,” Gallup. http://www.gallup.com/poll/116500/ Presidential-Approval-Ratings-George-Bush.aspx. 16 “Bush Transcript: Case for Action,” ABC News. http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=91159&page=1. 17 “Presidential Approval Ratings—George Bush,” Gallup. 18 Powell, Colin C. “US Forces: Challenges Ahead,” Council on Foreign Relations, Winter 1992/93. http://www.cfr.org/world/us-forces-challenges-ahead/p7508. 19 Jeffrey Record, “The American Way of War, Cultural Barriers to Successful Counterinsurgency.” 20 Ibid. 21 Wolfowitz, Paul D. “Hearing before the Committee on the Budget House of Representatives One Hundred Eigth First Sessions, Department of Defene Budget Priorities for Fiscal Year 2004,” February 27, 2003. http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-108hhrg85421/html/CHRG-108hhrg85421.htm. 22 Obama, Barack “Obama remarks on Iraq and Afghanistan,” The New York Times. http://www. nytimes.com/2008/07/15/us/politics/15text-obama.html?pagewanted=all. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid. 25 “Global Public Opinion in the Bush Years (2001–2008), America’s Image; Muslims and Westerners; Global Economy; Rise of China,” Pews Research Center. http://www.pewglobal.org/2008/12/18/globalpublic-opinion-in-the-bush-years-2001-2008/. 26 Ibid. 27 “War on Terrorism,” Gallup. http://www.gallup.com/poll/5257/War-Terrorism.aspx. 28 Obama, Barack. “President Barack Obama’s Inaugural Address,” 29 Friedman, Benjamin H., Harvey M. Sapolsky and Chris A. Preble, “Learning the right Lessons from Iraq,” The Cato Institute, Policy Analysis No. 610. 30 Youssef, Nancy A. (May 12, 2010). “Pentagon Rethinking Value of Major Counterinsurgencies,” McClatchyDC. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/world/ article24582589.html. 31 Bowman, Tom.“As the Iraq War Ends, Reassessing the US Surge,” NPR. http://www.npr. org/2011/12/16/143832121/as-the-iraq-war-ends-reassessing-the-u-s-surge. 32 Walt, Stephen. “Top 10 Lessons of the Iraq War,” Foreign Policy, http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/03/20/ top-10-lessons-of-the-iraq-war-2/. 33 Harvey, Derek. The Lessons of the Surge: Defeating ISIS Requires A New Sunni Awakening,” New America Foundation, June 2014. 34 Hendren, John. “Sunni Awakening: Insurgents Are Now Allies,” ABC News. http://abcnews.go.com/ International/story?id=4045471.

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35 Obama, Barack. “Remarks by the President at the United States Military Academy Commencement Ceremony.” 36 Walt, Stephen. “Top 10 Lessons of the Iraq War.” 37 Ibid. 38 McCrisken, Trevor. “Ten Years on, Obama’s War on Terrorism in Rhetoric and Practice,” International Affairs. 39 Walt, Stephen. “Top 10 Lessons of the Iraq War.” 40 Obama, Barack. “Transcript: Obama’s Speech Against the Iraq War,” NPR. http://www.npr.org/ templates/story/story.php?storyId=99591469. 41 Obama, Barack. “President Obama’s Second Inaugural address.” 42 Powell, Colin L. “US Forces: Challenges Ahead.” 43 Obama, Barack. “Remarks by the President on a New Beginning Cairo University, Cairo Egypt,” The White House Office of the Press Secretary. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-bythe-President-at-Cairo-University-6-04-09/. 44 Nobel Prize Committee, “The Nobel Peace Prize for 2009,” NobelPrize.org. http://www.nobelprize. org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009/press.html. 45 Obama, Barack “My Plan For Iraq,” The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/14/ opinion/14obama.html. 46 “Bush: US to Stay in Iraq Till War is Won, President Does Not Set Timetable for Withdrawal,” CNN. http://edition.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/11/30/us.iraq/index.html. 47 Obama, Barack. “My Plan For Iraq.” 48 Roberston, Campbell. “Iraqi Army is willing, but not ready, to fight,” The New York Times. http:// www.nytimes.com/2008/08/06/world/middleeast/06soldier.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 49 Obama, Barack. “Remarks by the President at the United States Military Academy Commencement Ceremony.” 50 Dempsey, Martin E. “General Dempsey’s Letter to Senator Levin on the U.S. Military and the Syrian Conflict, July 2013,” Council on Foreign Relations. http://www.cfr.org/syria/general-dempseys-lettersenator-levin-us-military-syrian-conflict-july-2013/p31198. 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid. 53 Arsu, Sebnem. “Clinton Chides Turkey on Rights Record,” The New York Times. http://www. nytimes.com/2011/07/17/world/middleeast/17turkey.html. 54 Obama, Barack. “Remarks by the President at the United States Military Academy Commencement Ceremony.” 55 Review and Outlook, “Assad’s Embassy Raid,” Wall Street Journal. http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB 10001424052702303812104576440022654206458. 56 Schmitt, Eric. “CIA said to Aid in Steering Arms to Syrian Opposition,” The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/21/world/middleeast/cia-said-to-aid-in-steering-arms-to-syrianrebels.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 57 Cordesman, Anthony. “US Options in Syria, the Dempsey Letter,” Center for Strategic & International Sudies. http://csis.org/publication/us-options-syria-dempsey-letter. 58 Ibid. 59 Abdelaziz, Salma. “As US Ponders Syrian Aid Plan, Vicious al Qaeda Group Goes on a Rampage,” CNN. http://edition.cnn.com/2014/05/28/world/meast/syria-civil-war-isis-obama/index.html. 60 Ibid. 61 Garamone, Jim. “Officials Call ISIL Determined, Capable Foe,” Department of Defense News. http:// www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=122881.

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62 Obama, Barack. “Remarks by the President at the United States Military Academy Commencement Ceremony,” The White House Office of the Press Secretary. 63 Ibid. 64 Ibid. 65 Ackerman, Spencer. “Obama Administration Seeking $500m to Train ‘moderate’ Syrian rebels,” The Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/26/obama-seeking-500m-training-moderatesyrian-rebels. 66 Obama, Barack. “Remarks by the President at the United States Military Academy Commencement Ceremony.” 67 Chulov, Martin. “40,000 Iraqis Stranded on Mountain as IS Jihadists Threaten Death,” The Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/07/40000-iraqis-stranded-mountain-isis-death-threat. 68 Obama, Barack. “Statement of by the President, State Dining Room,” The White House Office of the Press Secretary. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/07/statement-president. 69 Obama, Barack. “Statement by the President on Iraq,” The White House Office of the Press Secretary. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/11/statement-president-iraq. 70 Obama, Barack. Statement of by the President, State Dining Room.” 71 Rubin, Alissa, Tim Arango and Helene Cooper, “US Jets and Drones Attack Militants in Iraq, hoping to Stop Advance,” The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/09/world/middleeast/iraq.html. 72 Obama, Barack. “Statement by the President on Iraq,” The White House Office of the Press Secretary, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/11/statement-president-iraq. 73 Axe, David. “Under assault by US Led coalition, Islamic State may shift tactics.” 74 Rubin, Alissa, Tim Arango and Helene Cooper, “US Jets and Drones Attack Militants in Iraq, hoping to Stop Advance.” 75 Ibid. 76 US Central Command News Release. “Aug.24 U.S. Military Conducts Airstrikes Against ISIL Near Irbil and Mosul Dam,” United States Central Command. http://www.centcom.mil/en/news/articles/aug-24us-military-conducts-airstrikes-against-isil-near-irbil-and-mosul. 77 Shear, Michael D., and Julie Hirschfield Davis, “Obama, ‘Appalled’ by Beheading, Will Continue Airstrikes,” New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/21/us/politics/james-foley-beheading-isisvideo-authentic-obama.html. 78 Obama, Barack. “Statement by the President, James S. Brady Press Briefing Room,” The White House Office of the Press Secretary. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/28/statement-president. 79 Kerry, John. “To Defeat Terror, We Need the World’s Help: The Threat of IS Demands a Global Coalition,” The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/30/opinion/john-kerry-the-threat-of-isisdemands-a-global-coalition.html. 80 Ibid. 81 Stewart, Phil. “US Says Forms ‘Core Coalition’ to Counter Iraq Militants,” Reuters, December 18, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/05/us-iraq-crisis-coalition-idUSKBN0H00TA20140905. 82 Ibid. 83 Obama, Barack. “Statement by the President on ISIL,” The White House Office of the Press Secretary. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/10/statement-president-isil-1. 84 Ibid. 85 “Robert Gates: US Will Need to Put Boots on the Ground in IS Fight,” CBS News. http://www. cbsnews.com/news/robert-gates-isis-boots-on-the-ground-needed/. 86 McCain, John and Lindsey Graham, “Stop Dithering, Confront ISIS,” The New York Times. http:// www.nytimes.com/2014/08/30/opinion/john-mccain-and-lindsey-graham-confront-isis.html. 87 Ibid.

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88 Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed. “The Consequence of NATO’S Good War in Libya,” War On The Rocks. http://warontherocks.com/2014/05/the-consequences-of-natos-good-war-in-libya/. 89 Whitman, Elizabeth. “Fighting ISIS: Kings of Jordan, Saudi Arabia Meeting to Discuss Terrorism, Regional Conflicts,” International Business Times. http://www.ibtimes.com/fighting-isis-kings-jordan-saudiarabia-meeting-discuss-terrorism-regional-conflicts-1827822. 90 Gubash, Charlene and Erin McClam, “Tricky Diplomacy awaits US in IS fight Analysts Say,” NBC News. http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/tricky-diplomacy-awaits-u-s-isis-fight-analystssay-n200711. 91 inograd, Cassamdra. “ISIS Crisis meeting: Kerry, World Leaders Discuss Threat to Iraq,” NBC News. http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/isis-crisis-meeting-kerry-world-leaders-discuss-threatiraq-n203446. 92 Allison, Graham. “Defeating ISIS: With Whose Boots on the Ground?” The Atlantic, http://www. theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/10/defeating-isis-iran-united-states-syria/381944/. 93 Ibid. 94 Szep, Jason and Mark John, “U.S. rules out military coordination with Iran,” Reuters. http://www. reuters.com/article/2014/09/15/us-iraq-crisis-iran-kerry-idUSKBN0HA15K20140915. 95 Lemmon, Gayle Tzemach and Stephanie Gaskell, “Obama’s ‘Iraq First’ Strategy working against IS?” Defense One. http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2014/12/obamas-iraq-first-strategy-working-againstisis/101670/?oref=d-river. 96 Terry, James L. “Department of Defense Press Briefing by LT. Gen. Terry in the Pentagon Briefing Room,” US Department of Defense. http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=5559. 97 Ibid. 98 Lemmon, Gayle Tzemach and Stephanie Gaskell, “Obama’s ‘Iraq First’ Strategy working against IS?” 99 New York Times Editorial Board, “The Slippery Slope Begins: Is US policy on fighting IS already changing?” The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/17/opinion/is-us-policy-on-fighting-isisalready-changing.html. 100 “Retaking Syria’s Kobane a Big Deal: Kerry,” The Nation. http://nation.com.pk/international/02Feb-2015/retaking-syria-s-kobane-a-big-deal-kerry. 101 Gayle Tzemach Lemmon and Stephanie Gaskell, “Is Obama’s ‘Iraq First’ Strategy working against IS?” 102 Caldwell, Leigh Ann “John Kerry: The Fight Against IS is ‘Going to Go On,’” CNN, Updated 1943 September 24, 2014. 103 Barnard, Anne and Somini Sengupt, “US Signals Shift on How to End Syrian Civil War,” The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/20/world/middleeast/us-support-for-syria-peace-plansdemonstrates-shift-in-priorities.html?_r=0. 104 Amos, Deborah. “Facing Threats from IS and Iran, Gulf States Set to Join Forces,” NPR. http://www. npr.org/blogs/parallels/2014/12/08/369374722/facing-threats-from-isis-and-iran-gulf-states-set-to-join-forces. 105 Ibid. 106 Axe, David. “Under Assault by US-led Coalition, Islamic State May Shift Tactics.” 107 Lucas, Ryan. “A Look at Syria’s Aleppo and the UN Truce Plan for the City,” Associated Press. http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/syrias-aleppo-truce-plan-city-29049845. 108 Sanger, David E. and Julie Hirschfeld Davis, “Struggling to Starve IS of Oil Revenue, US Seeks Assistance from Turkey,” New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/14/world/middleeast/strugglingto-starve-isis-of-oil-revenue-us-seeks-assistance-from-turkey.html. 109 Johnston, Patrick B. and The Rand Corporation. “Countering ISIL’s Financing,” Before the Financial Services United States House of Representatives, RAND Office of External Affairs. 110 Ibid. Anne Barnard and Somini Sengupta, “US Signals Shift on How to End Syrian Civil War.”

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Chapter 11

The European Response to IS Robert J. Pauly, Jr. and Kelly Roberts

Introduction Over three days in January 2015, three French-born Muslims with ties to Middle Eastern Islamic extremist organizations carried out a series of terrorist attacks that killed 17 people in Paris. First, on January 7, brothers Cherif and Said Kouachi conducted a targeted, military-style assault against the offices of the satirical weekly news magazine Charlie Hebdo, whose cartoonists had mocked the Prophet Muhammad in print. Twelve people were gunned down, including eight publication staffers. The next day, Amady Coulibali shot dead a policewoman. And, the day after that, as French police and counterterrorism teams cornered and eventually killed the Kouachi duo in a town north of Paris, Coulibali took hostages and killed four people at a Jewish kosher supermarket in the capital, before perishing in a brief gunfight as police stormed the establishment. The Kouachi brothers and Coulibali shared some common characteristics and motivations, many of which illustrate deeper challenges France and other European Union (EU) member states such as Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and United Kingdom face as a consequence of the marginalization of Muslim communities generally, and their European-born younger generations in particular. Both sets of attacks, which together represented the most deadly spate of terrorism in France since 1995, were inspired by—and carried out at least in part on behalf of—terrorist organizations that use extreme, perverted interpretations of the Islamic religion to recruit followers and justify their barbaric actions. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula claimed credit for the Kouachis’ attack, which was in response to the depiction of the Prophet Muhammad via unflattering cartoons in Charlie Hebdo. Coulibali pledged allegiance to Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (IS) before perishing, and his widow, Hayat Boumeddiene is believed to have since fled to IS-controlled territory in Syria. All three attackers had familial origins in North Africa, but were born and raised in Muslim communities situated in the urban banlieues that ring major metropolitan areas across France. The same is true of Mehdi Nemmouche, an IS member, who Belgian and French authorities believe shot and killed four in an attack on the Jewish Museum in Brussels in May 2014. The actions of Nemmouche, the Kouachis, Coulibali and Boumeddiene, as well as the attackers responsible for the bombings of the transit systems in Madrid in March 2004 and London in July 2005, are the worst consequences of a failure to effectively integrate Muslim communities into European society, one that, irrespective of where the blame lies, has left many among the younger generations of those communities increasingly susceptible to recruitment efforts by Islamic extremist groups broadly and IS specifically.1 While only a marginal proportion of the members of younger generations are likely to actually join IS or other broadly comparable groups, that still represents a significant number of recruits, sympathizers and the threats they pose, given the estimated 18 million Muslims living within the borders of Western European members of the EU.2 Projections suggest that figure, which includes some 4.7 million Muslims in France, 4.1 million in Germany and 2.8 million in the United Kingdom,

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will reach nearly 30 million, which translates to 7.1 percent of the Western European population by 2030.3 The issue of Islam in Europe has been a progressively challenging one for policy makers and practitioners in states across the region since the early to mid-1970s.4 The emergence of IS and the allure it has, in both the Greater Middle East and the West, will only add to the complexity and difficulty of such integrative challenges moving forward. As John L. Esposito, a scholar of Islam and Director of Georgetown University’s Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding notes, “For European Muslims especially, ISIS and domestic extremists, exploit the feeling of second-class citizenship, of marginalization, alienation and a lack of human dignity due to their identity as Arabs and/or Muslims.”5 With these observations providing a necessary contextual foundation, the balance of this chapter is divided into seven related sections which unfold in the following manner. The first section presents an overview of the threats IS poses to the EU generally, and Western European member states of that organization in particular, placing an emphasis on the targeting of marginalized younger generations of Muslims for recruitment. The second section examines the evolution, demographics and the extent of the marginalization of Muslim communities within Western European states generally; France, Germany, and the United Kingdom specifically. The third section examines the tools IS uses to recruit members and sympathizers within Western Europe. The fourth section examines the responses of EU member state governments and their allies to counter the threats posed by IS. The fifth section examines French, European, and broader Western Muslim communal leaders’ and organizations’ responses to counter the threats posed by the IS. The sixth section assesses the strengths and weaknesses of both EU member state, governmental, and Muslim communal efforts to counter the threats posed by IS. The concluding section assesses the prospects for the future of IS threats in the West generally, and within the boundaries of the EU in particular. Overview of IS Threats to EU Member States IS, in its present form, has been in existence for less than two years, but the threat it poses to EU member states are more serious than any presented by extremist groups drawing on extreme, illegitimate interpretations of Islam in the past. These threats are most sensibly assessed through an examination of the three most significant forms they take: terrorist attacks against largely civilian European targets; recruitment of marginalized younger generations of Muslims to support and fight for IS, whether in Iraq and/or Syria or against soft targets in the West; and further societal polarization, resulting from the use of “anti-Muslim” rhetoric by far-right political parties such as, the Front National in France, National Democratic Party of Germany and UK Independence Party (UKIP) in the United Kingdom. The Charlie Hebdo shootings represent the worst case to date of terrorism in France and was carried out by attackers inspired by extreme interpretations of Islam. However, it is by no means the only example in recent years of that brand of attack. Notable instances of these types of attacks include, the high profile March 2004 and July 2005 al-Qaeda supported railway bombings in Madrid and London, the assassinations of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh in November 2004 in Amsterdam, and British serviceman Lee Rigby in May 2013 in Woolwich, England, by “lone wolf” Muslim extremists inspired by perversions of Islam peddled by al-Qaeda, IS and their ilk.6 Understandably, such strikes against both civilian and non-civilian targets have alarmed European leaders and the citizens they govern, particularly because of the political and social instability even one terrorist attack produces, and the deep recruitment pool of marginalized Muslims across Western Europe for IS to draw on. As French scholar Gilles Kepel, an authority on both the politics

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of the Middle East and the evolution of European Muslim communities in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and other EU member states explains, the Charlie Hebdo attacks, “were typical of the latest generation of jihadis: They targeted Europe, which the terrorists see as the soft underbelly of the West, and relied on killers recruited among marginalized youths of Middle Eastern or North African descent but raised in Europe.”7 Terrorist threats have been a consistent concern for Western European states since al-Qaeda’s attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001. However, the recent wave of IS and alQaeda affiliated strikes within EU borders is the gravest concern yet, given the thousands from European Muslim communities who have either joined and/or fought for IS and many more who sympathize with the group.8 As Audrey Kurth Cronin, a scholar of terrorism and its foreign and national security policy implications at George Mason University, notes, IS “attracts followers yearning for not only religious righteousness but also adventure, personal power, and a sense of self and community. And, of course, some people just want to kill—and IS welcomes them, too. The group’s brutal violence attracts attention, demonstrates dominance, and draws people to the action.”9 The appeal to which Cronin refers is evident in an April 2015 United Nations Security Council report that estimates more than 25,000 foreign fighters from 100 countries are in IS ranks.10 Of that number, intelligence estimates suggest that thousands have origins in the West, most in Western European member states of the European Union (EU) but also hundreds in Australia, Canada and the United States.11 ISIS’ successful recruitment of Western Muslims threatens the states in which those individuals were born and raised (and, in most but not all cases, still reside) in multiple ways. First, and most dangerously, it lays the foundation for the training of IS members. It provides them with the operational skills they will need in order to plan and carry out attacks, upon returning to their European states of origin. Fortunately, to date, IS has had only limited success with this brand of operation; it has yet to surpass, or even come close to completing an assault or series of strikes anywhere in the EU, which is comparable to al-Qaeda’s successful bombings of Madrid in March 2004 and London in July 2005. But that could certainly change, especially if recruitment efforts continue to produce significant numbers of prospects willing and able to make their way to Iraq or Syria to train and join the fight. Second, as with those who actually join IS, the group uses perverted interpretations of Islam’s holy book, the Qur’an, to attract sympathizers willing to carry out their own attacks against European domestic targets. While they are typically less costly in terms of the number and types of casualties, “lone wolf” attacks are more difficult to prevent than deeper, more elaborate plots. The more effectively IS can spread its message to those inclined to listen for a range of reasons, including, most prominently, the belief that they have been denied an equitable place in the French society in which they were raisedthe greater the probability of a successful attack. Even one successful attack, which kills only a handful, still has the potential to shake the society where it occurs and deepen existing and/or generated tensions that foster societal polarization. Such polarization is precisely what IS seeks, as it will only help to intensify divisions between Western European majorities and the Muslim communities that ring metropolitan areas such as, Paris and Marseilles in France, Berlin and Hamburg in Germany, London and Bradford in the United Kingdom, Amsterdam and The Hague in the Netherlands, and the European and Belgian capital of Brussels. As Kepel explains, IS’ objective in Western European states and the cities therein “is to identify fractures within European society, and strike at them, in order to pit people against each other.”12 Those “fractures” are open to manipulation by all brands of groups on the political periphery, or at least within proverbial range of it. Islamic extremist groups such as al-Qaeda and IS, but also right-wing political parties using anti-minority rhetoric, typically target Muslim communities as

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a prominent tactic to increase their bases of support. Most such groups in Western Europe have drawn only limited support—victory in a city council or mayoral race here and the achievement of a parliamentary seat or two there—but one, the Front National in France, falls outside the norm. The party’s founder, Jean-Marie Le Pen, made it to a runoff in France’s 2002 presidential election, before losing decisively to then President Jacques Chirac. Front National now led by Le Pen’s daughter, Marine, currently holds two seats in the National Assembly and two in the Senate, along with 23 in the European Parliament—more than any other French political party in that body. In the aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo attacks, Marine Le Pen declared that the “absolute refusal of Islamic fundamentalism must be proclaimed high and loud by whomever. Life and liberty are among the most precious values”13 in an attempt to use the attacks to Front National’s advantage. So, too, was a statement from a Le Pen aide, who, according to the Euro-Islam Research Network (EIRN), suggested, “In mosques, the sermons must be in French. The associations must be monitored with vigilance, and any serious suspicion must bring about their dissolution. Funding must be strictly controlled. In addition, encouragement and most of all participation in jihad must be severely punished, and those with dual citizenship must automatically lose their French citizenship.”14 To date, the effects of Front National’s post-Charlie Hebdo attack rhetoric in France and comparable efforts by other comparable political groups in Western Europe have been mixed. For example, while Front National’s popularity is on the rise and has produced increases in parliamentary representation at both the French national and broader European levels, there have also been setbacks from the far-right perspective. Most significantly, the Front National missed an opportunity to gain an additional seat when its candidate, Sophie Montel, lost a runoff in a February 2015 by-election, only to fill an empty seat in the eastern French department of Doubs,15 and UKIP won only one seat despite projections of a better showing in the May 2015 parliamentary election in the United Kingdom.16 However, more ominously, an April report by a French antiracist watchdog group, the Observatory, warned that what it views as “Islamophobic” incidents increased by 500 percent over the first quarter of 2015 over the same period in 2015.17 Origins, Evolution and Extent of Marginalization of EU’s Muslim Communities In order to develop a deeper understanding of how the Islamic State uses the recruitment of marginalized, disillusioned and often quite bitter younger generation Muslims, and convinces them to carry out attacks against civilian targets in EU member states and powerful Western European states such as France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, one must begin with a primer on the post-World War II history of Islam in Europe. In the aftermath of World War II, states across Western Europe were in need of both physical and economic reconstruction, which, with ample American assistance in the form of Marshall Plan aid from 1948–52, produced a marked increase in demand for blue collar labor that could not be met domestically. Consequently, both government and private industrial interests began recruiting “guest workers” from Muslim majority states across the developing world, with the expectation that these laborers would stay only as long as the demand could not be filled domestically. The most substantial streams of such guest workers flowed openly from the Maghreb region of North Africa (anchored by Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia) to France, Turkey to Germany, and South Asia (Bangladesh, India and Pakistan in particular) to the United Kingdom during the 1950s and 1960s. In addition to the economic motives that drove the initial waves of Muslim migrants, insecurity pushed others to depart for Western Europe. This was in direct result of events such as, the division

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of the United Kingdom’s South Asian colonial empire into the independent states of India and Pakistan in August 1947 and the 1954–62 Algerian War for Independence.18 The “guest worker” programs were effective in the post-war rebirth and expansion of the economies of states across Western Europe. The all-male Muslim communities that housed these workers went largely unnoticed by the domestic populations of countries such as France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom. However, as a result of the economic downturn that accompanied the oil embargo imposed on the West by Muslim majority members of the Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries, most notably Saudi Arabia in the aftermath of Israel’s victory over its Arab adversaries in the October 1973 Yom Kippur War, the atmosphere changed quickly. Rather than return to their countries of origin once there was no longer a demand for their employment, these guest workers figured life would be more comfortable for their families in the West and their wives and families joined them in Western Europe. With the arrival of these families a digression for the development of European-born generations, whose members are often torn between the identities of their parents and grandparents and the Western society in which they were raised,19 was also cultivated. The reunification of Muslim families headed by the guest workers, who migrated to Western Europe during the 1950s and 1960s, produced both marked increases in the number of Muslims situated in the region, and significant qualitative changes in the characteristics and societal majority perceptions of the communities in which they have lived in since 1973. Quantitatively, the overall number and proportion of Muslims in the population of Western Europe has grown from negligible in 1973 to just under four million (2.3 percent of the population) in 1990 and 11.3 million (six percent) in 2010, and is projected to reach 16.4 million (8.6 percent) in 2030. Not surprisingly, but critically important nonetheless, those numbers are largest in the three most powerful and influential EU member states—France (4.9 million in 2010, with a projected 6.8 million in 2030), Germany (4.1 million in 2010; 5.5 in 2030) and the United Kingdom (2.8 million in 2010; 5.5 in 2015)—each of which has struggled to effectively integrate its Muslim communities into society.20 In the aftermath of the family reunifications of the mid-1970s, the former guest worker communities began to take on a cultural appearance more comparable to ones found in their countries of origin, than in the West. The vast majority of Western Europe’s Muslims are concentrated in culturally, economically, politically and socially marginalized communities ringing major metropolitan areas throughout the region, many, if not most, of which are insecure and tend to deepen negative societal perceptions and stereotypes of adherents. French law enforcement authorities, for instance, have even branded some of these places as “sensitive urban zones,” where police and emergency workers may need to take extra precautions given the probability of violence.21 The marginalization of such communities is a product of French government policies that emphasize the collective secular identity of the state, but also a lack of Muslim communal cohesion and unwillingness to engage in constructive dialogue and political exchange with the societal majority. Comparable trends are prevalent across Western Europe, given the secular nature of governance prevalent in the region for centuries. The aforementioned marginalization, and the lack of a sense of belonging, is most pronounced among members of the younger generations of Muslims who are born and raised in EU member states across the region, including Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom. While governmental efforts to integrate Muslim communities through models such as assimilation in France and multiculturalism in Germany and the United Kingdom have been ineffective, part of the blame lies with the leaders of those communities and their inhabitants. For example, Tariq Ramadan, a philosopher and scholar of Islam, and grassroots Muslim activist, whose grandfather, Hassan al-Banna, founded the Muslim Brotherhood in 1926,

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was born and raised in Switzerland. This suggests that European adherents to Islam, especially those of the younger generations, need to be more proactive in forging identities that fuse Islamic and Western values. Ramadan, an Oxford University professor and president of the European Muslim Network, emphasizes the importance for Muslims to seize the opportunity move forward on that front, stressing that for those who were born in the West or are citizens, “it is no longer a question of ‘settlement’ or ‘integration’ but rather of ‘participation’ and ‘contribution.’ My point is that we have now moved to the age of ‘post-integration’ discourse: we must henceforth determine the profound, accepted meaning of belonging.”22 Recruitment of IS Members and Sympathizers in EU Member States Estimations made by European governments, communal leaders and scholars suggest that thousands of individuals born and raised in Muslim communities in EU member states, along with substantially lower numbers of converts to Islam are among the 25,000 foreign fighters who have joined IS since the start of 2014. That figure is substantially higher than the hundreds of American members of IS.23 The most significant reasons for such disparities have both quantitative and qualitative roots. Quantitatively, overall, there are simply markedly more Muslims situated in EU member states than in the United States, particularly, if one focuses on those with ancestry in the Muslim majority states of the Greater Middle East. Specifically, as of 2010, there were only 2.5 million Muslims residing in the United States, two-thirds of whom had origins abroad, largely in the Greater Middle East. By contrast, as denoted in the previous section, there were 11.3 million Muslims living in EU states at that juncture.24 Qualitatively, Muslim communities in Europe tend to be marginalized to a much greater extent than is the case for those in the United States, especially in economic, political and social terms. And members of the younger generations have had a much more difficult time developing identities and then fitting into mainstream Western society in Western Europe, than those in the United States.25 Aside from the mere prevalence of Muslims in substantial concentrations in Western Europe, which is relative to countries such as Australia, Canada and the United States, there are myriad strategic reasons why IS targets the communities of the younger generations and seizes the opportunity for recruitment. Four such reasons merit deeper examination in the balance of this section: the geographic proximity of Western Europe to the Greater Middle East; the existence of familial bonds between Muslim majority states and regions therein, and communities within EU member states—most notably France, Germany and the United Kingdom; multiple generations of economic, ethnic, political, religious and social marginalization, which typically resonates the most among the young; and the extent to which Muslims in their teens, 20s and even 30s are receptive to recruitment through the internet broadly and social media outlets such as Facebook and Twitter, in particular. Geographically, while Western Europe certainly does not directly border the Greater Middle East, some EU member states are indeed situated on the periphery of that region, most notably Bulgaria, Italy, Portugal and Spain. For those further afield, a brief flight to Ankara or Istanbul, followed by a bus or car ride to a city along the borders between Turkey in the north and Iraq and Syria to the south, brings them to where they are then smuggled across into IS-controlled territory. As Kepel explains, “The third generation of jihad now has a battlefield: The territory in Iraq and Syria under the control of the Salafist group known as the Islamic State is just a few hours and a low-cost flight away from Paris, Brussels or London, and the would-be jihadists who travel there to fight can then readily be sent back to their native countries in Europe.”26 Thousands have made this trip since the start of 2014, including many women.

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The proximity of the Greater Middle East reduces the logistical challenges faced by those European Muslims intent on joining IS on the battlefields of Iraq and Syria relative to such hurdles for those further afield, whether in the Western Hemisphere (Canada and the United States) or the Southern Hemisphere (Australia and New Zealand). However, proximity alone is not sufficient to draw in recruits from Western Europe. Cultural familiarity is another important factor to consider. The fact that the vast majority of Western Europe’s Muslims have ancestral linkages in recent generations to the Greater Middle East, whether North African Arabs in France, Turks in Germany or South Asians in the United Kingdom, is also beneficial from the IS recruitment perspective. Exposure to the cultural and religious traditions of the heart of the Middle East through either travel to the region to visit relatives or simply through regular contact and interaction with parents and/or grandparents born and raised in Muslim majority states can lead those most dissatisfied and bitter over their present circumstances to sympathize with and, perhaps, join IS. While geography and familial linkages and relative cultural comfort levels are useful basic preconditions for IS to attract new members and sympathizers, the alienation, bitterness and anger that permeate many Muslim communities in Western Europe, including those where the Charlie Hebdo attackers and London bombers were raised in France and the United Kingdom, respectively, are considerable more important. The combination of joblessness, de facto ethnic segregation in low-income urban housing projects on the perimeters of large metropolitan areas, and social and religious exclusion is a volatile mix; one that drives many young Muslims to view marginalization, which is central to their identities. As Jocelyne Cesari, a Harvard University professor best known for her research on the younger generation European-born Muslims, explains, “Marginalized ethnic or religious groups take both the isolation imposed upon them by the dominant culture and the binary and essentialist categories with which the dominant culture characterizes them, and turn these disadvantages into positive elements of identity.”27 IS has the requisite tools and intent to target these disillusioned Western European Muslims across the region in an effort to ensure that the identities they build reflect that extremist group’s perspectives. The final piece of the proverbial IS recruitment puzzle is a volatile, but to aspiring extremists, it is quite alluring with combinations of ideology, theology and technology. Notwithstanding their economic, ethnic, religious and social marginalization, young Western European Muslims are also products of a modern Western society in the context that electronic communication and entertainment are central to daily life. They are adept at navigating the internet interactions with others around the globe via popular social media networks accessible through computers, mobile phones, iPads, tablets, and even watches. The convenience of the internet is a critically important tool for IS propagandists and recruiters, who can reach out to prospective members and other sympathizers in the EU member states of their choice without any direct physical contact needed. The message IS presents to their recruits is an extreme one, featuring violence (most notably videos of IS members beheading or simply shooting hostages), which is rooted in a perversion of Islam and packaged and distributed most often by tech-savvy Westerners who have already joined the group. As Cronin concludes, “In short, ISIS offers short-term, primitive gratification. It does not radicalize people in ways that can be countered by appeals to logic. Teenagers are attracted to the group without even understanding what it all entails, and the older fighters’ main focus is just to be associated with ISIS’ success.”28 EU Member State and International Responses to IS Threats Western European responses designed to identify and counter the myriad threats IS poses to states across the region and the populations they govern are best assessed by focusing first on

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the approaches of the three member states with the most power and influence in the EU—France, Germany and the United Kingdom—which also possess its largest Muslim communities. Politically, the Charlie Hebdo satirical magazine and the Kosher supermarket attacks produced a global show of solidarity in support of the French from across the globe, which was punctuated by a march in Paris the Sunday after those tragic events occurred, featuring a collective 45 world leaders, including French Prime Minister François Hollande, British Prime Minister David Cameron, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas but, somewhat surprisingly, not American President Obama. The three leaders among the marchers with the most immediate concerns were, of course, the heads of the three states with the EU’s three largest Muslim communities, Hollande, Merkel and Cameron. As one would expect, even for a leader on the left side of the political spectrum, Hollande took a strong stance in the aftermath of the attacks, both rhetorically and in practical terms. In a statement to the French people hours after the Charlie Hebdo attacks, the French leader took care not to link those shootings to Muslim communities in general or one or more extremist group(s) in particular, but was emphatic in pledging that the necessary steps would be taken to track down and punish those responsible, and also to minimize the potential for comparable episodes in the future. In particular, Hollande stressed; Today it is the Republic as a whole that has been attacked. The Republic equals freedom of expression; the Republic equals culture, creation, it equals pluralism and democracy. That is what the assassins were targeting. It equals the ideal of justice and peace that France promotes everywhere on the international stage, and the message of peace and tolerance that we defend—as do our soldiers—in the fight against terrorism and fundamentalism. France has received messages of solidarity and fraternity from countries around the globe, and we must take their full measure. Our response must be commensurate with the crime committed against us, first by seeking the perpetrators of this act of infamy, and then by making sure they are arrested, tried and punished very severely. And everything will be done to apprehend them. The investigation is now moving forward under the authority of the Ministry of Justice. We must also protect all public spaces. The government has implemented what is known as the Vigipirate Plan on “attack” level, which means that security forces will be deployed wherever there is the hint of a threat. Finally, we ourselves must be mindful of the fact that our best weapon is our unity: the unity of all our fellow citizens in this difficult moment. Nothing can divide us, nothing must pit us against one another; nothing must separate us. Tomorrow I will convene the Presidents of both assemblies as well as the political forces represented in Parliament to demonstrate our common resolve.29

Other French government officials echoed many of Hollande’s sentiments, as did a number of his counterparts across the EU. French Prime Minister Manuel Valls, for example, called for “a war against terrorism, against jihadism, against radical Islam, against everything that is aimed at breaking fraternity, freedom, solidarity.”30 Holding previously scheduled British-German talks on a range of European issues in London the day of the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris, Cameron appeared together to denounce the attacks and pledge solidarity with the French in countering Islamic extremism generally and the acts of al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and their affiliates specifically. Cameron stressed that the United Kingdom stands “absolutely united with the French people against terrorism and against this threat to our values—free speech, the rule of law, democracy. It’s absolutely essential we defend those values today and every day. … There is no one single answer to these appalling terrorist attacks. We have to all be vigilant. We have to try to address all the problems of radicalization that

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have happened in our country.”31 Merkel agreed, noting, “This is an attack against the values we all hold dear, values by which we stand, values of freedom of the press, freedom in general and the dignity of man. And again our thoughts are with the French people with all of those who have lost loved one in this horrific attack and everything we can do to help the French we will certainly do.”32 In the months since the Paris attacks, French leaders and their counterparts in other EU member states, have been relatively effective following through on their pledges of support. In the short term, efforts have been directed primarily toward developing and passing anti-terrorism and antiextremism legislation that will be helpful in countering the threats that IS in particular presents. As with al-Qaeda’s terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, which produced the expeditious drafting and passage of the USA Patriot Act just over a month later and the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security the ensuing year, the January 2015 Paris shootings have already produced significant legislative and policy initiatives in two EU member states in particular: France and the United Kingdom. In response to the above stated shootings, The French eliminated both the Koucachi brothers and Coulibali on January 9, 2015, ending the immediate threats to the population. However, those actions were just a point of departure for the formulation and implementation of a more sweeping set of related legislative and policy measures to mitigate the dangers posed by IS over the medium and longer terms. Building on a package of 2014 legislation passed by the French parliament, it has approved further measures since the Charlie Hebdo attacks, including what Prime Minister Valls brands “exceptional measures,” most notably some $490 million in additional spending to create more than 2,500 new counterterrorism jobs and monitor nearly 3,000 people the police consider surveillance targets.33 Ever tougher such measures are likely to continue in order to identify IS recruitment prospects and members and prevent them from planning and carrying out attacks. In the wake of the Charlie Hebdo attacks, the United Kingdom was quick to take the initiative to revisit and strengthen existing British counterterrorism laws and policies. In an address to the House of Commons, UK Home Secretary Teresa May made a case for more extensive counterterrorism measures, warning, “There can be no doubt that the terrorist threat we face is grave and relentless, it is a threat which takes many forms and causes suffering in many countries. I have always been clear that we need to keep our terrorism laws and capabilities under review and ensure that the police and intelligence agencies have the powers they need to do their job, and that is why this Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill is so important.”34 Cameron pledged during his successful spring 2015 reelection campaign to press for passage of the bill May specified. In the aftermath of a resounding electoral victory, Cameron followed through on that commitment, proposing a new set of measures targeting IS members and supporters. Notable among the raft of new laws are revocation of British passports for two years for those suspected of attempting to use extreme interpretations of Islam to radicalize young Muslims and power to close institutions, including mosques, that support IS ideology. May cautioned that “this extremist preaching, this message of hatred, this message of intolerance, can lead down a path of radicalization. What we are proposing is a bill which will have certain measures within it, measures such as introducing banning orders for groups and disruption orders for individuals, for those who are out there actively trying to promote this hatred and intolerance which can lead to division in our society and undermines our British values.”35 Given the political and security atmosphere prevalent in the United Kingdom since the terrorist shootings in Paris, ever stronger counterterrorism measures are likely, if not certain. At the broader inter- and intra-European, as well as at transatlantic levels, much of the discussion on the threats IS presents in the West has focused on the issue of countering violent extremism of variably types, but especially those targeting Western Muslim communities (in light of their relative prevalence) situated in Western Europe. Addressing attendees at a three-day White House

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sponsored Summit on Countering Violent Extremism in February 2015 in Washington, including myriad Middle Eastern and Western European, American President Barack H. Obama presented an appropriately nuanced explanation of the task at hand where the volatile combination of religious extremism and terrorism is concerned, explaining that “Al Qaeda and ISIL and groups like it are desperate for legitimacy. They try to portray themselves as religious leaders—holy warriors in defense of Islam. That is why ISIL presumes to declare itself the ‘Islamic State.’ And they propagate the notion that America—and the West, generally—is at war with Islam. That’s how they recruit. That’s how they try to radicalize young people. We must never accept the premise that they put forward, because it is a lie. Nor should we grant these terrorists the religious legitimacy that they seek. They are not religious leaders—they’re terrorists. And we are not at war with Islam. We are at war with people who have perverted Islam.”36 Obama’s remarks illustrate the need for a balanced approach in attempting to counter IS threats to the West, at home as well as abroad. That approach must have military “teeth” but also resonate in the minds of potential IS, a daunting task given the aforementioned description of the twisted (and at least somewhat unpredictable) nature of the range of factors that motivate Muslims born and raised in the West to join IS. European Muslim Communal Responses to IS Threats Equal to, if not greater in importance, than the aforementioned governmental responses to IS are those of the Muslim community leaders whose younger generations are targeted by extremist group’s propaganda. They are recruited and used for potential future terrorist attacks of the organized and “lone wolf” varieties. As with the rhetorical and policy responses of EU member state governments, more broadly the supranational institution, those emanating from within Muslim communities, which sit at the municipal and national levels, as well as regionally within Western Europe and in many parts of the Greater Middle East, have both short- and longer-term components. The former is most germane to this chapter and broader volume, with the concluding sections of both serving as useful points of departure for future, longer-term assessments. The Charlie Hebdo attacks produced a number of condemnations of the shooters and statements of support for the French people from leaders of Muslim majority states across the Greater Middle East. The most telling aspects of such statements were their emphases on the ways IS has woven extreme interpretations of Islam into its collective identity, which has proven to be detrimental to the vast majority of Muslims throughout the world, creating the need for close Western-Middle Eastern collaboration in confronting terrorist organization. Consider, for instance, the remarks of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, stressing that “terrorism is an international phenomenon that should be faced and terminated through joint international effort.”37 Further, and, in terms of religious legitimacy, even more significantly, Al-Azhar, a 1,000-year-old seat of religious learning in Cairo respected by Sunni Muslims around the world condemned the attacks, proclaiming that “Islam denounces any violence.”38 Additionally, former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiri Hariri called the attacks “a clumsy stab that harms Islam and hundreds of thousands of Muslims who have been living in France for decades, and benefiting from social, political and human rights.”39 And a Saudi Arabian official characterized the Kouachis’ assault as a “cowardly terrorist act which Islam as well as other religions reject.”40 Those condemnations and the ways in which they were articulated illustrate the seriousness with which Middle Eastern leaders view IS as a threat to their interests, power and security. Within the French, Western European and American Muslim communities, there were equally rapid and pronounced reactions to the Charlie Hebdo attacks, comparable in tone, if not fully in

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content, given the distinctions between the individuals, groups, communities and countries for which their messages were intended. One of the first, and more prominent, French Muslim leaders to speak out was Dalil Boubakeur, imam at the Paris Grand Mosque and President of the Muslim Council of France (CFCM). He branded the shootings as a “declaration of war,” adding that, “The times have changed. We are entering a new period in this confrontation. We are horrified by the brutality and savagery that took place in the Charlie Hebdo office.”41 The two largest Muslim umbrella groups in France, Boubakeur’s CFCM and the Muslim Brotherhood supported Union of Islamic Organizations in France, along with some smaller French Muslim groups issued a collective statement calling on imams to condemn “violence and terrorism wherever they come from” during Friday prayers and asking that Muslims show solidarity with all French citizens in response to the attacks by confirming “their wish to live together and peace and respect of the values of the republic.”42 Muslim communal groups in other Western European states and in the United States echoed many of the above sentiments. Dr. Shuja Shafi, Secretary General of the Muslim Council of Britain, for instance, emphasized that “nothing justifies the taking of life. Those who have killed in the name of our religion today claim to be avenging the insults made against Prophet Muhammad, upon whom be peace. But nothing is more immoral, offensive and insulting against our beloved Prophet than such a callous act of murder. Our thoughts, prayers and solidarity go to the families of the victims and the people of France.”43 Across the Atlantic, Council on American–Islamic Relations National Executive Director Nihad Awad stressed that “we strongly condemn this brutal and cowardly attack and reiterate our repudiation of any such assault on freedom of speech, even speech that mocks faiths and religious figures. The proper response to such attacks on the freedoms we hold dear is not to vilify any faith, but instead to marginalize extremists of all backgrounds who seek to stifle freedom and to create or widen societal divisions.”44 In both cases, the groups took care to make clear their view of IS as illegitimate as an “Islamic” organization under the tenets of the Qur’an, Sunna and hadith. One other extraordinarily important European Muslim voice to react to the Charlie Hebdo attacks was that of the Oxford scholar and grassroots activist Ramadan, who condemned the shootings and, more significantly, called on Muslims to play a proactive role in the political discourse to follow. With respect to the killings, Ramadan noted that, “contrary to what was apparently said by the killers in the bombing of Charlie Hebdo’s headquarters, it is not the Prophet who was avenged, it is our religion, our values and Islamic principles that have been betrayed and tainted. My condemnation is absolute and my anger is profound (healthy and a thousand times justified) against this horror.”45 Ramadan then turned to the longer-term issue he has focused on for nearly a quarter-century: the development of a Euro-Islamic communal identity, one based on positive, proactive political engagement and debate undertaken by younger generation Muslims in member states throughout the EU. In particular, he encouraged those younger Muslims to play active roles in the discussions on the place of Islam in European society and the threats that extremist groups such as IS pose to Muslims and non-Muslims alike moving forward, noting, “every day we have between 100 and 150 people being killed, and they are the victims of (IS) and violent extremist Muslims. I think that this is where, together, we should understand that you and me, as Europeans, we are on the same side acting against violent extremism and asking for consistency [from] our governments when it comes to the dignity of people and the dignity of life.”46 Those remarks build on the arguments Ramadan introduced in his 2004 book Western Muslims and the future of Islam, in which he suggested that “French, English, German, Canadian and American Muslims, women as well as men, are constructing a ‘Muslim personality’ that will soon surprise their fellow citizens. Far from media attention, going through the risks of a period of maturation that is necessarily slow,

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they are drawing the shape of European and American Islam: faithful to the principles of Islam, dressed in European and American cultures, and definitively rooted in Western societies.”47 One must hope that it is Ramadan’s vision rather than that of IS that proves more alluring to young Muslims over time. Strengths/Weaknesses of EU Member State and Muslim Communal Responses to IS Threats As with any responses to any set of threats and challenges growing out of a given issue area, those fashioned by EU member state governmental and supranational institutional officials and Muslim communal leaders to IS recruitment efforts and attacks have both strengths and weaknesses, both of which are examined in greater depth in the section that follows. EU and Muslim communal efforts are each assessed in turn, before the presentation of some suggestions on how these actors can best work individually and collectively to counter IS moving forward. As discussed previously, EU member states have employed a combination of legislative, intelligence gathering and communal outreach measures to date, both before (and since) the January 2015 Paris shootings in an attempt to manage the threats IS presents inside Western Europe. The principal strengths of those responses to the threats associated with violent extremist groups driven by perverted interpretations of Islam generally and IS specifically are threefold. First, the French government and police and counterterrorism forces under its command performed well in tracking down and eliminating the Kouachi brothers before they could carry out any further attacks following the Charlie Hebdo shootings, nor did they permit Coulibali to continue his trail of terror beyond the kosher supermarket where he took several hostages and killed four. Second, French leaders and their counterparts across the EU provided precisely the types of rhetorical responses and actions, symbolic and practical alike needed in the aftermath of the attacks. Overall, those in positions of governmental authority struck the proper balance between condemnation of the shootings and attraction of some to the extreme interpretations of Islam that AQAP and IS used to motivate the attackers on one hand and reassurance to Western Europe’s Muslim communities that it is not the religion they practice but an illegitimate perversion of that faith that should be blamed on the other. Third, the French and British governments have both recognized correctly that strengthening existing counterterrorism laws and approaches in ways that target related IS recruitment and propaganda techniques is essential and engaging in fast-track legislative strategies is in order to achieve that end. Yet, notwithstanding these positive efforts, there are also two significant areas of weakness associated with Western European governments’ efforts to mitigate the dangers IS presents. The first is a short- and medium-term concern, namely the dearth of an effective information campaign to counter IS’ social media recruitment campaign. The second is a long-standing inability, if not unwillingness, to develop more effective techniques to integrate Muslim communities equitably into mainstream European societies across the EU. The assimilation model of the French and multicultural approaches of the British and Germans in particular have quite plainly failed. There are also both strengths and weaknesses in the ways Western European Muslim communal leaders have attempted to counter IS’ quite successful efforts to recruit marginalized young Muslims to the group’s cause. The strengths are twofold. First, Muslim leaders have taken advantage of their cultural and religious backgrounds to describe and condemn IS in nuanced ways that illustrate the group’s mischaracterizations of the tenets of Islam to serve their political ends. Such rhetoric, whether intentionally or not, can complement the statements of governmental leaders, provided the

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latter emphasize that IS’ use of Islam is indeed an extreme and perverted one that an extraordinarily small percentage that Muslims share. Second, the recognition by Ramadan and growing number of other Western European Muslim leaders and activists to encourage the younger generations they influence to play more proactive roles in the development and evolution of a hybrid Euro-Islamic identity, albeit one that follows the central tenets of their faith, without rejecting Western societal norms. There is also one significant weakness—the continued lack of unity and cohesion among and across, Muslim communities—which is evident at the municipal, national and EU-wide levels alike. Ramadan’s work is an excellent point of departure, but the issue of Muslim cohesion must eventually be tackled much more comprehensively. Focusing on the shortcomings of both EU member state governments and Western European Muslim communities, there are three notable ways for both sets of actors—both singly and collectively, to make further progress in reducing the extent of the interconnected influence IS enjoys within the latter and security threats it poses to the region as a whole. First, EU governments must stay the course in characterizing the threats IS represents through properly nuanced language that explains precisely how the group uses Islam illegitimately to the detriment of Muslims and nonMuslims alike. Second, those governments are prudent to continually strengthen counterterrorism laws in ways that respond both to the evolution of IS’ social-media-heavy recruitment techniques in the West and the types of security threats it presents. Muslim communal assistance should be sought regarding those recruitment techniques in particular. Third, Western European Muslim leaders would be wise to take Ramadan’s lead in fashioning deeper multilevel collaborative webs across communities, metropolitan areas and countries, as well as ethnic, familial and religious denominational and interpretive groups to share existing and eventually agree on more cohesive ideas and priorities. Without a shared vision, progress toward countering IS influence in the short term and achieving more comprehensive and equitable integration of Muslim communities into Western European society will be slow. Conclusions This chapter was designed to achieve six related objectives. First, it presented an overview of the threats IS poses to the EU generally and Western European member states of that organization in particular, with an emphasis on the targeting of marginalized younger generations of Muslims for recruitment. Second, it examined the evolution, demographics and the extent of the marginalization of Muslim communities within Western European states generally, and France, Germany and the United Kingdom specifically. Third, it examined tools IS uses to recruit members and sympathizers within Western Europe. Fourth, it examined the responses of the EU and its member state governments’ responses to counter the threats posed by the Islamic State. Fifth, it examined French, European and broader Western Muslim communal leaders’ and organizations’ responses to counter the threats posed by the Islamic State. And, sixth, it assessed the strengths and weaknesses of both EU member state governmental and Muslim communal efforts to counter the threats posed by the Islamic State. Given the evidence presented in the aforementioned main sections of the chapter, when considering the prospects for IS’ actions toward EU member states and their responses, both governmental and Muslim communal moving forward, five things are clear. First, IS is unique in its ability to reach into Western society and attract thousands of followers among Muslims born and/or raised in Europe and the United States. And nearly all available evidence to date suggests that IS’ recruiting success is unlikely to be short lived. Second, as with the issue of IS’ allure among many

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marginalized younger Muslims, the public pressure on Western European governments to fashion effective policies and approaches to counter and mitigate, if not eliminate, the threats IS poses is already intense and will only grow more pronounced with each terrorist attack one or more of that group’s members or sympathizers manage to carry out. Third, the pressure mentioned requires action, which will come most often through the development, passage and application of stronger counterterrorism laws and use of tougher approaches to confronting IS and its members, supporters and sympathizers wherever they lurk. Fourth, how well Western European governmental strategies to counter IS work will be conditioned largely by the extent to which the policies formulated and implemented on behalf of those strategies target IS and its current and prospective future members narrowly rather than casting a broader net that risks further Muslim communal alienation and marginalization. Fifth, for Muslim communities to participate effectively in countering IS threats, cohesion is critically important but will not be achieved quickly or easily. Ramadan’s work on that issue is both innovative and constructive, yet it is also just a start. At their core, the January 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris illustrated once again the seriousness of the threats Islamic extremist organizations and their members, supporters and sympathizers pose to Western states such as France, Germany, United Kingdom and United States. Recognizing and countering those threats requires much more effective collaboration between Western governmental officials and Muslim communal leaders to confront violent extremist groups, most notably IS but also al-Qaeda and its affiliates, in ways that rely on credible, mainstream interpretations of Islam to discredit those groups’ reckless, self-serving perversion of that faith. To do so successfully represents an important first step toward a more secure future for both Muslims and non-Muslims across the boundaries of the EU. The very establishment of that institution was itself central to post-World War dream of the completion of European continent whole and free. IS’ objective and most significant threat it presents is to spoil that dream from within. Notes 1 (2015) “Terrorism in Paris: A Blow Against Freedom,” The Economist (January 10–16), electronic edition. 2 (2011) “The Future of the Global Muslim Population,” Pew Foundation (January): http://www. pewforum.org/2011/01/27/future-of-the-global-muslim-population-regional-europe/. 3 Ibid. 4 For an in-depth examination of the issue, see Robert J. Pauly, Jr. (2004), Islam in Europe: Integration or Marginalization? (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing). 5 John L. Esposito (2015), “Letter From the Editor,” Oxford Islamic Studies Online (March): http:// www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/Public/editor_letter.html. 6 For an incisive assessment of these types of al-Qaeda-inspired attacks and several such plots that did not come to fruition between the early and mid-2000s, see Gilles Kepel (2004), The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 241–87. 7 Gilles Kepel (2015), “The Limits of Third Generation Jihad,” The New York Times (February 16). http://mobile.nytimes.com/2015/02/17/opinion/the-limits-of-third-generation-jihad.html?_r=0&referrer=. 8 Joshua Berlinger (2015), “The Names: Who has Been Recruited to ISIS from the West,” CNN (February 26). http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/25/world/isis-western-recruits/. 9 Audrey Kurth Cronin (2015), “ISIS is Not a Terrorist Group: Why Counterterrorism Won’t Stop the Latest Terrorist Threat,” Foreign Affairs 94–2 (March/April), 94.

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10 (2015) “UN Says ‘25,000 foreign fighters’ joined Islamist militants,” BBC World Service (April 2). http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-32156541. 11 Berlinger, “Who has Been Recruited to ISIS from the West.” 12 Quoted in “After the Atrocities,” The Economist (January 16–23), electronic edition. 13 Quoted in Heather Saul (2015), “Charlie Hebdo shooting: Far-right Front National leader Marine Le Pen ‘wants to offer France referendum on the death penalty,’” The Independent (January 8). http://www. independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/charlie-hebdo-shooting-farright-front-national-leader-marine-le-penwants-to-offer-france-referendum-on-the-death-penalty-9965607.html. 14 Allessandria Masi (2015), quoted in “In Wake of Charlie Hebdo Attack, Marine Le Pen’s Call For The Death Penalty Threatens To Further Polarize France,” International Business Times (January 8). http:// www.ibtimes.com/wake-charlie-hebdo-attack-marine-le-pens-call-death-penalty-threatens-further-1777882. 15 (2015) “France by-election: Narrow win for Hollande’s party,” BBC News (February 9). http://www. bbc.com/news/world-europe-31269247. 16 (2015) “Results,” BBC News (May 8). http://www.bbc.com/news/election/2015/results. 17 (2015) “Islamophobia Soars in France Since Charlie Hebdo,” Euro Islam Research Network (April 26). http://www.euro-islam.info/2015/04/26/islamophobia-soars-in-france-since-charlie-hebdo/. 18 Pauly, Islam in Europe, 1–126. 19 Ibid. 20 “Future of the Global Muslim Population.” 21 (2013) “Forgotten in the banlieues,” The Economist (February 21), online edition. 22 Tariq Ramadan, What I Believe (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 5–6. 23 Berlinger, “Who Has Been Recruited to ISIS from the West.” 24 “Future of the Global Muslim Population.” 25 Jocelyne Cesari (2004), When Islam and Democracy Meet: Muslims in Europe and Muslims in the United States (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), 9–42. 26 Kepel, “The Limits of Third Generation Jihad.” 27 Cesari, When Islam and Democracy Meet, 25. 28 Cronin, “ISIS is Not a Terrorist Group,” 94. 29 François Hollande (2015), “Attack against Charlie Hebdo Statement by Mr. François Hollande, President of the Republic,” French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (January 7). http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/ en/the-ministry-of-foreign-affairs-158/events-5815/article/attack-against-charlie-hebdo. 30 Quoted in Matt Schiavenza (2015), “France Declares its Own ‘War on Terror,’” The Atlantic Online (January 10). http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/01/france-declares-its-own-war-onterror/384409/. 31 Quoted in Ben Riley-Smith (2015), “Britain Will ‘Never Give Up’ Freedom of Speech, David Cameron Says After Charlie Hebdo Attack,” The Telegraph Online (January 7). http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ news/politics/david-cameron/11331616/Britain-will-never-give-up-freedom-of-speech-David-Cameronsays-after-Charlie-Hebdo-attack.html. 32 Quoted in (2015) “Charlie Hebdo: World Leaders’ Reactions to Terror Attack,” The Telegraph Online (January 7). http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/11332726/Charlie-Hebdoworld-leaders-reactions-to-terror-attack.html. 33 Maya de la Baume and Dan Bilefsky (2015), “France Vows Forceful Measures Against Terrorism,” The New York Times (January 21). http://mobile.nytimes.com/2015/01/22/world/europe/amedy-coulibalyparis-gunman-france.html?referrer=. 34 “Britain will ‘never give up’ freedom of speech.”

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35 Peter Dominiczak and Rosa Prince (2015), “David Cameron to Fast-track Tough Anti-terror Laws,” The Telegraph (May 13). http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/11600927/DavidCameron-to-fast-track-tough-anti-terror-laws.html. 36 Barack H. Obama (2015), “Remarks by the President in Closing of the Summit on Countering Violent Extremism,” White House Office of the Press Secretary (February 18). https://m.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2015/02/18/remarks-president-closing-summit-countering-violent-extremism. 37 “World Leaders’ Reactions to Terror Attack.” 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid. 41 Quoted in Everton Gayle (2015), “World Leaders Respond to Charlie Hebdo Attacks,” Euro News (January 8): http://www.euronews.com/2015/01/07/world-leaders-condemn-paris-attack/. 42 (2015) “French Muslim Groups Condemn Charlie Hebdo Killings, Mosques Attacked,” RFI (January 8). http://www.english.rfi.fr/france/20150108-french-muslim-groups-condemn-charlie-hebdokillings-mosques-attacked. 43 (2015) “Paris Murders are a Greater Insult to Islam: Muslim Council of Britain Statement on Charlie Hebdo Massacre,” Muslim Council of Britain (January 8). http://www.mcb.org.uk/paris-murders-jan-08-15/. 44 (2015) “American Muslims Paris Terror Attack,” Council on American–Islamic Relations (January 7). https://www.cair.com/press-center/press-releases/12797-american-muslims-condemn-paristerror-attack-defend-free-speech.html. 45 Quoted in (2015) “How is the Muslim World Reacting to the Attack on Charlie Hebdo?,” Quora (January 7). http://www.quora.com/How-is-the-Muslim-world-reacting-to-the-attack-on-Charlie-Hebdo. 46 Quoted in (2015) “Tariq Ramadan Condemns Charlie Hebdo Massacre but Criticises ‘inconsistency’ of Political Reaction,” BBC Today Program (January 8). https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/europe/16242tariq-ramadan-condemns-charlie-hebdo-massacre-but-criticises-inconsistency-of-political-reaction. 47 Tariq Ramadan (2004), Western Muslims and the Future of Islam (New York: Oxford University Press), 4.

Chapter 12

Islamic State Recruitment Strategies and Tactics Brian Carriere

Introduction “There is something more compelling than state power, more intimidating than all the bullets, all the torture, and all the chains that a brutal dictatorship can muster. It is fiercer than the iron fist of a despot and stronger than the stench of death. Since time immemorial, kings, rulers, and generals have the power of an idea.”1 Ideas are difficult to combat and cannot be defeated with weapons. Ideas reside in the human psyche and can be used for good or evil. Ideas outlive despots and kings, presidents and politicians. When espoused by charismatic leaders, evil ideas have brought disaster, death and destruction to human history. Radicalism is such an idea, and it has been perpetrated in many forms throughout time. The speed and breadth at which an idea spreads is directly dependent on the technological means to disseminate information. The Protestant Reformation and the Age of Enlightenment each benefited from the printing press. In the twenty-first century, ideas can cross the globe instantaneously with the aid of internet-connected computers and radical groups like the Islamic State are taking advantage of the technological opportunities available. Maajid Nawaz grew up in the Southend, London, United Kingdom as a Muslim of Pakistani descent. Like many teenagers he rebelled against his parents and society. He found it difficult to ‘fit in’ with British culture, but also felt distant from his Pakistani heritage. Like many youths who do not connect with any particular groups, Nawaz found acceptance among radical Islamists. Often outcasts seek merely inclusion, even if the group they join is leading them to a destructive end. That was the pathway for Nawaz until his imprisonment in Egypt allowed for contemplation and an intellectual and spiritual transformation. This change resulted in his opposition to radicalism as a true solution to his problems and those of Islam in general.2 In addition to Nawaz, there are other examples of de-radicalization. Unfortunately, there are also countless stories of radicalization that do not turn for the better. This chapter examines the roots of radicalism, especially Islamism, and the distinctive differences among them. It focuses on Islamic State tactics for recruitment amid the general context of radicalization. This chapter will provide numerous examples within multiple sovereign states, as well as highlight counter operations in existence in multiple western states. Katrin Bennhold published an Op-Ed in The New York Times comparing the ideological transformation of a Londoner named Ibrahim Ahmed with that of a Swede named Robert Orell. Ahmed “played soccer (futbol) and listened to what he called white music.”3 As a Muslim; however, he did not fit in at school and “became increasingly disaffected with British society” as a whole. Orell read Mein Kampf and fantasized about exacting revenge on people he considered bullies against his culture.4 Bennhold’s account of these two men is not to compare the ideologies of Nazism and Islamism, but to illustrate how two young men were enticed by radicalism. Each boy felt himself to be a victim of society and each had little self-esteem to overcome the emotional disillusionment. Young boys and girls in such circumstances simply seek to belong to a group. Radicals often prey on the naïveté of young, vulnerable people and recruit them into their groups; much like a drug dealer seeks to hook young kids to develop a long term client. Bennhold says,

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“Both (men) were seduced by a narrative that put them at the center of a greater cause and offered them what they craved: a sense of belonging and a plan to act on their resentment.” These two men also became disillusioned by their respective groups and were influenced by others who had already left the group to do so for themselves. The radicalization story is similar in the cases of three young British girls who left the comfort and security of their suburban lifestyles to join the Islamic State in February 2015. Shamima Begum, Kadiza Sultana, and Amira Abase, all teenagers, flew to Turkey with plans of crossing the Syrian border to join the jihadi movement led by the Islamic State.5 The increase of radicalized westerners, especially those joining various Islamic terror organizations, has policymakers and counter-terrorism organizations concerned. The Center for Terrorist Research at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, published Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. and U.K.: An Empirical Examination of the Radicalization Process in 2009. This work examined the cases of 117 homegrown terrorists by observing their blogs, social media interactions, online postings and communiqué, and other records. From the empirical study, the authors recognized six behaviors that are important to the radicalization process and present among individuals who participated in an attack. In varying degree all of them possessed a legalistic interpretation of Islam; placed their trust in selected Islamic authorities; believed in an inherent schism between Islam and the West; had a low tolerance for theological deviance; attempted to impose their beliefs on other Muslims; and experienced political radicalization based upon the belief that the West seeks to subjugate Islam, that most Muslims fall short of the true faith, and that military action represents the only proper Muslim response.6

One of the authors of the aforementioned work, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, also authored My Year Inside Radical Islam: A Memoir. Gartenstein-Ross went from becoming part of the problem to part of the solution, says The Oregonian. Daveed, like Maajid Nawaz, joined the radical Islamist movement based on his strong desire to belong to something. He describes his story as the “seduction of radical Islam, which … can take its devotees suddenly and by degrees.”7 Daveed later turned FBI informant and is dedicated to counter-terrorism policy and security studies in the United States. The mastermind behind the London bombings of July 7, 2005 was Mohammed Sidique Khan. Journalist Shiv Malik spent a month in Leeds, United Kingdom with Khan’s brother. His is another story of a softly-spoken young man turned radical.8 Malik’s conclusion is that while the poverty and drug activity of Khan’s neighborhood of Beeston were influential in his radicalization, the primary factor was the “internal frictions within a traditional Pakistani community in Britain.”9 While these examples are not directly connected to the Islamic State each holds similar attributes and a common overall theme. An examination of radicalization in a general sense is necessary to fully understand how the Islamic State recruits and converts people to its cause, especially westerners. Changing Nature of Radicalization In the 1970s, terrorism became a more ubiquitous method of trying to influence political agendas and policy, especially in the Middle East. Recruitment at that time usually centered on personal connections among people within the affected states or communities. A westerner had little opportunity to join a terrorist movement without relocating to a foreign nation. In the twenty-first

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century, however, individuals utilize technology to communicate across the globe and engage in widespread activities of dissidence or terrorism. This era is known as the “digital age” and its enthusiasts are referred to as the “Twitter generation,” among other monikers. “There is little discussion and even less consensus about what radicalism and extremism even mean,” says Borum.10 The terms are often used interchangeably. Most people with radical ideas do not engage in terror activities, but some justify violent actions based on their extreme beliefs. A Dutch study reveals that, “Although radicalization has increasingly been subjected to scientific studies, a universally accepted definition of the concept is still to be developed.” However, sweeping policy changes call for two concepts which typically include violent radicalization and radicalization.11 The key difference among the two concepts centers on the process by which the individual or group is radicalized and carries out their goal(s). If process is important to understanding and delineating radicalization, then one could also assume an understanding of people or groups that facilitate the process is also important. A Quilliam report acknowledged “three important trends in the Arab world: rapidly rising internet usage, high levels of youth unemployment, and the continuing lack of real political change and sufficient peaceable outlets for legitimate political dissent.”12 These are the reasons that western states should become more proactive in countering the propaganda messages, especially those of radical jihadists and organized groups like IS. In 1995, less than one percent of the world population had access to the internet. Twenty years later, the internet is used by 42 percent of the world population.13 More than three billion people in the world regularly use the internet and the global village has become reality. Social media is one of the primary sources used by radicals. Facebook was founded by Mark Zuckerberg in 2004 and originally was only available to Harvard undergraduate students. He quickly expanded on the social networking site and by “September 2006 it was available to anyone with a registered email address.”14 In the nine years since its public introduction Facebook has nearly reached 1.4 billion registered users.15 Twitter has a similar history but with a smaller following. In March 2006, Evan Williams, Jack Dorsey and Biz Stone launched their social media site most noted for its 140 character maximum per message known as “tweets.”16 Today the free site has over 284 million users.17 The Taliban became one of the first radical Islamist groups to embrace technology as a tool for spreading its message and recruiting jihadists to its radical cause. According to Drissel, the Taliban’s resurgence “includes an innovative reliance on information and communication technologies (ICTs). Taliban leaders now communicate with many followers and potential supporters on Twitter, YouTube, Facebook, and other social media websites.”18 The Taliban is making amends with its rooted protests against technology and, instead, embracing is at as a tool of modernity that allows for great recruitment opportunities and information dissemination. Additional groups, including the Islamic State, have followed that pattern in recent years. In 2011, Twitter played an influential role in the Tunisian revolution that eventually ousted President Ben Ali. The public pressure resulted in the “rarest of phenomena, a popular revolt toppling an Arab dictator.”19 Many in the media eventually dubbed this event the first Twitter Revolution, especially when similar events followed that year in Egypt and elsewhere across the Middle East and Northern Africa. The ability to disseminate information and coordinate logistics via social media sites has made political activism more successful. No longer are days or weeks of planning and communication necessary. Instead, these movements become organic and take on a life of their own in a matter of moments. It has also been noted that the Tunisian revolution, although impactful because of its use of social media, did not include Islamists.20

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Examples of Radicalization via the Internet The internet has played an influential role in radicalization in the past two decades. The US Department of Justice defines online radicalization as “the process by which an individual is introduced to an ideological message and belief system that encourages movement from mainstream beliefs toward extreme views, primarily through the use of online media, including social networks such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube.21 Using these and other online media sources, extremists broadcast their views, post videos of people they wish to martyrize, incite violent actions, and more. In February 2015, the Islamic State posted a video online in which captured Jordanian pilot Muath al-Kaseasbeh was burned alive. This video breaks from the traditional actions of shooting or beheading the victim but it brings worldwide awareness to the Islamic State and its cause. In turn, the new attention provides IS with an opportunity to use online media to engage in targeted recruitment activities. For example, IS and other extremist groups have setup numerous online communities with like-minded people and they use the forums to communicate with new recruits and groom them in the ways of violence. In July 2011, Anders Breivik carried out a bombing and shootings in Norway. As with previous examples, those who knew him indicated he was “normal and caring.” Yet, his online selfradicalization resulted in the deaths of innocent people. It was discovered that his radicalization occurred after he experienced financial troubles and moved back into his mother’s home. He spent months isolated from society, playing video games, and surfing the web. This is where he connected with extremist political groups who hated western society. The literature indicates it is widely assumed that the internet serves as a tool for radicalization but there is little empirical evidence to support the claim. In 2013, Rand published a study of 15 case studies of online radicalization. It identified five repeated hypotheses from the literature and were confirmed in the case studies examined by the study. 1. The internet creates more opportunities to become radicalized. 2. The internet acts as an ‘echo chamber’: a place where individuals find their ideas supported and echoed by other like-minded individuals. 3. The internet accelerates the process of radicalization. 4. The internet allows radicalization to occur without physical contact. 5. The internet increases opportunities for self-radicalization.22 “Terrorism is the ultimate consequence of the radicalization process. Individuals gradually adopt an extremist religious or political ideology hostile to the West, which legitimizes terrorism as a tool to affect societal change.”23 In the West, and the United States in particular, self-radicalization has become one of the biggest concerns. While the world witnessed the destruction of the terror attacks on September 11, 2001 in the United States, few analysts expect to see a duplication of that level of destruction and view it as an exception to the normal pattern of disruptive terror activities. This reality results in a greater focus on homegrown terrorists and self-radicalized individuals who are outcast from the mainstream of society, yet still desire to be part of something larger than them, even if it is destructive. “While alienation and lack of integration play an important part in the radicalization process, they may not be the main factors motivating Europe’s jihadists to resort to terror.”24 It has become increasingly difficult for western nations to discern among Muslims who are non-violent and those who are willing to resort to terrorist actions. It is a frustrating predicament and becomes more confusing when “westernized” Muslims resort to terror or join the jihadists. It is also of key concern

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for foreign policy analysts when leaders within Muslim communities in the west condemn violent actions but acknowledge that they understand why some are compelled to commit such atrocities. Azzam contends, “While there are shared political concerns among the Muslim community in the West … what drives the radicalized minority is ideology.”25 Reality illuminates that Muslim immigrants in western societies enjoy a greater respect for human rights and rule of law than exists in their native Muslim countries. Despite this, some still find themselves compelled to join jihadists. This reinforces Azzam’s theory that radicalization is based on ideological differences as interpreted by the individual, not by consensus. Many of today’s self-radicalized individuals are classified as lone wolves. Pantucci identified varying typologies of lone wolves in his work for the International Center for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence. In it he describes four key typologies. The loner engages in acts of terror using the cover of extreme Islamic ideology but has no connection to any terrorist organization. The lone wolf appears to be alone in his actions but usually proves to have some contact with operational extremists. The lone wolf pack refers to individuals who are selfradicalized but have no contact with organized groups. The lone attackers operate alone but have connection with affiliated groups.26 Pantucci’s work primarily focuses on those individuals operating in connection with, or claiming to connect with, al-Qaeda, but the typology exists across other terrorist organizations as well and the internet has served a role that allows for more lone radicals than in years previous to the internet’s widespread availability and use. Why is the Internet Such a Useful Tool and How is it Being Utilized? The internet has played, perhaps, the most influential role in radicalization in recent years, especially among the millennial generation. As discussed previously, the internet has become more widely available across the globe. The advent of social media sites in the past decade contribute to a higher volume of use, especially among younger people. These factors, coupled with a savvy and guided effort by the Islamic State and other terrorist organizations, actualize increased recruitment and conversions to Islam. Most of these recruits adopt a radical and violent view of Islam that is perpetrated by terrorist organizations. “The internet has transformed the way we communicate … it is not surprising that terrorists and extremists have adopted it as one of the tools of their trade.”27 In addition to examining these examples, Briggs’ study finds that while the internet has become a key tool in radicalization radicalizing entirely online is uncommon but this could change. It is especially concerning that extremists, including IS, are making use of social media outlets to widen their network. It is also clear that the internet is used for operational purposes and western governments are having difficulty in getting ahead of this phenomenon.28 Briggs’ policy brief compiled for the Institute for Strategic Dialogue highlighted some of the most nefarious examples of individuals radicalized either partially or wholly by internet media. Among them is Younis Tsouli, who was heralded in 2004 as the “undisputed superstar of jihadism online.”29 Tsouli is a Moroccan-born resident of the United Kingdom. He joined web forums and began downloading videos, posting messages, and more before orchestrating his own terror attack. He was arrested by British authorities, convicted of inciting terrorism, and is currently serving a 16-year prison sentence. Hamaad Munshi was a teenager in the UK when he was arrested for possession of materials that he was planning to use in a terror attack. He was an admitted member of a group of “British online jihadists.”30 Hamaad Munshi became Britain’s youngest convicted terrorist and authorities believe

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his younger brother, Hassan, along with his friend Talha Asmal, have recently joined the Islamic State.31 Each of these young men comes from Dewsbury, West Yorkshire. The families describe them as normal teenagers who made good grades in school, yet still they were somehow enticed by the jihadist movement and may soon find themselves engaged in terror activities that may result in their deaths, along with those of many innocent lives. Other examples of individuals radicalized via the internet include Abdul Basheer of Singapore who was arrested in 2007 for attempting to join the Taliban in Afghanistan. Hussain Osman, one of the London bombers, indicated he was influenced by videos he viewed online. Those who carried out the 2005 Khan al-Khalili bombing in Cairo downloaded instructions on how to make bombs from a jihadist website.32 The Islamic State has duplicated many tactics and strategies used by other radical groups, including al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Nonetheless, this recruitment is not simply a problem in the US and UK; it is global. One thing that is evident from the research is that the internet successfully accelerates the radicalization process. Just as it has served to expedite many of our daily activities from communication to shopping, it is now better aiding nefarious groups in organizing, planning, and executing violent terrorist actions. Regardless of the influence of the internet, theorists such as Marc Sageman conclude that personal connections are still important, if not critical, to radicalization. “In his book, Leaderless Jihad, he observes, ‘ … most online participants also have friends who share their views and desires but do not spend so much time on the internet. Terror networks consist of a mixture of online and offline elements, and their respective in-person and virtual discussions mutually influence each other.’”33 Hoskins, et al, conclude that, “While the internet provides a convenient platform for activists to renew their commitment and reach out to like-minded individuals elsewhere, it is largely ineffective when it comes to drawing in new recruits.”34 Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and the Islamic State are each already using it. Numerous anecdotal stories have been highlighted here and many more appear almost daily in the headlines. While theorists and policy analysts have not reached a consensus it is clear that the internet is becoming a new battleground of ideas in the war on terror and the Islamic State has chosen to utilize this boundless tool. In early 2015, the United States thwarted at least two potential terror actions on behalf of IS in the US. In January, an Ohio man named Christopher Lee Cornell, 20 years old, was arrested for conspiring to bomb the US Capitol building in Washington, DC. It is possible that Cornell had traveled to Syria and received training. It is also alleged that he had direct communication with members of IS overseas. What Cornell did not know is that his co-conspirator was actually an informant for the US Federal Bureau of Investigation. Officials arrested him in Ohio before he began the final stages of his plan to travel to Washington, DC. Perhaps what is most concerning about Cornell’s plan can be stated in his own words, “I believe that we should just wage jihad under own orders and plan attacks and everything.”35 On April 10, 2015, 20-year-old John Booker was indicted on multiple charges for planning an attack on Fort Riley, a US Army installation in Kansas.36 If convicted he could serve life in prison. Alexander Blair was arrested in connection with Booker’s plot and he is charged with knowing about the plan and not reporting it to authorities. While these two events were unlikely planned and ordered directly by IS officials in Syria, they do give pause to the US and other western states to the concern of rogue radicals who cause damage in the name of Islamism without having a direct connection to the organization. Realistically, future consideration must be given to the use of the internet as a tool for radicalization and because it provides so much information for individuals to learn how to make bombs or execute terror actions. Perhaps the first step is to examine how it is currently being used by terrorists and then to develop a strategic counter-terror and counter-recruitment plan that could be coordinated by numerous western states simultaneously. Some virtual media organizations

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provide services in creating jihadist publications and visual presentations. Two important examples are Global Islamic Media Front and Al-Fajr (Media Center). Some of these organizations have developed a model that is similar to mainstream news outlets such as Reuters or the Associated Press and, according to Briggs, “there is evidence to show that … the internet appears to act as a library or classroom for jihad.”37 The internet and social media outlets provide great openness for its users, which create a paradox for radicals who are then forced to resort to closed forums and personal communication despite having access to technological advancements. Jihadists are cautious about what they make openly available online because that would make it easier for western states to counter them. Due to the nature of extremist communications, in the future it is reasonable to expect that terrorists will increase use of the deep or dark web significantly. Recruitment Tactics and Strategies The absence of unitary recruitment tactic should not be interpreted as inefficiency or distractions among IS and other jihadists. In fact, the lack of a unifying plan instead allows for varying strategies and tactics. Some of these tactics include targeting children, human trafficking, preying on the anger and angst of teenagers, as well as taking advantage of those with psychological or social problems. There is no moral ground when recruiting suicide bombers to the terrorist cause, any warm body will suffice. When Barack Obama completed the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq in 2014, the Islamic State went on the offensive to take control of key territories inside Iraq. Their success resulted in the capture of a variety of US weapons and munitions left behind. IS secured the weapons from the Iraqi Army, by force, and paraded tanks and other weapons through the town of Raqqa, the IS headquarters in Syria. They also videoed the parade and used it as a recruitment tool. The opportunity to utilize US weapons in the war for an Islamic caliphate is quite enticing to young radicals, especially since many envision the US and the West as the Great Satan. In August 2014, a Muslim cleric Syed Soharwardy, warned of Islamic State recruitment in Canada. He is the founder of the Islamic Supreme Council of Canada and is a pacifist Imam. Soharwardy said, “I am absolutely convinced that this recruitment is going on right here in this country, under our noses, in our universities, in our colleges, in the places of worship, in our community.”38 Soharwardy received death threats via Facebook due to his open condemnation of IS, but he knew personally of three young Canadian Muslims who died fighting with IS in Syria. “These people are brainwashing people here in this country,” said Soharwardy; although, he did not provide details as to how this was accomplished.39 In Australia, a report of Islamist militants joining biker gangs was reported in late 2014. “Islamism and organized crime are already mixing” and some motorcycle clubs “have been transformed by an influx of members of Middle Eastern origin, some of whom do not even ride motorcycles.”40 Australia, like several other western nations, has laws prohibiting citizens from joining radical Islamist groups. Many of these laws were enacted in the aftermath of the 2001 terror attacks and the origin of the global war on terror being waged by those same states. In Italy, three men were arrested in March 2015 for recruiting Islamist fighters for IS. They are accused of “actively seeking recruits [and] one faces charges of encouraging terrorism via the internet.”41 Two of the men were Albanian and the third is an Italian of Moroccan origin. Allegedly, the Italian penned a 64-page thesis “promoting the IS militant movement.” It was disseminated on social media and resulted in the successful recruitment of at least one young man born in Italy to

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Tunisian parents. The recruit had not yet departed for Syria, but Italian authorities have confiscated his travel documents and he was placed under surveillance.42 Islamic State recruitment is not limited to western nations. The group has also experienced success in recruiting other Muslims in the Middle East and Northern Africa. The Syrian revolution was initially touted as spontaneous, and mostly civilian, as its primary goal was to topple the Bashar al-Assad regime. An influx of immigrants, muhajirun, altered the strategy and resulted in success that was largely orchestrated by experienced, trained militants with an ideological purpose and a radical cause, the establishment of a Muslim caliphate. The proven success of these immigrants inspired “a large number of youths … to join their group and fight alongside them” near Aleppo, Syria.43 According to Eddin, “IS operated under a very clear and very different vision.” IS did not join the revolution, nor did it offer recognition to any institutions. Instead, IS has taken the stance that it is an independent state. It operates under that philosophy and works from that foundation. Consequently, IS increased its recruits in Syria by establishing a well-designed plan and offering a new homeland for immigrants and revolutionaries without exclusion. Another avenue of recruitment for IS evolved when “criminals looking to hide their past crimes and benefit from the IS name” signed up for the movement.44 This supports the notion that IS is not exclusionary in its recruitment choices. At times the organization will even accept people that do not agree entirely with its philosophy because they can be used for suicide missions later. With victories in Mosul and Anbar in 2014, IS membership increased and morale improved. Of course, US air strikes in that region also served to motivate new recruits. IS has successfully marketed itself as a defender of the oppressed, and many others, while portraying the US and other western states, including Israel, as the true enemy. IS has used turmoil, poverty, and desperation to exploit emotions and draw in more recruits, an age-old tactic of radicals who really only seek to gain total control over people. Many western states turn a blind eye to what is happening in their own countries simply because they are concerned with negative attention and unfounded claims of Islamophobia, especially in a politically correct environment of liberal progressivism like that of the US and UK. Given these conditions, some radical Muslims take advantage of the very liberty afforded western citizens that is typically non-existent in Muslim countries. A case in point is the story of Jihadi John, whose true identity was revealed in 2015 as Mohammed Emwazi. Born in Kuwait, Emwazi became a naturalized British citizen who graduated from Westminster.45 The university is known for radicalization and the Islamic Society at Westminster is viewed by many as extremist while it provides a platform for speakers that espouse a hateful and violent message. In that regard it is quite similar to the Council on American–Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the United States. Some British reports indicate that Islamist “entryism … continues to be a problem within British universities and schools.”46 An important component of the message pushed by such groups is that the world is at war with Islam. This victimization of Islam inspires more recruits who want to protect the oppressed. In reality, though, it is radical Islamists who are the oppressors in their home states and across the globe. Coming from the same neighborhood as Jihadi John was Bilal al-Berjawi. Both boys felt alienated by western society and that particular area of northwest London has become “fertile ground for militancy.”47 The network of radicals has come to be called the North London Boys and they have sent many young men to fight in Somalia and Syria since at least 2012.48 Shiraz Maher is senior fellow at the International Center for the Study of Radicalization at King’s College London. He acknowledges that the center’s “data clearly shows that individuals who go to Syria do so in clusters, in groups of friends, and are typically from the same geographic areas.” This information helps explain a pipeline from Minnesota in the United States. Troy Kastigar and Douglas McAuthur McCain grew up as close friends in a Minnesota suburb. The

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two began to get into trouble in high school and neither boy graduated. As their criminal records developed they converted to Islam and it was not long before they made their way to the battlefields of jihadists in the Middle East. Kastigar stated in a video that was posted online, “This is the real Disneyland. I’m with the brothers now.”49 The tools and ideals that called Kastigar and McCain are now reaching many thousands in the US and other western states today as being part of a movement and community that is accepting of new recruits is leading many to militancy and IS works it to their advantage. One strategy not yet mentioned is an English-language magazine, Dabiq. The name refers to the Battle of Marj Dabiq of the Sixteenth Century. The town was captured by IS fighters in August 2014, thus the symbolism of the magazine title is twofold. Its style is similar to the magazine Inspire, which Anwar al-Awlaki helped publish. The first issue of Dabiq was released in July 2014 and was published with the support of Al-Hayat Media Center. The magazine uses high-gloss pages with articles complemented with images. Viable Opposition BlogSpot secured copies of the first two issues and shared the following. The first issue depicts US soldiers being engulfed by flames, and on the subsequent pages IS fighters are portrayed as successful under a headline, “A new era has arrived of might and dignity for the Muslims.”50 In the second issue, a zoomed in photo of United States Senator John McCain appears under the headline, “In the words of the enemy.”51 This magazine is viewed as so critical to the Islamic State’s efforts that its launch was accompanied by a public appearance of IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. “Dabiq is being used by IS to promote their grand vision for a new Muslim Caliphate,”52 and the US and other western states need be attentive. The Islamic State has proven its willingness to recruit young children as well. Numerous YouTube channels devoted to radicalization depict Islamists brainwashing children as young as four or five to hate all “infidels,” which is often defined in these videos as those from Europe and the United States who kill Muslims. There is no context of the killings or even an explanation that murder itself is morally wrong. Perhaps this is because many radical Muslims believe in the justification of murder in the name of Islam. Reuters reports that since January 2015 the Islamic State has recruited at least 400 children in Syria alone. They are nicknamed the “Cubs of the Caliphate” and spend their days engaged in military training, accompanied with indoctrination.53 Rami Abdulrahman, head of the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, located in Britain, says IS selects children because they can be easily brainwashed. Abdulrahman also contends these children are often recruited from local schools, mosques and in public areas typically used for killing or punishing local people. A child witnessing such atrocities would likely be afraid not to join up with such a group and IS knows this is an advantage for them. In western states the strategy to target children is often by use of internet resources, especially social media. As of September 2014 more than 130 girls from Western states had disappeared and were believed to have made their way to Syria to fight with IS. The aggressiveness of the recruitment surprised US officials and its success is also a revelation.54 Nonetheless, this is evidence that IS knows how to seek and find western children and they are adept at recruiting them to the Islamist cause. Drissel examined the topic of online jihadism and the recruitment of youth in cyberspace, especially Muslim youth. Recruitment of Muslims in western states would, perhaps, be easier than recruiting western natives who are not Muslim. Drissel’s work focuses on Muslims who live in the west, but have origins to Muslim states elsewhere in the world. He finds that internet has played a persuasive role in mobilizing Muslim youth. He states, “The presence of social networking sites not only benefits Muslim extremists, but also dramatically enhances the opportunity for moderate Muslims and others to counteract the ideology of jihadism.”55 His findings correlate with the admission of Nawaz and others who were perceived as normal teenagers in their respective nations yet they still found themselves drawn to the Islamist movement.

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IS and other jihadi terrorists have demonstrated proficiency in the use of the internet, in general, and social media, in particular, as a method of disseminating information and recruiting new members. One report indicates that while “IS is using every contemporary mode of messaging to recruit fighters, its use of media is up to the moment,” there are surprisingly few calls to violent actions. IS’s primary goal is to secure and expand the Islamic State.56 That is not to say that much video evidence of violent action is not available online, because it is. The enigma is that IS rarely makes direct calls for violence in these videos. Presumably it is understood as part of the ideology and likely communicated via more private channels, perhaps offline. Further, IS does not send universal messages to all recipients. Many authors found that the tone used when targeting recruits in Muslim states is more vitriolic and violent than messages intended for Muslims in the west, or for westerners. Nonetheless, the bigger problem may not be the messaging or the format. When IS has success in gaining more ground, more cities, more weapons, more victories recruitment takes on a life of its own. That is not to say that IS does not continue its efforts, but they do become much easier as they have more success on the battlefield. Yet, another method of recruitment that terrorists and jihadists have used is human trafficking, which is defined as activities that “involves the exploitation of people through force, coercion, threat, or deception and includes human rights abuses such as debt, bondage, deprivation of liberty, or lack of control over freedom and labor.”57 This simply adds to the list of concerns for counterterror officials in western states. The manpower necessary to stay one step ahead of radical Islamists is incalculable and this is a moving target that is adapting and evolving to the world conditions. Counter-terrorism efforts must do the same. Online Media Utilized by IS In March 2015, Brookings released a study entitled The ISIS Twitter Census. It indicated that there were more than 90,000 IS-affiliated Twitter accounts in existence.58 IS uses a top-down hierarchical approach for spreading information (propaganda) to its supporters and potential recruits. Thus, one could reasonably conclude that much of the information being shared across these many accounts begins at high organizational levels among IS leadership. A few weeks after the report was released, it was discovered by some groups who monitor IS Twitter traffic that many accounts had gone missing. A company spokesperson confirmed that it suspended approximately 10,000 accounts “for tweeting violent threats.”59 In the past IS has called on its supporters to behead Twitter employees for shutting down accounts. If such actions occur in the coming weeks it could result in major responses from western governments. The Brookings study also indicates that the “users include a disciplined core group that sends messages frequently and understands how to maximize its support.”60 Extremists will often use any means necessary to achieve their goals, including the exploitation of technology. IS has proven to be more successful than most extremist groups though. The paradox is that IS seeks to restore an ancient caliphate that harkens to a time absent of technology while currently utilizing said technology to achieve its purpose. The study indicates that each of these IS-linked Twitter accounts has at least 1000 followers. While this is higher than the average user, it is not an alarming number in comparison. For example, Pope Francis has almost six million followers. US President Barack Obama has 58 million followers. Retired Atlanta Braves baseball player, Chipper Jones, has 461,000 followers.61 “While highly active and committed, IS supporters are an insignificant speck in the overall sea of Twitter’s active monthly user base.”62 Regardless, IS has taken serious the use of

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Twitter and other social media forums. The group’s content production has taken on a professional level of quality since 2014 and the effort is satisfied with new recruits and increased membership. Another favorite media source for IS has been YouTube. Videos of beheadings, executions, and even one of a person being burned alive have become common additions to YouTube channels linked to IS affiliates. A brief search on YouTube will reveal a variety of propaganda sources. Interestingly, though, many of the sources are not available to this American researcher. The channel administrator controls the settings and can choose to limit videos based on location of IP (internet protocol) addresses. If the IP address links to an American account it is blocked. This was the case in examining the channel of Al Jazeera English and a video entitled “Who are the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant?”63 Additional searches reveal numerous propaganda videos. Some are well produced while others seem less credible. Most infamous among these, though, include executions of innocent civilians, mostly journalists from western states. Presumably IS expects such videos to entice new soldiers to their cause of establishing a global Islamic caliphate. The fact that IS has developed and strengthened so rapidly should be of primary concern to western states. The coming months and years will reveal if that is the case. Countering Radicalization A 2014 study titled Jihad Trending examines online extremism and offers suggestions for how to counter it. The study focused on groups specifically operating in the United Kingdom and France and examined the role online messaging played in the radicalization process. Some of the principal findings of the report indicate the following: • The majority of radicalized individuals come into contact with extremist ideology through socialization before online indoctrination occurs. • Censorship efforts by governments have proven ineffective, costly, and counter-productive. • Positive measure would be more beneficial and proactive. For example, developing counterextremist content and online initiative to fight against extremism have proven productive, but there are too few.64 Terrorists in general, and IS in particular, have been far ahead of the game in utilizing online media to recruit terror fighters, to disseminate information, to help orchestrate terror actions, and the spread of propaganda messages. In short, IS has developed an internet and tech-savvy recruitment arm that now leads in online radicalization. Sasha Havlicek, CEO of the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, acknowledged that the US was losing the digital war with IS and other extremists and that “government is ill-placed to lead in the battle of ideas.”65 Nonetheless, efforts have been made and the tide is beginning to change in this digital war. One counter-recruitment organization developed by the US is called “Think Again Turn Away.” It was developed to target young Muslims who may be vulnerable to recruitment by violent groups and it includes a Facebook page, Twitter account, and YouTube channel.66 With this program, US officials are utilizing the same sources and similar techniques that have proven successful for IS in the past year. The reality is that this is an ideological war and many potential recruits can be swayed for good or for evil. If the US and other governments can get ahead of the curve they may find greater success in preventing recruitment before it even begins. Consider it similar to a public service marketing campaign regarding the health dangers associated with smoking carcinogenic

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cigarettes. If information is what the outcast lone wolves seek, then why not provide for them the realities of extremism and offer a peaceful alternative? One such effort established by the United States is the creation of a fictional character named Abdullah-X. He is an animated character that has his own website, online-only cartoon series, Facebook page, Twitter account, and YouTube channel. Abdullah-X’s slogan is “Mind of a scholar, heart of a warrior” and his goal is “building and developing the minds of young Muslims in how they view faith, identity, and a sense of place in society.”67 The character has gained support and as of April 2015 had 821 Facebook likes, 1,040 Twitter followers, and almost 800 subscribers to the YouTube channel.68 In the words of Abdullah-X, “Without providing critical, thought provoking and engaging online content backed by offline engagement, young people will continue to be driven towards narratives, ideologies and views that take them further away from understanding the world they live in a positive and beneficial way. I am here to challenge hate, ignorance and those who seek to exploit our young people.”69 Another online counter-radicalization website is called Extreme Dialogue. This project was launched in Canada in February 2015. Its stated purpose is “to reduce the appeal of extremism among young people and offer a positive alternative to the increasing amounts of extremist material and propaganda available on the Internet and social media platforms.”70 This media project includes personal stories from Canadian residents affected by violent extremism, including a mother whose son was killed fighting with IS in Syria in 2014. In addition to the proprietary website, Extreme Dialogue has a YouTube channel with 114 subscribers, a Facebook page with almost 1,200 likes, and a Twitter account with 378 followers as of April 2015. Hussain and Saltman contend that, “Counter extremist efforts should seek to dominate the online content consumed by audiences that are vulnerable to Islamist extremist counter cultures.”71 In essence, westerners have to change the narrative. It is no longer acceptable to assume the better angels of our nature will prevail. If the only narrative being shared is one of Islamists as victims then that becomes the real perception of those who are vulnerable and intellectually susceptible. Counter extremists must share a new side of the story that highlights the horrific realities of Islamist extremism. As George Orwell wrote, “Better an end with horror than a horror without end.”72 While the social media counter measures are important they cannot be achieved by government alone. Quilliam Foundation recommends, “Countering online extremism must be a joint effort between governments, civil society, and the private sector,” which includes the technology corporations that control much of the online traffic.73 Shifting the paradigm of online extremism covers three important areas: the nature of effective counter extremism, collaboration among public and private sectors, and effective initiatives with successful implementation. Some of these topics have been discussed in this chapter previously. Several reports have made varying recommendations. At this time there is no consensus as to the particular methods and initiatives to be implemented. Instead, each nation seems to be pursuing the broad goal of counter extremism independently of the others. In addition to the above recommendations, this author suggests a unified effort on the part of governments and international institutions who share the common goal of counter extremism and radicalization. Europe is currently guided by two policy conventions covering the use of internet by terrorists. The Convention on Cybercrime held its first meeting in 2006 and is the leading international treaty that provides for criminal laws in the realm of cybercrime. It represents the state parties to the Budapest Convention.74 Another Council of Europe initiative is the Committee of Experts on Terrorism, known as CODEXTER. Currently the agency has outlined four leading priorities:

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• Special investigation techniques (where the committee decided to review CM Recommendation (2005)10); • Radicalization, foreign terrorist fighters and the receiving of training for terrorism, including via the Internet; • Terrorists acting alone; • Assessment of possible gaps in the legal framework provided by Council of Europe international legal instruments in the area of the prevention and suppression of terrorism.75 The United States has implemented numerous programs and initiatives. Two critical ones are Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) and the Regional Strategic Initiative (RSI). The former is touted as “is a pillar of the Administration’s strategic approach to counterterrorism. Through a mix of local grants developed and managed by US embassies, and larger awards managed from Washington, the CVE program pursues three main lines of effort”: • Provide positive alternatives to those most at-risk of radicalization and recruitment into violent extremism; • Counter violent extremist narratives and messaging; and • Increase international partner capacity (civil society and government) to address the drivers of radicalization.76 The RSI operates on the fundamental principle that denying terrorists safe havens is paramount to counterterrorism efforts. Current locals of focus include, but are not limited to, the Pakistan/ Afghanistan border, Yemen, the Trans-Sahara region, and Somalia; all places that have served as breeding grounds for terrorists in the past.77 Early detection and intervention are critical to counterterrorism success. Prevention is even better. If the radicalization process can be hindered by targeting areas that are known to harbor and support terrorism, western states will have greater success in eventually defeating the Islamic State. Conclusion The Islamic State’s rise to prominence as a key player in the global war on terror occurred swiftly, but not surprisingly. Many US advisers were warned of the power vacuum that would exist if troops withdrew from Iraq. Still, President Barack Obama fulfilled his campaign promise to end a war that he claimed to oppose. As US troops evacuated and left war materials and resources to the fragile Iraqi government, radical terrorists formerly part of al-Qaeda moved in and took over. By summer 2014, the Islamic State had defeated numerous Iraqi cities and confiscated billions of dollars’ worth of weapons and munitions. Today the group operates from the Syrian city of Raqqa, which is deemed to be the official capital of the Islamic State. It seems each week a new headline reports the radicalization of a westerner or a Muslim in a western state. Some only desire to join IS in Syria and fight for the radical cause. Others prefer to coordinate with IS by aiding in the recruitment of other jihadists. Still more are content to serve as lone wolves in support of the cause of the Islamic State, which is a global caliphate. Governments and international agencies could perhaps be considered late arrivals to the efforts online radicalization but their efforts to thwart plans and monitor suspicious individuals. Numerous plots have been uncovered and some of them highlighted in this chapter. As the US and other western nations continue to respond to jihadist radicalization in this digital age it is likely that

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some programs will fail while others succeed. As President George W Bush iterated on numerous occasions, “The terrorists only have to be right one time. But we have to be right every time.” Notes 1 Nawaz, Maajid. Radical: My Journey out of Islamist Extremism. Guilford, CT: Lyons Press, 2013, p. 254. 2 Ibid. 3 Bennhold, Katrin. “Fertile Ground for Militancy in Hometown of Jihadi John,” The New York Times, March 5, 2015. 4 Ibid. 5 Boniello, Kathianne. “Why are Girls Flocking to ISIS?” New York Post, February 22, 2015. 6 Gartenstein-Ross, David and Laura Grossman. “Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. and U.K.: An Empirical Examination of the Radicalization Process,” Center for Terrorism Research, FDD Press. April 2009. 7 Gartenstein-Ross, David. My Year Inside Radical Islam: A Memoir. New York: Penguin Group, 2007, p. 2. 8 Malik, Shiv. “My Brother the Bomber,” Prospect Magazine, Issue 135, June 2007. 9 Ibid. 10 Borum, Randy. “Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories,” Journal of Strategic Security, 4.4 (2011): p. 9. 11 Veldhuis, Tinka, and Jørgen Staun. Islamist Radicalisation: A Root Cause Model. The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, 2009. 12 Musawi, Mohammed Ali. “Cheering for Osama: How Jihadists Use Internet Discussion Forums,” Quilliam Foundation, August 2010. 13 Internet World stats usage and population statistics http://www.internetworldstats.com/. 14 Phillips, Sarah. “A Brief History of Facebook,” The Guardian, July 25, 2007. 15 Social Bakers Analytics. http://www.socialbakers.com/statistics/facebook/. 16 Work, Jerry L. “The History of Twitter and What it Means to Tweet,” Ezine Articles, June 3, 2009. 17 Social Bakers Analytics. http://www.socialbakers.com/statistics/twitter/. 18 Drissel, David. “Reframing the Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan: New Communication and Mobilization Strategies for the Twitter Generation,” Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, 2014. 19 Zuckerman, Ethan. “The First Twitter Revolution?” Foreign Policy, January 15, 2011. 20 Koplow, Michael. “Why Tunisia’s Revolution is Islamist-free: And How their Absence Explains the Quick Fall of Ben Ali’s Regime,” Foreign Policy, January 15, 2011. 21 International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2014. “Online Radicalization to Violent Extremism,” Awareness Brief. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, p. 1. 22 Von Behr, Ines, Anais Reding, Charlie Edwards and Luke Gribbon. “Radicalisation in the Digital Era: The Use of the Internet in 15 Cases of Terrorism and Extremism,” Rand Europe (2013). 23 Silber, Mitchell D., and Arvin Bhatt. “Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat,” New York Police Department. 2007, p. 18. http://www.nypdshield.org/public/SiteFiles/documents/NYPD_ReportRadicalization_in_the_West.pdf. 24 Azzam, Maha. “The Radicalization of Muslim Communities in Europe: Local and Global Dimensions,” Brown Journal of World Affairs, Vol XIII, Issue 2, Spring/Summer 2007, pp. 123–34. 25 Ibid., p. 124.

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26 Pantucci, Raffaello. A Typology of Lone Wolves: Preliminary Analysis of Lone Islamist Terrorists. International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2011. 27 Briggs, Rachel. “Radicalization: The Role of the Internet,” Institute of Strategic Dialogue (2014). 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid, p. 5. 30 Ibid. 31 Halliday, Josh and Andre Rhoden-Paul. The Guardian, “Brother of UK’s Youngest Convicted Terrorist Feared to Have Joined ISIS,” April 7, 2015. 32 Briggs, 2014. 33 Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, p. 121, as quoted in Briggs (2014), p. 6. 34 Hoskins, as quoted in Briggs (2014), p. 7. 35 Barrett, Devlin. “Ohio Man Charged with Plotting ISIS-inspired Attack on U.S. Capitol,” The Wall Street Journal, January 14, 2015. 36 Helsel, Phil. “Kansas Man John Booker Indicted in ISIS-inspired Bomb Plot Against Fort Riley,” NBC News Online, April 16, 2015. 37 Briggs, 2014, p. 9. 38 Reuters, “Muslim Cleric Warns Against IS Recruitment in Canada,” August 23, 2014. 39 Ibid. 40 Reuters, “Australia Fears Islamist Radicals Joining Forces with Biker Gangs,” November 21, 2014. 41 Reuters, “Three Men Arrested for Recruiting Islamist Fighters in Italy,” March 25, 2015. 42 Ibid. 43 Eddine, Jalal Zein, “Islamic State recruitment in Syria,” NOW. https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/ reportsfeatures/564942-islamic-state-recruitment-in-syria. 44 Ibid. 45 Nawaz, Maajid. “The Education of Jihadi John,” The New York Times, March 3, 2015. 46 Ibid. 47 Bennhold, Katrin. “Same Anger, Different Ideologies: Radical Muslim and Neo-Nazi,” The New York Times, February 28, 2015. 48 Ibid. 49 Healy, Jack. “For Jihad Recruits, a Pipeline from Minnesota to Militancy,” The New York Times, September 6, 2014. 50 Viable Opposition, “The ISIS Recruitment Strategy,” August 28, 2014. 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid. 53 Cohen, Kelly. “IS Recruits 400 Syrian Children to Fight,” Washington Examiner March 24, 2015. 54 Wood, L. Todd. “ISIS’ New Child Recruitment Strategy Could Scare the Living Daylights out of You,” The Haven, September 22, 2014. 55 Drissel, David. “Online Jihadism for the Hip-Hop Generation: Mobilizing Diasporic Muslim Youth in Cyberspace,” The International Journal of Interdisciplinary Social Sciences, 2.4, 2007. 56 Shane, Scott and Ben Hubbard. “ISIS Displaying a Deft Command of Varied Media,” The New York Times, August 30, 2014. 57 Cinar, Bekir, “Human Trafficking is used for Recruiting Terrorists” (2010). Second Annual Interdisciplinary Conference on Human Trafficking, 2010. Paper 24. 58 Berger, J.M. and Jonathon Morgan. “The ISIS Twitter Census: Defining and Describing the Population of ISIS Supporters on Twitter,” The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, No. 20. March 2015.

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59 Gladstone, Rick. New York Times, “Twitter Says it Suspended 10,000 ISIS-linked Accounts in One Day,” April 9, 2015. 60 Gladstone, Rick and Vindu Goel. “ISIS is Adept on Twitter, Study Finds,” The New York Times, March 5, 2015. 61 These numbers were accessed from the respective Twitter profiles. 62 Brookings study, quoted in Gladstone and Goel, 2015. 63 Video link URL as of April 19, 2015 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f2oi3YIgKXo. 64 Hussain, Ghaffar and Erin Marie Saltman. “Jihad Trending: A Comprehensive Analysis of Online Extremism and How to Counter it,” Quilliam Foundation, May 2014. 65 Lucas, Fred. “US Outdone by Terrrorists on Social Media Battlefield, Experts Say,” The Blaze, February 18, 2015. 66 Thielman, Sam. “State Department Trolls ISIS with Horrifically Violent Anti-Recruitment Video,” AdWeek, September 4, 2014. 67 Abdullah-X. http://www.abdullahx.com/. 68 Numbers sources from respective social media websites. 69 Abdullah-X. http://www.abdullahx.com/. 70 Extreme Dialogue. http://extremedialogue.org/about/. 71 Hussain and Saltman, p. 107. 72 As quoted in Thielman, AdWeek, September 4, 2014. 73 Hussain and Saltman, p. 107. 74 Council of Europe, Cybercrime Convention Committee. http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/ economiccrime/cybercrime/T-CY/Default_TCY_en.asp. 75 Council of Europe, Committee of Terrorism Experts. http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/codexter/default_ en.asp. 76 US Department of State, Counterterrorism Programs and Initiatives. http://go.usa.gov/32ERW. 77 Ibid.

Chapter 13

Canada, Australia and New Zealand and the Islamic State Dara Conduit, David Malet, and Levi West

While Canada, Australia and New Zealand are politically and culturally similar because of their shared colonial heritage, they also share pertinent similarities specifically related to IS and their individual threat profiles. All three countries have had citizens depart for Syria or Iraq to fight with IS forces, and are home to support and facilitation networks of varying size and capability. Although each of the three countries attempts to cultivate its own image as a tolerant, open society that effectively integrates small but growing Muslim communities,1 IS presents a challenge to the long-standing allies’ abilities to maintain their pluralism and effectively address a new security environment featuring a common threat. The three countries are members of the “Five Eyes” (FVEY) intelligence sharing alliance, in partnership with the United States and the United Kingdom.2 The FVEY arrangement was a 1950s expansion of the 1941 Atlantic Charter that formally brought the Anglosphere Commonwealth countries into the Anglo-American international security architecture as “Second Parties.”3 Despite their unique operational ties with America and Britain, to date IS has not referenced FVEY or declared that participation in it makes member states targets. But by consistently aligning themselves closely with both the United States and the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand are described by IS as legitimate targets. In analyzing the unique but shared experiences of these three nations, this chapter will initially identify the commonalities among the three countries. It will then look at the cases of Canada, Australia and New Zealand individually, examining each for their domestic support networks, foreign fighters, and domestic attacks linked to IS, as well as the policy responses adopted by each government. Finally, the chapter will consider the policy responses that have taken place, and seek to make a contextualized and critical assessment of their individual and collective experiences. While New Zealand has not been subject of direct specific threats by IS, Australia and Canada have both been repeatedly referred to in IS audio releases, and in its English-language magazine, Dabiq. For instance, on September 22, 2014, the official spokesperson for IS released an audio recording entitled “Indeed Your Lord is Ever Watchful,” that exhorted followers: … You must strike the soldiers, patrons, and troops of the tawāghīt [infidels]. Strike their police, security, and intelligence members, as well as their treacherous agents … If you can kill a disbelieving American or European—especially the spiteful and filthy French—or an Australian, or a Canadian, or any other disbeliever from the disbelievers waging war, including the citizens of the countries that entered into a coalition against the Islamic State [emphasis added], then rely upon Allah, and kill him in any manner or way however it may be. Do not ask for anyone’s advice and do not seek anyone’s verdict. Kill the disbeliever whether he is civilian or military, for they have the same ruling. Both of them are disbelievers. Both of them are considered to be waging war [the civilian by belonging to a state waging war against the Muslims] … 4

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This pronouncement is one of numerous audio recordings, videos, and textual publications that make specific reference to Australia and Canada, and to the coalition against the Islamic State. These repeated calls demonstrate the danger that IS poses to Australia, Canada, and New Zealand is potentially disparate and multi-pronged, a general threat that could manifest in a variety of ways and at the hands of any individual who chooses to take up the cause. It is also worth noting that all three of these countries, in addition to their membership in the FVEY, have all actively participated militarily in the global effort to fight terrorism, whether in Afghanistan or in Iraq, and in combat roles or other forms of deployment of military capability or intelligence support. Although the three countries have made varied contributions within this effort, even if only providing logistical support to combat operations, their policies have been as overall consistent as their cooperation. Thus, there may be little to distinguish between the FVEYs in the view of IS, because all members are similar in language, culture, politics, and in Middle East policies so as to be indistinguishable to outsiders. In the global struggle that IS espouses, a strike against any FVEY state is a contributing blow against a monolithic Western enemy. Indeed, by actively continuing to be involved in the efforts of those parties that seek to “degrade and ultimately destroy the terrorist group,”5 Canada, Australia and New Zealand are likely to remain targeted and highlighted in IS propaganda and radicalization material; will likely experience continued activity among the support and facilitation networks that exist within their countries, suffer further (or initial) domestic terrorist attacks; and continue to have their citizens make their way to foreign locations as supporting participants in IS-related conflicts. This likely continuation of IS-related threats to all three jurisdictions makes an analysis of the experiences of the countries a necessary and valuable endeavor. Canada Canada, compared to its southern neighbor, appears to have had a high rate of IS militant activity, with multiple centers of domestic radicalization identified and multiple domestic plots and lone wolf attacks. And while Canada has produced larger numbers of foreign fighters relative to population for various causes throughout its history,6 this has been true of IS fighters as well, with one study finding Canadians joining IS at double the rate of Americans.7 The nation has also taken more aggressive steps than the United States has to prevent individuals from supporting IS, creating laws enacted at the same time and roughly equivalent to the measures undertaken by the antipodean FVEYs. Support Networks Jihadi networks had operated in Canada well before the establishment of the Islamic State, including the would-be Millennium bomber, al-Qaeda-trained Ahmed Ressam,8 and the “Toronto 18” charged in 2006 with plotting to bomb government and media targets. One Toronto 18 member, Ali Mohamed Dirie, was subsequently released from prison in 2012 and was shortly thereafter killed in Syria.9 In January and February 2015, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police announced charges against six members of a recruitment cell in Ottawa allegedly focused “on overseas activities, not on carrying out terrorist acts at home,” which in turn followed the arrests on terrorism charges of two brothers trying to get to Syria. Community health center youth services worker Awso Peshdary,

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described as a terrorist talent spotter, was arrested for participation in and facilitation of a terrorist group, while cell members who had already gone to IS were charged in absentia.10 Across the country, a radicalization hub emerged in Calgary, with an estimated 20–30 jihadists active in the city.11 Several who were acquainted through the Downtown 8th and 8th Musallah Islamic Centre would go on to join IS in the field and be featured in its social media campaign. These included slain convert Damian Clairmont and Farah Mohamed Shirdon, the son of a former Somali prime minister, who declared in a September 2014 video that IS would soon strike America until a black banner flew over the White House.12 Foreign Fighters An estimated 150–200 Canadians had traveled to join IS by 2015, but only 30 were reported by Public Safety Canada to be in the region at that time. Two different studies estimated that one-third of the Canadian foreign fighters had died in theater. The majority may have already returned, but precise data are hard to come by, and particularly because North American foreign fighters for IS seem to be less avid social media users than their European counterparts.13 Perhaps the most high profile Canadian IS fighter was convert Andre Poulin, who was featured in a slickly-produced martyrdom video titled “The Chosen Few of Different Lands.” In it, Poulin describes his upbringing as “a regular person” who engaged in Canadian pastimes and enjoyed an enriching life, but neglected to mention his criminal past. In one of the first IS recruitment videos to use a North American to appeal directly to North American audiences, he calls upon viewers to dedicate their lives to a meaningful and righteous cause while explicit video footage shows him killed in action.14 Canadian women have also traveled to join IS. Most went as jihadi brides. A typical example was a 20 year-old who called herself Umm Haritha who claimed that she experienced abuse in Canada because of her niqab, but could “live a life of honor” in the caliphate, where she was quickly married to a Palestinian fighter from Sweden.15 But one woman, who used the Twitter handle L.A. and regularly voiced support for jihadis, was tracked using her geo-location from Toronto to Raqqa, with an itinerary that included key battlefields and enemy-controlled territory. One Canadian intelligence agency noted that she had traveled “across more [IS]-controlled territory than any other account we have monitored,” and concluded that she was acting as an operative collecting intelligence for IS leadership in hostile areas where a woman could infiltrate unsuspected.16 At least two Canadians have joined anti-IS Kurdish militias, including an army veteran who had been assisted by another army veteran in Ottawa who was attempting to organize a “1st North American Expeditionary Force” to aid the Peshmerga, and a woman who had served in the Israeli military.17 Other Canadians have been thwarted in their attempts to travel to join IS. These have included the Larmond identical twins connected to the Ottawa ring, converts with reported anger management difficulties,18 and the perpetrators of Canada’s first two successful modern domestic terror attacks. Domestic Attacks On October 20, 2014, Martin Rouleau, a convert who was one of 90 Canadians on a government terror watch list, killed one uniformed Canadian Forces soldier and seriously injured another by ramming them with his car at a shopping center in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Quebec after spending two hours on the scene scouting targets. Rouleau had expressed on social media his anger over

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Western military strikes against IS and a desire to be martyred, and after a vehicle chase he was shot and killed while charging at a police officer with a knife.19 Just two days later, a separate shooting rampage at Parliament Hill killed another solider outside the Canadian War Memorial before that perpetrator was gunned down while forcing his way into the parliament complex. Michael Zehaf-Bibeau, another convert with a record of petty crime and mental illness, was not on the list of Canadians prevented from leaving the country, but because of concerns about his background, an extended review meant that approval of his passport request was still pending when he went on a shooting rampage at Parliament Hill on October 22, 2014.20 In March 2015, police arrested and prepared to deport Jahanzab Malik, a permanent resident of Pakistani origin who had received combat training in Libya. Malik was allegedly an IS supporter who planned to attack Toronto targets including the United States consulate and the financial district.21 Policy Responses In 2015, Prime Minister Stephen Harper responded to the growing threats posed by foreign fighters and IS-inspired domestic attacks with military strikes in the Middle East and new anti-terrorism legislation at home. On January 20, Canada became the first Western country to acknowledge that its ground troops had engaged with IS fighters, an expansion beyond both its stated air support role and mission of providing training to Iraqi government forces.22 On April 8, it expanded its air strikes into Syria, targeting IS brigades near Raqqa.23 The government also proposed the Anti-Terrorism Act, 2015, intended to build on powers granted by earlier bills passed in the wake of various al-Qaeda attacks against the West during the previous decade. Among other provisions, the bill would “criminalize the advocacy or promotion of terrorism offences in general.” Other provisions would enable the government to block or remove internet content, and expand warrantless detention from the current three day window to seven days.24 The proposal alarmed civil libertarians and legal associations, whose protests forced an amendment clarifying that lawful protests would not be considered terrorism and that intelligence agents could not make arrests.25 While the terror bill faced contentious passage, the government had already begun to exercise its previously seldom-used power to revoke passports of individuals suspected of planning to join IS. It also began to invalidate the passports of suspects who had already left Canada, charging a handful of individuals with passport fraud.26 Australia Of the Second Order members of the FVEYs, Australia is distinctive for having previously suffered a major terror attack directed against its citizens (the 2002 Bali bombing by al-Qaeda affiliate Jemaah Islamiyah) as well as a number of other attacks either planned within the country or conducted in Indonesia.27 It has also been one of the largest per capita contributors to IS foreign fighter ranks 2012–2015.28 This history, and the disproportionate levels of militant activity, have resulted in more aggressive legal restrictions against foreign fighting than in any other Western country, and less contentious debate about anti-IS measures than in either Canada or New Zealand.

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Support Networks The Australian Muslim community is relatively small, and while there has been a notable number of foreign fighters depart for Syria and Iraq, the supporter network and the recruitment networks have continued to remain operational, albeit under enhanced counter-terrorism pressure. In some instances, previously public hubs of jihadist and jihadist supporting activity have closed, and a number of the most influential Australian IS supporters have either been arrested or departed for Syria or Iraq. While this does not diminish the significance of the Australian supporter and recruitment network, these changes have made it a much more difficult network to research and monitor through open sources. However, in early 2015, Prime Minister Tony Abbott stated that “ASIO is currently investigating several thousand leads and persons of concern. Roughly 400 of these are high priority cases.” In the same statement, he noted that there were “at least 140 people actively supporting extremist groups.”29 Arguably, the most influential and significant actor in the Australian context was Mohammed Ali Baryalei, described in media as “hold[ing] a trusted position in IS’s operational command and to have facilitated the recruitment of at least half of the 60 Australians currently fighting in the Middle East.”30 Baryalei allegedly recruited and facilitated the travel of the two highest profile Australians involved in IS, Khaled Sharouf, and Mohamed Elomar, and allegedly masterminded an August 2014 plot to kidnap and behead an Australian in Sydney, and to film the attack for online distribution.31 He had previously been influential through an Islamic activist and preaching organization known as Street Dawah, an organization which was the connection for a substantial proportion of those investigated or charged in relation to recent IS-related terrorism offenses. It should be noted that initially Baryalei had an allegiance to Jabhat al-Nusra, before switching his allegiance to IS around June 2013.32 As of late 2014, there were unconfirmed reports of his death in Iraq, however his departure before arrest did not seem to have slackened the pace of recruitment within Australia.33 Baryalei managed to achieve a relatively high profile domestically, and subsequently attain a senior position within the IS command structure,34 but there are other important players that warrant analysis. One of the more influential Australians involved in overt public support for IS has been convert preacher Robert “Musa” Cerantonio. Cerantonio was highlighted in a report by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) that deemed him to be one of the three most influential online spiritual authorities for Western foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq35. His adept usage of social media, his fluent English, and engaging performances all contributed to a substantial online profile among IS-supporting social media users. He was particularly active on Facebook36 and, until his arrest, had his own programs on Egyptian satellite television. Although he stated at the time of the declaration of the caliphate that he would be going to Iraq, he was arrested in the Philippines as a result of the cancellation of his Australian passport.37 However, Cerantonio was subsequently cleared of charges and remains free in Melbourne.38 Another high profile preacher skirting the legal fringe was Mohamed Junaid Thorne who achieved notoriety after comments made in the wake of the stabbing of two law enforcement officers by IS supporter Abdel Numan Haider.39 Thorne issued heavily qualified statements such as “‘If I were to vocalise my complete support to [IS], I would get in trouble … If I was to say that [I] don’t support them at all, that would be untrue … I may support them [on] certain issues, while I disagree with them in other issues.”40 Furthermore, he was reported as claiming that Haider had attended one of his lectures at the Al-Furqan Centre in Melbourne, a location previously investigated by counter-terrorism authorities.41

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These three individuals are the public face of a substantial support community, some of whom have been actively engaged in fundraising, recruitment and the facilitation of travel to Syria and Iraq, which has made Australia a major source of Western foreign fighters for IS.42 Reports of significant domestic online support for IS also further attests to both the scale of the support community within Australia and the transnational appeal of the IS frame.43 On April 12, 2015 the website of the Hobart International Airport was hacked and defaced with pro-IS messaging reinforcing the targeting of Australia by IS.44 Foreign Fighters As with all other countries, the exact number of Australians fighting with IS is unknown, owing to the complexity of the conflict as well as variations in data classification. However, in February 2015, Foreign Minister Julie Bishop stated that around 90 Australian nationals were thought to be fighting with IS in Iraq and Syria.45 The previous month, ICSR had estimated that between 100 and 250 Australians had traveled to Iraq and Syria to fight since 2011.46 A further 200 people were prevented from leaving the country in the nine months to March 2015.47 By any of these measures, the figures for Australian mobilization in Syria and Iraq far surpass previous jihadist conflicts, given that only approximately 30 Australians participated in the Afghan war.48 The scale of the current mobilization can be partially explained by the fact that many Australians have connections to the Levant conflict– in the 2011 census, more than 200,000 people in Australia claimed Lebanese ancestry.49 As a result, analyst Andrew Zammit observed that, Jihadist activity in Australia has strong historical links with Lebanon … The Lebanon connection means that the conflict in Syria, a state that shares a border with Lebanon, has had greater relevance for potential Australian jihadists than [previous] insurgencies.50

This was reflected in the fact that Lebanese-Australians were disproportionately represented in foreign fighter figures in the early stages of the Syrian conflict.51 It is important to note; however, that Australians fighting with IS have come from a diverse range of backgrounds, including recent converts. Australians are also known to be fighting with other groups in smaller numbers, including Jabhat al-Nusra and the Kurdish YPG. As noted, high-profile Australian IS supporters have either stated that they were planning to go Syria-Iraq52 or have verifiably gone there, perhaps to avoid prosecution at home.53 But, Australian IS foot soldiers are also known to have participated in crucial battles. Indeed, the United States Department of State reported in 2015 that Australians were among the largest nationality of foreign fighters killed in Kobani in Syria.54 Some Australian fighters have allegedly also been involved in IS war crimes. In January 2015, allegations emerged that Khaled Sharrouf and Mohamed Elomar had enslaved women from the Yazidi minority in Raqqa province.55 Sharrouf had earlier attracted attention for posting a photo on social media of his seven-year-old son holding a severed head.56 A further 25 Australians were thought to have died in the conflict by early 2015, including those killed in suicide bombings.57 This was the case for Jake Bilardi, a Melbourne teenager, who reportedly detonated himself as part of a mass suicide attack operation in the city of Ramadi in Iraq in early 2015.58 Australia’s greatest concern about foreign fighters is centered on the impact that they might have on the country if they return, given that 19 of the 25 Australian Afghan war veterans that returned home later posed some level of security threat.59 So far, at least 30 Syrian war participants to have returned to Australia, although the bulk returned before IS declared its caliphate.60 The

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director of the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO) informed a senate hearing that these returnees had fought on both sides of the conflict, and represent ‘varying degrees of threat to the community.’61 However, Canberra has come under fire for failing to press charges against many of these returned fighters, owing to the difficulty of proving allegations that had taken place in a war zone.62 Domestic Attacks However, while the first successful Islamist attack on Australian soil was IS-linked, it was not conducted by an individual with any evident designs to go to Syria-Iraq.63 On the morning of December 15, 2014, Man Haron Monis, an Iranian-Australian national who had converted from Shiism, took 18 hostages in the Lindt Café in central Sydney.64 Two hostages and the gunman were killed in the standoff. Monis forced hostages to hang a black flag bearing the Shahada from the café’s front window. Reflecting the level of concern about IS among Australian commentators, the flag was widely misidentified as belonging to the group. Monis later requested that an IS flag be delivered to the café and declared that the siege was an IS attack.65 However, as details of Monis’ history emerged, it became clear that he had been on a path to radicalization well before IS’s emergence. He was investigated or reviewed by Australian counterterrorism agencies on at least 10 occasions since moving to Australia in 1996.66 Monis had a history of Islamist political activism, having faced charges for sending offensive letters to the families of Australian soldiers killed in Afghanistan, and regularly picketed the courts.67 And yet despite this background, it was not until IS emerged in its current form that he embraced political violence. This draws questions about whether IS pushed Monis towards violence, or whether he merely used IS to attract attention. Importantly, these questions did not dissuade IS from taking credit for Monis’ actions—the group praised him for “acting alone and striking the kuffār where it would hurt them most—in their own lands and on the very streets that they presumptively walk in safety.”68 Indeed, to IS, Monis was to be written into history as a hero and as one of the group’s fallen soldiers, despite the ambiguity surrounding his motivations. Australia had also been touched by IS-linked violence months earlier, when Abdel Numan Haider, an 18-year-old Afghan-Australian, stabbed two police officers in a police station parking lot and was shot dead. Haider had been identified by police as a “person of interest” and had his passport cancelled after purportedly taking an IS flag into a shopping center, posing with a flag bearing the Shahada and posting inflammatory remarks on social media.69 Like Monis, Haider’s ties to IS are unclear; although, the media reported that he had followed instructions to behead the officers and cover their bodies with the IS flag.70 Haider was also posthumously exalted by IS, which attributed his attack to the group’s calls for followers to take up arms in their home countries: “By calling on Muslims around the world to rise up in arms, the Shaykh launched attacks in Canada, America, and Australia (three of the countries mentioned in his speech) with nothing more than words and a shared belief in the act of worship that is jihad.”71 These attacks are concerning in that they show that IS’s message penetrated Australia within months of the group’s caliphate declaration. Both attacks were carried out by a single person who appeared to have had no coordination with IS, and who required no training and minimal resources. Monis and Haider were both known to police, but neither were thought to pose an imminent threat. Given the ease in which these attacks could be replicated, the ongoing risk of IS-inspired plots creates a considerable policy challenge for Australia. In recognition of this, Australia upgraded its counter-terrorism alert level to High in September 2014, with Prime Minister Abbott drawing attention to the danger also posed by returning foreign fighters.

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Policy Responses Australia has enacted a number of specific measures to counter the perceived threat of IS, including joining the international military intervention against IS in Iraq, increasing humanitarian assistance, passing new counter-terrorism legislation and increasing community engagement. This approach has largely received bipartisan support in Australia; although, it has been criticized for focusing on punitive measures rather than on community-based prevention.72 Australia was one of the first states to sign up for the United States-led coalition against IS, deploying approximately 400 Australian military personnel to the Middle East with the Air Task Group and commencing airstrikes on Iraq in early October 2014. The following month, 170 Special Forces troops began training the Iraqi Special Forces. Australia also delivered military supplies to the Kurdish Regional Government in northern Iraq with Baghdad’s approval. Canberra refused to participate in operations against IS in Syria, limiting its engagement to Iraqi targets. Prime Minister Abbott also ruled out putting Australian troops “on the ground” in a combat capacity, but flagged that Australia might increase its military commitment.73 In March 2015, Australia announced that it was sending an additional 300 Special Forces personnel to Iraq. Australia also enhanced its humanitarian commitment to Iraq, sending $5 million in humanitarian aid and delivering aid drops in northern Iraq, although this was a smaller humanitarian commitment than other FVEY members, such as Canada, which pledged at least $35 million in 2014.74 Canberra has also used legal instruments to combat IS. IS was proscribed as a terrorist organization in Australia in 2005 while it was still operating as Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad alRafidayn. This designation was renewed in July 2014. The proscription bans Australian nationals from having any relationship with IS, and carries heavy jail terms for violations of the ban. Australian counter-terrorism authorities have also recently received enhanced powers and funding, despite that they already enjoyed some of the strongest powers in the Western world.75 The primary new legislative tool that deals with the IS-threat is the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters Bill 2014), which was passed by the Australian Senate in October 2014. The laws make it easier for the Australian government to cancel passports, enabled the government to declare conflict areas as “no go” zones for Australians, lowered the threshold that counter-terrorism agencies needed to impose control orders and preventative detention, and enabled the cancellation of welfare payments on the basis of security assessments.76 Although the Australian Human Rights Commission found that the law ran afoul of some of Australia’s human rights obligations, the commission’s recommendations were overruled.77 In March 2015, the Australian parliament also passed controversial data retention legislation, which requires all metadata to be stored for a minimum of two years.78 Canberra designated Raqqa and Mosul as banned areas soon after the Foreign Fighters Bill came into force.79 Any Australian found to be present in those areas could face a 10-year prison term, which might enable law enforcement agencies to circumvent the challenges faced in pressing charges against Australia’s earlier returned fighters mentioned above.80 Australians accused of being in a designated area must prove that they did not undertake illegal activities, controversially placing the burden of proof on the individual. However, as of early 2015, no Australian had been charged under the declared areas amendment, so it is yet to be tested by the courts. Australians had however been charged under its predecessor, the Crimes (Foreign Incursion and Recruitment) Act, which came with a 20-year maximum prison sentence.81 The Act was first used in relation to the Syrian conflict in December 2013, when two men were charged of recruiting and planning to travel

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to the country.82 Fatima Elomar (Mohamed Elomar’s wife) was also charged under the law in May 2014 on allegations that she intended to travel to Syria.83 Australia also increased the rate at which it cancelled passport cancellations. Foreign Minister Bishop announced in 2015 that she had cancelled 100 passports in relation to the Iraq and Syria conflicts, more than double the number of passports cancelled in the decade to 2010.84 Additionally, the government increased funding for community-level Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programs, although these efforts have been criticized as being tokenistic. In August 2014, Prime Minister Abbott announced a $13.4 million package for a new CVE program as part of an additional $630 million earmarked for counter-terrorism. Senator Concetta FierravantiWells said that the program would include “referral and support processes for individuals at risk to help them disengage from their activities and to combat online radicalization with education programs and working with communities, industry and overseas partners.”85 However, criticisms emerged in January 2015 that the money had still not flowed through to grassroots projects, while Green Party legislators complained that the CVE measures made up just 0.5 percent of the new counter-terrorism package.86 A government-commissioned review into Australia’s counterterrorism machinery noted in February 2015 that while Protecting Australians (through traditional counter-terrorism measures) will always be the Government’s top priority … to address the long-term implications of this challenge, we must put much greater effort into reducing the pool of potential terrorists.87

The report recommended that Australia “significantly boost” its CVE programs by increasing community and public-private partnerships, prioritizing community cohesion measures, developing a strategy to counter extremist narratives in Australia and create programs to deal with returned foreign fighters.88 It also called for the government to develop a clear strategy and commitment to CVE. In a press release, Prime Minister Abbott welcomed the report, confirming that its recommendations would be put into action alongside a new national counter-terrorism strategy.89 However, time will tell whether the new strategy will be able to match existing counter-terrorism tools with equally strong CVE and prevention measures. New Zealand The only FVEY, as of 2015, that was not known to have been targeted for an attack by IS nonetheless took countermeasures commensurate with those of the governments that had been threatened directly. With its geographic isolation and a population under 5 million, the country would not seem to be a likely target for international groups seeking media exposure. When New Zealand raised its national terror alert in late 2014, the shift was “from a very low risk of a terror attack to a low risk. That means the assessment of the threat of a terrorist attack has gone from unlikely to possible but not expected.”90 Yet, Wellington acted aggressively in the six months following IS’ declaration of a caliphate, portraying the country as exposed by globalization. Prime Minister John Key noted that Kiwis are “prolific travelers” who could be exposed to attacks. The ranks of travelers also include a number who have at least attempted to join IS and pose potential threats upon return.91 New Zealand; although, differing in threat perception and without an established jihadi recruitment infrastructure, demonstrates relatively uniform counter-IS policy preferences across the Commonwealth FVEYs.

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Support Networks To date, there has been more evidence of home grown support for IS among Kiwi converts than among transplanted Muslim immigrants, most of whom hail from South Asia and the Pacific Islands Indeed, prominent Muslim community leaders insist that immigrants in New Zealand are too content with their employment conditions and quality of life to become radicalized.92 Still, WikiLeaks documents indicated that New Zealand Police had information that jihad veterans of Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Chechnya were residing in the country, including one Egyptianborn surgeon who was suspected of travel to Iraq. An Auckland mosque, led by a preacher who admonished worshippers not to wave the national flag when they attended All Blacks rugby matches, has been investigated as a potential center of IS support.93 Elsewhere on New Zealand’s North Island, an indigenous Maori convert who had been banned from visiting prisons because of radical preaching, and who had previously voiced support for IS, in 2014 renamed his community organization the Islamic State of Aotearoa and encouraged other Kiwis to join him in building a local extension of the caliphate.94 But, ironically, it was Christchurch on the South Island that appeared to be the most active radicalization cluster. Another Maori convert claimed that there were a dozen IS supporters in the city, and declared that in the event of New Zealand fighting IS he would be obligated to switch allegiances. Previously, at least two other converts who had worshiped at the same Christchurch mosque were killed in a drone strike in Yemen in 2009, while trying to meet another Kiwi jihadi, Mark John Taylor, who has since traveled to Syria and joined IS.95 Foreign Fighters Although the number of identified New Zealanders with IS remained in the single digits by 2015, Prime Minister Key stated that the government was monitoring 30–40 potential travelers and again as many others who could potentially provide them with material support.96 Analyst Timothy Holman has estimated the number of Kiwis who have traveled to join IS to be as high as 60.97 The most prominent was Taylor, aka Abu Abdul-Rahman, who was arrested in Pakistan in 2009 while trying to join al-Qaeda before eventually traveling to Indonesia, Yemen, and Syria, from where in mid-2014 he uploaded a video in which he burned his passport and declared his desire for martyrdom on behalf of IS. Within months he recanted, telling New Zealand media that he had only gone to Syria for “adventure jihad,” but his requests for a new passport were being ignored.98 Wellington remained tight-lipped about Kiwis who had become foreign fighters. Despite Taylor’s media presence, and a 2013 news report of three confirmed foreign fighters,99 in mid-2014 the government would acknowledge only one unidentified New Zealander with IS whom was presumed to be dead, and two brothers who had been thwarted by passport seizure.100 Another New Zealand citizen was arrested in Australia in late 2014 for attempting to travel to Istanbul as part of what he claimed was a mustering of 1,500 volunteers for the war.101 Domestic Attacks Despite the threats, New Zealand has thus far only suffered a couple of terror attacks in its history, which were the work of isolated domestic leftists and French agents targeting Greenpeace, and none involving Islamists.

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Policy Responses Perhaps because of this tranquil history, the government’s efforts to strengthen terrorism legislation and to participate in international military and intelligence efforts targeting IS drew pointed criticism from domestic political opponents that was far more akin to the debate in Canada than the pro forma approval by parliament in neighboring Australia. In early 2014, the government confirmed that it had cancelled passports for some individuals seeking to travel to Syria, but had done so for fewer than ten total since a 2005 law authorizing the measure.102 However, in December, the Prime Minister pushed through the Countering Terrorist Fighters Legislation Bill that provided a three-year authorization for the government to conduct 24 hour video surveillance and cancel passports for up to three years for terrorism suspects.103 Yet, the warrantless surveillance period had been reduced from the proposed 48 hours as a concession because of public concerns about civil liberties,104 and opposition leaders, including a former foreign affairs minister, argued that while terrorism or attacks against New Zealand interests should be illegal, that there should not be a blanket ban on travel to war zones or foreign fighting for other causes, including against the Assad regime specifically.105 In February 2015, citing the attacks in Canada and Australia as evidence of the need to fulfill a responsibility to international stability, Key announced the deployment of 143 non-combat troops to train the Iraqi military. Unlike the terrorism bill, the opposition refused to support the deployment and warned of mission creep. With the motion expected to fail, the government announced the deployment without permitting parliament to vote.106 Eyes on the Future Canada, Australia and New Zealand were extended formal, but secondary, membership into the Anglo-American security alliance during the Cold War because significant historic ties made them reliable allies and partners. In the twenty-first century, the transnational aspects of the War on Terror and the continuing threat of jihadi militancy ensure that the FVEYs continue close coordination in the face of a different mutual security challenge. Because IS statements encouraging actions against these countries pre-dated their military intervention and did not name other specific grievances, it is likely that these relatively homogenous states are viewed by IS as so closely linked that they would be targeted as privileged Western leaders regardless of particular policy differences between them. However, there is no evidence at this time of specific collusion between IS networks operating across FVEYs. Each country has contributed foreign fighters to the conflict in Syria and Iraq, with Canadian, and particularly Australian, combatants outstripping the ratios of the senior FVEYs, or other Western countries. IS has spotlighted FVEY citizens in its recruitment videos, as spokesmen, suicide bombers, and gleefully committing atrocities. Women from these countries have also taken the initiative to support IS on social media and recruit others to do so. Despite threatening attacks against FVEY nations, the IS leadership is clearly anxious to attract supporters from them, whether for fundraising, legitimation, or to attempt to plant seeds for future attacks by returnees. The countries share similar threat profiles. While New Zealand has avoided domestic terrorism, Australia and Canada have now both experienced attacks in support of IS. All have domestic jihadi networks that pre-dated the rise of IS but have now adopted its banner as a rallying point, although only in Australia is an organized IS network known to have attempted an organized attack or intended to upload a hallmark decapitation video to social media.

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Finally, in the years leading up to military strikes against IS, all of the second order FVEYs took active measures to cancel passports and, in the case of Australia, even enact a unique outright travel ban on entire regions regardless of purpose of travel. Counter-terrorism measures passed easily in Australia in the wake of two IS-linked attacks, but two better-organized assaults in Canada did not give the government the impetus to win new powers without opposition. In New Zealand, uniquely among the FVEYs, opposition politicians even voiced a reluctance to proscribe foreign fighting generally, although they acknowledged that joining IS should not be tolerated because it challenged national security. Overall; however, the second order FVEYs got out in front of the United States and United Kingdom, which had largely avoided seizing passports in the post-9/11 era despite having the legal authority to do so, possibly because the optics might appear draconian to the public as compared to a successful prosecution. According to the home secretary, the United Kingdom had not seized a passport in the preceding ten years while the Commonwealth FVEYs were increasingly using the power as a key counter-terrorism tool.107 Why Canada, Australia and New Zealand should perceive greater risks or act more aggressively to the threat from IS networks is not clear. All three countries have long histories of active involvement and heavy losses in British military campaigns through World War II. With notable exceptions such as New Zealand’s aversion to nuclear weapons or Canada’s refusal to commit combat troops to the Iraq War, they have closely followed American leadership since then. However, it should be noted that both of these schisms occurred when New Zealand and Canada had leftist governments (Labour and Progressive respectively) while all three of the Commonwealth FVEYs had conservative governments during the rise of IS in Syria and the beginning of military intervention against it in Iraq. But, the policy of passport seizures enjoyed broad political support in each country, indicating a common approach to counter-terrorism favored by the three countries independent of their participation in FVEY. Notes 1 Pew Research Center. The Future of the Global Muslim Population: Projections for 2010–2030. 2011. http://www.pewforum.org/files/2011/01/FutureGlobalMuslimPopulation-WebPDF-Feb10.pdf. 2 MacAskill, Ewan and Ball, James. “Portrait of the NSA: no detail too small in quest for total surveillance,” The Guardian. November 3, 2013. 3 National Security Agency. UKUSA Agreement Release 1940–1956. 2010. https://www.nsa.gov/ public_info/declass/ukusa.shtml. 4 Adnani, Abu Muhammed. “Indeed your Lord is Ever Watchful,” 2014. https://ia601400.us.archive. org/34/items/mir225/English_Translation.pdf. 5 Obama, Barack. Speech on Combating ISIS and Terrorism. Washington, DC. September 10, 2014. https:// www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/09/10/president-obama-we-will-degrade-and-ultimately-destroy-isil. 6 Malet, David. Foreign Fighters: Transnational Identity in Civil Conflicts. Oxford University Press. 2013: 100, 132. 7 Noonan, Michael and Phyl Khalil. “North American Foreign Fighters,” Journal for Deradicalization, 1.1, 2014: 66–96. 8 Johnson, Gene. “’Millennium Bomber’ Ahmed Ressam Sentenced to 37 Years in Prison,” Associated Press. The Star. October 12, 2012. 9 “’Toronto 18’ Member Ali Mohamed Dirie Reportedly Died in Syria,” CBC News. September 25, 2013.

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10 Associated Press. “Man Arrested in Canada over Alleged Role in Islamic State Recruitment Cell,” The Guardian. February 15, 2015; Helmer, Tony. “Terror Suspect Awso Peshdary Worked Closely with Ottawa Youth,” The Ottawa Sun. February 10, 2015. 11 Noonan and Khalil, 72. 12 Bell, Stewart. “Calgary Islamic Centre, Once Frequented by Youths who Went to Fight in Syria, Speaks out against Extremism,” The National Post. June 19, 2014; “’We Will Make Some Attacks in New York Soon’: Canadian Jihadist Claims ISIS is ‘Prepared Right Now to Make’ a U.S. Strike,” The Daily Mail. September 29, 2014. 13 Noonan and Khalil, 68, 74; Amarasingam, Amarnath. “The Clear Banner: Canadian Foreign Fighters in Syria: An Overview,” March 4, 2015 http://jihadology.net/2015/03/04/the-clear-banner-canadian-foreignfighters-in-syria-an-overview/; Stern, Jessica and J.M. Berger. ISIS: The State of Terror. Ecco. 2015: 80; Public Safety Canada. The Terrorist Threat to Canada. 2014: 18. 14 Corbeil, Alexander. “Why Canada Must Address its Foreign-Fighter Problem,” The Globe and Mail. July 16, 2014. 15 Roberts, Nadim. “The Life of a Jihadi Wife: Why One Canadian Woman Joined ISIS’s Islamic State,” CBC News. July 7, 2014. 16 “Female Jihadist Geo-tracked from Canada to ISIS Frontline,” RT. February 2, 2015. 17 Bell, Stewart. “Canadian who Volunteered to Fight with Kurds against ISIS says it’s the ‘Right Thing to Do.’” The National Post. November 21, 2014; “Canadian/Israeli Becomes First Female Foreign Fighter to Join Kurds,” Reuters. November 11, 2014. 18 Yogaretnam, Shaamini, Emma Loop, Matthew Pearson, and Glen McGregor. “Twins Facing Terrorism Charges are Latest Young Muslim Converts to Fall under Suspicion,” The Ottawa Citizen. January 11, 2015. 19 Lampert, Allison. “Canadian Terror Attack: Police Monitored Man who Killed Soldier,” The Age. October 22, 2014. 20 Carlson, Kathryn Blaze. “Ottawa Suspect Tried to get Passport to go to Syria,” The Globe and Mail. October 23, Lampert, Allison and Julie Gordon,” Canada Shooter Michael Zehaf-Bibeau Had Troubled Past,” Reuters. October 23, 2014. 21 Viera, Paul. “Canada Arrests Man Allegedly Planning Toronto Terror Attack,” The Wall Street Journal. March 11, 2015. 22 MacDonald, Alistair and Paul Viera. “Canadian Special Forces Again Exchange Fire With Islamic State,” The Wall Street Journal. January 26, 2015. 23 CBC News. “ISIS Mission: Canada Conducts 1st Airstrike in Syria,” April 8, 2015. 24 “PM Announces Anti-terrorism Measures to Protect Canadians,” Office of the Prime Minister. January 30, 2015. http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2015/01/30/pm-announces-anti-terrorism-measuresprotect-canadians#sthash.E0LzEVcU.dpuf. 25 “Amid Criticism, Federal Government to Introduce Amendments to Bill C-51 Next Week,” CTV News. March 27, 2015. 26 Logan, Nick. “The Trouble with Charging Canadian ISIS Fighters,” Global News. December 12, 2014; Bell, Stewart. “ISIS Urges Jihadists to Attack Canadians: ‘You Will Not Feel Secure in Your Bedrooms.’ The National Post. September 20, 2014; O’Malley, Kady. “Revoking ISIS Passports: Government Refuses to Disclose Numbers,” CBC News. September 22, 2014. 27 Sam Mullins. “Islamist Terrorism and Australia: An Empirical Examination of the “Home-Grown” Threat,” Terrorism and Political Violence 23.2 (2011), pp. 256–7. 28 “Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria,” RFE/RL. http://www.rferl.org/contentinfographics/ infographics/26584940.html.

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29 Abbott, Tony. Review of Australia’s Counter-terrorism Machinery for a Safer Australia, February 23, 2015. https://www.pm.gov.au/media/2015-02-23/review-australias-counter-terrorism-machinery-saferaustralia-0. 30 Anthony Greene. “More Australians Slip Away to Join Islamic State’s Fight in Middle East,” ABC News, November 14, 2014. 31 Rachel Olding and Megan Levy, “Who is Mohammad Ali Baryalei, the Man Accused of Conspiring to behead a stranger in Australia?” Sydney Morning Herald, September 18, 2014. 32 Andrew Zammit, “Islamic State Spurs Increased Jihadist Activity in Australia,” Terrorism Monitor, 13(2015). 33 Rachel Olding and David Wroe. “Australian Islamic State recruiter’s Death Unlikely to Halt Flow of Fighters,” The Sydney Morning Herald, October 29, 2014. 34 Greene. 35 Joseph A. Carter, Shiraz Maher, and Peter R. Neumann. 2014, #Greenbirds: Measuring Importance and Influence in Syrian Foreign Fighter Networks, (London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, 2014. 36 Carter et al. #Greenbirds, p. 26. 37 Deborah Gough. “Australian Islamic Extremist Robert ‘Musa’ Cerantonio Deported from Philippines,” The Age, July 23, 2014. 38 Dan Oakes, “Australian preacher Musa Cerantonio Claims to be Heading to Syria in Support of ISIS,” ABC News, July 2, 2014. 39 PerthNow, “Islamic ‘Sheik’ Junaid Thorne reports death threats to WA Police,” PerthNow, September 25, 2014. 40 Peter Lloyd and Suzanne Dredge, “Muslim preacher Junaid Thorne says slain Melbourne man Numan Haider was his follower,” ABC News, October 31, 2014. 41 Lloyd and Dredge. 42 http://australian-foreign-fighters.silk.co/explore/grid/collection/australian-foreign-fighters/column/ background/column/other-information/column/status/column/role/column/known-associates/image/image/ suggestion/filter/equals/sex. 43 Natalie O’Brien and Leila Abdallah, “Iraq conflict spills onto Australian social media,” Sydney Morning Herald. June 21, 2014. 44 Booker, Chloe. “Islamic State Message on Hacked Hobart Airport Website,” Australian Associated Press. April 12, 2015. 45 “The Nation, Auckland—Interview with Lisa Owen,” Minister for Foreign Affairs: The Hon Julie Bishop MP, http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/transcripts/Pages/2015/jb_tr_150227a.aspx?ministerid=4. 46 Peter Neumann, “Foreign Fighter Total in Syria/Iraq Now Exceeds 20,000; Surpasses Afghanistan Conflict in the 1980s,” ICSR. http://icsr.info/2015/01/foreign-fighter-total-syriairaq-now-exceeds-20000surpasses-afghanistan-conflict-1980s/. 47 “Australia Blocks Travel for 200 Suspected Militants,” BBC News, March 25, 2015. 48 Paul Maley, “Passport Ban Hits Aussies Already Fighting at the Front,” The Australian. October 25, 2014. 49 Joseph A. Carter, Shiraz Maher, and Peter R. Neumann, “#Greenbirds: Measuring Importance and Influence in Syrian Foreign Fighter Networks,” ICSR. http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/ICSRReport-Greenbirds-Measuring-Importance-and-Infleunce-in-Syrian-Foreign-Fighter-Networks.pdf. 50 Andrew Zammit, “Tracking Australian Foreign Fighters in Syria,” CTC Sentinel 6.11-12 (2013), p. 7. 51 Ibid.

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52 Carter, Maher, and Neumann, “#Greenbirds: Measuring Importance and Influence in Syrian Foreign Fighter Networks,” p. 15. 53 Rachel Olding, “Australian Islamic State Kingpin Mohammad Ali Baryalei Dead: Reports,” The Sydney Morning Herald, October 29, 2014. 54 Michael Safi, “Australians Fighting for Isis Reportedly Killed in Battle for Kobani,” The Guardian, January 28, 2015. 55 Matt Brown and Suzanne Dredge, “Australian Jihadists Khaled Sharrouf and Mohamed Elomar Accused of Enslaving Yazidi Women in Islamic State Stronghold,” ABC News, January 22, 2015. 56 “’The Act of a Lunatic’: Islamic State Jihadist Khaled Sharrouf’s Photograph of Son Holding Severed Head in Syria Condemned by Muslim Leader, Federal Government,” ABC News. August 11, 2014. 57 As of January 2015, 22 Australians had been killed in Syria: Safi, “Australians Fighting for Isis Reportedly Killed in Battle for Kobani,” Since then, reports have emerged about the deaths of IS fighters Jake Bilardi and Suhar Rahman, as well as Ashley Johnston, who was killed in late-February fighting with the YPG. 58 Michael Bachelard, “Jake Bilardi, Reportedly Killed in Islamic State Suicide Bombing, Planned to Attack Melbourne, Blog Says,” The Sydney Morning Herald, March 12, 2015. 59 Maley, “Passport Ban Hits Aussies Already Fighting at the Front.” 60 “Almost All Australians Who Returned from Syria and Iraq Did So ‘before Isis Existed’,” The Guardian, February 25, 2015. 61 Ibid. 62 Daniel Meers, “Australian Death Cult Jihadists Who Fought with Islamic State in Syria Return to Roam Our Streets,” The Daily Telegraph, January 2, 2015. 63 “Australian Jihad: Radicalisation and Counter-Terrorism,” Analisis of the Real Instituto Elcano 140 ARI (2011). 64 Watts argued that jihadist attacks in the West fit roughly into three overlapping categories: Directed, Networked and Inspired attacks: Clint Watts, “Inspired, Networked & Directed—the Muddled Jihad of Isis & Al Qaeda Post Hebdo,” War on the Rocks, http://warontherocks.com/2015/01/inspired-networked-directedthe-muddled-jihad-of-isis-al-qaeda-post-hebdo/. 65 Rick Feneley, “Sydney Siege: Man Haron Monis, ‘Humanitarian’ and Terrorist,” The Sydney Morning Herald, http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/sydney-siege-man-haron-monis-humanitarian-and-terrorist20141219-12ajn5.html. 66 “Martin Place Siege : Joint Commonwealth-New South Wales Review,” Australian Government/ NSW Government. https://www.dpmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/publications/170215_Martin_Place_Siege_ Review_1.pdf. 67 “Sydney Siege: Man Haron Monis, ‘Humanitarian’ and Terrorist,” pp. 4–13. 68 “Dabiq: Al Qaidah of Waziristan—a Testimony from Within,” Islamic State. http://media. clarionproject.org/files/islamic-state/isis-isil-islamic-state-magazine-issue-6-al-qaeda-of-waziristan.pdf, p. 3. 69 Gay Alcorn, “Abdul Numan Haider Was Quiet, Gentle and Softly Spoken, Friend Says,” The Guardian. September 24, 2014. 70 Ibid. 71 “Dabiq: Remaining and Expanding,” Islamic State, http://media.clarionproject.org/files/islamicstate/isis-isil-islamic-state-magazine-issue-5-remaining-and-expanding.pdf, p. 37. 72 Paul Donoughue and Lucy Fahey, “Why Are Young Australians Being Drawn to Islamic State?,” ABC News, March 13, 2015. 73 Emma Griffiths, “Iraq Crisis: Tony Abbott Says ‘No Intention’ of Sending Australian Troops into Combat; Arms Shipments to Begin This Week,” ABC News, September 1, 2014.

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74 Justine Drennan, “Who Has Contributed What in the Coalition against the Islamic State?,” Foreign Policy, November 11, 2014. 75 Christopher Michaelsen, “Australia and the Threat of Terrorism in the Decade after 9/11,” Asian Journal of Political Science 18.3 (2010). 76 Emma Griffiths and Simon Cullen, “Foreign Fighters Bill Passes Senate Amid Suggestions New Laws Could Allow Adf to Kill Australians,” ABC News, October 29, 2014. 77 “Australia Commences Combat Operations in Iraq,” Department of Defence. http://news.defence. gov.au/2014/10/06/australia-commences-combat-operations-in-iraq/. 78 Emma Griffiths, “Data Retention Laws Pass Federal Parliament as Coalition and Labor Vote Together,” ABC News, March 26, 2015. 79 “Islamic State: Australians Banned from Travelling to Is-Stronghold of Mosul in Iraq,” ABC News, March 2, 2015. 80 “Almost All Australians Who Returned from Syria and Iraq Did So ‘before Isis Existed’,” The Guardian February 25, 2015. 81 Paul Farrell, “Australians Fighting Overseas: How the Foreign Incursion Laws Work,” The Guardian, December 5, 2013. 82 Ibid. 83 Rachel Olding, “Court Date Set as Accused Is Supporter, Fatima Elomar, Reprimanded by Magistrate,” The Sydney Morning Herald. February 3, 2015. 84 Latika Bourke, “Jihadi Jake Bilardi’s Passport Was Cancelled by Julie Bishop in October Last Year,” The Sydney Morning Herald. March 12, 2015.; “Counter-Terrorism White Paper: Securing Australia, Protecting Our Community,” Australian Government Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. https:// www.asio.gov.au/img/files/counter-terrorism_white_paper.pdf, p. ii. 85 Daniel Hurst, “Melbourne ‘Terror Suspect’ Death Sparks Bipartisan Calls to Reach Isolated Youth,” The Guardian, September 24, 2014. 86 Natasha Robinson, “Radical ‘Fan Base’ Grows as Funds Sit Idle,” The Australian, January 16, 2015; “Countering Violent Extremism: Prevention Better Than Cure,” The Australian Greens. http://greensmps.org. au/sites/default/files/141011_centre_for_social_cohesion.pdf. 87 “Review of the Commonwealth’s Counter-Terrorism Arrangements,” Australian Government Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. http://www.dpmc.gov.au/pmc/publication/reviewcommonwealths-counter-terrorism-arrangements, p. 31. 88 Ibid, p. vi. 89 Robinson, “Radical ‘Fan Base’ Grows as Funds Sit Idle.” 90 “NZ ‘becoming Riskier’ as Terror Alert Raised,” TVNZ. October 13, 2014. 91 Cullinane, Susannah. “New Zealand Confirms Iraq Troop Deployment—CNN.com,” CNN. February 25, 2015. http://edition.cnn.com/2015/02/23/asia/new-zealand-troops-iraq/. 92 Gregory, Angela. “Kiwi Way of Life Soothes Likely Muslim Zealots,” The New Zealand Herald. July 15, 2005. http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10335925. 93 Tan, Lincoln. “Imam at Centre of Mosque Ruckus kept under Police Surveillance,” The New Zealand Herald. May 24, 2014. 94 Christian, Harrison. “Hawke’s Bay Muslim Forms Own Islamic State,” The New Zealand Herald. December 1, 2014. 95 Zelin, Aaron. “New Zealand’s Jihadis,” New Zealand International Review 40, 2: 13–17, MarchApril 2015. 96 Wilkinson, Jeremy. “John Key Discusses Foreign Fighters Legislation,” Scoop. December 1, 2014. 97 Holman, Timothy. “I See Red: ‘Guesstimating’ the Number of New Zealand Foreign Fighters and Potential Travelers,” Across the Green Mountain. October 7, 2014. https://acrossthegreenmountain.

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wordpress.com/2014/10/07/i-see-red-guesstimating-the-number-of-new-zealand-foreign-fighters-andpotential-travellers/. 98 Dean, Sarah. “Sorry Bro! Kiwi ‘Jihadi’ who Burned his Passport to Seek Martyrdom in Syria wants a New One … But it’s not Happening,” Daily Mail Australia. September 16, 2014. 99 Gower, Patrick. “Kiwis Fighting in Syria May Pose Terrorism Threat,” 3 News. December 5, 2013. 100 Fox, Michael. “Government ‘Withholding the Truth’ on Kiwi Fighters,” The Dominion Post. June 10, 2014. 101 Akerman, Pia. “No Turning Back Once in Syria, Wannabe Jihadi Amin Mohamed Told,” Australian Associated Press. October 2, 2014. 102 “Syria Action ‘Could be Outside Law’,” Radio New Zealand National. February 11, 2014. 103 “New Zealand Approves New Anti-Terror Laws,” BBC News. December 10, 2014. 104 Wilkinson, Jeremy. “John Key Discusses Foreign Fighters Legislation,” Scoop. December 1, 2014. 105 Trevett, Claire. “Key’s Syria Security Details May Be Smokescreen—Labour,” The New Zealand Herald. February 11, 2014; “Cunliffe Queries PM’s Syria News,” Stuff. February 11, 2014. 106 Cullinane. 107 Van Buren, Peter. “Can the US Seize Would-Be Jihadis’ Passports?” The Huffington Post. October 14, 2014; Barrett, David. “New Powers to Strip Passports from British Terror Suspects,” The Telegraph.

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Chapter 14

The New Islamic State Conclusions Robert J. Pauly, Jr.

Introduction This book was designed to examine and explain, in depth, the genesis and evolution of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (IS). Most significantly, this examination specifies the threats IS poses to the United States and its allies in the Greater Middle East and the West and assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the strategies and tactics they have employed in an effort to counter those threats. The book sought to achieve those objectives in the following ways. First, it traced the origins of IS to the aftermath of the elimination of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s regime, through the prosecution of Operation Iraqi Freedom in spring 2003; then it explored the ways in which the group has evolved, ideologically, theologically and geopolitically—beginning in Iraq through 2010, then in Syria from 2011–13, and in both countries since late 2013. Further, it examined the economic, ideological, geopolitical, religious and strategic causes of the evolution of IS, with an emphasis on the 2013–15 period. Second, it examined the challenges and threats IS poses in the Greater Middle East and the responses to those threats from states and non-state actors within and outside of that region. And third, it examined the challenges and threats IS poses in the West, and utility of the responses to those threats from the United States and its allies. The evidence gathered and presented in the three main sections of the book serves as a useful basis for discussion to unfold in this concluding chapter. In terms of both structure and content, that discussion initially mirrors—but ultimately moves beyond—those three four-chapter clusters. It has four related sections, which will proceed in the following manner. The first of those sections examines (and presents insights drawn from) economic, ideological, geopolitical, religious and strategic causes of the genesis and evolution of IS. The second section examines (and presents insights drawn from) the challenges and threats IS poses in the Greater Middle East and the responses to those threats from states and non-state actors within and outside of that region. The third section examines (and presents insights drawn from) the challenges and threats IS poses in the West and the responses to those threats from the United States and its allies. And the fourth section offers a set of closing observations on the future of IS and other extremist terrorist organizations (and the challenges and threats they pose) and recommendations on how best to fashion effective short- and long-term strategies to mitigate such threats moving forward. Origins and Evolution of IS As with many terrorist organizations, the history of IS has been an evolutionary one featuring strains of both continuity and change. It began as a largely Iraqi Sunni driven reaction to US intervention and expeditious elimination of Saddam’s Baath Party regime in spring 2003, albeit one inspired and supported by al-Qaeda. Given that final point, the group branded itself al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) under the leadership of the Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and built a presence

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primarily in Anbar Province in western Iraq from 2003–06. By design, that province is precisely where IS re-emerged from the proverbial ashes of its defeat to coalition of convenience between the United States and Sunni tribal leaders against AQI. That group had alienated those leaders by attempting to impose an extreme, draconian interpretation of Islam on the province and branding all who rejected that interpretation as infidels to be targeted and killed. The rapprochement between US military forces and the Sunni tribes, accompanied by the American force “surge” of 2007–08, reduced the AQI presence in Iraq to a negligible level by 2010, leaving the group in dire need of a fresh start. That new beginning came amid the chaos of an “Arab Spring” sparked intra-state conflict in Syria that erupted in earnest in spring and summer 2011, eventually pitting a diverse blend of secular opposition groups and terrorist organizations with extreme interpretations of Islam against the dynastic regime headed by President Bashar al-Assad. Taking advantage of the instability in Syria from 2011–13, IS emerged as one of the two most powerful groups opposing the Assad regime. The other group, the al-Nusra Front, is just as barbaric as IS in its actions and puts forward similarly illegitimate explanations for that behavior, based on twisted, perverse interpretations of Islam. The principal differences between the two are that the al-Nusra Front has maintained its allegiance to al-Qaeda core leadership now headed by Egyptian doctor and self-described cleric Ayman al-Zawahiri, while IS split with al-Zawahiri’s group in 2013, and has grown more powerful than any of its rivals, in terms the territory it controls and the global following it attracts and recruits from. The path to substantial increases in the territory IS controlled, beyond an initial power base in the northern Syrian city of Raqqa ran directly through Iraq to the east, which proved an easy target for conquest for three reasons in particular that American policymakers would do well to consider when managing US relations with Iraq and comparably diverse and unstable states in the Persian Gulf and broader Greater Middle East. First, the withdrawal of all US military forces from Iraq in December 2011 left Washington lacking the substantial presence necessary to temper the behavior of the Shi’ite majority Iraqi government then headed by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Second, Maliki presided over a Shi’ite dominated system in which the minority Sunnis were marginalized, most notably in terms of a lack of representation in military and political leadership positions. The marked improvements in security achieved on the heels of the successful US military “surge” of 2007–08 left Iraq considerably more stable from 2008 through the end of the aforementioned end of the American ground force presence than was the case from 2003–07. Third, given the Maliki government’s actions, the Sunni tribes representing the vast majority of the populations of western Iraq and the non-Kurdish segments of the northern part of the country viewed IS as a far lesser evil than the Shi’ite regime in Baghdad and thus put up little resistance when IS forces swept in from Syria over the first half of 2014. Nor did those Iraqi National Army units stationed in those parts of the country defend the territory they held, despite possessing advanced military hardware provided by the United States and vastly outnumbering IS. Instead, most abandoned their posts and left behind their equipment for IS to seize and incorporate into its own well organized and trained army, which has many former Saddam era Iraqi officers in leadership positions. By mid-2014, if not sooner, IS had gained and maintained control over such a substantial swath of territory so rapidly and treated those in its path so barbarically, often whether they resisted the advance or not, that the United States eventually took notice and slowly fashioned a measured response. By the time deliberations over that response began, IS was already consolidating control over oil fields in northern Iraq, generating resources for black market sales to help it fund and administer a $2 billion annual budget in 2015. For many terrorist organizations, funding is a perpetual challenge. Lacking that problem, IS has used its ample resources to support the tens of

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thousands of fighters serving beneath its black flag in Iraq and Syria, thousands of whom were born and raised in the West. Those resources have also funded the IS recruitment initiatives, which emphasize use of the internet, primarily by distributing materials such as videos of the beheadings and (in one case) immolation of Muslim and non-Muslim captives via Facebook and Twitter. The global appeal IS now enjoys, in turn, is fueling further growth in the group’s ranks and potential for expansion beyond its present confines, with the first signs of such expansion evident in Libya and, to a lesser degree, Afghanistan and Pakistan in winter and spring 2014–15. Through it all, IS continues to pose significant threats to states and the populations therein across the Greater Middle East and, increasingly, in the West as well, both of which are assessed in the forthcoming two sections. Assessing and Responding to IS Threats in the Greater Middle East With respect to the Greater Middle East, IS presents four sets of challenges, which are interconnected across multiple issue areas, ranging from military power and territorial integrity to religious interpretive differences and sectarian political machinations. The first set of challenges is geographic in nature and relates to the extent of territory IS controls in Iraq, Syria and beyond. The second set is economic, given the capacity that IS has demonstrated thus far to generate considerable resources, much more so than has ever been the case for al-Qaeda or any of its affiliates. The third set is both religious and sectarian, with IS exploiting Shi’ite-Sunni religious differences in order to ensure that Sunni tribes in Iraq in particular remain supportive of IS rather than shifting into an alliance of convenience with US forces as was the case with the “surge” in Iraq. And the fourth set is geopolitical in orientation, with emphases on the implications of IS’ actions for other states that are either situated in the Persian Gulf and/or broader Greater Middle East (e.g., Afghanistan, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan and Turkey) or have significant interests therein (e.g., China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and United States). IS’ ability to maintain control over such a vast expanse of territory is unprecedented for a terrorist organization in the Greater Middle East, and thus presents challenges the United States and its allies are unaccustomed to managing. Consequently, the military struggle against IS in Iraq and Syria has proceeded at a measured pace, one featuring a combination of air strikes by the United States and a combination of its European and Arab allies and American training and logistical support for the Iraqi National Army and Kurdish peshmerga forces in particular. One can argue over the number of US “boots” on the ground (mostly Special Forces units at present) that is appropriate in Iraq and/or Syria, whether a number in the thousands or tens of thousands. However, it is clear that a military presence of some sort will be needed for a period of years, if not decades, for the United States to keep pace with IS and hopefully keep it in check to whatever extent is feasible. Further complicating American efforts are the concurrent but uncoordinated measures Iran has taken against IS in both Iraq and Syria. With a self-proclaimed, but what the evidence does suggest is accurate, $2 billion budget for 2015 to defend, expand where possible and administer the territory it controls and has declared a caliphate in Iraq and Syria, IS is not encumbered by the funding challenges that have always plagued terrorist groups of all types. IS most likely built its initial pool of resources primarily, but not exclusively, through contributions from wealthy benefactors in the Persian Gulf who share that extremist group’s perverse interpretation of Islam, if not the will to carry out the barbaric acts taken on behalf of that ideology. The IS economic “boom’ of 2014 was fueled by the spoils of its territorial gains in Iraq, which left the group with hard currency seized from banks in the northern

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and western parts of the country, as well as the oilfields of the north. US and allied air strikes have reduced the flow of IS oil for sale on the black market, but the group has found other ways to generate revenue, including the imposition of religious and other taxes on those situated within or in need of access to the territory it controls. Further, IS has used ransoms paid by families and employers for those hostages not deemed valuable enough for execution. Iraq’s combination of religious and tribal sectarianism has long left it vulnerable to periods of insecurity and instability. Ironically, at least on the surface, Iraq was markedly more stable during Saddam’s time in power than since then. IS capitalized on the Sunni-Shi’ite divide, to be sure, but also on tribal allegiances that led the Sunni communities and individuals situated therein across much of western and northern Iraq to simply accept IS control. Ultimately, IS faced little military resistance as it swept across Iraq in winter and spring 2014. Whereas, at least in theory, a significant follow-on US military force of 10,000–15,000 would have left the Iraqi defenders better prepared, motivated and supported to resist the IS advance, in practice, those defenders largely abandoned their posts and equipment, which IS has put to good use in building a strong conventional army, with some of Saddam’s past generals serving as commanders. The best way to counter IS’ abuse of Islam, as an illegitimate justification for the group’s violent actions, is through the condemnation of its behavior by Muslim leaders such as Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and Jordanian King Abdullah II but also imams at the local level in as many places in the Greater Middle East as possible. As it has, perhaps, always been the case in the Persian Gulf and broader Greater Middle East, domestic and international politics are often interwoven and prone to states’ geostrategic and geopolitical motivations at given temporal junctures. Notwithstanding the dire nature of the threats IS poses to the heart of the Middle East in general and the Muslim majority states IS controls large and small swaths of (Iraq, Syria and, increasingly, Libya), has the potential to threaten territorially (Jordan, Lebanon and, perhaps, but to a lesser degree, Afghanistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) and is a neighboring nuisance to (Iran and Turkey), all of the states either situated or with vital national interests in the region have a range of foreign and national security policy motivations. IS is a significant concern for virtually all states in the Greater Middle East, as well as the United States, France, Germany, China, Japan and the United Kingdom, but it is not their lone worry. The United States, for example, must balance its interests in confronting IS, the weakening and eventual defeat of which both Washington and Iran favor, with Tehran’s misdeeds in other issue areas, most notably the pursuit of nuclear weapons, sponsorship of terrorist organizations and interference in the domestic affairs of other states, most notably Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen. The patchwork of geopolitical interests is not likely to grow any less complex moving forward. Assessing and Responding to IS Threats in the West As with the Greater Middle East, IS also presents daunting challenges in the West, both for states and populations they govern, including the Muslim communities therein whose second and/or third generations were born and raised in countries like France, Germany, the United Kingdom and United States. Those sets of challenges are most evident in three issue areas in particular. The first set is of a shorter-term nature and falls primarily, but by no means exclusively, on government leaders and policy makers and practitioners: keeping track to the extent feasible of Westerners who sympathize to some degree with IS, have joined that terrorist organization or are considering doing so. The second set focuses on efforts by governments and Muslim communal leaders singly and collaboratively to characterize IS and the threats it presents accurately, develop effective messages

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to counter the perverse interpretations of Islam it peddles and adjust as such threats evolve. And the third set is of a much longer-term nature, one that brings together governmental officials and Muslim leaders, both locally and nationally, in an effort to develop and implement more effective ways to integrate the communities the latter have the most influence over moving forward. The recruitment of Westerners by transnational terrorist organizations is not a new phenomenon for American intelligence gatherers and analysts to consider, given that al-Qaeda and its affiliates have engaged in such efforts for decades. However, with the rise of IS and its innovative use of the internet generally and social media outlets such as Facebook and Twitter specifically, the challenges US law enforcement, intelligence gathering, defense and foreign policy making agencies and departments have grown exponentially. Most significantly, keeping track of those among a growing pool of marginalized Muslims in the West who are most likely to attempt to plan and carry out an attack, either collaboratively with fellow IS members or in a “lone wolf” fashion. While the United States has done an effective job thus far preventing IS members or sympathizers from carrying out such an attack, even one successful bombing or shooting can terrorize a society, if only briefly, as illustrated in Australia, Belgium, Canada, France and Denmark in 2014–15 alone. Both governments and Muslim communal leaders have indispensable roles to play in developing and then using an appropriate set of terms to characterize and criticize IS. Those terms must not ignore religion in such characterizations, nor should faiths by unnecessarily generalized on the basis of a particular interpretation of that belief system. The Barack Obama administration has, at times, been extraordinarily reluctant to even use the word “Islam” when describing IS and the threats it poses. At its core, IS represents a threat to Muslims and non-Muslims alike who do not adhere to the narrow, extreme interpretation of Islam it peddles to those it targets for recruitment. Put simply, the United States should be willing to emphasize the fact that IS misuses Islam by articulating extreme interpretations of the Qur’an Sunna and hadith to further the group’s interests. The United States and its EU allies must be willing to work with Muslim communal leaders to develop shared characterizations of IS and its illegitimate interpretations of Islam’s sacred religious documents. Over the longer term, reducing the pool of prospects from which IS and or extremist groups can recruit demands three sets of coordinated actions that may, collectively, help to achieve progress in integrating Muslim communities more inclusively into the West generally and in European Union (EU) member states such as France, Germany and the United Kingdom. First, EU governments and citizens must learn to avoid branding Muslim communities as “immigrant” communities, given that the majority of Muslims residing in EU s states at present were born and raised there. Before progress can be made in the more effective integration of those communities into European society can be made, it is essential for all Europeans to recognize their permanence on the continent. Second, more Europeans of all religions would be prudent to be receptive to the message of Oxford University scholar and European Muslim Network President Tariq Ramadan, who has spent nearly a quarter-century encouraging the EU’s Muslims to develop a pious European variant of Islam that fits within Western norms. Third, bringing together governmental officials, Muslim communal leaders and ordinary citizens together for regular dialogue about the challenges such communities face in Western society. Closing Observations on the Future of IS, Extremism and Terrorism After nearly half a century managing terrorist threats posed by organizations that possess (and are often) determined to proliferate extreme interpretations of Islam for individual and group gains, the United States is familiar with the typical challenges associated with countering such dangers.

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Such challenges include the development of accurate intelligence on organizations whose leadership structures are extraordinarily difficult to penetrate, even once, let alone consistently. In past decades through the present, these types of extremist groups spanned much of the globe; although, most were born in the Greater Middle East, including the Muslim Brotherhood (1928–present), Hezbollah (early 1980s–present), Hamas (1987-present), al-Qaeda (1988–89–present) and Al Shabaab (2006-present). This concluding chapter revisited the central issues and themes addressed in the volume’s three main sections to make the case that IS is a much different and much more dangerous terrorist organization than any of those past such growing out of perverse, twisted interpretations of Islam within Muslim majority states and communities. This closing section of the chapter, and the book, leaves readers with two sets of closing observations, one rooted in interdisciplinary academic analysis and the other emphasizing insights and recommendations for policy makers and practitioners. The first set identifies those aspects of the evolution of IS and the threats it poses in the Greater Middle East and the West that are most critical to the informed, prudent development of strategies and policies to counter and mitigate such threats to whatever extent possible. The second set assesses the prospects for the future of IS and presents policy recommendations to counter the myriad threats it presents throughout the Greater Middle East and the West. Above all, three aspects of AQI’s rebirth as IS and the evolution of the group since spring 2011 are critically important to recognize. First, IS’ use (or, most religious scholars would suggest) abuse of Islam generally and the Qur’an, Sunna and hadith specifically has remained constant, whether to the group’s benefit or detriment at given temporal junctures. Second, IS’ mere existence, let alone the extraordinary level of power it has acquired, is a testament to its skillful adaptation to changing circumstances in the environment in which it operates. Third, IS’ proven ability to craft a message that appeals to younger generations of Muslims seeking both new identities and a sense of belonging gives it a better chance to achieve enduring influence over the fastest growing population groups in the Greater Middle East and the West. Ultimately, it is those younger, very often marginalized, generations of Muslims who will decide what direction their communities go in the future, and whether to side with the mainstream adherents to Islam or with those attracted to the extreme interpretations of that faith promulgated by IS and similarly radical groups. Recognizing the threats IS already poses and acknowledging the likelihood that those threats will grow, concurrent with the recruitment-driven increase in IS’ ranks, is the first step toward developing and implementing effective strategies and policies in response. Such strategies and policies must have both short- and longer-term components. In the short term, military tools such as airstrikes, small-scale ground operations carried out by US Special Forces teams and training and logistical support for surrogates battling IS on the ground in Iraq and Syria can certainly help to weaken the group and test its members’ resolve. Over the longer term, the United States and its allies must find ways to improve the economic and political circumstances younger generations of Muslims face so that they will have fewer reasons to join IS in the face of that group’s recruitment efforts. Those efforts must also have a significant religious component, one that portrays Islam as a faith, that like many others, can (and is) interpreted in a variety of ways by Muslims within and outside of the Greater Middle East. Mitigating the multifaceted threats IS poses, let alone eventually defeating that organization and discrediting the perversion of Islam that it stands for, will require a determined, collaborative effort from the United States and its allies, Muslim and non-Muslim majority states and their leaders and citizens alike.

Index Arabic personal names are indexed under the surname, not the definite article e.g. al-Baghdadi, Abu Bakr will be found under Baghdadi. The abbreviations for each of the organizations have been used for clarity and space e.g. IS and AQI for the Islamic State and al-Qaeda in Iraq respectively. al-Abadi, Haider 38, 69 Abbott, Tony 3, 199, 201, 202, 203 Abdullah II of Jordan 138 Abdulrahman, Rami 70 al-Adnanin, Abu Muhammad 66, 71 Afghanistan al-Qaeda in 62, 67 al-Zarqawi and JTJ 17, 24, 82 battle for Herat 17 counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine in 148 Soviet forces in 61, 64 US invasion of 146–7 Ahmed, Abu 21 Ahmed, Ibrahim 179 airstrikes, see also US-led coalition Combined Joint Task Force (coalition forces) 117, 130 cost effectiveness of 34 immolation of Muath al-Kasabeh as retaliation for 49 and increased sectarian divides 84–5 by Iran into Iraq 30, 84 IS oil fields 88, 90, 101, 105, 107 as key US strategy 9–10, 215 Middle Eastern support for 101 Saudi coalition strikes in Yemen 39 and support for Kurdish fighters 117–18, 153 US against IS 9–10, 25, 38, 84, 101, 106 US in Sinjar 120, 152–3 Ajnad Media Foundation 51 Al Hayat Media Center 48, 187 Al Shabaab 63, 218 Al-Fajr (Media Center) 185 al-Khansa Brigades 105 al-Nusra Front alliance with al-Qaeda 63, 98, 214 confrontation with IS 94 formation of 22 inter-jihadist rivalries with IS 102–3 and moderate rebel forces, Syria 101 pan-Arab orientation of 97

proposed merger with ISI 2, 22–3 as threat to Israel 133 al-Qaeda in Afghanistan 62, 67 alliance with al-Nusra Front, Syria 63, 98, 214 alliance with IS 17 alliance with JTJ 18–19, 30 anti-US ideology 61, 62–3, 103, 218 backlash, post-9/11 62 concerns over ISI and al-Nusra merger 23 decentralization of 63 defections to IS 69–70 economic warfare 62 end of affiliation with ISIS 2, 23, 64, 85, 98, 214 inter-jihadist rivalries with IS 103 membership 62 recruitment 67–8 Shi’a as apostates 62, 64 use of internet radicalization 184 al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) defections from 19 formation of 2, 8, 18–19, 30, 64, 82, 213–14 non-Iraqi leadership 19–20 support networks in Syria 99 tensions with Sunni tribal leaders 19, 30 al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 69, 103, 163 al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) 103 Anbar province, Iraq AQI presence in 30, 214 Iranian Shi’a backed militia in 132, 140 IS soft power tactics in 83 Sunni ‘Awakening’ policy in 65, 148, 153 al-Anbari, Abu Abli 69, 70 anti-Islamic extremists IS as 79 legislation, EU 171 proliferation of, post 9/11 81–2 Western strategies against 79–81 anti-terrorism legislation

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Australia 202–3 Canada 198 Department of Homeland Security, USA 55, 146, 171 in the EU 171, 174, 175 France 171, 174 internet use policies, EU 190–1 New Zealand 205 Patriot Act, USA 146, 171 United Kingdom 171–4 apostates and concept of takfir 95, 96 executions of 19 as legitimate IS targets 33, 44, 62, 82, 85, 94 removal from Arab lands 62 under Salafism 65 Shi’a as 33, 44, 62, 64, 68, 82, 94 Arab Spring backlash against Islamist parties 29–30, 39 political changes 29–30 and resurgence of IS 30, 82 use of technology in Tunisia 181 Western leaders’ reactions to 29–30 Arabian Bedouins 95 Army of the Order of the Naqshbandi Men 97–8 Asmal, Talha 184 al-Assad, Bashar 22, 38, 94, 99–100, 150, 151 Australia anti-terrorism legislation 202–3 Baryalei, Mohammed Ali 199 cancellation of passports 199, 201, 203 Cerantonio, Robert ‘Musa’ 199 Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programs 203 Elomar, Mohamed 199, 200 foreign fighters 198, 200–1 Foreign Fighters Bill (2014) 202 Haider, Adbel Numan 199, 201 IS recruitment in 185 jihadi networks in 199–200 Lebanese-Australian links 200 as legitimate IS target 195–6 military participation in fight against terrorism 196, 202 Monis, Man Haron 201 Sharrouf, Khaled 199, 200 terrorist attacks against 198, 201 Thorne, Mohamed Junaid 199 threat from domestic terrorists 200–1 Awad, Nihad 173 al-Awlaki, Anwar 187

Ba’athists alliances with jihadists, Camp Bucca 22, 66 cultural support for IS 8 de-Ba’athification process 17, 23, 71, 134 within IS 69, 70, 71, 97–8, 213 al-Badi, Haidar 24 al-Badri, Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali, see alBaghdadi, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Abu Bakr background of 66 as commander of the Faithful (caliph) 7, 15, 65, 66, 68, 71 declaration of the caliphate 2, 7, 50 and expansion into Syria 98 formation of ISI 20 lack of media presence 9 launch of Dabiq 187 as leader of IS 2, 22, 65, 66 ‘Open Letter to al-Baghdadi’ 65 pledges of allegiance to the caliph 67 radicalization of, Camp Bucca 21, 66 targeting of Shi’a 20 al-Baghdadi, Abu Omar 2, 19, 66 Bangura, Zainab 5 Baryalei, Mohammed Ali 199 Barzani, Masoud 122 Barzani, Masrour 118 Basheer, Abdul 184 beheadings, see also executions as JTJ tactic 17–18, 64 role of Western governments’ policies and 48–9 use in propaganda videos 48–9 on YouTube 52 Bennhold, Katrin 179–80 Berg, Nick 18 bin Laden, Osama alliance with al-Zarqawi 18–19, 30 concept of a caliphate 62 death of and IS retaliations 22 dictum on Islam 94 ideological differences with al-Zarqawi 64, 98 initial aims of al-Qaeda 61 letter to the American people 63 US/Saudi relationship and al-Qaeda motivations 61–2 black flags in Australian terrorist attacks 201 as cultural indicator 3, 16 early adoption of 2 inscription on 3 black masks 3–4, 6 Blair, Alexander 184

Index Blank, Joseph 44 Boko Haram allegiance to IS 7, 25, 67, 145 use of black flags 2, 3 Booker, John 184 Booth, William 139 Borum, Randy 181 Boubakeur, Dalil 173 Bradbury, Ian 116–17 Breivik, Anders 182 Brennan, Rick 30 Bush, George W. 146–7 caliphate al-Baghdadi as caliph 7, 15, 65, 66, 68, 71 as Arab caliphate 7, 34, 82 bin Laden’s concept of 62 call for Muslim settlers 97 declaration of 2, 7, 15, 129, 130 elimination of state borders 2, 7, 82 and the end of times 8–9, 50, 96 IS establishment of 30–1 IS vision of 4, 7, 84, 93, 96 need for cultural area 6 original caliphate, Muhammadan era 32, 96 pledges of allegiance to the caliph 67 as representative of global Muslim population 85 Cameron, David 170, 171 Camp Bucca 21–2, 64, 66 Canada anti-terrorism legislation 198 Canadian jihadi brides 197 domestic attacks 197–8 foreign fighters 197 Harper, Stephen 198 IS recruitment in 185 jihadi networks in 196–7 as legitimate IS target 195–6 military participation in fight against terrorism 196 online counter-radicalization (Extreme Dialogue) 190 policy responses 198 Poulin, Andre 197 Cantlie, John 49, 52 Cerantonio, Robert ‘Musa’ 199 Cesari, Jocelyne 7, 169 Charlie Hebdo attacks circumstances of 163, 164, 165 EU political responses to 170–1 Front National’s response to 166

221

Muslim community responses to 172–4 Ramadan, Sayid’s response to 173–4 children, recruitment of 70, 187–8 Clinton, William (Bill) J. 79 Committee of Experts on Terrorism (CODEXTER) 190–1 Connable, Ben 84 Cordesman, Anthony 101 Cornell, Christopher Lee 184 Cronin, Audrey Kurth 37–8, 165, 169 cultural areas, see also caliphate; governance and clash of civilizations 85, 86 defined 2 establishment of 7 cultural ecology 2 cultural expressions adherence to early Islam 5–6 defined 2 destruction of historical sites 5 as homogenous society 2 information control 2, 3 use of the term Islamic 4 cultural history defined 2 use of the Black Banner 3, 4 cultural indicators black flags 3, 16 black masks 3–4 cultural landscapes defined 2 masks and freedom of actions 6 shows of ‘normalcy’ 6 culture, term 2 Dabiq (journal) ‘A Call to Hijrah’ 50 coverage of immolation of Muath al-Kasabeh 49 FVEY as legitimate targets 195 name’s significance 8, 50 online publication of 9, 104, 187 as recruitment tool 49–50 Dabiq, Syria 8–9, 50, 96, 103 Daesh al-Dawla al-Islamiyya al-Iraq al-Sham (Daesh) 3 as non-approved term for IS 3 use by non-Muslims 3, 64 Dagli, Caner K. 4 Dempsey, General Martin 150, 155 Department of Homeland Security, USA 55, 146, 171

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Drissel, David 187 Duncan, Alan 116 Egypt Al-Azhar 172 financial support from Saudi Arabia 134 military coup and ousting of Muslim Brotherhood 39, 134 military options, Sinai Peninsula 135–6 response to Charlie Hebdo attacks 172 risks of sidelining the Muslim Brotherhood 135 Western reaction to the Arab Spring 29–30 Elomar, Mohamed 199, 200 Emwazi, Mohammed 186 Esposito, John L. 31–2, 70, 164 Europe, see also the West anti-terrorism measures 171, 175 anti-terrorist internet use policies 190–1 call for Euro-Islamic communal identity 167–8, 173–4, 175, 176, 217 Committee of Experts on Terrorism (CODEXTER) 190–1 Convention of Cybercrime 190 increasing Western divisions within 81 IS polarization strategy 165–6 marginalization of Muslims 167 multiculturalism and Islamic extremism 39–40, 167–8 Muslim community responses to IS 172–5 Muslim guest workers, post WWII 166–7 Muslim populations 167 policy and the issue of Islam 164 political response to Charlie Hebdo attacks 170–1 recruitment of marginalized Muslims 163–5, 168–9, 175 refugee activists and imported Islamic extremism 39–40 responses to IS 174–5 right-wing political parties 165–6 terrorist attacks 163, 164–5 understanding of diversity of Islam 33–4 executions, see also beheadings and connections with early Islam 5–6 individualization of the victims 3–4 and interpretations of Sharia law 4, 5–6 media strategy of 9 of Muslims 38, 49, 64 use of masks as tools of fear 3 Facebook 1st Battalion British Volunteers 116

1st North American Expeditionary Force 116, 197 Lions of Rojava 116 for radicalization 181 recruitment of foreign fighters, Kurdish forces 116 use by IS 52–3, 55 el-Fadl, Kahled Abou 1 al-Fahd, Nasir 88 financial resources oil revenue 22–3, 71, 105–6, 214, 216 revenue streams 88, 90, 105–6, 157, 215–16 Five Eyes (FVEY) intelligence sharing alliance 191, 205 Foley, James 48, 50, 153 foreign fighters, see also recruitment appeal of IS to 37–8 from Australia 198, 199, 200–1, 205 from Canada 197, 205 cultural familiarity 169 as domestic threats 69 Foreign Fighters Bill (2014), Australia 202 geographical proximity 168–9 and internet knowledge 169 legislation against, Australia 202–3 motivations for 97 from New Zealand 204, 205 numbers of 16 recruitment of by Kurdish forces 115–17 recruitment of marginalized Muslims 163–5, 168–9, 175, 217 social media and recruitment of 116, 169 in Syria 70–1 France, see also Charlie Hebdo attacks anti-terrorism measures 171, 174 Front National 166 marginalization of Muslims 167 Frisch, Hillel 130 FVEY (Five Eyes) intelligence sharing alliance 191, 205 Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed 180 Gates, Robert 154 Germany musical propaganda, WWII 51 Muslim Brotherhood in 39–40 Nazi Germany 40, 95 political response to Charlie Hebdo attacks 171 propaganda videos, WWII 47 Global Islamic Media Front 185 governance, IS education 104

Index IS and tasks of the state 7–8, 25, 68, 69, 83, 88–9, 102 IS in Syria 103–5, 106 outreach programs (da’wah) 104 public reactions to 106 public service efforts 105 sharia-guided measures 104 Graham, Lindsey 154 Greater Middle East, see Middle East Gulf Cooperation Council 156 Hagel, John 153 Haider, Adbel Numan 199, 201 Haines, David 48 Hamas 130, 132, 133, 218 Hariri, Rafiri 172 Harper, Stephen 198 Harrison, Ross 129, 135, 140 Hasan, Dr Usama 68 al-Hashemi, Tareq 24 al-Hasimi, Hisham 66 Hassan, Hassan 99 Henning, Alan 48 Hezbollah 36, 38, 87, 93, 100, 131, 132, 139, 218 Hollande, François 170 Huntington, Samuel P. 85, 86, 145 Hussain, Ghaffar 190 Hussain, Murtaza 48 Hussein, Fuad 16 ideology, IS as challenge to legitimacy of Muslim states 129–30 and Clash of Civilizations thesis 85, 86, 145 desire for global Muslim uprising 79, 84, 117 IS as insurgency movement 84 potential global spread of 81 and recruitment 97 religious ideology 94–5 and Salafi millennialism 93 Shi’a as apostates 33, 44, 62, 64, 68, 82, 85, 94 use of terrorism for advancement of 84 and use of violence 96 immolations 6, 49, 50, 101, 134, 138, 182 infidels, IS definitions of 4, 6, 8, 37, 38, 43, 44, 85, 187, see also apostates information control 2, 4, 6, 9, see also social media insurgencies counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine 146, 147, 148 IS as insurgency movement 84 limitations of military power against 147–8

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public understanding of 83 Iran airstrikes in Iraq 30, 84 direct action against IS 89 easing of sanctions 131 growing influence of 30, 84 Iranian-Saudi rivalry 34, 38–9, 134 Islamic Republican Guard Corp 131 nuclear program 131 as outside US-led coalition 130 Quds forces 131, 155 Shi’a militias, support for 131, 132, 140 Sunni fears of expansionism of 84 support for al-Assad, Syria 38, 100, 131, 151, 155, 156 support for Hezbollah forces 38, 93, 100, 131, 132, 139 support for Houthi rebels, Yemen 38–9, 139–40 support for Iraq’s Shi’a government 38, 132, 155 as threat to Arab Middle East 35 US-Iranian relationship 131, 156 Iraq, see also al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) 2003 invasion of 146 Anbar province 30, 65, 83, 132, 140, 148, 153, 214 and elimination of borders 8 as failed democracy 87 Iranian support for Shi’a government 38, 132, 155 Iraq First strategy, US-led coalition 155 IS state tasks in al-Raqqa 7–8 IS victories in northern Iraq 15, 16, 25, 81, 87–8, 152, 185 Northern Offensive 15–16 opponents to IS 93 Sinjar, combat in 118–19, 120, 152 Sunni ‘Awakening’ policy 19–20, 23, 24, 30, 65, 82, 98, 147, 153 Sunni-Shi’a animosities, historical 8, 17 Sunni-Shi’a divide, mismanagement of 23–4, 30, 81, 83, 214 Syria as threat to stability of 150 Turkish-Iraqi relations 137 unity of and independent Kurdistan 118, 134 US troops withdrawal from 30, 87, 149–50, 185, 214 Iraqi Kurdistan 114, 116, 122, 134, 137 Islam, see also Shi’a Islam; Sunni Islam call for Euro-Islamic communal identity 167–8, 173–4, 176, 217 diversity of Islam 32–4

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ideological divides within 80, 85, 86 IS as threat to global Muslim majority 34–5 IS’s extreme Islam within 3, 4, 30, 172, 175, 218 origins of, Muhammadan era 31–2 profession of faith (shadada) 3 prophecy of the end of times 8–9, 50, 96 threat from IS interpretations 34–7, 85–6 Islamic, term 4 Islamic extremism exportation to Europe through refugee activists 39–40 in Syria 94, 99–100 the Islamic State (IS) bureaucratic structure 70, 88 estimated size of 1, 16, 39 expansion of 9–10, 16, 38 future scenarios for 88–9, 106–7 names and development of 1–2, 44 as new form of threat 145–6, 218 territorial expansion 129, 130, 214, 215 transnational support for 25 and use of weapons of mass destruction 88 Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham (ISIS) 22, 63 end of affiliation with al-Qaeda 2, 23, 64, 85, 98, 214 merger with al-Nusra Front 22–3 oil revenue 22–3, 71 Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) 1 Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) 1, 189 Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) 2, 15, 63, 98 Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) anti-government role in the Syrian Civil War 22–3 formation of 2, 19, 82 leadership formation (Camp Bucca) 21–2 multi-layered structure of 44–6, 45 and sectarian tensions 98 targets 22 Israel border controls 133 enforced neutrality of 130, 132 Jordan as buffer state for 133–4 support for Iraqi Kurdistan 134 threat from al-Nusra Front 133 Italy 185–6 al-Jaafari, Ibrahim 117 Jabhat al-Nusra, see al-Nusra Front Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (JTJ) alliance with al-Qaeda 18–19

beheadings tactic 17–18, 64, 82 founding of 17, 66 Shi’a civilian and religious targets 17–18, 19, 82 Japan 47–8 al-Jawalani, Abu Mohammed 2, 98 jihad, forms of 95 Jihadi John 186 Jihadi Salafism 64, 65 jihadists alliances with Ba’athists, Camp Bucca 22, 66 cost effectiveness of 34 ideology of 95 inter-jihadist rivalries, Syria 102–3 jihadist networks, Australia 199–200 jihadist networks, Canada 197 jihadist networks, New Zealand 204 The Management of Savagery 96 online jihadis, Great Britain 183–4, 186 jizya (protection money) 5 Jordan border controls 138–9 as buffer state to Israel 133–4 fighters in IS 138 King Abdullah’s international standing 138 as member of US-led coalition 154 military capabilities 137–8 Muath al-Kasabeh (pilot) 6, 49, 50, 101, 134, 138 protests by IS supporters 138 refugees in 138 JTJ (Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad) see Jamaat alTawhid wal-Jihad (JTJ) Jund al-Sham (Soldiers of the Levant) 82 al-Kasabeh, Muath 6, 49, 50, 101, 134, 138, 182 Kassig, Peter 8, 48 Kastigar, Troy 186–7 Kepel, Gilles 164–5 Kerry, John 153, 154 Key, John 203 Khan, Mohammed Sidique 180 Kurdistan independence movements 122 Iraqi Kurdistan 114, 116, 122 lack of US support for 118 Kurds Al-Hasakah, combat in 119–20, 121–2 Canadians in 197 ethnic cleansing of 7 foreign recruiting policies 115–17 history of 113–14

Index and IS 8 Kobani, combat in 102, 103, 119, 120–1, 137 nationalistic pride 122 People’s Defense Force (HPG) 115 People’s Protection Units (YPG) 115 Peshmerga 114, 155 Peshmerga FRAME 116 recruitment to IS 97 Sinjar, combat in 118–19, 120, 152 as stateless nation 7 support from coalition airstrikes 117–18, 153 and Syrian instability 90 Women’s Protection Units (YPJ) 115 Lebanon 139, 172, 200 Libicki, Martin 84 Libya 30 ‘lone wolf’ attacks 25, 35, 163–5, 165, 183, 217 Maher, Shiraz 186 Mahmoud, Sheikh Hussein bin 4 Malik, Shiv 180 al-Maliki, Nouri policies and Sunni-Shi’a divide 17, 23–4, 30, 65, 69, 83, 152, 214 response to the Northern Offensive 15–16 al-Maqdisi, Abu Muhammed 19, 64 Marrui, Ali 36 al-Masri, Abu Ayyub 2, 20, 82 Mathews, Basil 86 May, Teresa 171 McCain, Douglas McAuthur 186–7 McCain, John 154, 187 McDonald, Kevin 3 Merkel, Angela 171 Middle East artificial state borders 6 geopolitical threat of IS 38, 216 instability and Sunni-Shi’a conflicts 87, 89, 90, 130 Iran as threat to 35 IS as regional threat 81, 172 Muslim community responses to IS 172 sectarian divides and US airstrikes 84 military strategies alongside diplomatic/political anti-IS strategy 148–9, 218 on the ground 102, 103 increasing Western divisions within 80–1 insurgency and limitations of military power 147–8 IS and hybrid warfare 145–6, 151–2, 157

225

IS strategy of sectarian conflict 2, 18, 64, 67, 215 IS victories in northern Iraq 15, 16, 25, 81, 87–8 nine principles of warfare 80 of US in Syria 150–1, 152 US military tactics 146–7 and use of weapons of mass destruction 88 Ministry of Media 46–7, 46, see also propaganda Monis, Man Haron 201 Morsi, Mohammed 134, 135 multiculturalism as failed policy, Europe 167–8 and Islamic refugee activists 39–40 Munshi, Hamaad 183–4 musical propaganda historical use of 50–1 IS national anthem 51 nasheeds (religious musical propaganda) 51–2 as soundtrack to videos 51, 52 Muslim Brotherhood attitudes towards a caliphate 71 as extremist group 218 French branch 173 as illegal organization, Egypt 134–5 as potential ally of IS 135 risks of persecution of, Egypt 135, 140 in Saudi Arabia 134 Muslim Council of France (CFCM) 173 nasheeds (religous musical propaganda) 51–2 Nassar, Sheikh Hamadah 1, 2 Nawaz, Maajid 179, 187 New Zealand anti-terrorism legislation 205 domestic attacks 204 foreign fighters 204 jihadi networks in 204 as legitimate IS target 195–6 military participation in fight against terrorism 196 terrorist threat assessments 203 nominalism, radical 30 non-Muslims elimination from the IS caliphate 7 within the historical caliphate 7 sexual violence against women 5 use of term Daesh 3, 64 Nordland, Rod 132 Northern Offensive, Iraq 15–16

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Obama, Barack, see also United States of America (USA) Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) 25 description of IS 79 Nobel Peace Prize 149 reevaluation of military strategies 148 reluctance for ground troops in Syria 150–1, 152 Summit on Countering Violent Extremism 172 support for Egyptian Arab Spring 29 oil revenue airstrikes against oil fields 88, 90, 101, 105, 107 for IS 22–3, 71, 105–6, 214, 216 oil smuggling, Turkish border 105, 137 Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 30 Orell, Robert 179 Osman, Hussain 184 Ottoman Empire 6, 7, 8, 71, 82, 86, 136 Pantucci, Raffaello 183 passports cancellation of, Australia 199, 201, 203 cancellation policies 206 revocation of, Canada 198 revocation of, UK 171, 206 Petraeus, General David 19, 147 plebisitarian democracies 87 Pocock, Andrew 145 Poulin, Andre 197 Powell, Colin 146–7, 149 propaganda, see also social media; videos, propaganda abandonment of official social media 47 Ajnad Media Foundation 51 Al Furquan Media 105 Al Hayat Media Center 48, 104 and control of information 2 credibility nodes 47 Grand Theft Auto, use of 53, 55 media arm of IS 46 Ministry of Media 46–7 musical propaganda 50–2 overview of use of 43, 104–5 propaganda channels 46 for recruitment 96–7 recruitment of marginalized Muslims 163–5, 168–9, 175 unofficial propaganda material via social media 46–7 US counter messaging attempts 55–6 use and appeal of violence 165, 169 on YouTube 52

Qatar 100 Quran hadd crimes 36 IS strict interpretation of 4–5, 102 recording of, classical Islam 32 on religious pluralism 85–6, 95 strict adherence to, Islamic extremism 95 radicalization Al-Fajr (Media Center) 185 concept of 181 and de-radicalization 179 of disillusioned youth 179–80 Global Islamic Media Front 185 in history 179 online counter-radicalization strategies 189–91 online radicalization 182–3 personal connections and 184 of prisoners, Camp Bucca 21–2, 64, 66 role of the internet 183–5 self-radicalization 182–3 strategic counter-terror measures 184–5 use of social media 181 use of technology, Taliban 181 Ramadan, Sayid 39–40 Ramadan, Tariq 167–8, 173–4, 176, 217 recruitment, see also foreign fighters; radicalization to al-Qaeda 67–8 appeal of fundamentalist Islam 4–5, 37–8 counter-measures and fears of Islamaphobia 186 defection to IS from al-Qaeda 69–70 of groups 186–7 human trafficking 188 impact of the Northern Offensive 16 and inter-jihadist rivalries 103 Islamist entryism in UK universities 186 lack of calls to violence 188 marginalized European Muslims 163–5 motivations for 70 Muslim community assistance against, EU 174, 217 of Muslims 186 propaganda for 96–7 replenishment of recruits 107 from the Sunni population 16 tactics in the West 37–8, 185–7 from the USA 70 use of children 70, 187–8 use of internet 1, 53, 68, 116, 169, 215, 217 Ruble, Kayla 48 Russia 84, 90

Index Sageman, Marc 184 Sakbani, Michael 131 Salafism and apostates 65 literal interpretations of the Quran 5, 33 Salafi millennialism and IS ideology 93 Salafist militants, see al-Nusra Front Saltman, Marie 190 Saudi Arabia airstrikes in Yemen 39 citizens in IS 134 executions 5 financial support for Egypt 134 ideological ties with IS 133, 134 involvement in Syrian civil war 100 Iranian-Saudi rivalry 34, 38–9, 134 legal beheadings 6 as member of US-led coalition 133–4, 154 Muslim Brotherhood in 134 response to Charlie Hebdo attacks 172 Sahwa movement in 134 Sharia law 34, 36 US military presence in and al-Qaeda 61–2 Wahhabis 5, 34, 95 Schenker, David 137–8 Shafi, Dr Shuja 173 Shakat, Assef 99 Sharia law acceptance by the West 39 application by al-Zarqawi 19 categories of offences 36 interpretation and application of 5–6, 7–8, 36, 83 and justification for public executions 4, 5–6 in Saudi Arabia 34, 36 strict interpretation of, al-Qaeda 62 in Syria 104 and Western-style laws 37 Sharrouf, Khaled 199, 200 Shi’a Crescent 30, 84, 87 Shi’a Islam as apostates 33, 44, 62, 64, 82, 85, 94 discrimination against, Saudi Arabia 34 and the division of the ummah, classical Islam 32 within IS ideology 44, 67, 68, 71, 130 Middle Eastern instability and Sunni-Shi’a conflicts 87, 89, 90, 130 schism with Sunni Islam 32, 67, 71 sub-sects of 33 Sunni perceptions of 35, 64

227

Sunni-Shi’a divide, mismanagement of in Iraq 17, 23–4, 30, 65, 69, 83, 152, 214 targeting of by AQI 2, 17–18, 19, 20, 64, 82 al-Sisi, Abdel Fattah 172 social media, see also Facebook; Twitter Abdullah-X (character) 190 closure of IS accounts 55–6 extensive use of 9, 30, 38, 80, 105, 145, 215, 217 Instagram 54 IS adaptability of use of 54–5, 70, 189 IS recruitment through 1, 53, 68 jihadi online forums 54 masks as tools of fear 3 online counter-radicalization strategies 189–90 for radicalization 181 recruitment of foreign fighters 116, 169 and unofficial propaganda material 46–7 US counter messaging attempts 55, 145 Soharwardy, Syed 185 Sotloff, Steven 48 state borders as artificial creations, Middle East 6 elimination of within caliphate 2, 7, 82 within Iraq 8 Sunni Islam and expansion of the Shi’a Crescent 30, 84–5, 87 fears of Iranian expansionism 84 as IS recruits 16 Islamic extremism 94 Middle Eastern instability and Sunni-Shi’a conflicts 87, 89, 90, 130 perceptions of Shi’a 35, 64 ‘Rightly Guided Caliphate’ period 32 schism with Shi’a Islam 32, 67, 71 strict interpretation of, IS 44 sub-sects of 33 and suicide bombers 35–6 Sunni-Shi’a divide, mismanagement of in Iraq 17, 23–4, 30, 65, 69, 83, 152, 214 Syria airstrikes and increased sectarian divides 84–5 Al-Hasakah, combat in 119–20, 121–2 Dabiq 8–9, 50, 96, 103 foreign fighters in 70–1 humanitarian aid for 129 inter-jihadist rivalries 102–3 Iranian support for Assad regime 38, 100, 131, 151, 155, 156 IS alliances with tribes 102, 103 IS expansion into 1, 30, 66, 93, 94

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The New Islamic State IS governance in 103–5, 106 IS in Raqqa province 94, 99 IS recruitment in 186 ISI and the al-Nusra Front 22–3 Islamic extremism in 94, 99–100 Kobani, combat in 119, 120–1, 137 opponents to IS 93 Rojava (Kurdish area) 115 Russian involvement in 84, 90 Saudi Arabian involvement in 100 Sharia law 104 support for IS, Sunni-Shi’a divide 97, 100 as threat to stability of Iraq 150 as transit corridor for jihadist fighters to Iraq 94, 99 US formed moderate rebel forces 100–1, 130, 152, 156 US military strategy for 150–1, 152 US-led coalition strategy for 156

takfir 95, 96 Taliban, see also Afghanistan destruction of historical sites 5 IS contempt for 85, 90 recruitment and the use of technology 181 refugee status for fighters, UK 40 use of internet radicalization 184 terrorism anti-terrorism legislation, Australia 202–3 anti-terrorism measures, Canada 198 anti-terrorist internet use policies, EU 190–1 EU anti-terrorism legislation 171, 174, 175 IS use of 84 ‘lone wolf’ attacks 25, 35, 163–5, 165, 183, 217 public understanding of 83 radicalization and homegrown terrorists 180 as result of radicalization 182 terrorist attacks, Europe 163, 164–5 threat from domestic terrorists 200–1 Western intelligence on 218 Terry, Lieutenant-General James 3, 155 Thorne, Mohamed Junaid 199 Traub, Erin 115 Trofimov, Yaroslav 6 Tsouli, Younis 183 Tunisia 39, 181 Turkey Kobani, Kurdish combat in 119, 120–1, 137 NATO protection of 136 and oil smuggling 105, 137 oppression of the Kurds 122 People’s Defense Force (HPG) 115

repression of Kurds 122 Suleyman Shah’s grave 136 Turkish-Iraqi relations 137 and the US-led coalition 136, 154 Turkish Kurdistan 114, 115 al-Turkmani, Abu Muslim al Afari 69, 70 Twitter #catsofjihad 53 #GenerationKalifah 9 #WorldCup 9 The Dawn of Glad Tidings app 53, 145 grassroots support on 54 hashtag campaigns 9, 53, 145 for radicalization 181 ThinkAgainTurnAway site 55, 189–90 US counter messaging attempts 55, 145 use of memes 53–4 use of, Tunisian revolution 181 volumes of tweets 55, 105, 188–9 United Arab Emirates (UAE) 100, 101, 154 United Kingdom (UK) anti-terrorism measures 171, 174 British online jihadis 183–4, 186 Islamist entryism at universities 186 as legitimate IS target 195–6 Muslim Council of Britain 173 political response to Charlie Hebdo attacks 170–1 revocation of passports 171, 206 United States of America (USA) see also airstrikes; the West al-Qaeda’s call for war against 61, 62–3 Charlie Hebdo attacks, response to 173 Council on American-Islamic Relations 173, 186 Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) 191 counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine 146, 147, 148 Department of Homeland Security 55, 146, 171 global standing, post war in Iraq 147 Inherent Resolve operation 117 involvement in Syrian civil war 100–1 IS as existential threat to 81, 88 IS recruits from 70 as legitimate IS target 195–6 online counter-radicalization strategies 55, 145, 189–90, 191 online radicalization 184, 186–7 Patriot Act 146, 171 propaganda videos, WWII 47 Regional Strategic Initiative (RSI) 191

Index Strategic Patience Strategy 81 strategy for defeating IS 79–81, 100–1, 148–9, 153–5, 156–7 support Egyptian Arab Spring 29 understanding of diversity of Islam 33–4 use of musical propaganda, WWII 51 US-Iranian relationship 131, 156 and the War on Terror 146–7 withdrawal of troops from Iraq 30, 87, 149–50, 185, 214 US-led coalition, see also airstrikes activities, 2015 25 Egypt 135 formation of 117–18, 153–4 Iran’s non-participation in 130, 131 Iraq First strategy 155 Israel’s neutrality and 130, 132 Jordan 137, 138 operations in Syria 156 Saudi Arabia 133 and strategy for IS 153–5, 156–7 Turkey 136, 154 United Arab Emirates (UAE) 134 Valls, Manuel 170, 171 videos, propaganda Al Furquan Media 105 beheadings 48–9 IS parade, Raqqa 185 soundtracks 51, 52 use in World War II 47–8 use of a North American in 197 on YouTube 52, 182, 189 violence attraction of 165, 169 justification through theological interpretation 4 and online recruitment 188 strategic use of 96, 102 Wagemaker, Joas 4 Wahabbism and concept of takfir 95, 96 in Saudi Arabia 5, 34, 95 al-Wahhab, Muhammad ibn Abd 94, 95 the War on Terror 35, 99, 146–7, 205 Weber, Max 87

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Wehrey, Frederic 134 Weiss, Michael 99 the West, see also Europe; United Kingdom (UK); United States of America (USA) anti-extremism discussions 171–2 limitation of IS through global Muslim majority 34–5 multiculturalism and Islamic refugee activists 39–40 reactions to the Arab Spring 29–30 recruitment of IS fighters from 37–8, 185–7 stance on Sharia law in Arab countries 39 strategy for defeating IS, overview of 79–81, 100–1, 216–17 understanding of diversity of Islam 33–4 western paradigms and IS strategies 83, 86–7 women al-Khansa Brigades 105 Canadian jihadi brides 197 enslavement of 69 idealized weblogs 105 radicalization of 180 role and status under IS 5 sexual violence against 5, 69 Women’s Protection Units (YPJ) (Kurdish) 115 Yazidi enslavement of 200 ethnic cleansing of 7 in the Quran 65 in Sinjar 118–19, 152 Yemen, Houthi rebels 38–9, 139–40 YouTube 52, 182, 189 Zammit, Andrew 200 al-Zarqawi, Abu Musab application of Sharia law 19 formation of AQI 18–19, 30, 64, 82, 213–14 as founder of IS 16–17 ideological differences with bin Laden 64, 98 Shi’a civilian and religious targets 2, 17–18, 19, 64, 82 tensions with al-Qaeda leadership 19, 82 al-Zawahir, Ayman 18, 19, 23, 64, 82, 98 Zelin, Aaron 54, 70