The Naxal challenge: causes, linkages, and policy options 9788131704066, 9789332506114, 8131704068

Table of contents :
Cover......Page 1
Contents......Page 6
Abbreviations......Page 8
Foreword......Page 10
Preface......Page 16
Chapter 1: The Naxal Movement: A Realistic Approach......Page 18
Chapter 2: The Trajectory of the Movement......Page 27
Chapter 3: Roots and Causes: The Case of Jharkhand......Page 35
Chapter 4: Roots and Causes: The Case of Dandakaranya......Page 42
The Larger Picture......Page 43
What have the Naxalites done?......Page 48
Chapter 5: A Political Approach to the Naxalite Problem: Viability and Prerequisites for Success......Page 56
The Scenario in Andhra Pradesh......Page 58
From a Law and Order Approach to Socio-Economic View......Page 60
Overview of the Remote and Interior Areas Development Programme......Page 61
Scheme Profile......Page 63
Response and Follow-up......Page 64
Approach of the TDP and BJP......Page 65
Approach of Congress Party/UPA......Page 72
Consensus on the Approach to the Naxalite Problem......Page 73
Notes and References......Page 75
Introduction......Page 79
Political Objective Armed agrarian revolution......Page 80
Andhra peace process......Page 84
Political Space for Naxalism......Page 86
Dynamics of Violence......Page 89
Conclusion......Page 93
Notes and References......Page 94
Chapter 7: Approaches to the Naxalite Movement......Page 100
Notes and References......Page 105
Chapter 8: Revolutionary and Counter-Revolutionary Strategies of the Naxalites and the State......Page 107
The Organisation Phase......Page 110
The Guerrilla Warfare Phase......Page 111
What Needs to be Done?......Page 116
Chapter 9: The Naxalite Movement: Impact of External Networking......Page 118
Introduction......Page 128
CPI (Maoist)–CPN-M Nexus......Page 130
Revolutionary Corridor......Page 134
Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organisations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA)......Page 135
Extra-Regional Links......Page 136
Revolutionary Internationalist Movement......Page 137
World People’s Resistance Movement, South Asia......Page 140
The Mumbai Resistance 2004......Page 141
Extra-Fraternal Links: ULFA, ISI and LTTE ULFA and ISI......Page 142
The LTTE......Page 143
Conclusion......Page 144
Notes and References......Page 145
Chapter 11: Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: An Overview*......Page 153
Introduction......Page 154
Primacy of Ideology......Page 158
Ethnicisation of Insurgency......Page 163
Internal Contradictions Within the State......Page 168
Conclusion......Page 171
Notes and References......Page 175
I: Press Statement Announcing the Founding of the CPI (Maoist)......Page 180
II: The First-ever Joint Interview of the General Secretaries of the Erstwhile CPI(ML)[PW] and MCCI......Page 185
III: Organisational Hierarchy: Communist Party of India (Maoist)......Page 215
Extent of Naxal Violence......Page 216
Naxal attacks on the police personnel......Page 217
Policy to deal with Naxalism......Page 218
Security related expenditure (SRE) scheme......Page 219
Long-term deployment of Central Police Forces (CPFs)......Page 220
Deployment of Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB) along Indo-Nepal border......Page 221
Review and Monitoring Mechanism Task Force on Naxalism......Page 222
Standing Committee of the Chief Ministers of the Naxal affected States......Page 223
Constitution of the Inter-Ministerial Group (IMG)......Page 224
Naxal Management Division......Page 225
Action Plans by States......Page 226
V: Naxal-affected States and Districts in India......Page 227
Andhra Pradesh......Page 228
Uttaranchal......Page 229
Kerala......Page 230
Tamil Nadu......Page 231
Uttar Pradesh......Page 232
Madhya Pradesh......Page 233
Karnataka......Page 234
Maharashtra......Page 235
West Bengal......Page 236
Orissa......Page 237
Chhattisgarh......Page 238
Jharkhand......Page 239
Bihar......Page 240
About the Editor and the Contributors......Page 241
Index......Page 248

Citation preview

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The Naxal Challenge

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© Observer Research Foundation

Observer Research Foundation is an independent think tank that develops and publishes policy proposals in the areas of economy, security, politics and governance. It also arranges seminars and lectures on topical issues as part of its mission to influence policy, both within India and abroad.

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The Naxal Challenge Causes, Linkages, and Policy Options

Edited by

P. V. Ramana

An imprint of Pearson Education

Copyright © 2008 Dorling Kindersley (India) Pvt. Ltd. Licensees of Pearson Education in South Asia No part of this eBook may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without the publisher’s prior written consent. This eBook may or may not include all assets that were part of the print version. The publisher reserves the right to remove any material present in this eBook at any time. ISBN 9788131704066 eISBN 9789332506114 Head Office: A-8(A), Sector 62, Knowledge Boulevard, 7th Floor, NOIDA 201 309, India Registered Office: 11 Local Shopping Centre, Panchsheel Park, New Delhi 110 017, India

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Contents

Abbreviations

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Foreword by B. Raman

ix

Preface

xv

1. The Naxal Movement: A Realistic Approach

1

D. Raja

2. The Trajectory of the Movement

10

K. P. Singh

3. Roots and Causes: The Case of Jharkhand

18

Harivansh

4. Roots and Causes: The Case of Dandakaranya

25

Ruchir Garg

5. A Political Approach to the Naxalite Problem: Viability and Prerequisites for Success

39

M. Shashidhar Reddy

6. Political Bases and Dimensions of the Naxalite Movement

62

Sanjay K. Jha

7. Approaches to the Naxalite Movement V. K. Padmanabhan

83

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CONTENTS

8. Revolutionary and Counter-Revolutionary Strategies of the Naxalites and the State

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K. Srinivas Reddy

9. The Naxalite Movement: Impact of External Networking

101

S. Gopal

10. The Maoist Web: An Overview

111

P. V. Ramana

11. Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: An Overview

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Krishna Hachhethu

Annexures

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I Press Statement Announcing the Founding of the CPI (Maoist) II First-ever Exclusive Joint-interview of the General Secretaries of the Erstwhile CPI(ML) [PW] and MCCI III Organisational Hierarchy: Communist Party of India (Maoist) IV Current Trends in Naxalism V Naxal-affected States and Districts in India

About the Editor and the Contributors

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Index

231

vi

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Abbreviations

AIADMK AICC BSD (ML) CCOMPOSA

– – – –

CPB (MLM)

–

CPC (Maoist) – CPEB (ML) – CPI – CPI (M) – CPI (Maoist) – CPI (ML) – CPI (ML)[PW] – CPN-M CRZ JVP LTTE LWE MCCI NDA

– – – – – – –

All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam All India Congress Committee Bangladesh Samyabadi Dal (Marxist–Leninist) Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organisations of South Asia Communist Party of Bhutan (Marxist–Leninist–Maoist) Communist Party of Ceylon (Maoist) Communist Party of East Bengal (Marxist–Leninist) Communist Party of India Communist Party of India (Marxist) Communist Party of India (Maoist) Communist Party of India (Marxist–Leninist) Communist Party of India (Marxist–Leninist) [People’s War] Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist Compact Revolutionary Zone Janata Vimukthi Peramuna Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam Left Wing Extremism Maoist Communist Centre of India National Democratic Alliance

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ABBREVIATIONS PBCP PBSP(CC) PBSP(MPK)

– Purba Bangla Communist Party – Purba Bangla Sarbahara Party (Central Committee) – Purba Bangla Sarbahara Party (Maobadi Punorgothan Kendra) PGA – People’s Guerilla Army PLA – People’s Liberation Army PLGA – People’s Liberation Guerilla Army PPW – Protracted People’s War RCCI(MLM) – Revolutionary Communist Centre of India (Marxist–Leninist–Maoist) RIM – Revolutionary Internationalist Movement RJD – Rashtriya Janata Dal TDP – Telugu Desam Party ULFA – United Liberation Front of Asom UPA – United Progressive Alliance WPB – Workers’ Party of Belgium

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Foreword Replying to a question in parliament on 14 December 2004, Sriprakash Jaiswal, Minister of State for Home Affairs, Government of India, had stated that till 30 November 2004, 420 civilians and 98 security force personnel were killed in Naxalite violence in 10 states, as against 410 civilians and 94 security forces personnel during 2003. From the media reports of the reply, it was not clear whether the figures given for 2003 covered the entire year or had figures for the period till 30 November 2003. According to the minister, Bihar with 155 deaths reported the largest number of killings, up from 128 in 2003. It was followed by Jharkhand with 150 deaths as against 117 in 2003. The other states which recorded an increase in the number of total casualties were Uttar Pradesh from 8 to 23, West Bengal from 1 to 14 and Chattisgarh from 74 to 75. Andhra Pradesh recorded a steep decrease from 139 to 74. Other states that recorded a decrease were Maharashtra from 31 to 15 and Orissa from 15 to 8. There were three deaths in Madhya Pradesh and one in Karnataka. In respect of individual states, the reply, as given in the media, did not indicate how many of those killed were civilians and how many were security forces personnel. Of the five states, which recorded an increase in Naxalite violence in 2004, four—Bihar, Jharkhand, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal—are in the proximity of India’s international border with Nepal or

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FOREWORD Bangladesh. Only Chhattisgarh is away from the border, but the increase in this state is marginal in contrast to the steep increase in the other four states. The general public perception is that the level of economic development, economic and social justice, and the quality of governance in Bihar, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh are weaker than in the other states of India. What are the reasons attributable for the increase in violence? Continuing economic and social backwardness and injustice? Poor governance? A state machinery insensitive to the grievances of the deprived sections of the population? An inadequately performing law and order machinery? External linkages in Nepal and Bangladesh? How is it then that Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal, which are generally perceived as better governed with a better-performing state machinery, have also registered an increase? From this, can one conclude that the impact of the external linkages factor in the spread of the Naxalite movement is stronger than it is generally believed to be? The five states that recorded a decrease or where violence was marginal are away from the international borders. In Andhra Pradesh, the significant decrease could be attributed to the mutual suspension of operations by the state government and the Naxalites for some months. What are the reasons for the decline in Maharashtra and Orissa? Seasonal and sporadic? Better performance by the state machinery? The Naxalite movement losing steam and a decline in the motivation of its cadres? How does one characterise the Naxalite movement? Is it political violence—understandable though not justifiable—due to economic and social injustice against the deprived sections of the population? Ideological insurgency? Ideological terrorism? If it is just political violence, how does one explain instances of indiscriminate killing of civilians through the use of land-mines and improvised explosive devices and targeted assassinations of political leaders such as the attempt in 2003 to assassinate Shri Chandrababu Naidu, the then Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh? Is it a mix of insurgency and terrorism as one saw in the case of the Janata Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) of Sri Lanka? x

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FOREWORD The post-World War II period saw the eruption of Marxist/Maoist insurgencies and terrorism in a number of countries in Asia, West Europe and South America. Among the Asian countries affected were the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, Myanmar, India, Nepal and Sri Lanka. Barring the case of the JVP in Sri Lanka, it was largely an insurgent movement mainly directed against the state machinery and those associated with it. The insurgency has since withered away in Malaysia, Thailand and Myanmar. The withering away in Malaysia and Thailand could be attributed partly to effective counter-insurgency operations by the security forces and partly to the general economic progress in these countries. Myanmar is a remarkable case of the withering away of the insurgency despite the lack of any economic progress in the country. This was partly due to ruthless suppression of the insurgents by successive military governments and partly due to the drying up of sustenance from China post-1979. In Sri Lanka, the insurgents-cum-terrorists of yesterday have become the mainstream political players of today. This transformation from insurgency to the political mainstream came about after the JVP apparently realised the futility of violence to achieve its ideological objectives, following a ruthless suppression of the insurgents/terrorists by the state. In western Europe, what one saw was pure and simple ideological punishment that terrorism practised through organisations such as the Baader-Meinhof and the Red Army Faction of the then West Germany, the Red Brigade of Italy, the Action Directe of France, the Carlos’ Group of International Revolutionaries, etc. They had no pretensions or illusions of being able to capture political power through terrorism. They just wanted to punish their perceived ideological adversaries. The movement withered away after the rapid economic progress of the countries was affected and the external sustenance dried up following the collapse of the USSR, Yugoslavia and other communist states of eastern Europe. In South America, and in the Philippines, India and Nepal in Asia, the violent Marxist/Maoist movement—whether one calls it xi

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FOREWORD political violence, insurgency, terrorism or a mix of insurgency and terrorism—still thrives. In India, over the years, there has been a geographical spread of the areas affected by the Naxalite movement. There are certain common characteristics of the Naxalite/Maoist movements in India and Nepal: • An educated leadership, not necessarily coming from the deprived classes, and often motivated by the ambition to achieve political power through the barrel of the gun. It is not very clear as to what extent is their motivation genuinely due to their sense of outrage over the prevailing economic and social injustice and their perception of an uncaring state and to what extent is their outrage merely a facade for their political ambition. • A cadre largely drawn from the deprived classes, many with little education, motivated by genuine economic and social grievances, but without any political ambitions. • Networking to achieve their political ambitions. • The continuing influence of Mao Zedong’s thoughts on the thinking of the leadership even though China itself has discarded them, while pretending not to have done so. What would be the parameters of a comprehensive and viable strategy to deal with the persisting and geographically-spreading Naxalite violence? The political approach: Should there be a common political approach at the national level or should it be left to the political leadership of the individual states affected? Economic and social approach: What are the pre-requisites of a successful political, economic and social approach? Law and order approach: A mix of all of them? How does one deal with the external aspect? To do a collective introspection over these questions and try to reach conclusions, that could provide useful inputs for our policy-makers, under its International Terrorism Watch Programme (ITWP), the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) had organised a two-day workshop under the auspices of its Chennai Chapter in Chennai on 28–29 January 2005. Dr P.V. Ramana, a widely acknowledged expert on the

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FOREWORD problem, who now serves on the faculty of the ORF at its headquarters at New Delhi, coordinated the workshop. Thanks to his untiring efforts and wide circle of acquaintances, a galaxy of experts on the internal and external ramifications of this problem attended the workshop, presented papers on various aspects and participated in the discussions. Dr Ramana needs to be complimented for editing the proceedings of the workshop in his usual competent manner in order to have them published and make available the collective wisdom of the workshop to the policy-makers and the general public. It is fervently hoped that this volume would not only contribute to a better understanding of the problem in the policy-making circles and in the general public, but would also be of help to the political leadership and other policy-makers in their continuing search for a solution to this problem. The Naxalite movement is essentially an ideological movement and not an ethnic or religious one. It gets its sustenance from social evils such as poverty, unemployment, exploitation of the poor classes, etc. It is also a movement which has drawn into its fold a large number of poor people across the tribal belt of India. It cannot be tackled through an exclusively law and order approach. It has to be tackled through a judicious mix of incentives, disincentives and political initiatives—incentives for the large sections of the population in the affected areas who have kept away from the movement despite intimidation; disincentives for those who have taken to violence in the form of vigorous application of the law against them; and political initiatives to counter the ideological attraction of the movement and to wean away from violence those who cannot be described as diehards. Disincentives and political initiatives are not alternatives. They have to go together. B. Raman Former Distinguished Fellow Observer Research Foundation

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Preface This volume is the outcome of a two-day national workshop on the Naxalite movement, hosted by Observer Research Foundation (ORF) at Chennai on 28 and 29 January 2005. Academicians, journalists with grassroots knowledge, experienced policy makers, bureaucrats and police officers with hands-on experience in dealing with the Naxalite issue participated in the workshop and also presented papers. The papers presented in this volume examine the following themes: social and economic causes of the Naxalite movement; its political bases; the viability of a political approach to solve the problem; the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary strategies of the Naxalites and the state, respectively; and the external linkages of the Naxalites. Additionally, there is an insightful discussion on the Maoist people’s war in Nepal. Note and reference lists, wherever possible, have been included. Some of the papers do not contain notes and references, while those that follow different styles have been retained in the original form in which they were prepared. The hosting of this workshop and the preparation of this volume have been possible because of a number of people, namely, R. K. Mishra, Chairman, ORF, Baljit Kapoor, Honorary Secretary, B. Raman, former Distinguished Fellow, Wilson John, Senior Fellow, and N. Sathiya Moorthy, Director of the ORF’s Chennai chapter. I am grateful to K. Srinivas Reddy, one of the contributors to this volume, and a few other friends who wish to remain anonymous, for

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PREFACE the many insights that they have enabled me to gain, over the past few years, thus giving me a deeper understanding of the Naxalite movement. I also thank another contributor, M. Shashidhar Reddy, for permitting me to use the maps reproduced in the annexures, which he had originally circulated along with his paper presented at the workshop. P. V. Ramana Research Fellow Observer Research Foundation New Delhi

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1 The Naxal Movement: A Realistic Approach D. Raja

India is a democratic country. We have accepted parliamentary democracy as our system. When we work within its framework, we come across several challenges. Broadly, we can discern two main challenges from the two extreme poles of political thinking. On the one hand, we have the neo-conservative Right-wing forces and, on the other, the neo-Left or extreme Left forces. The neoconservative Right-wing forces constitute one such extremism that throws up one challenge. They spread violence and instil hatred against one or the other section of the people in the name of religion. The other challenge is posed by the opposite extreme, the neo-Left forces represented by the Naxalites—the erstwhile People’s War Group (PWG), the present Communist Party of India (Maoist), and their ilk. Faced with these two challenges, what assumes importance in a parliamentary democracy is the role to be played by every arm of the state— the political executive, the bureaucracy and the police. This is what needs to be made the focus of a thorough and informed discussion. The Naxalite movement could be termed as Left-wing communism. It is a concomitant growth of the communist movement. Even Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels had to face the movement initiated by Mikhail Bakunin. In his time, Lenin had to deal with the Narodniks and

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D. RAJA Left social revolutionaries (SRs) in Russia. The Naxalites in India represent this trend. They have a long history. Let us recapitulate, in a nutshell, the origin of the Naxalite movement. The united Communist Party split in the early 1960s. Then, in the late 1960s, a kind of revolt erupted in the Naxalbari village of north Bengal and caught on, giving birth to the terms ‘Naxalbari movement’, ‘Naxal movement’, and ‘Naxalites’, which gained popular currency in Indian political lingo. After the split in the Communist movement, the trend which emerged was linked with Charu Mazumdar, who was promoting a Maoist model of New Democracy. Theoretical elaboration of this trend coincided with the Naxalbari movement. An objective assessment of the Naxalite movement necessitates a dispassionate understanding of the movement. Lenin termed this specific Left-wing communism an ‘infantile disorder’. However, in this context, it is unnecessary to debate over whether the Naxalite movement is infantile or adult. What needs to be recognised is that it is a ‘disorder’. Despite the movement having been curbed by some states, the effort to keep it in check must be kept up, for the movement continues to emerge like a phoenix from the ashes. Of crucial significance in this attempt is to contemplate over the socio-economic and political conditions that are conducive to such a movement. From the time they first came upon the world stage, the neo-Left opposed parliamentary democracy. Their theoreticians propounded the idea of an armed insurrection. In fact, they went to the extent of theorising on the necessity of violence. The communist movement in India has traversed through several stages. Even now, violence versus parliamentary democracy is an important issue for the communists. Spontaneous resistance to state terror, repression and brutality of class enemies has always been justified by them. Extra-parliamentary struggle has always been part of the class struggle. It might be useful to ask why violence is counter-posed to parliamentary democracy. India wants its system of parliamentary democracy to deliver— provide good governance, be transparent, be committed and responsive to the people and their problems. We adopted our constitution in 2

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A REALISTIC APPROACH the year 1950 and declared India a republic. However, in all these years, it needs to be noted that we have failed to solve problems of poverty, hunger, homelessness, illiteracy and, above all, the problem of social discrimination in the name of caste. The Indian masses live in the throes of injustice and discrimination. That is the social condition prevailing today. The urge to resort to violence finds fertile ground in precisely such a situation. It is perceived by some that parliamentary democracy has not delivered and that the bureaucracy is, by attitude, if not exactly anti-people, certainly pro-establishment. To add to it, there is the nexus of the politician, the bureaucrat and sometimes even the mafia with its vice-like grip on the common people, subjugating them to a life of misery and hardship. In this backdrop, the advocates of violence, the Naxalites, argue that parliamentary democracy has disillusioned the masses and the only option left with the people is to violently confront the oppressors—the state, the bureaucrats, moneylenders, landlords, and the mafia. Now comes the question: How do we assess the Naxalite movement? It is a disorder that needs to be put right or overcome. It needs to be confronted on a theoretical plane, which is the universally accepted belief that violence and individual annihilation cannot be the means to capture power or solve the problems of the suffering masses. The Naxalites will have to subscribe to the democratic parliamentary process and participate in the electoral process. Whether it should participate in the parliamentary democratic processes of the country was an issue vigorously debated by the founder leaders of the Communist Party. Eventually, they came to the conclusion that parliamentary democracy had emerged as a way of government in India and the communists could ill-afford to keep away from elections. Parliamentary democracy provides the avenue and the strategy to reach out to large sections of the people and mobilise them. In fact, in 1957, when the Communist Party of India (CPI) won the elections in Kerala, it was for the first time in the world that any communist party had come to power through democratic elections based on universal adult suffrage in a non-communist nation. Since then, the communists have continued to be 3

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D. RAJA represented in parliament, in the state legislatures and local bodies—infact, at all levels of democratic institutions. Indeed, if at all, parliamentary democracy has gained strength in India, it is because of the participation of the communists, much to the ire of Naxalites as also the neo-Rightists. The Indian parliament cannot be termed as reactionary. Though, undoubtedly, the Indian state is bourgeois, it is neither conservative nor reactionary. It is a bourgeois state that tries to be a welfare state. Thus, it is a bourgeois welfare state, and attempts should be directed at guiding it towards being an effective welfare state. Ideally, the Indian state should move towards the Left, but this is not happening and requires people’s support to take this course forward. The neo-liberal understanding of globalisation is aimed at destroying the very concept of a welfare state and also to question the need for a state. According to it, a state should remain as an instrument of mass management and oppression. The role of the state needs to be understood properly at a theoretical level. One should keep in mind that ‘crude realities create crude theories’, as remarked by Engels. Lenin once said: ‘Tactics must be based on a sober and strictly objective appraisal of the class forces in a particular state as well as of the experience of the revolutionary movements. It is very easy to show one’s revolutionary temper merely by hurling abuses at parliamentary opportunism or merely by repudiating the participation in parliament’. Here is where the Naxalites fail. The Naxalites have ideologically failed to make an objective, sober appraisal of the state and balance of class forces. Hence, they are often prone to make mistakes and fail. Fundamentally the Naxalites are disassociated with mainstream politics and confront the state through violence, treating violence as their programmatic position. Thus, in turn, they are confronted with an all too powerful and repressive machinery. The state has all the power. It has the army. It has the police and all the modern weaponry. One cannot confront such a powerful state with a small contingent of people armed with primitive weapons or a few sophisticated ones. You can confront the state only when you are backed by mass support. No armed revolution in history has, at any time, anywhere in the world, succeeded without the full support of the people. The Naxalites fail to perceive this truth and here lies the weakness of their 4

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A REALISTIC APPROACH theory. It must also be noted that the critique of the Naxalite violence negatively affects the entire communist movement and the working class movement. So, theoretically too, they do not have sufficient ground to sustain the movement, as it has often been proven. However, it continues to thrive. Naxalism has not been able to succeed or emerge as a national movement in its 40 years of history, but has remained regional, confined to certain states and regions of the country. It is also extremely subjective in its assessment of reality and tries to advance playing up emotions, even at the cost of objectivity and rationality. At present, the movement is active mainly in Chattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa, and Andhra Pradesh and in some other states to a certain extent. The social base of the Naxalites is mainly the tribals and dalits in backward and remote areas. The main issue they raise is the all important ‘land’ issue. In Brazil, the movement of the landless labourers has almost become a way of life. The landless labourers march in thousands, occupy land, hoist their flags, signifying that the land stands occupied by them. They cultivate the land, sing together, and live and eat together. The land movement in Brazil has many followers and admirers. In India, in 1970s, the CPI launched a massive land struggle movement to occupy land in several states, especially Bihar. It was then that the question of land reforms became an issue of concern for the government. In Kerala, when the communists were in power, land reforms were implemented vigorously and successfully. This was also the case in West Bengal. However, in other states, it remains to be implemented completely. In all such states, land reforms continue to be the burning issue for the landless people. The crucial question is: are land reforms possible now? With globalisation and neo-liberal economic policies being the order of the day, the government, both at the Centre and state level, is concerned more with big industries and firms, rather than the landless peasant and small and marginal farmers. Indeed, land reforms need to be implemented in the entire country without reversing the land ceiling acts. In several states, it is a vital, live issue. It is unfortunate that various state governments show lack of commitment to distribute surplus land or wasteland. Unless this is done, one cannot simply wish away movements like the Naxalite 5

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D. RAJA movement. Organised parties, such as the CPI, which participate in parliamentary democracy, do launch movements for land. However, the government responds to such movements with repression, crushing them with the iron hand of the bureaucracy and the police. This is because there are many powerful vested interests at play. There are several other reasons for the rise and growth of the Naxalite movement. In the countryside, moneylending is a thriving business. The rural poor are trapped in the clutches of the moneylenders. There are also the problems of caste and social discrimination. These are ills that provide an operational ground to the Naxalites. They reach out to the oppressed people and resort to violence in the name of justice. Unless serious steps are taken to deal with these problems, the Naxalite movement will continue to survive and gain legitimacy. With such a socio-economic base it would be foolhardy and dangerous to believe, as some do, that Naxalites need to be dealt with, on a law and order plane solely because they resort to violence and have no respect for the law. It requires a political solution, including taking urgent steps for land reforms, putting an end to private moneylending and curbing social discrimination. True, it is the duty of the authority to maintain law and order. But the law and order agencies—the police or the bureaucracy—have to function in a people-friendly manner, so as not to antagonise the people. Some political parties do try to address these problem. So, for instance, the CPI (Marxist–Leninist), CPI(ML), for a long time during its early years, advocated individual annihilation. Later, it veered around to the view that this was not a feasible alternative and entered mainstream politics, contesting elections for parliament and state legislative assemblies. There still remain other groups which continue to subscribe to the individual annihilation line of thinking—for instance, the CPI (Maoist) which was formed as result of the merger of the People’s War Group (PWG) and the Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI) in September 2004. One way to tackle them would be to engage them in negotiations. A peace process was initiated in this direction by the Congress-led Andhra Pradesh government in May 2004. It was a positive step and should be carried forward. There is a need to continue the dialogue. 6

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A REALISTIC APPROACH However, since December 2004, violence has re-erupted in the state. It is the work of the CPI (Maoist) but, on the other hand, the police have taken recourse to the now infamous fake ‘encounters’. One can neither justify these encounters nor the foisting of false cases without losing the moral right to call the Maoist actions unlawful and unacceptable. The approach to the problem, therefore, must be impartial, with no tolerance for such excesses as encounters and false cases. At the same time, the Naxalites should realise that their actions are unacceptable in a democracy and that they would have to participate in the democratic process. The first important step the authorities have to take is to respond to the demands of the Naxalites for the redistribution of land and other issues, clearly indicating how they would go about fulfilling their demands. Some immediate and practical measures have to be taken with a sense of commitment, especially land reforms and the liberation of the poor from the grip of moneylenders, contractors and the mafia. Across the political spectrum, there is a consensus against Naxalite violence, that it cannot be tolerated in a democratic nation as a means to capture state power. It is absolutely essential to bear in mind that retaliating spontaneously in a violent fashion to an act of injustice is one thing, and theorising violence and presenting violence as the means to capture power, is quite another. Violence is not the panacea for all ills. Since the days of Karl Marx this method has been criticised. When Lenin discussed this issue, it was still a trend in its infant stage, and thus critiqued as an ‘infantile disorder’. Today, it can no longer be termed infantile. Naxalites will have to draw lessons from the experiences of other countries and of revolutionary movements, elsewhere. It has been reported that Indian Naxalite groups have linkages with fraternal groups abroad. Those with access to classified information would know more about this. Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that irrespective of whether there are such linkages, active or otherwise, the situation varies from country to country. Some lessons could be learnt from a revolutionary movement in another country, but revolutions cannot be copied, imported, or exported. Every country has to find its own unique way to change the government or the state of the nation for the better. 7

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D. RAJA The Naxalites are a political party and it is, of course, the business of a political party to fight for power. In fact, the communist parties—the CPI and CPI(M) too, are fighting for political power, but, unlike the Naxalites, these parties are doing it through the democratic processes of participating in elections, mobilising people and working among people all over the country. On the other hand, the Naxalite groups remain confined to certain areas where there is abject poverty and social discrimination. There are the two major factors on which the Naxalite movement sustains itself. It has been said that the Naxalite movement is an expression of anger of the exploited people, but this anger cannot be equated with the anger of the state. However, the state, being what it is, should understand and address the problems of the downtrodden and the exploited masses. The state has no right to react to the people’s anger with equal anger. This is where the role of the state will have to change. There are many aspects to the Naxalite problem. For one, it is a popular movement with a solid socio-economic base. Crush it in one place and it rises up in another. It may, at present, not be an immediate threat to the state itself. But the Naxalite movement is a disorder and creates problems. Because it creates certain problems, the state indiscriminately attacks a very organised movement. This is a point the Naxalites need to understand. The Naxalites, in their urge to counter state terror and to threaten the state machinery, resort to abductions and killings, many a time innocent people and low-level policemen and bureaucrats become victims. This method not only affects their cause but also alienates them from large democratic sections of the people. Also, a point that needs to be emphasised is that the Naxalite movement does not have a theoretical base to stand on. Its theoretical framework has collapsed. Contemporary Naxalism stands confused. There is a certain ideological–political confusion among its ideologues and leaders. They are not able to assess the class character of the present state, its strategy and tactics. They thus fail to evolve the strategy and tactics needed to transform the system. At times it is even doubtful if they want to. For, if they wish to come to power, they must adopt a broader strategy and tactics and not be confined to confronting some village-level state machinery or bureaucracy. Violence at the village level will not take Naxalites 8

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A REALISTIC APPROACH far. It is time Naxalites realised this reality, rather than live with the illusion that the movement can be sustained for long by the two main problems of society—poverty and discrimination. Nevertheless, it does offer them a narrow support base for the present. Thus, in the present circumstances, it is vital to have a serious debate on how the state should address the political, social and economic causes of this movement. Honestly, this problem cannot be trivialised as a law and order issue, or resolved through police action. The state will have to address, sooner than later, the socio-political and economic causes on which this movement survives. This would not be just to put an end to the Naxalite movement. These issues will have to be discussed seriously and addressed with an urgency and commitment in order for the country to progress. Being largely an agrarian country, it will not be able to march on the road of progress unless the agrarian problems are dealt with first. For this, it is essential to dismantle the feudal structure, a task which Indian capitalism has failed to carry out. As long as the remnants of feudalism exist, social discrimination continues to prevail, it provides fertile ground for Naxalites to operate. Therefore, it stands to reason that irrespective of Naxalite demands, it is incumbent upon the government to take urgent and genuine steps for land reforms and to liberate the rural masses from the vicious cycle of debt. Simultaneously, it must put a complete halt to repression, which is violence by another name. Violence of any kind and by any group has no place in a democracy. In the final analysis, even as there is the need to address the political, social and economic causes, no ad hoc decision or solution can solve this problem and we must try to work out a long-term strategy. A law and order solution can only be a short-term measure of doubtful success. A permanent solution to the Naxalite problem can only be achieved through political action, accompanied by very concrete measures such as breaking the feudal/semi-feudal social system through land reforms and continuously striving for democratisation of civil life. It is all the more necessary to have a comprehensive plan for the development of backward areas, provide universal literacy to the entire population and continue welfare measures. The political empowerment of dalits and adivasis is imperative in the Indian context. The empowerment of women cannot wait any longer. 9

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2 The Trajectory of the Movement K. P. Singh

It is essential to recapitulate, briefly, the characteristics of the Naxalite or the Left-wing extremist movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s in order to be able to better understand and interpret the current status of this movement. Such an understanding would also help compare the different parameters of the movement as they stood in its initial phase, and as they stand today. More importantly, it would provide an insight into how this movement has been able to traverse a period of over three and a half decades, exhibiting great resilience. An important question has often been asked and continues to agitate the minds of many analysts: Is the Naxalite movement a terrorist movement, or is it a movement launched to rectify socioeconomic injustice? Going by the classical definition—that ‘terrorism is the use of violence towards political ends’—the Naxalite movement is a terrorist movement. In fact, the Naxalites, as they are known today, emerged on the national scene as the CPI(ML), after splitting from the CPI(M). Their avowed and pronounced objective is to capture state (political) power through an armed revolution. Moreover, all political movements, whether terrorist or otherwise, breed on inequities in the economy and social injustice. However, a

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THE TRAJECTORY OF THE MOVEMENT striking and essential difference between various political movements and the Naxalite movement is that the latter subscribes to violence as a philosophy. Therefore, clearly, the Left-wing extremist or the Naxalite movement in India is a terrorist movement. As is well known, within a couple of years of the formation of the CPI(ML), this organisational network of the Naxalites and their violent campaign engulfed the entire state of West Bengal. It established a sizeable presence in Bihar and Andhra Pradesh, besides affecting smaller pockets of Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Punjab, Jammu & Kashmir, Uttar Pradesh and Delhi. It had, indeed, spread like a prairie fire. The violence perpetrated by the Naxalites rose steadily to peak in 1971, when over 3,650 violent incidents were reported, involving the killing of some 850 ‘class enemies’—landlords, moneylenders, police informers, political activists—who they termed were reactionary, and police officials. However, soon thereafter, following the launch of joint operations involving the police and the army along the border areas of West Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, Naxalite violence and its influence declined as rapidly as it had ascended. As a result, within a couple of years, by about 1973, the first phase of the movement stood decimated. By the mid-1970s, it was widely believed that the movement was quite dead. It might be appropriate, at this juncture, to briefly consider the dimensions and the character of this movement’s first phase. • Firstly, the leadership and the middle-level activists were all thoroughly ideologically motivated. • Secondly, the movement drew into its vortex not only the political elements on the extreme fringe but also a large number of students. Indeed, several extremely brilliant students of Delhi University went all the way to the jungles of Bihar to hone their revolutionary skills! • Thirdly, almost 200 revolutionary journals and publications of different shapes and sizes were brought out in English and vernacular languages. The level of ideological content and enthusiasm was, thus, quite high. 11

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K. P. SINGH • At that point in time, the movement received the complete backing of China. The Communist Party of China extended guidance, financial support and training to the leadership. The Peking Review consistently devoted several column lengths to the movement, extolling it and the leadership provided by its founder, Charu Majumdar. Nevertheless, once the police–army operations began, the decline of the movement was remarkably sharp and sudden. There were several reasons for this collapse. (a) The Naxalite cadres, though high on motivation and enthusiasm, were not adept at functioning underground. They barely had training and experience in jungle warfare or in successfully running an underground apparatus. In other words, their resorting to violence was somewhat premature. They should have trained better to hone their field-level tradecraft skills before launching a violent movement. (b) The second factor that played havoc with the movement was internal dissensions. For instance, Tarimella Nagi Reddy of Andhra Pradesh did not join the CPI(ML). Within the CPI(ML), serious dissensions arose when S. N. Singh was elected general secretary and Charu Majumdar was expelled from the party. These dissensions continued for a little longer and when Lin Piao was disgraced in China, the movement split into anti-and pro-Lin Piao factions. Thus, internal dissensions proved to be a serious liability. (c) The third factor was their ideological insistence on the use of only country-made weapons—pipe guns, choppers, axes and sickles— while the police in those days were armed with .303 rifles, stenguns and carbines. This was a definite tactical disadvantage for the Naxalites in any confrontation with the police. (d) Yet another factor was their failure to adequately mobilise the masses at the ground level. They did not proceed beyond rhetoric. Moreover, their slogans were unenthusiastic and, sometimes, thoughtless. For instance, slogans like ‘China’s chairman is our chairman’, did not cut ice with nationalist Indians. Such slogans actually repelled the people. 12

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THE TRAJECTORY OF THE MOVEMENT (e) In the first phase, the principal theatre of Naxalism was the state of West Bengal, where 90 per cent of the countrywide violence was reported. There, the Naxalites had to contend with CPI(M) cadres who were already well-entrenched in the state, and with whom they were at ideological loggerheads. (f) Based on personality cult, the movement received a body blow with the arrest and subsequent death of Charu Majumdar in July 1972. Thereafter, even his supporters—as distinct from those who opposed him under the leadership of S. N. Singh—could not remain united and the movement petered out. By the mid-1970s, it appeared that this movement was gone for good. And then, during the Emergency (1975–1977) the Naxalite movement was so low-key that it might as well have been non-existent. But, in the post-emergency period, the remnants of the Naxalite groups made quiet and determined attempts at revival and reconsolidation, primarily through an overt agrarian agitation by highlighting the various issues concerning the poor and the downtrodden. Subsequently, in Andhra Pradesh, the People’s War Group (PWG) was established in 1980, under the dynamic leadership of the late Kondapalli Seetharamaiah, all ready and prepared with a secret violent agenda. Seetharamaiah systematically established underground dalams (squads) and the operational apparatus in North Telengana and in the entire Dandakaranya region. Simultaneously in Bihar, three Naxal groups were in the forefront of this revival process. One was the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC). It had a large ground-level base because of its mass actions. Groups of 400–500 revolutionary peasants, at times even a 1000, took part in violent action. This was very different from the secretive assassinations by a dalam, comprising five to 10 members. The MCC acted through its front organisations. The second was Party Unity, while the third group was the anti-Lin Piao group led by Vinod Mishra. Thus, there was the revival of the Naxalite movement in Andhra Pradesh, Dandakaranya (Central India) and in Bihar. These groups were, however, characterised by dissensions and a series of splits on the one hand, and a process of unification on the other, both occurring simultaneously. But the strength of the 13

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K. P. SINGH movement was such that, with each split at the ground level in the various groups, the numerical strength of each group increased, rather than diminished. The reason is clear. If, hypothetically, the united entity had a following of 500 cadres, once it split into, say two groups, each group tried and succeeded in enlisting more members, thus maintaining its original strength. Thus, in ground-level terms, these splits led to organisational progress, not regression. As a result, from the mid-1980s, Naxalite violence began to mount and reached a peak for a second time in 1991. Since then, the Naxalites have been able to ‘target-kill’ more than 500 ‘class enemies’ every year. These killings are not random; the class enemy/target is well chosen. They are the leaders of the society—politicians, social activists—whose agenda differs from that of the Naxalites, besides police officials, and police informers. It is not difficult to imagine the kind of trauma that such continuous, and sizeable target killings would cause to society. In 2004 alone, the number of those killed by the Naxalites exceeded 550. It is equally important to remember that while the Naxalite violence in the first phase was overwhelmingly concentrated in West Bengal, today it has spread to vast areas in the country and is evenly distributed in the states of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Jharkhand, Chattisgarh and southern Orissa. It would also help to bear in mind that this process of rehauling of the groups contributed directly to the increase in the ground-level strength of the movement. Therefore, since it is a ground-level movement, it has to be dealt with there, at that level, and endless debates on concepts and theories hold little significance. Presently, approximately 1,500 Naxalite-related incidents are being annually reported from the affected states involving the killing of more than 500 ‘class enemies’. The Naxalites have perfected the art of setting off land-mine explosions. Unlike in Jammu & Kashmir where landmines are detonated with remote-control devices, the Naxalites use the wire-control method. These are more difficult to neutralise because they are immune to electronic interference. It is estimated that the Naxalites cause approximately 100 land-mine explosions every year. Policemen travelling in vehicles are the regular victims of these attacks. 14

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THE TRAJECTORY OF THE MOVEMENT Besides, the Naxalites have been mounting daring attacks on the police—about 200 a year. They either attack police stations or ambush police patrols. For instance, during the attack on 6 February 2004, in Koraput, Orissa, it is believed that they looted more than 500 weapons in a single day. It is estimated that they have been snatching 250 to 300 weapons annually from the police, landlords and others. Besides, the Naxalites have been holding jan adalats and dispensing justice on the spot. Over 100 such instant trials are being held and instant justice is being meted out each year. There is no attempt at any secrecy—the trials are conducted after open announcements, sometimes a week in advance and, sometimes, before a 5,000-strong village audience. All this clearly shows how the Naxalites are able to act with impunity because of the failure of the governmental ground-level mechanisms. To cite an example, say a villager has a marital problem. If he approaches one of these jan adalats, the issue is settled within hours, whereas if he approaches the civil courts, the dispute could take years to settle. The strength of the armed cadre is approximately 8,000 trained men and women. Additionally, there is what they call the people’s militia of about 15,000 armed villagers who carry on their normal routine life, but are ready to serve when the occasion so demands. Naxalites field an arsenal of about 6,500 regular weapons, which includes more than 225 AK-47 rifles, around 250 SLRs, and a number of .303 rifles. Additionally, they have around 10,000 country-made weapons. In some cases, they have also used rockets. There is evidence that they also have arms manufacturing and repairing facilities and have started a limited use of wireless sets. They have got linkages with ULFA and certain other insurgent groups and that is also their supply line for sophisticated arms like AK-47 rifles. Their yearly budget—or rather their yearly extortions—is roughly Rs 150 crore. It is a sizeable amount with which they are able to sustain and recruit new cadres and pay them, according to reliable information, a stipend of Rs 1,500 per month. 15

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K. P. SINGH Five years ago, their reach was approximately across 75 districts that were considered badly affected. This figure has now (early January 2005) risen to 125 badly affected districts and around 30 targeted or partially affected districts. The new areas where they have emerged are North Bihar (East Champaran and the West Champaran districts), West Bengal (Midnapore, Bankura, Purulia and now even Malda), North Orissa (Mayurbhanjh, Keonjar, Sundargarh), and North Chattisgarh (Sarguja, Koria, Jashpur). Even Uttaranchal is getting affected, as also are three districts in eastern UP. The Naxalites also have designs of establishing a Compact Revolutionary Zone, (CRZ) starting from Nepal and going through Bihar, Jharkhand, Chattisgarh and Andhra Pradesh. According to them, they have already been able to achieve 75 per cent of this plan. Even according to neutral observers, about 60 per cent of this zone has been created, in the sense that they have a sizeable presence there. There are areas and pockets in the hinterland which they govern, administer and mete out parallel justice. Unlike the dissensions in its first avatar, today there is a process of consolidation and reunification of the movement. First, the Party Unity and the PWG merged to form the CPI(ML)[PW]. This was in 1998. Then the RCCI-Maoist merged with the MCC and the new outfit came to be called the MCCI and, in September 2004, the PW and the MCCI have merged to form the CPI (Maoist). This nomenclature has very disquieting connotations because now you have a CPI (Maoist), a Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) or CPN-M and a CRZ. So the problem is not only trans-states, but also trans-border and trans-national. Then, there are the international linkages. One linkage at the conceptual level is with the Left extremist parties of countries like Italy, Turkey, the USA, Tunisia, and Columbia, but in practical terms, it doesn’t mean much. The real linkage is through the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organisation of South Asia (CCOMPOSA), which includes the CPI (Maoist), the CPN-M, the Communist Party of Ceylon and four extremist groups of Bangladesh. With Nepal, there are live and active linkages. 16

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THE TRAJECTORY OF THE MOVEMENT Today, the situation is in favour of the Naxalites. Their strength is greater, their cadre far more battle-hardened. They have a spatial spread and better resistance capability. The government at the Centre formed model schemes around 1990–1991 and set up the Coordination Centre in June 1998. This Coordination Centre has rendered all possible help to the states by way of training, provision of arms, drafting a surrender and rehabilitation policy, and by reimbursing security-related expenditure. But still the ground-level hold and persistence of this movement is such that we have, at the most, been able to contain the movement in the sense that the violence has not been allowed to grow but it continues, with regular fatalities.

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3 Roots and Causes: The Case of Jharkhand Harivansh

The Naxalites wield a considerable degree of influence in the eastern Indian state of Jharkhand. During the elections to the state Legislature in January–February 2005, party leaders consistently avoided visiting areas where the Naxalites ran a parallel administration. This is because the Naxals had made two firm and ominous demands—money and guns. Since the Naxalbari uprising in 1967 and events of the following decade, the Naxalite movement has come a long way in making itself felt as a powerful presence in Bihar, of which Jharkhand was a part until it achieved separate statehood at the turn of the century. It became the 28th state of India on 15 November 2000, coinciding with the birth anniversary of Birsa Munda, the leader of the Santhal Rebellion. In earlier days, the Sarvodaya leader, the late Jayaprakash Narayan (JP), accepted the challenge thrown up by Bihar’s Naxalites. He started a peaceful, political campaign in a village called Mushari in north Bihar and spent many months touring the adjoining villages, working with missionary zeal to win over the Naxalites to peaceful ways of protest. JP then wrote the highly readable booklet called Face to Face, which is worth reading because his was the last political challenge to the movement in Bihar. Since then, mainstream politics and politicians have vanished from Bihar’s Naxal-dominated areas. In the

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THE CASE OF JHARKHAND later years, the legendary underground Naxal leader, Vinod Mishra of the CPI(ML), wrote his famous book, Flames from Fields. The book vividly describes the conditions in which the Naxalites were waging their struggle against the state at that time. Vinod Mishra also gives a telling account of the causes for organising the struggles and the problems and difficulties they were facing in conducting those struggles. Jharkhand has long been a favoured arena of the Naxal movement because everything, from its topography and forest cover to the exploitative socio-economic system, is custom-made, as it were, for such a movement. Jamshedpur, a hallmark industrial town of the country, was also well-known in those days for its jail, where many well-recognised faces of the Naxal movement made it to the rogues’ gallery. It was in this jail that Mary Taylor, a Naxal activist, wrote her famous book, My Years in Indian Prisons, in the 1970s. Since then, this movement has taken deep roots and spread wide in this region, its dominance unchallenged by state power and the political system. It is common knowledge in Jharkhand that in 18 out of its 22 districts, the Naxalites are the predominant force and, in most of these areas, they virtually run a parallel system of administration, justice and policing. The state has virtually abdicated its role in these areas, while the political parties confine their activities solely to the urban areas. But what is both shocking and pathetic is that the rest of India is blissfully ignorant about this state of affairs in Jharkand. In Bihar, too, they run a parallel system of government in 32 out of the total 40 districts. (The Bihar government acknowledges that 32 districts are affected, but claims that only 11 of these districts are highly affected). In this state, the Naxals have a presence even in urban areas. On 5 January 2005 six policemen, including the local Superintendent of Police, K.C. Surendra Babu, were killed in Munger district of Bihar. Also, a former Member of Parliament belonging to the Lok Janshakti Party, Rajesh Kumar, who was seeking election for the Imamganj constituency, was killed while campaigning for the February 2005 legislative assembly elections, on 22 January 2005, in Gaya district. Mahendra Singh, MLA, CPI(ML), a very popular leader, was murdered in Jharkhand on 16 January 2005, a day after he 19

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HARIVANSH filed nomination papers to seek re-election for a fourth consecutive term from Bagodar constituency, Giridih district. In Jharkhand, the situation is even more precarious, as is evident from the list of incidents given below. Since the inception of the state of Jharkhand: • The wife of a District Magistrate and more than 200 police personnel have been killed, including a Superintendent of Police, and some Rapid Protection Force (RPF) personnel. • Naxal groups have carried out 570 attacks on various government installations. • More than 300 people have been killed in extremist violence. • Naxal groups have snatched 227 sophisticated arms from police. • Police have killed 84 Naxals. • Villagers have killed 24 Naxals. • Police have found 35 underground bunkers in the deep forests. The government was quite unaware of the the fact that the Naxals had built them. • 19 Naxal training camps have been demolished. • 11 mini gun-making factories have been unearthed. Simply put, the state machinery has totally failed to confront the challenge. There is a great deal of truth in the popular belief that the Naxal movement is the result of the oppressive, exploitative system. It is a fact that the support base of Naxal groups consists of the exploited, underprivileged and neglected people. This paper needs to be viewed in the light of my own experiences as a career journalist, who has been closely watching and studying grass-roots movements. The attempt has been to explain the myth, the reality and the future of the Naxalite movement, or Left extremism, in Jharkhand. Contrasting a 40-year-old occurrence with exactly the same kind of occurrence in the recent times is enough to clearly show how exemplary the authorities were, in their response to the plight of the people in earlier days and how, today, the exact opposite attitude prevails.

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THE CASE OF JHARKHAND In 1967, there was a severe drought in the district of Daltonganj (then in Bihar, and now in Jharkhand). JP took things in hand and organised the Bihar Relief Committee on a mass scale. District Commissioner Kumar Suresh Singh, who later wrote a book on the famine, fully responded to the situation and went from village to village trying to ensure adequate supply of food grain to the starving folk. That was how responsive and conscientious the administration was in those days. After Jharkhand was formed in 2000, there was a drought in the same area once again. When the media raised the issue, the government first came out with a strong warning and then stopped giving advertisements to the ‘offending’ media groups. It was only after two scholars visited the place and wrote a moving report in a leading English magazine that the government finally took some half-hearted action—all too little to make much difference to the drought victims. The Supreme Court appointed a committee under Mr N.C. Saxena, an upright officer, who studied the problem and told me in an interview: ‘Jharkhand mein satta chor ho gayee hai’, (The state has become a thief in Jharkhand). It is this state of affairs that feeds fuel to the Naxalite fire. If people are hungry, and the Public Distribution System (PDS) shops send food grain to Bangladesh and Nepal for whatever reasons, the suffering people can hardly be expected to take it lying down. A group of journalists, visiting a village in Daltonganj, noticed that there were no wires connecting the electric poles, which had been installed 20 years ago. There was no electricity and there were no roads. This is the same area where JP and his team did such superb work during the 1967 drought. Today, if a newspaper raises any issue uncomfortable to the government, it is immediately threatened with the withdrawal or reduction of advertisements. This is the state of affairs today. Jhumra Pahar in the Jhumra Hills is known to be a Naxal bastion. The police dare not enter the hilly forest. Sometime after Jharkhand was formed, a police force was sent into the hills and, after a spate of encounters, they found a network of underground bunkers. Curious to 21

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HARIVANSH know how it had become a Naxal stronghold, we dug into the story of the area’s past. We found out that the place had once been a tea garden. When the tea garden went into ruins, the workers, now jobless, got no help from the government in the form of alternative employment. Ultimately, the workers took up arms. It can be said that corruption goes hand in hand with poverty and oppression. It is rampant in Jharkand. Politicians and bureaucrats openly take grease money from development agencies and contractors. In a micro study on corruption in the native district of a former finance minister, we found that, in a single rural development scheme in one village, Rs 50 crore had been siphoned away as ‘commission’ in four years. There was the animal husbandry scam, which involved a network of powerful politicians, criminals, contractors, and senior IAS and IPS officers. The Naxalites are no different. Just that, instead of bribe, they extort ‘levy’ from contractors, government officials, businesses, mines, factories, and forest contractors. They have even circulated a limited number of booklets, listing the sources of these funds. Reportedly, some government employees, too, have paid levy to the Naxalites. It might not be incorrect to term this as ‘state patronage’ of the Naxalites. A few of these instances are given below. (a) 1993—Senior officials admitted to the Chief Secretary and the Director General of Police that they paid a levy to a Naxal group. (b) 1997—At a meeting called by the Bihar Chief Minister, a Superintendent of Police went on record as having paid a levy. (c) The Chatra District Commissioner paid a levy to the Naxals (a few years back). As political parties engage themselves in endless debates on the movement, the Naxalites themselves are having a free run in the rural areas, because elections to the local bodies (panchayats) have not been held in Jharkhand. Obviously, the first step should be to hold these elections so that the machinery to deal with the people’s problems, particularly in the tribal belt, is activated. In the countryside and in the

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THE CASE OF JHARKHAND forest areas, jal, jungle and jameen—water, forest and land—are the most important issues. In the forests, if even a hint of an attempt is made to take control of land, or if a single tree is felled, the state and all its agencies—including the bureaucracy, police and judiciary (in fact, the entire government machinery)—rise against the person or persons involved. It is very difficult to get hold of any land record without paying a bribe. In Chotanagpur, there is a law that says that no outsider can purchase Adivasi land. Yet, for the last 100–150 years, big stretches of land had been openly occupied by non-tribals. When some of us took up this issue, there were some honest officers who stood up and restored the land to the tribals. This shows that the bureaucracy can be made sensitive to the people’s rights and needs. Probably, the most important need is to control corruption. Unfortunately, there is a near impregnable chain system of corruption. The lower officials are confident that they would not be touched because they have paid a certain amount to officials to secure a lucrative posting. Once moved to this post, they can, without fear, earn many times more than the bribe they had originally paid. The judicial system in the rural areas exists in name only. All the wings of the government—jails, police, justice, prosecution—have all become ineffective and the law enforcement agencies have become weak, corrupt and insensitive. The need for judicial reforms stares one in the face. It is no wonder that the Naxalites’ jan adalats have had such tremendous support from the people, though the motive has a dark and a bright side—fear of the Naxalites and the expectation of instant justice. A petty land dispute could keep a litigant running to and from the courts for two decades. At a jan adalat, the case would be settled in no time. It would be worth emulating, and supporting some social workers who are doing some credit-worthy work in the area. We have identified 12 such people working quietly and constructively in the Naxal-affected areas. With good reason, we call them ‘nayi sadi ke karmayogi’ (the wise workers of the new century). But our administration will never extend a helping hand to them. The Naxalites fear touching them because of the acceptability and respect they enjoy among the people. 23

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HARIVANSH The conditions in the Naxal-affected areas are likely to improve drastically if some tangible grass roots level action is taken to implement government schemes in the spheres of health, education and land reforms. As has been made amply clear, political activity is virtually nonexistent in Naxal areas. In these areas, the symbols of state power, the police station or the block development office, are lying idle, as no one is willing to stir out and do any work, for fear of the Naxalites. If they were able to earn the respect and the confidence of the people, the Naxals would fear them instead, and would dare not touch them. Some functional administration and political leadership have to be revived in these hapless areas. There may well be ideological deterioration in the movement, but it is the Naxals who continue to provide guns to the unemployed youth and inspire their impressionable minds with catchy Mao dictums, such as, ‘Power flows from the barrel of the gun’. The youth also get some regular monthly stipend and, in no time, they become a law unto themselves. For now there is nothing, certainly not from the government’s side, to stop them from organising and running a parallel administration.

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4 Roots and Causes: The Case of Dandakaranya Ruchir Garg

The Naxalite movement, which sparked off in 1967 as an armed uprising in Naxalbari, is an ominous presence today; a vast shadow looming across the political map of the nation. It has taken the nation by storm, affecting many states and is rapidly spreading to several others. The Naxalite presence and influence today stretches right from the borders of Nepal in the North East—where an armed struggle was launched in 1996 by the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), CPNM—right up to the borders of Kerala in southern India. There are also reports that the Naxalites of the CPI (Maoist) and the Nepalese Maoists are working towards carving out a Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ), or the Red Struggle Zone. There is even an intelligence report of the Union Home Ministry that, together, they entertain the hope of splitting India into two halves. Also, it is believed that the CPN-M played a significant role in bringing together the two most prominent Naxalite organisations of India—the PW and MCCI—to form the CPI (Maoist) on 21 September 2004. Twelve revolutionary organisations in South Asia joined hands and formed a common front, known as the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organisations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA), in 2001. The CPN-M played an important role in its formation.

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RUCHIR GARG Apparently, the revolutionaries of South Asia have a definite plan of action. According to Ramji, a member of the Politburo of the erstwhile PW and now a Politburo member of the CPI (Maoist): ‘The primary aim of the present CCOMPOSA in South Asia is to fight against Indian expansionism.’ It might also be noted that the erstwhile PW and the MCCI, now merged as the CPI (Maoist), are all included in the list of ‘Other Terrorist Organisations’ put together by the State Department of the United States. The estimated combined strength of the two parties is 12,000, of which more than half are armed underground members. It is in this context that the observation of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs needs to be understood, which said: ‘Left wing extremism has been posing one of the biggest challenges on the internal security front.’ The Larger Picture The above observation reveals the deep concern of the political parties, media and a major chunk of the representatives involved in the parliamentary democratic process who consider Naxalism a menace. There is also the sloganeering against the ruling government, the attack on legislative institutions, and the demonstrations on the roads of Delhi. Armed violence cannot be tolerated in any true democracy, but it has to be accepted for what it is—a real, basic and a significant challenge confronting the country’s established system. This face of the Naxalites is reflected in a montage of those areas of the country which are impoverished and hungry, face suicidal debts, unemployment, illiteracy, and shortage of potable water. The original and the real owners of water, forests, land and other natural resources are not only deprived of their rights, but are having to fight for their social and cultural identity, as also for the very basic needs of their daily existence. These are the areas, which, almost 60 years after Independence, are yet to feel the hand of development. Today, these are the areas of violence and bloodshed. There was a time (up to the 1980s) when there was no challenge to democracy in these areas. Land, water and jungle were protected by a democratic state. Even then, the democratic representatives only went 26

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THE CASE OF DANDAKARANYA about the business of ruling and had no concern or responsibility for the development and welfare of the common folk. The main role of the police appeared to be to forcibly prevent the Adivasis from exercising their age-old basic rights in the jungles, their home. These Adivasis were allowed to vote, ours being a democracy, but the same democracy seemed to have not given them the right to protect themselves from exploitation and even from threats to their lives. Every elected government in the country, after Independence, bears witness to this. The exploitation of these tribals was not on economic grounds alone. Their cultural and individual identities were trampled upon and even their basic human rights were not guaranteed. With such a backdrop for their agenda, the Naxalites had all the advantages in confronting the system of parliamentary democracy in different regions at different times. It also gave them the time and space to strengthen their organisational skills and their capabilities for armed struggle. Here, it would be useful to refer to chapter 7, ‘Retrospect and Prospect’ in Prakash Singh’s The Naxalite Movement in India. While referring to everyone from Jayati Ghosh and Krishna Bharadwaj to P. Sainath and the Jawahar Rozgar Yojana, he says that it was not a coincidence that Naxalism was present in those areas of the country where 90 per cent of the rural poor comprised those living below the poverty line. In an evaluation of the Jawahar Rozgar Yojana, in the same chapter, he says: ‘The analysis of the third round of the NSSO survey (1987–88) revealed that a little over 90 per cent of the rural poor, who live below the poverty line, live in the ten major states of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan, Tamilnadu, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal.’ It is not a coincidence that Naxalism, which was triggered off with the dream of a new people’s revolution, is rooted deeply in areas that are lowest in the human development index. There are numerous examples of this. One example is poverty, bondage and starvation in Kashipur in Orissa. In September 2000, when the news of starvation deaths in this area came to light and journalists and social workers went to the spot, the misery they witnessed was beyond imagination and totally inhuman. 27

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RUCHIR GARG There was absolutely no food grain. The people were forced to drink the extract of boiled rotten mango seeds and kernels. I was among the crowd who had landed there to witness the plight of the people being forced to live in hunger and bondage in our much-hyped democratic set-up. Their ration cards were duly marked to show that they had received the rations but the grains had been spirited away to other more lucrative destinations. Neither did the people have any employment, nor did they have money in their pockets. Chief Minister Naveen Patnaik faced the wrath of his people when it was published in the papers that, in his opinion, the extract of boiled mango seeds and kernel was a rich source of nutrients. Not surprisingly, his statement reminds one of the late P. V. Narasimha Rao who had uttered the same words when he visited Surguja after a starvation death was reported there in the early 1990s. When Patnaik went on a tour of these regions, his convoy was pelted with mango seeds. In one village he was also given this ‘juice’ to drink. One can safely presume that he did not drink this ‘nutrient’. It was the angry Adivasis whose self-respect he had hurt with his supercilious remark—not the Naxalites—who ‘mango-stoned’ Patnaik’s convoy. The Naxalites did not have to incite the tribals. Patnaik had unknowingly done their job for them. This action of the long-suffering tribals was their way of giving vent to their deep anger against the administration’s crass, uncaring attitude towards their plight. This deep-seated tribal antipathy unarguably played a strong supportive role when the PW attacked the district headquarters in Koraput District on 6 February 2004, and took the entire administrative machinery in the district to ransom, looting the treasury, the Superintendent of Police’s office, and the local jail. They also took away 500 weapons of various types and more than 25,000 rounds of ammunition. As has been said, this PW attack can be marked as ‘an important day in the current Maoist people’s movement’, as cited by the MCCI also. But the relevant point here is that such a massive attack just could not have been possible without the support and participation of the people. Kuldip Nayar described the pitiable condition of the Adivasis of Kashipur thus: ‘Orissa is another state where corruption may be less in 28

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THE CASE OF DANDAKARANYA comparison but where the government is using force to dispossess the Adivasis of their land in order to hand it over to the multinationals. Kashipur in Orissa is currently experiencing the onslaught because the tribals, who live around the mines, are sought to be moved out. If the bustees were to join the Naxalites then it would only strengthen the argument that the system did not give them any real option.’ The inadequate provision for Adivasis in the Constitution has been criticised by several people. According to Clause 3 of the Fifth Schedule and Article 244, the Governors of some specified states are required by law to send a report on the state administration to the President of India annually, or whenever he so desires. The annual report has to be sent within six months after the expiry of the financial year. There was an interesting incident in this connection. A parliamentary committee was studying the influence of the Naxalites in undivided Madhya Pradesh. It asked for the Governors’ earlier reports. It then came to light that the report for 1992–93, which the Governor’s secretariat had sent on 9 July 1996, had been gathering dust in the Ministry of Tribal Affairs till the year 2000, for ‘further examination’. By the time the report for 1996–97 was sent, the committee had completed its task. Its findings pointed out a basic flaw in the Governor’s report thus: ‘It is more painful to note that this report highlights only the achievements of the state government in tribal development. [An] in-depth analysis of the solution to the problems of the scheduled areas is not included in the reports.’ The story of the exploitation of these forest dwellers is centuries old. So also is the history of their uprisings against oppression. In 1825, they rose in revolt against the atrocities of the then Maratha rulers and the new rules they had imposed. This revolt is popularly known as the Paralkot Revolt and was staged under the leadership of Gaend Singh, who was killed during the uprising. There was the Koya Revolt of 1859 against the plundering and looting of forest wealth by the British. Then, there was the famous Bhoomkal Revolt of 1910. All these illustrate the inherent power and the will of the tribals to protest and revolt against the tyranny of the ruling classes. 29

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RUCHIR GARG Bastar came under British rule in 1854. After 1876, the British launched a number of activities in the name of development. The major roads in the region are a British contribution. The Raipur– Jagdalpur artery, which is now a national highway, was laid in 1898. Successive governments, for the last two decades, have been accusing the Naxalites of impeding development and obstructing the laying of roads. The authorities’ argument is that development, such as roads, would weaken the Naxalites’ vice-like grip over the people. The counter-argument put forth is that, even though the roads had been laid a hundred years ago, nothing has improved for the people and they continue to be exploited. Moreover, in the name of protection of forests and forest wealth, and with the stated objective of the welfare of the tribals of Bastar, the British introduced a number of forest laws, but all this was actually done with an eye on the invaluable wealth of the Bastar forests. There is no doubt that schools, hospitals and law courts were opened, basic needs provided, and policing introduced. But, despite this, conditions worsened for the populace because the presence of the British in the area increased and so did their atrocities. One British officer wrote: ‘The tribals did not appreciate or like the discipline introduced by the introduction of the new laws, the interference of the police in the area, schools, etc. All the people of Bastar were unhappy about changes in the lifestyle that were being introduced. The children of the forests— the Adivasis—accepted that they had an inalienable right to the forests and no interference would be brooked. They took it for granted that they could do whatever they wanted in the forests and that no one had any right to interfere in this matter.’ What is the condition today, after nearly 60 years of Independence? On 21 July 2004, the Ministry of Environment and Forests, under a directive from the Supreme Court, accepted a few hard facts given below: (a) Injustices committed against the tribal communities under the forest administration were age-old and still continued unabated; (b) Since the demands and rights of the tribal communities are not being respected and granted by the government, there have been atrocities; 30

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THE CASE OF DANDAKARANYA (c) Since the tribals do not have the documents to support their ownership of the land, the demarcation of the forests have not been properly formalised; (d) After 1947, large tracts of forests were declared as being ‘protected area’, but even then the rights of the tribals were not taken care of. The tribals, victimised by the authorities, are being evicted from their lands on a regular basis; and the Naxalites may have engaged with the victims of these atrocities. What have the Naxalites done? As is obvious, the Naxalite movement is far more than just a horde of a few thousand armed guerrillas operating out of hills and forests. It is a vast movement spreading across the country. And, what is relevant here is that its power base—its source of sustenance—is the poor underprivileged masses. Without that support, the movement would die away. It is in this context that Dandakaranya acquires a special significance. The largest Maoist organisation in India, the CPI (Maoist), has targeted this region as the base area for its burgeoning activities. The Naxalites recognise the long-term importance of Dandakaranya in their armed struggle. Geographically, Dandakaranya comprises the regions of Bastar, Narayanpur, Bijapur, Dantewada and Kanker districts of Chhattisgarh state and Gadchiroli district of Maharashtra. The region is rich in forest and mineral resources but, after Independence, development activities have, at best, been skeletal. And whatever be the scale of development, it has been market-oriented and not peoplefriendly. Of the total population, almost 60 per cent are tribal and the majority of them are Gonds. They live in a state of poverty, many of them deep in debt, unable to educate their children and without any health or medical care. The health index in this area is far below the national index and incidence of child mortality is high. Chhattisgarh Chief Minister Raman Singh has said that with the Naxalites opposing and undermining development plans and efforts, his government 31

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RUCHIR GARG is hard put to find ways and means to carry out its tasks for growth. The government has laid big claims that it wants to build networks of roads and rail lines, set up dams and establish big industries. But nowhere in its development agenda is there the mention of issues far more important and urgent to the tribals, such as health care and facilities for irrigation and farming. It seems to ignore the fact that there has been a large number of deaths due to malaria, dysentery, and inadequate maternity facilities. There is a great need for irrigation facilities, and new farming techniques in Bastar. There is, of course, the prevalence of the dreaded disease, AIDS, that needs immediate attention. But the government, as it appears, is more interested in catering to the ‘basic needs’ of the industrialists, tourists and investors. Surrounded by the tribal population—who are yet to see any welfare activity—Chitrakoot, in Bastar district, has the largest waterfall in Asia. To make tourist spots more attractive, colourful lights are provided there and the state capital Raipur is dotted with attractive hoardings to impress tourists. Against the wishes of the public, one industry has been granted permission to divert water—much needed by the Adivasis for irrigation—to Vishakapatnam. In the name of promoting industry, trees are being felled in large numbers and rivers being polluted. For example, if—as is reportedly planned—the Shankini River is used as the transport route for powdered iron, the pollution caused could result in the deforestation of an area that is the homestead of 6,00,000 forest dwellers. The Essar group has been allocated 14 hectares of land in the reserve forest area to lay pipelines and has been given the green signal to cut down trees. On paper, only 14 hectares have been allocated for laying the pipelines, but in real terms, it means that thousands of hectares of reserve forest land would be affected. Kawasi Lakhma, a Congress Legislator, had loudly vowed in an election campaign speech that the Essar pipeline would be laid ‘over his dead body’ and it was only on the strength of this promise that he was re-elected. It would now appear that he has taken another vow—a vow of silence— on this subject.

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THE CASE OF DANDAKARANYA In sharp contrast to the favours being granted to the industrialists, the tribals are being jailed for entering the very forests in and around which they have lived since the days of their forefathers. They are not allowed to collect either the dried leaves that carpet the forest floor or the firewood, which has been their natural source of fuel for generations. There is a fine example of how the government’s mishandling of ecological and socio-economic issues, in the name of industrial development, is strengthening the people’s support for the Naxalite movement. In 2003, the National Mineral Development Corporation (NMDC) proposed to set up a steel plant in Hiranar in Bastar district. It was then reported that the project site had been shifted to Nagarnar near Jagdalpur, allegedly because of the opposition from the Naxalites. Then the residents of Nagarnar raised their voice against the plant, staging protests rallies. They argued that the plant would result in the loss of their fertile farmland and pollute the Indravati River, which flows through the region, with industrial effluents. Compensation would, of course, be paid for the land acquired. But, job wise, it offered almost no opportunities for the local unskilled labour, as the state-of-the-art plant would almost entirely be manned by skilled and semi-skilled labour. But, brushing aside all these considerations, the then Ajit Jogi Government and the then opposition Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP) were united in the view that the plant must be set up in Nagarnar. As a result, the people’s movement was crushed. Dr Brahmadev Sharma and Vandana Shiva, who were heading to Bastar to express solidarity with the people, were prevented from entering Bastar and finally, the then Deputy Prime Minister, Lal Krishna Advani, laid the foundation stone of this project. The project, now operative in Bailadila, Bastar, has proved to have had near zero benefit and has been a big loss for the local, tribal people. What have they gained is a handful of jobs—low pay, Class IV—as peons, chaprasis, drivers and cooks. What have they lost cannot be calculated in terms of mere money. They have been uprooted from acres and acres of land that was their home, for a pittance. They have been dispossessed of the purity of the air and the water of the River Shankhini—industrial pollution has become their companion. 33

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RUCHIR GARG Mining of bauxite and iron ore in Keshkal have made their fertile lands uncultivable. Mechanisation has reduced employment opportunities, and because of opposition from the local populace and Naxalites, mining is not easy in Bastar. Their demand was that one of the rights guaranteed to the tribals should be that mechanisation would not be allowed to affect employment opportunities. Such a condition was not acceptable (read profitable) to the industrialists. It is more than likely that the farmers, too, would get involved because whenever there is an eco-political issue in Chargaon in Bastar or the Kuvvemari Khadan (the new iron ore areas), the farmers also tend to get actively engaged. The Naxalites have gone a step further. They have demanded that a White Paper be presented on ‘Development in Bastar’, so that one can assess the extent of the exploitation of iron, bauxite, tin, timber, dolomite, granite in the region, how much of it remains and what Bastar itself has gained. The people here are convinced that, annually, the Chhattisgarh government gets Rs 500 crore and the Maharashtra government Rs 150 crore, from development projects in Dandakaranya; but the governments have not been able to make use of this money in this area. This story does not end in Bastar. There was a time when the Dallirajhara mines in Bastar area employed 20,000 labourers. The labour unions claim that, even though production has increased, the number of labourers remains 20,000. When the Bhilai Steel Plant produced more than one million tonnes 20 years ago, it employed 96,000 labourers. Today the production is 5.2 million tonnes and the labour strength is down to 37,000. Under these circumstances, the Naxalites, active in Bastar forest, would naturally seek, and find it easy, to win over the increasingly dissatisfied unemployed labour in the neighbouring Dallirajhara and Bhilai areas. The hardship of mounting debt, and the consequences of greed and selfishness of a few, is starkly visible across Bastar to Bhilai—an ideal situation for the Naxalites to expand their field of influence. Any discussion on the social and economic causes of the Naxalite movement will not be complete without a mention of the armed people’s movement in the Telengana region of Andhra Pradesh that lies 34

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THE CASE OF DANDAKARANYA contiguous to the Dandakaranya region. The Naxalite flames have grown into a full-fledged fire in the Telengana districts and is spreading steadily. The roots of the movement can be traced back to the armed-peasants’ struggle of 1946–1951, popularly known as the Telengana Armed Struggle, in which 4,000 communist and militant farmers were killed and over 10,000 communist activists and leaders were incarcerated in jails for three to four years. Another 50,000 people were, at the time, rounded up and subjected to thrashing and torture for weeks and months at end. In the course of this movement, farmers of at least 3,000 villages, numbering approximately 30 lakh, out of a total of 16,000 revolting gram panchayats, joined together to form the gram rajya successfully. The government of Andhra Pradesh was swift in crushing the movement. This was the first time that a demand for the redistribution of land was made. This forms the most important component of the armed struggle of the Andhra Maoists in today’s struggle, and it remains the most important issue from all aspects—economic, social and political. In trying to convert Dandakaranya into a liberated zone, the Maoists have accorded high priority to the formation of the gram rajya committees or Revolutionary People’s Committees (RPC), i.e., the people’s government. By 2003, RPCs had been formed in 500 villages of Dandakaranya. The Maoist’s RPCs have influence over at least 2,000 villages. Commenting on the RPCs, a politburo member of the erstwhile PW says: ‘Now, we are forming RPCs which are geographically conducive for guerrilla warfare. There is people’s co-operation; there is a strong class struggle. RPC is the basic [form of] people’s rule. When there is this basic people’s rule in villages then it becomes very difficult for any arm of the official machinery to function properly there. This is because when two forces are working at once, only one force can remain. This could be either ours or the enemy’s.’ How did the Naxalites reach this level of struggle? We should take Dandakaranya as a guiding example. While delivering the valedictory address at the Workers’ and Farmers’ Representatives Second National Congress in January 1934, Mao Zedong said: ‘If we want to win we will 35

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RUCHIR GARG have to do a lot more, apart from rounding up the public. We will have to lead the farmers in land-related agitations, we will have to encourage their labours, increase the farm produce, safeguard workers’ rights, establish support committees, and solve the problems of the common man—clothes, food, health, housing and problems that occur in conducting marriages.’ Issues, which the Dandakaranya Naxalites are trying to handle, are plenty and include all the aspects of the acts of omission and commission of the successive governments and the miserable living conditions of the people. There is the problem of cultural identity, with attempts to suppress the local Gondi language and, the alleged conspiracy to keep them illiterate by not educating them about their own history, culture and language. There are special inhibitive laws targeted at the tribals. Then there are the adverse effects of the presence of national and multinational industries, atrocities of the police, excise and forest officials and the exploitation of tribals by the moneylender or the contractor class. It is not uncommon for patients to die due to sheer negligence and non-treatment at the health department’s clinics and hospitals. There is no succour and help from the social welfare department. The power-hungry politicians and some NGOs more often work against, rather than for, the interest of the tribals. Conversion of the tribals to Hinduism and Christianity is another attack on their cultural identity. The Naxalites have resolved to take up all these ills that are crippling Dandakaranya today. They are organising the tendu leaf collectors, as also the other sections of the tribal communities, into effective groups. The alienation of the tribals has become a major plank of their movement. To quote: ‘The spread of Hinduism has endangered the very existence of the tribals. By calling them forest dwellers, the tribals are being categorised as a class in the Hindu creed, which is a calculated conspiracy. The members of the Sangh Parivar, who are the spokespersons of the capitalist, contractor–industrialist class, are trying to sow the seeds of discontent and discord among the tribals. The Hinduisation of the tribals is being carried out by changing their names, their customs and culture, the gods and goddesses they worship, and in 36

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THE CASE OF DANDAKARANYA a way, their way of life. Their language is Gondi. As per the 1991 census, the Gondi-speaking people number 2,124,852. They are being Hinduised in a number of different ways in almost all aspects of existence. All in all, there is a major move towards fructifying the conspiracy of the complete alienation of the tribal in these areas.’ The Tendu collectors’ agitation for better wages and against exploitation in Dandakaranya began in 1982. Later on, under the leadership of the Naxalites, the tribal farmers occupied hundreds of acres of forestland. There was an agitation by agricultural labourers, another movement for fair and better pricing of forest products, one against the broker–agent class, another demanding reduction of liquor prices and for a ban on liquor sales. The erstwhile PW had noted once that its influence received a significant fillip in 1984 after an increase in the number of armed squads (dalams) in the Dandakaranya region. As a result, class struggle intensified and the Naxalite influence increased. During the severe drought of 1987–88, the Naxalites organised the tribals and launched what are known as ‘famine raids’, during which the houses of brokers, rich landlords and government godowns were looted for food grains, clothes and vessels and then distributed among the tribal peasants. In a detailed report describing the drought action, the PW had this to say: ‘This kind of movement is new for our party. The speciality of this movement is keeping it alive even while facing innumerable challenges. Besides working for community development, their (tribals’) involvement has also increased. In all, there was a good response in the entire Dandakaranya region. In doing so, the movement has been strengthened.’ The Naxalites have taken up the cause of prohibition and are fighting against other social evils, while having mobilised women. They have taught the peasants modern methods of farming, and have distributed seeds, built small dams and ponds, introduced bare-foot doctors and opened schools. They have played a highly significant role in getting land for the tribals and, more importantly, this was done not by cutting down the forests but by occupying the lands of big land-holders and distributing it among the landless. Care was also taken to ensure that there were no clashes between the tribal and the poor peasants. 37

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RUCHIR GARG The moral, or the pivotal truth, of the entire Dandakaranya story is self-evident: the region has all the conditions to make it a prime ground for revolutionary movements to flourish. Dandakaranya also illustrates how the Naxalites can motivate the tribals to realise their aspirations, put up a fight against the atrocities of the forces of exploitation and unitedly raise a powerful voice of protest. Under the influence of the CPI (Maoist), the tribals and peasants have clearly shown that they possess warrior-like qualities for united action. It is a sad but an undeniable fact that the democratic system has failed to deliver and the recent history of Dandakaranya is underlined with blood and hatred. The possibility of any improvement in the situation is not in sight. What is further daunting is that, in all probability, the situation is no different in all the other Naxalite-affected areas.

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5 A Political Approach to the Naxalite Problem: Viability and Prerequisites for Success M. Shashidhar Reddy

With the decline in authority in nearly every country, violence has become superficially an easy remedy, appealing especially to the few of the young as a means of remedying their grievances. I also agree with the implicit conclusion in the document that those of us who are in politics must consistently adopt the highest standards of which we are capable of and live up to our promises, although I am afraid, being human, we shall always fall short. The poor, the victimised, those who are unjustly treated, will always turn to non-democratic methods if there is no means of outlet or opportunities to remedy their injustices by constitutional methods. —Rt. Hon. Lord Callaghan, Former Prime Minister of the UK.1 India’s development, which has been rapid since Independence, has been dogged by distortions because of two reasons. First, we have not been able to raise enough funds for development and, second, we have failed to allocate them to the proper target groups. The main reasons for this failure are corruption, faulty planning and monitoring systems.

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M. SHASHIDHAR REDDY Consequently, people living in certain areas have been denied an equal pace of development. Social conflicts arising out of this state of affairs have not been adequately resolved by harmonising the competing and conflicting values, identities and interests. The administration and political system have failed to deliver. Judicial redressal has been expensive and time consuming. Political parties have tried to make amends but in vain. The seeds for the Naxalite movement were sown way back in 1967, when armed communist revolutionaries, who split from the CPI(M), led the uprising of Santhal tribals in Naxalbari, West Bengal. The uprising was a result of poverty and other problems of the tribals. Though it was crushed by the police on the orders of the state government, it set in motion the struggle of the oppressed people against feudalism, poverty, underdevelopment and all kinds of socio-economic exploitation. Since then, this brand of Naxalism—being referred to in popular parlance as the present Left-Wing Extremism (LWE)—spread to about 159 districts in 13 states of India, by the end of 2004. With close links with the Maoists of Nepal and alleged links with the LTTE in Sri Lanka, LWE has come up with what they call the ‘red corridor,’ or the Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ)—a fertile ground indeed for exploitation by forces inimical to the nation. As Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh noted: ‘The spectre of Left-wing extremism continues to haunt us, albeit in new forms. Charu Mazumdar had once talked of a “spring thunder over India”. In the initial days of the movement, many of them, the best and the brightest, had been attracted towards the movement. Almost 40 years later, the Naxalite movement has lost much of its intellectual élan, but it has gained in strength and has now spread to over 150 districts all over the country.2 ‘This phenomenon is a function of underdevelopment. It is not a coincidence that it is the tribal areas that are the main battleground of Left-wing extremism today. Large swathes of tribal territory from Andhra Pradesh in the south to the borders of UP and Bengal in the north and east have become the hunting ground of the Left-wing 40

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A POLITICAL APPROACH TO THE NAXALITE PROBLEM extremists, which has the potential to pose an even graver threat than militancy in Jammu & Kashmir and the North East.’3 As the Union Home Minister noted: ‘The widespread socio-economic, political and regional inequities prevalent in the country, coupled with poverty, unemployment and lack of proper infrastructure, remain the basic causes for continuance and spatial expansion of Naxalism. Recognising this and for tackling Naxalism from the developmental perspective, the central government has asked the states to accord high priority in the annual plans to ensure faster integrated development of Naxalite-affected districts.’4 In this context, the setting up of the Task Force on Naxalite violence by Congress President Sonia Gandhi is a clear demonstration of a rare political insight and far-sightedness. It is for the first time that any political party in the country has initiated this kind of an exercise. Since the Naxalite issue is fast emerging as the single largest challenge to the internal security of the nation, there is an urgent need to devise ways and means to tackle it. That the Naxalites consider extremism not as a problem but as a solution is something that needs to be appreciated, with the exception, of course, of their avowed credo of violence. While the administration is convinced that LWE is a problem, these groups project their movement as one that is waging a ‘revolutionary struggle’, to correct the prevailing injustice and exploitation in society.5 The Scenario in Andhra Pradesh Andhra Pradesh has a prominent place in the history of the Naxalites. Its origins date back to the ‘armed struggle’ in Telengana, against the autocratic rule of the Nizam of Hyderabad, between 1946 and 1951, with links to the CPI. The next significant phase was the post-Naxalbari events, when the cadres in Andhra Pradesh launched an armed struggle in November 1968, in Srikakulam district, a coastal district bordering Orissa. A ‘red political rule’ was claimed to have been established over an area of about 500 sq. km in that district in June 1969 by the CPI(ML), which is an offshoot of the CPI(M). This subsequently spread to the Telengana region, especially to its northern districts. 41

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M. SHASHIDHAR REDDY There were and are several groups of Naxalites. However, the term ‘Naxalites’ came to be equated in the main with the CPI(ML) [People’s War], or PW in short. After its merger with the MCCI, which mainly operated in Jharkhand and Bihar, the new outfit is now christened CPI (Maoist). The leader of this merged outfit is Ganapathy, a man from Telengana. It is believed that the leaders from Andhra Pradesh will continue to play a dominant role in guiding the new outfit. In fact, a majority of the central leadership of the erstwhile PW belonged to AP. That apart, the 2004 peace initiative of the Andhra government is the first bid by any state government to hold direct talks with the Naxalites. The Naxalite problem was mainly dealt with as a law and order problem by the successive Congress governments in AP up till 1983, when the Congress was defeated in the elections by the fledgling Telugu Desam Party (TDP) led by N. T. Rama Rao. The approach of the Congress governments towards the Naxalites was largely police oriented, with the Disturbed Areas Act enacted to give special powers to the police to deal with the armed extremists. Several districts came under this act. However, as observed by Dr M. Channa Reddy, former chief minister of AP, ‘The measures taken by successive governments in the state with a view to containing extremism did not yield results over a period of time. On the other hand, the content and the spread of extremism increased.’6 The TDP government adopted an approach which was inconsistent and vacillating—from one extreme to another. In the beginning, the Naxalites were warmly greeted with ‘Laal Salaam’ (Red salute), and even extolled as ‘desha bhaktulu’ (patriots) but, towards the end of the TDP tenure (end of 1989), the authorities resorted to blatant and gross violations of human rights in their dealings with the extremists. A large number of fake encounters took place and numerous false cases were registered against the youth. For example, there is the infamous case of Lakshmi and Ravi, arrested in the Ramnagar conspiracy case and held 42

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A POLITICAL APPROACH TO THE NAXALITE PROBLEM without trial for over three years.7 Or, the case of a young man named Janardhan, who was arrested more than a dozen times in as many years, charge-sheeted and acquitted each time, only to be finally arrested under the now defunct Terrorist and Disruptive Activites (Prevention) Act, TADA. Such police atrocities resulted only in impelling the Naxalites to increase and intensify their activities manifold. The Approach of Dr Channa Reddy’s Government (1989–90) The Congress party returned to power after the assembly elections of November 1989 and Dr Channa Reddy took over as the Andhra Chief Minister for the second time. His government’s approach towards the Naxalite issue has been widely acknowledged and appreciated. For the first time, it was treated as a socio-economic problem which had law and order ramifications. His government adopted the following threepronged approach to deal with the problem: 1. Extremists were allowed to come overground and were assured that there would be no hurdles to any lawful activity on their part. 2. It was made amply clear that no unlawful activity would be tolerated and would be dealt with firmly. 3. Simultaneously, action was initiated for economic development of areas where extremism thrived, so that the benefits of development programmes would reach the tribals, scheduled castes (SCs) and other weaker sections that inhabited remote and interior areas. There has been a general consensus among political parties, Members of Parliament and legislators about the validity of the government’s stand—that the problem should be viewed, first and foremost, as a politico-social and economic one and then as a law and order issue.8 From a Law and Order Approach to Socio-Economic View It was for the first time in 1990, that Chief Minister Reddy initiated the formulation of the Remote and Interior Areas Development Programme (RADP). This was submitted to the Planning Commission,

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M. SHASHIDHAR REDDY which approved an outlay of Rs 86 crore, over and above the annual plan for 1990–91. This was highly appreciated by the local people. Overview of the Remote and Interior Areas Development Programme This programme was formulated with two objectives: developing (a) the area and (b) the disadvantaged people. The following are excerpts from the message of Dr Channa Reddy, carried as a foreword to the action plan in July 1990. It gives an insight into the concept and background of the programme. ‘In the last three-and-a-half decades, the state, embarking upon a path of planned progress, achieved substantial development. While the state marches on its relentless war on poverty, ignorance, superstition and disease, there have been certain areas which have not kept pace with the rapid strides, because of their remoteness, inaccessibility and years of neglect. The government has now, possibly for the first time, thought of a special Action Plan for the development of these remote, inaccessible and hitherto neglected areas. ‘The programme, launched on 1 May 1990, is oriented towards an accelerated development of these areas by giving a special thrust to the key areas of communication, irrigation, medical facility and selfemployment. ‘The programme is being shaped with constant interaction with the people of the area. It started off with a week-long mass contact programme in which the Ministers in charge of the districts and senior Secretaries of the government participated. Based on the representations, an assessment of the felt needs of the people of the area was made and a list of programmes and works drawn up with a view to involve people much more fully in the implementation process. ‘The government has also delegated powers to the district administration to entrust work to local people, especially tribals, unemployed youth and other weaker sections on a nomination basis. This is intended to eliminate middlemen and enable the rural poor to get maximum benefit out of the programme. In order to bring the governmental 44

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A POLITICAL APPROACH TO THE NAXALITE PROBLEM functioning closer to the people inhabiting these interior areas, mobile revenue teams, mobile medical teams and veterinary teams have evolved. Shortly, mobile courts are also expected to start functioning to provide inexpensive and speedy justice. ‘It is now two months since the programme was launched and the implementation of the programme is proceeding at a brisk pace. The programme poses a formidable challenge, but with the co-ordinated and concerted efforts of the officials, political parties, voluntary agencies working in these areas, it should certainly be possible to achieve substantial progress and step up the level of development in these far-flung corners of the state.’ ‘Even though the programme was approved with an outlay of Rs 86 crore by the Planning Commission, at the time of finalising the Annual Plan for 1990–91, it was felt that an exercise had to be undertaken to make it need-based. With a view to taking into consideration people’s perception of their felt needs in the planning process, a week-long mass contact programme was launched in May 1990. This provided the people a forum to express their views and ideas about the potential and possibilities of growth and suggest the direction of development, which they would like their government to consider. Some of the measures contemplated in the RADP included: • Plan to entrust the work to local people, especially tribals, unemployed youth and other weaker sections on a nomination basis, with the elimination of middlemen. • Formation of mobile revenue teams to visit villages and settle land issues expeditiously. Mobile medical and veterinary teams visit to the interior villages. Also mobile courts to bring about inexpensive and speedy justice. • Many duties were delegated to the Collectors to accord administrative and technical sanction efficiently. A drive to distribute surplus land to the landless poor was planned. It was decided to fill up all vacancies in the area to provide better service to the people. • Career guidance cells were planned initially at the district headquarters to guide the youth, opting for self-employment, on the 45

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M. SHASHIDHAR REDDY possible avenues under various government programmes. It was proposed to engage tribal students passing out of polytechnics colleges to execute various works in the tribal areas, if necessary, by giving them contract work. • The whole exercise was a formidable challenge. But the government wanted to go ahead with the concerted efforts of officials, political parties and voluntary agencies to ascend the level of development in these areas. Strategy and Approach • Connecting remote villages through arterial roads to end their isolation. • Creation of assets, especially in the minor irrigation sector, as also in others. • Capacity building of specific sections for gainful employment. • Streamlining the administration for better delivery of services to make it responsive and decentralised. Interactions were conducted with the people of the area and based on their representations an assessment of the needs felt was made. A list of works was drawn up with a view to involving the people fully in their implementation. Scheme Profile • Arterial Roads • Minor irrigation and irrigation wells • Drinking water facilities • Credit facilities through Girijan (Tribal) Cooperative Corporation • Establishment of training centres • Training programmes • Promotion of sports • Implementation of programmes through government-assisted tribal contractors 46

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A POLITICAL APPROACH TO THE NAXALITE PROBLEM • Acquisition of agricultural land for assignment to tribals • Minor forest produce regeneration • Establishment of creche centres and midday meal centres The districts covered under the programme were Adilabad, Nizamabad, Vishakhapatnam, Khammam, Medak, Mahabubnagar, Karimnagar, Warangal and East Godavari. Ministers in charge of the districts along with senior secretaries in the government were responsible for the mass contact programme. Response and Follow-up The week-long mass contact programme was launched simultaneously in the worst-affected areas of all the nine districts. There was a tremendous response from the local people. It was noticed that even some of those who had joined the Naxalite movement attended and interacted with the officials. It was clearly visible that there was a genuine yearning in the hearts of the people for the development of their areas, neglected as they had been for such a long time. As a result of the new approach, there was an initial euphoria when the extremists came overground and held a large number of rallies in several places. When some people commented on the size of these turnouts, Dr Channa Reddy quipped: ‘If N. T. Rama Rao could become the chief minister, then why not Kondapalli Seetharamiah,’ referring to K.S. who built up the CPI(ML) Peoples’ War Group in Andhra Pradesh. It was implied that if the Naxalites could go to the people and win their confidence, sans violence, they were welcome. The state government was able to create a moral platform by allowing freedom for lawful activities, in contrast to the previous regime’s overemphasis on policing and resultant violations of human rights. The release of undertrials, who had long been languishing in jails, was one of the many other steps in the right direction. On this moral strength, the government went about enforcing law and order, which, after all, is its primary responsibility. There were instances of lawlessness. The police had to resort to firing to control unruly mobs, which resulted in the deaths of some extremists and 47

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M. SHASHIDHAR REDDY sympathisers in Madanapalli (in June 1990) and in Kamareddy in Nizamabad district, a little later. These deaths did not cause protests from the civil liberties activists, nor did the media make any adverse comments. Obviously, they were not labelled as ‘encounter’ deaths. At the same time, on several occasions, local people in affected villages put up resistance against some of the activities of the Naxalites, including arbitrary people’s courts passing unjust verdicts and the attempt to enforce their writ against the people’s wishes. The programme was going very well and all it needed was persistence. The aim was to continue it with a missionary zeal. Unfortunately, that was not to be. The momentum was lost when Dr Channa Reddy resigned as chief minister in December 1990 after being in office for just a year. Even though it was a Congress government that succeeded, there was a shift in policy. Further, it lacked a clear focus. It was an unfortunate and eminently avoidable instance of ‘policies not being continued for inherent value’.9 Ultimately, there was a total reversal of the policy; a ban was imposed on the CPI(ML) [PWG] in 1991. The RADP was forgotten soon thereafter. Approach of the TDP and BJP Between December 1994 and May 2004, the TDP government was again in power—headed first by N. T. Rama Rao and then by Chandrababu Naidu. It was again a period of vacillation for almost nine years between September 1995 to May 2004. Between 1996 and 1998, the United Front (UF) government was in power at the Centre and the TDP was a part of that government. Then, from March 1998 onwards, the TDP became a part of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), though it did not join the BJP-led NDA government at the Centre, with Atal Bihari Vajpayee as Prime Minister and L. K. Advani as Deputy Prime Minister and Home Minister. So, it would be logical to discuss the approach of the TDP and BJP-led NDA together.

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A POLITICAL APPROACH TO THE NAXALITE PROBLEM The 1998–99 Andhra Pradesh state budget contained an allocation of Rs 21 crore for the development of remote and backward areas, meant to augment education, health, infrastructure, link roads and provision for drinking water.10 There are several statements, observations and reports, which mirror the approach of the TDP and the BJP to the Naxalite problem, in terms of policy and programmes. Some of them are cited below:11 15 June 1998: ‘Describing Left-wing extremist ideology as the enemy of development which tries to gain intellectual legitimancy by exploiting the plight of the poor and the weak, Union Home Minister L. K. Advani has suggested a “non-political and nationalist approach” based on consensus to combat Naxalism and isolate extremist organisations. This will enable the governments to deal firmly with them in accordance with the overall national action plan. ‘While combating the menace, he said that the Centre and the states concerned should accelerate development and simultaneously take decisive and concerted security measures against the perpetrators of violence. “Unwavering and sustained political will was the most critical element in the task of elimination of extremism,” he said.’12 17 September 1998: ‘Asked about the law and order situation in Andhra Pradesh, Advani said that the situation was normal. He gave a pat to the state government, saying that it had dealt with the Naxalite problem “very effectively”.’13 11 February 1999: ‘Left-wing extremism is a major area of concern with regard to the internal security scenario of the country. Although the effective strength of the movement has remained confined to a few pockets in the country in the states of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh and Orissa, the fact remains that its ideology has a negative impact on the country’s socio-political life. The problem, therefore, cannot be regarded as a localised phenomenon but is a matter of national concern.14 ‘Keeping in view that Left-wing extremism was assuming serious dimensions in the affected states, the Union Home Minister convened 49

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M. SHASHIDHAR REDDY a meeting of the chief ministers of the concerned states at Hyderabad on 15 June 1998 to review the action being taken by the states in curbing Left-wing extremism as well as to prepare a strategy for tackling the problem effectively. ‘As a follow-up of the decisions taken at the meeting, the ministry of home affairs set up a coordination centre, headed by the Union Home Secretary with chief secretaries and director generals of police of the states affected by Left-wing extremism, as its members. Among the important decisions taken were that the states should prepare action plans incorporating the security as well as the development aspects in respect of the affected areas. The action plans have so far been received from the states of Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Orissa only and have accordingly been recommended to the Planning Commission. These are being considered by the Planning Commission in consultation with the concerned states.’ 13 March 1999: ‘Officials involved in anti-Naxalite operations expect that the work on this highway could start later this year and once completed, it would help the speedy movement of security forces in the Naxalite-infested areas of both the states (AP and MP). ‘Police circles pointed out that there were instances in which the public works department and private contractors had to abandon work due to the Naxalite threat. ‘Stressing the need for having a time-bound programme for construction of roads in these sensitive areas, they said it would help the police in anti-Naxalite operations, besides contributing towards the development of the tribal areas. ‘Describing Naxalism as a socio-economic and political problem, they said it has been proposed to utilise the remaining amount for various purposes, including construction of roads and bridges, improving health and educational facilities and generating employment opportunities for the local tribal population. They said that though law and order was a state subject, the problem of Naxalite violence was assuming a dimension that warranted a concerted campaign.’15

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A POLITICAL APPROACH TO THE NAXALITE PROBLEM 14 March 2000: ‘Home Minister L. K. Advani on Tuesday said that a conference of chief ministers of the states affected by Naxalism will be held in April. During question hour in the Lok Sabha, Advani said efforts will also be made to restructure state police forces. He said five states—Madhya Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, Maharashtra and Bihar—have been affected by the Naxalite problem. Assuring all assistance to the states affected by militancy, Advani said that the Naxalite problem is linked to economic development and, therefore, the planning for security and development must go together. As far as funds are concerned, he said some states have been asked to give perspective plans for the next five years on their need for modernisation and upgradation of the police forces. The demands for funds will be placed before the Planning Commission and the finance commission. ‘The Home Minister said that as police is a state subject, it is primarily the responsibility of the state governments to train, equip and modernise their forces to keep pace with the changing security and law and order scenario.’16 5 April 2000: ‘Naidu, who made an offer during a discussion in the state assembly on the Left-wing extremist activities on 3 April almost did a volte-face at the day-long meeting of the chief ministers of the five Naxalite-affected states, which was convened by Union Home Minister L. K. Advani, by proposing a multi-pronged strategy against the CPI(ML)[PW]. ‘Naidu said that the Naxalite problem was too serious an issue to be dealt with routinely. He suggested that the union government enact stringent laws to curb Left-wing extremism on the lines of the counterterrorism laws mooted by Italy and the United Kingdom. He proposed the use of the unmanned remote control aircraft developed by Israel and that of satellite pictures to identify Naxalite hideouts in the five states. Naidu made the offer quite reluctantly in the state legislative assembly on Monday, and his “tough and frank” talk at New Delhi, only exposes the lack of any sincere desire to have a real dialogue, according to civil rights activists in Hyderabad.’17

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M. SHASHIDHAR REDDY July 2000: ‘Invitation extended to the PW for “peace” talks. The proposal came within a few days after the PW guerrillas had killed Naidu’s right-hand man—the then Panchayat Raj Minister Madhav Reddy. He announced on the floor of the assembly that his government was willing to hold negotiations with Comrades Gaddar and Varavara Rao—to resolve the Naxal problem. That Naidu’s statement appeared on 1 April—April Fools’ Day—might not be just a coincidence. ‘Naidu pressed for an all-India ban on the CPI(ML)[PW] and the Centre assured them that it would take a decision soon on the matter. In fact, Naidu’s TDP has all along been maintaining that the Naxalite problem is a law and order problem and not a socio-economic and political one. It has refused to treat the Naxalites, particularly the PW, as political activists. Instead, it treats them as criminals.’18 4 October 2001: ‘Chief Minister Chandrababu Naidu ruled out unconditional talks with various Naxalite factions, saying that maintenance of law and order was his government’s main concern. ‘He did not agree with the opinion that the Naxalite problem was being viewed by the government only from a law and order angle. The government was not vindictive. A massive effort was on to tackle the socio-economic problems. “But a miniscule per cent of terrorists cannot hold 99 per cent of the population to ransom.” Terrorism was no answer to socio-economic or religious problems.’19 14 July 2002: ‘“The Andhra Pradesh government was ready for talks with the outlawed PWG ultras to find a solution to the vexed Naxalite problem,” said Chief Minister N. Chandrababu Naidu. Addressing a joint meeting of MPs and MLAs, he decried the PWG accusation that the government was resorting to encounters for delaying the process of peace talks. “The government is always in favour of talks and our intention is to find a solution to the problem,” Naidu said, adding that extremism and faction culture had no place in a peaceful society. The PWG had given a call for a state-wide bandh on 11 and 12 July to protest against police encounters after commencement of peace talks with the government. After three rounds of talks, the state government had agreed to hold direct talks with the PWG leadership, which was 52

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A POLITICAL APPROACH TO THE NAXALITE PROBLEM scheduled for 20 July. However, PWG emissaries pulled out in the first week of this month, protesting police repression and encounters.’20 10 December 2002: ‘Militarisation of the Naxalite outfits, their expansion into new areas and their continued attacks on security forces, and issues relating to economic development of the Naxalite-affected areas have been raised by state governments. Proposals or plans for development of the affected areas, received from Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Orissa, have been taken up with the Planning Commission for further necessary action. ‘Public order and police being state subjects, it is for the concerned state governments to devise various methods and take concrete steps to curb Left-wing extremist violence. However, the central government, besides convening the meetings of the coordination centre, also provides financial support to the Naxalite-affected states for combating Left-wing extremism. It also shares intelligence inputs and provides assistance of para-military forces on a need basis.’21 13 August 2003: ‘The Rajya Sabha was informed that integrated action plans, encompassing development as well as security aspects in Naxalite-affected areas, have been received from Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Orissa and forwarded to the Planning Commission for earmarking separate funds for the purpose. A committee constituted by the Planning Commission in this regard has, however, recommended that Left-wing extremism affected districts may be included under the proposed scheme of the Backward Districts Initiative (BDI) under the Rashtriya Sam Vikas Yojana. The Home Ministry has, accordingly, requested the Planning commission to include these districts under the BDI scheme so as to fill in the critical gaps in physical and social infrastructure in these areas. Besides, some funds have been allocated for construction of rural or district roads in the LWE affected areas under the Prime Minister Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY). ‘Giving this information in a written reply, the Minister of State for Home Shri I. D. Swami said that for coordinated action against Naxalism, a Coordination Action Group to coordinate sharing of 53

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M. SHASHIDHAR REDDY intelligence and anti-Naxalite operations among the affected states has been functioning under the chairmanship of the DGP, Andhra Pradesh. Besides, the Central government also shares actionable intelligence with the concerned state governments on a regular basis.’22 3 October 2003: ‘Shri Mukhtar Abbas Naqvi called upon all parties to rise above narrow political considerations and become active partners in the fight against terrorism. There is an urgent need, he said, for all parties to jointly help combat the increasing instances of Left-wing extremism and Naxalite violence and build a comprehensive strategy to deal with the problem. ‘The Planning Commission has also identified Naxalite-affected district for “Backward District Initiative”. Special funds are allocated for these districts for roads under the PMGSY. However, the ultimate responsibility of dealing with the issue rests with the state governments themselves. In this context, the state governments must put aside political differences and join hands to root out such violence completely.’23 3 October 2003: ‘Deputy Prime Minister L. K. Advani advocated a two-pronged strategy to tackle the Naxalite menace, of which the latest target has been Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister N. Chandrababu Naidu, who survived a bomb blast in Tirumala. Outlining the strategy, Mr Advani said that the government should take up the rapid development of areas afflicted by Naxalite violence. Simultaneously, they must deal firmly with violence perpetrated by extremists and other elements. “Such a strategy will yield proper resullts,” he said. Andhra Pradesh, he said, was taking the right initiatives to tackle the Naxalite violence. The Centre had set up a committee headed by the Union Home Secretary in 1998 to co-ordinate the anti-extremist operations in Naxal-affected states. The Centre would review the whole situation in the wake of the attack on Mr Naidu.’24 11 October 2003: ‘In this backdrop, while the military successes achieved by the police in “neutralising” the squads or top cadre of the PW in Andhra Pradesh made them exultant, the PW silently worked at modifying its strategies and tactics and emerged as a tough revolutionary party capable of taking defeats in its stride. The police agencies 54

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A POLITICAL APPROACH TO THE NAXALITE PROBLEM appear to have failed in revising their counter-strategies. The biggest flaw on the part of the government appears to be that it laid great emphasis on the “military option” while neglecting the core issues that spawned such violent movements.’25 15 November 2003: ‘The continuing Naxalite violence which comes in the way of implementing various development programmes is costing the state dear in resources and men. How a fresh election would enable him [Chandrababu Naidu] to deal with the Naxalites is not very clear. Even assuming that he would come back with an improved majority, the assembly cannot wish away the Naxalites. To treat the Naxalite movement as a law and order problem is at the heart of the non-policy which the chief minister is pursuing against the Naxalites. There should be fresh thinking, fresh policies, new tactics, which alone can solve the Naxalite problem.’26 24 October 2004: ‘BJP President L. K. Advani cautioned the UPA government at the Centre on the moves by Andhra Pradesh government in tackling the Naxalite problem and said, “It is a self-defeating and retrograde approach” and that “it was a matter of internal security of the country and any move by individual states would be dangerous.”’27 Approach of Congress Party/UPA The 2004 elections saw the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government installed at the Centre, replacing the BJP-led NDA government, which was in power since 1998. The new government adopted the National Common Minimum Programme (NCMP). Under the heading of ‘Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribe’, it is stated that the ‘UPA is concerned with the growth of extremist violence and other forms of terrorist activity in different states. This is not merely a law and order problem, but a far deeper socio-economic issue, which will be addressed more meaningfully than has been the case so far. False encounters will not be permitted.’28 Union Home Minister Shivraj Patil stated in an interview that, on especially the Naxalite problem, the government would accord 55

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M. SHASHIDHAR REDDY priority to economic development and social justice. ‘Dialogue is also an important element,’ he said. Congress President Sonia Gandhi made an announcement at the All India Congress Committee (AICC) meeting on 22 August 2004, that a ‘Task Force on Naxalite Violence’ would be set-up to go into the problem in depth. It was set up with the author as the convenor and former Chattisgarh Chief Minister Ajit Jogi, former Delhi Police Commissioner, Special Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs and Congress MP Nikhil Kumar and three others as members. Addressing a meeting of the task force on 5 November 2004, as a special invitee, M. K. Narayanan, then internal security advisor to the Prime Minister, and presently National Security Advisor, termed the Naxalite movement as the ‘politics of under development.’ Consensus on the Approach to the Naxalite Problem There are some common points that emerge on a perusal of the statements, observations and reports that have been listed above, credited to different political parties and formations. Unless political considerations crop up, there should not be much difficulty in evolving a formal consensus on the approach to tackle the Naxalite problem. The points for such a consensus are listed below: • • • • • •

The Naxalite problem is a serious threat to internal security. There is a need to accelerate development. There is a need for unwavering and sustainable political will. There is a need for a policy, action plans and programmes. There should be a continuity of good programmes. There should be an appropriate structural framework for effective monitoring. • There should be a political process, including talks, to resolve issues. Some of the other points that need to be considered are as follows. August 1999: BJP election manifesto ‘The multi-pronged strategy to eliminate the growing menace of Left-wing extremism, which extends from the Nepal border to Andhra 56

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A POLITICAL APPROACH TO THE NAXALITE PROBLEM Pradesh, will be more effectively implemented. The government will encourage the misguided youth who have joined various Naxal organisations to give up the path of violence. Development activities in affected areas will be intensified, with people’s participation.’ 8 February 2003: This is an excerpt from the speech of (former) Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee at the annual chief ministers’ conference on internal security: ‘The state governments should also accord a higher priority to the socio-economic development of the districts affected by Left-wing extremism. Here, scarcity of funds has not been the critical bottleneck; the problem lies in [its] implementation. Experience has shown that, wherever governmental schemes and programmes have been implemented well, with the participation of local organisations, and through proper communication of our objectives, the people themselves have forced extremist elements to stay off. In particular, we must resolve to accelerate the development of physical and social infrastructure in this belt. In this context, I have a few specific suggestions. • Construction of rural and district roads in critical clusters, identified by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), may be taken up on priority under the Prime Minister’s Gram Sadak Yojana and with the Central Road Fund. If necessary, suitable relaxation in the guidelines may be made for the execution of these works. • Priority should also be accorded to integrated implementation, in the same clusters, of all central and state government schemes in healthcare, education, and employment generation, with maximum involvement of Panchayati Raj Institutions and local and community-based organisations. • States should post their most experienced and committed police and administrative officers in these districts.’ November 1991: C. Subramaniam, then Chairman, Rajaji International Institute of Public Affairs and Administration, Hyderabad, said the following in his message for the publication ‘Naxalism—A Distortion of Democratic Development’: 57

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M. SHASHIDHAR REDDY ‘It is, however, to be recognised that the emergence of Naxalism was the direct result of lack of social and economic justice in different parts of the country. The most distinctive characteristic of this movement is that it is entrenched mainly among the most oppressed and exploited people and areas of the country. Viewing Naxalites as extremists and their struggle as a law and order issue may not be the correct approach to solve this problem. Nor will the Naxalite movement disappear with the mere enactment of progressive social and economic legislation or the launching of the welfare programmes. ‘It has to be more than that. In fact, it should be tackled on the social, economic and political fronts with the co-operation and involvement of the governmental agencies and the different segments of the society, so that the root cause, namely, social and economic injustice prevalent in different parts of the country, especially in certain backward rural and tribal areas are removed; and those who are actively involved in this movement are brought back to the mainstream of national life; and their energies utilised for the upliftment of the downtrodden and the oppressed through constructive programmes in a peaceful manner.’ Conclusion The period between 1998 and 2004 saw an enormous rise in the spread of the Naxalite movement. The focus of the various governments remained sharply, and almost exclusively, on the law and order dimension. Though there have been casual references, from time to time, to the underlying socio-economic issues involved, there were no concrete programmes and action plans evolved. Many views have been expressed. Many ideas have emerged. Yet there was no tangible action. It is now absolutely imperative to translate them into policies, plans and programmes and give a serious thought on how to monitor them, so that a better delivery system could be put in place, based on past experiences. Notes and References 1. See ‘Foreword’, in Naxalism—A Distortion of Democratic Development, Hyderabad: Rajaji International Institute of Public Affairs and Administration, November 1991.

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A POLITICAL APPROACH TO THE NAXALITE PROBLEM 2. See the address by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh at the annual conference of DGPs/IGPs, New Delhi, http://www.pmindia.nic.in, 4 November 2004. 3. Ibid. 4. See the address by Union Home Minister Shiv Raj Patil at the Annual Conference of DGPs/IGPs, New Delhi, Indian Express (New Delhi), 4 November 2004. 5. Cited from ‘Left-wing Extremism in Andhra Pradesh—Policy Issues and Directions’, a study conducted by the Centre for Public Policy and Systems, Administrative Staff College of India (ASCI), Hyderabad, May 1995. 6. Dr M. Channa Reddy, the then Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh, in a letter to the then Congress President Rajiv Gandhi, 25 April 1990, (copy available with author), giving an overview of the Naxalite problem in the state and explaining the new approach of his government. It was Reddy’s second tenure as chief minister. It is significant that during Reddy’s first tenure as the state’s chief minister between 1978–80, some parts of Karimnagar district were declared disturbed areas under the act. 7. At the time of their arrest, the two were recently married and were kept in solitary confinement without trial. They were released as a token of the new approach of the Channa Reddy government. The author, who was then a secretary of the Andhra Pradesh Congress Committee, apart from being the son of the chief minister, had conveyed this offer made by the government to the civil liberties activist and lawyer, K.G. Kannabiran, in the presence of revolutionary poet Vara Vara Rao and social activist Dr Balagopal. They were released along with another undertrial. 8. Chief Minister Dr Channa Reddy’s letter dated 25 April, 1990 to Congress President Rajiv Gandhi. 9. V.P. Rama Rao, speaking at a round table conference organised by the Dr M. Channa Reddy Memorial Trust on ‘Naxalism—Problems and Solutions’, Hyderabad, 30 November 2004. Rao was the chief secretary to the government of Andhra Pradesh in 1990, when the RADP was launched. Transcript of round table conference available with author.

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M. SHASHIDHAR REDDY 10. See the state finance minister’s budget speech for the fiscal year 1998–99. Copy available with author. This amount was from the regular budget. It was a meagre amount compared to an allocation of Rs 86 crore over and above the annual budget for 1990–91, approved by the Planning Commission. 11. The statements, observations and reports are presented in a chronological order. Comments, inferences and discussion on some of them follow in the subsequent pages, under different heads. 12. See a wire report circulated by the United News of India (UNI) on the then Union Home Minister L. K. Advani’s speech at the Chief Ministers’ Conference at Hyderabad, 15 June 1998. The report was captioned ‘Advani Calls Naxalism an Enemy of Development’. 13. ‘Advani Pats AP Govt. on Tackling Naxal problem’, www.rediff.com, September 1998. 14. Statement made by then Union Home Minister, L. K. Advani in the Rajya Sabha 11 February 1999, while speaking on Naxalite activities in the country, accessed at http://pib.nic.in/archieve/lreleng/11299/r231299.html. 15. ‘BRO to Build Navigable Roads through Naxal-hit Areas’, www.rediff.com, 13 March 1999. 16. ‘Advani calls CMs Meet to Discuss Naxalism’, www.rediff.com, 14 March 2000. 17. ‘Naidu Offer on PWG a Bogus, Feel Rights Activists’ www.rediff.com, 5 April 2000, 18. Refer to the July 2000 issue of Peoples’ March, Ernakulam, a pro-Naxalite magazine, ‘Naidu’s Double Speak’, accessed at http://www.peoplesmarch. com/archives/2000/july/2000/naidus.htm. 19. ‘Unconditional Talks with Naxals Ruled Out’, The Hindu, Chennai, accessed at http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/2001/10/04/stories/0404201 a.htm. 20. Refer to the report captioned ‘AP Govt. Ready for Talk with Naxals: Naidu’, 2002, accessed at http://news.indiainfo.com/2002/07/14/14 talks.html. 21. Cited from a written reply by the then Union Minister of State for Home, Ch. Vidyasagar Rao, to a question in the Lok Sabha, on the Naxalite problem, accessible at http:www.loksabha. nic.in, 10 December 2002.

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A POLITICAL APPROACH TO THE NAXALITE PROBLEM 22. ‘Action Plan to Curb Naxalism’, Press Information Bureau (PIB) Press Release, New Delhi, 13 August 2003. 23. Statement by Mukhtar Abbas Naqvi, General Secretary and Spokesperson, BJP, accessed at www.bjp.org, 3 October 2003. 24. ‘Advani for Twin Plan to Tackle Naxalism’, The Hindu, 4 October 2003. Advani said this at Hyderabad, when he came to inquire about the health of the then Chief Minister, Chandrababu Naidu, after he survived an attempt on his life by the Naxalites on 1 October 2003, at Alipiri, near Tirupati, in Andhra Pradesh. 25. K. Srinivas Reddy, ‘Extremist resurgence’, Frontline, Chennai, accessed at http://www.frontlineonnet.com/f12021/stories/20031024003602000. htm, 11–12 October 2003. 26. ‘Naidu Goes for Snap Polls’, accessed at http://www.samachar.com/features/151103/editorial.html, 15 November 2003. 27. Advani was speaking in Hyderabad. See a wire report circulated by Press Trust of India (PTI), 24 October 2004. 28. See the common minimum programme of the UPA government, agreed upon by all the alliance partners. Adopted later by the government as the National Common Minimum Programme (NCMP), accessed at http://www.pmindia.nic.in/cmp.htm.

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6 Political Bases and Dimensions of the Naxalite Movement Sanjay K. Jha

Introduction There has been a recent upsurge in the Maoist movement in India. This is evident from the continuous expansion of the Naxalites’ area of influence, the unification of Naxalite groups and greater ideological coherence, encouraged by the perceived success of Maoism in Nepal, as also due to the activities of several front organisations in the last few years.1 The most significant manifestation of this ideological synergy was the merger of the MCCI and the CPI(ML)[PW] to form the CPI (Maoist), in September 2004. Separately, they were the two most powerful groups, accounting for about 88 per cent of the country-wide Naxalite violence and 90 per cent of the resultant deaths.2 The merger could well herald the beginning of a new phase in the history of Left-wing extremism in India. As it is, statements by senior leaders of these groups suggest that they have been making a concerted effort to consolidate all ‘revolutionary splinter groups’ to forge a single formidable party.3 There are indications that some other Left-wing extremist groups, such as the Andhra Pradesh-based CPI(ML) (Janasakthi) and the CPI(ML) (Naxalbari)—an erstwhile faction of the CPI(ML) (Red Flag) active in West Bengal—might join the new party. According to some media reports, some of the Naxal groups in the

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POLITICAL BASES AND DIMENSIONS country planned to merge at a unity session that was to have been held in Vijayawada, Andhra Pradesh, in January 2005. But, for reasons unknown, the meeting was cancelled.4 Such an all inclusive merger undoubtedly holds the threat of further expansion and intensification of Maoist violence to newer areas. Indicative of this is the escalation of violence in Bihar and Jharkhand where, in the past, both the groups (MCCI and PWG) had been engaged in internecine clashes. For example, Bihar, where Maoists are active in 31 of the 38 districts, was the worst-affected state in 2004, with 155 Naxalite-related killings being reported between January and November, 2004. Jharkhand, where Maoists are active in 16 of the 22 districts, ranked second with 150 fatalities against 117, in 2003.5 In both the states, the intensity and scale of violence has risen after the merger. The pattern of violence also demonstrates that Left-wing extremism has been spreading to newer areas in the recent past. Political Objective Armed agrarian revolution The ultimate political objective behind this consolidation and expansion, according to various senior Naxalite leaders, is to build a Leftist alternative and mobilise the people on issues such as increased ‘imperialist intervention’ and ‘pro-imperialist policies’ pursued by the Union government. And, the whole process would be in support of ‘revolutionary war’ based on Chinese leader Mao Zedong’s theory of organised peasant insurrection, which has been a premiere illustration of revolutionary warfare, and inspired similar movements in different parts of the world.6 A cursory glance at the trajectory of the movement since 1967 demonstrates that the Naxalites have remained quite consistent in their commitment to their core ideology. This is true despite the fact that there has been a continuous evolution of their understanding of the Indian situation, the focus of the movement, its character and their fighting capabilities and financial resources. They reject the parliamentary system of governance and want to bring about a fundamental 63

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SANJAY K. JHA change in the nature of the Indian State. Their strategy of a protracted armed struggle towards this end entails the following stages: building up bases in rural and remote areas; transforming them first into guerrilla zones and then into liberated zones; area-wise seizure of power; encirclement of cities; and finally seizing political power at the centre and achieving nationwide victory.7 The pattern of their expansion in various parts of the country also illustrates the above. At the initial stage, their front organisations work with the common people. Once these groups carve out support among the populace, they start penetrating state structures, either through coercion or through a collaborative arrangement with a section of local government officials, contractors and politicians. In some areas, they perform many of the tasks of the state and run parallel administration, including collection of ‘taxes’, and holding of jan adalats (people’s courts).8 The erstwhile PWG claimed that it has established seven guerrilla zones in the country.9 These are in the Dandakaranya forests in central India, north and south Telengana region and Nallamala forests in Andhra Pradesh, nine districts in the Andhra Pradesh–Orissa border region, Magadh–Koel–Kaimur in Bihar and Balaghat–Gondia districts bordering Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra. The erstwhile MCCI, too, claimed to have formed guerrilla zones in Bhagwanganj and Sigori areas in Patna district, Konch and Imamganj areas in Gaya district of Bihar Palamu and Garhwa areas of Jharkhand. Not surprisingly, under the new CPI (Maoist) dispensation, armed struggle would remain the foremost form of struggle, the ‘army’ would form the bulk and the main force of the organisation and mass activities and political mobilisation would be undertaken precisely to serve the cause of war.10 The maiden press communiqué issued by the CPI (Maoist) clearly underlines this strategy. It said that its immediate programme would be to ‘overthrow the semi-colonial, semi-feudal rule of the big landlord–comprador bureaucratic bourgeoise classes, and imperialism that backs them, through [an] armed struggle and to establish the people’s democratic state under the leadership of proletariat—the new democratic state in place of it, by smashing the reactionary auto64

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POLITICAL BASES AND DIMENSIONS cratic state.’11 Therefore, the primary task of the party would be to transform the existing People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA) into a full-fledged People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and transform the existing guerrilla zones into base areas. The two ‘guerrilla armies’ of the CPI(ML)[PW] and the MCCI—the People’s Guerrilla Army (PGA) and the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA)—have reportedly been merged under the name of the PLGA from 2 December 2004. It is important to examine the significance of the merger, particularly when earlier attempts were not successful.12 In fact, the merger and the conceptualisation of this line is a result of a gradual convergence of views of these two groups on aspects such as the role of the party and approaches to revolution. During their time, Charu Mazumdar and Kanai Chatterjee, the supreme leaders of the CPI(ML) and MCC respectively, represented two irreconcilably different lines and approaches to ‘revolution’. At the time of the formation of the CPI(ML), in 1969, the Daakshin Desh, the earlier avatar of the MCC, remained opposed to the process due to sharp differences with the CPI(ML). They differed on issues such as the formation of a communist party, the existence of a revolutionary mass struggle and the preparedness of the people to participate in it. The erstwhile PWG, based on its assessment of people’s preparedness for an armed struggle, discarded total annihilation of ‘class enemies’ as the only form of struggle and stressed on floating mass organisations. It established several front organisations. During the 1980s, the Radical Students Union and Rytu Coolie Sanghaam had emerged as organisations with an impressive mass following and most of the erstwhile PWG’s present base and political cadres had evolved through that practice. However, during the 1990s, a growing militarisation of the then PWG could be noticed. The formation of the People’s Guerrilla Army (PGA), special guerrilla squads, Permanent Action Teams (PAT) and Special Action Teams (SAT) have been distinctive features of the erstwhile PWG’s activities in the last few years.13 After the formation of the CPI (Maoist), PWG critiques have pointed out that, while it seems to have retained the organisational command of the new body, the ideological–political perspective and orientation of the new party seems to be heavily influenced by the MCCI’s war-focussed variety of Maoism.14 65

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SANJAY K. JHA Moreover, available evidence suggests that operational compulsions and external factors also facilitated the unification of the two outfits. For example, intense police operations in Jharkhand, and the vigorous implementation of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) forced both the groups to enter into a strategic alliance and refrain from encroaching upon one another’s territory.15 In November 2002, a joint statement issued by the two groups at Patna stated that the indiscriminate use of POTA against activists and sympathisers of Naxalite groups by the Jharkhand government had ‘compelled them to iron out differences’ and fight jointly against state machinery. Also, since 2001, when the move for unification intensified, there has been increasing evidence of the emergence of operational linkages between the erstwhile MCCI and the Nepalese Maoists, known formally as the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M). The erstwhile MCCI started expanding its presence to the border areas in northern Bihar and Uttar Pradesh to facilitate movement of cadres and arms. Reports in November 2001 said that a leader of the CPN-M, Ravindra Thakur, met with some unidentified leaders of the then MCCI in Gaya to discuss the expansion plan. The latter went one step further to impart training to 53 CPN-M cadres in Hazaribagh and Chalho ranges in Aurangabad district.16 Besides, a top erstwhile MCCI leader, Pramod Mishra, is said to have visited Nepal in 2001 to discuss procurement of sophisticated weapons from the CPN-M.17 To give shape to their expansionist strategy in north Bihar, the then MCCI and PWG had formed the ‘Bihar–UP–MP Simant Regional Committee’ and ‘North Bihar Zonal Committee’. This apart, they have also formed ‘Utpirit Mukti Vahini’, in Bettiah in Bihar.18 The ultimate purpose of this understanding was to carve out a Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ)—a ‘red corridor’—spreading from Nepal through Bihar and the Dandakaranya region to Andhra Pradesh.19 The CRZ was conceptualised as a prelude to the further expansion of Maoism to virgin territories. Organisations such as the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organisations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA) and Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM), are believed to have acted as facilitators in this unification move.

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POLITICAL BASES AND DIMENSIONS Therefore, the circumstances leading to the merger of the PWG and the MCCI, and the programme of the CPI (Maoist), suggest the that the key strategy of Maoists will be to escalate violence and expand into newer areas. Developments in the recent past have suggested that they have been able to implement this strategy to a considerable extent. The pattern of Maoist expansion in the last few years confirms that both the groups have been making strenuous efforts to expand their areas of influence with an increasing measure of understanding and co-ordination. From 55 districts across nine states in the country in November 2003, the Maoists have been able to expand into as many as 156 districts spreading across 13 states by September 2004.20 Although Bihar, Jharkhand, Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh remained the worst-affected, Naxalite activities were also reported from Orissa, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Uttaranchal, Tamil Nadu and Kerala. In terms of fatalities, too, Naxal violence registered an upswing in the year 2004. Speaking in parliament on 14 December 2004, the Minister of State for Home Affairs Sriprakash Jaiswal said that Naxal violence had claimed 518 lives, including 420 civilians and 98 security force personnel, during the year, until 30 November 2004, while there were 513 deaths during the previous year.21 Andhra peace process If, as the Maoists profess, everything is supposed to serve their military strategy, where does the current peace process in Andhra Pradesh fit in their overall scheme? Even as it would be premature, at this juncture, to comment on the prospects for a negotiated settlement in Andhra Pradesh, there are indications that the peace process has run into trouble. While the government says it would continue with the talks, CPI (Maoist) State Secretary Ramakrishna and CPI(ML) Janashakti State Secretary Amar, in a statement issued on 17 January 2005, said that they were pulling out of the peace talks following the ‘repression let loose by the state police’.22 They were referring to the killings of a number of Naxalites in police encounters, which began a few days earlier.

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SANJAY K. JHA It appears that the Andhra Pradesh government is under the impression that negotiations would eventually culminate in the Maoists giving up their armed struggle to join the mainstream. Some analysts also view the talks as a turning point for the Maoists before they take to mass political activities, including participation in elections.23 The crucial question is: Will the Maoists disband their armed struggle if the Andhra Pradesh government was to meet their demands? The outfit has repeatedly said, in no uncertain terms, that it has no plans to lay down arms, either during or after the peace process, and the ongoing peace process does not show any signs that the organisation is deviating from the war path.24 In an interview to Telugu daily Vaarta, senior CPI (Maoist) leader Prakash categorically said: ‘Our immediate aim is to capture state power through [an] armed struggle by waging a people’s war based on Marxism–Leninism–Maoism. Our ultimate aim is to establish communism. This aim is non-negotiable. The talks have nothing to do with this aim of ours. Hence, the question of withdrawal of [the] armed struggle does not arise’.25 According to him, talks are meant to solve people’s problems, but armed struggle would continue till equality in society was achieved and the hold of the bourgeois and affluent sections on governance was eliminated.26 According to some analysts, negotiations have no place in the PWG scheme of things and it entered into negotiations owing to pressure from civil society and the intense losses it has suffered at the hands of the police in the state, especially in its traditional area of domination, the North Telengana Special Zone (NTSZ), a guerrilla zone.27 This is also one of the reasons why the Maoists have not been able to unambiguously articulate their agenda. The demands raised by the CPI (Maoist) during the first round of the peace process in October 2004 included land distribution and restoration of democratic rights; issues related to either the day-to-day problems of the common people and securing of more space for the CPI (Maoist) to operate were also raised. According to a senior leader of the CPI (Maoist), ‘We are going for talks to ensure a relatively democratic atmosphere in the state even if it be for a short while. Our aim is three-fold: one, to provide a democratic space for the oppressed people so that they can enjoy their dem68

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POLITICAL BASES AND DIMENSIONS ocratic right to agitate on their basic issues and to build a democratic movement; two, to reduce the level of violence in society by avoiding civilian targets that had become a norm for the police state; and three, to focus on various people’s issues and also attempt for a democratic resolution of some of the issues through discussions.’28 Apparently, the CPI (Maoist) aims to use negotiations as an instrument to get some of its demands met, thereby projecting itself as pro-people so as to enlarge its support base. Moreover, available evidence suggests that the outfit has used the ‘favourable context’ provided by the government to regroup, consolidate and rearm. Reports of land grabbing, armed Naxalites roaming freely in villages, holding public meetings, carrying out recruitments, extortions and training of new recruits and generally strengthening the organisation appeared regularly in the media. In the past too, the Maoists have tactfully used such peace periods as an opportunity to regroup, consolidate and expand. For example, during the failed peace process in 2002, the PWG used the opportunity to regroup and enhance its operational capabilities. Earlier, during the regime of Chief Ministers N. T. Rama Rao29 and M. Channa Reddy (1989–90), too, the PWG utilised the respite provided by the government to revitalise the organisation.30 Political Space for Naxalism What will the Maoists gain by giving up the armed struggle? Indeed, if they did, they would be no different from other left groupings, whom the Maoists hold in contempt as revisionists. The Maoists would lose all credibility as a revolutionary party. But the more important question is: do they have the potential to emerge as a significant political force? They seem to have drawn lessons from the experiences of the earlier phase of the Naxalite movement. Some Naxalite groups came over-ground and have been participating with ‘limited’ success in electoral politics. For instance, the CPI(ML) (Liberation), which came overground in 1992 has not since been able to emerge as a significant political force, even in parts of Bihar where it has a considerable mass base. Mainstream left parties such as the CPI and CPI(M) have also gone through a process of 69

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SANJAY K. JHA evolution due to various external and internal factors. In fact, due to their excessive reliance on underground activities and violence, the Naxalite groups have been reduced to an insignificant political force in the current Indian political scenario. They lack any decisive power to tilt the balance of forces in favour of the revolutionary transformation of Indian society. The class solidarity of the Indian poor has always had a fragile base and the Naxalites have not been able to mobilise this section. Communal and caste considerations have had far greater influence and success, as is evident from the ease with which mainstream political parties mobilise the Indian masses. Despite these shortcomings, democracy in India has resulted in the evolution of institutions that offer instruments of empowerment to the poor, which have proved to be far more effective than the methods propagated by the Naxalites. In fact, the politics of violence often works against the interests of those working towards a pluralistic and democratic society. For these reasons, many scholars have questioned the effectiveness of the Naxalites’ methods for bringing about any basic change in the society.31 Does the present political posturing of the Naxalites indicate an ideological crisis, or a calculated long-term strategy? According to Sumanta Banerjee, a well-known scholar on the Naxalites: ‘The disquieting trends in the movement today are actually manifestations of a deeper ideological crisis that has overtaken the old strategy and tactics of the leadership. Naxalite groups’ belief in violent revolution as a protracted process of the Chinese model remained unchanged. What was appropriate in Mao’s China in the 1930s cannot be replicated in India in the 21st century. The crucial enabling factors for the survival of the Naxalites are a new broadbased socialist movement with new organisational strategies, which would carry them forward into a wider political arena.’32 The most important lesson that could be drawn from the Naxalite movement, as Biplab Dasgupta, a well-known analyst of the Naxalite movement, has pointed out, is: ‘It is suicidal to adopt a particular prototype of revolution without judging its relevance to the history, culture, social and economic conditions and political realities of the countries concerned.’33 What, then, is the likely trajectory of the movement? There is a limit to how far they can go if the Naxals insist on pursuing a military strategy and 70

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POLITICAL BASES AND DIMENSIONS expanding their area of influence. Even if they were able to expand into virgin territories, how far can they proceed? Their ultimate success will depend far more on expanding their social base. The Naxalite groups have been able to reconcile their strategy with their grass roots activities and have continued to enjoy the support of a sizeable social base due to a number of factors. In each state, Naxalism has grown through a complex interaction with the local milieu and a number of factors have sustained this relationship. Some of these are rooted in the socio-economic conditions of the people and the failure of the civil administration in rural and tribal areas to fulfil the basic duties of addressing the day-to-day problems of the common people. The areas in which the Naxalite groups are active are marked by widespread poverty, unemployment, lack of economic development, poor civil governance, existence of powerful traditional structures of exploitation and an underequipped police force. In many areas, state institutions, including law enforcement agencies, have virtually ceased to exist, or at best have a nominal presence. The result is a near stoppage of economic and social development work, the absence of an effective mechanism at the grass roots level to redress grievances and to channel people’s dissatisfaction into other forms of protest. The mainstream political parties have not left the people with any political space to articulate their problems. It is this vacuum—this absence of a viable alternative—that the Naxalites have been able to fill. They exploit to the full the failure of the various state governments on issues such as land rights, minimum wages, education and rights of the tribal population, through a string of front organisations of students, youth, industrial workers, women and cultural activists. In some of their strongholds, they have taken charge of many tasks of the state and have been running parallel governments and are engaged in development programmes such as laying irrigation facilities and providing primary healthcare, besides demanding the full benefits of government programmes for the tribal population.34 It is a generally accepted belief today that Naxalism is rooted in the economic and social deprivation of common people and the state’s abdication of its fundamental duties. According to Biplab Dasgupta: ‘The most fundamental factor behind the birth of Naxalism was the 71

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SANJAY K. JHA existing socio-economic conditions in the country. Naxalism was one of several alternative forms in which the dissatisfaction of the people with their living conditions found expression in this period.’35 Underlining the basic causes behind the origin and growth of Naxalism in India, Sumanta Banerjee says: ‘The continuity of the ML movement is explained by the persistence and exacerbation of the basic causes that gave it birth: feudal exploitation, rural poverty, the Indian state’s recourse to repression to silence the protests of the rural poor and its bondage to two superpowers to maintain the status quo.’36 Arguing somewhat similarly, another view holds that Naxal violence is a product of rising democratic consciousness of deprived people.37 Some other scholars have attempted to link the movement with the self-respect of the downtrodden. According to Prakash Louis: ‘The militant peasant movements have wrested for the poor and the landless peasants their legitimate place in society. They have forced the landlords, government officials [and] politicians that they cannot take the toiling masses for granted anymore, that the downtrodden will resist oppression. A substantive outcome of the protracted agrarian movements has been that the landlords have been forced to come to certain compromise with the lower caste agricultural labourers after prolonged bitter battles.’38 Dynamics of Violence Despite the existence of a strong social and economic justification, it is not clear if there is a causal relationship between poverty, lack of economic development and persistence of violence. An analysis of Naxalite activities, their mobilisation strategy, the widening gap between their stated objective and activities on the ground and the growing criminalisation indicate a complex pattern of violence, which is gradually becoming self-sustaining. In this context, Ajai Sahni, a renowned counter-insurgency analyst, points out that once a conflict establishes itself and attains a certain level, it acquires a dynamic purely of its own, one that is self-sustaining unless forcefully and forcibly disrupted. He quotes Paul Wilkinson and says: ‘rebellions do not generally just fade away. They have to be put down ruthlessly and effectively if normal life and business are to be restored.’39 72

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POLITICAL BASES AND DIMENSIONS This is evident from the emergence of various stakeholders— through linkages between a section of the political leaders, businessmen and contractors—in order to share the huge financial incentives offered by Naxalism. These networks facilitate smooth flow of finances through extortion, leakage of development funds, illegal exploitation of forest resources and other criminal activities.40 Though there has been no empirical study to quantify the underground economy generated by Naxalism, some estimates put it at hundreds of crores of rupees. There is considerable evidence to suggest that Naxalite groups claim a large cut in government expenditure through imposing ‘levies’ on government projects in their areas of dominance. There were many reports in the media indicating that, to execute any development work in the affected areas in Bihar and Jharkhand, the contractors have to pay 30 per cent of the allotted money as commission to the local ‘area commander’ of the Naxalites. In some areas, the Naxalite ‘collection’ is far higher than the commercial tax collected by the government.41 According to some other media reports, in some parts of Jharkhand, many government officials do not even attend their offices due to the threat posed by the Naxals of the area. But the government’s funds are being used up.42 The extortion business has become so lucrative that, in many areas, unemployed youth and petty criminals posing as Naxalites are finding it an easy way to make money. The lure of money, and the diminishing role of ideology, has affected the Naxalite movement at the grass roots level. This has led to a growing criminalisation of the cadre base, a trend that is most visible in Bihar. The common cadres, who have very little education and lack proper indoctrination, are more involved with local issues, a tendency which is against Naxalite ideology. With arms in their possession, these young, lower-rung Naxalites more often than not behave like ordinary hoodlums and criminals. A case in point is the killing of a forest service officer, Sanjay Singh, in Bihar on 15 February 2002. Arrested and interrogated, MCCI ‘regional commander’ Nathuni Mistry said that the killing was planned by the local forest mafia and executed by the local MCCI ‘area commander’.43 Some media reports had earlier indicated the involvement of the MCCI itself, but the outfit came out with an outright denial. This 73

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SANJAY K. JHA is not a lone case of degeneration, of deviation from the Naxalite line. Caste consideration and the criminal background of some local Naxal leaders also play a powerful, influential role. About 40 Dalits were killed in the Masaurhi– Bhagwanganj–Dhanarua area in Patna district because of the rivalry between Jainandan Yadav, a former PWG Naxalite with a criminal background, and the PWG.44 The growing criminalisation of the cadre and an overlap of voluntary and coercive mobilisation make it very difficult to assess the level of popular support the Naxals enjoy. To add to the problem, there are hardly any reliable empirical studies to measure the level of support or to weigh the reasons for the common people joining the movement. A preliminary survey of media reports indicates that, apart from ideology, there are many complex local reasons which impel the common people to join Naxal ranks. In some areas, people admire the Naxalites simply because they wield enormous power in the villages. For some, joining the Naxal ranks gives them a sense of power, particularly to those belonging to the downtrodden sections of the society. In some areas, the Naxalites are a source of inspiration for physically exploited women. In many cases, the reason goes straight down to the stomach. Joining the Naxals is the one sure way out of hunger and starvation. Even among the poorer sections, the support base is not evenly distributed. There have been a number of instances where the local populace protested against Naxal violence. In fact, in many areas, their support base is shrinking. Linkages with mainstream political parties have also helped the Naxal groups to grow. There are reports of such linkages with regard to both the erstwhile PWG and MCCI.45 Naxalite activities during elections also suggests that their stated objectives have little role to play as far as grass roots mobilisation of electoral support is concerned. In a state like Bihar, caste remains, arguably, the most important factor in political mobilisation and its impact has been visible in the organisational structure, mobilisation strategy and activities of Naxalite groups. Though the CPI (Maoist) had officially declared that the continuance in power of the ruling Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) was against the interest of the party, in the same breath it admitted that the Naxalites and the RJD ‘share the same social base’. It has also reportedly alleged that 74

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POLITICAL BASES AND DIMENSIONS Laloo Prasad Yadav attempted to bribe its cadre and activists by providing incentives—government contracts and projects.46 Muscle power plays a critical role in elections in these states and the enormous clout wielded by Naxalite groups at the grass roots level has been one of the crucial instruments of influence in the electoral process. In Jharkhand, according to one estimate, the Naxalites have the capability to influence elections in some 54 of the 81 assembly constituencies.47 Not surprisingly, the Naxalite groups often use their influence to consolidate support for candidates or political formations that would make things easier for Naxalite operations after the elections. The resulting ambivalence has meant that their boycott calls have little or no impact on voter turnouts. Thus, for instance, during the April 2004 parliamentary election in Jharkhand, where the pre-poll campaign was marred by a series of attacks on security force personnel, the voter turnout was recorded at 55.71 per cent. Even in some of the worst-affected districts, including Palamu, Hazaribagh, Singhbhum and Lohardaga, the voter turnout ranged between 49 and 60 per cent. Similarly, many Naxalite dominated areas in Bihar registered an impressive voter turnout. There were reports, moreover, that these groups have themselves contested the elections through proxies. For example, during the panchayat (village council) elections in 2001, activists of both the erstwhile PWG and MCCI contested from Jehanabad district. In the parliamentary elections of April 2004, a former ‘sub-zonal commander’ of the MCCI, Ramlal Oraon alias Veer Bhagat, contested as an independent candidate from one of the worst Naxalite-affected constituencies, Chatra in Jharkhand. The voter turnout in some of the worst-affected assembly segments was the highest in the last 20 years.48 In Andhra Pradesh, too, the nexus with politicians has helped the Naxalites to grow stronger. Testifying before the Advocate’s Committee on Naxalite Terrorism in Andhra Pradesh, many political leaders admitted that there exists an ‘active politician–Naxalite nexus’.49 The Naxal groups have persistently exploited such favourable situations to consolidate their position in the state. The PWG’s relations with Andhra’s dominant political parties have been ambiguous. Each of them have, from time to time, found it expedient 75

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SANJAY K. JHA to seek extremist support to secure an electoral advantage, as have many individual politicians.50 Conclusion Given the trajectory of the Naxalite movement in India and the complex pattern of violence, the CPI (Maoist) is likely to continue with its agenda of escalating violence and expanding to newer areas. Apart from the traditional strongholds of the movement in Andhra Pradesh, Jharkhand, Bihar and Chhattisgarh, the authorities face further security challenges from further consolidation and expansion of Naxal activities to newer areas in Orissa, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, and Chhttaisgarh. Moreover, the movement has gained strength by the merger of Naxalite groups and the greater ideological coherence provided by CCOMPOSA, RIM and other front organisations. Any further consolidation of forces to concretise the idea of the CRZ into reality would give a boost to Left-wing extremist groups, besides making the Naxalite movement in India more violent than ever before. However, in the long run, the impact of the merger will depend on the extent to which unity percolates down to the cadre level, particularly because they had resisted earlier moves at unification. Incidentally, in Bihar and Jharkhand where they have operated on common territory, the history of their relations is marked by internecine violence. The divisive factors might resurface again and undermine the unity. Many see in the increased military strength, following the merger, the seeds of future conflict over the control of the huge resources in Jharkhand. Negotiations in Andhra Pradesh have provided a good opportunity for the government. The state government could gainfully utilise this opportunity to reach out to Naxal-affected areas and make the civil administration more responsive. Purposeful governance, specially targeted at the neglected rural areas would be the ideal beginning and the present government is in a better position to do that. Unlike his predecessor, the present chief minister has been able to identify himself with 76

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POLITICAL BASES AND DIMENSIONS the rural population. If he can translate his image into meaningful policy interventions, the current peace process could prove to be an effective instrument to counter Naxalism. The networking of the Maoist organisations and their growing activities in border areas—both interstate and in the India–Nepal border area—requires the individual states to find a way to contain or eliminate such networks which extend beyond their jurisdiction. Any strategy to this end would be effective only if two conditions are fulfilled. First, there must be a common understanding among all the concerned states in India, as also with Nepal, on the nature and trajectory of the violence, group dynamics, their support structures and external linkages. Second, a series of coordinated responses needs to be initiated against this challenge. Such joint responses must come as part of a comprehensive strategy, which should also address the underlying economic and socio-political issues which give rise to, and sustain, such movements. Notes and References 1. Prominent among such organisations which have been active are the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organisations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA), the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM), the World People’s Resistance Movement, South Asia (WPRM, South Asia), the Krantikari Jansangarsh Ekjutta Samiti and outfits involved in the Mumbai Resistance 2004. For example, Maoists in South Asia formed the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organisations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA) in 2001. The objective of this Maoist front is to ‘share experience’ and help the spread of Maoist campaign to various parts of the region. Apart from the CCOMPOSA, the RIM, which came into existence in 1984, has also been trying to coordinate the activities of Maoist parties in South Asia. 2. Annual Report (2003–04), Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, accessed at http://www.mha.nic.in/AR0304-Eng.pdf. 3. ‘Joint interview of the general secretaries of the Erstwhile CPI (ML) (PW) and the MCCI on the occasion of the merger of the two parties and the formation of the Communist Party of India (Maoist)’, People’s March,

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SANJAY K. JHA Volume 5, No. 11–12, accessed at http://www.peoplesmarch.com/archives/ 2004/nov-dec2k4/interview.htm, November–December 2004. 4. ‘Naxal Groups to Unite in January Next: Ramachandran’, accessed at http://www.manoramaonline.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=mano rama/MmArticle/CommonFullStory&c=MmArticle&cid=1095671018108 &channel=News&p=1002194839100&count=7 20040922. 5. According to a statement in Parliament by the union minister of state for home on 14 December 2004. See, ‘Maoist Violence Claims 518 lives: Jaiswal’, http://www.newindpress.com/NewsItems.asp? ID=IEP200412 14093514 &Page=P&Title=States&Topic=0&. Also, see Annual Report 2003-04, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, at http://www.mha.nic.in/ AR0304-Eng.pdf. 6. There have been many instances of ‘revolutionary warfare’ inspired by Chinese leader Mao. For example, insurgents in Peru, Vietnam, Thailand, Nepal, and India have held up Mao’s approach as that providing guidance for their campaign. 7. Op. cit., n. 3. Also see, People’s War Group (PWG), at http://www.satp. org/ satporgtp/countries/india/terroristoutfits/PWG.htm. 8. Dipak Mishra, ‘Extremist Violence in Bihar on the Rise’, at http://www.timesofindia.com/290500/29indi26.htm. 9. For the PWG, the base area is one in which organisational work is conducted; in a guerrilla zone, the PWG and the state are said to be equally placed, and in a liberated zone, the PWG holds a dominant position while the state is said to be scurrying for cover. It is similar to Mao’s three phases of revolution: strategic defensive, strategic stalemate and strategic offensive. 10. ‘Press statement: CPI (ML)(PWG) and MCCI Merged: Communist Party of India (Maoist) Emerged’, People’s March, Volume 5, No. 11–12, at http://www.peoplesmarch.com/archives/ 2004/ nov-dec2k4/Merged.htm, November–December 2004. 11. Ibid. 12. Earlier attempts to forge a unified Maoist front were not successful. Towards the end of 1988, the MCC and the PWG issued a joint appeal to enlist support for their objectives of raising armed units and establishing struggle areas. In September 1993, the PWG, the MCC and the CPI(ML) (Party Unity) decided to join hands and intensify Naxalite movement in

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POLITICAL BASES AND DIMENSIONS Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Maharashtra and other states. These groups together constituted the All India People’s Resistance Forum to build and develop a powerful anti-feudal and anti-imperialist forum. The MCC and the CPI(ML) (Party Unity), which merged with the PWG in 1998 in Bihar have, in the past, tried to join hands. However, the result of these moves was not very encouraging. The move for unity gained momentum after the PWG entered Bihar after a merger with the CPI(ML) (Party Unity) in 1998. The process to bury differences to fight the ‘common enemy’ reportedly started in 1999. Though separate decisions were made by the MCC and the PWG in January and March 2000 to end conflict, the results were not encouraging due to opposition from some of the top leaders of the MCC and clashes between the cadres at the grassroots level. 13. In response to a government decision to launch co-ordinated action against the Naxalites by police forces of the various Indian states affected by Naxal violence, the PWG formed the PGA, its military wing, in December 2000 by reorganizing its guerrilla force. The PGA functions under a single operational command, the Central Military Commission. In the Indian state where the PGA has a presence, there is a State Military Commission and in special guerrilla zones there is a Zonal Military Commission. A Regional Military Commission supervises a group of State Military Commissions or Zonal Military Commissions. Each Regional Military Commission reports to the Central Military Commission. All armed cadre of the PWG are organised under the PGA. See, ‘People’s Guerrilla Army’ at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/ india/terroristoutfits/peoples_guerrilla_arms_left_wing_extremists.htm. 14. ‘State-Maoist Encounter: Beyond the Euphoria of Merger and Truce’, assemble at http://www.cpiml.org/liberation/year_2004/November/commentary_merger_truce.htm. 15. In Jharkhand, one of the highest number of cases were registered under the POTA. See, Sanjay K. Jha, ‘Jharkhand: Anti-Naxal Strategy and Use of POTA’, at http://www.ipcs.org/nmt_militaryIndex2.jsp?action= showView &kValue=976&military=1016& status=article& mod=b. 16. ‘Extremists Working Under Camouflage’, The Times of India, Patna edition, 7 November 2001. 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid.

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SANJAY K. JHA 19. In an extraordinary meeting on Left-wing extremism held in Delhi on 4 2000, the then Home Minister, L. K. Advani, drew particular attention of the states towards availability of intelligence inputs suggesting a possible growth of a CRZ in the near future stretching an area from IndoNepal border to Andhra Pradesh through the Dandakaranya region. See, ‘Meeting of Union Home Minister with Chief Ministers on Left Wing Extremism’, at http://mha.nic.in/pr0400.htm. 20. See, Ajai Sahni, ‘Bad Medicine for a Red Epidemic’, South Asia Intelligence Review, Vol. 3, No. 12, 4 October 2004, at http://www.satp. org/satporgtp/sair/ Archives/3_12.htm. Also see, ‘About 45 per cent of India Under Terror Shadow’, The Times of India, New Delhi, 8 December 2004. 21. Maoist violence claims 518 lives: Jaiswal, at http://www.newindpress.com/ NewsItems.asp?ID=IEP20041214093514&Page=P&Title=States&Topic=0& Also see, Annual Report 2003–04, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, at http://www.mha.nic.in/AR0304-Eng.pdf. 22. Syed Amin Jafri, ‘AP: Maoists Pull Out of Peace Talks’, at http://us.rediff.com/news/2005/jan/17ap.htm. 23. Kuldip Nayar, ‘Rebels, not Criminals Approach this Disaffected Community in a Spirit of Conciliation’, at http://www.indianexpress.com/ full_story.php?content_id=62016. 24. ‘Naxalites Talk, Wielding Guns’, at http://www.telegraphindia.com/1040 921/ asp/nation/story_3783072.asp. 25. ‘No Illusions- Something Drastic would Emerge out of the Talks! If Government Violates Cease-Fire We Will Fight Back by Intensifying the People’s War!!’ People’s March, Volume 5, No. 9, at http://www.peoplesmarch.com/archives/2004/sept2k4/No%20Illusions.htm, September 2004. 26. G. Narasimha Rao, ‘PW to Continue Struggle for “Just Society”’, The Hindu, 21 September 2004. 27. P. V. Ramana, ‘Peace with PWG Naxals: A Wishful Exercise?’ http://www.observerindia.com/analysis/A213.htm. 28. Ibid. 29. N.T. Rama Rao was chief minister from 1983 to 1989 except for a brief period between 16 August 1984 and 16 September 1984 when N. Bhaskara Rao was chief minister. During his second tenure, from 1985 to

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POLITICAL BASES AND DIMENSIONS 1989, he was forced to take a tough stand against the PWG in view of an escalation in Naxalite violence. 30. Ajai Sahni, ‘Naxalism: Retreat of Civil Governance’, Faultlines: Wrintings on Conflict and Resolution, New Delhi, Volume 5, May 2000. 31. C.P. Bhambhri, ‘Maoism: a Failed Ideology’, The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 21 May 1999. 32. Sumanta Banerjee, ‘Naxalbari: Between Past and Future’, at http://www.epw.org.in/showArticles.php?root=2002&leaf=06&filename=4521&filetype=htm. 33. Prakash Singh, The Naxalite Movement in India, New Delhi: Rupa, 1995, p. 144. 34. Manoranjan Mohanty, ‘This Civil War is Growing’, The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 27 February 2000. 35. Biplab Dasgupta, The Naxalite Movement, Bombay: Allied, 1975, p. 211. 36. Sumanta Banerjee, India’s Simmering Revolution: The Naxalite Uprising, New Delhi: Select Book Service Syndicate, 1984, p. ii. 37. Manoranjan Mohanty, ‘This Civil War is Growing’, The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 27 February 2000. 38. Prakash Louis, The Naxalite Movement in Central Bihar, New Delhi: Wordsmiths, 2002, p. 259. 39. Ajai Sahni, op. cit. 40. Nityanand Shukla, ‘PWG’s tentacles spread far and wide’, at http://www.dailypioneer.com/secon3.asp?cat=\state9&d=STATES. 41. Dipak Mishra, ‘Extremist Violence in Bihar on the Rise’, at http://www.timesofindia.com/290500/29indi26.htm. 42. ‘Naxal Fear Now Blocks Development in Jharkhand’, at http://www. newindpress.com/Newsitems.asp?ID=IEP20011226111356&Title=States&r Link=0\. 43. Ajay Kumar, ‘Changing Face of MCC: Renegades have Upper Hand’, at http://www.bihartimes.com/articles/ajay/mcc_change.html. 44. ‘Masaurhi Carnages Create Panic in RJD’, at http://timesofindia. indiatimes.com/articleshow.asp?art_id=502458702. 45. Mammen Mathew, ‘Bihar: Caste, Politics and Cycle of Strife’, Faultlines: Writings on Conflict and Resolution, Vol. 2, p. 147.

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SANJAY K. JHA 46. Varghese K. George, ‘Maoists Open to Truce with CPI(ML) but not Poll Pact’, at http://www.indianexpress.com/full_story.php?content_id=62424. 47. ‘Pradesh ke 54 vidhan sabha kshetron mein matdan ki disha modne ki kshamta rakhte hain ugravadi’, at http://ind.jagran.com/newssite/citynews.asp? cityid=132&Ipageno=7&stateid=8. 48. Dainik Jagran, Ranchi, 6 January 2005. 49. The committee was formed by an order of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, dated 4 April 1997 on writ petition no. 6829/97, ‘to delve into the problem from various stipulated angles and submit its report and recommendations’. See report of the Advocates’ Committee on Naxalite Terrorism in Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad. K. Pratap Reddy, Senior Advocate headed the committee. Quoted in Ajai Sahni, op. cit. 50. Ajai Sahni, op. cit; Also see, P.V. Ramana, ‘Nexus with Politicians Helping the PWG’, at http://www.observerindia.com/analysis/A025.htm.

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7 Approaches to the Naxalite Movement V. K. Padmanabhan

Karl Marx, in his writings, did not show the way in which a revolutionary struggle could be conducted amidst non-European agraria for the achievement of socialism. It was the Russian Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, with Vladimir Ilyich Lenin as its principal architect, which validated the theory that Marxism could prevail in an Asiatic society too. The success of the Maoist Revolution in 1949 in China confirmed the process of social change associated with communism. Since then, neoMarxists have been exuding a pulsating zeal for violent means to achieve political transformation and social change in the third world.1 The Russian Revolution provided the impetus to Left-wing forces in India to establish the CPI, on 26 December 1925. However, within the CPI there were sharp divisions over the characterisation of the national bourgeoisie in India, and the role that they could be accorded in the socialist revolution and reconstruction. But, India achieving independence in 1947 and the CPI coming to power in Kerala within a decade (1957) was, indeed, outside the Marxian framework of social change. Similarly, the Sino–Soviet rift was contrary to the tenets of Marxian internationalism. There being no Marxist principles in these areas to guide the CPI, there were differences of opinion over questions of strategy and tactics of revolution in India, leading to a split in 1964.

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V. K. PADMANABHAN However, the formation of the CPI(M) did not set the problem at rest. Within the CPI(M) too, there were two groups: the majority of the politburo members advocated the extension across the country of the Kerala experiment of electoral participation, while a minority was opposed to any such deviation. In West Bengal, on 2 March 1967, the day on which the CPI(M)-led United Front Ministry assumed office, extremist ideologues organised ‘landless peasants’ revolts in three places in Darjeeling District—Naxalbari, Kharbari and Phansidewa. These extremists formed themselves into small insurrectionary groups in many states in India and came to be known as ‘Naxalites’. Later, in May 1969, these groups, belonging to various parts of the country (except Andhra Pradesh), met secretly in Calcutta and founded the third Communist Party in the country and named it the Communist Party of India (Marxist–Leninist), or CPI(ML) under the leadership of Charu Mazumdar and Kanu Sanyal.2 L. Appu, who attended the Calcutta convention of the CPI (ML), made an attempt to form a Tamil Nadu unit of the party. Conclaves of Naxalites were held in Ambattur in December 1968 and in Coimbatore in February 1969. At these meetings, it was decided to set up a central committee for the Tamil Nadu state unit. However, no such committee came into being, owing to a bitter dispute between anti-Lin–Piao followers and Lin–Piao strategists in the CPI(ML).3 Thus, in Tamil Nadu, the birth of the Naxalite movement was almost coterminous with the one in West Bengal. However, the movement in Tamil Nadu took much longer to get its act together. The reasons are discussed below. The Naxalites, initially, registered their presence in the traditional base areas of the CPI(M)—Thanjavur, South Arcot, North Arcot, Dharmapuri, Madurai, Ramnad and Tirunelveli districts. Second, the Naxalites had very little support in urban areas, as they had not undertaken any urban guerrilla activities. But their hold on the rural areas was considerable. Since exploitation and injustice was greater in rural areas, it spawned a prolific growth of Naxalite cells. They were concentrated especially in the districts of Coimbatore, Madurai, South Arcot, North Arcot and Dharmapuri. 84

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APPROACHES TO THE NAXALITE MOVEMENT Third, Andhra’s Naxalite group did not have a sizeable presence in Tamil Nadu’s extreme north, where the Andhra populace was an overwhelming majority. Fourth, the rank and file of the Tamil Nadu CPI(M) unit believed in electoral strategy. In West Bengal, the CPI(ML) was a faction of the CPI(M). But in Tamil Nadu, there were no defections from the CPI(M) to the CPI(ML). The 32 Tamil Nadu members who walked out of the National Council of the CPI in April 1964 to form the CPI(M) bluntly refused to espouse the Naxalite cause.4 Fifth, a set pattern was clearly visible in the organisation of the Naxalites in Tamil Nadu. A few spirited, educated youth were indoctrinated in Mao’s thought and Naxalite cells sprang up and functioned around them. L. Arputhaswamy and Lingasamy of Madurai, Rajan of Ramnad, Somanathan of Usilampatti, M. Krishnan and A. Guruswamy of Madurai, Mappilaiswamy of Tirunelveli, I. G. Geetha of Coimbatore, I. M. Sheriff of Avanashi, Kaliaperumal of Pennadam, A. M. Kothandaraman of Cuddalore and Kannamani of North Arcot were the prominent leaders of the Naxalite cells. But these cells could not achieve any worthwhile success in propagating Naxalite philosophy because arms and violence were alien concepts to the illiterate rural populace. In fact, the principle of functioning strictly as a secret, underground organisation greatly hindered the mass line activities of the Naxalites.5 Also, most of these leaders lacked funds for their organisational activities and for buying arms.6 Sixth, both the CPI and the CPI(M) were strongly averse to the emergence of the Naxalite movement in Tamil Nadu. Pratap Misra and Mohit Sen of the CPI argued that the Naxalites were equating revolution with violence and armed struggle, thereby confusing the content with form.7 When the CPI(ML) was launched, the Marxists of West Bengal bent over backwards to accommodate them but, subsequently, ruthlessly suppressed the Naxalite movement. Seventh, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) was in power when Naxalism emerged in Tamil Nadu. DMK chief M. Karunanidhi chided the Naxalites and said: ‘By murdering a few persons here and there the Naxalites cannot create any real revolution.’8 85

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V. K. PADMANABHAN Eighth, M. G. Ramachandran, the chief of the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK), held that ‘no government worth its name could allow a few misguided young men to take the law into their hands and commit lawlessness everywhere’.9 He launched Operation Ajanta to wipe out the Naxalite groups in Tamil Nadu, concentrating on North Arcot and Dharmapuri districts. Ninth, the TDP Government in Andhra Pradesh and the Congress, in Tamil Nadu, and at the Centre viewed Naxalites as incapable of any productive political action. In fact, the then Home Minister, Zail Singh was emphatic that the ‘law and order problems of the Naxalites must be tackled by chief ministers, who were the men on the spot.’10 In 1969, when the Calcutta congress of the CPI(ML) was held, it had no unit in Tamil Nadu. But during the next four years their activities were all pervasive. It goes to the credit of the Naxalites that they brought to the fore the problems of land reforms and wages, tribal life and suppression, casteism and the inability of state power to come to grips with them.11 But its pro-Charu Mazumdar/anti-Lin–Piao strategies and the centrality of Mao’s thought never made any dent in the political atmosphere of Tamil Nadu.12 This made it easy for the established power to treat the Naxalites strictly as a law and order problem.13 The Naxalite movement faced a plethora of difficulties in the state. There were the internal weaknesses of ideology, strategy and organisation, and external pressures emanating from Left-wing forces and other regional and national parties of the state. Explicit Chinese support to the CPI(ML) was not forthcoming, either at the national or state levels. Along with all this, this extremist party’s unswerving belief in the cult of violence invited the wrath of state power. Successive governments in Tamil Nadu, the DMK and the AIADMK, did not hesitate to take recourse to counter-violence. There were three strategies available to the government to deal with the Naxalite movement: the Gandhian way of educating the Naxalites; the institutional way of blocking their financial and human resources; and suppressing and eliminating them by counter-violence. Both the DMK and the AIADMK governments chose the last option. Also, the two parties 86

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APPROACHES TO THE NAXALITE MOVEMENT chose the path of supporting other regional political parties that were addressing the issues of the rural masses. Narayana Samy Naidu’s Peasant’s Party in Dharamapuri blunted the edges of the Naxalite movement in no small measure. By then, instead of aiming at the capture of state power, the Naxalite cells were forced to react to, and focus their attention on, hostile Left-wing forces, regional parties, and the police machinery and their informers. When the Naxalites’ politics of revolution and armed struggle shifted to politics of vengeance, it became easy for the police to eliminate the Naxalite cells in some genuine, and a number of, staged encounters. After some experience, the police became efficient in the three stages of operation: pre-custodial, custodial and post-custodial. While hunting down suspected Naxalites, the police meticulously planned the fake and fatal ‘encounters’. Those who were not killed but captured were treated to inhuman torture during detention. The police never hesitated to use the powers of detention under various Acts (some of which are now defunct). They included the Defence of India Act, 1939, Preventive Detention Act, 1950, Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971, National Security Act, 1980, Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987, and the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 1998. Naxalites were booked under First Information Reports (FIR) that accused them under sections 107, 120A, 121A, 124A, 141, 142, 144, 146, 148, 150, 152, and 157, of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. Sometimes, the premeditated delay in filing the FIR itself and the resultant detentions turned out to be one of worst kind of punishments. The police took its own sweet time going through the process of law where Naxalites were concerned. Legal aid was not denied, but was not encouraged. After prolonged trials, even if the courts discharged the Naxalites as not guilty, the police would be right back charging them afresh in other cases. Quite naturally, the Naxalites came to respond with wrath and vengeance when dealing with the police and their informers. The success and efficiency of the law and order approach adopted by the police was largely dependent on the political matrix in Tamil

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V. K. PADMANABHAN Nadu. In fact, the birth of the AIADMK rendered a serious blow to the ideological intentions of the Naxalites. Even on issues like ‘high caste’ versus ‘low caste’ struggles, the Naxalites failed to carve out any noteworthy support among the downtrodden. However, a significant achievement of the Naxalite movement was the greater fusion of revolutionary literature with dalit, tribal and minority literature. An important question is: could it be possible to extend the law and order approach of Tamil Nadu to contain the Naxalites in other states in India? The answer is an incontrovertible no. The problems and issues of the rural masses differ from state to state. Naxalites, too, adopt different strategies in the various theatres of operation. The personality factor of the Naxalite cells was another complication. Bangladesh played a role in some states and not in others. Some Naxalites cells had fraternal solidarity. Others did not. All these clearly indicate that the political idiom must be worked out first before taking a plunge into the law and order method of suppression through the police machinery. Notes and References 1. M. N. Roy, India in Transition, Bombay: Asia Publishing House, p. 68, 1971. 2. Biplab Dasgupta, The Naxalite Movement, Bombay: Allied Publishers, pp. 38–40, 1974. 3. The Times of India, Bombay, 24 October 1971. 4. The Patriot, New Delhi, 11 April 1970. 5. Charu Mazumdar, ‘March Forward,’ Liberation, vol. 2, no. 3, January 1969. 6. The Statesman, Calcutta, 30 March. 7. Pratap Mitra and Mohit Sen, Communist Party and Naxalites, New Delhi: Communist Party of India, p.77, 1975. 8. The Indian Express, Bombay, 3 November 1980. 9. The Hindu, Madras, 29 September 1980. 10. The Indian Express, 20 October 1980. 11. Sumanta Banerjee, In the Wake of Naxalbari, Calcutta: Subarnarekha, p. 26, 1980.

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APPROACHES TO THE NAXALITE MOVEMENT 12. A. K. Roy, Communism in Asia, Calcutta: Progressive Publishers, pp 50–79, 1976. 13. Shankar Ghosh, The Naxalite Movement: A Maoist Experiment, Calcutta: Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyaya, p.127, 1974.

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8 Revolutionary and CounterRevolutionary Strategies of the Naxalites and the State K. Srinivas Reddy

All men can see individual tactics necessary to conquer, but no one can see the strategy out of which total victory is evolved. —Sun Tzu, ‘The Art of War’ Strategy is simple in concept and complex in application. For the Maoists, devising a strategy is nothing less than a scientific exercise. They take great care in formulating a strategy which, of course, is based on the strong ideological moorings provided by ideologues of Marxist–Leninist–Maoist thought. For them, theory guides programme, programme guides strategy and strategy guides tactics. Undoubtedly, the effective implementation of these strategies and tactics ensure the resilience of the revolutionary movement. These are the essential inputs that guarantee the continuous rumble of the ‘spring thunder’. Pitted against the might of the state, both militarily and politically, the revolutionaries continue to spring surprises, rekindling the movement in areas where one thought that it had been stamped out completely, primarily by the state’s military forces. This

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REVOLUTIONARY AND COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGIES adaptability can directly be attributed to the correct implementation of the strategy. It plays a crucial role in the trajectory of the revolutionary movement, enabling it, after each fall, to rise like a phoenix from the ashes—surviving times of severe suppression—helping the movement to spread to virgin territories. But then, as a corollary, the state’s own strategy should also have brought about a situation enabling it to decimate the Left-wing extremist movement. After all, the state, too, employed some very effective counter-revolutionary strategies in fighting the Red rebels during the last 40 years. Obviously, the ground reality has not been what it was expected to be. Successive crackdowns employing counter-revolutionary strategies— considered effective—were carried out in Andhra Pradesh, right from the time of the government of J. Vengal Rao to that of N. Chandrababu Naidu. But the embers of the revolutionary movement refused to die down and were rekindled with an uncanny regularity. Where did the fault lie? The state did achieve some success, but little did the government’s strategists realise that there is a world of difference between the strategies of a revolution and those that counter it. The Andhra Pradesh Maoists have been exemplary in the use of the right mix of area specific tactics within an effective centralised strategy. The tactics range from simply organising a people’s protest in one area to laying an ambush for the police in another. On the other hand, the state’s counter-operations have been based solely on the tunnel vision belief that the only way to contain Maoist violence, and the spread of the movement, was to hit back at them with greater violence. The state’s one-track focus on the military angle left it bereft of the many dimensions needed to devise a coherent and feasible strategy, which would have helped prepare area-specific tactics. The net result is that while the police battled it out with the Maoists, the government was left airing claims of some military success—of wiping out several dalams (squads) in some ‘critical’ areas. The vital civil aspects of counter-revolutionary warfare appear to have been put on the back-burner. Whatever little there was of non-police, peaceful counter measures was also left to the same policemen who were expected to wield the Kalashnikov to fight the revolutionaries. 91

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K. SRINIVAS REDDY The government failed to coordinate the police and the civil effort towards the common purpose, whereas the Maoists succeeded brilliantly in fusing the tactics of self-preservation with the strategy for retaining the underground support mechanisms. Faced with an aggressive police force, the Naxalite leadership had the sense to withdraw squads from the open plains. The government watched with glee, airing claims that the police could ‘liberate’ most of the areas from the Maoist stranglehold. It just failed to realise that it was only a tactical retreat, a temporary move for self-preservation—a strategy that would also keep the underground support mechanism intact. But the abortive Maoist attempt on the life of the then Chief Minister, Chandrababu Naidu, at Alipiri, near Tirupati, on 1 October 2003, changed the course of the revolutionary movement. As part of the Naxalite strategy to increase counter-offensive operations during severe repression, so as to provide some space for the revolutionary movement, the Alipiri attack succeeded. It brought about changes in the polity that ultimately proved beneficial to the Maoists. The attack led to advancement of elections to the state legislative assembly and the Congress humbled the Telugu Desam Party (TDP) at the hustings. The Congress government began the peace process. A ceasefire came into effect and there was peace in the state for nearly seven months. The talks that followed were another attempt at a set of mismatched strategies. The Maoists’ aim was to exploit the talks as part of their strategy and the government had initiated it more out of political expediency than anything else. It was a peculiar scenario indeed, with one of the negotiating parties employing a carefully drafted strategy trying to derive a maximum, all round advantage while the other party drifted along with the current, letting events unfold themselves. It would now be useful to discuss the Maoists’ area-specific strategies and the state’s counter-strategies. Maoist principles hold that revolutionary warfare has three stages. They can be classified as: 1. The organisation phase

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REVOLUTIONARY AND COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGIES 2. The guerrilla warfare phase, which can be further classified into primary and advanced levels 3. The mobile warfare phase These three phases roughly correspond to the Maoists’ analysis that a revolutionary movement passes through the phases of strategic defense, strategic stalemate and strategic offensive. Significantly, one can see these different phases of revolutionary movement in almost all the 23 Andhra districts. The Organisation Phase In as many as 15 districts, the Maoists can be seen as employing the strategy of defense, but at the same time being very active in propaganda work. These districts are parts of Rangareddy, Medak, Nalgonda, Mahabubnagar (Telengana), Kurnool, Anantapur, Cuddapah, Chittoor (Rayalaseema), Prakasam, Guntur, Krishna, West Godavari, plain areas of East Godavari, Viskhapatnam, Vizianagaram and Srikakulam (the last three in the north coastal region). Essentially, the revolutionary strategy is to form front organisations and units specifically for mobilising women, workers, students and peasants and, generally, for anti-caste organisations. Headed by committed cadres, these units indoctrinate people considered impressionable. The propaganda chiefly revolves around administrative lapses, misdeeds by political party workers and the exploitative structures in the society. A determined bid is made by the revolutionaries to rally popular support. In this pursuit, the underground cadres often resort to ‘actions’ against money lenders, landlords and those who, for one reason or the other, have earned the ire of the people. The ‘actions’, from a non-legal point of view, can generally find justification. Whenever the police initiate action, usually by rounding-up ‘known sympathisers’ of Maoists, the revolutionary organisation is further solidified. The strategy, in essence, is to win over the people and prepare a base for more revolutionary actions.

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K. SRINIVAS REDDY Their activities in these 15 districts include: thrashing moneylenders and destroying promissory notes; attacks on, or sometimes elimination of, people found to be harassing women; eve teasers and those misbehaving with women being punished in praja (people’s) courts; warning the landlords to distribute lands; organising demonstrations against the government on popular issues; and issuing statements to the media. The government simply has no response to these activities. Neither the civil administration nor the police have come up with any counter-strategy. The normal police reaction is to round up the suspects, including those not even connected with a specific offence, and falsely implicate them in criminal cases. In most cases, the police resort to thrashing suspects in the vain belief that it would act as a corrective measure. But such counter-measures have only further strengthened people’s hatred of the police. In the case of non-police issues like agitations against caste discrimination, land distribution or the government’s policies, the civil administration, generally, does nothing, claiming that it is not a part of their duty. To cite a few instances, the Maoists had warned doctors, teachers and other government employees working in remote areas against abstaining from duty and had also initiated campaigns against corruption. Faced with the threat of being thrashed in praja courts, these government employees complied almost instantly. The effectiveness of a Naxalite warning was firmly established. The officialdom entrusted with the same job chose to remain blind to the fact that their inaction provided a readymade platform for the revolutionaries. Violence in the organisation stage is minimal, though the ominous presence of the armed cadre is there for all to see. This strategic defensive lulls the officialdom, even as other areas are witnessing violent incidents regularly. The Guerrilla Warfare Phase The guerrilla warfare phase prevails over the five North Telengana districts of Adilabad, Nizambad, Karimnagar, Warangal and Khammam, and in the forest areas of Mahabubnagar, Nalgonda, Kurnool, 94

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REVOLUTIONARY AND COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGIES Cuddapah, Chittoor, Rayalaseema, Prakasam, Guntur, West Godavri, East Godavari and Visakhapatnam. This phase puts the revolutionaries and the ‘enemy’ (state) on an equal footing in the fight for control over a particular area. During this phase, the main line of action is to attack the ‘enemy’, targetting, among others, police patrol teams or a person identified as a ‘class enemy’. In these areas, which passed through the organisation phase of the revolution in the late 1980s or early 1990s, the Maoist units are already running parallel administration at the village level—the Grama Rajya Committees (GRCs), and Village Defence Committees (VDCs). Till this stage, the Naxalites had confined their activity to remote villages, but as their influence spreads, semi-forest areas and plains are also being covered. A well-defined military structure would have already been put in place with Local Guerrilla Squads (LGSs) and area committees working in tandem with the GRCs and VDCs. A set pattern could be found behind the deceptively mindless violence by Naxalite cadres, who primarily target village-level political functionaries, irrespective of whether they are elected representatives like sarpanches and Mandal (administrative unit similar to a taluk) Praja Parishad presidents or mere political party representatives at the villagelevel. Consistent attacks on them, whether as reprisals or unprovoked, are aimed at creating a political vacuum, to be filled by the GRCs and other structures. In most of these villages, the Maoists have succeeded in using the ultimate weapon, terror, applying psychological pressure until all resistance is dissipated. A series of killings—of political activists, ‘police informants’ and ambushes on police patrols, attacks on police stations, elimination of ‘single targets’ have created a situation where unrest reigns supreme. And, to the great advantage of the Maoists is the law enforcement agencies’ total inability to control the violence and extend even a modicum of security to the populace. The only way out for the people is to cooperate with the Naxalites, especially when given the carrot and stick option of persuasion and intimidation. As for the government, it cannot be credited with any new counter-strategy. The civil administration chooses to remain totally aloof, 95

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K. SRINIVAS REDDY even as the underground cadres are exploiting every crack in the administrative structure. The police, left to deal with the situation, react with a shot-gun approach that helps the Maoists to gain more ground. This is because in their counter-attacks, the police could not care less about civilian casualties they cause, even if their target is a single Naxalite. A series of arrests and incarcerations of sympathisers results only in further antagonising the populace. All through the 1990s, the political leadership in Andhra Pradesh invariably indulged in debates over whether Naxalism was a socio-economic issue or merely a law and order problem. Alarmed at the increasing violence, successive governments reacted by ordering the use of pure force, seldom thinking of adopting the strategy of mixed civil and military action. Though lofty schemes were announced for developing Naxalite-affected areas in the name of addressing the root causes of the Naxalite problem, sufficient funds were never committed for the purpose. Successive governments came to depend more and more on the crude military solution—decimating Naxalite squads one after the other. It also became common to turn a blind eye to the extra-judicial practices of the police. In short, killing was implicitly accepted as normal practice in counter-revolutionary warfare, with no thought given to the dangerous consequences. No one seems to have realised that, for every single civilian casualty, there was a possibility of many more from the victims’ relatives and friends turning for succour to the Naxalites, or even joining the movement. With the counter-revolutionary strategy heavily leaning towards elimination of those involved with the Naxalites, or those suspected to be even remotely connected with underground cadres, the Naxalites found justification for their killings, calling them ‘retaliatory actions’. As violence reached alarming levels, the governments did give a serious thought to the problem, but it all came to half-hearted resolutions and insignificant results. Any sincere attempts at development activities were thwarted by meagre allocation of funds or, because of the all too frequent changes in the political leadership, abrupt changes in the administrative policies. The short-lived three-pronged strategy of 96

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REVOLUTIONARY AND COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGIES the Channa Reddy government in the early 1990s is, indeed, a classic example of this pattern. However, at one stage, when the Naxalites were forced to confine themselves to the jungles and there were less violent incidents in the villages, some pioneering effort was, indeed, initiated. In this context, mention needs to be made of a young police officer in Karimnagar district who began experimenting with a radically new strategy to counter the Naxalites. It was called WHAM—Winning Hearts And Minds. The district police, which was till then notoriously aggressive, turned a new leaf and launched a mass contact programme of identifying the people’s problems and finding solutions to them. The people’s involvement in such programmes, whether in the distribution of seeds to farmers or encouraging people to launch an agitation against teacher-absenteeism, proved very encouraging. After gaining some foothold in the villages, the second level of the WHAM strategy commenced. It was now time to deal with the Naxalites’ core support group—the militants. (Broadly speaking, the militants form the unarmed cadre, the base support group who actively support the Naxalites in various ways.) Winning over the militants was not an easy task. They first had to be convinced that they would not be harassed. To instill confidence, the Karimnagar police, in a dramatic gesture at a public meeting, burned all police records of the Naxalites and the militants who had surrendered. On the occasion, the police issued what became famous in Andhra Pradesh as ‘The Huzurabad Declaration’. In it, the police publicly proclaimed that those who had surrendered would not be summoned to police stations, be harassed for information, on suspicion. The refreshing turn around in police behaviour had, indeed, won over the people and stumped the Maoists. The Karimnagar experiment was certainly replicable, but, true to its nature, the bureaucracy never sat up to take note of the novel and successful experiment. It died a natural death once the prime moving force behind the experiment, the district’s Superintendent of Police (SP), was transferred. 97

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K. SRINIVAS REDDY It is easy to see from the Maoist’s criticism of the novel strategy that the state has always been reactive and not proactive in its response towards the Naxalites. Fuming at the success of the Karimnagar experiment, the Maoists accused the police of usurping the role of civil administration, arguing that the police were meant merely to enforce the law and to concern themselves with social welfare. At least this criticism should have stirred the bureaucracy into recognising that here was one strategy that was received well by the people and the best compliment was the Maoist criticism itself. With the Naxalites hiding in the jungles, this was just the right time to try and replicate this strategy not only in Telengana, but in other areas targetted on the Naxalites war map of the state. As expected, the political and the administrative decision-makers totally missed out on this golden opportunity. For the revolutionaries, it was only a matter of time to reclaim the areas they had lost. They proved true, Mao’s saying: ‘struggle, fail, struggle again, fail again, struggle again till the victory.’ They were given the opportunity to stage a come back when the Congress came to power in the elections following the Alipiri attack on Naidu. The Congress had already committed itself to holding talks with the Maoists by suspending anti-extremist operations, if it was voted back to power. The Congress began the talk process seeming to have learnt nothing from the 2002 experience, when the revolutionaries had unequivocally announced that the talks were only a part of the tactics to further the cause of New Democratic Revolution. The 2002 talks, eventually, failed to take off. After the Andhra Congress came to power in May 2004 the counter-revolutionary operations were suspended on the understanding that the Naxalites would also suspend armed action. This marked the beginning of another phase. While the Maoist representatives put forward a clear agenda backed by a sound political strategy, the government’s reaction was the same old knee-jerk exercise. The first round of direct talks, from 15–18 October 2004 failed to achieve any tangible results, but there was one development. The government 98

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REVOLUTIONARY AND COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGIES decided to distribute 100,000 acres of land in response to one of the Naxalite demands. The Mobile Warfare Phase This phase, according to the Maoist strategy, begins in areas where the revolutionaries had defeated the state forces, established complete control and had demarcated its areas. Though the Maoists have claimed that they have formed two guerrilla bases in the forest areas of Adilabad and Warangal, this is doubtful because of the continued presence of the state machinery in the area. What Needs to be Done? It is once again clear that the state’s counter-strategies do not relate to the Naxalite strategies and the Andhra government needs to redraft them at the earliest. This becomes all the more urgent in the wake of the unification of the revolutionary forces in India, as also because of the worldwide sustained effort to unify all organisations working within the framework of Marxist–Leninist–Maoist thought. The formation of the CCOMPOSA was announced on 1 July 2001 by Maoist organisations operating in India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal. Besides the emergence of the CPI (Maoist) as a major revolutionary party in this part of the world, there has been a rapid advancement of the revolutionary movement in Nepal. These international and national developments make it incumbent on the Indian government to evolve, gradually, a broad-based counter-strategy and policy at the national level. A strategy can be successful only when it is backed by a policy. A policy can be evolved only when the decision-makers have a thorough understanding of the problem. A thorough understanding would be possible only when they study the problem with an unbiased view because an unbiased study of a problem alone can lead to unbiased, effective solutions. The policy and counter-strategy of the state should be welldefined, discussed publicly, and revised after giving ear to the opinions of all political parties and the intelligentsia. The strategy should be 99

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K. SRINIVAS REDDY aimed at formulating long-term and short-term goals. It should be timebound and sufficient funds should be allocated, so that the programmes continue uninterrupted by political changes. Essentially, the strategy should focus on civil administration, rather than on the military dogma of ‘winning the war’. The long-term and short-term goals should be aimed at showing some tangible results to the people, whether it be the distribution of land or addressing other immediate problems of the people. The relevance of a revolutionary movement in a society can be minimised only when tangible results are shown. It is not merely adequate to formulate a policy and a strategy. Care should be taken to ensure its steadfast implementation. The civil administration must be galvanised into action and the role of police in the counter-revolutionary strategy should be reduced to a bare minimum. To make the civil administration effective and proactive, it is essential to critically evaluate the present structure of governance. Making the institution of Collectorate as the nodal agency for undertaking civil works may not yield the desired result, as the geographical expanse to be administered by a District Collector is too vast. Therefore, smaller administrative divisions for the areas would facilitate easy and effective administration. The most decisive element in an effective strategy is a unified effort by various arms of the state. A clever fighter is one who not only wins, but excels in winning with ease. —Sun Tzu, ‘The Art of War’

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9 The Naxalite Movement: Impact of External Networking S. Gopal

Historically, India’s communist movements have followed the trail of foreign countries, the first being the Bolsheviks of Russia. Communism itself is an imported ideology for India and at the time of its advent in India, only a relatively small number of the elite with western education were schooled in Marxist philosophy. A communist resolution of 31 May 1927 in Bombay (now Mumbai) called for a following of the example of the world’s communist parties and to seek the guidance of the Communist International. M. N. Roy had said that the communist movement of any country should be the national branch of the international communist movement. Roy later opined that the Indian bourgeoisie would, through national revolution, become the gravediggers of imperialism. During and after World War II, the then Soviet Union was the epicentre of international communism, influencing and guiding its movements around the world and the CPI was no exception. Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union and the latter’s entry into World War II made the Indian communists change the classification of World War II from an imperialist one to a people’s war. Even after India attained independence, the CPI, under B. T. Ranadive—following the international communist movement’s policy of ‘class against class’—initially took recourse to strikes and then resorted to violence,

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S. GOPAL inviting crippling retaliatory attacks from the government forces. The CPI was then practically liquidated in most areas, except in Telengana. The leadership there had been carrying on a peasant struggle since 1946, independent of the CPI central committee. The Telengana leadership, however, followed Mao Zedong’s new democracy theory of agrarian revolution, instead of the Russian line of general strikes and general uprising leading to a liberation of rural areas. The CPI under Ranadive refused to accept the new Maoist line of Marxism. Moscow, however, eventually accepted this line, and Chandra Rajeswara Rao replaced Ranadive as general secretary. Facing an onslaught by the Indian Army, the CPI called off its struggle in 1952 and conveniently found ideological justification in the advice offered by Moscow, which had by then reassessed the Congress party. More importantly, at that time, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru propounded the policy of non-alignment. The Soviet Union, thus, saw in Nehru’s India an ally in their fight against the West. The CPI, by then, had dubbed any further armed struggle as ‘sectarian’. The communists, during World War II and the Independence movement, did not realise that nationalism was a stronger driving force than any economic ideology. They did not see that nationalism had to be the precondition for socialism. They were thus isolated from nationalist forces during the freedom movement. The wave of anticommunism during the 1962 Sino–Indian war clearly displayed the predominance of nationalism over economic ideology. The split in the CPI in 1964, and the resultant founding of the CPI(M) was only partly due to the Sino–Soviet ideological rift in the international communist movement. It was, more importantly, over support to the Government of India on the Sino–Indian border clashes, a traumatic period for nationalist Indians. The Indian government clearly perceived the CPI(M) as a Chinese inspired threat. As a result, a large number of its cadres were imprisoned. However, facing the embarrassment of Chinese support to Pakistan in the 1965 War, the CPI(M) leadership broke away from the Chinese line and supported the Indian government in the war. 102

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IMPACT OF EXTERNAL NETWORKING Following the CPI(M) decision to participate in parliamentary democracy, the more extremist among the party split from it under the leadership of Charu Mazumdar. The new party, the CPI(ML), more popularly known as the Naxalites, unabashedly echoed the saying, ‘Chairman Mao is our chairman’. They saw the Great Proletarian Revolution—since accepted as an unmitigated disaster for China—as a moral atom bomb from which splinters flew out to various parts of the world to set off a conflagration wherever they landed. The then Soviet Union was seen as the chief revisionist force, which even came to the aid of the US imperialism. Radio Peking hailed the Naxalite movement as the ‘spring thunder of revolution in India’. The mantle of Maoism, thus, fell on the CPI(ML). The All India Coordinating Committee of Communist Revolutionaries, a precursor to the CPI(ML), saw as one of its main tasks the preparation of a revolutionary programme and tactical line based on a concrete analysis of Indian conditions in the light of ‘Mao Zedong’s thought’. The CPI(ML) advocated Mao’s theory of protracted people’s war and the ushering in of a new democratic revolution. It also issued slogans such as: ‘China’s Path to be Our Path,’ besides ‘China’s Chairman is our Chairman’. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and China itself taking capitalist steps, all of that was over and the Indian Left, including the Left extremists, were left to follow their own respective lines. Much earlier, China had stopped extending moral and material support to the Indian Left extremists. However, poor social conditions, poverty and continuing oppression by landlords provided a fertile ground for the revival of Naxalism, mainly in Bihar and Andhra Pradesh. The Naxalites in India, however, do not yet control any large area comparable to the ‘liberated zone’ that the Chinese communists had established in Yenan in the decade between 1930–40, or the sizeable tract that the Maoists occupy in neighbouring Nepal today. They have not been able to reach out to the vast number of peasantry in other parts of India. Their expansion has been limited to a few isolated pockets inhabited mainly by the tribals and the landless poor. Seeking safety in rural areas, they have also not been able to gain or establish any significant influence among urban industrial workers. 103

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S. GOPAL Presently, the concern is not so much the ideological and material support to the Left extremists from a foreign state as from collaborations with fraternal parties in neighbouring countries, as this could make both sanctuaries and sophisticated arms available to the Indian Maoists. The exception, of course, is Pakistan which is discussed in the subsequent passages of this paper. A remarkable success story of revolutionaries emanates from Nepal. The CPN-M with the avowed objective of establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat, has been very successful in enlarging its strength and bringing a large part of Nepal under its control. It is believed that the Nepalese Maoists run a parallel government in at least 45 of the total 75 districts in Nepal. Some observers feel that, excepting Kathmandu, all districts in that country have been affected. The Maoists claim that it is not a parallel government but the only government. On 26 December 2004, they issued a fiat to all government employees to stop working for the purani satta, i.e., the royal government of Nepal, and work for the nayee satta, i.e., the Maoists. Most government offices outside Kathmandu are now reportedly closed. The Maoists have been able to impose their will on the country whenever they so wanted. The clear examples are the blockades they had organised—first for a week beginning 18 August 2004, then in December and finally, for a fortnight in February 2005, coinciding with the launching of their ‘people’s war’ on 13 February 1996. The economy of the country has been shattered and many development works have come to a standstill. They have been able to collect taxes routinely from businesses, including petty toddy shops and poor truck drivers. Some international organisations have registered with the Maoists for undertaking development work on a limited scale. Also, the Maoists have forced many non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to recognise their ‘government’. It is believed that kangaroo courts are being held to ‘execute’ class enemies. Their success is directly related to the archaic administrations of the successive governments in Nepal. Ruling on an essentially feudal prescription, the governments have been vacillating between a policy of negotiations with the insurgents at one extreme and a strong military response on the other.

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IMPACT OF EXTERNAL NETWORKING Inevitably, the kingdom’s government would seek to bring India into the picture as a source of supply of military hardware and, perhaps, as advisers. The Indian government may even get pulled into the conflict to check the growing co-operation between the Nepalese and Indian Maoists. The Maoists in Nepal have already threatened to launch attacks, using human bombs, if India provided assistance to the Nepal government. Their recent abduction of Indian Army soldiers belonging to the Gurkha Regiment and their subsequent release has been viewed, by some analysts, as a political message to India to recognise the Nepalese Maoists as an independent entity and desist from joining the conflict, as they can hit the Indian Army in many ways. The erstwhile PWG and MCCI, which merged on 21 September 2004 to found the Communist Party of India (Maoist), and other tiny armed communist groups have established links with the Nepalese Maoists. They have also been able to build a network with communist revolutionary organisations in the neighbouring countries of Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Bhutan. Going under the banner of the CCOMPOSA, it formally announced its formation on 1 July 2001. The role of CCOMPOSA is to ‘coordinate and consolidate the unity among Maoist parties and organisations in South Asia’ as well as to ‘lend mutual assistance and exchange experiences and deepen bilateral and multilateral relations amongst Maoist forces in the subcontinent’. The Purba Bangla Communist Party (PBCP), which operates mostly in the western districts of Bangladesh bordering India, is a member of the CCOMPOSA. The newly created Communist Party of Bhutan (Marxist–Leninist–Maoist), CPB(MLM) was formed with the support of both Nepalese and Indian Maoist groups. In Sri Lanka, the fraternal party is the lesser known Communist Party of Ceylon (Maoist), an offshoot of the original pro-Beijing Communist Party of Ceylon, founded in 1964 under the leadership of the late Nagalingam Shanmugadasan. All these South Asian Maoist parties are also members of a larger international organisation called the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM). The RIM and the CCOMPOSA are reportedly advising the Nepalese Maoists against negotiating with the

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S. GOPAL government as they believe that the success of the Nepalese Maoists is a prerequisite to the success of the ‘people’s war’ in the entire region. In consultation with the RIM and the CCOMPOSA, the Nepalese Maoists had, well ahead of the merger between the PWG and MCCI, planned to create a liberated ‘Compact Revolutionary Zone’ (CRZ). The zone would extend from Nepal to at least five, if not six, Indian states across central India, to end somewhere on the northern fringes of Andhra Pradesh. Some of the Indian Left-wing extremist groups have established links with groups beyond South Asia and Asia. One of the groups presented a paper at the Annual International Communism Seminar, in Belgium, that was organised by the Workers Party of Belgium (WPB). The WPB has been conducting propaganda for the Nepalese Maoists. The erstwhile PWG’s congress held in 2001 was attended by a WPB representative. It is difficult to say how far these links have helped the Indian extremists. There has been an instance when police have recovered ammunition with Czech markings from a dump belonging to the Janasakthi, one of the many Indian Naxalite groups. Whether this is a flash in the pan or a part of a regular gun running network needs to be closely monitored in the future. It might be appropriate to discuss, in some detail, Sri Lanka’s revolutionary communist parties. As against the CPC (Maoist), the most influential revolutionary party ever formed in Sri Lanka is the Janata Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP). When it emerged in April 1971, it consisted of an extremely dedicated youth cadre, mostly in the age group of 18 to 30, posing a serious threat to the then elected government; it was essentially indigenous. It was ruthlessly crushed with significant help from India. The JVP had a strange mix of Marxist and nationalist ideologies. One of the five lectures delivered to the newly recruited cadre was on ‘expansionist India’. Having realised the futility of violence in achieving its goal, the JVP has now joined mainstream democratic polity and is today a member of the ruling coalition government. It is more concerned about the sovereignty of Sri Lanka and is an uncompromising critic of negotiations with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) on the latter’s demand for an interim self-governing authority for the

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IMPACT OF EXTERNAL NETWORKING north and east of the island nation. It would be interesting to speculate on the prospects of the Maoist movements in the various countries of South Asia, if the JVP were to return to its revolutionary ways and join CCOMPOSA. The extent to which the JVP will co-operate with the Indian Maoist groups, given their views on India, is also a moot point. The rapid growth of the Maoist insurgency across large parts of Nepal, and its clandestine connection with parallel violent Left-wing movements in India, should be the main cause of worry for any Indian government. There have been reports in the Nepalese media that many Nepalese Maoists have taken shelter in hideouts across its porous border with India, after committing depredations at home. The erstwhile PWG and MCCI had close relations with the CPN-M—sharing arms, training sites, and sanctuaries. There is also concern over the infiltration of the Maoists of Nepal into refugee camps of Bhutanese of Nepalese origin in Nepal’s eastern district of Jhapa. As mentioned earlier, the CPN-M and the Indian Maoists have succeeded in creating the Communist Party of Bhutan (Marxist–Leninist–Maoist), CPB(MLM). Over 1,05,000 Bhutanese refugees have been residing in seven camps in the eastern districts of Nepal since the exodus of ethnic Nepalese from Bhutan, following their being declared non-citizens with the implementation of the Bhutan Citizenship Act, 1985. The CPB(MLM) threatened to retaliate with an armed struggle and urged all victimised citizens to join the people’s war to overthrow the Bhutanese monarchy. A parallel and interesting development has been the acquisition of increasingly sophisticated arsenal by the Indian Left-wing extremists. The Naxalites of 1967 used traditional weapons like lathis, spears, sickles and other sharp edged weapons, or at best stolen single and double barrel guns. Today, they have access to AK-47 rifles, land-mines and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). This is mainly because of the easy availability of arms and explosives, particularly in the border areas. The network of arms smugglers and other militant groups, both inside and outside the country, is a ready source of arms to the Naxalites. The porous Indo–Nepal border is an ideal route for arms smuggling. A consignment of arms seized from the Naxalites in eastern Uttar Pradesh

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S. GOPAL was reportedly intended for the Maoist insurgents in Nepal. Increased activities of Pakistanis along this border have also raised the apprehension that Pakistan could very well fish in troubled waters to India’s detriment. There is the genuine concern that Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), with a sizeable presence in Nepal’s Terai region—in addition to a large and deeply entrenched network in neighbouring Bangladesh—could feed arms into the Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ) through its agents. It could also extend covert assistance to various ethnic and ideological insurgents in India’s North-East. Further, an unconfirmed report claimed that in the year 2000 a senior leader of the erstwhile PWG visited Karachi via Dhaka to meet ISI officials. There has been evidence of drug trafficking and the circulation of fake currency in this area through the border. It is also believed that the erstwhile PWG had procured arms directly from Bangladesh-based agents through the Sunderbans. Another disturbing aspect has been the reports of the erstwhile PWG’s links with the LTTE of Sri Lanka. The LTTE had apparently imparted land-mine know-how and IED-related manufacturing techniques to the erstwhile PWG. The outfit was also reported to have acquired AK-47s and sten guns from the LTTE in 1991. Besides, two videocassettes of the LTTE’s training modules are said to have been recovered from a PWG arms dump in Visakhapatnam district. In fact, in an interview, Maoist Chief Muppala Lakshmana Rao (Ganapathy) explained all these away by claiming that their links were with exLTTE members who had formed a communist group in India and that they had held training camps for them. He, however, did not rule out forming links with the LTTE in future and said that that such a relationship would be conducive to the revolutionary movement in India. Moreover, the erstwhile PWG’s links with the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) for purchase of sophisticated weapons are well-known. ULFA’s links with the ISI operating from Bangladesh, too, is an open secret. Thus, the link between the Indian Maoists and ISI operatives based in Dhaka would not be a far-fetched presumption. The ISI would be more than willing to acquire, after Jammu & Kashmir and the northeast region, a third destabilisation 108

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IMPACT OF EXTERNAL NETWORKING tool in the form of Left-wing extremists groups. Indeed, there were some media reports, in September 1998, about a link between the Lashkar-e-Taiba and the then PWG. Another North East insurgent group, the so-called Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO), had in the past sheltered Maoist insurgents from Nepal and, in return, received training from them. Nepal’s Maoist insurgents have also received training in handling weapons and explosives from the then PWG. There have also been indications of the formation of a India–Nepal Joint Regional Committee by Nepalese Maoists and their Indian counterparts in 2002 to co-ordinate their activities in the border areas. It is by now well-known that both the CPI (Maoist) and the CPN-M are among the leading members of the CCOMPOSA. Besides, and more importantly, the merger of the PWG and the MCCI as the CPI (Maoist) is a significant development that could drastically alter the course of the revolutionary movement not only in India, but across the entire South Asian region. The CRZ planned by the Maoists of the two countries would help in establishing linkages with other Maoist groups operating in South Asia, including the CPN-M and the BCP(MLM). Furthermore, the latter has pledged to work in close collaboration with the CPN-M. Besides, at the time of its founding, the CPI (Maoist) had declared that the armed cadres of the erstwhile PWG and the MCCI were being constituted as a so-called ‘People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army’ (PLGA), and also announced its support to ‘revolutionary struggles’ in Nepal, Peru, the Philippines, Turkey and ‘other places’. The new entity has reaffirmed its commitment to the classical Maoist strategy of ‘protracted armed struggle’, which defines its objectives not in terms of the seizure of lands, crops, or other immediate goals, but the seizure of State power. The CPN-M has consistently maintained that unless the Maoists of the South Asian region work together to counter India’s ‘pernicious role’, ‘final victory’ would elude them. The success of the Nepalese Maoists in achieving their objective in Nepal should be a clear warning that one cannot rule out a sudden spurt of cross-border terrorism along the Indo–Nepal border, as the Maoist groups focus on the consolidation of their CRZ. 109

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S. GOPAL There is no doubt that the Naxalite groups have succeeded in expanding their base to some extent, and have grandiose plans to carve out the CRZ. At the same time, no revolutionary group is likely to succeed in capturing power and ruling India, because an overwhelming majority of Indians have repeatedly displayed their aversion to violence in politics. Except for certain pockets where the Maoists hold sway, the rest of the country can hardly be called feudalistic enough to provide fertile ground for Left-wing extremism to flourish. Furthermore, the nationalistic spirit of Indians would be averse to accepting the success of an Indian party which has resulted from its co-operation with the socalled fraternal parties of other countries. National unity and spirit have been demonstrated repeatedly by Indians, including their response to the 26 December 2004 Tsunami tragedy in South India. However, the growth of Maoist ideology, the close relationship between the various Maoist groups in South Asia, and the consequent increase in insurgent and terrorist violence and disorders in the region would pose a threat to the smooth functioning of democratic governance and to the economy of the region. A preview of this is already visible in Nepal. Yet another danger is the possibility of co-operation between the Left-wing extremists and the various ethnic-insurgent groups in the North East. Material support from Pakistan through the ISI, which finds Bangladesh an easy ground to operate from, would accentuate this possible danger. Close coordination and co-operation between the security forces and intelligence organisations of the affected countries of the region alone would enable the elimination of these threats. But, it is equally important for India to root out the causes that breed such movements—such as feudal oppression by landlords, discrimination and economic imbalance in rural areas. This can only be achieved through land reforms, poverty alleviation and social legislation for equal opportunities. It is only when the terrorists feel that they have an upper hand over the State that they intensify their campaign of violence. But, sustained economic development, the implementation of progressive social policies and a firm handling of terrorism by the security forces, are the only ways to weaken the armed revolutionaries and ultimately persuade them to join the mainstream. 110

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10 The Maoist Web: An Overview P. V. Ramana

We communists are internationalists… one of our important duties is to establish strong relations with all genuine Maoist parties in the world… both the erstwhile MCCI and the erstwhile CPI(ML) [PW] have continued bilateral relations with Nepal, Peru, [the] Philippines, Turkey and other countries at the international level. The erstwhile MCCI had even joined the RIM (Revolutionary Internationalist Movement), while the erstwhile PW had decided to further deepen its relations with [the] RIM. Now… the party (CPI-M) has decided to continue its deep relations with [the] RIM and all other genuine Maoists… the unity of India's two important revolutionary organisations—the erstwhile MCCI and PW—will definitely have a very positive impact at the international plane. —Kishan, erstwhile General Secretary, Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI).1 Introduction The Naxalite movement in India has had a chequered history since it first flared up in Naxalbari in 1967. The movement has survived numerous splits and varying degrees of restrictions imposed by different state governments. Exhibiting considerable resilience, the Naxalites have regrouped and risen up every time, to gradually spread their areas of

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P. V. RAMANA operation to as many as 159 districts in 13 Indian states2 in a span of over three decades. On 1 October 2003, they carried out their most daring attack, thus far, when they made an unsuccessful attempt on the life of Mr Chandrababu Naidu, the then Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh, at Alipiri, in the foothills of Tirumala, Chittoor District. Earlier in the same year, towards the end of April, the US Department of State saw it fit to place two Indian Naxalite groups on the list of ‘Other Terrorist Groups’ in its Patterns of Global Terrorism Report, 2004. Nevertheless, the Indian authorities do not seem to adequately appreciate the intensity of the challenge that the Naxalites have been posing— and the possibility of its amplification—to the country’s internal security and to its democratic governance. Largely, the secessionist–terrorist campaign in Jammu & Kashmir and the terrorist-insurgent campaign in India's North East have attracted greater attention. Presently, there are at least 28 Maoist insurgent groups operating in India, with seven others operating in India’s neighbouring countries— four in Bangladesh and one each in Nepal, Bhutan and Sri Lanka. The most well-known among the 35 groups are the CPI (Maoist), and the CPN-M. The Nepalese Maoists have been scoring one spectacular success after the other since they launched their people’s war on 13 February 1996, and now have a presence in about 90 per cent of the total area of that country, in some parts of which they run a parallel government. The newest Maoist outfit to have been founded in South Asia is the Communist Party of Bhutan (Marxist–Leninist), CPB(ML). Its leader is said to be one individual named Vikalpa.3 In India, the CPI (Maoist) is the most lethal Naxalite outfit. It was formed following a merger of the CPI(ML)[PW], and the MCCI, on 21 September 2004.4 In fact, the PW was an amalgam of the People’s War Group (PWG) and the now defunct, Bihar-based Party Unity (PU). The PWG and the PU had merged after years of negotiations.5 Further, the Revolutionary Communist Centre of India (Maoist), based in Punjab, merged with MCC and the new group was christened the MCCI.6 Moreover, a significant movement of cadres from one group to the other has taken place, as borne testimony by a PW internal 112

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THE MAOIST WEB document. At a meeting, held in November–December 2002, the PW Central Committee (CC) noted that cadres from the CPI(ML) (Naxalbari)7 had joined the PW in ‘sizeable numbers’. This brought the PW to the view that it should interact discretely and carefully with the CPI(ML) (Naxalbari) and maintain cordial relations.8 At a press meet in Hyderabad on 14 October 2004, a leader of the CPI(ML) (Janasakthi) indicated that the CPI (Maoist) and CPI(ML) (Janasakthi) too, could merge, but hastened to add that no merger talks were currently under way. Such a merger should, therefore, not come as a surprise, if and when it happens. It would be in tune with the current trend of unification among the Maoist groups. The objective of these groups is to wage a protracted guerrilla war on the lines propounded by the Chinese leader, Mao Zedong, in order to herald a New Democratic Revolution (NDR). In the South Asian region, the linkages among the Maoist groups are two-fold: intergroup ties and broad fronts. Today—even as one witnesses the emergence of a totally unknown group in an entirely new area, Bhutan—three distinct features are clearly visible in the trajectory of the Maoist movements in the region: expansion to virgin territories, merger and consolidation and a continuous expansion of linkages. This paper seeks to present, especially, an overview of the intra- and extraregional linkages among Maoists or like-minded groups and dwell upon their extra-fraternal connections. As would be clear in the subsequent passages of this paper, the linkages among the Maoist groups range between, on the one hand, forging bilateral ties to floating broad fronts and, on the other, sending formal messages and ‘revolutionary’ greetings during conferences to exchanging skills and weapons. Reportedly, they also have formal, fraternal ties with similar groups operating in other parts of the world. CPI (Maoist)–CPN-M Nexus The CPI (Maoist) has formed a variety of linkages with the Maoists of Nepal. ‘Over the years, this association has evolved into a strategic alliance with a steady exchange of men and material, extension of training facilities and safe havens, and facilitation and procurement of arms 113

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P. V. RAMANA and explosives.’9 Indeed, as Ranjit Kumar Gupta, the Police Commissioner of Calcutta (now Kolkata) during the height of the Naxalite movement in the 1970s, notes in his book: ‘[o]f the two Indian Maoist parties, the association of the CPN-M has been mainly through the [then] MCCI on the Indian areas bordering Nepal.’10 Only recently, the Provisional Central Committee of the CPI (Maoist) issued a warning statement, ahead of the scheduled visit by King Gyanendra of Nepal to India, which was deferred. The statement declared that it would ‘mobilise’ the Indian people in support of the insurgent movement in Nepal and against the assistance that India was rendering to the government in Kathmandu in its fight against the insurgents. Apprehending that the Indian government might increase military assistance to Nepal, the CPI (Maoist) asked Indian troops ‘not to involve themselves in killing their class brethren by participating in the unjust military campaign of the Indian government.’11 In the past, the Nepal Maoists had sent a delegate, Chandra Prakash Gajurel ‘Gaurav’, to the 9th Congress of the then PW held in the Abuz Marh forests in Chattisgarh between 3 and 22 March 2001. Gaurav, a politbureau member, was arrested at Chennai airport in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu, on 20 August 2003, while attempting to proceed to Europe on a fake passport to carry out propaganda, and to liaise with like-minded groups there.12 The Nepalese Maoists and the then PW had their first meeting in 1995. According to a top Indian security force official, who this researcher had the opportunity to interview in Hyderabad, the then PW had, in 1989–90, thought of forming ties with extreme left-wing elements in Nepal.13 On a number of occasions, the then PW and the CPN-M had issued joint statements. These date back to as early as 1995, a year before the CPN-M launched its people’s war.14 On another occasion, on 25 January 2002, the politbureau of the CPN-M condemned the Indian government’s proscription of the then PW and the then MCCI under the now defunct POTA, 2002. It expressed its resolve to work together with the Indian Maoists to oppose the ban, as well as to build opinion against it.15 Yet another report claimed that the Maoists 114

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THE MAOIST WEB and the then PW had formed the Indo–Nepal Border Regional Committee (INBRC) ‘to coordinate their activities’ in Bihar.16 A little over a year ago, reports from Nepal indicated that on the night of 17 November 2003, a detained Maoist insurgent had admitted on the state-run television that the Maoists had received training in handling weapons and explosives from the erstwhile PW. Similar reports of the nexus between the Nepalese and Indian Maoists surfaced later too. It has been reported widely that the Maoists had trained together with the then PW and the then MCCI.17 There have even been reports that the Indian Maoists had shifted their training camps to Nepal from Andhra Pradesh.18 As has been noted earlier, the then MCCI, too, has had a close relationship with the Nepalese Maoists. According to a scholar:19 In February 1996, the MCC Central Committee published a paper welcoming the Maoist movement in Nepal. In October 1996, the MCC Congress condemned the repression of the Maoist movement in Nepal. According to reports in April 2000, the MCC and Maoists were holding joint training camps in Hazaribagh and Aurangabad. In September 2000, Pramod Mishra [a leader of the then MCCI] visited Nepal and had extended discussions with Maoist leaders. In August 2001, Nepalese Maoist leaders and Indian Naxal groups had a meeting in Siliguri where they discussed strategies to achieve the goal of the CRZ. Besides, many Nepalese Maoist cadres and leaders hiding in India were arrested on a number of occasions and handed over to the Nepalese authorities, or detained in Indian prisons. These include: Gajurel (mentioned in the preceding lines); central committee members of the United Revolutionary People’s Council, Kumar Dahal and Hitbahadur Tamang; Central Committee Members of the CPN-M, Kulaprasad K.C. Lokendra Bista and Anil Sharma; General Secretary of the All Nepal Peasant Organisation (Revolutionary), Chitra Bahadur Shrestha and some other leaders (on 2 June 2004); Maoist ideologue Mohan Vaidya ‘Kiran’ (arrested on 28 March 2004, in Siliguri, West Bengal);20 top leaders Matrika Prasad Yadav and Suresh Ale Magar (arrested in Lucknow, on 8 February 2004); 115

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P. V. RAMANA Bamdev Chatri, CPN-M Central Committee Member; and general secretary of the Akhil Bharatiya Nepali Ekta Samaj, a Maoist front outfit (arrested on 6 September 2002). Some other arrests included: eight insurgents undergoing treatment in private clinics in Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh, April 2002; nine insurgents in the same state in Balarampur district, 12 June 2002; two more in Bihar’s Madhubani district; and eight insurgents in Bihar’s capital, Patna, in February 2003.21 Furthermore, media reports from Andhra Pradesh said that the police had recovered the designs of a Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) launcher from an arms dump belonging to the erstwhile PW in the forests bordering the eastern Indian state of Orissa.22 It is possible that the Nepalese Maoists had shared the design with their Indian counterparts, but there is no conclusive proof. In September 2002, the Maoists launched an attack on troops of the Royal Nepalese Army and looted an RPG in Sindhupalchowk. Probably, its design was shared with the PW. Over and above all this, the Nepalese Maoists have been conducting propaganda for the Indian Naxalite groups. Evidence of this is clearly available on the website of the CPN-M: www.cpnm.org. Some months ago, they had put on the Internet, a joint call given by the then MCCI and PW and the CPI(ML) (Janaskathi) to boycott the April 2004 general elections in India. Similarly, there is evidence to indicate equally clearly that Indian Naxalite elements, too, publicise the activities of the Maoists of Nepal. For instance, the Maoist mouthpiece, People’s March, has repeatedly carried articles and reports on the violent activities of the Nepalese Maoists, as well as interviews with, and articles by, the leadership of the CPN-M. For instance, People’s March gave, in its March 2004 issue, a vivid description of the stunningly successful onslaught of the Maoists on Beni Bazaar, the district headquarter of Myagdi, western Nepal.23 The January 2005 issue carries the statement by the CPI (Maoist) against Indian assistance to the Nepal government cited earlier in this paper. The October 2004 issue carried an interview with Hisila Yami ‘Parvati’, the highest ranking woman leader in the CPN-M and wife of Baburam Bhattarai, no. 2 in the CPN-M hierarchy.24

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THE MAOIST WEB Revolutionary Corridor The Nepalese Maoists and the Indian Maoists are in the process of forming what is known as a ‘revolutionary corridor’25, stretching from Maoist strongholds in Nepal and extending down into the Dandakaranya forests, ending somewhere in Andhra Pradesh, after running across contiguous parts of Bihar, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh and Chattisgarh. The entire zone that comprises these areas is what is being termed as the Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ).26 It may be noted that the Indian Maoists have been operating in these areas for several years and already have a significant presence along the entire length of the corridor. Long before the CPI (Maoist) was formed, one keen Naxalite watcher had the far-sightedness to note: ‘If the merger efforts succeed, the PW’s plans to establish a revolutionary corridor between Nepal and Dandakaranya could fructify. The setting up of such a corridor would certainly fuel the extremist movement in the country, what with the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) already having a broad understanding with the PWG’.27 The formation of the corridor and establishment of the CRZ would help the insurgent groups in at least three ways. One, arms could be easily transported across the sub-continent. Two, during times of intense security force operations against the insurgents in any parts of the CRZ, they could quickly be relocated to distant and safer areas. Three, with increased presence of Maoist cadres along the length of the corridor, the Naxalites and Maoists might expand their influence to newer areas, increasing the instability in existing as well as fresh areas. These developments would, eventually, require greater attention on the part of the security forces to contain and foil rebel activities. Moreover, there is also the apprehension that:28 Once achieved, this CRZ will virtually drive a wedge through the vital areas of the country, cutting off the rich north-eastern part of India from the rest of the country. This very large zone will have control over huge deposits of minerals, oils and industrialised territory. This will provide them [Maoists] a powerful bargaining chip.

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P. V. RAMANA One well-known authority, however, notes that the threat need not be unduly exaggerated:29 ‘The possibility of the Maoists [of Nepal] using these groups for procuring arms and other logistics support in their activities exists and has certainly been harnessed, and this is a cause of security concern for India, as the arms may flow to Indian groups through these channels as well. However, the extent of [the] security threat posed by this to India should not be unduly exaggerated to rationalise India’s hostility towards the Maoists.’ Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organisations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA) In pursuance of their networking efforts, the Maoists in South Asia formed a broad front known as the CCOMPOSA and a formal announcement to the effect was made on 21 July 2001. Its objective is to ‘coordinate the activities of the Maoist parties and organisations in South Asia… by spreading a protracted people’s war in the region, in the context of hastening and advancing of the World Proletarian Socialist Revolution’. Members also seek to ‘fight Indian expansionism, world imperialism, especially American imperialism, build solidarity with anti-imperialist struggles throughout the world, build a broad front with the ongoing armed struggles of the various nationality movements in the subcontinent, and lend mutual assistance and exchange experiences and deepen bilateral and multilateral relations among Maoist forces in the subcontinent’. Moreover, there is, indeed, evidence to suggest that some of the decisions made at the annual meetings of the CCOMPOSA have been subsequently implemented. The Communist Party of Bhutan (Marxist–Leninist–Maoist), CPB(MLM), received substantial help from the Nepalese Maoists, before coming into being. Reports also indicate that, before it was born, 200 CPB-ML cadres had worked in the underground ranks of the Nepalese Maoists for sometime. Also, it has been said that these are disgruntled Bhutanese refugees of Nepalese origin staying in camps in Nepal, awaiting repatriation to Bhutan.30 At the first annual conference of the CCOMPOSA, it was decided to launch a 118

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THE MAOIST WEB journal by the same name31 and it was duly launched. In an internal circular, the PW, among other directives, had asked its cadres to boost the sale of the ‘CCOMPOSA’ throughout India. It had resolved at a meeting of the central committee to distribute pamphlets and posters on the journal, in all areas where it had a presence, as well as hold meetings and rallies through overground fronts of CCOMPOSA members. The PW has not ruled out distributing posters and pamphlets secretly in areas where there is a clamp down on its activities. At present the CCOMPOSA is believed to have nine members. These are: Bangladesh (1) Purba Bangala Sarbahara Party (Central Committee)—PBSP(CC) [Bangladesh], (2) Purba Bangala Sarbahara Party (Maobadi Punorgothan Kendra)—PBSP(MPK), (3) Bangladesh Sanyabadi Dal—BSD(ML), (4) Communist Party of East Bengal—CPEB (ML); Sri Lanka (5) Communist Party of Ceylon—CPC Maoist; India (6) MCC, (7) CPI(ML) (Naxalbari), (8) RCCI(MLM); Nepal (9) CPNM. CCOMPOSA has conducted three annual conferences till 2004. The third and last meeting was held in March 2004. Also, PBSP(MBRM) from Bangladesh and the Communist Party of Bhutan (Marxist– Leninist–Maoist), CPB(MLM) attended the meeting as observers. As had been the case during the two previous meetings, the thrust of the deliberations was on ‘American imperialism, Indian expansionism and tough handling by the respective authorities of the Maoist movements in each of the South Asian countries’. The political resolution said: ‘It is of utmost necessity to preserve, develop and extend these people’s wars in the entire region and initiate new ones. Let us Maoists vow to unite even more closely, build greater bonds of unity with the other struggling forces of the region, with all those who can be united against the common enemy, and turn the respective countries of South Asia into a strong bastion of world revolution.’33 Extra-Regional Links Some of the Indian Maoist groups have established broad fraternal linkages with a mélange of groups operating outside South Asia and Asia. For instance, the Janasakthi Naxalites presented a paper at the Annual International Communism Seminar in Belgium, that was organised by 119

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P. V. RAMANA the Workers Party of Belgium (WPB).34 It might be of interest to note that the WPB conducts propaganda for the Nepalese Maoists as well. Besides, the Janasakthi delegate at the seminar signed on his group’s behalf a memorandum condemning the Nepal government for its ‘tough’ action against the insurgents. Furthermore, the police in Andhra Pradesh has recovered ammunition containing Czech markings from a Janasakthi arms dump in Warangal district.35 Available information also suggests that the Indian Maoists have been able to win some sympathisers in the United Kingdom. For instance, a group by the name of ‘Indian Workers’ in Britain, has been bringing out a journal, Challenge Continues, sometime since 2003.36 The journal carries pro-Naxalite, as well as anti-West literature. There has been a lone and unverified report in an English daily from Nepal, which claimed that the Indian Maoists were ‘trying to form an international network’. It quotes an unnamed Indian Maoist leader as saying: ‘We are talking with several Maoist outfits not only in Asia but in Europe and America. Several rounds of discussion have taken place.’ He then went on to claim that they had initiated discussions with similar groups in Germany, Turkey, Norway, Japan, Australia, Peru, Belgium, Mexico, Senegal, Spain, the Philippines, Argentina, Colombia and Chile.37 In the absence of further reports, it would be premature to arrive at any conclusions in this regard. Revolutionary Internationalist Movement The Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM) was founded on 12 March 1984 at the second conference of Marxist–Leninist parties. A US online magazine, Revolutionary Worker Online claims that the RIM was founded with the common objective ‘to overthrow the old systems of exploitation and oppression and to bring into effect the new revolutionary power of the oppressed, led by the proletariat... [The constituent groups of the RIM] are waging, or preparing to wage, [a] revolutionary war, according to the conditions of their different countries’. There were 19 Maoist groups in the RIM at the time of its formation,38 but with the ejection of groups such as the Communist Party 120

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THE MAOIST WEB of Nepal (Mashal), the membership declined and now stands at 13 including the erstwhile MCCI. There is a South Asia chapter of the RIM and the participating groups meet annually. Available information indicates that the RIM South Asia (RIM SA) has held five meetings thus far, with the last of these having been conducted in the Bihar–Chattisgarh–Jharkhand– Orissa area in July 2003. When last counted, the following were said to be the members of the RIM SA: CPI(ML)(NB); CPN-M, MCCI; Proletarian Party of Purbo Bangla-Central Committee, PBSP(CC); Proletarian Party of Purbo Bangla-Maobadi Punargathan Kendro, PBSM(MPK); Revolutionary Communist Centre of India (Marxist–Leninist–Maoist), RCCI(MLM); Bangladesher Samyobadi Dal-Marxist–Leninist, BSD(ML); Communist Party of Bhutan (Marxist–Leninist–Maoist), CPB (MLM). It is yet not clear if the CPI (Maoist) would continue to be a member of the RIM. However, as has been cited at the beginning of this paper, the CPI (Maoist) leader Kishan said: ‘Now… the party (CPI-Maoist) has decided to continue its deep relations with [the] RIM’.39 In fact, the erstwhile PW was not a member of the RIM. The PW noted in one of its documents that political and ideological differences were surfacing among the constituent members of the CCOMPOSA since its inception because a majority were RIM members and had also expressed the view that the Maoist movements around the world had not yet evolved to a stage that was satisfying enough for it to join the RIM. Be that as it may, it cannot be doubted that multinational meetings of the Maoist rebels, including those of the RIM, serve to sharpen their thinking and to devise strategies to further their agenda. As the chief of the Nepalese Maoists, Pushpa Kamal Dahal ‘Comrade Prachanda’ noted in an interview:40 ‘We have made a deep appreciation in the context of the People’s War in Nepal that its development cannot be conceived if it is divorced from the experiences led by the PCP [Communist Party of Peru] RCP [Revolutionary Communist Party], USA, [the] RIM and revolutionaries in India, Turkey, Iran, [the] Philippines and other countries since 121

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P. V. RAMANA the death of Comrade Mao. The present rapid pace of development would have been inconceivable without the support of communist revolutionaries and freedom-loving people of different countries, and particularly the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement, during the period of the historic initiation of the People’s War. That is why we have conceived the new democratic revolution in Nepal as a base area of world revolution, internationalist in content and national in form. We have seriously sought to develop close solidarity with the struggles in other countries, whatever their level of development might be, to learn from their experiences and disseminate our experiences to them’. In this context, it might help to note that the ongoing Maoist insurgency in Nepal received special attention at the July 2003 RIM meeting. In a communiqué issued after the meeting concluded, RIM SA participants said:41 ‘The comrades from Nepal presented a vivid picture of the earth shaking advances of the People’s War, which [has] threatened not [only] the Nepalese ruling classes but also Indian expansionism and US imperialism. The parties and organisations participating in the regional conference resolved to fulfil their internationalist duty to develop a powerful mass movement against any direct or indirect military intervention against the People’s War led by the Communist Party of Nepal under the leadership of comrade Prachanda. The regional conference endorsed the slogan “Hands off Nepal!!” and gave a clarion call to the revolutionary masses of the world: “Look at the Himalayas, a better world is in birth!” ‘On another occasion, the Nepalese Maoists detailed the utility of having a continuous debate among themselves and with like-minded groups. In a document presented before the Second National Conference of the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist, the group said that the ‘Prachanda Path’ was evolved ‘in the context of [a] prolonged discussion inside and outside the party and the international communist movement, most importantly a high level of theoretical interaction with the RIM committee.’42 Also, during the July 2003 meeting, the insurgent groups discussed the problems being faced in advancing the Maoist programme 122

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THE MAOIST WEB in Bangladesh, which is in a rudimentary stage. Therefore, the rebels from Bangladesh could well have had the benefit of collective advice and the opportunity to think up new strategies and techniques to further their agenda. World People’s Resistance Movement, South Asia The WPRM South Asia is a new forum that has been established in the South Asian region by extreme Left-leaning elements. Available information indicates that its European chapter, too, is in existence. The forum has, in its fold, those who support and propagate, but do not necessarily wage, an armed struggle. WPRM is, in fact, an affiliate of the RIM and some members are fronts of Maoist groups. Explaining the rationale behind forming the grouping, one of its leaders said that, to counter the forces of imperialism that had been targeting the people of the world in numerous forms, there was an equal need to form as many groups to resist and oppose it. The grouping holds that the United States had ‘penetrated’ into the region in numerous ways—economically, culturally, politically and militarily— and that the states of the region have been acting as its ‘junior partner’. The penetration has, thus, ‘endangered independence and fatally threatened the life and livelihood of the people of South Asia… [Therefore], anti-imperialist forces from India, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka have united to form the … WPRM South Asia’. The grouping opposes American imperialism and seeks to ‘unite, mobilise and lead the masses to oppose the US-led global terrorist crusade and... support[s] all just struggles, including revolutionary struggles and people’s wars led by Maoist forces, as part of [the process of] building and advancing the worldwide anti-imperialist resistance movement.’43 In pursuit of its programme, WPRM South Asia has organised protests in India’s capital, New Delhi, and in other places such as the eastern Indian metropolis of Kolkata and has, thus, emerged as a platform to oppose state authority in different countries of the South Asian region. For instance, it had organised a rally and mass meeting in New Delhi, on 13 February 2003, ‘to protest the US war on Iraq, imperialist intervention in Nepal and Indian state repression’ and had 123

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P. V. RAMANA submitted a memorandum to the officials of the US Embassy and the Royal Nepal Embassy.44 Following the normal procedure, participants of such rallies are detained, cases registered against them and then released in just a few hours. But a member of WPRM South Asia, deciding to make a big thing of it, posted notices on the internet to create the impression that protestors appealing for the freedom of a ‘people’s leader’ were unceremoniously packed off to prison. The Mumbai Resistance 2004 The Mumbai Resistance 2004 (MR 2004) is a good illustration of the networks in place for the Maoist guerrilla outfits, and their fronts in various countries. It functioned as a platform for expressing opposition to imperialism and globalisation. It was an event organised by the several fronts of Maoist outfits, following a call given by the International League of People’s Solidarities (ILPS).45 In fact, the WPRM was one of the prominent participants in the MR 2004. This researcher gathered, during a field visit to Naxalite-affected areas in January 2004, that the then PW had held extensive internal discussions before deciding to hold the MR 2004. The leadership for the event was provided by the then PW’s sub-committee on Mass Organisations, and the then MMCI-affiliated Struggle Forum for People’s Resistance (SFPR). A central committee member of the then PW supervised all the preparations. The event was conceptualised by the then PW and discussed at a meeting held in Greece in 2003. For the erstwhile PW, the MR was an opportunity for political mobilisation, expanding its support base and incorporating into its fold several new groupings and elements in India. Participants for the event and the massive public rally were mobilised in large numbers from the relatively nearby tribal areas of Balaghat, Gondia and Gadchiroli, where the PW claims it has established a guerrilla zone of domination. In order to earn wide legitimacy for the event, the Maoists sought the blessings and, if available, the participation of renowned intellectuals. This explains why the highly respected jurist, Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer, a retired judge of the Supreme Court of India, sent a message of 124

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THE MAOIST WEB good wishes to the event. Nepalese Maoist leader Gaurav, detained at the Chennai prison, also sent a message of greetings.46 The list of participants in the MR was vast. Besides Indian groups, there were 24 international entities. Extra-Fraternal Links: ULFA, ISI and LTTE ULFA and ISI A senior police officer from Andhra Pradesh told this researcher47 that a leader of the then PWG had visited Dhaka, met with the leaders of the Indian terrorist outfit, the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA). He asked them what had happened to the money that they (PWG) had paid to ULFA (about INR 10 million) for buying sophisticated arms. The ULFA’s links with the ISI are by now well-known, and are welldocumented. It is probable that the ULFA had introduced the then PWG to the ISI through its handlers based in Dhaka, where the top leadership of the ULFA has had a base for some years now. Following the introduction, the then PWG leader might have quietly travelled to Karachi before going home. As for weapons, a truckload was subsequently dispatched to India, but a media report in Eenadu said that the truck was intercepted by the Indian security forces. All this clearly indicates that the ISI has steadily been expanding its ‘client base’ in India. If Jammu & Kashmir was the ISI’s first destabilisation base, and the north-east region its second, Naxalite-dominated areas appear to be its third target in India. Statements indicating PW–ISI links have emanated in the past from responsible Indian leaders. West Bengal Urban Development Minister Ashok Bhattacharya said in an interview (subsequently posted on the official website of India’s External Affairs Ministry) that, ‘[the Maoist insurgents of Nepal] with the help of [the] ISI, [are] trying to establish… links with the India-based Naxalite outfits… using the Siliguri corridor. The [then] Prime Minister [Sherbahadur Deuba] and our chief minister [Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee] discussed the problem threadbare… We are maintaining a strict vigil on the situation’.48

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P. V. RAMANA The Indian Maoists are, however, unwilling to admit to any links with the ISI. Their general secretary Ganapathy denied any such links in an interview to www.rediff.com. He said: ‘We deny the ISI part. We do not have any relation with them. That’s state propaganda to discredit us’.49 It is difficult to believe him, especially when, even as recently as on 10 January 2005, a media report from Jagdalpur held that the Maoists had received sophisticated arms from Pakistan-based terrorist groups.50 A further consolidation of the nexus between the Indian Maoists and the ISI holds the threat of increased inflow of small and sophisticated arms into the Maoist arms dumps in India. Besides, the ISI could supply the much-needed ammunition to suit the different weapons in the Maoist arsenal. There is another possibility that is of serious concern. The Maoists, who now have only ordinary explosives, might manage to procure far more lethal materials such as the RDX, which would enormously increase their striking capability. The LTTE Though it was a failure, the assassination attempt on the then Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister, Chandrababu Naidu, on 1 October 2003 brought focus on land-mines as a cheap and lethal form of weaponry. The then Deputy Prime Minister, L.K. Advani, said that the (erstwhile) PWG had links with the LTTE and had received expertise in using Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) from the Sri Lankan outfit.51 An Andhra political leader, Bandaru Dattatreya, the former Union Minister of State for Railways, told the Lok Sabha on 10 December 1991 that the PWG had acquired 60 AK-47s and 20 sten guns from the LTTE.52 He was quoting the then home minister of Andhra Pradesh as having said so on the floor of the state legislature on 20 August 1991. In December 2001, two videocassettes containing LTTE’s training modules were recovered from an arms dump of the erstwhile PW in Nelimaliga village of Visakhapatnam district.53 Then again, reports in late December 2002 indicated that the PWG and the LTTE had struck an arms deal some months earlier, but that the modalities (pricing) remained to be finalised. 126

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THE MAOIST WEB When questioned, during an interview in 1998, on the reports about LTTE instructors conducting training camps for PWG squads, Ganapathy said: ‘They were not [from the] LTTE. They were exLTTE. What happened was that these people came to India after leaving their organisation and formed communist groups. The PW had relations with these groups. As part of that, they held training camps for us’.54 To this unconvincing denial, Ganapathy went on to add: ‘We have had no relations with the LTTE till now. But we are not against having relations with them. We will certainly have links with them if an opportunity arises. We feel that such a relation would be conducive to the revolutionary movement’.55 Conclusion From the preceding pages, one arrives at a few tentative and broad conclusions. The Maoist groups of South Asia have benefited from the linkages they have established among themselves in more ways than one. They have merged, trained together, exchanged arms and have conducted propaganda for one another. On the other hand, ties with similar groups outside the region have brought them the benefit of wider reach, publicity and propaganda. These ties have not resulted in any noteworthy transfer of arms or funds. This can be explained in the light of the fact that they are underground organisations operating under conditions of what they term as ‘intense state repression’. Therefore, it is difficult for them to raise funds. Besides, they work against the wealthy classes and cannot expect, let alone secure, financial contributions from them, except through extortion. Their coffers, therefore, are far from full—far too meagre to meet their organisational expenses. Nor do these groups enjoy the largesse of state sponsorship as do the Pakistan-funded terrorists outfits in Jammu & Kashmir. However, it is noteworthy that even relatively smaller quantities of monies can sustain Maoist movements for very long periods, help them expand to newer areas, sharply enhance their lethality and, as a consequence, increase the scale of violence. Their weapons’ requirements are largely met through indigenous and ingenious manufacture, and from looting the security forces. They 127

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P. V. RAMANA are not in surplus of arms. If they had more, they would find it far more sensible to use them to expand their areas of operation and take the revolution to newer areas in the country than to donate or sell them to similar groups abroad. Thus, the extra-regional linkages have a limited utility and are, therefore, not a cause for alarm, though of some concern. The need to closely monitor the extra-fraternal linkages and the intra-regional linkages is borne out by their emerging pattern and the direction of the arms flow thus far. Moreover, there is a huge quantity of small arms in the region that has been lying idle after the Indian government had initiated a peace process with the Naga rebels in India’s North East and after the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE reached a cease-fire agreement. Besides, the rapid successes scored by the Maoists in Nepal and the increasing possibility that they might, one day, march into the capital, Kathmandu, has significant implications for the other countries in the region. The Maoist groups in these countries might feel further emboldened to take on the state and spread their activities and violence. It is quite possible that a Maoist government in Nepal would, as a matter of policy, extend assistance to fraternal groups in the region, especially in the next door neigbourhoods—India, Bhutan and Bangladesh. Notes and References 1. Kishan stated this in a joint interview with Muppala Lakshman Rao ‘Ganapathy’, the erstwhile General Secretary of the Communist Party of India (Marxist–Leninist) [People’s War], CPI(ML) [PW], published in People’s March, Ernakulam, Volume 5, Nos. 11–12, November– December 2004, under the title ‘Joint Interview of the General Secretaries of The Erstwhile CPI(ML)[PW] and the MCCI, on the Occasion of the Merger of the Two Parties and the Formation of the Communist Party of India (Maoist)’. 2. Of these, 126 districts have been affected to varying degree—high, moderate and marginal, while fervent attempts are currently being made by the Naxalites to target and bring under their influence the remaining 33 districts. Data, as of the end of 2004, provided by officials of the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, who wish to remain anonymous. The expansion of the Naxalites has, indeed, been rapid in the past

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THE MAOIST WEB few years. Noting this trend, one well-known analyst had this to say: ‘At the meeting of the Central Coordination Committee of Naxalite-affected states at Bhubaneshwar on 21 November 2003, the union home secretary had disclosed that a total of 55 districts in nine states were affected by varying degrees of Naxalite violence. Just ten months later, on 21 September 2004, an official note circulated at the meeting of chief ministers of Naxalite-affected states indicated that this number had gone up to 125 districts in 12 states, with another 24 districts being targeted by the Left Wing Extremists under their current agenda of expansion’. See Ajai Sahni, ‘Bad Medicine for a Red Epidemic’, South Asia Intelligence Review, New Delhi, Vol. 3, No. 12, 4 October 2004, accessible at http://www.satp. org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/3_12.htm#ASSESSMENT2. 3. For details on the demands of the group and the context within which it came into existence, see P. V. Ramana, ‘Maoism Surfaces in Druik Kingdom’, Sahara Time, New Delhi, 23 August 2003. 4. See The Hindu, Chennai, Indian Express, New Delhi, and Eenadu, Hyderabad, a vernacular Telugu daily, 15 October 2004. The merger was announced on 14 October simultaneously in the national capital Delhi and at a press conference in Hyderabad, the capital of the southern Indian state of Andhra Pradesh. The announcement in Hyderabad was made by the state secretary of the group, Akkiraju Haragopal ‘Ramakrishna’, a few hours before he lead the Maoist delegation the peace talks with the state government, on 15 October 2004. The erstwhile PW was predominantly Andhra Pradesh based, where it was founded in 1980, and had a presence in parts of at least seven other states, while the erstwhile MCCI was predominantly Bihar-based, and operated in parts of West Bengal, Orissa and Jharkhand. 5. The merger occurred in August 1998, after over five years of extensive negotiations, which had commenced in March 1993. 6. The merger was announced in a joint communiqué issued on 15 January 2003. At the time, the outfits, while ‘wholeheartedly declaring before the toiling masses of India’, said: ‘Our united organisation will be based on Marxism–Leninism–Maoism and remain firmly committed to the long cherished need for the great Indian people to carry forward the new democratic revolution’. See ‘Maoist Organisations Unite in India’, Revolutionary Worker, Chicago, No. 1200, 25 May 2003, accessible at http://rwor. org/a/1200/awtwindia.htm.

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P. V. RAMANA 7. The group has pockets of influence in the Indian states of Kerala, Maharastra and Karnataka. See ‘Maoist Organisations Unite in India’, Ibid. Furthermore, the CPI(ML) Naxalabari is an amalgam of itself the CPI (ML) Maoist Unity Centre (CPI-ML-MUC) and the CPI (ML) Red Flag. The MUC was formed on 22 April 1997 with the merger of Naxalite elements of the Kerala Communist Party and Maharashtra Communist Party that had emerged following the disbanding of the CPI (ML) Central Reorganisation Committee. The MUC merged with CPI (ML) Naxalbari in April 1999. Subsequently, sometime during or after the year 2000, a splinter group of the CPI (ML) Red Flag led by Rauf merged with CPI (ML) Naxalbari. It is believed that Rauf currently leads the CPI(ML) Naxalbari. 8. Internal document of the PW read during a field visit to Naxal-affected parts of Andhra Pradesh in January 2004. 9. Pranava K. Chaudhary, ‘Maoists’ bases in N Bihar likely’, Times of India, New Delhi, accessible at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/ articleshow/233956.cms., 15 October 2003. 10. Ranjit Gupta, The Crimson Agenda: Maoist Protest and Terror, New Delhi: Wordsmiths, p. 45, 2004. 11. The statement can be accessed online at http://cpnm.org/new/English/statements/stop_usa_2june04.htm and was signed by Ganapathy, the General Secretary of the CPI (Maoist). 12. Commenting on the arrest and the subsequent appeal by the chairman of the Maoist insurgents, Pushpa Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda’, not to deport Gajurel to Nepal, but set him free, an official of the Indian Embassy in the Nepalese capital, Kathmandu, reportedly said, ‘We suspect that he had gone there to meet the People’s War Group (PWG). He had certainly not gone there to teach in the Chennai University’. See http://www.nepalnews. com.np/contents/englishdaily/ktmpost/2003/aug/aug25/. 13. Interview with a senior police official, Hyderabad, January 2002. 14. At that time, they had issued a joint-statement signed jointly by Maoist insurgents chief Prachanda and a senior functionary of the then PW, ‘Suresh’. 15. See P. V. Ramana, ‘Marching CCOMPOSA, Limping SAARC’, article no. 855, in the online journal of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, accessible at http://www.ipcs. org/ipcs/militaryIndex2. jsp?action=showView&kValue=108&military=1015&status=article&mod= b, 12 September 2002.

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THE MAOIST WEB 16. Ibid. 17. One report emanated even as late as in April 2004. See http://www.nepalnews.com.np/archive /apr/arc_apr04_13.htm. 18. Asian Age, New Delhi, 19 August 2002. There has been no further information or whether these camps were continuing. It is, therefore, difficult to state the exact, present position. 19. See Sanjay K. Jha, ‘MCC and Maoists: Expanding Naxal Violence in Bihar’, article no. 991, 15 March 2003, published in the online journal of the Institute of Peace Conflict Studies, New Delhi, accessible at http://www.ipcs.org/nmt_militaryIndex2.jsp?action=showView&kValue=9 43&military=1016&status=article&mod=b. 20. While arresting him, the police reportedly seized several thousand books on guerrilla warfare, war maps writings of Mao, Marx and Engels, two computers, printers, a radio transmitter, a telescope used by the Russian army and a guerrilla training manual prescribed for American troops. Himalayan Times, Kathmandu, 31 March 2004. 21. Collated from various editions of http://www.nepalnews.com. 22. This was disclosed to the media by the then AP state police chief at a press conference on 26 May 2003, in Hyderabad. See The Hindu, Chennai, 27 May 2003. 23. The report is titled ‘Goebellian Lies Cannot Stop the Advance of the Nepalese Revolution’, and the editor’s note runs thus: ‘(This report was compiled from the internet sites giving the real information. As also the Maoists are now running four FM radio stations — earlier it was 5, but one was recently captured — the lies of the monarchy and their imperialist backers cannot go very far — Editor)’. The attack was made on 21 March 2004 and the report was prepared by the journal on 26 March. The report was published in the April 2004 issue of People’s March, Vol. 5, No. 4. One by the name of Govindan Kutty runs the journal, from Peroor House, North Fort, Thripoonithura, Ernakulam District, Kerala. The example is meant to illustrate the range of the linkages and is not intended to exhaustively enumerate the fact. 24. See People’s March, Vol. 6, No. 1, January 2005 and volume: 5, no. 10, October 2004.

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P. V. RAMANA 25. Minister of State for Home I. D. Swamy confirmed the existence of the idea of a revolutionary corridor or a Compact Revolutionary Zone in a written reply to the Lok Sabha. See the press release of the Press Information Bureau (PIB), on 5 August 2003, accessible at http://pib. nic.in/archieve/lreleng/lyr2003 /raug2003 /05082003/ r05082 00316.html. 26. Also see Sanjay K. Jha, ‘MCC and Maoists: Expanding Naxal Violence in Bihar’, accessible in the online journal of IPCS, at http://www.ipcs.org/ipcs/ militaryIndex2.jsp? action=showView& kValue=943&milit ary=1015 &status=article&mod=b and Sanjay K. Jha, ‘The Compact Revolutionary Zone’, South Asia Intelligence Review, volume 1, no. 34, 10 March 2003, accessible in the archives section at http://www.satp.org. 27. See K. Srinivas Reddy, ‘PWG-MCC Merger Moves Launched’, Hindu, 12 May 2002. 28. See Ranjit Gupta, Crimson Agenda, p. 29. 29. See S. D. Muni, Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: The Challenge and the Response, New Delhi: Rupa-Observer Research Foundation, p. 65, 2003. 30. See P. V. Ramana, ‘Maoism Surfaces in Druk Kingdom’, Sahara Time, New Delhi, 23 August 2003. 31. See ‘Publisher’s Note’ in the inaugural issue of CCOMPOSA, February 2003. 32. See ‘Resolution on the Present Political Situation Adopted by the Second Annual Conference of the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organisations of South Asia’, 15 September 2002. 33. See ‘Political Resolution of the Third Conference of CCOMPOSA, Adopted by the Third Conference of CCOMPOSA on 19 March 2004’, accessible at www.cpnm.org. In the resolution, the Maoist groups have also agreed to launch week-long protests (22–29 May 2004) primarily against ‘state repression’—coinciding with the anniversary of the Naxalbari peasant uprising of 1967, which is considered as the birth of the ongoing Maoist movement in India. Naxalbari is a village in the Siliguri division of West Bengal. 34. The seminar was held in early September 2002 and was attended by 42 groups ranging across South America to South-East Asia. 35. Following the recovery, a First Information Report was filed with the no. 32/97, on 17 October 1997. Information was gathered during a field visit in February 2002.

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THE MAOIST WEB 36. The editor-in-chief of the journal is one Mr Azad Hoshiarpuri. 37. See The Himalayan Times, Kathmandu, http://www.thehimalayantimes. com/fullstory.asp?filename= aFanata0sdqzpda5 Qa3sa.axamal&folder= aHaoamW&Name= Home&dtSiteDate=20041202. 38. See the ‘Declaration of the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement’, accessible at http://www.csrp.org/rim/rimdec.htm. 39. See People’s March, volume 5, nos. 11–12, ‘Joint Interview of the General Secretaries of The Erstwhile CPI (ML) (PW) and The MCCI, on the Occasion of the Merger of the Two Parties and the Formation of the Communist Party of India (Maoist)’, November–December 2004. 40. ‘However Tortuous the Road may be, the Victory of the World Proletarian Revolution is Certain’, Interview with Comrade Prachanda, Chairman, CPN (Maoist), 28 May 2001, accessible at http://www.humanrights .de/doc_en/archiv/n/nepal/politics/170202_interview_pra.htm. 41. See ‘Report: Holding of the Fifth South Asia Regional Conference of the Parties and Organisations of the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement’, People’s March, October 2003, p. 13. The signatories of the communiqué included the Communist Party of India (Marxist–Leninist) (Naxalbari), CPI(ML) (NB); the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), CPN(Maoist); the Maoist Communist Centre India, MCCI; the Proletarian Party of Purbo Bangla Central Commuttee, PBSP CC; the Proletarian Party of Purbo Bangla Maobadi Punargathan Kendro, PBSM MPK; the Revolutionary Communist Centre of India (Marxist–Leninist– Maoist), RCCI (MLM); the Bangladesher Samyobadi Dal (Marxist–Leninist), BSD (ML); the Communist Party of Bhutan (MLM), CPB (MLM). 42. ‘Prachanda Path: A Great Achievement’, A World to Win, London, Vol. 1, No. 12, p. 58. 43. See the ‘Statement of the World People’s Resistance Movement South Asia’, accessible at http://www.wprm.org/wprm_sa/wprm_sa/ wprm_sa.htm. 44. Some of the participating organisations in the rally included the Struggling Forum for People’s Resistance (SFPR), the Nepalese People’s Rights Protection Committee, India, the Lok Sangram Morcha, Porattam, the AIFPR, Jana Pratirodh Manch, the Indian Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU), Janashakti, People’s Union for Democratic Rights (PUDR), People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL), Nari Sangram Manch and Forum Against Imperialist Globalisation (FAIG).

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P. V. RAMANA 45. The ILPS was founded in May 2001 as an anti-imperialist grouping. Its charter says, ‘[to] promote, support and develop the anti-imperialist and democratic struggles of the people of the world, including the workers, peasants, women, youth, professionals and other sectors of society against the ideological, political, military, economic, social and cultural domination, and attacks of imperialism and reaction. It shall have a broad mass character, shall not be subordinate to any political party, government or church and shall afford equality to all participating organisations. It shall strive to realise the unity, co-operation and co-ordination of anti-imperialist and democratic struggles throughout the world. The league shall expose and oppose the oppressive and exploitative policies and acts of the imperialist and puppet states, the multinational companies and imperialist-dominated international agencies, such as the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO, and the military alliances such as NATO and the US–Japan Security Council’. See ‘The Charter of the ILPS’, accessible at http://www.ilps-news.com/central-info-bureau/intl-assembly/ first-international-assemly/the-charter-of-ilps/. The ILPS maintains an office at the following address: Postbus 1452, 3500 BL Utrecht, The Netherlands, and cites the telephone number 00-31-30-2400551, and Fax: 00-31-30-2322989. Its e-mail ID is [email protected], [email protected]. Giving a worldwide call for funds to support its agenda, it cites the account number of a lady Ms A. Bozbey, Account Number ABN–AMRO, Swift Code: ABN AWL 2R, The Hague, The Netherlands. The Indian representatives on its International Coordination Committee include Fathima Natesan Burnad, and Darshan Pal. Of them, at least Pal is an active member of the WPRM as well. 46. The two messages can be accessed from the official website of MR 2004, http://www.mumbairesistance.org. 47. Interview with a senior police officer, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh, February 2002. 48. See the official website of the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, http://www.mea.gov.in. 49. See The rediff interview/Ganapathy, http://www.rediff.com/news/ 1998/ oct/07gana1.htm. 50. See P. V. Ramana, ‘The Rediff Special—AP Maoists: The Party is Over!" www.rediff.com, 25 January 2005.

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THE MAOIST WEB 51. See ‘PWG has links with LTTE: Advani, Hindu, 6 October 2003. 52. See India, Lok Sabha, Discussion Under Rule 193, General Deterioration of Law and Order Situation in Various Parts of the Country with Reference to Recent Spurt in Incidents of Terrorism, Secessionism and Kidnappings, 10 December 1991, accessible at http://www.parliamentofindia. nic.in/lsdeb/ls10/ ses2/1910129105.htm#*m08. 53. See Eenadu, 8 December 2001, Warangal district edition. These were recovered, according to the news report, in the Kannavara–Eetarobbalu forests, Gudem Kotta Veedhi Mandal (administrative unit, similar to a taluk in other parts of the country). 54. See the Rediff Interview/Ganapathy, http://www.rediff.com/news/1998/ oct/07gana1.htm. 55. Ibid.

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11 Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: An Overview* Krishna Hachhethu

This plan of initiation of the people’s war would be based on the principle that everything is an illusion except state power. While remaining firm on the principle aim of the armed struggle as to capture political power for the people, the party expresses its firm commitment to wage relentless struggle against all forms of deviationist thoughts and trends including economism, reformism and anarchism. —‘Plan for the Historic Initiation of the People’s War’, adopted by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) in September 1995 Universal democratic and civil rights including multiparty competition, periodic elections, universal suffrage, rule of law, freedom of speech and press, fundamental and human rights etc. should be guaranteed. Forward-looking new state system and a new constitution, submitted by the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) during the negotiations in April 2003. *

This chapter was submitted on 29 January 2005. A few days later, on 1 February 2005, the King took over in Nepal and dissolved the parliament. Subsequently, there has been a sea change in Nepal’s politics. Presently, in February 2007, the Maoists are on the verge of joining the government and elections to the Constituent Assembly are set to be held in a few months from now. Perhaps, Nepal would be declared a republic in the months ahead.

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MAOIST INSURGENCY IN NEPAL Introduction On 13 February 2005, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) celebrated the ninth anniversary of the ‘PW.’ Within this short span of time, the insurgency, according to the Maoists, had reached the stage of ‘strategic offensive.’ The advance of the insurgency—through ‘strategic defensive’ and ‘strategic balance’—followed an increase in its military capacity and war economy. Its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) now consists of 3 divisions, 9 brigades, and 29 battalions. In view of the ongoing insurgency, and the present conditions in Nepal, it is almost impossible to verify whether the Maoists’ military machine (division, brigade and battalion) along the known lines of ‘regular’ armies, and estimates, therefore, vary on the actual strength of the Maoists’ armed force. An expert, however, assumes the Maoists’ armed strength as ‘one of the largest non-state military formations in the world’.1 The Maoists are collecting money through extortion, burglaries of banks and ‘levying taxes’. Reportedly, it is one of the richest ‘terrorist’ organisations, having accumulated between US$ 64 million and US$124 million.2 On the one hand, even as their military strength has increased, the Maoists have also formed and expanded their own administrative areas, on the other. The insurgency has now spread to all the 75 districts in the country, except two—Manang and Mustang—that remain unaffected by direct, armed confrontation between the security forces and the Maoist guerrillas. In line with the party’s policy of a protracted people’s war, and to suit best its pursuance of the formation of base areas, the Maoists started forming their own government at the village-level from late 1998 onwards. Now, the Maoists have established four tiers of government: central (United Revolutionary People’s Council), regional (nine autonomous regional governments), district, and village/city.3 The Maoists have already claimed that they have captured the rural areas thus eroding the area of control of the ‘old regime’ (state), and have made some inroads into the capital and districts headquarters.4 The Maoist insurgency has progressed rapidly and many factors contributed to the escalation of the violent conflict and its expansion all over the country. The blueprint of the insurgency,5 designed a year 137

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KRISHNA HACHHETHU before its implementation began, portrayed the Maoists’ confidence on the following accounts: • The geographical location (of Nepal) is most favourable for waging guerrilla war with direct links with the people. • A good mass base for guerrilla war can be created from the struggle against national oppression of a majority of nationalities (ethnic groups). • There is no possibility of a direct military collision between the enemies for political power; the armed forces of the people could take advantage of this situation to seize a definite area. • There is the possibility of initiating and developing guerrilla wars in different parts of the country by launching a peasant revolution as the backbone of the countrywide insurrection, by centralising activities in rural areas and by relying on, and uniting with, the poor peasants. • People’s support will continue to increase if the right revisionists are thoroughly exposed and the tactics of an armed struggle are pursued carefully. • The pace of development of the armed struggle to establish people’s alternative revolutionary power would be faster and would inspire us to undertake bold tactics to achieve the same. • Nepalis working in foreign countries—mainly those working in India—would be mobilised by conducting political work amongst them and using the area for supply of various logistics for the success of the armed struggle in Nepal. Such a well thought-out and well-planned blueprint of the Maoist insurgency indicates the possibility of the advancement of the armed struggle by a careful utilisation of Nepal’s topography, its geographical proximity to India, mobilisation of peasants and excluded ethnic groups, and guerrilla tactics. Besides, analysts have identified several factors, i.e., social injustice, unemployment, underdevelopment, problems of exclusion, and lack of good governance—that have

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MAOIST INSURGENCY IN NEPAL contributed to the escalation of the Maoists’ armed activities.6 Of course, the Maoist insurgency has its own multidynamics, but analysts differ on the major and minor factors that have led to the clear intensification of the insurgency. The divergence in views is a result of the varied academic discipline of each of the analysts. Development analysts proffer the argument that the Maoist movement ‘is basically a social and economic issue and is produced and sustained by failed development.’7 Another analyst feels, ‘The Maoist insurgency is mainly fuelled by poverty’.8 It might be useful to mention here that Maoist armed activity was launched in the mid-west hills—the heartland of insurgency—and the hill districts of this region, Rolpa, Rukum, Salyan, Dailekh, Jajgarkot and Dailekh districts, which, incidentally, also figure among the 18 lowest ranking districts in Nepal according to the human development index of the country.9 The influence of the Maoists is the strongest in the economically and socially deprived northern and western parts of the country. Sociologists and ethnologists analyse the Maoist insurgency chiefly from the ethnic angle. The hill high caste Hindus, Brahmin and Chhetri, and Newar (an urban ethnic group)—who constitute 35 per cent of the total population of the country—have long been in dominant positions in the power structure of the country. Others, i.e., hill ethnic groups, tarai caste and tribal groups, and dalits are generally considered as excluded and marginalised groups. The restoration of democracy in 1990 has witnessed the emergence of ethnic activism. Writing on the connection between ethnic rising and the Maoist insurgency, one analyst argues that ‘the people’s war … has blended class-based and caste/ethnic-based insurgency in the country’.10 The hill ethnic groups had always been in the forefront of action, irrespective of their ideological content, be it during the time of the unification of Nepal in 1768 or in the 1950–51 anti-Rana revolution or in several small-scale armed protest movements in the post-1960 period. An additional feature of the present time is the involvement of some other marginalised groups, i.e., Tharus of tarai, dalits and women in the recent insurgency of the Maoist party.

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KRISHNA HACHHETHU Political scientists regard failure of governance as the main reason behind the constant weakening of the Nepali state and the strengthening of the Maoists. The post-1990 politics of Nepal is characterised by some ambiguous clauses in the Constitution, the king’s assertion for power against the spirit of constitutional monarchy, lack of effective leadership, power-centric intra- and inter party factions and conflicts, political instability, lack of institutionalisation of political parties and parliament, and pervasive corruption. All these factors have impeded the task of democratic consolidation in Nepal.11 The Maoist insurgency has a dynamic entirely of its own, and factors such as poverty, unemployment, underdevelopment, exclusion, corruption, and bad governance have contributed to its enlargement. These are, however, supplementary factors that are not sufficient to explain why the Maoists have opted for an armed struggle and not other democratic options even though the advent of democracy in 1990 broadened the space for expressing discontent and staging non-violent protest. The political and ideological aspects could provide convincing answers as to why the Maoists took the path of an armed struggle. Class struggle in the form of an armed revolution is the core of communist philosophy. The primacy of political and ideological factors is evident by the avowed goal of the Maoist insurgency: to overthrow the present polity based on multiparty parliamentary democracy and constitutional monarchy through an armed revolution, and replace it with a new political system known as the new people’s democracy. The Maoist’s key agenda—round table conference, interim government, and constituent assembly—put forth during the last two rounds of negotiations with the government during August–November 2001 and April–August 2003—further mirrors the crux of the issue. Of course, the Maoist insurgency has its own multidynamics, including social, ethnic and economic. It is, essentially, an ideological and political struggle against the present political system in Nepal. In retrospect, the Maoist insurgency has been expanding and escalating on three major grounds. First, Leftist, or progressive, ideology and identity—monopolised by the Communist Party of Nepal—is popular among the people of Nepal. To be Left-leaning or communist, in

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MAOIST INSURGENCY IN NEPAL Nepali understanding, is to speak for ‘gans, bas, kapas’ (food, shelter and clothing) for the poor, to advocate radical and revolutionary change, and, above all to stand for absolute economic equality, even at the cost of political liberty. The Maoists seem to have been more successful both in mobilising the ethnic groups and in giving a political framework for ethnic demands—autonomy and federalism. Third, internal conflicts and contradictions among state actors have reduced the state’s power and capacity, which obviously placed the Maoists in an advantageous position. Primacy of Ideology The primacy of the ideology of the present insurgency can be seen in the origin and evolution of the communist movement in Nepal, in general, and the CPN-M, in particular. Three different timeframes can be traced to the origin of the ideology, strategy and organisation of the Maoist party.12 The Maoist party’s proclaimed goal is to establish a ‘new people’s democracy’, on the lines of Mao’s China. This conforms to the objective of the CPN—the parent organisation of all communist parties in the country—set at the time of its formation in 1949. Besides the adaptation of the core components of communist ideology, i.e., class struggle, armed revolution, and dictatorship of proletariat, the communist movement in Nepal has its own native contents, i.e., republicanism, nationalism based on anti-India and anti-West sentiment, and a non-conformist view of the Westminster system. The Maoist party upholds both the theoretical and native contents of communism in Nepal. On adopting the strategy suitable to their proclaimed goal, striking differences arose among the Nepali communists, since the early 1960s, which led to recurring splits in the communist movement and, consequently, the emergence of several splinter communist parties. Each of these splinter groups at the time of their inception appeared radical vis-à-vis the monarchy, liberal democracy and India. But, over time, most of them turned into moderate groups, including the CPN (Unified Marxist–Leninist or UML), which originated in the early 1970s as a Naxalite group professing the line of ‘annihilation of class

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KRISHNA HACHHETHU enemy’, but transformed, subsequently, in the post-1990 period, into a defender of constitutional monarchy and parliamentary democracy. To be a moderate Left meant participating in the broader democratic movement and processes in alliance with the Nepali Congress (NC). Essentially opposing this line, the CPN (Fourth Convention) was founded in the early 1970s, and most of the senior leaders of the present Maoist party started their career in that party. The United National People’s Movement (UNPM, a joint front of five Maoist splinter groups) maintained a distance from the other Left parties, despite its participation in the 1990 mass movement, launched jointly by the NC and the United Left Front (ULF, which consisted of seven communist splinter groups). The UNPM differed with the ULF’s approach of considering a multiparty system at least as an interim arrangement between the dismantled partyless Panchayat system and the proposed system of a new people’s democracy. Realignment among Leftist forces in the post-1990 period led to the formation of the CPN (Unity Centre)—consisting of several splinter groups of the parent organisation, the CPN (Fourth Convention). The CPN (Unity Centre)—through its political wing, the United People’s Front (UPF)—contested the 1991 parliamentary elections and the 1992 local elections as a strategy to ‘expose the sham of parliamentary democracy’. The then newly formed CPN (Unity Centre), under the leadership of General Secretary Pushpa Kamal Dahal (popularly known as Prachanda, or the fierce one), upheld faith in an armed revolution against the prevailing system of monarchy and democracy. The question of translating the idea of armed struggle into action led to formation of the present Maoist party as a separate group. The CPN-M was established formally as late as in 1995, following a split among two sections of leaders and cadres of the CPN (Unity Centre). Those who stood for continuous involvement in the parliamentary process inherited the name of the party CPN (Unity Centre) and the rest who advocated armed revolution gave themselves a new name, the CPN-M. The Prachanda-led Maoist faction’s non-conformist stand on the post-1990 political set-up, and its contentious adherence to the ideology 142

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MAOIST INSURGENCY IN NEPAL of a class war, is evident from the stand it has taken on the political developments since 1990. • In the UNPM, the Prachanda faction, which functioned under the formal name of Masal, pleaded for advancing the 1990 jan andolan to the point of achieving a new people’s democracy. On the other, the ULF called for the restoration of a multiparty system. • The Masal (Prachanda) demanded elections to a constituent assembly and opposed drafting a new constitution by the Constitution Drafting Commission in 1990. • As a constituent of the CPN (Unity Centre), the Prachanda faction condemned the new constitution—which paved the way for parliamentary democracy and constitutional monarchy—as a ‘reactionary constitution’. • The political report adopted by the Unity Congress of the CPN (Unity Centre) in December 1991 states, ‘Our political strategy is to establish a new democratic republic of Nepal with a people’s democratic dictatorship against feudalism and imperialism and on the basis of an alliance of peasants and workers under the leadership of the proletariat… For this, it is a must to adopt the line of a protracted people’s war with a strategy of encirclement of the city from the country side’. This Unity Congress elected Prachanda as the General Secretary of the CPN (Unity Centre). • The Prachanda faction of the CPN (Unity Centre) boycotted the 1994 parliamentary elections and adopted the new name of CPN-M in February 1995. The third expanded meeting of the central committee of the party held in March 1995 decided to launch a protracted people’s war. • Since February 1996, the CPN-M has been conducting a protracted people’s war and has rapidly expanded its areas of control. The increase in the popularity of Left and progressive ideology in Nepal is clearly evident in the fact that, while the CPN won a mere 4 out of the total 109 seats in parliament in 1959, the combined strength of the various communist parties in the post-1990 period varied between 82 and 95, out of the 205 members in the House of 143

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KRISHNA HACHHETHU Representatives. Besides, the communist parties secured around 40 per cent of the total votes polled in all the three parliamentary elections held after the restoration of democracy in 1990. The various competing Left parties in Nepal have taken three different courses. One, adapt to the parliamentary system: the CPN(UML) emerged as a major political force in Nepal. Two, participate in the electoral processes but retain a non-conformist ideology vis-à-vis bourgeois democracy: the CPN (Unity Centre-Mashal) and the NWPP adopted this line. Three, armed insurgency: CPN-M. In the present situation, complicated as it is by a combination of political/constitutional impasse in mainstream politics and intensification of the Maoist’s insurgency, it is generally believed that the balance sheet of political power and influence is changing at a very fast pace. The following passage illustrates how the situation is turning in favour of the Maoists. From one perspective, the Maoist insurgency in its mid-western strongholds can be seen as the renewal of an old confrontation between the thakuri raj and the radical Left. The thakuris (descendants of rulers of the old principalities) and their clients had long dominated this area, and their rule at the local level was repressive. This was in accordance with the authoritarian regime at the Centre during the partyless panchayat system (1962–1990). Even after the restoration of democracy in 1990, the former panchayats survived, reviving their power base with a new political trademark by responding to the Nepali Congress’s policy of incorporating the traditional social and political elite in its scheme of party building during the early 1990s. However, the sense of popular empowerment that spread after the successful 1990 jan andolan introduced a new power equation against the traditional forces. Both the CPN(UML) and the CPN (Maoist, formerly the UPF) emerged as the most influential Left forces in the people’s struggle against various forms of the thakuri raj in this region. The equation among the Left forces has changed in favour of the CPN-M as a consequence of the UML’s shift from Left to Centre, while the Nepali Congress is constantly heading towards Right from

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MAOIST INSURGENCY IN NEPAL Centre. The local thakuri-Centrist alliance in the mainstream parties has never been strong under the democratic set-up, and it became weak during the period of hung parliament (November 1994–May 1999). Owing to the dynamics of government making and unmaking, the parliamentary parties grossly ignored the need for party building at the local level. This was the most appropriate time for the CPN-M to create its own space and territory for a long ‘people’s war’. Of the several concerted efforts made for creating and expanding its own territory, liquidating opponents has been one of the main strategies pursued by the Maoists. They have killed civilians who they considered were ‘enemies of the people’—political party cadres, elected peoples’ representatives, landlords, businessmen, moneylenders, exploiters, and police informers. Looking from a class perspective, one western anthropologist observed, ‘People with large houses, guns, money and gold are more at risk than poorer less well-resourced people’.13 While launching the people’s war in a most organised way, the Maoists have adopted a uniform plan of action in different places: first disarm the local people by seizing their weapons and then kill some persons (whom they accused as ‘anti-people’) in an inhuman and barbaric way in broad day-light. As one author explained: ‘People have been killed while eating, dragged out of their house into the courtyard and killed in the presence of the family members, thrown off, tied to trees, hacked and shot in various parts of bodies to let them die of utmost pain’.14 The strategy, apparently, was to create a fear psychosis and evoke terror, rather than to kill many people. Consequently, elected people’s representatives of local bodies and local cadres of political parties fled to the district headquarters to ensure the security of their lives. The eviction of political activists from rural areas happened almost simultaneously with the withdrawal of the state machinery.15 The Maoists’ monopoly over several parts of the country would definitely infringe on the popular bases of political parties; this will become evident if competitive politics is closely observed in future. The leadership of the CPN-M consciously chose armed struggle and is motivated to achieve its ideological goal. Babu Ram Bhattarai 145

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KRISHNA HACHHETHU stated clearly: ‘[The] people’s war was initiated with a proclaimed aim of establishing a new democratic socio-economic system and state by overthrowing the present socio-economic structure and state… The people’s war is the inevitable instrument for overcoming the oppressive situation in the process of the historic new democratic revolutionary transformation.’16 How would the CPN-M cadres and sympathisers understand this observation? The party has invariably contextualised the ideology of class struggle with poverty, injustice and exploitation. One foreign anthropologist noticed in Dhorpatan, Baglung district, ‘People hear that communism is about the redistribution of wealth, and as most people in the area are extremely poor, this notion is very appealing, especially to disillusioned youth who turn to Maoism because it promises to better their living conditions.’17 Indeed, an International Crisis Group (ICG) report could be a good reference to contextualise the class ideology in the local milieu. The Maoists have quite successfully appealed to what are widely viewed as deep injustice within Nepal, including abuses by the security services. Much of their attraction has stemmed not from the resonance of Maoist theory among poor and often illiterate villagers, but from the frequently inescapable logic of a general population that feels at best poorly served by their government and at worst preyed on by officials. Early Maoist attacks were effective in capturing the public’s imagination because they targeted some of the most obvious signs of inequality in the form of local upper caste politicians, police posts, the judiciary, rural banks and land revenue offices.18 Besides, prompt delivery of justice, though at gunpoint, against all sorts of exploitation and social aberrations (e.g., gambling, alcohol, sexual assault) by the Maoists’ people’s courts has been widely appreciated. Ethnicisation of Insurgency The CPN-M has made concerted efforts in cashing in on the post-1990 ethnic upsurge in Nepal. The ethnic groups, along with the madheshias (original inhabitants of tarai) and dalits, have been marginalised as a consequence of historical process of the state-designed nation building scheme. 146

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MAOIST INSURGENCY IN NEPAL Since the time of the unification of Nepal in 1768, the rulers—Shahs, Ranas and Panchas—had tried to develop Nepal as a homogeneous, monolithic and unitary state providing protection to one language (Nepali), one caste group (hill Bahun–Chhetri), and one religion (Hindu), ignoring the reality of the Nepali mosaic.19 Besides, the state-designed ‘Nepalisation’ process—through Hinduisation, spread of the parbatiya culture, institutionalisation of the caste system converting separate identity of ethnic groups into caste structures, and centralisation of politics and administration—had led to increased disparity among different social groups. The hill high-caste Brahmins—Chhetri and Newar have long been in a privileged position. Other groups, i.e., janajati, madheshya and dalits are generally marginalised. The legacy of history is well-reflected in the unequal distribution of socio-economic resources and in the representation in the political power structure of the country.20 (See Table 11.1 and 11.2). Table 11.1 Human Development by Caste and Ethnicity, 1996 Dominant Groups

1 Life expectancy 2 Adult literacy rate % 3 Mean years of schooling 4 Per capita income Nrs 5 Per capita PPP income S$ 6 Life expectancy Index 7 Educational Attainment Index 8 Income Index 9 Human Development Index 10 Ration to HDI Nepal = 100

Marginal Groups

Bahun Chhetri Newar

Madhesi Janajati Dalit

Nepal

60.8 58.0 4.5

56.03 42.0 2.8

62.2 54.8 4.4

58.4 27.5 1.7

53.0 35.2 2.0

50.3 23.8 1.2

55.0 36.3 2.3

9,921

7,744

11,953

6,911

6,607

4,940

7,673

1,533

1,197

1,848

1,068

1,021

764

1,186

0.96 0.49

0.52 0.34

0.62 0.46

0.55 0.22

0.46 0.28

0.42 0.18

0.50 0.29

0.24 0.44

0.18 0.35

0.29 0.46

0.16 0.31

0.15 0.30

0.11 0.24

0.18 0.33

140.7

96.2

92.2

73.6

100.0

135.87 107.3

Source: NESAC, Nepal: Human Development Report 1998, Kathmandu: Nepal South Asia Centre.

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KRISHNA HACHHETHU Table 11.2 Integrated National Index of Governance, 1999 Dominant Groups

Marginalised Groups

Bahun/ Chhetri

Newar

Dalit

Other

1 Court

77.0

13.6

7.6

1.7

0

0

235

2 Constitutional bodies

56.0

24.0

12.0

2.8

0

0

25

3 Cabinet

62.5

9.4

15.6

12.5

0

0

32

4 Parliament

60.0

7.6

17.4

13.6

1.5

0

265

5 Public administration

77.6

17.6

3.7

1.2

0

0

245

6 Party leadership

58.8

10.9

15.8

15.2

0

0

165

7 Leadership: local elected bodies

55.5

15.7

16.2

12.0

0

0

191

8 Leadership: commerce and industry

16.7

47.6

35.7

0

0

0

42

9 Leadership: educational arena

77.3

11.3

7.2

2.1

1

1

97

69.1

17.9

0

4.9

0

0

123

11 Science/technology 58.1

29.0

9.7

3.2

0

0

62

12 Civil society leadership

75.9

14.8

7.4

1.9

0

0

54

Total

66.5

15.2

11.2

7.1

0.3

1

Population %

31.6

5.6

30.9

22.2

8.7

1

+ 34. 9

+9.6

- 19.7

- 15.1

- 8.4

-1

10 Leadership: cultural arena

Difference with population %

Madhesi Janajati

Total

Source: Govinda Neupane. Nepalko Jatiya Prasana (Question of Caste/Ethnicity in Nepal), Kathmandu: Centre for Development Studies, 2000.

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MAOIST INSURGENCY IN NEPAL Discontent against domination by the hill high caste is the central issue of the emerging minority movements in Nepal. The unequal power distribution among the caste or ethnic groups cannot be changed within the existing structures of the Nepali state: monarchical rule, a Hindu state, unitary form of government, primacy of one language (Nepali), domination by the hill Brahmin, Chhetri and Newar, centrality of Kathmandu, centralised administration, feudalism and patron–client based authoritarian culture. With a project of state restructuring, the minority groups have asserted for their inclusion. The agenda of state restructuring has several interrelated components, i.e., secular state, republican system, federal form of government, regional and ethnic autonomy, proportional electoral system, devolution of power to local government, equal treatment for all languages, equitable sharing of state resources, positive discrimination or reservation for minorities, and representation of different groups in public positions. The ethnic concerns are well addressed by the CPN-M. One famous sentence that has been used since the inception of the insurgency is: ‘To maintain the hegemony of one religion (Hinduism), language (Nepali), and nationality (Khas), this state has for centuries exercised discrimination, exploitation and oppression against other religions, languages and nationalities and has conspired to fragment the forces of national unity that is vital for proper development and security of the country.’21 The Maoist proposal of state restructuring converges the ethnic demands. Some key points of the Maoist’s scheme of state restructuring that have a direct bearing on ethnic and minority rights are: • Declaration of Nepal as a secular state • Equal treatment to all languages of Nepal • Ethnic and region based autonomy and right to self-determination • End of caste, ethnic, regional and gender-based discrimination • Special policy for the promotion of the interests of dalit and women

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KRISHNA HACHHETHU The Maoists concerted effort to blend ethnic rights and class war is evident by the formation of ethnic and region-based front organisations. Between 1998 and 2000, the Maoists formed seven ethnic-based and two region-based front organisations, namely Magarat National Liberation Front, Tamang National Liberation Front, Tamuwan National Liberation Front, Limbuwan National Liberation Front, Nepal Dalit Liberation Front, Tharuwan National Liberation Front, Thami Liberation Front, Majhi National Liberation Front, Newa Khala (ethnic-based), Madheshi National Liberation Front and Karnali Regional Liberation Front. The Maoists could penetrate, and expand their armed activities in the eastern hills and the tarai region only after the party’s ethnic and region-based front organisations began to function. Furthermore, based on ethnicity and regionalism the CPN-M adopted a federal structure with nine autonomous regional governments. These are: 1) Kirat autonomous region, 2) Tamang Salling Autonomous Region, 3) Tamuwan Autonomous Region, 4) Newar Autonomous Region (yet to be announced), 5) Magarat Autonomous Region, 6) Tharuwan Autonomous Region, 7) Madhesh Autonomous Region, 8) Bheri–Karnali Autonomous Region, and 9) Seti–Mahakali Autonomous Region. The ethnicisation of class ideology tremendously helped in strengthening the insurgency. The Maoists proudly said: ‘New and young party members from poor peasant, women, depressed communities, oppressed nations and nationalities and backward regions rapidly came out of the crucible of the people’s war in an unimaginable number.’22 Viewed from a different perspective, the CPN-M has some intra-party imperatives in ethnicising the insurgency since the people from ethnic groups wield considerable influence within the party organisation. They, indeed, have a preponderant presence in the armed wing of the party. By appointing party leaders from different ethnic groups as heads of the various and related regional governments, the CPN-M has maintained the caste–ethnic balance in the internal power equation of the party, and this could well have been to forestall the possibility of an internal rebellion by a certain group of people within the party. Strategically speaking, introducing the ethnic factor 150

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MAOIST INSURGENCY IN NEPAL in the insurgency served the party’s interests in appealing to, and mobilising the people of, the excluded groups. Though the Maoist ‘PW’ is political, the insurgency has a greater ethnic content in terms of the composition of the party’s PLA and militia. Internal Contradictions Within the State The institution of monarchy has always enjoyed a central position throughout the history of Nepal. But the survival of such a pivotal institution is now under question. King Gyanendra ascended the throne in the backdrop of the royal palace massacre of June 2001 in which King Birendra, along with all his family members and 10 other royals, was killed. The report of the committee that investigated the incident held the then Crown Prince, Dipendra as the culprit. The finding did not cut ice with the common masses and they suspected a conspiracy behind this great tragedy. This event changed the relation between the monarchy and the people. The parliamentary parties consciously ignored the mass psychology, but the CPN-M, which is championing for a republic, capitalised on it for obvious reasons. Unlike his predecessors, the new king, Gyanendra has some sort of a legitimacy problem. His popularity further declined as a result of his ambition to become a ‘constructive monarch’. The royal take over of power began on 2 October 2002 and invited a confrontation with the major political parties such as the NC and the UML, which were committed to a constitutional monarchy. The palace’s move of taking back power from the political parties was backed by some of the important countries of the international system, which thought that it would help integrate the state’s political and military power under the command of the king. (The Royal Nepal Army, RNA, not comfortable working with political party leaders, has been traditionally loyal to the institution of monarchy). But, the international community’s hopes were belied, and the distance between the king and the parties increased. This limited the palace’s manoeuverability, which was manifest during the second round of negotiations between the king’s nominated government and the Maoists in April–August 2003. During the process of those negotiations, the major parliamentary parties, the NC and UML, adopted a non-cooperative line, resembling the position of the palace and the 151

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KRISHNA HACHHETHU RNA during the first round of negotiations between the elected government and the Maoists between August–November 2001. Fissures between military power—commanded by the King—and the popular forces represented by the political parties have always been advantageous to the Maoists, prior to and after 2 October 2002. The Maoists have continuously gained strength by exploiting the weakness of their opponent, the state. The post-1990 politics has been characterised by an anarchy that is reflected in the major events that have occurred in the past 12 years: parliamentary elections were held four times; dissolution of the House of Representatives (HoR) was recommended six times; the HoR was summoned seven times to sit for special sessions; and the government was changed 13 times. All these were possible because politics revolved excessively around ‘power’. Besides, political instability, frequent change of government, politicisation and divisions among the police, erosion of ideology, and decline in the credibility of political parties and their leaders weakened the state’s crisis management capacity vis-à-vis the Maoists. Since politics was concentrated in Kathmandu, in the game of government making and unmaking, the parliamentary parties grossly ignored the need for party building at the local level. As a result, the Maoists were able to carve out space and territory for a ‘long protracted people’s war’. The Maoist insurgency was started at a time when the state was heading towards instability, anarchy and crisis owing to unholy alliances, both in nature and purpose, among the parliamentary parties. The state’s capacity to deal with the crisis had been severely eroded because of differences among the mainstream parties over the strategy to be adopted vis-à-vis the Maoists, during the initial phase of the insurgency. Two different reports, prepared by Members of Parliament (MP), after their visit to Rolpa district during Operation Romio, had clearly indicated such divisions. The NC MPs interpreted the Rolpa incident as ‘terrorist activities’, whereas the left MPs termed it as a ‘political confrontation between the NC and the UPF’ (the political wing of the Maoists). Worse, the mainstream parties wanted to use the Maoist insurgency against the other parliamentary parties, in pursuit of their own petty interests. The NC thought that 152

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MAOIST INSURGENCY IN NEPAL the rise of the Maoists would act as a countervailing force against the dominant position of another communist party, the UML. The UML also tried to cultivate the Maoists to cause a dent in the support base of its immediate electoral rival, the NC, as the Maoists trained their violence against NC cadres in their safaya (cleansing) actions.23 The NC and UML were under an illusion, until they realised the common threat, particularly after the UML’s interests were affected adversely and directly with the formation of the Maoist people’s government at different levels. Of the 25 districts where the Maoists formed district level governments, 21 were UML strongholds, in terms of the results of the 1997 local elections and the composition of the District Development Committees (DDC).24 The change of the UML’s role was clearly reflected in its (and also by other parliamentary communist parties) rejection of the Maoist proposal—put forth on the eve of the first truce and during the negotiations that followed during August–November 2001—to have a loose Left coalition on the agenda of a republican system and elections to a constituent assembly. The UML, indeed, endorsed the policy of armed mobilisation for counterinsurgency operations and the declaration of emergency (in November 2001) and its extension (February 2002). The changing role of the UML and other Left parties contributed to building a common approach and action plan against the Maoists. It was too late, and by that time the Maoists gained immense strength, which necessitated the use of the state’s armed capacity to fight the insurgency. The consensus among parliamentary parties vis-à-vis the Maoist insurgency has, however, been recently overshadowed by their division over the relation with the monarchy after King Gyanendra took over power since October 2002. Four parties including the UML are now in the King’s nominated government led by Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba. Four parties directly led by the NC have continuously taken to the streets opposing the royal ‘regressive’ steps. The UML changed camps recently from the five parties’ alliance opposing the regression to the palace camp, after the other members of the alliance poured water on its hope of leading a proposed all-party government. For the NC leadership, the ongoing protest movement is still a pressure tactic to 153

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KRISHNA HACHHETHU come to power. Pointing out the root cause of rivalry among the leadership of the parliamentary parties, the then US Ambassador, Michael Malinowski said: ‘Nepal’s house is on fire and the politicians are arguing about who gets to sleep in the master bedroom.’25 Contrary to the leadership’s quest for the king’s favour for power, the leaders of many political parties, including the NC and the UML, have been under tremendous pressure from their cadres to opt for republic and constituent assembly. This is another contradiction that a majority of the parliamentary parties are faced with. The state’s capacity to use armed force was, and is, limited. This is because the army is not under the control of the civilian government. The hostility between the political parties and military is compounded by factors of historical legacy,26 constitutional ambiguity,27 and non-cooperation between the two.28 Exchange of heated words between civilian leaders and military officials accusing one another for the escalation of the Maoist crisis surfaced publicly on several occasions. The government–military relation was further complicated by the palace’s separate dealing with the Maoists. Maoist leaders Prachanda and Babu Ram Bhattarai claimed of having an aghosit karyagat yaketa (undeclared alliance) with the late king Birendra and they claimed that he was not in favour of the elected government’s plan to mobilise the army against the people’s war.29 The army had deliberately, and consciously, kept itself away from successive elected governments, and multiparty parliamentary democracy, as if its primary duty was merely to protect the palace. The Maoists have taken advantage of the internal contradictions and crisis among the state actors—particularly conflicts among political parties, and confrontation between the palace or army and political parties—to enhance their strength and capacity. The possibility of the Maoists seizing state power through an armed insurgency is, however, least likely. Conclusion The people’s war, launched from the remote areas of the mid-west hills in February 1996 by a few dozen ideologically motivated hardcore 154

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MAOIST INSURGENCY IN NEPAL Maoists, has been making headway and expanding its presence and impact across the country. Through contextualising the ideology of a class war with poverty, injustice and exploitation and through ethnicising the insurgency, the CPN-M has strengthened its capacity of popular mobilisation and ability of armed fighting. Moreover, the CPN-M acquires power more through taking advantage of the weaknesses and internal contradictions of its enemy, the state, than the strength it gained through its own concerted efforts. The taking back of executive power by King Gyanendra on 4 October 2002 heightened the conflict between the palace and parliamentary parties. The failure of the post-1990 democratic governments to address the long-standing socio-economic problems of the country, i.e., poverty, unemployment, deprivation and discrimination against the minorities (dalit, ethnic groups, and women in particular) helped to enhance the Maoists’ strength, power and influence. People’s dislike for the leadership of mainstream parties and internal crisis, conflicts and contradiction among the state actors and institutions (i.e., palace, parties, parliament) paved the way for the escalation of the Maoist insurgency. Negotiations between the Maoist insurgents and the state, held twice in the past, failed to bring about a peaceful solution to the armed conflict. Its resumption cannot, however, be ruled out. Despite the CPN-M’s claims of advancing the insurgency to the stage of strategic offensive, the state is still militarily strong, as it is backed by the international community, in terms of arms, ammunition and manpower. The state’s military supremacy is pitted against the Maoists’ talent and motivation to rebel. The hope that negotiations would resume once again is based on the fact that, ‘this war (between the Maoist and state) is militarily unwinnable’30 for either side. A pertinent question connected to the possibility of peaceful resolution of the problem of insurgency is the ideological goal of the CPN-M: whether the Maoists would be steadfast to their ideological goal, or would they be willing to be flexible and amenable to the idea of finding an amicable solution to the insurgency problem? The CPN-M has started its ‘people’s war’ from 13 February 1996 with the declared objective of heralding a new people’s democracy. It is 155

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KRISHNA HACHHETHU distinct from the other Left parties of Nepal, especially because of its rejection of the system of monarchy and parliamentary democracy. It is, indeed, different from the other parties because it has applied Mao’s dictum, ‘power grows out of the barrel of a gun’, into action. If the CPN-M sticks to its ideological goal, the possibility of a peaceful settlement is unlikely. As one analyst suggested, ‘The case of Nepal is intrastate in which the stakes of both warring parties are high and that relates to the survival of the insurgency and its success, on the one hand, and the survival of monarchical regime on the other. If the Maoists win, monarchy will be eliminated, republicanism established; if the state wins, the revolutionaries would be eliminated’.31 The CPN-M has time and again shown that it is ideologically flexible. Its three-fold demands—round table conference, interim government and constituent assembly—do not include one for a republic. It has postponed its agenda of turning Nepal into a republic, though its demand for the election of a constituent assembly may pave the way to realising its republican agenda in future. Electing a constituent assembly is the bottom line of the Maoist party, which itself is a sign of reconciliation, considering its ideological position on a republican state, which was not included in the agenda of the earlier negotiations with the government. Furthermore, the party has reaffirmed that it would accept the multiparty system if the problem was settled at the negotiation table. The CPN-M position is well-reflected in Babu Ram Bhattarai’s response to a question by the ICG—Would the CPN(M) leadership be willing to accept a constituent assembly with the precondition that multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy be guaranteed? Baburam answered: ‘… if the particular historical condition and the prevailing balance of forces so demand, there can be a common understanding on certain issues during and after the election, but not certainly in the very beginning or right now and on fundamental questions of democracy. On our part, we are committed to multi-party democracy and other prerequisites of basic political, economic, social and cultural transformation, which we have outlined in the political agenda submitted during the recent peace negotiations.’32

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MAOIST INSURGENCY IN NEPAL Apparently, the question whether the CPN-M will stick to its original stand for a republican, one-party communist system, or revise its position in favour of continuing with the multiparty system and arrive at a ‘tactical understanding’ on retaining the institution of monarchy, will depend on how the insurgency is ended—through war or through negotiations. If one were to view the situation from the other side, the minimum condition for the peaceful settlement of the insurgency problem would be that the king should give up his ambition to become a powerful monarch. Of the several factors that led to the failure of the two rounds of negotiations between the state and the CPN-M, three major factors include: the king’s unwillingness to give up power, the vested interest of the generals of the RNA and the exclusion of parliamentary parties in the negotiations process. The resumption of negotiations cannot be ruled out altogether. One should also not ignore the fact that there are three contending parties that need to be involved. The essential rule of negotiations is to arrive at a compromise based on a principle of give-and-take among the contending parties. To conclude on an optimistic note, the problems thrown up by the nine-year old armed conflict could be resolved if an agreement could be reached on the following three points. 1. Revival of the pre-October 4 constitutional position, for a temporary period, to form an interim government of all parties (including Maoists), separation of military from the palace, absorption of the Maoists’ armed guerillas in the employment and job market before the election of a constituent assembly. 2. A tacit understanding among the political forces for the retention of kingship in the form of a full-fledged constitutional monarchy by the new constitution. 3. A provision of amendment in the constitution providing options to change anything through referendum.

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KRISHNA HACHHETHU Notes and References 1. Dhruba Kumar, ‘Military Dimension of the Maoist Insurgency’ an unpublished paper, p. 12, December 2004. 2. Cited in Dhruba Kumar, ‘Consequences of the Militarised Conflict and the Cost of Violence in Nepal’, Contributions to Nepalese Studies, p. 184, July 2003. 3. About the way the Maoists are running parallel administration, one states, ‘Outside the Kathmandu Valley and district headquarters, they have maintained a tight control over the movement of people, transport of goods and delivery of services. Through a short electronic message, they can bring the nation to a complete standstill, because of the fear they have been able to create over the years’. (Mukunda Raj Katel, ‘Negotiating the Maoist Conflict: Problems and Possibilities’, Nepali Journal of Contemporary Studies, vol. 4, no. 2, September 2004, p. 38.) Another elaborates, ‘They have also started practice of governance by establishing rules and regulations as well as developing textbooks for teaching at schools by banning the bourgeois subjects and Sanskrit teaching. By issuing a separate budget, introducing a visa system for visitors to the Maoist-infested areas, taxing the inhabitants, charging levies on commercial, tourist, or trekking transactions and extracting commissions from sale of timber and herbs like yarshagumba, the Maoists have registered the semblance of independence by creating a state within the state. (Dhruba Kumar, op. cit, p. 14). 4. Such a claim has in the case of the hill districts of the mid-west region— the epicentre of insurgency. But in other parts of the country, the vast areas are buffer zones between the Maoist-controlled areas in remote parts and the state-controlled area in district headquarters. The presence of both forces is felt in such buffer zones by the patrolling of the police and the army in the daytime and by the Maoist guerrillas at night. (This statement is based on an observation of 79 investigators who conducted a month long field work in August 2004 as enumerators of a survey on the state of democracy in Nepal) 5. ‘Strategy and Tactics of an Armed Struggle in Nepal’, Document adopted by the third expanded meeting of the Central Committee of the CPNM in March 1995. 6. For details see Arjun Karki and David Seddon (eds.), The People’s War in Nepal: Left Perspectives, New Delhi: Adroit Publishers, 2003;

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MAOIST INSURGENCY IN NEPAL Michael Hutt (ed), Himalayan People’s War: Nepal’s Maoist Rebellion, London: C. Hurst and Co. Ltd, 2004; Deepak Thapa and Bandana Sijapati, A Kingdom under Seize: Nepal’s Maoist Insurgency, 1996 to 2003, Kathmandu: The Print House, 2003; Deepak Thapa (ed), Understanding the Maoist Movement of Nepal, Kathmandu: Martin Chautari, 2003; S. D. Muni, The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: The Challenge and The Response. New Delhi: Rupa and the Observer Research Foundation, 2003; Arjun Karki and Binod Bhattarai (eds.), Whose War? Economic and SocilCultural Impacts of Nepal’s Maoist-Government Conflict, Kathmandu: NGO Federation of Nepal, n.d. 7. Devendra Raj Panday, Nepal’s Failed Development: Reflections on the Mission and the Maladies, Kathmandu: Nepal South Asia Study Centre, p. 12, 1999. 8. Harka Gurung, ‘Nepal: Maoist Insurgency and Indigenous People’, Nepali Journal of Contemporary Studies, vol. 3, no. 2, p. 4, September 2003. 9. NESAC, Nepal Human Development Report, Kathmandu: Nepal South Asia Study Centre, pp. 264–65, 1998. 10. Krishna Bahadur Bhhatachan, ‘Possible Ethnic Revolution or Insurgency in a Predatory Unitary Hindu State’ in Dhruba Kumar (ed.), Domestic Conflict and Crisis of Governability in Nepal, Kathmandu: Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies, p. 159, 2000. 11. To understand Nepali politics in the post-1990 period, see Lok Raj Baral, Nepal: Problems of Governance, New Delhi: Konark Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1993; Lok Raj Baral, The Regional Paradox: Essays in Nepali and South Asian Affairs, Delhi: Adroit Publishers, 2000; Lok Raj Baral, Krishna Hachhethu and Hari Sharma, Leadership in Nepal, New Delhi: Adroit Publishers, 2001; Michael Hutt, ed., Nepal in the Nineties, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1994; Martin Hoftun, William Raeper and John Whelpton, People, Politics and Ideology: Democracy and Social Change in Nepal, Kathmandu: Mandala Book Point, 1999; POLSAN, Political Parties and the Parliamentary Process in Nepal: A Study of the Transitional Phase, Kathmandu: Political Science Association of Nepal, 1992; Ole Borre, Sushil Raj Pandey and Chitra Krishna Tiwari, Nepalese Political Behaviour, New Delhi: Sterling, 1994; Dhruba Kumar, ed., State, Leadership and Politics in Nepal, Kathmandu: Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies, 1995; Dhruba Kumar, ed., Domestic Conflict and Crisis of

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KRISHNA HACHHETHU Governability in Nepal, Kathmandu: Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies, 2000; T. Louise Brown, The Challenge to Democracy in Nepal: A Political History, Routledge, London, 1996; Krishna Hachhethu, Party Building in Nepal: Organisation, Leadership and People, A Comparative Study of the Nepali Congress and the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist–Leninist), Kathmandu: Mandala Book Point, 2002. 12. For communist movements in Nepal, see Bhim Rawal, Communist Movement in Nepal: Origin, Evolution and Recent Development (in Nepali), Kathmandu: Samana Prakashan, 1988; Surendra K.C., History of Communist Movement in Nepal (in Nepali), Kathmandu: Vidyarthi Pustak Sadan, 1999. 13. Judith Pettigrew, ‘Guns, Kinship, and Fear: Between Ethnic Claims and Maoism’ in David N. Gellner (ed.), Resistance and the State: Nepalese Experiences, New Delhi: Social Science Press, p. 308, 2002. 14. Mukunda Kattel, ‘Introduction to the People’s War and its Implications’ in Karki and Seddon, op. cit. 3, p. 60. 15. Some reports indicating the state withdrawal in 1999–2000 are: ‘Among the 43 VDCs in Rukum, only Six have Chairpersons Residing in their Respective Village, (Kathmandu Post, 10 March 2000). ‘Among the 26 Police Posts in Rukum, only 11 have been Retained, (Kathmandu Post, 11 March 2000). ‘The Number of Cases Registered in the Rolpa District Court for Nine Months (from July 1998 to April 1999) was only 28 Against its Previous Record of Having Court Case at least 30–35 per Month, (Himal Khabar Patrika, 15–30 April 1999). 16. Babu Ram Bhattarai, The Political-Economic Rational of the People’s War, Kathmandu: Utprerak Prakashan, 1998. 17. Colin Millard, ‘Perceptions of Democracy and Dissent in the Valley of Dhorpatan’ in Gellner, op. cit. 13, p. 293. 18. International Crisis Group’s report, Nepal Backgrounder: Ceasefire-Soft Landing Or Strategic Pause?, p. 13, 10 April 2003. 19. The 2001 census of Nepal recorded 101 caste and ethnic groups and 91 languages and dialects. Based on caste, ethnic, regional, cultural and linguistic cleavages, Nepali population can be broadly classified into three major groups: parbatiya (hill people) and medhesia (plain people); jat (caste groups) and janjati (ethnic/tribal groups); and high caste and low caste Hindus.

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MAOIST INSURGENCY IN NEPAL 20. For details see Dor Bahadur Bista, Fatalism and Development: Nepal’s Struggle for Modernization, New Calcutta: Orient Longman, 1991; David N. Gellner et al (eds), Nationalism and Ethnicity in a Hindu Kingdom: the Politics of Culture in a Contemporary Nepal, Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1997; Marie Lecomate-tilouine and Pascale Dollfus (eds), Ethnic Revival and Religious Turmoil: Identities and Representations in the Himalayas, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003. 21. Quoted in Sudheer Sharma, ‘The Ethnic Dimension of the Maoist Insurgency’, unpublished report, p. 16, May 2002. 22. Text of a resolution passed by the second national conference of the CPN-M in February 2001. 23. Among the party cadres killed by the Maoist guerrillas till July 2000, the number of NC workers was 136, followed by 22 of the UML, 19 of the RPP and 1 of Mashal. See Text of the NC Recommendations to Resolve the Maoist Problems Submitted to the Deuba Commission, September 2000. The UML’s own study team led by Jhala Nath Khanal also found that the Maoists, in the initial phase of their violent actions, targeted the NC workers only. See Summary Report of the UML on Violence and Terror Created by the State and the Maoist, July 2001. Pancha Narayan Maharjan, ‘The Maoist Insurgency and Crisis of Governability in Nepal’ in Dhruba Kumar, (ed.), Domestic Conflict and Crisis of Governability in Nepal, Kathmandu: Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies, p. 172, 2000. 24. Krishna Hachhethu, ‘State, Democracy and Maoist Insurgency in Nepal’ (Paper presented to a seminar on The Maoist Movement in Nepal: Context and Implications, held in November 2001 in London, organised by the School of Oriental and African Studies, the University of London, p. 13. 25. ICG, Nepal Backgrounder, op. cit., p. 17. 26. The army was used by the late King Mahendra to a stage coup in 1960 against the NC government and multiparty system. The army had also been used time and again to suppress movements against the partyless panchayat system (1960–90). 27. The 1990 Constitution has a separate provision for military mobilisation, the Security Council (consisting of the prime minister, defence minister and chief of the army staff) which can only recommend it and the king takes the final decision. 28. Non-cooperation by the army was felt widely, particularly during the Maoist’s capture of Dunai, headquarter of Dolpa district in September

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KRISHNA HACHHETHU 2000. The then Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala, resigned obviously because of the army’s betrayal on the Holeri incident. The army disobeyed the government decision to counter the Maoist guerrillas after they held 76 police hostage on 12 July 2001 at Holeri in Rolpa district. 29. Kathmandu Post, 4 June 2001. 30. Liz Philipson, ‘Conflict in Nepal: Perspectives on the Maoist Movement’ (an unpublished report), 19 May 2002. 31. Dhruba, op. cit. (2005), p.3. 32. Text of Baburam Bhattarai’s letter to the ICG, 26 September 2003.

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Annexures I Press Statement Announcing the Founding of the CPI (Maoist) On 21 September 2004, amidst the thick forests in some part of India, the formation of the CPI (Maoist) was declared at a public meeting before an assembly of peoples’ guerrilla fighters, party activists and activists of mass organisations. The two parties, the Maoist Communist Centre of India and the Communist Party of India (Marxist–Leninist) [People’s War] were merged to form the new unified Party, the CPI (Maoist). However, this merger declaration has been withheld from the media for security reasons and is now being released to the entire people of our country and the world. The formation of this new Party has fulfilled the desires and aspirations of the oppressed masses of the country for a genuine proletarian party that can lead them to revolutionary change for the establishment of a new democratic society, advancing towards socialism and communism. This unified party has been formed after thoroughgoing discussions held between the high level delegations of the two parties initially and then finalized by the Joint Central Committee meeting of both the parties. Through these thoroughgoing and constructive discussions, held on an equal footing, five documents have been drafted and finalized. These documents are: Hold High the Bright Red Banner of Marxism–Leninism–Maoism, the Party Programme, Strategy and

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ANNEXURES Tactics of the Indian Revolution, the Political Resolution on the International and Domestic Situation and the Party Constitution. In addition to these documents it has also been decided that our beloved leaders and teachers of the respective parties, the late Com. Charu Mazumdar and Com. Kanai Chatterjee, will be recognized and highlighted as the founding leaders of the unified party. It was also decided that both these parties, stemming from the turbulent period of the decade of the 1960s, particularly from the great Naxalbari uprising, livingly inherited all that was revolutionary in the long history of the Indian communist movement. The peculiarity of the situation is that both these parties continued to flow as two separate streams of the revolutionary communist movement, wedded to the same cause of carrying forward the Indian revolution over the past 35 years. All these steps taken together clearly disclosed a unified understanding on almost all ideological and political questions of line. The line established provided a principled basis for the unity achieved by both the parties. Basing their decision on this, the Joint Central Committee meeting finally resolved to unite the two parties into a single unified party, which will, henceforth, be known as the Communist party of India (Maoist). Com. Ganapati was unanimously elected as the general secretary of the new party. The formation of the unified Communist Party of India (Maoist) will certainly prove to be a new milestone in the history of the communist movement of India. A unified Maoist party based on MLM continued to be a long and highly cherished need of the revolutionary minded and oppressed people of the country including all our ranks, and also all Maoist forces of South Asia and other parts of the world. Today, this long-cherished desire and dream have been transformed into a reality. The new Communist Party of India (Maoist) will continue to act as a consolidated political vanguard of the Indian proletariat. Marxism– Leninism–Maoism will be the ideological basis guiding its thinking in all the spheres of its activities. It will continue its struggle against Right and Left deviations, particularly against revisionism, by taking this as the main danger for the communist movement as a whole. It will still seek to unite all genuine Maoist groups that remain outside this unified Party. 164

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ANNEXURES The immediate aim and programme of the Maoist party is to carry on and complete the already ongoing and advancing New Democratic Revolution in India as a part of the world proletarian revolution by overthrowing the semi-colonial, semi-feudal system under the neo-colonial form of indirect rule, exploitation and control. This revolution will remain directed against imperialism, feudalism and comprador bureaucratic capitalism. This revolution will be carried out and completed through armed agrarian revolutionary war, i.e. protracted people’s war with the armed seizure of power remaining as its central and principal task, encircling the cities from the countryside and thereby finally capturing them. Hence, the countryside as well as the PPW (Protracted People’s War) will remain as the ‘centre of gravity’ of the party’s work, while urban work will be complimentary to it. Since armed struggle will remain as the highest and main form of struggle and the army as the main form of organisation of this revolution, it will continue to play a decisive role, whereas, the UF will be built in the course of armed struggle and for the seizure of power through armed struggle. Mass organisations and mass struggles are necessary and indispensable but their purpose is to serve the war. We also, hereby, declare that the two guerilla armies of the CPI(ML)[PW] and MCCI—the PGA and the PLGA—have been merged into the unified PLGA (Peoples’ Liberation Guerrilla Army). Hereafter, the most urgent task i.e. principal task of the party is to develop the unified PLGA into a full-fledged People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and transfom the existing Guerrilla Zones into Base Areas, thereby advancing wave upon wave towards completing the New Democratic Revolution. The formation day of the PLGA is to be 2 December the day when a people’s army was formed for the first time ever in our country in 2000, on the first anniversary of the martyrdom of the three CCMs, com. Shyam, Mahesh and Murali. Apart from this, the unified party will continue to pay added attention to building a new wave of revolutionary mass movements on various political and other issues of the people. It will involve all the vast sections of the masses in this struggle directed against imperialism, feudalism and the comprador bureaucratic bourgeoisie. The vicious imperialist 165

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ANNEXURES offensive in our country has resulted in mass destitution of an already impoverished people, particularly in the countryside, which has even witnessed thousands of suicides. The CPI (Maoist) will mobilize vast sections of the masses against the growing onslaught of the imperialists in the country, against state repression, together with mobilizing support for all the movements directed against imperialism and feudalism. The new party will also continue to support the struggle of the nationalities for self-determination including their right to secession, and condemn the brutal state repression on these movements. It will pay special attention in mobilizing and organising the women masses as a mighty force of the revolution, and will fight against all other forms of social oppression, particularly untouchability and casteism. It will continue to expose, isolate and defeat the more dangerous Hindu fascist forces, while exposing all other fundamentalist forces. It will continue to do so while keeping the edge of the people’s struggles directed against the new Congress rulers in Delhi along with the CPI/CPM and their imperialist chieftains. It will continue to expose and resist the expansionist designs of the Indian ruling classes along with their imperialist chieftains, particularly the US imperialists. It will more actively stand by the side of the Nepali people led by the CPN (Maoist), and vehemently oppose the Indian expansionists and the US imperialists from intervening in Nepal with their military might. It will also continue to support the people’s war led by the Maoist parties in Peru, the Philippines, Turkey and elsewhere. It will continue to support all people’s struggles directed against imperialism and reaction. It will also support the working class movement and other people’s movements the world over. It will continue to stand by the side of the Iraqi and Afghan people in their mighty struggle against the US imperialist-led aggression and occupation. The Unified Party will continue to hold high the banner of proletarian internationalism and will continue to contribute more forcefully in uniting the genuine Maoist forces at the international level. Besides, it will also establish unity with the oppressed people and nations of the whole world and continue to fight shoulder to shoulder with them in advancing the world proletarian revolution against imperialism and 166

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ANNEXURES their lackeys, thereby paving the way towards realizing socialism and then Communism on a world scale. Thousands of our martyrs have laid down their valuable lives for these lofty aims. The Central Committee (Provisional) of the unified Party—CPI(Maoist)—pledges that it will continue to advance along the path illuminated by them and thereby mobilize all its existing and latent energies in transforming the dreams of the martyrs into a reality. With revolutionary greetings, Kishan General Secretary Central Committee Maoist Communist Centre of India

Ganapathy General Secretary Central Committee CPI(ML)[PW]

Date: 14–10–2004 Source: People’s March, Ernakulam, Volume 5, No. 11–12, November– December 2004.

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II The First-ever Joint Interview of the General Secretaries of the Erstwhile CPI(ML)[PW] and MCCI In the context of the merger and the formation of the CPI(Maoist) our magazine, People’s March, interviewed Comrade Ganapathy and Comrade Kishan, the General Secretaries of the erstwhile CPI(ML)[PW] and the MCCI at an undisclosed location. This is an exclusive interview given to the People’s March, the first of its kind given to the press. Both leaders first gave their Red Salutes to People’s March, an independent magazine that reflects the Voice of the Indian Revolution. The interview had questions interspaced between the two leading comrades: Peoples March: The Revolutionary Camp and the oppressed masses are naturally happy to hear about the unity. Why did it take such a long time—35 years—since the existence of your parties? Why did it take over two decades of talks for the unity process to culminate? Ganapathy: It is true that the whole revolutionary camp, and all the revolutionary and democratic forces, and the entire oppressed masses of India will certainly feel so happy. The formation of the unified Communist Party of India (Maoist) is a new milestone in the history of the revolutionary communist movement of India. A unified Maoist party based on Marxism–Leninism–Maoism is a long delayed and highly cherished need of the revolutionary minded and oppressed people of the country, including all our ranks, and also all the Maoist forces of South Asia and other parts of the world. Now, this longaspired desire and dream have been transformed into a reality. As part of the world proletarian revolution, the Indian revolution has been advancing forward to establish a new democratic society by smashing the existing semi-colonial, semi-feudal system through the path of protracted people’s war. Our party has been leading not only the struggles of the basic masses of workers, peasants and the petitebourgeoisie, and supporting those interests of the national bourgeoisie that come in conflict with imperialism and the comprador big 168

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ANNEXURES bourgeoisie, but also fighting against all forms of social oppression, for the rights and emancipation of the oppressed nationalities, women, dalits and oppressed castes, minorities, etc. In this way we have won the confidence of the oppressed masses, who know that our party will stand steadfastly by them in all their woes and for their complete emancipation from all forms of oppression and exploitation. Quite naturally they will be happy with this merger. With the merger, the Party’s fighting capacity grows considerably, and, as a result, its effective striking power multiplies, thereby benefiting the masses. Over this lengthy period, where the international communist movement also has faced many splits and setbacks, the Maoist movement in India has seen some advancement and much sacrifice of the best of its cadre for this great cause. So, the entire revolutionary camp and all the people are naturally happy to see our unity. Now coming to the query: why did it take such a long time for these two streams to merge. Yes, it is true that our two parties existed separately for thirty-five years, and two decades of time for the unity talks, is a long time. But to concretely understand this, we must primarily look at the historical background, and the conditions in which these two Parties emerged and developed. In the period after the Naxalbari uprising, there were differences of opinions with regard to the immediate necessity of formation of the Party between the two leaderships. These differences could not be solved. So the CPI(ML), and MCC came into existence separately on 22 April 1969 and 20 October 1969, respectively. Later, the CPI(ML) was in disarray after the martyrdom of Comrade Charu Mazumdar (CM) and the setback of the movement. The Party split into many groups and there was vacuum of leadership on whom the major sections of the party could repose confidence. Apart from this, in 1976, after the demise of Com. Mao, with the seizure of power by the capitalist roaders, the counter revolutionary renegade Hua-Deng clique in China, and the Communist Party of China (CPC) turning revisionist, there ceased to be any international proletarian leadership and a revolutionary base. This had its negative impact on the Maoist movements worldwide, where a strong Right-wing and revisionist 169

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ANNEXURES trend swept the international communist movement. It had its repercussion in India too. Because of the absence of an International leadership and a revolutionary base, the problems of unity of revolutionaries in India were compounded. By 1980, the CPI(ML)[PW] and CPI(ML)[PU] evolved from the CPI(ML) stream, and the MCC built peasant movements and got strengthened. The CPI(ML)[PW] and the CPI(ML)[PU], from their very inception, had good relations with the MCC. The PW and MCC began unity talks from their very first meeting in 1981. However, the reason for the delay in the process was the lack of continuity of leadership. The arrest of Comrade Kondapally Seetaramaiah (KS), the leader of the PW, and later the internal crisis of the PW and split in the Central Committee (CC) delayed the unity process for several years. In the early 1980s the MCC lost its two top leaders, Comrades Amulya Sen (AS) and Kanai Chatterjee (KC), which had some negative impact, resulting in further delay in the unity process. Though there was basic unity on several major issues between the two Parties, there were some serious political differences on some major issues, and also a lack of maturity of the leaderships prevented the unity from fructifying. However, in this long period the revolutionary movement has developed and expanded, and the People’s Guerrilla Army/People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army (PGA/PLGA) got formed and guerrilla zones have been set up with the perspective of establishing Base Areas. Now, there is much more experience of both the leaderships and greater maturity in dealing with the issues and differences, and also in realising one’s own mistakes. So, the situation was ripe for the big leap in the unity process. Thus, by analysing the objective and subjective factors for the delay in achieving the unity, we will take lessons from this experience and resolve, in the future, to strengthen the unity now achieved. Keeping the lessons in mind, we will also endeavour to unite the revolutionary forces who are outside to the CPI(Maoist). PM: The M-L movement in India has a long history of splits; what guarantee is there that this will not be followed by a split? Can you give any assurance to the masses? 170

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ANNEXURES Ganapathy: Yes, in the past history there were many splits within the M-L movement. But splits are only one side of the coin; the brighter side was that there were continuous efforts to unify the revolutionaries. The CPI(ML)[PU], despite having its origins in Bengal, spread and strengthened by unifying several revolutionary groups. Although the CPI(ML)[PW] originated in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, it unified with revolutionaries in almost all the states where it was working. The MCC too, had originated in Bengal, unified many revolutionaries groups in it in many states and became the MCCI. The past could be broadly divided into three periods: After the setback in 1972, the main trend was splits; in the 1980s the main trend was the strengthening of the genuine revolutionary parties and the revolutionary movements, and degeneration of Right and Left opportunist parties and the weakening of their movements, and increasing steps towards unity; and in the decade of the 1990s the main trend was the development of the people’s war and the unification of genuine revolutionary parties and forces. These efforts finally culminated in the formation of the unified CPI (Maoist) this year. This unified party has been formed after thoroughgoing discussions, firstly held between the high level delegations of the two parties and then finalized by the Joint Central Committee meeting of both the parties. Through these deep and constructive discussions, held on an equal footing, five different documents have been drafted and finalized. These documents are: Hold High the Bright Red Banner of Marxism–Leninism–Maoism, the Party Programme, Strategy and Tactics of the Indian Revolution, the Political Resolution on the International and Domestic Situation and the Party Constitution. In addition to these documents it has also been decided that our beloved leaders and teachers of the respective parties, the late Com. CM and Com. KC, will be recognized and highlighted as the founding leaders of the unified party. It was also decided that both these parties, stemming from the turbulent period of the decade of the 1960s, particularly from the great Naxalbari uprising, inherited all that was revolutionary in the long history of the Indian communist movement. The peculiarity of the 171

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ANNEXURES situation is that both these parties continued to flow as two separate streams of the revolutionary communist movement, wedded to the same cause of carrying forward the Indian revolution over the past 35 years. All these steps taken together clearly disclosed a unified understanding on almost all ideological and political questions of line. The line established provided a principled basis for the unity achieved by both the parties. Basing on this unity the Joint Central Committee meeting finally resolved to unite the two parties into a single unified party. If we examine the history, it is true that a period has been marked with serious and agonising splits, which was a depressing feature especially after the set back in 1972. But since 1980, after the emergence of the CPI(ML)[PW] and CPI(ML)[PU], there has not been any vertical split within these parties. This is in stark contrast with the splits and degeneration in the parties of Right deviation and Left sectarianism. The MCC, too, did not suffer any major split. And now the basis of unity has been principled, and since it has been achieved after thoroughgoing discussions, it has a strong foundation. Within the party there will be differences, and as a reflection of the class struggle in society, there would be the possibility for the emergence of non proletarian trends. There will be a fight between right and wrong within the party. All internal differences will be solved on the basis of MLM and correct methods. The Marxist method of self-criticism and criticism, conducting inner-party struggles and rectification campaigns, to weed out non proletarian trends, guarantee a strong party unity, avoiding any split. History proves that in the past too, we basically solved all major internal problems in this manner. PM: Was your unity based on the needs to face the increased repression by the state on both your parties or on genuine unity of thought? Kishan: In my view the merger of the MCCI (Maoist Communist Centre of India) and the CPI(ML)[PW]{Communist Party of India (Marxist–Leninist)[People’s War]} and the birth of the Communist Party of India (Maoist), looked at from all angles, is an event of historic importance. The birth of the CPI(Maoist) will not only create a new revolutionary wave in India’s revolutionary struggles—in the development of India’s agrarian revolutionary guerrilla war and people’s war 172

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ANNEXURES and the communist movement in India—but will also have a positive and important impact on the international communist movement. The above mentioned can only fructify when the newly formed Party stands on a firm political, ideological and theoretical basis. Both these parties have a 35 to 40-year-long practical experience of conducting political, theoretical and revolutionary struggles. Yet they existed as two separate streams—the M-L stream and the MCC stream. To think that two such parties could take such a historic decision to unite, with just an approach to jointly facing state repression and not based on policy, could be due to subjectivism. If you view the past 40 years’ history you will see that: (i) in 1969 the then ‘Dakshin Desh’ Group (i.e., MCC) did not join the CPI(ML) formed under the leadership of Com. CM, and (ii) though 35 years have been traversed since 1969, and inspite of many rounds of unity talks, till the end, full unity could not be established. The question finally before us is, why? No doubt, there existed some basic differences between the two. These two streams have existed separately for the past 35 years because of some political and practical differences, and have yet advanced independently, fighting back the massive attacks and encirclement-suppression campaigns of the state. So, how realistic would it be to think, such an important merger could take place merely with an approach to jointly face state terror? Now I will answer your question from another angle. You must be aware of the fact that the unity talks initiated by the MCC’s founder leader, Com. KC, from 1981, with the then CPI(ML)[PW], under the leadership of Com. KS, failed in 1995. After that we were able to once again take up unity talks in February 2003. In that sitting, after serious and lengthy discussions and debates on numerous basic political and practical questions, it was possible to make a major breakthrough. Based on this positive conclusion, the meeting took important decisions to carry on continuous unity talks, prepare some basic documents and conclude the unity process basing on these documents. The documents were—Hold High the Glorious Red Banner 173

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ANNEXURES of Marxism–Leninism–Maoism, the Party Programme, the Strategy and Tactics of Indian Revolution, the Political Resolution (International and Domestic situation) and the Party Constitution. If the main aim of this merger is to counter state repression, there would have been no need to have decided to prepare the basic documents, but would have decided how to develop closer relations between the two parties to counter state terror and as to what other measures could be taken up to do so. But that did not happen. In the course of the four rounds of bilateral discussions over the past 20 months, the drafts of all these documents were prepared. Together with this, there were detailed discussions on all basic issues through which a general understanding was reached, only after which the historic decision for merger was taken. Therefore, it can be clearly stated that it was only on the basis of agreement on basic political and organisational issues that the historic merger process could be completed and on the basis of a strong political, theoretical and organisational line was the Communist Party of India (Maoist) formed. Now I will speak about the last part of your question. You asked whether this unity, based on ideology, could be said to be a true unity. My answer is: it could be said yes, as also no. Because true unity based on ideology should not be seen in an absolute sense. It should be seen in a relative sense. In other words it can be said that this unity which is basically and principally based on theory is a true unity. But, together with this, there is a secondary aspect, i.e., to make it based more on theory and a true unity, struggle is also needed. In this case, the principal aspect is unity, and the non-principal aspect is struggle. Together with this, dialectical materialism shows us that true unity based on theory can only be possible through the dialectical process of unity-struggleunity. If we look at all questions from the Maoist approach of ‘One divides into two’, it is only in the long process of negating the negative aspects and strengthening the positive aspects that we can further the process in a correct way to achieve true unity based on principles. Finally, in reply to your question, I would like to make one point; it is absolutely impossible to fight state repression without a strong 174

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ANNEXURES political-theoretical foundation and a correct Marxist military line. So, without a politically and theoretically strong Party we can’t achieve any thing. PM: Given that you had such a bad chapter which went so far as to be involved in mutual killing how were you able to resolve these serious differences and even proceed towards unity with such speed? Kishan: The first major point in the relations between our two parties was to develop a correct understanding of this bad chapter, i.e., Black Chapter in our relations. Till such a time, as we both recognised this tension period as a Black Chapter, it was not possible to solve the problems that had developed. Secondly, it was important to develop the understanding that we ourselves were responsible for this Black Chapter. Thirdly, it was necessary to understand that we had to engage in self-criticism with full frankness and sincerity of heart and mind, and also to place this self-criticism before the general rank-and-file and also the revolutionary masses. Even the most difficult problems can be solved if we are able to understand our own mistakes. Only after grasping this feeling, there will be no hesitation whatsoever for a genuine and objective self-criticism. Precisely, this is what happened regarding the solution to the problems associated with the Black Chapter. Today, both of us continue to engage in self-criticism with frankness on the correct aspects of this problem. We both have placed our written self-criticisms openly before the revolutionary rank-and-file and masses; and in future too, we will adopt a similar method. Only through this process of genuine self-criticism, we have been able to convert a bad thing into a good thing. When this problem was correctly solved, the unity process was bound to advance—and this is what, in fact, happened. You asked as to how it was possible to advance with such speed towards unity? Well, I think, such a question is absolutely natural, given the Black Chapter that existed. But, it must also not be forgotten that in the past, in the long fraternal relations between the MCCI and the CPI(ML)[PW] the aspect of cordial, strong and fraternal relations 175

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ANNEXURES was principal, while the aspect of the black chapter was secondary. If you reflect on the past 24 years’ friendly relations between the two parties and many bilateral meetings on the joint activities and on political issues, you will find that there is a long history of political debate behind today’s unity. Therefore, if you see it in totality, this final unity may be seen to have been achieved quickly, but that is not fully so, in reality. In fact only by adopting a correct Marxist-Leninist method and after quite heated political debates over a period, could we successfully complete this process and achieve unity. PM: There are still some revolutionary groups in the country, what is your united party’s approach to them? Ganapathy: It is true that there are still some revolutionary groups in the country and also many genuine revolutionary forces in the Right opportunist parties of the revolutionary camp. In addition, there are numerous individual comrades, who do not belong to any Party at present. But they were part of one or the other ML Groups at some point of time. They are also part of the revolutionary camp in the country. We seek to unite all genuine revolutionary groups, forces and elements that remain still outside our unified Party. So, one of the important tasks of our Party building is to unite all these forces. We will make serious efforts to realise this task in a principled manner, by conducting thorough and consistent struggles against revisionism and all nonproletarian tendencies, within the revolutionary camp, like reformism, economism, parliamentarism, postmodernism, etc., which seek to divert the masses from the path of revolution. For this we conduct polemics on political and ideological questions and tactics. PM: What will the impact of this unity be on the people of the country? Kishan: I think this unity and the birth of the CPI (Maoist) will have an unprecedented positive impact on whole of the masses including workers, peasants and all the toiling masses of India. In reality, the propeople mask of the various Gandhian vote-mongering and fake Communist Parties have, to a large extent, been exposed. For long, the people of India have been waiting for such a party that is capable of leading them in their liberation struggle. From the point of view of the 176

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ANNEXURES masses, the emergence of the CPI (Maoist) which is equipped with the experience of conducting revolutionary class struggle and agrarian revolutionary guerrilla war, is a very important event. That is why it can definitely be said that this unity will have a positive impact on the people of the country. But this is only one aspect concerning the birth of this new Party. Regarding other aspects it can certainly be said that with the announcement of the new Party, all the enemy and revisionist forces will go insane with anger. The above two factors will definitely occur. PM: Now coming to other questions. What have your two parties achieved in the last 35-years long history of your existence? What is the contribution of your parties to the development of the political and ideological line of Indian revolution? Ganapathy: If we look at the last 35 years of our past history, amongst all the confusions and setbacks that raged in the communist movement of India and in many countries, we have, to a large extent, been basically successful in applying MLM to the concrete conditions of the Indian revolution and have got many significant achievements. The Unified Party with a collective leadership saw the emergence of an ideologically and politically mature party—a party of a new type —that has developed and steeled itself through decades of intense class struggles in the course of advancing the Guerrilla War. In the process, we have also developed the Party line in the concrete conditions of the Indian revolution. And it is only by successfully doing this have we been able to grow into the type of force that we are today. With the present unity, we have achieved unity of most of the revolutionary forces in India. This, in itself, is an outstanding achievement. Now our party has acquired an All India character which has spread to over a dozen states. In some states like, AP, Bihar, Jharkhand, and Chhathisgarh we are a significant force. The United Party has not only united the revolutionaries within India, it has forged formidable fraternal relations in South Asia by taking part in forming the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organisations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA) and also with revolutionary parties abroad, especially with those parties which are waging PPW. 177

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ANNEXURES For the first time in the country, our two parties have formed a People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army and have developed Guerrilla Zones, and intensified Guerrilla War with a view to advance towards the formation of Base Areas. In some of these Guerrilla Zones we have been able to establish the Revolutionary People’s Political Power in an embryonic form. This, alone, is a substantial achievement in the face of the enemy’s fascist encirclement and several suppression campaigns. Over the years, the PLGA has been systematically strengthened from a small to a bigger force. This is reflected in: the growth from small skirmishes with the enemy to bigger battles; from small formations to bigger formations; from a few in numbers to larger numbers; to the development of a more systematic structure of commands and commissions; and, its greater ability to arm itself with the seizure of arms from the enemy. The PLGA, though still small, with its heroic actions and with more than two decades of continuous and consistent armed tactical counter offensives against the state police and various Special Forces and various paramilitary forces, became the apple of the peoples’ eye and a nightmare to the ruling classes. We took lessons by thoroughgoing debates and discussions on the Party. These inner party struggles gave a better understanding on how to conduct two-line struggle on the basis of democratic centralism with the aim of achieving a greater level of unity, and with the aim of defeating the wrong line or rectifying wrong deviations. In the process of two-line struggles, the Party leadership and the whole Party got steeled and a collective leadership evolved. This is one of the remarkable achievements. We have worked out specific policies for the various oppressed sections of the people, like the dalits and other oppressed castes, women, minorities, etc. from the class viewpoint of the proletariat, and have led many struggles on these issues. In the areas where we are a force to reckon with, we have taken up issues of political, economic, social, and cultural oppression extensively and people have achieved substantial victories, including construction and developmental activities, where people’s political power is being established by restricting the political power of the enemy classes. In 178

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ANNEXURES these areas the people are relatively more politically conscious, well organised, and better off with improved working and living conditions compared to the other regions. Now, they have more self-confidence, they have gained literacy and knowledge, they are able to stand upright with self-respect against all authority and they are free from the tyranny and terror of the landed elite, government officials, etc. Regarding the development of the political and ideological line, the united party has definitely enriched the party line. While adhering firmly to the respective parties’ basic line, which was formulated in the basic documents of earlier period of both the parties, we enriched several concepts basing on the rich experiences acquired in advancing the people’s war over these years, taking into account the political developments of the past three and a half decades. We firmly fought against both ‘Right’ and ‘Left’ deviations that were seen in the forging of the three magic weapons of revolution—the Party, Army and the UF—and in the formulation of tactics. It achieved a higher level of understanding regarding the concepts such as that of people’s army, guerrilla zones, Base Areas and the Revolutionary United Front; on persisting along the path of protracted people’s war, creatively applying the Maoist strategy to the concrete conditions in India and rejecting entirely the parliamentary form of struggle in the concrete conditions of India; building a secret Party with an underground structure with Professional Revolutionaries (PRs) forming its core; consistently adhering to the revolutionary mass line and building powerful mass movements linking them to the Protracted People’s War (PPW), etc. The united party addressed the ideological-political questions confronting the International Communist Movement today such as: the guiding ideology of the proletariat, the General Crisis of Capitalism and its impact on the world revolution, the question of the principal contradiction, the danger of world war, the understanding on the nature of the present Era, the significance of national liberation struggles and the need to unify the two streams of the World Socialist Revolution, and, finally, the danger of revisionism in the International Communist Movement (ICM). The united party thus enriched the

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ANNEXURES party’s understanding on the above questions concerning the contemporary world situation and the ICM and adopted clear-cut proletarian stand-points. In a nutshell, we can say that the two erstwhile parties have continued the ideological and political legacy of Naxalbari, and, while imbibing all the positive aspects, have further developed the line. The development of the line to the concrete conditions is embedded in the now formulated documents—MLM, Party Programme, Party Constitution, Strategy and Tactics, and a Political Resolution on the current situation. PM: What is the development of the political, organisational and military line since the 1996 Conference of the MCC? Kishan: Even today, at the international plane, the contradiction between imperialism and the oppressed nationalities and people is the principal and decisive contradiction. Due to the continuously deepening and increasing crisis of imperialism, the inter-imperialist contradictions are also intensifying gradually. Asia, Africa and Latin America have become the storm centres of Revolution. Revolution is the main trend in the world today and revisionism is the main danger in the present era. Because of the above conditions, the world situation is dayby-day becoming more favourable for revolution. We drew these conclusions in our 1996 Conference and we follow this even today. In our November 2002 Central Committee meeting, after much discussion and analysis we reversed our earlier understanding that ‘Russia was a weak superpower’ and concluded that this earlier assessment was wrong. In this meeting we also concluded that the US imperialism was a superpower and declared it the number one enemy of the world people. In our analysis of the domestic situation, we had seen that under the domination of the US imperialists, various imperialist forces are in the fray to increase their influence in the country. All the governments, from the BJP alliance to the Congress and other alliances are implementing political, economic and all policies according to their wishes. Together with this, the contradictions within the Indian ruling classes 180

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ANNEXURES are also gradually growing sharper. In fact, hardly ever before has the revolutionary situation been so excellent and favourable as today. On the basis of this analysis we decided to make the formation of our Red army and Base Areas a basic, chief, central and immediate task and to advance in that direction with speed; and to select strategic areas to systematically organize the work there. In the midst of this, in January 2000 a serious debate and dispute developed in our CC through which it was decided to accept Mao Thought as Maoism; and we took the decision that Maoism is a completely new stage, as a third, higher and qualitative development in the history of advancement of Marxism. Besides this, through an equally intense internal struggle we took a very important decision in this meeting to unilaterally stop all clashes with the erstwhile PW. In addition to this we also took a decision to stand by our earlier understanding of Stalin, basing on Comrade Mao’s assessment of him in the course of the Great Debate. In January 2000, the decision was taken to name Mao Thought as Maoism. But after this an opportunist group emerged in our Party that opposed this decision and which sought to put hurdles in the task of building the army and base areas. By launching a relentless struggle against them we were able to demolish them. At this time we also took initiative at the international plane to forge unity with genuine Maoists, and as part of this acquired membership to RIM. Similarly, at the national level we gave primary importance to unite genuine Maoists. And in this we also achieved success. Together with this, the erstwhile MCCI made major advances in all spheres. Major leaps were taken in strengthening all party committees, including the central committee, in both quality and quantity; and also in the sphere of determining a correct direction towards giving a well organised form to a Maoist military line and military organisation. We formed the most important department like the Central Military Commission and on 22 April 2003 announced the formal formation of the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA). In the past few years this brave army has fought many a great and heroic battle. The fight and guerrilla attacks of Tekari, Pretshilla, Topchanchi, Churchu, Chandrapura, Simrahni and Saranda are some good examples of such glorious battles. In short, it can be said 181

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ANNEXURES that the erstwhile MCCI, after its second central conference in 1996, and particularly after 2000, carried out a sharp two line struggle in the Party and defeated the incorrect line both theoretically and practically. And in the process, compared to earlier, we have been able in taking a qualitative leap in all matters. PM: Both your parties are confined primarily to the most backward forest belts of the country. Why in these 35 years of existence have you not been able to have much impact on the plains and urban areas, where the bulk of the population live? Ganapathy: In absolute terms what you say is not true that we are confined to the forests alone. Of course, it is true that our movement is stronger in the forests than in the plains and urban areas. This focus is linked to our path. Depending on the specific characteristics of the Indian revolution, we decided that the path of revolution is that of protracted people’s war. That is, by first setting up Base Areas in the backward areas and spreading these to the other areas and thereby ultimately encircling the cities from the countryside. So, it is according to this strategic understanding alone that work must be done in any area, whether forest, plain or urban. The forests and mountainous areas quite naturally get priority as these are the strategic areas where Base Areas can be set up. But, it is not correct to say that we have ignored the plain areas. We have built extensive anti-feudal and anti-imperialist struggles in the plain areas in AP and Bihar. Even today our Party is working in the plain areas in some states. In fact, in AP and B-J states much of our cadres, leadership and even the prestige of the movement were gained by developing the revolutionary movement in the plain areas. We built strong movements in several forest areas starting from and relying on the plain areas for our subjective forces, material help and concrete experience. In the process, we suffered severe leadership and cadre losses due to the most cruel and fascist suppression campaigns by the enemy, and due to our shortcomings. Accordingly we are trying to formulate and change our tactics—forms of organisation and struggle and method of work—in the plain areas. Acting according to our strategic plan in building the revolutionary movement in plain areas by following the 182

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ANNEXURES path of PPW, we have gained rich experience through our practice crimsoned with the blood of thousands of martyrs; and have also learned from the experience of the armed struggles of the oppressed nationalities of the Indian sub-continent. Keeping in the forefront our path of revolution, i.e. Protracted People’s War, we have been working in the plains, cities and villages and have consolidated our forces in the strategic areas. Before us, we have the experience of the first round of struggles of Naxalbari, Srikakulam, Birbhum, etc.; and then we also have our own direct experience of armed struggle since the end of the 1970s. This experience has itself proved the validity of the path of protracted people’s war. So, while focusing on the strategic areas, we have worked also in the plains and urban areas coordinating this latter work with that of the strategic areas. If we did not have this orientation, we too, would have gone into right deviations like so many of the other M-L parties and groups. Revolution cannot develop according to one’s own wishes; it will follow certain determined laws depending on the nature of Indian society, and the stage of the revolution. The general laws of PPW have to be applied to the specific characteristics of the Indian revolution. In the revolutionary process, it is for us to discover these laws and act accordingly in the most effective manner. Today, we are strong in the forest areas as these are the perspective areas for setting up Bases; where we are intensifying and expanding the class struggle for the seizure of political power, even though the starting point of our work has been the plain areas. We are also concentrating on the forest areas for the strategic needs of building a strong people’s army and establishing people’s political power by politically mobilising the vast masses and smashing the state power of the enemy classes. We are coordinating the three types of movement (broadly)—forest, plain and urban—with each other, according to the principles of PPW. The specificity of the Indian revolutionary process is that the ML movement faced a severe setback and splits after the historic revolutionary movements of Naxalbari, Srikakulam, etc. Another aspect of 183

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ANNEXURES this specificity is the existence and continuation of two independent Maoist streams—M-L stream and the MCC stream—in the country. Yet, despite these ups and downs, we have recovered from the setback and rebuilt the revolutionary movement, and have been step-by-step unifying the revolutionary forces in the country. The unity of our two major Maoist streams is the most positive aspect of this process. Despite these positive developments, the revolutionary forces are still weak in urban areas, and the revisionist leadership has still many influential pockets. There is a danger of revisionism which has a countrywide domination over the trade unions, a wide influence in the urban areas and even amongst the peasantry in some parts of the country, despite their feeble base. It also exists in the government and has a wide influence in three states. The revisionists, under the garb of the Red flag, propagate bourgeois ideology and politics, and adopt reformist tactics. It acts as one of the main props of the rule of the reactionary ruling classes in the country. It is one of the main sources of injecting parliamentarism, economism, reformism into the body politics of the oppressed masses and has become a major hurdle in building and developing the working class and urban movements. Due to the long influence of revisionist politics and practice in some areas there will be need for much patience, consistency and creative revolutionary initiatives to make a breakthrough. The cities and towns are the bastions of the imperialists and the Indian ruling classes. Yet, in a few towns and cities we had built powerful working-class movements, and these movements had created panic amongst the imperialists and the ruling classes and created a positive impact on the people, particularly the working class, students and intellectuals. But, they have faced many losses. Today, though we are a weak force in urban areas, we have a presence in many cities and towns in several states and are trying to develop the working class and the urban movement, which is also being influenced by the growing armed struggles in the rural areas. Finally, I would like to conclude that with great determination we will strive to advance and expand the Guerrilla war to establish Base Areas in the strategic areas; we will refine and develop our tactics to 184

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ANNEXURES rebuild, consolidate and expand the revolutionary movement in the vast plains of India, to advance the People’s War to drown the enemy in the great ocean of the class struggles of the vast masses; and we will rebuild, consolidate and expand the working class and urban movement in cities and towns, keeping in mind the strategic direction and the changing socio-economic-political conditions of our country. India is a highly diverse and complex social system and a country of enormous size; here, the enemy is much stronger; and the interests of the imperialists in India are greater because of its geo-political and economic situation. Hence, the odds are heavy; so, it will no doubt take more time, particularly in the plain and urban areas. But we are taking lessons from our experiences with regard to the work in the plain and urban areas. We will concentrate our work in the strategic areas to develop the People’s Army, and intensify the armed agrarian revolutionary war and establish Base Areas; coordinate this work with the work in the plain and the urban areas in a planned way with a strategic outlook by keeping in mind the dialectical relationship between these three types of areas; and we will make a breakthrough in building powerful movements in plain and urban areas. So, I firmly say that, our advance is inevitable. PM: In what way will your unity have impact on the development of the guerrilla war in the country? How will you face the massive onslaught of the Indian state? What concrete tasks have you set yourself to achieve Base Areas? Kishan: We believe that the direct impact of our unity will be most on the ongoing guerrilla war in the country. Also due to this, the agrarian revolutionary guerrilla war will attain a new inspiration and new dynamism, a new energy, and a new upheaval and will thereby expand and intensify throughout the entire country. Especially, when our erstwhile armies of the PGA and PLGA will unite into the newly formed PLGA, this can be said with much greater certainty. As far as the question of countering the massive onslaughts of the Indian state machinery is concerned, we think that not only will we be able to give them a fitting reply, but also completely smash them 185

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ANNEXURES through the creative application of our strategy and tactics to the path of protracted people’s war in India. In fact, one of the reasons that determine the specific application of the strategy and tactics to the path of protracted people’s war is that the enemy is strong and masses are weak. But this strength of the enemy and weakness of the masses is relative. This truth has been proved by our struggles over the last few years. Compared to earlier, we have now acquired some greater strength, while to some extent the enemy’s strength has definitely reduced in relative terms. Besides, in a huge country like India, it is not possible for the enemy to deploy its forces everywhere, particularly in the distant and widespread rural areas. Therefore, facing all types of difficulties and crossing all hurdles we can definitely smash to pieces the Indian state machinery and beat back their fierce attacks if we, on the one hand, make the rural areas the main centre of our work, while on the other, if we intensify our work amongst urban workers and all the toiling masses and bring a proper balance between both these types of work. Simultaneously, we will have to recruit lakhs and crores of the masses into the military battles to conduct the revolutionary mass movements and at the same time bring a correct coordination between the two. Therefore, one very important task before us is to bring a proper balance between the armed struggle and the widespread activities and movements of the masses and thereby develop and extend both. No doubt, to establish Base Areas we have determined some definite tasks. For example, developing through Guerrilla Zones and Guerrilla Bases we will have to move in the direction towards establishing Base Areas. Together with this we have to strengthen in every way, the formations of all three forces of the PLGA—the Basic, Secondary and Main forces; and through a proper command system a correct coordination has to be developed between them. In addition, within a fixed time frame the military formations have to be developed from the company to the battalion level. In this way, through both qualitative and quantitative development, the PLGA has to be turned into a PLA. If we are able to complete these tasks in a correct way, and we are able to draw vast sections of the masses into the guerrilla war and also 186

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ANNEXURES into the various other forms of struggle, then we can definitely achieve victory in the protracted people’s war, no matter how long, tortuous and difficult the process may be, facing the numerous twists and turns and ups and downs in the march forward. PM: Now to turn to other questions linked to the political impact of your movement. Your parties did not seem to have much impact to fight against the massive imperialist penetration into the country? Why? Also there seems little impact on the fight against the monster of Hindu fascism …. Why? Kishan: See, from one point of view, it is true that the impact of revolutionary struggles against imperialist intervention in the country cannot much be seen. To some extent this is even a fact. Firstly our subjective force is quite less than what is needed, and even of that which exists, the strength in the urban areas and industrial areas is far less compared to the rural areas. Therefore, we have not been able to intensify the struggle against imperialism as is needed, while, on the other hand, the other so-called anti-imperialists, like the parliamentary and revisionist parties and the NGOs, are nothing but a farce and a deception. In reality, the basis for real opposition to imperialism is only in the hands of genuine Maoists and revolutionaries. Therefore, even if at present the anti-imperialist struggle is somewhat weak, by rectifying our weaknesses in this sphere, we can definitely create and advance a strong movement against imperialist intervention, based on a correct approach to the issue. Though, on this issue, we are somewhat late, we can definitely advance this movement by adopting correct methods. On the question of the struggle against Hindu fascism too, there are a host of fake anti-communal forces. In such a situation it is no easy task, where, on the one hand we have to draw a clear-cut line of demarcation with such forces, and on the other, create and develop a genuine movement against Hindu fascism. In the true sense, problems like communalism and Hindu fascism can actually only be solved by developing and extending the class struggle. That is why you will find that in those areas where Maoist revolutionaries have influence, communal riots there, will be seen to be relatively less. 187

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ANNEXURES Therefore, by focussing on worker–peasant unity and by being able to build our revolutionary mass base amongst them through patient work, will we be able to build and conduct a genuine movement against communalism, religious fanaticism and Hindu fascism in a correct way and in correct direction. So, perhaps it is not fully true to say that the impact of the revolutionary movement against the problems of communalism or Hindu fascism is very little. But, it is no doubt true, given the way the RSS gangs are instigating communalism and provoking riots in India today, our response in giving an effective answer to them has been far less than what the situation requires. We are confident that the initiative we have now taken to rectify this shortcoming and the process we have recently started will soon bear fruits. PM: How do you view the impact of the US/Globalisation policies on our country? Kishan: I am of the opinion that the imperialists, particularly the US imperialist-promoted globalisation, has had a very bad impact on the life of our people and the national life of the country. These policies have pushed to devastation the living standards of every level of the people. If this is not stopped, in the next few years, it will have a horrifying impact. We believe that it is only the advancing agrarian revolutionary guerrilla war together with the development and expansion of widespread militant mass movements, that can successfully complete the people’s revolution, which alone can free our country from the dangerous effects of globalisation. PM: India is such a diverse country of nationalities, dalits and various castes, minority groupings, linguistic sections etc. How do you expect to unite such diverse elements, all of whom face not only class oppression but also varied forms of social oppression? Ganapathy: Women, dalits, Adivasis, oppressed nationalities and religious minorities are the most important of the social sections to be taken cognisance of by the party of the proletariat leading the revolution in the concrete conditions prevailing in India. All these sections 188

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ANNEXURES have special problems of their own and specific types of extra-economic oppression apart from class oppression. We have to pay due attention to solve their special problems, like patriarchy, untouchability and other forms of caste oppression, attacks on minorities and oppressed nationalities, etc. and approach these problems from a class view-point. We also have to link these tasks with the ongoing revolutionary movement. Towards this end, we have to not only bring these sections into class organisations along with other oppressed masses, but also evolve the necessary forms of organisations and forms of struggle for the widest mobilization of these sections on their special problems both on a short-term and long-term basis. Broader joint fronts too should be formed wherever and whenever necessary to address the specific grievances. However, while taking up specific tactics on the special problems related to these sections, we should keep in mind that the tactics should always serve our strategic line. We should place the specific programme for the solution of their specific problems in relation to, and in the overall context of, the on-going people’s war in the country. We must educate these sections how their problems are essentially class questions; how the material basis for the final solution of their problems lies in liberating themselves from class oppression; and hence, the imperative need for waging war against the common enemies—feudalism, imperialism, and comprador bureaucrat capitalism, that are oppressing the vast toiling masses in the country—unitedly with other oppressed masses under the leadership of the proletariat. We must demonstrate in practice how the people’s war and the ongoing class struggle is bringing these sections increasingly into the centre stage; how the latent potential and creative energies, the revolutionary initiative and capacities of these oppressed sections are being released in the course of the people’s war and the deepening class struggle. It is only by paying special attention and making conscious efforts, based on concrete planning, by the leadership of the Party to develop the oppressed among these sections, that we can bring a qualitative change in their overall status in the Party and position in the revolutionary movement

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ANNEXURES By pursuing the above-mentioned general line and approach, we will be able to draw the clear line of demarcation with the bourgeois parliamentary and revisionist parties, with the reformist NonGovernmental Organisations (NGOs) and other petty bourgeois organisations, as well as with the so-called Communist Revolutionary organisations in our country with regard to the solution of the problems of these special social sections. This can be done by demarcating the wrong approaches to these issues from the proletarian approach. At the same time we must fight against the mechanistic approach that ignores these social issues and thereby indirectly acts to perpetuate all these social evils. Conscious efforts have to be made amongst the males and upper castes from the oppressed to educate them against their patriarchal and casteist views. We must also take up consistent political exposure of the various bourgeois-revisionist-reformist trends within the movements of these sections. The Party must also fight against non-proletarian values inside itself that may manifest in subtle forms of patriarchy, casteism and caste biases, elitism and turning a blind eye to the rights of the oppressed sections. On the other hand, it must also educate comrades who may be influenced by the varied post-modernist trends, bourgeois feminism, Dalitsism, narrow nationalism, etc. It is only by remaining loyal to the politics of the proletariat and the ideology of Marxism–Leninism–Maoism and maintaining its own political and organisational independence, that the working class can give leadership and liberate the peoples from the sectarian approach to all these social evils and arouse them and bring them into the path of the revolutionary democratic struggle in its true sense (as part and parcel of the new democratic revolution). Yet, it must be understood that merely the new democratic revolution will not do away totally all these social evils. Though, the objective basis of an exploitative social system may not exist, it will continue to manifest in the superstructure—in people’s thinking and social/cultural norms and value. So, even after the victory of the revolution in the new democratic and socialist societies, the struggle will have to be continued in all realms of thinking and social practice. 190

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ANNEXURES PM: Today the dog-fights amongst the ruling classes are intensifying; how do you plan to use this to your advantage? Kishan: The fact is that revolutionaries always utilise the growing contradictions within the ruling factions in order to advance the revolution. But it must be remembered that in India, as yet, there is no clearcut polarisation due to these contradictions and none of these contradictions have reached the level of a war. Another point is that while they fight like dogs for the spoils of office, they get united when it comes to suppressing the revolutionary struggles. But of course, there are also contradictions amongst them, as to what policy is best used against the revolutionaries—soft or strong. That is why this question demands serious thought as to how this contradiction can be used in the interests of revolution. In order to effectively utilise the contradiction within these ruling classes to further the revolutionary struggle all the following points must be analysed and considered—the concrete condition of the revolutionary armed struggle and its nationwide impact; the condition of our subjective forces, particularly of the Party, People’s Army and United Front, and its impact on the people of the country; and the question of our ability to keep the initiative in our hands and our ability to effectively intervene on the varied political issues of the day. In this matter I want to say one more thing, in the present condition I don’t think it is correct to ally with one section of the ruling class parties in the name of utilizing contradictions among them. PM: Now coming to international questions. What is the significance of Maoism in the contemporary world? Can it help analyse the big changes taking place and give a perspective for the future in the present context? Kishan: We have accepted Maoism as the Marxism–Leninism of today. Marxism–Leninism–Maoism is in itself an integrated whole. It is such a dynamic science that, with its help one can better analyse all the branches of science. With it, we can correctly analyse anything, any event and draw conclusions. We know that Marxism does not merely interpret the world, but determines the laws that govern its change. Accordingly, what ever 191

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ANNEXURES changes have taken place in the world today or all the changes that have taken place since the very beginning of the imperialist era, till date, can only have been correctly analysed in the light of the theory of Marxism– Leninism–Maoism. This will apply to the future as well. Together with this, we must remember that Marxism–Leninism–Maoism is the guide to all our activities. Therefore, it acts as the theoretical guide to understand even big changes that may have taken place in any new conditions. We have to do our work not in a dogmatic way but apply it creatively. In addition, to understand the future within the framework of the present can only be done in the light of Marxism–Leninism–Maoism. Development of the world situation takes place only through the process of passing through various ups and down, the zig-zag path and through the process of advancing through both victories and defeats. Even all advances in the world and the social system go through this process and will continue to do so. Therefore, I am of the firm opinion that to understand today’s world and find solutions to its varied problems, the use of Maoism is of a historical and international significance. PM: How do you plan to develop relations with other revolutionary forces throughout the world? What impact will this unity have on the international communist movement? Kishan: We, communists are internationalists. This internationalism is best reflected through our slogan—Workers and oppressed people of the world unite! For the advance of the world communist movement there is utmost necessity to establish strong fraternal relations between the revolutionary struggles of the colonial, semi-colonial and semifeudal countries and the working class movements in the capitalistimperialist countries. With this approach, one of our important duties is to establish strong relations with all genuine Maoist parties in the world. Earlier, both the erstwhile MCCI and the erstwhile CPI(ML)[PW] have continued bilateral relations with Nepal, Peru, Philippines, Turkey and other countries at the international level. The erstwhile MCCI had even joined the RIM (Revolutionary Internationalist Movement), while the erstwhile PW had decided to further deepen its relations with RIM. 192

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ANNEXURES Now when a new Party—the CPI (Maoist)—is born, by following revolutionary traditions, the party has decided to continue its deep relations with RIM and all other genuine Maoists. As India is a vast populated country, the unity of India’s two important revolutionary organisations—the erstwhile MCCI and PW— will definitely have a very positive impact at the international plane. Today there is no socialist country in the world. Today, when the reactionaries are shouting from the roof tops that Marxism and Communism have been defeated, the merger of the erstwhile MCCI and PW and the formation of a genuine Marxist–Leninist–Maoist Party, is such an event, that too in a vast country with a population of one billion, that can give new life to the international communist movement. To the extent that we will be able to intensify revolutionary guerrilla agrarian war—protracted people’s war—under the leadership of the new Party, to that extent new energy will be infused into the International Communist Movement. PM: You have been always saying for the last 35 years the situation in the world is excellent for revolution. If so why are the Maoist forces in the world so weak? Ganapathy: Yes, the objective situation is in general terms excellent. The objective situation is very excellent in the third world or backward countries or oppressed countries or semi-colonies and colonies and the revolutionary objective situation is developing in the imperialist countries. But, why is there this contradiction that you mentioned? How can we understand this? We should understand that there is a dialectical link between the objective and the subjective factors; it is not a mechanical interconnection or a one-to-one relationship. If there was such a mechanical relation everything would be pre-determined and revolution would take place in the backward countries first only. Lenin said that, to a revolutionary situation to mature, both the objective and subjective factors must develop and then alone revolution breaks out at the weakest link. Though, today the storm centres of world revolution are the backward countries and the conditions are acute there, the occurrence of revolution is dependent on numerous 193

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ANNEXURES factors. Similarly, the development and growth of genuine proletarian parties (Maoist parties) is determined not merely by the extent of poverty but by the political content of the general democratic movement in that country and the growth of genuine proletarian forces within it. With the advent of imperialism, the crisis of capitalism took the form of a General crisis and ripened the objective condition for social revolution. The principal characteristic feature of the general crisis of capitalism in the era of imperialism is that capitalism as a whole is bogged down in a state of under-utilisation of capacity and permanent mass unemployment and inflation. The continuous massive destruction of productive forces through world wars and proxy wars, through under-utilisation of productive capacities of millions upon millions of people and the destruction of surplus commodities, even as millions of people languish in destitution; are all features of imperialism. The general crisis of capitalism brought forth all the fundamental contradictions in society to a bursting point—that between capital and labour, between imperialism and the oppressed nations and people, and between the various imperialist powers and monopoly capitalist groups. The conflict of the productive forces with the existing relations of production, thus, took on an explosive form ever since the advent of imperialism, leading to fascism, world wars and social revolutions. These will continue until the final victory of the World Socialist Revolution over the world capitalist system. The present day world is under a great disorder, turbulence and instability rarely witnessed after the Second World War. The collapse of Soviet Social imperialism and the complete integration of erstwhile bureaucratic capitalist states of East Europe, Soviet Union in the 1990s and China into world capitalist system have not mitigated the crisis of world capitalism. This ever intensifying crisis of the world capitalist system is the basis for the chaos, turmoil and instability which has become characteristic of the contemporary world situation. After the September 11 incident, in the name of fighting against terrorism, the US imperialism is unleashing a series of wars of aggression and carrying out attacks on the people all over the world. This has generated a 194

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ANNEXURES powerful backlash from the people, in various forms. Thus, a new situation has emerged where instability and turmoil have deepened further. Today, imperialism is facing an unprecedented worldwide crisis, unheard of ever since the end of the Second World War. All the fundamental contradictions are further sharpening. A new tide of revolutionary struggles, national liberation struggles and various people’s movements against imperialist aggression, oppression and exploitation is unfolding everywhere. There is great need to utilise this favourable situation to make great leaps in the ongoing people’s war in our country and advance towards the establishment of a new democratic state and then march forward to socialism. Vast areas of Asia, Africa, and Latin America are continuing as the storm centres of world revolution. Guerrilla war against the US occupation is intensifying in Iraq and Afghanistan. People’s war, under the leadership of the Maoist parties in India, Nepal, Philippines, Peru and Turkey, is advancing. The workers and vast sections of the masses in imperialist countries are fighting militantly against the policies of globalisation and war. Genuine revolutionary parties based on MLM are emerging in several capitalist countries. All this acts to weaken imperialism. Yet, relative to the 1960s and 70s, the proletarian movement is weaker. The principal reason for this is the growth of the revisionist trends worldwide and the betrayal of the national liberation movements of the 60s and the 70s. The reversals in the Soviet Union (1956) and then in China (1976) and the conversion of the Communist Party Of Soviet Union (CPSU) and the CPC into revisionist parties fuelled Rightist and revisionist parties throughout the world. The restoration of capitalism in these former socialist societies and the disintegration of the socialist camp had a very negative impact on the advance of the world revolution. Utilising the situation of this setback, the imperialists went on ideological and political offensive against communism trying to show it as being outdated, and floated various new forms of dissent theories. On the other hand, most of the genuine communist revolutionary forces were in disarray and ideological and political confusion rife with no international 195

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ANNEXURES centre. It is these factors that have resulted in the relative weakening of the Maoist forces today. In addition, the massive, genocidal repression unleashed on all revolutionary forces (as witnessed in Indo–China, Latin America, and now Asia) further created impediments in growth. But today, with the conditions worldwide becoming even more horrifying and the regrouping of genuine Maoist forces and the birth of new ones, the revolutionary situation is bound to advance. The relatively faster growth of the PPW in Nepal is a concrete example of the excellence of the revolutionary situation. If Maoist parties emerge in various countries and take concrete tactics, under a correct strategy, they are bound to advance. To do so, there is a need to correctly grasp MLM; know the nature of the imperialist era and grasp the historical task of the world working class and its Vanguard Parties; prepare the subjective forces; politically mobilise and lead the masses in the class struggles and advance the revolutionary wars to success. PM: Finally, what message does your united Party have for the people of the country? Ganapathy: Finally, our United Party calls on the people of India and the world over to: Unite! Unite! And Unite! Unite all the revolutionary and democratic classes and forces of our country—workers, peasantry, petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie, including all the oppressed social sections—under the leadership of the Communist Party of India (Maoist)! Organise! Organise! And Organise! Organise in the Revolutionary Mass Organisations, Red Army, and the Organs of New Political Power under the leadership of the Communist Party of India (Maoist)! Struggle! Struggle! And Struggle! Struggle to break the chains of Imperialism, Feudalism and Comprador Bureaucrat Capitalism for liberation! Struggle for great victories to triumph countrywide political power! No force, however mighty, can suppress the people’s struggles permanently! Ultimately Victory of the revolution is inevitable! It is

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ANNEXURES the law of transformation of class society! Final defeat is only of the enemy! Final victory is only of the oppressed masses! We give a similar call to the working class, oppressed nations and the people of all countries—Unite, Organise and intensify the struggle against imperialism and all reaction, for the advancement and success of the world socialist revolution under the leadership of the genuine proletarian Parties! Source: Peoples March, Ernakulam, Volume 5, No. 11–12, November– December 2004.

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ANNEXURES

III Organisational Hierarchy: Communist Party of India (Maoist)

CPI (MAOIST) CENTRAL COMMITTE

POLITICAL BUREAU (PB)

OrissaChhattisgarh Regional Bureau

Central Regional Bureau

Eastern Regional Bureau

South Western Regional Bureau

Northern Regional Bureau

Central Military Commission

Orissa Chhattisgarh

People’s Guerilla Army (PGA)

Coastal Jharkhand Assam West Bengal Belt

Maharashtra and Balaghat

Bihar

Central Propoganda Bureau

UP

Tamil Karnataka Kerala Nadu

State Military Commission/ Special zonal/ special area

Delhi Haryana Uttarakhand Punjab Regional

AP NTSZC DKSZC AOBSZC

SUCOMO

198

Central Printing Press

People’s March Editorial Board

Zonal/ District/ Division

Secondary Base Main Forces Forces Forces (People’s (Squads) (Palatoons) Militia)

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ANNEXURES IV Current Trends in Naxalism

Naxalism Naxalism continues to be an area of concern. Naxalites typically operate in a vacuum created by inadequacy of administrative and political institutions, espouse local demands and take advantage of the prevalent disaffection and perceived injustice among the under privileged and remote segments of population. Naxalism is not merely a law and order problem; it has deep socioeconomic dimensions. A multi-pronged strategy, essentially of sustained and effective police action, coupled with accelerated socio-economic development and management of public perception is being pursued to effectively tackle the Naxalite menace. Extent of Naxal Violence The overall Naxal violence during the years 2003–2006 is as under: Head

2003

2004

2005*

2006

No. of incidents

1597

1533

1608

1509

No. of civilians killed

410

466

524

521

No. of policemen killed

105

100

153

157

No. of Naxalites killed

216

87

225

272

* Reconciled figures for 2005. Source: Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Report, 2006–2007, p. 24.

During the year 2006, there have been 1,509 incidents of Naxal violence as against 1,608 during the year 2005, indicating a decline of 6.15 per cent. Resultant casualties during the year 2006 were 678 (civilians–521, SFs.–157) as against 677 casualties (civilians–524, SFs.–153) during the year 2005.

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ANNEXURES Naxal violence has significantly come down in Andhra Pradesh in terms of both incidents and casualties, though recent seizures of huge consignments of rocket shells and rocket launchers are a matter of concern. Chhattisgarh has seen higher levels of violence and casualties which is attributed mainly to greater offensive by Naxalites to derail Salva Judum, a voluntary and peaceful initiative by local people against Naxalites in Dantewada district of Chhattisgarh. The state police, along with Central Para-Military Forces (CPMFs), has improved its action against Naxalites as is evident from neutralisation of 74 Naxalites in 2006 as against 32 Naxalites in 2005. The level of Naxal violence as well as the number of casualties has, however, been contained in the other affected states. Current Trends Spatial spread and consolidation Of the total 12,476 police stations in the country, Naxal violence has been reported during the year 2006 from 395 police stations as against 460 police stations during the year 2005. Available reports, however, suggest that the CPI (Maoists) have been trying to increase their sphere of influence and activity in parts of Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Uttarakhand and also in new areas in some of the already affected States. The CPI (Maoists) have also been attempting to intensify their efforts for social mobilisation. The Revolutionary Democratic Front (RDF), set up in May, 2005 for this purpose, has been enlarged into the People’s Democratic Front of India (PDFI). Naxal attacks on the police personnel

A total of 157 police personnel were killed during the year 2006 in 210 attacks on the police and in 335 encounters with police. This has been mainly due to frequent use of Improvised Explosive Device (IED) or landmine blasts by the Naxalites.

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ANNEXURES Attacks on government/private properties The Naxal outfits have been targeting the police posts, railway stations, forest checkpoints and other government and private properties. The attacks on railway or other properties have been more prominent in the states of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar and Jharkhand. They are also targeting mining and mining-related activities and railway properties, besides resorting to occasional hostage taking. Holding of jan-adalats Jan-Adalats continue to be held by the Naxalites to dispense crude and instant justice, supplant the state apparatus and assert their hegemony over the rural tracts. However, in the current year 2006, 42 Jan-Adalats were held as against 114 Jan-Adalats in 2005. Measures Taken to Tackle Naxalism Policy to deal with Naxalism The government has been pursuing a clearly defined policy to combat the challenge posed by Naxalism. This policy comprises the following main components: • The government will deal sternly with the Naxalites indulging in violence. • Keeping in view that Naxalism is not merely a law and order problem, the policy of the government is to address this menace, simultaneously, on political, security, development and public perception management fronts. • Naxalism being an inter-state problem, the states will adopt a collective approach and pursue a coordinated response to counter it. • There will be no peace dialogue by the affected states with the Naxal groups unless the latter give up violence and arms. • The state governments will need to accord a higher priority to ensure faster socio-economic development in the Naxal-affected or Naxal-prone areas. The focus areas should be to distribute land to 201

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ANNEXURES the landless poor as part of the speedy implementation of land reforms, ensure development of physical infrastructure like roads, communication, power, etc. and provide employment opportunities to youth in these areas. • The central government will continue to supplement the efforts and resources of the affected states on both security and development fronts and bring greater coordination between the states to successfully tackle the problem. Special security and intelligence structures The Naxal-affected states have taken necessary steps to set-up or streamline special security and intelligence structures to effectively deal with the Naxal problem. Special police units raised by them for anti-Naxalite operations are being provided with specialised training in jungle or guerilla warfare. The Greyhounds Training School at Hyderabad and the Centres of Excellence run by the CPMFs are also being used for this purpose. Besides, it has been recognised that police station level collection of actionable intelligence holds the key to preventing Naxal violence. The Naxal-affected states have, accordingly, been asked to further streamline intelligence collection and share mechanisms between different agencies operating at the ground level so as to undertake intelligence driven anti-Naxalite operations. Security related expenditure (SRE) scheme The SRE scheme reimburses expenditure incurred by the states on ammunition, training, upgradation of police posts, etc. At present, 76 districts in 9 states, badly affected by Naxal violence, are covered under this scheme. This Scheme was comprehensively revised in February, 2005 so as to enhance the level of utilisation of funds. During the year 2005–06, the total budget outlay of Rs 45 crore was spent as against the average expenditure of Rs 9–10 crore in the previous years. So far, a sum of Rs 175.55 crore has been disbursed to the states under the scheme. The states have found this scheme very useful in improving

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ANNEXURES ground level police response in dealing with the Naxal problem. The Scheme has been extended for a further period of five years beyond 31 March 2006. Modernisation of state police Funds are given to the states under the Police Modernisation Scheme to modernise their police forces in terms of modern weaponry, latest communication equipment, mobility and other infrastructure. Funds are also used to fortify vulnerable police stations and outposts in the Naxal areas. However, some of the states need to improve the level of utilisation of funds under the Scheme. So far, the central government has released an amount of Rs 3,677.67 crore to the Naxal-affected states viz. Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, Uttarakhand, Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Karnataka. During the current year (2006–07), an amount of Rs 434.61 crore has been allocated to these states. India Reserve (IR) Battalions The Naxal-affected states have been sanctioned India Reserve (IR) Battalions (Bns.), mainly to strengthen security apparatus at the state level as also to enable the states to provide gainful employment to the youth, particularly in the Naxal areas. Recently, additional IR Bns. have also been approved for the Naxal-affected states. The central government will now provide Rs 20.75 crore per IR Bn. as against the earlier amount of Rs 13 crore per Bn. The states have been asked to expedite raising of these Bns. Long-term deployment of Central Police Forces (CPFs) In order to supplement the efforts of the states in providing an effective response to the Naxal violence, CPFs have been deployed on a longterm basis as requested by the affected states. The central government have exempted the states from the payment of cost of deployment of these forces for a period of three years from 1 July 2004.

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ANNEXURES Inter-state joint anti-Naxal operations The menace of Naxalism is an inter-state problem. Naxalites operate without any hindrance of political and physical boundaries. In order to overcome the problem of inter-state movements by security forces, joint or synergised operations by the Special Police Units of the neighbouring states need to be institutionalised. In this regard, a detailed Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) has been developed in consultation with the states. The nodal points have been designated as per the SOP. The states are now undertaking inter-state joint antiNaxal operations. Supply of Mine Protected Vehicles (MPVs) Keeping in view the increased casualties of police personnel and civilians caused by IED or landmine blasts, the Naxal-affected states have been provided Mine Protected Vehicles (MPVs) under the Police Modernisation Scheme. Altogether 112 MPVs have, so far, been given to the states. Besides, the states have been asked to designate Demining units with necessary equipment and trained police personnel. Protection of railway infrastructure Considering continued attacks on Railway properties by Naxalite groups, the Naxal affected states have been asked to set up credible mechanisms to enable effective coordination on ground between Railway Protection Force (RPF), Government Railway Police (GRP), local police and intelligence agencies to ensure protection and safety of railway passengers, railway tracks and other railway properties. Besides, Ministry of Railways has also taken necessary steps to further strengthen their infrastructure for improved safety and security of railways. Deployment of Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB) along Indo-Nepal border In order to ensure that there is no spillover effect of the activities of Nepalese Maoists into our territory, SSB has been given the responsibility 204

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ANNEXURES to guard Indo-Nepal Border. The Government has recently sanctioned 20 new battalions for the SSB to further improve management of borders in these areas. A modernisation plan involving an outlay of Rs 444 crore has also been sanctioned for the SSB. Backward districts initiative (BDI) and backward regions grant fund (BRGF) In order to enhance the capabilities of the Naxal-affected states to improve development response in the Naxal-affected areas, the central government had included 55 Naxal-affected districts in 9 states under the Backward Districts Initiative (BDI) component of the Rashtriya Sam Vikas Yojana (RSVY) and had provided financial assistance of Rs.2,475 crore to fill in critical gaps in physical and social infrastructure in these areas. While the utilisation of funds under this component by the states is being monitored by the Planning Commission and the MHA, it has been decided to subsume this component within the newly launched BRGF scheme. This BRGF Scheme covers a total of 250 districts and is to be administered by the Ministry of Panchayati Raj. It is expected that this scheme will enable accelerated socioeconomic development of these 250 districts which will help prevent Naxal spread in these areas. Public perception management The states have been advised to undertake a publicity campaign to expose unlawful activities and misdeeds of Naxal outfits and their leaders, futility of violence, armed struggle, loss of human life and property caused by Naxal cadres, absence of development activities in the affected areas due to fear and extortion of Naxal cadres, etc. Review and Monitoring Mechanism Task Force on Naxalism A Task Force was constituted on 7 October 2004, under the chairmanship of Special Secretary (IS), to deliberate upon the steps needed to deal 205

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ANNEXURES with Naxalism more effectively and in a coordinated manner. The members of the Task Force comprise the nodal officers of the nine Naxal-affected States namely, Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal and the representatives of Intelligence Bureau (IB), Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and SSB. The Task Force has provided a useful forum to discuss and streamline anti-Naxalite operations being carried out by the affected states. Coordination centre Keeping in view the overall dimensions of Naxalite activities, a highlevel Coordination Centre, set up in 1998 and headed by the Union Home Secretary with Chief Secretaries and Directors General of Police of the Naxal-affected states as its Members, meets regularly and reviews and coordinates steps taken by the states to control Naxalite activities. So far, 22 meetings have taken place, the last being in Bhubaneswar on 27 and 28 December 2006. The important decisions taken by the Coordination Centre, inter alia, include implementation of action plans to deal with Naxal problems, strengthening administrative structures to address both security and developmental aspects, improving ground level policing by way of time bound fortification of vulnerable police stations, filling up of vacancies in state police, expeditious raising of IR battalions, optimal utilisation of CPMFs, earmarking of de-mining units, streamlining of inter-state joint operations, improving operational and grassroots intelligence on Naxal-related activities, intensifying intelligence based anti-Naxal operations, etc. Standing Committee of the Chief Ministers of the Naxalaffected States Pursuant to the decision taken in the Chief Minsters’ Conference on Internal Security and Law and Order held on 15 April 2005, a Standing Committee was constituted under the chairmanship of the Union Home Minister with the Chief Ministers of 13 Naxal-affected states as its members. The second meeting of the Standing Committee was held 206

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ANNEXURES on 13 April 2006 in New Delhi under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister. The Standing Committee observed that while the action plans have been under implementation to pursue sustained and effective antiNaxalite operations by the states individually and jointly, there is a need to maximize the outcome and outputs of such plans. Also, states have been asked to improve delivery and monitoring mechanisms to ensure accelerated socio-economic development in the Naxal areas under the various developmental schemes. Constitution of the Inter-Ministerial Group (IMG) An IMG headed by Additional Secretary, MHA, has been constituted with the following terms of reference:• To review implementation of various centrally sponsored schemes and programmes being undertaken particularly in the Naxalaffected areas; • To monitor the progress in implementation of land reforms; • To ensure that the Naxal-affected States take necessary steps to address tribal related issues, facilitate meaningful implementation of Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas Act, PESA), formulate and implement a progressive and forward looking Resettlement and Rehabilitation (RR) policy for displaced persons or tribals, etc.; • To review progress of action taken for the developmental and security related infrastructure proposals under the Forest Conservation Act; • To closely review implementation of schemes like BDI and BRGF specially approved for Naxal-affected areas; • To assist the states to mount a sustained public awareness campaign to counter the propaganda unleashed by Naxal groups, and • To ensure that the Naxal-affected states put in place improved monitoring and delivery mechanisms for accelerated socioeconomic development in the Naxal-affected areas.

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ANNEXURES Empowered Group of Ministers (EGoM) A meeting of the Chief Ministers was held on Internal Security on 5 September 2006 and after detailed deliberations, the following decisions were taken to combat the Naxal problem: • There was unanimity amongst the participants that terrorism and Naxalism needed to be dealt with firmly. Closer cooperation among states and between the centre and states is imperative to deal with the wide array of complex internal security problems and threats. • To effectively deal with terrorists and Naxalites, states agreed to take time-bound steps to improve the quality of the State Special Branches with special focus on tactical and local intelligence generation. The importance of intelligence collection at the police station level was also emphasised. • An Empowered Group of Ministers, headed by the Home Minister, comprising select Union Ministers and Chief Ministers, will be set up to closely monitor the spread of Naxalism and evolve effective strategies to deal with the problem. EGoM has since been constituted. • Police forces alone cannot resolve all internal security problems. To combat them effectively, particularly, the problem of Naxalism, the state governments agreed to address socioeconomic issues such as land reforms, employment generation, health care, economic development and poverty alleviation. Naxal Management Division Recently, Naxal Management Division, headed by an Additional Secretary, has been set up in this Ministry with a view to ensuring periodic review and close monitoring of the Action Plans drawn up by the states to deal with the Naxal problem. The Additional Secretary is being assisted by senior civil and police officers who will frequently visit the states and make coordinated efforts to advise and guide the state government officials to effectively deal with the Naxal problem. 208

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ANNEXURES Action Plans by States The States have formulated Action Plans to deal with the Naxalite menace effectively. They have been asked to fine tune them and ensure their effective ground-level implementation to maintain constant pressure on Naxalites and further improve police and development response to successfully counter the challenge posed by Naxalism. Source: Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Report, 2006–2007, pp. 24–30.

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ANNEXURES V Naxal-affected States and Districts in India

Note: 1. 2. 210

The intensity of influence and the number of affected districts have increased since the time the maps were prepared. The number of states reporting Naxalite presence has also since increased.

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ANNEXURES Andhra Pradesh

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ANNEXURES Uttaranchal

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ANNEXURES Kerala

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ANNEXURES Tamil Nadu

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ANNEXURES Uttar Pradesh

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ANNEXURES Madhya Pradesh

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ANNEXURES Karnataka

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ANNEXURES Maharashtra

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ANNEXURES West Bengal

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ANNEXURES Orissa

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ANNEXURES Chhattisgarh

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ANNEXURES Jharkhand

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ANNEXURES Bihar

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About the Editor and the Contributors

THE EDITOR P. V. Ramana is Research Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. An expert in the field of South Asian security studies, Dr Ramana’s M.Phil. dissertation was titled “The Role of the Navy in India’s Security” and and his doctoral thesis was titled “Military R&D in India: Programmes and Processes”. Since 2002, Dr Ramana has been actively engaged in the study of Naxalite and Maoist movements in India and other South Asian countries. He has conducted several visits in Naxaliteaffected parts of Andhra Pradesh, his native state, and also Orissa, Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh. In February and July 2007, he toured the Bastar region of Chhattisgarh extensively, meeting government officials, journalists and the tribal population. Dr Ramana has contributed over 60 publications on the Naxalite movement in India. These include chapters in books; research papers; articles in newspapers like The Indian Express, The Tribune, Deccan Herlad, the vernacular Prabhat Khabar; and popular Web sites such as rediff.com. His paper “The Maoist Movement in India” was published in the peer-reviewed Defense and Security and Analysis, in December 2006.

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ABOUT THE EDITOR AND THE CONTRIBUTORS Dr Ramana is on the guest faculty of the Internal Security Academy, Mount Abu, and the Border Security Force Academy, Tekanpur. Dr Ramana served as an advisor to the task force on Naxalite violence appointed by the All India Congress Committee (AICC) in 2005. Today, he continues to advise policy makers, MNCs, scholars, journalists, security force officials and foreign diplomats.

THE CONTRIBUTORS Ruchir Garg has been a journalist for the past 18 years. Besides working with Sahara India Television, Mr Garg also reports from Chattisgarh for the BBC and rediff.com, as well as Dainik Bhaskar, Dainik Samvet Shikar and Jansatta. In May 1999, he became the first journalist from a Hindi language newspaper to camp with the erstwhile People’s War (PW) in the forests of Chattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Bihar, and speak with a number of leaders and cadres. He has been reporting and writing on the Naxalite movement since 1995. The subjects of his interests include deforestation in Madhya Pradesh, hunger deaths in drought-hit areas of Orissa and issues relating to the tribal population of Chattisgarh. He also attended an international conference organised by the All India People’s Revolutionary Front (AIPRF) in New Delhi, and subsequently wrote about the proceedings of the meeting in various newspapers. S. Gopal is retired as special secretary in the Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India. He was involved in studying security and strategic issues for more than three decades in the Government of India. Mr Gopal is presently an associate of the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Bangalore and is also a trustee of the Institute of Contemporary Studies, Bangalore. Krishna Hachhethu is associate professor of Political Science at the Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies (CNAS), Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu, Nepal. He has published several articles in refereed journals and edited books, and has contributed several research reports. He is also the co-author of five books. His publications include Party Building in Nepal: Organization, Leadership and People (Kathmandu: 225

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ANATOMY OF NAXALITE VIOLENCE IN INDIA Mandala Book Point, 2002). He is the country coordinator of Nepal, of a larger study project on the ‘State of Democracy in South Asia.’ He is currently working on a book project on ‘Democracy, Pluralism and State.’ Harivansh is chief editor, Prabhat Khabar, multi-edition Hindi daily published in Ranchi, Jamshedpur, Dhanbad, Deoghar, Patna and Kolkata. It is the largest circulated Hindi daily in Jharkhand. Sanjay Kumar Jha is a young and upcoming scholar on the Maoist insurgent movements in South Asia. His current project is at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, where he is an Associate Fellow, his research being based on Left-wing extremism in India. His areas of research interest include sub-conventional warfare, terrorism, insurgency low intensity conflict and counter-insurgency strategies, border management, and police and paramilitary forces in India. Dr Jha started his career as a research associate with the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, in 2000, where he was associated with www.satp.org, the institute’s website, and Faultlines, its quarterly journal. He moved on to IDSA in 2003. He has participated in many seminars and has presented quite a few papers. They include ‘Implications of the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal for India and South Asia’ (December 2004), ‘Left-wing Extremism in India’ (July 2004), ‘Dynamics of Insurgency and Politics in Nepal’ (July 2004, Ministry of Defence, Government of India). Dr Jha’s papers and articles have been published in many reputed journals and websites at home and abroad on topics relating to peace, Maoist movements, internal and external Security, and border management. They have been published in/posted at/reproduced by Faultlines (New Delhi), South Asia Intelligence Review, New Delhi, Strategic Analysis (New Delhi), Asian Affairs (London), www.outlookindia.com, www.terrorisme.net, www.atimes.com, www.ipcs. Dr Jha was awarded a doctorate, in 2001, by the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, for his thesis entitled ‘Internal security in a Third World Democracy: The Role of Paramilitary Forces in India.’

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ABOUT THE EDITOR AND THE CONTRIBUTORS D. Raja is the National Secretary of the Communist Party of India (CPI). Belonging to a family of agricultural workers, Comrade Raja was educated all through in government-run institutions. He started his political career as a student activist of the All India Students Federation (AISF). He then became a full-time functionary of the CPI. He was the Tamil Nadu secretary of All India Youth Federation (AIYF) from 1975–85. Later, he became the national general secretary of AIYF and continued in that position from 1985–1990. During this period, he led a nation-wide campaign under the slogan ‘Save India!’ and conducted a series of struggles against unemployment and for youth rights. He was elected to the national leadership of the party in the early 1990s and currently holds the position of National Secretary of the CPI. He is widely travelled in the entire former Soviet Union and most countries of western and eastern Europe, the United States of America, Cuba, and countries of South and South East Asia. He plays an active role in shaping national policies on a wide range of issues. K. Srinivas Reddy has been a journalist in Andhra Pradesh since the past two decades. Beginning his career with Newstime of the Eenadu group, he was with The Indian Express for five years after he moved on to The Hindu. Right from the initial days of his career as a journalist, Mr Srinivas Reddy took a keen interest in following the Left Wing Extremist (LWE) movement in Andhra Pradesh. He has extensively toured the areas where the Naxalites hold sway to understand the root causes of the problem and the reasons for the government’s failure to address the core issues that help spawn the revolutionary movement. Extensive field visits and a continuous study of Maoist literature, especially focussing on strategies and tactics, have helped him in gaining deep insights into the dynamics and nuances of the Naxalite movement. There have been several occasions on which the Maoists concurred with his analysis. There have also been other occasions on which they had initially differed, or found fault with his analysis but, subsequently, Mr Srinivas Reddy’s analysis was proved correct; a fact that the Maoists themselves acknowledged later, in their internal circulars. Indeed, this has been the 227

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ANATOMY OF NAXALITE VIOLENCE IN INDIA case on all the occasions that the Maoists disagreed with his analysis. Over the years, Mr Srinivas Reddy has had the occasion to hold extensive and exclusive discussions with the Maoist leadership. He had twice interviewed the general secretary of the CPI (Maoist), Ganapathy, in 1994 and 1998. He had the occasion to interact with quite a few leaders of the CPI (Maoist), including Akkiraju Haragopal alias Ramakrishna, presently the state committee secretary, Cherukuri Raj Kumar alias Prakash, presently a central committee member, Patel Sudhakar Reddy alias Sudhakar, Jinugu Narsimha Reddy alias Jampanna, presently the secretary of the North Telengana Special Zone Committee (NTSZC), Venkataswamy, former state committee member (killed in an exchange of fire in Nellore), the then members of the central committee, Nalla Adi Reddy and Seelam Naresh, who were killed in the 1999 Koyyuru encounter in Karimangar district, and many leaders at the district and squad levels. Shortly before commencing the peace talks with the Andhra Pradesh government in October 2004, the Maoist leadership explained their position to the people of the state on a number of issues at a meeting they held with journalists in the Nallamala forests. Three journalists were invited for the meeting. Mr Srinivas Reddy was among the three. M. Shashidhar Reddy is the younger son of the late Dr M. Channa Reddy—who was twice chief minister of Andhra Pradesh and governor of several states. Shashidhar Reddy is presently a member of the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), of the Government of India. Earlier, Shashidhar Reddy was appointed the convenor of the AICC Task Force on Naxalite Violence in October 2004 to make an in-depth study of the Naxalite problem, assess the impact of the programmes taken up by the government and make recommendations for policies, plans and programmes for the central government, state governments and the Congress party organisation. The report was submitted in March 2005. An ICAR (Indian Council of Agricultural Research) merit scholar during his undergraduate studies in agriculture, he holds a Master’s degree in Agronomy (1973) from Kansas State University. Considered an ideologue, an intellectual with a rare combination of political base at the grass roots level, he was one of the 250 participants at the Congress brainstorming session at Shimla, in July 2003. He is a third-time MLA from the Sanatnagar constituency in 228

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ABOUT THE EDITOR AND THE CONTRIBUTORS Hyderabad City. He was a minister for environment in the Congress government in 1993–94. Shashidhar Reddy participated in an international training seminar on ‘Political Strategies’ at Sintra, Portugal, in 1994 at the invitation of the Ferdrich Nauman Foundation of Germany, whose target group was ‘newly elected parliamentarians and future leaders.’ He was a member of the official Indian delegation to the second UN Conference on Sustainable Development (CSD) at New York, in 1994. He has distinguished himself as a politician who has always espoused issues of public importance, which have a great relevance for the future. He can singularly be credited with bringing the issue of Godavari water utilisation in Andhra Pradesh and particularly Telengana. When Dr Channa Reddy came out with a new policy to tackle Naxalism in 1989, his political adversaries were not only critical but used to complain to authorities in Delhi that Shashidhar Reddy was behind that policy. Some leaders in Delhi, probably, still remember that, while there is a general feeling that if that policy had been continued, things would have been different today. K. P. Singh taught in the Agra university for two years before joining the Indian Police Service (IPS) in July 1966. He retired as Director, Intelligence Bureau, Government of India, in August 2004; a position which he held for a period of over three years with great distinction. In that capacity, he acted as key advisor to the prime minister and home minister on policy issues of national security and governance. During his professional career spanning over 38 years, he served in the challenging theatres of dacoit-infested Chambal ravines, north-eastern region of the country and J&K, besides Delhi. His specialisation and expertise, both at the conceptual and operational levels, lie in the field of terrorism, insurgency, Maoist extremism, socio-ethnic issues and communal harmony. Highly knowledgeable in the arena of conflict resolution, he was closely associated with the peace dialogues relating to Kashmir, Nagas, Bodos and insurgent outfits of Tripura, Assam and Meghalaya.

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Index

Adivasis, 9, 28, 30, 32 exploitation of, 27, 29 inadequate constitutional provision for, 29 Advani, Lal Krishna, 33, 48–49, 51, 54–55 Aghosit karyagat yaketa, 154 AIADMK, see All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam AICC, see All India Congress Committee AIDS, 32 Akhil Bharatiya Nepali Ekta Samaj, 116 All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, 88 All India Congress Committee, 56 All Nepal Peasant Organisation (Revolutionary), 115 Andhra Pradesh, 12, 14, 16, 27, 40, 47, 49, 51, 53–55, 62–64, 66, 76, 84, 91–92, 96–97, 103, 106, 112, 115–17, 120, 126 activities of Naxalites, 48 Advocate’s Committee on Naxalite Terrorism in Andhra Pradesh, 75 anti-Naxalite operations in, 50, 54 approach of Congress Party/UPA, 55 approach of Dr Channa Reddy’s government, 43 approach of the TDP and BJP, 48 armed struggle in, 35, 41

Congress-led government in, 6 counter-offensive operations in, 92–93 Disturbed Areas Act, 42 groups of Naxalites in, 42 law and order situation in, 49 Maoists in, 91 Naxalite movement in, 5, 13, 39, 41 organisational network of the Naxalites in, 11 overview of RADP, 44–48 peace process in, 67–68 politician–Naxalite nexus in, 75 Ramnagar conspiracy case, 42 Remote and Interior Areas Development Programme, 43–44 talks with Naxalites, 42 TDP government in, 86 ‘The Huzurabad Declaration’, 97 Winning Hearts and Minds, 97 Annual International Communism Seminar, Belgium, 106 Appu, L., 84 Argentina, 120 Armed violence, 26 Arputhaswamy, L., 85 Australia, 120 Babu, K. C. Surendra, 19 Bakunin, Mikhail, 1 Banerjee, Sumanta, 70, 72

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INDEX Bangladesh, 16, 21, 105, 108, 110, 112, 119, 121–23, 128 communist revolutionary organisations in, 105 ISI operations from, 108 Maoist organisations operating in, 99 Bangladesh Sanyabadi Dal,119 Bangladesher Samyobadi Dal (Marxist–Leninist), 121 Belgium, 120 Bharadwaj, Krishna, 27 Bharatiya Janta Party, 33, 49 Bhattarai, Babu Ram, 116, 154, 156 Bhoomkal Revolt, 29 Bhutan, 107, 112–13, 118, 119, 121, 128 communist revolutionary organisations in, 105 Bhutan Citizenship Act, 1985, 107 Bihar, 5, 14, 16, 18–19, 21–22, 27, 42, 49, 51, 53, 63–64, 66–67, 69, 73–76, 103, 112, 115–17 escalation of violence in, 63 joint operations against Naxalities, 11 land struggle movement in, 5 Naxal groups in, 13 Naxalite movement in, 13, 18, 19 Naxalite-related killings in, 63 organisational network of the Naxalites in, 11 Bihar–UP–MP Simant Regional Committee, 66 Birendra, King, 151 Bista, Lokendra, 115 BJP, see Bharatiya Janta Party Brazil, 5 land movement in, 5 movement of landless labourers in, 5 BSD, see Bangladesh Sanyabadi Dal BSD(ML), see Bangladesher Samyobadi Dal (Marxist–Leninist), Callaghan, Rt. Hon. Lord, 39 CCOMPOSA, see Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organisations of South Asia

232

Central Road Fund, 57 Challenge Continues, 120 Chatri, Bamdev, 116 Chatterjee, Kanai, 65 Chhattisgarh, 5, 14, 16, 31–32, 34, 53, 67, 76, 114, 117 child mortality in, 31 Chile, 120 China, 12, 63, 70, 83, 102–03, 141 Christianity, 36 Colombia, 16, 120 Communist Centre of India (Marxist–Leninist–Maoist), 121 Communist International, 101 Communist movement, 5 split in, 2 Communist Party of Bhutan (Marxist–Leninist), 112 Communist Party of Bhutan (Marxist–Leninist–Maoist), 105, 107, 109, 118–19, 121 Communist Party of Ceylon, 16, 105, 119 Communist Party of China, 12 Communist Party of East Bengal (Marxist–Leninist), 119 Communist Party of India, 3, 6, 8, 40–42, 69, 83, 85, 101, 102 in parliamentary democracy, 6 Communist Party of India (Maoist), 1, 6, 7, 16, 105 Communist Party of India (Marxist–Leninist), 6, 10, 12, 16, 19, 41, 42, 47, 48, 51, 52, 62, 65, 67, 69, 84–85, 103, 111–12, 119 Chinese support to, 86 formation of, 11 Communist Party of Nepal, 117, 120, 122, 141 Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), 16, 25, 66, 104, 107, 109, 112, 114, 115, 116, 119, 121–22, 137, 141–46, 149–51, 154–57. Communist Party of Peru,121 Compact Revolutionary Zone, 16, 25, 40, 66, 76, 106, 108–10, 115, 117

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INDEX Contemporary Naxalism, 8 Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organisations of South Asia, 16, 25–26, 66, 76, 105–07, 118–19, 121 aim of, 26 formation of, 99 role of, 105 CPB(ML), see Communist Party of Bhutan(Marxist–Leninist) CPB(MLM) see Communist Party of Bhutan (Marxist–Leninist–Maoist) CPC(Maoist), see Communist Party of Ceylon CPEB(ML), see Communist Party of East Bengal (Marxist–Leninist) CPI, see Communist Party of India CPI(M), 8, 10, 13, 26, 38, 62, 64–65, 67–68, 69, 74, 76, 84–85, 102–03 largest Maoist organisation in India, 31 Naxalites of, 25 CPI (Maoist), see Communist Party of India (Maoist) CPI(ML), see Communist Party of India (Marxist–Leninist), CPI(ML) (Janasakthi), 113, 116 CPI(ML)(Naxalbari), 113, 119 CPI-M, 99, 109, 111, 113, 117, 121 CPI-M–CPN-M nexus, 113 CPN, see Communist Party of Nepal CPN-M, see Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) CPN (UML), 144 CPN (Unity Centre), 142–43 Criminalisation, 72–74 CRZ, see Compact Revolutionary Zone

exploitation in, 37 Naxalite movement in, 13, 31 ideal situation for, 34 problem of cultural identity in, 36 Tendu collectors’ agitation in, 37 Dasgupta, Biplab, 70–71 Dattatreya, Bandaru, 126 Defence of India Act, 1939, 87 Democratic revolution, 103 Desha bhaktulu, 42 DMK, see Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, 85

Daakshin Desh, 65 Dahal, Kumar, 115 Dahal, Pushpa Kamal, 142 Dalam, 13, 37 Dalit, 5, 9, 146 Dandakaranya, 25, 31, 34–36, 38, 64, 66, 117 development projects in, 34

ICG, see International Crisis Group Ideological–political confusion, 8 ILPS, see International League of People’s Solidarities Imperialism, 101 India, 18–19, 25–27, 29, 31, 39–40, 52, 56, 62–64, 70, 72, 76–77, 83–84, 86–88, 101–12, 114–28, 138, 141

Eenadu, 125 Engels, Friedrich, 1 crude realities create crude theories, 4 Europe, 120 Feudalism, 9 Gajurel, Chandra Prakash Gaurav, 114 Ganapathy, 42, 108, 126–27 Gandhi, Rajiv, 48 Gandhi, Sonia, 41, 56 Geetha, I. G., 85 Germany, 101, 120 Ghosh, Jayati, 27 Globalisation, 4–5 Gram rajya, 35 Great Proletarian Revolution, 103 Greece, 124 Gupta, Ranjit Kumar, 114 Guruswamy, A., 85 Gyanendra, King, 114, 151, 153, 155 Hinduism, 36

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INDEX India (continued) class struggle in, 2 communist movement in, 2 communist movements in, 101 communist party in the government, 3 conservative Right-wing forces in, 1 constitution, Clause 3 of Fifth Schedule and Article 244, 29 corruption in, 39 failure of the governmental groundlevel mechanism, 15 faulty planning in, 39 guerrilla zones in, 64, 65 Gurkha Regiment, 105 Indian Army, 102 Indian Maoists, 114, 115, 117, 120, 125 Indian parliament, 4 land struggle movement in, 5 Maoist insurgent groups operating in, 112 Maoist movement in, 62 Maoist organisations operating in, 99 mishandling of ecological and socioeconomic issue, 33 national bourgeoisie in, 83 Naxalite groups, 112 Naxalite movement in, 62 Naxalite organisations of, 25 Naxalites in, 2 neo-conservative Right-wing forces in, 1 neo-Left or extreme Left forces in, 1 NSSO survey (1987–88), 27 origin and growth of Naxalism in, 72 parliamentary democracy in, 2–4, 26–27 Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs, 26 Planning Commission, 43, 45, 50–51, 53–54 poverty, hunger, homelessness, illiteracy in, 3 revolutionary movement in, 108 set up of Coordination Centre, 17 Sino–Indian border clashes, 102

234

social discrimination in, 3, 6 strategy and tactics of revolution in, 83 Supreme Court, 21, 30, 124 Task Force on Naxalite, 41 INBRC, see Indo–Nepal Border Regional Committee Indian capitalism, 9 Indian expansionism, 118 Indian Penal Code, 1860, 87 Indo–Nepal Border Regional Committee, 115 Inter Services Intelligence, 108, 110, 125–26 International communism, 101 movement, 101, 102 International Crisis Group, 146 International League of People’s Solidarities, 124 Iran, 121 Iraq, US war on, 123 ISI, see Inter Services Intelligence Israel, 51 Italy, 16 counter-terrorism laws mooted by, 51 Jammu & Kashmir, 11, 14, 108, 125 militancy in, 41 secessionist–terrorist campaign in, 112 Jan adalat, 15, 23, 64 Jan andolan, 144 Janasakthi, 62, 106 Janata Vimukti Peramuna, 106–107 Japan, 120 Jawahar Rozgar Yojana, 27 Jharkhand, 5, 16, 18, 42, 63, 64, 66–67, 73, 75–76, 117 Adivasi land, 23 animal husbandry scam in, 22 escalation of violence in, 63 exploitative socio-economic system in, 19 future of Naxalite movement in, 20 jal, jungle and jameen problems in, 23 Jhumra Pahar, a Naxal basin, 21

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INDEX judicial system in, 23 Naxal groups in, 20 Naxal incidents in, 20 police operations in, 66 Public Distribution System (PDS) in, 21 resources in, 76 Jogi, Ajit, 33, 56 JP, see Narayan, Jayaprakash JVP, see Janata Vimukti Peramuna Kalashnikov, 91 Kaliaperumal, 85 Kamtapur Liberation Organisation, 109 Kannamani, 85 Karnataka, 27, 76 Karunanidhi, M., 85 Kerala, 5, 11, 25, 67, 83–84 Commu elections in, 3 Kishan, 111, 121 KLO, see Kamtapur Liberation Organisation Kothandaraman, A. M., 85 Koya Revolt, 29 Krishna Iyer, V. R., 124 Krishnan, M., 85 Kulaprasad, K.C., 115 Kumar, Nikhil, 56 Kumar, Rajesh, 19 Laal Salaam, 42 Lakhma, Kawasi, 32 Lashkar-e-Taiba, 109 Left-wing communism, 2 Left-Wing Extremism, 20, 26, 40–41, 49–51, 53–54, 57, 62–63, 110 Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich, 1–2, 4, 6–7, 83 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, 40, 106, 108, 126–28 Lingasamy, 85 Lok Janshakti Party, 19 Louis, Prakash, 72 LTTE, see Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam LWE, see Left-Wing Extremism

Madhya Pradesh, 27, 49–51, 53, 64, 67, 76, 117 influence of Naxalites in, 29 Magar, Suresh Ale, 115 Maharashtra, 31, 34, 49, 51, 53, 67 Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971, 87 Majumdar, Charu, 12, 13 Malinowski, Michael, 153 Maoism, 65 expansion of, 66 mantle of, 103 Maoist Communist Centre, 13, 16, 62–67, 73–75, 112, 115, 119 Maoist Communist Centre of India, 6, 16, 25–26, 28, 42, 62–67, 73, 74, 75, 105–07, 109, 111–12, 114–16, 121 Maoist groups, 105, 107, 109–10 Maoist ideology, 110 Maoist insurgency, 138–40, 144, 152–53, 155 escalation of, 155 Maoist movement fraternal links, 125 regional links, 119 Maoist people’s movement, 28 Maoist revolution, 83 Maoist violence, expansion and intensification of, 63 Mappilaiswamy, 85 Marx, Karl, 1, 7, 83 Marxism, 83, 102 Marxian internationalism, 83 Marxism–Leninism–Maoism, 68 Marxist philosophy, 101 Marxist–Leninist–Maoist thought ideologues of, 90 Mazumdar, Charu, 2, 40, 65, 86, 103 MCC, see Maoist Communist Centre MCCI, see Maoist Communist Centre of India Mechanisation, 34 Mexico, 120 Mishra, Pramod, 66 Mishra, Vinod, 13 Flames from Fields, 19

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INDEX Misra, Pratap, 85 Mistry, Nathuni, 73 Mumbai Resistance 2004 (MR 2004), 124 Munda, Birsa, 18 Naidu, N. Chandrababu, 48, 51–52, 54–55, 91, 112 Maoist attempt on life of, 92, 98 Naidu, Narayana Samy, 87 Naqvi, Mukhtar Abbas, 54 Narayan, Jayaprakash, 21 Face to Face, 18 Narayanan, M. K., 56 National Common Minimum Programme, 55 National Democratic Alliance, 48 National Mineral Development Corporation, 33 National Security Act, 1980, 87 Nationalism, 141 Naxalbari, 18, 25, 40, 41, 62, 84, 111, 113, 119 movement, 2 Naxalism, 5, 26–27, 40–41, 49, 51, 53, 58, 71–73, 96 birth of, 71 economy generated by, 73 expansion of, 41 extortion, 73 financial incentives offered by, 73 political space for, 69 revival of, 103 Naxalite groups, 62, 66, 69–71, 73–76, 86, 109, 112, 142 activities of, 74 belief in violent revolution, 70 merger of, 76 mobilisation strategy of, 74 organisational structure, 74 unification of, 62 Naxalite ideology, 73 Naxalite movement, 1–3, 5–6, 9–11, 13, 25, 27, 31, 33–34, 40, 47, 55–56, 58, 62, 69–70, 73, 76, 83–88, 101, 103, 111, 114

236

a parallel system of administration, 18–19 a popular movement, 8 an expression of anger of the exploited people, 8 arms manufacturing and repairing facilities, 15 attacks on the police, 15 causes of, 9 challenge to, 18 challenge to the internal security, 41 character of, 11 current status of, 10 definition of, 10 during Emergency (1975–1977) in India, 13 dynamics of violence, 72 fake and fatal ‘encounters’, 87 guerrilla zone, 124 ideological deterioration in, 24 instant justice, 23 linkages with political parties, 74 objective assessment of, 2 organised movement, 8 origin of, 2 police–army operations against, 12 political objective of, 63 process of consolidation and reunification of, 16 reasons for the rise and growth of, 6 result of the oppressive, exploitative system, 20 roots of, 35 seeds for, 40 social and economic causes of, 34 speciality of, 37 target-kill, 14 trajectory in India, 76 yearly budget of, 15 Naxalite philosophy, 85 Naxalite problem, 49, 51–55 consensus on the approach to, 56 solution to, 9 Naxalite strategy, 92 Naxalite threat, 50

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INDEX Naxalite violence, 14, 54–55, 62, 74 consensus against, 7 critique of, 5 Naxalites, 1–2, 4–13, 15, 17–19, 22–38, 41–43, 47–48, 52, 55, 58, 62–63, 67, 69–71, 73–75, 84–88, 103, 107, 111–12, 117, 119 activities of, 85 advocates of violence, 3 arms smuggling, 107 characteristics of, 10 counter-revolutionary operations, 98 counter-revolutionary strategies of, 90–91, 96 demands of, 7 face of, 26 ‘famine raids’, 37 growth of, 84 Indian groups, 7 killings in police encounters, 67 militarisation of, 53 organisational network of, 11 political posturing of, 70 revolutionary strategies of, 90 guerrilla phase, 94 mobile warfare phase, 99 organisation phase, 93 social base of, 5 survival of, 70 violence perpetrated by, 11 Nayar, Kuldip, 28 NC, see Nepali Congress NCMP, see National Common Minimum Programme NDA, see National Democratic Alliance NDR, see New Democratic Revolution Nehru, Jawaharlal, 102 Nepal, 16, 21, 25, 62, 66, 77, 103–25, 128, 136–41, 143–50, 153, 155–56 communist movement in, 141 democratic revolution in, 122 existing structures of, 149 India–Nepal Joint Regional Committee, 109 insurgent movement in, 114

internal contradictions, 151 Maoist guerrillas in, 137 Maoist insurgency in, 122, 136, 138–39 primacy of ideology, 141 Maoist insurgents in, 107 Maoist movement in, 115 Maoist organisations operating in, 99 Maoists of, 112, 114–18, 120–22 scheme of state, 149 Naxalites of, 25 nayee satta, 104 post-1990 politics of, 140 purani satta, 104 revolutionary movement in, 99 success of Maoism in, 62 Nepali Congress, 142, 145, 151–54 New Democratic Revolution, 113 NGOs, see Non-governmental organisations Nizam of Hyderabad, 41 NMDC, see National Mineral Development Corporation Non-governmental organisations, 36, 104 North Bihar Zonal Committee, 66 North Telengana Special Zone, 68 Norway, 120 NTSZ, see North Telengana Special Zone Operation Romio, 152 Oraon, Ramlal, 75 Orissa, 5, 15–16, 27–29, 41, 49, 51, 53, 64, 67, 76, 116 joint operations against Naxalities, 11 poverty, bondage and starvation in, 27 Pakistan, 102, 104, 108, 110 Chinese support to, 102 Panchayati Raj Institutions, 57 Paralkot Revolt, 29 Parliamentary democracy, 2–4 Parliamentary opportunism, 4 Party Unity, 13, 16, 112 PAT, see Permanent Action Teams Patil, Shivraj, 55 Patnaik, Naveen, 28

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INDEX PBCP, see Purba Bangla Communist Party PBSP, see Purba Bangala Sarbahara Party PBSP(MBRM), 119 PCP, see Communist Party of Peru Peasant’s Party, 87 People’s Guerrilla Army, 65 People’s Liberation Army, 65, 137 People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army, 65, 109 People’s March, 116 People’s War Group, 1, 6, 13, 16, 25–26, 28, 37, 42, 47–48, 52, 54, 106–09 guerrillas, 52 People’s War, 62–69, 74–75, 111–17, 119, 121–22, 124–27, 137 Permanent Action Teams, 65 Peru, 109, 111, 120–21 PGA, see People’s Guerrilla Army Philippines, the, 109, 111, 120–21 PLA, see People’s Liberation Army PLGA, see People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army PMGSY, see Prime Minister Gram Sadak Yojana Political liberty, 141 Pollution, 32 POTA, see Prevention of Terrorism Act Prachanda, 154 Prevention of Terrorism Act, 66, 87, 114 Preventive Detention Act, 1950, 87 Prime Minister Gram Sadak Yojana, 54, 57 Prince, Dipendra, 151 Proletarian Party of Purbo Bangla (Central Committee), 121 Proletarian Party of Purbo Bangla (Maobadi Punargathan Kendra), 121 PU, see Party Unity Punjab, 11 Purba Bangala Sarbahara Party (Maobadi Punorgothan), 119 Purba Bangala Sarbahara Party, 119 Purba Bangla Communist Party, 105

238

PW, see People’s War PWG, see People’s War Group Rajaji International Institute of Public Affairs ‘Naxalism–A Distortion of Democratic Development’, 57 Rajan, 85 Rajasthan, 27 Ramachandran, M. G., 86 Ramakrishna, 67 Ramji, 26 Ranadive, 102 Rao, Chandra Rajeswara, 102 Rao, J. Vengal, 91 Rao, late P.V. Narasimha, 28 Rao, Muppala Lakshmana, 108 Rao, N.T. Rama, 42, 47–48, 69 Rao, Varavara, 52 Rapid Protection Force, 20 Rashtriya Janata Dal, 74 Rashtriya Sam Vikas Yojana, 53 RCCI (MLM), 119 RCCI-Maoist, 16 RCP, see Revolutionary Communist Party Red Flag, 62 Red Rebels, 91 Red Struggle Zone see Compact Revolutionary Zone Reddy, Dr M. Channa, 42–44, 47–48, 69 Reddy, Madhav, 52 Reddy, Tarimella Nagi, 12 Republicanism, 141 Revolutionary Communist Party, 121 Revolutionary Internationalist Movement, 66, 76, 105–06, 111, 120–23 Revolutionary movement, 7, 91, 92 experience of, 4 Revolutionary People’s Committees, 35 Revolutionary strategy, 93 Revolutionary Worker Online, 120 RIM, see Revolutionary Internationalist Movement

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INDEX RIM SA: CPI(ML)(NB), 121 RIM South Asia (RIM SA), 121 RJD, see Rashtriya Janata Dal RNA, see Royal Nepal Army Roy, M.N., 101 Royal Nepal Army, 116, 151 RPCs, see Revolutionary People’s Committees RPF, see Rapid Protection Force RPG, 116 Russia, Narodniks and Left social revolutionaries (SRs) in, 1 Russian Bolshevik Revolution, 83 Rytu Coolie Sanghaam, 65 Sainath, P., 27 SAT, see Special Action Teams Saxena, N.C., 21 Jharkhand mein satta chor ho gayee hai, 21 Seetharamaiah, Kondapalli, 13, 47 Sen, Mohit, 85 Senegal, 120 SFPR, see Struggle Forum for People’s Resistance Shanmugadasan, Nagalingam, 105 Sharma, Anil, 115 Sharma, Dr Brahmadev, 33 Sheriff, I.M., 85 Shiva, Vandana, 33 Shrestha, Chitra Bahadur, 115 Singh, Dr Manmohan, 40 Singh, Gaend, 29 Singh, Kumar Suresh, 21 Singh, Mahendra, 19 Singh, Prakash, 68 The Naxalite Movement in India, 27 Singh, Raman, 32 Singh, S.N., 12, 13 Singh, Sanjay, 73 Singh, Zail, 86 Sino–Indian war, 1962, 102 Sino–Soviet ideological rift, 83, 102 Socialism, 83, 102 Socialist revolution, 83

Somanathan, 85 South Asia, Maoist groups of, 127 Soviet Union, 101–103 Spain, 120 Special Action Teams, 65 Sri Lanka, 40, 106, 108, 112, 119, 123, 126, 128 communist revolutionary organisations in, 105 Maoist organisations operating in, 99 Struggle Forum for People’s Resistance, 124 Subramaniam, C., 57 Swami, I. D., 53 Tamang, Hitbahadur, 115 Tamil Nadu, 11, 27, 67, 76, 84–86, 88, 114 birth of Naxalites, 84 Operation Ajanta, 86 organisation of Naxalites in, 85 Task Force on Naxalite Violence, 56 Taylor, Mary My Years in Indian Prisons, 19 TDP, see Telugu Desam Party Telengana, 34–35, 42, 64, 102 ‘armed struggle’ in, 41 Naxalite movement in, 13 Telugu Desam Party, 42, 48–49, 52, 92 Terrorism, definition of, 10 Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention)Act, 43, 87 Terrorist movement, 10 Thakur, Ravindra, 66 Tunisia, 16 Turkey, 16, 109, 111, 120–21 Tzu, Sun, 90, 100 UF, see United Front ULF, see United Left Front ULFA, see United Liberation Front of Asom UML, see Unified Marxist–Leninist Unified Marxist–Leninist, 142, 151–54 United Communist Party, 2

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INDEX United Front, 48 United Kingdom, counter-terrorism laws mooted by, 51 United Left Front, 142, 143 United Liberation Front of Asom, 15, 108, 125 United National People’s Movement, 142, 143 United People’s Front, 142, 152 United Progressive Alliance, 55 United Revolutionary People’s Council, 137 UNPM, see United National People’s Movement UP, see Uttar Pradesh UPA, see United Progressive Alliance UPF, see United People’s Front USA, 16, 120–21 imperialism, 103, 118, 122 Patterns of Global Terrorism Report, 2004, 112 Utpirit Mukti Vahini, 66 Uttar Pradesh, 11, 16, 27, 40, 66–67, 76, 107, 116 Uttaranchal, 16, 67

joint operations against Naxalities, 11 Naxalite violence in, 14 organisational network of the Naxalites, 11 WHAM see Winning Hearts and Minds Wilkinson, Paul, 72 Women, empowerment of, 9 Workers Party of Belgium, 106, 120 Working class movement, 5 World imperialism, 118 World People’s Resistance Movement, 123 World Proletarian Socialist Revolution, 118, 124 World War II, 101, 102 WPB, see Workers Party of Belgium WPRM, see World People’s Resistance Movement Www.cpnm.org, 116 Www.rediff.com, 126

Vaidya, Mohan ‘Kiran’, 115 Vajpayee, Atal Bihari, 48

Zedong, Mao, 63, 70, 85–86, 98, 103, 113, 122 democracy theory of agrarian revolution, 102 dictum, 24

West Bengal, 5, 13–14, 16, 27, 40, 62, 67, 76, 84–85, 115

240

Yadav, Jainandan, 74 Yadav, Laloo Prasad, 75 Yadav, Matrika Prasad, 115 Yami, Hisila ‘Parvati’, 116