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The Muslim Brothers in Europe: Roots and Discourse
 9004167811, 9789004167810

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The Muslim Brothers in Europe

Muslim Minorities Editors

Jørgen S. Nielsen University of Birmingham

Felice Dassetto University of Louvain-la-Neuve

Aminah McCloud DePaul University, Chicago

VOLUME 8

The Muslim Brothers in Europe Roots and Discourse

By

Brigitte Maréchal

LEIDEN • BOSTON 2008

Publié avec le concours de la Fondation Universitaire de Belgique. Published with the support of the University Foundation of Belgium.

This book is printed on acid-free paper. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The Muslim brothers in Europe : roots and discourse / edited by Brigitte Marechal. p. cm. — (Muslim minorities) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-90-04-16781-0 (hardback : alk. paper) 1. Muslims—Europe. 2. Jam’iyat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin (Egypt)—History. 3. Islam—Europe. I. Maréchal, Brigitte. II. Title. III. Series. D1056.2.M87M67 2008 305.6’97094—dc22 2008018909

ISSN 1570-7571 ISBN 978 90 04 16781 0 Translated by Jeff Lewis Copyright 2008 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, Th e Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishers, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. printed in the netherlands

CONTENTS

Preface ...................................................................................................

ix

Introduction: The thought of the Muslim Brotherhood, at the center of Orthodox Islam ........................................................

1

PART ONE

FINDING CONTINUITY IN AN UNUSUAL AND TUMULTUOUS HISTORY Chapter One The founding of the Brotherhood .......................... 1. Emergence during the 1930’s: daʿwah, mode of life and reform ....................................................................... 2. The 1940’s: political involvement, militarization, and growth of the movement .......................................................... 3. The mid-1950’s: repression and opposition, migration and radicalization ...................................................................... Chapter Two The contemporary Brotherhood ............................ 1. The 1970’s and 1980’s: differentiation and reappropriation .......................................................................... 2. The 1980’s: attempts at internationalization .......................... 3. The 1990’s: legalism and spillover from initial mb dynamic ................................................................................ 4. After 2000: toward a stabilized representative character, beyond internal questioning? .................................................. Chapter Three Migration and implantation in Europe ............... 1. The confluence of different histories and sociological generations ................................................................................. 2. Organizational structures ......................................................... 3. Diffusion and circulation in the production of meaning ..... 4. The importance of the Muslim Brotherhood today in the Muslim communities of Europe ...................................

19 20 23 27 32 34 45 50 53 56 56 59 69 77

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contents PART TWO

A DIVERSE HERITAGE, MARKED BY A SUCCESSION OF OUTSTANDING PERSONALITIES Chapter Four The unchallenged foundational contribution of Hassan al-Bannā ............................................................................. 1. The importance of his writings and their content ................. 2. The importance of his personality .......................................... Chapter Five The thought of Sayyid Qutb: difficult to avoid, but discreetly controversial ............................................................ 1. A specific continuity relative to Hassan Al-Bannā ............... 2. Internal controversy .................................................................. 3. The persistence of the influence of his thought up to the present day ...........................................................................

89 89 94

104 105 107 109

Chapter Six Other classic intellectual figures ............................... 120 1. Muhammad Al-Ghazāli ........................................................... 120 2. Mustafā Al-Sibāʿī, Saʿīd Hawwā and Sayyid Sābiq ................ 124 Chapter Seven Historical references from within the movement .................................................................................. 132 1. Various organizational leaders, including Saʿīd Ramadān ..... 133 2. Zeinab Al-Ghazali ..................................................................... 137 Chapter Eight Living figures of reference ..................................... 1. Figures of reference outside Europe ........................................ 2. Figures of reference who act as bridges between East and West ..................................................................................... 3. Figures of reference within Europe ......................................... Chapter Nine A dynamic tradition more or less held in check .................................................................................... 1. A line of descent of witnesses, a reservoir of meaning ......... 2. A tradition that is relatively open, but not openly debated ........................................................................................ 3. Labors related to selection and uniformity, by the organizational majority ............................................................ 4. Promotion of contextual adaptation, to the detriment of the homogeneity of the movement? ...................................

144 144 147 153

168 168 170 173 178

contents

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PART THREE

IDEAS THAT LEAD TO ACTION Chapter Ten Two complementary versions of the movement’s heritage ....................................................................... 188 1. A praxeology .............................................................................. 188 2. A vision of the world ................................................................. 190 Chapter Eleven The brotherhood through action ....................... 1. Profundity of faith and understanding of the message ....................................................................................... 2. Training and organization ........................................................ 3. Effort, action and setting an example ..................................... Chapter Twelve Framework principles for the Muslim community ....................................................................................... 1. Islam as a way of life: a great classic ........................................ 2. A gradual reform, from now on limited? ............................... 3. The preservation of the unity of the Umma as an ideal objective ...................................................................................... Chapter Thirteen Morals and social life ........................................ 1. Three approaches to the theme of jihad (and the theme of sacrifice) ...................................................................................... 2. A brake on gender role-mixing and cultural mixing, or even a bridle ............................................................................... 3. The zakāt as a principle of social justice ................................. 4. Framing the community using a structural dynamic of relative jurisprudence ............................................................... Chapter Fourteen Discourses regarding ultimate purposes and the relationships between different civilizations ................. 1. The vitality and superiority of Islam ....................................... 2. Changes nonetheless in perspective with regard to the West ...................................................................................... 3. Good stewardship of the earth and relationships with other persons ..................................................................... 4. In favor of recognition in the light of past and future history .........................................................................................

193 193 196 199

204 205 207 211 218 219 226 233 234

244 245 250 256 262

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Chapter Fifteen Concrete political projects? ................................ 1. A generally abstract relation to politics .................................. 2. The abstract ideal reference to an Islamic system, and the diffusion of this idea ................................................................. 3. The question of the caliphate, in suspense ............................. 4. Mentioning the theme of revolution .......................................

264 265

Chapter Sixteen Strong but confused ideas .................................. 1. Comprehensive way = globality of Islam: what does this mean? .................................................................................. 2. Difficulties involved in thinking of oneself as a member of a minority among other minorities .................................... 3. Confusion concerning connection to the modern salafiyya current of thought and hidden tensions with the Wahhabi-salafists ....................................................................... 4. Nebulous, transitory ideas? ......................................................

284

270 273 276

285 289

294 304

Conclusion ........................................................................................... 307 Sources .................................................................................................. 1. Original sources ......................................................................... a. List of interviews and profiles of persons interviewed .... b. Conferences, various presentations and interviews ........ 2. Documents ................................................................................. a. Newspapers, periodicals, magazines and booklets .......... b. Websites (organisations and press organs) ....................... c. Articles, cassettes and books from authors more or less closed to the mouvance of the Muslim Brotherhood .......

315 315 315 317 328 328 329 330

Bibliography—Selection of secondary sources ............................... 333 Appendix—The twenty principles of Islamic understanding according to Hassan Al-Bannā, comparison of the titles of two books ......................................................................................... 343 Indices ................................................................................................... Thematic index ................................................................................ Index of names ................................................................................ Index of organisations and ideological movements ................... Index of written medias .................................................................

347 347 349 351 353

PREFACE

My warmest thanks are addressed to Professor Felice Dassetto, who directed my PhD research with skill and patience. I am greatly indebted to him for his constant intellectual and emotional support. I am likewise indebted to friends and colleagues who encouraged me to carry this project forward. Special thanks are due to François Burgat, Amine Aït-Chaalal, Enzo Pace and Emilio Platti for their detailed critique of my work. Gratitude is also extended to my colleagues of the Interdisciplinary Center for the Study of Islam in the Modern World (Cismoc-Ciscow) and those of the Eurislam bibliographical network. Discussions with Abu Ruzbahan, Arash, Jordane, Alain, Nadia, Laura, Anne-Marie, Cécile, Valérie, Jean-Pierre provoked stimulating reflection and analysis. I am grateful for the Brothers and Sisters, associative leaders at all levels who dared to trust me thereby making my work possible. To those of you who took extra initiative you helped make my work even richer. Naturally these meetings were interesting for my academic research but also rich on the human level. The field research that enabled me to proceed with this project would have been impossible without the fsr funds of the Catholic University of Louvain-la-Neuve the frfc funds from the Belgian national foundation for scientific research (fnrs) and the funds from the Fondation Universitaire de Belgique for the english translation of this book. My final note of thanks goes to my family, whose love, support and encouragement made this work possible. To my parents but also, most of all, Fabien, my companion, who expressed his sense of humour while remaining sharply critical and constructive all the way through.

INTRODUCTION: THE THOUGHT OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, AT THE CENTER OF ORTHODOX ISLAM

As soon as one speaks about Islamism in the Arab countries and in Europe, the organization of the Muslim Brotherhood (mb) draws fire because of popular stereotypes. Their image is one of troublemakers, and this image has stuck persistently to the organization. The characterization goes back, in fact, to the early 20th century, in a colonial context, when the Brotherhood challenged the institutional and traditional Islamic authorities: they considered them ineffective in the defense of Islam, because they were satisfied to do nothing other than transmit traditionalist knowledge. The Brotherhood held that this attitude is insufficient. It leads to the decline of Muslim societies: if the Islamic system of religious and cultural references was left to erode, these societies would be helpless to resist the aggressive policies of the Occident. At length the Brotherhood began to be involved in Egyptian and Palestinian politics, and toward the end of the 1940’s it appears as a force, an armed one at that, strong enough to pose a threat to the authority of the State. In this case the State responded, and the Brotherhood was repudiated as regards both national politics and international diplomacy. Ever since, the negative image of putschists has clung to the Brothers. This stereotyping is more or less incorrectly related to the appearance of hardline radical groups, in revolt against authority—Takfīr, Takfīr wa Al-Hijra1 or Jihād. Since the beginning of the 1970’s these three groups, inspired in particular by Sayyid Qutb, the second great intellectual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, have preached armed struggle against governments considered to be impious, while the Muslim Brotherhood tried to come out from the underground and enter the political playing field. This spurious connection this image of ‘seditious rebels’ continued to be alleged in the later 1970’s and its credibility increased in the 1980’s, reinforced by the emergence of Islamic nationalist movements across the Muslim world: a number are considered violent, like Hamas in Palestine, condemned in the western world because of its continuous

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Anathema and Retreat.

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refusal to recognize the state of Israel and its endorsement of the use of violence even when civilians are placed at risk.2 The image of the Brotherhood was blackened as well for many when this connection to radicalism was developed into a perceived connection to contemporary international terrorism. In people’s imagination, they are associated with the appearance of the many armed cells (in the late 1990’s, and especially since 2000) which are more or less closely associated with the movement that came to be called Al-Qaida,3 Oussama Bin Laden himself and some of his mentors, such as the sheik Abdullah Azzam and Aymān Al-Zawahiri had at one time belonged to the Brotherhood. When the discussion of political and media analysts turns to the intellectual source of revolutionary Islamism, jihadist, the name of the Muslim Brotherhood is likely to be mentioned, if only as a distant influence. This seems abusive, as, if the movement’s founder, Hassan al-Bannā, has re-evaluated the concept of jihad, emphasising the importance of it’s being carried out, taking this dimension into account hinders understanding of the numerous other facets of their militance, their commitment. Admittedly, they represent one of the intellectual roots of Islamism, understood as an ideology at once religious and political which attributes global pretentions to Islamic religion with regards to society. But this fact must imperatively be understood in a historical context, and this, so much more than the dissidence of certain radical groups means that there has been a doctrinal or organisational break with the structure of the Brotherhood. In Muslim countries, at this the beginning of the 21st century, the Brothers use religious references to valorise their religious and political demands without it really being possible to distinguish if one or other of the principals weighs henceforward on the other. While more or less professing respect for existing legal frameworks, they look to introduce references from Islamic principals into the functioning of state and civil society all the while arguing against Arab political authorities when

2 However, Jean-François Legrain explains that since 1995, sheik Ahmed Yassine the movement’s founder proposed living peacefully alongside Israel ‘with no time limit, so long as all of the territories occupied in 1967 have been evacuated’. (J.-F. Legrain, ‘Le Hamas sur la scène politique’, Le Monde, 31 janvier 2006). 3 For an admirable piece of work that deconstructs this concept, made up out of whole cloth in the United States after September 11, 2001, see J. Burke (2003), who is not unaware that, a posteriori, certain individuals affiliated themselves in ideological terms with this movement.

the thought of the muslim brotherhood

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these are deemed despotic. They question the legitimacy of the state, especially when these governments try to exempt themselves from all criticism and all responsability, that’s to say notably if they no longer seem to submit themselves to a superior—Islamic—norm that is supposed to be shared by the whole of society. In a more indirect sense, the Brotherhood expresses a certain resentment with regard to an Occident that is arrogant, and which seeks to impose its own values and systems of meaning over the whole world. Islamist flirtations with radicalism during the 50s and 60s that aimed to overturn then existing powers in order to establish an Islamic state in some Muslim countries, began to seem both further and further away and ineffectual to the eyes of the, notably European, Muslim Brothers. And the violent phenomena of contemporary Islamism, which are above all, the aim of more or less autonomous splinter groups, also seem to them progressively distant. Their critical stance was affirmed when the Muslim Brotherhood condemned the attacks of September 11, 2001 against New York and Washington, as well as those which occurred on March 11, 2004, in Madrid—even though they continue to support Hamas—(at least their charitable actions)—in Palestine. In fact, some embattled researchers try to explain to what extent the Muslim Brothers, across the whole of the international scene, transform themselves with time and in different geographical contexts.4 But they are scarcely heard, given the apparent complexity and fragmentation of the Islamist phenomenon;5 it is much more vast than the political dynamics and strategies against which it has been until now compared as it also covers a number of preoccupations to do with identity, culture and ethics amongst others. Moreover, the understanding of this movement seems so much more difficult given that it has undergone numerous re-touches designed to respond to the aspirations of new generations, notably linked to the questioning of diverse founding modes of

4 For example [Tammam & Haenni, 2005; Leiken & Brooke, 2007]. We note that there is a great deal of research about specific movements or contexts; see especially the books by O. Roy, F. Burgat or G. Kepel for general academic approaches to the Islamist phenomenon. 5 The Muslim Brotherhood movement addressed itself from the beginning to Arab populations exclusively. But, in fact, similar ideological movements of political and religious consciousness-raising have emerged elsewhere in the Sunni world: the Jamāʾati-Islami movement (founded by Abu Al-Aʾla Al-Mawdudi) in Pakistan and the Millī Görüs, later, in Turkey.

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contemporary Islamism because the concretisation of utopian objectives has until now, always failed and because initial ardour and ambition have been transformed. Generally speaking, the dynamics of contemporary Islam have provoked virulent reactions: its very numerous detractors, more and less informed, have dominated the public domain and hindered the emergence of the calm debate that is so needed. In Europe, the Muslim Brothers are few even though they constitute an important reference, albeit little known in depth, at the heart of the Muslim communities. The number of their sympathisers, sensitive to the general principles of their ethos and/or Islamic work, is much greater than the number of their members (also known as partisans): in the three main countries studied (Belgium, France, Great Britain), the latter represent about a thousand people, whereas their preaching touches tens of thousands of Muslims. They are widely spoken of, but most often by mere name-droppers who know little about them. On one hand, structural developments have affected the real identity of the Brothers, who more and more often characterize themselves simply as members of the formalized modern associations they themselves created in Europe, some going as far as to question the significance of the very title, ‘Muslim Brotherhood’. From a strictly organizational point of view, this reality has become fairly tenuous. The international (leadership) structure of the Muslim Brotherhood has been reduced to a group of more or less formal interpersonal contacts and several annual meetings between leaders, but each national branch appears to be completely autonomous. Certainly, there are many common values supported by the members of this worldwide group, and symbolic as well as quite concrete demonstrations of this consensus are made when an appropriate occasion presents itself. But at the present time we observe local problems coming to the attention of the Muslim brotherhood in the first instance, even if the relationship of these problems to a global context does give meaning to the actions they decide to take, and how they view them [Maréchal, 2006]. As a result, belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood in a Muslim country is definitely very different from belonging to it in Europe, where Muslims are a minority, subject to various legal constraints though automatically endowed with certain freedoms and rights, and where certain realities once unknown to the Brotherhood, such as loyal citizens or the affirmation of international law, characterize

the thought of the muslim brotherhood

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the relationship of government and people. In general terms, because of the increasing pluralism of modern societies, the militant attitude of the Muslim Brotherhood is changing because their relationship to structures of authority has changed considerably, and continues to change as certain original aspects of their political program recede into the past. Undoubtedly, the name of the Muslim Brotherhood is widely invoked in many contexts even when there is no involvement on their part at all. Many political figures and most media reports give credence to a great number of impostors, but there are also many extreme right wing Internet sites that habitually use the mb as a bogeyman, and call it a threat to Western culture, without ever attempting to define it in real terms or explain how Western culture is threatened by it. A partial explanation for this lies in the difficulty of grasping the specific attitude taken up by the Brothers, which they define as the “path of the middle way” in Islamic thought: the Muslim Brotherhood believes itself to be at the center of many currents of thought within Islam. Indeed it makes a claim to include all of them. The Muslim Brotherhood is attempting to function as a magnet, grouping together all Muslims. In order to elaborate their philosophy, they put forward certain aspects of tendencies within Islam. However, they continue to distinguish themselves from and to separate themselves from each of these tendencies in one way or another, in order to maintain their specific identity. In relation to Sufism, for example, the Brotherhood is in agreement as regards the importance of spirituality, but it distances itself from the mystics who leave behind their involvement in the world here below, devoting themselves to the adoration of God and nothing else. In agreement with the Wahhabisalafist literalists, the Brotherhood affirms that the original sources of Islam (the Koran and the Sunna, that is, the prophetic tradition) must always remain predominant and their nature inalterable, but they admit the importance of the juridical methods of reasoning and the results obtained therewith by ulemas who came after the first three generations of Islam. The Muslim Brotherhood believes that in order to understand the content of the Islamic message in the light of a contemporary context, it is necessary to have recourse to multiple methods of interpretation of the sources of Islam; Wahhabi-salafists believe that only those methods used by the early companions of the Prophet are legitimate. So while the Brotherhood shows itself to be quite receptive to the positions of ‘liberal’ or ‘rationalist’ reformers, positions that require us to take into account the contemporary context in which we now read the religious prescriptions of the Koran, they do not justify this with reference to

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an appeal to reason as such, even though their own deliberations are intended to be reasonable. Rather, they speak of a duty of faithfulness to the message of Islam, and of a primacy of the texts and teachings of the companions of the Prophet. In relation to movements that advocate radical action, the Muslim Brotherhood agrees that the concept of jihad has legitimacy, but they redefine the scope of this concept, and try to place strict limits on any recourse to violence. Since the beginning of the 21st century, they have taken a more and more explicit position against the use of violence, although they still recognize this as legitimate in the case of the Palestinian conflict, where some use of violence is considered as legitimate self-defense. If we refer to the typology established by Tariq Ramadan, grandson of the movement’s founder, that determines six major tendencies within Islam in function with their relationship to the scriptural sources of Islam, the members of the Brothers’ movement are closer to Salafi reformism.6 But in emphasising the importance inherent to a conformity to the authentic tradition of Islam and of the necessary revitalisation of that tradition, the Muslim Brotherhood refer as much to sensibilities belonging to all other Islamic tendencies, to varying degrees according to different personalities. There’s only one sour note overshadowing this depiction: their tense relations with purist Wahabi-Salafist elements, whose interpretations are extremely strict, literalist, and even jihadist. The Muslim Brotherhood progressively distance themselves from the Wahhabi-salafist exclusive, disparaging attitudes to non salafist Muslims in general. They are very discreet in this opposition: they only rarely invoke this tension, notably because this seems to contradict their concern to re-unify the Muslim community. Over and above the misunderstandings generated by the complexity of the organization of the Muslim Brotherhood, there is a certain fetishism that attaches itself to their name, sustained by the fact that members are generally quite discreet regarding the fact that they belong to the movement. Careless analysts thus find it easy to overestimate the cohesion of

6 The set of categories established by Tariq Ramadan distinguishes school-based traditionalism, Salafi literalism, Salafi reformism, literalist political salafiyya, (essentially covered here as modern ‘salafiyya’ / see chapter 1), ‘liberal’ reformism (or ‘rationalist’ reformism) and Sufism [Ramadan, 2003:49ss]. Beyond the simple classification into these categories, it seems important to underline that one individual often expresses a combination of these sensibilities together—they are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

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the organization, while ignoring its internal tensions and dissensions. Such analysts also tend to interpret as essential, ideological positions that are perhaps sporadic, while the Brotherhood’s more extreme positions receive wide publicity and end up being considered as the core of a movement that proceeds through trial and error. Of course, the mb affects the imagination of Western people, the more so as it is presented as powerful and well organized. We have observed that very little research of high quality exists regarding this subject. It is certainly true that the mb is mentioned in passing in many newspaper articles or Internet articles,7 some of which are reasonably well-researched,8 but other than the book written by the journalist X. Ternisien,9 no one has at present published a full-scale study which goes beyond mere unfounded assertions. Some academic work has been done in French, mostly concentrating on the situation in that country:10 but this work is limited in scope and generally concerns itself with some particular organization or with a particular leader associated with the movement. Again, some of these authors are in earnest,11 but many others are simply contributing essays to the literature that are not based on in-depth fieldwork.12 Many of these simply wish to promote a particular concept of secularism, and this is often directed in an aggressive manner against organized religion and religion in general. Others are

7 For example M. Whine (2005), ‘The advance of the Muslim Brotherhood in the UK’, Center on Islam, Democracy and the Future of the Muslim World (available online: www.futureofmuslimworld.com). 8 See the article written by L. Vidino (2005). 9 See X. Ternisien (2005) who gives a general presentation of the movement. On the basis of lectures and several interviews with privileged witnesses, this author presents a popular version of Brotherhood conceptions that are fairly classic in a relevant manner. Unfortunately he remained insensitive to the complexity of the organizational dimension of this dynamic, and also failed to explain the aspect of internal debate among the Brothers. 10 Especially since they are influential among the Arab Muslim populations of that country, while in Great Britain, for example, Muslims of Arab origin are a very small minority among all Muslims. 11 On these personalities, see the works of A. Tamimi, on Rashīd Ghannoushī (2001), of L. Babès, based on a conversation with Tareq Oubrou (2002), of A. Caeiro on Tareq Oubrou (2005), F. Frégosi (2000) and Kh. Mohsen-Finan (2002) on Tariq Ramadan. On the Union of Islamic Organizations in France, see S. Amghar (2001) and F. Maulion (2004). On the Young Muslims of France organization, see O. Marongiu (2002). On the European Institute for Human Sciences, see Frégosi (1998). On the European Council for Fatwa and Research, see Caeiro (2005). 12 See C. Fourest, Frère Tariq. Discours, stratégie et méthode de Tariq Ramadan, Paris, Grasset, 2004; F. Venner, OPA sur l’islam de France—les ambitions de l’UOIF, Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 2005.

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concerned to defend Israeli policy and to condemn any attempt to question it. Still others are concerned to sound the alarm, reducing contemporary Islamic currents of thought to stereotypes; many authors are deeply ingrained with suspicion in regard to all such currents, and are basically arguing for the adoption of security measures to counter a perceived ‘threat’. Finally in this category of published writings we should mention the far too numerous books that are content to sensationalize the question of Islamic terrorism in Europe, many of which mention the Muslim Brotherhood only in passing.13 To date none of the authors of these books has attempted to gain a comprehensive understanding of this movement. At the end of the day, the lack of scholarly work in this area is disturbing. This movement is often condemned, but it is never analyzed in depth. A great deal of information, often raising suspicions, is in circulation, but there is no documented examination which might shed light upon the questions raised. A number of authors, whose scruples might be called in question along with their level of information, appear to have been offended by the militant attitude of the Muslim Brotherhood, assuming that it is a conspiracy to bring about the Islamization of all Europe, by means of an ‘infiltration’ of the governments of European States. If vigilance must be maintained and it is necessary above all to denounce any criminal act that is intended to damage Western systems of law; in the case of the Muslim Brotherhood, it is necessary to be realistic about what is really going on. On one hand, it is important to take account of the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood, like any other movement, is involved in a historical process. The brief article by S. Amghar (2006) concerning the ‘three stages of discourse by the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe’ already demonstrates this quite clearly: Amghar shows to what extent members of the movement have been led over time to moderate their rhetoric and their points of view. According to this author, the Brothers were indeed 13 For works in French, see, among others, A. Laïdi (2002), Le jihad en Europe—les filières du terrorisme islamiste, Paris, Seuil; A. Sfeir (2001), Les réseaux d’Allah—les filières islamistes en France et en Europe—La nébuleuse Bin Laden, Paris, Plon; A. Del Valle (2002), Le totalitarisme islamiste à l’assaut des démocraties, Paris, Editions des Syrtes; E. Razavi, Frères musulmans dans l’ombre d’Al-Qaeda, Jean-Cyrille Godefroy; S. Besson (2005), La conquēte de l’Occident—le projet secret des islamistes, Paris, Seuil. At the same time, other works of this type scarcely mention the Muslim Brotherhood, such as C. Moniquet (2005), Djihad et islamisme en Belgique—Tout sur les réseaux et les ramifications, edited by Jourdan-le-Clercq.

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initially concerned with the Islamic reconquest of the Arab States, at the beginning of the eighties, as they tried to constitute the basis behind an Islamist opposition. But given the weak impact of this strategy and also the progressive consideration of their anchorage in European countries linked to the advent of new generations of Muslims, the Brothers proposed a new orientation towards political action: they affirmed, since the end of the 1980’s, the possibility of a model for integration where the valorisation of an investment in citizenship co-exists along with collective Muslim identity. On our part, we believe that this second kind of discourse appeared later towards the middle of the 1990’s and co-exists alongside the first type of discourse although this former henceforward bears less and less weight. Moreover, while noting equally the emergence of a third discourse that values the exemplary nature of Islamic behaviour and culture as a source of well-being, we are less inclined to clearly evoke the emergence of individualist values as in these milieux concern for the Muslim collective remain very present. Thus we believe that fragments from all these kinds of discourse rub shoulders, where the second type seems nevertheless to remain predominant. In addition, the whole of our study aims to show the extent to which the Brothers heritage is differently re-appropriated beyond the sharing of a more or less commonly held ethos. And in order to refute the argument according to which Islamists, and the Brotherhood in particular, are infused by a spirit of anti-western revolt, especially among young Muslims, one need only read the article by P. Haenni (2006) concerning the incidents in French suburbs in 2005, which demonstrates that the young people involved had no sense of political engagement at all, nor any guidance in their lives, and this was what caused the disorder. On the other hand, the international context remains completely polarized as regards the question of terrorism (Islamic), even if some have begun to criticize the simplifications, the inexact identifications, and the other uncertainties involved in such an undertaking. At the same time, in the popular culture of our contemporary societies, there is a taste for the esoteric and the mystical, things that stimulate excitement by stimulating fear. At this level, Islamism attracts a great deal of symbolic material:14 the old remnant of a historical memory stretching

14 For an analysis of contemporary forms of belief that are situated outside institutional religion and outside the field of ideology and politics, see P.-A. Taguieff (2005), La foire aux Illuminés—Esotérisme, théorie du complot, extrémisme, Paris, Mille et une nuits.

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back to the religious struggles that opposed Christianity and Islam is reawakened in connection with the events of September 11, 2001 and everything that has followed it as well as by the rebirth of a Muslim sense of identity that is now taking place within European cities. This book15 is intended to present various ideological aspects of the Muslim Brotherhood, in adopting a viewpoint that is essentially socioanthropological. It is not focussed only on its leaders, or even their strategies for action as it targets more the whole body of movement’s members, whatever are their positions at the heart of this dynamic, while paying particular attention to their experience and their values. More precisely, this study analyses the manner in which a certain heritage of ideas has been appropriated and even actualized by members of the Muslim Brotherhood movement: it attempts to grasp their relations to the sources of the movement’s philosophy in an effort to understand the sources of their strength, and finally to determine how great this strength really is, as opposed to how great it is imagined to be. In concrete terms this book presents itself as a voyage to the country of the Brotherhood. The first part begins with a brief historical survey and finishes with the description of the organisational modalities by which the Muslim Brotherhood is increasingly anchored in contemporary Europe in order to forge the mentalities of European Muslims as far as possible. The following sections concentrate on the contemporary Muslim Brotherhood, and are organized around two themes. The first of these concerns the role played by various important figures within the Brotherhood, and the contribution made by individual personalities, during the period of the foundation of the organization and afterward, up to the present day, figures that constitute reference points and examples for militant members. The second section dissects the discourses: evoking the ideas important to the Brotherhood and notably 15 This work comprises part of the results of doctoral research defended in September 2006 at the Catholic University of Louvain (Cismoc, Belgium), titled ‘Héritage-Transmission-Organisations dans la mouvance des Frères musulmans: dynamiques européennes et implantations nationales (Belgique, France, Grande-Bretagne)’. This research was conducted between September 2001 and September 2006. It is based on more than 70 interviews with leaders and militants (the interviews are numbered in the text; they are specified in the bibliography) and on participation in conferences, congresses and seminars within the movement. In all, we participated in approximately 150 conferences, allowing us to hear about 50 speakers close to the milieux of the Brotherhood (these references are also given in the bibliography). Our observation was also expanded to other countries, such as Germany and Switzerland.

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those which give rise to disagreement among the European Brothers. This section does not pretend to give an exhaustive analysis, but rather to display the lines of tension that exist with regard to certain important topics, such as global Islam, the necessity of a militant attitude, a quest for recognition, etc. Beginning with an analysis of the contemporary re-appropriation of the heritage of the Brotherhood by European Muslims, we attempt to discern the real source of the force of the Brotherhood, in terms of spiritual and intellectual resources capable of mobilizing the energy of the people. This approach seems henceforth even more fundamental than the historical contribution of the Muslim Brotherhood, which constantly updated, remains a major reference for numerous European Muslims, be they conscious or not of the origins in which their contemporary ideas are based. We will thus have laid the foundations for a concrete understanding of this reality which remains partially evanescent, and whose numerous ideas are well and widely propagated at the heart of Muslim communities. The urgency of the context demands that we take a closer look at this dynamic, strong and weak in different ways, and that we refuse to allow the many prejudices that cloud the issue to continue to go unchallenged.

PART ONE

FINDING CONTINUITY IN AN UNUSUAL AND TUMULTUOUS HISTORY

PART ONE

INTRODUCTION

The organization known as the Muslim Brotherhood (mb, Al-Ikhwan al-muslimūn) first appeared in Egypt at the beginning of the 1930’s in a very particular sociopolitical context. The period was marked by the suffering associated with colonialism, and the abolition of the caliphate in 1924, something which had symbolized the unity and importance of Islam to Muslims. In the beginning, the overall goal of these Muslims, deeply involved as lay people, was to revitalize Islam and the Muslims, and to promote the goals of the group in religious, social, cultural, economic and political terms. The organization and the ideas of the mb went through a period of expansion, all while the Arab world was wracked by crises. New nation-States were in fact rapidly monopolized by more or less dictatorial groups, working in the name of ‘the nation’. This was the context in which the reform project of the mb arose, and it was affected by that context; the project was internationalized through a number of adaptations to national contexts. Th e mb became partly militarized and the movement acquired a radical fringe when members were confronted to the power of the State and some were obliged to exile themselves from their home countries, for some period of time or forever. Retracing the history of the Muslim Brotherhood involves more than an evocation of the past, because the historical memory of the movement is always perceived through trials undergone, especially various persecutions by governments, but this memory also has a cultural and an intellectual dimension. This history in at least three of its aspects remains quite alive today. In fact, it is a memory that must be honored, an exemplary moment worthy of inspiration, and a founding process for Muslim identity, because it involves the consolidation and continuation of the movement, a task undertaken in terms of its actualization in the light of contemporary contexts. Many testimonies, from partisans (those who are part of the organization of the Brotherhood strictly speaking) and from sympathizers, agree that the Muslim Brotherhood was made up of men of exemplary

16

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character in the historical period. These were heroic models, ideal good Muslims who made sense with the choices they made in life, and who showed themselves able to bear up under severe tests and extreme suffering. For certain young sympathizers, these heroes still stand for an experience that might one day allow them to grasp this historical memory in a worthwhile way, making their way toward an experience of their own equally worthy: the heritage of the Muslim Brotherhood is perceived as something that can help individuals advance toward self-realization, involving an Islamic code of principles of conduct meant for today, that allows individuals to react better to contexts, and that reinforces their determination to persist in the face of relative discrimination. In this connection we may cite the testimony of a young Algerian woman, with good contacts in the Brotherhood and with the Muslim Presence network, which is an organization created by Tariq Ramadan to facilitate contacts among young managerial level workers who belong to Muslim associations in Francophone countries. For this woman, the past and the present are reunited, and the previous experiences shed light upon the present situation. In her opinion, the Muslim Brotherhood, represented above all by Hassan Al-Bannā, developed an approach that involved all aspects of social life. By their exemplary behavior, they encouraged young people to make sense of their lives and to act responsibly. Thus their experience permits one to illuminate and to rectify certain practices currently engaged in, in order to envisage, perhaps! a better and worthier future: When you see the Muslim Brothers somewhere, you understand them, that they come from Hassan Al-Bannā, because he founded the Muslim Brotherhood. Through this . . . we understand them . . . also through the prism of colonialism during that period, British, etc. Here1 as a general rule, people are close to Hassan Al-Bannā. But not for the reasons you would think! I mean that . . . for the people that are very close, there are not a lot of things of Islam around. It’s a paradox. It’s the mind . . . it’s the idea of saying ‘you have to make sense to yourself, from the beginning’. ‘You have to be… a social person’, ‘you have to be a political person’, ‘you have to live in an economic world’. ‘You have to make sense’ in terms of… That is what is understood, what I mean is, when we talk about the Muslim Brothers as a ‘reference point’. [. . .] Me, personally, I know that Hassan Al-Bannā did some amazing things, at a time when one had to 1 The words in italic in all interviews indicate particular stress placed on them by the interviewee.

introduction

17

fight . . . against colonialism. I’m not talking about fighting the authorities with arms, going back through what happened back there and reliving it today; it is meaningless to think of it like that! These are two different histories . . . what we are trying to do, what we are trying to get out of it, is the essence of it. Which means that that man there, yes, he did amazing things, a way of conceiving Islam, of thinking his Islam in society. And it is exactly in that way that we live. And it is for that reason that there is a bond that is made!2

In this interview, the emotional relationship with the heritage of the past is rationalized, not only in terms of a contextualization of the past, but also in relation to possibilities for future action. Still, it is above all the aura of ‘amazing things’ done by Hassan Al-Bannā (and through his martyrdom?)3 that lends great significance to the ‘coherent’ state of mind that he practiced and recommended. Whatever this young woman may say of it, this really is equivalent to promoting the heritage of Islam as well as its ideological aspect. For certain older partisans, the suffering they experienced has given worth to the struggle they initially engaged in, and all this has become a resource for future generations, something that can serve as a symbol for mobilizing in the present. Like this Egyptian speaker, who recognizes the intrinsic value of undergoing persecutions. For him, this story must be placed in relation to an expression of the divine will, and it is a matter of putting oneself on the same side as the divine will. From this point, he therefore adopts a very optimistic position. He is able to laugh about previous historical reverses, because it was ‘thanks to’ the persecutions ordered by Nasser that the Islamic faith became more widespread and the general direction of movement on the international scene became positive; in addition to this, the persecutions led to popular support, and an unequaled strengthening of the reputation the partisans of the movement acquired for bravery. According to him, such suffering was all the more valuable and all the more useful for mobilization, to the extent that it appeared to signify that the sufferers had the support of God, as if God himself had chosen the Brothers to carry his divine message. He tells the story:

2

Interview no. 50. For a short biography of Hassan Al-Bannā, see especially [Mitchell, 1969:1–11; AlFattah El-Awaisi, 1998:46–63; Ramadan, 2002:178–225]. 3

18

part one Any event, bad or good, has to have a positive side and a negative side. You can talk about the negative side, about the clash; that one is endless.4 But one of the positive things is that they made the Muslim Brotherhood an international (movement?). [. . .] He kicked out our goal. He first massacred them, tortured them. That becomes a capita for the mixed generation or all the generations. It becomes its capita because he’s become . . . like a martyr for the people within, for this suffering. If I’m a person and have an ideology, and I suffered there, that’s my capita. And any ideology . . . And these things added up, plus the Ikhwan had to leave Egypt. Everywhere in the world; whenever he come [laughing] . . . he established them there! And that’s a truth behind: not every movement of the Ikhwan end up but a lot of places have started that way: some of the members had have to go, they go. We believe system is from God. [. . .] And God provides him, he uses that to spread the faith, his understanding was the understanding of the Ikhwan, about Islam. And [. . .] that’s the nature: Ikhwan is just an understanding of Islamic message. And Islam is everywhere in the world. It’s a message from them.5

We shall see in more precise terms what this story consists in.

4

He speaks here of the negative character, continued over a long period of time, of the unceasing conflict with the Egyptian political authorities in power. The Egyptian elections that were held in December 2005 confirmed once again this state of affairs. 5 Interview no. 13.

CHAPTER ONE

THE FOUNDING OF THE BROTHERHOOD1

The history of the Muslim Brotherhood in Arab territory proves to be very complex because of a great number of organizational changes (some due to the growth of the organization), varying interpretations of the organization’s heritage, and a multiplicity of methods for action decided on according to various contexts. The organization has taken on a number of different forms over the course of its history, and these forms arose in a variety of ever-changing political environments. The Brotherhood’s social, intellectual, and political mobilization becomes even harder to grasp as a whole when it is exported from its geographical origin. Members of the movement began to relocate to Europe, especially beginning in the 1960’s. They came from a variety of origins, sought to integrate themselves into the daily life of many different countries, and were obliged to deal with many different sensibilities and practices. The Brothers were deeply affected by this experience of living in societies where Muslims were a minority, and deeply affected as well in their efforts to (re-)constitute specific dynamics, sometimes very different from what they were used to, so as to make their message heard and to gain agreement with their positions in these different countries. They became a part of European Islam and they transformed it, but they also had an influence on wider social dynamics. A historical survey of the epic development of this movement will allow us to grasp not only its dynamic character in conjunction with a diverse group of contexts, but also the grandeur of its geographical spread and the great variation of its modes of development.

1 Concerning this aspect, see among others the historical reference works on the mb: [Mitchell, 1969; Carré & Seurat, 1983; Kepel, 1984; Al-Awaisi, 1998; Lia, 1998], and also the articles or books that deal more specifically with the movement in one or another country. The historiography of the mb is relatively small if we take account of authors that worked with primary sources. The historians are mostly Western; the first work was that of the American R.P. Mitchell. Arab historians have begun to show an interest in the phenomenon. Still, there are few original works in this domain, especially from a sociological point of view.

20

chapter one 1. Emergence during the 1930’s: daʿwah, mode of life and reform

The movement originally developed around an Egyptian teacher, Hassan Al-Bannā, whose father was a local religious leader. His charisma, his profound conviction, the sincerity of his faith (especially inasmuch as it was linked to his initiation into the Sufi brotherhood Husafiyya), and his very great ability in terms of organization rapidly made him a very respected leader, one viewed almost as sacred. Thanks to his unending campaigns across all Egypt, his popularity grew so great that his organization counted one million sympathizers in that country alone sometime around 1948 [Mitchell, 1969].2 Initially, the movement was engaged in a work of preaching, daʿwah: the religious message was presented, and preaching concentrated on the importance of daily religious practice, in order that the consciousness of Muslims in relation to their Muslim identity might be revivified, and in order that Muslim populations might be made dynamic once again, populations that had been affected by what was perceived as a period of decadence. While they were promoting an ethos of greater effort—to be nurtured through discipline and brotherhood—the Brothers were also organizing a system for the transmission of knowledge and the spread of solidarity: they created structures which then acquired a degree of independence, while still centered around their own figures of authority, and they offered a religious education based on small groups, something which required a high degree of personal involvement. On one hand, they imparted new value to their heritage, and even more to the Islamic faith. The Brotherhood emphasized that they were a part of the Sunni tradition, part of the long tradition of Islam: they were part of a movement in favor of a return to recognition of the value of the sources of Islam, a return to foundations, to the Koran and to the exemplary character of the Prophet, as recounted in the prophetic traditions. They showed respect for the principle of the inalterability of the texts, 2 O. Carré & M. Seurat [1983:8] say that certain persons have even put forward a total figure of 2 million sympathizers in Egypt, Syria, Palestine and Jordan. Despite this growth and the wishes expressed by Hassan Al-Bannā that women would come to participate in the movement, the number of women is fairly small in proportion. It is however non-negligible in relation to the involvement of women in public activities at that time. In fact, although the section of Muslim Sisters encountered resistance from male members of the movement, the section numbered 5000 members in 1948 [Mitchell, 1969:175].

the founding of the brotherhood

21

emphasizing that they were in continuity with the practices of the first three generations of Muslims (the salaf al-sālih, that is, revered ancestors, who are though as having understood the true sense of their religion because it had been transmitted to them directly by the prophet), and the great ulemas of the Muslim tradition, such as Abu Hāmid AlGhazāli (1058–1111), Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328), Ibn Al-Kathir (1300– 1373) or Ibn Al-Qayyim Al-Jawziyya (1292–1350). On another hand, the Brothers had in mind a complete social reform, implying that Islam should be considered as a complete way of life, and not only ‘a doctrine and some moral principles’,3 as in the opinion of most people at that time. Consequently, they called in question the authority of conservative ulemas in the name of a direct reference to the sources of Islam. They maintained that the texts could be consulted without the benefit of any intermediary, although they did recommend that all Muslims who had not attained a level of education that would permit them to interpret textual references themselves, should choose a guide for themselves from one school or another, able to assist them in their effort of interpretation. In the beginning, therefore, their position represented a liberalization of religious knowledge and tended to diminish the authority of ulemas with regard to Muslim populations, even if the Brotherhood was not completely opposed to the authority of these ulemas: they shared a single vision of the world although they represented competing forms of leadership, and reacted differently to the challenges of modernity. These positions were in continuity with a canonical reformist tradition (‘modern salafiyya’) whose leading figures were Jamal Al-Din AlAfghāni (1838–1897), Muhammad ʿAbduh (1847–1905) and Rashīd Rida (1865–1935). Since the second half of the 19th century, this intellectual tendency had supported efforts toward the renewal of Islam through the combination of a ‘syncretism of neo-Hanbalite puritanism’ and ‘utilitarian pragmatism’ [Laoust, 1932:190]; this tendency favored the attempt to revivify the Islamic faith while confronting the challenge of the West. On one hand, this intellectual current attempted to identify the causes of decadence in Muslim societies in the hopes of finding a remedy. Thus it accorded a renewed value to the foundational heritage of Islam while

3

Interview no. 60, with a woman of Egyptian origin.

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chapter one

at the same time questioning the pertinence, the credibility, and even the basic Islamic character of the traditional modes of religious worship dominant at the time [Nafi, 2004:28–60]. On the other hand, it made a choice of certain elements that could be taken over from Western civilization in order for Muslim civilization to become able to compete with it, although Western civilization was to be opposed without hesitation in those domains (especially dogma, law, and morality) in which an incompatibility of principles was apparent [Laoust, 1932:190]: it created a synthesis between ‘modern’ systems and values, and that which it perceived as the eternal Islamic system and its values. The Muslim Brotherhood considers itself to be the inheritor of this reformist current. That is why, as regards the interpretation of the sources of Islam, they opposed the taqlīd (that is, imitation resulting in the systematic and servile adoption of received doctrines and interpretations, especially such as were put forward by previous schools of jurisprudence), and spoke in support of the ijtihād (personal effort toward interpretation). They also defended the principle of talfiq (or tawfiq), a form of scholastic syncretism through which they sought to encompass all the traditions of Sunni schools of jurisprudence, although they hoped to go even beyond this. Just the same, in conformity with his wish to restore the unity of Muslims, Hassan Al-Bannā took a conciliatory tack toward all the factions represented among Muslim populations. He defused the tensions that existed within the communities with regard to competing schools of jurisprudence, recommending that disagreement on such matters be avoided, and he promoted a tolerant attitude, with an eye toward obtaining the largest possible consensus. Through such actions, the Brothers came to be identified with certain currents of thought within a movement of theoretical reflection that was calling for a kind of reform of Islam that would be both canonical and modern. However, their activity went beyond the theoretical. In fact, they ended up not only working concretely in the spiritual and educational area, and in progressive terms in the social area, where they sought to meet the needs of the population (especially by creating businesses and dispensaries); they also carried on activity in the political realm. In fact, since the 1930’s the Brotherhood had maintained a discourse of resistance to the activities of Christian missionaries, to colonization, and to Western imperialism. At a fairly early date, the movement also began to generate imitators in other Arab countries in the Machrek, especially in terms of

the founding of the brotherhood

23

relationships with and discussions begun by groups of modern intellectuals. On one hand, in Syria, governed under a French mandate: the Muslim Brotherhood began to be active as early as 1936, and organized the first Congress of student members of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria in 1938. On another hand, in Palestine, under the British mandate: Egyptian volunteer fighters, Muslim Brotherhood members, were present from 1936 to 1939 and engaged in cooperation with groups of the Qassām tendency (produced by the popular revolt of 1935–1936 in Galilee) and with Young Muslim groups under the Mufti of Jerusalem, Amīn Al-Husayni, who received military training4 [Carré & Seurat, 1983:209].

2. The 1940’s: political involvement, militarization, and growth of the movement At the beginning of the 1940’s, the movement was preparing itself to play an expanded role in the Egyptian political arena, and planning to participate in parliamentary elections.5 However, the beginning of the Second World War upset all political calculations. The relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian authorities oscillated between cordiality and mistrust. In January 1941, the movement had to decide whether to present candidates in the national elections, and Hassan Al-Bannā finally decided not to. His sections were temporarily closed in 1942. The situation presented by the war forced the Muslim Brotherhood to maintain a low profile, for despite the fact that an occasion seemed to have presented itself, to finish things with the British, the latter turned out to be more interventionist than expected with regard to internal Egyptian politics: specifically, they got a law passed that explicitly banned political involvement on the part of Islamic humanitarian organizations. From that point, the anti-British propaganda produced by the Brothers was soft-pedaled, since it could be costly. 4 In Algeria, at the same period, a movement emerged that was comparable to the Brotherhood, but which did not form a direct connection with them: the Association of Ulemas founded by ʿAbd Al-Hamīd Ibn Bādīs, in 1931. 5 For N. Ayubi, the increased interest of the Brotherhood in politics which became progressively one of their priorities, results above all from the confrontation between the Muslim Brothers and the new revolutionary regime, especially in the 1950’s [Ayubi in Esposito, 1995].

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chapter one

Nonetheless the Muslim Brotherhood increased its activities in general and openly supported the idea of nationalizing the Suez Canal Company [Lia, 1998:256ff.] The movement experienced increased militarization during the 1940’s. A special group known as ‘the secret apparatus’ was established; its action was similar to practices engaged in by the nationalist parties, Wafd and Al-Hizb al-Watani, during the 1920’s [Lia, 1998:177], and also had some relation to a decision by Prime Minister Ali Mahir Pasha, who ordered in 1939 that all schools should have their students practice military skills and manoeuvres [Lia, 1998:179]. According to R.P. Mitchell, this armed group was at the time explained as necessary for the defense of Islam and the defense of the Society of the Muslim Brotherhood; the group was supposed to defend the movement against the police and the Egyptian government beginning in 1943 [Mitchell, 1993:32]. It is true that certain members gradually began to exert their own authority, not simply that of the leader of the “secret” section, just as later they would shake free of the authority of the supreme leader of the movement himself, Hassan Al-Banna. The section became important in 1947 [Kepel, 1984], and some members, realizing that the group had the means to act, wished to act [Lia, 1998:181; Ternisien, 2004:64].6 Campaigns for the liberation of Palestine were begun in 1948, and so this militarization found an outlet; from that point on, the support of Palestine was strongly encouraged and given support within the movement. During the 1940’s, there was a relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the forces of the Axis. This relationship was not different from the ones maintained by other groups or persons who, like Gamal Abd Al-Nasser, were actively opposing British occupation [Kepel, 1984]. Most authors have chosen to remain silent regarding these matters. However, the Norwegian scholar Brynjar Lia has been able to shed light upon them. In the first place, he has determined the amount of financial support that passed through a German delegation in Cairo (Deutsches Nachrichtenburo), at least until October 1939. The money was given to the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, the Hajj Amīn Al-Husayni, in support of anti-British activity, beginning with pro-Palestinian propaganda efforts [Lia, 1998:179]. The Muslim Brothers admired certain aspects 6

In a journalistic work, this author made this observation following an interview with an Egyptian leader of the student section of the Brotherhood from 1944, who later became a member of the Maktab al-irshad al-ʿamm, the executive agency of the Brotherhood.

the founding of the brotherhood

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of the German and Italian regimes: the Axis powers were more than an anti-British instrument because they had achieved certain things recommended by Islam, even without knowing it. For example, they placed a high value on collective organization; they supported modest clothes; they encouraged early marriage, strong patriotism, and a fighting military spirit [Lia, 1998:80]. On the other hand, the Muslim Brotherhood distanced itself from the chauvinism and racism of these governments, especially when they attempted to export this into Muslim countries: they ‘criticized and condemned fascism and Nazism in their newspapers, above all when Fascist Italy engaged in brutal colonialist practices in Libya’ [Lia, 1998:80]. These positions are also illustrated in a British intelligence report dating from 1942, which observes that ‘although the Muslim Brotherhood may have imitated Nazi and fascist organizational forms, they have no particular sympathy for Nazi ideology’ [Lia, 1998:176]. In many Muslim countries, an anti-colonial fever developed, which led to the mobilization of intellectuals, and eventually the population. This raising of consciousness, at its height, gradually gained strength in Arab societies. The struggle drew in even more people because the Muslim Brotherhood was proposing a complete model of reform for society, rooted in the heritage of the region, and because the Brotherhood was beginning to look better and better suited to its tasks, to the extent that it benefited from modern, effective organizational structures. Further, the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood began to expand rapidly in the Middle East, because certain students, who had gone to Cairo to study, returned to their home countries having been made aware of the ideas of the Brotherhood. Interpersonal meetings during annual pilgrimages to Mecca, tents are set up (by the Brotherhood) in order to convert delegations of pilgrims from throughout the Muslim world. Here, the circulation of books and magazines, the presence of Egyptian militants and other Arab countries, helping stimulate the creation of new branches—especially important for generating support for the Egyptian Brothers when they declared jihad for the liberation of Palestine [Al-Fattah El-Awaisi, 1998a]—all this played a certain role in the diffusion of the ideology. The aura acquired by the Muslim Brotherhood during the combat in Palestine in 1948—when Arab troops got a look at their good organization, training and determination—had its effect as regards their other activities [Al-Fattah El-Awaisi, 1998]. As a result of all this, the Muslim Brotherhood was able to extend its sphere of action into many countries. The Brotherhood adopted in

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1945 the official and legal name, the Muslim Brotherhood of Palestine, but they were also present in Sudan in 1946 and in North Yemen in 1947, thanks to links that had been established with the Egyptian Brothers [Carré & Seurat, 1983]. In Iraq in 1948 the Muslim Brotherhood created an organization for the liberation of Palestine (Jamʾiyyat Inqath Falastin), which engaged in religious education and public mobilization with regard to the Palestinian question, but which also promoted the discussion of themes such as deviation from Islamic values [Al-ʾAzami, 2002:165]; in 1951 they founded the Muslim Fraternity in Iraq. The Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood operated in Lebanon under the name of the Servants of Mercy, and later under the name of Jamāʾā islāmiyya (Islamic group). As for the Palestinian branch of the mb, they founded the Association of the Muslim Brothers of Jordan after the Arab defeat and the creation of the Jordanian kingdom in 1953 [Carré & Seurat, 1983:209]. In most of these cases, the Palestinian situation can be seen to have played the role of a catalyst.7 As a result of this largescale involvement on the part of the Brotherhood in the opposition to the creation of a Hebrew state, their thought and their action became internationalized at an increasing rate. Just the same, this involvement also marked the beginning of their stigmatization in a Western environment. In Egypt, between 1945 and 1949, the movement was at its height. But at the same time the use of violence was becoming more common. Egyptian Prime Minister Mahmud Fahmi Al-Nuqrashi decreed the disbanding of the Brotherhood, but in December 1948 he was assassinated by one of its members, an act that marked the beginning of a troubled period for the organization. Hassan Al-Bannā was shaken by this affair and put out a public appeal to all young people, that they should stop committing acts of violence. Still, when the government began to repress the organization, Hassan Al-Bannā refused to acknowledge the decree disbanding it [Mitchell, 1969:68ff.], and it began to operate clandestinely. Two months later, in February 1949, Hassan Al-Bannā was himself assassinated8 and 7 For insight into arguments taken up by the Brotherhood, see Al-Fattah El-Awaisi A. (1998a) and (2001), Al-Quds ou la signification de Jérusalem en islam, Paris, Al Bouraq. In general, he mentions the importance of Palestine and Jerusalem, the holy city, in the history of Islam and of Muslims as well as the necessity of struggling against the unjustly established Zionist occupation, to the detriment of the Palestinians. 8 The automobile that carried the murderers belonged to a member of an agency of the government [Ramadan, 2002:224].

the founding of the brotherhood

27

the organization fell prey to dissension regarding the question of his successor. Despite such events, the relationship between the organization of the Muslim Brotherhood and the free Officers, initiated in 1940, became closer [Kepel, 1984]. These officers led a military coup d’état on July 23, 1952, and founded the Egyptian Republic in 1953: Gamal Abd AlNasser came to power, in large measure thanks to the Muslim Brotherhood which assured him of popular support. The revolution led by the free Officers was seen as a victory, but the relationship became tense and soon deteriorated, owing to the strong popularity of the Brotherhood, a portion of whose members took a dim view of the new authorities. The Muslim Brotherhood, which represented an unacceptable potential competitor to Nasser and to the colonial powers, was also disenchanted for its part, and its dissatisfaction grew swiftly. Nasser was a popular success, and he received a sort of international consecration at the AfroAsian Summit in Bandung in 1955, while the Muslim Brotherhood was accused of plotting against the state because of the existence of their special armed group, and such accusations were redoubled following an attempt to assassinate Nasser in October 1954 by a young Brother. Doubts have been expressed recently concerning the authenticity of this assassination attempt.9 Whatever the truth of this matter, the degree of state repression, to which the Brotherhood was subjected, was intensified from that point.

3. The mid-1950’s: repression and opposition, migration and radicalization In Egypt, the repression lasted until June 1971. Leaders of the movement were executed and members were tortured in prison. The testimony of an Egyptian woman illustrates the desire of the state to extinguish the movement, but even more the climate of suspicion that predominated among civil society at the time, even while the popularity of movement appeared quite certain:

9 As O. Carré and M. Seurat state, the possibility of the event having been staged completely, and orchestrated by the government, appears to be a live one in the wake of revelations and memoirs that have been published since 1974 [Carré & Seurat, 1983:60].

28

chapter one It’s true that I was very young when the movement was so active in Egypt during the 1950’s and after that in the 1960’s and . . . the savage repression of the government against the mb. But in fact, that did intrigue me just the same, when I was young and I was, uhhh . . . there was not a family in Egypt that did not have at least one member in the, uhh, mb. You see? And in my family, there were one or two people who were associated with the movement. And who were persecuted just because they belonged to that movement. And . . . and the repression of the government was really heavy-handed. Because it . . . so the first idea that I myself had as a . . . young Egyptian girl, with all the repression of the government. For me, the mb were like . . . I don’t know . . . devils, they were like . . . It was . . . They were really the devil himself. See? And that was the first idea that I had about the mb. And then we couldn’t even say the word ‘ikhwan’ because that word in Arabic means Brother. And the word itself was banned in society. And . . . we said . . . the . . . there is another word, that is, ‘ikhwa’, and the two words have the same root. But uhh . . . the word ‘ikhwan’ was completely replaced by the word ‘ikhwa’. That should show you how far . . . how far the prohibition went. You could not speak about the ‘mb’. You could not use the word ‘ikhwan’ because you would be immediately suspected of belonging to that movement.10

In fact, statistics up to 1966 indicate that more than 100 Brothers were killed by police or by the Army, 1450 Brothers received prison sentences or forced labor sentences, and 61000 were questioned and arrested [Carré & Seurat, 1983:81]. In other countries, situations differed. Sometimes the Brotherhood was able to operate in a completely peaceful environment. In Iraq, for example, the mb created the first Iraqi Islamic Party in 1958, after the installation of a multiparty framework. However, this framework deteriorated rapidly, and the members of the Iraqi Islamic party were put in prison sometime around 1959–1960.11 In Syria, the organization’s relationship with the regime in power deteriorated as well after 1963, following a coup d’état by the Ba’athist Party, after which that party engaged in repressive activities. In many places, the mb was forced to endure unstable situations, such as that in Palestine. 10

Interview no. 60. Interview no. 22. This speaker, whose father was a member of the Iraqi Islamic Party at that time, said that the dangerous nature of the situation later led the leader of the movement to ‘freeze’ the membership of the organization in order to protect its members: ‘The leadership of the Ikhwan in 1961 or 1962 dissolved the movement. It actually did not dissolved it; it froze it. The leader then was Dr Abd Al-Karim Zaydān . . . who’s a scholar, an academic, and he currently lives in Yemen. He found it too dangerous to work under the banner of the Ikhwan. And therefore he said. [. . .] “no more Ikhwan alMuslimin” because it is too dangerous; people will get killed.’ 11

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As a result of the dramatic and unforeseen experiences undergone by the organization, two distinct dynamics were established, the division taking place principally toward the middle of the 1950’s. On one hand the phenomenon of migration of members to other countries sometimes functioned in the manner of a pendulum, between waves of repression and brief periods of calm. On the other hand, Islamist thought was gradually becoming more radical, particularly among members of the movement held in prison. After the second official act dissolving the movement, issued in 1954, a number of Egyptian Brothers fled their country and went into exile. They landed in neighbouring countries such as Jordan, Lebanon, and (for a certain period of time) Syria, some even going to Gulf states, to Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia. For the Syrians, expatriation began in 1963, and for the Iraqis, in 1960. Saudi Arabia welcomed these exiles in the name of the struggle against nationalism and communism, but the Saudis also intended to diminish the prestige of Egypt in the Muslim world. Saudi Arabia became a center for militant Islamic political reflection, which progressively gave birth to a movement of political opposition to the Saudi regime.12 But this was a difficult and relatively disorganized period as regards the structure of the Brotherhood, whose main objective at this time was simple survival. These events did not prevent the ideology of the movement from spreading across the Muslim world. The mb adopted a formal configuration in the Sudan in 1954, essentially with the aim of combating communism and to obtain the country’s independence [Warburg in Esposito, 1995], and a small group of Brothers operated in secrecy in Libya at the beginning of the 1960’s. But elsewhere, local branches of the movement

12 See notably the capture of the Great Mosque in Mecca in 1979 (see 2.2) but also more globally, the whole Sahwa Islamiyya movement (the Islamic awakening) sometimes also referred to as the ‘Saudi Muslim Brotherhood’ [Ménoret, 2003] or the political literalist salafiyya. With the arrival in the country of the Muslim Brotherhood, some of whom came to occupy key positions in the Saudi education system, the Saudi Islamic opposition was indeed reinforced. The movement progressively constitutes the main tendency in Saudi Islamism (progressively after the 1960’s but above all in the wave of opposition in the 1980’s). It operates around an attempted reconciliation with power while maintaining their attention to retaining support from civil society, to opening the political debate to the populace and to questioning traditions which contradict Islamic law. The Brothers are ordered to leave Saudi Arabia following their support for the letter of demands addressed to the king in 1992 which criticises the power of the Al-Saoud family, resulting in a progressive weakening of the movement, especially around the beginning of the 2000’s.

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emerged, some in places where it had already been established. In Palestine, some Brothers, successors of the Qassām group, participated in the creation of the Fatah Resistance Organization founded by Yasser Arafat. In Jordan, the Party of Islamic Liberation (Hizb Al-Tahrīr), led by Taqī Al-Dīn Nabahānī, was created. This was a semi-dissident group that desired to become politically active and attempted to implant itself in other Arab countries [Carré & Seurat, 1983:209ff.]: the group favored a restoration of the caliphate, and practiced a mode of activism that was characterized by a certain anti-Semitism, and that did not exclude violence [Taji-Faruki, 1996]. During this chaotic period following the Second World War, the original philosophy of the mb, first set forth by Hassan Al-Bannā, changed. As we have seen, this original thinking was initially focused on opposition to colonization and to the patterns of administration characteristic of modern secular states, which the Brotherhood considered as a means of annihilating the Muslim normative system. With the rise of regimes seen as arbitrary and tyrannical, the efforts of the Brotherhood to go beyond a sort of ‘lay schism’ [Burgat, 1995:69ff.] reached a dramatic turning point: the Brotherhood began to focus on a reconstruction of Muslim identity based on a sharp challenge to the nature of existing régimes, all the more easy if these show themselves permeable to the influence of communist and atheist ideology or if the rampant secularism of societies seems to be more and more embarrassing. In this context, the ideas of solidarity and equality that are dear to Islamic thinking, do not remain sidelined. A certain number of thinkers in the mb movement began to emphasize the theme of social justice. Among these, we may note Sayyid Qutb—a literary, cultural and religious critic [Abu-Rabiʾ, 1996:96] who became a very influential member of the movement at the beginning of the 1950’s after a long stay in the United States—and also Mustafā Al-Sibāʿī, the first leader of the Syrian branch of the mb (until 1961). Moreover, in reaction to the intransigence of governmental authorities, a further radicalization of mb thinking occurred, especially in response to the writings of Sayyid Qutb concerning his frightening experiences in prison, writings in which the desire to react to injustice is very strong. Sayyid Qutb concentrated on the idea of strengthening an Islamic avant-garde that would be capable of bringing about an Islamic society and state, especially by means of an Islamization of the law (Islamic law was considered as something entirely self-sufficient, such that all external contributions were to be ignored). For him, only God possessed absolute sovereignty, and Muslim

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political leaders who did not conform to the divine will were liable to be overthrown. Sayyid Qutb thus underlined the radical difference between the Islamic system and other systems, which he considered to be essentially tyrannical, since they established the primacy, at a fundamental level, of the power of individuals and special interest groups [Carré, 1984; Shepard, 1996; Abu-Rabiʿ, 1996; Moussalli, 1999]. These conceptions strongly marked the thought of the mb during the 1960’s, but they received a mixed reception. The movement was then made up of different factions, and no single leader managed to control all of them. Two models, both of which had sprung from the original heritage of the mb, were now in competition: one favored progressive social and political change, and the other, revolution [Esposito, 1992:130]. However, in 1969, three years after Sayyid Qutb was hanged, having been convicted and sentenced to death on the basis of excerpts from his book Milestones (written in 1962), the guide of the mb, Hasan Al-Hudaybī, affirmed that the preference of the movement with regard to regimes in power was to seek compromise. Despite this attempt to regain control, by means of a redefinition of preferred modes of action, seditious ideas continued to affect a certain number of radicalized groups made up of persons that had initially come from the ranks of the Brothers, but who separated themselves from the organization, having decided to advocate violent insurrection. Among these groups was one called Islamic Jihād, which was responsible for the assassination of Anwar Al-Sadate on October 6, 1981 during a military parade. Islamic Jihad had hoped to lead a popular uprising that would be capable of establishing an Islamic state on an emergency basis. However, for the movement Al-Takfīr wa AlHijra (Anathema and Retreat), it’s more important to be isolated from a contemporary society, understood as a Jahilite society, a pagan society of pre-Islamic ignorance, which feels itself free from replying to the law of God, even if this movement did sometimes engage in violence [Kepel, 1984]. These movements were relatively autonomous in relation to the movement of the Muslim Brotherhood, but some of their members had originally come from that movement, just the same.

CHAPTER TWO

THE CONTEMPORARY BROTHERHOOD

Beginning in the 1970’s, what B. Lewis has called the ‘awakening of Islam’ is in full swing [Lewis, 1988]. Important changes take place, due to the resurgence of religious feeling and to the success of the Muslim Brotherhood in particular: from their mastery of means of mass communication, notably the press, their ideological and doctrinal domination is affirmed in the Sunni Arab world. Numerous aspects of social life are affected by their globalising, modern conception of religion which from the inside, tries to begin a real transformation of mind-sets, then life-styles in the face of rampant secularism. There was a return to ancient ideological and cultural tendencies in Muslim countries as Arabist, nationalist, and more or less socialistic programs were discredited. In the wake of successive failure of preceding political programmes, the Islamists emerge. They valorise their concerns and plans of action, even if these often remain very global and abstract. Certain come to reach into the hierarchy of the assemblies of national political institutions, while others exercise direct infl uence at the heart of certain international political institutions such as the Islamic World Congress (Muʾtamar al-ʿAlam al-Islāmī) [Ayubi in Esposito, 1995]. This influence of Islamists on the political scene seems moreover to be approved following the burning of the dome of the alAqsa mosque in Jerusalem on the 21st of August 1969, perceived as the proclamation of a judaisation of the Arab sector of the city. Indeed one week after this occurred, numerous Muslim political leaders met in Rabat for their first Islamic summit from which Islamic solidarity quickly becomes the spearhead of pre-independent demands from all of these countries, including those opposed to the advance of communism [Naba, 2007]. Everything thus happens as if the long incubation of ideas, begun in the thirties, has now given birth to new perspectives where the development of Islamic culture can henceforth be harmoniously perceived as part of the framework of a modern state. Recognition of the State or even enthusiasm for the State: the Brothers seem at ease with this modern structure, more so when it constitutes the field of the

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final combat, that is to say the installation of statal regimes that respect the precepts of the Islam that frames and favours the social transformations taking place. After four decades, certain preoccupations of Islamic political movements continue to feed national debates in a manner that is more or less recurring. It’s true that the original impetus behind these Islamist movements has changed, but their determination remains strong. It must be stated that they have hardly begun to realise the project for a real political model that is alternative and viable, based in coherent ideology, but we can henceforth evoke their capacity to question or rather to shake certain supposedly universal conceptions such as standards to take into account concerning freedom of expression. While underlining how much the Islamist dynamic remains an incomplete, ongoing process, like F. Burgat [Burgat, 1995:237], we aren’t able to subscribe to the theses postulated by some French political commentators [Roy, 1992; Kepel, 2000] who in mainly seeing these dynamics from the angle of the State and/or power strategies operated by certain leaders conclude that political Islam has failed. Not only have we been unable to testify to the failure of political Islam given their ongoing presence in Muslim political circles, but above all, numerous personal practices, initially promoted by Islamist movements, are now considered self evident for very many rank and file Muslims who sometimes feel quite distant from Islamist partisan dynamics. In this respect we are clearly in agreement with the findings of the sociologist Felice Dassetto who believes that Islam now possesses ‘increased legitimacy in the public sphere, including in European countries’ and that Islamic references have imposed themselves, even if only as a rhetorical point of view, for every Muslim state if not also for individuals. Still according to F. Dassetto, the context is such that it’s more important than ever to concretely translate this privileged status of Islam, be it from the valorisation of Islamic law, or from specific initiatives in the field of education [Dassetto, 2000a]. Yes, some of the Muslim brotherhood’s ideas are thus well implanted in all Muslim societies, and equally among European Muslim communities. Of prime importance amongst these ideas is the global nature of Islam, now considered self-evident by numerous young Muslims, or still more, the importance of taking into consideration the collective dimension of belonging to the Muslim community.

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Yes, the Muslim brotherhood plays a major role in the definition of being a modern Muslim. They have indeed succeeded in transmitting their ideas which witness a sharp awareness of Muslim identity and politics. In Europe, they are also trying to impose their presence as representative of ‘Muslims.’ They thus manage to make their voice heard, sometimes more loudly than should be possible, given the more restricted nature of their actual importance. At least for now. If, at the turn of the 20th to 21st centuries, some militants seem more and more touched by the questioning of essential principals that underpin the great Islamic project, this does not automatically mean that it has been completely abandoned: for some of them, this project remains an ideal to be realised in a future perhaps now further away, and from the outset in societies where Muslims form the majority, while reform of Islamic thought is henceforth seen as necessary to come to realise the initial objectives of revaluating Muslim thought and people. Moreover, at the heart of the Muslim brotherhood movement, a generation who have neither known the period of its founders nor the repression of the fifties, are gradually appearing. These actors bring new expectations, notably concerning the democratic project and will slowly make room for themselves at the heart of the organisational structures where there still subsists a certain suspicion towards a real plurality of opinions. They criticise the West’s cultural hegemony and try, not without difficulty, to redefine their goals—notably with regard to the violent and blind excess of contemporary jihadists, but they affirm the existence of an alternative to the western model without placing themselves in radical opposition to it. At the heart of this new succession, European representatives will probably have a very particular role to play.

1. The 1970’s and 1980’s: differentiation and reappropriation During the 1970’s and 80’s, the Muslim Brotherhood movement touched the minds and hearts of many young intellectuals. Their great influence was acquired through the circulation of ideas in Arab societies that wanted to renew the links between their Islamic heritage and reconnect with their own historicity. The publications of the brothers end up having significant impact on public debate [Ayubi in Esposito, 1995]. The seeds once planted reinforce themselves and new groups of Muslim Brothers are born in various Muslim countries. The breadth of their experience matched that of their projects for action. Analysis per country and per

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cultural context becomes indispensable, even more when certain movements distinguish themselves at intellectual level and obtain a certain level of autonomy, notably the Brothers in Tunisia, Sudan and the Gaza strip [Ayubi in Esposito, 1995]. In the Machrek Beginning in the summer of 1971, imprisoned members of the Muslim brotherhood in Egypt were set free, and the organization benefited from a decade during which it was able to diffuse its own ideology very widely. The mb remained solid in its rejection of violence despite having sympathy for one or another extremist group and the causes for which it fought. But the organization kept its activity within the limits of Egyptian law, and eventually found itself normalized [Auda in Marty & Appleby, 1994:374ff.]. It managed to wield great influence in society, and was once again a meaningful force [Carré & Seurat, 1983:107]. Just the same, at the beginning of the 1980’s, a discussion between the leader of the Egyptian Brotherhood, ʿUmar Al-Tilmisānī, and Rashīd Ghannoushī (then Tunisian leader of the Movement of the Islamic Tendency) provided evidence that the Brotherhood did not wish to become a political party, nor to join alliances with other opposition parties [Tamimi, 2001:60]. This position changed slightly beginning in 1983, when the supreme guide permitted a few carefully measured steps with regard to political pluralism and parliamentary democracy, by entering into alliances with various parties and secular political organizations. Moreover, in 1984, they entered an alliance with the liberal Wafd party, which won 65 seats out of 450 seats in parliament, seven of which were gained by the mb, making the Wafd the leading group in opposition to the party in power [Khoury in Esposito, 1995]. In Jordan, the brothers have maintained close loyal relations with the hachemite monarchy since the 1950’s; the monarchy considers them useful allies against left wing movements or even as a means of intimidating the neighbouring Syrian regime. As previously mentioned, this situation deteriorates, albeit slightly, in 1985, when the brothers dare to question the legitimacy of the sovereign’s political role [Milton-Edwards in Esposito, 1995]. The brother’s ease in State institutions is also found in Sudan from the second half of the 1970’s and until the end of the 1990’s as the brothers establish an alliance with the Jaʿfar Al-Nimeiri régime which then launches into a dynamic of islamization of the country. The brothers

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invest an important number of institutional functions. As for their organisation, the National Islamic Front, they come to progressively control the Islamic banking system, while a number of the brothers invest in strategic sectors such as transport, construction and the media [Warburg in Esposito, 1995]. In contrast, the situation in Syria and in Iraq was often very delicate. Between 1977 and 1982, the Muslim Brotherhood led a number of urban guerrilla actions and mass demonstrations in various Syrian towns in an effort to overthrow the Baʾathist regime of Hafez Al-Assad. These actions drew significant popular support [Carré & Seurat, 200:139]. But following a failed assassination attempt against the Syrian President in June 1980, more than 500 mb prisoners were killed at the Palmyra prison, and mere membership in the organization became a crime punishable by death. The largest confrontation occurred in February 1982, in the town of Hama. After carrying out bloody attacks against the institutions of the government, the Brotherhood called for the immediate establishment of an Islamic State [Seurat, 1983:103]. The authorities laid siege to the town and caused the death of some 10,000 persons. The Islamist movement was decimated, and the Baʾathist regime had eliminated all challenges to its power [Hinnebusch in Sidahmed & Ehteshami, 1996:209]. In Iraq, according to B. Al-ʾAzami, the assumption of power by the Baʾath Party after the coup d’état of July 17, 1968 quickly became a problem for members of the Iraqi Islamic Party, which was made up exclusively of members of the mb. Although initially they had enjoyed close relations with the authorities and had even participated in the exercise of authority, Islamic groups basically were opposed to the secular regime, something that could not fail to generate tension. A few activists were arrested, and then on April 1, 1971, the entire leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood was either jailed or forced to flee to neighboring countries. Because of this situation the Islamic Party and the mb with it ended up being completely marginalized in Iraq [Al-ʾAzami, 2002]. Despite these tumultuous events, the movement continued to attract support across the entire Muslim world. It became dominant, and continued to gain strength in countries that previously had been little affected by the movement, notably Saudi Arabia, Qatar, or Bahrain. Of course, the ideas of the mb had been discussed in all those countries for several decades, but the desire to organize and bring together different Islamist groups did not lead to action until after decolonization and the Arab defeat in the Six Day War in 1967, which sapped the legitimacy of

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secular Arab regimes. A member of the Tunisian movement Al-Nahda described the situation in this way: After the Nakba (catastrophe), and especially after 1973 and soon after certain countries got their independence there was a disenchantment and the idea of organizing the different groups that were everywhere in the world got going. There were liberation movements that wanted to challenge the modern State such as it had been established in some places, since the people of the society did not feel comfortable with such a state. 1

From this time forward, the Brotherhood served as an example; as the Moroccan Islamist sheik Abdessalam Yassine (who would later create the Justice and Welfare movement) noted at the time: ‘in Arab countries, all Islamic movements are defined in relation to the thought and the experience of “the Brothers” ’ [Yassine, 1979:23]. Various factors operated in favor of the movement. At fi rst, it saw its influence increased following the disappointment occasioned by the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, in which Arab countries, under the leadership of Nasser, lost Palestinian territory to Israel. This defeat marked the decline of Arab nationalism, accelerated by Nasser’s death in 1970, but also the beginning of a large scale debate concerning the policies that Arab states should adopt in order to organize society, at a moment at which their very legitimacy was slipping away, and the risk of instability even greater. The Brotherhood profits from a wave of liberation organised by Anwar Al-Sadate, from the oil windfall as well as from dividends acquired by some of their members during their exile in the Gulf States, to spread their ideas on a massive scale. They were able to transmit their message in a more efficient manner, especially through the reestablishment of regular publication of the magazine Al-Daʿwa between 1976 and 1981 and, even more important, through a series of books by sympathetic thinkers and activists who invaded, even monopolized literary production. In the context of the galvanizing impact of the Iranian revolution in 1979, the movement also benefited from great popular sympathy and the aura of bravery which attached to them aft er the persecutions they had been subjected to. As the classic religious institutions are used and above all weakened by the incumbent powers, something that drastically diminished the supply of persons who could serve as examples and references in the matter of religious science, the Muslim Brotherhood’s intellectuals encounter little competition and 1

Interview no. 34.

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even fill the void thus created. Their literature became mainstream in the Arab World. ‘Muslim Brotherhood’ had become a brand name, a household word. For F. Burgat, this development ‘shows quite well the role of forerunner played by the Brothers, there was no precedent for the position they occupied in this form, nor for the central, even monopoly position they occupied in the birth of the Islamic current’ [Burgat, 1988:47]. The prestige of the mb was so great that it is no exaggeration to say that their ideological and doctrinal domination over the entire Sunni Arab Muslim world, and even beyond, was predominant. In the Maghreb The dynamic of the expansion of ideas and organizations of the mb has operated continuously and continues to spread over the international sphere, but their implantation in the Maghreb was in general later in time and less solidly anchored than in the Machrek. The organization did not have a presence as such in every country, and when representation was arranged, it was formalized in various ways according to national political contexts. During the 1970’s, three types of relation to the movement could be distinguished. Morocco The connections here sometimes amounted to no more than a certain recognition, on the part of certain individuals, of a certain ideological affiliation. For example, the Nationalist party Istiqlāl, founded by the Muslim reformist Allāl Al-Fāssi, has a distinct tendency oriented in the same direction as the mb [Carré & Seurat, 1983:211]. The Muslim brotherhood maintains close relations with them [Ayubi in Esposito, 1995]. On the other hand, beginning in 1969, the Chabiba islamiyya, founded by Abdelkarim Mouti, adopted the book Milestones by Sayyid Qutb as its manifesto; it organized itself in two sections, linked together: one an association with an office on the street, politically moderate, and the other clandestine, revolutionary, recruiting its members especially from the population of university students [Zeghal, 2005:198ff.].2

2 On this theme, this author makes reference to two articles. That of Abdelsamad Dialmy (2000), ‘L’islamisme marocain entre révolution et intégration’, in Archives de sciences sociales des religions, no. 110, avril-juin 2000, pp. 5–27. And that of Mohamed Dharif (1992), Al-islām Al-siyāsī fī-l maghrib [Political Islam in Morocco], Editions Almajalla Al-maghribiyya li ʿilm Al-ijtimāʿ Al-siyāsī, Casablanca, pp. 226–250.

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This movement appears to have lasted only a few years, just until the middle of the 1970’s, and then some of its militants gradually adopted a more moderate version of Islamism before becoming members of more organized movements [Zeghal, 2005:199]. In the 1980’s, sheik Abdessalam Yassine attempted to unify Moroccan Islamism with himself at the center, including notably those who had come from the Chabiba, but this procedure did not meet with unanimous agreement: ‘Some joined him, but others did not necessarily accept the mystical aspect of Justice and Welfare’ [Zeghal, 2005:204]. While he was not himself a Muslim Brother, sheik Yassine admitted his relationship with the movement—above all with Hassan Al-Bannā-, but he was also the founder of a movement, a largely mystical one that centered around his Sufi sheik’s personality. Further, he stands as an example of the exceptional case in which Morocco stands, since he bases himself upon prophetic genealogy and therefore also on a relation to the Alawite dynasty. Algeria In Algeria, some cordial relations are maintained with some ulemas [Ayubi in Esposito, 1995] and certain persons allied themselves in a formal manner but as individual persons with the mb movement, or even created a specific group that claimed to be allied to the movement in that manner. However, they did not succeed in establishing a structure for a national branch. Certainly there were persons who endorsed the thinking of the Brotherhood, as there had been since the 1950’s. In particular, the cultural association Al Qiyam (values), circulating in the vicinity of the National Liberation Front (fln), was created in 1964 with the aim of rehabilitating Muslim values in the face of the damage caused by colonialism and the ‘decadence of society’. This organization was fairly unusual, because while it wanted to slow down ‘the implementation of laicist aspects of the fln program’, they promoted the knowledge of the French language and other values that were not specifically Islamic, in order to distinguish themselves from traditional ulemas. However, this organization was dissolved in 1970, 4 years after it was banned as a result of its protests against the hanging of Sayyid Qutb by Nasser [Burgat, 1988:150ff.]. During the 1980’s, certain testimonies invoke of the presence of the Brotherhood in mosques or on Algerian campuses, even though this presence does not appear to have been organized as such, either because of the authoritarian political context or because no exemplary leaders

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were available. An interview with an Algerian militant attests this absence of structure. He speaks of the temporary presence of persons from the Middle East who, from time to time came to give training of some kind, or else to appear on television: [. . .] The mosque where I prayed, it followed the tendency of the Brotherhood. Therefore, the leaders of that mosque were . . . considered . . . They considered themselves to be members of the Muslim Brotherhood. (Interviewer asks: but without being part of the organization . . .?) Ah, that . . . oh, that . . . I don’t think there was, at that time, an organization. Therefore it was . . . it was . . . lectures, instructional talks, . . . and . . . (all) steeped in this . . . this . . . this thought. Also perhaps through a certain image of exemplary conduct, hey, that was transmitted by . . . professors who came from the East or . . . And so that was . . . And therefore . . . uhhh . . . I saw in the mosque, so, the . . . when they gave courses . . . I was pretty close . . . Even: I went to some classes, I took some classes. My father preferred for me to take classes [rather than] to be elsewhere.3

The testimony of another Algerian militant complements the foregoing. Speaking of the way things were on university campuses back then, he attests to this invisible aspect of the movement, necessary because of the single party structure of the Algerian government, which did not tolerate any organizations of a political nature. According to this man the mb did not then exist as an organized structure, but that certain people lived according to their ethos: [. . .] Myself, I knew . . . in the face of the members of the Muslim Brotherhood, that I knew in Algeria. When I was at the University. You have to say that the presence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Algeria, they were . . . how can I say it? . . . It was not apparent, it was not seen. I mean: this was minimal because you know, in Algeria . . . there is . . . for years we only had one party . . . All the other parties, they were prohibited. And it was . . . a . . . how can I say it? . . . it was an organization . . . you could say . . . that no one saw! It was an organization, it was a way of life, it was people trying to live their life, and their faith according to . . . some . . . principles . . . principles they had believed in . . . That was it . . . Me, at the University, I knew members of the Muslim Brotherhood and I discussed things with them, I did some things with them; some of us even lived in the same room on the University campus. But it didn’t go beyond . . . how can I express it? . . . the personal level . . . It was not organized, it was not . . . It was a little community whose members lived together . . . who tried to live together according to the principles they were loyal to . . . the ones they agreed on, anyway! 4

3 4

Interview no. 55. Interview no. 44.

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In the rest of the interview, this speaker nonetheless mentions the existence of structures for students that were concerned with mb ideas, namely the Algerian Students’ League and the Independent Student Union (ugl). He explains: These were organizations of students only because there was no organization . . . there was no authorization . . . you could not start an association . . . For activities, there was nothing but student organizations. And I knew . . . I knew that through student work—hah!

According to him, there was no structured version of the Brotherhood’s movement until after February 1989, when President Chadli Benjadid decided to open up the political system. The other countries of the Maghreb In other countries of the Maghreb, links to the mb have not been informal or limited to certain persons, but they have been more formalized. They can be understood by means of a co-inclusive approach, through reciprocal constitution or rather the progressive integration of parties. Such was essentially the case in Tunisia, beginning with the Islamic Association movement created in 1976 [Carré & Seurat, 1983:211]. In order to obtain official recognition as a party, this organization transformed itself into the Movement of the Islamic Tendency (mti), created in 1981 principally by Rashīd Ghannoushī. Not only was recognition refused, but it was followed by a wave of repression [Burgat, 1988:214].5 The mb were generally perceived as a source of inspiration, a liberation movement that had two objectives: first, to liberate Muslim territories from all foreign influence and second, to establish an Islamic State that would operate in conformity with the precepts of Islam. The mti proved to be properly responsive to the specific Tunisian context, and gradually became a movement that was structured and rooted in that national context.6 It continued to develop within a legally permissible framework, and remained sensitive to progressive dynamics, even though this gave rise to a degree of internal tension. Nonetheless, most of its leaders ended up being imprisoned and the movement was subjected to severe 5 The Islamist movement emerged in this country at the end of the 1960’s and, between 1972 and 1979, published the magazine Al-Maʾrifah which made a strong contribution to the development of its ideological positions [Burgat, 1988:206]. Nonetheless, certain members, like Ahmida Enneifer, publicly took their distance from the Muslim Brotherhood. 6 See especially [Halliday in Ahmed & Donnan, 1994].

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repression in 1987 following a series of blunders involving policy shifts in the direction of authoritarianism, by the regime of President Bourguiba [Burgat, 1988:242]. These events underlined the importance of secrecy and decentralization in the movement; they also provoked the radicalization of certain elements within it. Many took the path of exile beginning in 1987, although the movement changed its name in December 1988. It became Hizb Al-Nahda, the Party of Rebirth, and received no less than 14.5% of the votes in the 1989 legislative elections. Toward the middle of the 1980’s, this movement became part of the larger, internationalized mb movement, to which it added its own weight. The two parties appeared to be reciprocally constitutive of each other. In fact, contrary to what might have been understood from an interview conducted with a member of the Tunisian movement, who questioned and even denied any direct affiliation with the mb, another member of the same movement took up from the outset a more nuanced position, expressed in these terms: The Tunisian movement was a cofounder, in a way, of the international mb movement. We did not join something that already existed because there was nothing to join before that. There were a few pilgrimages, a few meetings, a few consultations . . . And then after a few years, a structure for coordination emerged.7

While it is correct to insist upon the specific character of the Tunisian movement, that movement is recognized here as a part of the international organization. Nevertheless, it appears to have rapidly become independent from the international structure. Connections between contexts and modalities of structure The various ways in which branches of the movement were structured in various countries can be understood by being placed in relation with a number of historical parameters. For example, conditions for the development of the movement were a priori more favorable in Algeria than in Morocco; and yet both countries’ mb branches were rather peripheral as regards the organizational dynamics of the mb. In fact, Algeria had to undergo a long and painful experience of French colonization, begun in 1830, which did not come to an end until 1962, and during the 1970’s and 1980’s, policies of 7

Interview no. 46.

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Arabization in instruction were campaigned for by persons who were close to the mb, such as Muhammad Al-Ghazāli and Yūsuf Al-Qaradāwī. As for Morocco, it experienced 45 years under a colonial regime that was more flexible, a protectorate under which it was possible to maintain Arabic as an official language. But yet this comparison is not complete, for it is necessary to include other elements that constituted a restraining influence or rather an intellectual alternative to the organizational expansion of the mb movement. For example, we cannot forget the strongly nationalist character of Algeria after independence, also including an intellectual heritage as rich as that possessed by Malek Bennabi, who was also an alternative contribution to the establishment of the mb movement. In Morocco, other elements played a role, the nature of the regime in power and the particular constitution of the social and religious fabric: it is apparent that the diffusion of the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood was slowed by the specific status of the Alawite monarchy (in which the King is also the official defender of the Islamic faith and leader of the faithful), and by the importance of Sufi brotherhoods. In contrast, the authoritarian and even dictatorial development of the Tunisian regime and the highly symbolic attitude adopted by Bourguiba, especially as this involves the closing of the University of Zeitouna, constitute unprecedented provocations. These actions generated indignation among many groups, who were concerned to protect their Islamic heritage and who favored the establishment of Islamist groups that would be protective and respectful with regard to the continuity of that heritage. In Libya, the mb was at first a natural ally for Qaddafi to the extent that he had declared that the revolution he led in September 1969 had been ‘Islamic’ [Carré & Seurat, 1983:214]. Nonetheless, he broke with the Brotherhood and refused to treat with them because he considered them responsible for plotting against Nasser. For Qaddafi, not only was this act a sort of parricide, but he also considered the mb dangerous because he perceived them as enemies of his Arabist project [Burgat, 1988:37]. Furthermore, these various Islamic movements gradually appropriated for themselves the ideological heritage of the Brotherhood. As a function of contexts, and depending on the receptivity of their leaders, they ended up testifying to distinct doctrinal sensibilities, practices, and modalities of action. Although certain militants openly desired to constitute an Islamic nationalism or a universal Islamic project, certain authors, such as O. Roy, perceived them as Islamic-nationalist

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movements, with the imprint of national particularities, even a certain nationalism [Roy, 1995:101]. This internal diversity of national movements is perceptible at different levels. The same is true of variations in their relationships with the State apparatus. Most branches of the mb movement chose to collaborate with existing regimes, although the Palestinian organization Hamas (Harakat Al-Muqāwama Al-Islamiyya, created in 1987) decided in favor of armed action against the Israeli occupation, in which decision it was supported by other branches of the Brotherhood movement, anxious to conserve the Islamic nature of Muslim lands. And although the Islamic Tendency Movement in Tunisia was often in conflict with that country’s authorities, the Jordanian branch collaborated openly with the Hashemite monarchy. In contrast to the Egyptian Brothers, who were regularly thrown into prison by a succession of regimes, the Brothers in Jordan were over a long period of time the associates of the monarchy, even if between 1985 and the end of the 1990’s the King took his distance from them as a response to indirect attacks on his performance as King [Milton-Edwards in Esposito, 1995]. Another example concerns the fact that the Tunisian movement made no secret of its sympathy with progressive critics. It took a position equally close to the Sudanese Islamic movement of Hassan Turabi which had given support to the idea that women must participate in all the social and political programs of the Islamic movement. On the other side, the Egyptians and the Jordanians, above all, took a very conservative position in general, and especially as regards this question. While the majority of the Brotherhood’s movements aim to sensitise the Muslim masses, the Sudanese brothers above all represent a small elitist group [Warburg in Esposito, 1995]. In Yemen, although the movement was generally an urban phenomenon involving members of the middle class, it took on a tribal character [Watkins in Sidahmed, 1996:218]. Sometimes, distinctions must be recognized within a single national branch, by region but also and increasingly according to the individuals. For example, the Syrian branch of the mb movement veered into regional violent action during the 1980’s, but some groups within that organization rejected this alternative out of hand. Another example concerns the direct relation to belief. Certain brothers pay particular attention to the spiritual dimension of their faith—and are even sensitive to doctrines like the monist idea developed by Ibn ʿArabī (1165–1241) of the oneness of existence—or close to a Sufi brotherhood, like Khatmīyah in Sudan. On the other hand, numerous brothers who emigrated towards the gulf states are influenced by the literalist hanbali school of law which

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argues against any esoteric or gnostic approach to the texts, and notably the pantheism of Ibn ʿArabī. Some brothers have been transformed by contact with these ideas, while others, especially in Saudi Arabia, have themselves provoked the dynamisation of a new trend, that of the political literalist salafiyya (to use the terminology of Tariq Ramadan), above mentioned also as the Sahwa Islamiyya movement (see page 29). These latter have effectively been participating since the end of the 1960’s in the emergence of a trend situated at the intersection between the Ahl al-Hadith movement and the teachings of the Muslim brotherhood.8 In comparison with partisans of the prophetic tradition (who recognise the ultimate authority of the prophet in view of Islamic reform, to the detriment of other sources such as human reason or the consensus of scholars), the salafists see the hadith9 in a more critical and restrictive light as only the hadiths that are in complete conformity with the practices of the Prophet are taken into account. In relation to the second, adherents to the political literalist salafiyya borrow their conceptual framework and political conscience while refuting the importance that the Muslim brothers notably concede to the consensus of contemporary scholars10 and, more globally to humane Islamic reason.11

2. The 1980’s: attempts at internationalization During the 1980’s, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood had the wind in their sails. On the national scene at the time of the elections in 1987, they

8 Conference given by B. Haykel in Nijmegen, on the nature of salafist action and thought—28 September 2007, organised by the International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World (Leiden) and Radboud University, Nijmegen. 9 The hadith is the tradition of actions, gestures and words of the Prophet; it was collected together in writing in the 9th century. The Hadith is sometimes distinguished from the Sunna which literally means the prophetic tradition, i.e. the traditions which are attributed to the Prophet or the way which is directly associated with his religious guidance. However, its field of application depends on the interpretation given to it by Muslims. In effect, the wahhabi-salafists believe that it only covers the Hadith and the practice of the Prophet’s Companions while Muslims from the other Islamic schools of thought consider that the limits of this prophetic tradition are more broad, going so far as to include the Arab, pre-Islamic traditions and the interpretations of the Prophet’s Companions. Muslims who thus wish to give room to human reason believe that the Sunna also includes the consensus of the contemporary Muslim community in the accreditation of the content of the Hadiths etc. 10 See notably [Brown, 1996]. 11 For a further analysis of these connections, see 16.3.

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clearly affirmed their objectives for the islamization of society. In chanting their only slogan ‘Islam is the answer’, they affirmed that their main priority is to establish a state founded on Islamic law, the Sharia. However, a look at the whole of their manifesto testifies to their increased consideration of the pluralism of Egyptian society. Their second priority in effect consists in legalising the rights of Coptic Christians: they demand complete equality for the rights and responsabilities between Muslims and Copts. Moreover, they seek to implant a real international network especially for the purpose of consolidating the movement and their leadership, but also in an attempt to set in motion a pan-Islamic movement, one that would be capable of bringing about an Islamic State in the Muslim world. The prospects looked good, especially since the year 1979 turned out to be a decisive turning point with regard to the emergence of future militant Islamist revolutionaries around the world, even if many remain concerned above all by their own national issues. First of all, in January of that year the Iranian revolution forced the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, to go into exile. Taking his place was the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who intended to establish the first modern Islamic theocracy. It is very likely that there was a connection established between the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and certain members of the Iranian Islamist movement Fedayin-e Islam who had been trained in Cairo [Djalili, 2001], and it is also likely that there was communication between the Ayatollah Khomeini and the Supreme Guide of the Brotherhood, ʿUmar Al-Tilmisānī, subsequent to the latter’s assuming his post [Abdelnasser, 1997]. The Iranian revolution breathed new life into the Islamic movement all over the world and awakened many hopes. The Brothers considered the takeover in Iran as a victory in a revolution aiming at fidelity to Islamic law and at liberating the Iranian people from the oppression of a regime that ignored Islam. They were happy that such a thing had occurred, but they regretted the revolution at the level of the masses, because this was not in accordance with the policy of general moderation the Brotherhood was supporting at that time [Abdelnasser, 1997]. The political scientist Gilles Kepel has spoken of the influence of the Iranian revolution with regard to the beginning of the Intifada in 1987 in Palestine, under the influence of a pamphlet titled ‘Khomeini, the Islamic alternative’, dedicated to ‘two men of their century,’ ‘the martyred Imam Hassan Al-Bannāʾ and ‘the revolutionary imam Ruhollah Khomeini’ [Kepel, 2000:187].

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In his biographical work, the Tunisian leader Rashīd Ghannoushī explains that this event, initially perceived as a Shiite revolution, then seen as simply Islamic, in the wider sense, produced a tremendous impact in more than one way. According to him, it increased the popularity of Islam among Muslim populations by appearing to be an act on behalf of the poor and the oppressed. The Iranian revolution demonstrated as well that organized forces could overthrow a secular regime that had been influenced by the West. Even though Rashīd Ghannoushī was personally opposed to the use of such a revolutionary method, he could still draw inspiration from certain of its strategic aspects, and he judged that there is a parallelism that can be established between Hassan Al-Bannā, Abu Al-Aʾla Al-Mawdudi and the Ayatollah Khomeini. According to him, such parallelism has to do with the manner in which each of these figures considered Islam as a global project, with the importance given by each to the people, to the nation, to its independence, and to the fundamental sources of religion and confidence in God’s help, in addition to the role played by an organized network of members and sympathizers [Tamimi, 2001:53 ff.]. The stimulating effect of the Iranian revolution was also felt in Europe. A female Islamist militant from Tunisia, a member of the French League for the Muslim Woman (lffm) tells the story of how, in 1981 and 1982, in Paris where she had just arrived, she supported protests on the part of a view a few dozen Iranian students on the university campus in the 14th arrondissement. While she was carried along for a while by the effervescence of this movement, she ended up taking her distance from it and broke her connection with it once she realized that the Iranian students were proselytizing in favor of Shiism, and because they refused to show solidarity with Arab Islamists, refusing to take part in a protest against an Arab regime.12 Secondly, in November 1979, over a two-week period, the world watched the siege of the Great Mosque of Mecca by the traditionalist group Ahl al-Hadith (the people of the hadith) who were influenced by the Brotherhood’s style of making political demands to the extent that they were nicknamed the ‘new Ikhwan’:13 these people, whom we associate with the political literalist salafiyya movement, previously mentioned,

12

Interview no. 40. Cf. Madawi Al-Rasheed, A history of Saudi Arabia, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, pp. 144–145, quoted by [Ménoret, 2003:129]. These have been evoked previously under the name of the political literalist salafiyya. 13

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denounced the submission of the ulemas to those in power, but also the corruption and materialism of the latter in addition to their submission to the West. This exercise of force seriously destabilized the Saudi monarchy, whose legitimacy was called into question. The authorities were only able to resolve this situation, in which hostages were taken and held, with the assistance and the intervention of Western special forces personnel. Not only did this event call into question the legitimacy of the family of Saud as the guardians of the holy places; it also gave strength in retrospect to the Islamist critique that had been directed at the regime. It demonstrated the weakness of the regime, and the fact that its connections with the West were indispensable to it, and that the regime depended on those connections in order to maintain itself in many respects, including internal security. The desire to see an Islamic model emerge that was different from the model imposed by the reigning dynasty was very widely felt, although this did not take place. And failure in this respect carried heavy consequences, because many Islamist militants, and many members of the Brotherhood with them were forced into exile (including Brothers who had sought refuge in Saudi Arabia). Forced to leave although many of them had made good lives for themselves in professional and financial sectors, many of these emigrated to the West or to Pakistan. Pakistan shares a long border with Afghanistan, where in December 1979 the Soviet Union launched a military offensive in order to bring an end to an armed Islamic rebellion. This was the third major event of the revolutionary year 1979, for Afghanistan would become a place where thousands of Islamic fighters would come together to defend the cause of Islam. A sheik of Palestinian origin, Abdullah Azzam, played a pivotal role in this sequence of events.14 A graduate of the University of Damascus and of Al-Azhar, he received a doctorate in the area of Foundations of Muslim law (Usul Al-Fiqh), and this member of the Muslim Brotherhood began teaching at the beginning of the 1970’s at the University of King Abd Al-Aziz in Jeddah. He went to teach in Pakistan in 1980, under the influence of an Egyptian Brother, he ends up dedicating himself to mediation between warlords in order to improve the armed

14 For fuller information about Abdullah Azzam, and also for an analytical translation of the intellectual writings of the Al-Qaida movement, see the fascinating work of Kepel & Milelli, 2005.

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resistance movement. In order to encourage his fighters he also proclaimed in 1984 a fatwa entitled ‘the defense of Muslim territory is the main duty of the individual’, in which he stated the conflicts in Afghanistan and Palestine constituted armed combats, and every Muslim had a duty to contribute to their success; and his membership in the Jordanian branch of the Brotherhood was suspended as a result. He still enjoyed many personal contacts, and opened a service bureau in Peshawar through which some 20,000 fighters from a score of countries would pass, first to be trained and then to be sent to the front. In order to get support for his projects, Abdullah Azzam associated with Oussama Bin Laden. He also travelled through Europe and the United States during the 1980’s and 1990’s, raising money for the Afghan jihad [Hegghammer in Kepel & Milleli, 2005]. As regards the Afghan conflict, there are few scholarly writings that mention the role of the organization of the Brotherhood as such. Just the same, it is likely that the members of all national branches were probably eager to participate, and a large number of them did so. For such people, it was normal to find oneself in that area at that time, whatever might have been the type of activity engaged in. For example, a leader such as Gamal Al-Helbawy could be found there precisely between 1988 and 1994, perhaps even as early as 1984. He worked at the Institute of Policy Studies in Pakistan, but we do not know exactly what this represents and it is difficult to speak about this period. In parallel with this involvement in Afghan territory, which apparently represented a desire to contribute to the constitution of a Sunni Islamic state from which influence could be exercised and involvement encouraged across the entire Muslim world, a leader of the Egyptian mb, Mustafa Mashhūr, was traveling the world and especially Europe beginning in 1981.15 Operating especially during periods of pilgrimage, he attempted to solidify the connections between various national branches and established contacts with organizations that had similar objectives. By 1982, he had succeeded in creating an international organization, the stability of whose contacts appears to be attested over a period of about 10 years. At the heart of this international organisation of the brotherhood, the European brothers enjoy a representation in the organisation’s Assembly [Ayubi in Esposito, 1995]. However, in the wake of the first 15 Hussam Tammam, ‘La promesse, le parcours, l’argent. L’ organisation internationale des Frères musulmans’, a study that appeared in Arabic in the magazine Al-Manar al-gedid, 2004 (cited by X. Ternisien, 2005).

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Gulf war this international solidarity was publicly challenged by differences of opinion concerning the proper way to react to the aggression of Iraq against Kuwait. The Brotherhood’s international strategy is also questioned from within its ranks, as at the same time the Sudanese leader Hassan Turabi attempted to build an Islamic leadership structure that could compete with the Brotherhood: having acquired power in 1989 through a coup d’état, he organized—in vain—many ‘popular Arab and Islamic conferences’ [Kepel, 2004] in order to himself hold the flame of international Islamic activism.

3. The 1990’s: legalism and spillover from initial mb dynamic Over the course of the 1990’s, almost all the branches of the movement went through transformations. Certain national branches of the brotherhood begin to emerge from the underground (or are confined to it) while others make their entry into opposition or into the game of legal politics, except they only sometimes achieve this so confirming their positions. The reasons for this change were many: first, it had been observed that putschist strategies did not work, and that the repression that generally followed was difficult for the Brotherhood to weather, as indeed it was for the States involved; also, the progressive fringes of the movement as well as some of the most solidly established groups began to elaborate an internal critique of the logic of violent action. In this context, Islamist opposition groups enjoyed a certain success in countries that were really open to multiparty politics. Sometimes, however, the mb found themselves outflanked by the radical fringe movements around them, even though some were initially born out of their own ranks: we may cite the impasse of the civil war in Algeria which existed from 1992 (the time at which certain Algerian Islamists left to take refuge in Great Britain) and the bloody actions of Jamāʾā islāmiyya, which erupted in Egypt beginning in 1993 and culminated in the killings at Luxor in 1997. Overall, the mb, with varying success, persisted in respecting established order and in playing the legalist game upon various national scenes. In Egypt, they succeeded in being classified as an organization of professionals, but the end of an era of normalization and the beginning of a new repression soon followed, under the regime of Hosni Mubarak, beginning in 1992. In Algeria, they were very successful in 1995. And the president of Hamas, which had become the Movement of a Soci-

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ety for Peace (msp) in 1996, came in second in presidential elections (thanks to a collaboration with the Algerian secret services?) with a program that defended Islamic alternatives for society and respect for the order newly established in opposition to the fis, the Islamic Salvation Front. The Jordanian Brotherhood—included within the Islamic Action Front—became progressively weaker. Although it won 30% of the seats in the lower chamber of Parliament in the elections of 1989, it lost half its seats in 1993 and boycotted the vote in 1997 [Milton-Edwards in Sidahmed & Ehteshami, 1996:123]. Muslim Brotherhood candidates in Yemen (the Party of Islah, created in 1990) received 18.5% of the votes in the elections of 1997. In Morocco the Islāh wa Tajdīd movement (Reform and Renewal) was created in 1992 from elements of another movement founded in the 1980’s. Through a number of organizational mergers with associations that were quite different, its members supported a patchwork known as the Party of Justice and Development (pjd) in 1998, which allowed them to obtain political recognition [Zeghal, 2005:211ff.]. But the Tunisians of Al-Nahda, and Muslim Brothers from Syria, Libya and Iraq were forced into exile. On the international scene, the non-unified and non-homogeneous character of the movement was confirmed by the great variation in reactions from different Muslim Brotherhood organizations at the moment of the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1991. The support given to Iraq by a certain number of branches, notably under the influence of popular pressure, gives rise to severe tension that jeaopardises relations with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, the Brotherhood’s main financial backers at international level. Of course, on the other side, unwavering support with respect to the Palestinian question remained constant, although it created serious tensions in whatever State this support might happen to be expressed, for example in the Egypt of Anwar Al-Sadate when the Brotherhood condemned the Camp David agreement and the signature of a peace treaty with Israel in 1978. Nonetheless, despite the importance of the cause, whatever convergence existed was not sufficient to continue to produce the appearance of a true unity and a world wide organizational leadership, which some appeared to want to claim.16

16 We are thinking especially of the way in which the general Guide of the mb in Egypt, Muhammad Mehdi ‘Akef, appeared to present himself to the journalist Xavier Ternisien, declaring that he was “responsible for all Muslims”, adding immediately, “at

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During this decade, international interest waned for various reasons. The Egyptian brothers face up to the forced isolation to which they are confined by the Egyptian powers [Kristiaenasen, 2000] while the leaders of various branches which often become more important and also more autonomous face very different situations in which they feel themselves to be better placed to judge the actions to be taken. In addition, Hassan Turabi, leader of the Islamic National Front and president of the Sudanese parliament since 1995, persists in trying to propose an Islamic alternative and demonstrate his independence in a variety of ways (political investment in the Islamic popular congress and decision to shelter Oussama Bin Laden in Sudan between 1991 and 1996 among others) which doesn’t fail to give rise to tensions or even a certain confusion within the ranks of the Muslim brotherhood. Elsewhere, the organization of the mb experienced competition because of the increasing influence of (Wahhabo-)Salafists17 and their literature. The wind had shifted, for in the wake of the first Gulf war the weakened regimes of that region, especially the Saudi regime, preferred from that time forward to support pietistic, conservative and apolitical movements that could compete with an Islamist movement that might criticize their policies. At the same time the activity of Salafist jihadists, who endorsed armed struggle against regimes perceived as hostile to Islam, was growing. This movement was particularly successful during the 1990’s in relation to the conflict in Bosnia, in Chechenya, that followed the Afghanistan war where it found a fertile ground for expression. This group was further strengthened by its ability to attract many fighters for various campaigns. Beginning in 1992 and throughout

least, for all the Muslims who sympathize with the thought of the Muslim Brotherhood”. [Ternisien, 2005:109]. 17 After Olivier Carré, for whom wahhabism no longer exists per se as Saudi Islam found itself henceforward involved in various dynamics of globalisation [Carré, 1991], we use the term ‘wahhabi-salafism’ to designate the current main trend in Saudi Islam and of the Gulf in general, i.e. salafi apolitical literalism, which has progressively affirmed itself in line with the trends of the 1990’s, in comparison with the political literalist salafiyya (which emerged in the 1960’s and which knew its hours of glory during the 1970’s and 1980’s) to which some Muslim Brothers are close and with which it has ended up in deliberate competition. The wahhabo-salafist school of thought emphasises the assiduous nature of religious practise, in conformity with the example of the first Muslims. At one rigorist and adhering to a literalist and doctrinal reading of the hadith, its members refuse to take into consideration any contributions made after the original sources of Islam: they consider all practice not linked to the Koran or the Sunna as an inacceptable innovation.

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the decade, the Afghan Salafist jihadists, who were generously financed by the United States during the 1980’s, dispersed throughout the world. Because of these changes and the difficulties of distinguishing the various actors involved, Islamism saw its image tarnished in the eyes of Western states, and a number of partners in dialogue found themselves discredited [Kepel, 2000:445].

4. After 2000: toward a stabilized representative character, beyond internal questioning? At the beginning of the 21st century, the movement of the Brotherhood continues to oppose the cultural religious and political hegemony of the West, above all when that hegemony produces significant negative consequences for the Arab and Muslim world. The Brotherhood also maintains its legal opposition to a number of secular regimes, especially when such regimes are perceived as despotic. At the turn of the century, despite years of confrontations and reciprocal mistrust in relation to various authorities, it still appears difficult to ignore the influence of the mb upon the various Arab national scenes. A relative stabilization of relationships—sometimes very precarious— has been established. The Brothers have learned from their experiences and, encouraged by the renewal of generations, are turning to new preoccupations. Changes of viewpoint appear. They are related to the authoritarian leadership style of the organisation, but also to the questioning of ‘principles of the great Islamic narrative’, including issues such as an Islamic state or ‘Islam as a project of civilization providing an alternative to the West’ [Tammam & Haenni, 2005]. Changes in mentality also appear in line with the weight of experience of the older members. Reflections are begun which focus on important themes such as the relationship with the state, society as such, and democracy and pluralism. However, these reflections are not finished, and indeed certain themes are even considered by some as dangerous to speak of.18

18 See especially the journalistic article by M. Khalil (2006), ‘The Taming of the Muslim Brotherhood’, Meria, 13th of March 2006. Posted online at http://www.frontpagemagazine.com

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In many different ways, the Brothers have continued to progress within Muslim countries, with a few ups and downs. In fact, they are active in the political life of many countries: in Egypt they won 88 independent seats out of a total of 454 in the legislative elections of October 2005; in Palestine, Hamas gained an absolute majority of seats in the legislative elections of January 2006 (76 seats out of 132). In Iraq, the Brotherhood has been reborn from its ashes following the fall of the regime of Saddam Hussein. After intense discussions carried on since the end of the first Gulf War in 1991, some members in exile have decided to relaunch the Iraqi Islamic Party in order to participate in the political life of that country. In Syria, if the exiled Muslim brothers stay mobilised in relation to the political situation in their country of origin and its future perspectives, they envisage their return to the political scene in the medium term. The mb is attempting to create a platform for dialogue with other opposition forces, including Communists, and has been pursuing this aim since April 2005. They have declared that they are now ready to share power within a democratic state. But their plans seem more and more difficult to achieve now that their popular assizes have been sapped after thirty years in exile. In Jordan, as also in Algeria, they have lost some influence, especially since 2002. In general, they never obtain an absolute majority within national parliaments, but they are now benefiting from a more or less stable political presence that is far from being marginalized. On the world scene, the Muslim Brotherhood has gradually become ‘unremarkable’ and they appear more and more as inevitable partners in government, although they are not considered entirely credible by Western governments or desirable to local elites in power. This position is the result of a double convergence of trends. On one hand, in parallel with the victory of re-Islamization of social practices, the Muslim Brotherhood is contributing to the structure of national political scenes while other formations, political alternatives to the regimes in power, remain quite weak. However, the enthusiasm within the mb for specific political projects has been reduced, because the Brothers have not forgotten the difficulties produced by attempts to set up Islamic states, and indeed there appears to have been a certain deideologization of the movement. On the other hand, in view of the phenomena of types of blind radicalism, more and more widespread, and deeply marked as they are by

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the experiences of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, and by the specter of the many jihadist cells now claiming affiliation with Al-Qaida, the mb is keeping a low profile, presenting itself as a group of moderates and trustworthy interlocutors. They appear all the more acceptable since they are ready to dialogue with the West, and they have themselves been criticized by eminent figures within radical Islam such as Aymān Al-Zawahiri, a former Muslim Brother, much affected by the thought of Sayyid Qutb, and often presented as the mentor of Oussama Bin Laden. In his book titled La Moisson amère. Les soixante ans des Frères musulmans (The Bitter Harvest: Sixty Years with the Muslim Brotherhood), written between 1991 and 1992, he criticizes the Brothers. He accuses them of having violated the fundamental principles of Islam. And he judges that they have not only renounced ‘jihad against the tyrant’, but also that they have agreed to participate in a ‘democratic’ political process, thus implicitly recognizing the legitimacy of existing authorities and the sovereignty of the people [S. Lacroix in Kepel & Milelli, 2005:243–261]. While working concretely toward the realization of their many emendations, the Muslim Brotherhood is attempting to refine its objectives with regard to practices and ideological positions. The things that are going on in Muslim countries are still a more or less important source of inspiration for Muslim Brothers in Europe. In return, the experiences of European Brothers have an effect on trends in Muslim countries.

CHAPTER THREE

MIGRATION AND IMPLANTATION IN EUROPE

Members and sympathizers of the mb organization have been coming to various European countries as political exiles or students since the end of the 1950’s. They represent a juxtaposition of generations that is sociologically diverse. The dynamic of the mb is in fact today composed of persons who, while sharing a (profound) affinity for the heritage of the Brotherhood (in accordance with various levels of affiliation that are more or less formalized), are the product of very different social experiences. The Brothers are not numerous, but since the 1980’s, they have become leading actors in society thanks to their great dynamism. This dynamism is a product of their motivations, their intellectual capacities, and their proven organizational experience. In multiplying their activities in many different locations, notably in creating diverse associations that amount to arenas as much as showcases for their activity, they have acquired increased importance at the heart of Muslim communities. However, their visibility as the Muslim Brotherhood is still extremely moderate, because the movement is above all composed of a variety of informal networks, themselves based upon interpersonal relationships, and the long-term objective of these networks is educational activity. But, all the while seeking to promote Islamic values, including in the pubic sphere, they lead a number of major initiatives from modern organisations, aiming to represent and include all European Muslims.

1. The confluence of different histories and sociological generations The arrival of the mb in Europe is above all the result of individual trajectories; the organization’s implantation is not the result of a group intention or decision on the part of national movements and/or the international structure, even if we cannot be certain that such a plan never existed.1

1 After 1945, a liaison bureau with the Islamic world was created at Cairo, intended to maintain relations between the leaders of various Islamic movements and to see to

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The organizational dynamics typical of the mb are organized gradually, beginning with more or less fortuitous meetings between persons who share, or who come to share, common frames of reference and a desire to become involved and to make progress. Some members of the mb arrived in Europe following waves of repression which, in their home countries, led not only to a very great number of arrests, but also to the disappearance of persons. Such was the case in Egypt, at the time of the repressive actions ordered by Nasser in 1954 and in 1965, which in fact continued until 1971, and then began anew under Al Sadate from 1978 to 1981, and finally under Mubarak in 1995. Other waves of repression were organized, for example in Iraq in 1971. In Syria, repressive actions began around 1980, and the regime has never relaxed the prohibition of the movement. In Libya, repression took place during the 1980’s and 1990’s (particularly in 1997). In Tunisia, a violent wave of repression was directed against every part of the movement in 1981, and then again in 1987, and the political climate is no more favorable to Islamists today than it was more than 15 years ago. In the nineties, certain Iraqis emigrated at the beginning of the Gulf war in 1991 and from 1995 onwards some members of the Sahwa Islamiyya movement close to the Muslim Brotherhood left Saudi Arabia, with the same destination—Great Britain—, to escape government repression from a regime that no longer accepted criticism of its Islamic legitimacy by the Islamist movement [International Crisis Group, 2004]. Globally, the waves of migration toward Europe have now slowed down considerably because of immigration and labor policies on the part of most European countries that are more and more restrictive. During this same period, other members of the mb arrived in Europe as students, mostly since the 1960’s, their numbers varying essentially in relation to disturbances at the international level. Some students were already sympathetic to the ideas of the mb before arriving in Europe, but many discovered those ideas after arriving. This flow of students was significant up to the middle of the 1980’s, and then dropped off precipitously: student scholarship support increased significantly as regards opportunities for study in the United States and in Australia, while more the exchange of information between them. Although it devoted most of its attention to Muslim countries, three committees out of nine in that bureau dealt with the Muslim minorities that were found in the United States, in the Soviet Union and in Europe [Mitchell, 1969:172–174]. We have no further information about the seriousness of these activities; it is nonetheless very probable that they did not get very far, given that the emphasis at that time was always placed on national causes.

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restrictive policies in Europe with regard to immigration and labor made immigrating to Europe difficult, except for family members of persons who had already immigrated to Europe, and political refugees. We note finally that certain Muslims of the second generation, born in Europe, consider themselves to be members of the mb. In most cases these persons were socialized so as to accept the ideology of the Brotherhood, thanks to family connections, matrimonial connections, or through involvement in a mb association which they may have joined. In accordance with local organisational dynamics, more or less integrationist towards young people, these latter (cf. second generation Muslims) invested themselves more or less assiduously in the Islamic work begun by previous generations of the Brotherhood. All the while sometimes clearly demonstrating their concerns with the crises, particularly humanitarian, taking place in the Muslim world, they demonstrate a sensitivity acquired towards European cultures. These ‘sociological generations’ overlap and coexist in Europe. Taking the articulation of their specific characteristics into account seems to be as, if not more determining in the understanding of ongoing dynamics, than the specific theological or ideological positions of any given leader. The persons involved, with their different life experiences, must equally come to adjust themselves to the context of their environment. In the beginning, these political exiles and students considered their religious practice to be very important, and they attempted to make contact with other Muslims, Brothers or not. They were conscientious about their obligations in religious terms, and they organized themselves at the local level in order to practice their religion in a collective manner, for Islam is not lived as a strictly private practice. Friday prayers were held at first in private homes or in other locations to the extent that these became available. The majority of these persons had come to Europe not knowing whether they would stay permanently, but many of them did decide to stay. Those who stayed gradually expanded their community involvement and eventually formed a multi-dimensional Islamic religious community.

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2. Organizational structures2 At first, the Muslim Brotherhood organized inward-facing groups, but then it changed its perspective and became, beginning in the 1980’s and 1990’s, a powerful engine for the community as a whole. Beside the initial (re)constitution of links between people originating from the same country where the Brothers are careful to re-create some of their internal structures, notably the ‘families’,3 to continue mobilising common energies towards these native countries, the Muslim Brothers invest progressively at the level of local European scenes. The movement involved itself in communities in many ways: religious organizations, specialized associations (humanitarian, youth oriented, cultural, etc.), and involvement in the official representation of their religion in relation to the State, then to the European Institutions. From an individual point of view, they attempted above all to meet the concrete needs of their coreligionists through setting up local networks of solidarity involving students or persons sharing a political viewpoint. In 1954, the son-in-law of Hassan Al-Bannā, Saʿīd Ramadān, arrived in Europe after having succeeded in escaping from Egypt and crossing through several Muslim countries. A charismatic intellectual, who de facto represents the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe, he wrote a doctoral dissertation in English, entitled Islamic Law: its scope and equity, in which he demonstrated with the vitality and pertinence of Islamic law. He defended this dissertation at the University of Cologne, in Germany, where he also contributed to the installation of the Islamic Center of Munich, which would later become an important source of federative activity4 and which aimed to gather and train those young Muslims based temporarily in Europe in order that they could then dynamise Islamic militancy once returned to their native countries. At the beginning of 2 For a detailed analysis of the articulations existing between the organisational structures which comprise the ‘fields’ of the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe, see our book on the mouvance of the Muslim Brotherhood. 3 Small groups for exchanging ideas, solidarity or life-long learning. 4 For a biased contribution concerning this part of history, insufficiently contextualized and the little aware of the complexity of multiple dynamics within contemporary Islamism, see the journalistic article by I. Johnson, who from the title onward attempts to establish abusive comparisons between Nazism and Islamism, and to attach these accusations to the Muslim Brotherhood of earlier history. See I. Johnson (2005), ‘How a Mosque for ex-Nazis Became Center of Radical Islam’ in The Wall Street Journal, July 12, 2005.

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the 1960’s, in Geneva, he created an Islamic center in the Eaux-Vives neighborhood. He tried above all to help political refugees who had escaped repression in Egypt, or in other Arab countries. According to a witness, his Islamic Center appears nonetheless to be patronized mainly by Turks, as at that time the Egyptian intelligence services had kept the center under surveillance, and menaced Egyptian patrons.5 During this period, in Great Britain, where Saʿīd Ramadān maintained many contacts, the Muslim Welfare House (mwh), a group of houses that assisted Arab students by furnishing them rooms, a library, and prayer rooms, was established.6 This network was the first point of arrival for dozens of students. These accommodations allowed them to make contact very quickly with other students, who could assist them with their administrative paperwork. Moreover, beginning in 1962, some members formalized their association in the form of a Muslim collective open to students at British universities: they established the Muslim Student Society (mss), and then, in collaboration with some Muslim students from the Indian subcontinent, the Federation of Students’ Islamic Societies (fosis). Both organizations were made up of individual universities’ organizations of Muslim students;7 the first was almost exclusively made up of Arabic speakers, while the second was more diverse in its ethnic composition. University Muslim Student Unions are above all concerned with protecting the Muslim identity of theses students and to meet their training needs before they return to their own countries where they occupy leading positions; they thus organise multiple activities. At the national level, the mss gradually organized two major annual meetings, featuring presentations from speakers of the highest order in accordance with the criteria of Islamic activism. For all those who could not go back to their home countries during school vacations, these events—which came to be associated more and more with festive and familial activities—constituted not only a spiritual and intellectual 5

Interview no. 60. Interview no. 08. 7 In 1962, we note, the creation of the ukim (uk Islamic Mission) took place too; this organization is ideologically close to the Jamā’at-i-Islami (Pakistan) and at that time aimed ‘at establishing an Islamic social order in Great Britain in order to please God’ (see their site www.ukim.org). Running out of steam now, this movement appears to agree in most respects with mb thinking as of the beginning of the 21st century: it works toward the propagation of Islam, by furnishing educational services to children, and tries to demonstrate to opinion makers that Islam remains invaluable in every period of time. Further, on the occasion of the death of the Egyptian Guide, Mustafa Mashhūr, in 2002, the ukim expressed its condolences ‘[to its] brothers and sisters in the Muslim Association of Britain’. 6

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resource, a way of deepening and strengthening their faith and their involvement in Islamic work, but also an occasion to make contact with people from across the country of Great Britain. Many of the students who arrived at that time now are numbered among the elite, although younger students must now try to make a place for themselves. In France, certain members of the mb took up positions in the Association of Islamic Students in France (aeif), which was created in 1963. This was the first such association on a national scale. Created by the Indian professor M. Hamidullah, this association includes a certain number of young (intellectuals) from various Muslim countries who discuss certain themes of Islamic thought. At the end of the 1970’s, some militants left the aeif in order to form the Islamic Group in France (gif), which included persons that would later form the initial core group of the uoif, the Union of Islamic Organizations in France, whose members shared the same methods of preaching, but who decided to subordinate themselves to the international organization of the Muslim Brotherhood [Marongiu, 2002:84]. Since the end of the 1990’s the aeif has ceased to exist as an organisation, even though some members continue to be personally active in the European Muslim scene. In Belgium, a fairly modest student group was created in 1964, under the name of the International Union of Muslim Students. Over the years this group held meetings, mostly at the Free University of Brussels.8 This organization, like those in Great Britain and France, includes members of the Brotherhood, but they are in contact there with Muslims of various tendencies. Links are also created beyond borders between students resident in Belgium and those in other countries, notably with the aeif and the uoif in France. These student organizations, therefore, were the first real organizational foundation for the mb in Europe. As an example of their growth, we may observe that the annual meetings of the Muslim Student Society originally attracted a few hundred persons, while in 1987–1988 in Manchester a conference drew close to 2000 people.9 The influence of the mb in Muslim communities became more important, especially during the 1980’s. They enjoy the intellectual support of the Muslim Brothers based in Muslim countries, given their capacity to address the concerns of their contemporaries. Despite the fact that

8 9

Interview no. 38. Interview no. 26.

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they were not numerous, they thus became relatively influential at the mosques that they attended. Some of these became important centers of regional activity. This was most often the case in mosques whose leaders demonstrated a dynamic attitude and a certain freedom of expression in their public speaking. For example, we may cite the ad-dawah mosque in Paris, the Al-Khalil mosque in Brussels, the Bilal Center in Aachen, Germany, all of which were characterized by their affiliation with the former leader of the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, ʿIssām Al-ʿAttār. He became the spiritual leader of a network of European Brothers called Talāʾiʿ (Avant-Garde),10 which is closely linked to the network made up of members of the Association of Islamic Students in France (aeif). The Muslim Brotherhood was slow in taking the significance of permanent implantation in Europe into account. But, progressively their priorities changed and they became more interested in diffusing their ideas among local populations. Thanks to associations, the mb were able to take advantage of a greater freedom of expression than that which had been available to them when their activities were confined to the interior of mosques. The Brotherhood does not wish to indispose local mosque leaders who could be questioned by the public authorities made suspicious about the Brothers’ movement either by pious Muslims— understood in the sense of believers attached to personal devotion but unfavourable to forms of militant Islam—who don’t wish for their place of worship to be associated with the Brotherhood. In the nineteen eighties, they place themselves at the disposal of the community, creating places of worship and participating in their management. They assist their fellow worshippers in understanding their faith, that’s to say, according to them with a less traditionalist vision, more pedagogic and modern where the collective dimension of being Muslim is presented as primordial. They also developed activities to meet the needs of women and children; specific local sections were opened to women sometimes, and some activities were adapted for them. They thus give Arabic language or Islamic religion classes to mosque-going children. For example, Hassan Iquioussen, a young preacher of the second generation, of Moroccan origin, founder and first president of the Young Muslims of France (jmf), began to give conferences in French in order to encourage more conscientious observance of religious obligations, and

10 A few years ago, the name of this network changed to Al-Muntada Al-Islami fī Urubbā (Islamic Forum Europe).

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to encourage community involvement, reaching out to persons who did not know Arabic, especially young people. Holiday camps are organised with an emphasis on relaxation and spirituality. At the same time, some scouting associations were established, such as the Muslim Scout Association of Great Britain.11 Some brothers also began to invest themselves as teachers of Islamic religion in the Belgian public education network where courses on Islamic religion have been introduced since 1978. During this time, certain “families” and/or certain associations established connections. Gradually, they formed local networks, then regional ones. Then national federations grouped together these local and regional networks, forming platforms for exchanges which, officially, involved hundreds of mosques or European cultural associations: this took place quite rapidly, at first in Germany (from 1958 on) with the Islamic Union (Islamitische Gemeinschaft in Deutschland), but also in France, with the Union of Islamic Organizations in France (uoif; from 1983), and later, in 1997, the Muslim Association of Britain (mab) and the Islamic Intercultural League of Belgium (liib). But there are many other such organizations, because national federations of this type have emerged in many countries: the League of Swiss Muslims (lms, founded in 1992), the Union of Islamic Communities and Associations in Italy (ucoii, founded in 1990 as a result of collaboration between the Islamic Center of Milan and the student unions’ network, the Union of Muslim Students in Italy), etc. These national federations provided a higher public profile to all of the Muslim Brotherhood’s organisational structures, and thus ensured better external recognition of their members and their activities even though these reach large numbers of Muslims who are not directly affiliated to the organisational Muslim brotherhood. These organizations were linked together as parts of the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe (fioe in English), which is in sympathy with the message of the founders of the mb. This organization is relatively new: it was founded in 1989, under the influence of the increasing importance of European

11 In recent years, the Muslim Welfare House changed its program of activities, orienting them more directly toward all members of the community, because the number of students had diminished very greatly since the middle of the 1980’s: today it offers job search services, and a number of instructional courses including informatics.

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dynamics.12 It claims to unite organizations in 26 European countries, and all the national federations that are its members are supposed to follow similar objectives, such as issues of preservation and the distribution of a holistic Islamic culture where the sense of community belonging is reinforced, and integration of Muslims as European citizens or the positive role of Muslims in society are valorised. As for the fioe, it establishes organisms that play a role in community organization. It encourages the foundation of Islamic schools, and played a role, for example, in the creation of the European Institute for Human Sciences (iesh) based at Chāteau-Chinon, with associated facilities in Paris and at Lampeter in Great Britain, which offers Islamic training for imams and professors of religion. The fioe also plays a role in financial matters, in connection with the European Trust, which raises money in order to insure the continuation of certain projects. The Federation was involved in the creation of the European Council for Fatwa and Research (cefr)13 in 1997, an organism that attempts to develop minority-oriented jurisprudence in an effort to respond to problems experienced by European Muslims. Thus the Muslim Brotherhood is at the origin of these initiatives, although their success at this hour remains only partial as regards the larger population. Not everyone is in agreement with this monopolistic attempt to organize European Muslims and to talk in their name. At the same time, the Brotherhood has involved itself in more and more diversified activities. Some members are personally involved in a variety of Islamic humanitarian initiatives. For example the international organization of British origin, Islamic Relief (created in 1984). Other members have even created structures of this type, for example, charitable 12 Immediately external to the mb movement, there exist other international assemblies, competitors to an extent, more pluralistic, which aspire to play a role both political and religious, although for them, this is not a priority. This category includes above all the Council for Islamic Cooperation (since 1996), which in 2003 became known as the Muslim Council for Cooperation in Europe. Created before the cefr, this council also intends to represent Muslim interests and to constitute a European Council on jurisprudence. It brings together a number of directors of mosques initially closed to the aeif network such as Ad-dawah (Paris), Al-Khalil (Brussels), Bilal (Aachen), among others. Still, whether by reason of lack of ambition or lack of organization, this forum for exchanges is not used very much by its members; it remains on standby, which allows the fioe to take the dominant role with regard to the representation of European Muslims (despite the existence of a third initiative that is autonomous with regard to the Brotherhood’s movement, the European Islamic Conference, eic, that appears at least capable of stimulating federative energies). 13 For more information about this agency, see Chapter 13.

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organizations like the Committee for Assistance and Solidarity with Palestine (cbsp) in France, Al-Aqsa Humanitaire in Belgium and Germany, and Interpal in Great Britain. They have also established think tanks groups for research on Islamic economics, such as the Center for Study and Research on Islamic Economics, which toward the middle of the 1980’s in Brussels grouped together a number of students of economic sciences for the purpose of discussing Islamic economics and alternative contemporary doctrines, especially liberalism and Marxism. Some members eventually became involved in actual banking structures, such as Takafol S.A., Faisal Finance in Luxembourg, or the Muslim Investment Corporation Ltd. (in London), or went to work with financial counseling or investment organizations such as Interestrust (which attempts to complement humanitarian work by other associations, through teaching Muslims about compound interest) or First Ethical (Great Britain). There are organizations that group together young people born in Europe, that place themselves within the (ideological) mouvance of the Brotherhood. Such associations are created in a relatively independent manner, although they may be partially based on ideological affinities, such as in the Union of Young Muslims (ujm, Lyon) or the Muslim Presence network which appears to be separate from the partisan dynamic of the Brotherhood. Other organizations are closer to the Brotherhood in organizational terms, like the Young Muslims of France (jmf) or the Muslim Students of France (emf, successor to another student organization influenced by the Brotherhood, the uisef), affiliated with the Union of Islamic Organizations in France. The emf stands out after 2003 for its successful incorporation of its student unions in the Managing Bodies of Student councils even if this provoked a stir in France. In Great Britain, we may mention the Islamic Society of Britain (isb)—based on a chaotic partnership between the mb and former members of the group known as Jamāʾat-i-Islami—and its branch for young people, the Young Muslims Organisation uk (ymouk). In Belgium, no such initiative appears to have arisen, due to lack of interest or lack of communication among young people, but this could also be due to the fact that the Muslim Presence network has grown rapidly as a center for mobilization of young militants, whose numbers remain quite small. During the 1990’s, links were also established between some of the above-mentioned organizations and an organism devoted to international Muslim youth, the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (wamy), which although based in Kuwait, was created through the involvement

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of the mb. Beginning in 1996, the Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student Organisations (femyso), based in Brussels, was set up as a platform for exchanges, grouping together certain youth-oriented organizations linked to various national federations influenced by the movement of the Brotherhood (these federations were in turn grouped together in the fioe). Once again, this youth-oriented organization appeared to want to maintain its independence from the Brotherhood, although certain interpersonal and organizational connections are known to exist.14 The mb was also involved at the level of individual members in organisms devoted to representing Muslims in their relations with various States, such as the Muslim Council of Britain (mcb), the Muslim Executive of Belgium (emb) or the French Council of Muslim Worship (cfcm). They generally manage to obtain a significant number of seats in these bodies (of Muslim representation) even if they have to pact with representatives from other Muslim movements or ideological currents. They are often inescapable, and much more influential than the number of their members should allow, notably thanks to the absence of representation for the silent majority of Muslims from every country. Still in relation to their (pre)-political investment, a certain number of leaders in Europe have put themselves forward as spokespersons for branches of the Brotherhood established in Muslim countries, in order to lobby in the West for the worthiness of their cause. One such leader is Gamal Al-Helbawy, of Egyptian origin, who established temporarily the Muslim Brotherhood Information Center in London as a sort of wire service aimed at the Western press.15 His aim was to explain the point

14 femyso is trying to escape from being embedded in the body of mb activities, but innovative positions still appear difficult to undertake and questionable connections are maintained with Islamic youth organizations such as the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (wamy, see the article [Vidino, 2005] which makes reference to establishment of positions subsequently adopted by this organization concerning the Jews). mb partisans were a good stepping stone for this European organization, concerning their own replacement, but it appears difficult to shake loose completely from the Brotherhood framework in order to develop perspectives that are really Muslim and European at the same time. 15 Gamal Al-Helbawy explains that he came to Great Britain in order to represent and defend this cause following a decision taken by ‘some of the members of the mb of Great Britain and in other places’ (the identity of these persons was not disclosed). Now it appears that the original decision was not taken with the permission of higher Egyptian authorities within the Brotherhood movement, and that Gamal Al-Helbawy was forced

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of view of Egyptian members of the Brotherhood who had been thrown into prison following several waves of arrests in 1995, and who had subsequently been judged in an arbitrary fashion before military tribunals.16 Such was also the case with a certain number of Tunisian exiles, members of the Tunisian branch of Al-Nahda, who attempted to support political prisoners and to develop relationships of solidarity with their families. At the annual Salon of the uoif in Paris, they were in the habit of setting up a kiosk to publicize this situation. The Syrian leader Ali Sadr Al-Din Bayanuni, speaking from exile in London soon after the turn of the 21st century, attempted to make the voice of Syrian Brothers heard. In similar fashion, but with regard to a singular event, members of the Libyan branch got together in London in front of the Libyan Embassy to protest the arbitrary sentencing of a political prisoner.17 In fact, the partisans who decided to limit themselves to involvement in their own national branches are quantitatively a minority within the movement. Furthermore, they have not really had any impact, not even within the national federations: by making a choice to involve themselves only in their own national causes, they have found themselves relatively isolated. Still, in Great Britain, since the beginning of the 21st century, the Muslim Association of Britain (mab), followed by the recent platform, the British Muslim Initiative (bmi) have established bridges by associating themselves with association-related, union-related, and political actors who are not Muslims; this has permitted them to emerge from their isolation and to consolidate their position in order to promote causes such as an end to Israeli occupation of Palestine and the war in Iraq. Over and above their skills in the social and intellectual area, taken in the largest sense (as we shall observe in the following section, in relation to the circulation of ideas), the mb has extended these skills, with more or less success, to the religious sphere proper since the 1990’s. In relation to secularization, that is, modern differentiation and specialization of spheres in Europe,18 which has engendered and consolidated the

to stop the initiative, as if the Brotherhood could not accept there being any representation outside of Europe not under their control. (Interview no. 5). 16 A competing initiative, the Egyptian Action Group (whose links to the Egyptian national affiliates are not clearly established) was also begun in the mid-1990’s to promote the cause of Egyptian mb political prisoners. Interview no. 13. 17 Interview no. 35 18 A process emphasized in classic functionalist theory; see especially Talcott Parsons, Societies: evolutionary and comparative perspectives, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-

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autonomization of religious persons and religious institutions, the mb have experimented with a new field of action: they are as it were pushed in the direction of a sphere that they did not occupy, historically speaking, in Muslim countries, a sphere that benefited from the independence it was recognized to possess in Europe. The mb eventually discovered in the religious sphere a new space in which to maneuver, and they have been fairly effective at operating within it. On one hand, although most of the people who are connected to the movement have been and remain committed lay persons, we have observed a phenomenon of clericalization, in the sense of specialization and professionalization of a religious nature (cognitive, ritualistic, educational and even cultural, etc.) on the part of certain people within the mb movement. Such behavior is not typical, but this accentuation of clericalization is still significant. It is more or less the action of a few immigrants of the first generation, although some young people are beginning to become involved in the process. Their professionalization has to do with their possession of a certain knowledge or know-how that shows itself either in regard to religious interpretation or religious organization (having to do with locales for worship, with education,19 with representing Muslims, etc.). Just the same, this phenomenon is entirely dependent on grants of public and/or private money. Otherwise, its existence is often precarious. On another hand, we have observed that the mb tries to get involved directly in the areas controlled by religious authorities, and the movement appears more closely linked to these areas than it once did. Such is the case with the creation of the European Institute for Human Sciences at Chāteau-Chinon, and the European Council for Fatwa and Research, already mentioned.

Hall, 1966 (French translation: Sociétés. Essai sur leur évolution comparée, Paris, Dunod, 1973), but also Robert N. Bellah, “Religious Evolution”, in American Journal of Sociology, (XIX), 1954: 358–374. 19 In this decade schools have also been established by certain associations, but only in a very limited way. Thus in France we could point to the private lycee for Muslims, Averroes, and in Great Britain the Muslim Association of Britain has at least one school for its Manchester section, with some students. The Islamic school of Avicenna was opened in Brussels in September 2007 from the Al-Khalil mosque. On another hand the associations are frequently used for Koranic training and other activities, especially for children, on weekends.

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3. Diffusion and circulation in the production of meaning In parallel with this organizational activity, the mb circulated their ideas and points of view via many channels of communication. Alongside their training circles—which are reserved for their members—, preaching in mosques—exceptionally retransmitted via the Internet20—, they publish brief newsletters that are distributed in various Islamic centers (such as the quarterly Bulletin du centre islamique de Genève or the Essence ciel published by the mosque of Mons-en-Baroeul in France); they also organise numerous conferences on extremely diverse subjects.21 However we can organise them in three overall categories.

20

For example, the preaching of Ahmad Jaballah, from the Parisian center of the Union of Islamic Organizations in France. 21 Conferences are currently organised during meetings which take place over a day or more at which they become transformed into a veritable place of convivial stays where food and lodging are organised in an often simple or indeed summary fashion. For example accommodation is organised in university lodgings or in a commercial exhibition hall (where numerous families find themselves sleeping on the floor in sleeping bags). We participated concretely in around thirty such days thanks to the Salon du Bourget organised by the Union of Islamic Organisations of France which represents the most important demonstration in terms of scale (tens of thousands of Muslims come during 4 days). It’s held annually over the Easter weekend around themes related to religious education such as the reading of Islam, religious practice, freedom of religion. In total we spent eight days there. Equally in Belgium, several colloquies or study days have been set up by members of the Islamic Intercultural League of Belgium (we participated in a total of five days). Amongst other things they concern exposes organised in the context of Women’s day but also on themes such as commitment, Palestine, the treasures of Islamic civilisation or the family. In Great Britain, the Muslim Association of Britain organises an annual day for all its members at national level, in London. In one such day, the orthodox subject of Islam as Mercy for mankind is emphasised. During a seminar organised by one of the local branches, Glasgow, training for Islamic activism caught our attention (in the course of two days). We also participated in the annual camp of the Federation of Students’ Islamic Societies (fosis) in Nottingham in 2003 on the subject of the role and responsability of Muslim students in the 21st century (three days). Then we attended the residential course organised by the Islamic Foundation of Leicester, around the history of Palestine and its importance for Muslim heritage in collaboration with the humanitarian organisation Friends of Al-Aqsa (two days). Another colloquy this time in Birmingham, was organised by the Association of Muslim Social Scientists (amss) which concerns Islam in higher education (two days). Other colloquies of a day or several hours duration are also organised by local organisations; they gather several tens of people, sometimes several hundreds. They take place in mosques, in public auditoria or in university buildings. They address themes as wide as Islam as a way of living, secularism (Lille), the practise of Islam in European legal systems (Bordeaux), the diversity of religions and common values, the Muslim woman (Paris), fasting at Ramadan (London), citizenship (Liège), reflections on theology (Louvain-la-Neuve), male/female relations, humour in Islam (Verviers), Islamophobia, Islamist feminism, marriage, the family, the hijab, Islam in Europe, scholarly success, political work, youth, conscience

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Certain themes are more classic from a religious point of view, touching on orthopraxy or religious orthodoxy (with the exception of a debate about contemporary reflections in the subject of Islamic theology). Others come back to themes habitually or traditionally recognised as related to the Muslim Brotherhood such as Islam as a way of living, the unity of Muslims, Islamic activism and the Palestinian question or commitment. Still other themes concern more contemporary questions which relate more to social relations and/or the problems of society. It seems to us nevertheless difficult at this stage to draw conclusions on the basis of these observations, except to recognise that the first and third categories seem to now occupy a space within the discursive field of the Muslim Brotherhood. In fact, no deduction seems directly possible from the fact that themes traditionally seen as being of the Muslim Brotherhood in the strict sense are less present than others. It actually seems that these specific themes are often reflected in exposés related to other topics. The Brotherhood has no hesitation in making use of modern channels of communication, as shown by the fact that their conferences are often announced on Internet websites (the websites of their own associations, or pluralistic Islamic sites, such as Oumma.com in France) or by e-mail. They also publish books and audio and video cassettes (of, but not exclusively so, their conferences),22 articles in magazines and newspapers, and articles published in newspapers, journals and several websites (some but not all belonging to their organisations). They arrange to appear on radio and television programs, both Arabic and European; such programs play a predominant role in the circulation of ideas. Certain leaders now maintain their own websites or blogs, which facilitates a permanent point of contact between militants, and beyond. Beginning in the 1960’s, regular publications began to appear. Th e Muslim Student Society (mss) published a magazine called Sawt Al-Ghoraba (The voice of the foreigner, published from 1964 to 1993),23

and solidarity, unity in diversity, education of children, integration and radicalisation (Brussels) etc. 22 For a list of cassettes available in France and Great Britain during the 1980’s up to the early 1990’s, see http://www.lib.umich.edu/area/Near.East/MELANotes7374/ fabdulrazak.pdf. For a list of what is theoretically still available today, see the catalogue of Mediacom, an Amiens based company. 23 The first covers of this magazine are shown on the mss website. By keeping the same name all these years, the editorial policy once again symbolizes the difficulty the Brotherhood has in thinking of itself as taking part in the European context. This conception

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and the Association of Islamic Students in France (aeif) published Le musulman until the middle of the 1990’s. The Muslim Welfare House (mwh) began a series of sponsored translations, and published a number of important works by Islamic thinkers. The son-in-law of Hassan Al-Bannā, Saʿīd Ramadān, restarted the publication of the weekly newspaper Al-Muslimun as soon as he established himself in Geneva, in 1961 (publication continued until 1967); the magazine Al-Islam was published by the Islamic Center of Munich from 1958 on. In 1972, the magazine Al-Rāʾid (The Pioneer) was founded by ʿIssām Al-ʿAttār (exeader of the Syrian mb), in Aachen, Germany. In July 2007, this magazine had published some 260 numbers and its content had developed in a cultural direction, more so than a strictly political one. All these magazines produced in Europe functioned as barometers of historic and contemporary Islamist thought. But they also were the expression of attitudes that were sometimes quite different from each other. These publications, like the others mentioned below, have never received a detailed analysis; such research is necessary if we are to understand the manner in which the subjects and the debates dealt with in these publications developed. Beginning in the 1970’s, many translations of Islamist works (especially in French and English), linked to the mb movement, were distributed in Europe thanks to a free distribution service provided by the International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations (iifso), based in Kuwait. As for the monthly magazine of the Egyptian mb AlDaʿwa (The message), published in Egypt from January 1951 to September 1981 (with some interruptions), its publication was resumed from London in the 1980’s, and it continued to be distributed until 2002. According to a person who worked for that magazine, the point was to keep a symbol alive, even though at the beginning of the new century there were only 2700 subscribers worldwide.24 Cassette recordings of speeches by participants in the annual meetings of the mss or the fosis which speak in particular about the awakening of the Muslim world and the ways to proceed to reinforce this happening, were circulated

appeared to be modified in the 1990’s. Besides, if the magazine had remained attentive to current international developments, the number for December 1993 marked a turning point because it was devoted to a theme presented for the first time, that of the future of Islam in Great Britain (including photographs of young women wearing veils, studying in classes). 24 Interview no. 13.

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throughout Europe; they even reached the Arab world, according to the testimony of a member of the Muslim Brotherhood from Libya.25 In the 1990’s, other publications emerged, such as the weekly newsletter Risalat al-Ikhwan, published beginning in 1995 from London. Published in Arabic, this newsletter was distributed in both a paper and an electronic version; it is a body that maintains links between the members of the various national branches of the Muslim Brotherhood. The magazine Al-Europiyya, also in Arabic, was created in 1998 by the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe (fioe), and targeted members of its national (European) federations. It reported generally on its activities and those of the national federations. It provided overall information regarding situations and changes within Muslim communities in Europe, and also presented information relative to the dialogue between Islam and Christianity, reflections on faith, etc. Sometimes it featured an in-depth article concerning a theme of general interest, for example, informatics, biotechnology, international relations, etc. Its distribution remained limited; only about 700 copies were distributed in France, and about the same number in other countries, some going to Islamic centers, some going to individual subscribers.26 This publication never became very popular, mainly because it was in Arabic, and because some national federations began to publish their own magazines. The Union of Islamic Organizations of France has published since April 2004 a few numbers of the magazine Actualis, which presents examinations in depth of contemporary subjects, with contributions from intellectuals who are not members of the uoif, including non-Muslims. Th is was a real attempt at producing a publication of general interest and high quality, intended for all people (issues concentrating on feminism, television, etc.), that approached certain questions relative to religion, Islam, and Muslims in particular with a certain degree of discretion. The Muslim Association of Britain published Reflections, a newsletter written by student members of the mab. Its ambitions were more modest than those of some other publications, and it concentrated on reporting and on people sharing their life experiences. There was also Trends Magazine, published by the Young Muslims uk organization. In general terms, these initiatives, which emerged after 2000, have often been the

25 26

Interview no. 26. Interview no. 44.

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product of the youth organizations, or have been partially managed on their own account by young people from such organizations. We cannot consider them as Muslim Brotherhood publications pure and simple, but their content attests their connection with the thought of the Brotherhood, in a more and more contextualized form. Publishing houses were also established, including Tawhid Editions, connected to the Union of Young Muslims, in Lyon (ideologically close to the Muslim brotherhood, although they appear to be independent of the latter): this company published introductory books and popularizations of Islamic thought and jurisprudence, and children’s books in French, intended as spiritual resources and for Islamic training (the brothers Tariq and Hani Ramadan as well as Hassan Iquioussen are their top authors, although the list of authors they publish continues to lengthen). We may also mention two publishers connected to the Union of Islamic Organizations in France: Mediacom, based in Amiens, which initially specialized in audiovisual production (the company has produced an impressive collection of cassettes and books in Arabic, by authors and preachers who are members of the Brotherhood) and the Gedis company (Groupe Edition, Diffusion, Services), based in Bobigny, which publishes and takes charge of organizing cultural productions. We recall also the company Editions Arrissala in France. In Great Britain certain publishing houses, without being connected to the Muslim Brotherhood, publish works related to it. Such is the case with the Islamic Foundation,27 the TaHa Publishing House, Awakening uk, and a number of others. A certain number of publications in English, coming from India or from Egypt, and published by companies such as El-Falah or Islamic Inc. in Cairo and Lancers Books in New Delhi also are circulated in this country. We mention for example the book ‘Islam—Moderate Legislation for Progressive Nation’, by Muhammad 27 The Islamic Foundation in an institution initially founded by members of the Pakistani Islamist school Jamāʾāt-i-Islami, that is very close to the Brotherhood. Some of its members still have ties to the movement, but others are independent from it and involved in seeking new perspectives in an effort to constitute British Islam. This institution offers different services: it concentrates on publication of works by intellectuals of the Jamāʾāt-i-Islami or other Muslims (such as Tariq Ramadan or scholars associated with the Islamic Foundation unit called “Islam in Europe”, which was formed to pursue academic research into contemporary Islam), but it also hosts the Markfield Institute of Higher Education (mihe), which offers Masters specialising in Islamic economics. With a view to achieving openness to society, the centre offers open training sessions on Islam, destined for any civil servant who wishes to take part.

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Higab, published by El-Falah in 1997, that was given to me by a Libyan Brother who told us that this work largely represents the thinking of the contemporary Brotherhood.28 In basing itself on the Suras of the Koran and the hadiths, but in never as such evoking the history of the Muslim Brotherhood, this work claims to present ‘true’ Islam. It notably explains how to read and interpret the Koran’s message, the ‘last message for humanity’. It also recalls the principals for the functioning of an adequate mosque and for religious transmission and the virtues of moderation which all true Muslims must respect. This book constitutes a genuinely practical guide where the question of the Muslim State is never evoked while the project to constitute a transnational Muslim nation appears to be implicitly supported, based on respect for Islamic norms for each particular individual. From the beginning of the nineties, an additional step is taken with the establishment of spaces for private higher education, research bodies and the diffusion of public knowledge that become connected to public universities, notably in Great Britain. We may cite the example of the European Institute for Human Sciences (iesh), which we have already mentioned and which covers classic Islamic subjects.29 Azzam Tamimi’s Institute of Islamic Political Thought (iipt) in London offers shortterm workshops on Islamic political thought. The prestigious Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies, founded in 1985 as an institution associated with Oxford University to encourage the study of Islam and the Islamic world, appears independent from the organisational dynamics of the brotherhood. Nevertheless, some of its members or researchers demonstrate ideological or even organisational proximity to the brotherhood. Another private centre, the Centre for Islamic Studies, affiliated to the University of Wales at Lampeter also seems to attract a certain number of those sensitive to the Islamic movement, from Europe and from the Muslim world; this attribute results in part from the presence of the Iraqian doctor Mawil Izzi Dien, specialist in Muslim law and the ecological concerns set out in Islam. Moreover, some brothers, be they professors or students also have the possibility of attending an academic institute such as the Al-Maktoum Institute directed by Abd Al-Fattah

28

Interview no. 35. For a brief presentation of the courses offered in this institute in the 1990’s, see Frégosi, 1998. 29

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El-Awaisi in Dundee, and especially his Institute for Islamic Jerusalem Studies (now known as the Islamic Research Academy—isra). Affiliated with the University of Aberdeen, this private institute promotes research concerning Jerusalem while seeking also to promote the central nature of the faith and identity of Muslims. In offering student grants, in organising annual colloquies on this subject—which Yūsuf Al-Qaradāwī and numerous non-Muslim personalities have attended—and in publishing the Journal of Jerusalem Islamic Studies (7 volumes), this institute has contributed to reinforcing, in the academic and historical fields in particular, the legitimacy of the Islamic character of the city of Jerusalem. The presence of the Muslim Brotherhood is also attested on the Internet where, independent of the websites of the many national branches, in Arabic, and the sites of numerous associations mentioned, 30 other links also exist. Thus certain sites, outside of any formal connection with the movement, pick up and further diffuse some item of news in which the Muslim Brotherhood has taken action in some manner. We cite mainly the most prolific sites: islamiyya.net, saphirnet.info and oumma. com, all based in France, but also the pluralist Muslim site islamonline. net, based in Cairo, at once arabophone and anglophone. Finally, since the beginning of the first decade of the 21st century, two new tendencies have appeared or have been strengthened. They are still in their beginnings but their importance lies in their promise with regard to new perspectives. On one hand, the Brotherhood is more and more involved in the production of meaning in the name of the sphere of Muslim religious authorities. Not only has the fioe directly initiated the creation of the European Council for Fatwa and Research (cefr), which since 1997 has tried to embody ‘the major Islamic authority in Europe’. In ‘working simultaneously with traditional and modern interpretations’ the cefr tries to ‘ensure that Muslims remain connected to the Islamic norms’ [Caeiro, 2008]. But, in July 2004, during the annual conference of the Muslim Association of Britain in London, Yūsuf Al-Qaradāwī inaugurated the first meeting of the members of the International Union of Muslim Scholars (iums) which brought together dozens (perhaps hundreds ?) of scholars. This network adopted from that time closely argued religious positions with regard to certain themes (for example, hostage taking), but especially political positions. The network aims at

30

See list of documents.

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promoting cooperation between Sunni Muslims and Shiites. In London there is an institute for the diffusion of knowledge, the Islamic Institute for Development and Research (iidr), which promotes knowledge about Islam based on the publication of a group of small books and cassettes that intend to provide answers to questions that are pertinent in the light of the contemporary context. This institute seeks above all to bring young people together with religious scholars, especially through stimulating reflection and research on Muslim thought. These initiatives are intended to fill a gap in the activity of the Muslim Brotherhood which, for 20 years, has appeared to recognize the difficulties involved in developing its thought and Muslim thought in general. On the other hand, certain brothers are henceforward inclined to take part in pluralist debates without necessarily being contradictory, especially on the occasion of study days and colloquies organized by the International Institute of Islamic Thought (iiit), based in London and Paris.31 Generally speaking, they henceforward establish links with academics with a view to initiating scientific, quality process, and not just to acquire the rubber stamp of democracy designed to re-assure political authorities as interpreted by Gilles Kepel [Kepel, 2004]. Certain groups also are trying to become real institutes of training and counseling, open to the general public, with regard to certain delicate subjects such as Islamic political thought (see the iipt mentioned above) or terrorism (with the creation of the Center for the Study of Terrorism by Gamal Al-Helbawy). Based on their knowledge of Islamic tendencies from the inside, these researchers and speakers can claim to be the most competent with regard to the diffusion of this information. This institute appears all the more interesting since it is presented as capable of aiding Europeans to resolve problems that arise with the Muslim world, although this approach does not seem free of ambiguity concerning the taking into account of Western interests. Over and above this welter of initiatives, certain initiatives remain very local and or an influence that largely goes beyond the number of their members. Besides the sites in Arabic, it is now easier to have access to productions of the Brotherhood, in European languages.

31

Although this institute was originally founded by persons who were or had been close to the Brotherhood movement, the members of the two offices below mentioned seem totally independent from this dynamic. Moreover, some of its publications have expressed a virulent critique of the mb movement. See for example [al ʿAlwānī, 1996].

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4. The importance of the Muslim Brotherhood today in the Muslim communities of Europe The Brotherhood constitutes only one tendency among many others within European intellectual space and their numerical importance is relatively marginal, because the silent majority of European Muslims do not belong to a specific ideological tendency and they are not attached to specific practices: only a minority is moved to attach itself to such tendencies and to seek involvement in particular groups. In fact, among the diverse structures that contain numbers of militants, certain organized movements undertake procedures that are relatively similar to those employed by the Brotherhood, even though these movements have roots in geographical origins other than those of the Brotherhood (such as Millī Görüs or Jamāʾat-i-Islami members). Others, in contrast, are radically different, or even contest the vision of the world that belongs to the Brotherhood, as is the case with certain milieux allied to the Wahhabi-Salafist movement, when they reject the contributions of European civilisation, or Sufi brotherhoods—who dispute the political use of religion, or even, in France, lay Muslims, who are more difficult to get hold of and who do not constitute a collective in the proper sense, unless this is understood as a merely temporary formation.32 The influence of the partisans of the Brotherhood within Muslim communities seems totally disproportionate in regards to their numerical weakness. They have been actors in the front rank since the 1960’s, and their influence grew especially rapidly during the 1980’s, thanks to their dynamism, and their tenacity, linked to the fact that they feel themselves invested in a mission in the name of Islam, thus their open attitude which pushes them to collaborate whenever possible with every part of the community, including collaboration with Muslims who are not part of the movement of the Brotherhood. Their prestige is above all the result of long-term educational activity, carried on in depth throughout the community. Their message insists notably on the preservation of Muslim identity envisaged in its collective dimension, and on the distinction to

32 For the current state of research on European Islam, see especially [Dassetto, 1996; Nielsen, 1992, 1999; Maréchal, Allievi, Dassetto, Nielsen, 2003].

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be made between beliefs and practices that belong to “authentic” Islam, and practices that are more like customs, related to local traditions. The mb has benefited otherwise from the ‘Islamic awakening’ that took place at the end of the 1970’s: it is at its strongest across the entire Muslim world, but its enthusiasm has spread also among the Muslims of Europe. The Brotherhood’s ideas also strike a chord with young people, and those who are not so young; they have become a panacea, without Muslims having realized this. They appear all the more legitimate because they have been worked into the fabric of a vision of the revitalization of the larger Muslim community. A Belgian imam, who was an adolescent during the 1980’s, tells the story of how he received an Islamic education at a mosque, instructed by Muslim Brotherhood students from the Maghreb. Only long afterward did this imam realize that his education had had an ideological content. Certainly, the studenteducators, initially very active in their home-country universities, went about spreading their ideas in very different ways: they gave courses on religion, organized round tables devoted to certain themes using a question and answer format, and organized activities outside the mosque, such as scouting activities and football games.33 Their objective was not so much to recruit young Europeans, since their cause appears to have been linked above all to the development of societies in which Muslims were a majority: they desired more than anything else to serve, and even to strengthen the Islamic community in the places where they were, and at the same time to keep in practice as militants, against the day when they would return to their home countries. In Europe they acquired additional field experience by sharing the lives of ordinary people from strata of society that they had not known well before. The intellectual qualities of certain members, their expertise and their motivations have led the Muslim Brotherhood to play a leadership role among Muslims—especially of Arab origin—who took up residence in Europe beginning in the 1960’s and who developed their religious system of references beginning in the 1970’s. The lack of leadership in immigrant communities, especially those whose members were originally from the Maghreb area, reinforced this tendency: the first generation of immigrants was composed essentially of people who emigrated for economic reasons, and who came from lower-class strata, often with little education, sometimes even illiterate. It is natural that the Muslim

33

Interview no. 68.

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Brotherhood should play a leadership role among them, if only in virtue of the more lively understanding possessed by the members of the Brotherhood concerning the cultural and political context in which they found themselves. Thus the Muslim Brotherhood contributed to the forging of the mentality of Muslims in Europe. In the ‘battle for Europe’ where some Islamic currents try to ensure the predominance of their conceptions in the Muslim community, most attempts to offer explanations about Islam are certainly well disputed between the heirs of the Muslim Brotherhood and the salafists [Kepel, 2004]. At least between 1980 and 2000, knowing that if the brothers remained largely discreet as members of a particular movement, they showed themselves capable of converting their scope for action, in investing themselves henceforward at the institutional level, on diverse national scenes and European levels. On both these levels, with different modern associations, the Brothers more or less managed to consolidate their ascendence in presenting themselves as the true defenders of Muslims, notably with respect to the world’s humanitarian crises34 And to causes (become) specifically sensitive to the Muslim world.35 They also succeeded in appearing as the official managers of the Muslim community: not only did they continue to train Muslim communities—essentially in terms of education but also in terms of legal opinions, from the creation of the European Council for Fatwa and Research, but they also played the role of spokesperson for Muslims in claiming for themselves an important section of power without consulting non-militant Muslims to take their positions into account.36 In the long term, the Brotherhood also propose concrete

34 See for example the unprecedented success of the demonstration on the 15th february 2003 which gathered two million people behind the slogans ‘Don’t attack Iraq’ and ‘Freedom for Palestine’ in London. In the context of British military investment in the Iraqi quagmire, the British Brothers of the Muslim Association of Britain didn’t hesitate to question politicians while the French Muslim Brothers restricted themselves to strictly humanitarian initiatives. 35 See for example the widely broadcast affair of the caricatures of the Prophet. The Brotherhood appeared as particularly mobilised against this expressed disrespect, according to them, against the Prophet. But, again, they acted using very different methods according to the country (see 16.2). 36 At the heart of the representative body of British Muslims—the Muslim Council of Britain (mcb), about 12 of the 70 person central working committee of 2002 were partisans of the Muslim brotherhood and 8 were very close to the movement. Muslim brotherhood sensibilities are thus over-represented in this body and thus proportionally over represented in relation to the real composition of the British Muslim population where Arab populations form a minority. In France in that year, the Union of Islamic

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initiatives which support the reinforcement of the religious community and aim to assure a kind of collective autonomisation of European Muslims: on an educational level (notably in encouraging the creation of schools), on a financial level (on the basis of ‘European waqf ’ which, investment in property aside, aims to secure the revenue of organisations) and on the legal level amongst others (cf. the above mentioned cefr whose symbolic importance seems important in spite of the weakness of its concrete achievements). The last major initiative of the fioe, worth to be mentioned, is their official presentation of the “European Muslim’s Charter” on the 10th of January 2008 in Brussels; it reveals the wish of the Muslim Brotherhood members to position themselves as representatives of all Muslims on the European scene. If the Brotherhood remains important today, its organizational dynamic is in the process of becoming weaker. Many internal and external factors explain this phenomenon. First of all, their project, which appears to have been difficult to redefine, has lost some of its attraction. Most Muslims with whom the historical message of the Brothers does resonate, nonetheless distance themselves from their ideology or are indifferent to it: often, they focus all the more on the method of understanding of the Islamic message taught by Hassan Al-Bannā, who underlined the globalizing character of Islam, and even the necessity of organizing for the purpose of promoting Islamic identity. But political utopi=a is partially excluded while the ideology appears dogmatic in certain respects, notably following the difficulties experienced by intellectual leaders in evolving in the light of the conditions of a radically different contemporary context. Generally speaking, there is a certain lassitude among militants, coupled to an evolution in mentalities that is favorable to ‘involvement at a distance’. Such involvement is increasingly less exclusive, less directional, and more often temporary in nature.37 In so far as these characteristics appear to disfavour the maintenance of the organisational Muslim brotherhood, they reinforce the attraction of the wahhabisalafist school, which appears more egalitarian and democratic, which

Organisations of France also won a majority of the seats at the heart of the national body representing Muslims—the Conseil Français du Culte Musulman (cfcm). 37 J. Ion (1997), La fin des militants ?, Paris, L’Atelier.

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is experiencing a certain success among European Muslims when these lack strong frames of reference with regard to their identity. And then, there are the different dynamics associated with the Brothers, sometimes complementary, and also sometimes in relative disagreement. There are Muslims whom we could characterize as ‘in opposition’ in this sense, that they counsel a kind of Islam that keeps a low profile in relation to the European society and/or an Islam that makes strong claims and tries hard to raise people’s consciousness with regard to situations in their home countries, and with regard to situations perceived as unjust in relation to Muslims, especially in Palestine, in Afghanistan or in Iraq. Others who counsel dialogue with the majority adopt the profile of those who seek to integrate themselves, that is, they center their discourse upon education, good behavior and citizenship. Situations of injustice do move them, but they prefer to take up constructive and pragmatic points of view in relation to local situations. This organizational diversity, coupled with the way in which they keep some of their practices very discreet or even secret within the movement of the Brotherhood, also blurs their image and makes it more difficult for them to gain new members. On the other hand, at the heart of the movement, and by the side of formal organizations established by the Brothers that have always met with a degree of success, there is a group of associations or networks that are more informal and more open, and that are in the process of being set up: these go beyond the associations of the Brotherhood proper, and indeed they compete with initiatives of longer standing. They appear to be aimed above all at young people, especially through the European Muslim Network, founded by Tariq Ramadan, or in Great Britain, the platform associated with the project The Radical Middle Way: beginning from a partnership established between the Federation of Students’ Islamic Societies, the ymouk and the staff of the Muslim magazine Q-News, young people attempt to answer questions that are pertinent to their lives as young British Muslims today. In comparison with other intra-Muslim schools of thought, it seems as if the Muslim brotherhood must progressively face up to the revitalisation of some currents. By this we mean some traditionalist schools of thought, the widespread distribution of wahhabi-salafism in Europe but also trends focussed on the spirituality and humanism of Islam. As for non-militant Muslims beyond the confines of any Muslim organisation, who constitute the silent majority, some are finding other and very

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varied means of reinforcing their religious learning, and are then seeking to broadcast their ideas, notably via the media. The majority of the leaders of these schools of thought aim to secure a certain authority of representation; they are no longer content to see their role confiscated by those who are expressing concepts distant from their own. Generally speaking, the Brotherhood now seem to be being questioned and put under the spotlight. But their clerics are proving themselves flexible in trying to find new areas in which to invest. And above all, the movement has given birth, sometimes in spite of itself, to independent figures of authority who, in exceeding the brothers’ programme constitute its extension. Moreover, if their ideas sometimes seem passé, or if they seem to have been a corrosion of their Islamic principles, that does not necessarily imply that they were lost from the outset. Here again, they have been perceptive. The example developed later which concerns their aim in coming to apply Sharia law in a European context, for any act or intention, is very significant as, apart from apparently mundane demands, they are keeping alive collective, inclusive objectives, whatever the way in which these demands are actually received (with more or less distance) by contemporary Muslims.

PART TWO

A DIVERSE HERITAGE, MARKED BY A SUCCESSION OF OUTSTANDING PERSONALITIES

PART TWO

INTRODUCTION

The rise of the Muslim Brotherhood to the status of a cultural reference point was accomplished by means of a series of outstanding leaders who symbolize the meaning of the movement. Some of these figures have a high public profile, while others are less well-known. Through the relationship to these personalities, the organizational memory of the movement is continuously involved in a construction and reconstruction of its identity. The collective identity of the movement is constituted in terms of multiple strata, which are constructed in such a fashion as to place certain levels in varying relation to others. In this second part of this book, we present portraits of personalities within the movement, historical or contemporary figures that constitute examples and reference points for militants within the movement today. We shall make mention, in the course of examining the key themes of their thought and the concrete contributions of the members of this succession, of a ‘line of witnesses’. The analysis of the modalities, in formal terms, of their standing today will allow us to see to what degree these persons are perceived as important (or not) within the movement. Our first observations, relative to choices made in favor of (or against) certain personalities will establish the reasons for this valuation (or lack thereof) of their inputs, although these reasons may not always be completely understandable. Over and above the unchallenged foundational contribution of Hassan Al-Bannā (chapter 4) and the unavoidable but controversial contribution of Sayyid Qutb (chapter 5), we have divided our review of the figures of authority within the movement into three categories. First, there are classic intellectual figures whose reputations are not valued equally within the entire movement, such as Muhammad Al-Ghazāli, Mustafā Al-Sibāʿī, Saʿīd Hawwā and Sayyid Sābiq (chapter 6). Second, we delineate personalities within the movement itself, for example, leaders rising from within the movement to the head of either the Egyptian movement itself or of some national branch (chapter 7). In this category, we assign a particular importance to Saʿīd Ramadān and to Zeinab AlGhazali. Third, we present contemporary figures who today exert a certain influence across the entire movement, or even beyond it. Within

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this category, we distinguish those persons living in the Muslim world from those living in Europe, remembering that certain figures function as bridges between East and West. In this category there are such personalities as the current Guide of the movement, Muhammad Mehdi ʿAkef, as well as Yūsuf Al-Qaradāwī, Rashīd Ghannoushī, ʿIssām Al-ʿAttār, and the brothers Tariq and Hani Ramadan. Many other people, often little known in the public sphere, are mentioned here (chapter 8). We should note at the outset that although this pantheon is rich and imposing enough, it cannot be considered as exhaustive with regard to the whole set of important personalities who have counted for something in the movement since its inception. Our list of portraits has to do above all with personalities who have been referred to in our field work (in interviews and/or militant conferences) in Europe. In this context, it is possible that a certain number of persons, no doubt more embarrassing, or whose writings or sayings do not seem appropriate to the context anymore, were never mentioned at all. For example, ʿAbd Al-Qādir ʿAwdah (died 1954), who strongly affected the theoretical foundations of the movement, was never mentioned. He was a professional jurist and a disciple of Hassan Al-Bannā, and he briefly became the informal leader of the movement before being hanged for his opposition to the Egyptian regime. He wrote a number of books, among which we may mention Al-islām, bayna jahl abnāʾi-hi wa-ʿajzi ʿulamāʾi-hi (Islam between the ignorance of its sons and the incompetence of its scholars) and At-tashrīʿ aj-jināʾi al-islāmī, muqārana bi-l-qānūn al-wadʿī (Islamic penal legislation in comparison with positive law). He is considered by certain people to be the most signifi cant political theoretician of the mb, especially since the publication in 1951 of his book Al-Islām wa awdaʾuna al-siyasiya (Islam and Our Political Reality). For R.P. Mitchell, ʿAbd Al-Qādir ʿAwdah contributed, in a more detailed fashion than anyone else of his time, to the determination of the political aspects of an Islamic State; in particular, he enumerated the principles according to which ‘1. The Koran is the fundamental constitution; 2. The government operates on the basis of the concept of consultation (shūra); 3. The executive power is bound by the teachings of Islam and the will of the people. [. . .] As for organizational details, they must be deduced from these principles’ [Mitchell, 1969:246ff.]. Despite all this, members and sympathizers whom we interviewed did not mention him. This does not mean that his principles are no longer taught or discussed within the internal structure of the movement. In addition, it appears to be the case that he is a primary influence upon sheik Rashīd

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Ghannoushī, who has pursued political reflections with regard to Muslim countries [Tamimi, 2001:37]. However, this question was not spontaneously referred to in our interviews, and the apparent lack of interest in of ʿAbd Al-Qādir ʿAwdah today probably has to do with the lack of interest in political considerations within the movement in Europe, including among other things the modalities of operation of an Islamic state. Reference to ʿAbd Al-Qādir ʿAwdah also constitutes a reference for the founder of the Jordanian movement Hizb Al-Tahrīr, the Party of Islamic Liberation, who came from the ranks of the mb [Taji-Farouki in Sidahmed & Ehteshami, 1996:47]. Another example: a figure of the magnitude of the Palestinian sheik Abdullah Azzam (1941–1989) is nowhere referred to, in any connection. Nonetheless, this man, who caused the jihad to be revivified for the 20th century, appears on a list of leading classical intellectual authorities of the mb, and is mentioned in writings published on an anonymous website based in Great Britain, dedicated to the mb movement.1 After his death, writings expressing his thought, which furnishes “political justifications” and strategic objectives regarding the application of jihad [Hegghammer in Kepel & Milleli, 2005], were published by Azzam Publications and posted on an Internet site that was shut down after September 11, 2001 (www.azzam.com). The site had constituted an important communication center for jihadists worldwide.2 The silence of the Brotherhood (which is more and more committed to a rapprochement with European civil societies) with regard to Azzam is probably a result of the fact that his positions are not appropriate for public discussion in the current atmosphere. It may be that they are still discussed, although strictly confined to circles that are receptive to movements that are in a 1 The personalities mentioned are organizational leaders and/or intellectual personalities, historical and contemporary. In order of their appearance on the page, they are: Hassan Al-Bannā, Sayyid Qutb, ʿAbd Al-Qādir ʿAwdah, Mustafā Al-Sibāʿī, Hasan Al-Hudaybī, ʿUmar Al-Tilmisānī, Yūsuf Al-Qaradāwī, Saʾīd Hawwā, Abdullah Azzam, Hamid Abu Nasr, Rashīd Ghannoushī, Mahfoud Nahnah, Muhammad Ahmad AlRāshid, Fathi Yakan, Abdul Fattah Abu Ghuddah, Ahmed Yassine, Mustafa Mashhūr, Munir Al-Ghadban, Abdul Majid Zindani, Sayyid Sābiq, Muhammad Al-Ghazāli (and the text mentions that there are many others). This list was posted on the Internet during 1999 (www.ummah.org.uk/ikhwan) but the site, set up in English in the name of Hizb al-Ikhwan al-Muslimoon, has been down since 2002. It contained fairly basic information and featured a note from the author who disclaimed all responsibility for its content, saying that he was neither member nor sympathizer of the movement. Considering the content, it seems nonetheless that he was at least a sympathizer posing as someone who did no more than pass information directly from the mb to readers. 2 On the globalization of jihad as discussed on this site, see [Thomas, 2003:197ff.].

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dissident position in relation to the Brotherhood, such as the activists of the movement known as Hizb Al-Tahrīr, who continue to be attracted by Azzam’s idea of global jihad; it is also possible that Azzam may retain a following at the local level in some Muslim countries. The same situation obtains with regard to the Egyptian sheik Abd Al-Hamid Kichk (1933–1996). No interviewee mentioned his name, with the exception of a furtive mention of this eloquent preacher in one interview. It must be said that this sheik was at one and the same time close to the movement of the Brotherhood and relatively independent; it is possible that he was never a member of the organization although he shared most of their ideas.3 Moreover, his final sermons—which dealt mainly with the moral aspects of actions he considered incompatible with his vision of Islam—date back a number of years, and are marked by concerns and a certain discursive tone that appear to be more and more inappropriate with regard to the situation of European Muslims. His speeches are still available in a number of Islamic bookstores, and at the Salon du Bourget, but it seems now a long time since 1981, when his Friday sermons were recorded and rebroadcast or broadcast live across the Arab Muslim world, but also in European countries such as France and Belgium.

3 Despite his status as an employee in a government ministry, sheik Kichk was subjected to repression from the Nasser government in 1966, like all those suspected of being Muslim Brothers. In 1976, he wrote an article for the first issue of the Brotherhood magazine, Al-Daʿwa, when it resumed publication. For a biography of the sheik and an excerpt from one of his sermons see [Kepel, 1984:165–182].

CHAPTER FOUR

THE UNCHALLENGED FOUNDATIONAL CONTRIBUTION OF HASSAN AL-BANNĀ

The figure of Hassan Al-Bannā (1906–1949) commands great respect and no one can deny that his work was at the foundation of the movement. When we consider the image that people hold of Hassan AlBannā even today, it is astonishing to observe that he has lost none of his prestige. Well, almost none. Many young people and many partisans still mention his name as an example, a reference point, and as someone who can serve as an inspiration. In this chapter we will enumerate various aspects of his relationship to the movement that are still important today.

1. The importance of his writings and their content Hassan Al-Bannā was a fairly prolific writer.1 Nonetheless, only two works are frequently cited as books that are among the most important to certain individuals, and as basic reference books for the instruction of every militant. On one hand, there is the autobiographical novel Mudhakkirāt aldaʿwa wa al-dāʿiya (Remembrances of preaching and of a preacher), which appears to have an enormous effect in emotional terms upon partisans because of the author’s bravery and because of the personal experience of spirituality that is recounted in the book. This book is often considered to be the key that allows one to penetrate to the heart of his feeling, his message, and his movement.

1 In his book on Islamic reformism Tariq Ramadan (who associates the thought and the activity of Hassan Al-Bannā with the prolongation of that tradition) speaks about short texts (collected in ‘A collection of Letters’) and more than 2000 articles. He mentions that the ‘Tuesday lessons’ have now been retranscribed and published in one or two volumes [Ramadan, 2002:226]. On the life of Hassan Al-Bannā, see the same work pp. 178–225, or [Al-Fattah El-Awaisi, 1998].

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On the other hand, there is a collection of compilations of articles and speeches given at conferences—Majmūʾat al-rasāʾil (A Collection of Letters)2—essentially available in Arabic,3 which presents the many facets of his teaching. They are grouped under the following headings: ‘What are we asking people to do?’, ‘Toward the light’, ‘To young people’, ‘The mb under the banner of the Koran’, ‘Our call to a new role’, ‘Between yesterday and today’, ‘Letter from the fifth conference’, ‘Our problems— internal problems—in the light of the Islamic system’ (including also ‘The system of government’ and ‘The economic system’), ‘Jihad’, ‘A letter on teachings’, ‘The system of families,4 ‘Dogmas’5 and ‘Invocations’. Together these two texts present the fundamental principles of the movement. They explain in great detail the objectives and the program of the mb, and thus they form a sort of credo that prescribes opinions, conduct, and motivations for action of militants. Hassan Al-Bannā was above all a man with a mission. He managed to convince his followers of the worthiness of his mission by providing arguments, and above all by pointing out concrete directions which while remaining sensible would succeed in mobilizing people at every level, especially with regard to those for whom faith in daily life and spirituality were important. The last part of the Majmūʾat al-rasāʾil (Almaʾthurāt)6 consists in a compilation of passages drawn from the Koran and the Sunna (prophetic tradition) that were supposed to imbue the reader with spiritual virtue when the passages were memorized or read aloud, a virtue that would most particularly purify the heart. Th is section, which has been translated into a number of foreign languages,

2 It is interesting to remark that a well-informed translator of Hassan Al-Bannā, Charles Wendell (1978), translated the word al-rasāʾil as ‘tracts’ in order to underline the degree to which these writings constituted forms of preaching that summoned believers to make a commitment to religion. 3 There are a number of translations for certain chapters, especially in English and French. 4 This is the basic organizational structure of the mb. 5 This is the only theological study by Hassan Al-Bannā, which according to R.P. Mitchell was originally published in the newspaper Majallat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin in 1932. It concerns levels of faith, and the names and attributes of the divine [Mitchell, 1969:327]. 6 In the version of Majmūʾat al-rasāʾil we consulted, this part is placed last. In addition, it appears to have been published separately at first.

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appears to have aroused renewed interest in recent years, especially judging by the number of publications that have been devoted to it.7 One of these texts, The Letter of Teachings, is considered by many to be the main expression of the thought of the Brotherhood. It contains ten ‘pillars’, ten criteria of dedication that the most zealous members of the organization are supposed to follow. The first pillar concerns the importance of a healthy understanding of the Islamic message, which Hassan Al-Bannā sums up in 20 principles, clearly set forth, that define the manner in which the heritage of Islam is to be understood: he establishes principles of reading and of the interpretation of texts, and also determines an overall framework of admissible attitudes, or attitudes to be adopted with regard to individual practices (these are reproduced in appendix I). In this way, Hassan Al-Bannā does not establish a textual exegesis properly so called, but rather he gives to his contemporaries the means, or at least certain pathways, following which they can perform their own work of understanding the faith, framing this within a vision of the whole. The first of these principles consists precisely in affirming the global character of Islam,8 on the basis of the fact that the Koran and the Sunna speak of everything, that only Islam itself takes into consideration the totality, and also in view of the fact that life is a unity that cannot always be divided into parts.9 On this wise, Hassan Al-Bannā sought to go beyond 7 Especially in French, a version produced by a Frenchman of Algerian descent, Farid Abdelkrim (A la source du rappel, édition Gédis, Paris, 2003), with book and narrative cassette, and another version published by Tariq Ramadan (Al-maʾthūrāt, éditions Tawhid, Lyon, 2004). In Great Britain, see the English translation available from Muhammad Higab (Mémorial Supplications—Al-Imam Hassan Al-Bannā, Islamic Inc., Cairo, 1997). 8 In order to understand what this principle consists in, we refer to the translation that Tariq Ramadan has established (he is one of Hassan Al-Bannā’s grandchildren): Islam is a complete organization that encompasses every aspect of life. It is all at once a State and a nation, or a government and a community. It is also a morality and a force, and it is pardon and justice. It is also a culture and a jurisdiction, a science and an administration. It is also a material and a resource, it is gains and riches. It is also a struggle along a path marked out by God, and a call, an army and a thought. Finally it is sincere belief and healthy adoration. And Islam is all that in the same way. In accordance with the interpretation that Yūsuf Al-Qaradāwī gives of it, Tariq Ramadan believes that this principle must be taken in a gradual sense, for this global thought in Al-Banna always ends up being taken, by individuals or on the ground, as the comprehension of priorities [. . .] and local action that establishes stages for its development. [Ramadan, 2002:247ff.]. For more information on this theme see also Chapters 11 and 16. 9 Yūsuf Al-Qaradāwī is the one who speaks of the reasons for which Hassan AlBannā could not have avoided taking the principle of globality into account [Al-Banna, 2004:34ff.].

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the differences that divide Muslims. We may also say that he sought to construct an Islamic orthodoxy. The adoption of the principles enunciated in these texts constitutes one of his most important contributions, the impact of which continues to be felt today within the entire community. As for the other nine pillars, they concern the importance of work, combat ( jihad), sacrifice, obedience, perseverance, faithfulness to the cause, devotion to God (or sincerity), brotherhood, and confidence. It is for example interesting to remark that these ten points reappear in a pamphlet which was distributed by the organization, Young Muslims of France (jmf), at the Salon de Bourget in 2003. They were also included in a book published in 2004 [Al-Banna, 2004a] titled La lettre des enseignements—Les principes fondateurs du mouvement des Frères musulmans (The Letter of Teachings—Founding Principles of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement). In Great Britain, we found no translated works of this type. On the other hand these principles were constantly referred to during demonstrations with Muslim Brotherhood sponsorship in which we were able to participate; for example, the annual conference of the Muslim Association of Britain (mab) of July 10, 2004. While we were engaging in informal discussion with young women who had participated in the fosis camp in June 2003, one of them, who had also participated in mab camps, asked us if we had worked specifically on the ‘methodology of Hassan Al-Bannā’. She asked this question because one of the ‘senior members’ of the association had given her a book on this topic (she did not mention the title), at the same time asking her to write a synopsis of it to assist him in a speech that he was to deliver before other members of the same organization. These occurrences show that the ‘pillars’ are still a part of current reflection, and still considered worth sharing. Apart from the ‘methodological’ aspects found in these two books, we must also underline the extent to which the concerns of Hassan AlBannā are focused upon the weaknesses of the Muslim world. Two of his objectives, as regards the content of his texts, are concerned with the liberation of the Muslim world from all external domination and the establishment of an Islamic society or State. On an even more fundamental level, he was aiming above all at a general social, economic, and educational reform. The message of Hassan Al-Bannā is focused equally upon the individual and the collective level. On one side, he emphasizes the necessity of joining faith and action together, of considering the completeness of

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Islam as regards its ability to regulate all aspects of life, and the necessity of reforming one’s own character before attempting to reform society. On another hand, he exhorts his listeners to work toward the unity of Muslims and to face squarely certain contemporary challenges, such as the position of lay believers, the Palestinian question, social injustice, the defense of moral and ethical values, and the struggle against the degradation of morals. The great number of references made to the founder of the movement indicates that these two texts unquestionably constitute the foundation common to all in the Muslim Brotherhood. Every one we questioned made reference to them and commented on their great and continuing importance as a resource for thought and action. Inevitably, some will question their real utility today, but such questioners are rare. A single Brother in France, about 50 years old, suggested that Hassan Al-Bannā is no longer widely read,10 and one person in Great Britain said that ‘Hassan Al-Bannā is not read sufficiently today by the young Muslim Brotherhood, the young generation.11 But in France and in Great Britain at least, we found many young people ready to testify to his importance, and this appears to indicate that his influence continues. At least, there are many who speak of the importance of his name and of his teachings, even if not all of them have taken the time to really study the Arabic text. The vast majority of young people who are associated with the milieu of the Muslim Brotherhood are familiar with a certain number of the elements of his thought and/or his life story or one or another striking citation from his works. In France and in Belgium, the attraction many young people feel for the figure of Hassan Al-Bannā should probably be attributed to the activity of Tariq and Hani Ramadan, who have delivered themselves of a few rare eulogies with regard to their celebrated predecessor and his heritage. Moreover, the activity of organizations connected in some way to the mb is responsible for keeping his name alive and his work at the forefront of discussion, in whatever country it may be. It is important to note that in Muslim Brotherhood-related circles all the texts by Hassan Al-Bannā taken together constitute a corpus that can no longer suffer change. The context, the confluence of circumstances, the dated quality of these texts, all are set aside. Very little work

10 11

Interview no. 46. Interview no. 71.

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of a historical critical nature appears to have been carried out, as regards the distinction of different historical strata within his thought. In this way, the question of the evolution of the thought of Hassan Al-Bannā between 1930 and 1949 (the year of his death) is vacated.

2. The importance of his personality The interviews we conducted show that the personality of Hassan AlBannā is as important as the precepts that are taught based on his message. He is widely presented as an exemplary figure, someone who often appears to justify the entire movement all by himself. For the partisans, but also for sympathizers, he is the very image of an ‘awakener’, that is, in current parlance, a preacher who issues a call for consciences to awaken. For certain members of the mb, he is also a mujtahid mutlaq, a legislator capable of making free and independent decisions with regard to theological matters, and someone who brought renewal to religion in the 20th century, who reformed the interpretation of religion by following the intuition of the spirit of the Prophet. A man who ‘passed the torch’ The feeling that Hassan Al-Bannā is still very close to us, based above all on a connection that has an affective and spiritual nature, is very influential in the mb milieu. The exemplary character of his activity, accentuated by the fact that he was assassinated for his ideas, touches everyone in the movement. One of many testimonies to this fact is a book published in 2002 in Great Britain, with an introduction by Gamal Al-Helbawy (former spokesman for the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe), written to commemorate the memory of this extraordinary man who changed the course of events in the Arab and Muslim world, the book actually appearing on the occasion of the 53rd anniversary of his martyrdom [Al-Banna, 2002]. From among the most moving testimonies of partisans, we have chosen to present three which express a relationship to the person, Hassan Al-Bannā. They demonstrate the various ways in which this relationship is experienced. Hassan Al-Bannā is presented as someone who has ‘passed the torch’ (an expression which we have borrowed from the title of the novel by Bernard Tirtiaux “Passeur de Lumiere”), someone who has made it possible for things to become what they had to become.

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Thus it is when he appears to facilitate one’s relationship to the Prophet, but there is also an accession between self and self thanks to the affirmation of a possible form of human perfectibility, Islamically experienced. One of these partisans in fact maintains that he is a sort of prophet. For this man, Hassan Al-Bannā personifies the message of Islam for the contemporary era because of his actions. But in order to relativize his assertions, or even to counter the tendency that some people have to give Hassan Al-Bannā too much importance, he insists that we remember that in absolute terms it is the Prophet Mohammed who remains always of the greatest importance, in a manner that cannot change: [Hassan Al-Bannā], he is more or less a bridge between me and the Prophet. That is, [that] I could have studied the life of the Prophet and could have done what a lot of people do today: live inside a mosque, read the Koran, let my beard grow and there you have it. Understanding what the Prophet would have done in our time, the imam Al-Bannā did that. And so we are going to take a little bit from that. But the most important thing for us remains, and it’s important for people to notice, the Prophet Mohammed. It’s not anybody else.12

Another interviewee, even more emotional, speaks of his close and direct personal relationship in real terms with Hassan Al-Bannā. For him, Hassan Al-Bannā is still alive; he is perceived as maintaining a dynamic and intimately dialectical relationship with this person, a relationship that might be described as that between a midwife and the life the midwife is trying to bring to birth: to the extent that Hassan AlBannā is his spiritual and his modern model, Hassan Al-Bannā traces out for him a pathway that is at one and the same time narrow and open. He is a bridge that permits our interlocutor to attain the status of walīy Allah, that is, he enables him to become someone who is close to God, a friend of God. In his words: He is my partner. For myself, there are people who have marked me [. . .]. People with whom I have a spiritual relationship, right! There are lines that, when you read them, it’s not just a book, there is a sort of osmosis, even in dreams etc. There is a confusion of [two] souls. Me . . . I am very mystical and so I . . . believe in the question of souls, etc . . . One would say that he had . . . that I had always known this person . . . You can even be capable of talking about him and speaking in his place ! To say: ‘No, it’s not him’ [laughs]. So there you go . . . that isn’t rational! [. . .] You are not being

12

Interview no. 20.

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chapter four rational. It is . . . is . . . you feel it or you don’t. My relationship with . . . I . . . I don’t speak about it often . . . about that . . . Because you can’t . . . quantify it. But for me, he was . . . he belonged to hope. It is possible to be a saint and a modern man. He gave me the hope that I could realize my Islam: I can be a saintly person, and the mystical and Sufi sense of the term, I can be a mystic and act in a modern way, in an intellectual way, in theology (because they are, there is still, he has . . . he rearranged all these dimensions in his time, of course . . . you have to have in front of you the person of his time because there was colonialism, etc., well . . . we have to resituate things). But . . . I take from it the paradigmatic elements. There is one thing that remains the same, some permanent things. So for me it was the hope that this Islam . . . uhh, is possible. He did not . . . he did not give me . . . he did not give me . . . the answers. But he gave me hope.13

In this vein, Hani Ramadan, the grandson of Hassan Al-Bannā and the director of the Islamic Center of Geneva (CIG), has no difficulty expressing himself. He speaks with great emphasis, illuminating each facet of the personality of this modest and generous man. For him, over and above the charisma and the personality of his grandfather, it is above all his grandfather’s submission to God that he remembers. This trait was so marked that his grandfather tended to forget himself, in placing himself at the service of others: this was a man who was entirely obedient to God. You know, that may seem simple to you. But, in fact, I believe that that was the essential message of a man like Hassan Al-Bannā, at the heart of him: there was no part for his ego. My father used to say to me ‘I have never heard your grandfather say Ana,14 I, myself, I think . . . ’. He never spoke that way . . . that was not the way he talked. He was a man who lived in the greatest submission possible to God. And that is what Islam is! That is, there is no place for the ego. He was someone who served others, who loved greatly . . . who loved others greatly. He desired the Good. With an enormous energy that came out in his will, his love, his constant activity.

Further on, he continues to speak in this tone. He insists not only upon the spiritual character of his grandfather, but begins to describe this in even larger terms, going beyond of this aspect of the character of Hassan Al-Bannā in order to describe him in even more universal terms, focusing on his profound humanity, even with regard to non-Muslims: [. . .] his personality appeared to us to be brilliant because of . . . essentially because of . . . his vocation, if one may speak in this way, his spiritual

13 14

Interview no. 54. Ana = I, in Arabic.

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vocation. His spiritual involvement in the sense of . . . uhh . . . the depth of faith, and of ethics, in terms of behavior, in terms of social engagement uhh . . . with the fraternity of man. I was always struck, for example, by the fact that someone like Hassan Al-Bannā could be loved by . . . by Muslims, of course, but also by Christians in Egypt. A great deal. Uhhh . . . the Coptic Christians appreciated him and uhh . . . in fact . . . and their testimony, it is quite important to notice it because this man was someone who had in him a completely extraordinary dimension at the human level, huh. Therefore . . . he really knew uhh . . . well: who worked for the good of everyone [. . .].

And Ramadan adds at the end a phrase which carries the description of this superhuman character beyond itself, in order to accentuate the quasi-prophetic nature of Hassan Al-Bannā, when he says: He is like a model, a guide, as if Hassan Al-Bannā had already seen the path and had come back toward us to say “this is the way you must come.” 15

A pragmatic and respected man By the side of these sometimes lyrical testimonies, certain members of the movement appear more pragmatic as regards their relationship to the heritage of Hassan Al-Bannā. When they speak of him, they evoke above all the force of his mind, a spiritual presence at one and the same time concrete and extremely stimulating. Here is another example, which refers to the practical and always up to date message of the man, saying straight off: Hassan Al-Bannā I have great respect for him. I mean: when you read his words, you read what Hassan Al-Bannā wrote, it is as if he wrote . . . he has written them today. [. . .] I mean: the spirit is there. I mean it’s . . . useful. Hassan Al-Bannā was truly a brilliant genius.16

Another testimony refers in more concrete terms to the exemplary character of the behavior of Hassan Al-Bannā. His acts, but also his sharply conceived slogans, sum up admirably the essence of the essential principles of his message. He states: What attracted me for Hassan Al-Bannā very much: many sights. First of all, his ability to train himself and to educate himself. Not as a scientist or a big professor in one area but as a strategist who pick from different here

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Interview no. 59. Interview no. 71.

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chapter four and there and sort out something, some project, complete project, like a bee. The bee goes to different flowers and bring honey; this is exactly what I see. Secondly, some sentences that Hassan Al-Bannā wrote gave me a lot of insight and made me admire him very much. [. . .] I’ll tell you: in the West and in the East, when people say “time is”, when they appreciate time, what do they say? “Time is gold”! So when Hassan Al-Bannā was asked about time, and when he saw some people wasting their time, he said to them “Time is life”, and “those who are wasting their time are wasting their life”. He did not imitate or he did not just say “time is gold” but he brought something which is more extensive and more appreciated than gold. At the same time, this is materialistic ideas: gold and the other one is spiritual idea: “time is life”.17

One young partisan expresses how satisfying he fi nds it to discover the equivalent of a Gandhi or a Martin Luther King within the world of his own culture and religion.18 Another young adept explains that it is rather the willful and combative nature of Hassan Al-Bannā, associated as these are with a deep spirituality and true humanism, that have attracted him: Me, when they told me about the imam Al-Bannā, it was a bit like . . . if you will, like the way they presented Malcolm X to us. Do you see? Through a movie, you meet a man . . . unbelievable! Exceptionally unbelievable. This guy has a story, he comes back, he comes back practically from the point of no return and then he gets there, he organizes things, he sets everything up. And for me, coming from where I come from, this is fascinating: a charismatic personality like that . . . . I even remember having purchased the letters of the imam Al-Bannā because there was a photo on the book jacket when I bought it, even though I didn’t understand a word of Arabic back then. That’s to show you the kind of trip I was on back then . . . really just immature, etc. But over time, well, I found out that the imam AlBannā had a side to him that doesn’t get mentioned very much, really. He was someone who was deeply spiritual. What I recite when I say prayers in the morning and the evening, as invocations, they are invocations compiled by Hassan Al-Bannā. He was a person who lived during the night, but alone. He was someone who had a . . . a relationship with the heart, a relationship with the Muslims, and the non-Muslims, something not very many people talk about. In any case, that is the side of the person that I know. When you find out, for example, that he took a seat in the circles of spiritual prayer from the time he was 12 years old, the famous tarīqa AlHusafiyya. So, he was somebody important. That side of him, I didn’t find

17 18

Interview no. 05. Interview no. 48.

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all that out until later. And what fascinated me is that here was somebody who struggled, and they killed him for that [. . .].19

Some persons who are at times (very) critical of the mb movement today nonetheless admit their admiration and respect with regard to its founder. Persons with this attitude, like this Algerian man, not a partisan, typically affirm that ‘it is impossible to remain indifferent’ to his heritage.20 Another still more visibly affected by the recollection, speaks of the grandeur of a modest and complete man, before mentioning the failure of his successors and the failure of the movement in general: The important thing, is the human being. So, Hassan Al-Bannā was . . . therefore, he was a man who . . . uhh . . . who didn’t just talk about the Koran but lived it. What’s more, he had the extraordinary power of adapting his speaking to every level of society. Third, he left the halls of the great universities, like Al-Azhar, so he could put his arms around the whole world. And . . . after Hassan Al-Bannā, therefore things went downhill. There was . . . It’s like . . . You know . . . when you . . . get close to the source, you get the opportunity to get clear water, and the spring gets more bubbly . . .21

Those who take their distance When criticism of Hassan Al-Bannā is aired, it is not so much his personality or his thought that are criticized, but rather the nature of the references that are made today. The partisans of the movement draw objections, when they show their tendency to make his contributions something sacred. His detractors are thus not only external to the movement, but they are also part of it. Some Muslim interlocutors, who disagree at the broadest level with regard to the mb movement, sometimes manifest a degree of irritation at the importance that today is accorded to the personality of Hassan AlBannā. In their estimation this overemphasis on a personality is associated more with a passing fashion in Europe than anything else, and they deplore the fact that any critical commentary gets accused of being disrespectful, something which prevents any constructive dialogue.

19 20 21

Interview no. 51. Interview no. 64. Interview no. 41.

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For example, take a look at this reaction from a British Muslim, wellinformed and critical, with whom we spoke, especially on the subject of the presence of photographs of Hassan Al-Bannā and of the man who is often considered as his Pakistani equivalent, Aʾla al- Mawdudi, and then with regard to the photograph of Sayyid Qutb posted on the Internet site of and organization of Islamic youth, the ukim (uk Islamic Mission). He justifies this posting with regard to the need that some people feel to refer themselves to superior authorities, who become, in the course of this process, sacred cows, unhappily. He explains: [. . .] you want something that is bigger than life to justify all your actions. And people like Hassan Al-Bannā and Mawdudi, they are bigger than life. If I stand up now and say “Look I think that Mawdudi’s ideas are updated at this time” in public, they will think: “Oh, jeez, oh disrespectful! How can he criticise Mawdudi?” So that’s the pressure to it if you want to bring the discussion forward.22

At the very heart of mb circles, at the center of the mouvance, taking one’s distance from Hassan Al-Bannā is difficult, but it does happen. In this regard as in many others, the most interesting internal reactions come on the fringes of the movement, and these are not always as anticipated. The objectors fall into two categories. On one hand, there are people who have publicly distanced themselves from the organization as such, while still remaining loyal to the general aims of the movement. An example is the scholar Yūsuf AlQaradāwī, who no longer speaks as a member of the mb, but rather addresses himself directly to those involved in the Islamic movement. More particularly, he has issued a warning concerning those who ‘fear that a critique of the ideas of some Islamic leaders may be taken as an indictment against them or as the acceptance of the positions of their enemies’, since this would be equivalent to ‘attacking their prominence and their heroism’. In this connection, Yūsuf Al-Qaradāwī recalled that Hassan Al-Bannā himself noted that no one, other than the Prophet, was perfect [Al-Qaradāwī, 2004: 40ff.]. He thus showed himself conscious of the fact that the founding authority is more likely to be followed than his commentary. Another example: that of the deputy Supervisor-General of the Syrian branch of the mb, ʿIssām Al-ʿAttār, now about 80 years old, who, since 1961, lived near the border dividing Belgium and Germany. 22

Interview no. 01.

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For him, Hassan Al-Bannā was a thinker who succeeded in putting his ideas into action, but he was above all a human being capable of making mistakes. He pointed out that no one was supposed to be made into a sacred object, and that even with regard to Hassan Al-Bannā, as with Sayyid Qutb, it was necessary to maintain a critical distance in order to understand things correctly. ʿIssām Al-ʿAttār insisted on this point, which does not seem to have been the case at all times in mb circles, for it is important, finally, to value contemporary contributions in order to actualize the tradition. His words on the subject: [. . .] in order to study Islam, uhh . . . one must uhh . . . know the Koran and the traditions. Hassan Al-Bannā was a thinker. There are . . . there are, in history, thousands and thousands of thinkers. Hassan Al-Bannā was a great thinker. He was . . . he worked to coordinate his thoughts, to translate his thought, to realize his thought. He was a great thinker. But a man. In order for any man to do things justly and to be maʾsūm23 . . . to be perfect, complete [. . .]. We have to educate ourselves. Hassan Al-Bannā was a man. He lived before . . . . There are many new things now. Tomorrow will not be like yesterday. Uhh . . . tomorrow will be new. And . . . tomorrow depends on us [. . .]. Hassan Al-Bannā was a thinker, a scholar (ʿalim, a raʾīd, a führer) and many of the thoughts of Hassan Al-Bannā are valuable for . . . but it is necessary to leave that which is just, in place. We take what is useful for us and leave what is not useful now. We find many things good good. And it is in our interest to use them. But Hassan Al-Bannā is not God. Hassan Al-Bannā is not the Prophet. Hassan Al-Bannā was the master, he Mastered the Koran and the hadith . . . and . . . he responded to the needs that people had at that time . . . There are general orientations. I mean that this is the source. Hassan Al-Bannā was a man that uhh . . . who made some mistakes . . . and the primary source, for us is the Koran and the hadith. Sayyid [Qutb] was a man in truth, a real man in humanity. But we take some things from him and we leave the rest. He was very human, filled with . . . and he was with the forces of man; and he was able to be correct and also able to make mistakes. We are not the slaves of what has been written in the past. Because we are also able to think. And we can reflect on the fact that the past is past. We are not the slaves of any thoughts. And so that is why we take what is correct and leave behind what is not. Islam demands this ! Islam demands this. Islam does not allow you to accept everything without thinking about it.24

23

We note that the Prophet himself is called Al-Maʾsūm, without fault, by Hassan Al-Bannā (although this adjective is not a matter of one of the ninety-nine divine attributes). 24 Interview no. 65.

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On the other hand, those critical reactions that have contributed the most to the emphasis on these attitudes have come from persons who have acquired a certain independence with regard to the movement, especially when their level of training in religious sciences is recognized on all sides. Thus a certain graduate of Al-Azhar, while recognizing the qualities of Hassan Al-Bannā (especially such as relate to his Sufi nature, his openness, and the fact that he was ‘able to restore life to the Arab world’), is even more reserved in his expression, even showing himself to be quite distant intellectually from the ambiance that reigns above all, according to him, in Egypt. He does not say whether this enthusiasm is also shared in Europe. Me, I see that Al-Bannā, one has often . . . this is my opinion: they built a myth around him. That is how I see . . . the . . . I recognize all this: all his qualities, all this . . . I’m not rejecting that. But I think that . . . there has been a certain exaggeration, above all because I have lived in Egypt. I know the Egyptians. And their nature is to . . . they tend to exaggerate . . . [. . .] And so . . . that is all cultural . . . With regard to different societies. And . . . But I think that . . . even at the time of Al-Bannā, this is my opinion, it wasn’t AlBannā who was the real founder of the Brotherhood, it was . . . To the contrary, it was . . . the motor . . . but he was supported by . . . one could say . . . a large number of the scholars of his time. It was the good student who answered the . . . who did what they wanted, the reformists, right? Rashīd Rida, uhh . . . Ahmed Timur Al-Bachar, and Youssef Didjwi . . . and others . . . Many scholars who . . . who consulted him and who told him “we are with you but you see, here, I’m 70 years old, what can I possibly do?”25

A man unchallenged, a man of today Throughout this section, it thus appears clear that the contribution of Hassan Al-Bannā remains unchallenged, and his influence is still very great. He is distinguished from all others not only as a paragon of exemplary behavior, but also because he bequeathed a true methodology for the understanding of Islam. In fact, the content of his thought reflects a global attitude, armed with powerful instruments of practical application, rather than a content with a casuistical tonality or a strict definition. Certainly, several points of content remain very influential today, such as the idea of a global character, reform of the self and of society, attention to the matter

25

Interview no. 55.

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of morality, and of Muslim unity, or spirituality—a topic which today receives more attention than it did in the past. Other elements are deprioritized without disappearing completely, such as the liberation of Muslim territory from all domination. Still, the content of Islamic references is not fixed. Or rather, we should say that it maintains a certain suppleness because it is still possible to introduce new interpretations when the context justifies it, something which very probably explains the success of this approach. Some voices, even within the movement, have nonetheless begun to criticize the wrangling that has taken place on this subject.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE THOUGHT OF SAYYID QUTB: DIFFICULT TO AVOID, BUT DISCREETLY CONTROVERSIAL

Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966) was a writer who became a prolific ideologue late in life.1 Our primary focus in the present writing is his influence, as this has been expressed in our interviews, and indicated in our research. Thus the personality we will describe is less complex than Qutb really was, and we shall say nothing about his relationship with Gamal Abd AlNasser. This relationship, though, was responsible for trouble in Sayyid Qutb’s life. The two men came to know each other when the mb supported Nasser, at the time when he became President of Egypt. Sayyid Qutb felt betrayed when subsequently the movement was excluded from the councils of the powerful, after the revolution of 1952, and this feeling was involved in his radicalization and in the way events would later develop. Over and above his status as a martyr, connected with the fact that he was cruelly persecuted and in the end summarily hanged for his ideas alone, his thought is often mentioned, above all in private, in relation to his exegesis of the Koran. In fact, after his 1949 work Al-ʿadāla alijtimāʿiyya fī al-Islām (Social justice and Islam), around 1953–54, he was active in the opposition to Nasser’s despotic power and the abuses to which it led. Under Qutb’s influence the thinking of the mb became radicalized [Carré, 1984:135], at a time when the movement was under the direction of the former judge, Hasan Al-Hudaybī, whose actual influence within the movement had weakened. Sayyid Qutb is considered by many partisans and even by sympathizers to be an important point of reference for the movement. Still, his name is rarely invoked by those presenting papers at conferences, and many in a Muslim audience do not necessarily have the background to determine the origin or the proximity of certain thoughts discussed 1 On the evolution of the work of Sayyid Qutb as an author, see especially the analysis provided by Abu-Rabiʾ, 1996. He was also the author of literary criticism, poetry, an autobiographical work and many works concerning politics, religion and doctrine (on social justice, relations between civilizations, especially La bataille entre l’islam et le capitalisme, La paix mondiale et l’islam, etc.).

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today, that finally bear his stamp. This silence is evidence of a certain reluctance, a certain desire to distance oneself from a past that is very controversial outside mb circles. In private interviews we have observed that the consensus of mb partisans is sometimes denied. Some of them, not many, have even expressed a certain dislike for the figure of Qutb, even a rejection.

1. A specific continuity relative to Hassan Al-Bannā . . . In his thesis on the subject of Muslim reformism, Tariq Ramadan sums up adequately the question of the relationship between the two leading figures of the movement. According to him, Sayyid Qutb, in terms of his thought taken as a whole, stands in continuity with Hassan Al-Bannā; he ‘remained faithful to the global conception of the mb as it was formulated by the founder’ [Ramadan, 2002:428].2 However, over and above this perspective on an increased Islamization of the law and the muchdesired consolidation of an avant-garde formed by a minority of sincere Muslims, Sayyid Qutb does separate himself from the thought of Hassan Al-Bannā especially when he analyzes the causes of social dysfunction and set priorities for action. Qutb thought that the failure of the regime in power to respect divine prescriptions was the main problem, while Hassan Al-Bannā thought that the problem of understanding the faith was primary, and responsible for causing negligence in the management of human affairs [Ramadan, 2002:422]. Thus the main focus in this instance is religious education, not the abuse of power, although the latter problem was never absent from the thoughts and concerns of Hassan Al-Bannā. Further, Sayyid Qutb overvalued certain concepts and created new interpretations for others. In fact, in his major work, Fī Zilāl al-Qurʾān— In the shadow of the Koran—, published in 1964, he denounced the modern jāhiliyya, the state of ignorance emblematic of a break in the alliance with God, disloyalty and corruption on earth caused by the elevation of man to the status of the measure of all things and the source of

2 To justify this statement, the author suggests the possibility that both of them considered the necessity of a preparatory period for educating the people, developing the scientific spirit, and taking advantage of Western advances, but also in order to establish peace and respect between peoples [Ramadan, 2002:428].

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laws; he reacted against idolatrous and materialistic tyranny, which now covered the globe [Carré, 1984:207ff.]. Sayyid Qutb thus supported the principle of hākimiyya (God’s sovereignty is exclusive) according to which the judgment of God is the only valid judgment because it is the only impartial one: ‘He alone can judge things without regarding individual or class interests’. The principles of the legitimacy and the superiority of the divine sovereignty over any other power from this point are considered as absolute. In fact, if it turned out that spiritual education and patient political negotiation came to nothing, Qutb had not hesitated to plan for a general revolution [Carré, 1991]. This is a radical change in relation to the thought of Hassan AlBannā, because while he recognized the principle of divine sovereignty, he did not push it to its extreme theoretical limits as did Sayyid Qutb. S. Moussalli clearly explains the continuity and the separation between the two men. He points out that the political thought of Hassan Al-Bannā speaks of the necessity and the legitimacy of the—abstract—principle of hākimiyya, but in contradistinction to Sayyid Qutb, he proposed at the same time a flexible practical method: Hassan Al-Bannā believed that all political regimes were obligated to respect divine prescriptions, but he remained ready to cooperate with the official apparatus of the State, because in the final analysis he considered it to be the case that social practices depend on men, and men never have access to the final interpretation of divine intentions [Mousalli, 1999:123]. The conceptions of Sayyid Qutb were very influential, for as the Palestinian intellectual I. Abu-Rabiʾ puts it, they take their place in the great Islamic tradition and its understanding, all while themselves constituting a program of Islamization [Abu-Rabiʾ, 1996:110]. In order to measure his success, it is sufficient to count the number of editions and translations of his works, especially Fī Zilāl al-Qurʾān, a work of six fat volumes of 600 pages each, which has been regularly re-published since the 1960’s. In the Arabic countries, these volumes are periodically read and their contents debated by young militants [Carré, 1984:27]. Another oft-reprinted publication: Maʾālim fī al-tarīq (Finding the Way), a much more accessible book that contains some excerpts from the previously published work. These two works have influenced several generations, including certain immigrants settled in Europe.

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2. Internal controversy Within the movement, the conceptions of Qutb were severely criticized three years after his death by then-Supreme Guide, Hasan Al-Hudaybī, in a collective work titled Duʾat, lā qudā (Preachers, but not judges). This book was not published until 1977. Hasan Al-Hudaybī takes account of the emotional state of certain young prisoners, but also of the internal tensions that had been caused by the promotion of the concepts of hākimiyya (God alone is sovereign), jāhiliyya (the period of pre-Islamic ignorance) and takfīr (to accuse someone of being an unbeliever and ipso facto no longer to consider that person as a Muslim). Since the latter concept appeared capable of sowing disorder, chaos, and fitna, that is, a veritable internal war within the ranks of Muslims, Hasan Al-Hudaybī limited its interpretation and refused to accept the characterization of the Egyptian society as non-Muslim; he condemned the tendency toward excommunication of the leaders of society, since that status under Islamic law would make it a duty for Muslims to take up arms against them [Carré, 1984:20]. Further, in contradiction to be very sharp formulations of Sayyid Qutb, Hasan Al-Hudaybī recalled that the general prescriptions of the Koran and the Sunna are supposed to take contexts into account, and that in this procedure, the variations of human behavior cannot be avoided [Ramadan, 2002:434]. He denied the presence of the notion of hākimiyya In the Koran and said that it appeared abusive to attempt to expand the idea of the exclusive and absolute sovereignty of God over the realms of law, politics, morals, philosophy, etc. To the contrary, he argued, based upon the notion of hukm ( judgment, statute, injunction, government), the question was to distinguish between the laws (Justice) and political power (government); this was similar to that which AlBannā had established, leaving significant latitude for human action even where such action was to be framed in accordance with the divine prescriptions. Hasan Al-Hudaybī writes: ‘In truth, God the Most-High has left to us a wide field of action in the affairs of this world. It is for us to organize this field in conformity with our reason, in the framework of general objectives and purposes that the Most-High has chosen for us, and asks that we carry out, on condition, naturally, that we do not permit things that God has prohibited nor prohibit things that God has permitted. In the sacred Law (Sharia), there are obligations, prohibitions and

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‘neutral’ things3 [. . .]. Within the domain of the ‘neutral’, Muslims must provide guidance through decrees, laws, or ordinances, with regard, for example, to the political regime that shall apply the divine duty of Consultation [Shūra]’ [Carré & Seurat, 1983:98ff.]. Finally, with regard to the notion of jāhiliyya, Hasan Al-Hudaybī recalls in his text the important distinction, which must be preserved, between the work of the preacher and the work of the judge. For him, the mb must not only keep to their role as preachers, but must necessarily abstain from attempting to judge an entire society [Ramadan, 2002:437]. Despite being in a good position to comment on this question, Tariq Ramadan is hardly convincing when he speaks of the tolerance of Sayyid Qutb with regard to unbelievers. He maintains that Sayyid Qutb never called for a break between believers and unbelievers within Egyptian society, but rather concentrated his efforts on constituting an elite that was fully conscious and that would work to extend its influence [Ramadan, 2002:425]. However, based on the detailed analysis provided by O. Carré of the exegetical work of Sayyid Qutb, collected in Fī Zilāl al-Qurʾān (In the Shadow of the Koran), it appears difficult to support this conclusion [Carré, 1984:123ff.]. This is true for two reasons. First, by reason of his promotion of the idea—a predominant one—of fighting for God. Also, Sayyid Qutb aimed at the conversion of all the people on earth, because in his opinion the supreme objective consisted in liberating humanity and guaranteeing the divine guidance (qiyāda) of the human race. Thus, in opposition to the position put forward by Tariq Ramadan, O. Carré maintains that Sayyid Qutb was fighting against religious error in general, that is, against the damnation of Muslims who have left the pathway of Islam, and whom he considered as the ‘primary enemies of the message’ [Carré, 1984:122ff.]. Further, Carré points out that while reform and patience were supported by Qutb, peaceful action was not maintained at the level of a principle. On the other hand, over and above these observations, it appears that it would be equally abusive to attempts to establish a simple identification between Sayyid Qutb and the violent dissident movements that

3 An expression that Tariq Ramadan translates as ‘domains that are not regulated by prescriptions’ [Ramadan, 2002:435].

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came onto the scene beginning in the 1970’s. In this regard the clarity and delicacy of the formulations of Olivier Carré recommend themselves once again. He insists upon the specificity of the political context and the areas related to it, and he emphasizes that the supposed cooperation between Sayyid Qutb and such movements (Hizb Al-Tahrīr, Takfīr wa Al-Hijra and Jihād), which was alleged by the supporters of Nasser and by Egyptian Marxists, was entirely exaggerated. Certainly, Qutb constituted a source of inspiration for the extremists, but Carré maintains that there was no more than an indirect link between them, and this is all the more believable because these extremists had ceased to associate with the mb [Carré, 1984:15].

3. The persistence of the influence of his thought up to the present day Despite the initiative of Hasan Al-Hudaybī condemning certain principles supported by Sayyid Qutb, a certain modus vivendi was established with regard to the simultaneous acceptance of those of his writings that had been produced during the period of persecution and the texts of classic Islamic thought, a situation that was maintained up to the beginning of the present century. In fact, despite the public expression of differences (we refer to the declaration by Aymān Al-Zawahiri mentioned above, which was marked by a certain resentment toward the mb), the heritage of Sayyid Qutb is far from having been disavowed by mb partisans in Europe, or by their sympathizers. This of course does not exclude the recognition of a certain separation, nor the critique of Qutb’s ideas. Our interviews show that the tafsīr (Koranic exegesis) of Qutb remains, as separated from his other works, a familiar and valuable reference; a specialist such as Carré characterizes it as ‘the Koranic commentary that is proper to the Brotherhood’. He also observes that the particularly marked pragmatism of this commentary differentiates it from other works in this genre, which habitually adopt certain literary conventions. But he goes as far as to call it a ‘non-Tafsīr’ because it represents above all a program of action for the utopian construction of the Umma of the future [Carré, 1984:23ff.]. Within these specific limits, the tafsīr of Sayyid Qutb remains a frequent reference for many mb militants, whether these are partisans or simply those who consider themselves close to these ideas. Without being able to establish whether or not this is the position of the majority of the movement, we have the feeling that this hypothesis is plausible.

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But we do not have enough evidence to establish it in definite terms because this subject was not covered in all the interviews. In the following paragraphs, some interviewees express a direct and enthusiastic relationship to this text. Others maintain their reservations or their skepticism with regard to the real impact of this thought, which has been difficult to spread widely. (Rather) enthusiastic testimonies We asked an imam, an mb partisan, if he would counsel a young person desiring to work on Koranic exegesis to read Fī Zilāl al-Qurʾān, and he answered affirmatively without hesitation, saying that the text appeared very concrete to him, focused on practical matters, and sensitive to real contexts. He opined that this effort by Qutb, like all such efforts, merited consideration as such, although he recognized that there were gaps in the text, which in the end he excused easily enough. So, apparently, the consideration of the very particular circumstances of the life of Sayyid Qutb—who was persecuted by the Egyptian government under Nasser with particular intensity, something which caused the radicalization of his thought—does not appear to have invalidated the relevance of his writings. Our interviewee was of the opinion that this exegesis ‘tied the text to a context’, but did not make evident that the radical differences between that time and the contemporary situation. Further, he considers at the outset that only the Prophet is infallible and that therefore, by definition, all human beings are capable of making mistakes. This position allows him to excuse Sayyid Qutb, while separating himself from Qutb in personal terms, and while maintaining that he has not excused him. However this may be, there is no criticism, or rather, the utilization of this text appears to have been filtered or relativized only thanks to a recourse to other exegeses or to the personal interpretation that this imam may himself give. A certain condemnation is quite obviously in play in concrete terms, but in a general fashion, there is no attempt to establish direct criticism of the text by Qutb. However, there is implied criticism, which is shown by the failure to mention certain passages and the choice of certain passages for commentary which appear out of place. These are considered as relatively limited since the spirit of the text itself and the ideas that are defended in it are not really challenged.

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He explains: Yes! it is a good book . . . (Interviewer: What do you think about it, yourself ? Umm . . . Why is it a good book?) It is a good book that . . . uhhh . . . does not go into detail about linguistic conflicts, etc., that avoids myths and uhhh . . . stories . . . that are not . . . that are not authentic, things that you find in other tafsīr, that tie the text to a context, that try to . . . give a version of the text . . . to personalize the text that is to say . . . uhhh . . . you see the text walking in the street, and living with people. [. . .] It is not . . . abstract, it is not theory . . . No, no! It is uhh . . . But, sometimes, he exaggerated . . . But I understand that, because . . . the circumstances . . . Someone who wrote a book uhh . . . if he is at home, comfortable, breathing freely, has plenty to eat, who . . . who is calm.. is different from someone who is in a prison cell. Sometimes, Sayyid Qutb, in his tafsīr uhh . . . he was a little . . . tense! But, thankfully, we, in Islam, we have . . . one only who is infallible, this is the Prophet ! That is: we respect our scholars, our sheiks, etc. But say they are just human beings [. . .] They do not have the last word . . . And that is the secret of the success of Islam! It does not make any human being sacred. [. . .] Only the Prophet who is infallible. But the others are human beings. If he has made a great effort, he deserves our thanks, he deserves our esteem. But he remains a human being. [. . .] Sayyid Qutb was a human being. There are certain passages in which I find that he is a little overexcited, a little tense. But . . . I am not justifying this but . . . I can explain it, it is . . . uhh . . . the consequence of injustice, the consequence of torture, the consequence of imprisonment, the . . . .

In the next part of the interview, this partisan explains that in order to prepare a lesson of tafsīr he consults several different works of Koranic exegesis and chooses the elements that are best adapted to his purpose; thus he balances in more than one way the importance to be granted to the texts of Sayyid Qutb by having recourse to a variety of sources of inspiration, none of which are considered as perfect in principle. In the meantime, the question of determining the concrete significance of Qutb’s exegesis remains open: In each tafsīr, there are gaps, there are mistakes, and there is work to be done. Me, I am pragmatic . . . [. . .] I find something that is very clear, something that is clear, that is evident . . . and that is . . . And I find excuses for human beings because human beings, they are fallible . . . Human beings, they are weak, they are limited. Even if they are giants, they are human beings! I do not recognize any human being as sacred in nature. [. . .] Except for the Prophet who is infallible. Uhh . . . I do not like fanaticism and uhh . . . to say that this sheik, he is the best, he is someone who never makes a mistake, that is . . . uhh . . . that is to fall into . . . divinizing human beings. No! It is someone who has tried to do something . . . and I value

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In the course of another interview, a woman, an mb sympathizer, a partisan even within mb circles, also appeared enthusiastic about the work of Qutb, which played a determining role in her return to Islam, before her arrival in Europe. According to her, it is quite simply irresistible: Sayyid Qutb, it was he who had . . . who explained the Koran in such a way that any Muslim whatsoever who should read it would accept the explanations. These were extraordinary explanations! That is how it is! That is literature! Right, from the mb, that has made its way in Muslim countries.5

In the same vein, at a slightly greater distance, another imam who is close to Salafism and mb ideas, without himself being a partisan, explains his interest in the Zilāl. He relativizes before anything else its scope by invoking the status of Sayyid Qutb, whom he distinguishes clearly from the theologians. But in the meantime, while he is enumerating the qualities of the work of Qutb, this imam gives it a privileged status that justifies its regular use. In fact, he considers it to be at one and the same time very personal and also rooted in a more ancient tradition. It is distinguished for him in a positive manner by its contemporary, modern, aesthetic and pedagogical aspects, while classical exegeses can be characterized as much more technical and difficult to read: Careful, it’s not . . . One cannot really consider it as exegesis, eh! Because . . . Sayyid Qutb, he was . . . he was a man of letters. He was not a theologian! Therefore you have to be careful about that. He wrote this, uhh . . . in prison . . . And there’s more . . . the two main references, anyway, upon which he . . . he says it himself at any rate . . . upon which he based himself in order to write his book, they were . . . the exegesis of Ibn AlKathir and a book by Ibn Al-Qayyim which was called “Zad al-maʿad” which is a biography of the Prophet, with a very heavy emphasis on legal matters, very much involved with jurisprudence [. . .] And his book is more, if you will, some reflections, meditations if you will. That is why he called his book ‘In the shadow of the Koran” . . . Fī Zilāl al-Qurʾān . . . that means ‘In the shadow’ of the Koran . . . In fact, these are his experiences through uhh . . . what we might call . . . the interaction that he had with the Koran . . . the thoughts that he uhh . . . and the meditations and that made him more mature and which he drew from his reading of the sourates, etc. . . . that’s it, eh! [. . .] Certain people call that “Tafsīr”, exegesis. But it is

4 5

Interview no. 70. Interview no. 40.

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more . . . uhh . . . I would say . . . by courtesy. But theologically, you can’t call it that . . . (Interviewer: So what do you do? You take it . . . and set it beside other exegeses . . .) Yes always that, hmm . . . Of course . . . But he is . . . he is a contemporary . . . he is a contemporary, he has . . . when he . . . explains certain verses, he has a certain way of putting things . . . uhh . . . which you don’t find with the ancients because the ancients speak in the way in which people spoke during their time, careful. (Interviewer: Yes . . . In fact . . . even if in your opinion it is not a tafsīr as such, it is still the most contemporary tafsīr that exists, and therefore, as such . . .) In quotation marks . . . that is right. [. . .] He also takes a very pedagogical approach, hmm. Seeing that he had been trained as a pedagogue . . . And that is interesting. While the mufassirīn, the ancients . . . placed much more stress either on the meaning of a verse or else . . . on the technical part, I mean . . . or on the aspect that is uhh . . . how can I say . . . grammatical, the aspect of jurisprudence . . . Everything depends on the training of the theologian who undertakes the tafsīr of the Koran, eh! Everything depends on his training, eh! If you will . . . it is a little, it is the delicate touch . . . in addition [laughs]. It is a little bit that in the end . . . But it is a very beautiful book. Frankly. I love it very much.6

Another interview, with an official of the Muslim Association of Britain who, in contrast to the preceding male interviewees, does not exercise religious functions strictly speaking in a professional sense, expresses a position that is a priori more detached and more neutral but favorable, just the same. The status of interviewees certainly does appear to play a role in the nature of their answers, since the above speakers, persons who did exercise religious functions, appeared to be more sensitive to the literary quality of the text and to the practical contribution that they might draw from it in regard to the composition of their sermons. Our interlocutor from the mab tends not to consider the contribution of Sayyid Qutb as very important, although he does recognize his status, especially as an exemplary figure. Sayyid Qutb is for him on the same footing as other ancient and contemporary personalities. The Prophet and his companions hold the highest place of honor, but beyond that, all the important figures without particular distinction are assumed to represent examples from which students may choose, according to their own personalities, those which suit them the best. For this speaker, everything is presented as if the school he conducts—and the mab organization—did not intervene in choices of this kind, contenting itself to present the important personalities all in a group, without distinguishing between them, and without characterizing them in any definite way

6

Interview no. 68.

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although the contemporary figures that he cites as examples are indeed those that carry about them the connotation of the Muslim Brotherhood. He tells about his experience: The Mawdudi, Sayyid Qutb and all this: they will learn about them and . . . they will learn about these Islamic personalities . . . during their schooling. Because we use them. We use “Fī Zilāl al-Qurʾān” in the study of commentaries on the Koran. Well . . . we (we tell them) . . . who is the author of this book? It is Sayyid Qutb . . . I say: “who is Sayyid Qutb”? He says “in Egypt, it was . . .” and he’s going to learn all that. Well,Yūsuf Qaradāwī and all that. And they will [learn] the scholars of a thousand years ago: Abu Hurayra, and Muslim7 and all that, they lived 1400 years before them but . . . but the personality that we study in detail, is the Prophet Mohammed, May health and peace be unto him. And then his companions, the companions of the Prophet and the pious men and all that. But people after that: they learn what we call their attributes and we try to get them to think [about] all the figures on the syllabus, according to the curriculum because we’re going to do this and then we’re going to do that . . . and it’s . . . “who wrote this book?” . . . Oh, it was . . . Yūsuf Qaradāwī or Rashīd Ghannoushī or all sorts of things. And the students will develop and all that . . . They will have what we call examples, they have examples and they are free: the ones they like and the ones they don’t like, in the Islamic heritage and it is our duty to transmit all that to them, in one way or another. Because at the mab, we have a tendency to use Arabic. Because Arabic, the Islamic library, the majority of books are in Arabic. And if you need to find resources for your education and your knowledge, if you know Arabic, you have access to that heritage; if you do not know it (Arabic), that’s a limitation.8

Complementary testimonies that are more critical Other testimonies from mb partisans, who are not imams, are more critical of the supposed contributions of Sayyid Qutb, at least in private. One of them is of the opinion that this heritage is questionable, but he was the only interviewee in Great Britain who formulated such a position. Two other interviewees, in France, told us straightaway that, personally, they did not agree with the positions taken by Sayyid Qutb, although they avoided criticizing the current (non-) positions of other members of the movement, or the movement as such.

7 8

Famous traditionalists (specialists in the hadith). Interview no. 25.

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One of these persons explained to us that he had quit the movement of the Brotherhood in Morocco when he found out about the thought of Sayyid Qutb. He associated this thought with a real schism, a destructive one, at the heart of the movement. At that time, he indeed decided to separate himself from the movement, but he told us that he did not hesitate to involve himself in fairly radical discussions on this topic. Just the same, it is fairly strange to note that the attitude he adopted in Morocco did not prevent him from joining the movement of the mb in France at a later time. Although he did not speak of this directly, it appears that this philosophy is no longer a problem for him in the contemporary movement of the mb. Without more information on this subject, we can only form the hypothesis that the philosophy of Qutb has been de-emphasized by militants in France. But other testimonies do not confirm this. Our interviewee in this case may simply have judged that the thought of Qutb was no longer offensive, or even that it had been neutralized, for at all events it appeared to have been marginalized, almost without anyone having to do anything, since it seemed so distant from the reality of life in France—a position that may be naïve. As he tells it: the Muslim Brotherhood was fashion kind of brought me back, a little, to read . . . the philosophy of the Muslim Brothers. I was kind of a member. Up to a certain point when I found out about the books of Sayyid Qutb. I was a kind of member but I rejected the writings of Sayyid completely. At one point, uhh . . . especially when the group Takfīr wa Al-Hijra appeared. That was . . . you know? And I got in arguments and all that . . . And I started to have . . . a critical attitude . . . and despite everything that he might have of linguistic qualities, like, . . . I realized that his approach was (not) at all . . . This was what I even called at that time something that produced a crisis. That means what you think in a crisis. And at that moment, I completely rejected even the Muslim Brotherhood knowing that it was a product . . . Sayyid Qutb was a product of that school who, at a certain moment, all that was catastrophic for Muslim thought. It was . . . it came down to that. How could a great school, a great philosophy of reform give birth to a person who wanted . . . really . . . to destroy thought? I saw things like that, in that manner.9

Another mb partisan, who has in the past been a militant socialist, explained that he also had difficulty in reconciling himself to the heritage of Qutb. He came close to rejecting him, not only as regards his ideas, but also as regards his exegesis of the Koran:

9

Interview no. 47.

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chapter five I absolutely do not subscribe to the line taken by Sayyid Qutb.

On one hand, this interviewee took a position against what he saw as Qutb’s division of society into two parts, or indeed his division of the world itself in the same way, something which appeared to him not to correspond to the philosophy of the movement. Thus he demonstrated that he had established a hierarchy of priorities between the various contributions to the movement, and was opposed to any radical separation between believers and non-believers, as well as to a separation between bad and good believers, the latter to be represented by the Brotherhood: [. . .] many of the writings of Sayyid Qutb, I put them aside. Why? Because they did not go along with . . . even before, before . . . even when I was in Morocco . . . I didn’t go along with the idea of . . . of . . . . . . dividing society into two parts. That means: the kuffār, the . . . the . . . jāhilites . . . and then those . . . who are . . . who are in . . . in . . . the way . . . the Brothers . . . no! That appeared to me, that appeared to me to be a division . . . that . . . did not really serve the ideas of Hassan Al-Bannā, if you will . . . [. . .].10

At all events, during a second interview, he explained more fully why even the exegetical work of Sayyid Qutb bothered him; he was disturbed by what appeared to him to be an attempt to use the Koran for political purposes: I never read any of the books by Sayyid Qutb . . . except . . . except the tafsīr al-Qur’ān. [. . .] But even the tafsīr al-Qur’ān, sometimes, uhh . . . which bothered me . . . a little bit . . . it was this turning the Koran into an instrument . . . in order to put over an idea . . . Okay, I understand him: he was in prison, and he went through a period of confrontation with Nasserism. He knows that Nasser, he was the tool of imperialism . . . Okay . . . one must . . . one must . . . one must put that in its proper context. But despite that, I think that . . . his method was not healthy, of . . . of . . . explaining . . . umm: of pretending to give a tafsīr of the Koran and taking passages like that from the Koran in order to . . . uhh . . . get an idea across. Al-Qur’ān, now, it is . . . the instrumentalization of the Koran and that is . . . that is . . . that is a thing that is . . . And that is anyway why I . . . I didn’t . . . I said . . . “okay, the writings of Sayyid Qutb, that is . . . they don’t interest me”.11

Despite the relativizations—especially the fact that he was ‘only a little’ bothered, and bothered by the recourse to context in order to justify an

10 11

Interview no. 52. Interview no. 63.

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instrumentalization of the Koran—, this statement from a member of the movement is astonishing. It remains limited by the fact that some other more indirect uses of the Koran in other contexts by other members of the movement don’t seem to present to this person the same difficulties. Perhaps it was Qutb’s direct interpretation of the heart of the text of the Koran that posed a problem in the most particular terms for this interviewee, while other works by other authors could be perceived as placing themselves at the service of the message of the Koran, without claiming to have touched the core of it. Difficulties in reading Sayyid Qutb Certain young people, not Arabic speakers, show themselves to be flexible and even tolerant with regard to the ‘Qutbist’ heritage. But judging from their testimonies, this is above all due to a difficulty in correctly understanding his texts, which are difficult from a strictly linguistic point of view.12 This prevents them from making any commentary that is really pertinent to the content of his texts. Speaking about the historical references of the movement, and especially about Sayyid Qutb, one young partisan in France who had been educated in the tradition of mb ideas explained to us his ignorance of this philosophy, which appeared to him to be distant and hermetic. At any rate it was his opinion that those who supported the thought of Qutb did not always appear to have a good knowledge of it, and that as a result commentary about it did not go much into detail. In this context, criticism of Qutb appears de facto to be even more difficult to imagine: [. . .] I think that they present them as people who influenced our thinking without knowing very much about them for all that and I think that when you don’t know very much about someone, you can’t say that they have this faculty of being able to influence us. For me Sayyid Qutb, what I know about him, or in any case at that time, he was someone who got hanged for his ideas by a piece of filth, a dictator who was in power. That’s what I know. And what someone has against him today what is it? It’s having a reading of Islam in a particular context, a context where they don’t let people express themselves freely, a context in which the movement of the Muslim Brotherhood was exposed to incredible repression. That’s what I know about that person. He was someone who wrote something. He was someone who got involved kind of late and that’s it. If you listen a little bit

12

English and French translations of the work Fī Zilāl al-Qur’ān are now available.

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chapter five to those who talk about him or those who say that they are supporters of his today, you don’t find more than that. His writings strictly speaking, their content: well you already have to know quite a bit, eh, just to read “In the Shade of the Koran”, his tafsīr of the Koran for . . . Well I can open it, I can read it. But reading it and understanding what he was trying to say, those are two different things.13

Another young British sympathizer corroborates the difficulty of this approach. He told us how difficult it was to read Sayyid Qutb, because he uses long words and very flowery language. For this person, these things make it necessary for the reader to have a very high level of mastery of Arabic, something that fewer and fewer young people have, even if they come from an Arabic family. The ‘qutbist’ influence From all these considerations, it appears that the contribution of Sayyid Qutb remains without question a valuable resource, in human terms because of his exemplary integrity as much as at the ideological level. It is difficult to ignore him, although the controversies regarding him are discreetly expressed. For some partisans, his commentary on the Koran is a true actualization.14 The term ‘actualization’ is taken here in the current sense of ‘updating’, but also in its philosophical sense; it means that this exegesis is equivalent to, or allows, a passage ‘from potentiality to act’ of what is contained in the Koran, because it appears to confer upon the Koran its full practical dimension in terms of the contemporary period. Our interviewees have often appeared really to be at a loss to bring the writings of Qutb into a contemporary discussion; all the more, we have seen them taken as unremarkable, and we have seen them spoken of reluctantly or with a certain unwillingness of a personal nature. At bottom, with regard to the statements we have gathered, the lack of a position is in the end more common than any definite opinion. It is all the more difficult to put together a criticism of Sayyid Qutb, because he is still considered to be in continuity with the great Islamic tradition, and 13

Interview no. 20. We cannot give an estimation of the impact of the other contributions by Sayyid Qutb on the members of the movement, since our interviewees never volunteered any such information. Perhaps they are not as significant. And since the tafsīr appears to have been translated into French only recently, it seems evident that Jalons sur la route (Milestones, in English) will be the book read by most non-Arabic speakers. 14

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because he is descended from Hassan Al-Bannā in intellectual terms even though he differed with Hassan Al-Bannā, and especially because he took some of Hassan Al-Bannā’s ideas to extremes. Sayyid Qutb continues to hold a high place among the influences on the mb, despite the fact that he is not well known by young people, and despite the embarrassing nature of certain aspects of his philosophy. The recognized specificity of his experience is at any rate cited today in order to justify some of the positions that he took that are judged to be abusive. Finally, we have observed that the margin of tolerance of the partisans of the mb with regard to this part of their past is fairly broad. Certainly, Sayyid Qutb has not been made into a sacred figure and his influence is typically minimized in comparison to the importance attributed to the Prophet, who is the only figure acknowledged to be infallible, and also in comparison with the first generations of Muslims (the Salafs), who are acknowledged to have been closest to the true spirit of the message. But Qutb is a priori worthy of esteem, and owed thanks for his efforts. He is also worthy, a posteriori, of being excused for his errors. Such positions do allow a pluralism of opinions to continue to exist within the movement, but some questions remain unhappily open, especially as concerns the equal human dignity or lack thereof of non-Muslims, the real recognition given to a pluralistic outlook in relation to the postulated superiority of Islam, which is held by some to be the universal guiding light.

CHAPTER SIX

OTHER CLASSIC INTELLECTUAL FIGURES

After Hassan Al-Bannā, spiritual and organizational leader, and Sayyid Qutb, considered as the ideologue of the movement, other persons also influenced the theoretical foundations of the thought of the mb and their diffusion throughout the Arab and Muslim world. Besides ʿAbd Al-Qādir ‘Awdah, whom no one mentions, other figures, persons known as intellectuals and members of the organization at the same time, have gained support from certain fringe elements of the movement; most of these tend to be mentioned by sympathizers, and are rarely mentioned by partisans. This is the case with two Egyptians and two Syrians: Muhammad Al-Ghazāli, Sayyid Sābiq, Mustafā Al-Sibāʿī et Saʿīd Hawwā.

1. Muhammad Al-Ghazāli Muhammad Al-Ghazāli (1917–1996) is a religious thinker, a graduate of the Al-Azhar University and a very prolific author. He is respected by many militants for having kept alive the philosophy of the mb even after the death of the movement’s first thinkers. Beyond the contributions he has made in a number of areas, and his reputation as a scholar (ʿālim), his reputation has been sustained by the fact that he not only knew Hassan Al-Bannā, whose disciple he was, personally, but also by the fact that he has developed his thinking over time. His works concern a variety of themes such as faith, the defense of dogma and the law of Islam against attacks from Orientalists, the alteration or corruption of religious practices, preaching, refutations of false philosophy, the situation in the Muslim world, the history of the Prophet, and also positions with regard to the people of Israel. His book Al-Sunna al-nabawiyya bayna ahl al-fiqh wa ahl al-hadīth (The prophetic tradition between the men of fiqh and the men of hadith—also translated as ‘Between jurists and traditionalists’),1 published in 1989, turned out to 1 Fiqh must be literally translated as ‘comprehension’. It initially concerned all forms of knowledge, but later the concept became a synonym for religious and legal knowledge.

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be an enormous success, although it generated a high degree of controversy. The argument dealt with the theme of religious authority within Islam, considered in the light of the relation between the Koran and the Sunna, and the place of prophetic authority as the source of Islamic law and the methods used in criticizing hadith. Muhammad Al-Ghazāli showed himself to be very concerned about the practical implications that such choices represented. According to Daniel Brown, who published a very good book about the way in which the Islamic tradition might be rethought in the contemporary era, this book by Muhammad Al-Ghazāli illustrated the increasing influence of Islamic revivalists in this debate. These revivalists try to maintain their connection with the prophetic tradition and to fulfill the divine will, without however giving evidence of any very strict attachment to the classical corpus of the hadith, since it has been maintained that it is imperfect [Brown, 1996: 108ff.]. With regard to fatwas, Muhammad Al-Ghazāli offers flexible solutions when the textual indications are not clearly established; at times he relies upon the liberal argument of the public interest (maslaha) in order to justify his positions and to find appropriate solutions for the cases that are submitted to him. In this regard, he appears to leave a certain space for personal choice [Izzi Dien, 2004:150]. Muhammad Al-Ghazāli appears to be closer to certain militants than to some other thinkers or mb activists who died more than 40 years ago and whose historical contexts and contributions seem fairly distant. He is an important figure of reference for some movement sympathizers who openly favor innovative positions. We will cite two testimonies here from persons who are close to the militant wing of the mb, who explain their relationship to the works and to the person of Muhammad AlGhazāli, to whom they are particularly attached.

It is also translated as Islamic ‘jurisprudence’, the discipline implemented by jurists ( fuqaha) that tries to determine good Islamic practices in the area of worship and social relations with regard to the primary sources of Islam, and to a context, and even with regard to a principle such as that of the general interest. Th e fuqahas try to facilitate religious practices used by believers, by interpreting Islamic prescriptions that are not intangible. For their part the traditionalists (hadith specialists, muhaddithūn) think that religious authority must be judged in the light of conformity to the primary sources of Islam alone, though they concede a primordial importance to the hadith.

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The first of these interviewees confided to us at the beginning of the interview: I am quite fascinated by his writings, by the way he asks himself questions about everything.

This person recognizes that he represents a minority viewpoint—even if in his opinion the thought of Muhammad Al-Ghazāli has been well received in the Maghreb, particularly in Morocco. He states that he has enormous admiration for Muhammad Al-Ghazāli, even considering him to be his ‘master’. He appreciates the audacity of his positions with regard to the rights of women: Muhammad Al-Ghazāli has authorized the khutba al-marʾa, public discourses by women at mosques, although this does not extend to Friday prayers. According to this interviewee, Muhammad Al-Ghazāli has even stated that he recognizes the intrinsic value of the West, which he credits with the development of his thought. The speaker goes even further: Myself, I am fascinated also by the West, I respect the West, I respect the . . . I respect the law that the West has . . . I would say . . . has acquired by . . . by . . . by the evolution of its reflection on itself.

He goes on to connect this audacious position with two other themes: the relationship to democratic processes (he states that he would have been the first to say that these processes are ‘beyond discussion!’)2 and the relationship to the State of Israel. His position regarding Israel is extremely controversial, because Muhammad Al-Ghazāli recognizes the common root that ties Arabs and Jews together, while the mb movement considers the liberation of Palestine as one of its top priorities and associates the Jewish people with Zionism. As such, they cannot benefit from any recognition because they are considered as usurpers of Palestinian territory, which is also Islamic territory.3 . . . Our interlocutor admitted that he had agreed

2 In concrete terms the position of Muhammad Al-Ghazāli is more subtle, because he pronounced concerning the nature of government under Islam, arguing that it was related to the authority of the community. According to him, the authority that delegates power to a leader should act to oversee the application of the divine order on earth [Izzi Dien, 2004:145]. 3 On considerations having to do with Jews in contemporary Islamic thought, see [Taji-Farouki in Nafi & Taji-Farouki, 2004]. This book makes reference to the work of S. Qutb Maʿrakatuna maʿa al-Yahud (translated by R.L. Nettler: Past Trials and Present Tribulations: A Muslim Fundamentalist’s View of the Jews, Oxford, 1987). Sayyid Qutb is described as having essentialized the Jews and the conflicts between them and the

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from the beginning with the conciliatory and pragmatic position of the sheik, and also that this position had caused him to be drummed out of the movement: [. . .] Yes, he was completely rejected! He was kicked out of . . . of the circle, at the beginning. At the beginning. From the first moments, when he stated his positions, that suited me perfectly! I read . . . I read all his writings. All of them without exception. I was fascinated. And besides that, it was he who once made the jumʿa4 of the . . . He had daring, he did, eh! He had daring! Even with the Jews, he was enormously audacious! He prayed a jumʿa, he spoke of ‘the sons of Ibrahim, the sons of Abraham, they were cousins!”. And that is something you never hear anyone say! It was . . . We . . . if someone today prayed a jumʿa and talked about Jews and Israelis being “cousins”, he would be considered as a traitor! As if he were someone who . . . who had sold out Palestine and everything! No, no! He talked about cousins! He said “let’s look at our history, let’s go back into history. We are the children of Ibrahim. We descended from Ismaïl, you descended from Isaac. We are part of the same family”! That was someone who was looking for . . . rapprochement. And he was someone who wanted . . . sort of uhh . . . not to do . . . I would say about this rebirth of the Umma . . . uhh . . . that you have to live a large part of this rebirth with a conflict in which you have no interest at all!5

The second interviewee in this sequence explains how much he has been touched by the modesty of Muhammad Al-Ghazāli and by the fact that he has developed his thought along reasonable lines and adapted it to appropriate contexts, and also by the fact that he responds directly to contemporary questioning without avoiding criticism in relation to the Muslim community. He also explains that he has enjoyed a privileged relation with the scholar and has been able to ask him direct questions about the development of the movement: I can say: he is the only person who . . . uhh . . . attracted me. Who . . . who was the thing I was looking for. [. . .] What it was, I think, was his . . . his rationality, his way of convincing you . . . He also had I think . . . a certain . . . way of approaching questions that other people didn’t approach. So, for example: he used more concrete examples, more . . . He stated

Muslims, but the author forgets to mention that these positions are already in the Koran (sura IV) and the hadith. Besides, it is also reported that S. Qutb wrote, in his work Justice in Islam, that the Jews weaken all modern societies because they promote usury and secular philosophy (a discourse that appears to have been used, already, by Arab nationalists, as noted by S. Taji-Farouki). 4 Friday prayers. 5 Interview no. 69.

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chapter six things, I think that that also corresponded to something in my personality, clear, frank. So then uhh . . . criticism, for example, of the Muslim reality: he didn’t try to camouflage it. And so, I think, at this age, . . . I was seeking out the problems, seeking the . . . errors, what were the . . . things to avoid in your thinking just as in human action . . . I think he made it easier for me [. . .].6

Among partisans of the movement, Muhammad Al-Ghazāli was mentioned along with others as a person of reference who could be located in a direct line of descent from Hassan Al-Bannā, but not Qutb. He was also mentioned as a reference by different people, especially in Great Britain. But one young partisan expressed regret that at the end of the day he was not well-known, especially in comparison with Yūsuf AlQaradāwī, who has benefited from a great deal of attention from the media.7 As in these commentaries by sympathizers, Muhammad Al-Ghazāli thus appears to be the object of certain reservations; his personality, his thoughts and his writings do not appear to command full and complete adherence. Given the small degree of interest on the part of mb partisans with regard to his positions—very probably kept small by his exclusion from the movement in 1953—it seems possible to deduce that his status within the movement is rather equivocal, despite the fact that he was initially recognized as an intellectual and organizational authority.

2. Mustafā Al-Sibāʿī, Saʿīd Hawwā and Sayyid Sābiq Mustafā Al-Sibāʿī The founder of the Syrian mb was Mustafā Al-Sibāʿī (1915–1964), a professor on the faculty of Islamic law (Sharia) in Damascus and the editor of several well-known magazines including the monthly Al-Hadarah alIslamiyya (Islamic civilization) and Al-Muslimun (The Muslim); one of his best known works was a book titled Ishtirākiyya al-Islām (Islamic socialism), published in 1960. According to O. Voll, professor of Islamic history, this were concerned the economic implications of the Islamic message developed by Hassan Al-Bannā [Voll, 1991:367].

6 7

Interview no. 55. Interview no. 52.

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The use of the term ‘socialism’ by Al-Sibāʿī appears to have been badly understood by many militants at the time the book appeared. However, the Tunisian leader Rashīd Ghannoushī was favorably impressed by one of the magazines edited by Al-Sibāʿī, so much so that he drew inspiration from it to establish the newspaper Al-marifah (Knowledge) in Tunisia during the 1970’s, for the purpose of ‘stimulating Islamic civilization essentially by means of intellectual questions, not only by means of discussion from a political point of view’ [Tamimi, 2001: 17ff.]. Mustafā Al-Sibāʿī remains a figure of reference mostly for members of the Syrian mb, but he is rarely mentioned in the movement generally, except in a purely historical context. On the other hand, the particular nature of his experience could have affected some Sufi circles. We have collected a testimony from a Naqshbandi Sufi well-known in mb circles since the 1960’s, which makes reference to a spiritual change of direction supposedly undergone by Mustafā Al-Sibāʿī at the end of his life. Without mentioning his sources (although it is possible that his knowledge came from personal experience), this person connected the spiritual conversion of Al-Sibāʿī to criticisms that he directed against the mb movement: He made “tawba”,8 he said, and became a Sufi. It’s interesting. The thing that causes Mustafā Al-Sibāʿī to change was rethinking his position and when he wrote his book ‘Ishtirākiyya al-Islām’ (Socialism of Islam), he was misunderstood so much that he started to rethink and came to the conclusion that he had been wrong and that he’s got in the wrong direction (that of the Ikhwan).9

Therefore, it appears that the initial failure of members of the movement to understand his thinking, plus his late change of direction, which was probably considered as a kind of disloyal act, are the things that have prevented him from being referred to with any frequency within the movement. It is true that no partisan made any mention of the Sufi experience that Mustafā Al-Sibāʿī is supposed to have undergone. Saʿīd Hawwā A similar and relatively equivocal attitude appears to have been adopted with regard to Saʿīd Hawwā (1935–1989), another figure initially recognized as one of the main ideologue of the Syrian branch of the 8 9

That is, to repent, to convert. Interview no. 03.

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Muslim Brotherhood. He was an activist and a thinker, among whose most important writings were Jund Allāh thaqāfatan wa akhlāqan (The soldiers of God, their culture and ethics, a commentary on the Risalat altaʿalīm of Hassan Al-Bannā), Hādhihi shahadatī, hādhihi tajribatī (This is my testimony, this is my experience), and Tarbiyatunā Ar-Rūhiyyah (Our spiritual education). He considered his effort at self-development as the point of departure along a pathway toward God, and in general he considered Sufism as the complement of fiqh, that is, jurisprudence. In his book Al-madkhal ilā daʿwah al-Ikhwan al-Muslimīn bimunāsabat khamsin ʿaman ʿalā taʾsīsi-hā (Introduction to the preaching of the mb on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of its foundation; published in 1979), Saʿīd Hawwā opined that in an Islamic state all citizens must be equal, without regard to their race or beliefs, and that the state must guarantee freedom of expression, in the personal as well as the public sense. The exercise of power must be based upon the shūra (consultation) and the freedom of association (political parties, unions, minority associations and civil institutions) on his view, and he held that a system with only one political party is impracticable [Moussalli, 1999:88]. Within the movement, some of his positions have been judged too liberal or too deeply marked by Sufism. They were challenged at the moment when they were first expressed and led to the banning of their author. This did not prevent some partisans and sympathizers from considering Saʿīd Hawwā as an important figure of reference within the movement, although in other such circles he continues to be subject to ostracism. Sayyid Sābiq Finally, we may mention the Egyptian sheik Sayyid Sābiq (1915–2000), whose biography is rather different from others we have sketched. He was a sheik of Al-Azhar, and a member of the movement, who was suspected of having incited others to assassinate Prime Minister Mahmud Fahmi Al-Nuqrashi. This official had made a decision to dissolve the movement which was denounced by the sheik as an aggression against Islam which would lead to the closure of hundreds of mosques [Mitchell, 1969:73–74]. Sābiq had also been suspected of fomenting an assassination attempt in 1953 aimed at then-leader Hasan Al-Hudaybī, and this suspicion caused him to be suspended from the movement for a time [Mitchell, 1969:124].

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He published in 1954 a work of law and jurisprudence in five volumes, Fiqh al-Sunna; this work deals in a simple and accessible manner with questions that arise in daily life, from social relations to the adoration of God. In it he criticizes the confusion that exists between scholarly language and Sharia itself (the body of Islamic law that governs every aspect of human existence, including the life after death; also translated as ‘the way’), which he saw as indicative of the decline of Islamic society. According to R.P. Mitchell, whose account we are following [1969:237], this work was one of the most widely circulated among the members of the Brotherhood during that period. According to the researcher A.S. Roald, who explains that this book detailed the regulations established within the four schools of jurisprudence, while still tending to promote the points of view supported by the author, Sayyid Sābiq has continued to be read in the Arab world, by Islamists certainly, but also by other Muslims [1999:378]. In the context of our research in Europe, we have found that he is cited from time to time as a reference to be consulted, although only in Arabic. A French translation was withdrawn from a number of Islamic bookstores because certain passages were judged to be in error by groups within the mb. He has been mentioned in interviews. Islamic socialism, an innovative dynamic In parallel with these presentations of individual figures, we should also make mention of the existence of a widespread tendency that had its place in the chaos that occurred after the Second World War. This dynamic has also been challenged from an ideological point of view. In actual fact, Muhammad Al-Ghazāli and Mustafā Al-Sibāʿī, as well as Sayyid Qutb and ʿAbd Al-Qādir ʿAwdah formalized to some extent and gave an important place to the theme of social justice in relation to Hassan Al-Bannā, who had already paid some attention to it. For them, Islam is deeply ‘socialist’ because of its concern for the common interest of all, and because of the obligation of the zakat, Koranic alms-giving (the obligatory poor due); this position respects private property, but maintains that solidarity between all social categories is necessary. Th is is not a reference to the kind of class struggle mentioned in materialistic and atheistic communism, strongly opposed by all these thinkers. However, upon the basis of this Islamic ‘socialism’ they attempted to justify various claims including nationalizations, agrarian reform, social redesign, and economic planning.

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This tendency toward ‘Islamic socialism’ was not universally accepted within the movement. The socialistic tendency was challenged by the leader of the Iraqi Brothers, Sawwāf, while Taqī Al-Dīn Nabahānī, the chief theoretician of the Jordanian Brothers maintained reservations with regard to ideas about Islamic socialism. As for members of the movement who had emigrated, especially from the Gulf region, they were often imbued with a basic anti-Communist attitude that induced them to condemn out of hand any socialistic initiative [Carré & Seurat, 1983:84–91]. In mb circles in Europe the theme of social justice has not been taken up by many, and few discourses with any significant content have been written in regard to it. One notable exception nonetheless is constituted by the interventions of Tariq Ramadan in this regard. There have been a few initiatives of a very particular nature, centering around the defense of the rights of Muslim communities. Thus in France mb partisans make their voices heard especially with regard to questions about various types of discrimination and/or Islamophobia (for example, in regard to the vote on the prohibition against girls wearing headscarves in public schools), things that concern the local Muslim community. In England, they have come out to protest a number of things, including various anti-terrorism laws passed since September 11, 2001 and also in the aftermath of the London bombings. At the European level, Muslim Brotherhood members are often involved in attempting to gain recognition for Muslims as members of a religious minority, with the aim of obtaining some sort of specific protection. In all areas, there is another theme that is capable of mobilizing broad support: initiatives and demonstrations in favor of a solution of the Palestinian situation, and along the same lines, solutions for other very problematic humanitarian and political situations, such as those found in Kashmir or Chechnya. At such times the interest is in the situation of Muslims only, and not only people deserving help. But exceptions do occur, and there are cases in which a larger concern for the development of European society as a whole is at work. In the interviews conducted with partisans of the first generation, that is, mb partisans who emigrated from their home countries to Europe, the question of justice appears to dominate their thinking, but most often in a way that concerns above all the struggle against despotic regimes in those home countries. One Brother with whom we spoke with said that it was a question of training people so that they would grasp the objec-

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tive in the fullest terms and not content themselves with a simulacrum of justice. His argument places the injustice done to God above that done to human beings, without our having been able to elicit more information (the argument was not further developed in the interview): Cause Islam in general, and religion in general in one way you can say it is to bring justice and face injustice whether to the creator or to others. It is the main . . . [. . .] The main idea of religion. And it is also the main idea of good philosophers who want their world to become a good place for living.10

In another interview that covered similar ground, a militant of Egyptian origin opined that involvement of this kind was really a form of duty because of the preeminent importance of the theme of justice: [. . .] we, as Muslims, we should be fighting for the just cause all over [. . .] I think it is our duty and our responsibility that we should take it on board and fight with them. [. . .].11

Just the same, in the real world such men make choices between the causes they support, because they know that they cannot support all of them. To sum up in this section, we have observed that the movement is founded upon a number of figures, taken as benchmarks or reference points, men who are intellectuals and militants at the same time, and who are close in some way to the founder of the movement. There are persons who played an absolutely fundamental role in the establishment of the theoretical foundations of the movement—in this connection we note the historical preponderance of Egyptians and Syrians—but whose influence is at present restricted to the margins. Men such as Muhammad Al-Ghazāli, Mustafā Al-Sibāʿī, Saʿīd Hawwā and Sayyid Sābiq are not often mentioned by partisans, although they have attracted more interest among members at the fringe. Two things may explain the partisans’ standoffishness with regard to these personalities. First, there is loyalty to the group. It is a fact that some of these people underwent procedures leading to suspension or exclusion, and as a result they and their ideas became subject to a certain ostracism. Despite the passage of time, this shunning is consciously or unconsciously

10 11

Interview no. 10. Interview no. 19.

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maintained by members who want to demonstrate their loyalty to principles, and who may never have known the history involved, or the earlier contributions of these people to the structures of the movement. In this regard Mustafā Al-Sibāʿī represents a singular case, since he on his own motion departed from the principle of exclusivity that is part of the movement of the Brotherhood, by ‘converting’, that is, becoming a member of a different brotherhood, although an Islamic one. Secondly, different sensibilities exist with regard to ideological positions, even though these different sensibilities may change over time. Positions that are radically innovative when they are conceived—and which may be rejected for that reason—may become commonly accepted norms later on; it is equally true that positions that seemed to express the common understanding of the members of the movement may over time come to appear passé and without interest. For example, the political positions of Saʿīd Hawwā or Muhammad Al-Ghazāli appeared particularly problematic at the time when they were first enunciated. In 2007, their thematics may generate new opposition, or they may be rediscovered and considered in a new light. From a collective point of view, it is the constitution of the organization or simply the maintenance of a certain orthodoxy which becomes the point of contention when the organization’s heritage is discussed. This orthodoxy must be able to maintain a relatively clearly delimited frame of reference, while still authorizing sufficient flexibility to accommodate necessary changes. The fact that a certain orthodoxy is being defended shows up quite clearly in certain things, for example the absence of reactions to challenges to the organizational identity such as those connected with the heritage of Sayyid Qutb. The controversy over his activities and writings did not lead to suppression or banning from the groups in control. Other than the position taken by Hasan Al-Hudaybi, whatever criticisms might have been directed at Qutb have remained discreet. An important part of the group continues to subscribe to his ideas. Perhaps it is his status as a martyr that is at the root of this indulgence: no critical disagreement can be permitted, because it might dissolve the bond that holds the group together. Attacks on less central figures do not carry this risk. Nonetheless, we have observed a certain operation of ranking performed by the movement with regard to its most eminent fi gures, and this operation allows a large consensus to be maintained around the

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central figure of Hassan Al-Bannā. As for Sayyid Qutb, he is the beneficiary of greater respect than that accorded to many more liberal and open persons, who remain assigned to the second rank although their contributions are recognized. It is possible that this situation represents the prolongation of a certain inertia, connected with the difficulties the group has in questioning its own foundations. Individuals who are on the fringe of the group appeared to be more inclined to go beyond these consensus choices and to develop their own figures of reference.

CHAPTER SEVEN

HISTORICAL REFERENCES FROM WITHIN THE MOVEMENT

In this chapter we continue our exploration of personalities of reference within the movement by directing our attention to those persons who are most often mentioned by the partisans. With the exceptions of Zeinab Al-Ghazali (mentioned by women) and Saʿīd Ramadān, the following personalities are never mentioned by sympathizers. These authorities are in general militants who have come out of the mb movement itself; most of them have occupied organizational positions, as leaders of the Egyptian center of the movement, or more rarely as leaders of other national branches. The movement has succeeded in extending this ‘line of descent’ of leaders, most of whom have been Egyptian, and who are respected by everyone, but who are little known, because of the difficulty experienced by the movement in managing the succession of leaders after the death of the founder. Some of these leaders continue to be mentioned up to the present day, especially when they have been the origin of real intellectual advances. Their role as organic leaders within the organization does not produce nearly as much impact or influence. Even though this recognition, essentially formal, has been maintained in Europe, it is disappearing little by little. The reasons for this include geographical distance and concern for problems related to national contexts. This recognition is also weakened by the vicissitudes of the exercise of an authority whose attributes and prerogatives are becoming progressively weaker themselves, due to the advancing age of these leaders or to the bureaucratization of its institution. There are fewer and fewer people who knew the founder directly. The inability of these leaders to take contextual and attitudinal changes into account, changes that are occurring at an accelerating rate, is also a factor in the explanation of this phenomenon.

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1. Various organizational leaders, including Saʿīd Ramadān We continue now our survey of the organizational leadership of the mb with a look at the different leaders who succeeded each other as the head of the Egyptian organization: Hasan Al-Hudaybī (1951–1972), already mentioned, and then, in chronological order, ʿUmar Al-Tilmisānī (1972– 1986),1 Hamid Abu Nasr (1986–1996), Mustafa Mashhūr (1996–2002)2 et Maʾmūn Al-Hudaybī (2002–2004).3 These leaders are occasionally mentioned by partisans of the first generation, but their names are never spontaneously mentioned in our interviews or otherwise. However, they are mentioned in a book that was published in Great Britain on the occasion of the 53rd anniversary of the martyrdom of the imam Hassan Al-Bannā. Written by a British partisan and including a preface by Gamal Al-Helbawy, this book contains a list of 15 names of persons trained directly by Hassan Al-Bannā himself [Al-Banna, 2002].4

1 Three of his works are noted by Tariq Ramadan: Al-mulhim al-mawhub Hassan Al-Bannā, ustāz jīl (The Inspired One, receiver of gifts from God, Hassan Al-Bannā, the teacher of a generation), in 1984, Al-makhraj al-islāmī min al-maʾzaq as-siyāsī ar-rāhin (Islamic solution to the political impasse) in 1991 and Al-islām wal-hukūmat ad-dīniyya (Islam and religious power), in 1985 [Ramadan, 2002]. In the Mediacom catalogue, we found a video cassette titled Hadīth suhufī maʾa Al-shaīkh ʿUmar Al-Tilmisānī (A journalistic event—or a presentation ?—with sheik ʿUmar Al-Tilmisānī) and two others titled Fī wadʿāʿ al-murshid al rāhil (Farewell Beloved Guide) which indicate that the latter visited France. Beyond this enumeration, available from a company based in France, it is important to see how limited the distribution was for works like this, accessed only by a few Arabic speakers that already knew a lot about the matter. 2 See especially his works as cited by Tariq Ramadan: Qadiyyat az-zulm fī dawʾi al-kitāb wa as-sunna (Questions of justice and injustice in the light of the Koran and the Sunna) in 1986, Zād ʿalā at-tarīq (The Resources On The Way), Tarīq ad-daʿwa bayna al-asāla wal-inhirāf (Between the foundations and error, the path of preaching), Muqawwamāt rajul al-ʿaqīda ʿalā tarīq al-daʿwa (The Resistance of the man of faith on the path of preaching) in 1992 [Ramadan, 2002]. Two videocassettes are also available at Mediacom: Al-wāqiʾ al-duwalī al-muʾāsir (Contemporary international reality) and Al-minhāj al-wāqiʾī fī fikr al-imām Al-Banna (Realist programs in the thought of the imam Al-Banna). 3 One videocassette: Hurrīya al-insān wa hūqūquhu (Freedom of man and his rights) at Médiacom. 4 This list itself is reproduced from the book by Ahmad Hasan Shurbaji, Rakāʾiz fī minhaj al-imām (without further mention). Mentioned there: ʿSheik Abdul Fattah Abu Ghuddah, Sheik Muhammad Al-Ghazāli, Sheik Yūsuf Al-Qaradāwī, Ustādh Hasan Al-Hudaybī, Ustādh ʿUmar Al-Tilmisānī, Shahīd Sayyid Qutb, Shahīd ʿAbd Al-Qādir ʿAwdah, Sheik Sayyid Sābiq, Sheik Saʿīd Hawwā, Sheik Mustafā Al-Sibāʿī, Sheik Abd AlKarim Zaydān, Sheik ʿAbd Al-Halim Abu Shuqqah, Ustādh Abbas Sīsī, Ustādh Mahmud Shukri’.

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This recognition appears to be purely formal, even if it does seem to signify a certain gratitude for good service rendered to the movement, and perhaps also for specific contributions made by each thinker. As we have seen in the foregoing, especially in the cases of Hasan Al-Hudaybī and ʿUmar Al-Tilmisānī, some of these persons have in fact supported new directions for the movement, apart from the fact that they are also recognized because of the relationship they enjoyed with the founder. In fact, standing beside the book of the teachings of Hassan Al-Bannā, A Collection of Letters, the entirety of the publications of successive leaders are supposed to carry forward the initial message. This succession of contributions appears to have been forgotten with the passage of time, as if their importance paled beside the later dynamics of the movement: the realities experienced by members of the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe were radically different from those experienced in Muslim countries, and these courses of events gradually acquired their own momentum, no longer directly dependent upon the actions of a leader in Egypt. As a partisan of Egyptian origin testifies, at the time when Mustafa Mashhūr was the leader of the movement overall (in 2002), his recognition as such was essentially a matter of principle; he was more a symbol of the unity of the movement than the center of its intellectual development or of the connections that might be developed between different groups within the movement. And even if certain direct contributions were recognized, they appear not to have been credited with any particular significance: We do respect our leader because it’s a symbol of the command. But we don’t put too much weight on their discourses. He reads . . . Mashhūr was not really a real intellectual figure. He did not add too much in that. Of course, he has his touch, he has two or three books . . . or six-seven books . . . We respect him for that . . . We respect him greatly for the work he done, the sacrifice he done. Because, as I told you on the beginning, that’s a part of the counter for the movement.5

Furthermore, two interviews give evidence of a double separation that has taken place between the movement and these leaders. On one hand, a partisan educated in the mb tradition in France explains that young sympathizers know little of the successive contributions of these different leaders; they do not even know the titles of their books.

5

Interview no. 13.

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We make reference to what the founder said and to what his students might have said . . . knowing that, among young people for example uhh . . . I wouldn’t say that the young people . . . no! We could say that with those who speak French, at least: what they know about it is . . . uhh . . . mostly bits and pieces. So they know that there was this book named “Majmūʾat al-rasāʾil”, they know that there were a certain number of thinkers but for example . . . uhh . . . people would not be able to identify what Al-Hudaibī wrote in his time . . . or what ʿUmar Al-Tilmisānī might have done. There is this whole line of successive leaders who were just the same intellectuals who produced things in the field of Islamic thought. That, they would be unable to come up with. They don’t know all that.6

On another hand, a very well-informed sympathizer explains that he has learned to distinguish between the contributions made by activists and those made by thinkers—although we have been able to observe that such a distinction is never put into words by partisans; the movement appears in this regard to blur the distinction between these two categories, because sometimes a confusion of genres is apparent. For our interviewee in this case, advances in thinking are what count, and in this regard the contribution of intellectuals is especially important to him, although this tendency runs counter to the attitude that is habitually adopted within the movement: I make a distinction very easily today, myself, between the . . . let’s say the organizers, the administrators, and so the representatives . . . of this . . . this movement and their thinkers, their . . . At one time, I didn’t make this distinction. I think that . . . I think that it is quite normal if the structure does not manage to follow the thinking 100%. Thinking is faster and goes ahead of things.7

Among the other figures of reference that are mentioned by the side of these Egyptian leaders with at least nominal movement-wide authority, we should note the quite particular position occupied by Saʿīd Ramadān (1926–1995),8 who is frequently mentioned by sympathizers in their 60s. His specific position within the Muslim Brotherhood as it exists across Europe is related to three things. First, he is the son-in-law of Hassan Al-Bannā, and has been presented as his heir; he was also his personal secretary. A Sufi of British

6

Interview no. 43. Interview no. 55. 8 For more information, revealed by two of his sons, see the website of the Islamic Center of Geneva (www.cige.org), directed by Hani Ramadan, but also the first section of the book Islam, le face-à-face des civilisations, by Tariq Ramadan [Ramadan, 1996]. 7

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origin with whom we spoke, who had contact with Saʿīd Ramadān toward the end of the 1960’s, explained to us that Saʿīd Ramadān was a political person, but that he also gave evidence of a strong personal spirituality, something which was perceived as having emanated from the benediction he received from the founder of the movement himself. Without believing that Saʿīd Ramadān had himself become a member of a Sufi brotherhood, he tells the story of one of his own experiences, highly charged in an emotional sense, something which demonstrated, in his view, the true nature of this man: I don’t think, actually [he was] a member of the tarīqa himself although he was a very very spiritual man. I remember, I think it was in London, maybe in Geneva, we were praying the dawn prayer, the fajr. There was myself, Dr Saʿīd, Saïf Hussayn Nasser from America and Sadiq Al-Mahdi [. . .] So there were the five of us . . . There was someone else; I don’t remember. Anyway, we were praying. Dr Saʿīd was the imam and he was reciting some sahl al-kitab: sūrat al-rahmān, sūrat al-qaf or something . . . And he was exciting . . . some kind of experiencing it; and you could feel it, the whole room warmed up and there were tears running down his face as he was reciting it. So you can only reach that level if you are in one way or another a legitimate sheik . . . so he may have been more politically involved but you could not escape the fact that he was a follower of his father-in-law. And something Saʿīd owns of sheik Hassan: the barakat who came down on to top of Saʿīd9 [. . .].

Nonetheless, despite the fact that he enjoys such a positive image, he is disavowed by a certain number of Brothers who are imprisoned in Egypt, and who accuse him of having escaped the effects of repression. Since coming to Europe, however, Saʿīd Ramadān has worked in support of refugees who emigrate there. Furthermore, if he does indeed occupy a very specific place within the European panorama of the movement, it is because he was the initiator of a number of new organizational efforts, notably the Islamic Center of Munich and that of Geneva. Finally, all while working for the Islamic cause in general, in 1961 he completed a doctoral dissertation in Germany having to do with Islamic law. In this dissertation he demonstrated the internal dynamism of the primary sources of Islamic law (the Koran and the Sunna, the prophetic tradition), while ranking other sources, typically taken as primary, rather as methods and techniques that should be put to use in the interpretation of primary sources. In this way he has contributed to the

9

Interview no. 03.

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reconstruction of Islamic legal thought, knowing that the application of Muslim law remains one of the priorities of the Islamic movement. Over the course of time, his constant involvement upon the European scene notwithstanding, which has been especially marked by the diffusion of many small pamphlets10 intended to popularize the thought of the Muslim Brotherhood since 1961, he appears to represent a certain intellectual and organizational independence. It is probably this relative distance from the main organization of the mb that explains the fact that he is not frequently mentioned by the members of the movement. Finally, other leaders from different nationalities are mentioned from time to time. Among these we may cite the name of the Iraqi leader Abd Al-Karim Zaydān,11 the Kuwaiti thinker and preacher Mannāʾ AlQattān,12 and even more frequently the Syrian leader and sheik Abdul Fattah Abu Ghuddah (1917–1997), who is more widely recognized because of his religious knowledge. However, on the Web site that is devoted to him (www.Aboghodda.com), with text in Arabic and in English, he is represented as ‘one of the most celebrated Muslim scholars of our era’, celebrated as much for his work as a preacher as for his scientific efforts, and his bibliography runs to some 60 works, especially including works of jurisprudence and prophetic exegesis. He remains an important figure of reference, especially among Syrian militants.

2. Zeinab Al-Ghazali Zeinab Al-Ghazali (1917–2005) was a figure of classical authority who occupies a singular position: she did not influence the theoretical

10

Certain titles have been re-edited in France since the early nineties by the Islamic Center of Geneva of by the Tawhid publishing house, which explains their long run in Islamic bookstores, but also the fact that they are familiar, if not deeply so, to many militants. Available titles: ‘Islam, doctrine et mode de vie’, ‘Qu’est-ce qu’un Etat islamique?’, ‘Trois grands problèmes de l’islam dans le monde contemporain’, ‘L’islam et le nationalisme’, ‘L’islam et la politique’, ‘Le droit islamique’. 11 He wrote a book that was published by the iifso (International Islamic Federation of Student Organisations, Ryad): Al-fard wa-l-dawla (The Individual and The State). 12 We have little information about him. According to one of our interviewees this preacher travelled regularly to France for uoif conferences, and wrote a slim volume about the presence of Muslims on non-Muslim soil, and the question of the sedentarization of preaching and prophesying [Interview no. 43]. This is found on the Mediacom list: Iqāmat al-muslim fī baladin ghayr islamī (The establishment of Muslims in nonMuslim countries). We also find a video: Athar al-wāqiʾī fī fahm al-nūsūs al-sharʾiyya (The impact of the contextual on the understanding of the texts of Sharia).

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foundations of the mb movement but, from a symbolic point of view she had a significant influence upon the militants, because she was a woman who had responsibility for certain functions within the organization, although in a manner that was a little particular, just the same. In fact, Zeinab Al-Ghazali was above all else a relatively independent activist who founded the Association of Muslim Women during the 1930s. This association helped women to learn about Islam and sponsored humanitarian activities. The association ran an orphanage, gave support to poor families, and helped unemployed persons fi nd work. In the course of these efforts, the association quickly came to the attention of Hassan Al-Bannā. He attempted to persuade Zeinab Al-Ghazali to merge her association with the Muslim Brotherhood, a move that she initially refused. Even after she finally agreed to swear allegiance to Hassan Al-Bannā during the 1940’s, she and her association maintained a degree of relative independence from the movement, right up until 1965 when she was imprisoned. This did not prevent her from working very closely with the leaders of the mb, including Hasan Al-Hudaybī and Sayyid Qutb, promoting their cause and working as an organizer of study groups for 13 years [Ahmed, 1992:197ff.]. In interviews with male partisans of the movement her name is never spontaneously mentioned. However, in Great Britain nonetheless, her name appears formally in the magazine Inspire,13 in an article concerning the historical roots and the background of the Muslim Association of Britain (mab). Her name appears in this article directly after that of Hassan Al-Bannā, and beside that of Sayyid Qutb, as if their respective importance was to be attested by the fact that on this occasion the equal importance of the efforts of men and women was to be emphasized. In France, on the other hand, the only formal recognition obtained by Zeinab Al-Ghazali that we have observed within mb circles came at the moment of her death in 2005. Condolences were posted on the website of the Union of Islamic Organizations in France. Startlingly, condolences for Zeinab Al-Ghazali and Ahmed Deedat were presented together; the latter was an incomparable preacher in an inter-confessional context, but he had nothing to do with the mb movement. Zeinab Al-Ghazali was

13 A special journal issue distributed in London by the Muslim Association of Britain on September 28, 2002 (on the occasion of a demonstration for justice and peace in Iraq and Palestine).

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presented in quite summary fashion as a ‘militant in favor of women’s rights in Egypt’, someone who had been imprisoned like other Muslim Brothers, and a ‘political refugee’. The brevity of this account is probably due to the fact that the organization remains above all an organization of men. But the relative autonomy that Zeinab Al-Ghazali claimed to want to enjoy perhaps explains at least in part the lack of enthusiasm with regard to her memory on the part of partisans. However, Tariq Ramadan paid homage to her by taking a hand in the rectification of the French translation of her autobiographical work, entitled Days of my life in which she relates her experiences in prison at the time when Nasser was the leader of Egypt.14 Despite this relative absence of publicity, she remains the only contemporary woman who continues to stimulate in a significant way the ambitions and even the vocations of many young women within the movement, and this is primarily because of the narrative of her experiences in prison. This observation is also confirmed by research carried out by the French anthropologist N. Weibel: 15 Zeinab Al-Ghazali is recognized as a role model for women. The attitude of the young sympathizer, member of the Muslim Association of Britain, attested as much when she showed us, without prompting, her book in English, published by the Islamic Foundation, and explained how much it had meant to her. Further, despite the lack of testimony from female partisans on this subject, several female sympathizers have expressed themselves, based on their reading of this work in French or in English. Their testimonies are evidence of a real feeling of closeness, a grasp of the figure of Zeinab Al-Ghazali as an example, from different angles according to the personalities of the women testifying. First, there is an interview conducted with a young Belgian militant, unmarried, once close to certain mb partisans, but now involved with Muslim Presence. She is active in a number of areas, especially in the

14 Work published by éditions Al-Bouraq, Beyrouth, 1996. It is interesting to remark that in 1994, this work was published in English under a much more explicit title: Return of the Pharaoh—Memoir in Nasir’s Prison (translated by Mokrane Guezzou, published by the Islamic Foundation, Leicester). 15 In her intervention ‘Le terrain féminin—une conception différente du leadership’, on the occasion of a day of study organized by the sdre (Society, Law and Religion in Europe, Robert Schuman University) on ‘Mutations et acteurs émergents de l’islam européen’, Strasbourg, April 10, 2003. This researcher is the author of [2000] Par-delà le voile. Femmes d’islam en Europe, Paris, éditions Complexe.

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humanitarian and social fields and in inter-confessional dialogue. It is apparent that she is extremely attuned to the aspect of her service which is offered as it were ‘to please God’, especially when this service concerns persons whose honesty and integrity up here to her to be beyond reproach. The sincerity of their faith is equivalent for her to a presumption of positive evaluation, even though as witness she concedes that errors may have been committed. For this woman, Zeinab Al-Ghazali is the feminine counterpart of Hassan Al-Bannā, and she does not hesitate to raise the possibility that she might consecrate her life wholly to the realization of similar goals: she has been as it were conquered by the exemplary character of these persons, and by their reading of Islam and their involvement, although she does not seem to be very interested in the context that surrounded them. At any rate, she admits that she does not know very much about that period of history, or about the history of the movement, and she does not seem very interested in knowing more. Only the fact of pleasing God by acting in a manner that conforms to his will seems to account for this young woman. In fact, it is the preservation of role models for reference and imitation in action, and the perpetuation of their Islamic ideals that counts above all, because these ideals still seem pertinent to her as regards the progressive Islamification of the individual and eventually all society. Thus she tells the story of her link to these people from the past: Well, I think if I had lived in the time of Hassan Al-Bannā, and if I had met Zeinab Al-Ghazali, I would have loved working with her. [. . .] For example . . . and I would certainly have been . . . I would certainly have taken that path to arrive uhh . . . well at my final goal which is to please God. I would certainly have taken that path. If I had lived at that time [. . .] In any case, I think that I would have gotten involved then . . . In any case, if I was going to get involved . . . If I was really going to give my life for something, I would have given it for that. Ah ! ! My life, that sounds like a martyrdom, that makes it sound a little like the mujāhidin but well uhh. . . . [laughs]. [. . .] If . . . Really, if I had had to uhh . . . in any case, to get involved on that path, I certainly would have uhh . . . uhh . . . I would certainly have gotten involved on the path uhh . . . of Hassan Al-Bannā, on the path of Zeinab Al-Ghazali. Because when I read their books, well for me it’s something that . . . for me . . . which resonates in me. It’s not . . . It’s not emotionalism, it’s . . . I am convinced that they were people uhh . . . that they were people who were sincere, from the beginning to the end. They were not infallible, but I think that they were incorruptible. (Interviewer: And what is it that touches you especially in what they did or what they . . .?) Well the fact that they believed in what they did. Me, when I . . . when . . . when I read . . . I don’t know if you have read “Ayyām min hayātī” . . . “Days of my life”, me,

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I read it . . . I am. I am unable to finish it and . . . and . . . what? I am incapable of reading it and saying to myself uhh . . . “well ok then, I finished a book and now I put it on the shelf ”. That is for a few days, it . . . it works on me, huh. Really, I say to myself “well what do you know”.. I mean, those people, nobody ordered them to give so much of themselves. They got involved because it was a noble cause. Well . . . I . . . When . . . When you look at Hassan Al-Bannā and Zeinab Al-Ghazali, the vision they had of society, what they did first . . . well: “we think first of the individual Muslim, the Muslim family, then Muslim society, then we can say Islamic state if we want” . . . in short ! I mean that I, in any case, they are the ones who for me . . . yes, really, the ones I feel for the most, huh! (Interviewer: And what is it that touches you the most?) It is . . . It’s their sincerity and uhh . . . the . . . how shall I say? They believed in what they were doing! Really, they believed in what they were doing . . . While now, they were certainly mistaken!, about lots of things, hah! Well, I mean . . . well okay we only discovered years later that . . . well okay, Zeinab Al-Ghazali, I think she’s dead but . . . Yes, I think she is really old but I don’t think she’s dead yet . . . I mean . . . Okay, well, well, I don’t know . . . I suppose anyway that if somebody asked her the question today, she . . . (someone must have asked her this question) . . . Okay, okay I’m sure that she would say “well okay now, there, at that particular moment, I should have done that, at that other time, I should have done that other thing.” But, all in all, really the . . . me, at any rate . . . really, it’s . . . it’s something . . . In any case, it’s an interpretation . . . Actually that’s it: it’s the reading she made of Islam. Now me, today, I understand her that way. I understand her that way. But now, for everything that has to do with ‘war, various things, and company”, sincerely, I never . . . I do not have any . . . In fact, I don’t really know, myself . . . really, sincerely, all that never really interested me, y’know ! I mean I have . . . I don’t really have any opinion in relation to . . . well okay now . . . Today, when I hear someone say, ‘yes, but Hassan Al-Bannā . . . pushed people to do massacres, he incited people to act crazy, he incited people to make war” uhh . . . I don’t know. I don’t know. And if he did that, I don’t know why he did it. And if he didn’t do it, I don’t know why he didn’t do it. I just don’t know anything about it at all!.16

On another hand, for a married female sympathizer from France, a little older than the woman whose story we heard just above, with a close relationship to the Union of Young Muslims (Lyon), the attraction of a role model seems equally strong. Other aspects of the life of Zeinab AlGhazali inspire her just as much. In fact, she insists on this concrete version of Islam in daily life, which she experiences and considers as part of a married couple. She also places great importance upon the feminist character of the struggle that Zeinab Al-Ghazali experienced—an

16

Interview no. 53.

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attitude that is probably disapproved of or at least considered equivocal by certain conservative partisans, although we have no confirmation of this, in view of the fact that Zeinab Al-Ghazali did not hesitate to divorce her first husband in order to pursue her ‘mission’ [Ahmed, 1992:200]. This feminism is characterized by our interviewee in this case as something that Al-Ghazali pursued in cooperation with her second husband, although it is true that in a book by Leila Ahmed, Zeinab Al-Ghazali is portrayed as having been preoccupied, even within this second marriage, with goals that were primarily her own. This sympathizer’s account: For me she was a great lady. Me, I had read . . . I can [. . .] the name of Zeinab Al-Ghazali . . . but I have read very little of what she wrote because Arabic literature is not accessible for me . . . Thus I am pretty well handicapped in relation to that . . . But uhh . . . I read uhh . . . “Days of my life” . . . that was by Zeinab Al-Ghazali . . . [. . .] I knew that she was a woman who suffered a great deal, who was put in prison , etc . . . And so uhh . . . No, myself, it wasn’t . . . For me, these are women who command respect. When you read her book, you see that . . . the attitude that she had uhh . . . how she lived through that while married . . . Because when you are a woman, you see that part of it . . . it is . . . you see it like that . . . And you see, you look at our brothers, and that sort of thing to know . . . the freedom a woman has when she puts herself forward . . . She, she answered when people knocked on her door at two o’clock in the morning, her husband would open the door, he led them into her office, he went back to bed, that’s what I mean . . . You say to yourself, “but that is the kind of thing . . . that is . . . that commands respect” . . . because . . . she lived their Islam on a daily basis with . . . with her husband. She lived that way from day to day. And that is what we need! And Zeinab, she lived her Islam every day, that has to be connected to the repression, right . . . ! It was . . . it was connected to her story about Egypt . . . but it was the attitude. Me, I could give my life for that [. . .]. And the fact that she dedicated her life, that . . . how shall I say it . . . . . . that had an effect on the people around her, on the space she lived in, right . . . It was positive. I think it was extraordinary ![. . .] It’s one of the only books, anyway, written by a . . . a Muslim woman that made me . . . that affected me . . . that I was passionate about, what! Yep . . . it was strong! It was very very strong.17

In both of these cases, respect toward the complete involvement of Zeinab Al-Ghazali is considered more important than anything else. What is held of value above all is the fact that she carried out her inten-

17

Interview no. 50.

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tions with great energy and with a coherent dynamism in regard to Islam and to all Muslims. Over and above this exalted idea of a total involvement—in which the stakes are nothing less than the fact of ‘giving one’s life’—nothing regarding this story is criticized in the light of a contemporary context: very little critical distance is established with regard to this woman and her life experience. One of our female interviewees admitted her lack of knowledge of historical details, and even said that she was indifferent to them.18 Despite the radical specificity of the experience of Zeinab Al-Ghazali, her figure continues to stand as a real role model for life. Surprisingly enough, her exemplary character appears to touch the lives of female sympathizers whom we interviewed very deeply: Zeinab AlGhazali represents a very concrete model for imitation rather than some sort of distant historical heroine or iconic figure.

18

For a less ‘smoothed out’ approach to Zeinab Al-Ghazali (who has traits that appear contradictory at times, as in Ahmed, 1992:196ff.) and her work (considered as an Islamist discourse criticizing the functioning of a government, while being unable to really do so, being itself ‘produced within the processes of power’), see Mitchell, 1990).

CHAPTER EIGHT

LIVING FIGURES OF REFERENCE

The movement today is made up of white collar workers, thinkers and religious scholars, but also by preachers who stand in a complex relationship to the mb movement. We shall observe a distinction between those who are located outside of Europe, most of these in the Muslim world, and those who live in Europe. The first group makes up a sort of referential framework in the largest sense, although this framework may sometimes be a bit abstract; it is the second group that has the most concrete effect upon the European scene. In the space between the two, just the same, certain personalities take on the role of a bridge between two worlds. From this point, we have just as much to do, and perhaps much more, with intellectuals who stand outside the organizational movement of the Muslim Brotherhood but not its ideas, who are more or less critical of the movement, and who have a direct effect upon Muslim thought, and by this means upon the thought of those members of the Muslim Brotherhood who are most open to innovation.1

1. Figures of reference outside Europe From where we stand at the beginning of the 21st century, we see that a few personalities enjoy a great notoriety and an influential image, even a certain authority with relation to European militants, despite their geographical remoteness. Some of these are organizational leaders and the others are thinkers. As regards the first category of personalities, the most concrete physical representative of the movement is the leader of the Egyptian Mus-

1 We can cite for example personalities such as Abdelkarim Soroush, Nasr Abu Zayd, Muhammad Sharour, Abdelmajid Charfi, Mohamed Arkoun and also Abdelwahab Elmessiri, Fahmi Huwaidi, Munir Shafiq, Tariq Al-Bishri, Abdelhalim Ibrahim Abdelhalim, Bashir Nafi and many intellectuals associated with the International Institute of Islamic Thought (especially Ismail Raji Al-Faruqi and Taha Jabir Al-ʿAlwānī, Abdulhamid Abu Sulayman and Hisham Al-Talib), among others.

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lim Brotherhood, Muhammad Mehdi ʿAkef, the seventh successor to Hassan Al-Bannā, named to his present position in January 2004. From our reading of articles written in Arabic which are available primarily as posted on the website of the Egyptian Brotherhood, his legitimacy rests upon three elements: first, his proximity to the founder (he is one of the last leaders to have been able to know him personally), second, his extensive overseas contacts (he has lived in Europe among other places and he developed the international network of the Brotherhood in Europe), and finally the fact that he was condemned to death in 1954, something that confers upon him a sort of valor, the legitimacy of the status of a hero, and which testifies to a kind of ‘bravery’, an active form of resistance, and the toughness of his spirit, which has been able to keep going through adversity. In some of our interviews, one or another European partisan recounts for us briefly his visit to this leader, typically accomplished during a stopover in Cairo prior to continuing on during a pilgrimage to Mecca. These are courtesy calls that allow the visitor and the guide of the movement to catch up on news, or more motivated visits whose purpose is to seek counsel, to ask the guide’s opinion or even his approval of a particular attitude or organizational strategy. However, in the eyes of members of the Brotherhood from Europe his role remains above all symbolic. For partisans from other national branches, it is first and foremost their national leader who constitutes the most authoritative reference, and in comparison the Egyptian leader appears more distant, even secondary. And the majority of them even end up abandoning that reference there, later making a commitment to local organizations or European national branches that have established their own structures and that recognize their own figures of authority, in relative independence. This remark leads us to consider the question regarding the role of the leaders of various national branches. Some of them are mentioned from time to time in the interviews as figures of reference because they represent the movement and are involved in it. All of these persons are above all recognized for their activism within their respective national branches, activity which is perceived as the result of disinterested and even courageous altruism. Thus in order of importance we may mention the Algerian Mahfoud Nahnah (who occasionally traveled, especially to France, but who died in 2003), the Syrian Ali Sadr Al-Din Bayanuni (a legal expert, at the present time a refugee in London, but still categorized here as an extra-European figure, since his involvement is concentrated upon Syrian affairs), and even, surprisingly enough, the

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Yemenite Abdul Majid Zindani. We should also take note here of the respect generally given to the sheik Ahmed Yassine (spiritual leader of the Palestinian group Hamas, who disappeared in 2004) in recognition of his personality—strong and weak at the same time—and his unyielding dedication to the Palestinian cause. Other persons, mostly thinkers, are also mentioned; only a few of them are established in Europe and continue to appear meaningful. Otherwise, with regard to those who live outside of Europe, mention is made occasionally by a militant, a partisan, or a sympathizer of the Egyptian Muhammad Qutb (brother of Sayyid, who has himself written many books in Arabic concerning the theme of an Islamic awakening, books that are sold at Islamic book fairs), and also of the Iraqi Muhammad Ahmad Al-Rāshid, already mentioned in these pages, author of many works including Al-ʿawāʾiq (Obstacles), Al-muntalaq (The starting point), Al-raqāʾiq (That which softens hearts and souls) and Naqd al-ʿalmāniyya (Critique of lay status). As for the preacher and Islamic thinker, the Lebanese Fathi Yakan, president of the majlis al-shūra2 of the Jamāʾā islāmiyya in Lebanon from 1962 to 1992, he has been considered since the 1960’s as a pioneer of the Islamic movement. Some of his books are still in circulation, particularly two titles that have been translated into French: Que signifie mon appartenance à lʾislam? (What does my belonging to Islam mean?—in which the duties of a Muslim are summed up),3 still presented by the editor Tawhid as a reference book in 2002, and Les problèmes qu’ont à affronter la daʿwa et le da’iya (The problems the daʿwa and the daʾiya face; published by the IIFSO in 1990), which has for years served as a practical guide for preachers. These works appear today to be more and more obsolete, however. Despite Yakan’s nomination to a position in the Lebanese parliament in 1992, his rapprochement with the Syrian regime and an extremist-tinted speech made in support of Al-Qaida have put some distance between him and the main concerns of European Islamic militants. However, Fathi Yakan remains in contact with these militants via the Internet. In December 2006 he led prayers in front of thousands of demonstrators who were sympathizers of Hezbollah, mostly Shiites, in the heart of downtown

2

Consultative council. It is interesting to note that the title of this book in English is more assertive because it is translated as To be a Muslim. Its content is also different because it contains a second part that is devoted to organizational chapters of Islamic work, much more explicitly connected to the heritage of the Brotherhood (the work is available online at http:// www.youngmuslims.ca/online_library/books/to_be_a_muslim/part2/vii.htm). 3

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Beirut, and received commendations for this performance. This appears to have been a small but significant step toward the realization of the objective of uniting the Muslim community.

2. Figures of reference who act as bridges between East and West We will discuss in this section several persons who appear to act as bridges between the Muslim world and the West, thanks especially to their regular visits to Europe, but above all because they are true figures of reference in themselves. In most cases we will refer to Muslim scholars recognized outside the circles of the Muslim Brotherhood. Yūsuf Al-Qaradāwī Foremost in this category is the redoubtable Egyptian sheik Yūsuf AlQaradāwī (born 1926). He was a direct disciple of Hassan Al-Bannā, and was initially a member of the movement of the mb, but while he no longer exercises any organizational function, he still represents one of the most important religious references for the movement. In the view of legal expert Mawil Izzi Dien, professor of Islamic Studies at the University of Wales (Lampeter), he symbolizes the ‘new philosophy of the Muslim Brotherhood’, in which an attempt is made ‘to balance reason and moderation’ [Izzi Dien, 2004:133]. Yūsuf Al-Qaradāwī received a degree from the University of Al-Azhar in literature, the fundamental basis of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh) and the fundamental basis of religion (usul al-din). At the present time, he is the dean of the faculty of Sunna at the University of Qatar. He is the author of a great number of books in Arabic,4 some of which have been translated. They are reported to deal with the very concrete and present 4 Among his works in Arabic, we find At-Tarbiyyat al-islāmiyya wa-madrasat Hassan Al-Bannā (Islamic education and the school of Hassan Al-Bannā) in 1992, Nahwa wahda fikriyya li-l-ʿāmilīn li-l-islām (Toward the unity of thought among Islamic activists) in 1991, As-sahwa al-islāmiyya bayn aj-jumūd wa-t-tattaruf (Islamic awakening, between rigidity and extremism) in 1990, Al-ijtihād al-muʿāsir bayna l-indibāt wa-linfirāt (The effort of contemporary interpretation between discipline and excess) in 1994, Ghayr al-muslimīn fīl-mujtamaʾ al-islāmi (Non-Muslims in Muslim societies) in 1992, Awlawiyyāt al-haraka al-islāmiyya fīl-marhala al-qādima (Priorities of the future for the Islamic movement) in 1990, Min ajli sahwa rāchida—Tajaddud al-din . . . wa tanahhud bi-l duniā (The well guided awakening. Renewal of religion . . . and the renaissance of the world) in 2001. In French: La place de la femme en islam, Fiqh al-zakat, Pour un réveil islamique efficient, etc.

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dilemmas that affect Muslims, especially as regards Muslims who live in non-Muslim countries. Among these works, one of the most celebrated titles is Al-Halāl wa-l-Harām Fīl-Islam (The Lawful and Prohibited in Islam), written in 1960 and translated during the 1980’s. In this book he responds to a number of questions that are very frequently asked by Muslims who live in a Muslim society, and without hewing strictly to the line of one or another school of legal thought, he furnishes a practical guide to daily life. This book has become an indispensable reference. Al-Qaradāwī believes that Islam in legislation has deliberately left certain areas untouched, so as to leave room (in his view) for individual opinions [Izzi Dien, 2004:145]. In the introduction, he states a principle of Muslim law that has become famous: ‘Everything is permitted unless a text from the Koran or from the prophetic tradition clearly and explicitly stipulates the contrary.’ It is not at all unusual at the present time to hear this principle cited with approval in mb circles. Al-Qaradāwī has also distinguished himself in the area of jurisprudence by his emphasis upon the principle of wasatiyya, often translated as ‘middle way’ or ‘happy medium’, and this term is regularly employed in the Koran to describe the Muslim community: in concrete terms, Yūsuf Al-Qaradāwī endorses a gradualist methodology with regard to the application of Islamic law, and he considers it necessary for legislation to progress through a stepwise development, in contrast to the way things have usually happened in history. According to him, this gradual process over time must be related to the rootedness of Islamic belief and to the depth of the understanding of Islam within a certain territory. Thus, over and above the definitions of this term, wasatiyya, which may be put forward from time to time by sympathizers with the movement, perhaps vaguely affirming that the principle implies an attitude on the part of the believer in which ‘neither laxism nor extremism’ can be said to exist in religious practice, Al-Qaradāwī aims rather at a gradual but very concrete application of Islamic law. For Mawil Izzi Dien, Al-Qaradāwī’s statement, that the implementation of Islamic law cannot be immediate, appears to clash with the classic positions of the Muslim Brotherhood, for the movement typically holds that it is necessary to grasp Islam from the beginning as a whole [Izzi Dien, 2004:134]. However, both the practical disposition stated by Al-Qaradāwī as well as the principle defended by the mainstream of the Brotherhood appear to us to be no more than concessions in the direction of a principle of reality: taking into account a concrete context simply does not permit an immediate application,

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while on the other hand the Brothers arrange things, as we shall see in what follows, so that the value of the postulate according to which Islam constitutes a whole and must be considered as such is preserved.5 Yūsuf Al-Qaradāwī has presided over many councils, including the European Council For Fatwa and Research (established in 1997), which seeks to implement a jurisprudence that recognizes the rights of minorities on behalf of Muslims that do not live in Muslim societies. In connection with the meetings of this council, he comes to Europe at least twice a year. Al-Qaradāwī is seen every week, on Sunday, on the television show AlSharīʿa wa-l-hayāt, broadcast via Al-Jazeera, and on this show he deals with a variety of questions that arise in the homes of European Muslims. His Friday sermons are posted on his own website, www.qaradawi .net. He comments frequently on stories in the news, including those concerning international politics, and he typically adopts clear-cut positions when it comes to the condemnation of military attacks carried out in Muslim countries, and resistance to such attacks. Al-Qaradāwī is known above all in the West for the debates that have been occasioned by his approval of suicide operations in Palestine, or those which have followed his statements of support, restricted, it is true, to exceptional circumstances, for the principle according to which a husband has the right to beat his wife—mildly—when she adopts a rebellious attitude.6 On the other side, he is much less well-known, for example, for his critical positions with regard to the Islamic movement, including the mb. These are for example at the core of his book, Où est la faille? Réflexions sur la crise du monde de l’islam (Where is the flaw? Reflections on the crisis in the Islamic world) [Al-Qaradāwī, 2004]. In

5

See especially the section on ‘Islam as a way of life’. Many controversial positions, expressed by Yūsuf Al-Qaradāwī, are for example translated on the Memri site (Middle East Media Research Institute, in Washington DC, www.memri.org). This institute paints Fayçal Al-Mawlawi as a jihadist (we mention him again in what follows) based on something from his website concerning a fatwa issued May 26, 2003 concerning the American invasion of Iraq: Fayçal Al-Mawlawi expresses the view that there is an obligation to resist the Iraqi occupation, and that this belongs above all to Muslim governments. He adds that the aggression in Iraq does not entail a specific individual obligation toward the defense of Iraq, as it were, to physically engage in combat, but this latter action remains ‘desirable’ for those who can afford to do it, and they are assured of being rewarded for it (bulletin from Memri, Special Report no. 35). From the look of the content on that site, which mainly lists controversial positions adopted by Islamists, without any real critical objectivity, we may presume that the ‘institute’ is close to Zionist lobbies, or even to the Israeli secret service. 6

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this book he denounces the lack of internal self-criticism engaged in by Islamic groups, and encourages them to accept criticism directed at their leaders, and to promote the knowledge of weak points and existing disagreements within the movement, something which is not standard procedure at present. He disapproves of the fear of controversy among Islamic groups with regard to their own leaders and maintains that criticism of someone’s ideas does not imply criticism of the persons putting those ideas forward, or of their personal qualities. In addition, AlQaradāwī has condemned the exclusion that individual activists have encountered, as well as the tendency toward imitation and conservatism that brings in its train a tendency to reject thinkers who develop opinions that are innovative. In general terms, the radical style of this kind of stance, taken by AlQaradāwī, aims quite particularly at recapturing the Islamic dynamic as a whole: the sheik believes that this approach has an important role to play in the revitalization of Islam, and he brings to this effort his own contribution. He insists on the necessity of promoting the internal development of mentalities as well as practices, a goal which is to be achieved through the recognition of the importance of social action and collective work, and not exclusively through political action. All these positions carry significant weight, for Yūsuf Al-Qaradāwī is at this time one of the most popular scholars of the contemporary Sunni world; and certainly his renown is linked to his intensive use of media communication. But that does not alter the fact that he is recognized as an authority who is qualified to interpret the law. The popular success of his intellectual contributions, recognized as adapted to the contemporary period, confers upon him this informal but nonetheless real authority, even if he is not recognized by literalist circles. Fayçal Al-Mawlawi A lesser light still worthy of consideration is Fayçal Al-Mawlawi, mufti of Beirut and member of the Jamāʾā islāmiyya in Lebanon. He is a preacher and an intellectual, and exercises the function of judge of Islamic law (Sharia) in Lebanon after having obtained a Master’s degree in Sharia at the University of Damascus and a Master’s degree in law in Lebanon. His role appears to be above all historical in relation to European militants, especially because he lived in Europe between 1980 and 1985, during which time he became the religious counselor to the uoif,

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and participated in the creation of the European Institute for Human Sciences (Chāteau-Chinon). His activities are concentrated at the present time in the Muslim world, but he remains a vice-president of the European Council for Fatwa and Research, an organization with which other scholars are involved, who are less media-savvy, and who tend to be fairly close to the mb movement. He can be contacted through his website, www .mawlawi.net. Among his works of interest to European Muslims, we may cite Al-Usūs al-sharīʿa li-ʿalāqa al-muslimīn bi-ghayr al-muslimīn (The basic fundamentals of Sharia concerning the connection between Muslims and non-Muslims). Saʾīd Ramādan Al-Būtī Finally, it is fairly surprising to note that the sheik Muhammad Saʾīd Ramādan Al-Būtī (born 1929)7 is also considered as an important figure of reference within the mb movement. To be more exact, he constitutes a reference for a certain number of sympathizers, as well as partisans (or former partisans), especially Syrians. This Syrian, who knew Mustafā Al-Sibāʿī, has shown sympathy for the Islamic movement [Christmann, 1998], but never was a member of it, and sometimes criticizes it. His well-advertised opposition to the politicization of religion—he refuses to speak about dīn wa dawla, religion and the State [Christmann, 1998], and also opposes the notion of a fiqh for minorities (that is, an adaptation of Islamic jurisprudence specifically for Muslim minorities in the West). But this has not reduced his influence. He is therefore an exception in the panorama of figures of reference for the movement, usually populated by members of the movement. In fact, sheik Al-Būtī possesses several formidable advantages, including his notoriety as a scholar, holder of a diploma from the faculty of Sharia at the University of Al-Azhar. He has become the dean of the faculty of Sharia at the University of Damascus and is the author of more than 40 works, dealing with a great variety of subjects, some of which are attacks aimed at Wahhabi-salafist positions. He encourages the faithful to value their own personal opinions, and he has shown himself to be capable of transmitting his own ethical principles while yet adapting them to a contemporary context. In order to gain insight into his

7

For a fairly full glimpse of the personality of the sheik, see Christmann, 1998.

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teachings, which champion a moral culture based on the interiorization of ethical teachings based upon injunctions taken from the Koran and from the prophetic model, we recommend reading the 1999 book published by Houot. As for the relationship of this scholar to the Muslims of Europe, Muhammad Saʾīd Ramādan Al-Būtī makes frequent visits to Paris, especially to the Ad-dawah mosque, or to the Oxford Center for Islamic Studies (OCIS), an institution associated with the University of Oxford. His website, www.bouti.net, is constantly accessible and frequently updated, and this also gives him high visibility. A former partisan of the mb who is close to sheik Al-Būtī and is himself a member of the European Council for Fatwa and Research, shares with him, at least in so far as the European situation is concerned, the idea that the coalescence of religion and State—dīn wa dawla—is impossible. His arguments, however, appear nonetheless fairly confused. To be sure, his justifications are very concrete, but they oscillate between the observation that it is a practical impossibility to make a political movement with religious pretensions succeed (given the complete failure of all such initiatives to date), and the idea that consists in recognizing that the European context offers a sufficient number of occasions for the leaders of various confessions. The idea of such a political party thus appears to remain present to his mind even though he finally puts it aside, admitting that he has had the opportunity to work in Europe in an Islamic manner, in the manner in which he intended. He recognizes this from the outset, at the beginning of our interview: Because it is not possible, isn’t that true, at the present time, isn’t that so? We are working in a non-religious [lay] country8 and that lays status [laicity], for us, in my opinion, is an occasion to let all people, isn’t this true, work the way they want to. Muslim, Christian, Jew, etc. . . . without anyone . . . without putting them under constraint in their . . . So it is logical. If I may say so, myself I work in a Catholic country, for example, and so there are some strict things, and you have to respect them, etc. So in a lay country, people respect all religions, you work the way you want to, etc. And that, If I try to create a movement uhh, a political party that is for example religious, it won’t work. In my opinion, it won’t work!9

8 He thumps on the table at the same time, as if to underline his suggestions; this insistence signifies that this matter goes without saying from now on, and that he is intimately convinces of this (all while knowing how far the question remains unfortunately in suspense for many militants?). 9 Interview no. 38.

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As regards the opposition of sheik Al-Būtī with regard to the idea of a minority jurisprudence (which is a project that is supported by the European Council for Fatwa and Research, cefr, and also by the European organization of the mb, the fioe), he knows about this, and he affirms that the sheik has been concretely invited to come have a discussion with the members of the cefr in order that he may clarify the differences of opinion involved, which according to his own statements can only lead him to change his opinion, in the light of the realities of the present context: Him, for him, he says that the fiqh, there is only one. There is no fiqh for the minority. While at any rate, when there are examples, isn’t this so, when one gives examples, he will change! He will change! Myself, I know him very well, he is a great friend, and I love him very much, and I really have a great deal of esteem for him. But in order to judge rightly, you have to go inside. It can’t be done on the outside.

3. Figures of reference within Europe Among the persons of importance on the European scene as regards intellectual and discursive production, there is a great diversity of actors. Some of them are white collar workers, while others have a more independent profile. Setting aside a few exceptions, most of these people are self-taught with regard to Islamic matters, although they may have at their disposal different kinds of knowledge acquired over the course of their lives, sometimes within the framework of some well-known institution. Before speaking of the contributions of two French speakers, Tareq Oubrou and Tariq Ramadan, we will begin this part of our exposition by taking a look at two fairly singular personalities who enjoy a status, whether based on the past or still active, within their national branches by reason of their history. First there is Rashīd Ghannoushī, from the Tunisian movement Al-Nahda, who has lived in London since the middle of the 1980’s, and second, the former supervisor general of the Syrian mb, ʿIssām Al-ʿAttār, who has lived in Germany since 1969. Each of these persons wields a specific authority among the leaders of their respective national branches, above all because of their constant involvement in relation to the situation that obtains in their countries of origin, and both of them enjoy great recognition beyond the countries that have welcomed them, thanks to their work in the area of Islamic thought, among other things.

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In fact, the only reason that we are presenting these four personalities who are situated more or less at the fringes of the movement, is because they appear to put forward reflections that are at one and the same time original and meaningful, in order to stimulate progress in contemporary Muslim thought. Just the same, in order to finish off a review of the entire spectrum of contemporary European figures of reference, we should also mention, at least very briefly, a group of preachers who have shaped and influenced the European discussion scene at the center of the mb movement. These very numerous orators and preachers constitute so many other potential figures of reference for militants, and this is all the more true in as much as some of them also produce cassettes and books, or post writings on websites. Even if they sometimes present undeniable idiosyncracies, linked to their individual sensibilities or to be more or less important distance at which they stand with regard to the organizational framework of the Muslim Brotherhood, they nonetheless cannot be presented here in an exhaustive manner, above all because their conferences deal with themes that are relatively classic in relation to Islamic thought in general, and the thought of the Brotherhood in particular. In the French-speaking world, some of them are much in evidence, including Hani Ramadan (doctor of philosophy,10 often reviled as a radical but little known in the final analysis; he writes on a fairly eclectic range of subjects: exposés relative to dogmas of the faith, expositions of themes in which Muslim practice and spirituality meet, but also exposés of a more politically involved type, political in the largest sense, concerning the Palestinian situation or the critique of modernity;11 some of his articles are available on the website of the Islamic Center of Geneva, where he serves as director), Hassan Iquioussen (who deals above all with religious practices and the morality of behavior, in the largest sense; a very great number of his speeches at conferences are

10 See especially his work from 1990: Une critique de l’argument ontologique dans la tradition cartésienne, Publications Universitaires Européennes, ed. Peter Lang, BerneNew York-Paris. 11 For each of these categories we can cite for example Les Noms divins (1994) or, again, Aspects du monothéïsme musulman (1998), then La miséricorde en islam (2003) and La vie familiale (2002), and then L’islam et la dérive de l’Occident (2001) or Nouveaux articles sur l’islam et la barbarie (2005).

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available on cassette from the Tawhid publishing house),12 sheik Ahmad Jaballah (holder of a diploma in theology from Zeitouna, director of the European Institute for Human Sciences of Paris, member of the European Council for Fatwa and Research, this imam practices exegesis of the sources of Islam, knowing that certain cassettes devoted to the interpretation of one or another particular sura are available via the Internet. He also explains his positions on contemporary themes, for example the attitude that should be adopted in relation to lay society, relationships between men and women, etc.), sheik Zakaria Seddiki (holder of a diploma from Al-Azhar and from the Sorbonne, member of the Islamic Institute for Development and Research in London, who does not hesitate to write academic expositions on more sensitive topics, such as pluralism or martyrdom, in addition to writing on more traditional subjects, such as life after death, for example), sheik Hassan Amdouni (holder of a diploma in theology from Zeitouna, who organizes conferences on the theme of the family, family relations and good behavior) and, among others, sheik Abdelhamid Bouzouina (died 2005; a famous preacher of Algerian origin, known for insisting upon the responsibility that comes with being Muslim, on religious practice in a large sense, and on the intention that is supposed to accompany religious practice). In the English-speaking world, we may mention Gamal Al-Helbawy (for a sampling of some of his speeches, which deal with the Islamic movement and the proper way to preach, see his blog, http://www.khelbawy .com/download.html), Zahid Parvez (who speaks about the revivifi cation of Islam), Farid Elshayyal (concentrating on the role of students in Islamic activism), Daud Abdallah (on Palestine), Azzam Tamimi (who most often speaks on themes connected to contemporary Islamic political thought, or on Palestine and the question of democracy; his writings are available on the website of the Institute of Islamic Political Thought) or the Canadian resident Jamal Badawi (writing on the themes of women and the equality of the sexes, and engaging in interreligious dialogue; some of his sermons are available on the website http://www .inhalifax.com/Islamic_Page.html). We recall Hassan Al-Bannâ (with regard to the biography of the Prophet Mohammed and the custom of fasting) and also the children of certain militants, such as Abdurraham Al-Helbawy, Bara and Soumaya Ghannoushī. In order not to

12 For example: ‘Living ramadan’, ‘Marriage in Islam’, ‘Relations of parents and children’, ‘The qualities of the Prophet’, ‘Our daily spirituality’, ‘Testifying to your faith’ etc.

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marginalize their fundamental role in the mb dynamic, we will consider certain works by these personalities in Part Three, beginning with Chapter 12. Rashīd Ghannoushī First up in this sequence is Rashīd Ghannoushī (born 1941), who enjoys an incontestable degree of authority among partisans and sympathizers of the mb, extending well beyond the membership of the Tunisian branch. He has traveled to Europe many times, and on these voyages he came in contact with a broad range of currents of Muslim thought. His own thought has been influenced by his philosophical training, by his reading of Muslim Brotherhood literature, and by the writings of the Algerian thinker Malek Bennabi (1905–1973)13 [Tamimi, 2001].14 His preferred themes remain focused on Islamic societies, and concentrate a centrally on the question of secularization, civil society and democracy. In his most recent book, considered as the most important of his writings, he takes up the question of public liberty within an Islamic State (which, all in being recalibrated according to the maneuvering room he has available, remains an ideal for Muslim countries). He maintains that a model of Islamic democracy based on an alliance between procedural democracy and Islamic values remains possible, despite the radical critique that has been directed against liberal democracy as this is practiced in the West; Ghannoushī does not believe that Western democracy constitutes the ultimate model of this form of government. In this context, he goes on to argue that the basis of the legitimacy of an Islamic State must be a combination of the Koran and the Sunna along with an elevation of the principle of shūra, consultation, which cannot be limited to a simple choice or election of popular representatives. According to his biography, the importance of this figure of reference stems not only from his broad education and his innovative perspectives, from 13 According to G. Kepel, Malek Bennabi is an author who was close to the mb until the mid-50s (he wrote Vocation de l’islam in 1954). He repudiated it in order to carry out an internal critique of the causes of the weakening of Muslim civilization (he calls one of these ‘colonizability’, while the Brotherhood was known for pointing out the deleterious influence of the West as colonial power). Students that study with him are mostly Francophiles who think this thought opens the possibility of making reference to Islam as a vision of the world without rejecting French culture out of hand (the largest part of whom work to give a larger place to Islam in independent Algeria identify this objective as Arabization and the reversal of French influence) [Kepel, 1994:242–3]. 14 An academic treatise was devoted to him by Dr. Azzam Tamimi (British Islamic militant). He speaks of his career as well as of his thought, see [Tamimi, 2001].

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which he maintains the idea of the compatibility of Islamic and Western systems of thought, but also from his position as a broad-based leader, which confers upon him an international Islamic legitimacy [Tamimi, 2001:215]. ʿIssām Al-ʿAttār Next we meet ʿIssām Al-ʿAttār, who has spoken, especially since the 1980’s, in favor of the freedom of opinion (hurrīyat al-ra’y) and styles himself as an independent who wishes to work for the good of all humanity, not just on behalf of strictly partisan interests. In this connection, he has begun to call himself an ‘Islamic writer’ in order to underline the independent nature of his approach. When we interviewed him, he explained: I have chosen to work independently on behalf of my principles. And I have good relations with the Muslim Brotherhood, with all Muslims who work, without rivalry. But I work as I believe and I prefer it that way.

Further along, he adds that it is just this freedom of thought that he seeks to promote, especially among young people, by encouraging them to seek out their own role models and figures of reference, and along that path, their own paths to follow. Thus he explains, in commendable modesty, as if he was speaking directly to them, the importance of their ability to reflect for themselves, independently of his reflections. And he levels an indirect criticism at leaders of organizations who are too ready to believe that they should be followed, while by contrast he believes that he himself embodies no more than a means by which others are enabled to go further: You must be your own reference. Don’t be dependent on me. Listen. Read. Think. Seek out your own thought, your own truth, by yourselves. I know some things. Some things I don’t know. I am not always right. Because the world is always changing, changing, changing. You have to take notice of and understand this development in the world. If one of us was correct yesterday, today maybe [not] . . . I want young people to start thinking. And I want them to push our limits outward. I am a bridge ( jisr). You have to walk across in order to go further. Some important people think that they are the highest point or the final end (the goal). There is a kind of personality that wants to be the führer, the leader who gives everyone orders. But leaders should always be bridges instead, to help people go further. 15

15

Interview no. 65.

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In concrete terms, he works more in favor of the emergence of a scientific and cultural mentality among the militants, based on spirituality and intellectual openness, and on the sphere of the human, in general terms. Thus, while he still maintains certain positions in the political realm, this area no longer appears to be the center of his interests. In order to illustrate his state of mind, his daughter translated into French an excerpt from a poem that he had just published in the most recent issue of the monthly magazine Al-Rā’id: O my brother human being, wherever you may be . . . you need me. And I need you. In this world and at this time. This need will grow greater as time passes. O my brother human being, I draw near (I welcome?) your face and your heart and your thought and I too I see you approach (I welcome you) and I see your heart and your thought. And I welcome you. Give me your hand and I will give you mine. There is no other choice but for you to find things that are common to us and really necessary and themes that are really important for us to share . . . And that we should help each other . . . to save our souls and to save each other from hell. And to save all humanity. If not . . . we will be lost.16

French speakers The next part of our review must not omit personalities such as Tareq Oubrou, the imam of the Bordeaux mosque, a noted theologian working within the uoif (by the side, be it noted, of Ahmad Jaballah, another theologian whose approach is much more classical with regard to the production of canonical discourses) and Tariq Ramadan, professor of philosophy and frequent speaker at conferences, author of many works on European Islam. These two personalities appear to us to have been self-taught with regard to Islamic matters, even though they are holders of diplomas, and/or even though they have been proven to possess knowledge of a wide range of subjects. Tareq Oubrou Deeply rooted in the center of the movement, and in the structures of the uoif, Tareq Oubrou has developed his own original contribution as regards the interpretation of texts, and more especially their contextualization. He is also working to define the premises of a thought that has broken with the canons of the classical ideology of political Islam. But

16

For the complete text in Arabic see the magazine Al-Rā’id, no. 252, pp. 34–39.

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this second dimension still remains fairly undeveloped and at this time only represents a project that he would like to begin work on at some later time. In the meantime, this imam maintains a wide variety of interests and an ambitious program, while continuing to enunciate certain principles that are widely approved at present in the mainstream of the mb, such as the principle according to which Islam is a global religion destined to last for all eternity,17 but he also speaks in favor of the necessity of purifying Islam from practices that are purely cultural, especially when these practices make integration more difficult. He is working so that Muslim thought may become ‘a legitimate daughter of the West’.18 He wishes for Islam to acquire (as he wrote in 1998) ‘the status of a natural religion’ in Europe [Oubrou, 1998]. The richness of the reflection of Tareq Oubrou lies in that which he himself considers to be the inherent flexibility of religion, in view of the fact that human interpretations are constitutive elements of religious norms. As he reminds us, ‘there is no Sharia, except through interpretations’ [Oubrou, 1998]. Upon this basis, he has called for a hermeneutics of the Koran in which the interpretation of the Koran is made upon the basis of our knowledge of the historical context in which the text appeared and a knowledge of the context of the contemporary period, into which French Muslims have been placed by history. In underlining the importance of the history of the contemporary context, he is in effect implying that this knowledge does not belong to everyone automatically, and requires study in order to be fully understood: according to him, it is not enough simply to live somewhere in order to have sufficient knowledge of the culture surrounding one; he has called for a higher degree of flexibility, for it is not only the legal constraints of the contemporary context that must be taken into account, but also those constraints that go along with the social context.19 Oubrou wants to confront the real questions and the new questions that Muslims are asking themselves, and it is his intention to reform Muslim theology by means of a ‘revision of axiological thought’ which would still be a search for the core principles of Islamic teaching (hence the 17

Intervention at the Salon du Bourget, May 11, 2002, on ‘The Koran and its different readings’. 18 Interview (A) May 25, 2004. 19 Intervention at Bourget 2004: ‘Les principes et les bases d’un cheminement spirituel’.

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title of his short book, L’unicité de Dieu. Des noms et attributs divins—Of the Oneness of God. Divine Names and Attributes—which appeared in 2006), and which would underline the dynamic character of texts. Oubrou is also working to elaborate something he calls a ‘Sharia for minorities’,20 a subject on which he has already written two articles since 1998 (see bibliography). He has sketched this out in the form of an ‘integrative Sharia, which does not provoke a confrontation’ with the context in which it finds itself, and he bases this project upon two main principles. On one side, Tareq Oubrou attempts to elaborate the contours of a minimalist orthodoxy/orthopraxy in which a minimum number of invariants are retained21 (this in contrast with what the Brotherhood traditionally affirms regarding the global nature of Islam, which must concern every aspect of life). On another hand, he insists upon the ethicization of Sharia: he supports religious practice that is at one and the same time ritual and ethical, but does not reduce the Islamic norm to its moral dimension alone. In concrete terms, he maintains a normative role for Sharia, but brings it back to the law, understanding this in the axiological sense of Al-hukm, that is, wisdom, and back to the fatwa (the fiqh, jurisprudence). Moving further, he seeks to counter the pervasive secularization of Islam by reconciling Islamic law and the lay context: he intends to bring forward or, in other contexts, to conserve the relevance of Sharia within Muslim practice in France ‘ . . . by making sure that Muslims remain connected to Islamic norms such as this is enunciated by figures of authority’ [Caeiro, 2005b]. While committed to the preservation of the importance of collective references, he also places great value on the importance of the active role that every Muslim must play in the construction of an ethical and legal norm that is to be produced by the Islamic ‘way’, based on a knowledge of the foundations of religion and also on the context of the life of Muslims today. With regard to the entire sweep of this program, A. Caeiro, a scholar studying muftis and the production of fatwas in Europe, has established an observation that clears up the situation considerably. He has com-

20 Up to now we have spoken of the more limited concept of a ‘minority fiqh’. The concept of Sharia, which we have initially translated as Islamic law or way, designates the totality of the law-way of Muslims contained in Islamic sources (Koran and hadith) but also the prescriptions of jurists of the four great schools of law (for Sunni Muslims). 21 Conference ‘Pour une pratique légale de l’islam entre laïcité française et Sharīʿa’ (May 24, 2004).

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pared the perspectives that are connected with the utilization of the concept of ‘minority jurisprudence’ (developed by the European Council for Fatwa and Research) that constitutes the initiative to which most Brothers adhere, and those connected with the concept of ‘minority Sharia’ (Tareq Oubrou), and he has discerned in the latter concept, over and above its apparent familiarity, a discreetly implied criticism of the former concept, ‘minority jurisprudence’. According to Caeiro, these two approaches are radically different because their practical impact is completely different. The cefr is attempting to legitimate Islamic personal law upon the basis of a recognition of legal pluralism, while Tareq Oubrou avoids this claim, preferring to seek to incorporate French law (or rather, as we might say, the spirit of French law) within the economy of Sharia [Caeiro, 2005b]. As concerns the initiatives of the European Council for Fatwa and Research, Tareq Oubrou is attempting to associate his own initiative with a perspective in which the argument is carried on in terms of a debate about civilization and not in strictly legal terms. He does not deny the importance of the legal dimension, but he is inclined to connect it more closely to individual initiatives. Tariq Ramadan Field researcher, prolific essayist especially in philosophy, involved in the struggle against authoritarianism and injustice, quite at home in the world of mass media, Tariq Ramadan puts himself forward as an ambassador to Muslim youth, especially those who do not speak Arabic, and attempts to establish lines of communication between these young people and the public sphere, even at the European level. In the text of his dissertation (written in the area of Arabic letters and Islamology) [Ramadan, 2002], he harks back to the contribution of the canonical reformists (modern salafiyya)22 and to the specific contribution of the thought of his grandfather, Hassan Al-Bannā. With regard to questions of principle, his point of view remains similar to that of the mb at that time, for they also sought ‘to realize the objectives’ of Muslim reformist thought, or even to perfect the latter. The effect of this stance is very important to hundreds of young people within or on the margins of the Muslim Presence dynamic, which is itself on the margins of the movement of the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe. A reference to

22

On this theme see the introduction to Part 3.

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reformism becomes, for them, the filter of understanding or even the condition sine qua non of an eventual partial recognition of the heritage of the mb in Europe. Hassan Al-Bannā enjoys a privileged status in the minds of those young people, while the rest of the heritage of the Brothers is relativized, ignored, and even discredited, particularly in its contemporary organizational dimension. The many contributions of Ramadan also concern the relationship between Muslims, non-religious (lay) society, and national and European citizenship, and he has also interested himself in social questions, questions about justice, interreligious dialogue, pluralism, etc. Involvement, coherence, responsibility, ethics and spirituality are all among the words and concepts he makes use of most often. During the 1990’s, he made an innovative contribution, consisting in introducing these sociopolitical themes into the debate among Muslims, which up to that time had remained centered around community questions or intra religious questions. He offered new alternatives to young French speakers, and then to English speakers, to women as well as men, who had not up to that time heard a voice that could address their aspirations toward greater harmony between their religious beliefs and their integration into non-Muslim society. He linked his reflection on Islam to ongoing debates, and argued with reference to a number of non-Muslim intellectuals. He never tires of building bridges between the Muslim tradition and contemporary concerns, but he privileges the specificity of Islam in its global dimension, and denounces the limits or the deviations of Western systems. He is essentially a Muslim cultural activist who ties philosophical and (quasi-)theological considerations to contemporary realities. Rather than attempting to establish a complete overview of his thought,23 which would involve studying the changes he has undergone over the last 15 years, which are certainly consequential, we shall take the view that is more useful to examine his relationship with the thought of the Muslim Brotherhood and to show in what ways he is opposed to the positions taken by Tareq Oubrou. One interview, filled out with the help of many informal contacts and various field observations must allow us to sketch the character of his thought.

23 On this personality there are many existing articles and books, some academic (especially the writings of Kh. Mohsen-Finan, F. Frégosi and I. Hamel), others are mere polemics (like that of C. Fourest).

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Tariq Ramadan belongs first and foremost in the same reformist line of descent as the mb, it being given that reformism itself both enriches and goes beyond the currents of mb thought. Initially, he is situated in continuity with two heritages, reformist and Brotherhood-related, through his insistence upon the specificity of the contribution of Hassan Al-Bannā. In continuity as well with the procedure adopted in his dissertation, Tariq Ramadan can eventually be viewed as more closely related to his grandfather than to the Brotherhood’s school of thought, maybe even closer to Hassan Al-Bannā than to the reformist currents as well,24 although this distinction has more to do with content than with method. In fact, he begins by insisting upon a three-way break between Hassan Al-Bannā, the older heritages of the mb, and the later development that these have undergone. According to Tariq Ramadan, there was a difference of opinion between Hassan Al-Bannā and Sayyid Qutb, but there was another difference of opinion between Hassan Al-Bannā and the reformists, with regard to the relationship that was to be accepted with the West. Ramadan insists on the fact that the former adopted an attitude of resistance, while the two other parties reacted more violently or wished to take the offensive, as Rashīd Rida for example wished to do. Ramadan thus indicates to different conceptions: one approach essentially based on spirituality, and another approach, opposed to the first, based on later Salafist deviations within the movement of the Brotherhood. He explains: In doctrinal terms, I belong to a tradition . . . uhh . . . that is reformist, that cuts across the thought of the Brotherhood but which cannot be . . . cannot be . . . reduced to it. I think that Hassan Al-Bannā was a moment in the elaboration of the Egyptian situation, and that he contributed an extremely important element, uhh, for me, which was, intuitively, when you read Al-Bannā, you find no fear of the West, contrary to what some say. He is critical, yes, of the excesses of the West, that is evident. But he has no fear of the West.25

Further, the two lines of descent (from the Brotherhood and from the reformists) have their limits, according to Ramadan. In his view, the answers arrived at by the Brotherhood in their utilization of the instruments provided by the reformists (who based themselves upon the texts and upon reason, practicing both the ijtihād and the talfīq) were not 24 On the contribution of the reformists, see section 1 of Chapter 1 and section 3 of Chapter 16. 25 Interview no. 61.

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sufficient, given the new impetus that came with time. He takes this all the more into consideration, because he does not want to get stuck in a reading based on the twin aims of law and Islamic jurisprudence, as is actually the case with the Brotherhood at the present time. The dominant paradigm, involving a situation that is thought only with regard to tension between the majority and a minority appears to Ramadan to be problematic. He has criticized the fact that the European mb is apparently obsessed with the minority-based paradigm that polarizes society into ‘us’ and ‘them’ [Ramadan, 2003]. But he observes a distinction between the initiatives of the cefr and the generally conservative attitudes that are adopted, according to him, by the partisans of the movement, who thus arrive at a denial of their own reformist heritage and demonstrate that they are more inclined to imitate tradition than to attempt to innovate. He says: [. . .] there has been a double evolution today: there is a line of development that consists simply in protecting what one has acquired. That is for me it is those whom I call “muqqalidun mujaddidīn”, that is the imit . . . The tajdid, that is the opposite of the taqlīd. Well there are some who are the imitators of these reformers. That is they take their answers and their models of education and political training and then they do what they do with that. So that, it exists. Some . . . some . . . people who are very traditionalist, even if they are Brothers. And then you have another one, who is the one that appears to be the most powerful today, that is the group that insists above all on the aspect of minority, and at the head of that there is today of course the presence around the Majlis al bouhouth wa’l iftah at the European level, of Yūsuf Al-Qaradāwī, who has really undergone an extraordinary development26 . . . [. . .].

Tariq Ramadan recognizes the work carried out by the European Council for Fatwa and Research even if, in his view, it is necessary to go beyond this work. Tariq Ramadan would like to renew or even transcend former approaches, and he considers his own intellectual production innovative. It constitutes ‘a critical contribution’ within the tradition of the Brotherhood. At other times, he admits that he is completely isolated from the movement: So, there has been a rupture at the level of doctrine, even though I am faithful to a tradition.

26

Idem.

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His framework of reflection is based on taking the Koran, the Sunna, and the living context into consideration. According to him, the latter must at this time be conceived as it really is, as of equal importance to the two other elements in a normative construction. These elements must be placed in a dialectical relationship in which, through the ijtihād, adaptations of the normative order must be deducible. Nonetheless, according to Ramadan, the first thing to take note of (in 2005) was the existence of Muslim communities within law-governed States. Their established character had to be sufficient to put an end to the voluntarist initiatives by some Muslims to distinguish their communities in some specific way with regard to social relations. Nothing more than the central importance of law within Islam itself would impose an obligation on Muslims to accommodate the pre-existing conditions prevailing in their context; by the same token, the same exigencies of a context (including the recognition of pluralism) militated against those initiatives that would attempt to found communities upon Muslim law specifically. The alternative would be to take up incoherent or rather inconsequential positions in which the equality of rights for nonMuslims would not be recognized upon the same footing. Ramadan makes reference in this connection to the tools used by the reformists themselves (texts and reason), but he maintains that it is necessary to take into account the finalities to be attained, even including those that are to be drawn from Sharia (which he calls ‘The Path of Faithfulness’). He considers himself to be using the same tools that Hassan Al-Bannā used to go beyond the reformists. As a consequence of the positions he has adopted, but also because of his desire to affirm his own specificity at any price, he finds himself de facto involved in a completely dialectical relationship, even in opposition to mb partisans who believe that his thinking has gone too far, and has strayed from the reformist and Brotherhood-related framework. Some hold that he has betrayed the tradition because he has progressively emptied the fiqh of its content, that classical discipline of jurisprudence (often awkwardly translated by Islamic law), and that he only recognizes the validity of secular law. However, this criticism appears to be erroneous because Tariq Ramadan has not abandoned all reference to the sources of Islam, and still places a high value upon taking into account the finalities of the Islamic path. At any rate he is able to answer these accusations directly: The question is to know, “am I in this school of thought or in some other?” I say and I maintain that I belong to the reformist school to which Hassan

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chapter eight Al-Bannā belonged but which has a much longer tradition and which has been a tradition which goes beyond all of us. That is a certainty. So much for that. Now: do my answers correspond to the answers of Hassan AlBannā? On many levels: no ! Obviously: no ! On the other hand, do my tools correspond to some of his tools? Evidently yes because he himself used the tools of Abdallah Ibn Maʾsud and of . . . and of . . . it is madrassa almaqāsid!27 That’s it! Thus there is . . . on that, without making a claim . . . So myself, what I ask, it is for the people who are really, who are really working from the inside, this is what I say to them: what it is, is ‘tell me where the betrayal of . . .ʾal-maqāsid is there?’ Tell me!28

It is interesting to compare the intellectual stances of Tareq Oubrou and Tariq Ramadan. The first recognises the state of law but he attempts to oppose the secularization of Muslim law by re-dynamizing the internal flexibility of that law: he preserves the principle of elaborating an Islamic jurisprudence—based essentially on the texts of Islam in order to produce legal injunctions—, even if this initiative appears to be necessarily, according to him, above all the property of Muslims and not of some authority wishing to represent them or organize their religious authority (a point of distinction between him and the European Council for Fatwa and Research). The second, Tariq Ramadan, stands for a more direct recognition of the primacy of the State of law. Placing himself in continuity with the thought of the Andalusian Muslim scholar Abu Ishāq Al-Shātibi, he places a high value at the outset on an alternative which is perceived as in competition with the fiqh, with Islamic jurisprudence, because this alternative initially gives more value to human reason than does its counterpart in this case: he goes far beyond the idea of a specific form of recognition for Muslim law in order to promote the principle of the public interest (maslaha) and to support a recourse to the methodology of maqāsid al-Sharia (the ultimate finalities of Islamic law). Despite these differences of approach, and despite their progressive polarization (caused by direct criticism from Tariq Ramadan and by

27 To be translated as ‘the school of ultimate purposes according to Sharia’. It is a school of thought (or an ideology in the view of some), following especially in the line of the works of the imam Abu Hāmid Al-Ghazāli, and then those of the imam Abu Ishāq Al-Shātibi (dead in 790, year of the Hegira), that considers the ultimate goals of Sharia as constituting the foundation upon the base of which the comprehension of the sources of Islam can be attained. Certain thinkers of the present day, like sheik Al-Tāhir ibn ʿÂshūr, go further in this direction, for they end up seeing them as an alternative to the theory of Islamic jurisprudence in the comprehension of Islamic legal texts [Izzi Dien, 2004]. 28 Interview no. 61.

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journalistic interest in a running debate), these militants have many points in common: both seek new alternatives while still preserving the principle of the globality of Islam, as touching every aspect of life, both support taking the contemporary context into account in a fundamental way, both are careful to analyze Muslim thought within its context, both assign a high importance to human rationality (whether this analysis takes off directly from Islamic texts or from finalities that may be discerned on the basis of those texts), both insist on individual ethics in enlightened by Islamic principles and social involvement, and the search for means that permit one to attain the universal. At the end of the day, both must take account of the impact of a doctrinal reading upon the political reading of Islam, which both hold to be poorly adapted at the present time, and in need of modification.

CHAPTER NINE

A DYNAMIC TRADITION MORE OR LESS HELD IN CHECK

At the conclusion of this review relative to figures of authority, we may observe that the historical contributions we have sketched here are similar to sedimentary layers, coming one after the other and corresponding to each other. These individual contributions, often complementary, sometimes opposed to each other, sometimes contradictory, add themselves together to build up a body of work that is fairly complex and heterogeneous. The heritage of these figures of authority related to the Muslim Brotherhood, which has accumulated since its foundation, now constitutes a considerable achievement that is the rootstock of a real tradition [Hervieu-Léger, 1993] of Muslim Brotherhood thought. This tradition, however, is still far from constituting a corpus that would inform the contemporary thought of the Muslim Brotherhood in a unified manner. Rather, it functions as a reservoir of repertoires of meaning from which the Brothers of the contemporary period can draw, each in his own way, even if attempts have been made by the mainstream of the organization in order to present this heritage as a unified body of knowledge, or even to establish its coherence.

1. A line of descent of witnesses, a reservoir of meaning A great number of personal contributions maintain the living and dynamic character of the Muslim Brotherhood tradition. On one side, the succession of the authors of these contributions constitutes a real ‘line of descent of witnesses’,1 made up of thinkers, militants, and intellectuals. All these persons fit into the category of ‘witnesses’, taking the 1 We are indebted to D. Hervieu-Léger for the concept of a ‘lignée croyante’, a line of descent of believers [Hervieu-Léger, 1993], that defines persons who stand in continuity with a religious tradition. Still in the case of the mb it appears more to the point to speak of ‘a line of descent of witnesses’. Though we remember that the Arabic term shahīd is also used with reference to martyrs, this usage allows us to underline the specifi c character of the mb approach, actively militant: the mb are in fact ‘transmitters’ who by their action, knowledge, and teaching activities, testify to their faith and their message.

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term in its active sense, for they are better described as religious actors than as religious vectors,2 that is, persons responsible for no more than a neutral or passive transmission of religious knowledge. On another side, the attachment to ‘classical’ references remains powerful for militants of the Brotherhood, but this preference coexists with a willingness to approve of contemporary contributions that commemorate or even re-actualize in a variety of ways certain segments within the successive development of this thought. Within this framework, certain contemporary figures of reference can boast of having known the founder personally, something that confers upon them a higher degree of legitimacy. They are supposed to have profited from this very particular transmission, and supposed to be able thus to leave something behind them in their turn. Still, the number of such persons is dwindling rapidly, and little by little we are coming to the end of the time when it is possible to speak with those who personally witnessed the founding period. This changing of the guard cannot fail to affect the movement, even if the latter manages to keep the succession of authorities going. The survey of personalities that has occupied us in this part could leave the impression that the entire group of personalities who make up the heritage of the movement are considered to be at the same level of importance—with the exception of the founder of the movement, of course, and perhaps its ideologue as well. These various personalities are none the less differentiated according to the roles they have played (activists, exegetes, thinkers, martyrs and non-martyrs), and according to the current evaluation of their contributions, whether they are recognized as founders or not. These authorities can be divided into three distinct types, although the characteristics that go along with each type have evolved over time. During the founding period, it appears to be the case that the figures of reference were quite singular personalities. These persons—with Hassan Al-Bannā and Sayyid Qutb alone in the first rank—marked the movement as much by the integrity of their personal conduct and the dramatic character of their life experiences as by the originality of their spiritual and intellectual contributions. It is the many-faceted character of their personalities that constitutes a testimony.

2 The comparison between these terms was suggested by one of our interviewees— Interview no. 45.

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The mb authorities who succeeded them present themselves to us as both activists and intellectuals, even if some of them were active at the same time as the founders. These persons represent the movement by presenting doctrinal theoretical references that are in continuity with those which went before, but these later contributions appear not to have been as encompassing as the former ones. Only certain aspects of these personalities or their contributions are taken into consideration. Finally, since the beginning of the 1990’s, the movement has been represented by a group of persons who, while continuing to cast themselves in the ‘mould’ of the figures of reference who preceded them, and while continuing to present a double profile as activists and as intellectuals, now constitute post-modern theoretical references. In fact, these persons do not hesitate to communicate ideas which embody contributions that are more or less innovative, without necessarily being legitimated by being rooted in the Islamic scholarly tradition. These contributions appear above all to be relevant to an atmosphere of new conditions of existence for Muslims within the European context. In order to communicate their positions, they often have recourse to the mass media, and sometimes make reference to resources that are external to the movement. Preachers as much as thinkers, they are ‘witnesses to meaning whose authority imposes itself upon believing subjects via the testimony that they are able to give regarding the authenticity of their personal experience’ [Hervieu-Léger, 1997].

2. A tradition that is relatively open, but not openly debated All these personalities testify to the (relative) dynamism of this tradition, and they give it life by means of successive adjustments,3 while still maintaining its relatively open character. In fact, by preparing a place for successors who give rise from time to time to new lines of argument that take account more or less of the diversity of contexts and of certain segments of the collective memory, the movement gives itself

3 As the sociologist of religion M. Halbwachs (1877–1945), put it, all religions change, but they can only do so by means of a succession of adjustments: they cannot break apart the framework of notions within which they have grown up, leading up to that moment, in order to preserve the unity of the social whole (M. Halbwachs, Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire, Paris, Alcan, 1925; Paris, Albin Michel, 1994, p. 191 cited by [Hervieu-Léger & Willaime, 2001: 213]).

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the means to endure over time, in two ways: by preserving its cognitive basis, which is the foundation of its identity as much as of its unity, and by avoiding the trap of dogmatic formalism. Nonetheless, those members who are in the organizational mainstream are de facto constrained to establish distinctions among the many figures of reference that make up their heritage. And since they have not managed to stabilize a clearly defined corpus that could constitute a common standard of reference for everyone, they harmonize the heterogeneous whole they have by rounding off its corners: by simply setting aside that which is not appropriate, by avoiding direct criticism, and by excusing certain positions on grounds of the particularity of the context in which they were elaborated. Such a situation testifies to the fragility of the collective consensus, which has to be given at the outset in its totality, without their really being able to weigh, debate, and adopt assumed positions as the result of a process of decision. By obviating the possibility of divergent interpretations, the partisans continue to embrace the entire heritage without putting the apparent consensus that reigns within the group in danger. It is quite revealing to compare, for example, the positions of two important members of the Muslim Association of Britain with regard to the heritage of Sayyid Qutb and the place he occupies in the instruction given to young sympathizers. Interviewed separately, they admit that there does not appear to be much real agreement among the membership. One declared: I’m not happy with it! Why should we leave “Milestones” for instance? It’s unnecessary! [. . .] Sayyid Qutb Milestones’! Unless, of course, you read it in historical perspective. And this is not how it is being read! I’m opposed to reading it in this way. Euh . . . The books . . . they are many books that . . . euh . . . are not relevant!’4

The other had this to say: ‘The commentary of the Holy Qurʾān by Sayyid Qutb is constantly referred to, and regarded as an instrumental tool of teaching Qurʾanic sciences to our youth, and not only our youth . . . I mean: I was fascinated to be in Chicago, the other day, and I found that new converts to Islam, black Americans, afro-Americans, were learning, you know, from “In the shade of the Qurʾān”. So it’s, it’s something that we do refer to.5

4 5

Interview no. 71. Interview no. 22.

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A third person, already heard from in the section above on the contribution of Sayyid Qutb, stated that he presented the teachings of Qutb in a historical perspective, exactly as he would do with any other author, classical or contemporary, so as to allow young people to inform themselves and arrive at their own opinions.6 Another example is provided for us by a partisan in France. Based on his personal experience, he sums up the ambiguity that exists at the center of the organizational level of the mb. He explains to us the situation that obtained at the end of the 1980’s, a time when the discourses produced appeared unable to find an easy happy medium, or better, a precise framework for articulation. Although he now disapproves of these positions, the very presence of this partisan at the center of the movement for more than a decade demonstrates its capacity to accept such situations: The books of Sayyid Qutb. It was the beginning too, at the end . . . at the end of the 1980’s, we had the first uhh . . . works of the iifso translated into French, works by Muhammad Qutb, by Sayyid Qutb, etc. So, I read “Milestones”, “Islam, religion of the future”. That, then was utopia; there were older Brothers, Arabic speakers, who . . . who bombarded us . . . So, there was an ambivalent relation to Sayyid Qutb. In one sense, people valued him because of the self-denial he had demonstrated. He sacrificed himself for the cause, etc. On the other hand, people said to us that ‘Sayyid Qutb went too far in uhh . . . in his theorizing’ and uhh . . . already at that time, people made a connection between the thought of Sayyid Qutb and the groups that emerged later . . . para(military) groups [. . .], who after that, tipped over into terrorism. And people said to us ‘the Muslim Brothers are not like that, they don’t preach terrorism. They want to reform society from the bottom up’. And so that, that was always the credo . . . .7

In listening to these testimonies, we can gather the impression that these different perceptions were hardly ever discussed and never really debated. That would allow the movement to keep its membership as large as possible, centered around as many figures of reference as possible. But, finally, this policy does not appear as a source of fragility. The retention of a large base of support has proven to be an authentic source of legitimacy, because it allows the movement to touch the imagination of a very large segment of the population, and thus to raise the level of awareness of Muslims even more.

6 7

Interview no. 25. Interview no. 39.

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3. Labors related to selection and uniformity, by the organizational majority Within the organization, there is a relative regulation of transmission. This regulation attempts to resolve in part the question of the heterogeneity of the heritage of the movement by adopting certain collective positions: first of all by continuing to maintain the primacy of Hassan Al-Bannā, and next by teaching, often in a quite formal manner, the necessity of establishing contextualizations for the heritage of the movement, and finally by selectively assigning a higher value to certain contributions. Based on this labor of interpretation and of recomposition of the heritage, its characteristics of rationalization and spiritualization are emphasized by certain partisans. Via the promotion of certain points of reference, it is the reinforcement of the movement’s collective identity that is sought. The importance given to contemporary contextualization does allow certain people to interpret the heritage of the movement in a number of directions. This is more likely to undermine efforts that aim at insuring overall cohesion, to the extent that the heritage itself continues to give rise to tensions, especially with regard to certain contributions by Sayyid Qutb, and even in regard to the personality of Hassan Al-Bannā, to the extent that certain partisans have claimed that he is sacred. Predominance and contextualisation of the heritage of the founder Everyone agrees on the primacy of the heritage of Hassan Al-Bannā, and most of his successors stand in continuity with the spirit that he breathed into the movement. Many of the authors that we have cited recognize the importance of this initial impetus. As for European partisans of the Muslim Brotherhood, they regularly reaffirm this primacy while still opting for a certain flexibility of outlook. According to them, it is necessary to understand this heritage as a function of its context. It is also important to make a distinction between elements of content that are considered immutable in time and space, and other elements that are considered in a more particular manner because they belong to the particular historical context to which Hassan Al-Bannā also belongs; in this case they are considered as non-generic, and as subject to interpretation. In this interview a partisan explains how the procedure is handled by Hassan Al-Bannā:

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chapter nine Me, I say that he was capable of making those who listened to him understand and those who would listen to him concerning many things that he said about the context in which he found himself. And those who have studied his thought, have developed two dimensions of his writings and of his thought. There is a part that they have considered as being in the category of what is immutable, that which is destined to remain (you can find this in the classics, the immutable) and then there is that which is destined to change. So you don’t have to be Einstein either in order to understand that sometimes the imam Al-Bannā was talking to the Egyptian people. At that time, he was talking to them. But there are some things that remain in the domain of the universal, in the domain of the immutable. And no, I think that his thought can provide enormous inspiration for persons all over the world. The proof is, I myself today, I consider myself a disciple of his thought, I tried to take that which, that which can be accepted by someone who lives in France, who lives in the West. And that works. At any rate he himself said this at the time in a letter to someone, I don’t know who it was; he sent him a letter saying ‘you who are in a non-Muslim country, you who . . .’ so there you are; he gave him several pieces of advice.8

The organizational, chief selector of heritages In view of the differences that exist between the partisans of the organizational group that represents the mainstream majority position within the movement of the Brotherhood (this group is concentrated within the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe) and the partisans of branches and networks that are located nearer the fringe, and in view of the differences that exist as well between partisans and sympathizers with regard to the choices made concerning personalities and figures of reference that are to be recognized and assigned higher value, we must observe that the contributions to be recognized inside the organization are traditionally transmitted without much questioning. In fact, the coherence that the ‘organizational’ seems to wish to impose upon the movement from on high appears to be arbitrary, and it slows the movement down, even brings its progress to a halt. One person’s testimony, supported by a few other pieces of information which we have been able to glean in the course of our research, confirms this practice, a delicate business but one which is commonly engaged in by most ideological movements. A partisan, still loyal to the movement, but who is willing to criticize it, confirms the existence of a

8 Interview no. 20. This person speaks about ‘Letter to a Muslim Student in the West’ written by Hassan Al-Bannā.

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specific procedure of selection and ranking of writings and other contributions produced by various persons. In fact, this procedure is almost exclusively negative, and concerns the suppression of elements that appear problematic. In this way, the activists that determine movement policy attempt to maintain a sort of homogeneity and internal cohesion among members by orienting the movement in the direction that is thought to be in conformity with the general will. In fact, this triage of references does not appear to be subject to any discussion at all, nor to the most cursory consultation of the partisans. All that counts is that a consensus on the part of the leaders is reached with regard to these decisions even if it is only implicit. In concrete terms, this means that certain otherwise eminent figures receive no recognition within the structures of the fabric of the Brotherhood. And they stay unauthorised references even if they are valued within the “mouvance”, outside of partisans, or that certain positional variations are worked out over time and in space. Some personalities are visibly discredited at one particular time, only to be rehabilitated later on. One member mentioned to us the cases of Mohammad Al-Ghazāli and Saʿīd Hawwā. In his estimation, both of them were at one time placed beyond the pale, and continue to be ignored, the proof being the fact that they are no longer—or very little—read and studied within the study groups of the movement. This member told us how he came to be aware, over a period of time, of such machinations, although full realization did not come to him until he had acquired a certain knowledge and a certain critical distance with regard to the movement. For this man, the emergence of certain tensions—which even today cannot be discussed—apparently caused a number of voluntary separations from the movement, perhaps even expulsions in some form: [. . .] And afterwards, I discovered that . . . great thinkers such as . . . such as Muhammad Al-Ghazāli, our contemporary, such as Saʿīd Hawwā had been expelled from the Brotherhood at one time! And there, I said to myself . . . ‘Uh-oh, that’s pretty heavy’ . . . I mean, me, when I found out that Saʿīd Hawwā, at one time, had been kicked out, whether he decided to go on his own or was forced out, uhh . . . me personally, that was where I started asking myself questions, that was huge! When I found out that the same thing happened to Muhammad Al-Ghazāli, I felt the same way, I said to myself, ‘Uh-oh it’s . . .’ There are . . . there are things under the table that they’re not showing us . . . There are things that they’re not telling us. Because I cannot imagine that people like that, uhh . . . would ever be able

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chapter nine to do something against a group. And then afterwards, I understood a little better about how things worked.9

This Muslim Brother also noted that the ignorance of the abovementioned tensions, and even the temptation to ostracize certain members of the Brotherhood, appears to be ongoing in Europe in respect of persons who are considered potential sources of dissension, and who might put the necessary unity of the movement at risk, the movement in this connection being thought of as a true group with strict boundary lines. Such persons might fail to fulfill their duty of obedience with regard to the decisions made by the movement; in other cases they might demonstrate too much personal autonomy. Sometimes these two aspects are connected. The cases of ‘Issām Al-‘Attār and Sa‘īd Ramadān, whose integrity would be difficult to cast doubt on, and who had occupied toplevel posts in the organization, provide proof that cases of exclusion exist. The organization appears to have abused its discretionary authority, as if it were unable to tolerate charismatic personalities who shone with their own light or who demonstrated a certain intellectual independence. As our interviewee tells it: I could see that at the international level, from the little that I had learned about it, that there were things people were not telling us. (Interviewer: Such as?) Uhh . . . well like internal conflicts at the jamāʾāt of the Brotherhood. Internal conflicts, uhh . . . persons who were kicked out . . . Uhh . . . they talked to us about certain movements in history, like for example uhh . . . the emergence of the Talāʾi‘, with ‘Issām Al-‘Attār: they portrayed ‘Issām Al‘Attār to us as an example of . . . of the Brothers who . . . who defected, who refused to follow the orders of the Brotherhood. They portrayed the father of Tariq Ramadan, Sa‘īd Ramadān, as a personality that was kind of problematic, uhh . . . as somebody else who had separated from the Brothers. And after that, me I could see that . . . (Interviewer: But each time they had some argument to show this?) No! No argument. No argument. It was . . . [. . .] You know, when you are part of the trip and you have sworn allegiance to . . . to some kind of group. After that, somebody can say that . . . that “a wet bird doesn’t fly at night”. And you’re going to say “a wet bird doesn’t fly at night”. That is . . . you . . . you . . . you . . . there is no critical distance among the militants because the militant, at . . . at the same time he says “the jamāʾāt of the mb, it’s one jamāʾāt among all the others, you can’t turn the structure into something sacred because if not you’ll fall into

9

Interview no. 39.

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the trap, etc.”. But on the other hand, nobody attacks the thought of Hassan Al-Bannā or even . . . goes to criticize uhh . . . .10

All this does not necessarily affect the popularity of the two persons concerned (‘Issām Al-‘Attār and Sa‘īd Ramadān). In fact, in Belgium and in France, both of them still have a very positive image and are recognized as important without anyone raising the questions we have been discussing. In the eyes of many sympathizers, it is precisely the contributions of the persons who have been eased out or kicked out of the movement that prove to be the most stimulating. It appears that these tensions are never openly discussed, either within the organization or within the mouvance. Whenever doubts about the relationships of these persons to Muslim Brotherhood structures emerge in the course of the discussion, that discussion normally shuts down, and those with whom one is discussing pretend not to know the details of the story, which does seem plausible for a large number of them. And when we ourselves asked such questions, most of the persons who spoke with us either remained silent, tried to talk about something else, or pretended to know nothing. Even the principal subject of all this tension, ‘Issām Al-‘Attār, still living, avoids the subject and chooses to paper over all differences, saying that his relationship with the Brotherhood is above all brotherly. Thus the situation remains: there is an invisible line between legitimate authorities and illegitimate authorities, and there is a conflict over this line that cannot be discussed, that is either deliberately hidden from partisans or unknown to them, and it is not discussed by sympathizers. The younger generation also suffers from ignorance on these points. Partisans as well as sympathizers do not hesitate to speak about their personal preferences with regard to one or another contribution, but the expression of these individual choices only rarely places collective positions in question. A certain lack of interest with regard to this entire matter probably also plays a role, because the important thing now is the consequences of the new rootedness of Muslims in Europe. Why bother about certain old internal struggles—even if they are extremely apt to reveal the characteristics of certain mentalities (mentalities that are perhaps outmoded now?).

10

Interview no. 39.

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chapter nine 4. Promotion of contextual adaptation, to the detriment of the homogeneity of the movement?

Beyond the attempts to protect or to reinforce the identity of the movement (above all, it seems, when confronted with disobedience), an even more important contrarian dynamic appears to be at work. In fact, another collective position adopted by the partisans consists in reconsidering the heritage of the Muslim Brotherhood in the light of the contemporary context, and taking the specific characteristics of this context into account is given a very high value. This position is in line with a constant concern, always to interpret a particular kind of thinking in the light of its context, something that testifies at any rate to ‘the Islam of the happy medium, adaptable to every place and to every time’. Along these lines, partisans speak of the freedom of each branch of the movement, each (according to the appropriate context) drawing upon the common reservoir for what is most useful to each. Many observers emphasize that this is above all a positive procedure: the question is to get hold of that which is most advantageous in each situation, without worrying about criticizing or rejecting other things. The essential point is expressed by this British partisan: They find what suits them, because of course the situation in Egypt or the situation in Jordan and other countries . . . all of it has its own special needs and special requirements, special ways in dealing with things, special ways in dealing with individuals and so on. And there comes that we have the flexibility, as Muslim Association of Britain to take from the Islamic . . . from, as you said, from this wonderful heritage as we have. What we require, what we need, what makes us go in our mission in the uk for example, or in the European context and so on. So we take from it what is suitable for us. It does not mean that we are rejecting the rest but we are just taking what is more fruitful for us.11

Another interviewee, certainly a sympathizer and probably a partisan, spoke to us about a provocative aspect of the movement, which comes into play when it follows out the logic of this acceptance of diversity with regard to positions in interpretations, all the way to the end. By putting two possible attitudes in relation, and then relativizing the importance of the difference between the two, the movement shows to what extent

11

Interview no. 19.

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this principle of taking context into account can lead to the greatest possible heterogeneity at the center of the movement; but this can also lead to the trivialization of both attitudes, something the movement probably does not want. Without taking much time to think about it, this man produced the following analysis of the situation: carrying out attacks in Palestine and debating the question of lay status in France end up being integrated with the same ease and the same legitimacy, all based on the same Muslim Brotherhood heritage, quite simply because these variant behaviors are judged appropriate with reference to a context. As a result, by supporting with perfect equanimity a complete flexibility of Islamic solutions—and not specifically Brotherhood-related solutions, according to this man—in their association with contexts, the heritage of the Muslim Brotherhood is thereby brought back to the status of a de-ideologized practice. And by the same token, the necessity and the duty of arriving through one’s own judgment at an answer, and of maintaining a critical stance, is simply bridged over. In his words: I think that the basis of this ideology, is precisely the ability to be adaptable.[. . .] So . . . in the Palestinian context, that means . . . making things blow up . . . bombs. And in the context of the French Republic, it means . . . talking about lay status. And this is not a double discourse, if you will. It is something that we are living through . . . that we are adapting to. This is plasticity but it is, in fact, not something the Brothers are doing. It comes from Islam, quite simply. Islam, in time of war, tells you to make war. And in time of peace, it tells you to make peace. Well, what I mean is . . . it is the impetus you get from the context that creates your identity, in the final analysis . . . there is no . . . and the ideological bases of the Brothers, these are . . .: I think that it was the strength, right enough, not to . . . not to take a part . . . not to take a part of the Koran and to say ‘we are applying this’. But that’s just it . . . we come back once again to this matter of shumuliyya, this matter of of a global character. That is to say that the entire Koran is applicable, remains linked to priorities, the aulawīyāt and that, . . . uhh . . . according to a context, different things will appear to be appropriate . . . all while . . . uhh . . . so there are some constants that never move: that means Muslim orthodoxy in terms of dogma, in terms of practices, in terms of references to scholars when it is a question of . . . of fatwas on the mu’āmallāt . . . thus all ongoing actions . . . uhh . . . phoo . . . otherwise, myself I think that there’s nothing . . . if you will . . . me when I read . . . uhh . . . the imam Al-Bannā, for me, that’s all about now, right ! Completely. Because these are mechanisms, not solutions if you will!12

12

Interview no. 48.

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In the context of this interview, rich but fairly disjointed, the Koran is cited in evidence and interpreted in whatever way the context seems to require, without any clear principles or overall ethics being identified in the process. In the final analysis contexts are treated as the prime criteria for action while the Koran is supposed to function in the place of a practical manual in which solutions are presented clearly and in which the priorities that are to be taken into account are established from the outset. The heritage of the Brotherhood is presented here as bearing upon the less important of two questions, that is, the one regarding adaptation of practical modalities, while the fundamental question of textual interpretation and choices leading to action is avoided. Instead of maintaining that the diversity of positions adopted by national branches leads to an unstable position, owing to the extreme complexity that consequently exists at the international level, all of these positions are actually legitimated in the name of respect for orthodoxy. Other partisans go even further, judging that the organization’s acquiescence in this practice of contextual adaptation is actually the heart of the mb dynamic, and the secret of the continual regeneration of their thought. One partisan brought up this possibility at a meeting, after we had asked what, in the final analysis, made up the heritage of the mb, if even the contribution of Hassan Al-Bannā could find itself relativized: I like, yani, the way of sheik Hassan Al-Bannā and his though and I think he’s one of the important pioneers of the Muslim Umma. I think his thought is very important but at the time, you know, every country, every region has its own situation, ok? And, you know, he’s important but it is not a part of, yani, something to . . . “Everyone has to take that”: it’s not like that ! No one from the Ikhwan al-muslimin look to his thoughts like that. He’s one of the important Muslim thinker but you know, at the same time, it’s up to every country, every region to . . . [. . .] Well, we always have to renew, we always have to find how can we find something which is related to our own situation.13

In general terms, partisans thus adopt a positive stance with regard to the entire heritage, viewing it as capable of constant self-renewal, even if few of them can boast of a really extensive knowledge of the entire body of work. For some, this diversity is evidence of the fact that the heritage

13

Interview no. 14.

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is ‘not a closed library’,14 but rather something that is continually reactualized through the emergence of new thoughts, in accordance with the developments of the contemporary period. A French-speaking British partisan told us at the beginning of our conversation that he was open to new things from every direction. He said: ‘It is just as important to take into account the opinions of one’s friends as those of one’s enemy, for in truth, there is a light . . . and this truth is not exclusive’, and he also said: ‘a right opinion can contain an element that is not right, and an opinion that is not right can contain an element that is right . . ., he concluded: Everything is good, to learn from everything, wherever it may come from, as long as it does not contradict Islam.15

This opinion echoes one expressed by Hassan Al-Bannā, and indeed our interlocutor told us what he would have said: Islam liberates one’s reason and [. . .] it is open to the possibility of taking from each thing that which is good and useful, and it proclaims that wisdom is the goal of the believer, it is that which is most worthy, wherever it may be found.

In the meantime, these considerations raise once again the question of the limits of the heritage of which we have been speaking, and the difficulty of taking up positions adopted in foreign countries by reason of this heritage, including the intra-European scene. The question concerning lay society discussed in France remains, for example, unknown to certain British partisans, who do not understand why the majority of French Brothers no longer appear bothered by this principle.

14 15

Interview no. 34. Interview no. 25.

PART THREE

IDEAS THAT LEAD TO ACTION

PART THREE

INTRODUCTION

The Muslim Brothers in Europe are engaged in an attempt to preserve their role and their status as dynamic actors. Maintaining respect for what has been accomplished in the past, and acting according to diverse modalities of changing contexts—democratic and pluralistic, and in which they are a minority—, they get involved in various kinds of service to their community, and disseminate discourses and speeches with a variety of contents, all in a general effort to increase the degree of involvement of Muslims with regard to their religion and their community. Over and above certain themes that are developed in a specific way, they persistently recommend certain concepts, which only rarely receive a precise definition, to any Muslim who will listen. The most important of these include the principles of shumuliyya al-islām (the global nature of Islam),1 of iʿtidāl (principle of right behavior), of wasatiyya (principle of the “middle way”) and of fikr al-djihad (the concept of making an effort). These are recurrent themes, the base and support of the praxeology of the Brotherhood. They continue in this manner to transmit large portions of their heritage, while still managing to distance themselves from some parts of it and from some of their former practices. Thus they have moved away from the slogans they once repeated, which can be summed up in these two phrases: Islam is religion and State, Koran and sword, worship and command, fatherland and citizenship. God is our destination, the Prophet our model, the Koran our law, combat (jihad) our pathway, martyrdom our promise.

Certainly, this formula is still used when new members swear allegiance to the Brotherhood, and in small private groups, but at this time it appears to have a mainly formal and ritual character when it is repeated. Such notions are never publicly enunciated in Europe. Long-standing procedures for becoming a member and the pattern of operation based on secret meetings are at any rate being re-examined in

1

See 4.1 for the definition of this concept according to Tariq Ramadan’s translation.

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a gradual manner, such as by members of the younger generations when they are more inclined to value involvement in modern structures. Very general objectives, such as the preservation and the consolidation of an Islamic cultural identity, the reinforcement of the feeling of belonging to a community, and getting people to place a higher value on citizenship, are promoted. To take a notable example, the above description applies to the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe (fioe), which is the umbrella organization to which various organizations and networks connected to the Brotherhood belong. In this as in national organizations, the Brothers always soft-pedal certain aspects of their original slogans, especially those concerned with an (Islamic) State presented as something that should stir people up to undertake militant actions or even physical combat in an effort to spread the message of Islam. It’s true that the utopian dream of constituting one unique, revitalised and strong Muslim community is commonly held. But the means by which this should be achieved remain relatively unclear. For partisans of the movement in general, two visions of the heritage of the mb coexist, that are illustrated in chapter 10 by a variety of testimonies. For some, the heritage of the Brothers consists above all in a sort of praxeology, that is, a discourse upon action with a view toward getting results. For others, this heritage consists in a content, a vision of the world and of what it means to be religious. A more in-depth analysis of these two conceptions could attempt to answer the question of knowing what it is that is concretely understood, at the present time, by this idea of the global character or globality of Islam, an idea that appears to contain all the others. This analysis will occupy us in Part 3. In chapter 11 we will explain the way in which practical orientations toward action are considered, and the fields and modalities of action that these orientations cover; the task is to explain the practical axes around which an Islamic ethics finds itself practiced and promoted. In chapters 12–15 we give an exposition of a certain number of ideological positions defended by the mb in public debates or in the course of interviews. These are not exhaustive; certain points of view are only illustrated, and we give particular attention to points of convergence and divergence that may exist within the movement itself. We shall see also that certain ideas from Hassan Al-Bannā or from Sayyid Qutb, the two classic authorities to which the Brotherhood always makes reference, at one and the same time complementary and opposed, are re-appropriated. We are far from wishing to associate the thought of

introduction

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contemporary scholars with such classic authors as if that was the only way they could earn acceptance, and we do not wish to neglect their personal contributions, but certain parallelisms are too important to be ignored. Beyond the disproportion in the attention paid to two aspects of the heritage of Brotherhood, that is, beyond the fact that the ideological dimension receives more attention than the dimension of action, it is important for the reader to understand that these two procedures are complementary. What is more, it is only by following both paths at the same time that we can deal with the entire field of action of the Brotherhood. But it is above all in the area of concrete involvement with Muslims, and not that much in the area of intellectual debate anymore, that the mb shines, and demonstrates the value of their ideas for action, and their dynamism.

CHAPTER TEN

TWO COMPLEMENTARY VERSIONS OF THE MOVEMENT’S HERITAGE

The history of the movement’s heritage and its ideas strongly influence the intellectual expression of the Brotherhood in Europe. But there are divergent interpretations of this heritage. For some, the most important thing is the development of an ethos, a way of being, while for others the important thing is one’s way of conceiving the world.

1. A praxeology Certain sympathizers or partisans affirm that the mb symbolizes a way of being Muslim: [. . .] it is a way of seeing Islam. It is a way of acting. It is a way of living your Islam.1

In their eyes, the movement presents a method for understanding the message of Islam, modern and pedagogically correct, that revivifies the principles of Islam and stimulates Muslims to action. In this framework, the contribution of the mb appears to be independent of a more precisely defined corpus, or any precise ideology; their finalities are not defined and/or assumed by certain militants. Beginning with the formulation, Ikhwan al-muslimin is just . . . one way of understanding Islam2 (there are many other slogans that express the same meaning), the purposes and principles of the movement are relativized in concrete terms. As certain young people put it, they have to be formulated in phase with the context; for others, they cannot even be placed at the beginning of a discussion. The three interviews we now excerpt will show what we are talking about.

1 2

Interview no. 40. Interview no. 13.

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First of all, there is this declaration from a partisan who thinks that the heritage of the mb consists first and foremost in a fairly complete methodology for interpreting Islamic texts. He explains that this methodology actually contains a content of its own, but that the content concerns above all an attitude, a manner of approaching the context from a very general standpoint, one that gives priority to involvement in society through adaptation to it. According to him, this heritage is addressing himself to all, including the Young Muslims of France: There are people who were born here, who in their progress in Islam will, at a certain point, discover a kind of thinking from which they will learn . . . what? They will learn a methodology for the interpretation of texts or in any case parts of one because okay . . . they don’t necessarily have the background to penetrate into the details and then above all they’re going to encounter a thought that just the same is really plugged in to what is going on in society. That is to say ‘it’s necessary to get involved in society. It’s necessary . . . to completely recast the work of preaching. We have to have a discourse on . . . citizenship.’3

Next, a French partisan compares the methodology of the mb to that of the Moroccan left, a tendency to which he is quite sensitive, because it is connected to it by family ties. He speaks of his aversion toward ideologies that offer pre-established methodologies, ‘instruction manuals’, so to speak: he associates these with socialist ideology, which implies the distribution of pre-existing resources for the purpose of achieving a result that is determined in advance. His desire is to point up the plasticity of the methodology of the Brotherhood. Naturally, he recognizes that there is a content, a ‘general idea’ that is aimed at by the mb, but in his view he himself has available a space of action or manoeuvre that allows him to relativize this general idea and to submit it to the judgment of his own reflection. He concludes: Me, personally, I am always against these instruction manuals. That means that it’s necessary that we . . . I don’t like recipes . . . everything all done for you . . . ha ha [laughs] . . . It should be necessary to make your brain work a little. And what I have found in the writings of the Muslim Brotherhood, is just that. This means: they give you a general idea. This idea can be understood and . . . and . . . practised in different ways according to your culture, according to the time you’re living in, and according to . . . the place where . . . you happen to be.4

3 4

Interview no. 43. Interview no. 52.

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Finally we have a young British sympathizer with the thought of the Brotherhood, and who also endorses the value of a general approach, an open manner of being and acting, as opposed to a precise content to be accepted: The thought of the Brothers is more a type of reasoning than a content. For Hassan Al-Bannā, it was necessary to study reasoning before anything else, and not the products of reasoning. If there are differences between various ways of going about it, that should be taken as positive, because that will teach you tolerance . . . If the mind is at the center, then things get moved forward at the level of civilization.5

2. A vision of the world Other partisans nonetheless attest the existence of a content related to the mb heritage. They recognize that a common ideological matrix constitutes a real program of action.6 They admit the existence of a global vision that comes out of Islam itself, in which a real vision of the world of the future is at stake. In France and Belgium, however, the concept of ideology is rarely invoked in order to indicate the meaning of this content: never in public and only quite exceptionally in private interviews. The implicit (or explicit) “condemnation” by public opinion and in the media, of the notion that there exists in Europe an Islamic societal alternative, probably contributes to this timidity. Only scattered pieces of it are ever spoken about. But despite this reluctance, they illustrate the development of certain conceptions as a function of context, especially over the period from the 1980’s to the present. In the light of this testimony from a partisan, we can judge to what extent a kind of “utopian thought” was quite current in mb circles up to the early 1990’s. The discourses that were circulated during that period gave credibility to the idea that a real Islamic alternative existed, a notion which this interviewee no longer quite believes in: “We have to stop thinking that.” He thinks it is important to demonstrate that the 5

Interview no. 04. For R.P. Mitchell, the mb have from the beginning placed a high value on the development of a program of action and not a philosophical or ideological system. He supports his contention with reference to their particular choice of terminology, in which they favor concepts of action and programs over concepts of ideas and ideologies [Mitchell, 1969:326]. 6

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thought of the mb arose at a particular time, and that during the 1920’s and 1930’s it constituted a utopia. He insists upon the reality of this aspect, which (still according to this interviewee) never speaks its name. For him, there are today a number of new initiatives, but no long term project, and within the circles of the Brotherhood, “we do not know it”. That is to say, the partisans are not even conscious of this lack of a long term project, or else they don’t want to know about it, with a few exceptions. This partisan believes that it must be shown that the past attempts carried out in the name of the original utopian dream failed, and that it is time for the mb members to ask themselves what they are aiming at and where they want to go.7 In the more liberal context of Great Britain, it is more common to hear Islam spoken of as a societal alternative, especially with regard to statements about the application of Islamic law in family matters. The British approach is not limited to this aspect, however. For example, a partisan of the Muslim Association of Britain refrains from criticizing the societies of today directly, but he considers that they do have certain problems. And he still thinks that Islam has a solution to propose, and that his own association has a part to play in it; without speaking in precise terms of the content of the solution, he mentions assigning a higher value to a pious character on the part of individuals and a complementary approach to the social alternatives most often proposed. He recognizes the two-sided nature of this global project, both concrete and ideal, concerning the here-below and the beyond, but he insists on the positive aspect of the project, saying that it is not antagonistic towards existing societies: [. . .] what we want now, is what mab is doing, that is: we have, we want to create a Muslim who is balanced, who lives this life . . . as if it was the only one he would ever know . . . but he is pious, he is Muslim, he knows his creator, God, he works for that as if he was going to die tomorrow. That is the balance that we strike. Okay . . . the Muslim in Great Britain has problems and he has a social, legal, and economic environment and he is going to address these problems. [. . .] There is immigration, communitarianism, and all that which has created these communities. And then, the second, the third generation came along. They were born here. [. . .] All this is assumed in our position: our viewpoint, it’s more balanced, clearer. We see things the way they really are but there is something called ideology; an ideal, what you call an ideal. We have an ideology that we act on,

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Interview no. 39.

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chapter ten that we try to carry forward. Regarding our activities, we have an ideology and this ideology is not different or antagonistic towards society. We have seen, the problems that exist down there and we, as concerns our thought, our Islamic heritage, we have a solution, without contradicting that which society . . . this is the path that we are going to follow in order to resolve the problem. You can follow this path or not, you are free! We cannot force you to follow.8

In more concrete terms, the idea of an Islam that presents itself as a third way, in the form of an alternative to both socialism and capitalism, was mentioned at a conference organized by the Muslim Association of Britain.9 When we consider the various practices having to do with discourses in different countries, in relation to the observation of concrete practices, including organizational practices, we can say that there are convergences at the European level (these are described in chapters 12–15). It is difficult to establish clear distinctions between different countries, but we have observed above all that there are similar dynamics, and a common effort is indeed implemented beyond all tensions and differences. De facto, the mb works in order to create fertile terrain, and the project of a global Islam is to be planted there. In virtue of a proximity to the ideology of the movement and its ideals, specific attitudes and initiatives are adopted. These are abundant and diversified, and they have to do with many aspects of the personal and collective existence of the Brotherhood members. They concern normative, economic, and social initiatives that are carried out along a fairly broad front in the areas such as personal family law, education, humanitarian efforts. Altogether, they end up constituting a practical framework that is capable of helping Muslims live their Islam in conformity with practices that are socially valued within the movement and which participate in the idea that it is possible to live one’s Islam by integrating every aspect of life into it.

8

Interview no. 25. Seminar of the Muslim Association of Britain, (mab Glasgow, December 20–22, 2002), on the theme ‘Thinking globally, acting locally: a training course for Islamic activism’. Conferences by Zahid Parvez (first president of the Islamic Society of Britain) on the themes of ‘globalization’ and ‘Democracy and the British political system’. 9

CHAPTER ELEVEN

THE BROTHERHOOD THROUGH ACTION

In order to approach the difficult question of the nature of the heritage of the mb, many partisans and sympathizers reduce the ideological scope of the movement. They maintain that the movement only consists in proposals for general practical orientations, in respect of action. The guidelines that define the movement’s preferred modes of action in fact imply an ethos, a way of being Muslim rather than an actual body of instituted doctrine or precise dogmatic content. It is a practical Islamic ethics, that implies in a concrete manner how one should conduct oneself in accordance with a method of understanding and of action; such a method appears at any rate to be founded in the very nature of traditional Islam. In concrete terms, echoing Max Weber, we have to do with a ‘system of dispositions that impart a given orientation to actions, structuring action in the sense of a pattern of life conduct (Lebensführung)’ [Hervieu & Willaime, 2001:97]. These practical orientations can be discerned on the basis of three interactive axes.

1. Profundity of faith and understanding of the message An initial dimension of the ethos of the mb consists in recognizing the importance placed on a profound and primordial Islamic faith that is the source of life. As a consequence of such faith, a Muslim Brother is supposed to be following a pathway toward God, that is, to orient his thoughts and his actions in accordance with divine prescriptions. As Hani Ramadan sums it up, very simply and very radically, the meaning that one gives one’s own life is bound up with one’s orientation toward God: ‘were created to adore God’.1 This faith is illuminated by a method

1

Conference on ‘spirituality in Islam’ (Colloquy on marriage, Brussels, March 30, 2003).

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of textual interpretation that aspires to maintain the relevance of interpretation to its context. In mb milieux, grasping the Islamic message is closely associated with obedience to the twenty principles laid down by the imam Hassan Al-Bannā.2 These are considered by partisans to be muqaddasāt, that is, literally, sacred or unalterable. Everything goes back to the idea of establishing a system that is clear and coherent. Together, the twenty principles constitute a real practical method for grasping Islam and the spirit of its message, not just sacred texts. They are flexible and rigorous at one and the same time, especially with regard to the establishment of certain limits, to the end of avoiding the ‘pathways of hell’; fundamental elements are distinguished from details. The first principle is particularly important because it deals with the principle of the globality of the message of Islam, shumuliyya. In other words, this is Islam understood as encompassing every aspect of life: the human, the social, the universal, and the meaning of history. This precision explains the interpenetration of method—which is never only ‘neutral method’—and ideology. In fact, beginning from the principle of globality that has been derived from Islam itself, what we have in nascent form is the constitution of a real system that combines together values that are capable of producing a vision of the world. As we made our observations, we saw the effect of these principles— those supposed to be respected by all Brothers, and considered by them as the underpinning of their lives—expressed in many of the details of daily life and attitudes toward it: confidence in God and his judgment, a desire to obey divine commands in order to obtain divine satisfaction and its rewards, modesty and humility in behavior, the importance of the intention associated with an action, remembering to think about God on a regular basis, etc. These details are noticeable in the course of interactions and meetings. Without being specific to mb circles, they are at any rate significant enough. A good example is found in the impromptu interventions, occurring before or after conferences, devoted to prayers for divine grace on behalf of those who are suffering. Another example: the militant who, at the Salon du Bourget in 2004, pronounced himself shocked that a famous orator in the movement should be able to take undue pride in the popular success of his own 2 See the principles mentioned in Chapter 4 with regard to the contribution of Hassan Al-Bannā (also particularly Appendix 1).

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speeches. Another conference speaker finished his speech by asking God ‘to purify our intentions and guide our actions’, an attitude to remind his listeners that only God’s agreement gives any value to human actions. Still another: a woman who says that her husband travels a great deal, and she does not always know where he is going. She indicates, through her unlimited confidence in her husband, the strength of their shared Islamic convictions. These in fact emphasize the importance of the family and the prohibition against adultery: shared respect for Islamic precepts gives this woman a confidence that she wished to communicate to others. Or take three young militant women, more or less close to the mb milieu, who went to see The Last Samurai starring Tom Cruise—nine times over for one, and five for another. The story excited them greatly, because they saw celebrated in the film the same values they observe in their daily lives. They did not focus on the aspect of the film that depicted the end of a way of life—which we could liken, for them, to the end of an ideal world inspired by the respectful observance of Islamic precepts—but rather were happy to feel the emotion that the elevation of values inspired in them, in the context of an epic story that was both romantic and cruel. They were enthused by certain attitudes and fundamental qualities like respect, dignity, discipline, the quest for perfection, the idea of giving one’s all, modesty, nobleness of spirit, loyalty, the importance of a bond with tradition that makes room for modernity, the taste for a simple life in opposition to a destructive materialism, and willingness to become involved in struggle when it proves necessary. One of these women asked us to go with them, saying: “You simply must come—it’s just like the mb at the time of Hassan Al-Bannā!” At the end of the movie, there is no thought of discussing such a human adventure in the past tense, as if that time had gone forever. Rather, the beauty of the ethical gestures portrayed continued to run through their minds. The discussion of the film was very animated, stimulated by such exemplary behavior. The ideal of a life that makes sense, fully lived, with respect for tradition, is what remained with them. Some militants interrupted their interview upon hearing a call to prayer, went to fulfill their religious obligation, and returned ten minutes later. One man with whom we spoke welcomed us by saying Sala’am (peace), and he was surprised to hear us respond with a simple “Bonjour” (Hello), which seemed a bit flat to him. He then spoke further, as if to reassure himself, asking, “You don’t say Sala’am to me?” This same

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man suggested that we have coffee. Seeing me drink it black without milk or sugar, he said to me, “Ah, you are doing some serious research,” referring in all probability to what he perceived as the spiritual nature of my choice to prefer a rough and bitter taste for coffee something with which he could sympathize. In addition to numerous anecdotes and situations that testify to the importance of religious considerations, in the largest sense, and to the presence of the divine in the everyday, partisans also derive from this practical method certain conceptions and orientations with regard to personal and social life. Historically, these have to do above all with educational and political projects, in connection with those related to the constitution of a State, or at least an Islamic order in which Sharia would be applied. In Europe, the practical orientations of the mb are now focused rather upon preaching (daʿwa), understood in the broad sense as the promotion of Islamic culture, the defense of the interests of Muslims, of their identity and of Islam, the defense of spiritual and moral or ethical values, extending even to a struggle against a decline of morals, and also a struggle against social injustice (including the struggle for the liberation of Palestine) and a certain questioning attitude with regard to lay society, when it begins to be perceived that lay society is imposing its own ideologically-influenced vision of society upon some particular aspect of the general dialogue. Many conferences and interventions (speeches and commentaries) make reference to these preoccupations as well as to their practical consequences.

2. Training and organization The second constitutive aspect of the ethos of the Brotherhood consists in the organization of the transmission of the message and of action. It is above all a question of training, and of the establishment of organizations that are appropriate and effective. Such questions continue to have a high priority in the view of the mb, as concerns both partisans and sympathizers, for these necessary arrangements are what allows the transmission referred to above to be carried out, but it is also a matter of concretizing the social and collective dimension of Islam, and of actualizing the communitarian dimension. Thus the very life of a militant is centered around this communitarian involvement which participates, in the final analysis, in one’s involvement with God, who is omniscient and whose judgment cannot be escaped; from that point it is difficult

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to avoid personal scruples in cases of defection because it concerns the fundamental question of salvation and that which is beyond this earth. These organizations assign a high value to the knowledge of Islam and to involvement in Islamic work, as well as intra-communitarian brotherhood; they place themselves at the service of communities, and in this way take a hand in the construction of the identities of their members. They also provide a framework for the training of militants, so that the continuity of the movement may be insured and the work of Islam continued. Such organizations are significant resources in terms of dealing with the societies around them, because they give access to a certain visibility, even legitimacy for members, by virtue of the simple fact that they are there. We have collected many testimonies that insist upon the importance of this organizational aspect. Habitually, the members of the Muslim Brotherhood recognize the unavoidable nature of the organizational dimension. But certain members of the movement are inclined to compare the organization to an instrument, recalling that it is the propagation of the message, the daʿwa, that is the most important thing. These statements should be connected (among other things) with criticisms that sometimes emerge, directed against that which is perceived as the Brotherhood’s excessive preoccupation with the strictly organizational aspect, a preoccupation which is blamed for insufficient involvement in other areas, especially spirituality or social matters [al ʿAlwānī, 1996; Ghannoushī, 1997; Al-Qaradāwī, 2004, among others]. Here are a number of statements that illustrate in different ways the indispensable nature of the organizational aspect of the Brotherhood. One of the leaders of a national branch of the movement expresses straight away the fundamental and direct connection between the preservation of the faith itself and its collective practice: It is not possible to keep faith without an organisation, without Brothers, these relationships, to perform salat, prayers and fast and learning and essence of Islam.3

Another leader, speaking at a conference, recalled to his audience the importance of belonging to a community through belonging to a group, whatever it might be, thus associating the collective dimension of the practice with an actual obligation of worship:

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Interview no. 07.

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chapter eleven It is obligatory, because that helps us meet our obligations (especially because Islam never speaks to the individual as such, Islam always speaks to the community, to the group).4

A third member gives priority to the ideas of a necessary functional integration of the diverse activities of personal and collective life, which must allow the consolidation of the communitarian significance of the religious life and intra-Muslim brotherhood: . . . there are bonds that are made between persons, communitarian social connections that are important . . . So this is to say, if you will, that . . . what there is to the Brothers, is really an organization that allowed uhh . . . allowed associations or rather . . . Muslims . . . to live according to . . . uhh . . . work that allows one to go from one activity to another and to organize those activities. And to make it so that Islam is not a private affair in a limited worship framework but the very image of that which it is, of that which it was in the first days of the revelation, that is a religion, a faith, a culture which is going to spread across all society.5

A fourth leader goes even further in explaining this communitarian dynamism—which appears as something specifically emphasized by the mb—and the goals that are aimed at within its framework. He in fact connects them to classic intra-communitarian needs, but also links them to the objectives of openness and integration within the surrounding society: The Muslim Brothers, wherever they go, as individuals, they think that it is very important to have an institution, training, educating people, explaining about Islam, giving the culture, making dialogue with others . . . this is how; it cannot live as an individual separated from the society. And the best way to have this linkage and contact is to have an institution like a mosque, like a research centre, like an Islamic centre like Ustādh Sa‘īd Ramadān did in Switzerland. This is how the Muslim Brothers function if they go outside the Arab world but in the Arab world there is an organic structural entity.6

A fifth leader recognizes that the organizational dimension of the mb was originally a sort of continuation of recruitment methods prac-

4

Conference on Islam as a way of life by Abdallah Benmansour, March 13, 2005. Interview no. 59. 6 Interview no. 05. We note that this last phase is an attempt to dissociate the international organisation of the mb from what is happening in Europe. This was the beginning of a first interview, which was completed at two other meetings. The distinction between Arab world and Europe appears to be a little less fraught with consequences with respect to the organizational domain in the following interviews. 5

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ticed in Sufi brotherhoods. He admits just the same that this organizational dimension is not related only to worship practices, but ends up also containing “a project for governance”.7 In his view, this aspect remains important in terms of arranging for proper Islamic training, and for giving the organization the means to implement its objectives in a collective manner. According to him, these are primarily concerned with worship-related, cultural, and social matters. Nonetheless we have observed that a political dimension is also developed, indirectly, at the grassroots level.

3. Effort, Action and Setting an Example A third aspect of the organization’s ethos is based upon the idea of putting forth continuous or sustained effort ( fikr al-djihad), or upon an ethics of this idea,8 including under this the notion of exemplary conduct held up for imitation via the assignment of a high value to ideas such as the duty of leading a pious and virtuous life, one’s permanent struggle to master one’s own egoism and one’s bad habits, and also the accomplishment of an effort in the direction of preaching, which includes attempts to stimulate an Islamic sensibility within the society. These efforts are thought of as part and parcel of faith itself; thus the question is one of (re-) dynamizing one’s personal and collective faith, and one’s Islamic identity, and of making a dynamic and positive contribution to one’s community and, for certain people, one’s whole society. For many members of the mb, these objectives remain fundamental whatever the obstacles may be; difficulties are considered as occasions for strengthening oneself and reaffirming one’s own determination to be heard. The idea of struggle was especially emphasized by Anas Al-Tikriti, spokesman for the Muslim Association of Britain, at the annual conference of that organization in 2004 in London, at a moment at which the organization had just become aware of a smear campaign in the media, the purpose of which was to prevent the arrival in Britain of the Muslim 7 Interview no. 34. He relates that with Hassan Al-Bannā and the mb, ‘the question of the legitimacy of the State is raised, including that regarding institutional, official Islam’; as for the armed wing, he thinks it operates as a system of self-defense for the organization, and that it ‘also corresponds to the idea of the globality of Islam, because it is everything, including force and all that’. 8 Etymologically the notion of djihad means ‘effort made toward a determinate goal’ or perhaps ‘effort to perfect oneself in moral and religious terms’.

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scholar Yūsuf Al-Qaradāwī, and to prevent him from setting foot on British soil. He refuted this insult and transformed it into an occasion from which profit might be gained. He underlined the real necessity of grasping the opportunity to show others in society a different face for Muslims: Every trial and tribulation we are given may be an opportunity; we have to grasp them . . . and make use of them. We have to make friends and become better people.

After having recalled for his audience the objective of spiritual guidance, a responsibility to be assumed upon earth, he added that it is necessary to assume this responsibility through concrete involvement: We claim and believe we found the truth so we must get involved. To change things for the best.

According to him, there are two imperatives that must be maintained, namely, ‘Reformation and betterment’, and these aim at progress throughout the world.9 These notions of struggle are announced and concretely implemented on many occasions. Such is the case with debates that take place in France with regard to a legislative project that would prohibit the wearing of obvious religious tokens at school, and with protests in Great Britain against the war in Iraq, and with protests against a whole series of isolated events that are perceived as acts of Islamophobia, etc. In rare cases these ideas are expressed in a form that goes beyond this limited framework, ranging over larger social themes, in which the question of the responsible management of the earth and of all of humanity is mentioned. A priori, no effort is considered as vain, but rather represents, within the ideology of the movement, divine recompense.10 Nonetheless, this involvement is costly in terms of human effort, so much so that certain young partisans, speaking humorously, make light of something that can be onerous, characterize themselves as the “escapees from the da‘wa”. In general terms, this thought of effort and action is supposed to be present in all partisans at three levels. First, at the individual level, a person has a duty to take care to maintain self-control and a certain

9

Conference of July 10, 2004, Kensington Town Hall, London. These themes are set forth for the French-speaking public in a small popularizing book [Al-Banna:2004a]. 10

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coherence of the effort to reform oneself. For one of the Brothers whom we met, this principle of ‘islah nafsak’ (reform yourself by your own efforts) is the most fundamental of all.11 Next, the members of the Muslim Brotherhood are supposed to act in a responsible manner with regard to their families, and with regard to society. Th is is understood in the sense of a duty to guide others in the ways of Islam; the most general character of this demand is summed up in the expression according to which every Muslim must become “an imam in every field of life”.12 Another partisan believes that members must be animated by a drive towards success, from every point of view, spiritual, professional, social, etc.: Either he becomes a responsible worker in society, or else there is no point in him continuing! Because well, for us, as I have explained to you, it’s very important someone who contributes to society. It’s not somebody that society carries.13

The question of taking responsibility is here proclaimed, as opposed to an attitude in which one waits for society to give assistance. As another partisan recalled to us in interviews, there also exists a duty toward the Other, including non-Muslims. But this idea came up only rarely in our interviews, and was only mentioned a few times in all the conferences in which we participated. Nonetheless, a particular degree of sympathy and a great compassion are often expressed with regard to other members of the faith community, especially the Palestinians. Two long statements from partisans, each striking a quite different tone, testify to the intensity of the focus on this effort and this struggle. In listening to the provocative idea of ‘self-sacrifice’ mentioned by the first, and to the description of a moderate involvement that adapts itself to circumstances as offered by the second, we can feel that all the areas of life and the totality of personality are taken into account. The first testimony comes from a former mb leader who insists that sacrifice is fundamental, that the important thing is to give one’s all: one’s money, one’s time, one’s life. For this man, the heritage of Hassan Al-Bannā is important because of the emphasis placed on the notion of constant labor in the service of others, and in the interest of justice,

11 12 13

Interview no. 44. Interview no. 05. Interview no. 67.

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even if this goes against one’s own interests, and along with this, sacrifice and a personal relationship with God. He also speaks of the importance ascribed to the aspect of Islamic reform in a context that appears to require it, in which self-evaluation lays down the basis for change that is to come: [. . .] When Hassan Al-Bannā came, the whole nation was like destroyed. So he started with a full project of reforming through Islamic means. [. . .] He began to speak about Muslims in an international figure, who believe in Islam as a message for humanity, you see. This is one key. He began to talk people about justice, even if it is against yourself, and doing what we call evaluation and that comes upon our own self, before you sleep, before you go to bed, think about these duties. Have you done some good today or no, have you done some evil or will you do it tomorrow; have you respected your daily prayers and the relationship with God has gone any better or not? Spiritually. . .: what you see? So he began to talk in this language with people ; there was vacancy for that and people were waiting for a project. [. . .] But now, of course, many things have changed since Hassan Al-Bannā but the main principles, you see, like the main principles I was just talking about: it remains. He’s a great philosopher. So Hassan Al-Bannā was a great reformist. He told people how to sacrifice, how to work as I told you: a real Muslim Brotherhood member will never accept charity [. . .]. He can do charity to poor people but he himself should not aspire for that.14

We reopened the topic with the same person six months afterward, and he expanded upon the meaning of “sacrifice”. He connected this notion to a form of altruism, opposed from the beginning to egoistic attitudes, still recognizing that this dimension can take the individual a long way, in an involvement that might extend to the end of life. Habitually, however, the sacrifice demanded in this case concerns activities that appear to be fairly commonplace: Whether you are selfish or unselfish. Because selfish means you are selfcentred. But unselfish means you can sacrifice your time, you can sacrifice your money, you can sacrifice some of your ideas, you can sacrifice your blood for your country that needed that. To sacrifice is a big word, a specious word. But mainly sacrifice time to learn, sacrifice time to teach others when you become a learned man yourself, sacrifice time to do good, sacrifice time to invite people for practising Islam, sacrifice time to teach people many many many things.15

14 15

Interview no. 05. Interview no. 10.

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The second partisan, a younger man, speaks about the necessity of a concrete and moderate Islamic involvement touching every aspect of human activity. His words aim at illustrating how far the “Islam of the Middle Way” represents neither laxism nor extremism. This functional Islam, in practical terms, is thought of in connection with a sensitivity to context, but it is none the less all-encompassing and fraught with consequences in the lives of militants, on the spiritual, intellectual, and practical levels all at once: We try . . . I mean: I think that one of the thing that has found a lot of familiarity amongst Muslims world-wide was the fact that Hassan Al-Bannā, when he called, he called for practical Islam, for Islam to be in practised. At the same time, for the spiritual aspects to be emphasised upon. And at the same time, for us to revere to, you know, the scriptures of the Qur’ān and the Hadith and the such. And to adopt the traditional line of Islamic knowledge. All those were engulfed but at moder . . . you know: moderation in all three lines. You know: we take spirituality but we don’t become monks. You know: we take the Salafi approach of going back to the scriptures but we don’t become tied and enslaved by the words. You know: we have, you know, modern environments and modern context which we need to take into perspective. And at the same time, when we say “Islam in practice”, we do not forget our obligations are towards the soul and the heart, or towards the mind and the intellect. So I think that that resonates it largely and of course, you know, in the kind of education that we do offer, we try to . . . bring that kind of moderation of balance in all three aspects plus each aspect has its own branches and has its own implications. And we try to engulf all those.16

In parallel with the importance given to the adoption of modes of behavior that must be “moderate”, there is a setting-aside of an entire conception of work and effort concentrated upon oneself, such that it may lead, in the end, to physical combat. In fact no one speaks in explicit terms of this nonetheless fundamental dimension of the idea of jihad, such as it was reawakened by the Brothers of the past: the idea of a combat that is spiritual and physical at the same time, that might in some cases lead to violent acts, appears to have been purged from contemporary discourse.

16

Interview no. 22.

CHAPTER TWELVE

FRAMEWORK PRINCIPLES FOR THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY

In this chapter concerning ideological aspects of the mb movement, we now present three themes primarily associated with Hassan Al-Bannā: Islam as a way of life, the support of gradual reforms at the individual and social level, and Muslim unity. These are the guiding stars in the firmament of Brotherhood thought, and principles that are agreed on by most Brothers in Europe. Still, they are susceptible to minor adjustments. Other precepts are also regularly legitimated via association with the founder of the mb, but we will deal with them in chapters to come, in conjunction with other themes to be discussed. We could take for example the importance of joining daily religious practice to faith (Alimān wa-l-‘amal): faith must be joined to action; one cannot be fully Muslim without practicing one’s religion. This credo rests upon several principles, a high value placed upon worship practices, virtues and good morals, the acquisition of knowledge and the accomplishment of any Islamic task, taking responsibility and putting forth effort, but also upon a global system of punishment and reward to regulate one’s entire life (the worst punishments occurring after death in the other world). Before we delve into the topic, two points should be made. On one side all the conference participants with whom we spoke are more or less associated with the mb, but we cannot always distinguish partisans from sympathizers. Taken together they express a diversity of attitudes, and some of them are quite critical with regard to certain positions, including among others those of Sayyid Qutb. On another side the themes presented here cover a wide range of topics, but do not claim to set forth in an exhaustive manner the fl ow of ideas in circulation in mb milieux. The themes mentioned are intended as indicators that help us visualize the manoeuvring room that activists and contemporary preachers have, especially when we compare them to each other.

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1. Islam as a way of life: a great classic This theme is constantly emphasized at most public demonstrations. At the double conference organized at the mosque of Mons-en-Baroeul (in the Lille region), whose two themes were ‘Islam as a way of life’ and ‘Islam: how to live it in Europe?’, both stressed the primordial importance of adopting a complete Islamic way of life. The Islamic way of life is presented as the secret of Islam’s expansion on a global scale. God lies at the heart of everything, every act, every human intentionality, and every thing and every action is regulated by Islam. Thus, according to Abdallah Benmansour, no aspect of life is left to chance or personal judgment, since God always has something to say about it: your respiration, your gestures, your feelings, your feeling of hatred, your feeling of love, the countryside that you’re looking at, the people you are thinking about, the people you speak to, all your gestures are controlled and regulated by Allah. Everything is codified by Islam [. . .]; Everyone has hundreds of thousands of responsibilities, of circles of responsibilities. And each time Islam has something to say about it.

The omniscient presence of God implies that Islamic prescriptions are ever-present for any person who pays attention to them. God demonstrates his omnipotence even in the smallest things: “Islam is involved in almost every insignificant thing.”1 This conference speaker recalled that this divine supremacy is necessarily present at the heart of social relations. The divine hegemony is all the more in evidence, inasmuch as each action, and each act of caring directed toward another person—even in simply saying hello—offers us the possibility of conforming to the Islamic way. This speaker concluded his remarks by saying “In just a few seconds, I have applied the entire Sharia.” Thus he showed himself capable of great pragmatism, able to breathe life into the notion of an Islamist utopia, which considers the

1 Tariq Ramadan also recalls how deeply the divine presence can penetrate the heart of every action, if men only remember this: ‘It is the thought, the remembrance of God in man’s consciousness, that produces the sacred. Thus every action appearing to be free and completely ‘profane’—in terms of hygiene, sexual act, commerce, social engagements etc.- is all sacred as long as God is remembered along with it, and as long as it stays within ethical limits.’ In this discourse, the accent is not placed so much on the normative dimension of Islam, but the speaker replaces it by the necessity of taking ethical imperatives into account [Ramadan, 1996:309].

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Islamic way to be valid at all times and in all places. Instead of adopting, in his discourse, a classical tack, something that would have exhorted the faithful to labor to apply the Islamic way in every area, he reverses the field of the argument. Instead of motivating them to modify current laws or to push for the adoption of amendments that would make current laws more compatible with the spirit of Islam, rather he challenged his listeners to realize that every human activity already presents, in and of itself, an occasion for action in conformity with Sharia. Implicitly, he lets it be understood that the perspectives of a utopian Islamic system are still part of the present, and easily accessible starting from details, even if the whole remains invisible. According to him, the realization of this ideal depends only upon the goodwill of his listeners, for it to be assumed and communicated to others, discreetly and without much effort. In other remarks, when this speaker was exhorting his audience to perform Islamic labor that required more extensive personal involvement, he employed a logic that promoted Islam by means of rational and modern arguments. Although in the beginning the mb position speeches were likely to emphasize altruism, devotion, and brotherhood, this speaker added to the number of his arguments a call for strict individualism. He would say that Islamic labor is assigned a high value as a form of care directed purely upon oneself, at a bare minimum, in the interest of the salvation of one’s soul: this attitude is recommended “not as a strategic decision, no!,” but rather because everyone wants “to save his or her own souls. Not to go to Paradise, but simply not to go to Hell, to escape the fires of Hell.” Going beyond the promotion of objectives that are completely classical, this orator has placed the stamp of the sensibility of modern times upon his discourse: rather than simply enunciating altruistic ideals from which one’s own self-interest has been as far as possible rigorously excluded, to the glory of Islam and/or Muslims, ideals that sometimes fail to bring Muslims up out of their seats, the Islamic labor is presented as to be carried out as a matter of ‘pure egotism’,2 in order for the self not to be lost at the last judgment. By showing himself completely aware of the mental universe in which his listeners live, this orator was able to score a great success. He struck

2 Intervention by Abdallah Benmansour, member of the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe (fioe), March 13, 2005.

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them head-on, without beating around the bush, and without letting up. He was able to get his ideas across clearly and strongly, in such a manner as to spur forward the minds of those who heard him.

2. A gradual reform, from now on limited? The classical Islamist thought proposed by Hassan Al-Bannā also emphasizes the necessity of a re-Islamification of Muslim populations in a gradual manner, beginning with reform of the individual, the family circle, and the entirety of society and its institutions. Many preachers and members of mb milieux are attempting to implement this idea: they confront Muslims with their Islamic identity and exhort them to preserve it in a living and dynamic form. They call to the faithful to become conscious of their own heritage and the consequences that it implies in individual and social experience. They unceasingly remind people that faith and practice cannot be separated; one without the other is not enough. In a great number of public statements, spirituality is presented as a fundamental dimension of human being, even if it is not generally assigned a high value in and of itself. It is not presented as a form of transcendence of experience, but rather is thought as necessarily based in action: ‘There is no spirituality without acts, without works’. This spirituality, just the same, is more and more presented as essential and vital, to the extent that the surrounding context, materialistic or atheistic, more than any other context, appears to be hostile to this religious dimension. Humanism is not sufficient in order to make human beings fully human. Only faith allows this. A member of the Union of Islamic Organizations in France, who is also a member of the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe, Mohsen N’Gazou, puts it this way: It is necessary, it is time for Muslims to rehabilitate the notion of spirituality. In the absence of this vertical dimension [vertical in the sense of a relationship with God] we fall into an insolent materialism and a sterile humanism. Existence loses its meaning [. . .].

Furthermore, according to him, it is not sufficient for faith to be translated into acts; faith must also include a dimension related to the spread of the message, and those to whom the message is to be spread include non-Muslims. Faith is posited as an irreducible imperative in a context

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that in itself imposes the modalities of actions that are to be undertaken: it is the globality of the context that is presented as necessarily calling for the globalization of action. Implicitly, this means that action must be stepped up in order to match the difficulty of the challenges it faces. From this point therefore it is the context that ‘justifies’ the global responsibilities that have been placed upon Muslims; the globalizing message of Islam encounters, here at the beginning of the 21st century, the conditions of possibility for a complete realization of the project that was begun more than 1400 years ago, and re-dynamized more than 70 years ago. A new form of argument, of a contextual type, is to be applied to an old project, the globality of Islam, in order to reinforce its relevance. This is the kind of reasoning that we are apparently able to extract from the following citation: In the time of globalization, this means that Muslims have great responsibilities because they must bear witness to a faith and do so through action [. . .]. This is active participation in public affairs [. . .]; it is necessary to be useful to all humanity [. . .]. A Muslim must act virtuously toward nonMuslims; it is necessary to blame what is blamable and to act in favor of the good.3

These citations show that preaching and the scope of reforms that are to be promoted along the lines laid down by Hassan Al-Bannā are not intended to remain confined to the Muslim community. The idea of the universal vocation of Islam, as something destined for all humanity, is formally expressed in mb speeches. In 2005, the Muslim Association of Britain made available the videocassette of a conference at which Yūsuf Al-Qaradāwī was the featured speaker, which took place in 1999, and which was centered around the theme ‘The universal message’. On another hand, Hani Ramadan has confirmed in an interview that the necessity of spreading the message is a demand of Islam that cannot be evinced, even if it must be carried out according to strictly defined modalities. According to him Islam is to be spread around the world by its devotees, with the aim of gaining freely offered allegiance to Islam on the part of every one: [. . .] This is not a message that can be imposed by force of arms, or by violence. This is a message that must convince people from the inside.4

3 Conference on the theme ‘Le rapport entre la foi et la pratique’, Le Bourget, April 19, 2003. 4 Interview no. 59.

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During interviews, some partisans place themselves at a greater distance from the universalizing claim of Islam, without however calling into question the precept of daʿwa, the obligation to spread the message of Islam. When we asked a Belgian partisan how he understood and taught the principle of the seven levels of education (that is, the individual, then the family, the local community, society, a Muslim State, and in the entire world) through which gradual Islamic reform is to be accomplished, he limited its scope. He answered in a very pragmatic fashion, admitting that the necessary freedom of choice and that the means available for this project, the intrinsic resources of the community are all somewhat limited. He relativizes and constructs this principle by reducing it to three levels only, individual, family, and community. More precisely, he limits Islamic socialization to the level of the Muslim community alone. He is able fairly easily to ignore certain levels, such as the importance of spreading Islam to the heart of the surrounding society and also over the rest of the world. Later in the interview, by contrast, he was able to reconcile this view of the importance of the dimension of Islamic socialization with the assignment of an equally high level to ‘integration’ into the surrounding society, which is in his view just as important. In view of the fact that that society is not Islamic, this constitutes a questionable variation of the initial principles of the imam Hassan Al-Bannā, but this difference is probably only formal, since integration can also be taken to mean making one’s place in society and making oneself heard there, as a Muslim. He continues: This is important. For example . . . the imam Al-Bannā, he said that in the circle of education to . . . work on, there are seven phases. First, there is the person, the individual. Second phase, this is . . . the family. Third phase, is society at the local level. Fourth phase, is society at higher levels. Fifth phase, is the State. Sixth phase is the Arab world. Seventh phase, the whole world. Then we said: ‘this is a thinking . . . uhh . . . like America wanting to do an invasion by everybody in the world’ (laughs). That, that’s not our way, it’s not our role in the future [. . .]. Us, here in society, what do we need with all these things? We need three of them, they are very important. First, there’s the individual. Second, there’s the family. Third, there’s neighborhood society. And do we need these three things? We need two things: first thing, education according to an Islamic model, that means knowing how to pray, knowing how to keep the feast of Ramadan, knowing what is proper and what is improper, knowing who to marry, knowing . . . this is training that is normally uhh . . . for living Islamically. That’s all. You don’t go outside that context. For the rest, if you look at our program, we could give you one, uhh . . . you see that . . . uhh . . . how are we supposed to pray

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chapter twelve ? How do we . . . how do you read the Koran? [. . .] What was the Prophet like? Everything is in that context [. . .] Second, there is the family: how can you live a holy life in your own family ? What does ‘holy’ mean? This requires training that is a little special. That is…: we have to reflect concerning the education of children, first Islamically, and second scientifically. And a third important key is this, even if I myself think about going back to Morocco or Syria, I must not go [. . . ], I must leave this choice up to my child, who will do what he wants to do . . . [. . .] we must tell our children they are Belgians.5

Another militant of the mb, appearing to be marginal, judging by his way of considering these things, professed not to understand the project of gradual reform in seven stages: he notes the confusion currently reigning among the mb with regard to these initial principles that appear to be at some distance from the reality of today. He believes that this distance is a positive thing, because it forces people to think about the difference between these principles and this reality, but he admits that other partisans do not share his opinion, and that many of them prefer to continue to follow, to justify, and to assign a high value to the original principles enunciated by Hassan Al-Bannā and his superior wisdom. According to him, this prevents people from calling into question the adequacy of this comprehensive method for the understanding of Islam in the contemporary period: [. . .] Today the Muslims are completely turned upside down in their heads. The Muslims today are lost, the majority of them are [. . .]. They are confused . . . to me, this is in a good sense of the term. When you see that there are a certain number of anachronisms, because even in the thought of Hassan Al-Bannā, there are anachronisms . . . if you take the seven stages of the reform of society . . . (and therefore we will re-Islamize all the Muslim countries and then after that we will carry Islam beyond the lands of Islam). And today, Islam is present throughout the Western world and the Muslim countries have not yet been ‘liberated’, in quotation marks. So there are a certain number of anachronisms because he himself could not foresee everything. Therefore in what I am saying, there are other brothers who would say ‘no way!!! You don’t understand anything. Hassan AlBanna, to the contrary, he had a vision, he did not mean to say things the way you understand them today, he meant something else’ . . . one makes re-appropriations today as a function of one’s references, one’s culture, one’s intellectual level, etc.6

5 6

Interview no. 67. Interview no. 42.

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3. The preservation of the unity of the Umma as an ideal objective The concept of the Umma is frequently mentioned in the Koran. Most often, it refers to the community of those to whom God has sent Prophets and witnesses (most often without there being a particular distinction between those who adhere to the message and those who do not), or sometimes to the entire living population. Nonetheless, as a result of the influence of political Islam, the concept of Umma has become more restricted: it is now taken to refer to the community of believing Muslims in order to mean the transnational community of Muslims, in both a religious and a political sense [Ferjani, 2005:85]. De facto, militants believe that this community must come into existence so that they can fulfill their religious duties properly and be saved. At the same time, though, they do recognize the reality of nation-States, which constitute an antithesis to this singular supranational reality. In fact, among our contemporaries, the assignment of a very high value to the principle of the unity of Muslims is an incentive above all toward overcoming intra-communitarian differences, in recognition of the difficulty of the challenges faced by the community. Unity is oft en thought to be in opposition to the concept of fitna, which indicates the division at the heart of the Muslim community abhorred by the ulemas. Now, as Gilles Kepel analyses in his book Fitna—Guerre au cœur de l’islam, (Fitna—War at the Heart of Islam,) the chaos of contemporary Muslim communities pre-dominates, amongst other things due to the destructive impact of the jihadists, meanwhile the transformations and experience of European Muslims seems to demonstrate a potentially healthy example for the whole of the Muslim world [Kepel, 2004]. In this regard, one must remember that from a historical point of view Hassan Al-Bannā was deeply marked by the abolition of the caliphate— which up to that time had functioned as a symbol of Muslim unity—and marked as well by the effect of colonial policies that caused the social structures of Muslim countries to fall apart. Internal conflict within Islam was also perceived as having caused a loss of power, resulting in a decline of Islamic civilization, and therefore what was desired was the creation of a movement that would counteract such dynamics. At the present time, support for the principle of unity occurs frequently in mb speeches. It is often opposed to the concept of fitna;7 it is

7

A term that refers to division within the Muslim community.

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often spoken of by many sympathizers and partisans, either in addressing Muslims of the mb movement or those that are involved in the “organisationnel” (who have a duty to remain loyal, and even to close ranks, and this is taken even more seriously because the “organisationnel” finds itself in a difficult situation), or in addressing Muslims who are outside of all this. In Great Britain, the command to maintain unity is presented in a traditional and consensual form, through a direct reference to the Koran. The principle as in the Koran is directly stated, containing both an obligation and interdiction, in this verse: “Hold fast to the rope of Allah all of you together and be not disunited” (sura “The family” from ‘Imrān 3:103). This verse constitutes the official position of the Federation of Students Islamic Societies in the UK and Ireland; it is not only on the header of their website, but is also reprinted on their tracts. The same idea was mentioned at the annual Salon of Bourget, organized by the Union of Islamic Organizations of France. This theme was emphasized in 2005, when the union, sealed in place at the heart of the French Council of Muslim worship, between the various components of the community, was celebrated in the dithyrambic manner. In the speeches that were presented, similar local initiatives were also encouraged. According to a statement by the Secretary-General of the uoif, this formal union between different organizations should be considered as a historic event that should be recognized as a symbol of Muslim unity and a step forward in the construction of that unity. Let us rejoice, he said, for this unity has been created, but to the extent that it remains to be realized, let us work to that end. In the speeches, in fact, things are normally presented as further along than they really are on the ground, as expressed in the following intervention: we are living at a historical moment for Islam in France; the main components are in place so that we may testify to the unity of the Islam of France.8

This speaker continued by imploring his listeners: The unity that is in evidence around this table . . . I want it to be in evidence in all the regions and in all the cities. We must seize this opportunity.

8

Le Bourget, March 26, 2005.

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The president of the same organization spoke in a more moderate tone, in pronouncing the following invocation: May God preserve the unity of our community.

The principle of unity and solidarity is often frequently mentioned and often called into operation at the moment of humanitarian catastrophes. When confronted by situations of suffering, the idea is to intervene in favor of Muslim brothers and sisters in need, whether they are connected to the mb or not. Appeals for assistance are frequently announced in mosques and at conferences at which other dimensions than altruism are involved. Using as an example the “conversion” of his own daughter, who arrived in Europe at a very young age, this partisan explains that identification with the Palestinian cause has become a very powerful source of identification with the Muslim cause. He explains to his feeling of powerlessness, as he tries vainly to educate his daughter in an Islamic manner, but in contrast the injustice done to Palestine seems capable of affecting people strongly, to get a personal identification to lock on in a strong way; these phenomena for him explain the contemporary revitalization of Islam, even in the minds of young people who feel themselves at first to be very European, but who end up identifying just as much and even more with the Muslim community. I think that the notion of unity in Muslim, everywhere is still very strong. (Interviewer: And is it becoming stronger?) It is getting stronger through some catastrophes that happen in the Muslim world. For example, Palestine. For example I can feel this link, this relation between the Muslim identity and what happens in the Muslim countries, like in Palestine, in Bosnia, in Kashmir and the new, the revivalism of the Muslim identity within the new generation, the Muslim generation. My daughter, which came to Britain six years. I find many difficulties to educate her as a Muslim, as a part of the Muslim Umma. She practised prayers but I feel that she’s not part of our community; she’s part of the British reality. And once the Intifada in Palestine, she exploded. I feel that she’s transported totally; she start to follow what happens in Palestine, to follow the generation, what the young people, young Muslims in Palestine, what happened there? How the Jews killed [. . .] . . . so through media, through the channel Al-Jazeerah, I think Intifada islamised my daughter, and islamised a total generation in Europe through this Intifada in Palestine.9

9

Interview no. 07.

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Even though members of the Muslim Brotherhood or those who are close to it have a tendency to idealize the relations that exist among Muslims—including Shiites and Sunnites,—some of them are not deceived by this. The line of argument that consists in explaining intraMuslim conflicts in relation to political tensions only—and in a sense in which this political tension is instrumentalized—and not religious tension10 is not able to conceal the difficult or nonexistent relationships between Muslim communities of different tendencies. Certainly, the mb attempts to maintain the image of a consensus, and tries not to appear opposed to other movements, but it is difficult to detect the presence of any really constructive initiatives, except for the case of a certain number of young people. A partisan sums up the current situation neatly enough. He explains that concrete impossibility of real cooperation on the ground, since each group has its own preferences regarding action. According to him, there is no point in wanting to get around these differences because they reveal deep divergences in inclination, between one group in another. Nonetheless he immediately follows up this sort of field report by adopting a very abstract position, classic among the members of the mb, emphasizing the intention with which something is done: unity is realized through working together to please God, and working for Islam: Me, I have said . . . and now this is a personal opinion; I say ‘there is no point in coming to an agreement with all the different . . . uhh . . . the different colors of the Muslim rainbow’. It’s not worth trying. We leave everybody to work alone. Each one. Because . . . if you have studied the psychology of the person, everybody has . . . has something that he loves. If I come, myself, with my idea and it . . . touches someone’s heart, that could . . . he can join me. There are others, they are completely different. There are the Salafists, they touch you . . . they’re not in agreement [. . .]. This is why I say ‘there’s no point in coming to an agreement with them’. But it is very

10 See interview no. 71 in which the idealization of attitudes among Muslim groups is justified by speaking of the Christians, presented as people incapable of getting along with each other, as a historical counter-example: ‘[. . .] Medieval Christianity did have a problem with those who would disagree with it, even among the Christians themselves: different denominations fought each other. But in Islam, there were never religious wars. They were political wars, but never religious wars’. The same idea was mentioned several times during a day devoted to Unity in diversity, already cited. It would still be interesting to see if such allegations would still be formulated so easily concerning the present context of conflict pitting Sunni against Shiite in Iraq.

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important that we say that we are all Muslims, that we are all working for Islam, that we are all working for Allah uhh . . . success, that means ‘it has been accepted by Allah’. If someone has not succeeded, he must redo his work . . . apart from that . . . as far as that goes, Al-hamdu lillah, I have very good contact with everybody . . . Very very good experiences . . . extraordinarily good contacts. In my opinion I am the only one . . . the only person in Belgium.11

To certain (ex-) partisans it appears that the formulation of this ideal in favor of Muslim unity conceals an aspect of illusion, even of facticity, on several levels, especially when the mb speak of their openness a priori to all tendencies of Islam. In reality, in fact, the members of different Islamic tendencies do not have much contact, if any, with each other. Some of these tendencies, such as wahhabi-salafist or Sufis, are critical of the mb, considering it as just another faction concerned strictly with its own partisan interests and supporting a particular idea of Islam that requires suspicion. As for the Muslim Brotherhood itself, it affirms its distance from any movement that could be recognised as violent or that support violence, and it stands apart from Muslim movements that do not recognised them as the Islamic orthodoxy.12 Certain members of the Muslim Brotherhood can thus come to ignore or even denigrate various traditionalist schools or intra-Muslim movements, notably sufi brotherhoods when their practices seem too openly promote popular superstitions or irrational behaviour such as some trance ceremonies. Over and above the well-known principles of Hassan Al-Bannā, who told people to go seek out knowledge where ever it may be found, certain zealous militants may be tempted to attempt to harmonize, or perhaps more to render uniform, the beliefs and practices of European Muslims. Even if these attitudes are denounced, and by certain partisans who are concerned that such a principle might in the long term lead to the establishment of a unique way of thinking that would in fact be injurious to Islamic thought itself, all these limits logically restrict the pious wish for recognition of all degrees of all intra-Muslim schools of thought and currents. However the fact is that the European Brothers have proven to be progressively more and more inclined to establish relationships with Shiite leaders.13 They do this in imitation of Hassan Al-Bannā, who in

11

Interview no. 67. If this aspect is questioned by certain authors, an internal tension is well under way here in the movement. 13 See especially the initiative (already mentioned) of the International Union of 12

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the name of the unity of Muslims that was sought, adopted a conciliatory and moderate position with regard to Shiites. They are also acting in continuity with the Brothers of earlier times, who declared themselves open to all Muslims and refused to discuss doctrinal differences, which were considered as secondary [Abdelnasser, 1997]. For example, at a daylong meeting devoted exceptionally to rapprochement between Sunnis and Shiites, organized by the latter, the Sunni side of things was represented by people who are aware of the movement of the Brotherhood. One of them, the Belgian Yacub Mahi, recalled the sacrosanct principle of the appeal to unity, so frequently invoked as a slogan of the Brotherhood: Hassan Al-Bannā took from Rashīd Rida the principle according to which it is necessary “that we agree about our likenesses and excuse each other for our differences”.

He explained further on about the manner in which he understands that principle, pointing out the fact that unity does not mean uniformity. Without going as far as to speak of the richness of pluralism or the necessity of frank dialogue, in his opinion, common concerns should carry the day, and differences should be considered secondary, especially in so far as dogma is concerned. As it happened, he spoke of the necessity of establishing conditions that would permit people to go beyond the sclerotic condition of the current debate (this vision is apparently far from coming true since this interviewee thinks he has to remind us of it). He agreed that it is necessary not to “keep silent about our differences but there are priorities which we must allow to be recognized”, avoiding the error of making disagreement public in a gratuitous manner.14 During his discourse, in which he did not manage to make clear what those pri-

Muslim Scholars (iums) or the contacts begun especially by Yūsuf Al-Qaradāwī over Arab television. They are cited by V. Comras (2007), “The Muslim Brotherhood and the Growing Sunni-Shiite Conflict” in http://counterterrorismblog.org/mt/pings.cgi/3712. See notably the initiative of the ‘Amman Message’ which was endorsed by the majority of European Muslim leaders in Istanbul in July 2006 and which sets out the limits of orthodox Islam to put an end to the ‘anything goes’ accusations made by some extremist groups resulting in some Muslim organisations accused of non-belief and thus deemed ipso facto to be non Muslim (to read the Arabic version of this agreement now signed by over 500 religious leaders see www.ammanmessage.com. For an English summary of the whole of the process see the website of British researcher Yahya Birt: http://www .yahyabirt.com/?p=66. 14 Day of conferences on the theme Unity in Diversity, organized by a Shiite organization, Tawhid, Shiite and Sunni speakers attending, Brussels, May 7, 2005. This kind of initiative appears to be unusual.

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orities would be, he did implicitly recognize that the debate within the Muslim community in general is very weak in concrete terms because the priorities to be debated have not yet been clearly identified. Despite such appeals, it could all the same very quickly prove that differences of belief are de facto incompatible, such that it is impossible to ignore them and impossible to resolve them. Doubt cast upon the exemplary character of the companions of the Prophet by the Shiites, in light of the fact that these companions are held in the highest esteem by the Sunnis, ends up constituting a set of real problems for the mb, once you get past the introduction in a unity meeting. This observation has already been made by the Wahhabo-Salafists, who radically reject the critique made by the Shiites with regard to the early Caliphs. While all this is going on, however, the theme and the slogan of unity persists among the Brotherhood and continues to attract devotees. Their wide unitarian vision could however better be summarised using a more reductive formula, already used in another context for another intraMuslim schools by the British Muslim journal Q-News: ‘Unite, but follow me’.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

MORALS AND SOCIAL LIFE

In this second chapter dealing with the ideological characteristics of the mb, we will discuss thematic connections that are associated, to a greater extent, with Sayyid Qutb. Besides the intensive use of his Koranic exegesis, his impact is perceptible in many public speeches, sometimes in a quite explicit way. We give here several examples that are to be placed in relation with themes that come out of the Zilāl of Qutb as analyzed by O. Carré [Carré, 1984]. The themes discussed in this chapter (as well as in chapters 14 and 15) cover the areas of morals and social, community-related, civilization-related, and political considerations. The positions adopted are sometimes manichaean in nature,1 and sometimes subtle, inviting the reader to reflection and introspection. They have proven to be particularly important, because they are more concerned with social life; they directly imply certain modalities of intra-communitarian living together, and even more. The themes developed by Sayyid Qutb have come once again to match the tastes of the present day, developed and even amplified as concerns their consequences. They are given interpretations that are more differentiated than those initially put forward by Hassan Al-Bannā; the variations of opinion therein are more diversified or discreetly polemical. Throughout these chapters, the theme of individual responsibility is continuously sounded, although in another sense it is constantly placed in a relation of tension with regard to the idea of a responsibility toward the collectivity. In fact, although the theme of individual responsibility does concern the interpretation of Islamic texts, the area of social practices, and also the project of proper management of the Earth (khilafat

1 In this regard, O. Carré described as ‘grotesque’ the idea of reproaching Sayyid Qutb with having a manichaean vision of the world, in which every non-Islamic society is designated as a ‘society of error’: according to him, and with reference to Max Weber, this is part of any ‘ethics of conviction’ [Carré, 1984:73]. In the light of contemporary discussions, we have observed that the Qutbist analyses of Western dynamics are sometimes easily transposed onto a European context.

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al-ard), in the final analysis what is valued most highly is the duty of seeking to honor the initial pact that exists between God and human beings. Since they are given the use of creation in exchange for their submission to divine commands, it is always the management of responsibilities that are both individual and collective that is at issue.

1. Three approaches to the theme of jihad (and the theme of sacrifice) These two themes are part of the ten pillars of the Brotherhood, fundamental principles developed by Hassan Al-Bannā, around which the life of militants is to be organized. Founding his argument upon several suras, he established the centrality of the pre-existing Islamic concept of jihad. He puts new life into it, giving it a higher value and a practical scope as well. Hassan Al-Bannā developed the idea according to which it is important for a Muslim Brother to concretely seek to satisfy God: he must lead a virtuous life, persevere in the effort to accomplish his objectives, engage in a permanent struggle against his own ego, and make an effort to preach. In itself, the practice of faith thus becomes completely fundamental. Faith without works is not sufficient: for the Brotherhood, a Muslim worthy of the name must respect the five pillars of Islam, but must also practice filling the various aspects of his life with the spirit of jihad. At the center of his Koranic exegesis, Sayyid Qutb declares himself in favor of “the spirit of combat on behalf of God” [Carré, 1984:123– 142] against any absolute sovereignty (hākimiyya) on the part of human beings, of any type. According to him, the struggle to obtain proper guidance (qiyāda) for humankind, in the sense put forward by Islam, begins with education (tarbiyya) in the community, “for this should allow men to attain a level never before attained”; it is not a matter of forcing people to embrace Islam.2 Beyond the effort one is obliged to exert upon oneself, also called the jihad of souls (or the greater jihad), Qutb puts forward the idea of physical combat on behalf of God (also called the lesser jihad, or the jihad of the body). These two complementary dimensions can converge and rejoin each other. 2

S. Qutb, L’islam par le martyr, Riyadh, International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations, 1999, pp. 143–150. We do not know that S. Qutb wrote a book with that title, but the iifso circulates it as such, and it was probably put together from excerpts from another book (whose date we do not know).

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Here at the beginning of the 21st century the notion of jihad, as effort exerted upon oneself and as action, is not only still in use, but is used in ways that are sometimes very different. In speeches, three different registers are particularly identifiable with regard to the themes of jihad (and of sacrifice) in mb circles. These can be distinguished as efforts in the direction of preaching, efforts in the art of living as an individual, and efforts towards social well-being. These three registers thus concern the individual as well as the collectivity (Islamic or otherwise); they are often mutually complementary even if areas of emphasis are differently placed by different conference speakers. Three scholars have attempted to define the overall scope of the above-mentioned effort toward preaching (in the sense of proselytizing on behalf of Islam), in order to rebuke certain practices perceived as deviant. Let us look first at a statement from sheikh Abdallah Ben Biyya—a Mauritanian scholar, from the Malikite school, a former prime minister and a professor of Islamic law at the University of King Abd al-Azīz in Jeddah, vice president of the International Union of Muslim Scholars and an influential member of the European Council for Fatwa and Research (cefr)—, at the annual meeting at Bourget in 2004, organized by the Union of Islamic Organizations in France.3 Reacting to the attacks that took place in Madrid on March 11, 2004, this ulema put forward a canonical opinion to the effect that the advance of Islam could never justify violence, and that this was all the more true in this case since the authors of these violent attacks were themselves obscure and their objectives poorly defined. After having recalled that the greater jihad is the one that involves the struggle with oneself, he proposed to the faithful three meanings that jihad should take in Europe: combat should consist in the effort to “spread widely the values of tolerance”, to “take care of the image” of Islam, and to “bring back peace and security”. In this speech, the importance of the public affirmation of Islam is confirmed, but this affirmation must still be clearly limited in its modalities. Second, further reflections have been offered in this sense by Dr. Ramādan Al-Būtī, who although not a member of the mb, is still considered as an authority by certain members of the mb. In one of his works, specifically devoted to jihad,4 this scholar attempts to clarify the con-

3 4

Intervention of April 10, 2004. Dr. M.S. Ramadan Al-Bouti, Le djihad en islam—comment le comprendre et

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cept, something he considers necessary in order to counter interpretations and practices by Islamist groups that he considers to be deviant, because they contradict the spirit of Islam (they disavow “the legitimate essence of jihad, and also the basic rules of the religion”).5 In this book the author defends the idea that the nation of Islam can only be constructed upon a jihad of preaching, based on dialogue and free choice. As for the warlike jihad, the author does admit that this in fact can be prescribed in order to defend an already existing possession (such as Palestine), but it cannot be used to create a right, a State or an Islamic regime that does not already exist.6 Third, we should mention a spontaneous oral intervention on the part of sheik Zakaria Seddiki,7 holder of a diploma from the faculty of Sharia of the University of Al-Azhar, and professor of the European Institute for Human Sciences at Chāteau-Chinon, upon the occasion of a day of reflection on martyrdom. He in no way called into question the importance or the well-founded nature of the concept of jihad. Just the same, he expressed the opinion that in the tradition the notion of sacrifice is not connected with that concept as such, and he said that he would tend to remove it from any connotation of an irrational nature. For him, traditional Islam does not propose to individuals a project of martyrdom; rather, it speaks of a “transaction” between human beings and God. Proceeding from these postulates, he considers that the shahīd, the martyr, must be understood in the literal and restricted sense of a “witness to the message” who must act in the manner implied by that role, without all this necessarily implying the idea of death. Within this framework, the dimension of Islam that has to do with preaching is reaffirmed and redefined. As concerns the second register in which jihad is to be thought, which involves an effort toward self-mastery, and a struggle against one’s bad habits, this theme is often mentioned, although it is not often elaborated in a detailed way. In this register, discourses about effort and sacrifice are particularly closely linked to the process of becoming an individual, it being given that the individual is first and foremost conceived in the comment le pratiquer?, Dar El-Fikr—Damascus (French translation by Mohamed Nabil Al-Khayat), 1996, edition of 1 000 copies. 5 Idem, p. 298. 6 Idem, p. 242. 7 Day of study ‘Martyrdom as a category of political action’, organized by Cismoc (Centre for Interdisciplinary Research on Islam in the Contemporary World, Catholic University of Louvain), June 6, 2005.

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context of a personal relationship with God. We will mention here the sensibilities of two persons. On one hand, in the framework of a seminar on involvement, Farid Abdelkrim, a former president of the Young Muslims of France (jmf), insisted on the ‘art of living’.8 In his understanding this art involves the making of certain sacrifices, something that shook up the young people in his audience. In concrete terms, he judges that this effort upon oneself, djihad al-nafs (an effort exerted by the mind upon the individual self), should be actualized such as in the form of gifts of money. To the extent that his experience makes him say that this is one of the most difficult of tests, he encourages young people in this direction. His argument consists in reminding them that this is an investment in their future, in regard to their salvation. On the other hand, we would also like to cite from an interview with a sympathizer, a former member of the Association of Islamic Students in France (aeif) who is very much aware of the writings of Hassan AlBannā. Without mentioning the notion of jihad strictly speaking, he judges that the effort to change oneself is the pathway of individual liberation. For him, an effort toward self-mastery, in which the individual learns to dominate his own tendencies and his ego, allows the human being to be elevated, to grow and to become able to gain access to a form of the sacred. In a very poetic manner, he affirms the primordial character of this spiritual as well as existential quest: We are vertical beings. [. . .] Human being is essentially characterized by its vertical posture. This is not a matter of chance. Physically, this vertical posture allows us to marry together the energies of the sky and the energies of the earth. Spiritually speaking, this verticality recalls to us that we are capable of being connected with what is on high in order to dominate in a human fashion what is below. There you go . . . the ideal . . . And this demands a continuous effort and above all in an atmosphere . . . steeped in humility and modesty [. . .].

Further along, he speaks further of this conjunction between the necessity of action and self-effacement, which permits spiritual elevation: the purity of action, I can . . . describe it as non-action. This is to say, you do what there is to do without becoming the slave of the results that might constitute for each one of us a personal satisfaction.9

8 9

Seminar on involvement, Verviers, December 29, 2002. Interview no. 41.

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Third, as concerns the jihad carried on in relation to the struggle for social well-being (Islamic or on a wider scale), the preacher Tariq Ramadan has particularly distinguished himself. He puts forward a kind of reinterpretation, and makes an effort at contextualization. On one hand he affirms that the analysis of war made by the imam Hassan Al-Bannā limits the scope of this notion to legitimate defense (defensive war) and resistance to injustice (defense of the oppressed). As a result, he considers that outside these circumstances war is prohibited, and by the same token, so is the use of violence [Ramadan, 2002:352– 357].10 On another hand, Tariq Ramadan adopts a singular position, pushing this line of reasoning still further, and contending that the notion of jihad refers to collective action. Thus he promotes the innovative concept of a ‘social jihad’ and calls for increased consideration and attention paid to contemporary social problems at the local level (whether this is a matter of injustice, poverty, illiteracy, delinquency . . .). For him, the Palestinian cause certainly continues to be important, but he argues vigorously that this cause ends up constituting an obstacle to paying proper attention to other problems, by becoming a near-obsession and drawing attention to itself as a unique problem, such that too little attention is paid to other things [Ramadan, 1996:115–118]. Following upon the notion of social jihad, Ramadan also speaks of an economic jihad, in criticizing the effects of unrestrained capitalism. He affirms that in this area it is proper to speak of war, but he is using this concept metaphorically in a way that is classic in Muslim geopolitics. He says: Here, I am in the dar al-harb, with relation to the economy.11 In one of his other writings, he expresses his opposition to economic mismanagement, and to the excesses of the West, which impose inhuman sacrifices on some people:

10

Tariq Ramadan examines one of his grandfather’s last articles in which, after having spoken of the importance of peace, he recognized the sometimes inevitable nature of war under certain circumstances, which would then have to be carried on as successfully as possible. Five situations are mentioned, in which war is recognized as legitimate, because under these conditions it is a response to, in the terms of T. Ramadan, ‘humanitarian and well-intentioned objectives’. Thus he mentions: 1. Legitimate defense to protect one’s family, one’s property, one’s country or religion. 2. Defense of the freedom of belief and religious practices for persecuted believers. 3. Defense of the freedom of expression for the message of Islam. 4. War against those who betray a pact that they have concluded or who spread sedition among Muslims. 5. To save Muslims who are victims of injustice wherever they may be. 11 Conference of June 7, 2002.

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chapter thirteen The goal is to create a front of resistance against soulless liberalism, which today considers it natural to admit that the world order demands sacrifices . . . and that therefore there must be some people who are ‘sacrificed’ [Ramadan, 1996:115–118].

The idea of an economic jihad does not sound new and/or incongruous in the circles related to the mb,12 but this may not be why the idea finds itself once again in phase with current reality. This new tonality of the concept of jihad attracts the interest of many young people who are interested in a better redistribution of the goods of society, and in people helping other people. Nonetheless, the notion is not widely accepted. Beyond these most contemporary of registers, which concern the experience of European Muslims in a direct way, we should say something regarding Muslims who are fighting in a situation of oppression, meaning by this first of all Palestine, which is the object of a very wide consensus, at least by all appearances: in this framework, the jihad of combat is perceived as defensive and derives its legitimacy from the intention to push back against Zionist aggression.13 From this perspective, the legitimacy of suicide bombings is often admitted and these Palestinian ‘kamikazes’ are the objects of compassion, and even sympathy. In public, such actions are generally justified with reference to the inequality of the forces on the ground and the absence of any other alternative, if the Palestinians are to make themselves heard and to obtain recognition for their most elementary rights. In these public discourses reference is also made, though in a less insistent manner, to the sacrosanct principles of human dignity, of life, which is a gift from God and which must be preserved, basic human rights, etc. But we have never heard any conference speaker condemn these acts for involving civilian populations or for being associated with the act of suicide, which is forbidden by Islam. To the contrary, the Palestinian martyrs are celebrated as heroes, or at least as very courageous persons. Setting aside the situation of unequal forces, which authorizes resistance on behalf of those oppressed,14 two types of considerations provide 12 See for example Dr Hussein Chahatah, ‘Le djihad économique . . . un devoir religieux légal . . . et une nécessité de la foi’, in Aldaawah, no. 125, August 2002, p. 28. This official magazine of the mb, in Arabic, is available by subscription, and in some Islamic bookstores. It faces stiff competition from Internet sites and it may have stopped publication. 13 On this theme see also [Taji-Farouki in Taji-Faruki & Nafi, 2004:340]. 14 Under the effect of an abusive generalization, this theme could eventually lead some radical Muslim to justify attacks on Westerners, seen in the first place, at the level

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justification for these positions. On one hand, the necessary combat in favor of Palestine is assimilated to an act of faith; the form this struggle should take is not specified exactly, but it appears that its physical nature is implicitly admitted. Hani Ramadan speaks in this sense when he says: [. . .] as Muslims, we must reflect upon the path to follow to really defend . . . it is necessary to fight to liberate Palestine. Here in Europe, we favor dialogue between civilizations but on the ground, we must not deny this the necessity for this combat [this jihad] and we must not make concessions. It is our faith that teaches us today that we must fight for Palestine (the only way . . . without forgetting the fundamental rights of man . . .).15

On the other hand, certain motivations related to communities are mentioned. These themes, of jihad and sacrifice, thus participate in the continuity of the historical heritage, in a form that today has been “toned down”; the Muslim Brothers of Europe do not appear to be contributing anything particularly original to these themes. Just the same, there are certain distanciations that are in operation: especially with regard to the scope of sacrifice or to matters related to physical combat, concerning which violence is publicly condemned, although an exception is made in respect of the Palestinian question. Further, new intonations have appeared in relation to social jihad or spiritual elevation, which testify to the fact that the contemporary context is being taken into account, and that there is more concern for individuation. The problem of peaceful relations remains at the center of debates, but it is also important that individuals do not fail to perform the duties that fall to the believer, and it is also important not to feel oneself excluded from a whole range of integrative processes that may lead to the harmonious coexistence of civilizations at local, national and international levels.

of principles, as aggressors and as dominant. We have never heard anyone pronounce this hypothetical figure of speech in any European mb discourse, but we have heard reports of such things indirectly, in reference to certain marginal mb circles in which the model of integration of Islam and the Muslims into European space is perceived as encountering its limits. 15 Speech at a day of solidarity with Palestine, Brussels, March 1, 2003.

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chapter thirteen 2. A brake on gender role-mixing and cultural mixing, or even a bridle

The themes of “good” behavior and the crucial role of the family are very central. This includes the investment made by women in their education, and of active participation in society once her responsibilities towards her family have been fulfilled, are also subject to sustained attention.16 The issue of sexuality is also considered important, but it is not discussed explicitly as such. It underlies other themes. Thus at conferences on themes such as involvement, marriage, children’s education, etc., preachers such as the Frenchman of Moroccan origin, Hassan Iquioussen, warn about the crucial importance of choices in social relations and the choice of a mate, important for insuring the creation of a family that is strong in the faith. As regards practices, the separation of genders goes without saying, even if there are some variations in its application, and greater or lesser flexibility according to locations. In fact, the themes emphasized concern above all subjects that are the objects of a large consensus among Muslims. There are not many conferences or debates on the questions of homosexuality,17 unbelief, or excommunication (apostasy). Either there are no requests for such debates, since the Koranic point of view appears to be clearly established, or they are simply avoided, since they are delicate subjects that the mb don’t know very well how to approach in public, while still remaining relatively coherent with regard to their perspectives on tolerance and openness toward the surrounding society. A polemic by Hani Ramadan, ‘La charia incomprise’ (Sharia misunderstood), published in the French newspaper Le Monde for September 10, 2002, stands as a notable exception to this discretion. In this article, Ramadan justifies the stoning of women in Nigeria, as provided for 16 This insistence on the role of women in the movement reflects very probably the impact of positions argued for that were adopted by the Sudanese leader Hassan Turabi and following him by the Tunisian Rashīd Ghannoushī, dating from the 1980’s. 17 Internally, the Brotherhood appears still careful to position itself clearly on this theme, without provoking any finger-pointing in their direction, because of their having put a certain accent on the issue of homosexuality. Th is is the meaning of the informal procedure carried out by certain members of the fioe with regard to the ‘Commission des épiscopats de la Communauté européenne’ (known as Comece) when they tried to ‘sound them out’ early in 2007, to see if joint actions could be carried out with representatives of other recognized confessions (interview with a member of Comece, June 2007).

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under Sharia in cases of adultery. Ramadan inveighs against the archaic and barbarous image that is often attached to Islam; above all, he speaks of the dissuasive value of the sanctions provided for under Islamic law, explaining that the requirements for the application of such penalties, in most cases, render them inapplicable. Still, in this article, one might observe that Hani Ramadan is not interested in placing the greatest emphasis upon the theme of criminal penalties, or upon stoning as a particular example, and this was already clear from his title. Certainly, he testifies here to the constant difficulty the Muslim Brotherhood has in taking its distance from any of these principles, because he never questions the basic principle of such penalties in an Islamic State, nor the possibility of their actual application in extreme cases. What counts above all for him is reminding people of the importance of the divine law. He speaks first of the clemency of the divine and the goodness of the Prophet. He goes even further, invoking the purifying character of the divine law, which is accessible to those who can perceive the signs of the divine. Finally, beginning from the observation according to which the contemporary world is debauched, while the distress of men only grows greater, he recalls a few elementary principles of Islamic morality. According to him, these principles are absolute because they participate in the laws of nature, and are in agreement with those laws. He considers that they offer human beings a path to follow in order that they may not lose themselves in the liberation of morals, and may preserve their spirituality. Finally, beyond the polemic character of the theme as initially treated, which finds itself rendered common and public in an abusive manner, this article thus seems to us to be one of the more classic arguments from the brothers milieux, where the following of divine prescriptions is supposed to secure social order followed by the blossoming of man’s full humanity. Starting from a reference to the current situation, Hani Ramadan takes advantage of a valuable opportunity to address the public in the pages of an important newspaper, and seizes the occasion to call to all readers on behalf of the divine message. However reactions weren’t slow in forthcoming, either they immediately criticised a conception seen as contradictory to basic humanist values or they suggested a constructive process along the lines of Tariq Ramadan in 2003.18

18 On the issue of the implementation on punishments, the latter led an interesting educational initiative in 2003 and again in march 2005. He launched an ‘international

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When the subject of mixing is given some attention at conferences, parallels with the thought of Sayyid Qutb can be easily established. They are related to the question of the “natural” and absolute character of human behavior (something which can also justify the necessity of having “natural” laws to restrict behavior). For example, one may read in the Zilāl that sexual activity between men and women outside the bonds of marriage has disastrous consequences and necessarily implies the degradation of humankind: “To do this is necessarily to reduce oneself to the level of an animal, because the sexual instinct is always present and is fatal” [Carré, 1984:81]. In Brussels, at the mosque of the Islamic Intercultural League, at which the Belgian Brothers are present, during a conference for young people on the theme of the hijab, Hassan Amdouni, holder of a diploma from the University of Zeitouna in Tunisia, a former teacher at Chāteau-Chinon, speaks to the young women present about adopting a behavior that “honors” the wearing of headscarves, a term that is considerably stronger than a simple affirmation of the duty to adopt a particular behavior. He spoke of having the feeling that Muslims play a double game with the meaning of the headscarf for purposes of seduction, overtly as well as in terms of the underlying principle. He recalled the fact that this obligation predates the arrival of Islam in society; Islam only acted to “regulate” a practice that was already common, and that formed a part of popular wisdom. By contrast, the objectives of this wisdom are pursued and accentuated by Islam, which very firmly pushes women to involve themselves in society, and which furnishes favorable conditions for their recognition in this involvement.

appeal for a moratorium on corporal punishment, lashings and the death penalty in the Muslim world’ (the text can be found at www.tariqramadan.com). In the name of the justice, and equality preached by Islam, he asks Muslims, especially those in the Muslim world, to call for an immediate end to what he qualifi es as an ‘instrumentalisation’ of Islam. Moreover, in the absence of scholarly consensus concerning the status of such punishment, he calls for international research and an enlightened reform movement to carry out research based on the sources of Islam considered in relation to the contemporary world. Astonishingly, this initiative was badly received in the West by two opposing kinds of people. On the one hand by some secular Muslims and non Muslim milieux who seem unaware of the very great distance still to be covered to achieve real debate between Muslim communities and their religious leaders, and to arrive at the evolution of attitudes (see the criticism of Caroline Fourest on www.prochoix.org in particular). On the other hand it was criticised by some European Muslim leaders, who at the instigation of the fioe president or of some members of the European Council for Fatwa and Research (cefr) who, amongst others want to position themselves as defenders of Islamic norms to European Muslims [Izzi Dien, 2004]. Tariq Ramadan, between these two, seems either not to have done enough, or to have asked too much.

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On this occasion, the conference speaker contradicted and turned upside down the stereotypical way of talking that some non-Muslims have, in which Muslim populations are reproached with practicing machismo, with their backwardness in terms of social involvement, and with the fact that women are supposed to be submissive to the men who make them wear headscarves. To the contrary, it is God himself who through this practice gives primary recognition to the place of the woman in society, and gives to women the means of countering constant pressure from men. In this speech, the headscarf is referred to as the enabling condition for the responsible activity of women in society: it is understood that such activity would be impractical, even impossible if women could not distance themselves prior to anything else from this image as sexual objects that “is glued to their skin”. According to the speaker, it is precisely the persistence of this image that explains why the real impact of women in society—including Western society—remains in general denied; it being understood as well that through the respectful adoption of the rules of Islam, a new era would at last open up: [. . .] In history, we have taken the clothes off women and we have left men covered. We see this still today. Allah therefore legislated with regard to the hijab so that women would not be objects of desire and the coveting of the perverted. [. . .] There is a natural attraction between men and women. [. . .] If a woman wants to be someone responsible and active, she must get rid of the image that people have of her, the idea of the woman as object which has caused people to ignore women as they play their role in society—overwhelmingly up to today, this is not the case. Islam regulated the hijab, it did not institute it [. . .] in order for women to be recognized as chaste and worthy of respect. This has nothing to do with the denigration or the imprisonment of women [. . .]; this is in order to avoid the complete domination of men in society. [. . .] Islam wants women to be active agents. That is all. [. . .] Now, we Muslims have a problem. A woman puts on a form-fitting hijab that is transparent, and then puts on makeup. We know very well how this goes: a look—a smile—a word—a meeting—a date—and boom: disaster. Thus, if you please [. . .], nobody is judging anybody, but what wisdom is there in this hijab? You have to behave in such a way as to honor the hijab [. . .]. A woman has the right to be beautiful but she must not show off her attributes. [. . .] Islam is not a macho religion; it is a divine religion in which respect for moral virtue counts for something; morality is what underlies all rules; never forget that [. . .].19

19 Conference on “Hijab is far away from fashion!” Brussels, Islamic Intercultural League of Belgium, April 9, 2005.

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Between the lines of these considerations about the level of involvement that is necessary and responsible for women,20 the question of malefemale relationships is what is actually on the agenda. These statements reflect one particular take on contemporary reality (among others). In a paradoxical fashion, this speaker showed himself not unaware of feminine coquetry, although he wants it strictly contained. These words include many warnings, and in addition a sort of guard-fence: the real imperative that is put forward is that of respect for the law, which is supposed to contain intrinsic wisdom. Further, these statements do not leave much of a place for personal appreciation or individual responsibility in the area of relationships between persons: the maneuvering room left to human beings is reduced, and they seem not to merit much confidence or to exercise much judgment in the face of the ineluctable character of natural laws. Such observations run clean counter to any reasonable estimate of the worth of responsible social involvement in a society made up of men and women, between whom contacts appear to be inevitable and necessary. In the area of morals, another theme, discussed during a day devoted to marriage, was underlined. The idea according to which marriage is a sign of the divine greatness was vigorously defended: marriage “prevents man from becoming an animal” in the face of the dissolution of society, for “the development of morals, today, is in fact headed toward the degradation of morals”. Certain positions of the Imam Mustafa Turki, of Liege, also a holder of a diploma from the Zeitouna university, are more directly in line with the ideas maintained in the Zilāl, especially with regard to mixed marriages, which he firmly discourages despite certain aspects of his speech: One may marry Christian and Jewish women, but that is the exception and it is necessary that this take place in Muslim countries, because the context is a help; this demonstrates the openness of our religion; one should not pass lightly over this problem and statistics prove that mixed marriages are difficult. This is not racism.21

20

On this point we do not know if S. Qutb gave his opinion, although he appeared to work in close collaboration with (for example) Zeinab Al-Ghazali. 21 Colloquy on ‘The Muslim couple, between values and challenges. Marriage today:

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How could we not see in this disguised principle prohibiting mixed marriages a parallel with, and even a reaffirmation of the principles laid down by Sayyid Qutb? Qutb, who considered only the situation in Muslim countries, also discouraged in mixed marriages, judging them to be dangerous, and to be avoided. Even if such marriages are tolerated by the Koran, the case is supposed to remain theoretical because women coming from other monotheistic traditions, recognized traditions, are counted the same as women who are not believers, and marriage with unbelievers is clearly discouraged: “Christian and Jewish women are in fact idolatrous because of their blind belief in the Trinity or in the divinity of Esdras”; “amidst the world-wide ignorance of the divine guidance”, only Muslim marriage is the mark of Islam [Carré, 1984:86]. In his speech, Mustafa Turki addressed himself to young Muslims, many of whom had been born in Europe, who live in pluralistic societies, in which the choice of relationships for young people is necessarily more limited. By positing the principle that mixed marriages are an unusual exception, he gives his statement a scope even larger than that which Sayyid Qutb gave to his prohibition, since he was only referring to Muslims living in Muslim societies. Further, by evoking the possibility of “flexibility”, with regard to the authorization of mixed marriages if they take place in a Muslim country, this orator was pushing young people to emigrate and to separate themselves from their families often settled in Europe. On this wise, it appears to us that his essential desire was to indicate to young people the importance of the consequences of their choices, by reminding them of basic principles, for in itself his position seems to require a condition that is very difficult to assume, and which undermines his position itself (even if, let us remember, his hearers might choose for themselves, and in perfect freedom, to conform to his recommendations or not). The speaker justified the arguments underlying his statement not so much with reference to religious considerations, but rather with reference to information considered scientific; he did not delve into this information any further. His approach emphasizes communitarian concerns, that aim at reinforcing the religious identity of Muslims: Muslim marriage is recognized as highly preferable to any other, for men and women alike.

many questions’, organized by a temporary collective, Heysel, Brussels, March 29–30, 2003.

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Some preachers adopt more nuanced positions. We may mention here, for example, the propositions of Tareq Oubrou, who while criticizing the systematic repression of all mixing that is recommended by some preachers, does denounce the excesses of sexual liberation and the increase in deviant behavior. He emphasizes (with regret) the fact that the question of sex has been removed from the field of morals in order to be exclusively dealt with by doctors or legal experts, and he denounces the actual situation, the ‘obligation to live a life of aggressive mixing that becomes for many a real chore, that inhibits them and does violence to them’ [Oubrou in Babès & Oubrou, 2002]. We should also mention here the positions of Farid Abdelkrim, second president of the Young Muslims of France (jmf), whose tone at conferences is often sharp and sometimes quite sarcastic, although his intention is positive when he speaks this way. He denounces aberrations within the community, especially in the area of social relations, in order to encourage any listener to look within him/herself. He does not hesitate to speak about the delicate and even taboo theme of sexual relations; he wrote about this in his short book Les jeunes, l’islam et le sexe. Des réalités cachées (Young people, Islam, and sex. Hidden realities). While shifting rapidly from serious to lighthearted proposals, he dissects contemporary reality and sets forth the bases for coherent Islamic principles. On one hand, he encourages marriage, opposes premarital sex, and exhorts young people to take their responsibilities seriously. On another hand, he denounces prejudices regarding women and criticizes the lack of naturalness that is sometimes artificially maintained in malefemale relationships, encouraging Muslims not to become trapped in tense or superficial relationships. In one of his conferences he counseled patience ‘against’ the deviations of a permissive society, and defended the idea according to which ‘managing to look away’ from temptations depends on acquiring personal freedom.22

3. The zakāt as a principle of social justice This theme does not constitute a priority in mb circles. Certainly, the practice of giving money, of zakāt (this term is usually translated as “legal

22 Conference on relationships between men and women in Islam, Verviers, December 28, 2002.

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alms”) is one of the pillars of Islam. The custom is habitually respected as such, by virtue of its religiously obligatory character, although at this time it depends above all upon individual willingness alone; there is no official mechanism of collection associated with this custom. This practice is not the object of particular attention or bitter debates as the title of this section might have suggested. In contrast, a concern for social justice is something that Tariq Ramadan particularly concentrates on, and one of his priorities is to develop the zakāt within the framework of an Islamic “ethics” that he intends to promote. Without citing Sayyid Qutb, Ramadan comes up with proposals that are similar to his in the matter of alms-giving.23 At a meeting organized around the theme of solidarity, he developed the idea according to which this principle is a pillar of the tradition, and he underlined the spiritual as well as functional nature of this custom from a social point of view: ‘The zakāt is not legal alms-giving and it is not left up to the decision of each person; it is all at once a social tax, obligatory and purifying;’ it permits people to be at peace not only with themselves but with their Creator (‘to have peace in itself, not just with oneself ’). According to him, the entire philosophy of the zakāt, is to struggle against the need for public assistance; this is a constraint from God, because it is the right of the poor person. [. . .] Thus I do not give to you because I want to but because it is my responsibility and it is your right.

He ends by evoking a number of considerations related to actual practices: he criticizes the lack of interest among Muslims in general in the spirit of sharing that is recommended during the feast of Ramadan, and he also criticizes their lack of a social project.24 These considerations have their place in a continuation of the philosophy of the Zilāl, not only in terms of the “obligatory” and unavoidable character of this tax—something which is not surprising, since the zakāt constitutes one of the five pillars of Islam—but above all because it is justified as a “right of the poor”. This idea was put forward by Sayyid Qutb, for whom this tax corresponds to a “payment of a social tax of Islam established by God as a right that poor people have to share the goods of the rich, since God is the master of all these goods, and since

23

We remind the reader that Yūsuf Al-Qaradāwī devoted his dissertation to this theme (see below). 24 Conference on Consciousness, solidarity and action, organized by Muslim Presence, Brussels, June 5, 2004.

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he has lent them out as part of a contract one of whose conditions is to carry out the zakāt” [Carré 1984:152]. And yet Tariq Ramadan gives the impression of going beyond the claims of Sayyid Qutb, and this in two ways. On one hand, he speaks of the “purifiying” character of the custom, which to our knowledge is not mentioned as such in Sayyid Qutb. In speaking this way, he adds a redemptive dimension that would compensate for the material ease in which many European Muslims live. On another hand, he adds that the custom of zakat allows people to attain a peace within, a peace that has a very wide scope because it implies one’s deep concord with the Creator. In this way, Tariq Ramadan affirms the positive interest in the Islamic philosophical system in comparison with or even in opposition to justifications that are commonly mentioned by Westerners. In fact, these are limited: he distinguishes clearly the idea according to which some people are satisfied to be at peace with themselves, while Muslims must be in agreement with the highest divine principles, which allow them to attain a much more profound peace. At any rate, these speeches of Tariq Ramadan appear to be audacious; he invites Muslims not only to fulfill their civic obligations with regard to the State, but also to fulfill their strictly Islamic obligations, and to do so in a context in which there is a system of social security that is relatively functional and in which European Muslims participate directly. Like many other preachers, he exhorts Muslims to be movers and shakers in the social and economic areas; he requires that they increase their involvement. Like Sayyid Qutb and many other Islamic militants past and present, his deepest wish is probably to be able to modify the structures of economic and social relationships in order to benefit the most needy.

4. Framing the community using a structural dynamic of relative jurisprudence In line with the insistance on the protection of Muslim identity and notably respect for religious practice, the European Muslim brotherhood reveals its concern for the importance that should be given to the question of Islamic norms, seen at once as a means of education and particularly of guidance for individuals [Caiero, 2008]. This is why they try to make sure that there is some level of developmental dynamism at work with regard to the legal system, although in general this is very limited, for reasons explored below.

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At bottom the Brotherhood is interested in insuring that references and opportunities for development are offered to the Muslim community, and that Muslim law continues to be a point of reference within the community, and even that the obligatory and normative character of this law is recognized by European Muslims, at least in certain areas of private law, for example marriage and testamentary law. European Muslims remain obligated in relation to systems of law that compete with Muslim law, in regard to rights of nationality and rights of permanent residence. Since they live in a non-Islamic society, European Muslims also must at the end of the day decide for themselves whether they are obligated or not to follow religious precepts. In concrete terms the mb have gotten involved in the European Council for Fatwa and Research (cefr), which they created in 1997, by means of support from the Federation of Islamic Organizations of Europe (fioe). The cefr brings together about 40 people, mostly Muslim scholars from the four Sunni law schools. They have been co-opted (which gives their membership a certain uniformity), and some of them live in Europe, some in other Western countries, and some in Muslim countries. They get together usually once a year, at least, and debate the development of a minority jurisprudence ( fiqh al-aqalliyyāt). This is understood as Muslim law, which contains a group of legal obligations applicable to Muslim practices when the Muslims involved are part of a minority. On the basis of a minimalist orthodoxy and the application of the taysir principle (the principle of ease applicable in order to protect Muslim identity in difficult times, that constitutes the signature of Yūsuf Al-Qaradāwī [Caiero, 2008]), scholars try to harmonize their positions in order to determine a common position with regard to concretely problematic situations. Two examples of important decisions reached in this way are: the authorization for borrowing to buy the primary family residence, and theoretically accepting the possibility of a woman who converts to Islam remaining married to a non-Muslim spouse so long as there is a possibility of his also converting. In order to support their decisions, the cefr members base themselves upon the sources of Islamic legislation that are accepted by the majority of Sunnis (the Koran, the Sunna, consensus -ijmāʿ- and analogical reasoning -qiyās- as well as sources that are the objects of diverging opinions (among other things the preference for a judicial norm established on the basis of an analogy that is not initially considered as evident but which eventually proves to constitute an argument -istihsān-, a general interest that is not recognized as being contrary to Islamic law

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-maslah mursala-, precautions taken in order to avoid a more serious evil -sadd al-dharāʾiʿ, customs that are part of social life and recognized as beneficial -ʿurf-, etc. This plethora of sources gives the impression that the entire richness of Muslim law and its context has been taken into account, but this impression conceals certain things that are lacking. In fact, some questions are left hanging. The modalities and limits of this collective practice of interpretation of Muslim law in the light of the contemporary context are not spelled out. For example, there is no ranking of the sources that is officially recognized. And we may observe with the jurist Mawil Izzi Dien that there really are no arrangements for deciding what happens in cases of disagreement between different sources, especially with regard to the question of what the public interest is [Izzi Dien, 2004:146]. This lack of precision is very probably the result of the members’ inability to agree on a ranking of sources. This situation has given rise to criticism, from the camp of the Wahhabi-Salafists and others, and even from Muslims that respect methodological rigor, and who believe that the law can be more easily instrumentalized by such means. Furthermore, the cefr’s approach remains very traditionalist even though they challenge equally the most conservative and most liberal interpretations [Caiero, 2008]. On one hand, its members are mainly specialists in classical Islamic sciences, and specialists in the human sciences play only a secondary role. Certainly, depending on the issues under consideration, expert opinions are eventually sought, but their importance is marginal in relation to the entire process of decision, which is kept in the hands of scholars specializing in religious sciences. On another hand, when it explains the methodology that it adopts, the cefr claims to base itself first and foremost upon the four schools of jurisprudence and on other schools of jurists considered as ‘sources of great richness’. The process of taking into account the ultimate purposes of Sharia (maqāsid al-Sharīʿa) is mentioned last of all. But according to the liberal thinker Taha Jabir Al-ʿAlwānī, this attitude is insufficient faced with the demands of the contemporary world. For this doctor of the foundations of law—usul al-fiqh—from the University of Al-Azhar, who is also president of the North American Council of fiqh, who is attempting to make progress toward the establishment of a minority fiqh, the current context is radically different from that in which the four schools of jurisprudence came to prominence.25 In that context, the four schools

25

He mentions especially the fact that Muslims now come ‘to seek justice and refuge

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give evidence of numerous gaps in the consideration of relationships that are maintained with non-Muslims. For him, the important thing is therefore to adopt a new and renewed vision of the legal system which radically goes beyond the current reproductions or deductions based on ancient fatwas, now that even these are expressed in contemporary language, as occurs with those who currently give counsel with regard to fiqh (like the cefr): ‘The enormous quantity of theoretical fiqh that has been bequeathed to us and which deals with relations between Muslims and non-Muslims is very closely connected to the historical circumstances in which this fiqh was developed. It belongs to its own time and to its own location, and none of it can be applied to situations that are considerably different’ [Al-‘Alwānī, 2003:7]. Over and above the respect in principle that he holds for the schools of jurisprudence, he does consider that it is important to adopt a clear method from now on, one that will be ‘founded upon the principles, the objectives and the values of the Koran, in connection with the purposes of Sharia’ [Al-‘Alwānī, 2003:7]. In the light of criticisms implicitly levelled at the cefr, and in considering the mission it has explicitly assumed, we can understand that its mission does not really include the goal of stimulating the dynamism of reflection on the legal system of European Muslims in order to call forth the creativity of their legal tradition. In fact the cefr is instead focused on ‘preserving the identity of Muslims’ and ‘helping them remain within the framework of Islam’ in connection with the activity of preaching. It seeks above all to ‘facilitate’ their religious practice, and to ‘establish uniformity between the fatwas of different countries in Europe’ and by this means to ‘prevent controversy’.26 The purpose of the cefr is not to contribute innovative perspectives or to reinterpret questions of Muslim law in the direction of an ethics: the cefr aims rather at positioning itself as a source of guidance for European Muslims, beginning with a conception that is admittedly quite large, but nonetheless relatively fixed, of legal dynamism. It seeks above all to construct a strong Muslim community, which possesses a strengthened consciousness of its identity, on the basis of clear concepts (including the concept of

in non-Muslim countries’, the fact that the concept of citizenship or nationality were there unknown, and there was no international law, an observation indicating that only the logic of power dominated, while the world was not as intimately interconnected as it is now. 26 For a statement of principles and a look at the decisions adopted by this council, see their publication, Collection de fatwās, edited by Gédis in France in 2002.

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wasatiyya)27 and the duty of spreading the message such as this is understood among their ranks. Certainly this goal is apparently being pursued in a spirit of cooperation with the Western world, but the staking out of clear positions, especially as concerns the pure and simple recognition of the equality of all individuals, and as concerns the harmonious coexistence of civilizations, is something that remains undone because the cefr only concentrates on questions of detail at the present time. And the attitude that allows them to denounce the “so-called scholars and intruders who proclaim themselves able to send forth negative fatwas against the West [. . . and who] mislead Muslims by permitting them to misappropriate the goods of countries that have welcomed them, fed them, sheltered them and protected them, [. . . by authorizing them] to cheat, lie, betray and steal from them in every way possible” is not sufficient any more, because its limits are quite evident. In fact, considering the objects of this denunciation as “a shame upon Islam” is one thing. Comparing “this kind of Muslim” to “the Jews who think it is legitimate to steal the goods of others” is something else. Such cheap shots demonstrate that the moment for uniting around a critical coexistence that is respectful of pluralism has not yet arrived. Certainly the members of the cefr sometimes appear as defenders of the West, but in general the attitudes they adopt only demonstrate the limits of their creativity. In this group, the Brothers are well represented: there are independent scholars from every Muslim ideological tendency, but the Brothers have maintained at least partial control on the Council, either by the presence of affiliate members, or through those who are ideologically close to them. At this level they play an important logistical role. Still, as partisans and as sympathizers they are involved in the actual debates about jurisprudence as well. The mb also play an important external role, since their structures promulgate the decisions of the cefr, and pass them on to Muslims who come to their meetings. By this means they lend weight to the decisions, and credibility to those who have handed them down, and perhaps to themselves in the process. A scholar’s authority here to interpret and call for obedience to laws, whether or not he is independent, depends on his effort being recognized in the Muslim public. This public has final say

27

See the presentation by Yūsuf Al-Qaradāwī in Part 2.

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concerning thinkers, writers, jurists, etc., it considers qualified to say what the law is and to apply it. In the words of jurist Mawil Izzi Dien: ‘Islamic law, like other legal systems, requires a successful authority to justify its application. The success of the application of any legal system is dependent on the validity of its authority as well as on the commitment of the individual that the law rules’ [Izzi Dien, 2004:138]. The Brothers work to maintain the legitimacy of the authority they themselves created, because the survival of Muslim law in the West depends on it, among other things. In this way they play a predominant role because they participate directly not only in the elaboration of fatwas (consultative legal opinions) but also in the establishment of an overall institutional framework that then attempts to get itself accepted: they participate in the process whereby authorities are recognized as capable of establishing what the law is, but the decisions must be popular to be accepted. From a global point of view the mb thus participate in a process of legal formalization of Islam on behalf of European Muslim authorities, although they do not control the entire process. In a context in which other pluralistic structures of this type do not really manage to establish themselves or to get their authority recognized, as long as selfproclaimed religious authorities continue to emerge, appealing to all preferences, the mb can present itself as a group that is able to establish the authority of Islamic law under the aegis of a recognized authority, presenting their positions in writings that are fairly clearly written and argued, and intended to appeal to the greatest number of people possible. They are the organizers, the legislators, and the heralds of norms. Their position varies within these roles; they may agree with or oppose the classical sources of Islamic norms (sheiks and European Muslim scholars), and these authorities are also seeking to expand their reach gradually, especially through websites. In fact, while they try to obtain the exclusive right to speak in the name of Islam, and also to make themselves recognized as an accredited religious reference, seen as the official authority by the secular authorities at local, national and European levels, all in order to be able to play the role of intermediary regarding the understanding of Islam by non-Muslims, the Brotherhood sometimes provokes criticism in Muslim ranks, although this criticism remains muted for the time being. In order to illustrate the great emphasis that the mb places on the dynamic aspect of a legal system that would reconstitute itself in continuity with the work of the four traditional law schools of Sunni law, we

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present two examples related to current use of the concept of fiqh haraki, that is, dynamic fiqh. This expression was explicitly developed by Sayyid Qutb; it presupposes that Islamic jurisprudence is necessarily changeable, and adapts to contexts through a constant effort of interpretation (ijtihād). For him, Islamic laws were not literally applicable texts. Only active militants, strong from their spiritual experience, can create laws that remain within the spirit of Sharia while becoming adapted to a context. In this way, social changes are necessarily rooted in Islamic religious spirituality, source of proven values and an immutable morality. These laws are produced from the inside, alone, in being applied in changing societies [Carré, 1984:204ff.]. In Great Britain, the concept of a dynamic fiqh has been addressed by Zahid Parvez, a former member of the Young Muslims UK. He asks young people questions to get them to realize on their own, what kind of Islam they want to bring to life. Speaking of the tension between a fossilized Islam and an organic Islam, he explains that Sayyid Qutb spoke of the dynamic aspect of Islam, and demonstrated that it contains fundamental elements, to be sure, but also things that change in relation to a context.28 Without going into details, he makes mention of this author of the past, whom he recognizes as authority and reference. But he goes no further. He does not specify in any other way the scope of this concept. The question of knowing whether this jurisprudence is related only to a way of thinking about action, or really implies the constitution of positive law in the full sense of the term, remains unanswered. The concept of a dynamic fiqh has also been addressed by the imam of the mosque of Bordeaux, Tareq Oubrou, and in an innovative manner, during a speech at the Salon du Bourget.29 Despite the fact that he spoke only briefly about the necessity of the integration of contextual changes in the areas of theology and dogmatics, he developed an original line of argument, something that is rare in the mb circles of today. He spoke of new modalities, and he took up the call in favor of a dynamic fiqh, sensitive to its ancient roots, adapted to a context, and filled with renewed spirituality. On one hand, these modalities are developed, redefined, expanded, and finally made absolute: Tareq Oubrou deliberately empha28

Conference titled ‘The revival of the Ummah’, Nottingham, June 20, 2003. Conference on The mechanisms of adaptation of Muslim practice, at the annual meeting of the Union of Islamic Organizations in France, Le Bourget, Paris, March 26, 2005. 29

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sizes the dynamic aspect of the text when he declares that this aspect is at the heart even of the most essential foundations of Islamic law, and this from the beginning. After having spoken of the presence of contextual elements in the Koran itself, marked from the very first by its historical rootedness, he affirmed that the nature of the Koran is flexible in its essence. Adaptation in the matter of religious interpretation is thus posited as a natural thing. On the other hand, Tareq Oubrou makes adjustments to the demands made by Sayyid Qutb (whom he sharply criticizes in private) by making the public take responsibility for them: he invites his listeners to take their responsibilities personally, in order to construct normative references adapted to the surrounding context, he democratizes this process by opening it to those who are not active militants (or who are not scholars, in contrast to the practice of the cefr), opening it indeed to any Muslim. He does not specify whether this individualization of the norm is to be understood in a strictly individualistic way, but it appears that it could be looked at as both individual and collective at the same time, if these two dimensions cast light upon each other and are complementary. In this way, Tareq Oubrou upholds the global pertinence of Muslim law in the fullest sense of the term. Still, individual certainty is the ultimate support of the authority of this law, thus kept living and positive because it has retained all its practical usefulness. Here are his propositions, grouped subjectively under three heads, based on a quick selection of excerpts. In order to explain that there is “a subtle and closely woven dialectic between what is given in revelation and contemporary reality”, he recalls that not only is “human reality taken into consideration through the interpretation of texts but the message itself contains the interpretation of the Koranic moment [. . .]. Through the Tanzīl,30 the Koran includes the human condition and social evolution; thus it is a dynamic and not a static text as we commonly see today”. He then observes that the adaptation does not amount to a betrayal of the message, but rather actualizes it, by taking into consideration the multiplicity of cultures that are present. He explains: it is necessary “to give a form to this thought: [. . .] historical reality has always been in a relation to the construction of classical disciplines—tafsīr, fiqh, tasawwuf, usul al-fiqh, etc.; in continuity with this heritage, according to their methodology, we must emphasize these texts and also what I call zones of scriptural dynamism; one must orient oneself toward all the

30

The fact of coming to Earth, that is, the fact of having been revealed.

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dynamic aspects of thought, for we are in a situation of the interpenetration of cultures and thus it is necessary to recast our ways of thinking”. Finally, after denouncing the material and spiritual enfeeblement of the community, which has placed it at the periphery of History (“we are the product of a historical decline, and we acquiesce in this state of affairs; we must re-establish culture, intellectual excellence, and a refined sensibility, otherwise we will remain anachronistic”), he called for a greater assumption of personal responsibility as regards the references people look toward. He recommends “making people responsible for the construction of norms and their relationship with religion”. For him this necessity comes out of the very nature of the texts, which themselves seldom offer pre-arranged recipes. Thus it is a matter of “differentiating the principle, intangible, and the relativism of the principle when it confronts reality. [. . .]”. In this framework, he opposes the multiplication of laws and fatwas, because they lead Muslims away from taking their own responsibility, and he even thinks that there are too many normative references, and that they become counter-productive, eventually weakening the force of all norms: “Too many norms kills the norm—too much religion kills the religious feeling and even faith!” Thus he asks the question, “How can we invent a religion that is dynamic and flexible, while preserving its permanent substance?” Certainly the Brotherhood possesses a general Islamic culture that allows its members to interpret the texts of Islam for themselves. But this is not the case for people who gravitate toward the movement, whose general Islamic culture appears sketchy. Supporting an individualistic position appears idealistic or even unrealistic today. Making an exception for the teaching of Tareq Oubrou, whose point of view could eventually be shared by other leaders in the future, the Brotherhood most often attempts to limit or to contain, through their practice, the scope of the jurisprudential dynamism that was initially spoken of by Jamal Al-Din Al-Afghāni when he laid claim to the individual right to ijtihād. As regards the interpretation of texts, the promotion of individual responsibility has still not been taken very far. Furthermore, and especially as a result of the influence of the Brotherhood, this has been taken over by collective agencies attempting to gain recognition. It is not so much that the Brotherhood wants to limit the principle of individual responsibility, but in view of the current situation, they believe they are obligated to warn about so called errors and deviations. The claim to an individual ʾijtihād thus is spoken of from time to time

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today, for example upon the occasion of a number of annual salons at Bourget, in Paris. However, this claim is still relativized to a significant degree by the principle, endorsed by the Brotherhood, according to which any person that does not have enough information to form his own opinion must consult with competent persons. As it happens, these persons are designated by the brotherhood, and this allows them to continue to play a certain role in Muslim communities.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

DISCOURSES REGARDING ULTIMATE PURPOSES AND THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN DIFFERENT CIVILIZATIONS

Before we begin our analysis of contemporary discourses concerning civilizations and ultimate purposes, it is important for us to recall certain historical and political perspectives that have caused perceptions of the mb to suffer from prejudice. These perspectives are still circulating today. On one side, the historical identity of the Brotherhood is deeply rooted in their experience, particularly in the chaotic relationship they have had with the West during their history. This relationship went through the colonial and imperialistic experience at the beginning of the 20th century. In response to this experience, the mb has tried to unify Muslims so that they might liberate themselves from a foreign yoke. In the process, they also approach the West via certain tensions, or antagonisms perceived through history between secularization and religion, secularization and Islam: they are really fighting to maintain the Muslim character of the organization of Muslim societies, pitted against secularism promoted from outside, which they see as destructive and arbitrary. The classic structures of authority in the Muslim world have gotten weaker and weaker; they are seeking to preserve their religion, their culture, and their way of life, faced with a system that forces itself upon them by every available means. This tension with the European powers extends into the area of the Palestinian situation, also seen as unjust. And the Palestinian struggle has a privileged place in the history of the Brotherhood, because it was their first actual military engagement, one which later became a source of their legitimacy. On the other hand the mb place great stress upon faith, which is presented as a primordial factor that makes collective historical success for Muslims possible. The themes of Islam’s vitality and its superiority over other religions, often referenced by militants, are deduced from doctrines of the faith. In the traditional point of view, Islam is the last religion of the Book, completing those that preceded it (Christianity and Judaism). Islam brings their messages to fruition and claims to include their heritages while at the same time transcending them. With Sayyid

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Qutb, these themes are capped off by that of the visible decadence of the West, presented as atheistic and materialistic, void of spirituality and guilty of perverting morality. From such a perspective relations between the two civilizations are essentially conceived in religious terms, terms that emphasize competition between religions and even confrontation. These experiences and ideas are present to the memories of mb partisans or sympathizers in Europe. They give rise to internal tensions, because they lead to a view of the European situation that is radically different from the one they are rooted in, which they are trying to keep alive and relevant, their historical tradition. We have spoken of modalities in terms of which the themes of Islam’s superiority and the relationship to the West can now be grasped or renewed. The tensions they gave rise to are now to be continued as it were in other thematic areas. That is why we address these questions, which have become fundamental in the movement, of the importance of the recognition of Islam and the Muslims, but also the question of modalities according to which one’s religious obligations are conceived in respect of ‘good stewardship’ of the Earth, with non-Muslims more or less integrated into that.

1. The vitality and superiority of Islam The themes of dynamism, Muslim vigorousness, and the final victory of the Muslims are found in the Koran itself. It is announced that thanks to revelation Muslims united and reconciled their hearts as one, thus forming a community that can call any one toward the good, and condemn those acts which are blamable. Sura 3, verse 104 says that the Muslims will win: “They will be triumphant.” Verse 110 in the same sura gives a reason for the superiority of the Muslims over the believers in other religions of the Book because most of them have turned away from God’s message: “You will have the best community ever formed by men to order what is just, proscribe the guilty and believe in God. If the People of the Book were believers, it would be better for them. Some of them believe. But most of them are wretched men.”1 In his Koranic exegesis, written at the end of the 1950’s, Sayyid Qutb

1 Le Coran, translation by Jacques Berque (revised and corrected edition), Paris, Albin Michel, 1995.

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thought that Islam was coming to self-affirmation and gaining in importance, while Western civilization was declining. He considered the Muslim people as having been chosen from among the religions of the Book, and assumed that they were the “natural enemies” of Islam. The opposition appeared ever more clearly to him, to the extent that he observed that Western societies appeared to be moving further and further from the divine message. Taking up a strictly internal position with regard to religion, he wrote: “Islam is confronted in our time by the spiritualistic otherworldliness and materialistic atheism of Christianity” [Carré, 1984:121]. Here at the beginning of the 21st century the mb in Europe regularly makes reference to the intrinsic force of Islam. Some people, like Gamal Al-Helbawy, speak often of that which Islam can contribute to the West, while the question asked in the other direction, concerning that which the West can give to Islam, is much more rarely posed. Based on commentaries that are far from provocative, it appears clearly that they consider themselves as part of a long-term dynamic that is destined to prosper. One partisan expressed it this way: Muslim civilization is multi-secular, to be thought of as a constant, while other civilizations are thought of as evanescent, going through a rise, then a decline and an end.2 Based on affirmations such as “we believe in the need of Islam”3 or “without Islam, life has no meaning”,4 other partisans speak of the fundamental importance they reserve for Islam in their lives. This dedication is in no way placed in question by an ambient context of secularization. And at any rate, as another partisan puts it, this faith is reinforced, and supported by the divine himself if the faith is sincere: “if a man is close to God, God will answer him”.5 In these examples, we have been able to observe that the mb is particularly sensitive to signs that appear to testify to the vitality of Islam or that appear to indicate its final success. They also appear to possess a force which, in the final analysis, belongs to the very content of belief. In public speeches, however, the superiority of Islam is little spoken of as such, rather it is presented in a context of the question of a decline of the West. This theme is spoken of in detail twice, based on an analysis of 2 3 4 5

Interview no. 25. Interview no. 13. Interview no. 70. Interview no. 59.

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the religious type that focuses on a decline of Christianity without taking into consideration any other factors. In both cases, the observations are based on diverse sources, and blended indistinctly with the statements of a conference speaker. The whole is presented as something to be assumed, and no question is raised in regard to it in later debates. The Algerian Rachid Benaïssa, a former disciple of Malek Bennabi, once more or less closed to the Association of Islamic Students in France, AEiF [Kepel, 1987], expresses his vision, basing himself upon European references. The presumed neutrality of his sources grounds the legitimacy of his discourse, because the persons he mentions are not supposed to have a personal interest in recognizing the ultimate success of Islam. By basing himself on quotes from a British theologian, without giving many other details about his work, and on the work of one of the “masters of doubt”, Friedrich Nietzsche, Rachid Benaïssa supports his own observation, with crystalline clarity: the West will decline, because the Christian faith has lost momentum, and Islam alone can carry forward the torch of belief in the West. Of course, he is making a prediction about changes that will take place in the future, but it is presented as an inevitable fact. The son of God of the Christians himself is supposed to have announced the coming of the Prophet, and therefore of Islam following him. In this connection, the expression “Paraclete”, already present in the Koran, is here employed in a tendentious manner by Rachid Benaïssa; for him it refers to the Prophet, but it refers to the coming of the Holy Spirit in Christian theology. A British theologian, Wilson, says that Christianity will decline. Why? Because Christians no longer believe in it; only a very small minority still believes that Jesus is the son of God. [Thus] it is the Crescent which [will slake] the thirst for religious belief. Only Islam will succeed. Besides, another text from Nietzsche affirms “war to the death for Rome, peace for Islam”. These two texts indicate the status of Islam today. [. . .] The whole world thinks this, for it is the only alternative. Islam haunts the world today. There is no risk that people will return to Christianity [. . .] and anyway Jesus himself said “it is necessary that I part, otherwise the Paraclete will not come to you”.6

Already mentioned, Abdallah Benmansour also speaks about the superiority of Islam. He began his conference on “Islam as a way of life” by speaking at some length of the enormous commercial success of a book 6 Intervention on the theme Islam, a unitary speaking addressed to a plural world, at a day of study on the theme Unity in Diversity, Brussels, May 7, 2005.

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by Dan Brown, The Da Vinci Code. He fully explained that the argument of this book rested, in the final analysis, upon interest that was generated by a denunciation of the foundations—actually spurious—of the Catholic Church. He invited his listeners to buy this book, which had caught the imagination of practically everyone (practicing Christians, Jews, Muslims, unbelievers). He took it to be an element in a proof supporting past prophecies and his own vision of European civilization, in which Islam appears as the only spiritual and ideological alternative, one which must impose itself upon Europe in the natural course of events. His affirmation: I am convinced that among the most important arguments in this book is the idea that “the identity of Europe is under threat”. For the Times, in fact, this demonstrates that the Catholic church has lied throughout history, etc. But, above all, the worst nightmare is that one single ideology, a religion that is capable of taking over the heritage of Christ, this is Islam, which possesses the force, the ability, and the possibility of causing nonMuslims to convert to it [. . .]. If there is nothing more to look for along the aisle of ideologies . . . then only Islam remains! This idea shines with its own light (even if there is no Islamic State or group charged with creating one). They are in the process of becoming attracted to this idea. [. . .] I say to myself “this is strange, the Prophet already predicted this for us: Islam will grow so great that it will live in every house”.

After beginning with such acerbic and even aggressive apologiae, Abdallah Benmansour managed to appear very convincing, although he had not actually read the book. In support of his propositions, he used an argument from authority based on a reference to an article in the famous British newspaper, which he interpreted subsequently in relation to his own point of view. His statements were uttered without any hesitation, and without any critical distance with regard to this fiction: the putative truth he expressed appears to have been judged only on the basis of the commercial success of the book. The only thing he was really trying to do was to reaffirm certain ideological postulates that he cared about. In the course of all this, not disinterestedly but without regret, he took advantage of the occasion to attack the reputation of the Catholic Church, by saying that it was based on a series of lies. He created an atmosphere of competition with regard to Christianity, and thus reinforced in the minds of his listeners the eventual necessity of surpassing the Catholic Church. This was one more occasion for recalling that Islam is the only way along which the essence of truth is constantly tested and proven. According to him, Islam can thus claim to be the only plausible alternative lying in the future.

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In this way, by urging his listeners to read the novel, to which he attributes, without foundation, the status of a key work for the understanding of European culture,7 Abdallah Benmansour offers only his own categories of reading for the apprehension of the world around us. In contrast to other sensible speeches, sensible in their respect for others’ point of view, he makes use of the data available to support his own apologetics, desiring above all to reinforce the confidence of Muslims and the feeling of the superiority of their community. His statements are easily accepted because these ideas are rooted in a tradition according to which the success of faithful believers here below is given in the sacred writings as a certainty. During a question and answer period, although many questions were asked, not one of the faithful questioned the perspectives offered. These two examples are very illuminating with regard to the optimistic perspectives that are generally favored within the movement in relation to the future propagation of Islam in the world. The argumentation remains very strongly rooted in the religious text, although sometimes some external literary references may be used. And the context appears to receive little consideration. In fact, the situation of Islam is exclusively considered from a classic religious point of view, only in relation to the other religions of the Book, that are from this perspective considered to be in a real relation of competition with Islam: neither contemporary religious pluralism nor the complexities of contemporary belief in the light of subjective experiences are considered. In this kind of speech the pluralism of values and religious experiences finds no place, and a single alternative is put forward as the winner. These deterministic positions in Islamic apologetics are not the object of unanimity in the ranks of the Brothers. For some, the much vaunted vitality of Islam is not as remarkable as some portray it. In private conversations, some Brothers admit that there is also a great deal of skepticism among the membership, although very few would be willing to admit it. They speak of the incompatibilities of their project (associated with this classic aim and the “natural” expansion of Islam) and European reality. Others make mention of the increasing problem of the absence of extensive knowledge of Arabic language among young

7 And all the while, he knows that less than half his audience knows who La Gioconda (The Mona Lisa) is!

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European Muslims: this lack is getting worse and worse and prevents these young people from learning correctly about their religion and/ or deepening their relationship to it. Finally, for other members of the movement the persistent reference to the superiority of Islam smacks of a lack of realism and humility, and they disapprove of this. In a more subtle fashion, but just as revealing, a partisan recognized that the Brothers “should” fight for every just cause. By the use of the modal verb, he indicated awareness of the gulf that can exist between an ideal and reality: the Muslims are not such faithful believers as they ought to be. Overall, the dominance of Islam and of the Muslims remains an important leitmotiv because the community is thought of as potentially the best. Islam and the Muslims will be or could be the best among men if they correctly apply their religion. Many consider that there is a long way to go in the proper application of divine precepts.

2. Changes nonetheless in perspective with regard to the West We have just seen to what extent the theme of the superiority of Islam remains, at the end of the day, quite popular in people’s thoughts. It is seldom the object of debate despite the fact that the conformity of the practices of contemporary Muslims to the supposed precepts of Islam has been rather forcefully questioned. To the contrary, positions adopted with regard to the West are becoming more numerous and more detailed. They are more often the object of debate, all the more so because very few historical and religious references speak about integration in a non-Muslim context. The time when the mb of history could consider the West as an external and relatively monolithic power, valued only for its technological and scientific accomplishments, appears more or less distant. The time is also past when, at the time of their first arrival in Europe, their primary concern was to protect themselves against the influence of Western society. The relationship “us—them” was the focus of attention until the middle of the 1980’s: as a partisan testifies, Western society appeared to be nonreligious, permissive and lax, and the whole problem was to do everything possible to preserve one’s identity and one’s Muslim faith.8

8

Interview no. 52.

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At the present time these themes are called into question and other themes are set over against them, since the way in which people grasp the idea of the West is the object of a more sensitive understanding and thus things appear in a more nuanced light. The themes of discourse are no longer only reduced to considerations such as the “loss” of spirituality, the “liberalization” of morals, or the “absence of morality that opens a place for the relativity of political considerations alone”. Based on two excerpts given below, we are able to observe that among partisans of the first generation that emigrated to Europe, their view of the West has been transformed and rendered more complex. This progressive and overall positive change has given rise to modifications of different intensity in behavior according to the sensibilities of different people. Ahmad Al-Rawi, of Iraqi origin and president of the fioe through 2006, spoke about his own discovery of the diversity of Westerners. He laid great stress upon the changes that had occurred in his understanding of the West, which he initially perceived as in opposition to Islam, and spoke of how, since his arrival in Europe, this understanding had had to be modified along with changes in all of his ideas, including those about religion. The images show themselves to be more complex than one had thought in the beginning: policies do not always reflect the people who make them, and Westerners are more open to Islam than Muslims had realized. He remains desirous above all of making non-Muslims intelligently aware of Islam, and thus reckons that he has a duty to play the role of a bridge between two worlds. This is perceptible in his discourse, especially when he shows that prophecy is easy in this respect: I consider myself I carry maybe sixty to seventy percent of what I understood at that time from the Ikhwan movement. As I say, as (a) moderate movement. But still when I came here, there are . . . there were many things changed, really. Very frankly, really, about even my attitude not just in . . . in Ikhwan thoughts: no! Much of that: even in the matter of fiqh, in the matter of . . . of fatwas, in matter of . . . some religious points of view euh . . . very frankly, our understand(ing) of the Western society: there, by all means, even as . . . as I remember when we were youth, consider the West in general, it is . . . it stands firmly against Islam. We did not distinguish between that society as a whole and between the . . . really . . . the leadership and . . . really . . . the influence forces in the political point of view. This is totally changed, really. I see: it is very . . . Because when I came here, and I involved in many relations with the . . . civilian associations or younger . . . of the Britain and European after that . . . I saw it their people as the other people: some of them misunderstand Islam, some of them

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chapter fourteen maybe stand against Islam because they misunderstand it, some of them, they are neutral, they have nothing to do with Islam, some of them even support some . . . just as goals here and there. We need to communicate with them, we discuss them. When you discuss with them, they are open like that. Maybe even they are even better than the other people because they are . . . they live in civilised . . . societies, maybe open. You are free to talk with them. You are free to discuss with them. And you influenced them. They influence you. It is . . . these things . . . really . . . I could say, it is changing my mind by all means. [. . .].9

In an interview with an Egyptian partisan who had dedicated his Islamic involvement to the benefit of the Muslim Association of Britain, the changes in perspective are even more substantial. Beginning with a very classic discourse, not very extensively developed, concerning the decadence of the West, he explains that a view from outside has become a view from within, and this predicted decadence may not be inevitable, thanks to the contribution of Muslims. For this Egyptian, Muslims living in Europe must starting now react and take their responsibilities seriously, because what is at stake is the survival of their own society, Western society. He does not hesitate to interpret and to actualize the Islamic message of the Brotherhood, explaining the importance of cutting the message of the Imam Hassan Al-Bannā into two parts. On one side, there is his (exaggerated?) critique of the West as imperialist invader. On the other side, there is his call for good actions and good counsel; by this means, our interviewee was able to maintain that Hassan Al-Bannā invited every Muslim to get involved wherever it may be, as an act of loyalty toward the society in which he has chosen to live. For him, it made little difference whether that society should be in the West or not, for the only important thing is to contribute fully as a Muslim to stop the decadence of the West, decadence that was leading to its destruction. This involvement is considered as a true duty, failing which would be to betray the society in which one lives, and to betray the message of Islam and the Brotherhood, which must be shared, to the extent that it appears to be profitable for everyone. In his words: (Interviewer: Do you think that there is a decay of the Western world at the moment? Is it a kind of discourse that is still present among the Ikhwan today?) I would say that the decay is carrying on and actually, this could show our message in the West because in the West, we believe that we, as Muslims, I mean Muslims wherever they are, we should be a reason

9

Interview no. 49.

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of flourishing things, we should be a reason of helping others, we should be a reason of . . . if there is decay: they should stop the decay because at the end of the day, they are living in the society and the whole society feel, then they all feel that . . . and this is really our understanding that if there is something wrong with the community, we should have said “Oh, let them . . . There are Westerners, let them goes it and let them”: no! We believe that it is our role to play to show them, to guide them. If we have something to guide them along, if we have . . . if we feel that this would destroy the society and all its principles, that’s our point [. . .] sometimes Muslims are very outspoken in this areas. Because it is not only related to understanding of Islam, but as well because of they feel the responsibility that they are having (?upon them). It is like you are betraying them if you see that there is danger that is facing them and just keep quiet about it because it is none of your concern. (B// So there is a real shift there from Hassan Al-Bannā’s time cf. now “we have to do something”?) Yes, the shift, I would see it, this shift, is not . . . It has reasons: one of it is because . . . Imam Hassan Al-Bannā, in that time: Egypt was occupied and it was a must for him to defend our country and to kick out the occupation and so on. So his message was quite clear and he had to, because at that time as well, because the West, Britain was in Egypt . . . so he had to make it clear that . . . the West is not a model that we should follow, because there was a lot of people who are (were) influenced by the West and saying that we have (had) to reject our life and destroy.. And he could feel that this was coming; that if they would have accepted that, that would have been the chaos. Like (?we saw) in some countries. But I think that the message now, because we are in the West, is that it should be the other side of Imam Hassan Al-Bannā’s understanding which is that it is our role and duties within the European context: what is our role? Our role is not just to sit here and make money! Our role is not just here to benefit from the facilities and from the knowledge that is here and so on. No! This is the Islamic teaching that we have to pull within the society. We have to make it fruitful, even if it is a non-Muslim State: that is still! It is still where we are living; it is like a dough that you are hold in; [. . .] I think we started to do that yesterday in the session . . . It’s like we are all in a boat and if we let people doing evil and [. . .] and destroying it, then we are all going to drown. So. . . .10

In these excerpts, the notion of the West’s decadence is not really questioned. Above all there is a concern for spreading the message of Islam. Still, these partisans’ involvement has been gradually reshaped as they have come to understand the European context better, and their own attachment to it. Both insist that their perspectives have become more flexible, because now there is greater rapprochement with the West and its populations. Both emphasize the necessity of communication or at 10

Interview no. 19.

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least interaction with the West in order to spread the message. With the second, though, the relationship comes to be examined because the West must be integrated, understood in its complexity, and helped. This position agrees with that of other Brothers who believe it necessary to “be of service to the West”,11 that is, to save it from decadence12 by means of Islam. Normally the Brothers reckon their duty to see that Islam and the Muslims take a higher place in the society of the West, and accordingly they may choose to get involved with the Muslim community exclusively—hoping that their positive impact will carry over indirectly onto the whole of society—or may choose to work directly for that society. These various attitudes, which bear upon the theme of a rapprochement between civilizations, rejoin a decision that was taken by Muslim scholars either issuing from or close to the Brotherhood’s movement in 2001. During a meeting at the European Institute for Human Sciences (Chāteau-Chinon), it was admitted that the presence of a large Muslim minority on European territory required clarification as to its status. Relative to classic Islamic geopolitical attitudes, the West thus came to be recognized as a land of Islam, or as a land of the covenant [T. Ramadan, 2000a]. Whatever the terms used on one and another side, it is thought that the West is not a territory that must be fought against: it is a land in which many Muslims have taken refuge or have found an acceptable situation. Therefore it is necessary for people to get involved, to integrate themselves into the society they live in, and to prosper in accordance with Islamic principles. In some cases, though, the increased proximity of the West brought more virulent critiques, which seen from an internal point of view concerned the most varied aspects of that point of view. In fact, certain Brothers maintain an unforgiving attitude toward the West: they criticize it on moral grounds, especially in relation to policies pursued with regard to European Muslims or to Muslims the world over. As regards their internal policies, European countries are often considered as supporting a strong dominant culture that leaves little room for Muslims: they believe they have the right to practice their forms of worship, but they denounce, more or less discreetly, a relative Islamophobia and/or discrimination that affects populations. In terms

11 12

Interview no. 63. Interview no. 19.

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of foreign policy the European countries are often considered to be partial as regards the geographical locations that are most affected by their actions. In the eyes of the British, especially, this observation appears all the more blameable, since their policy is seen as a double standard, playing the ideals promised internally against the means made available as part of foreign policy. An orator such as Hani Ramadan, particularly prolix on this subject,13 explains the barbarous character of the West by mentioning the fact that Europe accepts illegitimate military actions without making the slightest gesture, especially with regard to the Palestinian situation, because Europe has separated itself from every reference to transcendence.14 Other members of the movement think that the West bear part of the responsibility for the appearance of extremism and radicalism, including the Islamic variety, as this emerges in the rest of the world, especially as long as ‘it imposes a real yoke upon the rest of the world [. . .] and the values of Islam are trampled’15 or when Europe ‘denies the history of others [their civilizations]’.16 Some believe that the West appears less coherent than it did during the colonial period because it has failed to live up to its humanistic ideals, or because it is affected by an ideological vacuum. This is a great pity: the West no longer excites admiration. Worse still, it gives the impression of having doubly cheated Muslims, since the latter went through the colonial period to the profit of an unworthy system.17 In the same vein a partisan considers that the West has ‘betrayed itself ’ because it is no longer its cultural and intellectual advances that place it in the forefront, but only the use of force: ‘Only force is used’, ‘philosophy has fled the universities’.18 Tariq Ramadan has a different point of view. To be sure, he criticizes the stumbling of the West, but he encourages Muslims to give up their lightly held attitudes and sterile criticisms regarding decadence, exhorting them to confront European society in a constructive way. On this wise he shows that he has learned to know the West better over time. In fact, based on the analysis given in the book Les musulmans dans

13

See his quite numerous published works. Hani Ramadan, The factors in the emergence of the State of Israel, conference within the framework of a day of solidarity with Palestine, Brussels, Salle Lumen, March 1, 2003. 15 Interview no. 41. 16 Interview no. 69. 17 Interview no. 12. 18 Interview no. 46. 14

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la laïcité. Responsabilités et droits des musulmans dans les sociétés occidentales [Muslims under lay government. Responsibilities and rights of Muslims in Western societies] (1994), the sociologist F. Dassetto concludes that Ramadan has developed ‘a subtle version of apologetics and comparativism’ with regard to comparisons between civilizations. For example, to the extent that laicity is explained to Muslims based on a historical approach showing that it results from a struggle between reason and religion, just so far is this dichotomy supposed not to exist in Islam, which is presented as having possessed from its inception the things the West is supposed to have labored to achieve [Dassetto, 1996:234–7]. And in his own work, Islam, le face à face des civilisations, Tariq Ramadan makes reference to the periods of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment in order to repeat this idealized apologetic position: ‘the West had to have these “revolutions” in order to gain the freedom to believe, to act, and to seek; Islamic civilization has known nothing of the sort because of the nature of its message, which encourages each one of the faithful, nourished by the memory of meaning and by ultimate aims, to understand, to experiment, and to gain knowledge’ [Ramadan, 1996:314]. Still, a few changes can be noted in his thinking at this point. He admits that the Islamic model has limits when he says that Muslims must not idealize the history of Islamic civilization, because it was not always as tolerant and beneficent as some would have us believe. Overall, his judgment appears to have become more measured but the ambiguity he allows to exist between apologetics and their transcendence remains. He expresses, for example, the necessity of moving in the direction of an Islamic model of coexistence, based on pluralism and respect for religious, linguistic, and cultural identity-related differences (which amounts to recognition of gaps in the existing system), and he immediately adds that neither the United States nor Europe have provided a satisfactory answer to the question of the pluralism of collectives [Ramadan, 1996:171ff.]. Neither repugnant nor a paragon for imitation, the West constitutes for Ramadan one societal paradigm among others.

3. Good stewardship of the earth and relationships with other persons The question of the future of human beings and the world is now being rethought, because the world appears to be getting smaller and smaller and more and more interconnected. The theme of khilafat al-ard, the

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good stewardship of the earth, is thus revisited in the light of individual or collective responsibilities, in which everyone has a part, regarding the creation. By virtue of the initial covenant between God and human beings, in exchange for his submission to the divine commandment, every Muslim has an authority over the creation, but only in this sense that he has the use of the fruits of the earth. At conferences, this theme is directly addressed on some occasions. Various positions coexist within the movement of the European Brotherhood, embracing different modalities with regard to individual and/ or collective responsibilities that may be entailed by the obligation of stewardship. For some, this duty of good stewardship requires above all that one work in an individual and productive manner in behalf of the community of humanity; but the scope that is expressed in preaching—the propagation of the message—is seen rather as limited to the Muslim community. For example, at a spiritual retreat, late one night, on the campus of the University of Nottingham, on the occasion of the annual camp of the fosis organization in 2003, the facilitator for the evening’s activities—who was neither a partisan nor quite a sympathizer with mb ideas, but who saw himself as close to all Muslim groups—began to recite an ode to the beauty of creation, speaking about the stars, the constellations, etc. He observed that it was proper to thank God for this creation given to human beings, and that human beings must be considered as its stewards; they are under an obligation to manage it in the proper manner (he did not explain the details of this management). He reminded his listeners only of the importance of the principle ‘We are khilafat—we have vice-regency on it’. His speech made mention of the individual character of this responsibility which he connected with the fact that everyone is primarily concerned to ensure his or her own salvation. For other members of the Brotherhood on the other hand, good stewardship is first and foremost considered in its collective aspect: it must seek to influence the entire community and the society. This being the case, the globalizing pretensions of Islam are maintained and actualized, for the message of Islam is thought of as addressed to all humanity. An example of this position is given in the second point of this chapter, in the interview with Ahmad Al-Rawi. In fact, he could not prevent himself from wanting to spread Islamic precepts: he cherished the hope of becoming able to convince Europeans of the well-founded nature of the message of Islam for all men. When this message is really shared

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by the greatest possible number, good stewardship will go without saying. Between these two positions, we find for example the position of Ahmed Miktar, imam and preacher in the Lille area, expressed on the occasion of a conference that was held on the theme of Islam as a way of life. The theme of khilafat al-ard was also mentioned, in relation to the universal dimension of the cosmos: each Muslim is invited to take responsibility in an individual way, even if this act is at first part of a collective effort, since the obligation is the result of a contract that must constitute the central element around which all human lives are organized. This sympathizer with mb ideas sets forth his very broad conception of the responsibility of human beings for the earth, dictated by the structuring principles of Islam: this conception implies a restoration of warmth in human relations, concern for social, intellectual, and artistic work, etc., themes that are rarely spoken of in the circles of the Brotherhood. In his words: Islam itself goes beyond the context in which we live. We should not make of it that which it is not for Islam encompasses everything. We must concretize Al-khilafat al-ard, it is necessary that the mandate which we have received from the Father should be considered as an element that helps to construct and organize this life. Islam proposes to all humanity (to groups and Muslim families, etc.) every thing that is indispensable for life (that is to say, things with out which one cannot live). [. . .] Human beings live in a cosmos in which they are the central point of that cosmos. That is why there is a mandate.19

In this discourse, Islam appears as a primordial organizing principle that addresses itself to every Muslim, indeed to every human being: following certain digressions formulated in the speech, it appeared that the mandate spoken of was conceived in a fairly universalistic fashion, relatively detached from particular derivations or specifically Islamic cultural perspectives. In fact, it is interesting to remark that God, here, is surprisingly referred to as “Father”, something that is not part of current Islamic practice in which a radical separation between God and human beings is recognized (this is different from the very anthropomorphic relationship found in Christianity, for example, in which God is associated all at once with the idea of father, son, and Holy Ghost). The same can be said in respect of the affirmation of the central place of human

19 Conference, Islam as a way of life, followed by discussion, Mons-en-Barœul, Lille, March 13, 2005.

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beings at the heart of the cosmos: certainly human beings are traditionally placed in a particular relationship to the divine. However, in traditional conceptions, it is generally the divine that is placed at the center. For Ahmed Miktar communitarian positions appear to have been transcended, for they have been caught up in a larger vision that takes into consideration the role of every human being, from a perspective that is close to ecumenism. These various perspectives underpin particular conceptions of what it means to work toward good stewardship of the Earth, conceptions that reflect very different positions of the Other. These must be correlated with other kinds of considerations that show that the Other is more or less taken into consideration, as such, and/or in his or her specificity, within the milieux of the Muslim Brotherhood. First of all, the reference to religious belief remains primordial and it is a regular occurrence for it to be invoked, even questioned by the members of the movement. Further, certain distinctions are often observed, sometimes with discretion, as regards Western interlocutors, whether they are adherents to Islamically recognized religious beliefs or not. In the course of a speech in which Islam was presented as the solution par excellence (for all problematics, whatever they may be), the Egyptian Jamal Badawi20 took up a very restricted point of view with regard to the positive contribution of non-Muslims, for he only takes into consideration the believers among them, more specifically the believers in their role as members of a community: he affirms for example that ‘this21 does not exclude all the good points and contributions made by other communities of faith’; if his formulation is technically positive with regard to non-Muslims, it is nonetheless evidence of a condescending attitude toward them. In general, over and above the formal respect extended to the people of the Book, there exists a type of indifference or condescension or an attitude that admits little value for the others, or is frankly critical of them. With regard to Christianity, for example, the example of the conference on The Da Vinci Code has proven to be particularly illuminating. And if such an example were taken as an extreme case, still it is not uncommon to hear someone speak of various aspects of the

20 A prolific author on a variety of Islamic subjects (women, interreligious dialogue, leadership, other things), founder of the Islamic Information Foundation in Halifax (center for promotion of a better understanding of Islam in Canada), conference held July 10, 2004, Kensington Town Hall, London. 21 He is speaking of the fact that Islam is the solution par excellence for all problems.

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matter in an effort to affirm Islam by opposing it to other confessions. Thus the devotees of the religions of the Book appear in turn to be given a high value and then a low value by the members of the Brotherhood, although some among them, rare nonetheless, are sincerely involved in interreligious meetings or hoping for a return to Christianity in Europe, since that would indicate a return to more spirituality and morals. Besides this, the Koranic idea of kufr (that refers to the action of those who reject Islam despite the fact that they know it is the truth) continues to be associated with non-believers, although this use remains limited, as if the Brothers preferred to close their eyes, not seeing this reality, in order not to start arguments. Recognizing the pejorative nature of this term, most mb members are more likely these days to speak of ‘nonMuslims’ (ghair muslim) in order to refer to believers or non-believers of all sorts, indiscriminately, excepting their brothers and sisters in Islam. Despite this change, the term retains its negative connotation, if only because it is marked by negation, related to exclusion from the community of Muslims. Thus the Other is not in the first place considered on a footing of equality by all the members of the movement, as if there was something connected to the sharing of a single belief, which would interfere. And relationships with other persons, whether believers or not, remain in general very limited at the institutional level as well as the individual level, even if, in Great Britain above all, attitudes are in the process of being modified and people are more audacious than in other places: while existing collaborations are all the more rare (for example inviting such and such a non-Muslim academic or militant to a conference, so that he or she may express a point of view on the theme chosen by the organizers), the militants of the Muslim Association of Britain and the British Muslim Initiative (who are often the same persons) are trying to break open this isolation. They are establishing stronger and stronger connections with activists of all kinds who are interested in the struggle for human rights and justice, especially in Muslim countries.22 A young sympathizer confirmed for us that there are real differences of vision within the movement: many militants are in favor of 22 After having participated in the Stop the War Coalition composed of pacifist militants against nuclear power and various trades unions in 2002, to protest the war in Iraq and the occupation of Palestine, some members of the mab got involved in another coalition that brought together political figures, religious leaders, unions and human rights campaigners to demonstrate in favor of freedom of religious and cultural expression. See especially http://www.bminitiative.net/ (the creation of the abovementioned umbrella organization, the British Muslim Initiative having its own larger objectives).

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involvement as a civic activity, but others appear not to be ‘open to the question of whether it is really necessary to open up toward the West, because they are still asking themselves the question, whether they should fight or make peace with those who reject Islam’.23 Still, one partisan opined that the choice of working on the concept of citizenship constitutes at this time the dominant line of all the movements close to the Brothers. For him, this may have begun in connection with fairly superficial ideas, but the general direction is now firmly rooted in people’s mindsets.24 An article by the French Muslim of Italian origin, Omero Marongiu, goes beyond these observations: he dissects the two opposed paradigms that characterize the vision and the relationship that Muslims maintain with regard to their environment (the paradigm of conflict and that of cohesion). He is trying to propose very concrete paths in an effort to assure that every one may live together on better terms, and proposing basic principles, taking the position that what Muslims need above all is more intelligible discourse [Marongiu, 2005]. In the face of the reciprocal forms of separation that are often observed between Muslims and non-Muslims, Tariq Ramadan has also positioned himself as a bridge between civilizations. As a critical observer with a privileged status, he is working on behalf of the necessary (re-) adjustments that would permit better understanding and coexistence of cultures, but his positions are not shared by all the members of the movement. In an article titled ‘Manifeste pour un nouveau “Nous”. Appel aux Occidentaux musulmans, et à leurs concitoyens’ (Manifesto for a new ‘Us’. Appeal to Western Muslims, and their fellow citizens), which he has posted on his website, he now adopts much more critical positions with regard to his coreligionists than he had done previously. He says that the latter group should get more involved with their own fellow citizens, although he continues to signal a particular role for Muslims. According to him, in fact, European Muslims must continue to play a guiding role that is quite specific because they are now called to “reconcile their fellow citizens with their own ideals”. According to him, the modalities of Muslims’ involvement must change, because they must perform the labor of a midwife with regard to Europeans, who have forgotten their

23 24

Interview no. 56. Interview no. 46.

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own principles. The idea that Muslims are the future of Europe is a postulate that can be constructed in many different ways.

4. In favor of recognition in the light of past and future history Behind most themes that concern relations between civilizations, we find once again the question of a Muslim identity, of a renaissance for this identity, its preservation and its consolidation as a particular individual and collective identity. We have here to do with a true leitmotiv, and, par excellence, with what is at stake in cultural terms. This is apparent in the many forms of involvement by the Brothers. On one hand they are involved in pedagogical work within communities which is intended to constitute strong and proud Muslim identities. On the other hand, they are working in order to gain recognition for Islam and Muslims on the European scene and on national scenes.25 Nonetheless they appear to be doing this while keeping a low profi le, for a part from the organization of a few striking demonstrations (especially against the war in Iraq in London or the annual meetings at Bourget in Paris), they have at the end of the day developed few particular claims and seek above all rather to find accommodations that are personally satisfactory with regard to Muslim law, such as regards the rights and obligations of persons.26 In fact, the point of departure for this concern for recognition is a work of research and intellectual promotion. Thus, beginning with the historical angle, some people are trying to manage to rehabilitate the entire history of the Muslim peoples. Take for example this conference devoted to “the Muslim contribution to civilization” given by Professor Mohammad Salim Al-Hassani.27 In this framework, it is claimed that the contribution of the Islamic heritage to Western civilization has a 25

See 3.2. Interview no. 70. This person explains this with reference to marriage and the particular case of dowry: “As a minority, uhh . . . the Muslims respect Belgian law and at the same time respect uhh . . . the Muslim family code. (. . .) That is, we go the City Hall, okay, there are two witnesses, the parties are consenting . . . It is . . . (. . .) That is: there is complementarity. There is Belgian law, and if there is something specifically religious, uhh . . . it is handled within . . . the family!” 27 Conference given at the ‘Treasures of Islam’ congress, organized by the UMIVA (Unie der Moskeeen en Islamitische Verenigingen van Antwerpen), Antwerp, March 22, 2003. This professor of mechanical engineering, a Syrian, also spoke at training conferences, including one held by the Muslim Association of Britain. 26

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higher value than has been recognized. This contribution is supposed to have been ignored on purpose by the West, in order to allow the West to make more of its own capacity for innovation. Muslim Charafeddine, a Ph.D. in history from Bordeaux, traces the past of Muslims in France going back to the Middle Ages, and speaks of the harmonious relationships then maintained between persons of different confessions in the south of France, as well as certain privileged statuses that Muslims had acquired in that area at that time. In speaking of the glorious past of the Muslims, he makes no apologies. Rather, he took advantage of the occasion to warn his coreligionists, some of whom have a tendency to overvalue the mythical past to the detriment of a real consideration of the weaknesses of the contemporary era: one must look backwards [towards the past], but if your rear view mirror is bigger than your windshield, you have serious problems!28

Over and above the recognition of specific positive things that are proposed by the West, and which are quietly recognized, there also exists a certain bitterness. Today, rather than transforming the reactive relationship to the West into resentment, many Brothers expressed in one way or another a need to deal constructively with History through working in the context of European citizenship, especially working to improve the justice system. For most, this means above all, and in the first place, getting involved at the level of Muslim associations. As Rashīd Ghannoushī says: One day, we will be able to influence the West as much as it has influenced our countries—the world is destined to be one.29

Beyond their real desire for recognition, they demonstrate that they are nonetheless not that interested in being really accepted by Western populations, as if they thought this would happen of itself as soon as a strong and respectable identity could be affirmed.

28 Conference of February 5, 2005, titled The Muslim presence in Europe and during the Middle Ages: history of a contribution, at the third annual meeting of the Islamic Cultural Center of Liege on Islam in the West . . . the glory of yesterday and the challenges of today. 29 Interview no. 7.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

CONCRETE POLITICAL PROJECTS?

The relationship to politics constitutes a fundamental dimension, because the mb through history came very quickly to think of their project for societal reform in terms of the framework of a State. Certainly we have already shown that Sayyid Qutb specifically emphasizes the political dimension, but this dimension was not neglected by Hassan Al-Bannā, far from it. With the idea of the installation of a concrete organization, it is the question of the legitimacy of the State that finally arises. In Europe, the Brotherhood frequently oscillates between two models of grasping politics: at one and the same time “Bannist”, while containing pieces of the Qutbian discourse. Their intention is above all a reform at the level of the individual and then society beginning with a good understanding of religion, but some seek to constitute an elite that would be capable of educating and mobilizing the masses, or of Islamizing the law. Of course, the great majority tries to take into consideration their situation as members of a minority community, but politics is always thought of as the real, ideal, and even utopian motive power of social change. They experience difficulties in taking a clearly defined line. The most radical offer Islam as the “third way” beyond the failure of communism and capitalism, and struggle, sometimes in a very abstract manner, against the tyranny of the power of human beings when they do not make reference to divine prescriptions in order to support their decisions. The most moderate, who are in a majority within the movement, have gradually gotten over their initial malaise with regard to politics in the West. Since the time when the Union of Islamic Organizations in France organized, in 1992, a seminar that brought together a number of scholars around the theme of “Muslims in the West”, certain clarifications have taken hold that make it easier for Muslims to think about their integration into Europe. On one hand, the migration of Muslims toward Europe is now understood that those Muslims who have already emigrated to Europe are “here to stay” and although new “Europeans” continue to arrive as emigration continues, this allows them to plan for real long-term action on the Old continent. On another hand, beginning

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with the effort to go beyond classic geopolitical concepts such as dar alislam (lands of Islam, Islamic territory) and dar al-harb (lands of war), via the introduction of the concept of dar al-daʿwah (lands of preaching) by Fayçal Al-Mawlawi, European Muslims no longer have the impression that they stand before a dichotomy that is impossible to live with, and they see that they can peacefully earn recognition for their presence and their citizenship in Europe. Thus they get involved in many different ways: representing Muslims in the larger society, supporting social claims, sometimes in cooperation with existing trade unions (especially the organization of Muslim Students of France, or the British Muslim Initiative), and in connection with the organization of specific one-time events. We begin this chapter with a few general considerations concerning the abstract relationship that contemporary members of the Muslim Brotherhood have with politics. This allows us to specify their global framework of action. Then, we will take up three themes that are just as important when they are considered as keys to understanding as they are when considered as extreme cases; these will allow us to show the boundaries of Brotherhood perspectives. First comes the question of an Islamic State: this was initially recommended as a cure for the failures of the modern State, but in practice the Brothers do not seem overly concerned by this aspect of things. Second, we have the question of the caliphate as a project whose aim is the realization of Muslim unity. This project is still considered part of current preoccupations, although it seems fairly abstract. Third comes the theme of revolution. This is the antithesis of the principle of the gradual reform of society, and is now considered marginal. All together these themes show that political ideals have been maintained, but the Brotherhood does not publicly support any Islamic political project. Still, once past the radical nature of certain propositions, the claims made and the concrete means of action favored are in the end relatively well adapted to European national contexts.

1. A generally abstract relation to politics For the Muslim Brotherhood, Islam is still considered as a total system of life, which contains some political pretensions even if the necessity of adapting to the context of a non-Muslim majority is quite well recognized. Consequently, they keep alive certain themes of political Islam,

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but they only speak about them discreetly, from time to time, in the form of pieces of discourse with various tonalities. The spectrum of discourse related to politics can be divided into five categories. Here we present them in order of the intensity or scale of the changes each would like to see occur. At one extreme, we get fragments of revolutionary discourse (rare, since we only heard such talk one single time in all our fieldwork). At the other end of the spectrum there is a kind of discourse in which intervention is supposed only to be justified by a level of piety that is assumed at the start, a discourse that positions itself explicitly against any project of revolutionary action, even against political involvement strictly speaking (one mention). Between these two types of discourse, we find discourses that speak about the specific character of an Islamic political system (also one mention). There are also fragments of discourse that sound more like something that would be part of a culture of resistance (a little more frequently mentioned), such as certain speeches by Tariq Ramadan (who calls for an awakening at the level of citizens working together, in all areas of social life) or those, quite different, by the American imam Anwar Al-Awlaki. At a question-and-answer session, he affirmed that even if his position is “irrelevant”, political participation by Muslims must take the form of opposition to the system, with an exception for limited collaboration to solve common problems. For him, political involvement has to do with individual responsibility, and the important thing is for Muslims not to compromise their principles.1 Finally we have observed (fragments of) discourses that we would characterize as pro-Muslim lobbying, a category that contains the great majority of discourses and speeches of the political type within the mb “organisationnel”; most concrete practices and actions carried out by militants situated in this framework. While they recognize the legal framework of European countries, the lobbyists make demands on behalf of their religious communities. Political regimes of lay character cause them to ask many questions, especially in Great Britain, but in principle, for the Brotherhood in France at least, this appears to be looked at as a framework which gives everyone an occasion to express himself.

1 Conference titled ‘Humanity at death’s door—the ascent & descent of the ummah’ at the annual summer meeting of fosis (University of Nottingham, June 19–22, 2003), on ‘The role and responsability of Muslim Students in the XXIst century’.

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The enumeration of all these positions shows that the mb partisans have not figured out how to maintain a coherent political point of view in a society in which Muslims are a minority. The majority of militants integrate themselves, or at least seek to do so as best they can, into the dominant political and social system. They seek to be recognized within that system as actors who can produce positive changes in society. A very small number try to find ways that would permit them to introduce into the heart of the system certain preoccupations and sensitivities that appear to them to be specifically linked to Islamic ethics, while at the same time deserving to be accepted as universal values. For the time being, however, such developments—which would be situated in the direct line of the positive and critical collaboration with the temporal power, this precedent having been established by Hassan Al-Bannā— remain embryonic. In contemporary speeches, analyses speak concretely of social and political themes. In some cases, positions or questions that are directly related to practices in social life, such as the custom of zakāt or Ramadan, have to be reinterpreted as functions of the Western context. In other cases, the practices are personal ones—for example the wearing of headscarves—and their obligatory or optional character has to be evaluated. Or, the matter concerns the integration of Muslims into European society in a more general way. For example, many preachers and partisans affirm the importance of individuals’ taking responsibility, and also the importance of collective responsibility. During election campaigns, an approach emphasizing citizenship is urged, but the reason given is precisely Muslim identity and its promotion. Beyond this, political debate is almost non-existent: theoretical discourse related to political models or systems is only rarely spoken of (this is less true in Great Britain). One might almost say that Islam is most commonly defined as a political reading of religious texts, including a utopian dimension, but then it must also be admitted that within the European reality this dimension, often spoken of, is very little developed or argued out in intellectual terms. Further, there is in general no real discussion of the ins and outs of living together with non-Muslims: the mb only considers the possible satisfaction of the claims it chooses to make, remaining blind or at least having little sensitivity with regard to the reciprocal implications of the rootedness of Muslims in a pluralistic society (the exception to this being the more or less abstract exhortation, that people should fulfi ll

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their obligations as citizens). Still, youth organizations are more and more able to escape from these closed-off perspectives and to open up to the society around them. Finally, it is undeniable that there has been no retreat from political pretensions, and that the mb operates in an effective manner with regard to concrete initiatives, especially as regards the responsiveness of government representatives in relation to the Muslims community; but overall they remain outside the political arena strictly speaking. Certainly, their opposition to the multiparty system appears old hat, and participation in politics is spoken of approvingly, but at the end of the day the mb are hardly involved in party politics, preferring to operate through community-based Muslim associations. In the broadest terms, we have observed that the mb often operate in two ways. On one hand, they promote themselves by the repetition of slogans that hint at complete reform programs. These are regularly mentioned, but without being fleshed out in detail. The Egyptian Jamal Badawi took up the slogan, ‘Islam is the solution’, at an annual conference of the Muslim Association of Britain. He based this proposition on a variety of reasons, among which were rabbānniya (the majesty of God, that imposes God’s will in and of itself, upon everyone), the fact that Islam is a comprehensive life path (without further specifi cation), and that it ‘has a sense of balance’ as a religion that gives fundamental guidance to human beings and offers practical advice that is fully capable of helping them obtain what they seek.2 Thus religious and social considerations constitute the basis of this argumentation, without our being able to identify within it any concrete element that would allow us to grasp the underpinnings of a program. In the same way the imam and preacher Ahmed Miktar intones the same incantatory formula in a mosque near Lille: Islam is the solution to many social problems, it produces good citizens who act for the common good, it is a force in society, etc. When asked whether he considered the Muslim in society to be a force or a nuisance, he answered, that if someone was a nuisance, ‘It is because he does not live Islam as a way of life’.3

2

Conference of July 10, 2004, Kensington Town Hall, London. Conference on Islam as a way of life, followed by discussion, Mons en Baroeul, Lille, March 13, 2005. 3

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But on another hand, they stake out their position by making very broad criticisms of society: in the framework of their desire to reorganize the social field, the mb have devoted themselves to a re-actualization of religious motivation in a secularized world, and to an analysis of the modern world in its relation to religious feeling. Hani Ramadan, the director of the Islamic Center of Geneva, has taken his distance from Western modernity when this phrase is taken to indicate that everything that has to do with the business of the world has nothing to do with ethics. He associates this meaning with that of barbarism, pointing out that the 20th century was a period of the hidden exploitation of the misery of the world and of genocides past counting [Ramadan, 2001]. A book by Zahid Parvez of Britain, Building a New Society. An Islamic Approach to Social Change, which is generally on sale at the various mbrelated functions we attended, sums up the contemporary situation by proposing an Islamic methodology to guide and direct social change (especially as concerns the promotion of involvement in the Islamic Movement). In this work a dichotomy of perspectives is made apparent (Islam for example is presented as radically specific with regard to other religions, which are only concerned with the private sphere), secularization remains not only posited as an antithesis to religion, but also as the source of the emergence of materialism [Parvez, 2000:75]; the object is to oppose materialism with a valid social model that can function as a real alternative. Very few partisans realize that there is no real political program, that no concrete problem is really addressed, and that the analysis of the societal context is quite thin. The mb continues nonetheless to carry on, devoting itself to a number of organizational problems: without really knowing where they are headed, they continue to want to advance, one step at a time, as if just to see where it will lead. If the ideal Islamic society remains an objective that most members recognize can never be implemented in Europe, others still feel confident that their efforts will bear fruit: they are betting on the demographic rate of increase of the number of Muslims, and on the re-spiritualization of Islam in Europe, in hoping that their ambitions will be realized in a more or less distant future.

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We have never heard in public any intransigent appeals for the establishment of an Islamic system or State, such as this is expressed in the testament of Hassan Al-Bannā from 1943 [Carré, 1991:176], except for a slim volume by Saʿīd Ramadān from 1961 (re-edited in 1993), Qu’est ce qu’un Etat islamique? (What is an Islamic State?), which remains in evidence, although we do not know how widely circulated it has really been. For all, the Islamic State only concerns societies that are majority Muslim. Still, this project is indeed (re-) formulated during certain conversations, in which a number of subordinate conditions are attached to it, that take into consideration the surrounding social context, that is, the correlation of forces in European territory (majority non-Muslim, but also taking into consideration the hostility of European societies). Th e Islamic state in fact remains a distant ideal: it remains ‘within the heart of every believer’ and young European Muslims are still aware of it. Take for example this young sympathizer, who stated with perfect simplicity, without any arrogance, and without special pleading, his desire to see an Islamic state emerge, while still recognizing that the modalities of its functioning have not yet been concretely defined. He supports the normalcy of his propositions with reference to a parallelism he establishes with other monotheistic religions: This, this will never be debated! For the simple reason that . . . that . . . each . . . I believe, in my opinion, each believer, each militant, except . . . uhh . . . produce proof to the contrary, has as his objective and as his desire to see the day when there will be a State . . . a Muslim state in which he will be able to live his faith, he will be able to live . . . After, everything depends on what you mean by a Muslim state. Okay? Me I think that you are [laughs] . . . you are not . . . no! Please permit me . . . No, I tell you the truth: sometimes I have had interviews with a few journalists of the kind you get with Libération, Le Monde, and all the rest. We know that these are scandal sheets. They are people who have no . . . they are not intelligent enough to understand certain things. And uhh . . . what they do is . . . they use words to frighten society. Me, I’ll tell you about a concept that is true: you can’t be a believer no matter which, hey, Muslim, Christian, Jew . . . and not believe, you might say . . . in the kingdom . . . You see what I’m going to say?.4

4

Interview no. 56.

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In the course of another interview, a young female sympathizer also explains how much she desires the coming of a real Islamic State. For her, this would represent one of the most far reaching of the accomplishments of the Prophet. She believes that things would be simpler for her as a Muslim woman (especially with regard to discriminatory practices or rather to that permanent negotiation in which she feels caught up, which is required of her just in order that she may practice her religion), but also for every person, including non-Muslims, who in such a State would be recognized and respected as members of a minority. In the meantime, although she understands that this project is ‘supposed’ to constitute a fairly clear objective for the militants, she is not ready to get involved directly, especially if that would lead to some conflict with her environment. She prefers positive initiatives, limited, but quite concrete, that help people, especially those in distress. Such initiatives embody the spirit that would be developed under an Islamic system. For the rest, she maintains her position and clings to her aspirations although she shows that she is conscious of the reticence of European societies. Finally, although she is a member of the dynamic Muslim Presence, she here expresses her substantial disagreement with Tariq Ramadan, for whom an Islamic state does not constitute an ideal; she appears to have difficulties understanding his position, especially in view of the fact that she believes that this project represents the best social arrangement for everyone, including non-Muslims. She explains: Ah, there you go: for him: out of the question! That’s it, in fact. Yes yes. Yes. Ah . . . well look, that’s a good example! I have the impression (okay now I’m going to put words in his mouth but . . . well, anyway . . . I suppose that you will ask them the question . . .). Me, I have the impression that for him, in fact, you can . . . is it that we must or that we can? ? ? I don’t know . . . we should, we can, I dunno . . . uhh . . . being Muslim in a country is therefore uhh . . . non-Muslim and well . . . never making any claims . . . If you like, in fact, never working in the sense of . . . come on now . . . in . . . how can I say it? In the direction of the creation of an Islamic State. But then . . . And there, me, I say it clearly: uhh . . . I mean ‘everything’ . . . but I mean every Muslim, myself!, um, well . . . I don’t know . . . this might shock you . . . I mean, myself, is it clear when you know how to say it? When you know . . . when you know all the good . . . when you know all the good things, all the beneficial effects, in fact, that Islam has on you as a person, well it’s clear that you want to live it on an even larger scale. And it’s clear that when you are proud of something, well you want to share it with others. And it’s clear that when you know . . . Myself, I mean, me, in any case I am convinced here today that the best arrangement for me in . . . well . . . the best arrangement is the Islamic arrangement. Because I am convinced that it is right for Muslims

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chapter fifteen and for non-Muslims. Well anyway . . . that . . . when I read . . . how can I say it? The . . . the . . . uhh . . . how can I tell you about them? Well . . . I have read a little of that . . . well indeed in relation to minority rights, I mean: when I was reading, well . . . actually the Prophet how he treated minorities, well, how . . . so the agreements that he made and the company, etc., etc. well I say to myself ‘well finally, me, me personally, I’m going . . . I’m not going to say that I want to create an Islamic State, it’s not that! But I am persuaded that living in an Islamic State and well . . . (Islamic State, not Arab State!). I am persuaded that uhh . . . It’s funny to be saying this to you because you are Belgian . . . No but it’s true, I mean: frankly, I would like it very much if Belgium was Muslim! Why not? I mean where is the problem? I mean: where is the problem? I mean: if our universal values, if they are common to all, why not? That is to say that . . . I am not afraid to say ‘well yeah, that is a dream that I have’. Now, to fight to get there, no, because I know I have 50 years left to live and it’s not going to happen tomorrow and I don’t want to fight for that. Even if we are supposed to, well . . . we are supposed to work today for . . . well . . . for . . . so something happens in 200 or 300 years. Me, that’s not how I do things. That’s not how I do things. But me, I say to myself . . . I mean wait, but just the same an engaged Muslim, when he fights and when . . . when he continues a project, his project, to the end, but . . . but but . . . where does he end up? He ends up all the same at the very place the Prophet ended up at one point in his life! [. . .].5

In mb circles, positions vary with different countries. In France and in Belgium, militants are content to specify publicly that this does not constitute an objective except in Muslim societies, where it would be the choice of a majority (though as this question does not arise with regard to Europe). At the Salon de Bourget in 2004, at the height of the crisis over the question of headscarves, people were heard saying that the uoif ‘refuses to reopen the fundamental questions of society’ (still an implicit manner of recognizing that this idea could disturb certain Muslims). In private, certain persons asked themselves how in practical terms they could manage to build such a State (leaving it to be read between the lines that this is still far off and quite abstract), but others come quickly to the opinion that this is not possible now—that it is even a little ridiculous—and that there’s no point in talking about it in Europe. In Great Britain, by contrast, as we shall see in what follows, these principles remain in general terms the same but discourses sometimes appear more ambiguous.

5

Interview no. 53.

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However this may be, strict respect for positive laws in force is counselled everywhere in the milieux of the mb, even if in reality, relatively flexible practices manage in most cases to cope with two systems of laws. In fact, with respect to purely private matters, especially those within families, it is interesting to note that in principle, Muslim law and respect for it should constitute the first duty of a Muslim. As things stand, some people think that Muslim law is indeed the primary legal system of reference for people, although they are not demanding that the State recognize this law that belongs to a minority. And even when the cefr speaks about the elaboration of a minority jurisprudence, matters are subsequently left to the initiative of individuals; Muslims choose, or not, to follow it in soul and conscience.

3. The question of the caliphate, in suspense With regard to a question that is considered in a more realistic manner, we have observed that the notion of a caliphate, once given great importance, is now marginalized, although it has not disappeared completely from the ideas considered by the Muslim Brotherhood. Hassan Al-Bannā thought that the restoration of the caliphate was not a priority. Here at the beginning of the 21st century, this theme has not been abandoned, but at this time it is only discreetly spoken of, while the theme of Muslim unity is mentioned more often. A Sufi Muslim of the Naqshbandi tendency, relatively close to mb circles in Great Britain, thinks that the caliphate is a question that has become obsolete and is no longer really discussed. He observes that the Hizb Al-Tahrīr6 movement continues to advocate its return, but the mb does not do so; they have taken no more position on this question, because the issue appears to be hazardous, primarily because it would be impossible in concrete terms to obtain Muslim unanimity around a single person, and at any rate local preoccupations take more and more of people’s attention.7

6 This movement stems in historical terms from the Jordanian branch of the mb, but in Europe the connections between the Muslim Brotherhood and the members of Hizb Al-Tahrīr seem strained at best. According to our interviewee, the Muslim Brotherhood have in fact officially announced that they have taken their distance with regard to Hizb Al-Tahrīr. 7 Interview no. 03.

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At a conference given by Azzam Tamimi, a member of the mb of Palestinian origin, member of the Muslim Association of Britain, this kind of half and half position was directly illustrated, with regard to a slightly different matter; the project aiming at the restoration of the caliphate was not put in question in and of itself, unless it should be found to prevent the community from going forward. As an introduction to his speech about the attitudes that Muslims should adopt with regard to Jews, this speaker warned his young listeners about the possible group of problems that might lead to a confusion of priorities, and thus have the effect of causing important points to be neglected. Thus he spoke of conspiracy theories and the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, which he denounced as a worthless hoax. He also cited problems that emerge when the Koranic text is interpreted in a non-contextual manner. Finally he mentioned, and this was the point that interested us, the problem caused by illusory prophecies: from his point of view such prophecies make people dream and prevent them from acting. In his discussion, he directly criticized the Hizb Al-Tahrīr movement and its appeals for the restoration of the caliphate, while one of its members was seated before him. Without directly opposing the principle of an eventual restoration, he criticized those prophecies that speak of the imminent arrival of a Caliph (“their Messiah!”) because such prophecies prevent concrete actions from being implemented, and criticized the fact that militants waste their time and their energy in this way. In a rather cynical tone, he reproached these Muslims essentially with being a bunch of dreamers who, when all is said and done, do not do enough work on the ground, while according to him, urgent challenges confront the community now: “If you wait you are going to be a loser”, he said directly to the member of Hizb Al-Tahrīr. Without going any further, we may observe that above all it is pragmatism that is required, in the opinion of this partisan: the order of priorities must be modified because the waste of energy is detrimental to the work for Islamic causes, and especially the reinforcement of Muslim identity and Muslim community cannot be tolerated. So far from aiming at distant objectives or castles in the sky, it is a question here of getting involved in order to make progress toward concrete objectives through the adoption of properly adapted perspectives and attitudes, as quickly as possible.8

8 Conference on the theme ‘Muslim attitudes towards Jews’, in the framework of a seminar organized by the Friends of Al-Aqsa in collaboration with the Federation of

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On the continent, the same tone is perceptible. The question of the caliphate remains a hidden preoccupation that the mb doesn’t quite know how to manage. It was part of a coherent theoretical grouping in the time of Hassan Al-Bannā, and the Brotherhood is still attached to it; they seem to be afraid to pull one card out of a house of cards, for fear of bringing down the whole. Thus in our interview with Tareq Oubrou, imam of the mosque of Bordeaux, we had the impression that the question of the caliphate did indeed remain a key theme for certain Brothers. He spoke of this without being asked to do so. First he agreed that it was important to him to concentrate his thinking on the theme of politics, and he mentioned the question of the caliphate even before talking about an Islamic State. Overall, for him, the Brothers are paralyzed, if only unconsciously, by this subject and consequently their drive toward integration is blocked by the immediate impossibility of getting untangled from a conception in which the strong link to the Islamic political system leads to consequences that cannot be foreseen. The concern to reestablish a caliphate thus appears to him as problematic and he questions whether a theory of an Islamic State even exists. Oubrou reduces the whole matter to slogans and rhetoric, but recognizes candidly that many Brothers do not agree with him, and think the lack of a caliphate is a fundamental failure in obedience to religious prescriptions, a “sin” in short. A deep theoretical examination must be accomplished in this regard if mentalities are to continue to evolve. A sample: This is what no one will talk about! This organic connection between Islam and the State. Even the people who talk about an integration of the integration, they think that’s just it [chuckles], in an unconscious manner that this problem has not been resolved . . . Legality always rests with the majority, in the khilafat, etc., etc. It is as if: they are guilty of original sin. They are in a permanent situation of sinfulness.9

In the course of an informal discussion with a sympathizer, another illustration was furnished for us of the fact that the theme of the caliphate is still a priority whose modalities do get discussed without their becoming the object of long discourses. For him, certain Brothers reckon that this theme has been temporarily taken off the agenda, while others, as

Student Islamic Societies (fosis) titled ‘Residential course in history of Palestine and its importance to the Muslim heritage’, Islamic Foundation, Leicester, February 23, 2003. 9 Interview no. 54.

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he expresses it, think that the caliphate does not necessarily have to be embodied by one person alone: it could be represented by an elected assembly, following an Islamic consultation procedure. Beyond the concept, various organizational realities can thus be considered, to the end of maintaining the relevance of the principle. These positions are individual stances, and there are different kinds. Nonetheless, they illustrate the existence of a certain return to the question, perhaps even an evolution of conceptions, at least among some who are conscious of the necessity of finding new interpretations for the concept, perhaps even alternative paradigms, and all this without yet knowing how to proceed.

4. Mentioning the theme of revolution The theme of revolution is most specifically associated with the thought of Sayyid Qutb. Nonetheless, some reject the idea that this was part of his theorizing. For example, the dissident “Islamic Marxist”, the Egyptian Hassan Hanafi, thinks that the supposedly Qutbian idea of Islamic revolution was already present in the work of reformist Jamal Al-Din AlAfghāni, who is supposed to have called for immediate political action [Carré & Seurat, 2001:103] and to have endorsed the theme of a world cut in two, the world of Islam and the world of jāhiliyya, ignorance. As we have already pointed out, the theme of education and a promotion of individual reforms, to be pursued in the social environment, with respect for institutions, is widely preferred in mb circles to the theme of revolution. As such, we only heard revolution mentioned two times, in two quite different ways. But in both cases, revolution was thought in terms of a relation of complementarity that would be the equivalent of a type of gradual reform. At a conference on European Islam,10 speaking before a mixed group of Muslims and non-Muslims, linked to a variety of European institutions, Tariq Ramadan, playing upon the double register of change and revolution, as if only the latter appeared to him to be capable of lending weight to his words, addressed a non-Muslim public. He spoke of the “silent revolution” that is taking place, the confluence and profound

10 Conference organized by the Goethe Institute, with various speakers, on the theme Islam in Europe. Integration? Diversity? Or?, Brussels, September 20, 2002.

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emergence of a Muslim dynamic and a Muslim consciousness. For him, young Muslims “obtain the instruments they need in order to speak for themselves” and get involved in politics: beginning with a religious education, the acquisition of the “intuition of the faith”, of an understanding of European reality gained from the inside, and a re-appropriation of Arab terminology, which allows for the rehabilitation of concepts such as Sharia, jihad and ijtihād. Tariq Ramadan has formulated a number of theses that he judges to be strong: he speaks of the universality of Islamic principles, that admit the possibility of different cultures, and thinks that this does not necessarily contradict democracy or modernity, and he emphasizes the necessity of processes of internal democratization within Muslim communities. Without saying so explicitly, he speaks as if the advances that are being made at this time are the result of his action, as if he were testifying to his own major role in a process, and he adopts a tone that is not his habitual one. He affirms his own role as motivator and as one who enlightens: I am only a symbol, an avant-garde of intellectual Muslim citizens [. . .]. I am only an “advertisement” from these respectable and respected Muslims. [. . .] It will also be necessary to discuss things with women. [. . .] The conscience of Europe is sometimes more important among them than among middle-class Europeans in general. [. . .] The era of suspicion must come to an end. We must get to know each other and we must trust one another.

The open attitude of the conclusion could not be heard. The speech was perceived by the audience as a warning. This was all the more bothersome because the intonation employed in the speech smacked of arrogance, mingled with defiance. Tariq Ramadan appears to affirm his own force by shaking up the public; he would like the public to take account of the fact that nothing will ever be the same on the European scene, since according to him the Muslims are on the march, and from now on they will be inevitable. In the hall, the speech had its effect, but went over rather badly. So badly that a man of a certain age rose trembling to speak. He explained that he felt very uncomfortable listening to such propositions, which he considered provocative and even vengeful. Another person began to argue with Tariq Ramadan, and received a response in kind; this was Bassam Tibi, a Muslim academic notorious for his critical positions with regard to Islamism. He denounced the conquering vision of Ramadan and, more particularly, his uncritical re-appropriation of an Islamic vocabulary, for example the concept of jihad, overvalued according to this man in the thinking of the Muslim

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Brotherhood and that of Tariq Ramadan, himself. He reaffirmed his own profession of Islamic faith in order to underline the quality of his right to speak (which he appeared—unfairly?—to think that his interlocutor was denying him), Bassam Tibi denounced the dominant status accorded to a normative and restrained vision of Islam. To this he opposes the legitimate existence of an alternative vision, affirming his desire to obtain, finally, a recognition of Islamic philosophy along with authentic religious liberty: there is a struggle between the fiqh and the falsafa11 that has lasted nine centuries. It is necessary to be clear about terms and to draw conclusions from history. I would like to be a Muslim without jihad and without Sharia. Now in order to get that, I have to be seen as something other than a kāfir.

For him, the formation of a militant avant-garde has nothing positive about it. And since he detects, in the thought of Tariq Ramadan, the shape of the system that strikes a Qutbian chord, Bassam Tibi ends up playing on the same register by denouncing the use of an Islamic term that is pejorative and denigrating, such as kāfir (one who reject Islam despite the fact that he/she knows it is the truth, which allows certain Muslims to be excluded from the community in accordance with certain religious criteria. For him, this arrangement might lead to the denial of all those who do not strictly conform to a normative mold; this would very quickly lead to the non-recognition of intra-Muslim pluralism, and thus must be denounced. The theme of revolution was evoked in a quite different manner at the camp held by the Federation of Students’ Islamic Societies (fosis) in 2003, in an atmosphere of controversy over the British intervention in Iraq. We will discuss the high points of a speech by the black American imam Abdul Rashid, who invoked the model of Malcolm X.12 He stated at the outset that Malcolm was a symbol because he had fought for all causes and had not hesitated to give his life (‘The price of freedom is death’). Then he exhorted the public to struggle actively, including actions against the established order, while still wrapping himself in the mantle of legitimate self-defense. He cited as examples the struggle of black people against their oppressor, such as the police.

11 12

Jurisprudence and philosophy. Speech: ‘Malcolm X: a symbol for youth activism’, Nottingham, June 22, 2003.

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For him, the integration of Muslims into the body politic of Western democracies is not in the process of taking place for a number of reasons. He denounced first the oppressive nature of these regimes; mentioning especially the examples of Bosnia and Afghanistan, he put this question to his audience: “Why would we try to integrate into a system that is oppressing people all over the world?” As his response, he called for a reinforcement of Muslim identity without any concessions, using the metaphor of a cup of coffee; black, it is strong, but it loses something mixed with milk and/or sugar, and when you put in cream, it puts you to sleep. While calling for the creation of an Islamic State, like the Prophet who created an independent State, he rapidly and radically distinguished such a State from the democracies he denounced, in terms of religious considerations, as an associationist system, something which in other words would pretend to compete with divine will. He recalled for young people that this system places man at the center, and not God. You have to understand that democracy is kufr. Democracy is a word that comes from “the rule of the man”, by the people, for the people.

Next he lambasted values that were according to him constitutive of Western regimes, referencing the American situation, the situation of a country that pretends to uphold liberty and civil rights. To give the lie to that pretension, he cited the example of the importation of slaves from Africa. He spoke again of Malcolm X, who had observed that one must struggle for justice and equality, and not so particularly for human rights. As a means of casting doubt upon the existing system, he drew a distinction between “retail terrorism” and “wholesale”: in speaking of the position one ought to adopt with regard to skyjackers, he saw fit to ask who had struck the first blow. He concluded upon a very sharply worded position that rebuffed all questioning of the religious type, and that permitted him to excuse hijackers and Islam: ‘We don’t have to apologize for anything. We’re guilty because we’re Muslims.’ Continuing to jump from one idea to another, he returned incessantly to the importance of revolution. For him, it allows each man to accomplish his destiny in the search for freedom, though he tempered this attitude, saying that Muslims respect the laws of the countries where they live, and their neighborhoods, etc., because this is required by the law (he did not specify whether he was thinking of national or Islamic

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law); a few notes in a universal or conformist key allowed him to win back a few in the audience that might not have agreed with his previous discursive developments. Coming yet again to the question of revolution, he hastened to claim that his speech was not violent, since all that he had said was in effect written in the Koran, where the idea of jihad is also found. To shake up his listeners and to lend credence to his propositions, he once more addressed them in a provocative manner, asking them why they were inclined to avoid the Koranic verses about the Jews (implying that these verses are very negative, and that Muslims fail to address questions that appear problematic, preferring to close their eyes). Finally turning to politicians, he cast doubt on the confidence Muslims place in them: “You trust kuffar, these politicians—you put your life in the hands of a man who does not even pray”. The system is profoundly unjust and only functions on behalf of those who established it. This speech, we remind the reader, is considered completely marginal by us. It constitutes a particular model, having to do with the black American origin of the conference speaker, visibly marked by his personal history and by the difficulties encountered by Muslims after 9/11 in the United States. He should not be neglected, however, for he was present at a three-day camp during which he spoke a number of times, due to the absence of certain other speakers, while still others sometimes adopted very moderate or opposed positions. The audience was composed of several hundred young Muslim men and women, representing the Islamic societies at several British universities—the future Muslim professional class. They were targets for the themes of struggle and opposition to the Western “system”. This speaker’s interventions took various forms, but the substance remained the same, and so did the gaps in it. At the end the impression he created was indistinct, and disorganized with respect to the objectives of the revolution he favored. He stated that the laws in force in any place were to be respected, but he justified violent action by claiming legitimate self-defense or defense of religion, these two appearing to him to be closely linked. For all that, it appears that he favors more active resistance in the face of existing policies or politicians. Finally, we must admit that in his question and answer period he proved more realistic and pragmatic. After having shocked the audience, while some were still reeling, he began to speak in terms of gradual change. More than one listener found himself or herself confused by these sudden changes of direction.

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In fact, the burden of his argument emphasized objectives that are not those pursued by the Western model, which he never stopped denigrating by means of a play of oppositions, while the preservation of a strong Islamic identity continued to be presented as a priority, which must not be compromised in even the slightest manner. His speech was dynamic, but hollow, and he gave the impression of wanting to keep the young people on the alert and mobilized: above all, he wanted to rally them to the cause of Islam, but the poverty of his concrete objectives, reactions more than anything else, was visible to the public. Besides this, at the end of this conference, although his statements were not publicly challenged, certain young participants, in private discussions, shared their astonishment and even their disapproval. At the fosis camp, the theme of a world society cut into two very distinct visions was once more and brought forth and further specified by another conference speaker already mentioned, Zahid Parvez. He presented the Islamic vision of the world as the antithesis of the Western vision by using qualifying terms that were strictly religious. In opposition to the Islamic vision of the world, defined as a vision of divine oneness, or in terms of strict monotheism (based on the use of the term tawhid), he spoke of an “associationist vision of the world” (based on his use of the Arabic Islamic term shirk which can also be translated as polytheism or idolatry). He states: Shirk worldview starts with promises of freedom, justice, equality, happiness, but leads towards the domination of man over man (through manipulation of social structures). Tawhid worldview creates conditions and social structures that are conducive to human happiness, social peace and justice as well as societal development.

This observation, simplistic and manichaean, contains a certain dose of discursive intelligence inasmuch as it overturns utopian conceptions and reality: while the Western vision, “associationist”, is presented to people with many pretty promises, which lead to a form of dictatorship of the strong over the weak, the Islamic vision is described as completely realistic, because it attacks the very causes of problems, and undoubtedly ends up as the ideal society in concrete terms. Thus utopia is no longer utopia. What is real, according to him, cannot be trusted as to the manner of its functioning. Beyond this strictly religious perspective and his observation of this dichotomy, he does not advocate revolution, but rather the necessity of working over time to change society and its institutions. It is certainly

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undeniable that Islam aims at “a fundamental change in society”, and that the important thing is to marginalize materialistic conceptions in favor of a return to God and the human being at the heart of the city, which appears to him to be no more than a just outcome: Allah has been squeezed to the periphery (which is private life only); how can we re-center Allah to the center of society and then squeeze materialism out of the center and have Allah and human being into the center?13

He gave the impression that change could come about through peaceful means, on the basis of existing institutions, but he also knew what the real and even ultimate consequences would be, because he affirmed that the Islamic vision, once established as dominant, would cause different social structures to be erected: ‘If Tawhid is the dominant paradigm, then the social structures will be different.’ Throughout this speech, social life and social change were grasped mainly from a religious perspective, everything else appearing to be secondary, including the fact that Muslims (and/or the whole group of believers? If all, apart from their particular confession, could, if they wished, be included in this “vision of monotheism”) constitute only a minority within British society. While a specific vision of the world is proposed, which is the antithesis of that proposed by the West, in a direct line of derivation from the conceptions of Qutb, this one is presented as conciliatory, because it preserves existing institutions, and realistic: supporting itself, at first, upon existing institutions, the Islamic vision offered here solves the question of means, that it appeared to have so much trouble implementing. Certainly, the dichotomy remains in principle, but in reality, one would support itself upon the remnant of the other in order to establish itself. In the French-speaking world, such debates are at this time quite different, in general much more moderate, at least as regards political speeches with utopian overtones. Certainly, many conference speakers also called for change, but all the more often did we hear discussion of claims and contestation and resistance, as with Tariq Ramadan, that remained within the frame of strict respect for laws and customs currently in force, without ambiguity. The question of a revolution was never on

13 Conference and debate titled ‘The revival of the Ummah: the responsibility of the believers’, Nottingham, June 20, 2003.

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their agenda. For example, we could mention a citation related to initial protests made by Union of Islamic Organizations in France (uoif) against the law prohibiting the wearing of veils and headscarves in schools. Th is practice was perceived as a challenge to certain assumptions on the part of the French people as a lay people, presenting themselves in this case as aggressively nonreligious. Thus at the annual meeting at Bourget in April 2003, Abdallah Benmansour, one of the founding members of the uoif, rose to speak following a speech by Minister (now French President) Nicolas Sarkozy; he declared in a loud voice: OK. We remind you that we follow the laws. We do not break them. But we are going to ask you to change this law, because it is unjust. [. . .] Islam does not authorize us to violate the law. But if the law is unjust . . . nothing is taken away from our citizenship if we express our opinion and assert its truth. Quite the contrary!

And when Tareq Oubrou expresses himself with regard to the idea of ‘revolution’, it is for the purpose of challenging it. Certainly, change and reform are still the order of the day, but they are restricted to the personal sphere, while their social implications are not given the highest priority. He spoke as well of the validity of change beginning with the personal dimension alone, independently of any form of violence (at the conclusion of one of his conferences). A citation: Change yourself and the world will change. Islam does not work according to techniques of revolution, employed by men who want to change everything except themselves. This is not brutality; everything begins with us. I am only responsible for myself; change yourself and the world will change.14

Thus we are once again quite far from the conceptions of Sayyid Qutb, who according to O. Carré thought that political revolution was the key to the entire Islamic Revolution [Carré, 1984:165 & 211]. Respect for divine sovereignty no longer can be assumed to imply a rebellion against any exclusive human domination or against positive laws. These are respected everywhere. They would be criticized the more severely, wherever they might explicitly contradict divine prescriptions. But there as well, the Brotherhood appears rather satisfied with the system in place, because at the end of the day they rarely challenge it.

14 Conference, Principles and bases of a spiritual pathway, Paris, Le Bourget, April 12, 2004.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

STRONG BUT CONFUSED IDEAS

The spectrum of references used by the Brotherhood is extremely wide, because they justify their actions with regard to the Sunni tradition and their carrying forward of the canonical reformist tradition (modern salafiyya). They also make reference to their own heritage, the teachings of their leaders, which are constantly requested by partisans of the movement. Based on this, they train and educate their coreligionists by transmitting to them a global method of interpretation of the texts of Islam, and an ethos of living. By proposing ‘the’ Islamic point of view on a host of questions that have to do with every aspect of life—personal, family related, social and political—, they are recommending a specific way of being Muslim and of acting within the Muslim community and in society at large. They offer a vision of the world that also contains a political ideology and a social doctrine. Some great ideas have marked them, such as the “globality” of Islam, the importance of getting involved in “Islamic work” to bring about a “gradual reform” of society, of making “efforts” to change oneself, to think of Islam as being “the solution”, etc. These ideas touch people’s minds, and represent milestones that define the contours of behavior that is supposed to be authentically Islamic. But beyond the supposed clarity of these concepts, their content is far from always being univocal. A fairly brief, but very regular reminder of a few great concepts that have power to mobilize people, or of “referentials” that one supposes one’s entire audience to possess, does little to dispel the doubts raised by the fact that these concepts remain insufficiently analyzed. Not only have we seen that different positions are sometimes adopted as a function of interpretations from different groups of people, related to personal sensibilities and to contexts that must be taken into consideration.1 When we dig deeper in an attempt to explore certain

1 And even when the same context is in play, the unification of discourse remains a pious wish: the uoif for example attempted in the year 2000 to establish an internal

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questions regarding which unanimity is supposed to reign, we are able to observe that there is a space open for variant interpretations. Such divergences are deliberately kept open and not debated in order that the coherence of the whole and the largest possible consensus may be maintained, at least until the practices themselves began to take the new modalities of the context into account.

1. Comprehensive way = globality of Islam: what does this mean? The contemporary members of the mb propose a comprehensive way. Analysis still shows that the use of this term must be understood in two ways. In fact, “comprehensive” is understood as related to the human faculty of understanding or comprehension, but also as that which encompasses within its meaning the greatest possible number of ideas in one whole. This expression is a return to the classic idea, as it is used among the Brotherhood, of shumuliyya, globality in the comprehension of Islam and globality in the apprehension of the contemporary context. In fact, in accordance with what Hassan Al-Bannā said in the first of his 20 principles, Islam is a complete system that has to do with every aspect of life. Thus, while being qualified in its meaning based on the adjective ‘comprehensive’, whose connotations are quite neutral, this approach operates in the manner of a real matrix for reading and action; presented in very inoffensive and indefinite terms, the globalizing ambitions of Islam continue to be affirmed without there being any hesitation or difficulty, in any forum where such things might be discussed.2 Nevertheless, the ‘comprehensive path’ is not devoid of ideological content. It is related to a pedagogy that would be expected to produce an increasing rate of Islamification in terms of conceptions and practices, even if this is taught along with respect and loyalty toward contemporary European societies. Ambiguities remain with regard to this position, even in the movement: various interpretations are given for shumuliyya, but in interviews no definition other than the one mentioned was ever given that was any clearer. The scope of the term has not been well defined either, and group for reflection on coordinating the diffusion of the discourse of intellectuals in the broad movement around the mb, but nothing ever happened [Marongiu, 2002:89]. 2 It is for example the case on the 10th of January 2008 when the fioe presented its European Muslim’s Charter to worldwide press in Brussels—Navena lists did not question the organizers about this concept.

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so no one really knows what the globalizing ambitions of the founding heritage of the movement of the mb really come down to. The notion, used repeatedly, is never problematized. Questions about the meaning of the ‘englobing’ character of Islam or about the relation between religion and the development of modernity are, however, primordial: they are located at the heart of the controversies that the mb phenomenon gives rise to. What is at stake with regard to this question can be summed up in relation to a double articulation. On one hand, one wishes to know if Islamic involvement has to do with the individual dimension only, or rather with the collective dimension, and in what proportion. On another hand, it is a matter of knowing what aspects of life are involved in this englobing character of religion, by distinguishing elements within it such as religious belief, rituals, social relations, personal ethics and social organization or the organization of a State. In the light of such criteria, it appears that the mb are the product of a historical model in which Islam was established as a collective totality that concerns not only the whole of the collectivity, but also all the aspects of individual or social life that we have mentioned. Thus when they say englobing, they mean englobing in every sense of the term. Given their attachment to the European context, it has become problematic for the mb to know how to pass from this initial model to a model that appears not only to be adequate, but also acceptable to the European context. The diversity of themes and the ways in which they are developed, as we have presented it throughout Part 3, reveals the traditional and relatively utopian character of the Brotherhood’s ambitions, by the side of their analysis of the context and their pragmatism. On one hand, it shows that the Brothers remain attached to a perspective that is relatively traditional. They see reality through the prism of religion in most cases: it is involved, for example, in their view of personal identity, interpersonal relations, and also in the relations between civilizations. Many themes are presented in a form that is identical with that which was put forward by the historical Brotherhood, such as Islam considered as a way of life (that guarantees coherence with regard to individual behavior), the gradual nature of the reforms that must be accomplished, the Palestinian question or support for Muslim unity. Further, they continue in general to think of their project as encompassing every facet of life, that is, including the relations to political

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structures and economic theories that are held to be inherent in the Islamic model: the Islamic State remains for example a theme to be promoted, even abstractly, if only in relation to countries in which Muslims are a majority. In contrast, few new themes are explicitly developed, and most speeches concern questions relative to the practice and not the thought of Islam. Certainly, the Brotherhood talks about citizenship and the necessity of participating in legislative elections in order to increase the influence of the Muslim community, but in general terms there are very few innovations with regard to contemporary challenges. A theme such as that of the new Koranic hermeneutics remains confined to the personal reflections of a few leaders who do not speak about these discussions in public. On the other hand, the breadth of the themes dealt with attests the fact that the Brotherhood continues to hold a maximalist view, because they continue to oscillate between two types of reasoning, two dimensions of their project: ideological and utopian. They have a hard time leaving the second dimension behind, especially inasmuch as some of them continue to call for the reestablishment of the caliphate, or invoke the desire that Islam should be established the world over. By the same token, this illusion is more or less maintained based on the conservation of the collective dimension of perspectives, especially when they work in favor of recognition for Muslims as a religious minority in dealings with European institutions. This utopian dimension is also perceptible in a number of statements that are fairly subtle and that allow for discreet criticism of the existing system, along with a proposed alternative. We should recall in this connection the speeches mentioned that had to do with the promotion of an Islamic State or with revolution, those that portrayed Sharia as fully applied with regard to the smallest intentionally articulated realization within Islam, or that endorsed the wearing of the hijab or the practice of the custom of zakāt, constitute so many arguments capable of examining the process of assigning values to things in a society articulated upon the basis of other regulative principles. No great principle appears to have been really abandoned; at most they are grasped according to new modalities or set aside as objectives that do not have a high priority. The maximalist perspective of the Brothers stem from their founding principle, according to which Islam is an all-encompassing system. In their eyes this point of view is now justified just as much by the demands of the social context: for them, it is now the globality of the context that

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is presented as necessarily entailing the globalization of action.3 Implicitly, this means that the globalizing perspective constitutes an idea whose time has come. Action must continue to be thought as global, even increasingly so, in order to prove itself equal to the challenges it faces. It follows that this principle can find its second wind, because it is the context itself that justifies the global responsibilities that Muslims have a duty to take up. A few discreet changes in perspective confirm the actual restriction of the utopian character of the Brotherhood’s project. Certainly, their claim to influence continues to concern mainly the level of Muslim communities and not all of society; they are not much for proselytizing outside that community. In the community, they continue to get involved in a great number of areas. It appears inconceivable to them that religion should be looked on as something that is only personal and spiritual, and this is all the truer in view of the fact that most of them are completely caught up in Islamic grass-roots work that benefits Muslims. Religion and politics thus continue to be thought of as complementary, and this relationship obtains in a variety of ways. Personalities such as Tareq Oubrou, Tariq Ramadan or Omero Marongiu try to establish the foundations of an ethical Islam,4 which would put forward certain principles that might lead to action; the Brotherhood clings in general to a pragmatics of action in which they make concrete adjustments to their political ambitions. Certainly, they continue to repeat slogans and social criticisms that take in a great deal of territory, but in the end these are very abstract. They have proposed no coherent political program, but they take their stand in terms of a quest for recognition that is to be gained from the societies in which they live: they want to be recognized as legitimate positive actors, based on the specific abilities and values they possess. As a result, their politics is relativized, and becomes one dimension among others, while the question of identity becomes

3 Conference by M. N’Gazou on Freedom and Responsibility in Islam, Le BourgetParis, April 2004. 4 The Dominican E. Platti has made a distinction, often ignored, between personal religion (spiritual religion) and ethical religion in Islam, which is much harder to integrate into modern society than the strictly spiritual and personal attitude [Platti, 2000]. We note that this concern for the collective certainly appears to echo a denial of individualism, such as was formalized in the writings of Sayyid Qutb. According to him, individualism brings atheism in its train, and the moral dissolution of the West, etc.

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the main goal, one which appears more important now than the evocation of great political ideas from the past, such as the denunciation of the Western imperialist invasion, the struggle against a ruling class in Muslim countries, or the battle against materialistic atheistic systems. These are still spoken of here and there, but they are mentioned in rather a minor key and/or based on propositions which, instead of denouncing, arguments in hand, content themselves to speak about how just and how equitable, how much more balanced for human beings is the Islamic system. We are thus watching an attempt to disengage from radical politicization: the vast majority of the Brothers either translate radicalism into individual affirmation and pride in collective identity, or content themselves with personal correct practice associated with a pedagogy of the example. In this context, they make claims of a legal nature, especially as regards family law, but their initiatives still attest flexibility in their relationship to Islamic norms. In fact, the Brotherhood are more interested in concessions from the legal system of the State just because they no longer endorse the pure and simple application of Sharia as they once did. They limit their pretensions while attempting to maintain the viability of the myth of the Islamic project, but they know that the illusion is less and less convincing among the members of the movement in Europe.

2. Difficulties involved in thinking of oneself as a member of a minority among other minorities The Brotherhood has some difficulties with regard to their current status, because they still consider their relationship to non-Muslims in terms of majority-minority; but they are gradually separating from the conception of a dichotomous relationship between the two components of that equation.5 Moreover, they also have difficulties in establishing real partnerships with other parts of society. To think of oneself as a minority is one thing. To think of oneself as a minority among other minorities is something else. 5 Omero Marongiu explains the present difficulty Muslims have in thinking of themselves as a minority, recalling that from a historical point of view this situation could only result from a loss of political hegemony. Rather than having people continue to think of themselves in terms of majorities and minorities, he considers the importance of thinking in terms of ‘citizens with different sensibilities’ [Marongiu, 2005].

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Since the heritage is thought of as a legacy that is relatively open to interpretation and to the continuation of ideas, a reservoir of meaning from which each may draw as he likes, inconsistencies appear. In fact, certain themes continue to be grasped in the classic manner, such as Islam as a way of life. Many others have been re-appropriated in various ways, according to different tonalities: there are large variations with regard to basic orientations that take shape regarding action and discursive content of the ideological type, and there are boundaries here and there, which also run between networks and local groups. And these can even be sources of tension between them. Their ideas no longer appear in definite terms to those outside the movement, but this is often true for members on the inside: their ideas are nebulous. We will give a few concrete examples. With regard to homosexuality, the Brotherhood generally subscribes to traditional Islamic thought, which refuses to admit this phenomenon. Their position is that there is no possibility of recognizing homosexuality, especially not as a natural predisposition that simply occurs in some human beings. For some members, it appears to be a fashion or perhaps the result of social pressure. And so occasionally an association of homosexuals will denounce the homophobia of their positions. And yet, at a demonstration that the Brotherhood organized in London in support of Palestine and the end of the war in Iraq, they found themselves shoulder to shoulder with gay organizations. Obviously, this gave rise to discussions at the European level, in which people wanted to know if the Brothers of Great Britain had acted correctly in accepting this participation, because this action might cause some to think that they had begun to tolerate or to admit homosexual practices. Azzam Tamimi, one of the promoters of that demonstration, a member of the Muslim Association of Britain, justified the action by saying that it was obvious that the Muslims of his association were not going to demonstrate in favor of gay rights—because that would contradict the faith and the choice of lifestyle of Muslims—, but that in this particular situation, they had simply decided to be pragmatic and to allow this participation in the name of the common struggle.6 Thus they avoided any debate on the subject.

6

Interview no. 71.

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With regard to the question of the recognition of lay society, that is, secular society, there was at first no clear-cut position, except from a historical point of view. We have already mentioned the fact that ‘laicity’ is considered by the Brotherhood as very problematic because they are confronted by a denatured lay society, motivated from the outside in the interest of ends that are above all imperialistic, promoted by certain minorities that are privileged by these colonial advances they favour. Since their emigration to Europe, their conceptions have run up against their experience. Certain members see now that the secular character of institutions can function as a guarantee for living together in pluralistic societies. But not all appear to share this optimism. Public demonstrations took place when the law of March 15, 2004 was passed in France, the law that prohibited the wearing of headscarves in schools. Differences of opinion broke out among different national associations within the Brotherhood: the uoif was conciliatory with regard to the decision arrived at legally; the Muslim Women’s Society (mws) and the mab put together a campaign called ‘Assembly for the Protection of Hijab’ (also known as Pro-Hijab). This was an attempt to use all possible legal means to protect the right of women to wear headscarves according to their own convictions. The idea was “to prevent the prohibition in places where it might be adopted, but also to end the prohibition in countries that had already enacted it”.7 Thus the British are inclined to contest the matter and they seek to carry out actions at the European level, while the French, the people who are most concerned, accepted the legislation fairly quickly, while still considering it to be unjust. “Laicity” remains a strange concept, something to be suspicious of because it is not well understood, among the British, while the French are trying as best they may to grasp the implications of the concept in their environment. As for the respect that must be shown to the Prophet, the Muslim Brothers very probably share a similar concern. And yet this idea is not always expressed in the same way. In fact, on the occasion of the affair

7 An inaugural conference was organized on July 12, 2004 (in the presence of Ken Livingston, Lord Mayor of London, Yūsuf Al-Qaradāwī and Tariq Ramadan), also present representatives of several dozen organizations (fioe, isb, fosis, Muslim Council of Britain, Association of Muslim Lawyers and also Liberty for Human Rights and the National Assembly Against Racism, etc.). In September about fifty participants also went to Brussels, in order to call upon European parliamentarians to address their concerns. This was not very successful.

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of the cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten, the reactions from the French and British organizations were quite different in thought and attitude. The uoif called for calm and for keeping the pressure on via a national petition calling on the French President to intervene to “guarantee the dignity of citizens of the Muslim confession”. The uoif also threatened to bring a complaint against all the French media outlets that published the cartoons (and did it). Avoiding making this a strictly community problem, the mab also appealed for calm, but organized a demonstration in London on Feb. 11, 2006, in which Muslims and non-Muslims both participated. Unity of viewpoints, standing against Islamophobia and hate speech, was expressed there without regard to one’s particular religion. On its website, the mab expressed its dismay and pronounced itself shocked by the situation, and the organization also hailed and supported the decision made by certain media companies not to publish the cartoons. Finally, in an article that appeared in the Manchester Guardian on Feb. 10, 2006, the president of the mab said that the cartoons had nothing to do with freedom of expression, but were incitations to religious hatred; the defenders of the freedom of expression, who were also heard from in this matter, minimized that which Muslims consider sacred by holding up another form of the sacred. Adopting a provocative tone, he demonstrated by the argument of reductio ad absurdum, that the defenders of freedom of expression should also contest the laws that make it illegal to deny the Holocaust, or the laws against hate speech (‘Indeed, if freedom of speech were really the non-negotiable absolute in the west it is now claimed, then we would expect there to be uproar at legal bans on Holocaust denial or laws against incitement to racial hatred [. . .]’). Even in relation to the Palestinian question, one of the themes about which there is the most agreement among the Brothers, tensions are perceptible with regard to perspectives and actions decided on. In fact, they hold the historical position of being the first defenders of the Palestinian cause. And, in Europe, they continue to act favorably toward that cause in many ways, especially by humanitarian action. But tensions now exists between the Muslim Association of Britain and the Union of Islamic Organizations in France (and also the members of the League of Muslims of Belgium): according to one of their militants, the first organization devotes 20% of the energy of its militants to this question, but the second does not want to get involved politically nor to

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make Palestine a priority for action;8 the Muslim Association of Britain cannot accept this position, because it considers such an attitude as a kind of defection from the ideals of the Brotherhood and evidence of cowardice. In addition, other tensions appeared between different youth organizations at the time of the commemoration of the Holocaust and the visit to Auschwitz and organized by Father Shufani in May 2003. Several members of the executive Board of femyso (Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student Organisations) conducted a very animated debate in which personal positions were very clear-cut and reflected the divergences between the sensibilities of the French and the British. The French thought that it was a duty to remember, and to participate in a larger effort to assume and to re-appropriate for oneself the entirety of European history in order to become more fully citizens of Europe; so they decided to participate in the initiative. The British considered the whole thing to be completely foreign to their history, and considered that they owed nothing to anyone in this regard. It appears that this question is still closely associated to the Palestinian question, because for some people any recognition of the past of the Jewish people would be tantamount to recognizing the legitimacy of Israel, in one way or another. For them, only a commemoration of all genocides, including that inflicted upon the Palestinian people, could be considered, 9 and so they refused to take part in the initiative. On the French scene, young people from the association Muslim Students of France (emf), members from the Bordeaux section, got into a lively argument with members from the Lille section. The people from 8

Interview no. 47. This speaker thinks that the differing positions of the two organizations is not linked to a fundamental difference, but only to internal considerations of the uoif, who lack assurance as regards the recognition of the presence of the organization in France. He thinks that in France, such involvement could put the organization at risk: On the question of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, we don’t want that to be brought home to French or European territory . . . that doesn’t stop anyone from supporting . . . by feelings, that doesn’t stop anyone feeling responsible. But we don’t want it to be the priority. The mb make that a priority, one of their priorities. So, uhh . . . we started taking our distance and doing a new reading, repositioning in terms of several questions. So we said to ourselves: we have to take our context into account. We are in a particular situation. It’s up to us to set in place the pillars that will allow our group to survive. 9 Interview no. 63 (among others).

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Lille could not understand why the people from Bordeaux got involved in such an initiative, seeing that many other causes deserved to be supported just as much.

3. Confusion concerning connection to the modern salafiyya current of thought and hidden tensions with the Wahhabi-salafists We have said that the mb presents itself as in a close relation to all the currents of thought that cross the Muslim world, and that they claim a place at the intersection of all currents. With regard to each tendency (especially Sufism, Salafism, and even liberal rationalism), they say that they are on a never-ending quest for the ‘middle way’. This stance allows them to think that they are close to all the tendencies, and so they can emphasize at the same time their own encompassing character, including the concrete possibility of realizing their dream to unite Muslims and their orthodoxy. According to them, the latter is assimilated to the authenticity of their practices: they are not only part of the continuity of practices extending back to the first generations of Muslims (the salaf al-sālih), they also claim to be in continuity with the intellectual current of the modern version of salafiyya, an Islamic reformist movement from the second half of the 19th century that re-emphasized the importance of the founding sources of Islam and criticized traditional religious worship. Analyzing the situation on the ground, we must say that the content of these affirmations, that function as so many slogans, still appears relatively vague. Further, they even appear to give rise to contradictory situations that are problematic for partisans of the Muslim Brotherhood who are trying to confront the challenges of the contemporary context. And thus we will now speak of the manner in which the Muslim Brothers, themselves, described their relationship to the historical current of the modern salafiyya, and to the contemporary current of Wahhabi-Salafism, attempting each time to establish a critical point of view. To conclude, we will attempt to see where the lines of tension are situated in the European movement of the Muslim Brotherhood, an organization that has perhaps always tried too hard to be all things to all Muslims, thus running the risk of being nothing in particular.

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Modern salafiyya Among contemporary partisans, the connection between the mb and canonical Muslim reformism (modern salafiyya) remains quite active. This continuity is attested in the interviews, and some even think that it is the Brotherhood that has made the most specific contribution, and the most innovative one. This aspect is emphasized by the former president of the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe (fioe), Ahmad Al-Rawi: he explained, without giving details, that the mb represents a historical stage of development, because they came up with new ideas, as they followed in the footsteps of the reformists. 10 Another partisan thinks that most militants share an idea that is frequently mentioned, according to which the mb has gathered within itself all previous contributions (and has also gone beyond them somehow): they are supposed to have taken over the entire reformist tradition because they emphasize its practical accomplishment, including its theoretical and intellectual aspects. This reformist heritage is thus thought of as having been ‘synthesized’ and ‘theorized’ by the mb.11 The Tunisian Rashīd Ghannoushī believes however that their intellectual contribution takes shape as, and passes through, action above all: the mb emphasizes its organizational and political aspects; by the same token, they have thus transformed the reformist movement, which was rather intellectual, into something more complete, into a way of life: It’s a new ijtihād which is try to adapt the Western technologies, the Western sciences through Islamic culture without change the essence of Islam. So Ikhwan Al-Muslimin are part of this and is an evolution of Islamic though and Hassan Al-Bannā represent a very important step in this development. Hassan Al-Bannā passed forward the Islamic reformism into politics, machines of work and changes . . . So he added to this development the notion of organisation, organisation because reformism before Hassan Al-Bannā was a trend of thought. But Hassan Al-Bannā transformed this reformism not only in a way of thinking but in a way of life through the organisation.12

For his part, Tariq Ramadan maintains just as solidly the connection of the mb to reformism in his thesis, in which he wrote of those he called ‘mujaddidūn wa islāhiyyūn’ (“those who renew and who reform”). He

10 11 12

Interview no. 29. Interview no. 39. Interview no. 07.

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distinguishes them clearly at the beginning from reformists supporting a liberal Islam strictly turned toward the West [Ramadan, 2002]. In this book, he depicts the mb of history (and above all Hassan AlBannā) as in continuity with their own reformist predecessors. Without identifying every break or source of tension, he seeks to prove to what extent the mb are not only accomplishing what was initially hoped, but also completing, and even giving perfection to the dynamic. It is not only the logic of the reformists that finds itself “prolonged”, but the mb are presented as seeking “to realize the objectives” of reformist thought. His point of view thus remains, in principle, similar to that of the historical mb. Tariq Ramadan concentrates on emphasizing the elements that are in continuity, basing his argument on similar content or approaches. Three themes represent this continuity, and constitute for him the basis of reflection for many contemporary intellectuals. First, there is the necessity of a return to the Koran and to the Sunna, and interpretations of these sources that are in phase with their context. Second, the fact of conceiving and organizing resistance to political, economic, and cultural colonialism in order to preserve the Muslim identity. Third, the elaboration of a strategy of the social and political type that might preserve the unity of the Umma and prevent the Muslims from being made into slaves [Ramadan, 2002:36]. Within this framework, he next attempts to show that some of the contributions of the mb were taken over from certain great reformers:13 the desire to return from sources linked to a rational demand in Al-Afghāni, insistence on education in the writings of ʿAbduh, the idea that the nature of action must change, and special emphasis on a caliphate in the work of Rida. The dynamics begun in the field of social action in other Muslim countries, that is, initiatives for organized resistance led by Saʿīd An-Nursī (1876–1960) in Turkey and by ʿAbd Al-Hamīd Ibn Bādīs in Algeria (1889–1940)—where an independentist (pro-independence?) consciousness was born in the name of Islam—as well as the importance seen in spirituality and engagement by the Indian Muhammad Iqbāl (1873–1938), have also been developed. 13 We note for example that Tariq Ramadan never speaks about the reformist contribution of the Syrian Abd Al-Rahman Al-Kawakibi (1849–1902), who criticized the Ottoman regime, and whose concerns turned him toward Arab nationalism and Arabism (these problematics are probably judged of little importance by Tariq Ramadan, who appears much more concerned to affirm the Islamic and universal character of reformism).

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At the end of his analysis Tariq Ramadan explains that the mb (and first and foremost Hassan Al-Bannā) do not think the West is diabolical. He maintains this position over and above observations about the bankruptcy of the West (connected with its negligence and its refusal to remember God) and their conclusion according to which the future now belongs to Islam, whose civilization will bring the world the solutions that it lacks. The author reminds us of how much the mb aim at the reform of society, not the overthrow of governments in which cultural and identity-related matters are found at the heart of their preoccupations. For him, thanks to the action of the Brotherhood, “the great tradition of reformist Islam has thus remained alive” and the ideas of Hassan Al-Bannā have been communicated to every corner of the Muslim world [Ramadan, 2002:459]. The impact of this position taken by Tariq Ramadan is very important, especially for hundreds of young people who are situated at the center or somewhere near the Muslim Presence organization, which we have situated at the margins of the movement in Europe. This perception is so dominant that the reference to reformism becomes for them the fi lter of comprehension, even the condition sine qua non of an eventual partial recognition of the mb heritage. Hassan Al-Bannā enjoys a privileged status, while the whole of the mb heritage is eventually relativized, ignored or discredited, especially as regards its contemporary organizational dimension. Here are two examples. First we have a young man close to the publishing house of Tawhid in Lyon, who thinks that it is the connection to reformism above all that allows the mb heritage and their project to retain a certain relevance. While taking his distance from the contemporary mb, he has re-appropriated more or less the thought of Hassan Al-Bannā, in terms of content, though he distinguishes between historical periods and the present day, and is conscious of the adaptations necessary to bring this thought into the light of the contemporary context. He explains: At this time, today, if we speak about the mb, and in particular of Hassan Al-Bannā, it is because he was part of a tradition of reformists, that today we think that in our context, I think that his discourse is valid. Now, he, he thought deeply, he . . . developed a thought, in his context. And today it is necessary that we . . . by drawing inspiration from many things that . . . that he put in place, we must realize that, according to our context. As he did what he did according to his context. And there you are! After, the mb,

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chapter sixteen there was the mb of Hassan Al-Bannā, at the time of Hassan Al-Bannā, and there are the mb of today. It’s different.14

On another hand we have this young woman, member of the inter-associational platform Muslim Presence, and for her it is also the theme of reformism that makes her admit some interest in the mb, though she is not as close to them as the previous interviewee. In fact, without knowing about the details of their thought, she proves quite reticent when the idea of a connection between herself and the dynamic she is part of and the mb is spoken of. She thinks that they are quite foreign to her, for she knows little about them and their ideas are perceived as coming from outside. They are thus judged inappropriate with regard to the local contemporary (Belgian) context. She recognizes that the organizational movement of the mb in the past had a certain relevance, but she now thinks that this is no longer well adapted to the contemporary context (like any very particular organizational connection, which also shows that she does not consider the dynamic Muslim Presence as constituting a separate organization). She shows that she is conscious of the traditional character of the reformist movement (and she also connects the Brotherhood to that tradition). For her, the only source of interest is the manner in which the mb interprets religious texts. She affirmed that she has a personal interest in this traditionalist reformism, but she is also interested in the movement represented by the new rationalist Muslim thinkers. This young woman is constructing her own personal path, attempting to combine a variety of sensibilities that a priori are difficult to reconcile. Paradoxically, she does not question the idea of the all-encompassing character of Islam, as endorsed by the Brotherhood, and now associated with the spirit of reform, such as this is presented by Tariq Ramadan. Going further, we could perhaps say that she does not seem to realize that the interpretative reading of the reformists that she likes is more closely associated with the mb than with the reformists strictly speaking who, beyond the ‘solidity of the foundations of their theological discourse’ [Nafi, 2004:47], never really developed a concrete method of approach to textual interpretation. This intervention shows as well that ideas endorsed by the mb seemed to be picked up by people without their being consciously aware of it. In fact, the interpretative reading of Islam by the mb now finds itself assim14

Interview no. 32.

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ilated to the reformist heritage although the vision of Islam as ‘englobing’ was not part of it, strictly speaking (compare, precisely, the critique of Hassan Al-Bannā on this point, mentioned by R.P. Mitchell). Personally, I do not sympathize at all with the Muslim Brotherhood movement. I am sure that it was once a movement that had . . . that perhaps had legitimacy at a certain time. But I’ll tell you: today, frankly, I don’t know any of them . . . I don’t even know them . . . I don’t know what the Muslim Brotherhood thinks! Except for, well, basic things: ‘the Koran is my constitution’, and that sort of thing. You see? But I’ll say that it is not at all . . . that it is not at all adapted to . . . to the actual context. If by contrast, we place the movement of the Muslim Brotherhood in the line of the reformers, traditional, well then that might be interesting! To the extent that . . . I don’t believe that one can sympathize with a . . . with a . . . (movement?) . . . with a movement that is quite singular but one can sympathize with the . . . uhh . . . with the ways in which they interpret the text, you see? I would say: you can base yourself on the typology that Ramadan sets up, you see, even if it is . . . it can be criticized . . . it can be criticized because there is . . . there are certain . . . it . . . it needs to be revised, at certain levels. For example, I think that one could never . . . set up categories based on that typology15 . . . ! OK, is such and such a person, such and such an association is part of a literalist political movement or supports purely traditional literalism, or is part of a pietistic movement, or supports rationalist reform in attempting . . . or traditional. Me, personally, maybe I don’t sympathize anymore with the traditional reform position because the importance of going back to the sources, but also rationalist, huh, you see? To a certain extent, do you see? I am very interested by Arkoun and by . . . and by . . . and by Nasr Abu-Zaid. Not by Soheib Bencheikh, even if [. . .]. So, you see? I think that . . . I think that the categorization is more relevant in terms of ‘relationship to the text’ but in terms of the Muslim Brotherhood ‘movement’, phooey.16

Such a great number of positions developed within the Muslim Brotherhood movement, just in relation to the modern version of salafiyya, attest the persistence of the belief in the connection that is supposed to have existed between the historical Brotherhood and the reformist movement. This persistence nonetheless appears abusive now, although it is not completely without foundation. On one hand, the differences and even divergences between these two historical dynamics are deliberately set aside. Nonetheless, both of them come from very different approaches: the reformists were primarily

15 This speaker mentions the categorization established between six major tendencies who derive their thought from Islam [Ramadan, 2003:49ff.]. 16 Interview no. 53.

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intellectuals but the Brotherhood emphasized above all an Islamic action that was originally well argued in doctrinal terms although this may perhaps appear less and less true. However, very little information related to the particularities of the two dynamics has come to light: at the end of the day they appear not to be known in detail, something that facilitates the transmission of misconceptions that we have often encountered in the course of our research. But the net result of all this is a benefit for the Brotherhood, which thus enjoys a prestigious anchorage in the intellectual history of the Muslim world. On the other hand, the persistence of some of these misconceptions does not reckon with the distance that today separates the contexts of the inheritors of the movement of the Brotherhood in Europe from those of the reformists of the past. In fact, in a context in which there are ongoing tensions related to the necessary readjustments that must be carried out with regard to religious thought and practice and the liberal expectations of an enlarged society, what can we do with these ideas that once could mobilize people, but now are obsolete, ideas that promote among other things cultural resistance or a return to the caliphate? The difficulty of rooting out such ideas, which are in fact still endorsed by certain partisans of the movement, appears to constitute, from now on, a serious obstacle to addressing the real problematics that sharply confront contemporary Muslims? Doesn’t this insistence on the heritage of the modern salafiyya create, despite itself, gaps in the general approach to contemporary requirements? Certainly, the testimony of the two young people heard here shows how important it is to them that action takes the contemporary context into consideration. But we will have to wait and see how far the relative traditionalism of many partisans of the Brotherhood itself ends up being communicated to the younger generations, in a situation in which few major intellectual developments are taking place. Wahhabi-salafism When members of the Brotherhood were asked directly about their relations with the Wahhabi-Salafists, they admitted that there was tension in the movement. Actually, certain Brothers went out of their way to emphasize the other side of things: some underlined the fact that all Muslims are brothers, and some attempted to minimize things, saying that there are Salafist Brothers and Salafists that support the Brotherhood. Some pointed out that the Brotherhood movement shares a

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number of conceptions with the (Wahhabi-)Salafists, without going as far in some cases (especially as concerns choice of clothing, which for the Salafists is related to the practices of the Prophet). Other Brothers expressed frank and sustained doubts, underlining the particularity of the Wahhabi-Salafist tendency, and especially its exclusiveness, though even they recognized that it was also a reform tendency, like the historical tradition of the canonical salafiyya (Muslim reformism). Partisan members of the mb thus attest a certain distance but also a certain malaise with regard to the militant Wahhabi-Salafists. Sometimes this is because they are thought of as defending a static and reactionary vision of religion, and are incapable of facing the challenges with which the contemporary world confronts them, especially the pluralistic nature of some modern societies; such positions are probably accentuated because of pressure that has been placed on the Brotherhood in a Western context, especially since September 11, 2001, as concerns their presumed connection to terrorism. It may also be that the Brotherhood thinks that they are difficult to maintain relations with or to negotiate with. This position is connected to the fact that the Brothers are themselves sharply criticized for their laxism or even their promotion of innovations (the Wahhabi-Salafists would like to eradicate every late contribution to the original sources of Islam, holding them to be unacceptable), for their method of operation, perceived as strictly particularist and partisan, for too much involvement in politics (detrimental to the faith and insufficiently committed to the principle of uniqueness, the tawhid), etc. Some mb partisans thus speak of a clear distinction between the Wahhabi-Salafists and every other Muslim tendency, as exemplified in the words of this militant woman who is making the fact of belonging to the movement of the Brotherhood banal: all Muslims have been influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood [. . .] except the Salafists and a few splinter groups, everybody is a little bit mb.17

In fact, the Wahhabi-Salafists represent a problem for the Brotherhood, especially because they are opposed to each other with regard to a certain number of primary conceptions and doctrinal positions held by their respective movements. So the (Wahhabi-)Salafi sts put forward exclusivist, even sectarian or inquisitorial attitudes, according to which they will be the only ones to be saved, or to pass beyond (even among 17

Interview no. 40.

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Muslims); they indiscriminately accuse Muslims from other tendencies of being unbelievers in various ways, and decree in summary fashion their expulsion from Islam (the takfīr). The status that is supposed to be conferred upon them in this process could lead to violence, if they successfully argue that revolt is a religious duty for them when the State is not considered as an Islamic State. The Wahhabi-Salafists also think that they should be loyal to Muslims, while rejecting the Shiites, and sometimes professing disdain or even hatred for non-Muslims; they reject the work of the Brotherhood on behalf of their work for the integration of Muslims into European societies. They appear to be inclined to promote a break with other systems: they would prefer to see Muslims shut themselves off from the society around them, so that their cultural identity will be protected and to lower the risk that they may be “contaminated” by atheistic ideas that are in the air, and perceived as incompatible with Islam. The Brotherhood can hardly be reconciled with such discourses, because they usually stand for openness with regard to European societies while still promoting a reinforcement of Muslim identity. But the Brotherhood generally maintains discretion and refrains from speaking of their relations with the Wahhabi-Salafists (whom they refer to only as ‘Salafists’, a gesture that tends to minimize the importance of the gap between them). Criticisms are not often expressed; the Brothers give their opinions in a slightly muted fashion on this subject. It appears that they concentrate almost exclusively on the priority and the ideal of Muslim unity, and they would not like to be led to undermine it themselves. This principle is all the more sensitive a subject because the two movements share after all a history and common concerns. We have cited the fact that they try to promote a program of self-purification and changes in society, but they share a concern for revitalizing the sources of Islam and its religious practices. From an organizational point of view, they share a common historical experience, that of politically literalist salafiyya, which nonetheless ended up breaking free from those who had inspired it and even from those who had initiated it (in the mid-1980’s). From an intellectual point of view, their respective scholars have also sometimes turned out to be true sources of inspiration for each other, and authorities of reference for the militants of one or the other tendency. Now, it is possible that changes are in the process of happening. Among the mb, the restraint may become modified into allowing tensions to emerge into the open (at least towards outsiders of the movement).

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On one hand, in fact, criticisms do get voiced, in the margins of certain conversations. This happens when some Brothers speak about the disasters that Wahhabi-Salafist ideology causes among young people who following it break completely with society, and are thus completely unable to function within it; this situation partly justifies the get-involved policy of the Brotherhood in communities, which counters these influences, which are perceived as causing damage, especially to young people, but also to society as a whole. We have also heard such protestations made explicit by persons in Belgium, for example, where the Salafists managed to infiltrate and then simply wrest away two worship centers that were initially built and financed by the Brotherhood. The latter were thrown out without being able to do anything about it, to their chagrin. So, there is a real competition, and it seems appropriate to do whatever is necessary in order to safeguard one’s boundaries and zones of influence. On the other hand, we are obliged to observe that the Wahhabi-Salafists are in other ways useful to the Brotherhood, especially with regard to European state institutions. In fact, they function as a measurement of worth for the Brotherhood with regard to European societies. Because the Wahhabi-Salafists are there, the Brotherhood looks more like a serious dialogue partner, and an available one, while other Muslims will not even accept a seat at the same table. Within this framework, the Brotherhood might be more willing to separate itself from its initial positions as regards the priority principle of Muslim unity, and make a small exception just this once for a tendency that causes so many problems. Despite all the rhetoric produced, it is possible that a break is gradually taking place in people’s minds, because what is at stake may be the advance of thought and the integration of Muslims into Western society, even into modernity itself. These things may come to seem more valuable than a last ditch defense of the principle of unity, which appears to be more and more difficult to maintain. In the meantime, the use of the term salafiyya within the Brotherhood-inspired tendency generates a certain confusion, but this also is considered useful by the Brotherhood in the sense that it allows real tensions and dissensions at the heart of the Umma to be camouflaged. Their perspective on integration has become even more important than it was before, because in the effort to promote Islamic authenticity, initially promoted by the mb, the Wahhabi-Salafists have stolen a march, and are proving more and more to be real competitors.

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chapter sixteen 4. Nebulous, transitory ideas?

At the conclusion of his research concerning the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the sociologist Z.W. Munson said that the major characteristic of their ideology is its lack of a distinctive character or of ideas that are sharply contested. For him, this is what guaranteed the success of the Brotherhood: the fact that they expressed themselves in familiar Islamic expressions that were already widespread and simply conformed to the popular understanding of religion and the prescriptions of established religious scholars, nothing more [Munson, 2002]. From a historical point of view, the situation of the Brotherhood in Europe appears to be quite different, because in relation to the context, it is not possible to say that the ideas of the Brotherhood “lack a distinctive character”. On one hand, in fact, they integrate easily into Muslim communities where a summary, traditional and pietistic understanding of Islam predominates, often colored by superstition and local beliefs; Muslims that came to Europe in the waves of labor migrations did not try to mix religious beliefs and social practices, because they restricted their religiousness to a strictly private context, trying not to make waves and to be as discreet as possible. On the other hand, Western societies during the 1950’s and 1960’s had barely begun to understand the Muslim world: the Westerners did not know much about Islam or the Muslims. At first a kind of indifference was the norm, but this was replaced soon enough during the 1980’s by a fear of Islam generated by the Islamic Revolution in Iran. In the light of international notoriety, the identity of the Brotherhood came to appear to many Muslims and Europeans as high profile, and that made some afraid. Nonetheless, thanks to their activity in the area of education, the message of the Brotherhood has affected the entire Muslim community at a very deep level. It has made progress and has shown that it knows how to change itself in sensible ways: using simple principles, the Brotherhood tries to reconcile spirituality, religious practice and involvement in society. Their public concern for Muslim unity appears capable of defusing tensions between different Muslim communities with different sensibilities. In so far as they are preoccupied with the promotion of better citizenship among European Muslims, they try to be the best allies of the non-Muslims. It appears at this time more and more important to establish the parallelism that exists between this and the observation of Z.W. Munson: the Brotherhood has been successful at diffusing its ideas throughout the whole group of Muslim communities. But as they try to

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adapt these ideas to contexts, and as this proves to be possible and necessary, they maintain a certain nebulosity with regard to positions that might become the objects of controversy. The ideological project no longer exists. The utopia is no more, though it has not completely disappeared. Between the two states, the Brotherhood appears to have difficulty in taking over the entirety of its historical heritage, difficulty in taking a unified stand. The Brotherhood thus follows a line of action and pragmatism, in which they limit the scope of the collective and place a portion of the content in parentheses. They are situated in a transition period in which they really no longer have a model to propose, and they are looking for the foundations of a new reflection to be pursued, without this being much concerned with a contemporary reflection on fundamentals that is based on the mode of constitution of the sources of Islam and their readings. Even though these things are debated at the center of current scientific research, the Brotherhood appears to follow them from a great distance, preferring the company of traditional scholars. They do already offer paths that lead out of the impasse in which some already think they are trapped. The Brotherhood is moving from projects on a global scale to projects on a micro-global scale: the key to the survival and the perennial character of their Islamic project is found in the details of daily life. There is where the secret of their Islamic message is to be found: wherever they are, whatever they do, they insist that there is a way to apply all of Sharia, the way of Islam as a whole. And the project of an Islam with globalizing pretensions finds itself sustained at least in terms of individual practices.

CONCLUSION

At the end of this voyage to the country of the Brotherhood, it must appear to us that the final result is still very complex. In fact, the move to Europe by the Brotherhood at first preceded and then accompanied the great waves of Muslim immigration toward Western Europe. Most of them arrived as political refugees or as students, many coming from the Machrek, and they had lived—and some still live—in the hope of returning to their own countries, in which they also hoped to see a change of regime. Most of them have gradually changed their outlook. Th ey were forced to by a number of things, especially by the coming of new generations to whom they wished to transmit their values, and for whom they felt responsible in some way. We will now review the various elements that have characterized their presence in Europe, and the degree of their influence upon the European scene.

An honored memory that is more and more distant The historical contribution of the Muslim Brotherhood remains a reference for many European Muslims, at least for those who situate themselves in proximity to this school of thought, which now claims the allegiance of a majority of Muslim militants of Arab origin, without limiting itself strictly to that group. The Brotherhood has clearly contributed to the forging of the mentalities of these European Muslims, even if most Muslims who are aware of their patrimony take their distance from it, or are more and more indifferent to it. Among the partisans, the historical memory of the movement, still living, is honored, especially with regard to its tragic episodes. Th is historical memory is also reworked as time goes by, inasmuch as events or persons that might compromise the movement are pushed aside. There is a denial of certain violent actions in the past: the Brotherhood present a whitewashed version of the history of the movement, turning aside from its implications in relation to the war in Afghanistan, and also from the accusation of laxism in comparison with the activities of dissident groups (especially Hizb-Al-Tahrīr and Al-Muhajiroun), even

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in Europe, that have promoted the idea of jihad, and that have not hesitated to serve as gateways, sending young people to fight in Bosnia, in Chechnya, and elsewhere. The Brotherhood does not answer questions about these connections, because they are dissident elements in relation to their contemporary projects, and in relation to their endorsement of the ideas of the necessity of dialogue and mutual recognition. Overall, the movement is still considered as a pantheon of intellectual figures and militant personalities of reference, the first and foremost of these the founder of the movement, who remains an exemplary figure. The Brotherhood was at the origin of the creation of a real tradition that has been renewed again and again, and even modernized. This tradition insists on the necessity of an Islamic religious education that is appropriate to its context, and on the necessity of respecting the precepts of religion in every area of life. It also insists on the importance of spirituality and religious practice.

The motivation of a very active minority The Brotherhood continues to affirm that it is militant, that it is working on behalf of Islam and the Muslims, and doing so essentially through the activity of associations, concentrating on education and organizing within communities. The Brothers offer a global method for being Muslims in Europe. They adapt their discourse to this context in order to promote their objective, which is consciousness-raising. They affirm an Islamic orthodoxy that appears to be coherent, and their practices have become a standard that is an inspiration for militant activity. They work very hard at promoting an Islamic identity that is proud of itself, strong, full of meaning and initiatives that are tailored for the contemporary period. They address themselves to the entire group of the members of the Muslim community, to whom they offer basic Islamic education and the teachings of the Brotherhood, all while attempting to inculcate a sense of individual and collective responsibility with regard to religion. They try above all to remain at the level of the average Muslim, even if some of them believe that they belong to a sort of elite. They constitute an active minority in the sense that Serge Moscovici gave the term, but they appear to have difficulty grasping their role at the center of the community. They are torn between proposing a pedagogy of the good Muslim and putting forward concrete contents, that

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are situated between ideology and Utopia. They conceive of themselves as pedagogues, or, eventually, even guides that wish to help their coreligionists better understand their religion and become more fully human, but also as vigilant men, aware of what is at stake, who sound the alarm when necessary and do not hesitate to roll up their sleeves. They appear to want to think of themselves on one hand as an exemplary group of witnesses and interpreters, but on another hand as a sort of militant avant-garde that mobilizes the community and seeks to maintain a level of control over changes taking place.

Organizational success and increased visibility The Muslim Brothers are neither an evanescent reality nor a homogeneous structure. By the side of their traditional structures, they construct modern organizations, relatively hierarchical in nature, that are more and more visible. They make an appearance on the national scene of most countries. They play a non-negligible role as the representatives of Muslim communities in their relations with public institutions. They carry out intense and even feverish organizational activity: they have played a central role in the implantation of Muslims in Europe, and they try to react more or less instinctively to events, varying the level of their involvement as situations require. They reap a certain dividend from all this, in the form of public recognition from European States. Among the many Muslim actors on the European scene, the mb appear to be the ones that perceive the necessity of coming to grips with the framework of the institutions of nation-States, and those of the Europe that is under construction; without necessarily showing that they understand how much leeway they have and all that is at stake, they push forward. They are perhaps more able than other actors to mobilize a cultural and a social capital: they have available in fact a certain number of motivated militants, and they control a social capital that comes from networks of connections, allegiances, and friendships inherited from their traditional organization. The mb furnishes leadership, since it is a relatively structured entity that shares a common culture, ways of living and ways of doing things. Their implantation in Europe did not follow a planned strategy or some sort of plot involved in a cloak and dagger infiltration of the Continent. Certainly, they sought to make a place for themselves, and to make their presence known in a specific way to Muslims in Europe, but

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we have underlined the pragmatic character of their action, as this is sustained across many essays and attempts.

Strong but unclear ideas, under tension that is not discussed A movement without momentum In parallel with their large involvement as religious actors in an institutional and association-related context, the Brothers play a privileged role as well in the formulation of discourse. They openly spread Sunni orthodoxy, influencing religious consciousness via the diffusion of a method for the understanding of texts, placing a high value on Islamic practices, and encouraging more spirituality. They share most of the conceptions of traditional Islam, but also state what Muslims should be like, in their view: they value a Muslim ethos that affects every area of life, whose aims have a collective basis—or shall we also say, an ethical one. After several decades of Islamic work, the Brotherhood has brilliantly succeeded at insinuating their conceptions into the heart of the community of believers, without many of them quite realizing how this happened. In fact, their interpretative reading of Islam appears widely shared in the community, at least as representing an ideal Islam toward which all should tend. This is now associated with the reformist heritage, whose modernizing characteristics appear appropriate to the demands of the contemporary context, all while the Brothers regularly seem to be seen promoting conservative positions. This militant involvement rejoins ethical prophecy, the foundation of Islam, re-actualized by Hassan Al-Bannā. Here it becomes normalized and routine, aiming at convincing the largest possible number of Muslims—and in this, it has succeeded fairly well. The Brotherhood draws fairly heavily upon the thinking of the Brothers of history, but this thought is applied in new contexts that make a new outlook necessary, and the creation of innovations. Everywhere, they try to adapt their discourse to contemporary situations, even if in only formal terms, in order to get a hearing and in order to accomplish their objective of making people more conscious of religion. They develop intellectual elaborations that are transitions in a stepwise progression. They still boast some strong ideas, but these are not explicated in detail: they function now as so many slogans to rally the faithful, even if

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they are rarely capable of functioning as the basis of arguments. Instead of offering an explicit ideology, they propose an utopian horizon for action, but more important are the interpretations differentiated based on the same reservoir of meaning. Their managed interpretations sometimes give rise to tension within the ranks, or between different currents within the movement. These concern questions such as the right way to have an effect on politics in a non-Muslim country, collaborations to be set up with persons of whose behavior they may disapprove in principle, the greatest possible transparence that can be given to the movement, the endorsement of a caliphate, the proper place for young people, etc. But their speech remains muted. The tensions never spill over into open public debates. These are then all the more conspicuous at times; but the entire heritage is never the subject of debate. In general, though, the nebulosity maintained in speeches appears to constitute a resource that the Brotherhood profits from, since it makes it easier to obtain the allegiance of the largest possible number of people. This situation makes it possible to keep alive an ideal horizon of action. The heritage thus retains referential scope of authority, enough to pursue and to sustain involvement on behalf of Islamic action. Loss of some force, but no swan song yet Thanks to their dynamism, the mb remains important in Europe. They give the impression of being stronger and more numerous than ever, but they also appear to be an organization that lacks momentum, for a number of reasons we will now examine. From a strictly organizational point of view, the Brothers find it hard to leave certain modes of command structure behind; but these modes are not transparent and fail to make enough of a place for young people. The latter are becoming less and less interested in the Brotherhood’s structures, partly because they are quite demanding in terms of mobilization of militants. In general, we have seen the militant path progress in orienting itself toward forms that lie at some distance from its original ones; less directive and more punctual in terms of investment, and today’s militants get involved in the community in many different ways. All these changes call in question the way in which they continue to uphold the classic transmission of militantism as exemplified by the mb of history.

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From an ideological point of view, the Brotherhood finds itself faced with a general re-evaluation of the grand principles that marked the hours of Islam’s political glory, while the legitimacy acquired by the intellectuals of the historical movement seems to be receding into the past. What is more, they appear to have difficulty elaborating a way of thinking that is really in phase with the contemporary context, for despite their best efforts, their positions in the face of current events and their theoretical elaborations appear to be insufficient, irrelevant, even incoherent. Certainly, certain militants propose interesting pathways for reflection, but more often these are pushed to the periphery of the tendency, and are tolerated, not recognized within the trend of the majority. Still more fundamentally, the latter has had difficulty in finding a place for voices that without necessarily being radically innovative or avant-gardist, do not hesitate to emphasize divergences of opinion and the pluralism of the movement. In fact, despite the place given to sometimes provocative speeches, the movement is suffocating because of its inability to create a place for really adversarial debates, unless this should take place in one or another small circle. Islamic thought should be openly discussed, including at large popular meetings organized by the organization. Since the potential for renewal of the movement is limited today, the most stimulating advances in Muslim thought now occur outside the movement. The militants of the movement appear to be fairly indifferent, unable to perceive what is emerging, still embryonic, contemporary Islamic reflection, which has made an approach to new Koranic hermeneutics. Thus, although the Brotherhood have appeared relatively innovative, from a historical point of view, but in matters of religion they have become traditionalists. And their efforts in favor of reinforcement of Muslim identity and Muslim communities now seem to conflict with their concern about integration into civil society; they are anxious to insure some application for Muslim law, and they strongly promote this, even if only in limited areas of the law. From an ontological point of view, the identity of the mb is being called in question, from both the individual and the collective point of view. Faced with questions from every direction, this identity has difficulty affirming itself in a clearly defined manner, and in relation to the positions of the members. In terms of the categories established by the sociologist G. Bajoit (distinguishing assigned identity, engaged identity, and desired identity [Bajoit, 2003]), various sources of tension explain

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why the Brotherhood identity continues to be expressed in muted tones and labors to affirm itself upon the public stage. First, the assigned identity is negative, because the European context is generally mistrustful and even hostile (even though the past identity of the movement is little known to the average Muslim and non Muslim, certain people become emotionally attached to it). Second, the engaged identity (that is, such as this is concretely developed by the mb) is all at once broken, in transition, and marked by various changes that are sometimes at cross-purposes. There are reinterpretations of the initial heritage that now coexist, none of which predominate. Third, and as a result, the desired identity never appears clearly conceived. Apart from fragments of reflection in one area or another, sometimes mutually antagonistic depending on the protagonists, there does not appear to be a clear vision that emerges, that is potentially viable. The European identity of the Brotherhood remains in suspense, waiting to be worked out. M. Halbwachs, a sociologist of religion, points out that all religious innovations are subordinated to the imperative of continuity [Halbwachs cited in Hervieu-Léger & Willaime, 2001:191]. As it happens, given the weight of the past identity and the identity assigned to the Brotherhood, the latter are called on to adapt themselves in a fairly radical manner in order to respond to the demands of the contemporary context, which might seem difficult to imagine for a certain number of the members of the movement. In this relatively hostile framework, past and assigned identities are sometimes transformed into restrictive elements that make the emergence of engaged and desired identities very difficult. Meantime, it is clear that in its formal modalities the engaged identity already appears to be different from the past identity, especially with regard to the secretive nature of the movement, something that is progressively being left behind now. This development appears to be inevitable because there is a real incompatibility between the secretive aspect (which pushes the organization away from the social environment, not only perceived as a fact, but also as a value in itself [Simmel, 1996:131]) and the fact that integration and active citizenship are recommended. The richness of the socialization engaged in by the members of a secret group counterbalances the fact that they have to isolate themselves from the rest of society, but really opening up toward society makes it obvious that secrecy is incompatible with the context.

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All these tensions are masked off within the movement, especially inasmuch as it is experiencing increased competition from other Islamic organizations. In fact, the Brotherhood showed its force when it threw itself into the struggle against traditionalist religious forms, marked by a certain folklore and localist practices. But they are nowadays in a weak position on the international scene, especially because of the WahhabiSalafist tendency. The Brotherhood matches up badly with them, and they are caught in their own game regarding who is the most authentic, after having been one of the first to preach a return to authenticity. Whatever may be the outcome of this relationship, at any rate the Brotherhood’s own ranks appear to be producing people who are gradually outgrowing it, something that would allow the organization to maintain a certain force, including force beyond themselves, and in some sense against themselves. In fact, beyond the current inter-generational crisis, their channels of religious transmission have allowed them to train a certain number of young people, who while taking their distance from the organization, are still able to feel the influence of the historical organization. The Brotherhood had therefore prepared, almost unwillingly, their relief column, although they could not confine it to the initial structures. A certain renewal of the elite, even limited, exists, even if this eventually assumes the form of dynastic generations, the children of . . . The Brotherhood is thus passing the torch, despite themselves, but this too is in continuity with their heritage. And thus they remain present, in a way.

SOURCES

1. Original sources a. List of interviews and profiles of persons interviewed No. Interview Date

Place

Sex

Nationality

2002 No. 01 No. 02 No. 03 No. 04

16 May 2002 17 May 2002 19 May 2002 20 May 2002 (A) 20 May 2002 (B)

(UK) London (UK) London (UK) London (UK) London

M M M M

?/UK Q-News Tunisia fosis UK (ex-fosis) Palestine fosis

(UK) London

M

Egypt

(UK) London

M

Palestine

(UK) London

M

Tunisia

No. 08 No. 09 No. 10

21 May 2002 (A) 21 May 2002 (B) 22 May 2002 23 May 2002 01 Nov. 2002

(UK) London (UK) London (UK) London

M M M

Liban Syria Egypt

No. 11

02 Nov. 2002 (UK) London

No. 12

No. 18

19 Nov. 2002 (A) 19 Nov. 2002 (B) 20 Nov. 2002 (A) 20 Nov. 2002 (B) 21 Nov. 2002 (A) 21 Nov. 2002 (B) 21 Dec. 2002

No. 19

22 Dec. 2002 (UK) Glasgow M

Egypt

No. 20 2003 No. 21

28 Dec. 2002 (BE) Verviers

Algeria/FR

22 Feb. 2003 (UK) Leicester M

?

No. 22

23 Feb. 2003 (UK) Leicester M

Iraq

No. 05 No. 06 No. 07

No. 13 No. 14 No. 15 No. 16 No. 17

Organisation

(National branch)—mab— wamy (idem)—mab— iipt idem—cefr

(UK) London

M

?

(UK) London

M

Egypt

(UK) London

M

Palestine

(UK) London

M

Iraq

mwh—mab idem (idem)—mab— wamy Palestine Return Centre Muslim Aid (ex-fosis) National branch?Daʾwah Mag National branch?—mab amss—iiit

(UK) London

M

Pakistan

isb—ymouk

(UK) London

M

?

Al-Muhajirun

Pakistan

(ex-ymouk), isb, (mab) (National branch)—mab jmf—uoif

Palestine

(UK) Glasgow F

M

Friends of Al-Aqsa mab

316

sources

Table (cont.) No. Interview Date

Place

No. 23 No. 24

(UK) B’ham M Egypt (UK) Sheffield F&M Syria

Islamic Relief mab

(UK) Manches- M ter (UK) Manches- M ter (UK) B’ham M

Algeria

(ex-mss)—mab

Libya

(National branch)—mss (ex-mss)—mab

(FR) Strasbourg M (FR) Le Bourget M

Morocco Iraq

(FR) Le Bourget F

France

(ex-aeif) (National branch)— fioe—cefr emf

(FR) Le Bourget

France

Islamiyya.net

(FR) Le Bourget M

Algeria/FR

Tawhid—pm

(FR) Le Bourget M

?/FR

jmf

M M

Tunisia Libya

F

Palestine

F

Egypt/UK

M

Syria

National branch (National branch)—mss National branch?—mab ex-ymouk— ex-fosis (National branch)— Talāʾiʿ—cefr

No. 25 No. 26 No. 27 No. 28 No. 29 No. 30 No. 31 No. 32 No. 33 No. 34 No. 35 No. 36 No. 37 No. 38 2004 No. 39 No. 40 No. 41 No. 42 No. 43 No. 44 No. 45 No. 46 No. 47 No. 48 No. 49

24 Feb. 2003 25 Feb. 2003 (A) 25 Feb. 2003 (B) 26 Feb. 2003 (A) 26 Feb. 2003 (B) 09 April 2003 19 April 2003 20 April 2003 (A) 20 April 2003 (B) 20 April 2003 (C) 20 April 2003 (D) 03 May 2003 19 June 2003

(FR) Paris (UK) Manchester 20 June 2003 (UK) Nottingham 21 June 2003 (UK) Nottingham 08 July 2003 (DE) Aachen

Sex

16 Feb. 2004 (FR) Lille M 29 Feb. 2004 (FR) Paris F 01 March 2004(FR) Paris M 07 March 2004(BE) Liège M 10 March 2004(FR) Lille M 19 March (FR) Paris M 2004 (A) 19 March (FR) Paris M 2004 (B) 25 March (FR) Paris M 2004 (A) 25 March (FR) Paris M 2004 (B) 25 March (FR) Paris M 2004 (C) 10 April 2004 (FR) Le Bourget M (A)

Nationality

Iraq?

Organisation

FR Tunisia Algeria FR FR Algeria

jmf—uoif lffm (uoif) (ex-aeif) jmf—uoif jmf—uoif fioe

Morocco

(ex-aeif)

Tunisia

National branch

Morocco

uoif

Algeria/FR

uoif

Iraq

(National branch)—fioe

sources

317

Table (cont.) No. Interview Date

Place

No. 50 No. 51 No. 52 No. 53 No. 54 No. 55 No. 56 No. 57 No. 58 No. 59 No. 60 No. 61 2005 No. 62

10 April 2004 (B) 11 April 2004 14 April 2004 22 April 2004 25 May 2004 (A) 25 May 2004 (B) 26 May 2004 27 May 2004 07 June 2004 15 June 2004 (A) 15 June 2004 (B) 16 June 2004

Nationality

Organisation

(FR) Le Bourget F

Algeria/FR

pm

(FR) Le Bourget M (BE) Liège M ULB Brussels F (FR) Bordeaux M

Algeria/FR Morocco Morocco/BE Morocco

jmf—uoif emf—uoif pm uoif

(FR) Bordeaux M

Algeria

uoif (iesh)

(FR) Bordeaux (BE) Brussels (BE) Brussels (CH) Geneva

M M F M

Morocco Morocco Morocco/BE Egypt

emf Adl waʾl Ihsan jmf—pm (Islamic Center)

(CH) Geneva

F

Egypt

(CH) Geneva

M

Egypt

European Islamic Conference pm (National branch)

29 Jan. 2005

Sex

M

Pakistan?

No. 63 No. 64 No. 65

(UK) Birmingham 05 Feb. 2005 (BE) Liège 04 April 2005 (BE) Liège 06 April 2005 (DE) Aachen

M M M

No. 66

07 April 2005 (BE) Brussels

M

No. 67 No. 68 No. 69

12 April 2005 (BE) Brussels 13 April 2005 (BE) Brussels 14 April 2005 (BE) Brussels

M M M

No. 70

04 May 2005 (BE) Brussels

M

No. 71

05 June 2005 (BE) Brussels

M

No. 72 No. 73

13 June 2005 (BE) Brussels 30 Sept. 2005 (NL) Leiden

M M

Morocco/FR? emf—uoif Algeria (Islamic Center) Syria (National branch)—Talāʾiʿ Tunisia Academy Al-Khayriyya Syria liib Morocco/BE (Islamic Center) Morocco (Charity for the Promotion of the youth)—Union of mosques bx Tunisia (National branch)—liib Palestine (ex-fosis), mab Morocco/BE (Islamic Center) UK? Islamic Foundation

b. Conferences, various presentations and interviews A stay in Cairo (16th October–24th November 2001): various interviews with researchers (Ivesa Lüebben, Patrick Haenni), and the director of the centre for political and strategic studies at the newspaper Al-Ahram (Nabil Abd Al-Fattah), a permanent member of the website Islam-on-line and Gamal Al-Bannā (independant thinker and brother of the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood movement), met at the Fawziyya Foundation. Annual meeting of Muslims in France, organised by the Union of Islamic Organizations in France, uoif (Parc des expositions du Bourget—Paris, 10th and 11th of May 2002) on ‘Islam: which reading are we talking about?’.

318

sources

– Contacts with various people working in Islamic libraries and publishers, Islamic humanitarian organisations etc. – Conferences by: – Lahj Thami Breze, president of the uoif: ‘The word of the uoif’. – Ahmad Jaballah, theologian, director of the Parisian section of the European Institute of Human Sciences: ‘The Importance of Science (comprehension) in Islam’. – Ahmad Al-Rawi, president of the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe: ‘The role of Islamic Institutions’. – Hassan Zaki, professor in jurisprudence at the European Institute of Human Sciences (Nièvres): ‘The mutable and immutable in Islam’. – Sheik Abdallah Basfar, professor for reading the Koran and jurisprudence in Saudi Arabia. – Mohsen N’Gazou, in charge of education at the uoif: ‘How to understand the Sunna?’. – Sheik Abou Al-Yazid Al-Ajimi (Koweit University): ‘The best approach for understanding Muslim dogma’. – Mahfoud Nahnah, founder of the Algerian Hamas movement, who became President of the Society Movement for Peace: ‘For an authentic comprehension of Islam’. – Amro Khaled, presenter on the Iqra channel, ‘Aspects of the companions’ behaviour’ – Hani Ramadan, director of the Islamic Center of Geneva, on ‘Foundations of Muslim ethics’. – Tareq Oubrou, Rector of a mosque in Bordeaux, ‘The Koran and its different readings’. Stay in London (especially for some interviews—16th to 24th of May 2002). Among others: – Search for the Muslim Brotherhood Information Centre (empty office) – Demonstration of the Saturday 18th of May for Palestine and Iraq, organised among others by the Muslim Association of Britain (mab); contacts with some demonstrators. – Interviews with the former spokesman for the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe (up to 1997), the editor of a Muslim magazine (Q-News), a senior member of the Muslim Association of Britain, a permanent member and a member of the Executive Bureau of the Federation of Student Islamic Societies in UK & Eire (fosis), the leader of AlNahda movement, a member of the Muslim Welfare House, a convert to the Naqshbandi Sufi movement, the leader of the Syrian mb. Conference given by Tariq Ramadan (professor of philosophy, founder of Muslim Presence network), organised by the Group of Sociology of Religions at the catholic University of Louvain (Louvain-la-Neuve, 6th and 7th of June 2002). Debate about his last works and on the recent developments in theology concerning the Muslim presence in Europe. Conference on ‘Islam in Europe–Integration? Diversity? Or?’, organised by the Goethe Institute (Brussels, 20th of September 2002). Speakers included Mustafa Kastit (theologian, Islamic and Cultural Centre of the Cinquantenaire, Brussels), Dalil Boubakeur (Rector of the Paris mosque), Tariq Ramadan and Bassam Tibi (Göttingen University). Stay in London, 31st of October to 3rd of November 2002, 19th of November to 21st of November 2002 (especially for interviews) – Visit to the Muslim Welfare House, a community development centre, open since the sixties (such as the library). – Interviews with a member of the humanitarian organisation ‘Muslim Aid’, a person who works for the magazine Daʾwah, a leader of the movement Al-Muhajirun and member of ‘The society of Muslim Lawyers’, a senior member of the Muslim Association of Britain, a member of the humanitarian and research organisation (Pales-

sources

319

tine Return Centre), a member of the International Institute for Islamic Thought, the spokesman of the mb in Europe, a member of the organisation Young Muslims UK and Islamic Society of Britain. – Conference of Daoud Abdallah, organised by the Muslim Welfare House, on ‘How to fast in Ramadan?’ (3rd of November 2002). – Discovery of the journal ‘Risālat al-ikhwan’. Conference on ‘Islam in Europe or European Islam?’ (European Parliament, 11th of December 2002). Presentation by the director of the femyso (Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student Organisations, based in Brussels), Ibrahim Al-Zayyat. Seminar of the Muslim Association of Britain, (mab Glasgow, 20–22 December 2002), on ‘Thinking globally, acting locally: a training course for Islamic activism’. – Conferences by – Dr Azzam Tamimi (member of the Muslim Association of Britain and director of the Institute for Islamic Political Thought) on ‘Democracy and Shura’, ‘Muslim attitude towards the Jews in the West’, ‘Winning the arguments—Palestine’. – Zahid Parvez (former president of the Islamic Society of Britain) on ‘globalisation’ and ‘Democracy and the British political system’. – Yvonne Ridley on media. – A young member of the mab on ‘Proactive Politics Project’. – Various members of the fosis on ‘Students politics working group’. – Interviews of a senior member of this regional mab section, two young girls present at the seminar and various contacts with some participants who came from the North of England and Scotland. Conference by Farid Abdelkrim (ancient president of the organisation Young Muslims of France, jmf), organised by the Youth Committee of the Islamic Educative and Cultural Center of Verviers on ‘The relations between men and women in Islam’ (Belgium, 28th of Decembre 2002). Seminar on commitment organised by the Youth Committee of the Islamic Educational and Cultural Centre of Verviers (29th of December 2002). Conference organised by the association ‘Pièces à Conviction’ on ‘Islamophobia—Why Islam frightens?’ (University Faculties Saint-Louis, Brussels, 6th of February 2003). Among others: conference given by Tariq Ramadan on ‘Alternatives to Islamophobia: towards mutual understanding’ Stay in Great-Britain, 21st–26th of February 2003 – Seminar of the organisation Friends of Al-Aqsa, in collaboration with the Federation of Student Islamic Societies (fosis): ‘Residential course in history of Palestine and its importance to the Muslim heritage’ (Islamic Foundation, Leicester, 22nd–23rd of February 2003). – Conferences and debates with: – Ismaïl Patel (president of Friends of Al-Aqsa) on historical facts about Palestine. – Dr Adil Salahi (Markfield Institute of Higher Education, Islamic Foundation, Leicester): ‘Approach towards the Jews’. – Dr Azzam Tamimi: ‘History of Political Zionism’, ‘Presenting the case for Palestine’, ‘Muslim attitude towards Jews’ and ‘the link between the revival of the Muslim community and the Palestinian question’. – The woman in charge of the ‘politics’ section at fosis (Manchester): on the weight and power of the Muslim community. – Dr Daoud Abdullah (researcher at the Palestinian Return Centre): ‘An overview of the Palestinian Refugee Crisis’.

320

sources – Hasan Sali Patel (Friends of Al-Aqsa): ‘The media war’. – Dr Farid Elshayyal (Senior Lecturer at the Markfield Institute of Higher Education): ‘Muslim Palestine (Palestine during Islamic times)’. – Dr Ataullah Siddiqui (researcher at the Islamic Foundation): ‘Issue of Palestine in Interfaith dialogue’. – Anas Al-Tikriti (spokesman of mab): ‘Students and the issue of activism & lobbying: Muslim students and the Palestinian cause–possibilities and obligations’. – A south-African Deobandi sheik on ‘South African experience towards Palestine’. – Interviews with a Deobandi member of the organisation Friends of Al-Aqsa and with a member of the mab. Diverse informal contacts with young people, most of whom are active in some organisations such as fosis, mab, etc. – Some interviews with a member of Islamic Relief (in Birmingham), a senior member of mab (Birmingham section), a member of mab (Sheffield section), a senior member of mab (Manchester section), a member of the Muslim Student Society (mss, active since the 1960’s).

A day of ‘Solidarity with Palestine’ organised, among others by the humanitarian organisation Al-Aqsa (Salle Lumen, Brussels, 1st of March 2003). With some conferences by Yahya Michot (academic at the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies), ‘In order to better understand the historical point of view’, Hani Ramadan (Director of the Islamic Center of Geneva) on ‘The elements that favoured the settling of the state of Israël’, Mustafa Kastit and Rachid Haddache (Islamic and Cultural Centre of the Cinquantenaire, Brussels). Absence of ʿIssām Al-ʿAttār (former leader of the Syrian mb). Play and cartoons on Palestine. Conferences of the sheik Taher Tujgani and Farid Al-Asri (Al-Khalil mosque, Brussels, the 8th of March 2008), on ‘The Hegirian Era’ & ‘For a new attitude to women’. Congress organised by umiva, Union of Mosques and Islamic Association in Antwerpen (Belgium, the 22nd of March 2003) on ‘Treasures of Islam’. Conferences of – Prof. Mohammad S. Al-Hassani (Manchester University): ‘Muslim Contribution to Civilisation’. – Prof. Mustafa Basil (linked to the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies): ‘European Muslims: Citizenship and Identity’. – Meeting with a permanent working at the femyso. Presentation of the website www.muslimheritage.com Conference on ‘The Muslim couple, between values and challenges—The wedding today, multiple questions’ (Heysel, Brussels, 29 and 30 of March 2003). Conferences by – Dr Hassan Amdouni (lawyer, Brussels): ‘The importance of marriage and its benefits’. – Pr. Mustafa Turki (juriste, Liège): ‘The path towards marriage, choice of partner . . . before the wedding. – Dr Ahmed Al-ʾAch (psychologist, Paris): ‘Psychology of the couple’. – Dr Mohamed Kharoubat (University Qadi Iyad-Marrakech): ‘The components of the wedding contract’. – Dr Faouzia Al-Ashmawi (University of Geneva): ‘The emotional life, love relationships’ & ‘Psychology of the man, psychology of the woman’. – Dr Hani Ramadan (Islamic Center of Geneva): ‘Daily spirituality’. – Sheik Taher Tujgani (theologian-Antwerpen, League of the Imams in Belgium): ‘The dissolution of marriage’. – Prof. Yacub Mahi (professor of Islamic religion, PhD student): ‘Evolution of the manners in the Muslim community in Europe’.

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– Prof. Mustafa Kastit (theologian-imam, Brussels): ‘Conflicts in married life’. – Hassan Iquioussen (speaker, Lille): ‘Love’. – Malika Dif (writer, Paris): ‘Education of the couple through the Prophetic model’. Conference organised by the Cultural Committee of the Islam and Cultural Center of Liège, Al-Ittisam mosque (Liège, 29th of March 2003). Speakers: Prof. Anouar Kbibech (Paris) on the theme ‘To be a Muslim citizen today in Europe’. Conference organised by the Association Fraternity on the theme ‘The Muslim Family in Europe’ (University Faculties Saint-Louis, Brussels, 5th of April 2003). Various speakers: Kamal Oucible (psm, France) on ‘The Prophetic model for family relations’), Habiba Hamdaoui (prison chaplain) on ‘Real-life experience in the Muslim community in Belgium’, Yacub Mahi (professor of religion) on ‘How to reconcile reality and the ideal?’. Interview with a member of the Association of Islamic Students in France, aeif (9th of April 2003, France). Twentieth annual meeting of Muslims in France, organised by the uoif on the theme ‘Islam, from a reading to practise’ (Paris, Le Bourget, 18–20th of April 2003). – Various conferences cf. – Dr Okacha Ben Ahmed: ‘Presentation of the meeting’. – Tareq Oubrou (rector of the mosque in Bordeaux): ‘Some aspects of the Muslim dogma’. – Badr Al-Mass (writer of books on the Sharia): ‘The human dimension in the religious practice’. – Hassassi Fassassi (writer and president of the faica): ‘Liberty, equality, fraternity’. – Mohsen N’Gazou: ‘The relation between faith and practice’. – Lhaj Thami Breze (president of the uoif), opening speech of the Salon. – Muslim Charafeddine (former president of EMF, Muslim Students of France): ‘Muslims and France, a history to be known’. – Ahmad Jaballah (theologian, member of the steering committee of the uoif): ‘Th e practice of Islam: between obligation and derogation’ – Ahmad Al-Rawi (president of the fioe, Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe): ‘European Muslims and the Iraqi crisis’. – Sheik Abdallah Basfar (imam of the mosque in Medina). – Fouad Alaoui (general secretary of the uoif): ‘The consultation: evaluation and perspectives’. – Boubaker El-Hadj Amor: ‘The uoif since 20 years’. – Speech from Home Office Minister Nicolas Sarkozy. – Amr Khaled (famous storyteller about the life of the Prophet on Iqra channel): ‘Th e goal of life’. – Hassan Iquioussen (former president of Young Muslims of France): ‘Balance in religious practice’ (but he then switched to an elogy to militants of the uoif). – Farid Abdelkrim (former president of jmf, Young Muslims of France): ‘The Muslim presence in France—a duty to remember’. – Jean-Louis Abdelhalim Herbert (architect): ‘Practice or prosélytism? The visibility of the cult, mechanisms explaining rejection’. – Malika Dif (speaker): ‘The family, what now and for the future?’. – Dr Abdallah Milcent: ‘The elements favouring the socialisation of our youth’. – Presentation of many associations such as emf, jmf, cbsp—Committee for charity and solidarity with Palestine—, lmmf, Islamic Relief—telephone call with a volunteer in Baghdad—, concert with children, etc. – And also brief speeches from Dr Al-Mursi (director of the Wamy, Cairo), Ibrahim Al-Zayyat (president of femyso), Kamel Cherif (secretary of the Word Islamic Council), Abdallah Benmansour (Lille) to introduce the Home Affairs Minister Nicolas

322

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Sarkozy, Mahmoud Doua (Association of Muslims in Gironde, Bordeaux) on ‘Muslim morality in a lay society’, etc. – Some interviews such as with the president of the Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe (fioe), young people closed to the editor Tawhid (Lyon), a leader of the organisation Young Muslims of France (jmf) in Evreux, a leader of the organisation Muslim Students of France (emf) in Grenoble, a founding member of the Website www.Islamiya.net and some informal contacts with some people involved in the monthly review Al-Europiyya Interview with a member of the Tunisian movement Al-Nahda (Paris, 3rd of May 2003) Seminary ‘Diverse Religions, common values’, Addaʾwa mosque (Paris, 3rd of May 2003). Conference given by – – – –

Jean Baubérot (academic): Father Michel Lelong: ‘Ethical and spiritual heritage of the three Abrahamic religions’. Jean-Louis Abdelhalim Herbert: ‘Testimonies of interreligious experiences’. P. Roland (academic): ‘The laïcity of the State, a common philosophical value for diverse religions’. – Salah-Eddine Nakdali (director of the Islamic Centre—Bilal mosque in Aachen) on ‘Islamic ethics and human values’. ‘Young voices: advice for success at school and our responsability towards education’, organised by the Intercultural Islamic League (Brussels, 31st of May 2003). Among others: conference by Fethi Fredj (professor of Islamic religion). Interview with a member of the Europan Council for Fatwa and Research and member of the Bilal Islamic Centre (Aachen, 8th of June 2003). Annual summer conference of the fosis (University of Nottingham, 19–22nd of June 2003), on ‘The role and responsability of Muslim Students in the 21st century’. – Conferences (always followed with debates) by: – Imam Anwar Al-Awlaki (Al-Hijrah mosque, Virginia, United States of America) on the issues ‘Humanity at death’s door—the ascent & descent of the ummah’, ‘Th e revival of the Ummah: the responsibility of believers’, – Zahid Parvez (former president of the Islamic Society of Britain) on the topic ‘Revival of the Ummah’, – Sheik Suhaib Hassan (member of the European Council for Fatwa and Research) on the topic ‘The road to salvation & the importance of unity through the Qurʾan & Sunna’, – Imam Abdul Rashid (came from United-States of America), on ‘Malcom X, a symbol for youth activism’, – Sheik Ibrahim Mogra, on a theme related to non-Muslims, – Dr Hani Al-Banna (director of Islamic Relief): entertaining for a qiyyam al-lail, a vigil prayer evening, – Sarah Joseph (editor of the magazine Emel) on ‘Muslim Students in the West—the source (of energy) & energy for change’, – Dr Azzam Tamimi on the theme ‘Hope & despair of the Ummah’, – Anas Al-Tikriti with a speech promoting political commitment . – Absence of Gamal Al-Helbawy, Tariq Ramadan and Ahmad Al-Rawi. – Diverse interviews such as with a leader of the Muslim Student Society, an ex-executive committee member of fosis and a leader of the womens’ section of the Muslim Association of Britain. Watching a film produced by the Palestine Return Centre on the city of Jenine and many informal contacts with some young people, especially young women.

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Conference of Nadia Yassine (Movement Adl wa’l Ihsan, in Morocco), organised by the Association Fraternity (University Faculties Saint-Louis, Brussels, 27th of Septembre 2003), concerning her book ‘Toutes voiles dehors: Invitation au voyage au bout de la sincérité’ (all veils outside: invitation for a journey to the end of sincerity). Seminar organised by the Islamic and Cultural Centre of Liège, Al-Ittisam mosque: ‘The Family facing its heritage and contemporary challenges’ (Liège, 13th of Decembre 2003). – Conferences by – Omero Marongiu (sociologist, former leader of Young Muslims of France) on the subject ‘Generational gap’. – Christine Partoune (professor of geography in Liège) – Yacub Mahi – Badawiyya (Mainz): ‘From victims of violence to actors of violence’. – (Absence of the Kuwaiti speaker Jasem Al-Mutawa) – Many informal contacts. Conference of Dyab Abou Jahjah (PhD student in political sciences and founding member of the European Arab League, Antwerp), on the theme ‘Remove the veils at school?’, organised by the Hoover Chair at catholic University of Louvain-la-Neuve (Louvain-la-Neuve, 16th of Decembre 2003). Conference of Farid Abdelkrim on the theme ‘Youth: what place for them in our society?’ at the Intercultural Islamic League of Belgium (Brussels, 20th of February 2004). Conference of Farid Abdelkrim on the topic ‘Humour in Islam and the importance of l’humour in daʾwah’, at the Educational and Cultural Islamic Center in Verviers (Verviers, 21st of February 2004). Conference by Noura Jaballah, president of the French League for the Muslim Woman, on the topic ‘The Muslim woman in France’ (La Courneuve, Paris, 29th of February 2004). And interview with a member of the French League for the Muslim Woman. Interview with a member of the Association of Islamic Students in France, aeif (Paris, 1st of March 2004). Day at the European Parliament on ‘Islamist Feminism: from paradox to reality?’, organised by Muslim women in Europe/Muslim Presence (European Parliament, the 5th of march 2004). Speeches of members of Muslim women in Europe, of Christine Delpy (French feminist), Alima Boumediene (parliament member), Saïda Kada (associative militant in the group ‘French women and militant Muslims’, Lyon) and Tariq Ramadan on the theme ‘Muslim feminism—from concept to alternative’. Many informal contacts during the dinner meeting. Meeting of the dynamic Muslim Presence (Brussels, 6th of March 2004). I was forced back without any specific notification. In the framework of the world-day for women, seminar organised by the Intercultural Islamic League of Belgium on the subject ‘Muslim Women in Belgium: identities, recognition, participation’ (Brussels, 7th of March 2004)—Life-experiences testimonies with Nicole Thill (Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe), Latifa Rhomari, Hela Khamsi, Carole Constant, Malika Hamidi. Presentation of the film ‘Foulard—Hijab’ and many testimonies and contacts with the members of diverse Muslim associations. Conference of Omero Marongiu on committment in the social field. During the evening, dinner and screening of the film ‘The last Samouraï’ with Muslim young women.

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Conference of Guy Haarscher and Ahmad Jaballah on the theme ‘Islam in a lay society’ (Lille, 10th of March 2004), organised by the Islamic League of the North. Conference organised by the organisation ‘Splendors of the world’ on ‘Islamophobia: myth or reality?’ (Brussels, 12nd of March 2004)—Speeches of Mueddin Mohsin (Splendors of the world), Fabienne Brion (academic), etc. Participation in the debates and meeting with a few associative actors in Brussels. Interviews with a journalist for the magazine Al-Europiyya and a member of the Association of Islamic Students in France, aeif (Paris, 19th of March 2004). Interviews with a member of Al-Nahda and two leaders of the Union of Islamic Organizations in France (Paris, 25th of March 2004). Congress of the uoif, (Bourget, Paris, 9—12th of April 2004): ‘What place for religious freedom in society today?’. – Many speakers such as: – Badr Al-Mass (professor of Islamic Studies): ‘Religious practice in modern societies in the West’. – Lhaj Thami Breze (president of the uoif): ‘The identity of the uoif’. – Fouad Alaoui: ‘Positions, accomplishments and projects’. – Ahmad Jaballah (director of iesh, Paris): ‘La liberté religieuse en Islam’ (Religious Freedom in Islam) – Sheik Abdallah Ben Biyya (member of the European Council for Fatwa and Research): ‘Muslims and the respect for social balance: canonical approach’. – Soltani (replacing Mahfouz Nahnah), on social Islam. – Tareq Oubrou (imam of the mosque in Bordeaux): ‘The principles and bases of a spiritual path’. – Abdallah Milcent: ‘Is there a life after the law’ ? – Farid Abdelkrim and Tareq Abdelwahed: ‘An idea of freedom’. – Amar Lasfar (rector of the mosque in Lille). – Mohsen NʾGazou: ‘Liberty and responsability in Islam’. – Dr Anas Chaker (member of the medical association Avicenne in France): ‘Religious freedom at the hospital’ – Musical moments (album Dhikroun), testimonies of Noël Mammère, Saïda, Kada, Noura Jaballah, sheik Daʾij Abd Al-Hawaich (Spain) and representatives from other countries such as Dr Farouk Al-Batal, sheik Moussa aʾAsharif, Dr Al-Mutawa, Dr Al-Fadil, etc. Questions and answers with chouyoukhs Abdallah Ben Biyya, Ahmad Jaballah, Ounès Attas Abu Suleyman et Al-Bachri Al-Arabi on the topics of the veil and the bombings in Madrid. – Interviews with the president of the Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe, a leader of the organisation Young Muslims of France and a militant close to the Union of Young Muslims. – Some informal contacts with some members of psm (Muslim Participation and Spirituality), a leader of lnmf (National League of Muslims in France), two recognised speakers, a student at the liesh (Chāteau-Chinon) and many others in the “VIP zone” of the Salon. Interview with a leader of the uoif (Belgium, 13rd of April 2004) Interview with a member of Muslims Presence (Brussels, 22rd of April 2004) Day-observation of the conference on Palestine (Salle Lumen, Brussels, 1st of May 2004), organised by the group 1st of March. With Hani Ramadan on the topic ‘Jews and the Prophet’. Visualisation of a cartoon dessin animé ‘Mohamed Dorra’. Absence of ʿIssām Al-ʿAttār.

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24th annual seminar of the Islamic League for Mutual Aid, ‘Western Muslims with regards to contemporary political orientations’ (Brussels, 22nd of May 2004). With some speeches by Gamal Al-Helbawy on ‘Political work in the West’ and Dr Larbi Kechat ‘Islam and citizenship’. Conference of the Association of Muslims in Gironde (Bordeaux, 24th of May 2004) on the topic ‘The practice of Islam, between French laicity and European law’. Diverse conferences and meal with: – Mahmoud Doua (Averroès Circle): ‘Presentation of the theme’. – Jean-Marc Trigeaud (University of Bordeaux): ‘Approach from the philosophy of the law—Problem of the laïcity and religious manners’. – Brigitte Badevent-Gaudemet (academic): ‘The legal status of Islam in France’. – Marie-Claire Foblets (professor Catholic University Leuven): ‘The juridical statute of Islam in Belgium’. – Gerhard Robbers (professor of constitutional law at the University of Trèves): ‘The juridical statute of Islam in Germany’. – Muslim Charafeddine: ‘The medieval experience of the Muslim minority in the South of France’. – Olivier Roy (academic): ‘Birth of a European Islam’. – Michaël Privot (member of femyso): ‘Birth of a European Islam: practical case’. – Sheik Zakaria Seddiki (Al-Azhar-La Sorbonne): ‘Adaptation of the practice of Islam’. – Tareq Oubrou: ‘For a legal practice of Islam between French laïcity and the Sharia’. Interview with a member of the Association of Muslims in Gironde (who is member of the uoif) and with a professor of the Institute for the Study of Human Sciences (Chāteau-Chinon, Nièvres). Bordeaux, 25th of May 2004. Interview with a member of the association Muslim Students of France (emf), section of Bordeaux (26th of May 2004) Conference by Rachid Benzine (about the book ‘New thinkers of Islam’) on the theme of his latest research on koranic hermeneutics (Bordeaux, 25th of May 2004). Interview with a member of the Association Fraternity, linked to the Moroccan movement Adl waʾl Ihsan (Brussels, 27th of May 2004). An afternoon organised by Muslim Presence (Passage 44, Brussels, 5th of June 2004): – Malika Hamidi: Presentation of Muslim Presence. – Ali Rabbi (member of Muslim Presence Roubaix): ‘Why the trial of Lyon Mag and Le Temps?’ and call for solidarity. – Conference of Tariq Ramadan: ‘Consciousness, Solidarity and Action’. Interview with a member of Muslim Presence (Brussels, 7th of June 2004). Conferences on the topic ‘Opportunities & challenges facing Muslim communities’, organised by the European Policy Centre (Brussels, 9th of June 2004): with Jocelyne Cesari (academic), Khaled Swaid (president of femyso), Denise Helly (academic), Saqeb Mueen (Muslim Council of Britain, uk). Interviews with a member of the Islamic Center of Geneva, a Muslim woman member of the European Islamic Conference, a member of Muslim Presence (15–16th of June 2004). Annual conference of the Muslim Association of Britain (mab): ‘Islam, mercy to mankind’ (Kensington Town Hall, London, 10th of July 2004). With conferences by – Dr Azzam Tamimi (director of the International Institute of Islamic Political Thought): ‘A time to rise’. – Dr Jamal Badawi: ‘The future of Islam’.

326 – – – – –

sources

Tariq Ramadan, on how to overrun the fiqh of minority Omar Abdelkafy: ‘Message for the youth’. Ossama Saeed: Presentation of mab (vision, methodologies, etc.) Yūsuf Al-Qaradāwī, on the methodology of the daʾwah. Anas Al-Tikriti (member of mab) on commitment

And presentation of many Muslim associations and services such as the bank HSBC and the ‘Islamic banking’—, 1st ethical—financing counsellors—, Human Relief Foundation—a charity organisation—, fosis, International Union of Students, etc. Participation at the first round table on the education of imams and teachers of Islamic religion (King Baudouin Fondation, Brussels, 18th of November 2004). With the presence of some members of the League of the Imams in Belgium (Mustafa Turki and Taher Tujgani) Library of the Islamic Foundation, for the selection of Risālat Al-Ikhwan and the magazine Daʾwah. Some informal contacts with some members of the Islamic Foundation (Leicester, 28th of January 2005). Participation at the seminar on the theme ‘Islam in Higher Education’ organised by the amss (Birmingham, 29–30th of January 2005). Contacts with different representatives of Islamic institutions etc. (European Institute of Human Sciences in Lampeter, International Islamic University Malaysia (iium), Institute Al-Maktoum (Dundee), Markfield Institute of Higher Education (Leicester), Islamic Studies department at the University of Lampeter. And diverse informal contacts with some Muslim actors. And conferences by: – Prof. Malory Nye & Alhagi Manta Drammeh: ‘Agenda for the development of research & teaching in the study of Islam & Muslims’. – Gary Bunt: ‘Approaches to the computer (mediated study of Islam in Higher Education)’. – Prof. Hassan Ahmed Ibrahim: ‘The experience of the International Islamic University of Malaysia (iium) in Higher Education’. – Jorgen Nielsen: ‘Challenges facing the study of Islam in Higher Education’. – Yahya Michot: ‘The myth of the great Baddie: Ibn Taymiyya and the new orientalist?’. – Tariq Ramadan: ‘Western approaches to the study of Islam in higher education: an appraisal’. – Sean McLoughlin: ‘Mapping the multiculturAl-disciplinary study of Muslims in Britain: 70’s–2000’. Interview with an ex-south Asian Muslim Brotherhood member (Birmingham, 29th of January 2005) Third annual meeting of the Islamic and Cultural Center of Liège on ‘Islam in the Occident . . . The glory of the past and the challenges of today’, 4–5 of February 2005. Conferences of: – – – –

Alain Gresh: ‘Islam in Europe: analysis of contemporary challenges’. Vincent Geiser: ‘Islam and Muslims in the European imagination’ Tariq Ramadan: ‘Deconstruct Islamic thought’ Muslim Charafeddine: ‘The Muslim presence in Europe and in the Middle-Ages: the history of a contribution’. – Omero Marongiu on ‘The European society in the imagination of Muslims’. – R. Ghannoushī (could not enter Belgium) Interview with a member of the Union of Islamic Organizations in France (Liège, 5th of February 2005) Interview with a member of the Union of Islamic Organizations in France (France, 16th of February 2005)

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‘Muslim women in Belgium—from yesterday to today—Work, Family, Society and leisure’ organised by the Intercultural Islamic League of Belgium (Brussels, 5th of March 2005, in the framework of the “Womens’ day”). Presentations of the liib, Malika Boumezgane Nora El-Youssouffi, etc. Conferences organised by the Al-withaq mosque: Abdallah Benmansour and Ahmed Miktar on the theme ‘Islam as a way of life’, followed by a debate (Mons en Baroeul, Lille, 13th of March 2005). Informal contacts with some women participating at the conference. Annual conference of the Union of Islamic Organizations in France on the theme ‘Which content?’, (Le Bourget, Paris, 26th of March 2005): conferences by – – – –

– – – – – – – – – – –

Ahmad Jaballah: ‘Islam and the values of the Republic’. Presentation of the French League for the Muslim Woman Fouad Alaoui: ‘Conditions for the integration of Islam in the Republic’. Mohammad Moussa A. Charif (professor of Islamic sciences at the University Abdelaziz; presentator on Iqra channel of a show called ‘The manuscript’ where he presents some historical personalities and exegesis works): the importance of work for the future of Muslims. Abd El Wahhab Bakri (president of jmf) on the duty to remember. Sheik Abdallah Basfar: ‘The universal dimension of the call of the Koran’ (advice for reading). Father Michel Lelong: ‘Religions facing changes in the modern world’ Fouad Alaoui, Lhaj Thami Breze, Dalil Boubakeur and the general secretary of the National Federation of Muslims in France on the unity of the French Council for the Muslim Cult. Lhaj Thami Breze: ‘Why the Islam of France?’ (on the political and theologian-canonical work of the uoif). Dalil Boubakeur: ‘A word from the president of the French Council of the Muslim Cult’. Badr Al-Mas: on the main axis for the meaning of life. Jean Baubérot: ‘The Republic and the cults after 100 years of law on the separation’. Olivier Roy: ‘The lay society in face of Islam’. Tareq Oubrou: ‘The mechanisms of adaptation for the Muslim practice’. François Burgat: ‘A France of Islam for an Islam of France’

Interview with a member of the Islamic and Cultural Centre of Liège, Al-Ittisam mosque, Liège, 4th of April 2005. Interview with a former leader of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (Aachen, Germany, 6th of April 2005) Interview with a member of the Academy Al-Khayriyya (Molenbeek, Brussels, 9th of April 2005). Conference organised by the Intercultural Islamic League of Belgium, by Dr H. Amdouni on ‘The hijab, far from being a fashion!’ (Brussels, 9th of April 2005). Interview with a member of the Intercultural Islamic League of Belgium (Brussels, 12th of Apri 2005). Interview with an imam in Brussels (Brussels, 13th of April 2005). Interview with a former member of the Humanitarian Association for the Youth (Brussels, 14th of April 2005) Interview with a member of the Intercultural Islamic League of Belgium (Brussels, 4th of May 2005)

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A day of conferences on the theme ‘Unity in diversity’ organised by Tawhid (University Faculties Saint-Louis, Brussels, 7th of May 2005). Speeches and debates with: – Yahya Michot: ‘How unity was realised during some periods of the Muslim civilisation?’. – Fadlalah (chiite leader, Paris): ‘The jurisprudential rapprochement between different trends’. – Rachid Benaïssa: ‘Islam, a unitary word in a plural world’. – Yacub Mahi: ‘Spirituality at the service of the union’. Day of conferences on ‘The education of children in Islam’ (Passage 44, Brussels, 14th of May 2005). Conference by Hassan Amdouni on ‘The child in the Koran’. Interview with a senior member of the Muslim Association of Britain (Brussels, 5th of June 2005) Interview with an imam of Brussels (Brussels, 13th of June 2005) Interview with a political advisor of the European Commission, in charge of the dialogue between cults and philosophies (14th of June 2005) Conference organised by the European Policy Centre on the theme ‘Integration and Radicalisation’ (Résidence Palace, Brussels, 6th of December 2005). Interventions of Mahmoud Doua (Association of Muslims in Gironde, Bordeaux) and Daoud Abdallah (member of Muslim Council of Britain). 2. Documents a. Newspapers, periodicals, magazines and booklets Actualis—Islam et Société (quarterly, France). Al-Daʿwa (monthly magazine). Al-Europiyya—The voice of Muslims in Europe (monthly magazine in Arabic published by the Information department of the Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe, fioe). Bulletin du Centre Islamique de Genève, no. 27, avril 2004. Inspire (a newspaper, special edition published by the Muslim Association of Britain on the 28th of Septembre 2002 (for the demonstration for justice and peace in Iraq and Palestine), 20 pages. Islam—Le Saviez-vous? (Islam—Did you know?—collection of booklets produced by the Union of Islamic Organisations of France). Ittihād al-munadhamāt al-islamiyyah fi Europā (Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe), Al-Ittihād fi sifahāt (1997). jmf—Le Message (bi-monthly journal), Jeunes musulmans de France—Tourcoing. La lettre de l’uoif (The Letter of the uoif—periodical bulletin edited by the Union of Islamic Organisations of France). Manifeste de femmes musulmanes (Manifesto of Muslim women—brochure edited by the llfm). Numéro spécial édité par jmf Tourcoing à l’occasion de la 20e rencontre annuelle des musulmans de France (Special nummer edited by Young Muslims of France for the 20th annual meeting of Muslims of France, 2003). Reflections (The Student Newsletter of the Muslim Association of Britain), since May 2004. Risālat Al-ikhwan (weekly publication of the Egyptian mb, available via subscription or mailing list). Tawhid, catalogue 2002–2003—sélection d’ouvrages sur l’islam, Lyon, Editions Tawhid, 2002.

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The European Council for Fatwa and Research (ecfr), Collection of Fatwās (1st session: Sarajevo, 2nd session: Dublin, 3rd session: Köln), Volume I, Paris, Editions Gédis, 2002. The Political Perspective for Syria—The Muslim Brotherhood’s vision of the future (London, 16th of December 2004). b. Websites (organisations and press organs) Medical Association Avicenne of France (amaf): www.amaf-france.org Aachen Centre: www.iid-alraid.de Islamic Centre of Geneva: www.cige.org Islamic and Cultural Centre of Verviers: www.ceciv.be Committee for charity and solidarity with Palestinians (cbsp): www.cbsp.fr European Council for Fatwas and Research (ecfr): www.ecfr.org Dr. M. Saʿid Ramadan Al-Bouti: www.bouti.net Tawhid Editions: www.islam-france.com Muslim Students of France (emf): www.emf.asso.fr Fayçal Mawlawi: www.mawlawi.net Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe (fioe): www.eu-islam.com Federation of Student Islamic Societies in UK & Eire (fosis): www.fosis.org.uk Forum of European Muslim Youth & Student Organisations (femyso): www.femyso.com Muslim Brotherhood (in English): www.ikhwanweb.com Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood: www.amlalommah.net Syrian Muslim Brotherhood: www.ikhwan-muslimoon-syria.org Institute of Islamic Political Thought (iipt): www.ii-pt.com International Institute of Islamic Thought (iiit): www.iiit.org Islamic Society of Britain (isb): www.isb.org.uk Islamiya: www.islamiya.net Islam-on-line: www.islamonline.net Young Muslims of France (jmf): www.jmf.asso.fr European Institute of Human Sciences (iesh): www.iesh.org League of Swiss Muslims (lms): http://www.rabita.ch French League for the Muslim Woman (lffm): www.lffm.org Muhajiroun: www.almuhajiroun.com Muslim Association of Britain (mab): www.mabonline.info Muslim Council of Britain (mcb): www.mcb.org.uk Muslim Welfare House (mwh): http://www.mwht.org.uk/ Young Muslims in Germany (mjd): http://www.mj-net.de/ Oumma: www.oumma.com Muslim Presence: www.presence-musulmane.com Saphirnet: www.saphirnet.info Tariq Ramadan: www.tariqramadan.com The Muslim News: www.muslimnews.co.uk UK Islamic Mission (ukim): www.ukim.org Union Of Islamic Organisations in/of France (uoif): www.uoif-online.com World Assembly of Muslim Youth (wamy): www.wamy.co.uk Young Muslims organisation UK (ymouk): www.ymouk.net Yūsuf Al-Qaradāwī: www.qaradawi.net

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APPENDIX

THE TWENTY PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC UNDERSTANDING ACCORDING TO HASSAN AL-BANNĀ, COMPARISON OF THE TITLES OF TWO BOOKS (FROM EDITIONS CHAMA AND EDITIONS MEDIACOM, FRANCE, 2004)

In this presentation, we compare the titles of these principles as they were presented in two French editions dating from 2004 published respectively by éditions Chama and Mediacom [Al-Banna, 2004; AlBanna, 2004a]. These are very different from each other: the first book, quite concise, seems very close to the original Arab edition (even though it stipulates that it aims rather to make the content of the message easily comprehensible rather than to stick to its form) while the second incarnates a clear attempt to re-appropriate the original message in order not only to render it more accessible to the contemporary public but also to adapt it to contemporary reality, taking the new context into account (it concerns the principles discussed by Yūsuf Al-Qaradāwī and the French translator of the book). We prefer to use these French publications rather than the original Arab, as when focussing on the headings that resume these principles (with an eventual commentary that we have added ourselves) the issues seem much more explicit. On the other hand it’s interesting to note the margin for manoeuvre demonstrated by these contemporary translations, notably the Mediacom version which is less literal than the Chama publication. It’s interesting to note the lengths taken to achieve the sensitisation of a young Muslim who often doesn’t speak a word of Arabic or who possesses too superficial a level of understanding to really access the original texts. To begin with, let’s again note that the explanations or specifications made in the 4th column are given in relation to those evoked by the fi rst or the second or both editions in function of their clarity in relation to the initial suggestions of the text. They are purely indicative and not at all exhaustive. For a more complete overview of these principles, refer directly to the aforementioned texts.

344

appendix Chama

1. The global nature of Islam 2. The sources of legislation

Médiacom The global nature of the message of Islam The sources of reference

Specifications / Explanations

Islam is a complete system that concerns all aspects of life Koran and Sunna in the light of the rules of the Arab language and worthy transmittors of the tradition 3. That which is not taken The position of Intuition and these other into account by the Islam with regards to elements cannot be accepted sources of legislation inspiration, visions and as references under Sharia (Sharia) dreams except when there are no contradictions 4. Illicit actions to be The protection of Prohibition of the carrying discouraged the principle of pure of fetishes, of sorcery, of the monotheism practice of the occult etc. 5. Guiding advice and The domain of public In the absence of any interpretation of the interest particular mention in the texts sacred text, the opinion of the imam is respected so long as it does not contradict Sharia Everyone can be proved 6. Only the prophet The refutation of all Muhammed is infallibility beyond the right or wrong except the infallible Koran and of the Sunna Prophet. Do not vex or hurt people, rather question their and the prohibition of intentions the denigration of the scholars 7. Imitation and The question of Any Muslim not capable of attendance jurisprudence schools interpreting the texts himself must follow an imam. The Ethics of Divergence of opinion on 8. Authorisation to secondary questions of law digress from secondary disagreement must not be a reason for opinions without division. provoking hostility Prohibition of Avoid any superfluous 9. Investing time in speculation questioning about improbable efficient action and events. useful discourse 10. The noblest form of Divine Names and The knowledge of God, the faith Attributes affirmation of his unity, his adoration and his freedom without any kind of anthropomorphism are the most noble forms of faith. 11. Innovations denied by The best way of rejecting When unfounded (or Islam must be fought innovation bewilderment). There is divergence—to each 12. Concerning justifiable Additive innovation, subtractive innovation specialist his opinion. innovations judged differently by lawyers and the imposition of cultural practice 13. Love, respect and The Muslim position on That’s to say ‘those who believe honour virtuous men. Saints and fear Allah’

the twenty principles of islamic understanding

345

Table (cont.) Chama

Médiacom

Specifications / Explanations

14. Authorisation for visiting Muslim cemeteries according to the instructions of the Sunna 15. The invocation of God

Visiting tombs and caution against imploring the dead for assistance

Lawful practice is respectful of the Sunna (you must not seek the help of the dead, etc.)

‘At-tawassoul’

16. No consideration to false traditions

Customs and Word Games

17. Actions undertaken by the heart are more important than physical acts 18. Freedom of thought and honour given to scientists

The action of the heart above the action of the senses

Recurring to intermediaries (that is any of His creature) is a secondary disagreement (but risks leading towards polytheism) In matters of practices that are incompatible with the sacred texts and so outside Islam, you must make your own opinion while not paying attention to the words, but to their content. But to achieve both is a religious obligation (each is of distinct importance)

19. Opinion based on religion and that which is based on science

Religion and Science

20. Limits between apostasy and faith

The issue of excommunication (takfīr)

The position of Islam with respect to reason and the use of others’ knowledge

Islam encourages contemplation of the universe, it frees reason. Islam accepts everything that does not contradict it On the face of things, contradictions can exist between the two domains. In the meantime, where there is reason for doubt, religion prevails. Muslims are not to be excommunicated except in a few very specific circumstances cf. if he admits to his atheism or if he calls the Koran a lie, etc.

INDICES

Thematic index Action (importance of individual/ collective militancy—religious practice: 62, 69 n. 21, 79 n. 35, 109, 140, 142, 145, 150, 154, 155, 185, 187, 190 n. 6, 193–203, 222 Authentic tradition of Islam (reference to the): 6, 20–21, 106, 111, 112, 114 Avant-garde (constitution of): 30, 105, 108, 278, 309 Caliphate: 15, 30, 211, 265, 273–276, 287, 296, 300, 311 Citizenship (versus isolation from society): 9, 31, 63, 69 n. 21, 162, 186, 210, 228, 237 n. 25, 261 Composition (of the movement): 56, 58, 144, 154, 174 Democracy (interest for): 34, 35, 55, 122, 122 n. 2, 155, 156, 277, 279, 281 Difficulties to understand the movement: 3–5, 6–7, 9–10 Education—da‘wah (preaching/spreading the religious message)—understanding the Islamic faith: 18, 20, 21–22, 56, 62, 64, 68 n. 19, 69–76, 91, 101, 102, 105, 117, 133 n. 1, 146, 147 n. 4, 188, 208, 219, 298 Exemplary figure (importance of role models): 15, 16, 40, 94, 102, 113, 139, 140, 141, 157, 195, 199, 277, 309 Families (the organisational system of families): 20, 59, 63, 90 Family (as a major source of interest): 55, 69 n. 21, 123, 141, 155, 191, 193, 195, 196, 207, 209, 210, 223 n. 10, 226, 230, 235, 262, 284, 289 Forces of the Axis, Nazi Germany (relations to): 24–25, 59 n. 4 Gender: 20, 44, 69 n. 21, 122, 138, 141, 147 n. 4, 149–150, 154, 155, 226–233, 277, 291

Global character of Islam (shumuliyya): 16, 21, 33, 40, 91, 91 n. 8, 102, 137 n. 10, 142, 148, 159, 160, 167, 185, 194, 199 n. 7, 205–207, 208, 268, 285–289, 305 Hâkimiyya (Exclusive God’s sovereignty): 106, 107, 219 History of the movement—movement in an historical process: 8–9, 15–82 Homogeneity of the movement (vs critics of ideas or internal pluralism): 27, 31, 34–45, 49, 50, 51, 52, 81, 100, 102, 107, 109–117, 114, 115, 119, 123, 125, 126, 128, 130, 131, 149, 157, 164, 166, 170–181, 192, 237, 261, 291–294, 311, 312 Homosexuality: 226, 290 Human responsibility—commitment— khilafat al-ard: 2, 16, 69 n. 21, 70, 90 n. 2, 145, 155, 162, 200– 201, 205, 218, 239, 240–243, 256–262 Importance of the movement: 4, 32, 33–34, 37–38, 54–55, 56–58, 64, 77–82, 99, 162, 243, 301, 307, 314 Individualism (versus collective aims): 9, 206, 288 n. 4 International organization: 49, 61 Interreligious dialogue: 72, 140, 155, 162, 225, 259 n. 20, 248, 259 n. 20, 260 Islamic (society or) State: 31, 36, 41, 46, 49, 53, 74, 86, 92, 126, 137 n. 10, 137 n. 11, 151, 152, 156, 186, 221, 227, 265, 270–273, 275, 279 Islamic currents (relations to sufism in particular): 5, 20, 39, 43, 44, 77, 125, 199 Islamic currents (relations to wahhabi-salafism in particular): 5, 6, 45, 52, 52 n. 17, 77, 79, 80, 121, 151, 214, 236, 294, 300–301 Islamic Economics: 65, 90, 124, 127 Islamization of the law—promoting the Muslim normative system—fiqh for minorities: 30, 46, 59, 64, 82, 105, 106,

348

indices

120, 121, 124, 127, 136–137, 137 n. 10, 148, 150, 151, 153, 160, 161, 164, 166, 191, 227–228, 234–243, 262 n. 26, 273, 283, 289 Jâhiliyya (the state of pre-Islamic ignorance): 31, 105, 107, 108, 276 Jews (relations to): 30, 32, 66, 120, 122, 122 n. 3, 123, 238, 274, 279, 292, 293 Jihad (fighting for God—to sacrifice oneself to please God): 2, 6, 20, 25, 49, 55, 87, 87 n. 2, 88, 90, 92, 96, 98, 108, 134, 142, 185, 199 n. 8, 199–203, 219–225, 277–278, 280, 308 Liberal Muslims (relations to): 5–6, 77 Liberation (of the Muslim territories)— opposition to colonization: 9, 22, 29, 30, 41, 44, 48, 92, 103, 149 Loyalty to the movement—involvement: 49, 80, 125, 126, 129, 130, 136, 137, 139, 176, 311 Martyrdom: 17, 94, 104, 155, 168, 172, 221, 224, 278 Memory of the movement: 15–18, 168–181, 307–308 Middle way (path of, wasatiyya): 5, 147, 148, 185, 203, 294 Moral values (ethics): 3, 93, 95, 97, 103, 126, 151, 154, 160, 162, 167, 180, 193, 195, 196, 205 n. 1, 228–229, 233, 237, 267, 269, 288, 288 n. 4, 310 National branches: 4, 44, 49, 50, 67, 72, 75, 132, 145, 153, 156, 174, 178, 180, 197 Non-Muslim society—relations with Non-Muslims: 46, 67, 72, 96–97, 119, 137 n. 12, 147 n. 4, 151, 174, 207, 214 n. 10, 230, 235, 237, 259, 267, 271, 280, 289, 292, 302, 304 Organization (importance of the): 20, 37, 40–41, 41, 56–57, 56 n. 1, 58, 59–76, 136, 146 n. 3, 196–199, 293 n. 8 Palestine: 23, 24, 25, 26, 49, 67, 69 n. 21, 75, 79 n. 34, 81, 93, 122, 128, 146, 149, 154, 155, 179, 213, 221, 223, 224–225, 244, 292, 293 Pillars (20 principles): 91, 92, 194 Pluralism (recognition of): 5, 35, 46, 53, 119, 155, 158, 161, 162, 165, 216, 238, 249, 256, 278

Politics (interest for): 23–31, 32, 33, 35, 80, 149, 154, 155, 158, 162, 167, 264, 265–269, 288, 301 Promotion of Muslims as a minority: 9, 128, 149, 161, 164, 179, 289, 289 n. 5 Protection/Promotion of the Muslim identity (including Muslim heritage): 3, 60, 69 n. 21, 75, 77, 80, 146, 186, 237, 262, 281 Qiyâda (divine guidance): 18, 108, 219 Radical Islam (relations to): 1–3, 15, 52, 55, 146, 172, 216, 221, 274, 279 Rationalization versus imitation of traditional practices: 1, 6, 22, 78, 120, 123, 159 Reason (use of)—personal opinion: 107, 121, 143, 147, 151, 157, 159, 167, 190, 230, 241 Reform project (gradual reform): 15, 22, 31, 32, 33, 34, 91 n. 8, 92, 93, 102, 141, 192, 207–210 Reformist historical movement (relations to)—modern salafiyya: 6, 21–22, 105, 161, 163, 164, 294, 295–300 Relations to the leadership (of the organization): 53, 85–181, 100, 111, 112, 122, 124, 125, 126, 129, 132, 134–135, 145, 169–170, 177 Rest of the Muslim community in general (relations to)—openness (of members/ the movement towards others): 62, 76, 77, 79, 98, 99, 102, 107, 116, 126, 155, 162, 215, 239, 301, 302 Revitalisation of Islam/the Umma: 6, 15, 21, 92, 109, 146, 147 n. 4, 150, 155, 213 Revitalisation of Islamic Thought: 76, 80, 94, 115, 121, 125, 135, 144, 153–154, 158, 159, 161, 177, 187, 287, 300, 301, 303, 305 Revolt—revolution: 17, 31, 36, 47, 106, 265, 276–283 Secret apparatus: 24, 27, 199 n. 7 Secular system (reactions to): 30, 36, 47, 69 n. 21, 93, 146, 152, 155, 156, 160, 162, 165, 166, 181, 196, 256, 266, 269, 283, 291 Shiites (relations to): 47, 76, 146, 214–217, 302 Shûra (consultation): 86, 108, 126, 156 Social justice (social injustice): 30, 93, 127–131, 162, 196, 201–202, 232–234

indices Spirituality: 90, 95, 96, 98, 103, 126, 136, 154, 158, 162, 200, 207, 222 State structure (interest for)— representation: 32–33, 45–50, 66, 79, 80, 106, 199 n. 7, 211, 234, 264, 279, 280, 309 State structures in Muslim countries (relations to): 2–3, 23, 24, 26 n. 8, 27, 27 n. 9, 28, 29, 30, 31, 34–44, 48, 50–55, 272 Superiority of Islam: 31, 119, 234, 244, 245–250 Takfîr (to accuse someone of being an unbeliever): 107, 278, 280, 302 The Prophet (relationship to): 95, 110, 114, 121, 291 To contextualize (to take the contexts into account): 17, 42–45, 93, 97, 101, 103, 110, 118, 123, 130, 132, 137 n. 12, 140, 148, 150, 151, 153, 157, 158–160,

349

165, 167, 173–174, 178–181, 208, 241, 265, 299 Unbelievers (relations with): 108, 116, 226, 231, 260 Unity (of Muslims), versus fitna (chaos): 15, 22, 70 n. 21, 92, 93, 103, 107, 211–217, 303 Violence (use of): 26, 27– 31, 34, 35, 44, 49, 50, 108–109, 141, 220, 223, 224, 226, 228 n. 18, 279, 280, 283, 302, 307 West (relations to the): 9, 21–22, 26, 34, 53, 54, 76, 122, 137 n. 12, 156 n. 13, 157, 159, 162, 163, 191, 223, 224, 229, 234, 238, 244, 245–250, 250–256, 261, 263, 277, 279, 281, 282, 297 Youth (interest of/for young people): 16, 34, 58, 65–66, 73, 76, 81, 90, 93, 118, 134, 157, 161, 231, 293, 297, 303

Index of names ‘Abduh, Muhammad: 21, 296 ‘Akef, Muhammad Mehdi: 51 n. 16, 145 ‘Awdah, ‘Abd Al-Qâdir, 86, 87, 87 n. 1, 120, 127, 133 n. 4 Abd Al-Nasser, Gamal: 17, 24, 27, 37, 39, 43, 57, 88, 104, 109, 110, 116, 139 Abdallah, Daud: 155 Abdelkrim, Farid: 91 n. 7, 222, 232 Abu Ghuddah, Abdul Fattah: 87 n. 1, 133 n. 4, 137 Abu Nasr, Hamid: 87 n. 1, 133 Abu Shuqqah, ‘Abd Al-Halim: 133 n. 4 Al-‘Alwânî, Taha Jabir: 144, 197, 236 Al-Afghâni, Jamal Al-Din: 21, 242, 276, 296 Al-Assad, Hafez: 36 Al-Attâr, ‘Issâm: 62, 71, 100–101, 153, 157–158, 176, 177 Al-Awlaki, Anwar: 266 Al-Bannâ, Hassan: 2, 16, 20, 20 n. 2, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 30, 39, 46, 47, 59, 80, 87 n. 1, 89–103, 105–106, 107, 116, 119, 120, 124, 126, 127, 131, 133, 134, 138, 140, 141, 147, 155, 161, 162, 163, 165–166, 169, 173, 177, 179, 180, 181, 186, 190, 194, 195, 199 n. 7, 201, 202, 203, 204, 207–210, 211, 215, 218, 219, 223, 252–253, 267, 270, 273, 275, 285, 295–299, 310

Al-Bûtî, Sa’îd Ramâdan: 151–153, 220 Al-Fâssi, Allâl: 38 Al-Ghadban, Munir: 87 n. 1 Al-Ghazâli, Abu Hâmid: 21, 166 n. 27 Al-Ghazâli, Muhammad: 43, 87 n. 1, 120–124, 127, 130 133 n. 4, 175 Al-Ghazali, Zeinab: 137–143 Al-Hassani, Mohammad Salim: 262 Al-Helbawy, Abdurraham: 155 Al-Helbawy, Gamal: 49, 66, 66 n. 15, 76, 94, 133, 155, 246 Al-Hudaybî, Hasan: 31, 87 n. 1, 104, 107, 108, 109, 126, 133, 133 n. 4, 134, 135, 138 Al-Hudaybî, Ma’mûn: 133 Al-Husayni, Amîn (Mufti of Jerusalem): 23, 24 Al-Jawziyyan Ibn Al-Qayyim: 21, 112 Al-Kawakibi, Abd Al-Rahman: 296 n. 13 Al-Mawdudi, Abu Al-A’la: 3 n. 5, 47, 100, 114 Al-Mawlawi, Fayçal: 149 n. 6, 150–151, 265 Al-Nuqrashi, Mahmud Fahmi (Prime Minister in Egypt): 26, 126 Al-Qaradâwî, Yûsuf: 43, 75, 91 n. 8, 91 n. 9, 87 n. 1, 100, 114, 124, 133 n. 4, 147–150, 164, 197, 200, 208, 216, 233 n. 23, 235, 291 n. 7

350

indices

Al-Qattân, Mannâ’: 137 Al-Râshid, Muhammad Ahmad: 87 n. 1, 146 Al-Rawi, Ahmad: 251, 257, 295 Al-Sadate, Anwar: 31, 37, 51, 57 Al-Shâtibi, Abu Ishâq: 166, 166 n. 27 Al-Sibâ‘î, Mustafâ: 30, 87 n. 1, 124–125, 127, 130, 133 n. 4, 151 Al-Tikriti, Anas: 199 Al-Tilmisânî, ‘Umar: 35, 46, 87 n. 1, 133, 133 n. 1, 133 n. 4, 134, 135 Al-Zawahiri, Aymân: 2, 55, 109 Amdouni, Hassan: 155, 228 An-Nursî, Sa‘îd: 296 Arafat, Yasser: 30 Azzam, Abdullah: 2, 48, 48 n. 14, 49, 87, 87 n. 1, 88 Badawi, Jamal: 155, 259, 268 Bayanuni, Ali Sadr Al-Din: 67, 145 Ben Biyya, Abdallah: 220 Benaïssa, Rachid: 247 Benmansour, Abdallah: 198 n. 4, 205, 206 n. 2, 247, 248, 249, 283 Bennabi, Malek: 43, 156, 156 n. 13, 247 Bin Laden, Oussama: 2, 49, 52, 55 Bourguiba: 42, 43 Bouzouina, Abdelhamid: 155 Charafeddine, Muslim: 263 El-Awaisi, Abd Al-Fattah: 74 Elshayyal, Farid: 155 Enneifer, Ahmida: 41 n. 5 Ghannoushî, Bara: 155 Ghannoushî, Rashîd: 7 n. 11, 35, 41, 47, 86–87, 87 n. 1, 114, 125, 153, 156–157, 197, 226 n. 16, 263, 295 Ghannoushî, Soumaya: 155 Hamidullah, Muhammad: 61 Hanafi, Hassan: 276 Hawwâ, Sa‘îd: 87 n. 1, 125–126, 130, 133 n. 4, 175 Hussein, Saddam: 54 Ibn ‘Arabî: 44, 45 Ibn ‘Âshûr, Al-Tâhir: 166 n. 27 Ibn Al-Kathir: 21, 112 Ibn Bâdîs, ‘Abd Al-Hamîd: 23 n. 4, 296 Ibn Ma’sud, Abdallah: 166 Ibn Taymiyya: 21 Iqbâl, Muhammad: 296

Iquioussen, Hassan: 62, 73, 154, 226 Izzi Dien, Mawil: 74, 147, 236 Jaballah, Ahmad: 69, 155, 158 Khomeini, Ruhollah: 46, 47 Kichk, Abd Al-Hamid: 88, 88 n. 3 Mahi, Yacub: 216 Marongiu, Omero: 261, 289 n. 5 Mashhûr, Mustafa: 49, 60 n. 7, 87 n. 1, 133, 134 Miktar, Ahmed: 258, 259, 268 Mouti, Abdelkarim: 38 Mubarak, Hosni: 50, 57 N’Gazou, Mohsen: 207, 288 n. 3 Nabahânî, Taqî Al-Dîn: 30, 128 Nahnah, Mahfoud: 87 n. 1, 145 Oubrou, Tareq: 7 n. 11, 158–161, 162, 166, 232, 240, 275, 283, 288 Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza: 46 Parvez, Zahid: 155, 192 n. 9, 240, 269, 281 Qaddafi: 43 Qutb, Muhammad: 146, 172 Qutb, Sayyid: 1, 30, 31, 38, 39, 55, 87 n. 1, 100, 101, 104–119, 122 n. 3, 124, 127, 130, 131, 133 n. 4, 138, 163, 169, 171, 173, 204, 218, 218 n. 1, 219, 219 n. 2, 228, 230 n. 20, 231, 233, 240, 241, 245, 264, 276, 278, 282, 283, 288 n. 4 Ramadan, Hani: 73, 93, 96–97, 135 n. 8, 154, 193, 198, 208, 225, 226–228, 255, 269 Ramadân, Sa‘îd: 59, 60, 71, 133–137, 176, 177, 198, 270 Ramadan, Tariq: 6, 6 n. 6, 7 n. 11, 7 n. 12, 16, 45, 73, 73 n. 27, 81, 89 n. 1, 91 n. 7&8, 93, 105, 105 n. 2, 108, 128, 135 n. 8, 139, 158, 161–167, 205 n. 1, 223–224, 227, 228 n. 18, 233–234, 255–256, 261, 266, 271, 276–278, 282, 288, 291 n. 7, 295–299 Rashid, Abdul: 278 Rida, Rashîd: 21, 102, 163, 296, 216 Sâbiq, Sayyid: 87 n. 1, 126–127, 133 n. 4 Sawwâf: 128 Seddiki, Zakaria: 155, 221

indices Shukri’, Mahmud: 133 n. 4 Sîsî, Abbas: 133 n. 4 Tamimi, Azzam: 74, 155, 156 n. 14, 274, 290 Tibi, Bassam: 277, 278 Turabi, Hassan: 44, 50, 52, 226 n. 16 Turki, Mustafa: 230

351

Yakan, Fathi: 87 n. 1, 146 Yassine, Abdessalam: 37, 39 Yassine, Ahmed (cf. founder of Hamas): 2 n. 2, 87 n. 1, 146 Zaydân, Abd Al-Karim: 28, 133 n. 4, 137 Zindani, Abdul Majid: 87 n. 1, 146

Index of organisations and ideological movements Ad-dawah mosque (Paris, France): 62, 64 n. 12, 152 Ahl al-Hadith (movement): 45, 47 Al Qiyam (Algeria): 39 Al-Aqsa Humanitaire: 65 Algerian Students’ League: 41 Al-Khalil mosque (Brussels, Belgium): 62, 64 n. 12, 68 n. 19 Al-Muhajiroun: 307 Al-Nahda (Tunisia): 37, 42, 51, 67, 153 Al-Qaida: 2, 48 n. 14, 55, 146 Association of Islamic Students in France (AEIF): 61, 62, 64 n. 12, 71, 222, 247 Association of Muslim Lawyers: 291 n. 7 Association of Muslim Social Scientists (AMMS): 69 n. 21 Association of Muslim Women (Egypt): 138 Association of Ulemas (Algeria): 23 n. 4 Bilal Center (Aachen, Germany): 62, 64 n. 12 British Muslim Initiative (BMI): 67, 260, 260 n. 22, 265 Center for Study and Research on Islamic Economics (Belgium): 65 Center for the Study of Terrorism: 76 Center of Milan (Italy): 63 Centre for Islamic Studies (University of Wales, at Lampeter, UK): 74, 147 Chabiba islamiyya (Morocco): 38, 39 Committee for Assistance and Solidarity with Palestine (CBSP): 65 Council for Islamic Cooperation (Muslim Council for Cooperation in Europe): 64 n. 12 Egyptian Action Group: 67 n. 16 European Council for Fatwa and Research (CEFR): 7 n. 11, 64, 64 n. 12,

68, 75, 79, 80, 149, 151, 152, 153, 155, 161, 164, 166, 220, 228 n. 18, 235–241, 273 European Institute for Human Sciences (IESH): 7 n. 11, 64, 68, 74, 151, 155, 221, 254 European Islamic Conference (EIC): 64 n. 12 European Muslim Network: 81 European Trust: 64, 80 Faisal Finance (Luxembourg): 65 Fatah Resistance Organization (Palestine): 30 Fedayin-e Islam: 46 Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe (FIOE): 63, 64, 64 n. 12, 66, 72, 75, 80, 153, 174, 186, 207, 226 n. 17, 228 n. 19, 235, 251, 291 n. 7, 295 Federation of Students’ Islamic Societies (FOSIS): 60, 71, 81, 212, 257, 266 n. 1, 275 n. 8, 278, 291 n. 7 First Ethical (Great Britain): 65 Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student Organisations (FEMYSO): 66, 66 n. 14, 293 French Council of Muslim Worship (Conseil Français du Culte Musulman—CFCM): 66, 212 French League for the Muslim Woman (LFFM): 47 Friends of Al-Aqsa: 69 n. 21 Hamas (Algeria): 50 Hamas (Harakat Al-Muqâwama Al-Islamiyya, Palestine): 1, 3, 44, 54, 146 Hizb Al-Tahrîr (Party of Islamic Liberation): 30, 87, 88, 109, 273, 273 n. 6, 274, 307 Husafiyya (Sufi Brotherhood): 20, 98

352

indices

Independent Student Union (UGL-Algeria): 41 Institute for Islamic Jerusalem Studies—Islamic Research Academy (Al-Maktoum Institute—Dundee): 74–75 Institute of Islamic Political Thought (IIPT): 74, 76, 155 Interestrust (Great Britain): 65 International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT): 76 International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations (IIFSO): 71, 137 n. 11, 146, 172, 219 n. 2 International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS): 75, 216, 220 International Union of Muslim Students (Belgium): 61 Interpal: 65 Iraqi Islamic Party: 28, 28 n. 11, 36, 54 Islah wa Tajdîd movement (Reform and Renewal, Morocco): 51 Islamic Action Front (Jordania): 51 Islamic Center of Geneva (Switzerland): 60, 96, 135 n. 8, 136, 154 Islamic Center of Munich (Germany): 59, 71, 136 Islamic Cultural Center of Liège: 263 Islamic Foundation (Leicester, Great Britain): 69 n. 21, 73, 73 n. 27, 139 Islamic Group in France (GIF): 61 Islamic Institute for Development and Research (IIDR): 76, 155 Islamic Intercultural League of Belgium (Ligue Islamique Interculturelle de Belgique, LIIB): 63, 69 n. 21, 228 Islamic National Front (Sudan): 52 Islamic Relief: 64 Islamic Salvation Front (FIS, Algeria): 51 Islamic Society of Britain (ISB): 65, 192 n. 9, 291 n. 7 Islamic Tendency Movement (Tunisia): 44 Islamic Union in Germany (Islamitische Gemeinschaft in Deutschland): 63 Islamic World Congress (Mu’tamar al-‘Alam al-Islâmî): 32 Istiqlâl (Morocco): 38 Jamâ’â islâmiyya (Islamic Group—Egypt): 50 Jamâ’â islâmiyya (Islamic Group—Lebanon): 26, 146, 150 Jamâ’at-i-Islami: 3 n. 5, 60 n. 7, 65, 73 n. 27, 77

Jihâd: 2, 31, 109 Justice and Welfare movement (Morocco): 37, 39 Khatmîyah: 44 League of Swiss Muslims (LMS): 63 League of Muslim of Belgium: 292 Millî Görüs: 3 n. 5, 77 Movement of a Society for Peace (MSP, Algeria): 51 Movement of the Islamic Tendency (MTI, Tunisia): 35, 41, 44 Muslim Association of Britain (MAB): 60 n. 7, 63, 67, 68 n. 19, 69 n. 21, 72, 75, 79, 92, 113, 138, 138 n. 13, 139, 171, 178, 191, 192, 199, 208, 252, 260, 260 n. 22, 262 n. 27, 268, 274, 290, 291, 292, 293 Muslim Brotherhood Information Center (London): 66 Muslim Council of Britain (MCB): 66, 79 n. 36, 291 n. 7 Muslim Executive of Belgium (Exécutif des Musulmans de Belgique, EMB): 66 Muslim Investment Corporation Ltd. (Great Britain): 65 Muslim Presence (Présence Musulmane, in French): 16, 65, 139, 161, 233 n. 24, 271, 297, 298 Muslim Scout Association of Great Britain: 63 Muslim Student Society (MSS, Great Britain): 60–61, 70, 71 Muslim Students of France (Etudiants Musulmans de France, EMF): 65, 265, 293 Muslim Welfare House (MWH—Great Britain): 60, 63 n. 11, 71 Muslim Women’s Society (MWS): 291 National Islamic Front (Sudan): 36 Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies (OCIS): 74, 152 Party of Islah (Yemen): 51 Party of Justice and Development (Morocco): 51 Sahwa Islamiyya movement (the Islamic awakening—Saudi Muslim Brotherhood): 29 n. 12, 45, 47 n. 13, 57

indices

353

Takafol S.A. (Luxembourg): 65 Takfîr wa Al-Hijra (Anathema and Retreat): 1, 31, 109, 115 Talâ’i‘ (Vanguard)—Al-Muntada Al-Islami fî Urubbâ (Islamic Forum Europe): 62, 62 n. 10, 176 The Radical Middle Way: 81

137 n. 12, 138, 150, 158, 207, 212, 220, 240 n. 29, 264, 272, 283, 284 n. 1, 291, 292, 293 n. 8 Union of Muslim Students in Italy: 63 Union of Young Muslims (Union des Jeunes Musulmans, UJM, Lyon): 65, 73, 141

UK Islamic Mission (UKIM): 60 n. 7, 100 Unie der Moskeeen en Islamitische Verenigingen van Antwerpen (UMIVA): 262 n. 27 Union of Islamic Communities and Associations in Italy (UCOII): 63 Union of Islamic Organizations in (of) France (UOIF): 7 n. 11, 7 n. 12, 61, 63, 65, 67, 69 n. 20, 69 n. 21, 72, 79 n. 3,

World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY): 65, 66 n. 14 Young Muslims of France (Jeunes Musulmans de France, JMF): 7 n. 11, 62, 65, 92, 189, 222, 232 Young Muslims Organisation UK (YMOUK): 65, 72, 240

Index of written media Actualis: 72 Al-Da‘wa (The message): 37, 71, 88 n. 3 Al-Europiyya: 72 Al-Islam: 71 Al-Ma’rifah (The knowledge): 41 Al-Muslimun (The Muslim): 71, 124 Al-Râ’id (The Pioneer): 71, 158 Awakening UK: 73 Azzam Publications: 87 Editions Arrissala: 73 Gedis (Groupe Edition, Diffusion, Services—Paris): 73 Inspire: 138 Journal of Jerusalem Islamic Studies: 75

Le musulman (The Muslim): 71 Mediacom (Amiens, France): 70, 73, 133 n. 1 Reflections: 72 Risalat al-Ikhwan (The letter of the Brothers): 72 Sawt al-Ghoraba (The voice of the foreigner): 70 TaHa Publishing House: 73 Tawhid Editions (Lyon, France): 73, 146, 155, 297 Trends Magazine: 72