The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics 9781501701948

Citation preview

The National Question in Yugoslavia ORIGINS, HISTORY, POLITICS

IVO BANAC

Cornell University Press ITHACA AND LONDON

PUBLICATION OF THIS BOOK WAS ASSISTED BY A GRANT FROM THE PUBLICATIONS PROGRAM OF THE NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE HUMANITIES, AN INDEPENDENT FEDERAL AGENCY.

Copyright © I 984 by Cornell University Press All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher. For information, address Cornell University Press, Sage House, 512 East State Street, Ithaca, New York 14850. First published I984 by Cornell University Press. First printing, Cornell Paperbacks, 1988.

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING IN PUBLICATION DATA

Banac, lvo. The national question in Yugoslavia. Bibliography: p. Includes index. ISBN-13: 978-o-8oi4-9493-2 (pbk. : alk. paper) ISBN-10: o-80I4-9493-I (pbk. : alk. paper) I. Nationalism-Yugoslavia. 2. Yugoslavia-Politics and government1918-I945· I. Title. DR1295.B36 1984 949.7'02 83-45931 Cornell University Press strives to use environmentally responsible suppliers and materials to the fullest extent possible in the publishing of its books. Such materials include vegetable-based, low-VOC inks and acid-free papers that are recycled, totally chlorine-free, or partly composed of nonwood fibers. For further information, visit our website at www.cornellpress.cornell.edu. Paperback printing

IO

9 8

The National Question in Yugoslavia

To my mother Annte autem dedit partem unam tristis, quia Annam diligebat.

Contents

Preface Preface to the Second Paperback Printing A Note on Transliteration, Terminology, and References Abbreviations

II 15 I7 19

I: ANTECEDENTS AND ANTIPODES To Be Reckoned among Nations Lands and Identities Fates, Mentalities, Invisible Frontiers National Ideologies The Unification

21

PART

PART

II:

21 31 59 70 115

GREAT SERBIA AND GREAT YUGOSLAVIA

141

Institutions The Radicals The Democrats The Democratic Centralists Racial Messianism in Culture Centralization PART

III:

141 153 169 189 202 214

226 226 231 237 248 26o 270 291 307 328

THE HARD OPPOSITION

The Party of Radic Problems of (Con)Federalist Politics For a Croat Peasant Republic The 1920 Croat Peasant Revolt against Draft-Animal Registration Croat Mnemonists Montenegrin Greens The Ka~aks The Macedoine The Communists PART

IV:

340 340 351

THE AUTONOMIST OPPOSITION

The Slovene Catholic Populists The Croat Liberal Bourgeoisie

7

Contents The Muslims of Bosnia-Hercegovina The Cemiyet

359 377

V: The The The The

379

PART

PART

DISENCHANTMENT

Twenty-one Months of the Interim Parliament 1920 Elections Centralist Bloc Masters the Constituent Assembly Tragedy of the Vidovdan Constitution

VI: THE BUILDING OF SKADAR

Selected Bibliography Index

8

379 387 393 403

406

417 437

Maps and Tables MAPS

I- I. I-2. 1-3. 1-4. 1-5. I-6. I-7. 2- I. 2-2. 2-3· 3- I. 3-2. 3-3· 3-4· 4-I. 4-2. 4-3·

Constituent areas of Yugoslavia Serbian and Croatian dialects Orthodox population Muslim population Catholic population German and Albanian population Hungarian and Turkish population The strength of the NRS in the elections of November 28, 1920 The strength of the Democratic party in the elections of November 28, 1920 The strength of the Agrarian party in the elections of November 28, 1920 The strength of the HPSS in the elections of November 28, 1920 The 1920 Croat peasant revolt against draft-animal registration The tribes of Old Mont~negro, eastern Hercegovina, the Brda, the Bay of Kotor, and northern Albania The strength of the Communist party in the elections of November 28, 1920 The strength of the Slovene and Croat Catholic parties in the elections of November 28, 1920 The strength of the National Club in the elections of November 28, 1920 The strength of the JMO and the Cemiyet in the elections of November 28, 1920

32 48 51 52 54 56 57 I 57 q6 190 228 250 273 331 350 355 369

TABLES

I- I . Yugoslavia's national structure, I 9 I 8 2-1. Yugoslavia's land taxation, 1919-1928

58 225 9

Maps and Tables

5-1. Regional contributions by political party, November 28, 1920, elections for Yugoslavia's Constituent Assembly 5-2. Regional votes and percentage cast for each political party, November 28, 1920, elections for Yugoslavia's Constituent Assembly

10

388 389

Preface Before charter flights and motels it was the legend of romantic barbarianism and heroic chivalry that shaped the European image of the South Slavsan image that markedly resembles the tales of the Wild West. Alberto Fortis's dramatic description of the hajduks, or brigands, of Dalmatia includes this tidbit: "The objects of their rapine are bovine animals and sheep, which they transport to their lairs to feed themselves and to supply them with hide for shoes." In 1914, John Reed saw the war-ravaged Serbs as the "strong virile stock of a young race not far removed from the half-savagery of a mountain peasantry." A considerably less perceptive young Irishman, Patrick the O'Doneven, viewed these lands and societies as a version of Ireland's West Country skillet, "filled with simmering 'stirabout' that crackles to explosion in places where it boils ... forced to keep on spluttering by the fire beneath, which is never allowed to go out." Outlaws, rustlers, mountain men, mules, hostile clansAnd then, there was the notorious national question, a term that, from the Western point of view, conveyed the very essence of Eastern Europe. The Russian domains commanded prior attention, but after them it was surely the complicated nationality problems of the South Slavic regions that, to Westerners, best exemplified the East European national question. The fact of recognition, however, did not necessarily imply understanding; indeed, profound misunderstanding was more often the result. The South Slavs themselves were aware that their perennial struggles for national equality-struggles fought both internally and externally-had only reinforced the Western inclination to treat them with condescension or, indeed, scorn. The "petty local feuds" among these "bits and refuse of peoples" (Volkerabfiille-the phrases only by chance belong to Friedrich Engels) interfered with the grand moves of European cabinets and, as Bismarck scornfully put it, were "not worth the healthy bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier.'' Faced with such sentiments, South Slavic intellectuals came to believe that one had to have an equivalent history to understand. If the very idea of a national question seemed baffling, particularly to the English-speaking II

Preface

world, surely this was because the terminology that detailed the (unpleasant) matters between two or among several nationalities bore no relation to the situation in countries where the dominant consciousness of nationhood was not the product of a shared history of subjugation to alien rulers. The nationempires of the West, which themselves often dominated others, did not really comprehend what it meant to live in a ''house of bondage.'' The decision to study the question of South Slavic national aspirations from the inside, and not as a perplexing phenomenon that repeatedly set Europe aflame, was taken by these intellectuals as the mark of a kindred spirit. R. W. SetonWatson therefore "understood" the South Slavs because he was a Scotsman. Frano Supilo, visiting Edinburgh in January 1917, viewed the Scottish capital as another Zagreb. Supilo clearly saw at least two national societies in Britain. He had on his own (South Slavic) spectacles. In this book I have tried to look at the national question of Yugoslavia with a clearer eye, focusing on the first two and a half years (1918-1921) of the history of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. (Since this first common South Slavic state was even then unofficially referred to as Yugoslavia, I shall follow this practice throughout for the sake of simplicity.) Much effort has gone into this study, but, even if I am said to have failed in all other respects, I hope that my readers will gladly recognize that they were not glancing through the wrong end of perspective glass, by which the views and concerns of the protagonists were in any sense minimized. The national question has to do with the conditions (by definition inadequate) for the free and independent development of nations and national communities-inadequate, because were it otherwise the question would not exist. Though even Switzerland has its Jura problem, the national question is presumed missing in those happy lands that either are uninational or at least are spared dissension between different groups. Neither can be said of Yugoslavia. To this day, its political and social life is dominated by a particularly complex, long-standing, and troublesome nationality problem. The concept is therefore essentially negative. It describes inharmonious relations among various nationalities, characterized by the supremacy of one group (or a coalition of groups) and the resistance (violent or passive) of the others. And since tolerance for one's neighbor is regarded as a virtue even when it is not practiced (and perhaps especially then), the standing East European euphemism for the national question is the cumbersome phrase "problems (or aberrations) in internationality relations," or sometimes simply the last two words. The purpose of this book is to provide the first complete study of the origins of the tragic sequence in Yugoslavia that precipitated a long period of interwar instability, brought untold suffering to her peoples during the course of the Second World War, and continues to test the wisdom of her leaders. 12

Preface

No single book could possibly provide a worthy appraisal of the whole history of Yugoslavia's national question, and I therefore chose to concentrate on the period that set the pattern for the subsequent development of the problem. This is, in short, a genetic study, which traces and analyzes the history and characteristics of the South Slavic national ideologies, connects these trends with Yugoslavia's flawed unification in I9I8, and ends with the adoption of the centralist constitution of I 92 I . It will not take readers through the labyrinthine byways of the two interwar decades, nor will it guide them through the dramatic wartime struggles and the postwar socialist experiment. But none of these developments, each in its own way connected with the new twists in the national question, can be understood without the prelude that contained all the seeds of future disorders. The aim is therefore to provide the single book that will serve as a learned introduction to the national problems of interwar, wartime, and present Yugoslavia. Although the contrasts in the material culture of Yugoslavia's various peoples represented a serious obstacle to harmonious unity, the national question cannot be attributed to rivalries over distribution of wealth or to the choleric temperament of entire nations. On the contrary, mutually exclusive national ideologies have been most responsible for the tensions between particular nationalities, contributing more to these tensions than the attempts by various of Yugoslavia's political groups to encourage and perpetuate particular forms of national inequality. This book therefore focuses on these ideational questions, illustrating how the delusive aspects of national ideologies have influenced both personal and group consciousness and in that way helped to shape events. Since it is my considered judgment that relations between the Serbs and the Croats are central to any discussion of Yugoslavia's national question, I have examined certain topics at greater length than others, among them the characteristics of Serb and Croat national ideologies, the meaning attached to Yugoslavist unitarism among the Croats and the Serbs, and the role of the Radic phenomenon in the movement for Croat sovereignty. Throughout, though many of the matters I discuss are still subject to widely varying interpretations, I have made every effort to present a truthful-if not necessarily detached-picture of events. Evidence itself exerts its power over historians and pushes them to assume stands according to the values that they profess. The contents of the book reflect the present stage of scholarship and should be viewed in part as an attempt to combine the findings of several generations of historians, mainly from Yugoslavia, into a newly interpreted whole. Surprisingly, although most studies on various aspects of Yugoslavia's history must deal in one way or another with the national question, this is the first general study of the subject. Therefore, in addition to voluminous amounts of published sources and documents of the period, I have made careful use of

IJ

Preface

the inquiries of those colleagues who best advanced the knowledge of interwar Yugoslavia's political, diplomatic, and economic history, even though their purpose may not always have been to comment on the various aspects of the national problem. Many of the themes I introduce, those of a social and, especially, intellectual and cultural nature, have never been studied before, and they necessitated primary research carried out in various depositories and research institutions of Yugoslavia. I should point out that few investigators have had the occasion to examine so broad a range of periodical literature for inquiry into the period under consideration. This rich source mitigated the loss or inaccessibility of documentary collections relating to the activities of certain prominent individuals and political groups. This work has gone through several major revisions and now bears little resemblance to its early versions. When I started work on my dissertation at Stanford some years ago I had an entirely different subject in mind, but gradually I realized that my original topic was only a small part of the huge and complex national problem in Yugoslavia, and in due course it was the national problem that consumed all my attention and became my main subject. Though I do not recommend this style of work, I am infinitely indebted to those institutions and individuals who made the long quest possible. I am especially grateful for the grants from the International Research and Exchanges Board and the Fulbright-Hays Commission, Stanford University, and the A. Whitney Griswold Faculty Research Fund at Yale. I am glad to acknowledge the generous assistance of the staffs of the University and National Library (Sveucilisna i nacionalna knjiznica), the Archives of Croatia (Arhiv Hrvatske), the Institute for the History of the Workers' Movement of Croatia (lnstitut za historiju radnickog pokreta Hrvatske), and the Lexicographical Institution (Leksikografski zavod), all of Zagreb, and of the Hoover Institution and the Stanford University Libraries at Stanford University and the Sterling Memorial Library at Yale. The Frederick W. Rilles Publication Fund of Yale University provided a grant that met the expenses of the maps included in this book; I thank the Rilles Publication Fund Committee for its generous support. The assistance of a good many other persons, too numerous to be mentioned individually, including dear friends and members of my immediate family, is also sincerely appreciated. I should, however, like to single out several persons to whom I am under a special obligation. Walter and Hildegard Oerter probably have no idea what their help and friendship meant to me in a particular moment of distress connected with this project. I do-and thank them again in this fashion. I am extremely grateful for the valuable suggestions of several colleagues, especially John Ackerman of Cornell University Press, Jeffrey Brooks of the Department of History at the University of Chicago, and Norman Naimark of the Department of History at Boston University, who read all or parts of the 14

Preface several versions of my manuscript. I warmly appreciate the patience and consummate artistry of Shirley Taylor, who edited the manuscript for publication with fearful intelligence. I also owe much to Branimir Babic, my master mapmaker, Mary Whitney and Florence Thomas, who took the burden of typing the final draft, Jose Roberto Martinez, the postman of Dark Hollow Road, and Nikola Svilokos, the master of Tinicum scriptorium. Over the years I have benefited from the totally selfless support of three persons, whose roles in the shaping of this manuscript are complementary. There is a point in the research of every topic when an author's interest, with all the elements of the story resolved, begins to sag. Ivo J. Lederer, whose style always carved out my way, seized me by the scruff of the neck at that point and has held me to my task ever since. Few scholars can match Jozo Tomasevich's determination in following up the very faintest historical tracks. I have profited enormously from the vast learning that he acquired in decades of most disciplined studijanje i ricerkavanje, as he will best note after reading this book. The entire volume would have been impossible without the invaluable aid, inspiration, and encouragement of Wayne S. Vucinich of the Department of History at Stanford, my mentor and veritable uncle, who taught me all the intricacies of muderisluk. Finally, a special recognition to my wife, Manana, who has long been oppressed by historical sciences. faC oVo Dan lnoCh nepr/stah trudeCi: prlafnu tVoiu MoCh druXbu XeLeci. Ivo BANAC New Haven, Connecticut

Preface to the Second Paperback Printing The new printing of this book is being scheduled at the time when Yugoslavia is disappearing as a state. There is an evident connection between the failure of Tito's Yugoslavia and the failure of early royalist Yugoslavia, the subject of this book. The connection is precisely the inability in both cases to establish a sincere and equal collaboration between the South Slavic and other Balkan nationalities which inhabit the cultural and historical space that was enclosed within the borders of Yugoslavia. This book offers an explanation of why failure was structurally unavoidable, and shows how the governance of Yugoslavia always depended on coercion. That is why the ghosts of the past keep watch over Yugoslavia's bloodied deathbed. The

15

Preface

irony is that the farcical aspects of I 9 I 8- I 92 I are being repeated as tragedy. In November I99I, Milos Vasic, a star reporter for the Belgrade oppositional weekly Vreme (Time), gave a synthetic description of the fall of Vukovar, the Croatian town on the Danube that withstood three months of bombardment and siege by the predominantly Serbian Yugoslav People's Army before its defenders were overcome: Two men are dragging a short, funny man with a wool cap. He IS beaten and bloodied. As they strike him, all the while shouting "Ustasa," he says that he had come to visit his old mother and children, and then became trapped in Vukovar. When they see the newsmen, the two men lift him up between them like a trophy, saying "Photograph this Ustasa. They're all playing us for fools." A huge bearded man with a fur hat and a [Chetnikl cockade comes upon the scene and says sternly, "Take him to headquarters so that his identity can be established, and don't any of you touch him." This bearded fellow is always close by. Everybody listens to him. He is measured and correct. A bit later there arrives a group whose helmets bear the inscription "Section for silent liquidation" (Odeljenje za tihu likvidaciju). They ask, "Did you see that little Ustasa? Those two guys just beat him to death." People are now coming out of basements-dumbfounded, scared, and heartbroken. Though we inquired of them all, not a single Serb civilian among them claimed that he'd been held hostage. All of them had stayed on, hoping that it wouldn't come to this but nobody, they say, had held them against their will. On Monday 18 November, we see a column of 2,ooo men as they are being loaded into trucks. All are Croats; it is not clear where they are being taken.

In 1917, before there was a Yugoslavia, Miroslav Krleza wrote: "Everything is unsolved in our country. Everything is being entangled in our own lies, and what is needed is Light and generally and above all-Fire. Our whole life is now a vast dying, whereas the purpose of life is not that it rot, but that it burn." Ignis sanat. I. B. New Haven, Connecticut 16 December 1991

16

A Note on Transliteration, Terminology, and References The systems of transliteration from Cyrillic to Roman alphabets, each in its specific way, are notoriously difficult of solution. Though I retained a simplified version of the Library of Congress system for Russian, I prefer the linguistic system in transliterating paleo-Cyrillic and South Slavic Cyrillic alphabets. The merits on each side may appear equal, but the linguistic system's diacritics, also used in the Croatian and Slovenian Roman alphabets and Romanized Serbian, certainly command--{)r ought to command-prior choice in works dealing with the South Slavs. In linguistic transliteration the various Balkan Cyrillic alphabets put on almost identical Roman garb, eliminating as nearly as possible the artificial differences that derive from the systems of transliteration themselves-the differences among these alphabets and between them and the South Slavic Roman scripts. Moreover, to heighten the scriptory unity of the South Slavic languages, I abandoned the substitution of the Cyrillic x with the Roman x in the linguistic transliteration from Bulgarian, my preference being the Roman h. Therefore "Hristov" and not "Xristov," which, I trust, will please Messrs. Hristovskis and Hristices. In the course of writing this book, after some prior experiments, I felt a special obligation to help establish proper English usage for the South Slavic national appellations. Against the anarchy that obtains in this area, I prefer a definite morphological system, which, in part, is derived from H. W. Fowler's rule for Arab, Arabian, Arabic. For nouns, I prefer Slovene(s), Croat(s), Serb(s), Bulgar(s). The noun Croatian(s) is used only for the inhabitants of the pre- 1918 counties of Croatia proper (Zagreb, Bjelovar-Krizevci, Varazdin, Modrus-Rijeka, Lika-Krbava) with Medjimurje; Serbian(s) and Bulgarian(s) for the inhabitants of pre- 1912 Serbia and Bulgaria (in all three cases with exceptions). For adjectives, Slovene, Croat, Serb, and Bulgar refer to people (irrespective of and as opposed to specific territory). Therefore, Slovene women, Croat leader, Serb movement, Bulgar aspirations. The 17

A Note on Transliteration, Terminology, and References

adjectives Slovenian, Croatian, Serbian, and Bulgarian refer to the land, the language, and other concepts that assume a long history. Therefore, Slovenian mountains, Croatian language, Serbian history, Bulgarian literature. The same adjectives refer to any aspect of Croatia proper, Serbia proper, and Bulgaria proper (as above, with exceptions). Therefore, Croatian Sabor, Serbian army, Bulgarian cadets, and so on. This system is not perfect, but it certainly eliminates many problems in an area noted for confusion and, occasionally, plain willfulness. Unless noted otherwise, the emphasis in quotations is taken directly from the sources. All translations, unless otherwise noted, are my own. Throughout, the reader will encounter many statistical references that are not specially footnoted. All references to the numerical strength of national, religious, and linguistic groups in the immediate post-I9I8 period are drawn or negotiated from the preliminary results of Yugoslavia's I 92 I census-Direkcija drZ.avne statistike u Beogradu, Prethodni rezultati popisa stanovnistva u Kraljevini Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca 3 I. januara 1921. godine (Sarajevo, I924). All references to the electoral performance of political parties, groups, and candidates in the elections for the Constituent Assembly (November 28, I920) are derived or calculated from the official publication of electoral results-Statisticki pregled izbora narodnih poslanika Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca (Belgrade, I92I).

18

Abbreviations

BMORK Cemiyet DS HPS HPSS HRSS HSK HSP HZ JDL JMO JO KK

KONARE KPJ NRS PNP SLS SRPJ(k) SSDP SSP

sz

B;}lgarski makedono-odrinski revoljucionni komiteti (Bulgar Macedono-Adrianopolitan Revolutionary Committee) islam Muhafazai Hukuk Cemiyet (Society for the Preservation of Muslim Rights) Demokratska stranka (Democratic Party) Hrvatska pucka stranka (Croat People's Party) Hrvatska pucka seljacka stranka (Croat People's Peasant Party), the official name of Radic' s party from I 904 to I 920 Hrvatska republikanska seljacka stranka (Croat Republican Peasant Party), the official name of RadiC's party from I920 to I925 Hrvatsko-srpska koalicija (Croato-Serb Coalition) Hrvatska stranka prava (Croat Party of Right) Hrvatska zajednica (Croat Union) Jugoslovenska demokratska liga (Yugoslav Democratic League) Jugoslavenska muslimanska organizacija (Yugoslav Muslim Organization) Jugoslavenski odbor (Yugoslav Committee) Komiteti i Mbrojte Kombetare e Kosoves (Committee for the National Defense of Kosovo; the Kosovo Committee) Komiteti Nacional Revolucionar (National Revolutionary Committee) Komunisticka partija Jugoslavije (Communist Party of Yugoslavia) Narodna radikalna stranka (National Radical Party) Privremeno narodno predstavnistvo (Interim National Legislature) Slovenska ljudska stranka (Slovene People's Party) Socijalisticka radnicka partija Jugoslavije (komunista) (Socialist Workers' Party of Yugoslavia [Communist]) Srpska socijaldemokratska partija (Serbian Social Democratic Party) Starceviceva stranka prava (StarceviC's Party of Right) Savez zemljoradnika (Alliance of Agrarian Workers)

19

Abbreviations TMORO VMK VMRO VMRO (ob.)

20

Tajna makedono-odrinska revoljucionna organizacija (Secret Macedono-Adrianopolitan Revolutionary Organization) V;;~rhovnija makedonski komitet (Supreme Macedonian Committee) V;;,tresna makedonska revoljucionna organizacija (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization) VMRO (obedinena) (VMRO [United])

PART

I

Antecedents and Antipodes To Be Reckoned among Nations The perception that humanity is divided by national and linguistic characteristics is as ancient as recorded history. The sacred history of the Israelites (Deut. 32:8) holds that the Most High divided the nations and separated the sons of Adam. Contemporary social scientists-sharing in our present loss of a common allusion-are far more likely to be familiar with Stalin's five necessary characteristics of a nation (common territory, economic life, language, and psychological makeup, as well as certain national specifics in culture) than with the biblical attributes of the People of God (ho laos). For Israel was a community of blood, language, worship, and fate. It had common institutions and a defined sacred territory. Though products of selection, the Israelites bore the marks of the hallowed people that were not necessarily at variance with the experiences of their neighbors. The non-Israelites, the peoples (ta ethne), could recognize themselves in Israel's national experience. There is no question that the ability to distinguish between one's own national community and other national communities was unimpaired, unambiguous, suprasocial, and-one might add-remarkably accurate long before modern nationalism. Yet, for reasons that need not be examined here, the conventional historical point of view frequently rebels at the suggestion that the lasting sense of national loyalties ought not be paired with the spirit of nationalism. Like the bourgeoisie, its supposed social carrier, nationalism seems to have been gestating through the ages, to be born by a Caesarean gash in the course of the French Revolution. At the beginning of this inquiry the misunderstandings connected with practically all aspects of nationhood must therefore be cleared, and the terminology defined. Certainly the most ambiguous and muddled term that requires a clear explanation is that of the nation itself. Contemporary American usage assigns this term to a vast variety of phenomena, though largely territorial and political. When a roving reporter is said to have crisscrossed 21

Antecedents and Antipodes

the ''far-flung comers of the nation,'' it is clear from the context that he did not become a spiritual astronaut who investigated the uncharted byways of his countrymen's collective personality. He simply went about a particular country. Or, when we hear that the "oil-producing Persian Gulf nations" of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, and the Emirates are of one mind on a particular question, the term nations certainly refers to states. All of these states are Arab, and state sovereignty apparently does not affect their consciousness of belonging to a large community of people which views itself as the Arab nation. Nations and states generally do have common territories, but their frontiers are not necessarily the same. And since nations must not be confused with states, the much misused term nation-state makes sense only if the territory of a nation corresponds exactly to the territory of a state. In Europe, at least, state frontiers more often than not divide nations. The Spanish-Portuguese frontier and the waters that encircle Iceland and Malta are perhaps the only genuine national frontiers in Europe. This does not of course mean that Portugal, Iceland, and Malta are the only European nation-states. Most European countries with numerically insignificant national minorities may well qualify, though none are as uninational as the three cited examples. Moreover, some nations may be split among several almost entirely minority-free states. Germans are an absolute majority in the two Germanies, Austria, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein, and form significant minorities in several other European countries. Other nations-the Albanian case is particularly poignant-may have one state that forms their national nucleus or matrix (the term matrix-state is applied in such cases), though its members are important minorities in neighboring states. Still other nations have no state of their own but form a minority within one (Bretons) or more states (Basques, Kurds). Then there is the category of multinational states-particularly germane to this study, since Yugoslavia is an excellent example of a state that contains many nations, none in this case with an absolute majority. My definition of the term nation is not, then, readily fixed by political criteria. Cultural attributes, above all language, are decisive. Because modem national ideologies place great stock in the ability of language to provide an instant national identity, we tend to forget that even from the earliest times language was a frequent synonym for a national community. Yahweh was praised "by all tongues" in recognition of the multinational mystery of the world. The term barbarian indicated those outside the linguistic frontiers of the Hellenic world. And in the South Slavic annals, the tum of phrase of Priest Martinac from Grobnik, who in 1493 noted with sorrow that the Turks ''fell upon the Croatian language,'' clearly conveys an attack upon a people. In principle, though a single language may be shared by two or more nations, a single nation cannot be multilingual. English is indeed the language of a group of nations, either partially assimilated by or the extensions 22

To Be Reckoned among Nations

of England, but the English nation speaks only its own English language. The exceptions to this principle are most often a result of centuries of assimilation (as in the Irish case), of unique historical circumstances (the Swiss example), or of colonial experience. Considering the importance of language to national identity, it is not surprising that saving (or shaping) the national language is the first priority of nationalism. National movements are often mistaken for linguistic movements, but clearly, the Quebecers, for example, are fighting for more than the equality of the French language. Besides the cultural criteria of nationhood, which also include the customs, character, and psychology of each people, nations are also founded on certain historical premises. Every nation is a product of specific development. The autocephalous Serbian church or the continuity of Croatian parliamentary life, vested in the Sabor (assembly) and in the figure of the Ban (prorex or viceroy), are examples of separate institutions that become the foci of national consciousness. Traditions of statehood, or simply the memories of past sovereignty, are often vested in such institutions. It is highly significant that, among the South Slavs, the national identity of the Bulgars, Croats, and Serbs was acquired, though not firmly fixed, long before the development of modern nationalism. These three nations maintained a collective memory of their medieval statehood, and this memory survived in various forms-in the consciousness of national elites but also in part in popular imagination-