The Monroe Doctrine And United States National Security In The Early Twentieth Century [1st Edition] 3030434303, 9783030434304, 9783030434311

Table of contents :
Acknowledgements......Page 6
Contents......Page 8
List of Figures......Page 9
Introduction: A Cluster of Loyalties......Page 11
The Empire of the Monroe Doctrine......Page 29
Out of Line with American History......Page 32
A General Principle of Living Policy......Page 45
Regional Hegemony and Pan-Americanism......Page 55
Ordered Liberty......Page 58
Fellow Sponsors......Page 70
The German Peril......Page 81
Navies and Islands......Page 91
The Japanese Peril......Page 98
A Shibboleth and a War......Page 103
An Obsolete Shibboleth?......Page 107
Divorced from the Old World......Page 118
Conflicted Diplomacy......Page 132
The Trichotomy of the Treaty Fight......Page 140
A Defence of the Monroe Doctrine......Page 145
A Monroe Doctrine for the World......Page 155
Regional Organisation......Page 162
Recognition, Reservation, and Rejection......Page 168
One Hundred Years and Still Going Strong?......Page 179
Fiasco at Santiago......Page 183
Fittingly Observed......Page 188
Defects in Its Own Nature......Page 203
Conclusion: Anything or Nothing......Page 209
Bibliography......Page 217
Index......Page 245

Citation preview

SECURITY, CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD

The Monroe Doctrine and United States National Security in the Early Twentieth Century

ale x bryne

Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the Contemporary World Series Editors Effie G. H. Pedaliu LSE Ideas London, UK John W. Young University of Nottingham Nottingham, UK

The Palgrave Macmillan series, Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the Contemporary World aims to make a significant contribution to academic and policy debates on cooperation, conflict and security since 1900. It evolved from the series Global Conflict and Security edited by Professor Saki Ruth Dockrill. The current series welcomes proposals that offer innovative historical perspectives, based on archival evidence and promoting an empirical understanding of economic and political cooperation, conflict and security, peace-making, diplomacy, humanitarian intervention, nation-building, intelligence, terrorism, the influence of ideology and religion on international relations, as well as the work of international organisations and non-governmental organisations. More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14489

Alex Bryne

The Monroe Doctrine and United States National Security in the Early Twentieth Century

Alex Bryne Nottingham, UK

Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the Contemporary World ISBN 978-3-030-43430-4 ISBN 978-3-030-43431-1  (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-43431-1 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover credit: Granger Historical Picture Archive/Alamy Stock Photo This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Acknowledgements

Just as the citizens of the United States gave thanks to the Monroe Doctrine during its centennial anniversary, I too wish to express my gratitude to the individuals and organisations that have made this book possible. The parameters and premise of this study were first developed in my doctoral thesis and I would like to accordingly thank the University of Nottingham’s School of Cultures, Languages and Area Studies for funding my research and providing me with several travel grants. I am similarly grateful to the association for British American Nineteenth Century Historians (BrANCH) for awarding me a Peter Parish Memorial Fund Research Grant to support a research trip to the United States. The process of transforming my doctoral research into a monograph has been a challenging one—writing a book without the security of full-time academic employment took a heavy financial and emotional toll. I am therefore eminently grateful to the following individuals for their guidance, support, and assistance over the past few years. My doctoral supervisors Bevan Sewell and Maria Ryan have continued to support my research since my graduation, as have my doctoral examiners Paul McGarr and David Milne. Jimmy Brookes, Mark Eastwood, Alex Ferguson, Steve Gallo, Daniel King, Hannah Murray, Ben Offiler, Jennie O’Reilly, Steven Parfitt, and Elizabeth Wiedenheft have all shaped the book in one way or another, be that through reading drafts or entertaining my ramblings on early twentieth-century United States foreign

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

relations. In this regard, special thanks must be paid to my brothersin-arms Tom Bishop and Lorenzo Costaguta. It has been a pleasure to work with Molly Beck and Maeve Sinnott at Palgrave, and my final thanks go to the anonymous reviewers of my work who provided insightful, detailed, and valuable feedback.

Contents

Introduction: A Cluster of Loyalties 1 The Empire of the Monroe Doctrine 19 Regional Hegemony and Pan-Americanism 45 A Shibboleth and a War 93 The Trichotomy of the Treaty Fight 131 One Hundred Years and Still Going Strong? 171 Conclusion: Anything or Nothing 201 Bibliography 209 Index 237

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List of Figures

The Empire of the Monroe Doctrine Fig. 1 “Uncle Sam’s Temptation” Fig. 2 “Uncle Sam’s Picnic”

28 38

Regional Hegemony and Pan-Americanism Fig. 1 “He’ll take the old umbrella along” Fig. 2 “That’s a live wire, gentlemen” Fig. 3 “Magnified Security”

59 74 83

A Shibboleth and a War Fig. 1 “Mad Dog?” 100 Fig. 2 “The Vast Territory That Our Monroe Doctrine Obligates Us to Defend” 122

The Trichotomy of the Treaty Fight Fig. 1 “The Rocky Road to Peace” 139 Fig. 2 “Why all this fuss over article ten?” 149

One Hundred Years and Still Going Strong? Fig. 1 “One hundred years old and still going strong. You can’t help wishing him many happy returns of the day” 173

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LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 2 Monroe Doctrine centennial half dollar 183 Fig. 3 Tomb of James Monroe, hollywood cemetery, Richmond, VA 186

Conclusion: Anything or Nothing Fig. 1 Secretary of State John Kerry speaks at the Organization of American States on November 18, 2013 208

Introduction: A Cluster of Loyalties

To citizens of the United States, the advent of the twentieth century ­signified more than the mere passage of time. A palpable sense of expectation and excitement accompanied the turn of the century as Americans dreamt up wonderous new destinies for their nation. The scene in New York City on 31 December 1900 was typical. Throngs of Americans filled the city’s lavishly decorated streets to watch impressive firework displays and enjoy festive singing and dancing. Crowds gathered around preachers who lauded the passing of the old and the arrival of the new, proclaiming that Americans could “count with confidence upon still greater material progress in the future.”1 Magazine editors tapped into the abundant fascination with the dawning of a new century and published verbose articles on the bright future that awaited Americans. The aptly named Century Magazine claimed that this optimism was rational and predicted with utmost certainty that the United States would witness improved working conditions, the end of political corruption, and a greater international role within a few short years.2 The twentieth century was heralded as one of prosperity and progress and a moment in which the United States was prepared to reap the benefits of a new era. 1 New 2 The

York Tribune, January 1, 1901, 1. Century Magazine, January 1901, 473–474.

© The Author(s) 2020 A. Bryne, The Monroe Doctrine and United States National Security in the Early Twentieth Century, Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the Contemporary World, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-43431-1_1

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Although these statements can be dismissed as a mixture of pageantry and hyperbole, there was, in fact, some truth to them. The emergence of the progressive movement pointed to various avenues of domestic and societal reform and there was ample evidence to suggest that the United States was entering a distinct new chapter in its history that marked its rise as a great power on the world stage. Nowhere was this clearer than in the development of the nation’s imperial policies. Since its independence, the United States had chiefly confined its territorial expansion to the North American continent. Only the acquisition of several tiny uninhabited islands in the Caribbean and Pacific supplemented a broader policy of settler colonialism and armed conflict with Native American tribal nations and Mexico. Yet the United States entered the twentieth century having initiated a new phase of imperial expansion and empire-building that fundamentally altered its geopolitical reach. The annexation and subsequent pacification of the Philippines solidified the nation’s imperial interests in East Asia, and the development of a predominantly informal empire in Central America and the Caribbean unleashed an imperial drive for regional hegemony in the Western Hemisphere centred on the protection of the Panama Canal Zone. Within the first few years of the new century, the scope and nature of the United States Empire had been emphatically redefined.3

3 The nature of United States imperialism continues to attract significant attention among historians. Recent studies that have shaped scholarly discourse include Daniel Immerwahr, How to Hide An Empire: A Short History of the Greater United States (London: Bodley Head, 2019); Antony Hopkins, American Empire: A Global History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018); Walter Hixon, American Settler Colonialism: A History (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Paul Kramer, “Power and Connection: Imperial Histories of the United States in the World,” American Historical Review 116, no. 5 (2011): 1348–1391; Richard Immerman, Empire for Liberty: A History of American Imperialism from Benjamin Franklin to Paul Wolfowitz (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010); Charles Maier, Among Empires: American Ascendancy and Its Predecessors (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007); Mary Heiss, “The Evolution of the Imperial Idea and U.S. National Identity,” Diplomatic History 26, no. 4 (2002): 511–540; Paul Kramer, “Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons: Race and Rule Between the British and United States Empires, 1880–1910,” Journal of American History 88, no. 4 (2002): 1315–1353; Frank Ninkovich, The United States and Imperialism (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001); Edward Crapol, “Coming to Terms with Empire: The Historiography of Late Nineteenth-Century American Foreign Relations,” in Paths to Power: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations to 1941, ed. Michael Hogan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

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Most of the nation’s decision-making class lauded this moment of empire-building. Politicians, diplomats, international lawyers, academics, and military officials alike widely believed that the United States would gain a host of political, strategic, and economic benefits by expanding and solidifying its imperial reach. Only the most ardent anti-imperialists dissented entirely.4 Yet it would have been naïve for policy makers to simply rest on their laurels. In a timely review of the nation’s nineteenth-century foreign relations, international lawyer John Bassett Moore warned the readers of the Harvard Law Review that the “graver meaning” of the nation’s imperial achievements needed to be recognised. By projecting its influence, power, and polity beyond North America, the United States had amassed an “increase of national responsibilities” that demanded a reassessment of national security. Not only was the United States now responsible for defending territory and colonial subjects in the Pacific and maintaining spheres of influence in Latin America, its bourgeoning imperial power did not sit comfortably with traditional republican and anti-imperial values. Americans were justified in their confidence, but Moore deemed it pertinent for policy makers

4 The term “decision-making class” comes from Bruce Kuklick, Blind Oracles: Intellectuals and War from Kennan to Kissinger (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 44. It refers collectively to the group of United States elites that influence the direction of United States foreign relations from both within and without the State Department. During the early twentieth century, this group primarily consisted of politicians, diplomats, international lawyers, academics, and military officials. Academic and intellectual pursuits had become increasingly professionalised by the turn of the century, which helped historians, international lawyers, social scientists, and their ilk solidify personal and professional linkages with the State Department and contribute to Washington’s foreign policy decision-making process. Its members were almost exclusively white and male, which accounts for the position that most of the protagonists of this book adopt on issues relating to race and gender in the conduct of United States foreign relations. For studies that engage with the relationship between academics and United States foreign relations, see Ricardo Salvatore, Disciplinary Conquest: U.S. Scholars in South America, 1900– 1945 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016); Ian Tyrrell, Historians in Public: The Practice of American History, 1890–1970 (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2005). For international lawyers, see Benjamin Coates, Legalist Empire: International Law and American Foreign Relations in the Early Twentieth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); Stephen Neff, Justice Among Nations: A History of International Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014); For military officials, see Richard Challener, Admirals, Generals, and American Foreign Policy 1898–1914 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973).

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to ensure that in another one hundred years “the cause of free government, free commerce, and free seas may still find in the United States a champion.”5 How did Moore and his contemporaries seek to reconcile the nation’s new imperial responsibilities with the demands of national security during the early twentieth century? This book explains that the answer lies, in part, with the Monroe Doctrine. First enunciated in President James Monroe’s annual message to Congress in 1823, the Monroe Doctrine was a foreign policy proclamation that outlined that the United States would view any further colonisation of the American continents as a threat to its national interests and advised against involvement in European conflicts.6 The passage of time granted the doctrine a semi-­ sacred status within the national consciousness, and by the turn of the twentieth century, it was popularly regarded as a foundational historic document that demanded reverence and respect. A mythology had solidified around it, one that claimed that the United States had been able to protect its national interests on the world stage because its leaders had adhered to the doctrine’s tenets since its enunciation. The Venezuelan boundary dispute of 1895–1896 was central to this process of mythmaking and seemingly confirmed this narrative. When a border dispute broke out between Venezuela and British Guiana, President Grover Cleveland and his Secretary of State Richard Olney invoked the doctrine to challenge British influence in the Western Hemisphere, successfully instigating an arbitration process. Standing up to the British Empire proved to Olney that adherence to the Monroe Doctrine had granted the United States a “practically sovereign” position across the entire Western Hemisphere.7 Yet the historical reality of the Monroe Doctrine’s value was less inspiring. Whilst various Presidents had aligned policy decisions to its defence and maintenance throughout the nineteenth century, the 5 John Bassett Moore, “A Hundred Years of American Diplomacy,” Harvard Law Review 14, no. 3 (1900): 181–182. 6 The phrase Monroe Doctrine was not commonly used until the mid-nineteenth century. The relevant sections of James Monroe’s message that constitute the doctrine can be found at “Monroe Doctrine,” December 2, 1823, The Avalon Project, https://avalon.law. yale.edu/19th_century/monroe.asp. 7 Nick Cleaver, Grover Cleveland’s New Foreign Policy: Arbitration, Neutrality, and the Dawn of American Empire (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 127.

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doctrine had not served as the fundamental, unifying basis of the nation’s foreign relations. To begin with, domestic reaction to Monroe’s proclamation had been mixed. Congress refused to endorse its tenets and many statesmen argued that it was incompatible with President George Washington’s plea in his Farewell Address of 1796 to avoid permanent alliances. Despite appeals to the doctrine, the United States had ignored several instances of European intervention and colonialism in Latin America, including the French invasion of Mexico in 1862 and the British acquisition of the Falkland Islands and Belize in 1833 and 1862 respectively. Indeed, the United States had never been militarily powerful enough to prevent any significant European intervention in Latin America and had been reliant on Britain to maintain the geopolitical status quo in the hemisphere. Whilst Onley viewed the Venezuelan boundary dispute as a sign of British acquiescence to the Monroe Doctrine, the Foreign Office simply did not consider the fight to be worth the hassle. However, details and contradictions in the historical record did not matter. What did matter was the appeal of the United States firmly asserting its international prowess and protecting its national interests by opposing European meddling in Latin America. In a moment when the nation’s imperial policies were changing, it therefore seemed pertinent to square them with the doctrine’s guiding tenets.8 What made the Monroe Doctrine even more appealing was its vague meaning. Although the importance of an independent Latin America free from European colonialism had been clear, the original text of the doctrine was otherwise non-committal and open-ended, containing traces of anti-colonialism, isolationism, non-interventionism, hegemonic 8 The best historical study of the Monroe Doctrine during the nineteenth century is Jay Sexton, The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and Nation in ­Nineteenth-Century America (New York, NY: Hill and Wang, 2011). For a concise narrative of the doctrine’s history, see Mark Gilderhus, “The Monroe Doctrine: Meanings and Implications,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 36, no. 1 (2006): 5–16. Although outdated, Dexter Perkins, A History of the Monroe Doctrine (London: Longmans, 1960 [1955]) remains invaluable to understanding the doctrine’s impact. The origins of the doctrine are addressed in Ernest May, The Making of the Monroe Doctrine (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975). The relationship between the doctrine and Washington’s Farewell Address is examined in Jeffery Malanson, Addressing America: George Washington’s Farewell Address and the Making of National Culture, Politics, and Diplomacy (Kent, WA: Kent State University Press, 2015), 5, 82–92. For a literary study of the doctrine during the nineteenth century, see Gretchen Murphy, Hemispheric Imaginings: The Monroe Doctrine and Narratives of U.S. Empire (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005).

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aspiration, imperial ambition, paternalism, and Pan-Americanism. These traces were ambiguous, presenting the nation with an apotheosised document that could be invoked to justify a wide range of policy decisions. The foreign policy intellectual Walter Lippmann observed this phenomenon in his 1915 publication The Stakes of Diplomacy. He noted that the doctrine could “mean anything or nothing in the actual affairs of Central and South America,” yet for the people of the United States, it equated to “a cluster of loyalties” that could be effectively “summoned to action” when required. Sanctioned by years of habit, domestic reaction to the doctrine had become “almost automatic” and Lippmann argued that this had permitted authoritative officials to invoke it for almost any purpose: It may cover a totally new course of action. In the last ninety years or so it has covered many courses of action. But it has covered them. Because the covering was familiar, the action has been palatable. We have been ready to fight in defense of the Monroe Doctrine, leaving it for the President to decide what it means.9

What Lippmann had exposed was the paradox of the Monroe Doctrine. His reference to the doctrine’s ability to “cover” a variety of policies highlighted the fact that its fluid and ever-changing meaning had become one of its most defining features by the early twentieth century. Yet his description of the doctrine as a “cluster of loyalties” suggested that citizens of the United States held its malleable tenets in the highest esteem. Even though the revered policy’s meaning had become so unsettled and open to reinterpretation over the course of nearly a century of application, it retained the potency of a historic tradition and continued to represent American values that were deemed worthy of a tenacious defence at any cost. It was for this reason that decision makers flocked to the doctrine during the early twentieth century to explain, justify, and direct the consolidation of the United States’ overseas empire whilst reconceptualising notions of national security. Accordingly, this book demonstrates that during the early twentieth century, the Monroe Doctrine served the role of a national security framework that was used to justify new directions in United States

9 Walter Lippmann, The Stakes of Diplomacy (New York, NY: Henry Holt and Company, 1915), 18–20.

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foreign relations when the nation emerged as one of the world’s leading imperial powers. As the United States’ overseas empire expanded in the wake of the Spanish–American War, the nation’s decision makers engaged in a protracted debate over the meaning and application of the doctrine that lasted well into the 1920s. Through public addresses, congressional debates, academic publications and conference papers, literary-political magazines, newspapers, and official and private correspondence, Americans argued over the doctrine’s purpose and collectively fractured its meaning as it was reconceptualised and broadly aligned to two antithetical notions simultaneously. On the one hand emerged a Monroe Doctrine that justified the maintenance of regional hegemony in the Western Hemisphere, namely an imperialistic power relationship that permitted the United States to exert dominance over the nations of Latin America and engage in economic and military intervention. According to Americans who advocated this interpretation, the doctrine stood as an enunciation of the United States’ destiny to assume the role of the dominant power in the Americas, justifying any policy that maintained the nation’s influence throughout the Western Hemisphere. On the other was a Pan-American Monroe Doctrine that embodied a commitment to inter-American unity and political, economic, cultural, intellectual, and military cooperation. Pan-Americanists and other proponents of inter-American cooperation argued that the doctrine dictated the United States to engage with the nations of Latin America in mutually beneficial ways. During the early twentieth century, much of the foreign policy establishment believed that the existence of a hegemonic power relationship was essential to the existence of the United States. However, opposing voices argued that the United States would serve its security interests more effectively through policies of inter-American cooperation. By debating the meaning and application of the doctrine, Americans sought to utilise it as a rhetorical device to justify policy decisions aimed at either maintaining regional hegemony or securing inter-American cooperation. Both of these overarching approaches to Latin America were at the heart of United States foreign relations during the first two decades of the twentieth century, and the doctrine’s unsettled meaning reflected the divisions that existed among domestic perceptions of the nation’s new role on the world stage. Through surveying the varied forums through which this debate took place, its staggering scale and reach becomes apparent—any citizen with at least a passing interest in its nation’s foreign relations could not have

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avoided engaging with the Monroe Doctrine. George Blakeslee, a prominent historian of Latin America, was right to claim in 1914 that the nation was faced with “an epidemic of discussion regarding the Monroe Doctrine.”10 To appreciate how and why the doctrine served as a national security framework, we must first understand what national security encompasses. As a historical paradigm in the field of United States foreign relations, national security is defined as the defence of what citizens consider to be the “American way of life,” namely national “core values.” As Melvyn Leffler explains, national security transcends the assessment of rival nations’ capabilities for the purpose of defending citizens and territory, because threat perception is additionally influenced by a nation’s own strength, the appeal of its ideology, and the patterns of the international system. Therefore, when considering national security, policy makers combine material national interests with broader ideological and cultural goals, generating identifiable core values that are determined worthy of defence regardless of the cost. Whilst decision makers may not agree entirely on specific objectives at any given time, core values represent a combination of material and cultural goals “that emerge as priorities after the trade-offs are made.”11 Although the term national security did not emerge within the political lexicon until the mid-1940s, decision makers had always engaged with the inherent notion of defending core values from external threats throughout the nation’s history.12 Scholars are increasingly concerned with studying United States national security prior to the Cold War in order to understand how core values have developed over time. In his broad chronological study of United States national security, William Walker presents a compelling case for the creation of an American

10 George Blakeslee, “Should the Monroe Doctrine Continue to Be a Policy of the United States?” Proceedings of the American Society of International Law at Its Annual Meeting 8 (1914): 217. 11 Melvyn Leffler, “National Security,” in Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, ed. Frank Costigliola and Michael Hogan (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 3rd ed., 2016), 25–29. 12 On the usage of the term national security, see Dexter Fergie, “Geopolitics Turned Inward: The Princeton Military Studies Group and the National Security Imagination,” Diplomatic History 43, no. 4 (2019): 644–645.

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“national security state” at the close of the nineteenth century, arguing that the United States “actively engaged the world to protect its economic interests and enhance its security” during this period.13 Indeed, Ross Kennedy has analysed President Woodrow Wilson’s approach to the First World War in terms of national security, positing that the President was driven by a desire to prevent the United States “becoming an authoritarian, militarized state constantly on the verge of war.” According to Kennedy, Wilson believed that a system of international relations based on alliances, secrecy, and suspicion had to be replaced with one of collective security to protect not only United States citizens and territory but the American way of life as well.14 Approaching the history of the Monroe Doctrine through the paradigm of national security provides us with an ideal medium through which to examine the formation of the United States’ core values during the early twentieth century. Scholars typically argue that United States national security has consistently encompassed the defence of liberty, liberalism, republicanism, democracy, self-determination, and capitalism to varying degrees.15 These core values were drawn from foundational documents such as the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution and upheld as distinctly American ideals that needed to be defended internationally. Whilst this book does not aim to dispute the importance of these core values in the conduct of United States foreign relations during the early twentieth century, it seeks to expand our understanding of United States national security and demonstrate that core values have additionally been generated internationally through years of interaction between the United States and the other nations of the world. In other words, core American values have been international in nature as well as domestic. This book posits that during the early twentieth century, the Monroe Doctrine’s malleable “cluster of loyalties” were perceived as fundamental to the existence of the United States. Yet disagreement persisted over 13 William Walker, National Security and Core Values in American History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 52–62. 14 Ross Kennedy, “Woodrow Wilson, World War I, and American National Security,” Diplomatic History 25, no. 1 (2001): 1–3. 15 Andrew Preston, “Monsters Everywhere: A Genealogy of National Security,” Diplomatic History 38, no. 3 (2014): 480; Walker, National Security, 5–6; Melvyn Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 267.

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which core values the doctrine truly embodied. Did the doctrine demand an expansive empire in the Western Hemisphere and beyond to ensure national security, or direct the nation to acts of cooperation and unity among the American republics? The doctrine’s capricious meaning facilitated dispute and contention over the evolution of United States foreign relations in a watershed moment of the nation’s imperial development. Because the doctrine’s meaning was easily manipulated, it was actively reinterpreted to provide justification for the renegotiation of the nation’s foreign relations on the grounds of maintaining the core values that it was deemed to embody. When examining the relationship between regional hegemony and inter-American cooperation, it is important to emphasise the distinction that United States decision makers made in perceiving them as core values of national security rather than simply foreign policy strategies. The global histories of empire tell us that policies of imperialism and international cooperation are compatible with one another in the right circumstances. Most empires have cooperated to some degree with the peoples and nations they exert power over to strengthen their imperial control, and local elites often willingly cooperate with imperial powers to pursue their own interests.16 In the case of Latin America, both Britain and the United States instigated policies of cooperation with national leaders as a means to achieve their imperial ends in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries respectively.17 Imperialism and cooperation become antithetical when they are elevated to the status of core values. As the Monroe Doctrine’s meaning fractured and its proposed application began to

16 Tanja Bührer, Flavio Eichmann, Stig Förster, and Benedikt Stuchtey, “Introduction,” in Cooperation and Empire: Local Realities of Global Processes, ed. Tanja Bührer, Flavio Eichmann, Stig Förster, and Benedikt Stuchtey (New York, NY: Berghahn, 2017), 1–29; Timothy Parsons, “African Participation in the British Empire,” in Black Experience and the Empire, ed. Philip Morgan and Sean Hawkins (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 257–285; Matthew Brown, “Introduction,” in Informal Empire in Latin America: Culture, Commerce and Capital, ed. Matthew Brown (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), 13–14; Ronald Robinson, “Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration,” in Studies in the Theory of Imperialism, ed. Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe (London: Longmans, 1972), 117–142. 17 Mark Gilderhus, “Forming an Informal Empire without Colonies: U.S.-Latin American Relations,” Latin American Research Review 40, no. 3 (2005): 312–325; Alan Knight, “Britain and Latin America,” in The Oxford History of the British Empire, Vol. 3, The Nineteenth Century, ed. Andrew Porter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 124.

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divide Americans, a certain segment of the nation’s decision makers did not consider inter-American cooperation a means to an imperial end—it was the end. Whilst advocates of the empire would tout Pan-American rhetoric to increase support for imperial control in the Americas, proponents of a multilateral Monroe Doctrine saw the two as incompatible. For Pan-Americanists and their allies, i­nter-American cooperation should not bolster the United States’ imperial grip. It was a core value that ought to be defended and secured for its own merits. By appreciating the extent to which inter-American cooperation was advocated—as either a policy or a core value—a greater understanding of the relationship between notions of hegemony and cooperation can be discerned. * * * The debate over the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine that this book traces began during the Spanish–American War of 1898. “The Empire of the Monroe Doctrine” explores the ways in which the American ­anti-imperialist movement invoked the doctrine to protest the annexation of the Philippines. Anti-imperialists aggressively invoked the doctrine to differentiate between a structure, practice, and policy of imperialism that they believed to be consistent with American traditions, and one that was akin to European colonialism and antithetical to foundational American ideals, presenting an idealised vision of the form the United States Empire ought to take. Although they ultimately failed to convince Republican policy makers that the doctrine forbade the acquisition of the Pacific islands, advocates of overseas expansion realised that the doctrine, as interpreted by anti-imperialists, was at odds with the new direction of the United States’ imperial policy. This prompted the architects of the United States’ overseas empire to reconceptualise the doctrine and view it as a flexible and malleable policy that could accommodate historic shifts in United States foreign relations. In enunciating his corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in 1904, President Theodore Roosevelt granted governmental approval to a new interpretation of the doctrine that sought to defend United States hegemony in the Western Hemisphere through justifying the expansion of the United States Empire in “familiar” terms, advocating imperial expansion as a legitimate defence of national core values. The enunciation of the Roosevelt Corollary as a reinterpretation of the Monroe Doctrine is a well-known episode in the history of United States foreign relations. However, its association with the imperial ascendancy of the nation has obscured the implications of the debate over the doctrine’s meaning that was taking place throughout the early

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twentieth century. Leading scholars such as Jay Sexton, Walter LaFeber, and Serge Ricard have argued that the expansion of the United States’ imperial power directly transformed the doctrine via the Roosevelt Corollary into a policy that justified regional hegemony and the growth of the United States Empire.18 Although this is true, the linearity of this narrative is misleading. The doctrine did not simply transform into the Roosevelt Corollary by virtue of a presidential enunciation. Instead, it fractured into two disparate yet interconnected interpretations; “Regional Hegemony and Pan-Americanism” traces this process during the Republican administrations of Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft. To appreciate the impact of the Monroe Doctrine upon the course of United States foreign relations and grapple with the relationship between imperialism and international cooperation during a period of national ascendency, a more nuanced understanding of the doctrine’s evolution is required to reflect the contested nature of United States foreign relations more broadly. As historian of inter-American relations Juan Pablo Scarfi has recently attested, Latin American politicians and intellectuals began to raise dissent against the hegemony-facilitating interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine during the first years of the twentieth century and proposed a Pan-American application in response. ­Pan-Americanists in the United States soon adopted this argument in their own rhetoric, arguing that some, if not all, of the American republics ought to maintain the doctrine together.19 These individuals interpreted the doctrine as a facilitator of inter-American cooperation and a policy that bound the Americas together for the benefit of mutual security. Just as many Latin American officials had hoped before the Congress of Panama in 1826, Pan-Americanists argued that the doctrine was the ideal foundation of an inter-American system posed against European colonialism in the Americas.20 Rather than worsening the already 18 Sexton, Monroe Doctrine, 3–12 and 244–248; Serge Ricard, “The Roosevelt Corollary,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 36, no. 1 (2006): 18; Walter LaFeber, “The Evolution of the Monroe Doctrine from Monroe to Reagan,” in Redefining the Past: Essays in Diplomatic History in Honor of William Appleman Williams, ed. Lloyd Gardner (Corvallis: Oregon State University Press, 1986), 123–132. 19 Juan Pablo Scarfi, “In the Name of the Americas: The Pan-American Redefinition of the Monroe Doctrine and the Emerging Language of American International Law in the Western Hemisphere, 1898–1933,” Diplomatic History 40, no. 2 (2016): 189–218. 20 Jeffrey Malanson, “The Congressional Debate over U.S. Participation in the Congress of Panama, 1825–1826: Washington’s Farewell Address, Monroe’s Doctrine, and the Fundamental Principles of U.S. Foreign Policy,” Diplomatic History 30, no. 5 (2006): 823.

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decaying state of United States–Latin American relations by tightening the United States’ imperial grip on the hemisphere, matters of security and diplomacy ought to be met by strengthening inter-American unity through cooperative and multilateral policy initiatives. Inter-American unity was therefore deemed an essential component of national security among an increasingly vocal section of the United States decision-­ making class. By aligning the Monroe Doctrine to inter-American cooperation, a subsection of the United States decision-making class promoted ­Pan-Americanism to the status of a national core value. As an ideology, Pan-Americanism is the belief that the United States and the republics of Latin America share a special relationship and ought to cooperate for mutual benefits. Whilst this notion was grounded in geography in its most primitive form, it gradually extended to politics, primarily in support of New World republicanism, as well as culture.21 In his classic study, Arthur Whitaker argues that Pan-Americanism was one of the many “shifting and imperfect forms” of the “Western Hemisphere idea” given political expression, namely the notion that the peoples of the Western Hemisphere stand “in a special relationship to one another which sets them apart from the rest of the world.”22 In the 1880s, the modern Pan-American movement was initiated by the United States and was motivated to bring about inter-American unity to prevent European intervention in the Western Hemisphere and develop inter-American trade.23 Few of the movement’s instigators can be considered genuine advocates of lofty goals such as inter-American unity and equality, and a wealth of policy makers have since adopted Pan-Americanism as a disguise for unilateral gains. Accordingly, modern Pan-Americanism is often criticised for being the “friendly face of U.S. dominance in the hemisphere.”24 Benjamin Coates highlights the tension that existed within 21 John

Fagg, Pan Americanism (Malabar, FL: Krieger Publishing, 1982), 3. Whitaker, The Western Hemisphere Idea: Its Rise and Decline (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1954), 1. 23 On the distinction between modern and traditional Pan-Americanism, see Mark Petersen, “Argentine and Chilean Approaches to Modern ­Pan-Americanism, 1888–1930” (PhD diss., University of Oxford, 2014), 3–18. 24 David Shenin, “Rethinking Pan Americanism: An Introduction,” in Beyond the Ideal: Pan Americanism in Inter-American Affairs, ed. David Shenin (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000), 1. 22 Arthur

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United States-led ­Pan-Americanism from the outset, describing it as a concept that “simultaneously erased and heightened distinctions between North and South Americans,” ultimately legitimising United States geopolitical advancement through the rhetoric of shared Americanness.25 United States Pan-Americanists have additionally been criticised for making assumptions about the reality of hemispheric unity. Mark Gilderhus argues that they “presumed the existence of natural harmonies in the western hemisphere and reasoned that the creation of a functioning, regional system would benefit all participants by facilitating, among other things, the settlement of disputes, the expansion of trade, and the diminution of European influences.” Many Latin Americans were generally more concerned with disparities of wealth, power, and culture than cooperating with the Colossus of the North, and often found PanHispanic or Pan-Latin alternatives more desirable.26 Historians have ably addressed the failures and imperial nature of Pan-Americanism during the early twentieth century, yet its role in ­ United States national security requires interrogation. The historiography of United States–Latin American relations is predominately concerned with the hegemonic aspirations of the United States, which has led to Pan-American initiatives being overlooked. Since the 1960s, historians have tended to occupy what Mark Gilderhus refers to as the “radical perspective” of United States–Latin American relations, namely that “the distinguishing feature of U.S. relations with Latin America has been the prevalence of conflict and exploitation.”27 Whilst this book makes no effort to downplay the severity of this power relationship, nor deny the imperial nature of Pan-American initiatives, it revisits Pan-Americanism through the Monroe Doctrine debate and scrutinises the relationship between notions of hegemony and cooperation and their impact upon 25 Benjamin Coates, “The Pan-American Lobbyist: William Eleroy Curtis and U.S. Empire, 1884–1899,” Diplomatic History 38, no. 1 (2014): 33. 26 Mark Gilderhus, ­ Pan-American Visions: Woodrow Wilson in the Western Hemisphere 1913–1921 (Tuscon: University of Arizona Press, 1986), ix–xi. For more insight into the difficulties facing inter-American unity, see Greg Grandin, “Your Americanism and Mine: Americanism and Anti-Americanism in the Americas,” American Historical Review 111, no. 4 (2006): 1042–1066; Alan McPherson, Yankee No! Anti-Americanism in U.S.Latin American Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 11–20; Emily Rosenberg, “World War I and Continental Solidarity,” Americas 31 (1975): 313–334. 27 Mark Gilderhus, “An Emerging Synthesis? U.S.-Latin American Relations since the Second World War,” Diplomatic History 16, no. 3 (1992): 431.

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United States national security. By examining proposals for inter-American cooperation and approaching Pan-Americanism as a core value of United States identity, it seeks to acknowledge that a segment of the nation’s decision-making class was beginning to understand national security as inseparable from collective inter-American security. Scholars have begun to draw attention to the fact that United States citizens have identified with the notion of an inter-American community to varying degrees throughout history. Caitlin Fitz demonstrates that this sentiment exerted significant influence as early as the first decade of the nineteenth century, and Richard Cándida Smith argues that by the First World War “national leaders were encouraging a utopian vision of the future relations of the world’s peoples, a vision distinctly in conflict with the historical concept of the nation as the most natural, indivisible source of collective identity.”28 According to Stephen Park, hemispheric connections have been present for centuries. Scholars have simply been “blinkered by the categories of national identity” and overlooked them.29 Latin America has consistently served as a primary security concern of United States policy makers, and by understanding the extent to which Pan-Americanism fed into debates over national security, this book draws upon the scholarship of Andrew Tillman and Juan Pablo Scarfi and analyses the interconnections between hegemony and cooperation in the history of United States–Latin American relations to “shed new light on the contradictions that have governed inter-American relations.”30 But why was the nation’s decision-making class so concerned about Latin America as a matter of national security? Why did the Monroe Doctrine’s “cluster of loyalties” transform so readily into core values at the turn of the century? The reason was fear. For core values to take hold of the national consciousness, threats to the nation must be perceived, 28 Caitlin Fitz, “The Hemispheric Dimensions of Early U.S. Nationalism: The War of 1812, Its Aftermath, and Spanish American Independence,” Journal of American History 102, no. 2 (2015): 356–379; Richard Cándida Smith, Improvised Continent: Pan-Americanism and Cultural Exchange (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017), 16. 29 Stephen Park, The Pan American Imagination: Contested Visions of the Hemisphere in Twentieth Century Literature (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2014), 4. 30 Juan Pablo Scarfi and Andrew Tillman, “Cooperation and Hegemony in US-Latin American Relations: An Introduction,” in Cooperation and Hegemony in US-Latin American Relations: Revisiting the Western Hemisphere Idea, ed. Juan Pablo Scarfi and Andrew Tillman (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 2–12.

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and during the early twentieth century, the fear of foreign challenges to the Monroe Doctrine was pervasive.31 As Nancy Mitchell demonstrates, the United States foreign policy establishment was obsessed with the possibility of a German threat to national interests in the Western Hemisphere, regardless of the actual intent of German policy makers.32 The spectre of a “German Peril” in the Western Hemisphere generated a sense of urgency in the Monroe Doctrine debate as both i­nter-American unity and regional hegemony were deemed threatened. As such, the doctrine became an integral part of the military, political, and popular national response to this perceived European challenge to United States interests. Although Germany was positioned as the United States’ primary antagonist during the early twentieth century, Japan was additionally viewed as an equally daunting foe, especially after its military victory over Russia in 1905. The possibility of a Japanese challenge to the Monroe Doctrine fundamentally altered its geographic scope, and it was during this period that the language of the doctrine was reinterpreted to target not only European interference in the Western Hemisphere but that of all non-American nations.33 The debate over the Monroe Doctrine became particularly volatile in 1913. “A Shibboleth and a War” begins with the publication of the Yale historian Hiram Bingham’s scathing critique of the doctrine that caused a national stir and generated an outpouring of commentary on its meaning and application. The outbreak of the First World War the following year complicated matters even further. The doctrine was fresh in the minds of Americans and it was initially looked upon as a barrier that had warded off the conflict from the Americas. However, it soon became apparent that the belligerent nations had altered the very fabric 31 Preston,

“National Security,” 479; Walker, National Security, 8. Mitchell, The Danger of Dreams: German and American Imperialism in Latin America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999). See also Ragnhild Fiebig-von Hase, “The United States and Germany in the World Arena, 1900–1917,” in Confrontation and Cooperation: Germany and the United States in the Era of World War I 1900–1924, ed. Hans Jürgen Schröder (Providence, RI: Berg Publishers, 1993); Manfred Jonas, The United States and Germany: A Diplomatic History (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984). 33 Serge Ricard, “Theodore Roosevelt: Imperialist or Global Strategist in the New Expansionist Age?” Diplomacy & Statecraft 19, no. 4 (2008): 642; William Nester, Power Across the Pacific: A Diplomatic History of American Relations with Japan (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1996), 74–76. 32 Nancy

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of international relations and that the doctrine had to be reshaped to meet security demands. As such, the debate over the doctrine’s application was amplified as Americans sought to convince one another that either regional hegemony or inter-American cooperation was the core value that the nation needed to defend during the war. When the United States entered the conflict in 1917, the concurrent debate over the doctrine’s meaning and application shifted in tenor and combined with the debate over post-war international organisation known as the treaty fight. “The Trichotomy of the Treaty Fight” examines how these two debates became symbiotic—the Monroe Doctrine influenced the attitudes that Americans held towards a league of nations, and the prospect of a new world order altered the ways in which Americans considered the application of the doctrine. The doctrine was one of several issues at the heart of the treaty fight, and by positioning the efforts to reinterpret its meaning and application within the narrative of the treaty fight, the debate over international organisation and post-war internationalism that wracked the nation can be considered ­ a trichotomy: a debate between proponents of unilateralism, global organisation, and regional organisation. To protect national core values, Americans were faced with three potential degrees of commitment to internationalism after the conflict ended. Ultimately, the Senate’s rejection of the Treaty of Versailles seemed to signify that policy makers were primarily concerned with maintaining United States hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. However, as “One Hundred Years and Still Going Strong?” explains, the centennial anniversary of the Monroe Doctrine demonstrated that United States national security was still contested. Several high-profile events were held across the United States in 1923 that celebrated and lauded the wisdom of the doctrine one hundred years after its enunciation, ranging from expositions to academic conferences. Yet the centennial was not an isolated episode in which the doctrine momentarily held the attention of the nation, rather it served as an important milestone in the debate over the meaning and application of the doctrine that had been taking place since the Spanish–American War. The centennial served as an ideal moment to ­reconcile notions of hegemony and cooperation, demonstrating that after one hundred years of service, the doctrine remained an essential tool for decision makers to frame the role of the United States in the world and its national security.

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By 1923, the Monroe Doctrine was far removed from President James Monroe’s original message. Having been subjected to an unprecedented degree of scrutiny over a quarter-century, the doctrine had become a contested concept at the heart of wider debates over the conduct of United States foreign relations and the conception of national security, fracturing into two disparate yet related interpretations. It became aligned with a broad range of ideologies and issues, including isolationism, anti-colonialism, Pan-Americanism, regional hegemony, informal imperialism, racial paternalism, and the reach of international law, and was an acute consideration for the United States decision-making class during key historical events, such as the acquisition of the Philippines, the Mexican Revolution, the construction of the Panama Canal, the First World War, and the debate over the League of Nations. Through reinterpreting the doctrine, Americans did not simply posit new directions in United States foreign policy—they emphasised the complexity and divisive nature of United States national security.

The Empire of the Monroe Doctrine

The Spanish–American War of 1898 was a resounding victory for the United States. Spain’s Pacific and Caribbean armed forces were defeated in the space of ten weeks and its long imperial presence in the Western Hemisphere finally came to an end. Whilst “Cuba Libre!” and “Remember the Maine!” were the popular rallying cries of the conflict, President William McKinley’s administration was motivated by a vast range of political, strategic, and economic considerations in its decision to oust Spanish rule from Cuba and beyond. It soon became apparent that territorial expansion was on the cards, and for Spain’s former colonial subjects who fought alongside United States armed forces, victory was bitter-sweet.1 1 Although the war is typically referred to as the Spanish–American War, historians tend to agree that the term is problematic because of the emphasis it gives to the United States and Spain at the expense of Cuban and Filipino combatants. However, for reasons of brevity, it will be used throughout. Notable histories of the conflict include Thomas Schoonover, Uncle Sam’s War of 1898 and the Origins of Globalization (Lexington, KT: University Press of Kentucky, 2003); Louis Pérez Jr., The War of 1898: The United States and Cuba in History and Historiography (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1998); Kristin Hoganson, Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998); Thomas Paterson, “United States Intervention in Cuba, 1898: Interpretations of the Spanish-American-Cuban-Filipino War,” The History Teacher 29, no. 3 (1996): 341–361; Joseph Smith, The Spanish-American War: Conflict in the Caribbean and the Pacific, 1895–1902 (London: Longmans, 1995); David Trask, The War with Spain

© The Author(s) 2020 A. Bryne, The Monroe Doctrine and United States National Security in the Early Twentieth Century, Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the Contemporary World, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-43431-1_2

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With the signing of the Treaty of Paris in December 1898, the United States claimed the spoils of war and absorbed Spain’s colonial possessions into its own imperial sphere, annexing Guam, Puerto Rico, and the farflung Philippines whilst placing Cuba under the supervision of a protectorate. Hawaii was additionally annexed during the conflict after years of intrigue, transforming the United States from a largely contiguous imperial polity into an unmistakably colonial and ­extra-hemispheric empire. Although the annexation of Hawaii, Guam, and Puerto Rico were widely accepted as logical acts of national expansion concurrent with Thomas Jefferson’s vision of the United States as an “Empire of Liberty,” the acquisition and violent pacification of the Philippines was met with angry domestic protest by a host of self-proclaimed ­anti-imperialists. The American Anti-Imperialist League was established in the summer of 1898 to pressure all branches of government against annexation, decrying the subsequent armed conflict against Filipino insurgents.2 As part of their protest, anti-imperialists invoked the Monroe Doctrine, inadvertently setting the groundwork for the debate over its meaning and application that this book traces. Surprisingly, the doctrine had been almost entirely absent from the political debates over Cuba prior to the war—it would certainly not have been out of the place for the McKinley administration to rationalise a conflict with Spain as an effort to prevent European interference in Cuba. However, as Jay Sexton explains, the events of the

in 1898 (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1981); Philip Foner, The Spanish-American War and the Birth of American Imperialism, vols. 2 (New York, NY: Monthly Review Press, 1972). 2 Important scholarship on the anti-imperialists includes Ian Tyrrell and Jay Sexton, ed., Empire’s Twin: U.S. Anti-Imperialism from the Founding Era to the Age of Terrorism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015); Michael Cullinane, Liberty and American ­Anti-Imperialism: 1898–1909 (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Jim Zwick, “The Anti-Imperialist Movement, 1898–1921,” in Whose America? The War of 1898 and the Battles to Define the Nation, ed. Virginia Bouvier (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001); Robert Beisner, Twelve Against Empire: The Anti-Imperialists 1898–1900, with a new ­foreword (Chicago, IL: Imprint Publications, [1968] 1992); Richard Welch Jr., Response to Imperialism: The United States and the Philippine-American War, 1899–1902 (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1979); Daniel Schirmer, Republic or Empire: American Resistance to the Philippine War (Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Publishing Company, 1972); Berkeley Tompkins, Anti-Imperialism in the United States: The Great Debate 1890–1920 (Philadelphia, PN: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1970); Fred Harrington, “The Anti-Imperialist Movement in the United States, 1898–1900,” The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 22, no. 2 (1935): 211–230.

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Venezuelan boundary dispute had aligned the doctrine to the Democratic Cleveland administration, whose members openly opposed the prospect of territorial expansion.3 Invoking the doctrine at this moment would have proven illogical for the Republican leadership, so they turned to Manifest Destiny and the notion of civilising missions as their idealistic weapons of choice. This left the Monroe Doctrine in the rhetorical armoury for the anti-imperialists to wield. Anti-imperialists argued that the annexation of the Philippines abrogated the Monroe Doctrine and represented a dangerous abandonment of traditional United States foreign policies. Despite their name, anti-imperialists were not opposed to the imperial expansion of the United States outright—it was specifically extra-hemispheric colonialism that they rallied against. To anti-imperialists, the annexation of the Philippines transformed the United States from a unique, American republic-empire into a distinctly European style empire that would not only endanger the lives of its people, but jeopardise United States interests in the Western Hemisphere. By abandoning the doctrine and annexing territory outside the Americas, the United States would become embroiled in the colonial conflicts of the Eastern Hemisphere, invite European empires to seek conquest in Latin America, and facilitate the rise of domestic militarism. National decline was certain, and the acquisition of the Philippines would set the United States along the same self-destructive path that all other empires were doomed to follow. As socialist Morrison Swift demanded, Americans needed to avoid the same fate as the last Greeks and Romans, “flaccid, indifferent, helpless to save themselves.”4 Through invoking the doctrine, anti-imperialists outlined the structure and form of the kind of empire the United States ought to be—an empire of the Monroe Doctrine. If policy makers adhered to the principles laid out in the revered policy tradition, the United States Empire would remain distinct and distant from the empires of Europe and avoid the ills of excessive and immoral imperialism. Of course, the anti-imperialists ultimately failed to prevent the annexation of the Philippines, which placed the Monroe Doctrine in an unusual theoretical position. If the maintenance of the doctrine really 3 Jay Sexton, The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and Nation in Nineteenth-Century America (New York, NY: Hill and Wang, 2011), 211–213. 4 Morrison Swift, Imperialism and Liberty (Los Angeles, CA: Ronbroke Press, 1899), 194–196.

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was incompatible with Philippine annexation, why did it not cease to exist and fall out of political rhetoric after the islands were formally acquired? Why did it continue to occupy such a prominent position within United States foreign policy decision-making for decades to come? Anders Stephanson notes that this “sticky point was either evaded by rhetorical claims to the effect that the spirit of generosity expressed in the Monroe Doctrine vis-à-vis Latin America was now merely being extended; or it was peremptorily dismissed.”5 Whilst Stephanson’s summary is true, it does not provide a full explanation. To understand why the doctrine persisted as an embodiment of American values and ideals, we must examine how territorial expansionists sought to square Philippine annexation with its continued application. They perceived colonial expansion as a means through which to strengthen United States hegemony in the Western Hemisphere and began to actively reshape the doctrine’s meaning and application to align new policy developments with existing ideological values. This process set the precedent for the larger debate over the doctrine that would take place over the subsequent quarter-century in which the nation’s decision makers scrutinised the doctrine’s meaning to interrogate core values of national security.

Out of Line with American History Anti-imperialists faced several difficulties in their efforts to foment ­opposition to the annexation of the Philippines. Firstly, they represented a tired, old, and conservative response to the Philippine question when compared to the youthful, energetic, and promising perspectives of the annexationists. Although influential figures such Samuel Clemens, George Washington Cable, Andrew Carnegie, Jane Addams, and William Jennings Bryan protested against annexation, most anti-imperialists belonged to a generation that was firmly embedded in the cultural milieu of the nineteenth century and, to put it bluntly, had little time left on the earth. Adopting the negative position in a national debate of such scale was made even more challenging when their opponents promised economic prosperity and drew upon the invigorating ideal of a civilising

5 Anders Stephanson, Manifest Destiny: American Expansion and the Empire of Right (New York, NY: Hill and Wang, 1995), 92–93.

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mission.6 More importantly, anti-imperialists struggled to maintain a united front. Internal disagreements hamstrung their efforts as many anti-imperialists prioritised their personal agendas in their protest. Antiimperialists came from a wide range of social spheres and backgrounds, held divergent political affinities, and objected to annexation for vastly different reasons.7 Some opposed annexation on moral grounds and supported the plight of the Filipinos, whereas others were horrified by the prospect of the Philippines becoming a state of the union and further tainting the Anglo-Saxon racial stock of the United States. Objections relating to labour, militarism, and constitutional law tended to attract specialised rather than widespread attention, and political differences eventually caused an ideological rift in the movement. When William Jennings Bryan stood for the Democrats in the 1900 presidential election and made anti-imperialism one of his core campaign planks, the Anti-Imperialist League announced its support for the party, angering a fraction of its members. A splinter group subsequently established the National Association of Anti-Imperialist Clubs on the grounds that anti-imperialism transcended party politics.8 The outspoken anti-­ imperialist and grandson of John Quincy Adams, Charles Francis Adams Jr., went so far to bitterly describe his cause as “an incoherent, inarticulate mass of discontent.”9 These divisions were certainly an important contributing factor to the failure of the anti-imperialists. Yet as Michael Cullinane argues, the existence of internal divisions did not necessarily equate to ineffectual protest. Indeed, Cullinane posits that anti-imperialists remained unified in their broad advocacy of American liberty despite their individual agendas. Even if the notion of liberty meant different things to individual anti-­ imperialists, they all believed that the annexation of the Philippines was antithetical to one of the nation’s founding ideals, granting a “commonality to their interests.”10 Broadly speaking, anti-imperialists feared the 6 Sexton, Monroe Doctrine, 213–214; Beisner, Twelve Against Empire, 221–222; Schirmer, Republic or Empire, 7–8. 7 Beisner, Twelve Against Empire, 220–221; Harrington, “Anti-Imperialist Movement,” 220. 8 Zwick, “Anti-Imperialist Movement,” 171–192. 9 Charles Francis Adams Jr. to James Bryce, May 31, 1900, Reel 69, Viscount James Bryce Papers, Weston Library, Bodleian Libraries, University of Oxford. 10 Cullinane, Anti-Imperialism, 5–8, 179–180.

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destruction of historic, abstract political principles such as liberty over all else, because their maintenance allowed Americans to differentiate their republic-empire from the empires of Europe. Regardless of the reality, the historic continental expansion of the United States was considered by ­anti-imperialists to have been in line with the cause of human liberty, democracy, and self-determination. On the other hand, the subjugation of Filipinos went against everything the nation stood for. The Monroe Doctrine served the same role for anti-imperialists. It represented infallible abstract political principles and, aside from one or two outlying individuals, anti-imperialists were almost entirely unified in the way in which they interpreted and invoked the doctrine.11 Monroe’s guiding principles were therefore a crucial binding force for the movement. Examining the pamphlets, speeches, and ephemera produced by anti-imperialists during and after the war with Spain reveals how readily they invoked the Monroe Doctrine. The National Association of AntiImperialist Clubs positioned the doctrine in pride of place alongside the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence in Article 1 Section 1 of its own constitution as a political principle that a­nti-imperialists needed to strive to maintain.12 In a treatise titled Manila or Monroe Doctrine?, anti-imperialist John Chetwood argued that invoking the doctrine would bring about a decisive verdict against the acquisition of the Philippines, trumping all other concerns. His argument was embedded in the myth of the Monroe Doctrine—it had “been a rudder to the ship of state and a guarantee of good faith to the whole world” and the prospect of its abandonment was “a more momentous issue than has engaged the public mind since the close of the Civil War.”13 Anti-imperialists viewed the doctrine as a historic cornerstone of United States foreign policy that 11 Yale’s William Graham Sumner was the most notable anti-imperialist critic of the Monroe Doctrine. He argued that it was imperial in nature and referred to it as the “Monroe fetish”: “Earth Hunger or the Philosophy of Land Grabbing,” in William Graham Sumner, Earth-Hunger and Other Essays, ed. Albert Keller (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1913), 59; William Graham Sumner, Conquest of the United States by Spain (Boston, MA: Dana Estes and Co., 1899), 31. Stanford’s David Starr Jordan expressed similar views, but he nonetheless invoked the doctrine for the anti-imperialist cause: David Starr Jordan, Imperial Democracy (New York, NY: D. Appleton and Company, 1899), 19–20. 12 The Republic, September, 1900, 1. 13 John Chetwood, Manila or Monroe Doctrine? (New York, NY: Robert Lewis Weed, 1898), 3.

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had ably directed the nation’s foreign relations with both the nations of Europe and the Western Hemisphere since its enunciation in 1823. They believed that Philippine annexation presented an undue rupture with its interpreted tenets of non-entanglement and anti-colonialism. The United States had no reason to become involved in extra-hemispheric affairs via the Philippines and any colonial gains were simply not worth the abandonment of a tried and tested foundational tradition. Even the leader of the Filipino insurgents, Emilio Aguinaldo, recognised the power the Monroe Doctrine held within the United States and invoked it during an address on the topic of Philippine independence.14 By invoking the Monroe Doctrine, anti-imperialists demonstrated their adherence to the “Western Hemisphere idea” and the notion that the world could be divided into two distinct geopolitical spheres. The doctrine framed a division between the republican United States and a monarchical and colonial Europe, denoting the Western Hemisphere as the region in which the United States’ national interests laid. As Colonel Thomas Livermore argued, the Western Hemisphere was the region “where we already have our burden” rather than in “remote territories like the Philippines.”15 Accordingly, the doctrine was deemed to enforce what Major John Parker described as an “implied limitation” upon the reach of United States foreign policy. The doctrine not only declared that the United States should “defend the Western Hemisphere from outside interference, but inversely, that we will refrain from unnecessary interference in the affairs of the Eastern Hemisphere.”16 However, the problem was more than maintaining the nation’s traditional geopolitical interests. Anti-imperialists argued that abstaining from ­extra-hemispheric expansion permitted the maintenance of the “other half” of the Monroe Doctrine that justified the United States’ opposition to any European interference in the Western Hemisphere. Acquiring the Philippines

14 New

York Times, October 2, 1898, 22. from Thomas Livermore, In the Name of Liberty: Anti-Imperialist Meeting, Tremont Temple, April 4, 1899: Protest Against the Philippine Policy (Boston, MA: The Anti-Imperialist League, 1899), 24. See also Charles Francis Adams Jr., Imperialism and the Tracks of Our Forefathers (Boston, MA: Dana Estes & Company, 1899), 12–13; Erving Winslow, “The Anti-Imperialist Faith,” North American Review 175, no. 553 (1902): 815; Jordan, Imperial Democracy, 107–108. 16 John Parker, “What Shall We Do With the Philippines?” The Forum, February, 1902, 669. 15 Letter

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would function as an abrogation of the doctrine and invite European nations to seek territory in the Americas. The American Peace Society’s magazine The Advocate for Peace adeptly summarised this position in an editorial titled “Criminal Use of the Monroe Doctrine”: To suppose that we can push our sovereignty at will over the islands of the Pacific, to the coast of Asia, and can hover threateningly over the “spheres of influence” of the European powers, and then expect these “expanding” nations to quietly hold aloof from the vast unfilled territories of South America and to endure forever our vaunted paramountcy over the whole western world, is the height of absurdity … If the half of the Monroe Doctrine which applies to our conduct in the eastern hemisphere has by our own act ceased to be operative, the European nations are perfectly consistent in declaring that the other half is dead also.17

Upholding the Monroe Doctrine was perceived by anti-imperialists as a delicate balancing act between the United States and the nations of Europe, one that would crumble if the Philippines were annexed. Maintaining the doctrine demanded restraint on both sides and was, as former Vice President Adlai Stevenson described it, a “binding force” that applied to and limited the geopolitical activity of the United States as well as European powers.18 Charles Francis Adams Jr. looked back at the way in which the United States upheld the doctrine against Britain in 1895 during the Venezuelan Boundary Dispute as an example of how the nation ought to act. By reasserting what Adams called the “Handsoff” principle of the doctrine in 1895, the United States had chosen not to establish a protectorate in Venezuela despite an alleged history of instability in the nation. This had been a “far-seeing, beneficent, and strictly American” policy and it followed from this that the United States should be true to its own traditions: “Having relieved the Spanish islands from the dominion of Spain, we should declare concerning them 17 “Criminal

Use of the Monroe Doctrine,” The Advocate of Peace, June, 1900, 125. Stevenson, “A Republic Can Have No Subjects,” in Republic or Empire?: The Philippine Question, ed. William Jennings Bryan (Chicago, IL: The Independence Company, 1899), 270–271. See also Geo Seward, The Philippine Question, Montclair, New Jersey, October 21, 1898, Reel 23, John Hay Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC; Untitled speech delivered at Omaha, Nebraska, June 14, 1898, Box 50, William Jennings Bryan Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. 18 Adlai

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a policy of ‘Hands-off,’ both on our own part and on the part of other powers.”19 Extending the geopolitical interests of the United States outside the Western Hemisphere was additionally perceived as a dangerous decision. Alongside inviting European influence in Latin America, ­anti-imperialists argued that acquiring the Philippines would tie up the United States in the tumultuous diplomatic affairs of the Far East. As John Chetwood outlined, anti-imperialists perceived Asia as an “annex of Europe,” and if the United States acquired the Philippines, it would find itself “in a nest of European or Japanese dependencies” and exposed to European colonial conflicts.20 According to Carl Schurz, the German-born former Secretary of the Interior, the United States would be exposed to and become involved in the European balance of power that the proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine had sought to shield the United States from.21 A cartoon from the Washington Post emphasised that however tempting annexation was, colonial imperialism was European in nature and aligned with conquest and aggression, whereas the maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine demanded anti-imperialism and a rejection of annexation (Fig. 1). Anti-imperialists predicted that abandoning the Monroe Doctrine and annexing the Philippines would make the formation of larger armed forces a necessity, which was largely reviled by anti-imperialists as both an unnecessary financial burden and facilitator of domestic militarism. Andrew Carnegie, the famous industrialist who offered to ­ buy the Philippines its independence from the United States government for $20 million, was particularly adamant on this issue. Annexing the Philippines would destroy the oceanic barrier that had protected the United States’ territory and would drag the nation into a region that was a hotbed of conflict: “It is chiefly this Far Eastern question which keeps every shipyard, gunyard, and armor yard in the world busy night and day, Sunday and Saturday, forging engines of destruction.” The United States did not have a strong enough navy to compete with the other imperial powers and would thus have to either increase military spending or rely on a humiliating and unreliable alliance with Britain to 19 Adams,

Imperialism, 35–36. Manila or Monroe Doctrine? 18–19. 21 Carl Schurz, “Our Future Foreign Policy,” August 19, 1898, Reel 97, Carl Schurz Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. 20 Chetwood,

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Fig. 1  “Uncle Sam’s Temptation,” Washington Post, June 26, 1898 (Image courtesy of the National Archives, Washington, DC. John Bull suggests that Uncle Sam ought to indulge in a meatier meal of “conquest” and “foreign aggression” rather than ordering an “anti-annexation broth.” Uncle Sam remains unconvinced, placing his faith in the Monroe Doctrine and avoiding entangling alliances)

ensure the safety of the Philippines. The United States could increase its armed forces in strength and number if necessary, but this was the major downside of Philippine annexation for Carnegie. Militarism would

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fester within the United States and would suppress the moral forces that made the United States a higher civilisation.22 The attorney turned anti-imperialist poet, Howard Taylor, captured these sentiments clearly in “The Creed of the Flag” - an attack on imperialism written at the request of William Jennings Bryan: Must we turn to the Old World, again, With the penitent Prodigal’s cry? Must we arm us and march in the van Of Europe’s barbaric parade And boom out a gunpowder gospel to man To open a pathway for trade?23

In short, the Philippines would bring all the evils of colonial conflict to the United States’ front door. As the war against Spain and the debate over the fate of the Philippines raged on, the long-standing struggle over the proposed annexation of Hawaii finally reached a conclusion. In 1893, the United States had sternly signalled its interest in the Pacific insular kingdom by militarily aiding the disposition of its reigning monarch Queen Lili’uokalani. The newly established government of the Republic of Hawaii quickly petitioned the United States for annexation, gaining the approval of President Benjamin Harrison. However, party politics stalled the process. The petition did not pass through Congress before Grover Cleveland returned to the White House the same year and subsequently withdrew the proposal.24 The matter was left unresolved until the House was prompted to vote in favour of Hawaiian annexation on 15 June 1898 by President McKinley’s decision to annex the Philippines. Despite 22 Andrew Carnegie, “Americanism versus Imperialism,” North American Review 168, no. 506 (1899): 1–5; Andrew Carnegie, “Distant Possessions: The Parting of the Ways,” North American Review 167, no. 501 (1898): 242. 23 Howard Taylor, “The Creed of the Flag,” Box 22, Bryan Papers. 24 On United States–Hawaiian relations prior to annexation see Tom Smith, “History, ‘Unwritten Literature,’ and U.S. Colonialism in Hawai’i, 1898–1915,” Diplomatic History 43, no. 5 (2019): 813–839; Walter Hixon, American Settler Colonialism: A History (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 146–150; Thomas Osborne, Empire Can Wait: American Opposition to Hawaiian Annexation, 1893–1898 (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1981); Merze Tate, The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom: A Political History (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968).

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protest from native Hawaiians, the President signed the Newlands Resolution on 7 July, formally establishing the Territory of Hawaii. Although some congressmen invoked the Monroe Doctrine to oppose the annexation of Hawaii, it was not seen as an act of expansion that would bring about the decline of the nation.25 ­Anti-imperial sentiment was not as prominent in the Hawaiian case, and whilst all anti-imperialists opposed the annexation of the Philippines, fewer had qualms with annexing Hawaii. As Robert Beisner notes, the “Hawaiian issue caused considerable disunity and confusion” among the a­nti-imperialist movement.26 This was because Hawaii and the Philippines were perceived as vastly distinct territories in terms of their relationship to the United States. In the congressional debates over Hawaii, Theobald Otjen of Wisconsin argued that Hawaiian annexation ought to be an exception to the United States’ anti-colonial policy, because the islands were “practically a protectorate” and within the sphere of the Monroe Doctrine already, unlike the Philippines.27 This was not the first time that the geographic scope of the doctrine had been applied to Hawaii. In 1842 Secretary of State Daniel Webster had argued much the same.28 Samuel Barney, also representing Wisconsin, posited that annexation was justifiable “not as an initiatory step in a colonial policy, but rather as an act to protect our present national individuality and to secure us from foreign intervention with affairs upon the American continent.” It followed that annexation was “a natural result and consummation of the Monroe doctrine than a departure from it.”29 Daniel Ermentrout of Pennsylvania claimed that the doctrine was enunciated to prevent Europe from “intermeddling with us,” and the acquisition of Hawaii would only 25 For statements of opposition to the annexation of Hawaii based on the Monroe Doctrine see The Nation, June 23, 1898, 470; U.S. Congress. Senate. Annexation of the Hawaiian Islands, 55th Congress, 2nd Session, Congressional Record, June 30, 1898, 6517–6544; U.S. Congress. House. Proposed Annexation of Hawaii, 55th Congress, 2nd Session, Appendix to the Congressional Record, June 14, 1898, 633–637; U.S. Congress. House. Annexation of the Hawaiian Islands, 55th Congress, 2nd Session, Appendix to the Congressional Record, June 15, 1898, 714–719. 26 Beisner, Twelve Against Empire, 221. 27 U.S. Congress. House. Proposed Annexation of Hawaii, 55th Congress, 2nd Session, Appendix to the Congressional Record, June 11, 1898, 496–502. 28 Sexton, Monroe Doctrine, 112. 29 U.S. Congress. House. Proposed Annexation of Hawaii, 55th Congress, 2nd Session, Appendix to the Congressional Record, June 11, 1898, 560–562.

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“strengthen our means of defense against European intermeddling.”30 For proponents of Hawaiian annexation the motive was clear: if the United States did not acquire the islands, another rival nation would. The self-defensive nature of the Monroe Doctrine permitted the annexation of Hawaii given its geographic location in the Western Hemisphere—this is what differentiated Hawaii from the Philippines. Even though Philippine annexation was deemed incompatible with the Monroe Doctrine, most anti-imperialists did not simply wish to abandon the Filipinos after ousting Spain. After all, many ­ antiimperialists had supported the war against Spain in 1898 on anti-colonial grounds. Most anti-imperialists proffered the establishment of a protectorate over the Philippines in line with the Cuban example. They believed that temporarily controlling aspects of the Philippine government, rather than committing to outright annexation, was not necessarily a lesser of two evils, but a policy worth pursuing. Like their rival expansionists, most anti-imperialists adhered to the concept of a racial hierarchy, which positioned the Anglo-Saxon race as racially superior to Filipinos.31 Senator George Hoar pleaded in the Senate that whilst the United States needed to protect the Filipinos from the “cupidity of any other power until they could establish their own independence in freedom and in honor,” it had to do so by keeping “to the old channels.”32 In an open letter, he made plain that it was the duty of the United States to protect both Cuban and Filipino liberty, but crucially outlined that it had to protect these nations against the greed and ambition of the United States itself:

30 U.S. Congress. House. Proposed Annexation of Hawaii, 55th Congress, 2nd Session, Appendix to the Congressional Record, June 14, 1898, 648–652. 31 On the racial dimensions of the debate over Philippine annexation see Paul Kramer, The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2006); Walter Williams, “United States Indian Policy and the Debate over Philippine Annexation: Implications for the Origins of American Imperialism,” Journal of American History 66, no. 4 (1980): 810–831; Christopher Lasch, “The Anti-Imperialists, the Philippines, and the Inequality of Man,” The Journal of Southern History 24, no. 3 (1958), 319–331. 32 George Hoar, The Conquest of the Philippines: Extracts from the Speech of Hon. George F. Hoar, of Massachusetts, in the United States Senate, Thursday, April 12, 1900 (Washington, DC: s.n., 1900), 2.

32  A. BRYNE If we were bound in honor and in righteousness, bound by the history of our past, bound by the principles and pledges of our own people, to abstain from depriving Cuba of the liberty we had given her because it was right, we are, in my judgement, all the more bound to abstain from depriving the people of the Philippine islands of their liberties because it is right.33

Indeed, when the Platt Amendment formalised the United States protectorate over Cuba in 1901, Hoar described it as “a proper and necessary stipulation for the application of the Monroe Doctrine.”34 Hoar was not alone. Anti-imperialists widely believed that the Monroe Doctrine justified the establishment of a protectorate over annexation. William Jennings Bryan argued that the establishment of a temporary protectorate in the Philippines would hardly be a burdensome task for the nation because the United States had acted as a protector of the Central and South American republics under the Monroe Doctrine for almost a century prior. Here Bryan differentiated between European and American protectorates: “An American protectorate gives to the nation protected the advantage of our strength, without making it the victim of greed,” whereas a European protectorate resulted in the “exploitation of the ward by the guardian.” Ultimately, Bryan claimed that the Monroe Doctrine had acted as a shield for Latin America over three-quarters of a century without inflicting any burdens upon the United States and ought to be replicated in the Philippines rather than committing to annexation.35 Andrew Carnegie similarly pondered why the Philippines should be annexed rather than put under a protectorate, invoking the legacy of the Monroe Doctrine in the Western Hemisphere as justification: Cuba is under the shield of the Monroe doctrine; no foreign interference is possible there. Place the Philippines under similar conditions until they have a stable government, when eight millions of people can be trusted to protect themselves. The truth is that none of the powers would risk the hostility of eight millions of people, who had tasted the hope of Independence. “Free and Independent” are magical words, never forgotten, and rarely unrealized.36 33 George Hoar, Our Duty to the Philippines (Boston, MA: New England Anti-Imperialist League, 1900), 3–9. 34 Sexton, Monroe Doctrine, 219. 35 “Imperialism,” in William Jennings Bryan, Speeches of William Jennings Bryan, vol. 2, ed. Mary Bryan (New York, NY: Funk & Wagnalls Company, 1909), 46–47. 36 Carnegie, “Americanism versus Imperialism,” 12.

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After being charged by a New York newspaper that he only opposed the annexation of the Philippines to allow Germany the chance to acquire the islands, Carl Schurz claimed that Germany would not want the islands because “a sensible government would be about as eager to grab that archipelago as a prudent dog would be to grab a porcupine.” To Schurz, President McKinley was seemingly unaware that under the Monroe Doctrine the United States had protected Latin America with a protectorate by demanding that European nations stop short of infringing their territorial integrity and independence, all without the need for annexation or the burden of a large navy. In turn, the application of this protectorate ought to be same for the Philippines.37 A handful of anti-imperialists realised that a Philippine protectorate would draw less criticism from Latin American nations than annexation. Former Senator George Boutwell argued that the weaker nations of the world would view the United States with caution if it annexed the Philippines, claiming that there would be no guarantee that “our flag may not be carried across the Rio Grande into Mexico, or to the mouth of the Amazon, or to the city of Rio Janeiro.”38 Carl Schurz similarly claimed that the Monroe Doctrine had gained the United States the respect of the Latin American republics by protecting them from European interference. How, he asked, would turning a war of liberation against Spain “into a war of conquest affect the relations of the United States with their Southern neighbors?” For Schurz, it seemed obvious that Philippine annexation would fill Latin Americans with dread.39 Diplomatic dispatches from Latin America offered some confirmation of this expectation. Charles Page Bryan, the minister to Brazil, reported several instances in which these fears were expressed. The newspaper Cidade de Rio argued that Brazilians ought to have no faith in the future course of United States foreign policy if it continued its imperial

37 “For Truth, Justice and Liberty,” September 28, 1900, in Carl Schurz, Speeches, Correspondence and Political Papers of Carl Schurz, vol. 6, ed. Frederic Bancroft (New York, NY: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1913), 248–249. 38 George Boutwell, “Address by the President,” in Annual Meeting of the AntiImperialist League, Now the New England Anti-Imperialist League, at Wesleyan Hall, Boston, Saturday, November 25, 1899 (Boston, MA: New England Anti-Imperialist League, 1899), 22. 39 Carl Schurz, “Thoughts on American Imperialism,” The Century, September 1898, 783–784.

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expansion, and Eneas Martins, the chairman of Brazil’s Committee on Foreign Relations, declared that the Spanish–American War was an injustice. The “victory of the North Americans meant the subjection of America by Americans by a practical and real application of egoistic Monroeism.”40 The minister to Central America, William Merry, also reported that the Costa Rican paper La Republica discussed the Monroe Doctrine’s “radical and alarming transformation” as the United States strove to become “Lord and Master” of all the Americas.41 Turning to the musings of former President Benjamin Harrison, it becomes clear it was only outright annexation that was deemed an abrogation of the Monroe Doctrine rather than a limited form of intervention. He too argued that the implication of the doctrine was that “we shall leave the rest of the world alone”; however, he often expressed a desire to see the United States “secure a snug little harbor for a coaling station” in the Philippines to obtain both commercial and strategic benefits.42 Harrison’s opinions are perhaps not surprising when one recalls that he had attempted, reluctantly, to annex Hawaii during his own presidency, but his statements only reinforce the intense opposition among anti-imperialists to the complete annexation of the Philippines.43 Harrison may have been satisfied with the strategic location of the Philippines, but he still argued that the United States had “done something out of line with American history” by acquiring “insular regions, situated in the tropics, and in another hemisphere.”44 * * *

40 Charles Page Bryan to John Hay, June 9, 1899, Reel 66, Despatches from United States Ministers to Brazil, 1809–1906, Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives II, College Park, MD. 41 William Merry to John Hay, November 20, 1900, Reel 86, Despatches from United States Ministers to Central America, 1824–1906, Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives II, College Park, MD. 42 “Former President Harrison,” May 20, 1898, Reel 41, Benjamin Harrison Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC; Benjamin Harrison to R. W. Gilder, May 20, 1898, Reel 41, Harrison Papers; Benjamin Harrison to John Foster, March 10, 1900, Reel 42, Harrison Papers. 43 George Baker Jr., “Benjamin Harrison and Hawaiian Annexation: A Reinterpretation,” Pacific Historical Review 33, no. 3 (1964): 296; Beisner, Twelve Against Empire, 188. 44 “The Status of Annexed Territory and of Its Free Civilized Inhabitants,” Reel 121, Harrison Papers.

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When Andrew Carnegie published his autobiography in 1920, he argued that the annexation of the Philippines had represented a “serious departure from our traditional policy of avoiding distant and disconnected possessions and keeping our empire within the continent.”45 His recollection aptly summarised the way in which the anti-imperialist movement interpreted the structure of the United States Empire in the debate after the Spanish–American War. By invoking the Monroe Doctrine to protest the annexation of the Philippines, anti-imperialists differentiated between what they understood as the distinct nature of United States and European imperialism. The doctrine represented a form of imperialism that was deemed compatible with national tradition. The United States Empire was understood as being limited to the Western Hemisphere and needed to be protected from European designs by an adherence to the delicate diplomatic balance that the Monroe Doctrine had established. Extra-hemispheric colonialism would drag the United States into a system of inter-imperial rivalry in the Far East, whereas relying on a system of protectorates would alleviate diplomatic risk whilst providing potential economic and strategic benefits and fulfilling the civilising mission of the nation. As Democratic Senator Horace Chilton expressed in a ­letter to William Jennings Bryan, it was wholly necessary to oppose any extra-hemispheric expansion, but there was no need to temper expansion in the Americas. The line for expansion, and the empire, ought to be drawn “on the same general circle with the Monroe doctrine.”46

A General Principle of Living Policy The geographic circle of the Monroe Doctrine was, however, ultimately broken through the annexation of the Philippines. Yet the sacred foreign policy tradition did not suddenly pass out of existence—it only became a more prominent issue in United States foreign relations as the ­twentieth century progressed. As if to prove the anti-imperialists wrong in the moment that they proclaimed its death, the doctrine was enshrined by

45 Andrew Carnegie, Autobiography of Andrew Carnegie (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1920), 358. 46 Horace Chilton to William Jennings Bryan, December 31, 1898, Box 22, Bryan Papers.

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the United States delegation at the First Hague Peace Conference, held between May and July 1899, in a reservation to the convention. Whilst the United States agreed to the various resolutions that were passed at the conference relating to international law and warfare, it did so on the grounds that its “traditional attitude toward purely American questions” would not be relinquished in the process.47 The tenacity of the doctrine was made abundantly clear by President Theodore Roosevelt two years later in his first annual message to congress when he outlined that the United States would commit itself to the administration of the Philippines, guiding its people along the path to self-governance, all the while upholding the Monroe Doctrine as the “cardinal feature” of United States foreign policy.48 Proponents of Philippine annexation did not accept the arguments made by anti-imperialists and refused to believe that extra-hemispheric expansion would render the doctrine abrogated. Yet this is not to say that their protests had no effect. On the contrary, by making the doctrine a central component of the debate over imperialism, the anti-imperialists inadvertently forced their rivals to reconceptualise the doctrine’s application so that it accommodated new forms of imperial policy, providing the context for the doctrine’s subsequent fracture. A prominent response to the anti-imperialists was to simply state that Philippine annexation was not relevant to the application of the Monroe Doctrine. Framing the annexation in terms of a civilising mission, an editorial in Harper’s Weekly posited that the doctrine would only ever be betrayed if “we deliberately take that territory by conquest, and merely to increase our territory.”49 Whereas anti-imperialists grouped Asia and Europe into the same hemisphere and clung to the notion of a world divided solely between the Old and the New, expansionists saw Asia and Europe as distinct geopolitical areas. Diplomat Whitelaw Reid argued that the Monroe Doctrine “might have been properly understood as a general assurance that we would not meddle in Europe so long as they

47 James Brown Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, vol. 2 (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins Press, 1909), 210. 48 “Message of the President,” December 3, 1901, in United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1901 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1902), xxxii–xxxvi. 49 “No European Interference,” Harper’s Weekly, July 23, 1898, 707.

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gave us no further trouble in America; but certainly it did not also ­abandon to their exclusive jurisdiction Asia and Africa and the islands of the sea.”50 Reid believed that Philippine annexation did not violate the doctrine because it stood primarily against the further colonisation of the Americas, which was in no way conflicted “with our holding what our Navy and Army conquered in the China Sea, South of Asia, in the course of our just war with Spain.”51 Indeed, Reid argued that the United States had always been expansionist and former leaders had already reached out “to remote wildernesses far more distant and inaccessible then than the Philippines are now – to disconnected regions like Alaska – to island regions like Midway, the Guano Islands, the Aleutians, the Sandwich Islands.”52 When the United States became involved in the Second Samoan Civil War and annexed what would become known as American Samoa in 1900, it was similarly brushed aside as an acceptable anomaly to the Monroe Doctrine.53 However, arguing that the Monroe Doctrine was simply irrelevant to the acquisition of the Philippines and American Samoa was only so convincing. Civil War veteran Horace Fisher’s thought process on the issue was typical. As demonstrated in a letter to the Secretary of the Navy, John Davis Long, Fisher began by arguing that “our foreign policy outside of America and Europe – whether in the pacific, eastern Asia or southern Africa – has no connection with, nor can it in any way affect, our Monroe Doctrine for good or for evil.”54 Yet a few months later, 50 Whitelaw Reid, “The Territory with Which We Are Threatened,” The Century, September 1898, 793. 51 Whitelaw Reid to C. M. Gayley, April 14, 1899, in Whitelaw Reid, “Rise to World Power: Selected Letters of Whitelaw Reid 1895–1912”, ed. David Contosta and Jessica Hawthorne, Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 76, no. 2 (1986): 59–61. See also William Peffer, “A Republic in the Philippines,” North American Review 168, no. 508 (1899): 316–317; Charles Turner, “The American Primacy,” The Sewanee Review 12, no. 2 (1904), 237; Washington Post, November 28, 1898, 6; New York Times, October 4, 1898, 8. 52 New York Times, October 22, 1899, 15. 53 Ernest Huffcut, The Philippine Problem in the Light of American International Policy (Utica, NY: s.n., 1902), 14. For United States relations with Samoa see Paul Kennedy, The Samoan Tangle: A Study in Anglo-German-American Relations, 1878–1900 (New York, NY: Barnes and Nobel, 1974). 54 Horace Fisher to John Davis Long, July 15, 1898 in John Davis Long, Papers of John Davis Long 1897–1904, ed. Gardner Allen (Boston, MA: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1939), 156–159.

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Fig. 2  “Uncle Sam’s Picnic,” Puck, September 28, 1898 (Image courtesy of the Library of Congress, Washington, DC. As Uncle Sam welcomes the Philippines, Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Ladrones Islands [Guam] into a carriage representing the United States, an anti-imperialist questions whether there is enough room for the new children. Hawaii has already come aboard. The anti-imperialist wears colonial-era clothing and has “Monroe Doctrine” emblazoned upon his tricorne hat)

Fisher published his thoughts in the Atlantic and took a modified stance, arguing that the United States “reserved the right to change or modify” the doctrine when cases arose for its “practical application in the promotion of great permanent interests of the nation.”55 The Monroe Doctrine, as interpreted by the anti-imperialists, was now viewed as outdated. This theme was expertly capitalised upon by pro-expansionist humourist magazines in their political cartoons. As one example of many, Puck characterised the anti-imperialist movement as an old man wearing outdated attire with the Monroe Doctrine adorned on his colonial-era tricorne hat (Fig. 2). These images pointed towards the emergence

55 Horace Fisher, “The Development of our Foreign Policy,” The Atlantic, October 1898, 553.

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of a wider theoretical understanding of how the doctrine ought to be considered: a set of guiding principles that needed to be reconsidered as conditions at the national, hemispheric, and global level changed and developed. A rigid interpretation of the doctrine as enunciated in 1823 did not meet the needs of United States policy makers at the turn of the twentieth century, nor the new vision of the United States Empire. In order to ensure the ascendancy of the nation on the world stage, expansionists argued that the doctrine needed to be adapted so that it could remain in force alongside new policy directions. President Roosevelt had begun to reconsider the nature of the Monroe Doctrine before entering the White House and had concluded that it ought to be considered a fluid policy rather than a rigid set of guidelines. In 1896 during the aftermath of the Venezuelan boundary dispute, Roosevelt authored an article in which he conceptualised the doctrine as “a broad, general principle of living policy,” in other words, a policy that needed to adapt to the changing conditions the United States encountered.56 Throughout his presidency, Roosevelt would continue to voice this interpretation more frequently to justify his own corollary to the doctrine, arguing that it could not “remain fossilized while the nation grows,” either it had to be abandoned or “modified to meet the changing needs of national life.”57 Historian Albert Bushnell Hart, who would go on to write a detailed history of the doctrine, echoed these remarks, claiming that a whole host of changed conditions warranted a modification of the doctrine.58 Alfred Mahan, a former United States Admiral and renowned naval expert, held a similar opinion. To Mahan, the doctrine possessed “an inherent principle of life, which adapts itself with the flexibility of a growing plant to the successive conditions it encounters.” Without the ability to adapt to the “national necessities”

56 Theodore Roosevelt, “The Monroe Doctrine,” The Bachelor of Arts, 2, no. 4 (1896): 437. 57 Theodore Roosevelt to Cecil Spring-Rice, July 24, 1905, in Theodore Roosevelt, The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, vol. 4, ed. Elting Morison (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1951), 1283–1287. See also Theodore Roosevelt to Elihu Root, May 20, 1904, in Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, vol. 4, 801–802; Untitled Speech, Chautauqua, Aug. 11, 1905, in Theodore Roosevelt, Presidential Addresses and State Papers of Theodore Roosevelt, vol. 4 (New York, NY: Colliers, 1905), 439–441. 58 Albert Bushnell Hart, “The Monroe Doctrine and the Doctrine of Permanent Interest,” American Historical Review 7, no. 1 (1901): 82–83.

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of the United States, the doctrine would no doubt “die deservedly.”59 Mahan did not fear the militarisation of the United States like Andrew Carnegie and believed that strengthening the nation’s armed forces, particularly the navy, would empower United States influence. Rather than inviting threats, he had argued since the 1890s that the United States would reinforce national security through territorial expansion, bolstering the navy, and projecting the nation’s power.60 One of the most appealing factors in favour of the United States’ annexation of the Philippines was its economic and commercial value. Since the work of the Wisconsin School, historians have placed significant emphasis upon the economic motivation for extra-hemispheric expansion, linking the Philippines to the nation’s newly formulated Open Door policy.61 Rather than acquiring the islands to exploit their natural resources, the Philippines were seen as the vital component in a system of coaling and naval stations that would help establish a trade network to Far Eastern markets.62 As argued by Massachusetts Senator Henry

59 Alfred Thayer Mahan, “The Monroe Doctrine,” National Review, February 1903, 871–889. An extended version of this article was later published as “The Monroe Doctrine: A Consistent Development,” in Alfred Thayer Mahan, Naval Administration and Warfare: Some General Principles with Other Essays (Boston, MA: Little Brown and Company, 1908), 355–409. 60 David Milne, Worldmaking: The Art and Science of American Diplomacy (New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2015), 21. Mahan’s influential work included The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783 (London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co., 1890) and The Interest of American in Sea Power, Present and Future (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1897). 61 William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York, NY: W.W. Norton, [1959] 2009); Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion 1860–1898 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1963); Thomas McCormick, “Insular Imperialism and the Open Door: The China Market and the SpanishAmerican War,” Pacific Historical Review 32, no. 2 (1963): 155–169. See also Joseph Fry, “From Open Door to World Systems: Economic Interpretations of Late Nineteenth Century American Foreign Relations,” Pacific Historical Review 65, no. 2 (1996), 277– 303; Michael Cullinane and Alex Goodall, The Open Door Era: United States Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017). 62 Charles Conant, “The Economic Basis of ‘Imperialism’,” North American Review 167, no. 502 (1898): 340; Mayo Hazeltine, “What Shall Be Done about the Philippines?” North American Review 167, no. 503 (1898): 389–390; Mark Dunnell, “Our Policy in China,” North American Review 167, no. 503 (1898): 393–409.

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Cabot Lodge, world power was frequently understood as tied to centres of monetary exchange, and the United States was on the verge of being able to seize this power if it could prevent China from being divided. To Lodge, the Philippines would provide what the United States needed in the region: “coaling stations and ports in the East,” both of which had become “essential conditions in our time.”63 Annexation was thus widely argued by its supporters as a logical adaptation to the changing economic climate of the world, aimed at maintaining access to China’s markets and bringing with it new-found international power for the United States. Surely, this was far more important than adhering strictly to a policy that had been enunciated around eighty years prior? The former United States minister to Siam, John Barrett, certainly thought so. Although Barrett fell victim to the spoils system and lost his diplomatic post in the Far East just before the war with Spain broke out, he was well known among policy makers and business leaders for his knowledge of Far Eastern markets.64 His words carried weight on matters relating to the Philippines and Barrett publicly advocated the expansionist policy of the McKinley administration, believing that the Philippines would grant the United States significant economic and strategic gains in the Far East. Barrett referred to the Philippines as “the southern key to the Far East” and the “Cuba of the Far East,” emphasising that the United States needed to grasp this economic opportunity whilst it presented itself. “If we seize the opportunity we may become leaders forever,” he proclaimed in the North American Review, “but if we are laggards now we will remain laggards until the crack of doom.”65

63 Walter LaFeber, The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, vol. 2, The American Search for Opportunity, 1865–1913 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 157–158; William Widenor, Henry Cabot Lodge and the Search for an American Foreign Policy (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1980), 93–98. 64 Salvatore Prisco III, John Barrett, Progressive Era Diplomat: A Study of a Commercial Expansionist, 1887–1920 (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1973), 38. Examples of praise for Barrett’s expertise include H. W. Lawton to John Barrett, October 6 1899, Box 18, John Barrett Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC; Henry Kent to John Barrett, February 1, 1900, Box 18, Barrett Papers. 65 John Barrett, “The Problem of the Philippines,” North American Review 167, no. 502 (1898): 259–267; John Barrett, “The Cuba of the Far East,” The North American Review 164, no. 483 (1897): 173–180.

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Despite the promise of economic prosperity, Barrett realised the power of the Monroe Doctrine in the hands of the anti-imperialists. He noted that “the strongest adverse argument” that anti-imperialists would pose against Philippine annexation would be the destruction of “the splendid New World isolation that gives the Monroe doctrine its breath of life.”66 Yet Barrett was unconvinced, jotting haphazardly in one of his notebooks that the doctrine was “not destroyed – not even impaired but […] strengthened” by the annexation of the Philippines.67 He believed that because economic and geopolitical conditions on the world stage had shifted so dramatically since 1823, an adherence to the doctrine as originally enunciated would unnecessarily restrict the development of United States foreign policy. This was the crucial objection that annexationists posed against anti-imperialists: If conditions, precedents, law, the Constitution, and traditional policy are against colonization … is it not possible, after a great war that has no respect for precedents and traditions and evolves entirely new conditions, that our Constitution or laws shall be so modified as to permit a system of colonial or dependent government?68

The United States had ascended to the status of a world power and expansionists located its interests in the Far East as well as in the Western Hemisphere. Why should the Monroe Doctrine hold the nation back? Could it not be reinterpreted and modernised to meet the demands of a new century whilst maintaining a commitment to regional hegemony in the Western Hemisphere? This idea began to spread among the decision-making class and even some anti-imperialists eventually admitted that a modification of the Monroe Doctrine was necessary. Madison Jayne, honorary ­vice-president of the National Association of Anti-Imperialist Clubs, argued that because the doctrine of 1823 was no more, it could be modified and even strengthened:

66 Barrett,

“The Problem of the Philippines,” 263. Notebooks, Box 2, Barrett Papers. Emphasis in original. 68 Barrett, “The Problem of the Philippines,” 263–264. 67 Undated

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The underlying principle of the Monroe Doctrine is a protest against ­tyranny, and its spirit is universally beneficent; in 1820 we were weak, and merely from expediency we restricted its application to this hemisphere: but now we are strong, and the doctrine should be without territorial limitation; since we have become a world-power, let us make its application world-wide.69

As former Iowan Congressman John Kasson noted in his 1904 h ­ istory of the doctrine, the “original Declaration was limited, in words, by the circumstances of that epoch. The reasons upon which it was founded provided room for a further development and extension of that ­declaration.”70 According to the response of pro-annexationists, a choice did not have to be made between the annexation of the Philippines and the maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine as John Chetwood had argued—both Manila and the Monroe Doctrine could be claimed by the United States. * * * In his study of United States imperialism, Antony Hopkins describes the United States Empire at the turn of the century as “an exemplary member of the group of late-start empire-building states in Europe.”71 This description would have no doubt pained members of the anti-­ imperialist movement—the transformation of the United States from an empire centred on the tenets of the Monroe Doctrine to one that functioned in a similar manner to the empires of Europe was the very process that they fought against after the war with Spain. As they sang elegies for the sacred Monroe Doctrine, advocates of imperial expansion responded by changing the way in which they understood it. The doctrine would now function as a set of guiding principles that were open to reinterpretation and adaptation. This was a crucial moment for the way in which the nation’s decision-making class approached the doctrine—its meaning

69 Madison

Jayne, The Monroe Doctrine (Bay St. Louis: s.n., 1900). Kasson, The Evolution of the Constitution of the United States of America and History of the Monroe Doctrine (Boston, MA: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1904), 255. 71 Antony Hopkins, American Empire: A Global History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018), 380. 70 John

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had become unsettled, representing competing visions of the United States Empire. But this was merely the beginning. Over the following decade, the doctrine would continue to reflect opposing perceptions of the United States’ role on the world stage as its meaning was aligned to two antithetical core values of national security—regional hegemony on the one hand and Pan-Americanism on the other.

Regional Hegemony and Pan-Americanism

Between October 1901 and January 1902, John Barrett found himself back in the service of the State Department. The former minister to Siam struggled to obtain another diplomatic post in the Far East after the Spanish–American War and was instead appointed as a member of the United States delegation to the Second Pan American Conference, held in Mexico City. Although he was initially disappointed with the geographic shift of his career, this appointment generated Barrett’s professional interest in Latin America and secured him three subsequent ministerial positions in the region and ultimately the role of Director General of the International Union of American Republics in 1907. Established in 1890 after the First Pan American Conference, the International Union of American Republics was an intergovernmental organisation based in Washington DC that sought to foster economic and political unity among the American republics. As an early creation of the modern Pan-American movement, the organisation tended to operate in the interests of the United States rather than the collective Americas. Although every Latin American diplomatic representative in Washington had a seat on its governing board, it was the appointed Director General who led the organisation’s activities with the blessings of the Secretary of State. When Barrett joined the organisation in 1907, he quickly became renowned for his enthusiastic commitment to Pan-Americanism. He revitalised the organisation’s hitherto lacklustre © The Author(s) 2020 A. Bryne, The Monroe Doctrine and United States National Security in the Early Twentieth Century, Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the Contemporary World, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-43431-1_3

45

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operations and oversaw its transformation into the Pan American Union in 1910. With the financial and political aid of influential citizens such as Andrew Carnegie and Theodore Roosevelt, the rebranded organisation acquired a purpose-built building in the capital which today hosts the union’s successor organisation, the Organization of American States.1 Yet at the time of the Mexico City conference, Barrett was still unfamiliar with inter-American relations. To prepare himself for service, he sought the advice of some trusted correspondents. Charles Gardiner, an attorney for the Manhattan Railway Company, informed Barrett that he ought to be led by two goals at the conference: firstly, to oversee the development of a Pan-American coalition against any European designs in the Western Hemisphere, and secondly, to ensure the primacy of the United States within such system. Gardiner argued that these principles had been central to United States foreign policy and had been clearly enunciated in the Monroe Doctrine.2 Albert Shaw, the editor of Review of Reviews, made similar suggestions, recommending that Barrett make it his chief business to cultivate goodwill among the Latin American delegations, whilst remembering that “in the Western Hemisphere the overshadowing principle must be the paramountcy of the authority of the United States.”3 The advice Barrett received was clear but conflicted: in its dealings with Latin America, the United States should foster ­inter-American cooperation and Pan-Americanism whilst concurrently expanding its hegemonic control of the hemisphere. After the Filipino insurgents were declared “pacified” in 1902, anti-imperialist protest within the United States faded into relative obscurity. Invoking the Monroe Doctrine had failed to convince policy makers that extra-hemispheric expansion would abrogate the revered policy tradition and spell disaster for the nation’s interests in Latin America. Yet by questioning the maintenance of the doctrine in the context of the United States’ global ascendency, the anti-imperialists forced the nation’s decision makers to reconceptualise it as a set of guiding principles that were open to modification as the nature of the United 1 The transformation of the International Union of American Republics into the Pan American Union is told in John Barrett, The Pan American Union: Peace, Friendship, Commerce (Washington, DC: Pan American Union, 1911). 2 Charles Gardiner to John Barrett, September 4, 1901, Box 19, John Barrett Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington DC. 3 Albert Shaw to John Barrett, November 30, 1901, Barrett Papers.

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States foreign relations developed. The discourse surrounding the doctrine began to fundamentally change, and as Barrett’s correspondents hinted, its meaning was reinterpreted in two distinct ways. Architects of the nation’s extra-hemispheric expansion began to reinterpret the doctrine as an enunciation of the United States’ dominance of the Americas that positioned regional hegemony as a core value of national security. Personified by the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, this imperial interpretation of the doctrine was invoked to justify policies of dollar diplomacy and intervention within Central America and the Caribbean. The annexation of overseas territory after the war with Spain emboldened United States policy makers and generated what David Healy describes as a “drive for hegemony” in the Americas. Controlling access to Latin American markets, maintaining regional stability, securing points of strategic interest, and adhering to the perceived paternalistic duty of the Anglo-Saxon race all combined to instate regional hegemony as a core value of national security that needed to be maintained and ­protected at all costs.4 The second reinterpretation of the Monroe Doctrine was ­Pan-American in nature. After Latin American critics began to propose the multilateral application of the doctrine, inter-American cooperation gradually found support within the United States as an alternative to the development of a forceful and imperialistic relationship with the other American republics. Influenced by growing anti-Yankee sentiment in Latin America, the perceived economic and political benefits of hemispheric unity, the rise of Pan-American ideology, and the “rediscovery” of South America, Pan-Americanists within the United States adopted the call for closer inter-American relations by aligning the doctrine to Pan-Americanism. 4 Historians tend to emphasise one motivation for imperial expansion over the others. On economic motivations see David Healy, Drive to Hegemony: The United States in the Caribbean 1898–1917 (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), 145–163; Marc-William Palen, “The Imperialism of Economic Nationalism, 1890–1913,” Diplomatic History 39, no. 1 (2015): 162–163. On political motivations see Dana Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean 1900–1921 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964), 531–537; Alan McPherson, The Invaded: How Latin Americans and Their Allies Fought and Ended U.S. Occupations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 4–7. On cultural motivations see Emily Rosenberg, Financial Missionaries to the World: The Politics and Culture of Dollar Diplomacy, 1900–1930 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 1–3; Lester Langley, The Banana Wars: An Inner History of American Empire 1900–1934 (Lexington, KT: University Press of Kentucky, 1983), xvii–xx.

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Although the doctrine was not applied multilaterally during the first decade of the twentieth century, it is important to recognise that the alternatives to the Roosevelt Corollary were advocated. For Pan-Americanists, it was through cooperation and seeking to understand Latin American history and culture, rather than through interventionism, that national gains in regional trade and security could be secured. For decision makers uncomfortable with an overt drive for hegemony, Pan-Americanism was positioned as a core value of national security that needed maintaining. Permitting all, or some, of the nations of Latin America to uphold the doctrine was viewed as a vital component of this Pan-American vision. But the Monroe Doctrine’s meaning was not reinterpreted after the war with Spain without reason—the nation’s decision makers had specific threats to national security in mind. At the turn of the century, Germany and Japan were both perceived as threats to United States interests in Latin America, be that via formal colonisation, the penetration of Latin American markets, or acts of informal imperialism. In response to the German threat, both the maintenance of regional hegemony and inter-American unity were considered vital components of the United States’ national security policy, and the threat of Japanese activity in the Americas brought about a historic enlargement of the doctrine’s geographic scope—now all non-American nations needed to be warned away from Latin America rather than solely European empires. Advocates of the Roosevelt Corollary argued that the nation’s guiding role in the world would be threatened if it failed to maintain hegemony in the Western Hemisphere, whereas Pan-Americanists sought to generate inter-American unity to maintain hemispheric security. As its meaning broke apart, the doctrine served to bridge notions of hegemony and cooperation in domestic perceptions of national security whilst simultaneously emphasising their incompatibility, thereby collating disparate facets of United States foreign relations into a common discourse. As the doctrine fractured under the spectre of foreign threats, the d ­ ecision-making class did not simply posit new directions in United States foreign policy—they emphasised the complexity and divisive nature of the nation’s core values.

Ordered Liberty The Venezuela crisis of 1902–1903 was fundamental in transforming the Monroe Doctrine into a national security framework. The course of events and subsequent resolution prompted the enunciation of both

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the Roosevelt Corollary and the Drago Doctrine—proclamations that served as frameworks for the two new reinterpretations of the Monroe Doctrine—and provided United States policy makers with enough evidence to fear German designs in Latin America. The crisis was typical of imperial gunboat diplomacy. When the Castro government defaulted on its various foreign loans, Britain, Germany, and at a later instance Italy, enacted a joint naval blockade of Venezuela in December 1902. Seeking to settle their various claims, the European nations sought the acquiescence of the United States prior to taking any action and both President Roosevelt and the State Department were willing to permit the blockade so long as no territory was sought by the European powers. The President had made clear in his annual message of 1901 that the United States would not “guarantee any state against punishment if it misconducts itself, provided that punishment does not take the form of the acquisition of territory by any non-American power,” expressing privately that he was willing to permit European nations to “spank” any Latin American nation that “misbehaves.”5 However, when the blockading powers began to bombard coastal fortifications, the United States press reacted critically to the violence and foresaw a danger to the Monroe Doctrine, vocally opposing European methods.6 Roosevelt pressed for the dispute to be submitted to international arbitration at The Hague, to which the Castro government and the European powers eventually submitted. This was seen as a great success for the Roosevelt administration and subsequent accounts of the crisis were filled with praise for what was perceived as Roosevelt’s maintenance of the Monroe

5 “Message

of the President,” December 3, 1901, in United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1901 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1902), xxxvi–xxxvii; Theodore Roosevelt to Hermann von Sternburg, July 12, 1901, in Theodore Roosevelt, The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, vol. 4, ed. Elting Morison (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1951), 115–117. 6 “Venezuela and the Monroe Doctrine,” The Outlook, December 27, 1902, 971–973; Washington Post, December 25, 1902, 6. Reports reached the State Department that Central American opinion similarly objected on the grounds of a violation of the Monroe Doctrine: William Merry to John Hay, January 17, 1903, Reel 91, Dispatches from United States Ministers to Central America, 1824–1906, Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives II, College Park, MD.

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Doctrine.7 Roosevelt himself was imbued with the feeling that he had successfully upheld the doctrine, informing Grover Cleveland that he was proud to have continued the policy the former President had enunciated in the Venezuelan boundary dispute of 1895.8 The result of the tribunal in February 1904 was, however, disappointing for the United States. Preferential treatment was awarded to the blockading powers, effectively enshrining their aggressive actions.9 Fearing that European powers would attempt further aggressive action to pursue other claims within the Western Hemisphere, Roosevelt sought to develop a policy that would prevent European nations from finding any pretext for forcible intervention.10 The President’s gaze was immediately drawn to the Dominican Republic, a Caribbean nation that was wracked with national debt, resulting primarily from the actions of the United States-based San Domingo Improvement Company.11 Discussing the matter with Elihu Root, a lawyer who had served as the President’s Secretary of War until January 1904, Roosevelt began to formulate a solution by recasting the application of the Monroe Doctrine.12 Root threw his support behind the President and surmised that there was:

7 Washington Post, January 24, 1903, 6; New York Tribune, April 3, 1903, 6; William Penfield, “The A ­ nglo-German Intervention in Venezuela,” North American Review 177, no. 560 (1903): 86–96; Thomas Edgington, The Monroe Doctrine (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1904), 312. 8 Theodore Roosevelt to Grover Cleveland, December 26, 1902, in Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, vol. 3, 398. He later referred to the resolution as a “striking enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine”: Theodore Roosevelt to Elihu Root, June 2, 1904, Box 163, Elihu Root Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington DC. 9 “Germany, Great Britain, and Italy v. Venezuela et  al.,” American Journal of International Law 2, no. 4 (1908): 902–911. 10 John Thompson, “Theodore Roosevelt and the Politics of the Roosevelt Corollary,” Diplomacy and Statecraft 26, no. 4 (2015): 571–590; Matthias Maass, “Catalyst for the Roosevelt Corollary: Arbitrating the 1902–1903 Venezuela Crisis and Its Impact on the Development of the Roosevelt Corollary of the Monroe Doctrine,” Diplomacy and Statecraft 20, no. 3 (2009): 383–402. 11 Cyrus Veeser, A World Safe for Capitalism: Dollar Diplomacy and America’s Rise to Global Power (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2002), 1–7. 12 Theodore Roosevelt to Elihu Root, May 20, 1904 in Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, vol. 4, 801–802; Theodore Roosevelt to Elihu Root, Jun. 7, 1904, Box 163, Root Papers. The best biographical study of Root remains Phillip Jessup, Elihu Root, 2 vols (New York, NY: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1938).

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an obligation correlative to the right that we can insist upon the right to keep European Nations from overwhelming the small American Republics only so long as these Republics fulfil the functions of civilized governments and performs their international duties, and that the assertion of the right of protection carried with it the duty of insisting upon the small Republics not violating the rights of the Nations against which we protect them.13

Roosevelt formally announced his corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in his annual message of 1904, declaring that: Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power.14

Invoking the doctrine, Roosevelt proclaimed that as a civilised nation the United States had a duty to intervene in the affairs of any nation within the Western Hemisphere that acted in an uncivilised manner. By functioning as an international police power, the United States would set right the wrongs of incompetency, removing the need for any European powers to do so forcefully themselves and ensuring its dominant and guiding role in the Western Hemisphere. Because the Dominican Republic had failed to act with financial integrity, Roosevelt believed that the Monroe Doctrine demanded United States intervention. The President drafted a protocol which would permit the United States to take over the custom houses of the Dominican Republic, stating that such action “affords a practical test of the efficiency of the United States Government in maintaining the Monroe doctrine.”15 Unfortunately for Roosevelt, it found significant opposition

13 Elihu Root to Thomas Hubbard, November 17, 1904, Box 185, Root Papers; Elihu Root to Thomas Hubbard, December 1, 1904, Box 185, Root Papers. 14 “Message of the President,” December 6, 1904, in FRUS 1904, xli–xlii. 15 “Message from the President of the United States,” February 15, 1905, in FRUS 1905, 334–342.

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within the Senate and was ultimately rejected. The President was adamant that to prevent European nations from challenging the doctrine, the United States had to take preventative measures and establish order in the Dominican Republic by taking over the financial machinery of the island. He went so far as to claim that voting against the protocol was a vote in favour of the violation of the doctrine and decided to implement the protocol without Senate approval.16 The establishment of the customs receivership in the Dominican Republic and the enunciation of the Roosevelt Corollary solidified a new reinterpretation of the Monroe Doctrine that was not only driven by a desire to prevent European intervention in the Western Hemisphere, but to ensure the United States’ dominance of the Caribbean and Central American regions through justifying interventionism. As Jay Sexton argues, the corollary “articulated the themes that Roosevelt had come to associate with the doctrine,” namely, the inevitable conflict between civilised and uncivilised peoples; the right of the United States to act as both judge and guardian of the Western Hemisphere; and opposition to any imperial rivalry within the United States’ sphere of influence. The doctrine was transformed from a negatively framed policy to a positive one that actively called for United States intervention and divided the globe between civilised and uncivilised nations, rather than between the Old and New Worlds.17 Anders Stephanson notes that the community of the doctrine now extended across the Atlantic to other civilised nations rather than southwards to encompass solely American states. Once civili­sation was deemed as the core facet of the doctrine, “all manner of places and spaces including Latin America could be redefined, reinscribed with new meaning according to an evolutionary scale.” Central America and the Caribbean region were perceived as populated by uncivilised peoples who needed the discipline of the United States and Roosevelt had, therefore, altered the “smooth, republican space of ‘the Americas’” into a “striated” space, one that was “ordered according to

16 Theodore Roosevelt to William Tiffany, March 14, 1905 in Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, vol. 4, 1139. For details on the customs receivership see G. Pope Atkins and Larman Wilson, The Dominican Republic and the United States: From Imperialism to Transnationalism (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1998), 37–43. 17 Jay Sexton, The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and Nation in Nineteenth-Century America (New York, NY: Hill and Wang, 2011), 229–239.

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quite different criteria” and based upon the idea of a more traditional sphere of i­nfluence.18 The dichotomy of the Monroe Doctrine was, in the words of Marco Mariano, recast to support a dominant role of the United States in shaping the order of the world, signifying the influence of Progressive Era values upon foreign policy.19 Senators who opposed the Dominican protocol were initially critical of the Roosevelt Corollary. For example, Isidor Rayner of Maryland dubbed the President’s proclamation as a “counterfeit presentment” of the Monroe Doctrine.20 Yet advocacy tended to drown out opposition. Henry Cabot Lodge outlined that maintaining peace and “ordered ­liberty” in the region was essential to prevent any challenges to the doctrine, and Thomas Patterson proclaimed his support for any policy that prevented European nations from oppressing nations of the Western Hemisphere, calling for the doctrine’s “robust, manly, and unqualified support, in its broadest sense.”21 To historian Albert Bushnell Hart, the doctrine had been necessarily enlarged, standing against the establishment of colonies in the Americas and the use of military force in collecting indemnities, whilst authorising the United States to “keep its neighbors up to a reasonable standard of good order and financial responsibility toward foreigners.”22

18 Anders Stephanson, “A Riff,” H-Diplo Roundtable Review 14, no. 10 (2012): 37–38; Anders Stephanson, Manifest Destiny: American Expansion and the Empire of Right (New York, NY: Hill and Wang, 1995), 107–108. 19 Marco Mariano, “Identity, Alterity, and the ‘Growing Plant’ of Monroeism in U.S. Foreign Policy Ideology,” in U.S. Foreign Policy and the Other, ed. Michael Cullinane and David Ryan (New York, NY: Berghahn Books, 2015), 65. 20 U.S. Congress. Senate. The Genuine Monroe Doctrine, 59th Cong., 1st Sess., Congressional Record, January 8, 1906, 793–797. See also On the Charge that President Roosevelt is Attempting to Subvert the Monroe Doctrine (New York, NY: Parker Constitution Club of New York City, 1904); “The Monroe Doctrine and the Santo Domingo Treaty,” North Carolina Journal of Law 2, no. 4 (1905): 147–149. 21 U.S. Congress. Senate. Moroccan Conference and Relations with Santo Domingo, 59th Cong., 1st Sess., Congressional Record, January 24, 1906, 1470–1475; U.S. Congress. Senate. Moroccan Conference and Relations with Santo Domingo, 59th Cong., 1st Sess., Congressional Record, January 31, 1906, 1802–1803; New York Times, December 24, 1904, 6; Washington Post, December 12, 1905, 6; “The New Monroe Doctrine,” The Outlook, February 11, 1905, 366–368. 22 Albert Bushnell Hart, “The Monroe Doctrine in its Territorial Extent and Application,” Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute 32, no. 3 (1906): 797.

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What many of these decision makers had in the backs of their minds was the construction of the Panama Canal. In November 1903, in between the Venezuela crisis and the subsequent Hague tribunal, the Republic of Panama separated from Columbia with the aid of the United States. The signing of the Hay–Bunau-Varilla Treaty granted the United States control over the Panama Canal Zone, inciting Roosevelt to famously claim years later that he personally “took the Canal Zone.”23 Whitelaw Reid perhaps best outlined the way in which the future control of an isthmian canal altered perceptions of the Monroe Doctrine and made the Roosevelt Corollary a necessity. Speaking at Yale University, Reid outlined that the moment had arrived in which the doctrine had to be stringently applied to the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean, given their proximity to the future canal. The United States, he argued, could not afford to “tolerate nuisance at its doors, and the races that people those shores must keep the peace and preserve order as to us, and conform to ordinary international obligations toward the world. To this the moral duty of our strength points and our material interest binds us.”24 In private he expressed similar sentiments to Roosevelt, claiming that the United States must dominate the region and that the chief use of the Monroe Doctrine must be to assert the “paramount authority” of the United States.25 The doctrine had become associated with the United States’ self-proclaimed right to construct an isthmian canal long before the secession of Panama—throughout the n ­ineteenth-century policy makers consistently believed that the doctrine entitled the nation to dominate a trans-isthmian canal, be that in Nicaragua or elsewhere.26 23 New York Times, April 23, 1911, SM6. On the acquisition of the Panama Canal Zone see Richard Collin, Theodore Roosevelt’s Caribbean: The Panama Canal, the Monroe Doctrine and the Latin American Context (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1990), 163–338; Michael Conniff, Panama and the United States: The Forced Alliance (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 3rd ed., 2012), 63–83. 24 Whitelaw Reid, “The Monroe Doctrine, the Polk Doctrine and the Doctrine of Anarchism,” Yale Law Journal 13, no. 1 (1903): 16–41. 25 Whitelaw Reid to Frederick Gillett, November 7, 1903 and Whitelaw Reid to Theodore Roosevelt, November 9, 1903, in Whitelaw Reid, “Rise to World Power: Selected Letters of Whitelaw Reid 1895–1912”, ed. David Contosta and Jessica Hawthorne, Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 76, no. 2 (1986): 85–86. 26 John Major, Prized Possession: The United States and the Panama Canal 1903–1979 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 10, 36, 158; David McCullough, The Path Between the Seas: The Creation of the Panama Canal 1870–1914 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1977), 608–610; Rolt Hammond and C. J. Lewin, The Panama Canal (London: Frederick Muller, 1966), 33.

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The Panama Canal would continue to dominate the Monroe Doctrine debate, and its construction, coupled with United States paternalism, vindicated this new interpretation of the doctrine, establishing a precedent for United States interventionism within Latin America that would ensure regional hegemony. Theodore Roosevelt’s successor, William Howard Taft, displayed little interest in foreign relations whilst serving as President. He left ­ international matters almost entirely to his Secretary of State, Philander Knox, who in turn relied heavily on his Assistant Secretary Francis Huntington-Wilson. Historians tend to assess these two figures as poor diplomats who rarely concealed their disdain for Latin Americans.27 They built upon Roosevelt’s foundations and adopted dollar diplomacy as one of their guiding foreign policy principles, orchestrating interventions in Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Honduras that strengthened the hegemony-facilitating reinterpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. Huntington-Wilson described dollar diplomacy as “using the capital of the [United States] in the foreign field in a manner calculated to enhance fixed national interests,” which Taft famously summarised as “substituting dollars for bullets.”28 As David Healy remarks, it became “an article of faith in Washington that the customs receivership had solved the Dominican problem, and policy makers awaited similar cases to which the new technique could be applied.”29 The administration was also driven by Progressive Era values of civility and race and sought to provide Central American and Caribbean nations with stable financial machineries to prevent any revolutions that would otherwise herald European interference in the region. As Michael Hunt explains, United States policy makers, who during the early twentieth century were almost exclusively white, have consistently drawn distinctions between the peoples of the world upon the basis of their skin colour when forming

27 Walter Scholes and Marie Scholes, The Foreign Policies of the Taft Administration (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1970), 12–19; Munro, Dollar Diplomacy, 160–162; Healy, Drive to Hegemony, 145–146. 28 “Mr. Huntington Wilson’s Address at Baltimore,” May 4, 1911, Box 14, Philander Chase Knox Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington DC; “Message of the President,” December 3, 1912, in FRUS 1912, x. 29 Healy, Drive to Hegemony, 124–125.

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foreign policy. Along with historians such as Lars Shoultz and Fredrick Pike, Hunt argues that United States–Latin American relations have been predicated on the belief that the people of Latin America constituted an inferior branch of the human species.30 Based upon the condemnatory “black legend” of Spanish character, Latin American nations were perceived to be “parodies of the republican principles that they claimed to embody.” Racial mixing further tarnished their reputation; however, the darker the skin the harsher the outlook. Haiti, for example, was often singled out as occupied by particularly inferior peoples.31 By the turn of the twentieth century, a combination of three stereotypical images of Latin Americans dominated the United States, which Hunt describes as follows. The first, the dark-skinned Latin male, was perceived as lazy, cowardly, dishonest, and corrupt. The second, the Latin female, was a much more positive, fairer-skinned image of a redeemable Latin living in what was depicted as a mongrelised society without succumbing to its degrading effects. It was the role of the Anglo-Saxon American to save this Latin and introduce her to civilisation. This second image was popularised during the Spanish–American War and began to be applied primarily to South American nations during the early twentieth century. The third type, the black Latino child, developed as the United States drove for regional hegemony. Leading policy makers worried that the image of a Latin female implied the benefits of racial mixing and reverted to an image that was deemed less appealing. Unwilling to sacrifice dominion over Latin Americans, United States elites perceived Latin Americans as poor and ignorant, but capable of advancement under guidance. These racial stereotypes bolstered the rhetoric of civilisation and the need to spread law and order around the world.32 One of the most striking examples of this ideology can be found

30 Michael Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 48–62; Lars Schoultz, Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998); Fredrick Pike, The United States and Latin America: Myths and Stereotypes of Civilization and Nature (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1992). 31 Brenda Plummer, Haiti and the United States: The Psychological Moment (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1992), 1–3. 32 Benjamin Coates, Legalist Empire: International Law and American Foreign Relations in the Early Twentieth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 21–24.

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in the diaries of Henry Stimson, Taft’s Secretary of War. Recounting an official visit to the Caribbean, Stimson expressed pity for the United States officials stationed in the Dominican Republic because they were “doing a very useful work under most trying circumstances.” According to Stimson, the island was subjected to “the pall of the negro despotism” and was “weighed down now by a far more hopeless population than existed on it when Columbus discovered it four hundred years ago.”33 In the few instances in which Taft chose to discuss the Monroe Doctrine, he echoed the racial paternalism of the Roosevelt Corollary, stressing that the doctrine could only be upheld by aiding the nations of Central America and the Caribbean and ensuring the stability of the region.34 Knox was far more vocal on the subject and he informed the President that the enforcement of the doctrine required “a measure of benevolent supervision over Latin American countries to meet its logical requirements.”35 The Secretary of State believed that the Monroe Doctrine held the United States “responsible for order in Central America, and its proximity to the Canal Zone makes the preservation of peace in that neighborhood particularly necessary.”36 Whether “rightfully or wrongly,” the United States was “held by the world responsible under the Monroe Doctrine” to help turbulent American republics “take their rightful place among the law-abiding and progressive countries of the world.”37 In his most notable address on the doctrine, Knox outlined its role in ensuring the stability of the region surrounding the soon-to-be-completed Panama Canal. Like Roosevelt, he argued that the Monroe Doctrine ought to be considered a living policy, stating that it “has required interpretation and construction to apply its precepts to special cases.” For Knox, the formation of the Roosevelt Corollary and

33 “Trip to the West Indies and Panama,” Henry Lewis Stimson Diaries, Reel 1 Volume 2, 42–46, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library. 34 “Message of the President,” December 3, 1912, in FRUS 1912, xii. Unlike most Presidents before him, Taft was not particularly fond of the Monroe Doctrine and his devotion towards it was, in the words of an early biographer, “slowly acquired, like a taste for olives”; Henry Pringle, The Life and Times of William Howard Taft, vol. 2 (New York, NY: Farrar & Rinehart, 1939), 694–695. 35 Munro, Dollar Diplomacy, 161–162. 36 “Notes for Argument in Favor of Honduras and Nicaragua Loan Conventions,” Box 9, Knox Papers. 37 Untitled note addressed to the Senate, January 1911, Box 28, Knox Papers.

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the crisis in the Dominican Republic acted as a moment in which the doctrine’s focus changed to ensuring the stability of Caribbean and Central American nations. In a phrase which personified dollar diplomacy, Knox likened upholding the Monroe Doctrine to “an insurance risk, our risk decreases as the conditions to which it pertains are improved.” As interventions in Honduras and Nicaragua had proven to Knox, certain nations “find it impossible to extricate themselves from the thraldom of civil strife, and they quite naturally look to their more prosperous and powerful neighbor for aid and guidance.” He concluded that it “would not be sane to uphold a great policy like the Monroe Doctrine and to repudiate its necessary corollaries and neglect the sensible measures which reason dictates as its safeguards.”38 Such was Knox’s interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine that even in a speech dedicated to the International Union of American Republics in April 1909, he could not resist stating that the organisation’s “sympathies should swiftly respond to the demands of justice, and it should frown upon, as intolerable or seditious, violence, plottings, plunderings and revolt.”39 The United States press frequently mirrored this official rhetoric and took great effort to tie the Monroe Doctrine to dollar diplomacy during this period.40 Although the administration’s foreign policy makers held little interest in Latin American perceptions of the United States, it attempted to promote the Monroe Doctrine as a force for good (Fig. 1). In the spring of 1912, Knox conducted a two-month tour of Central America to discuss the benefits of the United States’ recent interventions in the region. Taft requested that the Secretary of State visit the region to establish further diplomatic ties that would ultimately allow the United States to “exercise as useful an influence as possible in that part of the world,” but failed to account for the United States’ imperial reputation.41 Speaking on the Monroe Doctrine in Panama, Knox stated that it would

38 Philander Chase Knox, “The Monroe Doctrine and Some Incidental Obligations in the Zone of the Caribbean,” New York, January 19, 1912, Box 43, Knox Papers. 39 “Address of Hon. Philander C. Knox,” April 15, 1909, Box 28, Barrett Papers. 40 See various newspaper transcriptions in Box 14, Knox Papers. 41 William Howard Taft to Philander Chase Knox, February 10, 1912, Box 16, Knox Papers.

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Fig. 1  “He’ll take the old umbrella along,” Minneapolis Journal, February 12, 1912 (Image courtesy of the Hennepin County Library. Before his tour of Central America, Knox brings out his Monroe Doctrine umbrella to paternalistically shield the nations of Latin America from any rain) reach the acme of its beneficence when it is regarded by the people of the United States as a reason why we should constantly respond to the needs of those of our Latin American neighbors who may find necessary for our assistance in their progress toward better government or who may seek our aid to meet their just obligations and thereby to maintain relations to the family of nations.42 42 Philander Chase Knox, Speeches Incident to the Visit of Philander Chase Knox Secretary of State of the United States to the Countries of the Caribbean, February 23 to April 17 1912 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Press, 1913), 15–16.

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Whilst the United States press widely celebrated the tour as a fulfilment of the obligations bestowed by the Monroe Doctrine, the Latin American reaction was far from laudatory.43 Anti-United States demonstrations took place in Nicaragua prior to Knox’s visit, and Ignacio Suarez, the President of the Nicaraguan Assembly, publicly attacked the Secretary of State’s intentions.44 Responding to this criticism, Knox stressed that the Monroe Doctrine did not imply imperial desires on the part of the United States; rather it embodied a defence of republicanism within the Western Hemisphere and tasked the United States with the responsibility of maintaining democratic institutions in nations that suffered from political instability.45 By aligning the doctrine to the core value of regional hegemony, both the Roosevelt and Taft administrations positioned notions of civility and race as essential considerations of national security. However, as much of the Latin American reaction to Knox’s tour demonstrated, the United States had generated an antagonistic and imperial reputation and faced widespread anti-Yankee sentiment within its new sphere of influence.

Fellow Sponsors Latin Americans were immediately wary of the Roosevelt Corollary. Proposals for a redefinition of the Monroe Doctrine were made by prominent Latin Americans at the time the Roosevelt Corollary took shape; however, these proposals envisioned the doctrine as a multilateral policy that tapped into the notions of inter-American cooperation and non-interventionism that were perceived as inherent in the original message.46 By the turn of the century, United States activity within the Western Hemisphere had created discontent among Latin American nations and the doctrine was viewed primarily with disdain. 43 United States press clippings can be found in Central American Trip, 1912, Scrapbook no. 6, Box 38, Knox Papers. Latin American press clippings can be found in Central American Trip, 1912, Scrapbook no. 1, Box 33, Knox Papers. 44 Michael Gobat, Confronting the American Dream: Nicaragua Under U.S. Imperial Rule (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005), 82. 45 Knox, Speeches, 57. 46 Juan Pablo Scarfi, “In the Name of the Americas: The Pan-American Redefinition of the Monroe Doctrine and the Emerging Language of American International Law in the Western Hemisphere, 1898–1933,” Diplomatic History 40, no. 2 (2016): 191–192.

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As one example of many critical voices, Columbian writer José Vila angrily described it as “the jawbone of an ass brandished in the hands of Cain.”47 This widespread anti-Yankee sentiment prompted several prominent Latin Americans to seek a modification of the doctrine along lines which would benefit all the American republics, rather than just the United States. Argentine statesman Luis Drago was one of the first to do so. Drago reacted to the severity of the Venezuela Crisis by issuing what would become known as the Drago Doctrine in a dispatch to the State Department. Seeking to prevent any future instances of European gunboat diplomacy, Drago proposed that those who invested or lived in foreign nations should make claims with local tribunals and courts rather than resorting to diplomatic and military interventions as had taken place in Venezuela. Claiming that any forceful collection of debts would lead to a situation “at variance with the Monroe Doctrine,” Drago desired to develop an anti-interventionist and hemispheric reinterpretation of the doctrine.48 Whilst popular throughout Latin America, the Drago Doctrine was viewed unfavourably in the United States and was rebuffed by John Hay and Theodore Roosevelt. However, upon Hay’s death in 1905, Elihu Root took up the position of Secretary of State and began to direct most of the United States’ Latin American policy. Root viewed the Drago Doctrine more favourably and whilst United States hegemony was his top priority, as demonstrated by his initial advocacy of the Roosevelt Corollary, he often favoured policies of cooperation over coercion and was keen to undo the negative reaction instilled by the corollary. As such, Root’s appointment is perceived by many historians as a turning point in United States policy towards Latin America. In the words of David Healy, his “goals were multiple: to win the Latin’s friendship by espousing their cause, to give them a larger international voice in safeguarding their own interests, and to erect new barriers against European interventions in the western hemisphere.

47 James Rippy, “Literary Yankeephobia in Hispanic America (Concluded),” Journal of International Relations 12, no. 4 (1922): 524–538. 48 Luis Drago to Martin Garcia Mérou, December 29, 1902, in FRUS 1903, 1–5. See also Amos Hershey, “The Calvo and Drago Doctrines,” American Journal of International Law 1, no. 1 (1907): 26–45; Arthur Whitaker, The Western Hemisphere Idea: Its Rise and Decline (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1954), 86–107; David Shenin, Argentina and the United States: An Alliance Contained (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2006), 33.

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Whilst it was meant to serve United States purposes, Root’s course represented enlightened self-interest, for it was intended to serve the ­ needs of others as well.”49 Root’s reputation grew largely from his 1906 goodwill tour of Latin America. Coinciding with the Third Pan American Conference held during July and August in Rio de Janeiro, Root set a remarkable precedent in conducting this trip, being one of the first United States statesmen to undertake a high-profile tour of Latin America, inspiring Knox’s 1912 tour. At the conference, Root was well received and he outlined that the United States wished for “no victories but those of peace; for no territory except our own; for no sovereignty except sovereignty over ourselves.”50 At a later speech in Uruguay, he referred explicitly to the Monroe Doctrine, stating that the great declaration of Monroe, made in the infancy of Latin-American liberty, was an assertion to all the world of the competency of ­Latin-Americans to govern themselves and their countries. That assertion my country has always maintained, and my presence here is, in part, for the purpose of giving evidence of her belief that the truth of the assertion has been demonstrated.51

The purpose of Root’s visit was clear: to allay fears of United States imperialism and soften United States rhetoric that frequently referred to Latin Americans as racially inferior. Symbolically, the building in which the conference was held was renamed the Palácio Monroe in August as a sign of friendship.52 Pan-Americanist missionary Samuel Guy Inman later recounted in 1917 that the palace’s name testified that “our Monroe doctrine has no terrors” for Latin America, arguing that nothing since Root’s tour had “so increased the friendship of the two Americas.”53 It was during the Pan American Conference that Root expressed his advocacy of the Drago Doctrine and suggested that it should be discussed 49 Healy,

Drive to Hegemony, 135–139. Root, Latin America and the United States: Addresses by Elihu Root, ed. Robert Bacon and James Brown Scott (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1917), 10. 51 Ibid., 58–59. 52 Washington Post, August 2, 4. 53 “Travel Experiences in Brazil,” 1917, Box 13, Samuel Guy Inman Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington DC. 50 Elihu

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at the upcoming Hague peace conference of 1907. Impressively, Root secured the unprecedented attendance of many Latin American nations at this gathering of world powers and he personally joined the United States delegation. Before the Hague conference began, the United States delegation met at the State Department and Joseph Choate, former Ambassador to the United Kingdom, asked Root to outline the United States’ attitude towards the Drago Doctrine. Echoing Drago’s assertion that debt collection should be a local matter, Root explained that the forceful collection of Latin American debts was “dangerous to the best interests of the United States, and the abandonment of the practice of forcible collection would relieve the stress or pressure of the Monroe Doctrine upon this country.”54 However, Root’s conduct during the Hague conference itself revealed the limits of his P ­ an-Americanism. Despite his advocacy of the Drago Doctrine, he was primarily interested in its specificities, namely preventing forceful debt collection, rather than shaping a new Monroe Doctrine and potentially limiting United States political action.55 As such, the United States delegation only advocated the tenets of the Drago Doctrine that referred to debt collection, proposing a distorted version of the doctrine that became known as the Porter Convention, named after the delegate General Horace Porter.56 Drago and the Argentinean delegation personally rejected the convention in frustration, tainting the good-feeling that had been produced during the PanAmerican Conference. Root’s approach to Latin America was guided by a more nuanced approach to the concept of race than the likes of his successor, implementing a policy that distinguished between the geographical divisions of Latin America. Although he adhered to the notion that the AngloSaxon race occupied the top rung of the global racial hierarchy, Root believed that people of South America ought to be distinguished from

54 “Meeting of the American Commission to the Second Hague Conference,” April 20, 1907, Box 21, Joseph Hodges Choate Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington DC. 55 Whilst discussing the Hauge conference with Theodore Roosevelt, Whitelaw Reid predicted that the Drago Doctrine would not be accepted as it was “too much of a selfdenying ordinance to be entirely agreeable to any [delegation]”: Whitelaw Reid to Theodore Roosevelt, January 15, 1907, in “Letters of Whitelaw Reid,” 121. 56 “Limitation of Employment of Force for Recovery of Contract Debts,” October 18, 1907, The Avalon Project, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hague072.asp.

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those of Central America and the Caribbean. Root’s private correspondence clearly outlines his opinions and Lars Schoultz argues that his “specific contribution to inter-American relations was to disaggregate the nations of the region into two different classes – one the turbulent Caribbean region, the other the stable, progressive countries of southern South America and Mexico.”57 He had a fairly high opinion of South Americans and in a letter to Senator Benjamin Tillman he stated the following: South Americans now hate us, largely because they think we despise them and try to bully them. I really like them and intend to show it. I think their friendship is really important to the United States, and that the best way to secure it is by treating them like gentlemen. If you want to make a man your friend, it does not pay to treat him like a yellow dog.58

This favourable opinion was influenced in part by the recent “rediscovery” of South America. Ricardo Salvatore argues that this was a moment in which the United States decision-making class sought to learn more about South American culture, history, politics, and geography, both for the purpose of improving inter-American relations and to exert a form of control and dominance via methods of informal imperialism such as knowledge production. Root’s tour signified the influence of Progressive Era faith in the accumulation of knowledge upon United States–Latin American relations, which was additionally reflected in the professionalisation of Latin American studies at United States universities.59 As archaeologist-historian Hiram Bingham claimed in 1907, Latin American History and Politics was becoming “an uncommonly good” field for research, arguing that inter-American friendship had to rest upon “a basis of intelligent appreciation.”60 Indeed, this sudden academic interest in South America led more thoughtful policy makers such

57 Schoultz,

Beneath the United States, 192. Root to Benjamin Tillman, December 13, 1905, Box 186, Root Papers. 59 Ricardo Salvatore, Disciplinary Conquest: U.S. Scholars in South America, 1900–1945 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016), 25–31; Ricardo Salvatore, “The Enterprise of Knowledge: Representational Machines of Informal Empire,” in Close Encounters of Empire: Writing the Cultural History of U.S.-Latin American Relations, ed. Gilbert Joseph, Catherine Legrand and Ricardo Salvatore (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), 80. 60 Bulletin of the Pan-American Union, February 1908, 283–300. 58 Elihu

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as Root to draw further divisions among the South American nations. Argentina, Brazil, and Chile (collectively known as the ABC nations) attracted the most favour, placing them on a superior platform to other South American nations, who were in turn seen as more advanced than the Central American and Caribbean nations. There was, as Salvatore notes, the existence of a “Great Divide” between the Andean and ABC nations in the minds of statesmen such as Root.61 As Joseph Smith argues, the act of referring to the other nations of the Western Hemisphere via their own distinctive groupings “reflected contemporary progressive ideas, which distinguished between different nations and placed them in an ascending order of merit.”62 Theodore Roosevelt himself was no stranger to recognising that certain Latin American nations no longer needed the protection of the doctrine, and as early as 1901 he stated that the nations of South America “can work out their own salvation for themselves.”63 In his annual message of 1905, he further outlined that there were “certain republics to the south of us which have already reached such a point of stability, order, and prosperity that they themselves, though as yet hardly consciously, are among the guarantors of this Doctrine.” It was the ABC nations that the United States should “now meet not only on a basis of entire equality, but in a spirit of frank and respectful friendship, which we hope is mutual. If all of the republics to the south of us will only grow as those to which I allude have already grown, all need for us to be the especial champions of the Doctrine will disappear.”64 The Taft administration was also keen to stress this and the President stated that “the changed circumstances of the United States and of the Republics to the south of us, most of which have great natural resources, stable government and progressive ideals, the apprehension which gave rise to the Monroe Doctrine may be said to have nearly disappeared.”65 Knox referred to South American nations as being “consciously or unconsciously fellow sponsors with the United States of the Monroe Doctrine 61 Salvatore,

Disciplinary Conquest, 4, 254–256. Smith, Unequal Giants: Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and Brazil, 1889–1930 (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991), 52. 63 Theodore Roosevelt to Frederic Coudert, July 3, 1901 in Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, vol. 3, 105–107. 64 “Message of the President,” December 5, 1905, in FRUS 1905, xxxiii–xxxv. 65 “Message of the President,” December 7, 1909, in FRUS, xv. 62 Joseph

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as a Pan-American idea as well as an American policy,” whereas Joseph Choate believed that Argentina and Brazil were “getting to be such great and powerful nations” and would have to be considered as “no longer in any manner under the guardianship of the United States, and will certainly have to be consulted, in any attempts, at any rate within their own territory, to enforce the Monroe doctrine.”66 Indeed, concerns even emerged within the State Department around the potential formation of a new ABC Monroe Doctrine to rival the original. For example, Nicolai Grevstad, the United States minister to Uruguay, predicted that the opening of the Panama Canal would force the ABC nations to establish closer diplomatic relations to offset United States dominance. He reported that South Americans had expressed the opinion that “it would be wise for the South American republics to enter into closer relations for mutual protection of their independence and interests,” which could result in the formulation of “a definite formula, not a Drago doctrine, but a South American Monroe doctrine, fronting north as well as east.”67 Root’s thoughts on the inhabitants of Central America and the Caribbean reveal why his Pan-American policy was limited to South America and ultimately favoured the maintenance of regional hegemony over inter-American cooperation. In a letter to Andrew Carnegie, Root claimed that Central Americans had “always lived in an atmosphere of suspicion of each other, and dealing with them requires a great deal of patience and consideration, which is sometimes difficult to maintain,” paternalistically referring to them in another letter as “the proud and sensitive people of those little republics.”68 Root described Haitians as “densely ignorant” and hoped that some situation would arise “in which we could be of material help to them and in which we could give them that help in such a way as to establish the right sort of relations.”69 This perception of racial inferiority altered the way in which Root understood 66 Knox, Incidental Obligations; Joseph Choate to Edwin Morgan (27 January 1911), Box 15, Choate Papers. 67 Nicolai Grevstad to Philander Chase Knox, May 1, 1912 in Department of State, Division of Information, Series A, The ABC Alliance, Box 40, Knox Papers. 68 Elihu Root to Andrew Carnegie, December 13, 1907, Box 188, Root Papers; Elihu Root to Hart Lyman, December 27, 1907, Box 188, Root Papers. 69 Elihu Root to Albert Shaw, December 14, 1908, Box 189, Elihu Root Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington DC.

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the Monroe Doctrine and, combined with the paramount importance of the Panama Canal, the Caribbean was deemed the region in which the United States had to exercise a predominant influence: “It is there that the true justification and necessity for the Monroe Doctrine is found. We must control the route to the Panama Canal … We cannot permit any un-American power to obtain possession of any of those countries.”70 Financial stability was crucial and in reference to Costa Rica, Root claimed that it was “so important to have the next door neighbor of Panama under the financial control of Americans, with a power of ultimate control by the United States rather than have it vested in any foreign power.”71 To Albert Shaw he summarised his stance, emphasising a commitment to hegemony in the circum-Caribbean: If we can maintain for a time the right sort of relations with them, we can exercise an enormous influence over their conduct for their own good and for ours … patience and a few years of the right kind of treatment I am sure will give us in that part of the world the only kind of hegemony we need to seek or ought to want.72

Therefore, Root held absolute faith in the necessity of maintaining a unilateral Monroe Doctrine, rather than any multilateral reinterpretations, personally embodying the tensions between a desire for both hegemony and cooperation. Root occasionally floated the idea that an ABC nation could take on some of the responsibility of the Monroe Doctrine, but it was not typical of his opinion.73 Whilst serving as Secretary of State, he ultimately aimed to “lose no convenient opportunity to impress upon [Latin Americans] that it is a matter of our own concern, not theirs.”74 As the Republican administrations implemented dollar diplomacy and soured of United States–Latin American relations, Pan-American sentiment began to rise in the United States. The International Union of American Republics assumed a greater presence in inter-American affairs under the directorship of John Barrett and the organisation generated 70 Elihu

Root to Lyman Abbott, December 24, 1908, Box 189, Root Papers. Root to John Hay, January 7, 1905, Box 185, Root Papers. 72 Elihu Root to Albert Shaw, January 3, 1908, Box 188, Root Papers. 73 Joseph Smith, Brazil and the United States: Convergence and Divergence (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2010), 60. 74 Elihu Root to Henry Watterson, May 16, 1906, Box 186, Root Papers. 71 Elihu

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significant interest in Latin American trade. Through a combination of a genuine commitment to the Pan-American ideal and a desire to increase inter-American commercial activity, efforts to improve inter-American relations, rather than resorting to coercive policies, gradually became more popular among the decision-making class. As Latin Americans continued to posit multilateral reinterpretations of the Monroe Doctrine, several Pan-Americanists from within the United States warmed to the possibility of a Pan-Americanised Monroe Doctrine as an alternative interpretation to the Roosevelt Corollary. Barrett seized his new-found prominence and began to express the opinion that Latin America would soon be able to uphold the Monroe Doctrine itself.75 Alongside the Drago Doctrine of 1902, two Latin American proposals stand out. The first was enunciated by Alejandro Álvarez, a Chilean international lawyer with connections to the United States international law community. At the first Pan American Scientific Conference of 1908, Álvarez outlined that there were distinctly American problems in international law due to the nature of the geography, settlement, economic development, and racial issues present in the New World.76 In subsequent papers on the subject, Álvarez proposed that the Monroe Doctrine could be used as the basis for the establishment of a system of American International Law. The doctrine gave a “characteristic touch to the international relations of the states of the New World” that made it of great importance to international law and Álvarez believed the principles growing out of the Monroe Doctrine “may be regarded not merely as incidents of policy but as declarations of actual principles of international law of American origin.”77 The second emanated from two Brazilian diplomats, José Paranhos, the Foreign Minister more commonly known as the Baron of Rio Branco and Joaquim Nabuco, an Ambassador to the 75 Salvatore Prisco III, John Barrett, Progressive Era Diplomat: A Study of a Commercial Expansionist, 1887–1920 (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1973), 68. 76 Report of the Delegates of the United States to the Pan-American Scientific Conference Held at Santiago, Chile December 25, 1908, to January 5, 1909 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1909), 44. 77 Alejandro Álvarez, “Latin America and International Law,” American Journal of International Law 3, no. 2 (1909): 269–353; Alejandro Álvarez, “American International Law,” trans. Leo Rowe, Proceedings of the American Society of International Law at Its Annual Meeting 3 (1909): 206–220. On American International Law see Juan Pablo Scarfi, The Hidden History of International Law in the Americas: Empire and Legal Networks (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

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United States. Both men were keen on ensuring strong ties between Brazil and the United States and they believed that a multilateral Monroe Doctrine could serve the interests of both nations.78 Rio Branco tended to speak highly of the Monroe Doctrine, writing an article for the Jornal do Commercio in 1908 that emphasised that Brazil was the first South American government to officially accept the doctrine, tracing the history of United States–Brazilian relations as an embodiment of an “ancient friendship.”79 Nabuco had intended to achieve practical results, planning to discuss the doctrine’s evolution at the Fourth Pan American Conference in 1910. However, he died just months before. The Brazilian delegation attempted to honour his wishes and informally discussed the proposition with other delegations during the conference. Tellingly, the United States delegation refused to debate the possibility of a Pan-American Monroe Doctrine during the proceedings.80 The early United States proposals for a Pan-American Monroe Doctrine often reflected regional distinctions. William Scruggs, a former diplomat in Latin America, argued in an unpublished essay that there were certain Latin American nations which were admirable in their development and governance, proposing that there should be “an American concert of good States, working in harmony with the United States, to keep the peace, to foster trade, to advance collective civilization, and to regulate and even punish the disorderly and dishonest States.” Such a proposal would preserve the Monroe Doctrine and “relieve us of sole responsibility for disorders in the bad States and save us from ungenerous suspicions.”81 In his famous book The Promise of American Life, the Progressive intellectual Herbert Croly noted that the Monroe Doctrine had developed 78 Britta Crandall, Hemispheric Giants: The Misunderstood History of U.S.-Brazilian Relations (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011), 29. 79 Jornal do Commercio, January 20, 1908, 1. 80 Alejandro Álvarez, “The Monroe Doctrine at the Fourth P ­ an-American Conference,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 37, no. 3 (1911): 24–30; Samuel Guy Inman, Problems in Pan Americanism (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1926), 207–209; Gordon Connell-Smith, The Inter-American System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966), 52. 81 William Lindsay Scruggs, “The Monroe Doctrine and its Future,” 43–45, Reel 2, William Lindsay Scruggs Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington DC. This unpublished essay served as the basis for a subsequent article, although the content in question was removed: William Lindsay Scruggs, “The Monroe Doctrine: Its Origin and Import,” North American Review 176, no. 555 (1903): 185–199.

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a “dangerously militant tendency” which ought to be addressed by ­modifying the doctrine as “a positive principle of political action in the Western hemisphere.” Croly argued that European influence within Latin America could be gained through means other than territorial acquisition, namely via immigration and commercial ties, and that the Monroe Doctrine made inevitable a clash between the United States and the nations of Europe. The separation of the New and Old Worlds was diminishing every year and it was “only in relation to the Monroe Doctrine that we still make much of the essential incompatibility between European and American institutions.” Croly thus advocated the creation of a political system between the Americas; however, the internal conditions of most Latin American nations posed a problem to this end. Pan-Americanism, he argued, must be more than a mere matter of geography, demanding the establishment of a “pacific system of public law in the two Americas.”82 Texan Representative James Slayden enthusiastically acted as a spokesman for a Pan-American revision of the Monroe Doctrine. In 1912, he argued that the Monroe Doctrine did not give the United States the right to intervene, proclaiming that the “rule laid down by Mr. Monroe served a good purpose one time, but the necessity for it passes long ago … I can see no harm to come from its frank abandonment, at least so far as it is supposed to interdict colonization.” Slayden thus proposed a new American policy for peace, one that “proposes that the various American governments shall mutually agree that hereafter no territory shall be transferred from one to the other as a consequence of war.” The doctrine ought to serve as “a treaty that will simply say that the American governments in the future shall not steal territory from each other.”83 Admittedly, the efforts of Slayden and likeminded Pan-Americanists had limited political impact during the Roosevelt and Taft presidencies, yet they demonstrated that the doctrine was open to a very different reinterpretation, and that not all Americans were satisfied with Roosevelt’s corollary. Unity among the American republics was gradually becoming understood as a core facet of United States foreign relations. 82 Herbert Croly, The Promise of American Life (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1909), 291–314. 83 James Slayden, “The Relations of the United States to Other American Governments: The Monroe Doctrine and its Limitations,” Proceedings of the Third American Peace Conference Held in Baltimore, Maryland May 3 to 6, 1911 (Baltimore, MD: Waverly Press, 1911), 157–173.

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The German Peril The transformation of the Monroe Doctrine into a national security framework was fundamentally influenced by the pervasive fear of the German government’s imperial designs in Latin America. Policy makers began to consider Germany a threat during the Spanish–American War when German naval activity at Manila aroused suspicion.84 The Ambassador to Germany, Andrew White, reported in 1898 that certain German newspapers viewed the war as an opportune moment to secure naval bases in South America and advocated German acquisition of territory in the Philippines. Whilst White noted that there “seems nothing in all this specially threatening as yet,” he advised the State Department to “be on its guard.”85 Combined with the passage of the First Fleet Bill in the Reichstag during the same year and the discovery of German war plans aimed at the United States, naval officials grew wary of the strength of the Germany Navy. It was not long before this suspicion solidified itself in the political and public realm due to President Roosevelt’s intimate connection with naval affairs.86 Indeed, German rhetoric only served to fan the flames—German officials were infamous for their criticism of the Monroe Doctrine.87

84 Thomas Bailey, “Dewey and the Germans at Manila Bay,” American Historical Review 45, no. 1 (1939): 59–81; Collin, Roosevelt’s Caribbean, 66–74. 85 Andrew White to John Hay, May 13, 1898 and June 18, 1898, Reel 85, Despatches from United States Ministers to the German States and Germany, 1799–1906, Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives II, College Park, MD. 86 Nancy Mitchell, The Danger of Dreams: German and American Imperialism in Latin America (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 218–220. 87 Criticism of the Monroe Doctrine was rampant in the German press, but it was Otto von Bismarck’s historic comments that Americans tended to refer to. He described the doctrine as “international impertinence,” “that monstrosity in International Law” and “a species of arrogance peculiarly American and inexcusable”: Otto von Bismarck to Georg Münster, June 1, 1884 in German Diplomatic Documents 1871–1914, vol. 1, ed. Edgar Dugdale (New York, NY: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1928), 176; Herbert Kraus, “What European Countries Think of the Monroe Doctrine,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 54, no. 1 (1914): 109; Wolf von Schierbrand, “Conversations with the Four German Chancellors,” The Century Magazine, May 1902, 155.

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Much like the United States, Germany began to establish itself as a global power at the turn of the century, positioning the two nations on a potential collision course.88 As Nancy Mitchell explains, the perceived aggression of Germany “helped to exonerate the interventionism of the United States,” because it allowed policy makers to distinguish United States activity from that of the empires of Europe. It was not just that an enemy was needed, rather the United States needed to be “different and better.”89 It was through the Monroe Doctrine that the United States made this differentiation, tying a revered policy to notions of regional hegemony. This partly explains why it was Germany that captured the United States’ attention and became the nation’s primary rival in Latin America in the minds of United States policy makers, rather than any other European empires. For example, despite Britain’s dominance of the region throughout the nineteenth century, it was not viewed as a threat to the Monroe Doctrine after the resolution of the Venezuelan boundary dispute of 1895–1896. Indeed, British policy makers had actively deferred geopolitical, although not commercial, influence in Latin America to the United States as a process of AngloAmerican rapprochement developed.90 The outcome of the Venezuela Crisis accurately reflected this. Despite joint European action during the Venezuelan blockade, it was only Germany that gained a negative image within the United States. Henry Cabot Lodge noted that the United States press differentiated between Britain and Germany during the crisis, observing very little anger towards the former. Expressing his own opinion, he believed that it was “inconceivable that any English Government should really wish to destroy their good relations with

88 Ragnhild Fiebig-von Hase, “The United States and Germany in the World Arena, 1900–1917,” in Confrontation and Cooperation: Germany and the United States in the Era of World War I 1900–1924, ed. Hans Jürgen Schröder (Providence: Berg Publishers, 1993), 37; Manfred Jonas, The United States and Germany: A Diplomatic History (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), 51–55. 89 Mitchell, Danger of Dreams, 2–8. 90 For Anglo-American relations during this period see Iestyn Adams, Brothers Across the Ocean: British Foreign Policy and the Origins of the Anglo-American ‘Special Relationship’ 1900–1905 (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2005); Bradford Perkins, The Great Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1895–1914 (New York, NY: Atheneum, 1968); Alexander Campbell, Great Britain and the United States 1895–1903 (London: Longmans, 1960).

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us for the sake of playing the German game.”91 Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote that he was sorry to see that “Britain has associated herself with any other power in the Venezuela business,” whilst Secretary of State John Hay noted with pleasure that Germany had come out of the affair with a damaged reputation, one which the United States could use to its advantage within Latin America.92 As the numerous cartoons highlighted at the time, it was Germany that was perceived as having attacked the Monroe Doctrine rather than Britain or Italy. Most images depicted German figures as taking the first move to challenge the doctrine as its allies looked on cautiously (Fig. 2). What made this perceived threat more acute was that it clashed with the United States’ own ascendency. One of the main bones of contention was the presence of Germans in Brazil. During the early nineteenth century, German emigrants began to establish diasporic hamlets and settlements, subsequently referred to as “colonies” by citizens of the United States, within several Latin American nations, including Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Venezuela. Southern Brazil attracted the most German emigration and it is estimated that by 1900 over 350,000 Germans lived within the states of Paraná, Santa Catarina, and Rio Grande do Sul. Before the First World War, Brazil was home to the largest German diaspora outside the United States and was perceived by German nationalists as a possible location for the rebirth of a new Germany. What made this German presence in Brazil unnerving to the United States was the persistence of a distinctly German culture within the colonies, the German dominance of trade in the region, the Pan-German movement’s vocal desire to see the establishment of a formal colony in Brazil. Building upon the fears expressed against German naval expansion, Americans were wary that Brazil could be used as a naval base by Germany and as a location to barrack troops in a future conflict with the United States.93 91 Henry Cabot Lodge to Henry White, February 3, 1903, Box 17, Henry White Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington DC. 92 Alfred Thayer Mahan to Leopold Maxse, December 22, 1902, in Alfred Thayer Mahan, Letters and Papers of Alfred Thayer Mahan, vol. 3, ed. Robert Seager and Doris Maguire (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1975), 49–50; John Hay to Henry White, March 15, 1903, John ­Hay-Henry White Correspondence, Digital Maryland http://collections.digitalmaryland.org/cdm/. 93 Sebastian Conrad, “Rethinking German Colonialism in a Global Age,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 41, no. 4 (2013): 548; Mitchell, Danger of Dreams, 108–109; Thomas Schoonover, Germany in Central America: Competitive Imperialism, 1821–1929 (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1998), 112–115; Borus Fausto,

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Fig. 2  “That’s a live wire, gentlemen,” New York Herald, December 16, 1902 (Image courtesy of Alamy Stock Photos. In this cartoon depicting the Venezuela Crisis, the German Kaiser is portrayed as the one willing to cross the Monroe Doctrine whilst John Bull looks cautiously on. Uncle Sam is presented as a powerful and authoritative figure, whereas Venezuelans are completely absent from the scene)

The concern with which the State Department regarded the existence of European settlement colonies in the Western Hemisphere is aptly demonstrated by a dispatch that was issued by John Hay to all diplomatic and consular officers in Latin America in March 1900. The colony issue “Brazil: The Social and Political Structure of the First Republic, 1889-1930” in The Cambridge History of Latin America, vol. 5, ed. Leslie Bethell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 783–784; Frederick Luebke, “A Prelude to Conflict: The German Ethnic Group in Brazilian Society, 1890–1917,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 6, no. 1 (1983): 1–9; Ian Forbes, “German Informal Imperialism in South America before 1914,” The Economic History Review 31, no. 3 (1978): 388; James Rippy, “German Investments in Latin America,” Journal of Business of the University of Chicago 21, no. 2 (1948): 65–66.

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had become “one of great importance” to the Department of State and Hay was “desirous to have as full information as possible upon the subject.” He attached a total of sixteen questions that he required answering as soon as possible for every Latin American nation, including when any colonies were first established; how many separate colonies existed; what nationalities they were composed of; whether the colonists retained their original nationalities and preserved their own languages and schools; and whether separate laws were established for their own local governance.94 If Europeans were establishing colonies in which their own cultures, laws, and systems of governance were being maintained, then one of the core tenets of the Monroe Doctrine was being directly challenged. The usage of the term colony is additionally important. Whilst it was widely used at the time to refer to diasporic settlements and societies, including groups of United States citizens living abroad, it was a loaded term that carried with it the severity of a genuine colony in the political sense. William Scruggs posited that these German settlements were “already colonial in every sense except in name” and worried that Europeans in Latin America would look to their home governments to intervene if they were wronged during periods of civil unrest, which would in time cause friction with the maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine.95 The existence of these colonies was even reported to be having a detrimental impact upon the way in Latin Americans perceived the Monroe Doctrine itself. Before beginning his tour of Latin America in 1906, Root received a briefing from George Cole, a consul in Buenos Aires, outlining Argentinian opinion on the United States. Whilst the doctrine was largely unpopular, he argued that the reason for this was the influence of European colonists who “teach these people that the Monroe Doctrine is only a snare to entrap them.”96 One of the most anxious and hyperbolic protestations against German colonies came from Emory White, a businessman with significant trade

94 “Department of State Circular,” March 31, 1900, Reel 12 (Argentina), Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State 1801–1906, Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives II, College Park, MD. 95 Scruggs, “The Monroe Doctrine,” 38–41. 96 George Cole to Elihu Root, April 26, 1906, Reel 25, Despatches from United States Consuls in Buenos Aires 1811–1906, Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives II, College Park, MD.

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interests in Latin America. In December 1902, he shared his concerns with President Roosevelt, outlining that he was “simply astonished at the growth of German commerce,” arguing that Germans had managed to gain significant influence among the armies and governments of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. According to White, the German colonists demonstrated an “inbred hatred of everything American” and laughed at the futility of the Monroe Doctrine. United States trade in the region was actively curtailed by Germans and he believed that a crisis would soon emerge: “The very air in South America is impregnated with German ideas, German goods, German aggressiveness and a little later, if you lease, with a German Government.”97 Such economic concerns prompted serious discussion among academics, businessmen, and diplomats alike. Organisations such as the Merchant Marine Commission were concerned about the extent to which Germany and other European nations had gained an economic and commercial foothold in Latin America, and pessimistic reports airing similar anxieties frequently made their way to the State Department. From private letters to published articles, Americans complained that United States steamship lines to Latin America were pitiful in comparison to European lines, that European banks were dominating the region, and that the United States share of regional trade was embarrassing.98 Whilst historians such as Nancy Mitchell emphasise that a policy of preventative interventionism was favoured among policy makers to 97 Emory White to Theodore Roosevelt, December 16, 1902, Theodore Roosevelt Digital Library, https://www.theodorerooseveltcenter.org/Research/Digital-Library/ Record?libID=o39864. Similar expressions of concern include Alvey Adee to Charles Page Bryan, September 6, 1901, Reel 26 (Brazil), Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State 1801–1906, Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives II, College Park, MD; “German Expansion,” The Outlook, May 18, 1901, 150–151; John Simmons, “The Monroe Doctrine: Its Status,” Michigan Law Review 5, no. 4 (1907): 248; Hugh Johnson, “The Lamb Rampant,” Everybody’s Magazine, Mar. 1908, 291–301; Paul Reinsch, World Politics at the End of the Nineteenth Century (New York, NY: Macmillan Company, 1900), 281–286; Albert Hale, The South Americans (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1907), 321–323. 98 Report of the Merchant Marine Commission, Together with the Testimony Taken at the Hearings, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1905), iv–v; Leo Rowe, “The Danger of National Isolation,” North American Review 185, no. 617 (1907): 425; George Cole to Robert Bacon, December 7, 1905, Reel 25, Despatches from Buenos Aires; Bulletin of the Pan American Union, February, 1908, 272–273; Charles Pepper, “Steamship Lines to South America,” September 10, 1909, Box 7, Knox Papers; William

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counter German influence in Latin America, particularly in the Caribbean and Central American regions, historians have overlooked the existence of alternative proposals. Increasing the United States’ hegemonic influence in the region was not the only possible course of action that was considered, because United States hegemony was not the only core value considered to be under threat. The growth of Pan-Americanism in the United States generated proposals for multilateral, ­inter-American strategies to combat German schemes and to protect Pan-American unity and solidarity. Whilst serving as Ambassador to Argentina in 1904, John Barrett submitted a memorandum to President Roosevelt outlining that German influences were “bending their energies to forestall all American effort [in Latin America].” The southern republics were, in his opinion, entering upon a period of unprecedented development, however, this would only be assured “provided the policy and attitude of the United States Government is in harmony and sympathy with [Latin American] ambitions and progress.” For Barrett, it was through a policy of inter-American cooperation that the United States could advance its interests in the region and prevent nations such as Germany from “securing a position from which it will be most difficult to oust them.”99 After leaving his post in Argentina, Barrett submitted some suggestions to the newly formed Merchant Marine Commission with the main intention of impressing the importance of establishing improved steamship communication between the United States and South America. The lack of direct lines for passengers, mail, and cargo was problematic and needed to be resolved to improve inter-American commercial, social, and political relations.100 Barrett suggested that the United States must make gains in commerce and influence within Latin America “through the cultivation of friendly relations and mutual confidence” rather than through protectorates or intervention along the lines of the Roosevelt Corollary to the

Finley to Philander Chase Knox, July 8, 1909, Box 8, Knox Papers; Elmer Youngman to Philander Chase Knox, September 14, 1909, Box 27, Knox Papers. 99 John Barrett to Theodore Roosevelt, December 20, 1904, Box 21, Barrett Papers. Emphasis in original. 100 “Memorandum of Remarks Submitted to the Merchant Marine Commission,” June 24, 1904, Box 21, Barrett Papers; Report of the Merchant Marine Commission: Together with the Testimony Taken at the Hearings, vol. 2, Hearings on the Great Lakes and Pacific Coast (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1905), 677–683.

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Monroe Doctrine.101 A “holier than thou” paternalistic attitude within the United States was something that should no longer hold any sway.102 After assuming the directorship of the International Union of American Republics, Barrett desired to work directly with any United States commercial bodies, manufacturing centres and businesses to awaken interest in Latin American trade opportunities, offering the services of his organisation in supporting trade expansion.103 One of Barrett’s most noticeable efforts was when he organised a Pan American Commercial Conference in February 1911. With over seven hundred delegates in attendance, Barrett outlined that the conference would act as a forum for United States business leaders to discuss the possibilities of Pan-American commerce and ultimately collaborate with one another and with the Pan American Union to achieve commercial success in Latin America.104 Underpinning this drive for trade, aside from the demand for markets and the desire to oust European competitors, was the notion that said trade would benefit the nations of Latin America through increased contact with the United States. For Barrett and many other Pan-Americanists, Latin America was paradoxically perceived as both a developed and underdeveloped region, functioning as a viable and reliable location for trade and investment, but one that additionally required trade and investment to develop. Accordingly, there was a noticeable tension within Barrett’s promotion of the Latin American market. Whilst he took great care to refer to Latin American nations as members of an equal relationship with the United States, utilising lofty Pan-American rhetoric, he contradicted this notion by claiming that, aside from the more developed ABC nations, the majority of Latin American nations were “in the infancy of their possibilities” and would stand to benefit from closer ties with the United States.105 This disjuncture between the idealised rhetoric of Pan-Americanism and its actual implementation was clear to see at the Pan American Commercial 101 John

Barrett to George Finley, June 1, 1906, Box 25, Barrett Papers. United States as a World Power” Feburary 26, 1910, Box 29, Barrett Papers. 103 John Barrett, “A Ready Aid in Foreign Trade,” System, March 1908, 91–104; John Barrett to William Howard Taft, September 14, 1909, Box 29, Barrett Papers. 104 Proceedings of the Pan American Commercial Conference February 13–17, 1911 (Washington, DC: Pan American Union, 1911). 105 John Barrett, The Pan-American Union: Peace, Friendship, Commerce (Washington, DC: Pan American Union, 1911), 10. 102 “The

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Conference, as Barrett did not invite any Latin American business leaders to the gathering. Whilst Barrett outlined that United States businesses needed to be buying produce from Latin America as well as selling, he was more concerned with getting United States businesses mobilised. Only the diplomatic representatives of Latin American nations were present at the conference, their role simply to promote the economic conditions of their home nations. Despite advocating cooperation over hegemony, Pan-Americanists still tended to exhibit paternalism during the first decade of the twentieth century. As widespread as the German Peril was among decision makers, it did not go unopposed. German Americans were one of the most respected immigrant groups in the United States at the beginning of the twentieth century and were renowned for successfully assimilating into American society.106 German colonies in Latin America were primarily viewed with such contempt because policy makers believed that no efforts were being made by German immigrants to assimilate into Latin American societies. Indeed, it was unthinkable that Teutonic peoples would lower themselves to Latin standards in an age of racial hierarchies and pseudoscientific racialism. Yet individuals from both the United States and Latin America attempted to dispel this perception. The United States minister to Brazil, Charles Page Bryan, was insistent in his despatches to the State Department that there was no need to be concerned about German colonies in Brazil. Shortly before his resignation in 1902, he conducted a tour of southern Brazil in response to Hay’s aforementioned request for information. He reported that German immigrants were loyal to Brazil, that the Monroe Doctrine was praised at gatherings he attended, and that Brazilians themselves held no quarrels with the Germans.107 John Bassett Moore received a stern letter from the Baron Rio Branco in 1901 informing him that no German threat existed. Attaching a table showing immigration figures, he noted that numbers had rapidly declined in recent years, arguing that there was no foundation for the “sensational articles” published in the United States about a German invasion. He told Moore that he would “render a great service by contradicting the 106 Russell Kazal, Becoming Old Stock: The Paradox of ­ German-American Identity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 2. 107 Charles Page Bryan to John Hay, June 25, 1900, Reel 67, Despatches From Brazil; Charles Page Bryan to John Hay, April 2, 1901 and May 17, 1901, Reel 68, Despatches from Brazil.

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false reports that some of your newspapers put in circulation in order to excite ill-feeling between the United States and Germany.”108 The Journal do Commercio insisted that Germans were not seeking territory in Brazil and that Bryan’s trip proved that Americans could not find “the famous German peril which is preoccupying so many journalists and depriving devotees of the Monroe Doctrine so much sleep.” The article took the opportunity to ridicule American paranoia, claiming that some Americans will be disappointed by the absence of a genuine threat: “they [will] lament that their heroism as knights errant of American independence will be without employment.”109 Some Americans adopted a completely different position and argued that greater European influence in certain Latin American nations would be beneficial, claiming that the Monroe Doctrine was a barrier to improving the societal conditions of Latin America. G. Crichfield was one such proponent, arguing that the Monroe Doctrine acted as a shield for uncivilised nations. If the United States was to abandon the doctrine, “we are morally certain that the civilized powers would speedily intervene to put an end to the present intolerable conditions.”110 This particular argument has parallels with the Roosevelt Corollary in its division of the world into civilised and uncivilised nations but took the concept to the extreme. An article for The Atlantic went so far as to describe Germans as “a most desirable kind of immigrant. Wherever they go a higher civilization goes with them.”111 Another commentary argued that if “a new Prussia or Bavaria were set up in Brazil, a new Italy in Argentina, another Holland in Patagonia, a new Brittany in Guiana, who can say that the result would constitute a menace to the United States?”112 Upon recognising that there was friction between the Monroe Doctrine and

108 José Paranhos, Baron of Rio Branco to John Bassett Moore, November 22, 1901, Box  119, John Bassett Moore Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington DC. 109 Thomas Dawson to John Hay, November 1, 1901, Reel 69, Despatches from Brazil. 110 George Crichfield, American Supremacy: The Rise and Progress of the Latin American Republics and their Relations to the United States Under the Monroe Doctrine, vol. 2 (New York, NY: Brentano’s, 1908), 635. 111 Charles Dole, “The Right and Wrong of the Monroe Doctrine,” The Atlantic, April 1905, 569. 112 Walter Wellman, “Shall the Monroe Doctrine be Modified?” North American Review 173, no. 541 (1901): 832–844.

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Germans in Brazil, Stephen Bonsal argued that it should not be a cause for concern: “To many, as to myself, these well-ordered, prosperous communities have always appeared pregnant with hope for the future of the neglected continent, as oases of activity and industry in a dreary desert of intrigue and corruption that stretches almost without interruption or exception from Panama to Cape Horn.”113 For Americans who invested deeply the idea of a racial hierarchy, there was no German threat to the Monroe Doctrine, rather the doctrine was an outdated obstacle to the advancement of civilisation. Germany’s national development and growth uncovered the folly of enforcing the doctrine and appropriate adjustments ought to be made to its application for the benefit of civilisation as well as United States interests.

Navies and Islands The fear of German activity in Latin American additionally aligned the Monroe Doctrine to the United States Navy and the two became intertwined in the national imagination during the early twentieth century.114 This is particularly noteworthy because the doctrine had been traditionally lauded as a policy that had been maintained without the need to resort to force of arms. Alfred Thayer Mahan and Theodore Roosevelt were both prolific in expressing the necessity of expanding the navy to uphold the doctrine. Mahan argued that because Germany’s colonies were “far from the first order of commercial value,” it would undoubtedly look towards Latin America for expansion. The United States needed to expand its navy and the question was not “what we are willing to pay, but whether we are willing to hold our most cherished international dogma – the Monroe Doctrine – at the mercy of a superior navy.”115 Speaking at the Naval War College in 1908, Roosevelt argued

113 Stephan Bonsal, “Greater Germany in South America,” North American Review 176, no. 554 (1903): 58–67. 114 Mitchell, Danger of Dreams, 57–63, 128; Richard Challener, Admirals, Generals, and American Foreign Policy 1898–1914 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973), 18–23; Dirk Bönker, Militarism in a Global Age: Naval Ambitions in Germany and the United States before World War I (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012), 39–41. 115 Alfred Thayer Mahan to Charles Stewart, March 19, 1909, in Letters and Papers of Alfred Thayer Mahan, vol. 3, 290–292; Robert Seager, Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Man and His Letters (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1977), 490–517.

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that the Monroe Doctrine “unbacked by a navy is an empty boast” and would not be “observed by foreign nations with sufficient strength to disregard it.”116 This relationship was fostered by the press in the myriad of political cartoons that depicted the two as inseparable (Fig. 3). Upon taking the post of the Secretary of Navy in 1909, George von Lengerke Meyer signified in his guiding principles for the administration of the Navy that the “Monroe Doctrine is no stronger than the Navy; the Navy is no stronger than the Fleet; and the Fleet is the Navy.”117 Congressional debates on the state of the navy tested the efforts of policy makers to align the Monroe Doctrine to the Navy. On 20 February 1904, Alston Dayton of West Virginia invoked the doctrine as one of many reasons to increase the size of the United States Navy. Along with the need to defend the nation’s newly acquired insular possessions, to ensure that an isthmian canal was built, and to protect American citizens abroad, the maintenance of the “fixed policy” that was the Monroe Doctrine demanded a larger navy.118 However, his claim was challenged by Gilbert Hitchcock of Nebraska, which he described as “a most ridiculous proposition.” Hitchcock reminded the House that the doctrine had been enforced without a large navy since its enunciation and argued that it was only endangered by an aggressive policy. In Hitchcock, we find the remnants of the anti-imperialist argument regarding the doctrine, as he observed that European nations would not keep out of the Western Hemisphere whilst the United Sates asserted its own right to cross the oceans with its own “conquest of empire.”119 Indeed, President Roosevelt encountered many voices of dissent as he invoked the doctrine to secure a larger fleet. Carl Schurz argued against the claim that a navy was required to uphold the Monroe Doctrine because

116 The Navy, July 1908, 16–20. See also Theodore Roosevelt to John Davis Long, September 30, 1897, in Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, vol. 1, 695; Theodore Roosevelt to Joseph Cannon, December 27, 1904, in Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, vol. 4, 1080–1081; Theodore Roosevelt to James Watson, August 18, 1906, in Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, vol. 5, 372–378. 117 Mark Howe, George von Lengerke Meyer: His Life and Public Services (New York, NY: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1920), 451. 118 U.S. Congress. House. Naval Appropriation Bill, 58th Cong., 2nd Sess., Congressional Record, Feburary 20, 1904, 2149. 119 Ibid., 2154.

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Fig. 3  “Magnified Security,” Puck, May 6, 1908 (Image courtesy of the Library of Congress, Washington DC. In this pro-naval expansion cartoon, Uncle Sam is led to believe that the Monroe Doctrine can be protected by the United States Navy because national vanity and pride have unrealistically magnified the nation’s defensive capabilities)

the United States had allegedly been able to enforce the doctrine without a large fleet in the past.120 Even the former Secretary of the Navy, John Davis Long, expressed some concern. He worried that a larger navy might tempt offensive activity and believed that the Monroe 120 “Parker vs Roosevelt: An Open Letter to the Independent Voter,” September 1904, in Carl Schurz, Speeches, Correspondence and Political Papers of Carl Schurz, vol. 6, ed. Frederick Bancroft (New York, NY: G. P. Putman’s Sons, 1913), 370–371.

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Doctrine was being pushed “a little too far” through the Roosevelt Corollary.121 Andrew Carnegie suggested that the government ought to focus on ensuring the success of the Pan American Railway instead of creating battleships. Expanding the navy would be costly and generate militarism, whereas a railway connecting the Americas together would provide peace and security. Unlike battleships, railways were immune from external attack and transporting troops to Latin American nations by rail would be far more effective defence. Carnegie was adamant that this would settle the Monroe Doctrine “for all time.”122 In April 1908, Theodore Burton of Ohio attacked a policy of naval expansion, stating that the strength of the United States and its ability to uphold the doctrine was to be found “not only in our Navy and Army, but in our resources and our position in the world.” Demanding that the doctrine requires naval expansion was a “destructive argument” and took the nation away from its “ancient moorings” of keeping out of Old-World affairs.123 Burton proved to be a thorn in Roosevelt’s side and the President had previously written to him directly in an attempt to convince him otherwise.124 Furious at the lack of progress, Roosevelt claimed that the House and the likes of Burton “seemed to possess an infinite capacity to do wrong.”125 Yet the idea that the Navy and the Monroe Doctrine required one another remained prominent and these arguments were continuously made in various forms of print media.126 This prominence can be partly explained by the efforts of the Navy League of the United States. Founded in 1902 with the aim of advocating the expansion of the United States Navy, the league successfully brought naval matters into 121 “Hon.

John D. Long on Increase of Navy,” Advocate of Peace, April 1905, 71. Rutkow, The Longest Line on the Map: The United States, the Pan-American Highway, and the Quest to Link the Americas (New York, NY: Scribner, 2019), 86–87. 123 U.S. Congress. House. Naval Appropriation Bill, 60th Cong., 1st Sess., Congressional Record, April 15, 1908, 4777–4778. 124 Theodore Roosevelt to Theodore Burton, February 23, 1904 in Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, vol. 4, 735–737. 125 Theodore Roosevelt to Richmond Hobson, April 16, 1908 in Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, vol. 6, 1008–1009. 126 Francis Loomis, “The Position of the United States on the American Continent – Some Phases of the Monroe Doctrine,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 22 (1903): 3; Edward Stanwood, “The Moral Aspects of the Monroe Doctrine,” The Outlook, February 8, 1902, 371; The Navy, August 1908, 13. 122 Eric

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the public and political eye.127 In discussing its formation, LieutenantCommander John Gibbons explained that “a strong feeling is aroused whenever the Monroe Doctrine is attacked, and the concentration of interest upon internal affairs gives way to legislative liberality in appropriations for ships and men.”128 In his inaugural address, President Taft claimed that the United States armed forces ought to be organised to rapidly expand “into a force sufficient to resist all probable invasion from abroad and to furnish a respectable expeditionary force if necessary in the maintenance of our traditional American policy which bears the name of President Monroe.”129 It was specifically against the idea of a German threat, however, that such arguments were primarily posed. Prominent naval figures such as Asa Walker, George Dewey and David Taylor voiced with certainty that Germany would soon test the Monroe Doctrine.130 To Mahan, Germany was a continual threat to the doctrine and the security of the Panama Canal made the matter even more serious.131 Roosevelt was similarly rampant in this view in his letters, claiming that Germany would “make us either put up or shut up on the Monroe doctrine.”132 This naval rhetoric was tied to the hegemony-facilitating interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine because it was intrinsically linked to the security of the Panama Canal. It became vital that Germany was prevented from using its naval strength to acquire a strong strategic position in the surrounding region. Rumours continuously circulated concerning 127 Armin Rappaport, The Navy League of the United States (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 1962), 3–14. 128 John Gibbons, “Navy Leagues,” North American Review, May 1903, 761. 129 William Howard Taft, “Inaugural Address,” March 4, 1909, The American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/inaugural-address-46. 130 Challener, Admirals, Generals, and American Foreign Policy, 15–29. 131 Alfred Thayer Mahan to Bouverie Clark, July 23, 1909, in Letters and Papers of Alfred Thayer Mahan, vol. 3, 307–308; Alfred Thayer Mahan to Henry Cabot Lodge, January 8, 1912, in Letters and Papers of Alfred Thayer Mahan, vol. 3, 443–444. 132 Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge, March 27, 1901, in Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, vol. 3, 31–32; Theodore Roosevelt to George von Lengerke Meyer, April 12, 1901, in Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, vol. 3, 52; Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge, June 19, 1901, in Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, vol. 3, 97–98; Theodore Roosevelt to Cecil Spring-Rice, July 3, 1901, in Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, vol. 3, 107–109; Theodore Roosevelt to Cecil Spring-Rice, November 1, 1905, in Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, vol. 5, 61–64.

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German plans to purchase both the Galapagos Islands and the Danish West Indies, purchases that would call the Monroe Doctrine into question and threaten the canal. The United States itself had no desire to acquire the Galapagos Islands, but was not willing to let them fall into German hands, and the United States eventually purchased the Danish West Indies in 1917, just before entering the First World War. In both instances, United States policy was justified on the grounds of preventing Germany from acquiring the islands and challenging the Monroe Doctrine. Statesmen had sought to acquire the Danish West Indies since the end of the Civil War, given their strategic location in the Western Hemisphere. It had become widely known that the Danish government was unhappy with the islands’ unprofitability, which facilitated frequent diplomatic efforts to purchase the islands. Around 1902 a deal was almost secured by Henry White, however, the Danish parliament unexpectedly refused to allow the sale.133 By the turn of the century, the islands had become closely associated with the Monroe Doctrine in the public consciousness and their purchase was deemed to be in accordance with its maintenance.134 At a British royal gathering in April 1903, White managed to discuss the islands with the Queen consort Alexandra, who was herself Danish, and reported on what Secretary of State John Hay described as some “rather interesting gossip about the way the Danish Islands business is regarded in Royal circles in England and Denmark.”135 Alexandra informed White that she was pleased that the recent acquisition negotiations had failed and expressed a hope that her home nation could turn around their economic viability. White assured her that the United States had no intention of acquiring the islands if it were against Danish will, to which she replied that “I hope you will never let Germany have the islands; that is what we Danes would dread

133 William Holt, Treaties Defeated by the Senate (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1933), 105–110; Henry White to John Hay, May 15, 1901 and October 23, 1901, John Hay-Henry White Correspondence, Digital Maryland, https://collections. digitalmaryland.org/digital/collection/hawp. 134 Washington Post, January 3, 1901, 6; Horace Fisher to John Davis Long, January 29, 1902 in John Davis Long, Papers of John Davis Long 1897–1904, ed. Gardner Allen (Boston, MA: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1939), 421–423. 135 John Hay to Theodore Roosevelt, April 15, 1903, Reel 5, John Hay Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington DC.

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above all things.”136 White confidently informed her that the United States would never permit that to happen as it would be the “grossest infringement” of the Monroe Doctrine. Comments like these, relating to the possibility of German challenges to the Monroe Doctrine, were at the centre of subsequent drives to acquire the islands during the Wilson administration. Turning to the Pacific Ocean, the Galapagos Islands were offered on lease to the United States at the close of the nineteenth century by the Ecuadorian President Eloy Alfaro. However, naval officials did not deem them worthwhile, even for a coaling station. After construction began on the Panama Canal, the islands took on more strategic importance and United States policy makers sought to keep the islands out of European control. Long-serving State Department official Alvey Adee adeptly summarised the United States’ position: “We don’t want them for ourselves and won’t allow any European (or extra-American) power to acquire control of them.”137 Rumours emerged in 1908 that a German syndicate intended to buy the islands from the Ecuadorian government which caused concern in the State Department. Elihu Root stated that there would be no objection if an American nation purchased the islands, however, if they were sold to a non-American power then the United States would object. Any “attempt to obtain possession of those Islands by a foreign power would raise for the United States the question whether the Monroe Doctrine was to be abandoned or not.”138 This concern was adopted by the Taft administration and ­Huntington-Wilson recommended to Knox that he inform the German Ambassador about the rumours, stating that the “United States would learn with very grave concern of a project for the control of those Islands by any ­non-American power.” Huntington-Wilson was “convinced that Germany is trying to get the Islands” and outlined that “our special objection to the acquisition by non-American powers of coaling stations or naval bases in either of the localities mentioned, or elsewhere near the

136 It is worth noting that Queen Alexandra was vehemently anti-German and had never forgiven Germany for the events of the Prussian-Danish war of 1864. 137 Ronn Pineo, Ecuador and the United States: Useful Strangers (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2007), 85–87. 138 Elihu Root to William Fox, June 18, 1908 in Department of State, Division of Information, Series A, Sale of the Galapagos Islands, Knox Papers.

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trade routes of the Panama Canal.”139 Hegemony was deemed vital in the Western Hemisphere and any prospect of a non-American challenge to the United States’ geopolitical position was deemed dangerous on the grounds of the Monroe Doctrine.

The Japanese Peril Just as the Monroe Doctrine became tinged with anti-German sentiment during this period, Japan suffered a similar fate. Like Germany, the emergence of Japan as a global power at the turn of the century was perceived as a potential threat to United States interests and deemed as a direct threat to the doctrine. Unlike the perception of the German threat, however, the Japanese threat is regarded by historians as being latent and one which only became more acute towards the end of Theodore Roosevelt’s presidency.140 Diplomatic tension between Japan and the United States primarily stemmed from the issue of Japanese immigration to Western United States.141 In a letter to Roosevelt, Alfred Thayer Mahan claimed that Asiatic immigration was “against the spirit” of the Monroe Doctrine because “they don’t assimilate, they colonize, and virtually annex. Permitted, the Pacific slope would be an Asiatic territory in twenty years.”142 According to a memorandum produced by the British Embassy in Washington, Roosevelt truly believed that “the Japanese intend to colonise on the Pacific slope of America and Canada.”143

139 Francis Huntington-Wilson, “Galapagos Islands,” Box  28, Knox Papers; Francis Huntington-Wilson to David Hill, July 16, 1910 in Department of State, Division of Information, Series A, Sale of the Galapagos Islands, Box 39, Knox Papers. 140 Akira Iriye, Pacific Estrangement: Japanese and American Expansion, 1897–1911 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), 72–73; William Nester, Power Across the Pacific: A Diplomatic History of American Relations with Japan (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1996). 141 David Patterson, “Japanese-American Relations: The 1906 California Crisis, the Gentlemen’s Agreement, and the World Cruise,” in A Companion to Theodore Roosevelt, ed. Serge Ricard (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 391–401; Michael Cullinane, “The ‘Gentleman’s’ Agreement: Exclusion by Class,” Immigrants & Minorities 32, no. 2 (2014): 139–161. 142 Alfred Thayer Mahan to Theodore Roosevelt, December 2, 1911, in Letters and Papers of Alfred Thayer Mahan, vol. 3, 435–436. 143 “Memorandum,” March 1908, Reel 83, Viscount James Bryce Papers, Weston Library, University of Oxford.

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The Russo-Japanese War made plain that Japan was bound to be a ­powerful rival and its proximity to the Philippines was a constant concern. In a despatch to the Ambassador to Japan, Root expressed his concern at Japanese activity in Manchuria during the conflict, claiming that Japan had acted in a manner which aimed to establish its own commercial advantages in the region, thereby forgoing its commitment to the Open Door. It would be “a grievous disappointment if the abortive attempt of Russia to create a national monopoly of material interests in that quarter were to be succeeded by a similarly exclusive establishment of Japanese interests there,” wrote Root, subsequently asking the Ambassador to “make our apprehensions impressively known to the Japanese Government.”144 George Meyer, whilst serving as Postmaster General under Roosevelt, recorded in his diary that Root had expressed the notion that Japan certainly had the potential to “demolish the Monroe Doctrine.”145 Towards the end of his presidency, Roosevelt even noticeably switched between German and Japanese antagonists. Briefing Philander Chase Knox, he claimed that the most important foreign policy developments would concern United States–Japanese relations, ­ confessing that he no longer believed that Germany had any designs against the doctrine.146 This anti-Japanese sentiment would have an important impact upon the evolution of the Monroe Doctrine, notably switching the doctrine’s targets from European powers to all non-American powers and from colonisation to non-political forms of influence. In the summer of 1912, a Senate resolution was passed which has become known as the Lodge Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. In response to the suspected purchase of Magdalena Bay in Mexico by a Japanese business, a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations worked on a resolution in opposition to the deal. The recent outbreak of the Mexican Revolution stoked fears among policy makers and exacerbated rumour

144 Elihu Root to Luke Wright, March 24,1906, Reel 108 (Japan), Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State 1801–1906, Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives II, College Park, MD. 145 Howe, Meyer, 370–371. 146 Theodore Roosevelt to Philander Chase Knox, February 8, 1909, in Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, vol. 4, 1510–1514.

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into reality. In May Senator Lodge, who had headed the subcommittee, claimed that the moment was opportune for the Senate to make a declaration in regard to the Monroe Doctrine “in order to make it clear that that statement is not confined to government action merely or to colonization under government auspices, but that by the word ‘colonization’ we also cover action by companies or corporations or by citizens or subjects of a foreign State which might do, at a place, for instance, like Magdalena Bay, precisely what the doctrine was intended to prevent.”147 Debate emerged in the Senate over the extent to which the doctrine was really applicable in this case, but did not gain any headway.148 Criticism was surprisingly widespread in the press the Advocate of Peace tellingly referred to the Magdalena Bay issue as the “Annual Japanese War Scare,” expressing surprise that Lodge would accept the rumours without sufficient investigation: Does Senator Lodge or any other well-informed man really believe that Japan, from her far distant seat, with her comparatively small navy and small resources, has been quietly and craftily planning to dispute with the United States the Monroe Doctrine at the cost of a terrible war with us, and that she is expecting for this purpose to secure a naval base on Magdalena Bay without our Government discovering her?149

Undeterred, Lodge submitted the final resolution on 31 July which stated: That when any harbor or other place in the American continents is so situated that the occupation thereof for naval or military purposes might threaten the communications or the safety of the United States, the Government of the United States could not see without grave concern the possession of such harbor or other place by any corporation or association which has such a relation to another Government, not American, as to give that Government practical power of control for national purposes.

The resolution was briefly debated before being passed on 2 August. Albert Cummins of Iowa requested that Lodge speak “with regard to the 147 U.S. Congress. Senate. Land at Magdalena Bay, 62nd Cong., 2nd Sess., Congressional Record, May 1, 1912, 5661. 148 Ibid., 5662–5666. 149 “The Annual Japanese War Scare,” Advocate of Peace, May 1912, 106.

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real meaning of the resolution as it affects what we ordinarily know as the Monroe doctrine,” asking whether it was “an extension of that doctrine as it has been generally interpreted or is it a mere application of the doctrine?” Lodge replied by stating that it rested on “broader and older grounds than the doctrine, on the law of nations, but that the Monroe Doctrine was an extension of this principle.” As such, the resolution was “merely a statement of policy, allied to the Monroe doctrine, of course, but not necessarily dependent upon it or growing out of it.”150 In his classic history of the Monroe Doctrine, Dexter Perkins describes the Lodge Corollary as a “quasi interpretation”—it “did not remain dissociated from Monroeism in the debates in Congress or in the public mind, and probably owed at least some of the support which it secured to the same kind of sentiment which gave strength to the principles of 1823.”151 Thus, whilst it was arguably not an appropriate extension to the Monroe Doctrine, it was generally considered to be a corollary. What makes the Lodge Corollary important is that it altered the doctrine’s scope and set a precedent for subsequent interpretations of the Monroe Doctrine. Not only was the doctrine now positioned against all non-American powers rather than European, but it also emphasised that economic and financial influence in Latin America were now considered threats to United States interests. This discourse would be developed further as the decade continued. * * * When the Taft presidency ended in 1913, the Monroe Doctrine had undergone a considerable transformation process. Widely recognised as a flexible and malleable policy, the doctrine’s meaning had begun to fracture into two broad reinterpretations over the course of a decade. In response to the new conditions that the United States faced on the hemispheric and international stages, the essence of the doctrine was distilled and aligned to the notion of regional hegemony on the one hand and inter-American cooperation on the other. The doctrine served as a discursive tool through which these core values were debated, linking the two antithetical values to a common point of reference, demonstrating 150 U.S. Congress. Senate. Foreign Occupations on American Soil, 62nd Cong., 2nd Sess., Congressional Record, August 2, 1912, 10045–10047. 151 Dexter Perkins, A History of the Monroe Doctrine (London: Longmans, [1955] 1960), 271–274.

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their distinct yet interconnected relationship. The desired result of each reinterpretation of the doctrine was the same, namely, to keep non-American influence out of the Western Hemisphere and defend American republicanism. However, the devil was in the details. Under Roosevelt and Taft, there was an official consensus that the Monroe Doctrine ought to ensure United States hegemony at the expense of inter-American cooperation, at least in the circum-Caribbean region. Yet the stage had been set for an unprecedented moment of debate in which the two reinterpretations of the doctrine would clash in a more emphatic manner. Furthermore, the doctrine’s scope had simultaneously been enlarged and transformed into a military as well as political policy. All activity conducted by any non-American that was deemed to interfere in affairs of the American republics was now perceived as a threat to United States interests and the Monroe Doctrine became synonymous with the United States Navy. As conditions in international relations changed, the doctrine evolved to meet them. Yet, it did so at the cost of unanimity. More so than any point in time since its enunciation, the Monroe Doctrine was now simultaneously understood and interpreted in a variety of different ways. As well as the two overarching interpretations explored in this chapter, arguments were now being posed that challenged the value of the doctrine, emphasising the contested nature of United States–Latin American relations. Whilst it retained its status as a revered foreign policy tradition, the doctrine had become unstable as United States decision makers used it as a medium through which to understand the role of the United States in the world and determine core values of national security. When Woodrow Wilson assumed the presidency, new challenges in international affairs would continue to unsettle the position of the doctrine and its meaning and application would be pushed to its limits, drawing upon these formative years of debate.

A Shibboleth and a War

After rediscovering the awe-inspiring Incan ruins of Machu Picchu, the archaeologist-historian Hiram Bingham became a quasi-celebrity in the United States. The nation was fascinated by the Yale academic’s discoveries in Peru and he found fame as one of the “first white men in over 400 years” to enter the remains of the ancient city.1 The discovery bolstered his career and served to promote the value of studying Latin American history in universities; however, it additionally provided Bingham with a platform from which to embark upon his “campaign against the Monroe Doctrine.”2 In 1913 Bingham published The Monroe Doctrine: An Obsolete Shibboleth, a scathing critique of the revered foreign policy tradition that drew upon his knowledge of Latin American history and current affairs.3 He argued that the Monroe Doctrine had caused significant damage to United States–Latin American relations and called for its outright abandonment. European nations, he argued, no longer posed a threat to the sovereignty of the American republics 1 New

York Times, December 22, 1911, 2. Bingham to James Bryce, October 21, 1915, Reel 74, Viscount James Bryce Papers, Weston Library, University of Oxford. 3 First published as an article, Bingham soon expanded his critique in monograph form: Hiram Bingham, “The Monroe Doctrine: An Obsolete Shibboleth,” The Atlantic Monthly, June 1913, 721–734 and The Monroe Doctrine: An Obsolete Shibboleth (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1913). 2 Hiram

© The Author(s) 2020 A. Bryne, The Monroe Doctrine and United States National Security in the Early Twentieth Century, Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the Contemporary World, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-43431-1_4

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as they had done in 1823 and certain South American nations, such as Argentina, Brazil and Chile, could ably defend themselves from any extra-hemispheric threats, making its application redundant. More importantly, the doctrine had produced and facilitated a long history of United States hegemony and informal imperialism within the Western Hemisphere, rather than generating the admiration of Latin American nations, which soured hemispheric relations and made the doctrine unpalatable to most Latin Americans. For Bingham, the only way to ensure hemispheric peace and stability was to alter the direction of United States foreign relations through the abandonment of the Monroe Doctrine and the adoption of a more amicable and cooperative Latin American policy. The publication of Obsolete Shibboleth caused quite a stir—never before had such a sustained disavowal of the sacred Monroe Doctrine been made by a citizen of the United States. Newspapers and magazines that would have otherwise ignored the publication of an academic tract dedicated front page articles to Bingham’s proposal and its content was deemed worthy enough to insert into the Congressional Record.4 Interest in the doctrine was suddenly at an all-time high. In January 1914, John Barrett claimed that hardly a day went by without the Pan American Union receiving “requests from individuals or libraries for a list of books, articles, speeches, etc., on the Monroe Doctrine,” whereas the Pan American Society of the United States found itself similarly inundated with requests for information on the doctrine “from students in our high schools and colleges, but also from clergymen, lecturers, and other public speakers.”5 Collections of articles on the doctrine were published to satisfy inquisitive minds and guides published for debating societies attempted to summarise the various positions one could adopt on the future application of the doctrine.6 4 U.S. Congress. House. Monroe Doctrine, 63rd Congress, 1st Session, Congressional Record, July 18, 1913, 2527–2531. 5 John Barrett to Francis Huntington-Wilson, January 20, 1914, Box 36, John Barrett Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC; The Pan American Society of the United States: Secretary’s Report 1916–1917 (New York, NY: Pan American Society, 1917), 11–12. 6 Edith Phelps, ed., Selected Articles on the Monroe Doctrine (New York, NY: H. W. Wilson Company, 1915); Edwin Shurter and Carl Taylor, Both Sides of 100 Public Questions Briefly Debated with Affirmative and Negative References (New York, NY: Hinds, Noble & Eldredge, 1913), 55–57.

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The nation’s decision makers took to the Monroe Doctrine in droves and a deluge of commentaries were penned in response to Bingham’s critique. The debate over the doctrine’s meaning that had been taking place since the Spanish–American War served as the foundation of an intense moment of discussion which solidified the doctrine’s alignment to two antithetical core values. Although few were bold enough to parrot Bingham’s demand for abandonment, Pan-Americanists drew upon the themes of inter-American cooperation that underpinned the argument of Obsolete Shibboleth and advocated a Pan-American reinterpretation of the doctrine with greater urgency as more Americans became convinced that United States national security was tied to i­nter-American unity. However, the imminent completion of the Panama Canal and the instability of the Mexican Revolution made an interventionist Monroe Doctrine aimed at maintaining United States hegemony in the Western Hemisphere very appealing. The pervading opinion generated by Bingham’s publication was that the doctrine as enunciated in 1823 was archaic and needed to be reinterpreted and applied to modern international conditions. The nation’s elites almost unanimously believed that the Monroe Doctrine had to be reframed for it to remain a useful policy tool; however, the question was whether it should be aligned to the core value of cooperation or hegemony. Three academic conferences functioned as the locus of this debate. The first was devoted to the subject of Latin America and held at Clark University, Worchester, Massachusetts, during November 1913 and organised by the historian George Blakeslee.7 The second was the National Conference of the Foreign Relations of the United States, which took place on 3 and 4 April 1914 and held under the auspices of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (AAPSS) in Philadelphia. An entire session of panels was dedicated to the Monroe Doctrine during this conference, consisting of fourteen papers presented by both Americans and Europeans.8 The third was the Eighth Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (ASIL), held in Washington between 22 and 25 April 1914. The society devoted 7 The five papers presented on the Monroe Doctrine were published in The Journal of Race Development and in an edited collection: George Blakeslee, ed., Latin America Clark University Addresses November, 1913 (New York, NY: G. E. Stechert and Company, 1914). 8 The conference proceedings were published in the AAPSS’s journal the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.

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five sessions of papers over four days to the sole topic of the Monroe Doctrine. Although Phillip Marshall Brown, a leading member of the ASIL, commented during the event that it was “out of place” for a legal society to dedicate most of its annual meeting to a discussion of the doctrine, the ASIL was a well-connected organisation that appealed to academics, diplomats, and politicians alike.9 Under scrutiny, the doctrine was positioned at the centre of a wider debate over the relationship between core values of regional hegemony and inter-American cooperation in the conduct of United States foreign relations. However, as the debate was underway, the outbreak of the First World War suddenly demanded the nation’s attention. Because the debate over the doctrine’s meaning had occupied a prominent place among decision makers, it had immediate consequences that influenced the nation’s response to the first years of the war. The doctrine was a prominent facet of the nation’s reaction to the conflict, which in turn prompted further attempts to reinterpret the doctrine’s meaning and application. The doctrine was initially praised for having kept the United States out of the war; however, as the fighting continued, a sense of urgency took hold of the debate over the doctrine’s meaning, and the tensions between inter-American cooperation and regional hegemony that had shaped the doctrine’s history since the turn of the century transferred seamlessly into the context of a global conflict. The war served to highlight the division between the Old World and the New, generating further justification for a multilateral application of the doctrine; however, the threat of war signified to many Americans that the Western Hemisphere needed a stringently and unilaterally enforced Monroe Doctrine supported by a larger navy. Because of its fractured meaning, the doctrine functioned as an ideal frame of reference through which the United States determined its national security demands and the conduct of its relations with Latin America and the belligerent nations during the first half of the First World War. The issues at the heart of the debate were additionally reflected by the attitude of the Wilson administration towards the Monroe Doctrine. During his first term, President Woodrow Wilson and his inner circle 9 Comments of Phillip Marshall Brown in “Statements, Interpretations, and Applications of the Monroe Doctrine and of More or Less Allied Doctrines,” Proceedings of the American Society of International Law at its Annual Meeting 8 (1914): 114. As per the norm, the proceedings of the meeting were published by the society.

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sought to reconcile the tensions inherent in the doctrine’s application and determine the value of inter-American cooperation and regional hegemony in the formation of their foreign policy. The President paradoxically desired to apply the doctrine in both interventionist and multilateral terms, resulting in the conduct of a muddled Latin American policy that exemplified the doctrine’s fractured nature. Although he criticised the policies of dollar diplomacy that his predecessors had enacted, Wilson oversaw numerous interventions in Latin America during his first term, including Mexico, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic, that functioned as the application of the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.10 At the same time, Wilson sought to transcend the unilateral enforcement of the doctrine through the formation of a Pan-American pact, and he spoke favourably about Pan-Americanism and inter-American cooperation in public. The extent to which Wilson truly adhered to PanAmerican ideology has long been questioned by historians; however, his administration’s conflicting attitude towards the Monroe Doctrine drew upon its fractured meaning, pandering and subsequently contributing to the debate over notions of hegemony and cooperation.11

An Obsolete Shibboleth? When Woodrow Wilson began his first term as President in March 1913, the Mexican Revolution became one of his immediate concerns. Victoriano Huerta had seized power in Mexico and Wilson was 10 Historians tend to pin this disjuncture on Wilson’s lack of knowledge relating to both foreign relations and the Latin American region, forcing him into following tried and tested policies: Alan McPherson, A Short History of U.S. Interventions in Latin America and the Caribbean (Chichester: Wiley Blackwell, 2016), 72–73; Brian Loveman, No Higher Law: American Foreign Policy and the Western Hemisphere Since 1776 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 194–195; Michael Neagle, “US Policies Toward Latin America,” in A Companion to Woodrow Wilson, ed. Ross Kennedy (New York, NY: Wiley, 2013), 206–207; Kenneth Clements, Woodrow Wilson: World Statesman (Boston, MA: Twayne Publishers, 1987), 125. However, John Milton Cooper Jr. refutes the argument that Wilson was unprepared for the demands of foreign relations: John Milton Cooper Jr., The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), 266. 11 Renowned Wilson scholar Arthur Link argues that the President and his cabinet were more concerned with reaping the benefits of inter-American cooperation without having to renounce interventionism: Arthur Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era 1910–1917 (New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1954), 106.

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bequeathed with the decision of whether to recognise the new government by the outgoing Taft administration. Objecting to the undemocratic formation of the government, Wilson chose not to recognise the regime and developed a personal distaste for Huerta. As the revolution became increasingly violent and unstable, it caused widespread apprehension across the United States, given how invested the nation was in Mexico’s stability.12 Former Secretary of War Henry Stimson believed from the onset that “we were going to have great trouble in some form with Mexico,” and the safety of the so-called American Colony in Mexico City often prompted concern.13 The revolution additionally threatened to endanger the United States’ investments which had been primarily funnelled into “politically unstable” ventures such as mining, railroads, and petroleum.14 The Monroe Doctrine reared its head when Americans realised that European nations, who had invested an equally significant amount of capital in Mexico, might intervene to restore order.15 Accordingly, when Wilson won the election, he began receiving letters urging him to take some sort of action in Mexico because of the duty the Monroe Doctrine bestowed upon the United States to maintain order. The Governor of Texas, Oscar Colquitt, wrote to Wilson in February 1913 claiming that “the obligation of the United States to the world under the Monroe doctrine makes it now a duty for our Government to intervene in Mexico, not for conquest or territorial gain but to restore

12 William Raat and Michael Brescia argue that the revolution was “not simply a Mexican event, but an episode in the history of the United States as well”: William Raat and Michael Brescia, Mexico and the United States: Ambivalent Vistas (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 4th ed., 2010), 132. 13 “Outline of Mexican Trouble,” Henry Lewis Stimson Diaries, Reel 1 Volume 2, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library. Whilst United States citizens lived all over Mexico, approximately twelve thousand lived in Mexico City by 1910: John Hart, Empire and Revolution: The Americans in Mexico Since the Civil War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 271–272. 14 Lars Schoultz, Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 236–237. 15 John Skirius, “Railroad, Oil and Other Foreign Investments in the Mexican Revolution, 1911–1914,” Journal of Latin American Studies 35, no. 1 (2003): 38; John Womack, “The Mexican Revolution, 1910–1920,” in The Cambridge History of Latin America, vol. 5, ed. Leslie Bethell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 93–94.

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order and protect life and property.”16 A few months later, Delbert Haff, a lawyer who specialised in representing American mining and railway companies before Mexican courts, urged the President in a memorandum that, whilst armed intervention would be a calamity, the United States had a responsibility “growing out of the Monroe Doctrine” to act in some manner to resolve the Mexican crisis.17 These letters, expressing a notion of duty, would not have been out of place in a memorandum written by the Taft administration. Caricaturing the predicament that the nation found itself in, Puck depicted the Mexican Revolution as a mad, rampaging dog that the United States had to deal with before other non-American nations decided to ignore the Monroe Doctrine and intervene themselves (Fig. 1). However, demands for United States intervention on the broad grounds of maintaining the Monroe Doctrine did not go unchallenged. Commentators such as former State Department Solicitor Joshua Reuben Clark argued that the application of the doctrine was not relevant to the Mexican Revolution, angrily suggesting in a memorandum that people should “[r]ead the Monroe Doctrine before talking about it.”18 Proposals for Pan-American initiatives and solutions were additionally posed as a more amicable alternative. John Barrett devised a plan for the Pan American Union to mediate the revolution in February 1913, proposing that the crisis be resolved through the formation of an international commission held under the auspices of the United States.19 Although the proposal was rejected by the Wilson administration and lambasted by the Ambassador to Mexico, Barrett received enough favourable comments to remain committed to the idea that 16 Oscar Colquitt to Woodrow Wilson, February 12, 1913 in United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1913 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1920), 705. 17 Delbert Haff to Woodrow Wilson, May 12, 1913, in Woodrow Wilson, The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 27, ed. Arthur Link (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978), 419–425. 18 “Suggestive Points on the Mexican Situation,” July 1913, Box 9, Philander Chase Knox Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. 19 Barrett’s proposal was sent to various politicians, including the President, and was published in the press: John Barrett to William Howard Taft, February 13, 1913, Box 34, Barrett Papers; New York Times, February 14, 1913, 1. Mexico had always held significance for Barrett and he had often expressed a desire to be appointed as Ambassador: John Barrett to Theodore Roosevelt, December 20, 1904, Box 21, Barrett Papers.

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Fig. 1  “Mad Dog?” Puck, August 6, 1913 (Image courtesy of the Library of Congress, Washington, DC. Personified as a mad dog, the Mexican Revolution is depicted being as walled off from clamouring European powers and Japan by the Monroe Doctrine. Frustrated by the disturbance that the revolution was causing on his side of the wall, Uncle Sam is left alone to decide whether to reach into his holster labelled intervention and silence the dog)

the revolution could be resolved through Pan-American cooperation. In July, Barrett wrote to Wilson again and began to formulate a PanAmerican reinterpretation of the Monroe Doctrine that might guide mediation efforts: Even if Latin America may not be overenthusiastic about the Monroe Doctrine, in so far as it suggests our leadership and dominance in the Western Hemisphere, it is unanimous for the Pan American Doctrine as a possible substitute for the former. In other words, if you can give a Pan American tone to mediation, you will strengthen Mexican confidence in your good intentions and gain the lasting sympathy of the rest of Latin America.20 20 John Barrett to Woodrow Wilson, July 26, 1913, Box 35, Barrett Papers. Emphasis in original.

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Just as Bingham had argued, Barrett believed that inter-American cooperation ought to guide United States–Latin American relations; however, he believed that the Monroe Doctrine’s principles still held some value and should be reinterpreted rather than abandoned. Even though it was essentially a matter of semantics that divided their proposals, Barrett felt the need to defend the doctrine and criticise Bingham’s thesis.21 As the Monroe Doctrine became a prominent talking point in academic conferences, Barrett readily contributed to the discourse. In various addresses, he outlined that a Pan-American Monroe Doctrine would “adopt, absorb and enlarge the Monroe Doctrine as an original policy of the United States into a greater and all-American policy, where each nation would have the same rights of attitude, the same dignity of position and the same sense of independence as the United States now has.” The obstacle that Barrett foresaw was that Latin Americans would not trust any policy born out of the Monroe Doctrine, not because they perceived the original message of 1823 as dangerous to their interests, but because of the way it had been reinterpreted and applied since. He posited that whilst the tenets of Monroe’s message would be maintained and made multilateral, new terminology ought to be used to absolve it from any negative associations. Referencing Bingham’s critique, Barrett claimed that if “its haphazard interpretation can be supplanted with responsible and reasonable judgment, the majority of arguments against the doctrine in Latin America, and also in the United States, in describing it as obsolete will fail absolutely in their purpose and logic.”22 Summarising his thoughts to George Peabody, Barrett explained that many Americans had simply interpreted the doctrine “in the wrong way” and reiterated the primary issue at stake: “If we can get away from the idea of patronizing our sister republics and can make them feel that the Monroe Doctrine belongs to them as much as to us, there will be no doubt about it regaining its popularity among them.”23

21 Barrett’s opinion on Bingham can be found in an untitled and undated memorandum in Box 96, Barrett Papers. 22 John Barrett to Romeo Ronconi, December 6, 1913, Box 35, Barrett Papers; John Barrett, “Pan-American Possibilities,” Journal of Race Development 5, no. 1 (1914): 19–29; John Barrett, “A Pan-American Policy: The Monroe Doctrine Modernized,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 54 (1914): 1–4. 23 John Barrett to George Peabody, April 7, Box 36, Barrett Papers.

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Other notable advocates of a Pan-American Monroe Doctrine who presented academic papers on the subject were figures such as former minister to Argentina Charles Sherrill and historian George Blakeslee.24 The growth in power, both geopolitically and economically, of the ABC nations was cited as the main justification for a redefinition of the doctrine, as was the need to understand how Latin Americans interpreted the doctrine. To advocates of a Pan-American Monroe Doctrine, there was no genuine European political or military threat to the American republics anymore and the time was ripe to enact policy modifications for the good of hemispheric solidarity. Harvard professor Archibald Coolidge was impressed by the volume of these proposals being made in the academic sphere and claimed that the doctrine’s Pan-American facets now “completely overshadows” any of its other interpretations.25 Whilst the Monroe Doctrine had primarily been reinterpreted as a facilitator of United States hegemony during the first decade of the century, these responses to Obsolete Shibboleth demonstrated that Pan-American interpretations were now deemed far more viable. What accounted for the upsurge of interest was the recent progress made by the Pan-American movement. From around 1910 onwards, Pan-Americanism, as an ideal and policy, was discussed in the press ­ and other print media with increasing interest. Pan-American societies began to form across the nation and various organisations, ranging from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the American Association for International Conciliation to the Aero Club of America,

24 Charles Sherrill, “The Monroe Doctrine from a South American Viewpoint,” The Journal of Race Development 4, no. 3 (1914): 322–323; George Blakeslee, “Should the Monroe Doctrine Continue to Be a Policy of the United States?” Proceedings of the American Society of International Law at Its Annual Meeting 8 (1914): 217–230; Address of John Latané in “Statements, Interpretations, and Applications of the Monroe Doctrine and of More or Less Allied Doctrines,” 113; Hiram Bingham, “Should We Abandon the Monroe Doctrine?,” The Journal of Race Development 4, no. 3 (1914): 353–354; George Tucker, “The Monroe Doctrine,” The Journal of Race Development 4, no. 3 (1914): 326– 327; Comments of William Hoynes in Hiram Bingham, “The Latin American Attitude Toward the Monroe Doctrine,” Proceedings of the American Society of International Law at Its Annual Meeting 8 (1914): 200–201; Charles Adams Jr., “The Origin of the Monroe Doctrine,” Proceedings of the American Society of International Law at Its Annual Meeting 8 (1914): 26. 25 Comments of Archibald Coolidge in “Annual Banquet,” Proceedings of the American Society of International Law at Its Annual Meeting 8 (1914): 334.

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established Pan-American divisions and committees.26 The Pan American Union made a concerted effort to make ­ Pan-Americanism a popular talking point and it became a much more potent force in apolitical inter-American relations after the construction of its new headquarters in 1910.27 When Barrett assumed the organisation’s directorship in 1907, he expressed his desire to improve its services and “accomplish results that will be of benefit to all the nations of the western hemisphere.”28 He informed President Taft in 1909 that he had a “big campaign” underway, which involved improving the quality of the organisation’s monthly bulletin; organising commercial conferences and meetings to stimulate inter-American trade; and facilitating an inter-American exchange of academics.29 As the latter strategies suggest, Barrett often strove to work with academics who studied Latin America to educate the citizens of the United States about Latin American history, culture, and politics because he believed that a major obstacle to Pan-American comity was the “profound ignorance prevailing among the greater portion of the educated men and women of the United States as to the real Latin America.”30 Through corresponding and collaborating with academics as they undertook research trips in the region, the Pan American Union became part of an informal Pan-American network that sought to utilise expert knowledge to increase inter-American commercial, academic, and cultural links.31 Collectively, these experts on Latin America often chose to highlight the opinion of Latin Americans to bolster their Pan-American credentials. Barrett, for example, was conscious that Latin American voices were not given enough consideration during debates on the doctrine 26 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Year Book, 5, 1916, 68; American Association for International Conciliation, Pan American Division Memorandum, April 1914; Aerial Age Weekly, September 27, 1915, 29. 27 Mark Petersen describes apolitical inter-American affairs, such as communication, housing, art, health, aviation, and patent protection, as “second dimension” PanAmericanism, in contrast to “first dimension” Pan-Americanism that encompasses geopolitical considerations: Mark Petersen, “Argentine and Chilean Approaches to Modern Pan-Americanism, 1888–1930” (PhD diss., University of Oxford, 2014), 29–30. 28 John Barrett to J. A. Ryan, January 17, 1907, Box 26, Barrett Papers. 29 John Barrett to William Howard Taft, September 14, 1909, Box 29, Barrett Papers. 30 John Barrett to Nicholas Murray Butler, December 14, 1904, Box 21, Barrett Papers. 31 On working with academics, see “Memorandum for the Press,” February 3, 1907, Box 26, Barrett Papers.

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and informed international lawyer James Brown Scott that the absence of a “big Latin American” to speak at the ASIL’s Eighth Annual Meeting was “a pity.”32 In the absence of Latin Americans, academics drew upon their expert knowledge and diplomats claimed expertise due to personal experience. Hiram Bingham and George Blakeslee explained that they could discern Latin American opinion on the Monroe Doctrine through their continual study of the region and research trips, whereas Barrett tended to refer to himself as “the only Pan-American officer in America” or as “an impartial, nonpolitical and international officer,” given his position within the Pan American Union.33 It is worth noting, however, the importance of this knowledge production in United States– Latin American relations. Ricardo Salvatore argues that whilst Latin Americanist scholars favoured “expanding the forces of cultural engagement and scientific cooperation,” knowledge production “constituted the appropriate mode of engagement for a benevolent empire,” particularly in South America.34 Mark Berger similarly believes that scholarship, study, and data collection reinforced United States hegemony, arguing that most scholars were just as estranged from Latin America as policy makers were. To Berger, the study of Latin America can be evaluated as a weak profession before the First World War with a limited critical output.35 The interaction between notions of hegemony and cooperation in the process of knowledge production is readily apparent in the debates over the Monroe Doctrine. Early twentieth-century efforts to understand Latin America may have been conducted with the end goal of facilitating inter-American cooperation through the creation of a ­Pan-American Monroe Doctrine; however, they were inherently tied to a system and mechanism of informal imperialism. Participants in the debate who favoured a policy of regional hegemony over inter-American cooperation subjected Pan-Americanism to a

32 John

Barrett to James Brown Scott, April 8, 1914, Box 36, Barrett Papers. “Monroe Doctrine,” 218–220; Bingham, “Latin American Attitude,” 182; Barrett, “Monroe Doctrine Modernized,” 1; John Barrett to Joseph Tumulty, October 5, 1913, Box 35, Barrett Papers. 34 Ricardo Salvatore, Disciplinary Conquest: U.S. Scholars in South America, 1900–1945 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016), 2, 212. 35 Mark Berger, Under Northern Eyes: Latin American Studies and US Hegemony in the Americas, 1898–1990 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 2–29. 33 Blakeslee,

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barrage of criticism. Although they agreed that the ABC nations could certainly uphold the doctrine themselves, they baulked at the thought of Central American and Caribbean nations attempting to do so. For example, Former Rear Admiral French Ensor Chadwick outlined that working together with the ABC countries was essential to the development of the doctrine. However, the matter stood “on a very different footing as to the regions bordering on the Caribbean seas and the Gulf of Mexico, and on the part of the Pacific in the neighborhood of the Panama Canal.”36 An adherence to racial hierarchies fundamentally shaped this opinion, yet on top of this, Chadwick’s statement included the magic words “Panama Canal,” the opening of which was eagerly anticipated throughout the United States because of the important strategic and commercial benefits it would provide. Scheduled to be completed in the summer of 1914, this asset had to be protected and the stability of the surrounding region became of vital importance. Like Mexico, any European influence in the area was deemed to be unacceptable and figures such as Chadwick argued that the Monroe Doctrine ought to prioritise ensuring regional stability over protecting Latin American nations. The United States needed to protect its own interests and the commercial and strategic benefits of the Panama Canal, secured through regional stability, would far outweigh those of Pan-American cooperation. This point was emphatically repeated over the course of the debate, most notably by former Secretaries of State, John Foster and Elihu Root.37 The dispute with Great Britain over canal tolls that took place between 1912 and 1913 emphasised the desire of the United States to maintain total control over the canal’s operation. As a young John Foster Dulles argued, the doctrine ought to be “rigidly enforced” in “that portion

36 French

Ensor Chadwick, “The Present Day Phase of the Monroe Doctrine,” The Journal of Race Development 4, no. 3 (1914): 314. 37 Address of John Foster in “Misconceptions and Limitations of the Monroe Doctrine,” Proceedings of the American Society of International Law at Its Annual Meeting 8 (1914): 125–126; Elihu Root, “The Real Monroe Doctrine,” Proceedings of the American Society of International Law at Its Annual Meeting 8 (1914): 20; William MacCorkle, “The Monroe Doctrine and Its Application to Haiti,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 54 (1914): 35–53; John Latané, “The Effects of the Panama Canal on Our Relations with Latin America,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 54 (1914): 84–91.

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of Central America where it was of peculiar importance to the United States.”38 Former diplomat Paxton Hibben argued that the United States could never share the responsibilities and privileges of the Monroe Doctrine with any of the other American republics for reasons of national interest and refuted the idea that the ABC countries would even want to uphold it. Pan-Americanists had simply “erected in their imagination an alluring mirage” which they would never attain.39 Latin Americanist scholars were even attacked for attempting to use their academic knowledge as justification for the transformation of the Monroe Doctrine. Despite the prominence of Progressive Era faith in the use of experts, these scholars were branded as out of touch with reality, basing their arguments on academic nonsense from the misguided perspective of their ivory towers.40 The Monroe Doctrine, it seemed, was too sacred a tradition for academics to meddle with. Pessimism was also expressed about the future intentions of non-American powers and suspicion of German and Japanese designs in Latin American persisted unabashedly. Conditions may have changed since 1823, but there was no reason to lessen the dominance the United States maintained in the Western Hemisphere.41 Events in April 1914 brought Mexico back into the spotlight as the Tampico Affair shook United States–Mexican relations. Nine United States sailors were arrested by Mexican armed forces on 9 April in the

38 “The Panama Canal Controversy Between Great Britain and the United States,” January 12, 1913, Reel 1, John Foster Dulles Papers, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University. 39 Paxton Hibben, “The South American View as to the Monroe Doctrine,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 54 (1914): 63–65; William Hull, “The Monroe Doctrine: National or International?,” Proceedings of the American Society of International Law at Its Annual Meeting 8 (1914): 162–163; Charles Pepper, “The Meaning of the Monroe Doctrine,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 54 (1914): 114–116. 40 Comments of Charles Herrick in Bingham, “Latin American Attitude,” 196; Colby Chester, “The Present Status of the Monroe Doctrine,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 54 (1914): 21; Pepper, “Monroe Doctrine,” 113. 41 J. M. Callahan, “The Modern Meaning of the Monroe Doctrine,” The Journal of Race Development 4, no. 3 (1914): 365; Hull, “Monroe Doctrine,” 159; Joseph Wheless, “The Monroe Doctrine and Latin America,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 54 (1914): 73–75; U.S. Congress. House. Mexico and Asiatic Menace, 63rd Congress, 2nd Session, Appendix to the Congressional Record, March 27, 1914, 266.

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port city of Tampico after a misunderstanding exacerbated by the revolutionary context. Although they were promptly released, frayed tensions led Wilson to order military intervention and marines captured Veracruz on 21 April. The following day, Wilson received official support from Congress, a date which coincided with the first day of the ASIL’s Eighth Annual Meeting, the last of the three conferences that framed this period of the Monroe Doctrine debate. Elihu Root, the President of the society, stated at the banquet held on 25 April that over the course of the meeting he had “been feeling very unhappy over our affairs in Mexico” and he aptly emphasised the fractured nature of the Monroe Doctrine in relation to the United States’ southern neighbour: “It is not in the possibilities of human nature that there should not be differences of opinion, differences as to policy, and everyone who has a duty to perform must act according to the dictates of his own judgment and his own conscience in the performance of his duty.”42 The crisis was mediated by the ABC nations in May through a diplomatic peace conference at Niagara Falls, although responses in the United States were mixed.43 On the one hand, figures such as former Senator Albert Beveridge viewed the mediation as damaging, arguing that it would solidify Latin American solidarity against the United States and represent a challenge to United States hegemony and the Monroe Doctrine.44 Barrett, however, urged support of the mediation, arguing that it would have far-reaching consequences and help foster Pan-American solidarity. He proclaimed that it would be the “first great example of a tangible and practical application of the right kind of Pan-American cooperation” and represent the value of a Pan-American Monroe Doctrine.45 Representative James Slayden similarly highlighted that the mediation had set a precedent for solving future problems via

42 Comments

of Elihu Root in “Annual Banquet,” 327. Small, The Forgotten Peace: Mediation at Niagara Falls, 1914 (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2009); P. Edward Haley, Revolution and Intervention: The Diplomacy of Taft and Wilson with Mexico, 1910–1917 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1970), 140–151. 44 “Mexican Question,” May 18, 1914, Box 305, Albert Jeremiah Beveridge Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. 45 “Statement of John Barrett,” April 27, 1914, Box 36, Barrett Papers; John Barrett to Henry White, July 15, 1915, Box 37, Barrett Papers. 43 Michael

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Pan-American means and inter-American cooperation appeared more viable now that it had been put into practice.46 As the summer of 1914 dawned, it was clear that the Monroe Doctrine was in a state of crisis. Dissent against the doctrine had suddenly become far more vocal from within the United States and arguments for the doctrine’s reinterpretation dominated the discourse. Should the doctrine serve the interests of the United States or those of the entire hemisphere? Should it be applied to foster inter-American cooperation or establish hegemony among the Americas? With these unresolved and contested questions at the forefront of American minds, the First World War broke out.

Divorced from the Old World The Monroe Doctrine became a central facet of the national reaction to the First World War and it was widely regarded as having kept the nation out of the conflict. Not only had the doctrine warned Americans away from forming alliances with European powers, it had prevented European political and colonial systems from spreading further throughout Latin America, in turn distancing the American republics from the imperial conflicts of the Old World. The doctrine stood as a symbol of the initial relief and pride felt by Americans as a distant war began to tear empires apart. The New York Tribune ran an editorial on 6 August which informed its readers what they owed to the historic doctrine, namely neutrality brought about by the “almost complete divorce of the New World from the poisonous tyrannies and rivalries of the Old.” The Tribune was quick to snub the recent arguments in favour of the doctrine’s abandonment “by men with a reputation for thoughtful wisdom,” arguing that before the end of the war the Monroe Doctrine “will have more friends than ever before.”47 Had the doctrine not been upheld over the past ninety years, “nothing under heaven,” former President Theodore Roosevelt argued, could have prevented the United States from being involved in the war.48

46 James Slayden, “The A.B.C. Mediation,” American Journal of International Law 9, no. 1 (1915): 150. 47 New York Tribune, August 6, 1914, 8. 48 New York Times, August 16, 1914, 10.

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The war made it easy for United States citizens to draw distinctions between the tragic Old World and the hallowed New, presenting Pan-Americanists with an opportunity to bolster Pan-American sen­ timent and promote closer inter-American commercial and political ties. As wartime trade between Europe and Latin America declined, Americans realised that it was an ideal moment to secure dominance in Latin American markets.49 “Act Promptly,” advised an article in the Los Angeles Times, for there was a “sudden and great demand in Brazil, Argentina, Chile and other South American parts for American goods.”50 To Francis Huntington-Wilson, the war forced upon the United States a “unique opportunity to gain and hold our proper place in the finance, trade, and enterprise of Latin America.”51 During the first weeks of the conflict, Barrett drew upon the plight of the American republics and claimed that there was a “commercial, financial and shipping crisis resulting in South America from the European war.” United States businesses ought to fill the void left by Europeans not just for commercial gains, but because doing so would earn the nation the “lasting gratitude of South America” and place it in a “position of great permanent advantage with every South American country concerned.”52 Indeed, two years into the war Barrett conducted a trip to Britain and France and learnt that European businesses would seek to restore their lost trade with Latin America after the war, generating a need on the part of United States businesses to act promptly.53 The long-awaited opening of the Panama Canal in August 1914 made inter-American trade even more appealing and as Henry Fletcher, the Ambassador to Chile, argued, European nations had presented the United States with a prime opportunity by “looking off the book and into the trenches.”54 49 Stephan Rinke, Latin America and the First World War, trans. C. Reid (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 80. 50 Los Angeles Times, September 25, 1914, II4. 51 Francis Huntington-Wilson, “Pan-American Relations as Affected by the War,” Current History 2, no. 2 (1915): 351–357. 52 “Press Memorandum,” August 7, 1914, Box 37, Barrett Papers; “The South AmericaUnited States Situation as Affected by the European War,” August 8, 1914, Box 37, Barrett Papers. 53 “Memorandum,” October 16, 1916, Box 41, Barrett Papers. 54 Henry Fletcher to Robert Patchin, October 2, 1914, Box 3, Henry Prather Fletcher Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

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The Wilson administration was inclined to agree. William Gibbs McAdoo, the Secretary of the Treasury, led the governmental drive towards Latin America and temporarily converted to the Pan-American cause in the first few years of the war. He vigorously pursued trade expansion and pushed a bill proposing that government-owned shipping corporations operate inter-American merchant fleets to ensure the United States’ economic primacy.55 During the Progressive Era, trade was considered a crucial component of United States–Latin American relations. As Emily Rosenberg argues, United States policy makers adhered to an ideology of “liberal-developmentalism,” namely a belief that the United States’ own economic and social history could serve as a universal model for less-developed nations to adopt. For a nation, in this case a Latin American nation, to transform into a modern society, policy makers believed that it needed commercial interaction with the United States so that it may develop similar commercial practices and institutions.56 This helps explain why the Pan American Union was so focussed on trade and commercial relations as they were justifiable in benevolent terms. Barrett frequently lauded Latin American nations and attempted to dispute common stereotypes, yet he emphasised their “potentialities” and noted that most of the republics were not quite as advanced as the United States yet.57 The war not only offered potential commercial gains, but would help facilitate hemispheric unity through connecting the Americas via trade and commerce. Here we can see the relationship between hegemony and cooperation at work. United States influence was central to both notions; however, it was the means of establishing influence that differed drastically. The war was additionally perceived as an opportunity to serve the diplomatic interests of the Pan-American movement and strengthen desires for hemispheric unity through continued advocacy of a P ­ an-American Monroe Doctrine. After the Pan American Union convened a special 55 David Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1980), 299–308; Donald Murphy, “Professors, Publicists, and Pan Americanism, 1905–1917: A Study in the Origins of the Use of ‘Experts’ in Shaping American Foreign Policy” (PhD diss., University of Wisconsin, 1970), 421–436. 56 Emily Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890–1945 (New York, NY: Hill and Wang, 1982), 7. 57 John Barrett, “All America!” North American Review 192, no. 657 (1910): 178; Barrett, Pan American Union, 10.

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meeting to discuss the implications of the war upon the neutral American Republics, Barrett increased his efforts to promote the necessity of PanAmericanising the Monroe Doctrine, arguing that the war was fostering amicable relations between the United States and Latin America.58 For Barrett, war made the “evolution of the Monroe Doctrine into a PanAmerican doctrine or policy” inevitable and its adoption would “mean that the Republics of Latin America will stand with their physical and moral force for the protection of the sovereignty and unity of the United States against a foreign attack just as the United States would stand for them in an hour of similar distress.” Filled with enthusiasm, he believed that no greater good than the Pan Americanisation of the Monroe Doctrine could possibly come from the conflict for the Americas.59 Other prominent Pan-Americanists such as William Shepherd, Leo Rowe, and Charles Sherrill joined in Barrett’s chorus, drawing upon their pre-war arguments with renewed vigour.60 An editorial in the Outlook declared that in the climate of a world war the Monroe Doctrine was “now no longer something that merely concerns the United States” and must become a policy of cooperation between “the stable governments of the New World,” whilst the New Republic proclaimed that the war had “increased the desire and the necessity for a cooperative international policy in the two Americas,” concluding that the doctrine had been “vindicated.”61 The Advocate for Peace looked to the nations of the Western Hemisphere as harbingers of peace. P ­ an-Americanism was “one of the most hopeful, concrete agencies for the promotion of the human weal,” claiming that collectivism and cooperation was “the call

58 Bulletin

of the Pan American Union, December 1914, 929–931. Statement,” November 24, 1915, Box 39, Barrett Papers; John Barrett to Editor of New York Times, December 3, 1915, Box 39, Barrett Papers; John Barrett, “Practical ­Pan-Americanism,” North American Review 202, no. 718 (1915): 413–423; John Barrett, “The Pan-American Union and Peace,” Advocate of Peace, January 1916, 7–8; New York Times, November 8, 1915, 5. 60 William Shepherd, “New Light on the Monroe Doctrine,” Political Science Quarterly 31, no. 4 (1916): 578–589; Leo Rowe, “Bringing the Americas Together,” Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 7, no. 2 (1917): 272–278; Charles Sherrill, Modernizing the Monroe Doctrine (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1916); New York Times, April 18, 1915, SM21; Washington Post, October 24, 1915, 17. 61 “The War and the Monroe Doctrine,” The Outlook, November 25, 1914, 654–655; “Pan-Americanism,” The New Republic, December 19, 1914, 9–10. 59 “Thanksgiving

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to the Western Hemisphere.”62 George Blakeslee surmised that during the war the nation’s “best public opinion has come to believe that even our cherished Monroe Doctrine should be placed upon some kind of a Pan-American foundation.”63 The prospect even gained some favourable attention in Latin America. The Chilean newspaper La Union, for example, declared that the jealousies aroused by the Monroe Doctrine had disappeared and that it was now animated by the “fraternal spirit of the big brother of the American continent” and the notion of mutual aid.64 For Barrett, the war was the pinnacle of his nation branding strategy and seemed to prove that Pan-Americanism was “an up-to-date question, which appeals to the imagination of the people of all callings and possibly interests them more than any other phase of our foreign affairs.”65 With Pan-American sentiment buoyed by the war, historian Roland Usher was prompted to conduct a study of Pan-Americanism and it seemed inevitable to him that the victor of the war would clash with the Monroe Doctrine.66 He argued that Pan-Americanism was not yet a reality and that to realise its potential an administrative union of the American republics had to be formed, including the multilateralisation of the Monroe Doctrine. The problem was that despite the rhetoric of Pan-Americanists, there had been no tangible progress towards the establishment of a political American union. More importantly, Usher argued that there was “no actual evidence of a desire on the part of the American states to make it real.” Pan-Americanism was based upon the premise of an organic bond between the American republics, however, Usher believed that such a bond did not really exist: Unless we can demonstrate that Pan-Americanism has behind it deep fundamental concepts and is likely to subserve important American ends, a close connection with the Latin-American republics will scarcely be a policy for the maintenance of which the United States ought to sacrifice anything of substantive value. If such is now the true meaning of the Monroe Doctrine, the expediency of its continuance will then become a matter of grave doubt. 62 “The

Call to the Western Hemisphere,” Advocate of Peace, January 1916, 3. Blakeslee, “The Panama Canal in Time of War,” The Outlook, August 25, 1915, 976. 64 Translation of article from La Union, March 7, 1916, Box 4, Fletcher Papers. 65 John Barrett to Charles Evan Hughes, July 24, 1916, Box  41, Barrett Papers. Emphasis in original. 66 Roland Usher, Pan-Americanism: A Forecast of the Inevitable Clash Between the United States and Europe’s Victor (New York, NY: Century Co., 1915), 5. 63 George

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Ultimately, Usher believed that Pan-Americanism was a flawed ideology, rendering a Pan-American Monroe Doctrine an impossibility. It was a misnomer that the American states shared a close geographical proximity, merely an assumption that North and South America shared political and economic interests, and a fallacy to claim that the Western Hemisphere was isolated. The American republics were deeply connected to Europe and the North and South Americas were not well acquainted: “they do not know one another – race, language and religion act as barriers … [w]e have no common interests with them, nor are we closely connected with them; we are, in fact, sundered by totally dissimilar interests and by a generally different outlook upon life.”67 Whilst Usher questioned the ability of Latin Americans to function as equals to Anglo-Saxons, he noted that they were keenly aware of the ways in which Native Americans were treated and did not believe that they would be treated as equals either. For Usher, the United States could not grant equality in a Pan-American confederation whilst it maintained social barriers against African and Native Americans.68 This presented obstacles for the establishment of a Pan-American Monroe Doctrine—a closer connection between the United States and the Latin American republics would be considered “so abnormal and artificial, so lacking in mutuality, and so entirely devoid of popular confidence.” To Latin Americans, the Monroe Doctrine would always equate to imperialism and territorial expansion, and whilst the United States was free to apply the doctrine to new circumstances as it saw fit, it must recognise that it was a scheme that Latin Americans would perceive as inimical to their interests.69 Usher was, of course, not alone in his criticism of Pan-Americanism. In January 1916 the Literary Digest compiled a host of criticism, yet it still concluded that overall sentiment towards PanAmericanism was growing and that there would be tenable benefits to a multilateral Monroe Doctrine.70 Whilst the prospect of inter-American trade prompted P ­ an-Americanists to look upon the war as an opportunity, optimism was far from all-­ encompassing. The Monroe Doctrine may have kept the United States

67 Ibid.,

204–233. 294–300. 69 Ibid., 390–402. 70 Literary Digest, January 8, 1916, 51–53. 68 Ibid.,

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out of the war, but that did not mean that it would remain unchallenged. German designs in Latin America became even more pronounced in the context of the war and it seemed inevitable that if Germany was victorious, it would seek to expand its empire into Latin America. Walter Page, the United States Ambassador to Great Britain, frequently referred to the danger that Germany posed to the doctrine, claiming that unless the Allies could prevent the onslaught of German militarism, the doctrine would be, to quote his oft-used phrase, “shot through.”71 The Ambassador to Germany, James Gerard, seemed to agree, referring to the British Royal Navy as the only barrier between Germany and the doctrine.72 The fears of the past decade regarding the German presence in Brazil were reignited and Americans grew concerned that the war would eventually spread to the Western Hemisphere.73 In a letter to the Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, Alfred Mahan argued that if Germany gained control of the European continent it would not be long before it came to challenge the Monroe Doctrine.74 This pre-existing suspicion of German designs did not, however, erase any sense of shock at the transpiration of events. For example, Joseph Choate confessed that “we never thought at the Hague in 1907 that Germany would threaten all treaties as scraps of paper or that she was then (as it now appears she must have been) preparing for this

71 Walter Page to Woodrow Wilson, September 6, 1914, in Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 31, 6–8; Walter Page to William Jennings Bryan, October 15, 1914, in Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 31, 159–160; Walter Page to Edward House, September 22, 1914 in Walter Page, The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page, vol. 1, ed. Burton Hendrick (New York, NY: Doubleday, 1922), 328–335. 72 James Gerard to Edward House, August 3, 1915, in Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 34, 238–239; James Gerard, My Four Years in Germany (New York, NY: Grosset and Dunlap, 1917), 152. 73 Washington Post, June 10, 1914, 3; New York Times, June 7, 1915, 10; Walter Lippmann, “What Program Shall the United States Stand for in Internal Relations?” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 66 (1916): 63; Diaries, vol. 2, November 24, 1914, Edward Mandell House Papers, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library; W. E. Stokes to John Barrett, February 3, 1915, Box 38, Barrett Papers. 74 Alfred Thayer Mahan to Josephus Daniels, August 15, 1914, in Alfred Thayer Mahan, Letters and Papers of Alfred Thayer Mahan, vol. 3, ed. Robert Seager and Doris Maguire (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1975), 541–542.

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horrific slaughter.”75 The doctrine may have served as a barrier to the conflict, but it now needed reinforcing. The first indication that Germany might challenge the Monroe Doctrine surfaced in October 1914 when a brief controversy erupted in the United States press concerning the applicability of the Monroe Doctrine to Canada in the case of a potential German invasion of the British dominion. The German Ambassador to the United States, Johann von Bernstorff, and former Colonial Secretary, Bernhard Dernburg, made a series of public comments outlining that Canada had voided any protection the Monroe Doctrine might have granted it by sending troops to fight against Germany in the war. It followed from this, the Germans argued, that the United States should not view any wartime invasion of Canada as a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. Normally a forgotten event in the narrative of United States neutrality, Phillips O’Brien has recently brought the controversy to scholarly attention in his examination of United States reactions to the outbreak of the First World War. O’Brien argues that the reaction to the controversy was an example of a moment when the American press genuinely pondered intervention into the conflict, supporting his thesis that the American public were not simply shocked and appalled by the outbreak of the war.76 Canada’s relationship with the Monroe Doctrine is a peculiar one. The doctrine was often regarded as applicable to Canada informally despite the fact that it was not an American republic.77 The relationship was most notably considered in 1938 when President Franklin Roosevelt declared that “the people of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other empire,” a statement which is often referred to as Roosevelt’s extension of the Monroe 75 Joseph

Choate to James Bryce, January 10, 1915, Reel 70, Bryce Papers. O’Brien, “The American Press, Public, and the Reaction to the Outbreak of the First World War,” Diplomatic History 37, no. 3 (2013): 469–470. 77 In his classic history of United States foreign relations, Samuel Flagg Bemis argued that the Monroe Doctrine had “always applied to Canada in spirit if not in word”: Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States (New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 5th ed., 1965), 795. Indeed, in 1902 the Canadian Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier claimed that the Monroe Doctrine protected Canada “against enemy aggression”: John Brebner, North Atlantic Triangle: The Interplay of Canada, the United States and Great Britain (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1966), 276–277; John Dickey, Canada and the American Presence (New York: New York University Press, 1975), 61. 76 Philips

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Doctrine to Canada.78 Yet for the century prior to this statement, the relationship is largely ignored by historians. The explanation for this lies in the fact that original remit of the Monroe Doctrine is not considered applicable to Canada due to its colonial connection to Britain.79 However, some passing thought was given to this relationship during the first decade of the twentieth century. From Britain, a former member of the Governor-General’s Council in India, Sir Alexander Miller, argued that the Monroe Doctrine was unquestionably in the interests of Canada, and in a lengthy letter to the New York Times, a reader claimed that it was in relation to Canada that the doctrine would receive “its greatest test” over the coming years.80 In discussing the prospect of a war between Britain and Germany, diplomat Lewis Einstein even predicted that the relationship would be tested.81 The 1914 controversy represented a unique moment to determine how the doctrine applied to Canada. When war broke out, concerns initially appeared within both Canada and the United States that Germany might invade the former. Letters were sent into various newspapers that expressed the anxiety of American citizens, primarily arguing that Canadian action in the conflict was a direct threat to the Monroe Doctrine as it would invite German military action into the hemisphere.82 The controversy originated with Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the British Admiralty, who briefly discussed the Monroe Doctrine in an interview with an American journalist in late August 1914. Churchill was asked whether the United States had 78 Charles Fenwick, “Canada and the Monroe Doctrine,” The American Journal of International Law 32, no. 4 (1938): 782. 79 Heiko Meiertöns, The Doctrines of US Security Policy: An Evaluation Under International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 79; John Thompson and Stephen Randall, Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 4th ed., 2008), 5–6; Dexter Perkins, A History of the Monroe Doctrine (London: Longmans, 1960 [1955]), 356–357. 80 Alexander Miller, “The Monroe Doctrine from an English Standpoint,” North American Review 176, no. 558 (1903): 733; New York Times, August 24, 1902, 8. 81 Lewis Einstein, “The Anglo German Rivalry and the United States,” Box 17, Knox Papers. 82 New York Times, August 23, 1914, 6; Honolulu Star Bulletin, August 29, 1914, 9; Washington Herald, September 13, 1914, 22; New York Times, September 26, 1914, 2; Michael Kitchen, “The German Invasion of Canada in the First World War,” The International History Review 7, no. 2 (1985): 245–247.

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any direct interests in the result of the war. Although he was remiss to make a judgement on behalf of a foreign nation, he believed that if Germany were victorious, “the burden which we are bearing now would fall onto your shoulders.” Although the United States need not be too concerned about any direct German aggression, he posed the following: “The Monroe Doctrine, however, carries you very far in South as well as North America; and is it likely that victorious Germany militarism, which would then have shattered France irretrievably, have conquered Belgium, and have broken forever the power of England, would allow itself to be permanently cut off from all hopes of that overseas expansion and development with which South America alone can supply it?”83 Reacting to Churchill’s comments, Ambassador Bernstorff sent a note to the State Department on 3 September which attempted to convince the United States that there was no truth in Churchill’s claims and that Germany did not intend to expand into South America. The note was largely ignored, as were Churchill’s inflammatory remarks, and it was not made known to the United States public at large. However, it was brought to public attention a month later by Dernburg after Canadian troops were assigned to the British war effort. On 22 October, he gave an address at Newark in which he made Bernstorff’s note public, attempting to allay any fears within the United States that a victorious Germany would seek to challenge to Monroe Doctrine.84 The following day, however, he was asked to speak further on the matter and he expanded, referring to Canada’s aid to Britain in the war as a direct violation of the Monroe Doctrine.85 The press was eager to hear the German Ambassador’s opinion and Bernstorff outlined that by sending troops to Europe to fight against German forces, Canada had forfeited any claim it had to United States protection under the Monroe Doctrine. As such, the United States should not view any landing of German troops on Canadian territory as a violation of the Monroe Doctrine.86 Whilst this was not intended as a threat, it had the opposite effect, and the press responded angrily. Bernstorff and Dernburg had inadvertently landed Germany in a

83 The

Manchester Guardian, August 31, 1914, 4. York Times, October 23, 1914, 4. 85 New York Times, October 24, 1914, 1. 86 New York Times, October 26, 1914, 4; Washington Post, October 26, 1914, 1. 84 New

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diplomatic faux pas that the Ambassador desperately tried to resolve. Feeling the pressure, he issued two further statements, one as an official statement from the embassy, which placed all the blame for the affair on Churchill. However, he remained adamant that Canada had not acted “in the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine” and that the “German point of view is that by joining in a European war Canada has put herself outside of the pale of the Monroe Doctrine.”87 The State Department did not become involved in the affair but articles filled the press that questioned the relationship between Canada and the Monroe Doctrine.88 Prominent political figures also presented their opinions and Elihu Root continuously expressed the opinion that a German victory would result in a threat to the Monroe Doctrine through a Canadian invasion.89 Former President William Howard Taft, however, outlined that the Monroe Doctrine did not bind the United States to a defence of Canada if it was attacked. The only situation that would justify objections from the United States would be if any territory was permanently occupied.90 This incident demonstrated how strong the fear of German imperial expansion was within the United States. In the context of the war, even farfetched comments prompted an impassioned defence of the Monroe Doctrine as old fears were reignited. The reaction is even more emphatic when compared to the response of the Canadian press, which displayed little anxiety. Summarising the reaction, the Literary Digest outlined that “Canada smiles at Count von Bernstorff, refuses to take Dr. Dernburg seriously, and even makes it plain that she does not take much stock in our Monroe Doctrine.”91 Yet in matters concerning the Monroe Doctrine, the United States press simply could not ignore the Germans’ words and took the opportunity to delve into the curious relationship between Canada and the doctrine. 87 The Sun, October 27, 1914, 8. For Dernburg’s review of the controversy a month later, see Bernhard Dernburg, “Germany and England: The Real Issue,” Saturday Evening Post, November 21, 1914, 25. 88 “Germany and the Monroe Doctrine,” The Outlook, November 4, 1914, 524; New York Times, October 26, 1914, 4; Los Angeles Times, November 8, 1914, 8; Washington Post, November 8, 1914, 13. 89 Phillip Jessup, Elihu Root, vol. 2 (New York, NY: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1938), 325. 90 New York Times, November 28, 1914, 12 and February 17, 1915, 10. 91 Literary Digest, November 14, 1914, 956.

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For advocates of naval expansion, Germany’s belligerency confirmed pre-existing fears that the United States required a larger navy to defend the Monroe Doctrine. Senators and Congressmen such as Augustus Gardner pleaded for the creation of more battleships and invoked the Monroe Doctrine directly as the war gave their demands a sense of urgency.92 Once again, opponents of naval expansion claimed that the Monroe Doctrine had never required a strong navy in the past, but within the context of a world war these rebuttals were largely ineffective.93 The Navy League of the United States grasped the opportunity to increase the effectiveness of its campaign and, whilst it advocated neutrality, argued that preparedness was essential to prevent a future invasion of the United States.94 In December 1915, President Wilson presented new naval estimates and introduced the largest naval bill the nation had ever seen. The league was ceaseless in its support of the bill and it adeptly enlisted the Monroe Doctrine to ensure its passage. Consulting the official organs of the league, which during this period were the periodicals Seven Seas and Sea Power, the prominence of the doctrine is clearly visible. One member of the league who took almost every opportunity to invoke the doctrine was Perry Belmont. A former Democrat, Belmont had been partly responsible for inserting into the 1912 Democratic Party Platform a clause concerning naval defence and the Monroe Doctrine.95 As a primary contributor to the articles that appeared in both Seven Seas and Sea Power, Belmont continuously pointed out that the platform of 1912 had yet to be realised in terms of naval defence 92 New York Times, October 18, 1914,10 and December 6, 1914, 18; “The Monroe Doctrine,” Current History 5, no. 1 (1916): 154–163; Justus Doenecke, Nothing Less Than War: A New History of America’s Entry into World War I (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2011), 36. 93 U.S. Congress. House. Naval Appropriation Bill, 63rd Congress, 3rd Session, Appendix to the Congressional Record, January 29, 1915, 903; U.S. Congress. House. The Naval Bill, 63rd Congress, 3rd Session, Appendix to the Congressional Record, January 29, 1915, 926–927. 94 Armin Rappaport, The Navy League of the United States (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 1962), 44–52. 95 “Democratic Party Platform of 1912,” June 25, 1912, The American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/1912-democratic-party-platform; Perry Belmont, An American Democrat: The Recollections of Perry Belmont (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2nd ed., 1941), 500–501.

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and the Monroe Doctrine.96 Whilst expressing his disappointment, he would always discuss the conflict that persisted between the systems of divine right and republicanism, arguing that the doctrine, backed up by a suitable navy, was the nation’s only safeguard against European systems of governance. Belmont argued that divine right was “in our own time as much the antithesis of the principles of the sovereignty of the people as when it called into life the Monroe Doctrine which has now become the universal aspirations of all the free governments, wherever situated, and the embodiment of the most effective policy in their defense.”97 The cardinal feature of the league’s activity was its annual convention in April 1916, which garnered a significant turnout. The league managed to attract the support of Albert Bushnell Hart, a historian of the Monroe Doctrine, who in an address outlined that the doctrine required “a powerful navy, a navy constantly advancing, a navy ready at all times for instant service.” Hart argued that the doctrine, “as a piece of paper upon which are imprinted certain black characters, has come to the end of its usefulness. You cannot longer impose it upon peoples who can raise such fleets as have been raised by Germany and France and Great Britain during the present war.” The choice was clear: “either we must give up the Monroe Doctrine … or else stand behind the Doctrine from top to bottom.”98 Other preparedness organisations displayed a similar commitment to the Monroe Doctrine. Upon being made the Honorary President of the National Security League, Joseph Choate claimed that the doctrine was “not worth the paper on which it is written” unless adequately supported, and the American Defense Society included the maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine in its platform.99 Pan-Americanists additionally 96 Seven

Seas, September 1915, 5–10. Seas, August 1915, 6–9. 98 Albert Bushnell Hart, “Naval Defense of the Monroe Doctrine,” Addresses Before the Eighth Annual Convention of the Navy League of the United States Washington, DC April 10–13, 1916 (Washington, DC: Navy Printing Co., 1916), 24–36. 99 Joseph Choate to Stanwood Menken, January 21, 1916, Box 22, Joseph Hodges Choate Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC; Hand Book of the American Defense Society (New York, NY: American Defense Society, 1918), 2; Robert Ward, “The Origin and Activities of the National Security League, 1914–1917,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review 47, no. 1 (1960): 51–65. 97 Seven

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sought to utilise the preparedness movement to foster inter-American solidarity. Barrett informed Solomon Stanwood Menken, the founder of the National Security League, that the security of the United States was linked to the security of the entire Western Hemisphere, and offered to cooperate with the movement from a Pan-American perspective.100 In an address at Illinois, he declared that the war’s conclusion would bring about “a final test by Europe or Asia of the real meaning of the Monroe Doctrine,” outlining that it had to be suitably defended by force of arms, and multilateralised, to ensure its survival.101 Fortunately for these organisations, Wilson’s naval bill was approved on 21 July 1916 and signed on 21 August. The Navy League was naturally satisfied with the Naval Act of 1916, as almost its entire platform had been achieved. Having utilised the doctrine to seemingly great effect, the league continued to present the doctrine as a vital consideration in naval affairs as the war developed.102 The significance of the German threat and the relationship between the Monroe Doctrine, Canada, and the United States Navy was that the doctrine was primarily portrayed as part of a system of United States hegemony rather than a facilitator of inter-American cooperation. The imperial imagery of the Monroe Doctrine is clear in a map that appeared in the August 1915 issue of Seven Seas outlining the geographical scope of the Monroe Doctrine (Fig. 2). The entire Western Hemi­ sphere fell under the shield of the doctrine, including Canada, as did the Philippines, Hawaii, and American Samoa. It was clear from this map that the United States needed a larger navy to defend its Pacific holdings and the rest of the Americas and the doctrine was depicted as an imperial sphere of influence rather than a statement of policy. The United States had a vested interest in ensuring that around a third of the globe was within the geographical boundaries of the Monroe Doctrine. The imperial reach of the nation had not broken the circle of the Monroe Doctrine as the anti-imperialist movement had feared—it had merely expanded it.

100 Stanwood

Menken to John Barrett, November 15, 1916, Box 41, Barrett Papers. Pan American Preparedness Appeal to Illinois,” February 20, 1916, Box 98, Barrett Papers. 102 Sea Power, August 1916, 22. 101 “A

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Fig. 2  “The Vast Territory That Our Monroe Doctrine Obligates Us to Defend,” Seven Seas, August, 1915, 30 (Image courtesy of HathiTrust. Featured as part of an article on national self-defence, a map from Seven Seas depicts the Monroe Doctrine as a sphere of influence that encompasses the entirety of the Americans and stretches across a large swath of the Pacific)

Conflicted Diplomacy By August 1913, Ellen Axon Wilson had predicted that the Monroe Doctrine was going to be an integral aspect of her husband’s presidency. United States–Mexican relations were creating so much trouble for the President that he was forced to spend less time with the First Lady, prompting her to jokingly wish “a plague on the Monroe doctrine.”103 Most Presidents of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were forced to deal with matters relating to the doctrine in some fashion whilst in office; however, Wilson’s preoccupation with the doctrine arguably surpassed even that of Theodore Roosevelt. On 27 October 1913, Wilson first outlined his interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine

103 Ellen Wilson to Woodrow Wilson, August 19, 1913, in Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 28, 194–195.

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at the Fifth Annual Convention of the Southern Commercial Congress in Mobile, Alabama, as part of his enunciation of the administration’s Latin American policy. Although he did not invoke it by name, likely in an effort to avoid offending Latin Americans, the policy he proclaimed at Mobile was referred in relation to the Monroe Doctrine in private correspondence.104 During his address, the President stated that he desired to improve relations with Latin America and that the “United States will never again seek one additional foot of territory by conquest.” However, Wilson was deeply concerned about Latin American dependence on European investment, which had manifested itself in his reaction to the Mexican Revolution, and he believed that European investors were gaining a subtle form of control over Latin American political affairs by seeking special commercial concessions and privileges. Wilson therefore proclaimed his desire to see Latin America undergo “an emancipation from the subordination … to foreign enterprise,” a statement that, according to Mark Gilderhus, “verged on a declaration of economic war” and actually foreshadowed United States intervention.105 The Mobile address thus drew directly upon the ideas of the recently proclaimed Lodge Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, emphasising that non-American control of Latin American affairs via financial means would be viewed as detrimental to United States interests. Like Pan-Americanists, Wilson believed that European influence could be countered by increasing United States trade with the region. Commercial ties would foster more favourable inter-American relations, expose Latin American nations to superior United States ideals and stabilise the circum-Caribbean though an influx of finance.106 Although he framed United States policy as anti-imperial, Wilson instead sought to strengthen regional hegemony. 104 “A Draft Circular Note to the Powers,” October 24, 1913, in Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 28, 31–432; Colonel House Diary, October 30, 1913, in Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 28, 476–478; William Jennings Bryan to Woodrow Wilson, October 28, 1913, in Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 28, 455–457; John Bassett Moore to Woodrow Wilson, October 28, 1913, in Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 28, 487–463; Walter Page to Edward House, November 26, 1913, in Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 28, 593–594; Walter Page to Woodrow Wilson, December 21, 1913, in Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 29, 51–53. 105 “An Address on Latin American Policy in Mobile, Alabama,” October 27, 1913, in Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 28, 448–452; Mark Gilderhus, Pan-American Visions: Woodrow Wilson in the Western Hemisphere 1913–1921 (Tuscon: University of Arizona Press, 1986), 17–18. 106 Neagle, “US Policies Toward Latin America,” 208–209.

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William Bayard Hale, a journalist who served as an emissary for the President in Mexico, viewed Wilson’s interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine as a signifier of the United States’ domination of the Western Hemisphere and the establishment of “our moral Empire in America.” All the United States wanted, Hale proclaimed, was order in Mexico and Central America and if these nations look to the United States for protection under the Monroe Doctrine, then “we are at the very least entitled to see that the governments of these countries are lawfully constituted, in order that a due and proper continuity of internal order shall be maintained.” Using phraseology akin to that of the Roosevelt Corollary, Hale argued that the moral United States Empire, supported by the Monroe Doctrine, would put right the wrongs of less civilised nations and, “contrary to the ways of material empire, will aim at no petuity [sic] for itself.”107 Robert Lansing, a counsellor to the State Department and Secretary of State from June 1915, reinforced Wilson’s views on the Monroe Doctrine through producing two memoranda on the subject, the first written just before the First World War broke out. Lansing voiced his agreement with the sentiments of Wilson’s Mobile address, claiming that aside from the acquisition of power by means of occupation, conquest, or cession, European control via finance should be a crucial consideration of the United States. He additionally believed that the doctrine should be modified to oppose political control only if it possessed “the element of permanency” and that the Monroe Doctrine and Pan-Americanism were not always in harmony. To the Secretary, the “integrity of other American nations is an incident, not an end” of the doctrine.108 His second memorandum, which came in November 1915, intended to restate the financial aspect of his previous and highlight the necessity of keeping the Canal Zone free of European control.109 He chose to emphasise the Caribbean region as particularly 107 William

Hale, “Our Moral Empire in America,” The World’s Work, May 1914, 52–58. Nature and Extent of the Monroe Doctrine, and its Need of Restatement,” June 11, 1914, in United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Lansing Papers 1914–1920, vol. 2 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1940), 460–465; Robert Lansing to William Jennings Bryan, June 16, 1914, in FRUS Lansing Papers 1914–1920, vol. 2, 459–460. Emphasis in original. 109 Robert Lansing to Woodrow Wilson, November 24, 1915, in FRUS Lansing Papers 1914–1920, vol. 2, 466–467. 108 “Present

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susceptible to financial control, arguing that the Monroe Doctrine should be expanded to define the Caribbean region as an area in which the United States “will not tolerate control over or interference with the political or financial affairs of these republics by any European power or its nationals or permit the occupation, even temporarily, by a European power, of any territory of such republics.”110 Much like the defenders of a unilateral Monroe Doctrine, Lansing believed that the safety of the Panama Canal required a rigid enforcement of the doctrine and that the doctrine ought to be applied differently to the various regions of the Western Hemisphere.111 His distinction between Latin America and the Caribbean region not only emphasised the latter’s strategic importance, but that its populace was deemed unable to maintain order itself. Whilst Lansing believed that the maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine trumped Pan-Americanism, he thought that the latter could be used to strengthen the former. In one of his earlier memoranda as Secretary of State, Lansing suggested that the United States adopt policies to cultivate a “Pan-American doctrine with the object of alienating the American republics from European influence, especially the German influence.”112 Later that year, speaking before the Second Pan American Scientific Congress, he claimed that Pan-Americanism was “in entire harmony with the Monroe Doctrine” even though he knew that the reverse was not always true.113 Wilson made similar comments at the same gathering and in his annual message of 1915, noting that they both embodied the spirit of “law and independence and liberty and mutual service.”114 The potential benefits of Pan-Americanism prompted Wilson’s efforts to establish a Pan-American pact. The pact was conceived to establish respect for territorial integrity and international arbitration among the American republics and the administration conducted

110 “Present Nature and Extent of the Monroe Doctrine,” November 24, 1915, in FRUS Lansing Papers 1914–1920, vol. 2, 468–470. 111 Robert Lansing to Joseph Choate, January 20, 1916, Box 15, Choate Papers. 112 “Consideration and Outline of Policies,” July 11, 1915, Reel 1, Robert Lansing Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. 113 Robert Lansing, P ­ an-Americanism (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1915). 114 “Message of the President of the United States to Congress,” December 7, 1915, in FRUS 1915, x–xi; New York Tribune, January 6, 1916, 1.

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initial discussions with the ABC nations.115 Edward “Colonel” House, Wilson’s confidante on matters relating to foreign relations, was a crucial voice in convincing the President that the pact would serve United States interests and described it as an effort “to broaden the Monroe Doctrine so that it may be upheld by all the American Republics instead of by the United States alone as now.”116 Ross Kennedy argues that Wilson’s conception of national security was linked to the existing international system in which states were responsible for their own security. Without a ruling authority, insecurity was rampant, facilitating suspicion and entangling alliances that would eventually endanger the United States.117 As such, Wilson’s proposal for the League of Nations towards the close of the First World War was inherently connected to matters of national security. This framework can be applied to the Pan-American pact, which was based upon House and Wilson’s belief that that the failure of European diplomacy resulted primarily from the absence of international organisation. Functioning as a precursor to the League of Nations, the Pan-American pact would serve as the basis of a Western Hemispheric system of organisation to ensure peace. He hinted at the potential possibilities of the pact in the spring of 1916 during several talks urging support for preparedness, openly acknowledging that a pact was being discussed and that it might lead to “that handsome principle of reciprocal respect and reciprocal defense.”118 Argentina and Brazil proved relatively easy to convince; however, Chile adamantly resisted the proposal. Because Chile had a ­long-standing territorial dispute with Peru over Tacna-Arica, it rejected the prospect of guaranteed territorial integrity.119 Its resistance delayed 115 “Draft Articles for Proposed Pan-American Treaty,” January 29, 1915 in FRUS Lansing Papers 1914–1920, vol. 2, 472–473; “Draft Articles for Proposed Pan-American Treaty,” April 13, 1916, in FRUS Lansing Papers 1914–1920, vol. 2, 495–496. 116 Edward House to Robert Lansing, October 12, 1915, in FRUS Lansing Papers 1914– 1920, vol. 2, 486–488. 117 Ross Kennedy, “Woodrow Wilson, World War I, and American National Security,” Diplomatic History 25, no. 1 (2001): 2–3. 118 “An Address in Chicago on Preparedness,” January 31, 1916, in Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 36, 1916, 63–73. 119 William Jennings Bryan to Woodrow Wilson, April 3, 1915, in Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 32, 1915, 474; William Jennings Bryan to Woodrow Wilson, April 21, 1915, in Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 33, 1915, 52–60; William Jennings Bryan to Eduardo Suárez-Mujica, April 27, 1915, in Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 33, 1915, 77–80;

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proceedings and William Sater argues that the pact caused “consternation, if not fear” in Chile and was directly against its national interests.120 The First World War caused further problems and, rather than generating Pan-American solidarity as P ­ an-Americanists liked to believe, a crisis of “continental solidarity” swept Latin America. Emily Rosenberg argues that the war revealed “an inconvenient, even dangerous, disunity within the hemisphere” which clashed with Wilson’s idealised vision of a harmonious Latin America.121 Mark Gilderhus, who has conducted the most detailed study of Wilson’s Latin American policy, makes a similar point, positing that Wilson assumed the existence of natural harmonies among Latin American nations and between the United States and its fellow American republics. In reality, Latin American nations were far more concerned with their own national interests and were not comfortable with exposing themselves to further United States influence.122 Thus, by the time the United States entered the First World War in April 1917, Wilson had abandoned the idea of an American pact and shifted his attention to the formation of an international league as opposed to a hemispheric system of organisation. The President certainly appreciated the benefits of hemispheric solidarity and a PanAmerican Monroe Doctrine, however, if the Pan-American pact is considered alongside his other ruminations on the Monroe Doctrine, it raises questions of whether the pact would have even been established had Chile acquiesced. The administration’s decision to conduct initial talks with the ABC nations exclusively demonstrated the hierarchy within which the United States had placed Latin American nations, and the nation’s policy outlook towards the circum-Caribbean, not to mention the various interventions, was hardly Pan-American in spirit.

William Jennings Bryan to Eduardo Suárez-Mujica, April 29, 1915, in FRUS Lansing Papers 1914–1920, vol. 2, 482–484; Henry Fletcher to Robert Lansing, August 9, 1916, in FRUS Lansing Papers 1914–1920, vol. 2, 496–497; Diaries, vol. 2, March 29, 1916, House Papers. 120 William Sater, Chile and the United States: Empires in Conflict (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1990), 83–85. 121 Emily Rosenberg, “World War I and Continental Solidarity,” Americas 31 (1975): 313–334. 122 Gilderhus, ­Pan-American Visions, 156–157.

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Yet Wilson’s shift in understanding the Monroe Doctrine mirrors the arguments of historians such as Greg Grandin who argue that Latin America served as a region in which the United States tested policy formation before applying it worldwide.123 Through considering the administration’s fractured interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, an interpretation that reflected those of the wider decision-making class, it becomes clear that the nation was unable to determine which notion— either i­nter-American cooperation or regional hegemony—the Monroe Doctrine, and the entirety of its relations with Latin America, should embody. * * * Wilson’s first presidential term stands as one of the most fascinating periods in the history of the Monroe Doctrine. The heightened tensions of the Mexican Revolution and the completion of the Panama Canal provided a context of hemispheric relations that demanded reflection upon the application of the doctrine. Overlaid with comment, the doctrine’s meaning remained fractured to such an extent that not even the President could apply it consistently. The outbreak of the First World War complicated matters even further. Although the United States initially looked upon the doctrine as a barrier warding off the conflict from the Americas, it soon became apparent that the belligerent nations had altered the fabric of international relations and the doctrine had to be reshaped to uphold national security. As such, the debate over the doctrine’s application was amplified as Americans sought to respond to the war via policies of regional hegemony and inter-American cooperation. The doctrine became even more closely associated with the United States Navy as the preparedness movement utilised it in their bid for military expansion and the conflict forced the nation to consider whether the doctrine applied to Canada and what implications this had upon inter-American relations. Distinctions between the New and Old Worlds were readily drawn to unite the American republics, yet the war simultaneously demonstrated that the United States could not avoid the ramifications of the conflict by virtue of geography. In a moment of global crisis and conflict, the Monroe Doctrine’s fractured interpretation lay at the heart of United States foreign relations and national security. 123 Greg Grandin, Empire’s Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism (New York, NY: Henry Holt and Company, 2007).

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Unfortunately, the nation’s troubles had only just begun. During Wilson’s second term, the President gradually realised that the United States could not remain neutral and declared war on Germany in April 1917. Determining the shape of post-war world order became Wilson’s primary concern and the debate over the Monroe Doctrine’s meaning played a crucial role in the treaty fight.

The Trichotomy of the Treaty Fight

During his ill-fated western tour of the United States in September 1919, President Woodrow Wilson struggled to conceal his exasperation with the Monroe Doctrine. Throughout his second presidential term, Wilson had tirelessly campaigned for the establishment of an international organisation that would maintain global peace after the conclusion of the First World War, yet the prospect of United States membership to the League of Nations was continuously criticised by his domestic opponents on the grounds that it would destroy the revered foreign policy tradition. To allay these fears, the President had argued that the covenant of the League of Nations extended the principles of the doctrine to the entire world rather than abrogated them and secured a specific reservation on the Monroe Doctrine in the text of the covenant (Article 21). His antagonists were unconvinced and criticised the reservation for misrepresenting the doctrine’s meaning. In Spokane, Washington, Wilson vented his frustration to his gathered audience: “I do not know how the Monroe doctrine could be any more explicitly accepted than it is in the covenant … What more could you say?” Although the President admitted that the doctrine had caused problems in the drafting of the covenant given its slippery definition, he was adamant that Article 21 was “the most extraordinary sentence” in the covenant, because it symbolised “the world recognizing the validity of the Monroe doctrine.” Yet his critics apparently wanted more. With clear note of irritation, Wilson sarcastically posed the following suggestion: “Shall we © The Author(s) 2020 A. Bryne, The Monroe Doctrine and United States National Security in the Early Twentieth Century, Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the Contemporary World, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-43431-1_5

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get [the nations of the world] to express their belief in the deity of the Monroe doctrine? They accept it for the first time in the history of the world, and they say that they will do nothing that will interfere with it. I must submit that it is absolutely irrational to ask for anything more.”1 Wilson’s frustration with the Monroe Doctrine was not misplaced. It cast a long shadow over the treaty fight and opponents of the League of Nations adeptly invoked the doctrine in their efforts to block the Senate’s ratification of the Treaty of Versailles. United States membership to an international league was attacked on the premise that it would permit non-American activity in the Western Hemisphere, challenge the nation’s hegemony in Latin America, and force United States armed forces into distant and unnecessary conflicts—all outcomes that allegedly betrayed the doctrine’s guiding tenets. Wilson and his allies desperately tried to highlight the compatibility between the doctrine and the League’s covenant, but ultimately failed to assure the nation that it would be protected if the United States joined an international league. In the words of Harvard’s President, Abbot Lawrence Lowell, it became the “greatest bugbear” of the treaty fight.2 Historians have long recognised the importance of the Monroe Doctrine to the outcome of the treaty fight. Whilst it did not ­singlehandedly dictate the final decision to reject the Treaty of Versailles, its maintenance was deemed just as important as other major considerations such as immigration control and the balance of power within the proposed League of Nations.3 It did, however, serve a broader role and 1 “Address at Spokane, Wash., September 12, 1919” in Woodrow Wilson, Addresses of President Wilson: Addresses Delivered by President Wilson on His Western Tour September 4 to September 25, 1919 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1919), 170. 2 The Lodge-Lowell Debate on the Proposed League of Nations (Boston, MA: Old Colony Trust Company, 1919), 40. 3 William Mulligan, The Great War for Peace (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014), 97; Christopher Nichols, Promise and Peril: America at the Dawn of a Global Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 299–230; John Cooper Jr., Breaking the Heart of the World: Woodrow Wilson and the Fight for the League of Nations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 61–64; Lloyd Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition: The Treaty Fight in Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 101–102; Ralph Stone, The Irreconcilables: The Fight Against the League of Nations (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1970), 53–57; Dexter Perkins, A History of the Monroe Doctrine (London: Longmans, [1955] 1960), 277–306; Thomas Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Great Betrayal (Chicago, IL: Quadrangle Books, 1945), 232; John Spencer, “The Monroe Doctrine and the League Covenant,” American Journal of International Law 30, no. 3 (1936): 400–413.

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continued to function as a framework through which Americans enunciated their thoughts on national security. Indeed, the various interpretations of the Monroe Doctrine that were invoked during the treaty fight epitomised domestic debates over policies of internationalism in a postwar world. When the United States entered the First World War in April 1917, the concurrent debate over the doctrine’s meaning and application shifted in tenor and combined with the new debate over post-war international organisation. The two became symbiotic—the treaty fight generated commentary on the Monroe Doctrine, and the now fractured doctrine influenced the attitudes that Americans held towards the prospect of international organisation and internationalism. Orthodox narratives of the treaty fight frame the debate as a contest between two opposing notions, namely internationalism and quasiisolationism. Historians have since revised and challenged the simplicity of this dichotomy by exploring the nuanced and variable perspectives held by both advocates and opponents of international organisation.4 Yet despite these developments in our understanding of the nature of the treaty fight, the debate is still primarily perceived as having taken place within a binary framework: as a choice between membership to the League of Nations or a rejection of international organisation. This chapter draws upon the work of Stephen Wertheim who convincingly demonstrates that the traditional dichotomy of the treaty fight needs to be revised. In his study of the proposed legalist-sanctionist league that was advocated by the likes of Elihu Root, William Howard Taft, and Theodore Roosevelt, Wertheim highlights that viable alternatives to the League of Nations were proposed during the treaty fight and that the debate needs to be understood as more than simply a “two-sided morality tale.” Because historians embed their research within the traditional dichotomy of the treaty fight, alternative proposals, such as those made for a legalist-sanctionist league, have been overlooked. For Wertheim, internal debates among proponents of global organisation are just as

4 Nichols, Promise and Peril, 230–231; Cooper, Breaking the Heart of the World, 5; Akira Iriye, The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, vol. 3, The Globalizing of America, 1913–1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 68–72; Lloyd Ambrosius, Wilsonian Statecraft: Theory and Practice of Liberal Internationalism during World War I (Lanham, MD: SR Books, 1991), xii–xiii; Ambrosius, The Treaty Fight in Perspective, xii; Stone, The Irreconcilables, 178–182.

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important for historians to consider, because it demonstrates that the early twentieth century was the moment in which “American ideas of internationalism were at their most vibrant and diverse.”5 Tracing the Monroe Doctrine debate through the course of the treaty fight solidifies this argument. If we consider the ways in which Americans reinterpreted the doctrine at this moment, the debate over international organisation can be framed as a trichotomy: a debate between proponents of unilateralism, global organisation, and regional organisation. Advocates of a ­Pan-American interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine advocated a limited degree of commitment to internationalism by positioning the doctrine as the basis of a regional American league of nations. Alongside the various demands for global organisation and the stringent defence of unilateralism, the prospect of regional organisation was proposed as an alternative approach to post-war internationalism that found support among the nation’s decision-making class and complicated the wider discourse of the treaty fight. Whilst the traditional narrative of the treaty fight has obscured the proposals for regional organisation, so too has the centrality of Woodrow Wilson to the debate. As the previous chapter explained, Wilson initially desired to implement a system of regional integration when he became President through the formation of a Pan-American pact. However, by 1917 he had turned his attention to global organisation and abandoned the idea of an inter-American system. Historians perceive his abortive Pan-American pact as a precursor to the League of Nations and argue that his regional aspirations transformed into global ones.6 Although this is a sound interpretation, historians tend to focus almost exclusively on the President’s personal policies and overlook the wider advocacy of regional organisation that was voiced outside the White House during the treaty fight. Demands for the formation of a regional American league of nations permeate and complicate the traditional dichotomy of

5 Stephan Wertheim, “The League That Wasn’t: American Designs for a LegalistSanctionist League of Nations and the Intellectual Origins of International Organization, 1914–1920,” Diplomatic History 35, no. 5 (2011): 797–799. 6 Mark Gilderhus, Pan-American Visions: Woodrow Wilson in the Western Hemisphere 1913–1921 (Tuscon, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 1986), 49.

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the treaty fight as prominent Pan-Americanists occupied a distinct and critical position on post-war internationalism. The three overarching visions of a post-war order—unilateralism, global organisation, and regional organisation—were aligned to different reinterpretations of the Monroe Doctrine and their corresponding core values. Firstly, unilateralists interpreted the doctrine as a facilitator of United States hegemony in the Western Hemisphere, drawing inspiration from the Roosevelt Corollary. They sought to protect the unilateral nature of the doctrine and argued that if the United States joined an international league, it would be powerless to prevent European or any other non-American powers from interfering in what they considered purely American affairs that the United States was justified to dominate. Secondly, Wilson and his supporters proposed that the doctrine’s core principles could be expanded to a global scope through the establishment of the League of Nations, reinterpreting the doctrine as an international defender of self-governance. Advocates of the League claimed that because the doctrine had permitted the nations of Latin America to develop on their own terms without European meddling, all nations could benefit from its principles through international organisation. Finally, Pan-Americanists occupied a middle ground and aligned a Pan-American interpretation of the doctrine to the formation of a regional American league of nations. The internationalism and cooperation inherent in global organisation would be maintained, but it would take a regional form to protect hemispheric and inter-American interests. Although this latter position was often sidelined during the treaty fight, it nonetheless signified the existence of a third path that was advocated by those who held concerns over inter-American unity. Taken together, these reinterpretations of the Monroe Doctrine presented three potential avenues for the United States to follow in a p ­ ost-war era: the reinforcement of a policy of unilateralism; the establishment of regional PanAmerican organisation; or membership of a global concert of nations. Within the wider context of the treaty fight, the Monroe Doctrine served to divide participants further as they advocated one of three core values of United States national security: the maintenance of regional hegemony, bolstering Pan-American unity, or spreading democratic self-governance.

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A Defence of the Monroe Doctrine The prospect of joining an international league of nations after the First World War was not the first instance in which the Monroe Doctrine had been deemed under threat by the ratification of international treaties and agreements. Although the following events were often trivial and did not attract much public outrage, they set a precedent for the discourse of the treaty fight and highlighted the obsessive need of many statesmen to protect the doctrine’s unilateralism from the machinations of internationalism. The first example was during the First Hague Conference of 1899, a gathering proposed by the Russian Tsar Nicholas II that sought to regulate rules of warfare and promote international arbitration. As the conference proceeded, the United States delegation grew concerned about the relationship between the Monroe Doctrine and the proposed convention. Serving as one of the delegates, Alfred Thayer Mahan argued that the proposed Article 27 might be considered an infringement of the doctrine. This article required signatories to settle disputes via international arbitration, which could lead to extra-hemispheric interference in the Americas should Latin American nations become involved in future international disputes. Mahan’s colleague Andrew White worried that the convention would be defeated in the Senate by ­“over-sensitive” patriots if the doctrine was not protected. The delegation was thus moved to draft a reservation which excluded the Monroe Doctrine from the convention in all but name.7 The night before the reservation was submitted, White admitted that he had “been tossing about in my bed and thinking of our declaration of the Monroe Doctrine to be brought before the conference,” expressing the fear that “the conference will not receive it, or will insist on our signing without it or not

7 James Brown Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, vol. 2 (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins Press, 1909), 210. Article 27 stated that the “Signatory Powers consider it their duty, if a serious dispute threatens to break out between two or more of them, to remind these latter that the Permanent Court is open to them. Consequently, they declare that the fact of reminding the conflicting parties of the provisions of the present Convention, and the advice given to them, in the highest interests of peace, to have recourse to the Permanent Court, can only be regarded as friendly actions”: “Convention (I) for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes,” July 29, 1899, Avalon Project, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/hague01.asp.

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signing at all.”8 To White’s relief, the reservation was passed without a word of objection and was even replicated verbatim in the convention of the Second Hague Conference in 1907. The Senate issued a similar statement in relation to the Algeciras Conference of 1906. Attended primarily by European delegations, the conference met to settle Germany’s protestations against French control in Morocco, yet the Senate found it necessary to resolve that United States participation in the conference was not an intention to “depart from the traditional American policy which forbids participation by the United States in the settlement of political questions which are entirely European in scope.”9 In a letter to one of the United States representatives, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge outlined why this dispute between European empires was of concern to the United States: in a moment in which fear of the German Peril was rife, United States policy makers were concerned that Germany would use the conference to secure a port in Morocco, an act which Lodge strangely described as Germany expanding “uncomfortably close to the Monroe Doctrine.” German activity as distant as West Africa was perceived as part of the wider German challenge to the Monroe Doctrine, transforming United States interest in the conference to “more than that of a disinterested friend.”10 It was the Taft Arbitration Treaties of 1911 that served as the major portents of the treaty fight. The treaties were signed on 3 August 1911 and established systems of bilateral arbitration between the governments of the United States, Great Britain, and France.11 Opposition to the treaties had been quietly voiced before they were signed, and within the space of a week, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, headed by Senator Lodge, submitted a report in which it objected to the treaties

8 Andrew White, Autobiography of Andrew Dickson White, vol. 2 (New York, NY: The Century Co., 1905), 339–342. 9 “Reservations of the Monroe Doctrine Appearing in Treaties or Conventions to Which the United States Was a Party,” March 8, 1919, Box 58, Lester Hood Woolsey Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. 10 Henry Cabot Lodge to Henry White, May 5, 1906, Box 18, Henry White Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. 11 John Campbell, “Taft, Roosevelt, and the Arbitration Treaties of 1911,” Journal of American History 53, no. 2 (1966): 279–298; John Noyes, “William Howard Taft and the Taft Arbitration Treaties,” Villanova Law Review 56, no. 3 (2011): 535–558.

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on a number of grounds, including the safety of the Monroe Doctrine.12 During the negotiation process, British officials had been wary about the possibility of the Monroe Doctrine causing difficulties, and their apprehensions were justified.13 In an attempt to preserve the treaties as originally intended, Secretary of State Philander Chase Knox and State Department Counsellor Chandler Anderson argued that the doctrine was outside the realm of international jurisdiction because it was an ­enunciation of policy—it was irrelevant to the treaties and no reservation was required.14 Yet the Senate was unmoved by these claims and crafted a reservation on the Monroe Doctrine, demanding that it could never be submitted to any form of arbitration.15 With reservations secured, the Senate ratified the treaties on 7 March 1912, yet President William Howard Taft was notably disappointed by the necessity of amendments.16 The Senate’s insistence on protecting the doctrine could have wrecked the treaties, leading Puck magazine to portray the doctrine as a 12 S. Doc. No. 98, 62nd Congress, 1st Session, 1911, Box 18, Chandler Parsons Anderson Papers Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. For statements that objected to the treaties on the basis of the Monroe Doctrine see “The Arbitration Treaties and the Monroe Doctrine,” Box 19, Anderson Papers; Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge, June 12, 1911, in Theodore Roosevelt, The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, vol. 7, ed. Elting Morison (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954), 279–284; Alfred Thayer Mahan to Theodore Roosevelt, June 19, 1911, in Alfred Thayer Mahan, Letters and Papers of Alfred Thayer Mahan, vol. 3, eds. Robert Seager and Doris Maguire (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1975), 411–412. 13 Edward Grey to James Bryce, May 11, 1911, Reel 86, Viscount James Bryce Papers, Weston Library, University of Oxford; “Arbitration Treaty,” Reel 87, Bryce Papers; Edward Grey to Bryce, December 2, 1911, Reel 88, Bryce Papers; Edward Grey to James Bryce, April 3, 1911, in British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898–1914, vol. 8, Arbitration, Neutrality and Security, eds. G. Gooch and Harold Temperley (London: H.M. Stationary Office, 1932), 561–562; James Bryce to Edward Grey, December 19, 1911, in Origins of the War, vol. 8, 600. 14 Untitled and Undated Memorandum, Box  16, Philander Chase Knox Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC; Philander Chase Knox, The Arbitration Treaties Pending between the United States and Great Britain and the United States and France, Cincinnati, November 8, 1911, Box 43, Knox Papers; Untitled Memorandum, August 8, 1911, Box 19, Anderson Papers. 15 U.S. Congress. Senate. General Arbitration Treaties, 62nd Congress 2nd Session, Congressional Record, March 6, 1912, 2865–2886; U.S. Congress. Senate. General Arbitration Treaties, 62nd Congress 2nd Session, Congressional Record, March 7, 1912, 2934–2955. 16 William Howard Taft to James Bryce, March 12, 1912, Reel 87, Bryce Papers.

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Fig. 1  “The Rocky Road to Peace,” Puck, August 30, 1911 (Image courtesy of the Library of Congress, Washington, DC. As President Taft and Secretary Knox desperately try to move the arbitration treaties along the road to peace, they become wedged against the Monroe Doctrine whilst Senator Lodge urges the Senate to move in the opposite direction)

stubborn obstacle to the implementation of systems of international arbitration and world peace (Fig. 1). The treaty fight mimicked much of the discourse surrounding the Taft Arbitration Treaties on a much grander scale and many participants once again argued that the doctrine could not be maintained or enforced effectively in a system of international organisation. The summer of 1915 witnessed the first major drive towards the establishment of an international league of nations with the formation of the League to Enforce Peace. Headed by former President Taft and prompted by the outbreak of the First World War, the League proposed the creation of a league that would settle international disputes and enforce peace among nations via the threat of combined military

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action and economic sanctions.17 Critics of internationalism immediately questioned the relationship between the Monroe Doctrine and the League to Enforce Peace’s platform, arguing that a league of nations would not only abrogate the doctrine’s protective barrier but bind the United States politically and militarily to European politics. The same criticism was hurled against Wilson when the President advocated the formation of the League of Nations. His opponents emphasised three interlinked facets of the Monroe Doctrine to demonstrate why United States membership would equate to the doctrine’s abrogation. The first was the unilateral and distinctly American nature of the doctrine; the second was the doctrine’s role as a policy of national self-defence; and the third was the doctrine’s insistence on a policy of non-entanglement in European affairs. Prominent political figures and academics gave numerous addresses and wrote a deluge of articles on the relationship between the Monroe Doctrine and international organisation, firmly positioning the doctrine as one of the core issues of the treaty fight. Journals, newspapers, and literary-political magazines were filled with impassioned arguments against United States membership on the basis of protecting the doctrine and it became a rallying point for anti-League organisations such as the League for the Preservation of American Independence which proudly displayed its commitment to the doctrine on its official correspondence and membership forms.18 More broadly, it weighed on the minds of sceptical citizens, who sent voluminous amounts of letters to public opponents of the League of Nations, pleading for them to use their political clout to protect its tenets.19 Tellingly, opponents of international organisation often described the League of Nations as a new

17 Ruhl Bartlett’s study remains an authoritative text on the League to Enforce Peace: Ruhl Bartlett, The League to Enforce Peace (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1944). 18 League for the Preservation of American Independence membership form, Box 214, Albert Jeramiah Beveridge Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. 19 Senator William Borah’s papers are an excellent collection in this regard. He claimed that around ninety-eight per cent of his incoming mail expressed an opposition to a league of nations, and the Monroe Doctrine featured consistently. Boxes 76 and 767 through 770 of his personal papers are most relevant. See William Edgar Borah Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

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Holy Alliance—the coalition of European powers which the Monroe Doctrine had been originally formed against.20 In May 1916, Secretary of State Robert Lansing briefed Wilson on the relationship between the Monroe Doctrine and the League to Enforce Peace’s proposals. He was sceptical about the value of the League and was worried about matters of United States national interest and sovereignty in light of its intention to impose international arbitration by force. Lansing argued that the United States should not have to limit its independence of action “to the will of other powers beyond this hemisphere,” nor put itself in a position in which it would be compelled to send its armed forces to Europe or Asia to settle distant disputes. Lansing preferred a system based on regional organisation, much like the Pan-American pact that Wilson was still working on at the time and was hesitant to commend a system that would allow European nations to “cross the ocean and stop quarrels between two American Republics.” In short, he deemed the League to Enforce Peace “a serious menace to the Monroe Doctrine.”21 Wilson remained unconvinced and the League to Enforce Peace’s imposition of forced arbitration was mirrored in Article 10 of the proposed covenant of the League of Nations, which functioned as the main qualm of critics in relation to the Monroe Doctrine.22 Under Article 10, many Americans believed that the Monroe Doctrine would be subjected to the jurisdiction of the League of Nations rather than the United States alone, granting non-American powers a voice in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere and abrogating a national

20 “The Doctrine or the League,” North American Review 210, no. 765 (1919): 147– 148; “The League of Nations Discussion,” The Outlook, August 27, 1919, 629–630; “Society of Nations or Holy Alliance?” Box 797, Borah Papers. A concerned citizen even wrote to William Borah stating that “people are not for the League of Nations” because “they remember the holy alliance”: John Garber to William Borah, January 3, 1919, Box 76, Borah Papers. 21 Robert Lansing to Woodrow Wilson, May 25, 1916 in United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Lansing Papers 1914–1920, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1939), 16–18. 22 Article 10 stated that “The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.”: “The Covenant of the League of Nations,” The Avalon Project, https:// avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/parti.asp.

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policy of self-defence. Opponents of the League argued that under its jurisdiction, disputes between American nations would be subjected to the will of all its member states, whereas the Monroe Doctrine forbade any non-American nations from interfering in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere. In the eyes of these unilateralists, the doctrine had acted as a barrier between the Old and New Worlds and protected the geopolitical interests of the United States, facilitating its ascendency in the Western Hemisphere. The Monroe Doctrine that anti-Leaguers invoked was the hegemony-facilitating doctrine akin to the Roosevelt Corollary— the reinterpretation of the doctrine that embodied regional hegemony as a core value of national security. Article 10 challenged this core value, elevating the Monroe Doctrine to an irreconcilable national policy. Senator Lodge emphasised the unilateralism inherent in the Monroe Doctrine and objected to the destruction of what he described as its “real essence.” It was essential that “American questions shall be settled by Americans alone” and he insisted that the doctrine could only be interpreted by the United States.23 Lodge was particularly adept at utilising populist rhetoric in his defence of the doctrine, frequently claiming that it would be the American people who would object to its destruction.24 The Lion of Idaho, Senator William Borah, tarred league advocates as unpatriotic Americans who were “in favor of abandoning the Monroe doctrine and permitting European nations to determine the affairs of the Western continent,” disavowing the possibility of the “dickering of our sovereignty to foreign powers.”25 Other critics, such as Elihu Root, were more concerned with the self-defensive nature of the doctrine, stressing that the United States would be thrown into new dangers by joining a league and would lose the protective wall that the Monroe Doctrine had for so long maintained.26 Former Senator Albert 23 Henry Cabot Lodge, The Senate and the League of Nations (New York, NY: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1925), 227–261. 24 Lodge’s letters to James Bryce are excellent examples of this rhetorical style: Henry Cabot Lodge to James Bryce, January 16, 1919, March 25, 1919, April 8, 1919, Reel 71, Bryce Papers. 25 William Borah to Chas Gilkey, December 30, 1918, Box 76, Borah Papers; William Borah to Frank Munsey, April 19, 1919, Box 769, Borah Papers. 26 Elihu Root, “Letter of Honorable Elihu Root to Honorable Will H. Hays Regarding the Covenant of the League of Nations,” American Journal of International Law 13, no. 3 (1919): 591; David Hill, “The Betrayal of the Monroe Doctrine,” North American Review

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Beveridge argued that one major pitfall of the League was the fact that it might one day permit the now-disgraced Germany to have a say in American affairs.27 Fortunately for Beveridge, he believed that no “natural sentiment” truly existed for international organisation and that “the instinct and the good sense of the people are in favor of maintaining our traditional American policy and against this and every other attempt to overthrow it.”28 Former Secretary of War Henry Stimson drew upon the ideas inherent in the Lodge Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in his criticism. Whilst Article 10 prohibited territorial gains through aggression, it made no reference to the peaceful acquisition of territory, which had now become a far greater concern to Americans than the anti-colonialism of the 1820s. For Stimson, non-American control of Latin America via economic or demographic means was the “danger most to be feared,” because rival designs in the Western Hemisphere did not normally start with military action, but from “the proposal to acquire a coaling station or an innocent looking island within strategic distance of the mouths of the Panama Canal or even from the granting of a railway concession within a strategic area.” The future of the American republics relied on keeping the Western Hemisphere “as free as possible from the extension into it of the strategic systems of more thickly populated powerful Europe.” Under unilateral control, the Monroe Doctrine could be utilised to prevent any kind of challenge to United States hegemony, whereas the League of Nations would restrict this to purely military aggression.29 How would the League stop Germans gaining control of Brazil via immigration? How would the League prevent the Japanese purchase of Magdalena Bay in Mexico? The United States needed the final say in hemispheric matters under the Monroe Doctrine to ensure regional hegemony. 212, no. 780 (1920): 586–591; William Shepherd, “The Monroe Doctrine Reconsidered,” Political Science Quarterly 39, no. 1 (1924): 35–40; Henry Taft, “The Monroe Doctrine and a World Organization,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 96 (1921): 42–43. 27 Albert Beveridge, “Pitfalls of a ‘League of Nations’,” North American Review 209, no. 760 (1919): 312. 28 Albert Beveridge to Thomas Bauer, March 13, 1919, Box 214, Beveridge Papers. 29 Henry Stimson to Will Hays, February 18, 1919, Box 137, Elihu Root Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

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Stimson’s comment on innocent looking islands was likely a reference to the Danish West Indies. The United States officially acquired the islands on 31 March 1917, mere days before declaring war on Germany, renaming them the United States Virgin Islands. However, unilateralists employed them as a visceral example of the dangers international organisation posed to the Monroe Doctrine. Prior to their acquisition, the League to Enforce Peace was criticised because its platform would prevent the United States from objecting to the islands’ purchase by any other nation. The Executive Secretary of the League to Enforce Peace, Theodore Marburg, received an anxious letter on the subject in April 1915, protesting the fact that the United States would have to wait for a league to make a decision on the island’s purchase by a European nation before it could resist their acquisition and defend the Monroe Doctrine.30 According to another member of the League, George Grafton Wilson, this objection was one of the most frequently raised criticisms of its proposal.31 The islands were valued so highly by the United States because of their strategic location. Secretary Lansing best summarised their importance in a report to Wilson, arguing that because of the security of the Panama Canal, “the possibility of a change of sovereignty of any of the islands now under foreign jurisdiction [in the Caribbean] is of grave concern to the United States.” Crucially, because of the need to maintain the Monroe Doctrine, Americans ought to “look with disfavor upon the transfer of sovereignty of the Danish West Indies to any other European nations.”32 The context of the First World War threatened to manifest a worst-case scenario in which Germany might attempt to acquire the islands, facilitating a renewed drive to acquire the islands and thereby ensure the spread of United States hegemony in the Caribbean.33 30 William Foulke to Theodore Marburg, April 24, 1915 in Theodore Marburg, Development of the League of Nations Idea: Documents and Correspondence of Theodore Marburg, vol. 1, ed. John Latané (New York, NY: Macmillan Company, 1932), 36–37. 31 George Grafton Wilson, “The Monroe Doctrine and the Program of the League to Enforce Peace,” World Peace Foundation Pamphlet Series 4, no. 4 (Boston, MA: World Peace Foundation, 1916), 9–10. 32 Robert Lansing to Woodrow Wilson, January 22, 1917 in FRUS 1917, 692–694. 33 Christopher Capozzola, “The United States Empire,” in Empires at War: 1911–1923, eds. Robert Gerwarth and Erez Manela (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 239– 240. Sentiment in favour of acquiring the Galapagos Islands still bubbled below the surface as well, although the government remained disinterested. See for example the revealing

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Yet even after the islands’ acquisition, unilateralists continued to refer to them in their anti-League protestations. On the Senate floor, Borah argued that if Germany had purchased or gained the islands before the United States, and if the United States had desired to object on the grounds of maintaining the Monroe Doctrine, then it would have been left at the mercy of a league’s decision if the League had already been established before 1917. Should the counter-factual league have decided that Germany was within its rights to purchase the islands, then the United States would have been unable to object to this abrogation of the Monroe Doctrine without facing dire consequences. “I thank God,” Borah summarised, “[that] the people still vote and [that] they will control the policy of this Nation in matters which touch their vital interests and involve the security of this nation.”34 For Americans who interpreted the Monroe Doctrine as a facilitator of United States hegemony and a policy of national defence, international organisation thus equated to a destruction of its core principles. They perceived a foreign policy of unhindered unilateralism as the only viable post-war approach towards international relations if the United States intended to maintain hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. Ultimately, the doctrine had kept the nation out of unnecessary conflicts in the past and was worth protecting from systems of international organisation to ensure the development of an unfettered, unilateral foreign policy. Of course, it must be noted that the very act of United States belligerency called the sanctity of the Monroe Doctrine into question. As Iowan historian Harry Plum argued in early 1918, the war “had violated the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine.”35 Wilson seemingly ignored Monroe’s advice by becoming entangled in a war that originated in Europe. Congressmen such as Harold Knutson of Minnesota who opposed belligerency drew attention to this disjuncture in their protests, proclaiming that belligerency was a path to “entangling alliances which might at a future date endanger the Monroe doctrine and embroil us in another

conclusion of the following article: George McBride, “The Galapagos Islands,” Geographic Review 6, no. 3 (1918): 229–239. 34 U.S. Congress. Senate. League of Nations, 65th Congress, 3rd Session, Congressional Record, December 6, 1918, 189–199. 35 Harry Plum, “The Monroe Doctrine and the War,” University of Iowa Extension Bulletin 31 (1918), 21.

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holocaust such as they now have in Poland and Flanders.”36 Wilson personally believed that belligerency did not equate to the abrogation of the Monroe Doctrine, informing Elihu Root that it merely planted the doctrine “more securely than ever upon the very principles upon which the world is invited to act,” however, this disjuncture serves to emphasise the paradoxical manner in which the doctrine was invoked during the treaty fight and the period of belligerency.37 The fluid and variable meaning of the doctrine explains how the same foreign policy tradition was so readily invoked as a basis for three different approaches to post-war world order.

A Monroe Doctrine for the World On 22 January 1917, President Wilson addressed the Senate and put forward his vision of a post-war world order. He called for both “peace without victory” and the establishment of a “concert of power” to prevent further wars, stating that the elements of peace “must be elements that engage the confidence and satisfy the principles of American governments.” Wilson believed that the current conflict had been caused by the machinations of Old-World politics and that the world needed to adopt “American principles” and “American policies” to ensure peace. As such, Wilson proposed that the nations of the world “should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world: that no nation should seek to extend its polity over any other nation or people, but that every people should be left free to determine its own polity, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful.”38 According to Wilson, the 36 U.S. Congress. House. Two Wrongs Do Not Make a Right, 65th Congress, 1st Session, Appendix to the Congressional Record, April 5, 1917, 22–23; U.S. Congress. House. War With Germany, 65th Congress, 1st Session, Appendix to the Congressional Record, April 5, 1917, 57 and 73. 37 Woodrow Wilson to Elihu Root, April 7, 1917, in Woodrow Wilson, The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 42, ed. Arthur Link (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), 6. One of Wilson’s former students, journalist David Lawrence, advised Wilson to mention in his address to Congress that the Monroe Doctrine would remain the cardinal feature of United States foreign policy despite the declaration of war, however, Wilson did not heed the advice: David Lawrence to Woodrow Wilson, March 31, 1917 in Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 41, 512–514. 38 “An Address to the Senate,” January 22, 1917 in Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 40, 533–539.

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Monroe Doctrine had permitted the nations of Latin America to develop their own form of ­ self-governance and the President believed that if its principles were extended to the entire world, forming the basis of a league of nations, then all nations could experience the same extent of self-governance. There would be no need for any more entangling alliances, governments would be decided by the consent of the governed, freedom of the seas would be ensured, and armed forces would no longer be used as an instrument of aggression. Wilson’s reinterpretation of the Monroe Doctrine is telling of the way in which he conceptualised the conduct of international diplomacy. In his intellectual history of United States foreign relations, David Milne argues that United States policy makers can be divided into two discernible groups: those who approached diplomacy as an art, and those who approached diplomacy as a science. Individuals that were drawn to the study of history, philosophy, and literature, such as Alfred Thayer Mahan, Theodore Roosevelt, or Henry Cabot Lodge, considered diplomacy an art and were reluctant to “depart from observed historical precedent,” whereas figures such as Wilson, trained in the social sciences, were more likely to see the world as “makeable” and would attempt to “transcend history rather than operate within its observed confines.”39 ­Anti-league voices couched their interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine in a discourse of tradition and precedent during the treaty fight, even though it was far removed from the original doctrine of 1823, yet the manner in which Wilson dramatically reinterpreted the Monroe Doctrine, first in terms of regional and subsequently global organisation, demonstrated his belief that national core values were “makeable” and open to significant renegotiation. Drawing upon the notion of self-determinism inherent in the doctrine, he positioned its global extension as an essential component of United States national security. Wilson’s progressive re-envisioning of the Monroe Doctrine was, of course, fundamentally hypocritical. The President called for universal self-governance whilst the United States continued to paternalistically occupy various “little” nations because they had been deemed unable to effectively govern their own affairs.40 If Wilson truly desired to 39 David

Milne, Worldmaking: The Art and Science of American Diplomacy (New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2015), 16. 40 According to Michael Cullinane and Alex Goodall, rather than repudiating dollar diplomacy, Wilson “exchanged Taft’s policy of substituting dollars for bullets with a policy of dollars and bullets”: Michael Cullinane and Alex Goodall, The Open Door Era: United

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adhere to his own global extension of the Monroe Doctrine, then he would be forced to grant the Philippines its independence and withdraw troops from Nicaragua, Haiti and the Dominican Republic. However, this hypocrisy did not hinder the popularity of a new global Monroe Doctrine among League advocates, because it was formulated primarily to stand in a direct challenge to unilateralists and critics of international organisation. Rather than amounting to the destruction of the doctrine’s core principles, Wilson believed that international organisation would extend them to the world for the benefit of all nations, reinterpreting that doctrine as a facilitator of global organisation. The President found a great deal of support in this reinterpretation among leading members of the League to Enforce Peace. Abbott Lawrence Lowell found much to fault in the recent history of the Monroe Doctrine’s application, yet he too believed that it had ultimately protected Latin American sovereignty, which made it an ideal base upon which to build a new international order. Within a league of nations, the doctrine’s principles would be upheld by all member nations, making it a much more effective policy than it could ever hope to be under the United States alone (Fig. 2).41 Hamilton Holt similarly lauded the doctrine’s ability to promote self-determined democracy and argued that it must be universalised to keep “every democracy safe and protected against subversion of its government.”42 George Grafton Wilson advocated the transformation of the “narrow” Monroe Doctrine into a “broad” application that would facilitate the unfettered development of democracy, essentially preventing nations from interfering in the internal affairs of others. He additionally criticised unilateralists for attempting to exempt the doctrine from international arbitration. Whilst the United States had secured specific reservations concerning the Monroe Doctrine in the two Hague Conventions and the Taft Arbitration Treaties, the so-called Bryan Treaties, a series of bilateral arbitration treaties that were signed between 1913 and 1914,

States Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017), 59. 41 Abbot Lawrence Lowell, “The League to Enforce Peace,” North American Review 205, no. 734 (1917): 29–30; Abbott Lawrence Lowell to James Bryce, April 4, 1919, Reel 72, Bryce Papers. 42 Hamilton Holt, “The League to Enforce Peace”, Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science in the City of New York 7, no. 2 (1917): 68–69.

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Fig. 2  “Why all this fuss over article ten?” Des Moines Register, October 25, 1920 (Image courtesy of the Jay N. “Ding” Darling Wildlife Society. A cartoon by Jay Darling promoted Woodrow Wilson’s interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine in pictorial form. The United States had maintained its own Article 10 in the form of the Monroe Doctrine since 1823 and there seemed no reason why it could not prevent wars on a global scale through the League of Nations)

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had no such clauses, meaning that the doctrine was technically already subject to international arbitration.43 If policy makers truly wished to position the Monroe Doctrine above international arbitration, why did these treaties not include similar reservations? Surely, Theodore Marburg argued, the United States could “afford to submit questions involving even the Monroe Doctrine for investigation before going to war over them.”44 Influential figures such as former President Taft and his brother Henry also threw their lot in with Wilson’s reinterpretation of the Monroe Doctrine and it was popular among a wide variety of academics.45 Historian John Latané was convinced that, because of developments in the last twenty years, the time was at hand when “we must either abandon the Monroe Doctrine altogether, or resort to an alliance to maintain it, or to some form of world federation to extend it.” He believed it was futile to cling to the traditions of the past and that the old order in which the doctrine had been proclaimed had long passed, even though “some of our representatives in the halls of Congress are reluctant to recognize the fact.” Lanaté associated this extension of the Monroe Doctrine with “guaranteeing to free states the right of self-development,” claiming that on no other basis could a league be

43 George Grafton Wilson, “The Monroe Doctrine After the War”, Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science in the City of New York 7, no. 2 (1917): 297–302; Wilson, “Monroe Doctrine and League to Enforce Peace,” 6. On the Bryan Treaties see “The Bryan Peace Treaties,” The American Journal of International Law 7, no. 4 (1913): 823–829. 44 Theodore Marburg, League of Nations: Its Principles Examined, vol. 2 (New York, NY: Macmillan Company, 1919), 44–45; Henry Taft, “The Monroe Doctrine” in The Covenanter: An American Exposition of the League of Nations (New York, NY: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1919): 160; Samuel Plantz to William Borah, February 18, 1919, Box 770, Borah Papers. 45 “World Peace Debate,” in William Howard Taft, The Collected Works of William Howard Taft, vol. 8, Taft Papers on League of Nations, ed. Frank Gerrity (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2003), 109–110; “The League of Nations” in Henry Taft, Occasional Papers and Addresses of an American Lawyer (New York, NY: Macmillan Company, 1920), 134–139; Carl Becker, “The Monroe Doctrine and the War,” Minnesota History Bulletin 2, no. 2 (1917): 67; Roger Babson, “Drawing Together the Americas,” Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science in the City of New York 7, no. 2 (1917): 255–256.

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established.46 Even Republican Senator George Norris, one of the Irreconcilables who opposed the Treaty of Versailles in any form, recalled in his memoirs that the “possibility that American membership in the League might endanger the Monroe Doctrine did not frighten me.” He informed some of his colleagues that “the right kind of league would make the Monroe Doctrine obsolete and unnecessary. If the League proved to be successful and received the genuine and honest support of all nations, the conditions that had inspired the Monroe Doctrine would not appear.”47 Just as the unilateralists had done, Wilson and his fellow advocates of global organisation interpreted the Monroe Doctrine in a way that positioned it at the heart of their vision of the post-war world order. To Americans who took this position in the treaty fight, the maintenance of the doctrine demanded global organisation for its role as a defender of self-governance to be fulfilled. Given its global scope, it is surprising to learn that very few individuals from outside the United States advocated Wilson’s vision of a globalised Monroe Doctrine, even as lip service. Whilst League advocates in Britain such as James Bryce occasionally referred to the need for “a higher, nobler Monroe Doctrine for the whole world,” most foreigners did not seem particularly interested in adopting the concept.48 Occasional messages of support were sent to the President from Latin American diplomats and politicians, however, as we shall see, the prospect of a regional Monroe Doctrine was more appealing to the United States’ southern neighbours.49 However, one striking reference came from India. In late 1918 the Indian Home Rule League published a pamphlet titled ­Self-Determination for India which, among other demands, highlighted that Indian nationalists wanted the protective values of the Monroe Doctrine for themselves. This expression of advocacy was, of course, aimed at capturing Wilson’s support for Indian self-determination;

46 John Lanaté, “The Monroe Doctrine and the American Policy of Isolation in Relation to a Just and Durable Peace,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 72 (1917): 101–108. 47 George Norris, Fighting Liberal (New York, NY: Macmillan Company, 1945), 204–205. 48 New York Times, November 8, 1917, 12. 49 Julio Betancourt to Woodrow Wilson, January 24, 1917, in Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 41, 8–10.

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however, it served to solidify the association between the Monroe Doctrine and ­self-governance.50 Of course, not all advocates of international organisation cared about the Monroe Doctrine. In fact, some were delighted with the prospect of its destruction. These Americans believed that the predicted benefits of international organisation would far outweigh the need to maintain the doctrine, making it a necessary sacrifice for greater aims. In a public interview, former Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan claimed that whilst it was “not stated with sufficient clearness that the Monroe Doctrine is preserved” within the League covenant, any imperfections of the League should not act as a barrier to its acceptance.51 Virginia Gildersleeve, the Dean of Barnard College, bemoaned the “honest but narrow-minded patriots” who were “unwilling to risk the submission of such vital matters as the Monroe Doctrine, for instance, to any international tribunal. Yet unless some concessions are made, some sacrifice of freedom of action, an orderly government of the world is impossible.”52 Senator Borah received several letters from Quakers who challenged his desire to protect the doctrine, outlining that world peace was worth far more to the nation than preserving an old policy.53 In the words of George Grafton Wilson, “if the American policy as embodied in the Monroe Doctrine will not stand the test of investigation and consideration,” then it was “time for the United States to be determining why it should longer give to the Doctrine its support.”54

50 Erez Manela, Wilsonian Moment: Self Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 163–164. See also the comments of former Labour Party Leader Arthur Henderson in: Amrita Bazar Patrika, June 14, 1918, 2. 51 “Bryan Interview,” Box 50, William Jennings Bryan Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. 52 Virginia Gildersleeve, The Relationship of Nations (New York, NY: League to Enforce Peace, 1918). 53 Susan Radley to William Borah, December 6, 1918, Box 76, Borah Papers; Caspar Hodgson to William Borah, February 20, 1919, Box 770, Borah Papers; Maureen Waugh, “Quakers, Peace and the League of Nations: The Role of Bertram Pickard,” Quaker Studies 6, no. 1 (2002): 59–79. 54 Wilson, “Monroe Doctrine and the League to Enforce Peace,” 10.

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Regional Organisation For Pan-Americanists, the treaty fight and United States belligerency in the First World War presented an opportunity for the nation to solidify inter-American relations and develop an internationalist policy limited to the Americas. Rather than advocating or outright objecting to global organisation, United States Pan-Americanists promoted the establishment of an American league of nations, placing their faith in the growth of Pan-American sentiment and messages of support from several leading Latin American political figures. They believed that if the Monroe Doctrine was made Pan-American, it would serve as an ideal basis for regional organisation, and that the Pan American Union could be adapted and expanded to serve as the foundations for the political infrastructure of the future league. After the United States declared war on Germany in April 1917, several Latin American nations gradually followed suit. Just as the neutrality of the American republics in 1914 was perceived as evidence of PanAmerican unity, so too were the various war declarations.55 For example, Bernard Baruch, a member of the Advisory Commission of the Council of National Defense, noted that mutual belligerency would serve to unite the American republics in defence against a common threat.56 After Brazilian merchant ships became the target of German submarine attacks in the Spring of 1917, Brazil took its first steps towards belligerency by severing its diplomatic ties to Germany. Its Ambassador, Domicio da Gama, informed Secretary Lansing that Brazil had recognised the fact that one of the leading belligerents of the war was “a constituent portion of the American Continent, and that we are bound to that belligerent by traditional friendship and the same sentiment in the defense of the vital interests of America.” Da Gama directly linked the conflict to the Monroe Doctrine, arguing that its “true character” would be revealed as a wartime policy of “continental solidarity” brought the American republics together.57 The Literary Digest marked the occasion 55 Stephan Rinke, Latin America and the First World War, trans. C. Reid (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 109. 56 Bernard Baruch to John Barrett, June 4, 1917, Box  42, John Barrett Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. 57 Domicio Da Gama to Robert Lansing, June 4, 1917, in FRUS 1917 Supplement The World War, vol. 1, 294–295.

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by sarcastically applauding Germany for generating Pan-Americanism as a result of its naval strategy.58 Although a sense of inter-American unity was developing, policy makers continued to view the circum-Caribbean region as vulnerable to German activity. Whilst travelling the region to survey local opinion on the war, John Foster Dulles warned his uncle Secretary Lansing that the German colony at San José might facilitate Costa Rica being “thrown into the hands of the Germans” and becoming “a center of German activity.”59 John Barrett, the Director General of the Pan American Union, was similarly concerned about German activity now that the two nations were at war, expressing distaste for the “insidious” presence of German propaganda throughout Latin America.60 Belligerency stoked the fire of the German Peril and now, more than ever, the American republics needed to unite and defend their shared values against German militarism. Yet it is worth mentioning the expectation that many United States citizens held regarding Latin American belligerency. In March 1918, Elihu Root expressed his frustration in a letter at the fact that Uruguay and Argentina had not yet joined the war alongside the United States, claiming that conflict was “the one opportunity to act in time for the preservation of real independence by the American republics both South and North.”61 This expectancy was even implicit in a map published in the New York Tribune in July 1918 that listed the belligerency status of all the American republics. Those republics that had not declared war or severed diplomatic relations with German were listed as “still neutral,” implying that they should have already joined their sister nations many months ago.62 Barrett continued to be one of the most vocal advocates of a ­Pan-American Monroe Doctrine during the treaty fight and he dedicated much of his public utterances to bolstering support for an American league of nations. He believed that the war was bringing an end to old 58 Literary

Digest, June 9, 1917, 1769. and Economic Conditions in Costa Rica, As Bearing to the Question of Recognizing the Government of General Tinoco,” May 21, 1917, Reel 1, John Foster Dulles Papers, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University. 60 John Barrett to Martin Egan, June 10, 1918, Box 44, Barrett Papers; Rinke, First World War, 119. 61 Elihu Root to B. Lorenzo Hill, March 5, 1918, Box 136, Root Papers. 62 New York Tribune Review, July 14, 1918, 2. 59 “Political

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animosities between the United States and Latin America and it followed that at the close of the conflict the Monroe Doctrine needed to be made multilateral.63 He also desired to expand the Pan American Union’s political role and the treaty fight offered him an ideal rostrum from which to argue that the organisation ought to be transformed into an American league of nations. Writing for the Journal of Race Development in 1918, he proclaimed that through the Pan American Union, the American republics were “showing the way to the world for international cooperation and a league of nations which shall preserve forever that peace which all men and all nations now hope will be inaugurated at the conclusion of this war.”64 As the Director of the Massachusetts Peace Society, Jay huerta, informed Barrett in 1915, Pan-Americanists believed that if there had been a Pan European Union similar to the Pan American Union, then the war might have been avoided in the first place.65 In December 1918, Barrett formed a more coherent plan for an American league and sent his suggestions directly to President Wilson. Unfortunately, Wilson did not approve of regional organisation any longer and remained committed to a vision of peace via the establishment of the League of Nations.66 Barrett looked at the extent to which the United States was divided over the issue of international organisation and released a statement outlining that it was an ideal opportunity to consider the formation of a Pan-American league as an alternative, one that would “have the authority to initiate mediation or arbitration of any dispute between two American governments and to summon all the others to support such action with their moral influence.” Such a league, he argued, would “make peace forever permanent on the Western Hemisphere, avoid the interference of Europe and Asia in American affairs and preserve the Monroe Doctrine.”67 The Director General continued to stubbornly press Wilson on the matter during the Paris Peace 63 John Barrett, “The War and the New America—The New Pan America,” The World Court 3 (1917): 564–565; John Barrett, “What the War Has Done to the Monroe Doctrine,” Current Opinion 65, no. 5 (1918): 291–293. 64 John Barrett, “Pan American Outlook,” Journal of Race Development 9, no. 2 (1918): 114–119. 65 Jay Hudson to John Barrett, March 29, 1915, Box 38, Barrett Papers. 66 John Barrett to Joseph Tumulty, December 3, 1918, Box 46, Barrett Papers. 67 “Statement of John Barrett,” December 22, 1918, Box 46, Barrett Papers.

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Conference, asking him to make a public statement on the results the Pan American Union had achieved as an embryonic regional league of nations.68 Surely, he asked, if it was “impossible to secure the ratification of the covenant except by meeting the demands of those who feel the need to protect the Monroe Doctrine, then is it not possible that this thought of developing a stronger and more practical Pan American League is deserving of attention?”69 Wilson was unconvinced and stated that “it would be a pity to divide the world into two organizations.”70 Barrett thus sought other avenues of advancement, submitting his proposal to Senators and the press in April 1919, referring to the Monroe Doctrine as a “solution to the League of Nations problem.”71 Thomas Sterling responded favourably, arguing that if the Treaty of Versailles was rejected, a regional league should be created to deal with American questions and the Monroe Doctrine, concluding that “one of the greatest benefits arising out of the present discussion of the proposed constitution for a League of Nations is the information which the people of the United States are receiving in regard to the Monroe Doctrine and the great interest they are taking therein.”72 However, many other replies were less appreciative. Henry Myers favoured a reservation on the doctrine within the League of Nations covenant rather than the formation of a regional league, and Lodge argued that the question of the Monroe Doctrine must first be considered by the Senate in relation to the League of Nations before any plan for its preservation could be discussed.73 Unfortunately for Barrett, this campaign proved to be his swansong. Over the course of his career in Latin American affairs, Barrett had trodden a fine line between irritating and pleasing United States policy makers. Many powerful statesmen had positive things to say about his work, but they were often critical in private. When he served as 68 John Barrett to Robert Lansing, February 12, 1919, Box 46, Barrett Papers; John Barrett to Joseph Tumulty, February 28, 1919, Box 46, Barrett Papers. 69 John Barrett to Woodrow Wilson, March 40, 1919, Box 47, Barrett Papers. 70 John Barrett to Joseph Tumulty, March 26, 1919, Box 47, Barrett Papers. 71 New York Times, April 4, 1919, 2; “Statement of John Barrett,” April 3, 1919, Box 47, Barrett Papers. 72 Thomas Sterling to John Barrett, April 28, 1919, Box 47, Barrett Papers. 73 Henry Myers to John Barrett, April 11, 1919, Box 47, Barrett Papers; Henry Cabot Lodge to John Barrett, April 30, 1919, Box 47, Barrett Papers.

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minister to Panama in 1905, Theodore Roosevelt had been so angry with Barrett’s diplomacy that he demanded his removal from the country, informing William Howard Taft that “this is his final trial to see how he will do.”74 Even in the moment in which he assumed the directorship of the Pan American Union, Elihu Root had to persuade Rear Admiral Arthur Robinson that Barret would not cause problems, admitting that it was certainly “a dreadful thing for a man to get people in the habit of not taking him seriously.”75 As Salvatore Prisco explains in his ­semi-biographical study of Barrett’s career, he had continuously clashed with Presidents over the role of the Pan American Union in political affairs and alienated himself from the State Department through his various initiatives. The disfavour which Barrett found himself in was viewed as increasingly problematic by the Latin American representatives on the governing board of the Pan American Union, who worried that his reputation was obstructing favourable treatment from the State Department. The fact that he pushed for the establishment of an American league of nations in a unilateral fashion was the final straw among his Latin American allies.76 Submitting his resignation in the autumn of 1919 and stepping down officially in September 1920, Barrett claimed that he had to resign for financial reasons. In reality, he had proven himself a continual nuisance to the Wilson administration. Despite these personal complaints against Barrett from Latin American representatives, the notion of a Pan-American Monroe Doctrine at the centre of an American league was still largely popular among them. South American diplomats, such as Ignacio Calderon of Bolivia, Francisco Varela of Peru, and Rómulo Naón of Argentina all advocated these designs vocally.77 They were additionally popular within academic circles, 74 Theodore

Roosevelt to William Howard Taft, April 20, 1905 and Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge, April 20, 1905 in Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, vol. 4, 1161–1167. 75 Elihu Root to Arthur Robinson, December 31, 1906, Box 187, Root Papers. 76 Salvatore Prisco III, John Barrett, Progressive Era Diplomat: A Study of a Commercial Expansionist, 1887–1920 (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1973), 85–90. 77 Ignacio Calderon, “The P ­an-American Doctrine,” in Report of the Twenty-Second Annual Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration: May 17th, 18th and 19th 1916 (Mohonk Lake, NY: Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration, 1916), 179–180; Ignacio Calderon, “The P ­an-American Union and the Monroe Doctrine,” Journal of International Relations 10, no. 2 (1919): 133–137; Washington Post, February 9, 1919, 28; Francisco Tudela y Varela, Early Efforts in Both Americas Towards the Establishment of a League of Nations (Washington, DC: s.n., 1919); Rómulo Naón,

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gaining support from figures such as Nicholas Murray Butler, Henry Ballantine, and George Blakeslee; although these academics stressed that the past friction caused by imperialistic interpretations of the Monroe Doctrine had to be overcome.78 Even Senator Lodge toyed with the idea, although he proposed that as part of this dual league system the United States would be “in control” of the American system “under the Monroe Doctrine.”79 Talk of regional organisation briefly shone another spotlight on Canada’s relationship with the Monroe Doctrine. Although Barrett had previously advocated Canadian membership to the Pan American Union during several trips to Canada in the early 1910s and had received little favourable response, he was reinvigorated by the treaty fight.80 During a visit to Toronto in November 1917, Barrett re-emphasised his desire to invite Canada to join the Pan American Union, having proposed to the rest of the Governing Board that the issue be discussed at the next Pan American Conference. Whilst Canada was not an American republic, Barrett believed that some sort of honorary membership ought to be granted because the war was strengthening hemispheric solidarity and Canada was fighting for the same causes as the United States and the belligerent Latin American nations. It would be fitting, he continued, that after the war “all the other countries of America should invite Canada to be a potent factor in their continued solidarity.” To support his suggestion, Barrett provided proof that Canadian membership had been contemplated for some time. When the new headquarters of the Pan American Union, the Pan American Building, was built in 1910 in Washington DC, the Governing Board ordered that “a chair should be made carrying the coat of arms and the name of Canada to be occupied

The European War and Pan Americanism (New York, NY: American Association for International Conciliation, 1919). 78 Cosmos [Nicholas Murray Butler], The Basis of Durable Peace (New York, NY: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1917), 108–110; George Blakeslee, “True Pan-Americanism: A Policy of Coöperation with the Other American Republics,” The Journal of Race Development 7, no. 3 (1917): 342–360; Henry Ballantine, “Shall the United States Join a League to Enforce Peace?” The Advocate of Peace, February 1917, 55. 79 William Widenor, Henry Cabot Lodge and the Search for an American Foreign Policy (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1980), 316–317. 80 Peter McKenna, Canada and the OAS: From Dilettante to Full Partner (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1995), 66–67.

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by some future representative of that country who might sit at the Governing Board table!” Barrett believed that this act intimated the invitation to Canada and that the American republics needed to “prepare to make it real and develop for the first time in history a perfect Pan American Union.”81 Through Barrett’s personal persistence and the growth of P ­anAmerican sentiment within segments of the decision-making class, advocacy of regional organisation was presented as a viable alternative during the treaty fight that represented a middle ground in terms of the extent to which the United States ought to embrace internationalism. The concept of regional organisation stood as the natural evolution to the proposals for a Pan-American Monroe Doctrine that had continued to grow in popularity since first enunciated at the turn of the century. Like unilateralists, Pan-Americanists desired to remain removed from distant affairs, however, they believed that inter-American cooperation via regional organisation, rather than regional hegemony, was the most appropriate path for the United States to follow. Moreover, the circulation of these proposals among the nation’s decision makers demonstrated that the treaty fight was a multifaceted debate that forced policy makers to reconcile with a variety of internationalisms rather than simply adopting an all-or-nothing position.

Recognition, Reservation, and Rejection When Wilson left for Paris in December 1918 with the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, he remained committed to the idea that the League would extend the doctrine to the world. As such, he initially saw little need to refer to the Monroe Doctrine within the first draft of the League covenant despite critics demanding some form of reservation. However, certain members of the commission were concerned about the hold the Monroe Doctrine might have upon the American people and attempted to convince Wilson that a reservation or some sort of clause relating to the doctrine was wise. In the weeks prior to the conference, Lansing advised Wilson in several memoranda to consider the doctrine’s position in relation to the League, primarily because his opponents would continue to utilise it against his cause. Every effort had to 81 “Pan America and Pan Americanism: Their Mighty Meaning to Canada,” November 26, 1917, Box 98, Barrett Papers.

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be exhausted “to make public opinion unanimous and to deprive the opponents of the League of the plausible arguments of unconstitutionality and abandonment of national policies.” He additionally suggested that Wilson should try and frame the League covenant negatively, rather than filling it with positive guarantees, on the grounds that a negatively framed covenant would pose less of a challenge to existing policies such as the Monroe Doctrine.82 This latter argument was supported by David Hunter Miller, a legal advisor of the commission who made significant contributions to the drafting of the Treaty of Versailles. Miller was keen on developing a reservation on the Monroe Doctrine because he was “not in favor of having guarantees of Latin-America made by non-American Powers.”83 Miller subsequently informed the President of his views on the matter, arguing that the doctrine needed to be “thrown into the balance” because it had permitted the nations of Latin America to develop their own form of civilisation and ideals. Whilst Miller argued that Latin American development could be criticised as “slow” and “faulty,” it was still a form of self-determined development which had been enabled by the Monroe Doctrine.84 Wilson refused to heed this advice and there was no reference to the Monroe Doctrine in the first draft of the League of Nations covenant. Unsurprisingly, when Wilson returned to the United States in February 1919 to present the draft, the Monroe Doctrine continued to be a point of contention. Upon his return to Paris in March, Wilson received a string of telegrams from Taft in which he strongly advised Wilson to draft a reservation on the Monroe Doctrine, claiming that a suitable reservation “would probably carry the treaty.”85 The commission thus occupied itself with forming a Monroe Doctrine clause throughout March. Charles Thompson, an American journalist at the

82 “Memorandum on League of Nations and U.S. Traditional Policies,” December 18, 1918, Reel 1, Robert Lansing Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC; Robert Lansing, The Peace Negotiations (New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1921), 48–50. 83 David Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant, vol. 1 (New York, NY: G. P. Putman’s Sons, 1928), 29–30. 84 Ibid., 45–48. 85 William Howard Taft to Woodrow Wilson, March 18, 1919, “Memorandum for the President,” March 19, 1919; William Howard Taft to Joseph Tumulty, March 28, 1919, in Works of William Howard Taft, vol. 8, 295–299.

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conference, recorded in his diary that because of this anxiety over the Monroe Doctrine a number of possible amendments were being worked on “by almost everyone in the American commission.”86 Stephan Bonsal also recorded in March that Wilson “has been to see [Edward] House twice since his return, and the subject of these conferences is how best to introduce the Monroe Doctrine reservation, demanded by the Senate, into what had been hopefully regarded as a closed covenant, signed and sealed.”87 What made matters more complicated was the attitude of other ­delegations present at the conference. Whilst the British delegation did not oppose the inclusion of a Monroe Doctrine clause in theory, Seth Tillman argues that Prime Minister Lloyd George “undertook to exploit the President’s domestic embarrassment for purposes of securing an Anglo-American agreement on naval armaments,” creating an “artificial opposition to the Monroe Doctrine.”88 Edward House worried that this resistance might wreck any chance of a Monroe Doctrine reservation; however, he took it upon himself to convince Wilson that it was necessary, insisting that the President “force Lloyd George to come to our way of thinking.”89 The French delegation was just as troublesome. On 10 April at the Fourteenth Meeting of the Commission on the League of Nations, Wilson aimed to finalise the position of a Monroe Doctrine reservation in the covenant, proposing that the clause be attached to Article 10 as an amendment. However, the French delegation was particularly vocal in its objections, demanding a clear definition of the doctrine be given. What followed was quite unexpected. Miller recorded that Wilson “became very much stirred,” his agitation visible in the quivering of his lower lip. Unwilling to take any more criticism from the French, he gave an impromptu speech which Miller described as “perhaps the most

86 Charles Thompson, The Peace Conference Day by Day: A Presidential Pilgrimage Leading to the Discovery of Europe (New York, NY: Brentano’s, 1920), 257–258. 87 Stephan Bonsal, Suitors and Suppliants: The Little Nations at Versailles (New York, NY: Prentice Hall, 1946), 263. 88 Seth Tillman, Anglo-American Relations at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961), 280–289; Adam Tooze, The Deluge: The Great War, America and the Remaking of the Global Order, 1916–1931 (New York, NY: Viking, 2014), 69–270. 89 Diaries, Volume 7, March 27, 1919, Edward Mandell House Papers, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library.

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impressive speech I ever heard.” The President outlined that the Monroe Doctrine had been declared in the face of European absolutism, demanding that such absolutism should not spread to the Western Hemisphere. The doctrine was, therefore, a forerunner to the League of Nations, and through its belligerency the United States had sought to defend its principles. Was the United States, Wilson asked, to be denied the recognition that it was the first nation to uphold these principles? Were the other nations going to withhold from the United States the “small gift of a few words” which state the fact that it had been devoted to the principles of liberty and independence that were to be consecrated in the League of Nations for the past century? The covenant was, Wilson concluded, the highest tribute to the Monroe Doctrine because it was an extension of its principles, and a reservation was nothing more than proclaiming that the doctrine was not inconsistent with the covenant.90 House similarly recorded in his diary that the meeting was “one of the stormiest meetings we have had at all.” He criticised the stubbornness of the French delegates, referring to their complaints as one of the most “stupid performances I have ever witnessed.” House wrote that Wilson’s speech was “impassioned” and “full of eloquence and good sense,” convincing everyone present except for the French.91 At the conclusion of Wilson’s address, the American delegates believed that the Monroe Doctrine reservation had been passed, being transferred from Article 10 to 21. However, as the next day began, it transpired that the French still objected to the reservation. Wilson remained frustrated and outlined his annoyance at the suspicion cast upon the Monroe Doctrine, emphasising that the reservation was made to “relieve a state of mind and misapprehension on the other side of the water.”92 House claimed that the American delegates were “not in a humor to take anything except what we wanted” and as such the reservation was finally accepted. It had been “an exhibition of Anglo Saxon tenacity.”93 The Monroe Doctrine was now formally recognised in the League of Nations covenant, with Article 21 stating that: “Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the 90 Miller, Covenant, vol. 1, 442–450; “Minuets of a Meeting of the League of Nations Commission,” April 10, 1919, in Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 57, 218–232. 91 Diaries, Volume 7, April 11, 1919, House Papers. 92 Miller, Covenant, vol. 1, 453–460; “Remarks on the Monroe Doctrine,” April 11, 1919, in Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 57, 266–268. 93 Diaries, Volume 7, April 12, 1919, House Papers.

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validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace.”94 In the United States, the response to Article 21 was largely divided. League advocates felt that the reservation had not only met the demands of the Senate and protected the Monroe Doctrine but enshrined it. Wilson personally defended Article 21 upon his return, attesting its value before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and during his Western tour.95 Vice President Thomas Marshall and Democrat Senators Key Pittman and Claude Swanson all voiced their approval of the reservation, arguing that it had suitably taken care of the problem and Lowell described the doctrine as occupying a “very favorable position.”96 Henry White, a delegate of the peace commission, defended the reservation’s terminology, arguing that if it expressly exempted too much, other nations would have demanded similar privileges.97 These discussions over the draft covenant prompted Americans to consider the connection between the Monroe Doctrine and international law. In response to Article 21, the New York Times ran an editorial which boldly claimed that the reservation equated to recognition of the doctrine’s status “as public law.”98 Many advocates of the League believed that achieving this allegedly legal recognition of the doctrine was a great achievement. Prior to this moment, the doctrine had been widely regarded as separate from the realm of international law, functioning as a policy declaration of the United States.99 Former Secretary of the Interior, Walter Fisher, had 94 “The Covenant of the League of Nations,” The Avalon Project, https://avalon.law. yale.edu/imt/parti.asp. 95 “A Conversation with Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,” August 19, 1919, in Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 62, 339–411. 96 Thomas Marshall, “America, the Nations and the League,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 84 (1919): 196; U.S. Congress. Senate. Address by Senator Key Pittman, 66th Congress, 1st Session, Congressional Record, June 10, 1919, 894–897; U.S. Congress. Senate. Treaty of Peace with Germany, 66th Congress, 1st Session, Congressional Record, July 14, 1919, 2532–2545; Abbot Lawrence Lowell to Elihu Root, May 1, 1919, Box 137, Root Papers. 97 Andrew White to Elihu Root, March 7, 1919, March 19, 1919, Box 137, Root Papers. 98 New York Times, April 14, 1919, 12. 99 Root’s address before the American Society of International Law in 1914 best represented the ways in which Americans perceived the relationship between international law and the Monroe Doctrine: Elihu Root, “The Real Monroe Doctrine,” Proceedings of the American Society of International Law at its Annual Meeting, 8 (1914): 427–442. For a

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remarked in 1917 that “it would be a good thing if we had to define and defend the Monroe Doctrine at the bar of reason” and Historian George Blakeslee lauded the League covenant as having placed the doctrine “in whole or in part, in the body of international law,” giving it the “legal backing and the pledged support of all states of the World League.”100 Whilst Taft had repeatedly argued that the doctrine was not part of international law, its recognition within the League Covenant was cause for celebration: “Never before in our history has the world set its approval upon the doctrine as in this Covenant. It is really a great triumph for the supporters of the doctrine. It is not only a reservation in favor of the United States asserting it, but it is an affirmative declaration of its conventional character and of its value in securing international peace.”101 However, it transpired that this argument was largely unconvincing due to the strength of Article 21’s critics and because of the reality that the Monroe Doctrine was not an instrument of international law. Yet this legalist rhetoric is understandable when one accounts for the prominence of international law during this period. This was a moment in which international law was becoming increasingly professionalised and international lawyers were occupying prominent positions within the State Department. There was a growing sense that legal measures could be utilised for the good of peace and that international law was “an essential component of the nation’s emergence as a Great Power.”102 Whilst the recent evaluation of the Monroe Doctrine’s relationship to international law see Heiko Meiertöns, The Doctrines of US Security Policy: An Evaluation Under International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 50–51. On Article 21 of the League covenant specifically see John Spencer, “The Monroe Doctrine and the League Covenant,” American Journal of International Law 30, no. 3 (1936): 400–413. 100 Walter Fisher, “A League to Enforce Peace,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 72 (1917): 195; George Blakeslee, “The Monroe Doctrine and the Proposed Constitution of the League of Nations,” The Journal of Race Development 9, no. 4 (1919): 420–428. 101 “Analysis of the League Covenant as Amended,” in Works of William Howard Taft, vol. 7, 290–291. 102 Benjamin Coates, Legalist Empire: International Law and American Foreign Relations in the Early Twentieth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 2; Stephen Neff, Justice Among Nations: A History of International Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), 300–306; Katharina Rietzler, “Fortunes of a Profession: American Foundations and International Law, 1910–1939,” Global Society 28, no. 1 (2014), 13; Francis Boyle, Foundations of World Order: The Legalist Approach to International Relations, 1898–1922 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999), 3–23; John Hepp,

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League of Nations itself represented a departure from traditional aspects of international law, this rhetoric demonstrated that global organisation was widely perceived as a way to grant the Monroe Doctrine some form of legal recognition. Prominent anti-League figures had a field day when Article 21 was revealed. Beveridge’s correspondence was filled with criticism of the Monroe Doctrine reservation and Lodge claimed that Article 21 “proposed to kill” the doctrine, describing it as “worse than worthless.”103 Hiram Johnson argued that it “could not have been written with any other purpose than the destruction of the Monroe doctrine,” concluding that Article 21 was typical of every aspect of the League: “It is pretended that it does one thing when it is intended it shall do another. It is not frank, nor fair, nor open, nor honest. Where plain language might express, without equivocation or ambiguity or evasion, the plain language is not employed.”104 Former Ambassador Charlemagne Tower referred to the reservation as a “statement so non-committal that is difficult to ascertain what meaning it may have at all in relation to the Monroe Doctrine,” whereas historian David Hill posed the key questions on most Americans’ lips: “Between whom is it an engagement? What does it engage? If President Wilson could not define it, what are the foreign Powers to understand by it? Here is clear ground for indefinite controversy.”105 Historian William Shepherd was troubled by the strange definition, likening it to the act of describing a crab as a “red fish that

“James Brown Scott and the Rise of Public International Law,” Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era 7, no. 2 (2008): 151; Cecilie Reid, “Peace and Law: Peace Activism and International Arbitration, 1895–1907,” Peace and Change 29, no. 3&4 (2004): 528; Frederic Kirgis, The American Society of International Law’s First Century 1906–2006 (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2006), 1–24. 103 Letters to William Borah, Will Hays, Philander Knox, Frank Munsey, Medill McCormick and George Moses in Boxes 214–216, Beveridge Papers; U.S. Congress. Senate. League of Nations, 66th Congress, 1st Session, Congressional Record, August 12, 1919, 3778–3791; Henry Cabot Lodge to James Bryce, May 27, 1919, Reel 71, Bryce Papers; Henry Cabot Lodge to Elihu Root, April 29, 1919, Box 161, Root Papers. 104 U.S. Congress. Senate. The Monroe Doctrine, 66th Congress, 1st Session, Congressional Record, June 2, 1919, 505–506. 105 Charlemagne Tower, “The Origin, Meaning and International Force of the Monroe Doctrine,” The American Journal of International Law 14, no. 1/2 (1920): 24; Hill, “The Betrayal of the Monroe Doctrine,” 592–593.

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swims backwards,” and lawyer George Pepper found fault in the doctrine’s apparent peacekeeping nature, stating that it was proclaimed with the interests of the United States in mind, not world peace.106 Whilst certain commentators noted that Article 21 “scarcely deserves serious consideration” due to the infrequency in which the United States would be powerless to act against a violation of the Monroe Doctrine, there was an overwhelming sense of dissatisfaction with the reservation.107 Ultimately, Article 21 did little to satisfy critics of the League and the Monroe Doctrine remained a core reason as to why the Senate rejected the Treaty of Versailles. Despite Barrett’s suggestions, the prospect of a regional league was not discussed formally at the peace conference.108 Yet the rejection of the Treaty of Versailles in the United States Senate granted even more impetus to demands for regional organisation, and support came from a number of Latin American officials as well as from within the United States. Former Congressman James Slayden once again advocated a Pan-American transformation of the doctrine, stating that the failure of the League of Nations signified the necessity of an American league, one that would permit all the American republics to uphold and maintain the doctrine.109 International lawyer Philip Marshall Brown agreed, noting that the Senate’s actions signified that regional issues should be tackled before international ones and that “there should be no inherent logical difficulty in converting this declaration of rights [the Monroe Doctrine] into a Pan-American declaration.”110 Chilean representative, Beltran Mathieu, informed Edward House that he believed that an American League could function alongside the League of Nations, and 106 Shepherd, “The Monroe Doctrine Reconsidered,” 65–66; George Pepper, “The Objections to the League of Nations Covenant,” Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science in the City of New York 8, no. 3 (1919): 36. 107 Thomas White, “The Amended Covenant of the League of Nations,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 84 (1919): 187–188; Arnold Hall, The Monroe Doctrine and the Great War (Chicago, IL: A. C. McClurg & Co., 1920), 146–147. 108 However, John Bassett Moore noted that Wilson did speak about the abortive Pan American pact in passing to Epitácio Pessoa, the President-elect of Brazil: John Bassett Moore to da Domicio da Gama, June 19, 1919, Box 120, John Bassett Moore Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. 109 James Slayden, “A League of the Americas,” Advocate of Peace, June 1921, 231. 110 Phillip Marshall Brown, “The Monroe Doctrine and the League of Nations,” The American Journal of International Law 14, no. 1/2 (1920): 210.

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the President of Uruguay, Baltasar Brum, outlined in an address at the University of Montevideo a plan for regional organisation closely related to the principles of the Monroe Doctrine.111 Brum’s proposal, which he simply described as “American Solidarity,” was particularly noteworthy— as the following chapter explains, it would play a role in establishing the climate of post-war inter-American relations, although not in the way he had intended. Brum’s plan was similar to Barrett’s previous suggestions. Within a regional league, “the Monroe Doctrine proclaimed as a standard of foreign policy of the United States would become a defensive alliance between all the American countries, founded on a deep sentiment of solidarity with mutual obligations and reciprocal advantages for all concerned.”112 Indeed, Barrett proudly noted that Brum’s proposal was “in harmony with what it has been my privilege to advocate for many years in connection with the Pan American Union.”113 The Uruguayan President was so committed to the notion of an American league that within the space of a week of his enunciation, he had challenged a newspaper editor who had denounced his proposal to a duel.114 Whilst Pan-Americanists had much to be hopeful for, no tenable progress was made in the aftermath of the treaty fight to Pan-Americanise the Monroe Doctrine or to form an American league of nations. The fact that many Latin American nations joined the League of Nations challenged any prospect of hemispheric unity under a multilateral Monroe Doctrine.115 More importantly, many Latin American nations remained cautious of the United States, given the manner in which it had used the Monroe Doctrine in recent history, and favoured securing Latin American solidarity over outright Pan-American unity.116 The proclamation of the Carranza Doctrine by the Mexican President Venustiano 111 Diaries,

Volume 8a, July 26, 1920, House Papers. Brum, American Solidarity (Montevideo: Imprenta Nacional, 1920), 13–14. 113 “Memorandum requested Mr. Hudson Halley,” April 23, 1920, Box 99, Barrett Papers. 114 Washington Post, April 27, 1920, 5. 115 As Yannick Wehrli argues, the League of Nations presented Latin American nations with the opportunity “to strengthen their position on the international stage, particularly in relation to the United States.”: Yannick Wehrli, “New Histories of Latin America at the League of Nations,” in Beyond Geopolitics: New Histories of Latin America at the League of Nations, eds. Alan McPherson and Yannick Wehrli (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 2015), 2. 116 Rinke, First World War, 251–254. 112 Baltasar

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Carranza in 1918 aptly demonstrated this. Carranza’s emphasis on policies of non-intervention, and his demand that diplomacy should not be used to protect private interests, was prompted by the United States’ unfavourable reaction to the new Mexican Constitution. However, United States officials perceived the Mexican doctrine as a direct challenge to the Monroe Doctrine and a call for Latin American nations to unite against United States interests. Mexican newspapers such as El Pueblo vocally disavowed the Monroe Doctrine and a lengthy report prepared by the State Department’s Office of the Solicitor claimed that the Carranza Doctrine aimed to ultimately “array Latin-America against the United States.”117 Internationalism, whether full-blown or regional, seemed to be off the table by the dawn of the 1920s. * * * On 30 December 1919, Hiram Bingham, the Yale historian who had advocated the abandonment of the Monroe Doctrine in 1913, presented a paper at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association titled “The Future of the Monroe Doctrine.” Although Bingham had been largely silent on the Monroe Doctrine throughout the course of the treaty fight, as a new post-war era dawned, he renounced his earlier demands and called for the strict maintenance of the doctrine that he had previously so despised. He argued that his 1913 thesis was based on the supposition that European nations had “long since lost their tendency towards despotism” and that the stronger nations of South America would join the United States in any future defence of the Americas. The conduct of the war had shattered these suppositions, Bingham argued, and he criticised Germany’s aggressive policy and the lacklustre attitudes of Argentina and Chile during the conflict. He believed that the Monroe Doctrine was now no longer obsolete but “more firmly held than ever 117 “The Attitude of the United States Toward the Carranza Doctrine,” August 23, 1918, Box 18, Woolsey Papers. Robert Lansing was equally as critical of the doctrine: Robert Lansing to Woodrow Wilson, August 21, 1919, in Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 62, 449–450. On the formation of the Carranza Doctrine see Mark Gilderhus, “Wilson, Carranza, and the Monroe Doctrine: A Question in Regional Organization,” Diplomatic History 7, no. 2 (1983): 112–115; Jurgen Buchenau, In the Shadow of the Giant: The Making of Mexico’s Central American Policy, 1876–1930 (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1996), 121–122; William Raat and Michael Brescia, Mexico and the United States: Ambivalent Vistas, 4th ed. (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2010), 127–128.

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before” and argued that its maintenance was essential in order to prevent potential Japanese and Russian ambitions in the Western Hemisphere, proposing that the United States should “Cubanize” Mexico through a policy of intervention. The United States, he concluded, must remain committed to upholding the Monroe Doctrine, ensuring that it was “latent in Temperate America, active in Tropical America, and immediately effective in Mexico.”118 Bingham’s reversal suggests that the unilateral, imperialistic, and hegemony-facilitating interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine emerged dominant after the conclusion of the war and the treaty fight. The idea that the Monroe Doctrine could be globalised soon died along with the rejection of the Treaty of Versailles and key policy makers were either uneasy with or simply ignored the idea of utilising it as a basis for ­Pan-American unity. For many Americans, the Monroe Doctrine could not function within the framework of international organisation and the threat that any league of nations posed to its unilateral maintenance was an important contributing factor to the Senate’s rejection of the treaty. Not even a reservation could satisfy ardent supporters of the Monroe Doctrine—only the United States could interpret its application. Yet despite the apparent victory of the unilateral, ­ hegemonyfacilitating interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, the treaty fight still served to emphasise how fractured the doctrine’s meaning had become nearly one hundred years after its enunciation. The two antithetical core values that had become central to competing early twentieth-century interpretations of the doctrine found significant support during the treaty fight. Wilson’s Republican successors attempted to utilise the Monroe Doctrine’s upcoming centennial anniversary to solidify their interpretation of the doctrine in the aftermath of the First World War and the battles of the treaty fight. However, as the various celebratory events would demonstrate, the doctrine’s meaning was far from clear and remained very much open to renegotiation. The notion of a global Monroe Doctrine may have waned but demands for Pan-American unity continued to clash with Republican policies of unilateralism, demonstrating the tension that remained among the nation’s core values.

118 Hiram Bingham, “The Future of the Monroe Doctrine,” Journal of International Relations 10, no. 4 (1920): 392–403. On Bingham’s reversal see Thomas Karnes, “Hiram Bingham and his Obsolete Shibboleth,” Diplomatic History 3, no. 1 (1979): 55–57.

One Hundred Years and Still Going Strong?

Of all the fashionable activities available to citizens of the United States during the early twentieth century, none had become quite as popular as the public celebration of anniversaries. Whether commemorating the founding of a city, a historic military victory, or the birthday of a famous national leader, anniversary celebrations were a continuous feature of the nation’s cultural calendar. Celebratory banquets, social gatherings, church services, parades, and public readings were typical activities of the period that offered Americans from a broad range of social classes the opportunity to assess the contemporary relevance of historic events and contribute to the reformation of national memory. The exposition boom of the Gilded Age and the Progressive Era heightened this fascination with anniversaries and many of the nation’s great world’s fairs, such as the Centennial Exposition (1876) and the Louisiana Purchase Exhibition (1904), were purposefully aligned to the commemoration of the past. Large-scale expositions remained popular after the First World War and organisers continued to frame them as anniversary celebrations, including the Century of Progress Exposition (1933) and the Texas Centennial

© The Author(s) 2020 A. Bryne, The Monroe Doctrine and United States National Security in the Early Twentieth Century, Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the Contemporary World, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-43431-1_6

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Exposition (1936).1 For most citizens living in urban regions, there always seemed to be a historic event to commemorate. There were, of course, a handful of individuals who rolled their eyes at the extent to which Americans indulged themselves in commemorating the past. Writing for Scribner’s Magazine in October 1923, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge bemoaned the public for jumping at the chance to celebrate any and all anniversaries regardless of their significance. He noted that Americans had become “creatures of habit and slaves to the arbitrary divisions of time,” claiming that few anniversaries needed to be in constant remembrance. Instead, only a “distinguished few” ought to be engaged with. One such anniversary that Lodge deemed worthy of “reverence and commemoration” was the centennial anniversary of the Monroe Doctrine. Because the doctrine had become “inextricably interwoven” into the history of the United States through securing the independence of the American continents and promoting “the peace of the world,” Lodge reasoned that it would “never be amiss to review its history and reiterate its significance.”2 Popular opinion reflected the senator’s hyperbolic sentiments. Despite how contentious the Monroe Doctrine’s meaning had become over the past two decades, an unprecedented amount of appreciation was showered upon the revered policy throughout 1923. At the start of the year, Congress established the Monroe Doctrine Centennial Commission to ensure that the anniversary was duly recognised. Headed by individuals such as former Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby, Governor of New York Alfred E. Smith, and author George Henry Payne, the commission 1 John Bodnar, Remaking America: Public Memory, Commemoration, and Patriotism in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 30–31; Robert Rydell, All the World’s a Fair: Visions of Empire at American International Expositions, 1876–1916 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 4; World of Fairs: The Centuryof-Progress Fairs (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 15. Recent studies of commemorative anniversaries in the United States include M. Todd Bennett, “The Spirit of’ 76: Diplomacy Commemorating the U.S. Bicentennial in 1976,” Diplomatic History, 40, no. 4 (2016): 695–721; Bruno Giberti, Designing the Centennial: A History of the International Exhibition in Philadelphia (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2015); Robert Cook, Troubled Commemoration: The American Civil War Centennial, 1961–1965 (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 2007); Lyn Spillman, Nation and Commemoration: Creating National Identities in the United States and Australia (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 2 Henry Cabot Lodge, “One Hundred Years of the Monroe Doctrine,” Scribner’s, October 1923, 413–423.

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Fig. 1  “One hundred years old and still going strong. You can’t help wishing him many happy returns of the day,” Collier’s Weekly, December 1, 1923 (Image courtesy of the Jay N. “Ding” Darling Wildlife Society. Uncle Sam wishes the ghost of President James Monroe many happy returns of the day for protecting the Americas from the empires of Europe)

was granted $122,500 from the Treasury to organise several celebratory events across the nation.3 A range of private organisations arranged their own patriotic celebrations, utilising oratory, imagery, and the written form to honour the role the doctrine had served in facilitating the ascendancy of the nation. Cartoonist Jay Darling triumphantly reflected public sentiment—the anniversary was to be a moment of national celebration and pride (Fig. 1). Although significant national anniversaries often adopt a celebratory tone, they are rarely devoid of political implications. To paraphrase 3 U.S. Congress. Senate. Anniversary of Monroe Doctrine and Death of James Monroe, 67th Congress, 4th Session, Congressional Record, February 24, 1923, 4491. The Commission received instructions that $67,500 should aid the James Monroe Memorial Association in the purchase of Monroe’s former residence in New York and establish a memorial foundation to raise funds to further the “progress, amity, and good will among the peoples of the Pan American Republics.” The remaining $55,000 was for organising “a general program of public celebration” in New York City, Washington, DC, and Virginia.

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Melani McAlister, they are cultural texts that not only reflect reality or “reproduce some pre-existing social reality,” but actively produce meanings and implications.4 The Monroe Doctrine centennial anniversary was no exception. It transcended the act of memorialisation and provided a unique forum for Americans to reconsider and debate the doctrine’s meaning after the First World War.5 The doctrine’s centennial was particularly meaningful because there was no historical disconnect between the commemoration of the doctrine’s proclamation and its application in 1923. Unlike wars or other historic events that tend to receive national commemoration, the Monroe Doctrine was not buried in the past—it continued to serve as a consideration among policy makers as Americans celebrated its one hundredth anniversary. Indeed, as this book has demonstrated, the centennial itself did not prompt a sudden interest in the doctrine. Instead, it functioned as another milestone in the chain of events that generated debate over the doctrine’s meaning and the core values of United States national security. Built upon two decades of prior debate, the centennial anniversary positioned ­Pan-American identity alongside notions of hegemonic superiority and forced the nation to engage with the antithetical nature of the core values the doctrine was deemed to embody. It accentuated the doctrine’s unsettled meaning and reflected the discord that permeated domestic perceptions of the place of the United States in the world during the early 1920s. The treaty fight had ended, but the doctrine continued to guide Americans’ understanding of internationalism. Accordingly, the Monroe Doctrine centennial anniversary is not simply a fascinating example of commemorative culture within the United States. Both Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes and President Calvin Coolidge attempted to use the centennial to enunciate the 4 Melani McAlister, Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the Middle East Since 1945 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005), 5. 5 The Monroe Doctrine’s centennial anniversary has received very little scholarly attention. An examination of the commemorative events and the extent to which they demonstrated the doctrine’s domestic popularity can be found in James Isenhower, “Protean Policy: Understanding the Monroe Doctrine’s Regular Recurrence within the American Foreign Policy Debate” (PhD diss., Duke University, 2004), 22–66. Most references to the centennial focus exclusively on Secretary Hughes’ address at Philadelphia. However, some studies, such as Clif Stratton’s analysis of education and empire in the United States, mention the centennial in passing: Clif Stratton, Education for Empire: American Schools, Race, and the Path of Good Citizenship (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2016), 170.

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Republican administration’s official interpretation of the doctrine, one that sought to solidify the nation’s dominant position in the Americas. Yet several of the commemorative events and the accompanying commentary presented alternative interpretations of the doctrine, emphasising the futility of defining and applying the now fractured doctrine. The celebratory tone was additionally marred by long-standing critiques of the doctrine and Americans continued to question whether it ought to be interpreted as a unilateral foreign policy device that strove to maintain United States hegemony in the Western Hemisphere, or as a Pan-American doctrine that emphasised a multilateral approach to hemispheric affairs. As historian William Shepherd reflected after the centennial’s conclusion, the celebrations demonstrated how “elusive and elastic” the doctrine’s meaning had become.6

Fiasco at Santiago The centennial anniversary coincided with the early years of a new post-war phase of United States foreign relations. As the nations of Europe languished in the devastating aftermath of the First World War, it appeared unlikely that the Monroe Doctrine would be challenged by its historic detractors in the near future. The threat of German activity in the Western Hemisphere became negligible after it was stripped of its colonial empire, and the victorious European powers emerged battered and bruised from the conflict. The collapse of the Hapsburg and Ottoman empires reinforced the notion that the old powers were giving way to the new, and it was only Japan and the newly formed Soviet Union that generated much concern among United States policy makers. The United States was one of the few nations to benefit economically from the war, placing it in an ideal position to enforce its hegemonic control of the Americas.7 It therefore became increasingly difficult to

6 William Shepherd, “The Monroe Doctrine Reconsidered,” Political Science Quarterly 39, no. 1 (1924), 35. 7 William Mulligan, The Great War for Peace (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014), 303, 340; Akira Iriye, The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, vol. 3, The Globalizing of America, 1913–1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 73–75; Frank Costigliola, Awkward Dominion: American Political, Economic, and Cultural Relations with Europe, 1919–1933 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), 25.

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rationalise the use of force in Latin America to maintain regional security. The policies of forceful intervention in the circum-Caribbean that had been the hallmark of Woodrow Wilson’s Latin American policy were viewed as inappropriate and gradually lost public support.8 Efforts were made to withdraw United States troops from the Dominican Republic and policy makers sought to allay the fear of Yankee imperialism within Latin America. However, Wilson’s Republican successors had no intention of relinquishing regional hegemony nor straying from unilateral foreign policy initiatives. It was easy for Republican policy makers to criticise the now-disgraced Democrat’s policies and score political points, but genuinely cordial inter-American relations would only be pursued if they served national interests. The United States Empire was certainly not a benevolent presence in Latin America after the war and troops were sent to Honduras in 1924 and Panama in 1925.9 Ultimately, President Warren Harding clung to the idea of the “good old Monroe Doctrine of America dominating the affairs of the New World as they concern us.”10 The Fifth Pan American Conference, held in Santiago, Chile between 25 March and 3 May 1923 demonstrated that the rejection of the Treaty of Versailles had not settled the Monroe Doctrine question. The conference had originally been scheduled to take place in November 1914, yet the detrimental economic impact of the First World War upon several Latin American nations, including the host nation Chile, forced the

8 Emily Rosenberg, “World War I, Wilsonianism, and Challenges to U.S. Empire,” Diplomatic History 38, 4 (2014): 859; Alan McPherson, The Invaded: How Latin Americans and Their Allies Fought and Ended U.S. Occupations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 194–195; Lester Langley, The Banana Wars: An Inner History of American Empire 1900–1934 (Lexington, KT: University Press of Kentucky, 1983), 169–170. 9 Brian Loveman, No Higher Law: American Foreign Policy and the Western Hemisphere Since 1776 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 228; Lester Langley, America and the Americas: The United States in the Western Hemisphere (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2nd ed., 2010), 119; Kenneth Grieb, The Latin American Policy of Warren G. Harding (Fort Worth, TX: Texas Christian University Press, 1976), 1–13; Bryce Wood, The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy (New York, NY: W. W. Norton and Company, 1961), 3–5; Alexander DeConde, Herbert Hoover’s Latin American Policy (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1951), 3–5. 10 Harding described the Monroe Doctrine in this way shortly before being elected President in 1920: New York Times, October 15, 1920, 2.

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Pan American Union to postpone the conference.11 In 1922 a revised programme was created and a new date set. However, inter-American disputes marred the proceedings from the outset. Mexico was forbidden from sending a delegation because it was not represented on the Governing Board of the Pan American Union, and Peru and Bolivia refused to participate due to ill will surrounding the ongoing Tacna– Arica dispute.12 The conference was intended, among a variety of issues, to discuss the possibility of naval and military reductions and limitations, the rights of aliens, disease prevention, the reorganisation of the Pan American Union, and the codification of an American international law.13 Crucially, this was the first instance in which the Pan American Union permitted the overt discussion of political matters, which provided scope for the Monroe Doctrine to become a topic of debate. Questions regarding the Monroe Doctrine emerged when the formation of a regional American League of Nations was proposed by the Uruguayan delegation. Hope remained among Pan-Americanists across the hemisphere that some sort of regional system of international organisation could be established in the wake of the First World War. After concluding his term as Uruguay’s President, Baltasar Brum continued to advocate a Pan-American reinterpretation of the Monroe Doctrine through the enactment of his “American Solidarity” plan and saw the conference as an ideal opportunity to push the issue. Accordingly, the Uruguayan delegation announced that it would bring a proposal for the establishment of an American league of nations before the conference.14 The nation’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Juan Bueo, passionately

11 “Memorandum for the Press,” October 7, 1914, Box  37, John Barrett Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington DC; James Vivian, “Wilson, Bryan, and the American Delegation to the Abortive Fifth Pan American Conference, 1914,” Nebraska History 59 (1978): 56–69. 12 On the absent delegations see William Collier to Charles Evan Hughes, January 22, 1923 in United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1923, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1938), 291–292. For the Tacna-Arica dispute see Elbridge Colby, “The Tacna-Arica Dispute,” Georgetown Law Journal 13, no. 4 (1925): 343–366. 13 Fifth International Conference of American States: Special Handbook for the Use of the Delegates (Washington, DC: Pan American Union, 1922). 14 Brum’s renewed proposal is detailed in Hoffman Philip to Charles Evan Hughes, February 23, 1923 in FRUS 1923, vol. 1, 293–294; New York Times, February 11, 1923, 4.

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outlined the reasoning behind Uruguay’s commitment to a league, explaining that the “solidarity of the nations of America is neither artificial nor vainly Utopian. It is absolutely natural, the logical sequence of their past history.” To Bueo, a “United America is not, I repeat, an ideal merely; it is no vain dream, but an economical and social reality, which will overthrow all obstacles by the force of its own inherent fitness.”15 Unfortunately, now that the treaty fight had ended, there were not many influential decision makers in the United States that remained committed to regional organisation, which significantly reduced the volume of opinion being dispersed domestically in favour of an American league. Having retired from the Pan American Union in 1920, the United States’ most vocal supporter of inter-American solidarity, John Barrett, made little effort to advocate an American league as stridently as he once had.16 Without Barrett’s tirade of positivity, the prospect of an American league did not gain widespread attention. Those who did take an interest in the Santiago conference gave mixed predictions. On the one hand were figures such as Senator George Pepper who viewed Brum’s proposal as an essential step towards what he deemed the inevitable formation of a world league “with divisions corresponding to the Eastern and Western Hemispheres, where conditions require separate consideration and separate treatment.”17 Yet on the other, pessimistic opinion abounded, including an editorial in the New York Times that claimed that “no country in South America, except Uruguay, trusts us” enough to join any form of regional organisation.18 In the end, opinion on the issue hardly mattered. Under the direction of Secretary Hughes, the United States delegation to the conference had no intention of supporting the formation of a hemispheric league or establishing a PanAmerican Monroe Doctrine. Unilateralism was the delegation’s mantra, and the proposal was doomed from the outset.

15 Bulletin

of the Pan American Union, January 1923, 14–15. his resignation announcement of 1920, Barrett noted that he would continue to dedicate his time to advocacy of an American League of Nations. However, his efforts were negligible in comparison to earlier efforts: “Special Final Announcement of John Barrett,” August 25, 1920, Box 95, Barrett Papers. 17 New York Times, April 3, 1923, 2. 18 New York Times, March 4, 1923, 10. 16 In

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Samuel Guy Inman, a missionary from the Committee on Cooperation in Latin America, was present at the conference as a reporter and recorded the negative attitude of the United States delegation in his letters. He observed that the Uruguayan delegation had been subjected to informal pressure at the start of the conference in an effort to prevent any discussion of a league, noting that the United States delegation had taken “a negative stand in all matters referring to an American League of Nations.”19 Inman subsequently published a lengthy report on the conference that, despite praising many other aspects of the conference, referred to the ordeal as the “American League of Nations Fiasco.” In an act of defiance, the Uruguayans placed the proposal before the conference, which only sparked the Columbian delegation to demand an accurate definition of the Monroe Doctrine. Ambassador Henry Fletcher, the head of the United States delegation, responded by emphasising the doctrine’s unilateral nature and declared that it could never be made multilateral, bringing the matter to a swift conclusion.20 The New York Times was typical of the press reaction, reporting that Uruguay’s suggestion was “an embarrassment to our representatives.”21 Indeed, in the delegation’s official report, the proposal for an American league was not even recorded and the Columbian attack on the Monroe Doctrine was noted as being “not discussed.”22 Surveying the conference proceedings, the academic Herman James joked that despite the efforts of the United States to avoid a discussion of the doctrine, “some of the delegations succeeded in paying their respects, not altogether of a respectful nature, to that inter-American bone of contention.”23 The conference had ushered in the Monroe Doctrine’s centennial with a rocky start.

19 “Travel letter from S. G. Inman,” April 6, 1923 and June 1923, Box 13, Samuel Guy Inman Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington DC. 20 Samuel Guy Inman, ­“Pan-American Unity in the Making,” Current History 18, no. 6 (1923): 919–925. 21 New York Times, May 12, 1923, 14. 22 Report of the Delegates of the United States of America to the Fifth International Conference of American States (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1923), 6. 23 Herman James, “Latin America in 1923,” American Political Science Review 18, no. 3 (1924): 544.

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Fittingly Observed The Monroe Doctrine centennial anniversary generated an impressive range of celebratory events and undertakings. Organisations including the American Historical Association and the Woman’s Bar Association held celebratory gatherings to mark the occasion, whereas the Society of Descendants of James Monroe instigated a campaign to acquire derelict properties that previously belonged to the fifth President of the United States.24 The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace tasked Chilean international lawyer Alejandro Álvarez with publishing a commemorative study of the doctrine, and several Latin American nations sent official congratulatory messages to the United States government.25 Indeed, the Brazilian Society of International Law held a commemorative session in which the nation’s foreign minister, Felix Pacheco, declared that the doctrine had been a “clear and unmistakable call to continental solidarity,” making the anniversary “a truly American festival.”26 Yet there were four major events that served as the focal points of the centennial: the “American Historical Revue and Motion Picture Exposition: The Monroe Doctrine Centennial,” held in Los Angeles from 2 July to 4 August; the “International Centennial Celebration of the Promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine,” held across Virginia from 1 to 2 December; the American Academy of Political and Social Science’s “Commemorative Session of the Centenary of the Monroe Doctrine”, held in Philadelphia from 30 November to 1 December; and a weeklong celebration held in New York from 1 to 7 December. It was through these events that the meaning and application of the Monroe Doctrine were both presented to the public and debated by decision makers. The Los Angeles commemoration is best described as a faux celebration in which the Monroe Doctrine served a secondary role for its

24 “The Meeting of the American Historical Association at Columbus,” American Historical Review 29, no. 3 (1924): 424; Washington Post, December 2, 1923, 3; New York Times, July 15, 1923, E2; New York Times, November 21, 1923, 24. 25 Alejandro Álvarez, The Monroe Doctrine: Its Importance in the International Life of the States of the New World (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1924). The Latin American messages of congratulations were printed in Bulletin of the Pan American Union, April 1924, 424–427. See also The Monroe Doctrine Centenary (Rio de Janeiro: Sociedade Brasileira de Dereito Internacional, 1924). 26 Bulletin of the Pan American Union, March 1924, 218–226; New York Times, December 3, 1923, 17.

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organiser—the Hollywood film industry. Held in the newly constructed coliseum at Exposition Park, the month-long event was essentially a public relations stunt that aimed to restore faith in the motion picture industry after several high-profile scandals had tarnished its reputation.27 A grand festival of film required significant funding and plans developed to hold an exposition in the summer of 1923 funded by the sale of commemorative coins. Event organisers knew that asking Congress to permit the striking of coins that commemorated the film industry would fail and decided to make the exposition a joint celebration of film and a suitable historical event. With the Monroe Doctrine’s centennial on the horizon, the organisers decided that a somewhat early tribute would suffice to acquire a suitable subject for a commemorative coin and attract wider interest. Through December 1922 to January 1923, Californian Congressman Walter Lineberger pestered the House of Representatives to accept a bill for striking a half dollar commemorating the Monroe Doctrine. The bill stated that the Los Angeles Clearing House would receive exclusive rights to the coin, which drew stubborn opposition from representatives who objected to both the decentralisation of commemorative coins and the appropriateness of Los Angeles as a site to commemorate the doctrine. Critics claimed that the creation of said coin would imply that the centennial was a local affair and Lineberger’s dissenters focused on protecting the doctrine’s “national character.” Lineberger defended the proposal by declaring that he did not think “any portion of the country is more interested in the Monroe doctrine [than California], because it was through the Monroe doctrine that California was annexed.” He dubiously argued that the doctrine had “kept the European powers from taking action for the acquisition of California for a period of nearly 25 years,” and thus the region owed its place in the Union to the doctrine’s proclamation.28 The bill eventually received approval on 27 John

Trumpbour, Selling Hollywood to the World: U.S. and European Struggles for Mastery of the Global Film Industry, 1920–1950 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 20. 28 United States Congress, House, “Coinage of 50-Cent Pieces in Commemoration of the One Hundredth Anniversary of the Enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine,” 67th Congress, 4th Session, Congressional Record, December 18, 1922, 636–637; U.S. Congress, House, “Coinage of 50-Cent Pieces,” Congressional Record, January 15, 1923, 1762–1763. Lineberger’s argument indirectly drew upon the work of the historian Robert Cleland, A History of California: The American Period (New York, NY: The Macmillan Company, 1922), 32; Robert Cleland, One Hundred Years of the Monroe Doctrine (Los Angeles, CA: Times-Mirror Press, 1923), 10, 33–36.

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24 January 1923 as opposition faded, but Congress had already demonstrated at the outset of the year that the commemoration of the doctrine was a touchy subject. Once struck, the coin received widespread appreciation in the press. The Commission of Fine Arts clinically described it as a “well executed” design, and the American Numismatic Association found little to criticise, claiming that it was equal to, if not better, than recent commemorative coin designs.29 The coin was designed by sculptor Chester Beach and it bore a strikingly similar, if not outright plagiarised, image to the seal of the 1901 Pan-American Exposition, presenting an overtly Pan-American motif to the United States public.30 The front of the coin displayed silhouettes of presidents Monroe and John Quincy Adams, whereas the reverse depicted the American continents personified as female figures (Fig. 2). North America can be seen extending her hand down to South America in a sign of friendship and cooperation whilst holding a laurel of peace, and South America reaches upwards in response, carrying a horn of plenty. The continents’ hands symbolically meet at the Panama Canal, symbolising the interconnectedness of the Americas. The Los Angeles Times explained to its readers the design implied that the Monroe Doctrine had ensured peace in the Americas and fostered economic prosperity among the nations of the Western Hemisphere.31 The first of the coins was presented to President Harding at the White House on 6 June, and the bulk of the coins were sold at the exposition itself, marketed on the promise that they would increase in value.32 In her study of United States colonial currencies, Alvita Akiboh explains that money is an “iconographic material object.” Images that appear on currencies are chosen and approved “to represent the nation’s shared history and culture” with the hope of affirming national identity. For example, after annexing the Philippines and Puerto Rico following the Spanish–American War, the United States introduced currencies in 29 Washington Evening Star, May 13, 1923, III4; “Minutes of Meeting of Commission of Fine Arts, February 21, 1923,” United States Commission of Fine Arts, https://www.cfa. gov/records-research/accessing-our-records; The Numismatist, July 1923, 297. 30 David Hill, “Frozen in Time: The Studio of Chester Beach,” American Numismatic Society Magazine, 10, no. 1 (2011): 13. 31 Los Angeles Times, June 30, 1923, II1. 32 Los Angeles Times, June 7, 1923, I2 and July 4, 1923, II2.

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Fig. 2  Monroe Doctrine centennial half dollar (1923) (Image courtesy of the United States Mint)

its newly acquired territories that contained almost identical imagery to the United States’ own domestic dollars. Although Filipinos and Puerto Ricans were not legally American citizens, Akiboh argues that the use of United States iconography on notes and coins affirmed imperial control over them and “invited them into the U.S. cultural nation – a nation defined by shared history and culture, not legal status.” This process made the “borders of U.S. national identity… unstable” and the imagery used on the Monroe Doctrine centennial coin posed a similar challenge to the rigidity of United States national identity.33 By displaying a supranational image on a coin that normally “stops at the border,” ­Pan-American connections appeared as a facet of United States national identity through the commemoration of the doctrine. Although citizens do not interact with commemorative coins as much as regular currency, the wide press coverage and release of the centennial coin into circulation after the exposition closed in August ensured wide observation of the image. This is important to note when considering the way in which the Monroe Doctrine manifested pictorially throughout the exposition. 33 Alvita Akiboh, “Pocket-Sized Imperialism: U.S. Designs on Colonial Currency,” Diplomatic History 41, no. 5 (2017): 875–876.

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Whilst local newspapers such as the Los Angeles Times fervently advertised the exposition, it is clear that the doctrine was of secondary interest to the organisers. Adverts focused on presenting images of Exposition Park and generic film iconography rather than giving the Monroe Doctrine centre stage. This is not to say that the doctrine was completely absent from the exposition. Some of President Monroe’s personal artifacts were on display, a statue in his likeness was erected, and the fifth tableau of the “American Historical Pageant” that depicted six major events in American history focused on the enunciation of the doctrine.34 But this content was few and far between. Editorials in specialist film magazines vainly sought to link the doctrine to the film industry, but most published material simply ignored it.35 The most telling example of this ignorance was the “Special Monroe Doctrine Centennial Section” of the Los Angeles Times, published on the exposition’s first day. Despite its title, this ten-page supplement barely gave any attention to the doctrine, merely devoting one short article to it. Unwilling to admit that Hollywood was experiencing a crisis of confidence, another commentary even attempted to argue that the film industry was assuring the success of the doctrine’s centennial celebrations rather than the reverse.36 Indeed, local businesses similarly sought to capitalise upon the centennial. For example, the Los Angeles Gas and Electric Corporation printed an advert that listed all the luxuries President Monroe had missed out on in 1823. He would never have seen a gas mantle, eaten a meal cooked with gas, turned on an electric light, or ridden in an elevator and his “shirts and collars never felt the caress of an electric iron,” all services that the corporation aimed to provide.37 Yet the few adverts that did pay lip service to the Monroe Doctrine presented imagery of the American continents. Without a tangible object to portray, the default personification of Monroe’s declaration took the form of geographic 34 For details of doctrine-related exhibits at the exposition see Los Angeles Times, July 2, 1923, IV2 and July 4, 1923, II2; Official Souvenir Program: American Historical Review Motion Picture Exposition and Monroe Doctrine Centennial (Los Angeles, CA: James G. Evans, 1923). 35 Foster Goss, “An Exposition without Parallel,” American Cinematographer, December 1922, 10–11. 36 “Special Monroe Doctrine Centennial Section,” Los Angeles Times, July 2, 1923, IV1–10. 37 Los Angeles Times, July 2, 1923, IV8.

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inter-American unity. This implicit Pan-American sentiment was bolstered further by the decision to dedicate the exposition’s opening on 3 July to “honoring the peoples of South America” and their diplomatic representatives who had travelled to take part in the event.38 Whilst the Los Angeles commemoration was certainly an unusual method of commemorating the Monroe Doctrine, it nonetheless presented a PanAmerican personification of the doctrine at the outset of the nation’s commemorative efforts. Whilst it is easy to disregard this imagery as surface-level Pan-Americanism, absent of any genuine sentiment, its existence gave credence to those citizens seeking to develop a deeper, supranational American identity via the creation of a Pan-American Monroe Doctrine. Between 1 and 4 December, President Monroe’s home state, Virginia, became the host of the International Centennial Celebration of the Promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine, a four-day celebration organised by the Southern Commercial Congress that took place across William and Mary College in Williamsburg, the state capital Richmond, and at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville. The focal event of the celebration was a grand pilgrimage to Monroe’s tomb, yet most of the celebration was dedicated to speeches, which were collated in a senate document and published as official proceedings in 1924.39 The Virginian celebrations positioned the figure of Monroe himself at the forefront of the commemorations, which meant that the event was almost entirely celebratory in nature. A general mood of excitement and pride permeated from the region in anticipation of the centennial, with one historian from the University of Richmond boldly claiming that “whilst the Monroe Doctrine is not law, it is life.”40 Many of the addresses at the celebration contained similarly superfluous accounts of the beneficial impact of the doctrine and how it had ensured the successful and peaceful development of the Western Hemisphere. Individuals such as the Elbert Trinkle, the Governor of Virginia, and Georgian Congressman William Upshaw referred to the doctrine as having provided “protection against foreign penetration into our western world” and embodying an 38 Los

Angeles Times, July 4, 1923, II1. of the Monroe Doctrine: Proceedings of the International Centennial Celebration of the Promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine Held at Richmond, V.A., December 2–4, 1923 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1924). 40 Washington Post, June 11, 1922, 4. 39 Promulgation

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Fig. 3  Tomb of James Monroe, hollywood cemetery, Richmond, VA. Date of photograph unknown (Image courtesy of the National Archives II, College Park, Maryland)

“uncringing, stalwart stand for American integrity and American development” respectively.41 The official proclamation issued by the governor at the start of the celebration confusingly referred to the doctrine as having a “magic power,” and it was even the subject of two poems that emphasised its peace bringing nature (Fig. 3).42 41 Elbert Trinkle, “Address at the Tomb of Monroe,” Promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine, 20; William Upshaw, “In Memoriam,” Promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine, 28. 42 Minnigerode Andrews, “Ode,” Promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine, 83–85; Horace Carlisle, “The Monroe Doctrine,” Promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine, 85–86; “Proclamation,” Promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine, vii. The Commonwealth of Virginia continues to enact official recognition of the doctrine’s anniversaries akin to this proclamation, although it refrains from describing the doctrine as holding a “magic power.”

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Yet the celebration was not without controversy. A significant number of the speeches given over the course of the celebration addressed an issue that was, in Virginia at least, of pressing importance: the authorship of the doctrine. Scholars have firmly established John Quincy Adams as the primary author of the doctrine, yet at the time of the centennial there was a strong backlash against this relatively new discovery.43 Even though numerous historians had presented evidence that Adams was the author, they were collectively lambasted at the Virginia commemoration for positing a falsehood.44 Clarence Jones, the president of the Southern Commercial Congress, claimed that by giving credit to Adams, these “false historian[s]” had almost managed to “snatch from Monroe the one glory that has been remembered by an association with his name.”45 When former Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan did not give Monroe adequate credit in his speech, he was scorned by Rose Gouverneur Hoes, Monroe’s great-granddaughter and president of the Society of Descendants of James Monroe, who announced that “I fear no one and from this time forth I want to challenge the man or woman who claims the Monroe doctrine for anyone but the man to whom the credit is due - James Monroe - the fearless Virginian.”46 The authorship controversy was particularly acute during the year of the centennial because former presidential candidate Alton Parker had recently discovered and publicised a letter written by Thomas Jefferson that arguably contained the genesis of the doctrine.47 Among this bickering and borderline fanaticism, some voices of reason tried to focus on the application of the doctrine. Virginian 43 Charles Edel, Nation Builder: John Quincy Adams and the Grand Strategy of the Republic (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), 6. 44 For example, James Angell, the President of the University of Michigan, argued in 1905 that Adams inspired “the slow moving and lethargic President to fling out the challenge of 1823 … James Monroe held the trumpet, but John Quincy Adams blew the blast”: James Angell, The European Concert and the Monroe Doctrine (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, 1905), 13. The development of the Adams argument is explored in: Edward Crapol, “John Quincy Adams and the Monroe Doctrine: Some New Evidence,” Pacific Historical Review 48, no. 3 (1979): 413–418. 45 Clarence Owens, “Remarks,” Promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine, 5–6. 46 Rose Gouverneur Hoes, “Response,” Promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine, 100–101. 47 Alton Parker to Elbert Trinkle, November 28, 1923, Box 8, Alton B. Parker Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington DC. See also various press clippings from October 1923 in Box 32.

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representative Robert Moore referred to the doctrine’s role in recent foreign policy debates in his address, arguing that the doctrine had not been abrogated through the annexation of the Philippines or belligerency in the First World War. Like so many other Americans had come to believe, Moore argued that the doctrine ought to be considered a living policy, because there had been no suggestion in 1823 that “our Government should subject itself to a perpetual restriction, regardless of any and all changes that might occur.” To Moore, the doctrine was “a single, comprehensive inhibition under which the United States has placed the nations of the Old World, while leaving itself complete freedom in any contingency that may arise to decide whether it will or will not relate itself to their affairs.”48 It seemed as though the efforts of Theodore Roosevelt and his successors in actively reshaping the doctrine were worthy of just as much appreciation as James Monroe himself. At Philadelphia, the Republican Administration enunciated its position on the Monroe Doctrine. On 30 November and 1 December 1923, the AAPSS held a commemorative session of addresses with Secretary Hughes presenting the keynote. Although the event was limited to members of the association and invited guests, all the addresses were subsequently published in the AAPSS’s journal and were widely reported in newspapers. The Pan American Union’s new Director General and AAPSS President, Leo Rowe, opened the two-day session at Philadelphia by declaring that the policy had “marked the beginning of an epoch of Pan-American service of which we as citizens may well be proud.” Unlike the Virginian celebration that indulged in nostalgia, Rowe immediately shifted attention towards the present. He claimed that the United States now faced international problems far greater than in 1823, and thus the AAPSS had arranged the gathering to ascertain “the obligations of the present and the immediate future rather than to congratulate ourselves on the services of the past.”49 48 Robert Moore, “President Monroe and his Message of December 2, 1823,” Promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine, 16–18. Moore’s speech was subsequently printed in the Congressional Record: U.S. Congress. Senate. “President Monroe and his Message of December 2, 1823,” Address of Representative R. Walton Moore, of Virginia, at William and Mary College, Virginia, Saturday, December 1, 1923, 68th Congress, 1st Session, Congressional Record, 6 December 1923, 77–81. 49 Leo Rowe, “Introductory: The Monroe Doctrine Centenary,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 111, Supplement: The Centenary of the Monroe Doctrine (1924): 5.

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Hughes delivered a broad analysis of the state of United States foreign relations that considered the doctrine’s role one hundred years after its proclamation.50 He outlined that since its enunciation, the doctrine had been modified in two particulars. First, rather than only applying to the activity of European nations, the doctrine’s tenets now applied to all non-American Powers. Second, opposition to colonisation now encompassed any acquisition of territory through transfers of dominion or sovereignty. The doctrine’s essential message remained unchanged, which could be summarised as opposition “to any non-American action encroaching upon the political independence of American States under any guise, and to the acquisition in any manner of the control of additional territory in this hemisphere by any n ­on-American Power.”51 Hughes was adamant that the United States’ actions on the world stage since the turn of the century had been in line with this interpretation of the doctrine. The war with Spain was fought to secure Cuban independence, and the territorial acquisitions that followed were not driven by a desire to interfere in the political independence of the peoples of the East. It was the maintenance of the Open Door that pushed the nation into the Pacific—an objective that was a pursuit of the “same aims of independence, security, and peace which determined the declaration of Monroe.” Entering the Great War was similarly acceptable, “for the cause of liberty itself was at stake,” and the United States sought no territory. Indeed, the domestic fight over the Treaty of Versailles had demonstrated that the United States still desired to avoid unnecessary meddling in European affairs.52 Now that the war was over, Hughes explained that the nation’s policy towards Europe would be to oppose any alliances, pursue peaceful settlements for international disputes, and facilitate an economic recovery in the region. Any cooperation with the

50 Hughes’s keynote was very similar in content to another address that he gave earlier that year before the American Bar Association in Minneapolis: Charles Evan Hughes, “Observations on the Monroe Doctrine,” American Journal of International Law 17, no. 4 (1923): 611–668; Charles Evan Hughes, “The Monroe Doctrine After One Hundred Years,” Current History 19 (1923): 102–113. The AAPSS speech appeared as Charles Evan Hughes, “The Centenary of the Monroe Doctrine,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 111, Supplement: The Centenary of the Monroe Doctrine (1924): 7–19. 51 Hughes, “Centenary,” 9. 52 Ibid., 9–12.

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nations of Europe that furthered peace was, in Hughes eyes, consistent with traditional policy.53 Although Hughes believed that there was little imminent danger of any non-American intervention within the Western Hemisphere, he reminded his audience that the future was uncertain and the doctrine needed to remain essential policy to be applied whenever necessary: “To withdraw it, or to weaken it, would aid no just interest, support no worthy cause, but would simply invite trouble by removing an established safeguard of the peace of the American Continents.”54 Although he welcomed foreign recognition of the doctrine, Hughes emphasised that the doctrine was a unilateral policy declaration that was ultimately maintained for the national security of the United States. Nonetheless, the doctrine had “rendered an inestimable service to the American Republics.” The United States held no policy of aggression towards Latin America; rather it desired “to make available its friendly assistance to promote stability in those of our sister Republics which are especially afflicted with disturbed conditions involving their own peace and that of their neighbors.” Hughes’ aim was the creation of “a Pax Americana maintained not by arms but by mutual respect and good will and the tranquillizing processes of reason.” Whilst Pan-Americanism was “not in strictness an application of the Monroe Doctrine,” it did not stand as an obstacle to Pan American cooperation; “rather it affords the necessary foundations for that cooperation in the independence and security of American states.”55 However, Hughes was adamant that the United States maintained a special interest in the Caribbean region, namely, the protection of the Panama Canal. The United States deemed the Canal’s “complete immunity from any adverse control” essential to peace and security. Any disturbances in the Caribbean were of “special interest to us not for the purpose of seeking control over others but of being assured that our own safety is free from menace.” However, any right to intervene in the region would stem from the right of the United States to protect itself, not from the Monroe Doctrine.56

53 Ibid.,

13; Hughes, “Observations,” 627–628. “Centenary,” 13. 55 Ibid., 13–17; Hughes, “Observations,” 626–627. 56 Ibid., 620–626; Hughes, “Centenary,” 18. 54 Hughes,

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In concluding remarks for Hughes’s session, Rowe claimed that historians of the future would “refer to the Philadelphia address… as one of the few instances in which the official immediately responsible for the direction of our international relations has laid before the people a comprehensive review of the foreign policy of our country.”57 Hughes expressed similar views privately and believed that the centennial was valuable in shaping public understandings of the doctrine and United States foreign policy. He emphasised the event’s importance to various correspondents throughout the year and informed the editor of Current History that he desired to direct citizens to what he believed was the doctrine’s “true content.”58 Hughes’s famous speech was the first of several given at the AAPSS. He was followed by three Latin American ministers: Jacobo Varela of Uruguay, Ricardo Alfaro of Panama, and Salvador Cordova of Honduras. All three speeches adherence to diplomatic etiquette rather than providing critical arguments, and they outlined that Latin America had benefited from the doctrine’s existence. However, Alfaro made certain to highlight the extent to which the South still understood the doctrine as a facilitator of United States imperialism.59 The session ended with speeches from an international lawyer, Phillip Marshall Brown, and an academic, Harry Collings. Brown’s address contrasted starkly with the preceding speakers. He did not believe that the United States had yet achieved dominance in the hemisphere, claiming that the European political tradition of the balance of power remained as prominent as ever and had every reason to be “deplored and resented.” Monroe

57 Leo Rowe, “Concluding Remarks by the President of the Academy,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 111, Supplement: The Centenary of the Monroe Doctrine (1924): 20. 58 Charles Evan Hughes to George Oakes, August 24, 1923, Reel 56, Charles Evan Hughes Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. 59 Jacobo Varela, “The Meaning of the Monroe Doctrine to the Republic of Uruguay,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 111, Supplement: The Centenary of the Monroe Doctrine (1924): 21–23; Ricardo Alfaro, “A Century of the Monroe Doctrine,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 111, Supplement: The Centenary of the Monroe Doctrine (1924): 24–31; Salvador Cordova, “The Meaning of the Monroe Doctrine to Honduras,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 111, Supplement: The Centenary of the Monroe Doctrine (1924): 32–33.

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had established his policy on the basis that the nations of the Western Hemisphere did not function within this political system but, crucially for Brown, the United States “has the sovereign right to protect its national interests irrespective of the Monroe Doctrine.”60 Moreover, the United States had “no valid reason or right to arrogate to itself the sole interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine.” He argued that the declaration was a Pan-American principle, and whilst circumstances might force the United States to take the lead in defence of the hemisphere, it was not “private property.” Such claims led to resentment within Latin America, something that Brown had noticed at the Fifth Pan American Conference. Regardless of the reasons for its unilateral enforcement, the doctrine had “been a policy productive of lamentable results without any apparent compensating advantages. The possibility of a genuine understanding and sympathy with these nations is becoming increasingly difficult.” In short, unilateral enforcement of the doctrine should not dictate the United States’ relations with Latin America. Defence against encroachments in the hemisphere required true ­Pan-American action, a “regional understanding” for the good of the entire hemisphere in distinction from the European balance of power. Brown noted that the Pan American Union had been trying to achieve this goal since its creation, but if the United States refused to accept that all the nations of the hemisphere should be co-guarantors of the doctrine, then it was doomed to fail in its purpose. Collings brought attention to the doctrine’s problematic number of interpretations, arguing that it was only ever going to be “as strong as its weakest interpretation.” There was no agreement on the doctrine’s true purpose and, whilst one hundred years of history had not weakened its principles, “popular prejudice has read into them interpretations and extensions alien to the original declaration.” Paraphrasing Otto von Bismarck’s infamous criticism of the doctrine as “an international impertinence,” Collings argued it was free from impertinence; rather the impertinence lay in the doctrine’s many misinterpretations.61 It was undeniable that these misinterpretations were somewhat 60 Philip Marshall Brown, “The Monroe Doctrine and L ­ atin-America,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 111, Supplement: The Centenary of the Monroe Doctrine (1924): 34–36. 61 Herbert Kraus, “What European Countries Think of the Monroe Doctrine,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 54 (1914): 109.

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related, but they were not part of its true meaning. The doctrine was not isolationist in nature, nor did it demand domination of hemispheric affairs. Providing clarity required two courses of action. Hughes had just carried out the first: shear away its accretions and make it acceptable to the nations of the hemisphere. The second step was more in line with Brown’s thinking: give Latin American nations a part in its maintenance.62 Whilst the Philadelphia commemoration primarily served as a rostrum from which Hughes could enunciate the Coolidge Administration’s interpretation of the doctrine, the notion of a ­hegemony-facilitating doctrine continued to come under criticism from advocates of a P ­ an-American policy. The New York commemoration was conceived as an opportunity to emphasise the doctrine’s Pan-American nature. Beginning on 1 December, the weeklong celebration was organised by the International Pan-American Committee, a New York-based organisation established in April 1923 by the former director general of the Pan American Union, John Barrett, for the purpose of “awakening continental public attention on the importance of Pan-American solidarity for the peace and progress of the western hemisphere.”63 Barrett remained committed to fostering Pan-Americanism after resigning from the Union in 1920 and was aware of the importance that the centennial would have in shaping the nation’s interpretation of Monroe’s legacy. As one of the most vocal advocates of a Pan-American Monroe Doctrine during the First World War and subsequent peacemaking process, he aimed to emphasise the importance of inter-American cooperation through the New York celebrations.64 In November, he wrote to Hughes informing him that the committee aimed to ensure that the celebration would not offend Latin American sensibilities. He was eager to ensure that other major celebrations expressed similar sentiments but decided not to approach the organisers of the Virginia and Philadelphia celebrations due to their semi-official nature. The committee was directly approached by the organisers of the Los Angeles commemoration for advice, however, Barrett recalled that 62 Harry Collings, “Misinterpreting the Monroe Doctrine,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 111, Supplement: The Centenary of the Monroe Doctrine (1924): 37–39. 63 Washington Post, April 30, 1923, 3. 64 “Report of the Chairman on the Celebrations of the One Hundredth Anniversary of the Declaration of the Monroe Doctrine,” January 1, 1924, Box 97, Barrett Papers.

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“they completely disregarded it and the Monroe Doctrine celebration part of the program was a complete fizzle and the subject of much sarcastic comment in Mexico and California and in some of the Central and South American countries.”65 He sought the input of other prominent figures, contacting Rowe to enquire about the organisation’s own initiatives and meeting Coolidge, who agreed to provide a special message. Emboldened by meeting the president, Barrett began appointing honorary members of committee specifically in recognition of the centennial and sought the expertise of academics such as Albert Bushnell Hart, Archibald Coolidge, and Hiram Bingham to help discern the “essence of the Doctrine.”66 In mid-November, Murray Hulbert, New York’s acting mayor, issued a proclamation to prepare the city for the celebrations. Outlining his appreciation for the doctrine, he urged that everyone make 2 December “a day of reconsecration [sic] to that excellent American policy which has steered our national craft away from the shoals and the rocks and has made us realise in every generation that if we would be strong and happy and prosperous we must paddle our own canoe.”67 Celebrations began in earnest on 1 December after City Hall adopted a resolution stating that along with George Washington’s “Farewell Address,” Monroe’s Doctrine had “furnished a foreign policy for America to follow for all time.” It was “as necessary today as when first promulgated for the protection of the rights and interests of the American people.”68 Throughout the following week, readings were given at churches, schools, public meetings, and social clubs, all providing what Barrett hoped would be a “non-controversial” review of the doctrine’s historic impact.69 On the day of the centennial, the president of the Pan

65 John

Barrett to Charles Evan Hughes, November 11, 1923, Box 62, Barrett Papers. Barrett to Nicholas Murray Butler, November 13, 1923 and Untitled Announcement, December 2, 1923, Box 96, Barrett Papers. 67 Murray Hulbert, “Proclamation,” November 17, 1923, Box 97, Barrett Papers. 68 New York Times, December 2, 1923, 22. 69 “Memorandum Regarding the ­Nation-Wide Commemoration of the One Hundredth Anniversary of the Promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine,” December 2, 1923, Box 97, Barrett Papers. On the doctrine being taught in schools see “To the Students and Pupils in the Schools of New York,” November 27, 1923, Box 62, Barrett Papers; “A History Lesson,” Time, 2, no. 2 (1923): 4. On the doctrine as a feature in church services see Brooklyn Daily Eagle, December 1, 1923, 8. 66 John

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American Society, Severo Mallet-Prevost, gave addresses over the radio, transmitted along with readings of Monroe’s message, from the WEAF station of the Radio Corporation of America. He emphasised that the doctrine had facilitated inter-American solidarity by allowing the “weak and struggling communities of 1823” to grow into great nations.70 Coolidge sent Barrett his promised message which was published through the press on the date of the centennial. The President was pleased that “in hundreds of cities, all over the continent, this anniversary occasion is to be fittingly observed” because it deserved more than “passing notice.” Coolidge continued to outline his satisfaction that “within recent years a greatly improved understanding of the true intent and significance of the Monroe Doctrine has come to be entertained not only throughout the American world, but in the whole world as well.” It was clear to him that the doctrine had helped guarantee peace for a hundred years and, no doubt, would continue to serve such interests for another century. In concluding, Coolidge noted that the American people “cannot but be glad to know of the widespread recognition of this celebration as marking one of the important epochs in the history of our country, and of its sister republics of the three Americas.”71

Defects in Its Own Nature Unsurprisingly, the centennial generated significant commentary. Newspapers, literary-political magazines, and academic journals saw a plethora of articles dedicated to the doctrine’s meaning and application that often contrasted sharply with the celebratory tone of the commemorative events. The Forum headed its December issue with two articles focussing on how the doctrine had evolved since its enunciation. The editor, Henry Leach, explained in a letter to readers that

70 Severo Mallet-Preovost, “Monroe Doctrine,” December 2, 1923, Box 97, Barrett Papers. The Radio Corporation of America subsequently thanked Barrett for permitting the station the “privilege of broadcasting an event as important as the Monroe Doctrine Centennial.” Other radio stations also broadcast commemorative messages. The Philadelphia-based Lit Brothers Radio Broadcasting Station broadcast addresses by former ambassadors Roland Morris and William Potter, who discussed the doctrine’s relationship with the Far East and Europe respectively: Chas Popenoe to John Barrett, December 3, 1923 and Lit Brothers to John Barrett, November 26, 1923, Box 62, Barrett Papers. 71 Calvin Coolidge to John Barrett, December 1, 1923, Box 62, Barrett Papers.

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the issue would address the centennial because it was claiming so much attention; however, he outlined that this was “not because it has been found unworkable—but because minds concerned with the constructive development of our Western Countries see danger in the continuation of its strict interpretation.”72 In the first article, the former ambassador to Argentina, Charles Sherrill, argued that a change in meaning was beneficial. Having previously advocated a Pan-American reinterpretation of the doctrine, he reasoned in 1923 that it needed to be “kept up to date, and thoroughly modernized, just as our education, our business methods, our machinery.”73 Ernest Gruening, the editor of The Nation, presented the counter-argument, pointing out that too many interpretations already existed, necessitating a return to its original meaning and application so far as possible.74 What was clear from these two opinion pieces was that both authors were displeased with the current interpretation of the doctrine. As noted by Megan Threlkeld, women internationalists from the United States frequently criticised the nation’s foreign policy in Latin America as imperialistic during the 1910s and 1920s. Whilst many leading figures of this group still adhered to pseudoscientific theories of race, they advocated inter-American cooperation over imperial policies, focusing on the role women could play in fostering Pan-Americanism.75 Organisations such as the Pan American Round Table, based in San Antonio, Texas, formed to pursue this goal. Writing to the Presidents of all Latin American nations, the organisation’s Director General, Florence Griswold, argued that the First World War had made it a necessity to improve inter-American relations. She proposed a societal process of “Americanization” in which “each nation of the Western Hemisphere should create a means whereby the spirit of patriotism and principles of good government will be instilled in the minds of the youth.”76 72 Henry

Leach to John Barrett, December 10, 1923, Box 62, Barrett Papers. Sherrill, “Monroe Reinterpreted,” The Forum, December 1923, 2161–2162. 74 Ernest Gruening, “Monroe Versus His Interpreters,” The Forum, December 1923, 2170–2178. 75 Megan Threlkeld, “The Pan American Conference of Women, 1922: Successful Suffragists Turn to International Relations,” Diplomatic History 31, no. 5 (2007): 826. 76 “Copy of Letter to the President of each Latin American Republic,” June 6, 1921, Box 1, Pan American Round Table of San Antonio Records, Special Collections, University of Texas at San Antonio, Texas. 73 Charles

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A common cause was needed among the nations of the hemisphere. During the centennial, several suffragists reflected this stance by criticising the doctrine as an imperialistic tool. One of the more striking commentaries came from suffrage leader Carrie Chapman Catt, who spoke on the matter before the Foreign Policy Association. She outlined that the doctrine was “false in theory and pernicious in its application” because there was no logic, justice, or ethics that could “possibly make justifiable the right of any nation, by its own assumption of authority, to assume direction over any other nation without that nation’s consent.” In defiance of the vocal laudations the doctrine had received, she claimed that Latin Americans had not forgotten the 1840s war with Mexico, Secretary of State Richard Olney’s imperialistic reinvigoration of the doctrine in 1895, or the Roosevelt Corollary, describing it as an outworn “defense of commerce and big business.” Catt did not blame Hughes for attempting to clarify the doctrine’s meaning at its centennial; however, he was only a “temporary interpreter,” as inevitable reinterpretations would occur over time. She likened the doctrine to an old umbrella that one cannot throw away: “‘Ashes to ashes and dust to dust’ doesn’t apply to umbrellas and the Monroe Doctrine.”77 Fellow suffragist Alice Blackwell was similarly critical, arguing in the Woman’s Journal that the doctrine of the twentieth century had transformed the United States from “big brother” to “big highwayman.” She advised women to concern themselves with the postwar situation in Latin America as well as Europe, as the fear and suspicion generated in the Western Hemisphere by the doctrine could “prepare the soil of war.”78 Further advocacy of a Pan-American Monroe Doctrine was voiced despite the failures of the Fifth Pan American Conference. The New York Times featured an article in December by Pan-Americanist Richard Skinner who argued that the centennial ought to merit “a freshening up of our recollections” because the principles of the doctrine were of South American origin and always intended by Monroe and Adams to be multilateral. Skinner believed that the United States had h ­ igh-handedly appropriated 77 Carrie Chapman Catt, “The Monroe Doctrine and Our Latin-American Relations,” Foreign Policy Association Pamphlet 21 (New York, NY: Foreign Policy Association, 1924). The Washington Post printed segments of Catt’s address but criticised her argument as having “very little” worth: Washington Post, December 16, 1923, 1 and December 18, 1923, 6. 78 Alice Blackwell, “The Monroe Doctrine: The Other Side,” Woman’s Journal 8, no. 15 (1923): 28.

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the doctrine as its sole property, which relegated Latin American figures, such as Don Manuel Torres, a Colombian and the first Latin American diplomat recognised by Washington in 1823, to obscurity.79 Former ­under-secretary of state, Norman Davis, signalled that after one hundred years, the doctrine needed to function as a facilitator of inter-American cooperation, as this was “the role for which it was intended.”80 However, Captain Conway Cooke expressed pessimism, arguing in the Outlook that international relations were as dangerous as ever and the doctrine would take on more importance in the future, primarily because of the “rise of fanatic Socialism, Bolshevism, dictatorships, and disruptive social upheavals in Europe.” Considering these potential threats, the time had arrived “for the United States to enter Latin America on a co-operative investment basis, making the Americas a self-supporting, self-contained community of nations.”81 The historian Archibald Coolidge wrote one of the most astute analyses prompted by the centennial. Writing in the newly founded Foreign Affairs, which he edited, Coolidge summarised the dominant theme of commentary on the doctrine’s hundredth anniversary: “satisfaction and praise.” With few exceptions, the American people were still proud of it as a moment of past wisdom that benefitted the entire hemisphere; yet it occupied a problematic position in American foreign policy given the extent of its interpretations. For Coolidge, the doctrine contained “defects in its own nature” and threats by the “tendencies of the age.” The first was the supposed existence of an “especial community of interests and aspirations between the peoples of the western world.” Geographically, the separation of the New and Old Worlds was now virtually non-existent and certainly the case economically. Foreign trade depended on many variables, “among which sentimental ones are apt to play a small part and are not likely to be durable.” There was no reason why “non-contiguous American countries should deal with each other rather than with anyone else. In the long run trade will follow whatever are the natural lines.”82 Coolidge believed it would be foolish simply 79 New

York Times, December 2, 1923, SM3.

80 Norman

Davis, “American Foreign Policy: A Democratic View,” Foreign Affairs 3, no. 1 (1924): 30. 81 Conway Cooke, “An Expanding Doctrine,” The Outlook, November 28, 1923, 539–541. 82 C. [Archibald Coolidge], “The Future of the Monroe Doctrine,” Foreign Affairs 2, no. 3 (1924): 373–376.

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to assume that the entire Americas were culturally compatible, arguing that the people of the United States had far more in common with Northern European nations. Turning to Pan-Americanism, Coolidge could not deny that a natural sympathy existed among the American republics; however, the world’s political systems had changed since 1823. Republics were now far more common—and even despotic—in other parts of the world. Systems of governance alone, therefore, could not continue to justify the doctrine. I­nter-American cooperation was certainly achievable, yet Coolidge doubted whether “the Monroe Doctrine and the Pan-Americanism which has grown out of it are based on any unusual solidarity between the commonwealths concerned.”83 Invoking arguments of the American Anti-Imperialist Movement after the Spanish–American War, Coolidge questioned the course of United States policy since 1900. To subscribe to the doctrine implied that the United States should refrain from interference in Europe and Asia. The annexation of the Philippines and advances in communication and transportation had drawn the United States into the affairs of both continents. Whilst the United States was justified in entering the Great War, it “assumed an active role in remaking the map of Europe and the leading one in creating a league [of Nations] meant sooner or later to include all nations.” This hypocrisy made the “logic of the situation and the Monroe Doctrine look peculiar.”84 Coolidge admitted that a shift in national interests was not necessarily problematic, yet the doctrine ought to be “superseded by some new conception, either because of increasing resistance to it as it stands or because its objects may be obtained by other and better means.”85 Latin American resistance was another vital consideration. Coolidge argued that there was no real proof of the doctrine protecting these nations from harm, and even if it had, the United States had soured any good relations facilitated in 1823 by its war with Mexico in the 1840s. American protection was hypocrisy considering interventions in Panama and the Caribbean and the destruction of native cultures in the Philippines and Puerto Rico. Most ironic, Latin American nations feared the United States more than any European Power. Certain Latin American officials may have been vocal advocates of a Pan-Americanised 83 Ibid.,

376–377. 377–379. 85 Ibid., 379–380. 84 Ibid.,

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Monroe Doctrine, yet the Fifth Pan American Conference and Hughes’s pronouncements demonstrated that such a transformation would never take place: “‘Monroeism’ and Pan-Americanism in spite of our efforts to reconcile them may come to represent incompatible ideals between which we shall have to choose. Such a prospect is not pleasant.”86 To Coolidge, it was not attacks from without that threatened the doctrine’s integrity one hundred years after its enunciation, but its own dissolution from within. * * * The Republican Administration had attempted to use the centennial as a platform to enunciate its official interpretation of the doctrine, yet several of the commemorative events and accompanying commentaries presented alternative interpretations, challenging the direction of American foreign policy. The question of whether the doctrine needed to be reinterpreted as either a unilateral foreign policy device to maintain United States hegemony in the Western Hemisphere or a P ­ an-American policy that emphasised a multilateral approach to hemispheric affairs remained in dispute and tainted the celebratory tone. The First World War and the treaty fight may have ended, but the debate over the United States role in the Western Hemisphere and the wider world had not, transforming a moment of national celebration and memorialisation into a site of contestation. Laudation did not equate to clarification. As Hughes strove ardently to protect the doctrine’s unilateralism during the centennial, his detractors drew upon the discourse of the prior two decades of debate and voiced their own analyses of the revered policy. Challenging official conceptions, Pan-Americanists remained committed to the prospect of the doctrine’s multilateralism and critics continued attacking whilst it remained in the spotlight.

86 Ibid.,

381–386.

Conclusion: Anything or Nothing

The coast of fair America We’ll guard from every foe, And spread o’er the glorious land The Doctrine of Monroe.1

As these lines from an 1896 musical dedication to President Grover Cleveland signify, the Monroe Doctrine had already become steeped in a popular discourse of national security by the turn of the twentieth century. Citizens of the United States may have held divergent interpretations of the doctrine’s meaning, but at least one thing was clear—it was considered a policy that ultimately guarded, defended, secured, and protected the territory of the United States from extra-hemispheric threats. Regarded as a semi-sacred foundational document, the doctrine not only guided policy makers in the tangible defence of territory, but also the defence of the core values it embodied. Whatever the doctrine’s tenets were, they needed to be maintained at all costs. As the imperial polity of the United States evolved and expanded after the Spanish–American War, the Monroe Doctrine justified the conduct of United States foreign relations during the early twentieth century. The simultaneous rise of the German and Japanese empires generated a tenacious fear at both 1 Le

Roy Lewis, The Doctrine of Monroe (Brooklyn, NY: Chas. W. Held, 1896).

© The Author(s) 2020 A. Bryne, The Monroe Doctrine and United States National Security in the Early Twentieth Century, Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the Contemporary World, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-43431-1_7

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a popular and policy making level that United States interests in the Western Hemisphere would be challenged, granting the doctrine more relevance than ever before and transforming it into a national security framework. The Monroe Doctrine’s meaning had always been ambiguous, but after the anti-imperialist movement unsuccessfully invoked the doctrine in their protests against the annexation of the Philippines, the doctrine became widely understood as a guiding set of tenets that could be actively reshaped over time. During the early twentieth century, the doctrine was not simply invoked in a variety of situations to justify policy. Instead, its meaning was reinterpreted in two distinct ways, each aligned to antithetical core values of United States national security. The doctrine fractured as one camp of decision makers reinterpreted it as an enunciation of United States hegemony in the Western Hemisphere, whilst another called for the development of a Pan-American Monroe Doctrine that embodied inter-American cooperation and unity. Both core values were ambiguously present in President James Monroe’s message of 1823 and a prolonged debate over the doctrine’s meaning engrossed the nation throughout the early twentieth century. Americans were torn between the need to maintain hegemonic control in Latin America or foster Pan-American unity for the good of national security. Like the doctrine itself, national security was subjective. Beyond the defence of citizens and territory, it contained no fixed meaning and was a contested concept that was reinterpreted and reassigned core values to suit the needs and demands of the time. By scrutinising the Monroe Doctrine’s meaning through a protected debate, United States decision makers established a unique discursive linkage between notions of regional hegemony and inter-American cooperation, presenting both ideals as fundamental to the existence of the United States. The doctrine acted as a prism thought which issues of imperialism, international trade, race, military preparedness, and international law related to national security, and how major events and developments of the period, ranging from the annexation of the Philippines and military interventions in the Caribbean, to the construction of the Panama Canal, the First World War, and the establishment of the League of Nations, were all approached with the doctrine’s core values in mind. Latin America was deemed crucial to national security and the doctrine’s fractured meaning reflected the discord that permeated domestic perceptions of the nation’s role in the world. All this was possible because the Monroe Doctrine allowed the nation’s decision makers to engage with

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the nation’s role on the world stage in ways that Walter Lippmann would describe as “familiar.”2 In an incidental turn of fate, the debate over the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine coincided with its centennial anniversary. The occasion presented an ideal opportunity for policy makers to repair the doctrine’s fractured nature, yet the various commemorative events that were held to mark the occasion reflected and exacerbated the doctrine’s contested meaning. The doctrine was not simply a declaration of policy that a President or Secretary of State could define. In the words of Gretchen Murphy, it served as a “set of discourses” through which Americans formulated their “national identity as well as foreign policy.”3 The debate of the early twentieth century further solidified and transformed this discourse as Americans viewed it as a signifier of core values of national security. Throughout the remainder of the 1920s, the doctrine continued to generate debate over the nation’s foreign relations. However, its status as a national security framework began to wane. Although fostering Pan-Americanism and maintaining regional hegemony remained foreign policy goals in the aftermath of the First World War, the absence of an immediate or overbearing threat to United States national interests in the Americas made an active defence of the doctrine’s core values less of a national security priority. Yet this did not mean that the debate over the Monroe Doctrine’s meaning ceased. Advocates of a multilateral Monroe Doctrine saw significant progress made towards their goals during the interwar period when President Herbert Hoover sought more cordial relations with the nations of Latin America.4 In 1930, the State Department published the Clark Memorandum in an attempt to define and clarify the doctrine’s purpose, disavowing the Roosevelt Corollary in the process.5 Theodore Roosevelt’s iconic embodiment of the 2 Walter Lippmann, The Stakes of Diplomacy (New York, NY: Henry Holt and Company, 1915), 18–20. 3 Gretchen Murphy, Hemispheric Imaginings: The Monroe Doctrine and Narratives of U.S. Empire (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005), 4–17. 4 Alan McPherson, “Herbert Hoover, Occupation Withdrawal, and the Good Neighbor Policy,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 44, no. 4 (2014): 623–639; Alexander DeConde, Herbert Hoover’s Latin American Policy (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1951). 5 United States Department of State, Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine: Prepared by J. Rueben Clark Undersecretary of State December 17, 1928 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1930), xxiii–xxiv; Gene Sessions, “The Clark Memorandum Myth,” The Americas 34, no. 1 (1977): 40–58.

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United States’ desire to maintain hegemonic control in the Americas was extracted from the Monroe Doctrine by an official source, suggesting that the United States might in fact consider inter-American cooperation a policy priority over regional hegemony. Although Dexter Perkins overstates the reality in his classic history of the doctrine, a policy reversal away from the interventionism that had characterised the doctrine during the first two decades of the century was starting to take place. By 1941 and the United States’ entry into the Second World War, more and more Americans seemed “ready to accept the concept of hemispheric solidarity.”6 President Franklin Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy was a crucial factor in bolstering this sentiment.7 Indeed, in 1934 the President of the Foreign Policy Association, Raymond Buell, described Roosevelt’s Latin American policy as reframing the Monroe Doctrine to defend Latin America from the United States as well as ­ extra-hemispheric threats.8 During the Eighth Pan American Conference (1938), a multilateral agreement of inter-American cooperation was formulated that was widely viewed as a Pan-American interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine.9 The following year, the outbreak of the Second World War revived the doctrine’s presence in national security concerns. In comparison to the First World War, the State Department actively pursued inter-American security initiatives at the outset of the conflict. An emergency inter-American gathering was held in Panama in September 1939 to establish what 6 Dexter Perkins, A History of the Monroe Doctrine (London: Longmans, 1960 [1955]), 346–362. 7 Juan Pablo Scarfi, “In the Name of the Americas: The Pan-American Redefinition of the Monroe Doctrine and the Emerging Language of American International Law in the Western Hemisphere, 1898–1933,” Diplomatic History 40, no. 2 (2016): 218; Mary Stuckey, The Good Neighbor: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Rhetoric of American Power (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2013), 174; Mark Gilderhus, “The Monroe Doctrine: Meanings and Implications,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 36, no. 1 (2006): 13; Justus Doenecke and Mark Stoler, Debating Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Foreign Policies, 1933–1945 (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 124-125; Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932–1945, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1995), 176; Gerald Haines, “The Roosevelt Administration Interprets the Monroe Doctrine,” Australian Journal of Politics and History 24, no. 3 (1978): 332–345. 8 New York Times, January 7, 1934, XX3. 9 Charles Fenwick, “The Monroe Doctrine and the Declaration of Lima,” American Journal of International Law 33, no. 2 (1939): 257–268.

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was informally known as the Pan American Security Zone, a perimeter around the American continents that would be multilaterally defended from belligerent activity.10 The Assistant Secretary of War, Louis Johnson, confidently proclaimed that these two initiatives had transformed the Monroe Doctrine into “a cooperative doctrine of the entire New World.”11 Unfortunately, this Pan-American optimism did not retain much hold within the United States after the Second World War. Although the Pan American Union was transformed into the Organization of American States in 1948, heralding a new era of inter-American diplomacy that John Barrett would have been proud of, the Cold War created a distinct new climate of international relations that was far removed from that of the early twentieth century. As Lars Schoultz argues, a new “consensually held belief system” directed United States policy makers in their approach to Latin America and national security after the Second World War. The nation’s security policy was now directed towards preventing communism from taking hold in the region at all costs.12 Notions of regional hegemony and inter-American cooperation were no longer considered to be core values, but strategies in defence of other core values, namely Western democracy and capitalism. The Monroe Doctrine was quickly reinterpreted as a tool of containment and in March 1950, George Kennan formulated the Kennan Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, an enunciation outlining that the United States would consider any attempt to extend communism to the Western Hemisphere a threat to its national security. Throughout the Cold War, this was the Monroe Doctrine’s purpose.13

10 “Declaration of Panama,” October 3, 1939 in United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1939, vol. 5, The American Republics (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1957), 36–37. 11 New York Times, November 10, 1939, 14. 12 Lars Schoultz, National Security and United States Policy Toward Latin America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), 13–14. 13 Gaddis Smith, The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine (New York, NY: Hill and Wang, 1994), 65–72; Greg Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2011 [2004]), 7–8; Brian Loveman, No Higher Law: American Foreign Policy and the Western Hemisphere since 1776 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 269–274; Stephen Rabe, “A Question of Power: U.S. Relations with Latin America,” Diplomatic History 34, no. 2 (2010): 448.

206  A. BRYNE

By the turn of the twenty-first century, the Monroe Doctrine had fallen out of favour among United States policy makers. It has rarely been invoked since the end of the Cold War and the days in which every Democratic and Republican party platform contained at least one reference to its maintenance are long gone. Public devotion to the doctrine has also waned considerably, although it still seems to hold some sort of semi-mystical position within the national consciousness. Foreign opinion on the doctrine is entirely negative—to outside eyes it represents United States impertinence and a desire for imperial control, and Latin Americans gave up hope of establishing a true Pan-American Monroe Doctrine long ago. The words of Hiram Bingham strike a more appropriate chord a century later—the doctrine has undeniably become “hoary with age.”14 Indeed, exactly one hundred years after Bingham called for the abandonment of the Monroe Doctrine, a Secretary of State attempted to fulfil his wish. Speaking before the Organization of American States on 18 November 2013, Secretary John Kerry described the doctrine as an assertion of the United States’ authority “to step in and oppose the influence of European powers in Latin America.” He made little effort to defend the doctrine’s tenets and triumphantly declared that the “era of the Monroe Doctrine is over.” This statement was met with applause, briefly diverting Kerry off-script to agree with his audience’s reaction: “that’s worth applauding. That’s not a bad thing.” He continued by claiming that the relationship that we seek and that we have worked hard to foster is not about a United States declaration about how and when it will intervene in the affairs of other American states. It’s about all of our countries viewing one another as equals, sharing responsibilities, cooperating on security issues, and adhering not to doctrine, but to the decisions that we make as partners to advance the values and the interests that we share.15

14 Hiram Bingham, The Monroe Doctrine: An Obsolete Shibboleth (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1913), 111. 15 John Kerry, “The United States and Latin America: The Power of Partnership,” Organization of American States, Washington, DC, November 18, 2013. Transcript available at “Remarks on U.S. Policy in the Western Hemisphere,” U.S. Department of State, https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/11/217680.htm.

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Kerry’s address signified that the Barack Obama administration viewed the doctrine as a manifestation of the United States’ desire to secure and maintain the status of an imperial hegemon in the Americas, and that said doctrine ought to have no place in future inter-American relations. It is not difficult to appreciate why Kerry considered the doctrine an abuse of the United States’ power and a tool of imperialism, yet this book demonstrates that defining the Monroe Doctrine is not so simple. During the early twentieth century, Kerry’s words on partnership and equality would not have been out of place in a speech or article on the doctrine by an advocate of Pan-Americanism. The debate that took place over its meaning firmly established the existence of a Monroe Doctrine on either side of the divide between regional hegemony and ­inter-American cooperation. Proclaiming the death of the doctrine is ultimately meaningless— as Walter Lippman realised in 1915, it can mean “anything or nothing.” Whilst the history of the doctrine’s application is undoubtedly one of United States imperialism, it has played a significant role in drawing the attention of United States decision makers to the notion of inter-American cooperation. For many Americans that engaged with the doctrine during the early twentieth century, the doctrine directed the United States towards Pan-American cooperation and proclaimed inter-American unity as a core value of national security. In reality, Kerry was not announcing the end of the Monroe Doctrine—he was proclaiming that the United States desired to cooperate with the nations of Latin America rather than exert imperial dominance over them (Fig. 1). Kerry’s enunciation came at an opportune moment, a mere decade before the bicentennial anniversary of the Monroe Doctrine. Members of the Donald Trump administration have quietly invoked the doctrine since Kerry proclaimed its demise, confirming on the eve of its bicentenary that it remains “a cluster of loyalties” that can be effectively “summoned to action” when required.16 Whilst it is unlikely that we shall see

16 Robbie Gramer and Keith Johnson, “Tillerson Praises Monroe Doctrine, Warns Latin America of ‘Imperial’ Chinese Ambitions,” Foreign Policy, February 2, 2018. https:// foreignpolicy.com/2018/02/02/tillerson-praises-monroe-doctrine-warns-latin-americaoff-imperial-chinese-ambitions-mexico-south-america-nafta-diplomacy-trump-tradevenezuela-maduro/; Adam Taylor, “What Is the Monroe Doctrine? John Bolton’s Justification for Trump’s Push Against Maduro,” Washington Post, March 4, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/03/04/what-is-monroe-doctrine-johnboltons-justification-trumps-push-against-maduro/.

208  A. BRYNE

Fig. 1  Secretary of State John Kerry speaks at the Organization of American States on November 18, 2013 (Image courtesy of Maria Patricia Levia/OAS)

any grand celebratory events in 2023 to mark the occasion, citizens of the United States may benefit from looking back to the early twentieth century when considering the historic role the doctrine has served. Doing so might prompt Americans to dwell on the relationship between hegemony and cooperation in the conduct of the nation’s contemporary foreign relations and perhaps signify the importance of Pan-American solidity not only to the future of United States national security but to the peace and security of all American nations.

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Online Material The American Presidency Project. University of California. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/index.php The Avalon Project. Yale Law School. http://avalon.law.yale.edu. John Hay-Henry White Correspondence, Digital Maryland. Enoch Pratt Free Library. http://collections.digitalmaryland.org/cdm. Theodore Roosevelt Digital Library. Dickinson State University. http://www.theodorerooseveltcenter.org/Research/Digital-Library.

Index

A ABC nations, 64–67, 78, 102, 104–108, 125–128 Adams, John Quincy, 23, 182 Adams Jr., Charles Francis, 23, 26 Addams, Jane, 22 Adee, Alvey, 87 Aero Club of America, 102 Aguinaldo, Emilio, 25 Alaska, 37 Alexandra, Queen, 86 Alfaro, Eloy, 87 Alfaro, Ricardo, 191 Algeciras Conference (1906), 137 Álvarez, Alejandro, 68, 180 American Academy of Political and Social Science (AAPSS), 95, 188, 191 American Anti-imperialist movement internal divisions, 22–24 Monroe Doctrine and, 11, 20–22, 23–34, 24n11, 35, 46–47, 121, 199

Western Hemisphere and, 24–25 American Association for International Conciliation, 102 American Commission to Negotiate Peace, 159–160 American Defense Society, 120 American Historical Association, 168, 180 American league of nations. See regional organisation American Peace Society, 25–27 American Society of International Law (ASIL), 95, 104, 107 Anderson, Chandler, 138 Anti-Imperialist League, 20, 23 Argentina as ABC nation, 64–66, 78, 94, 102, 104–108 First World War and, 109, 154, 168 German colonies in, 73, 75, 81 Pan American pact and, 126 Austria-Hungary, 175

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 A. Bryne, The Monroe Doctrine and United States National Security in the Early Twentieth Century, Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the Contemporary World, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-43431-1

237

238  Index B Ballantine, Henry, 158 Barney, Samuel, 30 Barrett, John International Pan-American Committee and, 193–194 Mexico and, 99–101, 99n19, 107 Pan-Americanism and, 45, 76–79, 102–103, 107, 109–112 Pan American Monroe Doctrine and, 68, 99–101, 107–112, 121, 154–159, 167 Pan American Union and, 46, 67, 78, 94, 99, 102–103, 110, 154, 155, 167, 178, 193, 205 Philippines and, 41–42 Baruch, Bernard, 153 Beach, Chester, 182 Belize, 5 Belmont, Perry, 119–120 Beveridge, Albert, 107, 142–143, 165 Bingham, Hiram, 16, 64, 93–94, 101, 104, 168–169, 194, 206 Blackwell, Alice, 197 Blakeslee, George, 8, 95, 102, 104, 112, 158, 164 Bolivia, 177 Bonsal, Stephen, 81, 161 Borah, William, 142, 142n25, 145, 152 Brazil as ABC nation, 65–66, 78, 94, 102, 104–108 First World War and, 109, 153 German colonies in, 73–75, 79–81, 114, 143 Monroe Doctrine centennial anniversary and, 180 Pan-American Monroe Doctrine and, 68–69 Pan American pact and, 127 Spanish–American War and, 34

Brazilian Society of International Law, 180 Britain Canada and, 115–117 imperialism in Latin America, 4–5, 10 imperial rivalry and, 27 Panama Canal and, 105 Paris Peace Conference and, 161 Royal Navy, 114, 120 Taft Arbitration Treaties and, 137 Venezuela boundary dispute and, 4, 26 Venezuela crisis and, 48, 72–73 British Guiana, 4 Brown, Phillip Marshall, 96, 166, 191–192 Brum, Baltasar, 166–167, 177–178 Bryan, Charles Page, 33, 79–80 Bryan Treaties, 148 Bryan, William Jennings anti-imperialism and, 23, 32, 35 on Monroe Doctrine authorship, 187 treaty fight and, 153 Bryce, James, 142n24, 151 Buell, Raymond, 204 Bueo, Juan, 177 Burton, Theodore, 84 Butler, Nicholas Murray, 158 C Calderon, Ignacio, 157 Canada Monroe Doctrine and, 88, 115– 119, 121 regional organisation and, 158–159 Caribbean Panama Canal and regional stability of, 54–58, 105, 124–125, 144, 190, 202

Index

perceived racial inferiority of inhabitants, 52, 56–57, 63–67 United States hegemony in, 2, 47, 55, 77, 92, 104, 125, 175–176 United States territory in, 2, 19, 144 Carnegie, Andrew, 22, 27, 32, 35, 40, 46, 84 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 102, 180 Carranza Doctrine, 167–168 Carranza, Venustiano, 167–168 Castro, Cipriano, 48–50 Catt, Carrie Chapman, 197 Central America Panama Canal and regional stability of, 54–58, 105, 124–125, 144, 190, 202 perceived racial inferiority of inhabitants, 52, 56, 61–66 United States hegemony in, 2, 47, 50, 52, 77, 105, 124, 175–176 Chadwick, French Ensor, 105 Chetwood, John, 24, 27, 43 Chile as ABC nation, 64–65, 78, 94, 103–108 First World War and, 109, 168, 176 German colonies in, 73, 75 Pan-Americanism and, 112 Pan American pact and, 126–128 Chilton, Horace, 35 China, 41, 88–89 Choate, Joseph, 63, 66, 114, 120 Churchill, Winston, 116–117 civilisation, 21, 29, 35, 36, 51–52, 56–57, 60, 69, 80–81, 124, 160 Clark, Joshua Reuben, 99, 203 Clark Memorandum, 203 Clemens, Samuel, 22 Cleveland, Grover, 4, 21, 29, 50, 201 coaling stations, 34, 40, 87–88, 143

  239

Colby, Bainbridge, 172 Cold War, 205 Cole, George, 75 Collings, Harry, 191–192 Colquitt, Oscar, 98 Columbia, 54, 179 Congress of Panama (1826), 12 Cooke, Conway, 198 Coolidge, Archibald, 102, 194, 198–200 Coolidge, Calvin, 174, 193–195 Cordova, Salvador, 191 Costa Rica, 34, 67, 154 Council of National Defense, 153 Crichfield, G., 80 Croly, Herbert, 69–70 Cuba, 19–21, 30–33, 55, 189 Cummins, Albert, 90 D da Gama, Domicio, 153 Daniels, Josephus, 114 Danish West Indies. See United States Virgin Islands Davis, Norman, 198 Dayton, Alston, 82 Denmark, 86–87 Dernburg, Bernhard, 115–120 Dewey, George, 85 dollar diplomacy, 55–58 Dominican Republic, 50–53, 56–58, 97, 148, 176 Drago Doctrine, 49, 60–63, 66 Drago, Luis, 60–64 Dulles, John Foster, 105, 154 E Ecuador, 87 Einstein, Lewis, 116

240  Index empire, 2–4, 2n3, 6, 9–11, 20, 21, 43, 104, 175 Ermentrout, Daniel, 30 F Falklands Islands, 5 First World War international trade and, 10–109 outbreak of, 16, 96, 115, 128, 139 Pan-Americanism and, 108–113, 141–160 United States belligerency, 96, 128, 145–146, 188, 205 Fisher, Horace, 37 Fisher, Walter, 163 Fletcher, Henry, 109, 179 Foster, John, 105 France, 117, 120, 137, 162–163 G Galapagos Islands, 85–88, 144n33 Gardiner, Charles, 46 Gerard, James, 114 Germany colonies in Brazil and Latin America, 73–75, 79–81, 114, 143 criticism of Monroe Doctrine in, 71 German Navy, 71, 81, 84–86, 120 Philippines and, 33, 71 threat to national security, 15–16, 33, 48, 71–82, 88–89, 113– 120, 144–145, 153–154 Gibbons, John, 85 Gildersleeve, Virginia, 152 Grevstad, Nicolai, 66 Griswold, Florence, 196 Gruening, Ernest, 196 Guam, 20 Guano Islands, 37

H Haff, Delbert, 99 Hague, The Hague Peace Conferences (1899 and 1907), 36, 62–63, 114, 136–137, 148 international arbitration, 49 Haiti, 56, 97, 148 Hale, William Bayard, 124 Harding, Warren, 176, 182 Harrison, Benjamin, 29, 34 Hart, Albert Bushnell, 39, 53, 120, 194 Hawaii, 20, 29–31, 34, 121 Hay, John, 61, 73, 74, 79, 86 Hibben, Paxton, 106 Hill, David, 165–166 Hitchcock, Gilbert, 82 Hoar, George, 31 Hoes, Rose Gouverneur, 187 Hollywood, 181 Holt, Hamilton, 148 Holy Alliance, 141 Honduras, 55, 58, 176, 191 Hoover, Herbert, 203 House, Edward “Colonel,”, 125–126, 160–163, 166 Huerta, Victoriano, 97 Hughes, Charles Evan, 174–175, 178, 188–193, 197, 200 Hulbert, Murray, 194 Huntington-Wilson, Francis, 55, 87–88, 109 I India, 116, 151–152 Inman, Samuel Guy, 62, 179 inter-American cooperation. See Pan-Americanism internationalism, 132–135 international law, 68, 163–164

Index

International Union of American Republics. See Pan American Union Italy, 49, 73, 80 J James, Herman, 179 Japan, 16, 48, 88–91, 106, 143, 169, 175 Jayne, Madison, 42 Jefferson, Thomas, 20, 187 Johnson, Hiram, 165 Johnson, Louis, 205 Jones, Clarence, 187 K Kasson, John, 43 Kennan, George, 205 Kerry, John, 206–207 Knox, Philander Chase Central American tour, 57–60, 62 Dollar diplomacy and, 55, 55–60 Monroe Doctrine and, 57–60 South America and, 65 Taft Arbitration Treaties and, 137–139 Knutson, Harold, 145 L Lansing, Robert Carranza Doctrine and, 168n117 Monroe Doctrine and, 124–125, 139–142, 159 Pan-Americanism and, 124 treaty fight and, 139–142, 159 United States Virgin Isles and, 144 Latané, John, 150–152 Latin America . See also individual nations and geographic regions

  241

as area of academic study, 64, 93, 104, 106 cooperation with nations of, 8, 46, 60–61, 123, 190, 198 First World War and, 108–112, 153 hegemony and informal imperialism in, 2, 10–11, 14, 45–46, 55, 104, 175–176, 190 Pan-Americanism in, 13, 127 Pan-American Monroe Doctrine and, 12, 60, 69–70 race and, 55–62, 78–79 regional organisation and, 158, 166–167 United States reputation in, 14, 33– 34, 61, 63, 64, 104, 112–113, 196, 199 Laurier, Wilfrid, 115n77 Lawrence, David, 146n37 Leach, Henry, 195 League for the Preservation of American Independence, 140 League of Nations, 17–18, 126, 131–133, 133–136, 160–168 League to Enforce Peace, 139–142, 144, 148 Lili’uokalani, Queen, 29 Lineberger, Walter, 181 Lippmann, Walter, 5–6, 203, 207 Livermore, Thomas, 25 Lodge, Henry Cabot Algeciras Conference and, 137 diplomacy and, 147 Lodge Corollary and, 89–91 Monroe Doctrine and, 53, 137, 142, 153, 156, 165 Monroe Doctrine centennial anniversary and, 172 Open Door and, 40 regional organisation and, 158–159 Taft Arbitration Treaties and, 137–139 treaty fight and, 140, 158, 166

242  Index Venezuela crisis and, 72 Long, John Davis, 37, 83 Lowell, Abbott Lawrence, 132, 148, 163 M Machu Picchu, 93 Mahan, Alfred Thayer diplomacy and, 147 First Hague Peace Conference and, 136 Germany and, 73, 84–85, 114 Japan and, 88 Monroe Doctrine and, 39, 86, 88, 136 United States Navy and, 81–82 Venezuela crisis and, 72 Mallet-Prevost, Severo, 195 Marburg, Theodore, 144, 150 Marshall, Thomas, 163 Mathieu, Beltran, 166 McAdoo, William Gibbs, 110 McKinley, William, 19–21, 29, 33 Menken, Solomon Stanwood, 121 Merry, William, 34 Mexico absence at Fifth Pan American Conference, 176 French invasion of, 5 Magdalena Bay, 89–90, 143 Mexican-American War, 2, 197, 199 Mexican Revolution, 89, 95, 97–101, 123 Tampico Affair, 106 Meyer, George von Lengerke, 82, 89 militarism, 21, 23, 27, 84 Miller, Alexander, 116 Miller, David Hunter, 159–160 Monroe Doctrine American anti-imperialist movement and, 11, 19–22, 24n11, 23–34, 35, 46–47, 121, 199

Article 21 reservation on, 131, 162–166 as barrier to civilisation, 80 as national security framework, 6–8, 48, 202 as “living policy,”, 39–43 Canada and, 115–120 global Monroe Doctrine, 146–152 Kennan Corollary, 205 Latin American opinion of, 14, 59, 67–70, 93, 104, 199, 206 Lodge Corollary, 89–91, 123, 143 original text of, 5 Pan-American Monroe Doctrine, 6–8, 11–13, 47, 60–61, 67–70, 98–103, 110–112, 120, 125, 134, 153–159, 166–167, 177–178, 183–185, 191–192, 193, 195, 197, 198–199, 204, 206 Roosevelt Corollary, 11, 46–48, 52–53, 57, 60, 61, 68, 77, 80, 84, 97, 124, 135, 142, 197, 203 United States Navy and, 81–88, 118–121 Monroe Doctrine centennial anniversary, 17, 171–175, 180, 195, 203 American Historical Revue and Motion Picture Exposition: The Monroe Doctrine Centennial (Los Angeles), 180–185 Commemorative Session of the Centenary of the Monroe Doctrine (Philadelphia), 188–193 International Centennial Celebration of the Promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine (Virginia), 185–188 New York celebrations, 193–195 Monroe Doctrine centennial half dollar, 181–182

Index

Monroe, James, 4, 18, 180, 182, 185–188, 202 Moore, John Bassett, 3, 4, 79 Moore, Robert, 188 Morocco, 137 Myers, Henry, 156 N Nabuco, Joaquim. See Rio Branco, Baron Naón, Rómulo, 157 National Association of ­Anti-Imperialist Clubs, 23, 24, 42 national security core values of, 8–10, 13, 15 First World War and, 96, 126 Monroe Doctrine and, 6–8, 9, 47–48, 201–203 race and, 60 terminology, 8–9 threats to, 14–47, 48, 71 National Security League, 120 Native Americans, 2, 113 Navy League of the United States, 84, 119, 121 Niagara Falls peace conference (1914), 107 Nicaragua, 54, 58, 60, 148 Nicholas II, Tsar, 136 Norris, George, 151 O Obama, Barack, 207 Olney, Richard, 4, 197 Open Door policy, 41, 89, 189 Organization of American States, 46, 205, 206 Otjen, Theobald, 30 Ottoman Empire, 175

  243

P Pacheco, Felix, 180 Page, Walter, 114 Panama, 54–55, 58, 81, 176, 191, 199, 204 Panama Canal acquisition of canal zone, 54 Monroe Doctrine and, 54–55, 57, 66–67, 85, 87–88, 95, 105, 125, 143, 144, 190 Monroe Doctrine centennial half dollar and, 183 opening of, 66, 105, 109 toll dispute, 105 Pan American Conferences Eighth Pan American Conference (1938), 204 Fifth Pan American Conference (1923), 176–179, 192, 197, 200 First Pan American Commercial Conference (1911), 78 First Pan American Conference (1889–1890), 45 First Pan American Scientific Conference (1908), 68 Fourth Pan American Conference (1910), 69 Second Pan American Conference (1901–2), 45 Second Pan American Scientific Conference (1915), 125 Third Pan American Conference (1906), 62 Pan-Americanism as core value of national security, 9–11 criticism of, 13–14, 104–106, 113 First World War and, 108–113, 142–160 growth of, 103, 108–112

244  Index imperialism and, 13–14 Monroe Doctrine and, 6–8, 13–14, 48, 60–62, 67–70, 98–103, 110–112, 120, 125, 134, 153– 159, 166–167, 178, 183–185, 192, 193, 197–199, 204, 206 women internationalists and, 196–197 Pan American Railway, 84 Pan American Round Table, 196 Pan American Security Zone, 205 Pan American Society of the United States, 94, 194 Pan American Union Canada and, 158–159 First World War and, 110 John Barrett and, 45, 67, 78, 94, 99, 102–103, 111, 154, 155, 167, 178, 193, 205 Latin American trade and, 107 Leo Rowe and, 188 Philander Chase Knox and, 89 regional organisation and, 153–159 Paranhos, José, 68 Paris Peace Conference, 159–164 Parker, Alton, 187 Parker, John, 25 Patterson, Thomas, 53 Payne, George Henry, 172 Peabody, George, 101 Pepper, George, 166, 178 Peru, 93, 126, 157 Philippines annexation of, 2, 11, 19–30, 34, 40–43, 188, 199, 202 currency, 183 defence of, 2, 71, 89, 121 Philippine–American War, 2, 20, 36, 199 protectorate, 30–33 Pittman, Key, 163 Platt Amendment, 32 Plum, Harry, 145

Poland, 146 Porter Convention, 62–63 preparedness, 119–121 Puerto Rico, 20, 182, 199 Q Quakers, 152 R race African Americans, 113 Anglo-Saxonism, 23, 47, 56, 63, 113, 162 perception of Filipinos, 31, 31n31 perception of Latin Americans, 56–67, 78–79, 113 Spanish “black legend,”, 56 United States foreign relations and, 56 Radio Corporation of America, 195 Rayner, Isidor, 53 regional organisation, 153–159, 166 Reid, Whitelaw, 36–37, 54–55, 63n55 Rio Branco, Baron, 68–69, 79 Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 115, 204 Roosevelt, Theodore civilisation and, 52–53 diplomacy and, 147 Dominican Republic and, 50–51 Drago Doctrine and, 61 Germany and, 85 Japan and, 89 Monroe Doctrine and, 36, 39, 50–53, 81, 108, 187 Panama Canal and, 54 Pan American Union and, 46 Philippines and, 36 Roosevelt Corollary, 11, 48–53, 203 South America and, 65 treaty fight and, 133 United States Navy and, 81–86

Index

Venezuela crisis and, 48–50 Root, Elihu Galapagos Islands and, 87 Japan and, 88–89 Panama Canal and, 105 Pan-Americanism and, 61–67, 154 Roosevelt Corollary and, 50, 75 South American tour, 61–65 Tampico Affair and, 106 treaty fight and, 133, 146 Rowe, Leo, 111, 188, 191, 194 Russia, 16, 88–89, 169 Russo-Japanese War, 89 S Samoa, 37, 121 San Domingo Improvement Company, 50 Schurz, Carl, 27, 33–34, 82–84 Scott, James Brown, 104 Scruggs, William, 69, 75 Second World War, 204 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 89, 137 Shaw, Albert, 46, 67 Shepherd, William, 111, 165, 175 Sherrill, Charles, 102, 111, 196 Skinner, Richard, 197 Slayden, James, 70, 107, 166 Smith, Alfred, 172 Society of Descendants of James Monroe, 180–186 South America as distinct from Central America and Caribbean, 63–66 informal imperialism and, 104 origin of Monroe Doctrine and, 197 Pan-American Monroe Doctrine and, 157 “rediscovery” of, 47, 64 steamship lines to, 75–76

  245

Spain, 19–21, 26, 31 Spanish–American War, 7, 11, 19, 19n1, 34, 45, 56, 71, 95, 182, 199 Sterling, Thomas, 156 Stevenson, Adlai, 26 Stimson, Henry, 57, 98, 143 Swanson, Claude, 163 Swift, Morrison, 21 T Taft Arbitration Treaties, 137–139, 148 Taft, Henry, 150 Taft, William Howard Dollar diplomacy and, 55–60 Mexico and, 97 Monroe Doctrine and, 57, 57n34, 85, 118, 164 South America and, 65–66 Taft Arbitration Treaties and, 137–139 treaty fight and, 133, 140, 160 Taylor, David, 85 Taylor, Howard, 27–29 Thompson, Charles, 160 Tillman, Benjamin, 64 Torres, Don Manuel, 198 Tower, Charlemagne, 165 Treaty of Versailles, 17, 132, 156, 160, 166, 169, 176, 189 Trinkle, Elbert, 185 Trump, Donald, 207 U United States Navy, 27, 33, 37, 40, 81–85, 119–121 United States Virgin Islands, 86–87, 144 Upshaw, William, 185

246  Index Uruguay, 62, 154, 166–167, 177– 178, 191 Usher, Roland, 112 USS Maine, 19 V Varela, Francisco, 157 Varela, Jacobo, 191 Venezuela Venezuela crisis (1902–3), 48–50, 61, 72–73 Venezuelan boundary dispute (1895), 4, 21, 26, 39 Vila, José, 61 von Bernstorff, Johan, 115 von Bismarck, Otto, 71n87, 192 W Walker, Asa, 85 Washington, George, 5, 194 Webster, Daniel, 30 White, Andrew, 71, 136

White, Emory, 75–76 White, Henry, 86–87 Wilson, Ellen Axon, 122 Wilson, George Grafton, 144, 148, 152 Wilson, Woodrow First World War and, 9, 145 global Monroe Doctrine and, 146–152 interventions in Latin America and, 97, 176 Latin American policy of, 97n10, 122–127 League of Nations and, 126–128, 131, 134, 159–164 Mexican Revolution and, 97–101, 106, 122 Navy and, 119 Pan-American pact and, 97, 125–126, 141 Paris Peace Conference and, 159–164 Woman’s Bar Association, 180