The Military in Thai Politics 1981-86 9789814379885

Table of contents :
Contents
Tables
Figures
Preface
Chapter one Introduction
Chapter two Military Factions and Their Struggle for Power
Chapter three Politics of Compromise and Military Factionalism
Chapter four The Army and Its Increasing Commitment to Domestic Tasks
Chapter five Legitimization of the Military's Role Expansion
Chapter six Conclusion
Appendices
APPENDIX 1 Results of the 1986 General Election
APPENDIX 2 Excerpts of Prime Ministerial Order No. 66/2523: "Policy of Struggle to Win Over Communism"
APPENDIX 3 Excerpts of Prime Ministerial Order No. 65/2525: "Plan for Political Offensive"
APPENDIX 4 Prime Ministerial Order No. 47/2529: Additional Explanations Regarding the Operation In the Struggle to Win Over the Communists
APPENDIX 5 Prem's Coalition Government (1981-87)
APPENDIX 6 Commanders-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Army (1978-84)
APPENDIX 7 Military Positions and Ranks of General Arthit Kamlang-ek (1981-86)
APPENDIX 8 Military Positions and Ranks of General Chaovalit Yongchaiyuth
References

Citation preview

THE MILITARY IN THAI POLITICS

1981-86

The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies was established as an autonomous organization in May 1968. It is a regional research centre for scholars and other specialists concerned with modern Southeast Asia, particularly the multi-faceted problems of stability and security, economic development, and political and social change. The Institute is governed by a twenty-two-member Board of Trustees comprising nominees from the Singapore Government, the National University of Singapore, the various Chambers of Commerce, and professional and civic organizations. A ten-man Executive Committee oversees day-today operations; it is chaired by the Director, the Institute's chief academic and administrative officer.

THE MILITARY IN THAI POLITICS

1981-86 Suchit Bunbongkarn Chulalongkorn University

I5EA5

INSTITUTE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES

Published by Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Heng Mui Keng Terrace Pasir Panjang Singapore 0511 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

© 1987 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies The responsibility for facts and opinions expressed in this publication rests exclusively with the author, and his interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views or the policy of the Institute or its supporters.

Cataloguing in Publication Data

Suchit Bunbongkarn The military in Thai politics, 1981-86. I. Thailand - Armed Forces - Political activity. 2. Civil-military relations - Thailand. 3. Thailand- Politics and government. I. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. II. Title. UA853 T4S94 1987 ISBN 9971-988-61-5 Typeset by Art Communication Workshop Printed in Singapore by Kim Hup Lee Printing Pte Ltd

Contents List of Tables List of Figures Preface

Vll

viii ix

INTRODUCTION From Armed Intervention to Playing by the Rules II

III

IV

MILITARY FACTIONS AND THEIR STRUGGLE FOR POWER

9

The Fall of the Young Turks and Its Impact on Thai Politics Military Factionalism: The Young Turks, the Democratic Soldiers and the Class 5 Group Key Players in New Factional Politics in the Army Factional Conflicts and Alignments within the Army

24

POLITICS OF COMPROMISE AND MILITARY FACTIONALISM

34

9 II I7

General Prem's Delicate Balancing Act Military Factions, Political Parties, and Prem's Government Stability

40

THE ARMY AND ITS INCREASING COMMITMENT TO DOMESTIC TASKS

49

The Internal Security Operation Command and Its Control over Mass Organizations Rural Mass Organizations: Democratic Development at the Grassroots The Capital Security Command: A New Power Base of the Military Leaders The Mass Psychological Operations of the Army

v

34

49 53 58 62

V

VI

LEGITIMIZATION OF THE MILITARY'S ROLE EXPANSION

68

Political Ideology of the 66/2523 Group The Political Implications of Order No. 66/2523

68 73

CONCLUSION

77

The 1986 Election and the Military's Political Role Party Politics in the 1986 Election Civil-Military Relations and Political Development in Thailand

77 81 83

Appendices

2

3

Results of the 1986 General Election

89

Excerpts of the Prime Ministerial Order No. 66/2523: "Policy of Struggle to Win Over Communism"

90

Excerpts of the Prime Ministerial Order No. 65/2525: "Plan for Political Offensive"

94

Prime Ministerial Order No. 47/2529: Additional Explanations Regarding the Operation in the Struggle to Win Over the Communists

100

5

Prem's Coalition Government (1981-87)

105

6

Commanders-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Army (1978-84)

106

7

Military Positions and Ranks of General Arthit Kamlang-ek (1981-86)

107

Military Positions and Ranks of General Chaovalit Yongchaiyuth

108

4

8

109

References

VI

Tables

Voter Turnout for the Thirteen General Elections

3

2

Results of the 1979 General Election

35

3

Results of the 1983 General Election

36

4

Results of the 1986 General Election

89

Vll

Figures

2

Organization Chart of the ISOC

52

Organization Chart of the Capital Security Command as of 1985

60

viii

Preface

This is a study of the role of the military in Thai politics after the fall of the Young Turks in April 1981 up to the dissolution of the House of Representatives in May 1986. The period saw an interesting change in the military's perception of politics as it began to expand its role in civil affairs. This expansion included several programmes in rural development, peace-keeping duties and mass mobilization in rural and urban areas. The Army also emphasized its involvement in democratic development at the grassroots as a measure to defeat communism. Whether this role expansion indicates that Army leaders are now prepared to play the game by the rules, exercising their political role short of a seizure of power is still debatable and deserves further serious study. This study, however, intends only to examine the political implications of the military's increasing commitments to domestic and developmental tasks. It is my hope that the study will provide not only a better understanding of the Thai civil-military relations but also a clearer picture of the nature of the problems involved in the democratic development of Thailand in the 1980s. This study could not have been possible without the permission of the Royal Thai Army and the Internal Security Operation Command (ISOC). I am indebted to General Chaovalit Yongchaiyuth, Lt.-Gen. Jaruay Wongsayanh, Lt.-Gen. Pichit Kullavanij, Maj.-Gen. Chamnien Oonchit, and Colonel Somsak Salyakamthorn who were kind enough to allow interviews and arrange briefings on the civil affairs of the ISOC and the Army. My thanks also go to the officers of the ISOC and the First Army Region for their briefing and assistance. I would also like to thank Professor Kernial S. Sandhu, Director of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, for the Institute's support during my stay in Singapore. Dr Sharon Siddique of the Institute was kind enough

IX

to give me advice and suggestions concerning my research. I greatly benefited from discussions and comments on my draft paper presented at an in-house seminar at the Institute on 5 July 1986. Others in the Institute to whom I would like to express my appreciation are Mrs Patricia Lim, the librarian and her staff for the excellent library service, Mrs Y.L. Lee, the executive secretary and her staff for their kind assistance, Mrs Betty Kwan for her excellent typing, and Pauline Khng in the Publications Unit for editing the manuscript.

Suchit Bunbongkarn

X

chapter one

Introduction

FROM ARMED INTERVENTION TO PLAYING BY THE RULES

When Prime Minister General Prem Tinsulanond in reference to a move by some parliamentarians and part of the Army to topple the government after the opening of the parliamentary session on 1 May 1986, stressed that everyone should play the game by the rules, every one apparently did.' The attempt by the opposition parties and Social Action Party (SAP) defectors to create a government crisis by voting against a decree to double the registration fee for diesel vehicles was certainly constitutional. But it was against political etiquette since the SAP was one of the coalition parties that formed the government. 2 The Army Commander, General Arthit Kamlang-ek also observed the rules, not because he was subservient to the Prime Minister but because the parliamentarians' attempt to rock the government served his interests well. His conflict with General Prem was publicly known and his chances of moving up the political hierarchy would be brighter if the Prem government was brought down. It was expected that after the opening of the National Assembly, Prem's government would be in serious trouble due to the disintegration of the Social Action Party, the largest government coalition partner. The trouble would lead to a collapse of the Prem government with General Arthit waiting in the wings. The period between the fall of the Young Turks in April 1981 3 and the dissolution of the House of Representatives saw a gradual growth of democratic development in Thailand. While there was another coup attempt on 8 September 1985, the military, by and large, was forced to share power with the political parties and the elected House of Representatives. The House of Representatives had not since 1949 enjoyed such a long stretch of parliamentary rule in having three consecutive elections (1979,

2

The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86

1983 and 1986) without a successful military interruption. Throughout this six-year period, an uneasy political balance was maintained, allowing political parties and the House of Representatives to strengthen themselves. Although their ability to accomplish this was limited and the possibility of a coup could not be ruled out, it was the political parties, not a coup that put an end to the Prem government. 4 However, the military is still a formidable political force as it has been since 1932. Coups, not elections, formed the norm for changing the government. For more than fifty years, the political change in Thailand has evolved in a pattern which some Thai political analysts called a vicious cycle - starting from a coup, followed by an election and a brief period of parliamentary rule before a crisis sets in leading to another coup. 5 This cycle certainly reflects the struggle for power between military elites and elected political elites which has always led to the Army's seizure of power. Since 1979 the parliamentary system has been more durable and a coup is becoming more difficult to achieve. But the military continues to be able to influence government decisions. It is believed that the government's stability largely depends on the military. This cycle can also be explained in a context of conflict between the two elitist groups over the issue of political participation of the masses. In their study of political participation in developing nations, Huntington and Nelson point out that the political elites' attitude on the desirable levels, forms and bases of political participation (defined as an activity by a private citizen designed to influence governmental decision-making) depends in part on their effectiveness in getting into and remaining in power. 6 The political elites out of power are more likely to be interested in expanding political participation as a way of altering the balance of forces in the political arena, while the incumbent political elites are normally not in favour of expansion of political participation. The latter may be in a better position to broaden the scope of participation but as Huntington and Nelson argue, ''they are much more inclined to see any shift in the participation pattern as a threat to the political status quo of which they are the principal beneficiaries". 7 In the case of Thailand, the analysis of Huntington and Nelson seems relevant. The military elites who are often the elites in power have no interest in an expansion of political participation. Their reasons, publicly known, are that the Thais are not ready to take part in politics, do not know how to exercise their rights properly, and can thus be easily exploited by competing elected politicians who are concerned only about their own personal interests. However, the real motive behind this opposition is that an expansion of popular political participation will enhance the political legitimacy and power of civilian politicians, thus threatening directly the military elites' domination in politics.

Introduction

3

For the civilian political elites who generally are the challengers to the status quo, an expansion of political participation is essential. The people are their power base and source of political legitimacy. Bringing the people or new societal groups into the political process will alter the existing balance of forces through a strengthening of the political position of the elites out of power and a weakening of the incumbent elites. However, this has not been easy to accomplish. What parliamentary politicians lack is an effective and highly institutionalized party system to serve as a tool for establishing links with various social groups, institutions and the masses. As Kramol points out, political parties in Thailand in Western political theorists' views are merely political cliques or at best political factions. 8 They pose no threat to the military's monopoly of power. Other factors contributing to the perpetuation of the Army's domination in Thai politics are the lack of political consciousness among the masses and the low level of popular participation in the political process as reflected in the low voter turnout in every general election since 1933. As shown on Table 1, the voter turnout of only two out of thirteen general elections exceeded 50 per cent of the total number of eligible voters. In the Table 1 Voter Turnout for the Thirteen General Elections

General Election 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

Date of Election 14 Nov 7 Nov 12 Nov 6 Jan 29 Jan 26 Feb 26 Feb 15 Dec 10 Feb 26 Jan 4 Apr 22 Apr 18 Apr

1933 1937 1938 1946 1948 1952 1958 1958 1969 1975 1976 1979 1983

Number of Eligible Voters

Votes Cast

Percentage of Votes

Number of MPs

4,278,231 6,123,239 6,310,172 6,431,827 7,176,891 7,602,591 9,859,039 9,917,417 14,820,180 20,243,791 20,623,430 21,283,790 24,224,470

1,773,532 2,462,535 2,210,332 2,091,788 2,117,464 2,961,291 5,668,566 4,370,789 7,285,832 9,549,924 9,072,629 9,344,045 12,295,339

41.45 40.22 35.03 32.52 29.50 38.95 57.50 44.07 49.16 47.17 43.99 43.90 50.76

78 91 91 96 99 123 160 160 219 269 279 301 324

SoURCE: Election Division, Department of Local Administration, Ministry of Interior, table tabulated by the author. See also Such it Bunbongkarn and Pornsak Phongphew, Prutikam Kanlongkananseang Khong Khonthai [Thai voting behaviour], (Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University Press, 1984), pp. 110-1.

4

The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86

Bangkok constituencies where people are more politically exposed, and economically and socially better off, the voter turnout has always been low, and in some elections was the lowest. 9 This low level of political participation particularly in the capital city demonstrates that a large number of Thai people still regard politics as a matter for the elitist groups. They are not concerned with power contests of political elites unless these contests directly affect their way of life. They do not feel that they need access to the political process even if it has been offered. Among those who voted, quite a number cast their votes not because they wanted to exert influence but because of various "personal" reasons. Some were paid to vote, some had personal ties with a candidate, and some were mobilized by military officers. 10 Such political attitudes do not pose obstacles for military leaders who seize power or wish to perpetuate their political control. One could argue that the 14 October 1973 uprising showed that the Thais are not politically apathetic. However, this case is an exception. This student-led mass uprising which involved more than half a million people was successfully organized not because the masses wanted to take part in the political process but that they could no longer tolerate the decade-old dictatorial and oligarchic rule of Thanom Kittikachorn, Praphat Charusatien and Narong Kittikachorn. One can see that the voter turnout of the two elections following the fall of the Thanon-Praphat regime did not increase (see Table 1). While several new political parties and pressure groups were formed, involving people who had not been in politics before, the masses generally were not affected by the politicized environment of that period. Some of the people were brought into the political arena but they were mobilized by either right or left wing groups for specific purposes only. The students' efforts to politicize the rural people were met with resistance on the part of the military thus reducing the students' chances of accomplishing the task. Coups, therefore, are not incongruent with the Thai people's political value. Even in the case of the 6 October 1976 coup when student protestors were suppressed viciously, the people, in general, seemed to accept the coup as a normal political occurrence. Such a political attitude has helped the military leaders to determine the scope of political participation with a relatively free hand. Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat's five-year rule (1959-63) and the subsequent rule by Field Marshals Thanom and Praphat for another five years (1964-68) were dictatorial military regimes with absolute power. Political freedom, popular political participation and political parties were not allowed. Sarit wanted absolute power because he wanted to secure his political position and to pursue his plan of national development. He believed that democracy was not urgently needed in Thailand. What the

Introduction

5

country needed most, he felt, was to mobilize all the resources available to develop its economy and this could not be done effectively under democratic rule.u Than om and Praphat followed their predecessor's rule but after five years they had to allow limited participation in 1968 in order to prolong their stay in power. However, they made the mistake of launching a "coup" in November 1971 to regain absolute power. But their restrictions on political participation following the coup cost them their power, reputation and wealth. Their rule was toppled by the mass uprising on 14 October 1973, and some of their properties were confiscated because of their alleged corruption. Sarit's predecessor, Field Marshal Phibulsonggram was known as a shrewd and skilful political leader who was fairly successful in manipulating the political process to get into power and to remain in power in the 1930s. Phibul retained the system of limited participation adopted after the 1932 revolution to legitimize his rule (1938-44). Under this system, the Thais were allowed to elect half of the members in the legislature while the other half was appointed by the government. Although he allowed relatively free expression for the elected members of the House of Representatives, for those who appeared to be his rivals, he took strong measures against them. Key members of the alleged opposing groups were arrested and prosecuted in a special court on charges of sedition. 12 The masses were also mobilized to support Phibul's military campaign for a territorial claim on French Indochina as a part of his pan-Thai movement and it was the first mass participation since the 1932 change of government from absolute to constitutional monarchy. When Phibul regained power after the coup in November 1947, he and the coup group agreed to allow a civilian government and an elected House of Representatives to exist under an interim constitution drafted by the coup group. They even allowed the civilian government to set up its own committee to draft a permanent constitution as they saw fit. 13 However, the honeymoon period between the military and the elected politicans was short-lived. In November 1951, Phibullaunched his own coup to consolidate the 1947 coup group's power. The 1932 constitution was re-introduced with slight revisions to allow military and civil service officers to be appointed as members of the cabinet and of a unicameral legislature that had also elected members. The scope of political participation was thus readjusted to serve the needs of the military. Military leaders who came to power after Sarit have followed a similar pattern. An abrogation of the constitution, dissolution of Parliament, prohibition of political participation, and the ban on political parties and political gatherings were common features after the coups of 1971 and 1976. The only difference between these two coups was that a military junta was established after the 1971 coup but in the 1976 coup, a dictatorial

6

The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86

civilian rule was set up as a front for the military. However, this total contraction of political participation did not strengthen the power base of the military leaders. Thanom and Praphat were toppled two years after the 1971 coup. In 1977 Admiral Sangad Chalawyu and General Kriangsak Chommanand overthrew the ultra-right regime of Thanin Kraivixian only a year after he was made government leader by the military. The 1977 coup was intended to ease political tension owing to the disaffection of various groups both within and without the Army. A new constitution was promulgated in 1978, one year after the coup, to allow a "semi-democratic" government to be set up for four years before a "fully fledged democracy" could be developed. The foregoing analysis of the relationship between military coups and political participation up to 1977 has demonstrated that the levels, forms and bases of political participation were largely determined by the interest of the military elites. The scope of participation was adjusted for the purpose of getting into power or for the retention of power by the military leaders. However, a broad expansion of political participation had never been the military's intention. What they were interested in was a total reduction of political participation or a limited participation which allowed only a few selected groups to enter the political arena under their supervision. The limitation or the suspension of political participation did not work in the military's favour if it stayed for too long. The military had to yield to demands for greater participation or they would face a political crisis which would cost them their power. Nevertheless, expanded participation survived for short periods as the new military elites would step in amidst political turmoil and political participation would again be reduced. Since the general election in 1979, the conflict between military and elected political elites has undergone some change. This stems from the fact that the prospects of civilian elites having a greater share in the power structure have increased. The system under the 1978 constitution has weathered several political storms. It has survived two attempted coups and elected politicians appear to have a better opportunity to establish links with the masses, expand their power base and institutionalize their own parties. In a semi-open political period such as this, the military had to look for more options to influence the government decision-making process other than through a seizure of power. The military leaders seem to realize increasingly the political significance of popular political participation and mass support. What they have been doing recently is to establish a link with the masses at the grassroots, mobilizing them to support the Army's actions. Several mass organizations have been set up by or with the support of the Army. The nature of the conflict between military leaders and elected politicians is no longer over whether political participation

Introduction

7

should be reduced or increased but in the competition for mass support. Political participation is now needed by political parties and the Army. Most studies on the role of the military in Thai politics have concentrated on the period before 1981. No comprehensive and systematic study in this area has been attempted to cover the period after the April 1981 coup. The changing attitudes of military leaders in this period with regard to mass participation in political and national security affairs deserve serious study. This was a period in which the strength of the military and the participant political institutions were put to test. The Army has redefined its mission to include rural development, peace-keeping duties and other civil affairs. It has also developed a "political infrastructure" mass organizations, civil affairs centres, Bangkok peace-keeping force for mass mobilization to support the Army's programmes. Whether this role expansion indicates that the Army leaders are now prepared to play the game by the rules, exercising their political role short of a seizure of power is still debatable and requires serious investigation. With an intention to answer the aforementioned questions, the study will examine the pattern of military involvement in Thai politics during the period of 1981-86. It will also examine the nature of military expansion into non-military affairs and the political implication of this expansion, that is, if this increasing commitment in domestic task implies the Army leaders' preparation to exert their influence in the political process beyond the use of force. The perceptions of military leaders in relation to the military's involvement in politics and with civilians will also be examined. The study of civil-military relations in Thailand and in other developing countries has been an emphasis on coups d'etat. What is more important as Welch notes is the level of direct military participation in politics short of forcible seizures of control. Armed forces in developing countries should be perceived as exercising a direct - and appropriate - series of political roles beyond the "orthodox" ones, such as advising policymakers and defending against external attacks. 14

This study is an attempt to analyse the role of the military in Thai politics short of forcible seizures of power. It will, as Bienen urges, look at the interaction between the military and civilian institutions, the military's role and influence in the decision-making process and its links with various mass organizations." It will use the military as a central unit to analyse political conflicts in Thailand. It aims to provide not only a better understanding of Thai civil-military relations in the recent period but also a clearer picture of the nature of problems involved in the democratic development of Thailand in the 1980s.

8

The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86

NOTES I For details of this interview see the Nation, 29 April 1986, p. I. 2 As members of one of the government parties, the Social Action Party parliamentarians should have voted for the government bill. For details of the vote over this issue see Bangkok Post, 2 May 1981, p. 1. 3 The "Young Turks" refers to a group of middle-ranking army officers who staged an abortive coup on I April1981. For details of their ideology, aspirations and their involvement in politics, see Chai-Anan Samudavanija, The Thai Young TUrks (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982). 4 After being defeated in the House of Representatives over the diesel vehicle tax decree on I May 1986, General Prem, the Prime Minister decided to dissolve the House; the dissolution meant that a new government would be formed after the general election. 5 See Chai-Anan, op. cit., pp. 1-3 and Likhit Dhiravegin, "Thai Politics from June 1932 to the Coup of 1957: The Struggle between the Bureaucracy and Democracy", p. 8 (Paper presented at the International Conference on Thai Studies, 22-24 August 1984, organized by the Thai Studies Programme, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok.) 6 Samuel P. Huntington and Joan M. Nelson, No Easy Choice, Political Participation in Developing Countries (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 3, 29. 7 Ibid., pp. 29-30. 8 Kramol Tongdhamachart, Toward a Political Party Theory in Thai Perspective, Occasional Paper No. 68 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and Maruzen Asia, 1982), p. 39. 9 Bangkok was recorded as having the lowest voting turnout in the 1952, 1979 and 1983 general elections. See Suchit Bunbongkarn and Pornsak Phongphew, Prutikam Kanlongkananseang Khong Khonthai [Thai voting behaviour], (Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University Press, 1984), p. 110. 10 Ibid., p. 231. II Thak Chaleomtiarana, Thailand: the Politics of Despotic Paternalism (Bangkok: Social Science Association of Thailand, 1979), pp. 151-69, 226-7. 12 For one of the studies which covers in detail Phibul's ruthless attempt to eliminate his opponents see Payab Rojanavipak, Yook Tamin [The age of terror], (Bangkok: Sor Sethaburt, 1972). 13 For an excellent study of the November 1947 coup, see Suchin Tantikul, Rathaprahan 2490 [The 1947 coup], (Bangkok: Social Science Association of Thailand, 1972). 14 Claude E. Welch Jr., "Civil-Military Relations: Perceptions from the Third World", Armed Forces and Society 2, no.2 (Winter 1985): 184. 15 Henry Bienen, "Armed Forces and National Modernization: Continuing the Debate", Comparative Politics (October 1983), p. 9.

chapter two

Military Factions and Their Struggle for Power

THE FALL OF THE YOUNG TURKS AND ITS IMPACT ON THAI POLITICS

The fall of the Young Turks in the abortive coup in April 1981 greatly affected both the Army and the Thai political system in many aspects. Ironically one impact from the failure of the coup was that it reinforced the political strength of the Army. It also increased the survival period of the political parties and the House of Representatives, thus allowing them more time to institutionalize. Army leaders could claim, however, that the survival of the participatory political institutions and the elected political elites still depend on the Army. It was they not the civilian political leaders who resisted the coup from the beginning. It was the Army who had the will and capacity to face and resolve this kind of crisis and who safeguarded the democratic institutions. Another related effect was that the collapse of the Young Turks gave rise to a number of new Army leaders, the majority of whom had played a decisive role in suppressing the coup. They were notably Maj.-Gen. Arthit Kamlang-ek, Maj.-Gen. Harn Leenanond, Maj.-Gen. Chaovalit Yongchaiyuth, and Colonel Suchinda Kraprayoon. Only Colonel Pichit Kullavanij, another rising military leader who was appointed Commander of the 1st Infantry Division (a politically key important post in the Army) was not involved in the coup suppression. Although these officers had important posts before the coup, the fall of the Young Turks allowed their rapid rise in the Army's hierarchy at an unprecedented speed. In the political sphere, the successful suppression of the coup did not

10

The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86

lead to political stabilization and a strengthening of participatory politics. On the contrary, political uncertainty and government instability were prevalent throughout the period following the April 1981 coup. Shifts of political loyalty and alignment among the legislative members which occurred twice were one of the major factors contributing to the political uncertainty and fragility of Prem's government. Reshuffles of cabinet members and changes in the coalition government partners to ease the political tension occurred three times during the six years. 1 The government compromise had to be reached not only among the coalition parties but also among various factions within the parties. Government fragility was further increased by a prevalence of factionalism within the Army. Throughout the modern period of Thai politics, the Armed Forces, particularly the Army has been a formidable political force whose support for the government is essential to the latter's survival and stability. After the April 1981 abortive coup, the cohesiveness of the Army was not restored despite the fall of the Young Turks. Factionalism within the Army prevailed with new groups forming around the Army's new leading figures. At the same time the influence of the Young Turks in the Army remained considerably strong. The patron-client relationships between leading members of the Young Turks' group and low-ranking officers particularly the warrant and the non-commissioned officers were so deeply entrenched that they could not be easily uprooted. This prevalence of factionalism within the Army made it impossible for Prem's government to secure the full support of the Army consistently since only one or two factions of the Army were unswervingly loyal while some were liable to changing loyalty. What is more important is the position of General Arthit whose support for the government seemed more selective after he was appointed Army Chief as can be seen from his criticism of several government policies. The most outstanding example was his attack on the government devaluation of the baht in November 1984, and his demands that the government reverse the decision as well as reshuffle the cabinet. Thus, a compromise with all these factions in the Army was attempted by the government to pacify them as well as to ease the tension, but it could not be reached in every issue. General Arthit's behaviour in the last three years in the Army's top post convinced many political analysts that he was not one of General Prem's men, leaving Chaovalit and the "Class 5" faction as the only base of General Prem in the Army. As one analyst commented Arthit's role in helping put down that rebellion [the 1981 coup] helped him to the top Army post, but his relations with Prem have steadily deteriorated in recent years as it became clear he had his eyes fixed on the prime ministership.2

However, the politics of compromise during this period contributed to

Military Factions and Their Power Struggle

11

the relatively long period of participatory politics. Factionalism within the Army and the political parties led to political uncertainty and fragility of the government, but the Army leaders' power and influence were insufficient to coerce the government or to seize power. Eventually, they had to settle for a compromise.

MILITARY FACTIONALISM: THE YOUNG TURKS, THE DEMOCRATIC SOLDIERS AND THE CLASS 5 GROUP

Factionalism is nothing new in the Thai Army's modern history. It is inherent within the modern structure of this military establishment because it exercises a patron-client relationship covering nepotism, personal and inter-marriage ties, and business and commercial links. To appreciate the political impact of the Army's factionalism during 1981-86, one has to look at the factional conflict within the Army in the late 1970s. Before 1973, Army factions were formed and developed through a patronage system to support particular military leaders' involvement in politics. These factions served as their informal political organization for political manoeuvres, political and financial support inside and outside the Army, establishing links with other political and social groups, and campaigning for their political supremacy. The widespread factionalism in this period made the Army a personalized organization of some military leaders and degenerated to the point that during and after the October 1973 uprising, the Army became the most defamed institution. After 1973, a new type of faction emerged in the Army where its adherents never identified consistently with a particular leader. This faction had as its purpose, the rebuilding of the Army, making it a real (professional) national army. But in the process of doing this, they were enmeshed in polities and as a consequence became political groups, influencing changes in the government and its decision-making process. Between 1973 and 1981, the new factions in the Army could be divided into three groups, namely, the Young Turks or the Young Military Officers group, the "Democratic Soldiers", and the Military Academy graduates of Class 5. The Young Turks were perhaps the most influential as well as the most controversial faction in the Army prior to 1981. In his study of the Thai Young Turks, Chai-Anan Samudavanija describes them as a faction to defeat factionalism within the Army: Informal groups in the Thai Army could be developed through a number of factors - graduates of the same class at the Military Academy, class links between men involved in a particular event (the 1932 coup promoters, the 1947 coup initiators, officers in the army unit which fought in Korea, Laos, and Vietnam), inter-marriage between leading families, and member-

12

The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86

ship of the same corporate boards. The Young Military Officers Group was different from other informal groups in the Army at least in one aspect it was a deviant small group. It professed and supported behaviours and attitudes in conflict with the norm of the Army. It was in fact a faction aimed at fighting factionalism in the Army. It was an informal group striving for a qualitative development of its own, an incremental drive towards the transforming of a faction-ridden Army into a professional national Army. 3

The formation of this Young Military Officers Group reflected the strong resentment of middle-ranking officers at the prevalence of politically oriented factions in the Army, which fought each other for political supremacy and personal gain. Phibul, Phin, Sarit, Thanom and Praphat developed their own groups composed of military officers who were tied together by common interests as well as personal bonds which had developed over several years. The ties were strengthened through acquired wealth, power, respect and privileges enjoyed during their long years in power. 4 This pursuit for power by the military leaders caused the Army's degeneration into divisive groups which fought each other for political supremacy. The Young Military Officers Group's disgust over the personalized conflicts among the military leaders motivated their informal organization with the aim of restoring respectability to the military establishment. According to Chai-Anan, the political turmoil from 1973 to 1976 planted the seed for the Young Military Officers Group. 5 During this period, military institutional interest was threatened by the student movement. The radical National Student Centre of Thailand was the prime mover against the military suppression of the communist insurgency. It also tried to force the government to hasten the withdrawal of American military bases in Thailand and criticized the Armed Forces' defence spendings. 6 The political polarization between the left and the right leading to widespread political unrest, assassinations, demonstrations, protests and counterprotests also raised the concern of the young officers over the future of the Thai nation. In this period, the country was left almost in a political vacuum, without strong leadership, effective political institutions, or a cohesive army. Most of the young officers were unhappy at this destabilizing effect of the political system and according to Chai-Anan, Against this background of political polarization, threats to corporate interest, weak and uncommitted army leadership and a strong sense of relative deprivation, a group of young army officers, all of whom were graduates of the Royal Chulachomklao Military Academy's Class 7 (graduated in 1960) decided to form a secret movement ... They called themselves "Khana Taharn Num" (Young Military Officers Group). 7

Military Factions and Their Power Struggle

13

The core members of the group were Colonel Manoon Roopkachorn, the then Commander of the 4th Cavalry Regiment; Colonel Choopong Matvaphan, Commander of the 1st Cavalry Regiment; Colonel Pridi Ramasoot, Commander of the I st Infantry Regiment; Colonel Chan boon Phentragul, Commander of the 31st Infantry Regiment, Colonel Prachak Sawangchit, Commander of the 2nd Infantry Regiment and Colonel Chamlong Srimuang, Secretary-General to General Prem, the Prime Minister. The group had expanded its membership to include a number of junior officers in the early 1980s. In March 1981, about fifty army officers from the ranks of colonel to captain were members of the Young Turks group. Included were twelve regiment commanders, eleven battalion commanders, and a number of staff officers. Initially the group was known for its integrity and cohesiveness. The members of the group expressed on several occasions their distaste for big capitalists, corrupt politicians, weak leadership in the Army, and personal rivalry among political elites. The widening gap between the rich and the poor, the privileged and the underprivileged, and the urban and the rural areas were the major concern of the Young Military Officers Group. What the country needed most, from their point of view, was a strong, decisive, and incorruptible leadership to build a better society for the Thai people. 8 Their ideas and perceptions on the national problems as well as their solutions to the problems were not developed in a clear ideological or philosophical framework. Their political thought was simple, unstructured, and pragmatic, typical of young military officers who would like to see quick and effective action for all the problems facing the Thai nation. Their solutions to the problems were seemingly conventional, at least, in relying on coups and strong leadership with integrity. They were involved in the October 1977 coup and brought General Kriangsak Chommanand to power to replace Thanin Kraivixian as Prime Minister. Two years later in early 1980 they switched their support from General Kriangsak to General Prem with whom they had developed a "father-son" relationship for a number of years. General Kriangsak resigned in February 1981 and General Prem was appointed Prime Minister. However, unlike other military factions the Young Turks were not interested in top posts in the Army or the government; they preferred the role of power-brokers giving support to those they saw fit. The abortive coup in April 1981 led to the collapse of the Young Military Officers Group. They either failed to realize the political significance of the throne or they failed to neutralize this most revered institution. They also lacked competent, politico-military strategists. The majority were troop commanders who had combat experience either in Vietnam or in counterinsurgency in Thailand or both. However, the coup on 1 April 1981 was not within their previous experience. It was a "war" in which political fac-

14

The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86

tors were more decisive than military hardware. Colonel Chamlong who had the potential to be the mastermind of the group dropped out of this faction shortly before the coup because in his own words "some of our members changed their ideology - if we wanted to do something big, we would have to have an unwavering and genuine ideology" .9 However, the strength and influence of the Young Military Officers Group were undisputed from the late 1970s until the coup. The group was known as the most powerful faction in the Army and in the political arena. Its influence although largely reduced, remained in the Army after the abortive coup and its impact on the political scene could be felt throughout the first half of the 1980s. The other military faction which came into existence about the same time as the Young Turks was a group called the Democratic Soldiers. This group grew from the concerns of a number of military officers over national security, political stability, and the increasing threat of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) in the period following the October 1973 student uprising. 10 Unlike the Young Turks, the core of the Democratic Soldiers' group was composed of staff officers in the Army, a number of whom were assigned to work in the Internal Security Operation Command (ISOC), a military-dominated agency responsible for counter-insurgency. One of the founding members was Maj.-Gen. Ravi Wanpen who worked in the ISOC for a number of years and was regarded as the public leader of the group. The other was Colonel Chavat Pisuthipan who could be considered as the most important key member behind this group. Colonel Chavat spent most of his military career teaching political science and comparative politics in the Military Academy. He was an artilleryman by training but a political scientist by profession. As a lecturer in the Military Academy for decades, his political analyses after the October 1973 uprising were well received by his former students and made him an influential figure with the Democratic Soldiers. Other notable members of the group were General Chaovalit, the present Army Chief and Colonel Songsak Suyanond, a lecturer in the Army War College. All the leading members of the Democratic Soldier's group could be regarded as politico-military officers who had not commanded troops but were involved in planning counter-insurgency measures or in organizing political activities against the united front of the CPT. Their political thinking was formulated during their involvement in these activities and were influenced by a former CPT ideologue, Prasert Sapsunthorn. Prasert had served the Army as an analyst on communism, and the ISOC as a counterinsurgency advisor for some years. The underlying political thought of the Democratic Soldiers and that of Prasert was largely identical, indicating that he was probably the mastermind of the group. Unlike the Young Turks, the Democratic Soldiers seemed to have given more thought to their

Military Factions and Their Power Struggle

15

ideas. They considered a long-term reform of the Thai society within a framework of what they called "democratiz ation". From their perspective, "democratic reform" or even "democratic revolution" was the only solution to the problems of the Thai nation. They have insisted that democratization is essential at all levels and in all major institutions including the military establishment in order to win over the communists as well as to develop the country. However, the Democratic Soldiers never elaborated on what they called a "democracy " particularly at the practical level. They simply defined democratization as a process by which the people could exercise their sovereignty in the fullest capacity in the political system. The only explanation they gave was that the democratization of the political system could not be completed without democratization in every major political and bureaucratic institution. This only raised more questions than answers. How successful were the Democratic Soldiers in expanding their influence and network within the Army in particular, and society in general? Their major effort was to expand their ideas and establish ties horizontally within the Army. But the leftist ideological tone made it rather difficult for ordinary army officers to accept them. Unlike the Young Turks, the Democratic Soldiers did not aim at establishing vertical links with senior officers. The only vertical connection they had was with General Prem through the help of General Chaovalit and General Harn, who shared similar ideas, at least, in the use of political measures to fight the CPT." However, for other military officers, the Democratic Soldiers' ideology was unacceptable. Some officers even looked on this group with suspicion as they were convinced that the group was being used as a front for the communists since their analysis of political developments in Thailand did not differ from the Marxists. However, the Democratic Soldiers were able to penetrate the staff and educational units of the Army. They were able to control the publication of Sena Suksa, a journal issued by the Army's General Staff and Command School, of which Colonel Chawat was made the editor. Several controversial articles were included in this conservative journal for the first time. 12 The group also looked for its expansion outside the Army. It had established links with union leaders, student activists, academics and politicians. It had even supported a political party called Puang Chon Chao Thai (Thai People), to be the group's political front, but the party performed very poorly in the general elections in 1979 and 1983. Unable to expand its influence within the Army and the body politic and perhaps with added pressure from senior military officers, the group decided to disband in November 1981. Nevertheless, the Democratic Soldiers' political thinking greatly influenced the formulation of the Prime Ministerial Order No. 66/2523 which laid down guidelines for the suppression of communist insurgencies. 13

16

The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86

This order was announced on April 1980 while the Prime Minister, General Prem, was concurrently the Commander of the Army, indicating his endorsement of the "political offensive" strategy which was first developed by the Democratic Soldiers. General Harn, the former Fourth Army Region Commander and General Chaovalit, the present Army Chief were the major proponents of the order, and were actively involved in its implementation. Another group in the Army which made its presence felt in the early 1980s was the Chulachomklao Military Academy graduates of "Class 5". These Class 5 officers refer to the fifth class of military cadets who graduated in 1958 under the new curriculum adapted from West Point. Informal gatherings or groupings of officers of the same class in the Military Academy were not an unusual practice. But the formation of Class 5 had special objectives other than social get-togethers of contemporaries. The members of this class tried to build up the cohesiveness of their group as a parallel to that of the Young Turks with an aim to countering them. The Class 5 group not only survived the coup in 1981 but gained more strength and influence within the Army after the coup. The role and influence of Class 5 will be discussed later in this study. What will be mentioned here is the basic nature of their role before 1981 compared to the other two groups. The leaders of the group were Colonel Suchinda Kraprayoon, now the Assistant Chief-of-Staff for Operations, Colonel Issarapong Noonpakdi, former Commander of the 21st Regiment and the 1st Infantry Division and now the Deputy Commander of the Second Army Region. This group had no intention of expanding membership beyond their class. Nor did they profess to be a political or reformist group. However, they made their public stand clear in that they did not agree with the Young Turks' behaviour whom they considered "soldiers out of line", without respect for senior officers. Their stand against the Young Turks' influence drew them closer to Arthit, then Deputy Commander of the Second Army Region and Chaovalit, then Director of the Army Operations Directorate who were arch rivals of the Young Turks. They had formed a "united front" to block the Young Turks' road to power and were the first group to stand up against the Young Turks in April 1981. A striking common feature of the three Army factions is that they were groups organized by middle-ranking officers without the specific purpose of supporting an Army leader on a permanent basis. 14 Even in the case of the Young Turks, although they were closer to General Prem, the group was not organized for the initial reason of supporting him. This feature differed from previous military factions which from 1932 to the ThanomPraphat period, were organized as the power base of military leaders who competed with each other for political supremacy. Each military strong-

Military Factions and Their Power Struggle

17

man in the past like Phibul, Sarit or Praphat had formed his own group of support within the Army. But the Young Turks, the Democratic Soldiers, and the Class 5 group were formed amidst the political turmoil and weak Army leadership of the 1970s. Their concern over the political instability and demoralization in the Army led them to form informal groups in the hope of doing something about these problems. They were neither led by any Army leaders, nor did they allow themselves to be exploited for the benefit of particular army generals. Nevertheless, two of the three groups disintegrated after the coup in 1981. Although they continued to have influence within the Army, the old pattern of military factionalism which grew out of the personal aggrandisement of army leaders re-emerged. KEY PLAYERS IN NEW FACTIONAL POLITICS IN THE ARMY

What the Army needed most during the period after the coup was strong leadership to bring back prestige and cohesion to the military institution. This need reflected a general concern among many army officers over the disarray within the Army which followed the fall of Thanom and Praphat in 1973. In fact, the Army's image had been tarnished before their downfall because of their involvement in big businesses, large-scale corruption, and nepotism. But the liberalized political atmosphere after the 1973 student uprising allowed the barrage of criticisms by student activists, progressive political parties, and union leaders on the "politicians in uniform". Efforts to clip the wings of the Army were also made by several progressive and left-leaning movements. The navy chief, Admiral Sangad Chalawyu, was a military strongman but he did not represent the Army. Admiral Sangad was the Commander of the Royal Fleet, a powerful position in the Navy, second only to the naval Commander-in-Chief. But he came into conflict with Marshal Thanom who denied him the post of Naval Chief, just a few weeks before the October 1973 uprising. This conflict with Thanom caused him to lend support to the students in the uprising. He was made Commander-in-Chief of the Navy immediately after the October riots, and later the Supreme Commander, a position which had always been monopolized by the Army. The Army did not benefit much from his promotion, since he occupied himself with the development of the Navy which had long been neglected. 15 General Krit Srivara, the Army Chief in 1973 who had been involved in politics for a number of years and who defected from the Thanom-Praphat side during the uprising did not live long enough to rebuild the Army. He died from a heart attack in April 1976. His successors, General Boonchai Bamrungpong and General Serm Na Nakorn were considered typical senior military officers who prefered the status quo. General Kriangsak who in

18

Th e Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86

1977 was made Supreme Commander was not considered an army man because he had been at the Supreme Command Headquarters for too long. The fact that Admiral Sangad instead of the Army Chief was appointed leader of the coup in October 1976 emphasized that the Army was suffering from a leadership crisis. The emergence of the Young Turks and the Class 5 group in the late 1970s did not help solve the leadership problem. The Young Turks' promotion of General Prem did not lead to cohesion in the Army. Factionalism still prevailed during General Prem's period as Army Chief from October 1978 to August 1981 although the Army's image improved because of his honesty and integrity. However, the conflict between the Young Turks and Class 5, coupled with the effort of the Democratic Soldiers to propagate their ideology of democratic revolution which a number of officers regarded as leftistoriented, raised serious concern among professional soldiers on the rifts in the Army. They believed that a successor to General Prem must have a strong sense of leadership to heal all the wounds in the Army. General Arthit was in a better position than other leading figures in the Army as an acceptable successor to General Prem in the military and political spheres. General Arthit had projected his personality as a new military strongman, and leadership was badly needed in the Army at that time. In a series of private discussions with two leading military figures in 1981, Maj.-Gen. Suchinda, the director of the Army Operations Directorate and Maj.-Gen. Vichart Laithomya, the Commander of the 2nd Cavalry Division and a close aide of General Prem agreed that General Arthit would be a suitable future Army leader because he had demonstrated strong and decisive leadership. 16 General Arthit made his strong personality felt to army officers and the public when he came out against the Young Turks in the period before the abortive coup. He and his former classmates, Maj .-Gen. Yuthasak Krongtraujrok e, then Commander of the Chulachomkla o Military Academy and Lt.-Gen. Ham, the Deputy Chiefof-Staff for Operations had established a link with other groups in the Army particularly the Class 5 group and Maj.-Gen. Chaovalit to counter the Young Turks. General Arthit's brief appointment to the commanding post of the 1st Division in Bangkok in 1980 represented an effort by this faction to deter the Young Turks' movement. But the Young Turks retaliated by lobbying General Prem to move Maj .-Gen. Arthit to the Second Army Region as the Deputy Commander. This appointment was considered a demotion for Arthit since the 1st Division was politically more important as it commanded all troops in and around Bangkok, were the troops used to stage or suppress a coup. His conflict with the Young Turks reached the point of no return when he and his group decided to suppress the Young Turks' coup on 1 April

Military Factions and Their Power Struggle

19

1981, while a number of senior officers seemed reluctant and some had joined the coup before defecting to the government side. General Arthit telephoned the Queen informing her about the coup when a group from the Young Turks came to see General Prem in the evening of the 31 17 March asking him to head the coup doomed from the start. Under pressure from the Palace, the Young Turks had to release General Prem who refused to join the coup. The King, the Queen and General Prem evacuated to Korat, a home base of the Second Army Region where the headquart ers for the coup suppression was hastily set up. General Arthit as Deputy Command er of the Second Army Region took command of the suppression mission. To no one's surprise, after the coup was crushed General Arthit was appointed Command er of the First Army Region which controlled the troops in Bangkok and all the Central Plain provinces. This was a strategic position in the Army since by tradition anyone who controls 18 the First Army Region would later control the Army . General Arthit's access to the palace as revealed in his telephone call to the Queen put him in a better position than others competing for the Army's most powerful post. His contact with the revered institution went back to the mid-1970s when he was the command er of a civilian-policemilitary combined force stationed in Loei province. A few years later he was named an "Outstand ing Thai Citizen" by the Saichaithai Foundatio n which was established under the patronage of Princess Sirithorn to provide welfare for injured soldiers. This award brought General Arthit closer to the palace and made him better known to the public as a dedicated soldier who worked hard for the betterment of the Thai people. With all these factors, it was, therefore, not a surprise that after being appointed Command er of the First Army Region in April 1981 with the rank of lieutenant-general, Arthit had only to wait five months to be promoted to assistant commander-in-chief of the Army with the rank of full general. But he still kept the post of Command er of the First Army Region, making him, in effect, the most powerful person in the Army. It was widely known that the Army Chief, General Prayuth Charuman i was of a weak19 personality and he was in this post until General Arthit could take over . When General Prayuth retired in October 1982, the Army's top post was made over to General Arthit as anticipated. In 1983, he succeeded General Saiyud Kerdphol as Supreme Command er of the Thai Armed Forces while retaining the Army Chief post. The last Army Chief who concurrently held the Supreme Command er's post was Marshal Thanom in 1964. Considering the fact that General Arthit came from a humble origin and his promotion during the most part of his military career was rather slow, his appointme nt to these two top positions was astonishingly rapid. General Arthit came from the family of a low-ranking army officer residing in Bangkok. His father was a captain in the Army who enrolled

20

The Military in Thai Politics, 198/-86

in the service as a non-commissioned officer. General Arthit was not considered a bright student while studying at the Chulachomklao Military Academy; he graduated with a relatively poor record. 20 His assignments in the Army were mostly upcountry posts, remote from the power centre. Those who attained the Army's top posts before him were "Bangkok" or "urban" soldiers except for General Prem. Sarit, Thanom, Praphat and Krit, were "Bangkok" soldiers and followed the traditional path to the top by moving from the post of commander of the 1st Infantry Regiment to that of the 1st Infantry Division, then to the commanding post of the First Army Region. These posts were stationed in Bangkok. General Boonchai, General Serm and General Prayuth broke this traditional path but still were "Bangkok" soldiers; they were in staff positions based in the capital city before being appointed the Army's Commander-in-Chief. General Prem was the first to break this trend, followed by General Arthit.2 1 General Arthit had always maintained that he was not an "urban" solider and that his experience in rural areas acquainted him with the hardship endured by the soldiers and people outside Bangkok unlike the "urban" generals. He also claimed that he never had a chance to enjoy the luxury available to all military elites in Bangkok. He once made a sarcastic remark that while the military elites in Bangkok enjoyed playing golf, he had to be content with playing badminton. My posts were all in rural areas. We did not have a golf course over there. The only recreation we could have was badminton, because this game needed little space. As Commander-in-Chief of the Army, I am ex-officio Chairman of the Army's golf club, but I do not play golf. I still stick to badminton. 22

Another leading Army officer who rose to power after the Young Turks' abortive coup was General Harn. He graduated from the same class as General Arthit and they shared something in common: they were against the Young Turks. Harn was involved in drafting Order No. 66/2523 which was the "bible" for counter-insurgency. 23 His rise in the Army after the fall of the Young Turks could be attributed to the fact that he was one of the most trusted aides of General Prem. Harn, a southerner by birth as was General Prem, worked under Prem in the Second Army Region Command. He was Deputy Chief-of-Staff of the Second Army Region when Prem was the Commander. Both of them had worked closely together in using the "political offensive" strategy for suppressing the insurgeny in the Northeast. Then Harn moved back to Bangkok to head the Army Operation Directorate and was later appointed Assistant Chief-of-Staff for Operations. After the coup, Harn was moved to the South to take command of Fourth Army Region. Before his appointment, the region had been plagued with problems: banditry, the Muslim separatist movement, smuggling from

Military Factions and Their Power Struggle

21

and into Malaysia, and the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) which sought sanctuary in Thai territory. The main problem was the communist insurgency. The CPT had a number of strongholds in the provinces of Nakorn Srithammaraj and Surat Thani and its influence there had increased rapidly in the past decades. Upon assuming duty, General Ham announced his determination to solve these problems as soon as possible. This policy known as the Tai Rom Yen (The Pleasant South) was aimed at restoring peace and order to the South. His success was recognized by the people there, the mass media, the government authority and foreign observers. As one foreign journalist put it "former Fourth Army Commander General Ham Linanond ... did more than most in shaping Thailand's successful counter-insurgency strategy.' ' 24 However, his achievements put him in conflict with General Arthit. Through this success, General Ham had proved a capable military leader and brilliant strategist as well as effective administrator who could challenge the leadership and authority of General Arthit, and he often did. The conflict between these two military leaders, which eventually forced General Ham to resign from active service, had great political impact. 25 General Chaovalit was another military leader who rose rapidly in the Army after the collapse of the Young Turks' coup. He was one of the major opponents to the Young Turks in the early 1980s and was a key person behind the coup suppression. He was known to be attached to the Democratic Soldiers when this group was formed at the initial stage but he never publicly identified himself with them. In fact, he shared similar ideas with the Democratic Soldiers on the causes of the insurgency and the measures to suppress it. These ideas were eventually adopted by the government of General Prem in Order No. 66/2523. In an interview with General Chaovalit, he admitted that he had played a role in drafting this order with a number of military officers including General Ham. But he declined to specify the role of the Democratic Soldiers and Prasert Sapsunthorn in the issuance of the order. 26 However, it was obvious that the underlying principle of this order was similar to that of the Democratic Soldiers, indicating that their influence was quite significant. The rise of General Chaovalit was unusual as those who had previously reached the top post in the Army were from the infantry, artillery or cavalry. But Chaovalit was in the signal corps which by the Army tradition was not as prestigious as the other three fighting corps, and thus the advancement in the military career was usually slower. However, his unusual and rapid rise could be attributed to his close relations with General Prem and his brilliant ability in military and political manoeuvres. General Chaovalit served as a secretary to General Prem while he was Minister of Defence in 1979. Even after further promotion he served as General Prem's "personal" advisor for military and political affairs. It can be said that

22

The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86

Chaovalit is one of the most trusted aides of the Prime Minister along with General Ham. His success in implementing Order No. 66/2523 put him in a better position than his colleague to move upwards. As one of the major architects of this order, General Chaovalit had demonstrated his unusual intellectual ability in analysing the cause and effect of the communist insurgency as well as providing political means to suppress them. More importantly, he went about implementing the order. He organized annual briefings on the success of this order in counter-insurgency to high-ranking government officers to keep them informed and checked the government agencies concerned to ensure the order was fully understood and adhered to. Most analysts and communist defectors were convinced that the SinoVietnamese split and the inflexibility of the CPT leaders to adapt to the changing political and social environment were the main causes of the decline of the CPT. But, as one of the political observers remarked, "It is also true that a more enlightened government approach in the late 1970s served to hasten the party's downfall. " 27 Chaovalit had been known as one of the bright officers since he graduated from the Military Academy in 1954 in the first class under the revised West Point-oriented curriculum. He was sent to the United States for further studies at the U.S. Army's electronics school and later to the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. After the coup, he moved from Chief of Army Operations Directorate to be Assistant Chief-of-Staff for Operations, then to Deputy Chief-of-Staff and in 1985 was appointed Chief-of-Staff. In May 1986, in an unprecedented move by General Prem, he replaced General Arthit as Army Commander. However, his well-known partiality for political manoeuvres may not always be an asset for his future political role. To many, his subtlety was too difficult to understand. As one junior officer who wanted to remain anonymous remarked, "For Pee Sua [Brother Tiger, a nickname for Lt.Gen. Pichit Kullavanij], we know very well what he is thinking, but for Pee Chiew [Brother Chiew, a nickname for General Chaovalit], we are not sure what he is thinking, he is too subtle to understand or to follow. " 28 Lt.-Gen. Pichit Kullavanij was another army officer who climbed up rapidly in the Army hierarchy after the Young Turks' coup. But the factors contributing to his rise were somewhat different from the others. He was not in the anti-Young Turks' clique. Nor did he participate in the coup suppression. He was appointed Commander of the 1st Infantry Division after the coup because he was one of the Palace's most trusted officers and capable of deterring any coup attempts. His heroic achievement in liberating Khao Kor, a mountainous terrain in Pitsanuloke-Petchabun-Loei triangle and probably the largest CPT stronghold in the country, had moved him closer to the Palace. It took the government years to overrun

Military Factions and Their Power Struggle

23

Khao Kor and the crucial assault was in January 1981 which broke the resistance line of the CPT and since then Khao Kor has become a show piece development project and a tourist attraction. The credit for this success was given to Pichit who commanded the Third Army Region's troops. 29 The educational background of Pichit differed from the other three generals. He enrolled in 'the Military Academy one year after General Chaovalit. A year later, he won a scholarship to study at West Point, making him the only one among the leading figures of the Army who received an undergraduate training abroad. A brief survey of the educational background of all commanders of the Army since 1932 will reveal that they not only enrolled but also graduated from the Military Academy. 3° Foreign education or training only came after the graduation. While the Army has sent a number of outstanding cadets to study in foreign military schools at the undergraduate level for several decades, none of these graduates has been able to reach the top post in the Army. If General Pichit is appointed the Army Chief, for which he has the potential, he would break this tradition. In an interview with him, General Pichit considered himself a member of the elitist group of Thailand who had the privilege of the best education but unlike those educated abroad, he had been working upcountry in his mid-career life. 31 After returning from the Indochina war, he was attached to the Third Army Region based in Pitsanuloke, and in 1976-77 he was in charge of destroying the CPT stronghold at Khao Kor. His personality is more that of an "upcountry" soldier than one educated abroad. He is frank and consequently less diplomatic, tough and decisive, attributes which appeal most to junior commanding officers who could be his power base if he chose to develop one. The other two military leaders that need mentioning here are General Saiyud and Lt.-Gen. Suchinda, leader of the Class 5. General Saiyud was a prominent figure in the military establishment with wide connections within the Army and abroad. He was considered an intellectual soldier who had campaigned for a political strategy to suppress the CPT before it was spelled out in Order No. 66/2523. He also introduced the concept of total defence which recognized a multi-dimensional approach to include political, social and economic development as an integral part of a defence policy. 32 But his influence in the Army was minimal because he had been away from the Army for too long (since October 1974 to work at the Supreme Command Headquarters). His personal links with key middleranking army officers were cut off almost entirely. He succeeded General Serm as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces in October 1981 but won no personal recognition from General Arthit, the Army Chief, who regarded General Saiyud as one of his rivals in the power struggle within

24

The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86

the military circle. The conflict between these two generals partly stemmed from General Saiyud's attempt to develop more effective control over the three armed forces by appointing the commander of each service as deputy supreme commander. But General Arthit was personally against this and never performed the function of a deputy supreme commander. This was General Arthit's attempt to demonstrate to the public that he, not General Saiyud, was the sole leader of the military establishment. Although he did not endear himself to General Arthit, he won the hearts of many intellectuals, public-minded citizens and other professional groups who looked on him as an alternative to General Prem, the country's leader. In the case of Lt.-Gen. Suchinda, the Assistant Chief-of-Staff for Operations, his rapid promotion was of no surprise because he was the leader of the Class 5 group which was the arch rival of the Young Turks and was actively involved in suppressing them. General Suchinda graduated from the Military Academy in 1958 in artillery and was considered one of the bright students of his class. He won a scholarship to study at Fort Leavenworth and later became the assistant military attache in Washington DC, one of the prestigious posts for middle-ranking staff officers. In four years he rose rapidly after the collapse of the Young Turks from Chief of Intelligence Division in the Army Operations Directorate with the rank of colonel to the post of Assistant Chief-of-Staff with the rank of lieutenantgeneral. Other members of his class also rose to command key positions in the Army. In the October 1984 military reshuffle, eleven out of the total fourteen divisions were commanded by the Class 5 graduates including the 1st Division, the 2nd Cavalry Division and the Anti-Aircraft Division which were all based in Bangkok. With all these commanding positions, Class 5 had become a single powerful group and no coup attempt could succeed without its support.

FACTIONAL CONFLICTS AND ALIGNMENTS WITHIN THE ARMY

All those who supported General Arthit for the post of Army Chief in the hope that cohesion would return to the faction-ridden Army were disappointed since factionalism remained throughout his term. The prevalence of military factions as in the 1950s and 1960s was a result of some military leaders' pursuit of political power. Generally, there was a consensus among the military leaders including Generals Arthit, Chaovalit and Pichit, that the Army's involvement in politics was essential for political stabilization in the country, but they differed in form, and purpose of involvement. These differences led to greater divisiveness within the army and forced factions to come to the surface. General Arthit's involvement in politics was

Military Factions and Their Power Struggle

25

not to succeed General Prem when he voluntarily retires but to challenge his political leadership. Political analysts were convinced that for General Arthit, any type of military involvement in politics was possible ranging from political manipulation, coercion or the use of force if it could move him up to the top political post. His attack on the government's baht devaluation in November 1984 was often cited as an example of his attempt to coerce the government. In the case of the government defeat in the Parliament in May 1986, it was believed that General Arthit "had been stirring the political water" .33 General Chaovalit's view was that military participation in politics was necessary when the country was in a transitional period towards a full democracy; it would help stabilize the political system and make democratic development possible. But how this is to be implemented is an open question. General Chaovalit agreed that the Army should be one of the pillars of General Prem's government and he would support General Arthit as long as General Arthit supported General Prem. But whenever General Arthit made clear that he was challenging General Prem, then Chaovalit would rather support the latter. For Lt.-Gen. Pichit, Army intervention in politics was inevitable when the nation with its monarchical institution was in real danger. His "orthodox" idea was acceptable to many officers. Thus internecine rifts among the military leaders led to a formation of factions or informal groups to support each leader's political involvement. The prevalence of military factions prevented military leaders from successfully seizing power as demonstrated in the 9 September 1985 coup. The balance of power among various Army factions made it almost impossible for any military leader including General Arthit to have total Army support in the political struggle. The political ambition of General Arthit brought back the old pattern of military factionalism of the 1960s. The purpose of forming a group was almost purely political, that is, to support a particular military leader's role in politics. The group had no formal membership or organizational structure. Although General Arthit was the Army Chief and the Army had to follow his order, he still needed a "personal" group of officers for his "political machine", with special assignments and responsibility beyond the official duties of an Army officer. Such political assignments were given only to those who could be trusted. General Arthit's supporters can be divided into three categories. (a) The first was formed by his classmates at the Military Academy and other senior officers who had been associated with him for a long time. These included General Mana Ratanakoset, former Assistant Commander-in-Chief, General Tienchai Sirisamphan, and General Juthai Saengtaweep, Deputy Army Chief who were his classmates and

26

The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86

in varying years, his prominent supporters. (b) The second group was composed of his staff officers and aides. Some of them like Lt.-Gen. Wanchai Reungtragul, Colonel Pirapong Sanpakpisuth and Colonel Somsak Salyakamthorn, were selected to work for his political ambitions. (c) The third group was composed of troop commanders at the battalion level. Not all the battalion or regiment commanders in Bangkok were Arthit's men; the majority were unaligned professional soldiers. But some were drawn into Arthit's camp by his staff or aides, particularly Colonel Pirapong, the chief aide of General Arthit. 34 A question arises as to why did these people work for General Arthit. Was it because General Art hit was the Army Chief and everyone had to work for him anyway? The answer is rather complex. Several worked for him to express their gratitude for previous favours. This reflected a patron-client relationship in which the boss would give his subordinates rewards and privileges among other things in exchange for their support and loyalty. General Juthai, for example, was considered the most loyal and had committed himself in several actions to strengthening General Arthit's political position. Before General Arthit came to power, General Juthai held no important position in the military apparatus and his promotion had been slower than a number of his classmates. 35 In a controversial interview with the press, he defended the extension of General Arthit's term for another year. I cannot see any problem regarding the extension of General Arthit's term for another year. It will not block other officers' promotions. If it does, I cannot see any problem either. My promotion had been blocked for a number of years while I was a colonel, I could still tolerate it. 36

General Mana was the Director of the Army's Reservist Directorate when General Arthit was appointed Commander of the First Army Region. This position was not a significant step to a powerful post in the Army but under Arthit General Mana soon rose to be the Assistant Commander-inChief. General Tienchai also suffered a setback after the 1973 uprising as he was attached to Field Marshal Praphat when he was Commander of the Special Warfare Centre in Lopburi. He later became Deputy Commanderin-Chief. Without General Arthit, these three generals would have never been promoted to such high positions. This is the patronage system which General Arthit employed to organize the nucleus of his group. He picked those who felt relatively deprived, gave them a reward that they never thought possible; and therefore put them under an obligation to be his loyal supporters. The case of Generals Juthai and Akraphon Somroop's campaign for an extension of General Arthit's term demonstrates this clearly. Several political analysts have agreed that the twogenerals' full support for

Military Factions and Their Power Struggle

27

the extension and their aggression against General Prem over this issue was to express their sincere thanks to their patron who had lifted them from obscurity. As an analyst of Matichon Weekly in a commentary on the generals' aggressive interview on 21 March 1986 over the extension issue puts it: Soldiers always have deep attachment and affection for each other. In the eyes of the outsiders, the expression of the two Generals was aggressive and inappropriate, but for the comrades-in-arms, this was an expression of their "spirit" before their retirementY

For staff and commanding officers who worked for General Arthit, their motive was no other than that they would get quick promotion, privileges, influence and other rewards that they were unlikely to have received if they remained strictly professional soldiers and were not selected on a personal basis. Some of them were hand-picked by General Arthit, others were recommended by his staff. Junior officers and battalion commanders were linked to General Arthit by his aide Colonel Pirapong who was deputy commander of the 1st Engineering Corps Regiment. General Arthit as Army Chief and Supreme Commander was in a better position than other military leaders to expand his influence among junior officers because the appointments of officers up to the rank of colonel were within his purview. But from the rank of major-general onwards, he would need the approval of the Defence Minister. This allows General Prem to manage military reshuffles at this level for an assurance of his power base in the Army. Thus, not all the Army generals were on General Arthit's side. Arthit would only have their support on legal military operations but not necessarily for political moves. Arthit's abrasiveness, overt political ambition and rivalry with General Prem has alienated him from several factions in the Army. Even his own friends like Generals Tienchai and Mana had lately distanced themselves. His major base was a group of battalion commanders around Bangkok who were not in a position to do much. Another faction within the Army was that of General Chaovalit. As he has been involved in staff operation for most of his career, his group was developed among the staff officers particularly those who worked with him on Order No. 66/2523 such as Colonel Songsak Suyanond. But when he was promoted, he needed a broader base. His faction later developed as in General Arthit's to include former classmates and other junior officers both in staff and commanding posts. His former classmates at the Military Academy who were loyal to him and accepted his leadership were Lt.-Gen. Sunthorn Kongsompong, the Commander of the Special Warfare Command, and Maj.-Gen. Chaichana Thareechat, the Deputy Commander of the Third Army Region at Pitsanuloke, Lt.-Gen. Jaruay Wongsayanh,

28

The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86

the Assistant Chief-of-Staff for Civil Affairs and Lt.-Gen. Wanchai Reungtragul, the Deputy Chief-of-Staff. Others were staff ·officers who had worked at his office for some time. 38 But as General Chaovalit never commanded troops, he had few "followers" among commanding officers and in this respect, Lt.-Gen. Sompong and Maj .-Gen. Chaichana were a great asset to him. Certainly, those who decided to work close to Chaovalit expected promotion, influence and other rewards in return. Some of them supported him not only because of personal ties but that he had helped them when they were less fortunate. Maj.-Gen. Chaichana, for example, who was allegedly involved in the Young Turks' abortive coup when he was Commander of the 2nd Cavalry Division, admitted that General Chaovalit had done a great deal to get him out of the post-coup "nightmare" .35 Despite the fact that his base in the Army was broadened, Chaovalit's links with staff officers who subscribed to the "ideology" of Order No. 66/2523 were still very close. He was still the leader of this group and a number of staff officers who worked under him kept to the guidelines laid down by the order in explaining counter-insurgency as well as the Army's role in politics. However, General Chaovalit was flexible enough to be less emphatic on this order when he needed a broader base both in and outside the Army. Chaovalit's strength did not come from his faction alone. Support from others particularly Class 5 was an advantage over other contenders for the Army's top post. The close tie between General Chaovalit and Class 5 was developed through Lt.-Gen. Suchinda, the president of Class 5 who had worked under Chaovalit for a number of years. Chaovalit also maintained close links with General Prem through Maj.-Gen. Mongkhol Ampornphisith, an aide to the Prime Minister. It was widely known that General Chaovalit had developed contacts outside of the Army which included the mass media, union leaders, and businesses. With all these connections, he became a strong candidate to succeed General Arthit and probably General Prem. Another important group within the Army in this period was the officers of Class 5 under the leadership of Lt.-Gen. Suchinda Kraprayoon. As mentioned earlier, the influence of the Class 5 group reflected the fact that eleven out of the fourteen divisions of the Thai Army were commanded by the graduates of Class 5. They were: Maj.-Gen. lssarapong Noonpakdi, Commander of the 1st Infantry Division, Bangkok; Maj.-Gen. Salya Sripan, Commander of the 2nd Infantry Division, Prachinburi; Maj.-Gen. Somporn Termtongthai, Commander of the 3rd Infantry Division, Karat;

Military Factions and Their Power Struggle

29

Maj.-Gen. Buntan Nienchaleoy, Commander of the 6th Infantry Division, Korat; Maj.-Gen. Vorapim Disyabutr, Commander of the 11th Infantry Division, the First Army Region; Maj.-Gen. Chadchai Theerathanond, Commander of the 9th Infantry Division, Kanjanaburi; Maj.-Gen. Viroj Saengsanit, Commander of the Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division, Bangkok; Maj.-Gen. Puchong Nilkham, Commander of the Artillery Division, Lopburi; Maj.-Gen. Wimol Vongvanij, Commander of the 1st Special Warfare Division, Lopburi; Maj.-Gen. Kachorn Ramanwong, Commander of the 2nd Special Warfare Division, Lopburi; Maj.-Gen. Ariya Ukoskit, Commander of the 2nd Cavalry Division, Bangkok. 40 The influence of Class 5 extended beyond the Army into the police department and the Ministry of Interior as one member of this class was the Commander of the Crime Suppression Division and the other served as an aide to General Sithi Chiraroj, the Interior Minister. In fact, Suchinda once served as an aide to General Sithi when the latter was Deputy Army Chief and the Permanent Under-Secretary of the Defence Ministry. A number of the Class 5 were appointed for the Bangkok City Council in 1984 demonstrating a close link between this group and General Sithi. Unlike the other two factions, this group was strictly that of former classmates and it was not formed to support a particular Army leader. In fact, Class 5 had the ability to shift their support with the changing times. During 1981-82 they supported General Arthit, but in 1984 when General Arthit appeared to agree in principle with Maj .-Gen. Pichit on the reinstatement of the Young Turks, Class 5 moved away from him to support General Prem and General Chaovalit, as demonstrated in the suppression of the September 1985 coup. 41 Although a powerful faction in the Army, only about thirty out of 115 members of Class 5 held the rank of a two-star general in 1985 and not more than twenty were active in the group. The others did not share much of the benefit and influence enjoyed by the leading members. While the group appeared more cohesive than others, various members of the group had developed an independent vertical link with their seniors. Suchinda and Issarapong, were known to be close to Generals Prem and Chaovalit; Wimol, who now replaced lssarapong as the 1st Division Chief was once close to General Arthit as he publicly supported him in the Army's bid for constitutional amendment in 1983. But he switched to Chaovalit's camp in 1985

30

The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86

when he organized the airlift of the "crack" troop to Bangkok to suppress the Septemer 1985 coup. Viroj and Prasert Sararith, head of the personnel department were close to General Arthit; Ariya was equally linked with General Prem and Arthit. 42 However, with the appointment of General Chaovalit as the new Commander-in-Chief of the Army in May 1986, there was no doubt that all the key members of Class 5 were united behind their new Army Chief. The factions of Lt.-Gen. Pichit and General Harn did not surface clearly in this period. When Lt.-Gen. Pichit was promoted to head the politically important 1st Division, most observers considered him a potential Army leader as he was close to the Palace and had an outstanding combat record. In early 1983, he led the Army's campaign for constitutional amendment and resigned from the Senate with General Arthit in apparent protest against the votes on this issue. In 1984 he put himself closer to General Arthit and projected himself as a potential rival to General Chaovalit for the Army's top post. He led another campaign this time for a two-year extension of General Arthit's term for the posts of Army Commander and Supreme Commander as Arthit's official retirement was scheduled for October 1985. He also agreed with the reinstatement of the Young Turks in active service. 43 These campaigns which put Pichit at odds with Generals Prem and Chaovalit were interpreted as a move by General Arthit and his group to project General Pichit as a competitor against General Chaovalit for the top Army post after General Arthit's completion of his two-year extension. Despite this, Pichit's faction did not have a strong public presence as he did not have the so-called "political machine". His followers were his official subordinates and junior commanding officers who respected his combat record and strong leadership. Pichit was not known as a politically ambitious soldier and this could be the reason why his faction was not particularly developed. It is possible that his public stand on the constitutional amendment, the extension of General Arthit's term and the reinstatement of the Young Turks, was not his initiative but a request or order from his superior. As for General Ham's faction, since his resignation from the Army to join the Democrat Party in 1984, he has concentrated more on building his popular base in Bangkok where he ran for a seat in the House of Representatives in 1985. He had a strong base in the Fourth Army Region which he once commanded, but since his preoccupation with Bangkok, his influence in the Fourth Army has been reduced. However, his achievements in the South when he was in charge of the Fourth Army Region are still remembered and there is no question that the South is his real home base. How were these factions involved in a power struggle among key actors in this period? Did the power struggle among the military factions set a new pattern of military involvement in politics particularly in relation to

Military Factions and Their Power

Stru~;gle

31

popular political participation? To answer these questions one must look first at the major political problem facing the Prem government in this sixyear period which will be discussed in the next chapter.

NOTES

2 3 4 5 6

7 8 9 10

11 12 13

14 15 16

17 18 19

20 21

The first cabinet reshuffle on 9 December 1981 was to include the SAP in the coalition government; the second was after the 1983 general election in September 1985 following the 9 September abortive coup in which General Kriangsak was involved and resulted in the resignation of his party members from cabinet posts. The third was on 16 January 1986 precipitated by the resignation of Kukrit as leader of the SAP, the largest party in the coalition government. See Siam Almanac 2528 (1985), pp. 482-83; and the Nation, 16 January 1986. p. 1. John McBeth, "Pre-emptive Strike", Far Eastern Economic Review, 5 June 1986, p. 14. Chai-Anan Samudavanija, The Thai Young Turks (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982), p. 47. Ibid., pp. 14-21 for a concise analysis of Army factions during the period. Ibid., p. 23. For detailed coverage of the political developments in this period, see David Morell and Chai-Anan Samudavanija, Political Conflict in Thailand (Cambridge Mass: Oelegeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1981). Chai-Anan, op. cit., pp. 23-4. Ibid., pp. 34-7. Quoted in John McBeth and Paisa! Srichartchanya, "The Coup Mentality", Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 November 1985. For an interesting analysis of the role of the Democratic Soldiers, see Chai-Anan Samudavanija and Suchit Bunbongkarn, "Thailand" in Zakaria Ahmad and Harold Crouch, ed., Military-Civil Relations in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. I 00-4. Ibid., p. 100. Ibid., p. 198. For details of this order, see ISOC, "Sarup nayobai kantorsoo peao auchana kommunis kamsangti 66/2523, kamsangti 5/2524, kamsangti 65/2525" [A brief note on the policy to win over communism: the Orders No. 66/2523, No. 5/2524 and No. 65/2525]. For a detailed comparison of the Young Turks and the Democratic Soldiers, see ChaiAnan and Suchit, op. cit., pp. 105-9. After the Navy's abortive coup in June 1951, naval strength was largely reduced and the development of the Navy placed on low priority. Maj.-Gens. Suchinda and Vichart were members of the Prime Ministerial Advisory Board in 1981-83 of which the author was also a member. During the meetings following the Young Turks' abortive coup, the question of Army leadership was often raised and the two agreed that General Arthit would be the best choice. Quoted from his briefing on the coup suppression to the Prime Ministerial Advisory Board on 21 May 1981. For details, see Chai-Anan, op. cit., p. 46. According to one analyst when General Arthit was the Commander of the First Army Region (1981-82), he was the most powerful man in the Army, over-shadowing General Prayuth, then Commander-in-Chief. In fact he was the "commander of the Army's Chief", Siam Mai (New Siam), 29 August 1981, pp. 12-5. See "The Rise and Fall of 'General Sunday'", the Nation, 28 May 1986, p. 4. Before he was appointed as Assistant Chief of the Army, General Prem was Commander

32

22 23 24 25

26 27 28 29 30

31 32

33 34 35

36 37 38

The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86

of the Second Army Region based in Korat. He was Commander of the Cavalry Training Centre in Saraburi before moving to the Second Army Region as Deputy Commander in 1973. In the case of General Arthit he commanded the 1st Division, and spent most of his career in the provinces. In 1972 he was Commander of the 23rd Regiment in the Northeast; during 1975-76 he was in charge of a combined force of civilian, soldiers and police (Unit No. 1718) in Loei. In 1977, he was promoted to Commander of the 3rd Division in the Northeast and was transferred to the 1st Division two years later before being transferred to Korat as Deputy Commander of the Second Army Region in 1980. See "Stewing in the Political Juice". Bangkok Post, 28 May 1986, p. 5. Quoted from his speech on "Badminton and National Security" at Chulalongkorn University on 12 October 1983. Harn was involved in the drafting of the order when he was the Director of Army Operations Directorate in 1979. McBeth and Paisa!, op. cit., p. 34. The first public conflict between these two leaders was over the transfer of a senior police officer in the South requested by General Harn, the then Commander of the Fourth Army Region but turned down by General Arthit as the ISOC's director. See Sayamrath Sapdavicharn (Siamrath Weekly Review], (19 June 1983), pp. 6-7. Interview with General Chaovalit at the Army Conference Hall on 21 January 1985. John McBeth, "A Long Tough March towards Total Security", Far Eastern Economic Review, 17 April 1986. This remark was confirmed in several comments and analyses in various newspapers and magazines. See, for instance, "Jubta Chaovalit-Pichit" [Watch Chaovalit-Pichit], Sapdavicharn (Siamrath Weekly Review), 19 June 1983, pp. 6-7. See John McBeth, "Farmers Replace Rebels in Security Scheme", Far Eastern Eastern Economic Review, 17 April 1986; Sayamrath Sapdavicharn, 29 September 1986, p. 5. General Phya Phahon, Field-Marshal Phibun, General Luang Aduldejcharas, FieldMarshals Phin, Sarit, Thanom, and Praphat, Generals Kris, Boonchai, Serm, Prem, Prayuth, Arthit and Chaovalit, Commanders-in-Chief of the Army from 1932 to the present were graduates of the Thai Military Academy. Phya Phahon, Prem, Prayuth, and Chaovalit went abroad for additional training after graduation from the Military Academy. Interview with Lt.-Gen. Pichit at the First Army Region Headquarters on 5 August 1985. For details see General Saiyud Kerdphol. "Kanborihankongtap Kap Sathanakan Thang Sothakit Konprathethai" [The administration of the armed forces and the economic conditions of Thailand]. Mimeographed. ISIS, Chulalongkorn University, 20 November 1985. McBeth, op. cit., p. 13. Colonel Pirapong Sanpakpisuth was an aide to General Arthit and also the Deputy Commander of the 1st Engineering Corps Regiment. He graduated from the Military Academy in Class 17 in 1970. General Juthai was promoted to major-general in 1978 holding the post of Army specialist which is an inactive post without specific assignments and responsibility. A year later, he became a staff officer attached to the Army headquarters, another inactive post. When General Arthit was appointed Assistant Army Chief in 1982, he was promoted to Assistant Chief-of-Staff for Intelligence. He held the post for two years before moving up to Deputy Chief-of-Staff in 1984, then a big jump to be Deputy Army Chief in 1985. See Matichon Sudsapda (Matichon Weekly), 6 April 1986, p. 6. Matichon, 22 March 1986, p. 1. Matichon Sudsapda, 6 April 1986, p. 6. They were Maj.-Gen. Pairoh Wongwatana, Colonel Apichai Waroonprapha, Colonel Suphachai Rodphothong, Colonel Sunthorn Chaimoeunwong and Colonel Cham Boonprasert; see "Jubta Chaovalit Yongchaiyuth, Naiphon Maileg Nung" [Watch Chaovalit Yongchaiyuth, the no. 1 general], Sayamrath Sapdavicharn, 10 November 1985, p. 5.

Military Factions and Their Power Struggle

33

39 Interview with Maj.-Gen. Chaichana Thareechat at the Third Army Region Headquarters, Pitsanuloke, 21 September 1985. 40 See "Sentang Jor Por Ror Roon Ha: Bot Pisuth Thaharn Acheep?" [Career line of the class 5: a test of professional soldiers?], Sayamrath Sapdavicharn, 16 December 1984, p. 4. 41 "Mitr Khong Satroo Kue Satroo: Jak Big Suer Tueng Big Su" [Friends of the enemy are enemies: from Big Suer to Big Su], Sayamrath Sapdavicharn, 30 September 1984, p. 4. "Big Suer" (Big Tiger) refers to General Pichit and "Big Su" is General Suchinda. 42 John McBeth, "Class of 1958 Holds Balance of Power", Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 November 1985; Sayamrath Sapdavicharn, 16 December 1984, p. 4. 43 "Royraew Prem-Arthit" [Sign of a crack: Prem-Arthit], Sayamrath Sapdavicharn, 19 August 1984, p. 4.

chapter three

Politics of Compromise and Military Factionalism

GENERAL PREM'S DELICATE BALANCING ACT

Political compromise was the name of the game that General Prem played in the period of study. As the Prime Minister lacked his own political organization, he had to perform a "delicate balancing act" among the three institutions - the Palace, the Army and the House of Representatives - that supported his administration in general, and between the Army and the House of Representatives in particular. The power structure during this period was such that no single political institution dominated the political system but power was shared by the three major political institutions. This share of power was reflected in the selection process of the Prime Minister after the April 1983 general election when a general consensus had to be reached among the monarchy, the Army and the elected House over who would be the next government leader. As expected, General Prem was reappointed Prime Minister being the only leader who was suitably qualified. This was confirmed by MR Kukrit Pramoj, the leader of the SAP, in his remarks at Chulalongkorn University: A real democracy must have elections which we have. The formation of the government must follow the rule, that is, the majority party would form the cabinet. But in the past we did not develop up to this stage. The House of Representatives did not play a key role in forming the government. The largest party in the House, the Chart Thai did not form a government. Appointing a Prime Minister and forming a government did not depend on the number of seats each party had in the House but on several other factors from "the highest" to the lowest. 1

34

35

Politics of Compromise and Military Factionalism

Although the Thai political party leaders were more aware of the weaknesses of the party system than in the 1960s, they were unable to overcome them in the 1980s. The multi-party system which had prevailed in the modern Thai body politic since the end of World War II emerged again after the 1979 election and remained throughout the period. The result of the 1979 election as shown in Table 2 indicates that several parties in the mid-1970s which were rejuvenated and ran in the election were unable to increase their seats to a significant level in the House of Representatives. The SAP picked up more seats than in the 1976 election but it was still far from the majority in the House of Representatives. Even the Democrat Party which was the oldest and the largest party in 1976 in terms of the number of seats in the House of Representatives suffered a severe setback in this election. It won only 32 seats compared to 114 in the 1976 election, and lost almost all seats in the Bangkok constituencies which had been the Democrats' stronghold since 1957. Table 2 Results of the 1979 General Election

Party

No. of Seats Won

OJo

Social Action Chart Thai Prachakorn Thai Democrat Seritham Chart-Prachachon New Force Others

82 38 32 32 21 13 8 75

27.24 12.62 10.63 10.63 6.98 4.32 2.66 24.91

Total

301

100

SouRcE: Division of Election, Department of Local Administration, Ministry of Interior.

In the 1983 election, no party had a big enough majority to form the government (see Table 3). Chart Thai and the Social Action Party scored an impressive increase and with the emergence of smaller parties and independent parliamentarians, their number of seats increased substantially, but were still insignificant to form a majority. However, an increase in a party's seats in the House of Representatives is not reflected in a direct proportion to the increase in party strength. All

36

The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86

Table 3 Results of the 1983 General Election

Party

No. of Seats Won*

07o

Social Action Chart Thai Prachakorn Thai Democrat National Democratic Social Democrat Siam Democratic Prachathai Progressive Prachaseree Others

92 73 36 56 15 2 18 4 3 1 24

28.40 22.53 11.11 17.28 4.63 0.62 5.56 1.23 0.93 0.30 7.41

Total

324

100

*The total number of MPs for the Social Action and Chart Thai parties increased a few days after the elections due to a merger with smaller parties and independent candidates. SOURCE: Division of Election, Department of Local Administration, Ministry of Interior.

the major parties were faction-ridden, and could not count on members' loyalty. A sizeable number of the parliamentarians who joined a party did not think about what they could give to the party but only thought of what the party could give to them. Factions within a large party were formed through a patronage system, under which an influential and wealthy parliamentarian would be accepted as the faction leader. The links between the leader and the followers were based on personal ties and individual gains. One of the major objectives of these factions was to fight for a seat in the cabinet for their leader to ensure their own access to privileges and benefits. Shifts of the parliamentarians from one faction to the other were common, depending on how much benefit they could get from each faction. It was also quite a normal practice of some factions to demand direct benefits from the party leaders in exchange for supporting the party. This practice thus revealed a lack of party loyalty among the parliamentarians with a destabilizing effect on the party system. MR Kukrit revealed that this problem existed in his own party. As he remarked: Politicians in Thailand are not easy to befriend, or to make contact with, or to please .... What they want is position and money. Don't think that

Politics of Compromise and Military Factionalism

37

these have been eliminated. They still exist. As the leader of a party I know best. My flesh was sliced every time there was a party meeting. When I asked them to raise their hands to support the government, I always met with a threat. Where is my power to deal with the threat? I always used Lord Buddha's way. When I was attacked by these Maras [devils], I always give; sometimes twenty thousand, sometimes, fifty thousand, sometimes, a hundred thousand .... What else could I do, if I did not give? 2

The rivalry within the SAP serves as a classic case of factional politics within a Thai political party. Factionalism had been rife in the party since it re-emerged in 1979. It started between Boonchu Rojanasathien's faction and Pong Sarasin's faction. The former faction was defeated in March 1981 when the SAP had to withdraw from the coalition government as a result of the "telex scandal" in which an SAP cabinet member was accused of personal gain in an oil deal with Saudi Arabia. When the SAP joined the coalition again in 1982 Boonchu was dropped from the cabinet. After the 1983 election, small parties and independent parliamentarians joined the party adding more factions within this largest coalition group. The conflict was exacerbated when newcomers like Sawat Khamprakop, Chaisiri Ruengkanjanaseth, Narong W ongwan and Surat Osathanukroh were given cabinet posts while old-timers like Montri Pongpanij and Kasem Sirisamphan were not considered. Montri and his group had consistently campaigned throughout the three years of Prem's new coalition government for a cabinet reshuffle so that he and his men would be in power. His move was successful when Kukrit resigned as the SAP's leader in December 1985 after his party was defeated in a Bangkok by-election. His resignation led to disintegration within the party. Although General Sithi Sawethsila, the Foreign Minister, was elected the party's interim leader and the cabinet reshuffle was made possible by the resignation of the Commerce Minister, Kasol Krairirkse, who was criticised by all sides for his failure to raise the price of rice, it did not improve the situation. In the first two weeks of January 1986, the SAP interim leader faced demands for cabinet seats from all factions within the party. The fact that the party had to submit to the Prime Minister sixty-one names for SAP's fifteen slots in the cabinet proved that the party was in disarray and defections from those who did not get any share in a new cabinet reshuffle was imminent. 3 Montri, Surat, and two others were included in the reshuffle but conflict in the SAP worsened since Boontheng Thongswat was dropped from the deputy premiership, infuriating the northern parliamentarians and other factions not in power. 4 Boontheng was one of the founders of the SAP, and his influence in the party could not be underestimated. The conflict now gained a new twist in a fight between a new ruling clique headed by Air Chief Marshall Sithi, Pong and Montri and the opposition faction led by Boontheng and his associates who were left out of power in the SAP

38

The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86

and the cabinet reshuffle. This conflict was the worst in the party history and led to General Prem's defeat in the House of Representatives over the diesel vehicle tax decree and the dissolution of the House on 1 May 1986. 5 This pattern of factional rivalry in the SAP representative of party infighting which focuses almost entirely on the personal interests of individual parliamentarians. A faction in power will be challenged by others and if a compromise cannot be reached, a split in the party would occur and may lead to a collapse of the party or the leading faction would be forced to step down and be replaced by a new faction or a coalition of factions. These new factions in power would later be challenged by others, restarting the cycle of conflict. A political balance had to be maintained between the coalition government parties as well as non-partisan technocrats in the cabinet when it involved economic issues. Prime Minister Prem appointed a number of former bureaucrats and business managers to the cabinet using his share of the slots. The most important and perhaps the most controversial was Sommai Huntragul, the Finance Minister. Aside from these people, General Prem's key economic advisers including the Secretary-General of the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) sat in the cabinet and the Economic Ministers Council. Conflicts over economic policies between partisan cabinet members and technocrat ministers were normal in cabinet meetings and compromises had to be reached to prevent a dissolution of government. Since 1983, Thailand has had economic difficulties largely due to overspending in both the government and private sectors, the global economic slowdown and falling commodity prices. The major concern of Prem's government during this period was the deficit in government spending and in the balance of payment which had been with the Thais for several consecutive years. The Minister of Finance's measures to cope with the deficit included strict fiscal discipline, cuts in unnecessary spending, tax restructuring, baht devaluation and export promotion. It was suggested that large-scale investments like the Eastern Seaboard project and the national fertilizer plant be postponed and several austere economic measures adopted. These measures, however, did not easily meet the approval of the coalition parties. Compromises had to be reached or the Prime Minister had to use his personal influence to persuade coalition partners to accept the proposed solutions. The Eastern Seaboard development project is a prime example of conflict between partisan and technocrat cabinet members. In the latter part of 1985, the NESDB submitted a proposal suggesting that because of the economic slowdown, the government should postpone the Eastern Seaboard project for a specific period as the huge investment in this project would strain the Thai economy and increase the debt-service ratio. All the coalition government partners did not want to see the postponement of

Politics of Compromise and Military Factionalism

39

the project since it would not do any good to the government's image. Technocrat ministers like Sommai Huntragul, Sulee Mahasantana and Kramol Tongdhammachart, who were attached to the Office of the Prime Minister agreed with the NESDB. The issue was deliberated at a cabinet meeting on 24 December 1985. After four hours of heated debate, General Prem worked out a compromise which was accepted. The cabinet in principle decided to proceed with the project but the technical aspects were to be studied in detail again by NESDB if necessary. 6 Another compromise over economic issues was the oil price restructuring. The Minister of Finance in January 1985 proposed an increase in the unrealistically low price of diesel but the proposal ran against objections from elected politicians in the government and opposition parties. Eventually, the government decided aginst increasing the diesel price but instead raised the tax on diesel motor vehicles by four times. The executive decree on the tax increase was issued in January 1986 and had to be ratified by the legislature when the National Assembly session resumed in May 1986. Despite this concession, parliamentarians from both government and opposition parties threatened to vote against it. 7 Finally the tax increase was revised downwards from four to twice the current rate. But the bill was still rejected by the legislature forcing the government to withdraw it in May 1986. Throughout his administration, General Prem had to struggle with all forms of economic problems. His austerity policy raised complaints from private sectors particularly banks, small and medium-sized industries and importers who thought that the government was not doing enough to induce local investments to push the economy out of the slump. The opposition party also used economic issues to discredit the government. The Ministers of Finance, Commerce, and Agriculture became the targets for attacks by the Chart Thai parliamentarians both inside and outside the National Assembly making it more difficult for General Prem to maintain the political modus vivendi. In May 1984, the Chart Thai lodged a noconfidence motion against Prime Minister Prem and five ministers, that is, Finance, Commerce, Agriculture, Industry and Interior. However, the debate was not carried out due to a technical problem. 8 In May 1985, the opposition resubmitted a motion of no-confidence against the Ministers of Finance, Agriculture, Commerce, Communications and Industry for failing to improve the economic situation, to lift the rice price, and to promote exports. 9 Although the government won a confidence vote, the Chart Thai's debate focusing on the economic performance of the government reflected widespread discontent among various sectors. The military was also dissatisfied with the government's economic performance. Aside from General Arthit's attack on the baht devaluation in November 1984, the government decree which outlawed the "Chamoy chit

40

The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86

fund" in 1984 met with muted resentment from the Air Force as many officers and their families were involved in this business adventure and some of them had reportedly won a huge fortune out of the "chit fund". The economic issues were also used as a justification for the September 1985 coup. The coup's emphasis on economic problems instead of national security issues revealed the discontent of at least part of the military establishment over government economic measures. 10 It also revealed that the masses were not happy either with the government economic policy, as economic justification would not have been used by the coup group. Nonetheless, the factionalism within the Army prevented the officers' dissatisfaction of the economic policy from unifying the Army for a move against the government. There were some military leaders who although unhappy with the government over the economic policy were unwilling to pull the rug from under General Prem on the grounds that the Prime Minister was honest and sincere in solving the nation's problems and they would prefer him to be in power.

MILITARY FACTIONS, POLITICAL PARTIES, AND PREM'S GOVERNMENT STABILITY

Party factionalism, the resentment of the Army and business sectors over his economic policy, and the role of the opposition party had created sufficient problems for General Prem's government. But an alliance which was hastily set up in early 1986 between General Arthit and dissident SAP members to oust General Prem on economic issues made the situation worse for the Prime Minister. An analysis of the military involvement in this period involves looking at it in terms of a power struggle between General Prem and his supporters on the one hand, and General Arthit and his alliances on the other. The support for each leader cuts across both the Army and parties. The contest during this period was thus not between the Army and the parties, but between two political groups whose support was drawn from various factions in the Army, political parties and other societal groups. In the first three and a half years after the collapse of the Young Turks in April 1981, General Arthit and the military elites were willing to support General Prem as leader of the government. During this period the Army's role could be described as that of a political deterrent force. This is the role, in Suchit and Kanala's term, "that sets a course of national politics, maintains a favourable status quo and will resort to every possible measure to deter any destabilizing efforts".ll Preserving Prem's national leadership by the military elites was to ensure political stability and military institutional interests. After the 1983 general election, the Army made it clear that it

Politics of Compromise and Military Factionalism

41

would accept only General Prem as Prime Minister and pledged to support the government as long as General Prem was the leader. General Arthit's attempt to pre-empt the Chart Thai Party's move against Prem's government was an example of the Army's deterrent role. The Army leader tried to dissuade the opposition from organizing a mock no-confidence debate outside the Parliament on 29 1anuary 1984. Although unsuccessful, it did deter the party from doing it again. 12 A few days later, a group of military officers in symbolic support for the government made a surprise call on the Prime Minister . 13 This show of force was criticized by the parliamentarians but it proved effective in countering the opposition move as the Chart Thai Party decided to cancel a plan to submit a no-confidence motion against the Prime Minister in February.' 4 When the Chart Thai Party planned on submitting a motion of noconfidence against the Prime Minister in May 1984, General Arthit again requested the party not to do so. He was criticized for meddling in political affairs but retorted: "Don't I have the right to make appeals? Does making appeals hJ.Irt democracy? If so let's not ask for food, for love and for VOteS during election campaigns" _I S On various occasions, General Arthit had expressed his willingness to support Prem's government. Whenever the Prime Minister went abroad, General Arthit always insisted that he would not allow any unscrupulous move against the government and the nation. On 27 August 1985, the Prime Minister's birthday, the General with a large number of armed forces officers called on him to express their best wishes and loyalty, and pledged: On behalf of the armed forces and police officers presented here, I wish the Prime Minister a happy birthday and would like to take this opportunity to express our loyalty to the Prime Minjster. ... We promise to follow the Prime Minister's policy in everything we do . 16

The military move in early 1983 to extend the interim clause of the constitution was not intended against General Prem, since General Chaovalit, the most trusted aide of the Prime Minister was involved, but it could be considered as an attempt by the military to retain the status quo in their favour. The extension would allow military officers to hold cabinet posts, retain the power of the Senate and maintain the election system used in previous general elections. The system under the interim clause would allow for a smooth political succession from one military leader to another. The military seemed to believe that the Army not the participatory institutions could produce capable political leaders. The interim clause would keep political succession open which the military considered as appropriate for the current political situation in Thailand. Thai politics from mid-1981 to mid-1984 was thus characterized by the

42

The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86

conflicts between the Army and the parties. The constitutional amendment attempt and the Army's deterrent role against the Chart Thai Party were seen as efforts on the part of the military to retain their political role and to curb the power of the political parties. The military elites still fully supported General Prem's political leadership. The mastermind behind this was Lt.-Gen. Chaovalit, the then Deputy Chief-of-Staff of the Army who was not only the architect of the fourth Prem government formed after the 1983 election but also the mediator on several occasions between General Prem and the opposition party. However, the conflict between General Prem and General Arthit emerged in mid-1984 when a group of senior officers led by Maj.-Gen. Pichit signed a letter to General Prem requesting a two-year extension of General Arthit's term as Army Chief and Supreme Commander after his official retirement in October 1985. All civil and military officers have to retire at the age of sixty but their term can be extended by the cabinet on an annual basis. Such extensions have always been unpopular and this request was no exception. It invited strong criticism and protest from parliamentarians, journalists and academics. General Pichit's statement which emphasized that the extension issue was strictly a "family business" only created a stronger outcry. For General Prem, the extension would affect his political control as it would strengthen General Arthit's power base in the Armed Forces.n General Prem's illness in August and October 1984 appeared to reinforce the Army's justification for the extension. The military could claim that the extension would thwart any destabilizing incident resulting from the Prime Minister's ill health. But a two-year extension at a time when the Prime Minister's health was poor, would put General Arthit in a strong position if there was a transition of power. The extension campaign coincided with the Young Turk's attempt to return to the Army. In August 1984 with the help of Maj.-Gen. Pichit, they had reached an understanding with General Arthit that he would not turn down their request for returning to the Army. In return, Colonel Prachak Sawangchit, the leading member of the Young Turks publicly expressed his support for the extension of General Arthit's term. This easing of strained relations between the Young Turks and General Arthit led to further polarization within the Army as General Chaovalit and the Class 5 group were known opponents of the Young Turks. The factional conflict in the Army worsened when two Young Turks, Colonel Manoon Roopkachorn and Colonel Bulsak Phocharoen were arrested in September on a charge of possessing lethal weapons. Colonel Prachak accused General Chaovalit and the Class 5 group of initiating the arrest. However, the crisis was averted when the two colonels were released and Colonel Prachak agreed to apologize to Generals Chaovalit and Suchinda. 18

Politics of Compromise and Military Factionalism

43

Maj.-Gen. Pichit's attempt to bring back the interim clause of the constitution in September also coincided with General Arthit's extension issue. In early 1983 the amendment bill to extend the interim clause was defeated in Parliament receiving 254 votes in favour, ten short of the required 264 votes. However, Colonel Phon Rerngprasertwit attempted to revive the amendment issue by lodging a motion which proposed that with the twenty vacant seats at the time of voting in 1983, the total number of seats in Parliament was 508 instead of 528 and the required number of votes for passing the amendment bill would be 254. Maj.-Gen. Pichit came out strongly in support of the motion. He pointed out that the amendment was necessary on the grounds that it allowed capable people in government services to assume political posts. His view was that while Parliament was not able to produce capable political leaders, those capable in the military and civil services should not be prevented from assuming political posts. He also added that a capable leader was urgently needed to be Acting Prime Minister in case of General Prem's absence due to illness. However, General Arthit moved a motion to postpone the bill indefinitely. Most analysts were convinced that apart from the unpopularity of the issue, General Prem's approval of the annual military reshuffle which came the day after General Arthit's request for the postponement, persuaded the latter towards a reconciliatory move. 19 This campaign by Maj.-Gen. Pichit and some Army officers was seen as an attempt to enhance the Army Chief's political leadership which could be a significant threat to the Prime Minister's political control. Although General Arthit did not publicly support the military campaign, he would have agreed to the Army's initiatives since he was the main beneficiary. The conflict between the two generals heightened when General Arthit appeared on the Army television on 7 November 1984 severely criticizing the government on the baht devaluation and demanding a withdrawal of the decision as well as a cabinet reshuffle. This was the first of General Arthit's direct threats to the government. He assumed that the public was unhappy with the government's economic policy and that General Prem's influence was weakened by his illness. It was, therefore, an appropriate time for him to make demands on the government leader and if he succeeded, then his political leadership would be less disputed. However, Arthit's calculations went awry. General Prem stood firm on his decision. Parliament and the public supported General Prem although they were not convinced of the merits of the devaluation. Arthit's known abrasiveness and his emotional appearance on television seemed to the public to underline a potential for autocratic rule if he assumed the top political post. More importantly, the Palace still supported the Prime Minister over the issue. General Arthit softened his stand a few days later but the damage to his image was done.

44

The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86

Throughout 1985-86, despite obtaining a one-year extension, General Arthit was determined to be the leading challenger to General Prem. The Army's attack on the Democrat Party is a good illustration of the military chief's attempt to weaken the Prime Minister's base. The Democrats were known to be staunch supporters of General Prem as several key figures in the party like Veera Musikapong and Chuan Leekpai, had close personal links with the Prime Minister. In the election for Bangkok's governor in November 1985, the Army radio in its strongly worded commentary on 11 November, accused the parties of self-interest and insincerity, and attacked the extravagant election expenditure of party candidates. The broadcast also referred to General Arthit's statement that "only the Army has never abandoned the people and its sincerity towards the people ... only the Army promises hope for the people". 20 This was obviously aimed at discrediting the Democrat Party and its candidate, Chana Roongsang, a front runner in the election, whose wealth and association with large businesses were well known. It also revealed that the military was supporting Maj.-Gen. Chamlong Srimuang, an independent candidate, who was a former secretary to General Prem and an avowed Buddhist and vegetarian. His integrity and frugal lifestyle had arrested the public mind. It is difficult to evaluate the impact of the Army's support for Chamlong's victory. The Army's attack on political parties could have been counterproductive for Chamlong, but as one analyst put it, ''his overwhelming victory reflects - at least in part - a general disenchantment with the established political parties". 21 In another Bangkok by-election in December 1985, the Army or at least a faction, secretly launched a campaign against two Democrat candidates, General Ham and Kanin Boonsuwan. The campaign reflected that the Army was supporting SAP candidates. The results showed that General Ham and his running mate won in all districts in the constituency except the military-dominated Dusit district. In this district and parts of Phya Thai district, the total number of eligible voters who were military officers and members of their families was 28,280. Of this number, 10,068 cast their votes for SAP candidates and only 988 voted for the Democrats. 22 It is also interesting to note that voter turnout of the military officers and their families was 41.3 per cent, which was higher than all other previous general elections. The extension of General Arthit's term for Army Chief and Supreme Commander for yet another year continued to cause serious conflict. His close associate, General Juthai, was a prime mover in submitting the request to the Defence Council in the early 1986. The request was turned down by General Prem on 28 March 1986. 23 The announcement came two days after General Juthai in an interview with the press claimed that General Prem had no option but to comply with the request because it had

Politics of Compromise and Military Factionalism

45

been approved by the Defence Council. 24 However, according to Deputy Defence Minister Paniang Kantarat the request was not deliberated in the council. 25 Several weeks before the Prime Minister's announcement, a show of force was organized by supporters of both sides in public visits to their respective leaders. The Army was split as there was no likelihood that these two factions could reach a compromise. After the announcement, General Arthit's faction began to form alliances with the opposition in the House of Representatives and with dissident parliamentarians in the government coalition with the aim of toppling the government when the House session opened in May 1986. Most analysts and the news media believed that General Arthit's faction and Boontheng Thongswat, the leader of the SAP dissidents were mapping a political strategy a few days before the opening of the National Assembly to overthrow General Prem. 26 When the government dissolved the House instead of resigning after the defeat over the diesel vehicle tax decree, the Arthit-Boontheng alliance continued to work for the newly formed United Democratic Party (UDP) for the election scheduled on 27 July 1986. The UDP was formed immediately after the House dissolution by anti-Prem parliamentarians like Boontheng, Dawit Klinpratoom from Chart Thai, Boonlert-Lertpricha, Sawat Khamprakob and Chongchai Tiengtham from SAP and Tamchai Khampato, former general manager of the governmentowned Krung Thai Bank. 27 The Army had reportedly set up an "election centre" in all Army regions in a move to block the Democrats and to work in favour of the UDP. 28 This move, however, was thwarted by the sudden dismissal of General Arthit as Army Commander on 25 May 1986. But he retained the largely ceremonial post of the Armed Forces Supreme Commander. Although no reason was given, most observers believe that General Arthit's dismissal was to prevent him from using every resource at his disposal to influence the national election. As reported in a respected news magazine: It has been widely known that before General Arthit was dismissed from the Army Chief post, he had made an effort to mobilize all military officers and their families for their votes. If this effort had materialized, then the United Democratic Party would have a better chance of getting more votes from the military and a better chance of winning more seats .... His order to set up the military election centre and to survey the exact number of military officers and their families who were eligible voters all over the country were tactics which would be used to help the UDP. 29

The dismissal of General Arthit deprived him of much of his influence, but it was reported that he was still determined to support the UDP in an effort to regain power after the general election. The political manoeuvring of the Army leaders in the latter part of this

46

The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86

period reflects an interesting pattern in their political involvement. The changing pattern included the development of links with political parties in Parliament and other pressure groups particularly large businesses to broaden their base outside the military establishment. Although coups were not ruled out as an option to gaining more power as reflected in the two abortive coups in 1981 and 1985, the Army leaders had considered alternatives for involvement in the political process without resorting to a seizure of power. They had to live with an expansion of political participation whether they liked it or not. The military elites had realized that a government system in which power was vested in a few elites and political participation prohibited, were difficult to realize. In contesting in the political arena against other political groups, the military elites had to expand their base, bringing new groups to support them. They had to play by the rules of the game, and the game allowed participation of various societal groups and the masses. The links between political parties and military leaders is not new in Thai politics. But unlike the military leaders of the 1950s and 1960s, the military elites in the 1980s were not involved in the political parties on a formal basis. Phibun, Sarit, Thanom and Praphat had established their own parties as their power base in the legislature, but Prem, Arthit and other leading military figures did not have parties of their own. Generals Kriangsak, Tienchai and Mana set up their parties only when they retired from service, and the parties apparently were not the front for the Army leaders in power. 30 The military elites' links with the political parties in the 1980s were temporary in that they were for specific purposes and would change with the political wind with new alliances. There was no organizational link between the Army and the parties. It cannot therefore be said that the parties and elected politicians had reinforced the power base of the military leaders on a long-term basis, since the links were ad hoc and tenuous. However, the military leaders attempted to establish this with various mass organizations at the grassroots as well. It is interesting then to know what role the military leaders expected the mass movements to play in support of their political involvement. How did they combine their links with parties, large businesses and the mass organizations? Did their relations with the mass organizations contradict their attempt to develop links with political parties? These problems will be examined in the next chapter.

Politics of Compromise and Military Factionalism

47

NOTES

2 3 4

5 6 7 8

9

10 11

12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

MR Kukrit Pramoj, "Key Note Speech at the Seminar on the Direction of Thai Political Science" in Posnsak Phongphew, ed., Thidthang Ratasat Thai [The direction of Thai political science], (Bangkok: Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, 1985), p. 8. Ibid., p. 9. Nation, 11 January 1986, p. 1. Montri Pongpanij was named Deputy Minister of Interior replacing Opas Pholsil; Surat Osathanukroh replaced Kasol as Commerce Minister; Prasob Busarakham replaced Pan Boonchit as Deputy Agricultural Minister; Subin Pinkayan a Member of Parliament from Chiangmai was appointed Deputy Finance Minister while Anmnuay Yossuk moved from Finance to be Deputy Commerce Minister. General Sithi Sawethsila was named Deputy Prime Minister while retaining the foreign minister's portfolio. For details see the Nation, 16 January 1986, p. I. Bangkok Post, 2 May 1986, p. I. Nation, 25 December 1985, p. I. Siamrath, 31 January 1985, p. I. Initially the Chart Thai Party submitted a no-confidence motion against General Sithi Chiraroj, the Interior Minister. However, on the day of the debate, General Praman Adireksarn, the Chart Thai leader, refused to open the debate. This was interpreted by the Speaker of the House as a withdrawal of the motion by applying House Regulation No. 47 which would allow the opposition to lodge another motion of no-confidence against the government, and they did. The constitution does not allow another motion of no-confidence if it has been defeated. In this case, it would appear that the opposition had the right to submit another no-confidence motion since the first was withdrawn and not defeated. But the government parties argued that Regulation No. 47 could not be applied to a no-confidence motion as this motion once submitted had to be voted on even if it was not debated. This was easily passed by the House and the motion against the Prime Minister and five other ministers was invalidated. For details see the Nation Review, 4 May 1984 and 12 My 1984. See the letter of Maj.-Gen. Praman Adireksan, the Chart Thai leader, to the Speaker dated 31 May 1985 on the no-confidence motion against the Ministers of Finance, Communications, Agriculture, Industry and Commerce (Motion Affairs Division, Office of the Secretariat of the National Assembly). John McBeth and Paisa! Sricharatchanya, "The Coup Mentality", Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 November 1985. Suchit Bunbongkarn and Kanala Sukhapanij-Khantaprab, "National Security and the Contemporary Political Role of the Thai Military" (Paper presented to the International Conference on Thai Studies, 22-24 August 1984, Bangkok, organized by Chulalongkorn University, pp. 12-3). Nation Review, 4 February 1984. Ibid. Nation Review, 12 February 1984. Nation Review, 7 May 1984. Sayamrath Sapdavicharn (Siamrath Weekly Review), 2 September 1984, p. 5. For an interesting analysis of the extension of General Arthit's term, see "Rayrao PremArthit" [A crack: Prem-Arthit], Sayamrath Sapdavicharn, 19 August 1984, pp. 4-5. Bangkok Post, 22 September 1984. For details see Sayamrath Sapdavicharn, 2 June 1985, p. 45. McBeth and Paisa!, op. cit., p. 35. See also Matichon, 12 November 1985. McBeth and Paisa!, op. cit., p. 35. Quoted in Sayamrath Sapdavicharn, 8 June 1986.

48

The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86

23 24 25 26

Matichon, 25 March 1986. Ibid. Ibid. John McBeth, "Rally Round the Generals", Far Eastern Economic Review, 29 May 1986. Dawit Klinpratoom eventually returned to the Chart Thai Party, see Bangkok Post, 9 June 1986. The existence of the centre was denied by Maj.-Gen. Nareudol Dejpradiyuth, the secretary of the Army on I6 May 1986, but it was confirmed by General Juthai after the dismissal of General Arthit. He reported that the Army election centre still functions to ensure high voter turnout of the soldiers; see Bangkok Post, 17 May 1986 and 5 June 1986. "Sahaprachathipatai Yangpenkamwang Kong Arthit" [The United Democratic Party is still the hope for Arthit], Sayamrath Sapdavicharn, 8 June 1986, p. 7. Another reason for General Arthit's dismissal later reported in the press was that he was planning to transfer about 190 officers mostly at the battalion and regiment commander levels to strengthen his position and it would affect several Prem-Chaovalit loyalists including Colonel Am porn Sawetserani, Commander of the 11th Infantry Regiment, who was close to Chaovalit and the Class 5 group. See Bangkok Post, 3 June 1986. Several early comments in the press looked at the Rasadorn Party as a political front for General Arthit. See Matichon Sudsapda, 6 April 1986, p. 6 and Sayamrath Sapdavicharn, 18 May 1986, p. 7.

27 28

29

30

chapter four

The Army and Its Increasing Commitment to Domestic Tasks

THE INTERNAL SECURITY OPERATION COMMAND AND ITS CONTROL OVER MASS ORGANIZATIONS

Military links with the masses in rural areas began in the period of Field Marshal Sarit through the programmes of rural development by the Central Security Operation Command of the Supreme Commander's Office. The major task of the command was to improve the living conditions of people living in communist-infiltrated areas. This covered the construction of roads and schools, wells, small-scale irrigation, crop improvement, and medical care. This rural development policy assumed that if the living conditions of the people in remote and communist-infiltrated villages were improved, then they would reject the communists for the government. After the student uprising in October 1973, the Army for a different reason began to enlarge its assistance programme to cover the people in all areas. During the 1973-76 period the Army was severely criticised by student activists, progressive politicians and labour leaders for its past political interventions, corrupt leaders and its collaboration with the U.S. Government in establishing U.S. military bases in Thailand. The Army leaders envisaged an urgent need to improve relations between the military and the people through providing assistance to them on a larger scale. The purpose was intended to rebuild the people's faith in the Army. On 9 June 1976, the Army issued Order No. 298/2519 which referred to the 1974 constitution and stipulated the armed forces' role in national development. It specified the objectives of the Army's assistance programme as follows:

49

50

The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86

• to give support to the government in community development and to supplement the development work of other government agencies; • to ensure the people's friendly attitude towards soldiers and their support for the Army's operations; • to monitor intelligence needed for military operations and to promote national security; • to support the Army's plan for communist suppression. 1

The assistance would include construction works, medical care, veterinary service, distribution of fertilizer and seeds, cultural shows and entertainment, and where needed, public disaster relief. Several instructions were stipulated in the order for army units to ensure the smooth operation of the programmes and co-ordination with other related government agencies. The soldiers were to fraternize with the people as a prerequisite to the success of the programmes. The order reflected the military's attempts to expand its role in a wider range of civilian tasks. It also demonstrated a new approach to counter the anti-military movements by establishing links with the masses, bringing them to the Army's side. However, what is interesting is that the role expansion of the Army coincided with ideas of the ruling civilian elites who would like the armed forces to be more involved in the developmental tasks to divert them from resuming a political role. The military elites also began to develop mass organizations as a counter-insurgency measure. One of the earliest village organizations set up for this purpose was the Volunteer Development and Self-Defence Villages established in 1975 through the initiative of General Saiyud, the then Deputy Chief-of-Staff of the Supreme Command. After the October 1976 coup by Admiral Sangad and General Kriangsak, several mass mobilization and mass training programmes for national security were established. One of the official objectives for these mass movements was to encourage people in rural and urban areas to co-operate with government forces in fighting against the communists. Another objective was to help villagers in self-defence and self-development. Since 1978, there have been at least three major mass organizations in rural areas established by the military: the National Defence Volunteers, the Volunteer Development and SelfDefence Villages, and the Organization of Military Reservists for National Security. To appreciate the political significance of these movements, one has to look at the nature of military control. The mass organizations established for national security purposes are under the control of the Internal Security Operation Command (ISOC) formerly known as the Communist Suppression Operation Command (CSOC). The CSOC which was established in 1965 combined military and police counter-insurgency into a single command. The first director of the CSOC was Field Marshal Praphat, the then

The Army and Its Domestic Tasks

51

Army Commander and Minister of Interior. In June 1974, its name was changed to the Internal Security Operations Command out of consideration for the People's Republic of China as the Thai Government was attempting to promote better relations. 2 Officially the ISOC is not part of the Army but a special entity set up under the Prime Minister. However, the de facto control of the ISOC is in the hands of the Army Chief who is its ex-officio director. What is more interesting is that all the top military officers concurrently hold the top posts in the ISOC: the Deputy Chief of the Army is its Deputy Director, the Assistant Chief of the Army is its Assistant Director and the Army Chief-of-Staff, the ISOC Chief-of-Staff (see Figure 1). The ISOC and the Army are thus symbiotic. More importantly, the ISOC has given the Army Chief vast authority over other government agencies involved in national security. This is revealed in Order No. 8312526 issued in 1983 to revise the functions of the ISOC which are: • to command and control the government agencies, civilian-police-military forces, paramilitary forces and all citizen volunteers in joint operations to win over communism. • to direct, supervise, monitor and implement the campaign to win over communism in accordance with the Orders of the Prime Minister's Office No. 66/2523 and No. 65/2525. • to co-ordinate with other government agencies in order to win over communism. 3

The Civil Affairs Centre of the ISOC is responsible for the implementation of a wide range of ISOC policies in politics, development and mass psychological operations. It works closely with the Army's Civil Affairs Directorate as the Army's Assistant Chief-of-Staff for Civil Affairs is in charge of the !SOC's Civil Affairs Centre. Its tasks include the handling of complaints on injustice and maltreatment, acting as a secretariat for the National Defence Volunteers, organizing political education programmes and training courses in national security for government and state enterprise officers, businessmen, union and student leaders, organizing mass movements for national security and democratic development purposes. It serves too as a centre for the Volunteer Development and Self-Defence Villages, and conducts public relations and mass psychological programmes for the ISOC. The exception is the Organization of Military Reservists for National Security which is under the direct control of the ISOC Operation Centre. The Civil Affairs Centre is, in fact, a political operation command of the ISOC undertaking all political operations and the socialization of the masses for counter-insurgency and promoting democracy. 4 At the local level, all the ISOC activities are under the control and supervision of regional army commanders who are the ex-officio directors

52

The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86

Figure 1 Organization Chart of the ISOC

ISOC Director (Army Chief)

I I

Deputy Director

r-- (Deputy Army Chief)

I

I I

r-1

4 Assistant Directors (2 Assistant Army Chiefs, Permanent Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Interior, Police Chief)

I ISOC Chief-of-Staff (Army Chief-of-Staff)

Operation Centre (Army Deputy Chief-of-Staff No. 1)

Intelligence

Civil Affairs Centre

Logistics Centre (Army Deputy Chief-of-Staff No. 2)

Military Reservist Centre

Field Operations Centre

NorEs: The !SOC since 1987 has undergone some change in its organization with the Prime Minister replacing the Army Chief as its head. The Army's Commander-in-Chief is now the !SOC Deputy Chief. An advisory committee will be set up comprising several key officers in various government agencies including the Parliament secretariat. This change was initiated by General Chaovalit to ensure smooth co-operation with other government offices, but it has been criticized as a move by the Army to extend its control over nonmilitary agencies. SouRcE: !SOC.

The Army and Its Domestic Tasks

53

of ISOC regions. The geographical boundaries of the army and the ISOC regions are identical, but the authority and functions of the ISOC regions are far greater, giving the regional army commanders who are ISOC regional directors, control over other government agencies involved in counter-insurgency. For instance, the provincial governor and district officer would normally report to the permanent under-secretary of the Interior Ministry but as directors of the ISOC provincial and district regions, they have to report directly to the respective regional army commander as well.

RURAL MASS ORGANIZATIONS: DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT AT THE GRASSROOTS

The 1981-86 period saw the establishment and rapid development of several mass mobilization programmes under Orders No. 66/2523 and No. 65/2525 which were issued in 1980 and 1982 respectively. One of the main emphases of the two orders is that the development of democracy is the only means to winning over communism at all levels of society and is a major preoccupation of the agencies concerned including the military. The mass mobilization programmes organized by the ISOC were officially intended to promote democracy but, as several analysts are increasingly aware, this "democratic development" might well be used by military elites to crush the democratic system itself. National Defence Volunteers

One of the important programmes of mass mobilization is the National Defence Volunteers organization (NOV) which was established in 1978 in communist-infiltrated areas to bring villagers back to the government's side. The NOV is an outgrowth of several mass movements organized before 1978. In that year, they were unified within one organization called the National Defence Volunteers except for the village scouts and the Volunteer Development and Self-Defence Villagers which were retained as separate organizations. The NOV's development can be traced back to 1973 when General Prem, the then Deputy Commander of the Second Army Region, began to organize villagers in communist-infiltrated areas to defend themselves from the insurgents' attacks as well as to co-operate with government forces in the suppression of the CPT. 5 The NOV programme has now been expanded to cover all provinces including Bangkok, and in 1984 there were about one million NOV members. 6 The NOV represents a new approach which emphasizes the people's cooperation with government forces in counter-insurgency. It also emphasizes

54

The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86

national loyalty to undercut the CPT. This approach was legitimized through the issuance of Order No. 66/2523 as a "politics before military" strategy. The objectives of the NDV are as follows: • to prevent and counter communist insurgents and external threats; • to prevent and counter riots and other disturbances; • to undertake surveillance for intelligence gathering and to provide security to their villages; • to help in public disaster relief and to help suppress crimes; • to help develop their own villages.7

The above indicates that the real objective of the NDV has more to do with national security than promoting democracy. The NDV programme was designed for a large number of "people's forces" to help government forces in times of war and in counter-insurgency. If necessary, this "people's force" can be developed into a fighting unit in a battle front line. 8 The NDV is organized in the same way as the military and is finally responsible to the director of the ISOC who is also the army chief and its supreme commander. The basic unit of the NDV is at the viiiage level, and all village-level units in a district are under the district officer who, in turn, reports to the provincial governor. All NDV forces in the provinces within an army region are under the command of the regional army commander who reports directly to the army chief. This administrative structure provides a legitimate channel for military leaders to exercise control over the masses and mobilize them in the interest of the generals. Every volunteer has to undergo a ten-day training course which combines political education and basic military training amounting to a hundred hours of lectures and practice. The eighteen hours on political education cover democracy, national security, strategy and tactics of the CPT, and government policy towards communist insurgents. The remaining time is concentrated on courses in economic and social problems, civil defence and public disaster relief practice as well as basic military training. 9 With time constraints and the low educational level of the trainees, substantial results cannot be expected. Most volunteers are villagers whose education does not exceed grade 4. They have limited political knowledge and would learn on the course that democracy is the most suitable form of government for Thailand. They would be taught some basic principles of democracy such as political freedom, equal rights, rule of law and the principle of majority rule. But they hardly comprehend the operations and mechanisms of democracy. Some of them barely know what a political party is, let alone the problems facing the Thai party system. 10 However, what they have learned in the political education course is that communism is "evil". It would be inculcated in them that the "real enemy'' of Thailand is communism and they have to fight it at all costs.

The Army and Its Domestic Tasks

55

The courses are designed to convince them that communism is the most dangerous threat to the three Thai institutions of nation, religion and monarchy. Similarly the basic military training course given to the NDVs, because of limited time and budget achieve little. In two observations by the author on the military training of the NDVs in Rayong province and Prachinburi, two common problems were found which were the inadequate qualified teaching personnel and the inadequate facilities. For instance, in a course on the use of weapons, they were given pre-World War II rifles to practice without a single bullet, and predictably at the shooting exam no one hit the target. It is, therefore, difficult to envisage their effectiveness particularly when it involves military operations. Despite all the weaknesses mentioned above, the training programme is at least a socialization process. As they are forced to stay together for a certain period, sharing experiences, and undergoing some tough physical training, the trainees develop a group identity with common basic attitudes towards good citizenship, national security and democracy. Above all, they are ready for mobilization and to act collectively when needed. Volunteer Development and Self-Defence Villages

Another programme of mass mobilization is the Volunteer Development and Self-Defence Villages. This project was launched in 1975 inaugurating a developmental approach to counter-insurgency. The programme was revised in 1978 and further strengthened by the issuance of Order No. 66/2523 in 1980. It differs from the NDV in its emphasis on development as the NDV is more military oriented. It can be considered a special form of rural development to promote national security and is included under national security in the fifth national economic and social plan. 11 In establishing a Volunteer Development and Self-Defence Village, the military has divided communist-infiltrated areas into two types: the communist stronghold area, and the area surrounding the stronghold in which the CPT has intensified its operation but has not achieved control. A number of Volunteer Development and Self-Defence Villages were established in the latter area to block further CPT subversion. The villages are organized on the assumption that if they are capable of defending themselves from the communist threat, and are able to improve their own villages, the insurgents will be defeated. The projects are developed with assistance from military and government officers. Several training programmes for villagers are organized by the ISOC officers on subjects relevant to rural development and self-defence such as management, village security, agriculture, public health, education and village industry, and government and politics.

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The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86

Each village is divided into sub-groups responsible for administration, education and culture, public health, development, finance, social welfare and village security. The success of the programme in a village largely depends on village participation. If the villagers are inactive in village administration and development projects, and dependent on government assistance, then the project is a failure. The programme is restricted to remote and highly impoverished areas, including the communist-infiltrated ones. The total number of such villages was 4,000 in 1981. 12 Military Reservists for National Security

The other rural-based mass organization is the Military Reservists for National Security established in 1981. This programme has significant political implication since it is widely perceived as an organization to support General Arthit or any political party sponsored by the General. Initially it was responsible to the Army's Reserve Corps Directorate headed by Maj.-Gen. Mana Ratanakoset, a close friend of General Arthit. In 1983, the Committee on the Reservists for National Security was established with the Army Commander as its chairman, and General Mana as its secretary to supervise the activities of the project. At the operational level, a Centre for the Reservists for National Security was set up under the ISOC. But the Army leaders still retain full control of the project. 13 The programme organizes reservists who are scattered all over the country for effective and rapid mobilization in times of war or emergency. 14 Intended for military operations only, the programme is modelled on the Israeli military reserve corps. 15 However, its scope has broadened to include the political, economic, social and psychological aspects. Its political objective is to encourage reservists to play an active role in local government and to instill democratic principles in the villagers towards developing a democratic political system with the King as its head. Economically, the project is designed to raise the living standards of the villagers. Socially, the reservists have to promote religious and cultural activities. And to achieve its military objective, the reservists are assigned to provide security for their locality and to assist in getting information for military and other government units. 16 Any reservist can join the project by simply filling in the application form. Admission is almost never refused. Friends and relatives of reservists are also eligible for membership. In 1985, the total membership was more than 600,000. 17 Its organizational structure is similar to the NDV, with the reservists at the village level forming a basic unit. All the basic units in a sub-district are grouped as ''sub-district one'', and above it are the district, provincial and regional army units. What is interesting is that the commander of each unit from the village to the provincial level is elected by

The Army and Its Domestic Tasks

57

its members. It is a democratic process within a military structure. 18 As a part of the programme, there are "democratic pavilions" in several sub-districts where the programme exists which are used by the project members. Activities of the democratic pavilion are conducted by a democratic pavilion committee whose members are elected by the reservist programme members in the sub-district. Most of the activities concentrate on encouraging the villagers to participate in solving their village problems. Political activities such as dissemination of democratic concepts, encouraging the villagers to vote in an election, and educating the people on the election process and political parties are also included. The democratic pavilion is the centre of political activity in the sub-district, the meeting place of the committee, the co-ordination centre for the villagers and government agencies, the centre for providing services to the people in the locality and a place where villagers can come and express their grievances. 19 As such, the reservists have become more politicized than the NDV which is militaryoriented, and the Volunteer Development and Self-Defence Village project which is development-oriented. Between 1981 and 1986 all three mass organizations received heavy attention from the military leaders as they were attempting to develop their leadership of the masses. As the army chief and the director of the ISOC, General Arthit was in a better position than others to develop his link with the masses and to manipulate the masses through the three organizations for his political gain if he chose to. Members of the NDV and the reservists programmes were often mobilized to support Army actions as in the case of the constitutional amendment issue in 1983 and the mass "walkathons" organized to celebrate the Queen and the King's birthdays in August and December 1984 respectively. The Army was able to rally only a limited number of villagers in a few provinces to support its bid for a constitutional amendment. The poor turnout was because the Army did not go all out to mobilize the masses since the amendment issue was highly unpopular. But on the royal birthdays, it did mobilize more than a million people to join the "walkathons" (sponsored walks) throughout the country. It would appear that General Arthit deliberately used the ''walkathons'' to advertise his leadership, political strength and barami (charisma). The success of the "walkathons" in terms of the huge response and the amount of money donated revealed the popularity of the royal family but it also indicated the effective link between the Army and the organizations at the grassroots. Inspite of this General Arthit did not have a largely rally to support his political campaigns. This was partly because the mobilization required the co-operation of the officers of the Ministry of Interior who work closely with mass organizations at the village level. With increasing conflict between General Prem and General Arthit, the Interior officers would follow their

58

The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86

superior, the Permanent Under-Secretary, Pisal Moolsathsathorn, who was Prem's supporter, making a rally for General Arthit impossible. Pisal demonstrated his ability to rally masses for political purposes, exploiting the military-sponsored organizations against the Army leader's interest. Another attempt by General Arthit to manipulate mass organizations for political benefits was revealed through the establishment of the Army's election centre in all four army regions in May 1986. These centres not only work at encouraging soldiers and their families to vote but could also mobilize the masses though the military-organized rural movements against some political parties, particularly the Democrat Party, a major opponent of General Arthit in the 1986 general election. However, this was not put to test as the centre was scrapped by the new Army Chief, General Chaovalit.2° In his directive given to all military units on the position of the Army over the election, the new Army Chief stressed that the Army would strictly maintained neutrality in the election campaigns and, for this reason, the centre was dissolved. Despite the failure of the Army to rally mass movements to support its leader in the political arena, the infrastructure for mass mobilization is there at the village level, and can potentially be utilized for mobilizing mass support for military elites in the future if the army can exercise control over the civil bureaucracy. One may argue that the mass movement programmes could lead to more political awareness through the politicization of rural people making it difficult, if not impossible, for the military to control and mobilize them. This, however, would be possible only if the Army revises the programmes to give less emphasis on national security and military affairs and stresses more on democratic values and practice. Moreover, with the hierarchical control superimposed on the movements, it is inconceivable that they would be able to exercise independent political participation.

THE CAPITAL SECURITY COMMAND: A NEW POWER BASE OF THE MILITARY LEADERS

Apart from rural mass mobilization programmes the Army since 1981 has expanded its role in peace-keeping in the capital city of Bangkok to cover a wide range of police functions including suppression of crimes, urban riots, terrorism and the "dark influences" (see Chapter 5). The Army stressed that the expansion was part of its attempts to counter communist penetration in the urban area and to eliminate "war conditions" favourable to the communist success in their revolutionary struggle. 21 The military leaders have always insisted that social and economic injustice and mistreatment of the people by government officers have to be eliminated to prevent the CPT from capitalizing on such issues. Apart from an in-

The Army and Its Domestic Tasks

59

creasing crime rate, and other social problems created by rural migration to the city, international terrorism was also cited as a reason for setting up the Capital Security Command (CSC). As Maj.-Gen. Wanchai Reungtrakul, the then Chief-of-Staff of the CSC put it: Several terrorist actions that have occurred in Bangkok are part of a frightening international terrorism. It is, therefore, imperative that we must have an effective unit with proper training, equipped with modern and sophisticated weapons and under a unified command to deal with terrorism. The Cabinet has authorized the Capital Security Command to deal with, suppress, stop and destroy all kinds of international terrorism. 22

The peace-keeping role of the Army was routinized after the CSC was established in 1981. According to the law enacted in 1976, the Army Chief is also the Peace-Keeping Director for Bangkok. But General Arthit in 1981 was keen enough to press for the establishment of the CSC to be under his control while he was the First Army Region Commander, leaving the Bangkok peace-keeping director post as more or less ceremonial. When the was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Army and later Supreme Commander of the Army Forces, he kept the CSC commander post. In the latter capacity General Arthit was able to exercise control over naval, air force and police units in Bangkok, making him the most powerful military leader in the country. 23 An operation centre known as Unit 123 was set up under the office of the Chief-of-Staff to co-ordinate various forces attached to the CSC. The centre through its telephone number 123, receives complaints, requests and reports on crimes and other disturbances, and gives out assignments to deal with these problems. The organizational structure of the CSC is illustrated in Figure 2. Since its establishment in 1981, the CSC has enabled General Arthit to publicly solve problems in Bangkok ranging from demonstrations to the poverty in slum areas. He played a leading role in defusing the tensions arising from protests and demonstrations by several pressure groups. He succeeded in projecting his "strongman" personality while attempting to pacify the protestors. For example, in the case of the Khon Khaen University students' protests outside Government House in 1983 against the selection process of the new rector, General Arthit as the Commander of the Peace-Keeping Force in Bangkok was able to project himself as a capable military leader when he successfully persuaded the university council to reconsider the selection process. He was also successful in defusing other protests by the labour groups of the Bangkok Port Authority and the Tobacco Monopoly. This exhibited his ability to utilize the CSC for leadership of the urban masses. 24 Two other important tasks of the CSC strengthened his leadership: one is the commander's role in improving the slum areas in Bangkok and the

60

The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86

Figure 2 Organization Chart of the Capital Security Command as of 1985

Bangkok Peace-Keeper (Army Chief: General Arthit)

Commander of the Capital Security Command (General Arthit)

r-----

Deputy Commanders

. . - - - - - Assistant Commanders

Bangkok Army Force

Bangkok Naval Force (Two battalions of Marines)

Chief-of-Staff

Operation Centre 123

SouRcE: Capital Security Command.

Bangkok Air Force (Two battalions of Air Force Infantry)

Bangkok Police Force

The Army and Its Domestic Tasks

61

other is the nation-wide television programme, Conversations on the Country's Problems. The CSC has paid a great deal of attention to the overcrowded, squalid, and poor areas in Bangkok which affect 500,000 people. For example, in the case of Wat Ladbaokhao community in Yannawa district, some squatter families petitioned the esc commander to intervene in their conflict with the landlord. They had refused to abide by a court order that they move out of the land as they had lived there for a long time and had no other place to go to. General Arthit intervened, using his authority and influence to successfully persuade the landlord to sell the land to the squatters at a reasonable price. 25 Several other squatter areas have been improved by the CSC in coordination with other government agencies such as the Housing Authority, the Metropolitan Electricity Authority, the Water Works Authority, and the Bangkok City Government. These areas became cleaner, safer and more pleasant with permanent pavements, electricity and water supply, playgrounds and community centres. As a result, the link between the CSC and slum dwellers has drawn closer, and General Arthit is seen as the "redeemer" of slum dwellers. He has demonstrated to the poor and the deprived that he has power, authority, influence and most of all, a willingness to help. The programme, Conversations on the Country's Problems, telecast on the Army's station on Channels 5 and 7 on Sunday evenings is organized by the CSC to ''educate'' the public on various political, economic and social issues. From 1981 to 1985 the programme was televised 205 times covering twenty-six political issues, thirty economic issues, fourteen on military affairs, and the rest were social, cultural and general issues. 26 Programme participants are screened by a committee appointed by the army chief to ensure that their views are consistent with his views. The programme is also a vehicle for Army leaders to express their ideas to the public, to persuade the government or agencies concerned to accept Army requests such as the constitutional amendment or to criticize the government as in General Arthit's outrage at the baht devaluation. The programme gives the Army leaders a better opportunity than available to civilian politicians to persuade or mobilize the public for the Army's cause. However, the Army failed to convince their television audience on the constitutional amendment issue, and in the case of General Arthit's attack on the baht devaluation, it backfired on him. These failures do not prevent the Army leaders from using the television station for other political purposes in the future. Mass movements parallel to those organized in the rural villages have also been set up in several urban slums and other agricultural areas on the outskirts of Bangkok. The NOV programme covers a number of low-level income areas where the members are supposed to serve as a core unit for

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The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86

any of the Army's mobilized activities. They are also expected to be major canvassers for military-supported candidates in elections. This effort worked out satisfactorily for the Army in the election for the governor of Bangkok and the by-election in the inner districts of Bangkok in November and December 1985 respectively. The military in co-operation with the NDV - mobilized voters in favour of Maj.-Gen. Chamlong, a nonpartisan candidate for governor, and the SAP candidates in the by-election. The CSC has undergone some changes after General Chaovalit took over the Army top post. The forces under the CSC were dismantled and its role was de-emphasized. However, since the law governing the CSC still exists, its operation can be reactivated any time.

THE MASS PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY

Apart from the rural movements and the CSC, other mass psychological operations were established to ensure the success of the role expansion of the military. Policies were also spelled out for all army units to work with possible maximum effectiveness. One of the military units established in 1978 but only gained formal endorsement in 1983 is the paramilitary force called taharn pran (local rangers)Y The original objective of the taharn pran was to develop a local volunteer paramilitary force to fight localized insurgency so that the regular forces could be deployed elsewhere against external threats. The Army is convinced that the taharn pran are more effective than regular forces in fighting insurgents because they belong to that locality, know the people and the area, and understand their needs and problems. The taharn pran differs from the NDV in that the former is much better trained, equipped and organized. The only difference between the regular force and the taharn pran is that the former is conscripted and the latter is voluntary. As of 1984, there were altogether 199 taharn pran companies or twentytwo regiments: four in the First Army Region, six in the Second Army Region, seven in the Third and five in the Fourth Army Region. Commanding officers from the platoon level to that of regiment are Army officers. The role of taharn pran has now been expanded to cover civil affairs. The civil role of the taharn pran guided by Orders No. 66/2523 and No. 65/2525, covers a large area of civic action and developmental programmes in the rural areas including the construction of roads, bridges and schools, medical and dental services, agricultural consultations, prevention and suppression of reserved forest encroachment, promotion of cultural and religious activities in villages, and musical entertainment. Apart from these activities, the taharn pran regiments of the First Army Region has a ----t..~~ ~~ en""'"' nrn11rammes which encompass child development,

The Army and Its Domestic Tasks

63

education for housewives, cultural preservation, campaigns against illiteracy, democratic development at the grassroots, agricultural planning and co-ordination, and development of villagers' technical skills. 28 Some of these projects were conducted through the santi-nimit ("Dream of Peace") unit in which some of the taharn pran participated. These activities are aimed at increasing the level of income and standard of living in the villagers along the border areas. The main emphasis is to encourage rural villages in "self-help". However, the role expansion of the taharn pran has also political implications. Through the deployment of taharn pran for developmental tasks in villages in the First Army Region, the loyalty of villagers to the government is on the increase and insurgency is declining. The paramilitary force has become a vital link between the Army and the people's organization at the grassroots; it has become another Army local unit to help mobilize support for the military establishment and its leaders. Another unit which was established to help military mass mobilization programmes was a santi-nimit unit. Established in 1982 under Order No. 6612523, the unit conducts "political offensive" campaigns against communist insurgents. 29 This is a small mobile unit and members can be either military personnel, taharn pran or police officers. In 1985 there were 70 units deployed in the four army regions. Each unit comprises at least five sub-units or operation groups- a group to survey the people's need, an assistance operation group, a political affairs group, a psychological operation and entertainment group, and a security group. Each unit spends approximately a month in a village before moving to another site. During its stay in the village, each sub-unit will be assigned its task, but since the length of stay in each village is short, the assistance given is usually limited to small projects which can be completed within a month. The unit is expected to function as a mass psychological operation, giving political education through training programmes and various forms of entertainment. This emphasis is clearly spelled out in a document on the santi-nimit unit issued by the Civil Affairs Directorate of the Army: The unit must give the knowledge to villagers on the democratic form of government with the King as the head of state, compare the differences between the communist system and the democratic system and emphasize that the democratic one is much better than communist totalitarianism because under the democratic system sovereignty is in the hands of the people; the government is not monopolized by a single party but the people can change the government by rule and within the period stipulated in the constitution. 30

According to the document, the unit portrays communism as "evil" using Laos and Kampuchea as illustrations. The "political offensive"

64

The Military in Thai Politics, /981-86

strategy of Order No. 66/2523 is to persuade CPT sympathizers to lay down arms and surrender to government authorities. The unit has to urge th~ people to treat communist defectors as compatriots. The case of the santi-nimit unit attached to the 12th Ranger (taharn pran) Regiment of the First Army Region illustrates its role. 31 This unit was operating in August 1985 in the villages of Ban Nerntakian and Ban Nongsai in the district of Srakeow, Prachinburi province. The projects completed by the unit included the construction of a child development centre for sixty pre-school children in the two villages. As part of the child development programmes of the First Army Region, this centre provides basic child-care, pre-school education, free lunches, and a playground. The budget to cover the construction and operation costs was partly drawn from the First Army Region, the rest came from business contributions in the province and the villagers. Apart from this, the unit's other tasks covered repairs of houses of teachers and bridges in the villages, an establishment of a village central fund for medicine, and agricultural improvements. For political education, besides a political study night class, there was musical entertainment, stage shows, comedies and plays which emphasized the Kampuchean plight as a result of the communist takeover, the mistakes of communist sympathizers in joining the CPT, the heroic acts of Thai ancestors, the threat from the eastern border, the Thai identity, and the democratic process which is how to properly elect parliamentarians. The entertainment programme proved to be highly effective propaganda in influencing the people. Several parliamentarians have expressed their concern that if the Army really used this unit against them during the election campaigns, it could cause effective damage. All activities of the mass movements and the military units cannot function smoothly and effectively without the co-operation of the Civil Affairs Directorate of the Army. The civil affair missions of the military in all the four army regions are conducted under ISOC authority and its Centre for Civil Affairs is responsible for planning and co-ordination. Since the Army plays a major part in the ISOC and army personnel are largely drawn to work for it, co-operation between the civil affairs activities of the Army and the !SOC's Civil Affairs Centre is necessary to ensure maximum effectiveness of the civil affairs programmes. The Army's Directorate for Civil Affairs was established in January 1982, following the establishment of the civil affairs units at the regional army level in 1977 and at the divisional level in 1979. The policies and missions of the directorate as spelled out by a senior officer are as follows: • to inculcate a democratic ideology in military personnel in all units including the reserve and paramilitary forces, to make them understand and appreciate the democratic form of government with the King as its head of the state, and to make them understand the political offensive

The Army and Its Domestic Tasks

65

policy as emphasized in the Prime Ministerial Orders No. 66/2523 and No. 6512525; • to facilitate the success of the programme on the Military Reservists for National Security; • to expand psychological operations by using all existing facilities to achieve disintegration in the communist revolutionary movement and to bring about mass defections of the CPT; • to conduct public relations operations to achieve a closer link with the people and to ensure the people's better understanding on the Army. 32

Other objectives of the directorate include giving assistance to the needy, increasing the standard of living and other rural development projects initiated by the King, and co-ordinating with other governmental agencies to ensure the success of all projects mentioned above. As can be seen, the missions of the directorate cover a wide range of activities, most of which are in the political and social spheres. The scope of the political responsibility directorate was summarized by General Arthit in one of his speeches to "civil affairs" military officers: The duties which you have to perform are beyond regular military functions. Your duties, connected with all forms of mass movement are aimed at preserving national security, educating the people to understand the democratic form of government with the King as the head of the state, convincing them that it is the best form of government for Thailand, and persuading the CPT elements to lay down their arms and surrender themselves to the government authority. 33

One of the public relations projects of the directorate is the radio programme, The Army Meets the People, which is broadcast daily throughout the country by the Army's radio station. The programme is designed to link the Army with the public and to publicize military activities, achievements, views and policies on political, economic and social issues. However, on several occasions, it has been used by General Arthit to broadcast his opinions on controversial political issues or to rebut personal accusations made by politicians and the mass media. He is the first Army Chief to extensively use the military radio station for political purposes. Other examples include the Army's campaign for the constitutional amendment in early 1983 which used the radio to rally for mass support, and the election for the governor of Bangkok in November 1985. It was known that the Army leader was supporting Maj.-Gen. Chamlong as the former was against the Democrat Party. On 11 November 1985, this radio programme criticized political parties for being selfish and corrupt. Two days later the programme accused a political party (presumably the Democrat Party) of being under the control of bankers and having followed the CPT line. 34

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The Military in Thai Politics, /98/-86

The Civil Affairs Centre of the ISOC has a radio programme too, called Sayamanusti which is also broadcast throughout the country daily by the Army's radio station. This programme has on occasions attacked outspoken civilian politicians critical of Army leaders. The Deputy Speaker of the House, Piyanat Vacharaporn, for example, was labelled a "dirty politician" without being mentioned by name on the radio programme on 2 October 1984. This was after he had raised the point that the Army might have "ill-intentions" in prohibiting cabinet members from visiting General Prem when he was warded at the Army hospital. 35 The military's expansion to cover domestic tasks in the first half of the 1980s was concentrated on swinging the masses in rural and urban areas to the Army's side in its struggle against communism. Mass manipulations and mobilizations through various channels have been launched in this period to break the CPT and to secure mass support for the Army's policies. From the point of national security, the military's civil affairs operations could be considered a success since the CPT disintegrated as a result with mass defections to the government side. With the wide array of organizations that have been outlined here and the broadcast media at their disposal, the Thai armed forces have much leeway in conducting mass psychological operations. This is to instill what has been euphemistically referred to as a "sense of responsibility" and a democratic ideology in the public consciousness, and indeed to gain crucial support for the military when necessary. Such involvements "legitimized" by Order No. 66/2523 draw no line between national security, politics, government services and military affairs.

NOTES

2 3 4 5 6

7 8

Royal Thai Army, Kongtapbok chauyleur prachachon [The army and its assistance to the people], (Bangkok: P. Samphanphanij, n.d.), pp. 70-4. Briefing by Colonel Manu Srisomboon of the ISOC at its headquaters, 14 July 1985. Ibid. Manu Srisomboon, op. cit. Kusuma Snitwongse, "Thai Government Responses to Armed Communist and Separatist Movements", in Chandran Jeshurun, ed., Governments and Rebellions in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985). The 1SOC, "A Lecture on Civil Affair Operation of the ISOC", Paper no. 2, p. 10. See also Suchit Bunbongkarn and Kanala Sukhapanij-Khantaprab, "National Security and the Contemporary Political Role of the Thai Military" (Paper presented at the International Conference on Thai Studies, organized by Thai Studies Programme, Chulalongkorn University, 22-24 August 1984, Bangkok, p. 18). Office of the Prime Minister, Office of the Prime Minister Regulations on National Defence Volunteers, BE 2521 [in Thai], (Bangkok: Local Government Department's Printing Office, 1981), pp. 4-5. Ibid., p. 3, and briefing by Colonel Manu Srisomboon, op. cit.

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9 Office of the Prime Minister, op. cit., pp. 18-22. 10 For detailed analysis on the impact of the training programme see Suchit and Kanala, "The Role of the Army in Political Development: A Case Study on the Role of the Army's Civil Affairs in Promoting Democratic Development in Thailand" [in Thai), (Paper submitted to the National Research Council of Thailand). II This part of the chapter on the operation of the Volunteer Development and Self-Defence Village is based on a briefing by !SOC officer, Colonel Tinasak Limdhirakul, at its headquarters, 14 July 1985. 12 Suchit and Kanala, op. cit., p. 19. 13 ISOC, The Reservists for National Security [in Thai], (Bangkok: P. Samphanphanij, 1985), pp. 9-10. 14 All reservists are registered in each Army Region but there was no organization to mobilize them for domestic tasks until the programme on the Reservists for National Security. 15 !SOC, op. cit., p. 9. 16 Op. cit., p. II. 17 According to the !SOC, there were 600,000 members in the Reservists for National Security programme in 1985. 18 ISOC, op. cit., pp. 26-31. 19 Briefing by MR Kamloondhep Devagul, !SOC officer, at its headquaters, 11 July 1985. 20 Bangkok Post, 15 June 1986, p. I. 21 Maj.-Gen. Wanchai Reungtrakul, "Kongkarnlung ruksapranakorn" [Capital Security Command] in See Pee Sontonapanhabanmeung [Four years of conversations on the country's problems], (Bangkok: Capital Security Command, 1985), p. 112. 22 Ibid., pp. 114-15. 23 Nation Review, 24 September 1984. 24 Suchit and Kanala, op. cit., pp. 16-7. 25 Royal Thai Army, op. cit., p. 156. 26 Capital Security Command, op. cit., pp. 141-96. 27 Royal Thai Army, op. cit., pp. 151-54. 28 Ibid., p. 153. 29 ISOC, "Santi-Nimit Unit" [in Thai), mimeographed. 30 Ibid. 31 12th Taharn Pran Regiment, "Santi-Nimit Unit" [in Thai], op. cit. 32 Briefing by Colonel Prativej Vejjaraks, Civil Affairs Directorate of the Army at the ISOC headquarters, 11 July 1985; see also the Royal Thai Army, op. cit., p. 162. 33 Royal Thai Army, op. cit., p. 161. 34 Matichon, 12 November 1985 and 14 November 1985. 35 Sayamrath Sapdavicharn, 28 October 1984, p. 4.

chapter five

Legitimization of the Military's Role Expansion

POLITICAL IDEOLOGY OF THE 66/2523 GROUP

Democratic development has been a major emphasis of the Army since 1981 as a measure to fight communism. The Army will stand firmly with the people; it will fight for the expansion of individual freedom and the sovereignty of the people until this becomes a reality; the Army will fight against ill practices and injustices in the political, social and economic spheres which are the "war conditions" and the causes of communist problems eroding the security of the nation, the religions, and the monarchy, in order to build, as the Thai people always wish, a perfect democratic system of government with the King as the head of the state. 1

The Army's "ideology" is enshrined in the two Prime Ministerial Orders No. 66/2523 (1980) and No. 65/2525 (1982). The first order laid down the "political offensive" strategy to win over the communists and provided the military explanations for the communist success which will be elaborated later. The second order is the implementation guideline for this counter-insurgency strategy. Both these orders have been used to legitimize political intervention by army leaders. 2 These orders were the brainchild of a number of staff officers who wanted a different approach to solving the communist problem. The leading figures who played a vital role in drafting the orders and pressing for their official adoption were General Harn, General Chaovalit and a number of the Democratic Soldiers. This group of officers came to be known as the "66/2523" group led by General

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Chaovalit and has been successful in reaching the top hierarchy in the military establishment. Order No. 66/2523 attributed the cause of the communist insurgency to political, social and economic injustice. Political injustice it explained is derived from the undemocratic form of government in which the sovereignty does not belong to the masses. Instead, it resides in the hands of a small group of people who use their economic power for their self-interest. This group, the 66/2523 officers believe, has never worked for public interest. Some of them including government officials have secured wealth and influence through doubtful means, or by exploiting the poor and the underprivileged who are unable to resist the exploitation. Economic injustice is connected to the "monopolistic" economic system, the exploitation of the poor, unequal distribution of income, unequal access to economic opportunity, and a widening gap between the rich and the poor. In one of his speeches to Thai students in the United States, General Chaovalit expressed this negative view of the big capitalists' in the rural areas: The conditions in rural society in Thailand is very distressing and I think all of you know it very well. You might have seen the people delighted to receive only ten or twenty baht. What is even worse are all the "influences" which are deep rooted in the rural society. You may have seen them; if they are not happy with someone, that one may die, he may get killed.... If someone has no money, then he may get it from them at an exorbitant interest rate and after three or four years he has lost all his land. This is the real condition of oppression and exploitation in the rural area. 3

The 66/2523 officers called the big capitalists who have oppressed and exploited the poor, ithiphon meud ("dark influences"). They include ricemillers, contractors, mine owners, timber merchants and corrupt government officials. A number of them have made their fortunes through various illegal means including gambling, smuggling, prostitution, illegal felling of forest reserves and loan shark rackets. 4 However, the officers have made it clear that some, not all big capitalists are the "dark influences''. This is the military's way of avoiding the Marxist theory of class conflict as they emphasize the exploitation and oppression of the poor by some individual capitalists, not the bourgeoisie per se. The military does not want to be accused of being socialist or Marxist. General Chaovalit has reiterated that his reference to the oppressive role of the capitalists is targetted at some and not all capitalists. He and the 66/2523 group believe in a liberal economic system but with moral values. We are in the liberal economic system and it is only this system that will lead to economic growth in the country. But the liberal economic system we are referring to must be a system with morality not one where power is a monopoly, or oppressive.s

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This anti-capitalist attitude is not new in the Thai military establishment. The Young Turks in the late 1970s were critical of the economic monopoly of big businesses, the exploitation of the poor by some capitalists and the business-military relationships. 6 This hostility was shared by a large number of junior and middle-ranking officers. In the past two decades, a large number of junior and middle-level army officers who conducted counter-insurgency missions in the jungles had been exposed to poverty and hardship in the rural areas as well as the oppression and exploitation of the rural people by the "dark influences". Thus the anti-capitalism inherent in Order No. 6612523 is congruent with the prevailing attitude of Army officers. A dictatorial government, according to the order, is the major condition for the rise in the communists' political offensive operations. To counter them, all democratic measures must be employed since economic measures have proved ineffective. General Chaovalit cited as an example the Central Security Command's failure to reduce communist infiltration despite its efforts to develop the rural areas. 7 What are these democratic measures? According to General Chaovalit, they are related to the sovereignty of the masses and individual freedom which are the major components of democracy. In his briefing to the National Security Council on the concept of Order 6612523, General Chaovalit said: If you ask: what is a democracy? The concise answer in accordance with

the principles of political science would be a government with sovereignty of the masses and freedom of individuals. The sovereignty of the masses must be the basic principle of the system while the individual freedom is supplementary. In other words, the sovereignty of the masses is the heart of a democracy .... Without it, that political system cannot be regarded as a democratic one although it allows the people to have political freedom. It is a "soft" dictatorial system. A "tight" dictatorial system allows neither political freedom nor the sovereignty of the masses. 8

The question is, how can the masses exercise their full sovereignty? In his explanation on the "political offensive strategy", General Chaovalit put the blame on the "dark influences", the unprincipled parliamentarians and some political parties for obstructing the people's exercise of sovereign power. He has reiterated on several occasions that the influence and exploitation of a number of local businessmen are the main obstacles to the development of a full democracy in Thailand. An ISOC document explaining Order No. 66/2523 contained similar views as that of General Chaovalit's. The document emphasizes that democratic development in Thailand can only be achieved through providing a condition under which the people can enjoy political, social, and economic justice; all causes of

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injustice in society have to be eradicated, for instance, the "dark influences", hooligansim, corruption of government officers, oppression and exploitation. Furthermore, the security in life and property of the people have to be ensured. 9 Several measures for achieving this are also spelled out in the document such as establishment of democratic mass movements, promotion of people's participation in political processes and improvement of government officials' performance. The officers including General Chaovalit maintained a negative attitude towards some parties and parliamentarians akin to the Thai public's view in general, particularly, criticism of the link between the "dark influences" and some political parties. One of the major obstacles to the progress of democratic development in Thailand, from their point of view, is the unscrupulous businessmen's increasing influence in political parties and in general elections, particularly those of 1979 and 1983. One of the officers pointed out that a number of unprincipled capitalists had attempted with considerable success after open politics was brought back in 1978 to manipulate the constitution, political parties and the elections for their own benefit. 10 In 1984, General Chaovalit said that if the elected parliamentarians worked for the interests and needs of the people, then the military would be satisfied, but if they were elected through the use of money, then the military would be unhappy.n What he would like to see was a mass party, not parties controlled by a small group of people. As he puts it: Our group wants to see a real and perfect democracy. Now we have political parties, but the most desirable type of a party is a mass party which is established to serve the masses. It should develop from a small or basic cell which was formed with the need of the people. This small cell will expand and grow step by step into a larger party. A political party is not only the secretary-general or the leader. In Thailand at the moment when we refer to the Social Action Party, everyone must think of MR Kukrit Pramoj or if a reference is made to the National Democratic Party, everyone will look at General Kriangsak Chommanand. 12

General Arthit also harboured negative views on political parties and parliamentarians. He once observed that an appointed senate could be more democratic than the unprincipled elected parliamentarians. This was made clear when he appeared on the Army television on 20 January 1983 to explain its campaign for the extension of the interim clause of the constitution: The Senate is an appointed House whose members can be appointed democratically - that is, senators will be proportionally drawn from all social and professional groups. Through this selection, the Senate will be more democratic than the House of Representatives which is an elected House. Under the present circumstances, we will not be able to have

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representatives of the poor or the real people's representatives in the House through the general election no matter how democratic it is. 13

General Juthai, the Deputy Army's Chief in 1985 and a close friend of General Arthit was another military leader who spoke out against elected politicians. In his interview with the press in early June 1986, he criticized parliamentarians for "being narrow-minded, selfish and radical and veiled in democratic garb to mislead the public" . 14 Lt.-Gen. Pichit who is not associated with the 66/2523 group shared his negative feelings. In his interview with the author, he contended that the elected parliamentarians were less responsible and possessed "less quality" particularly in terms of formal education compared to the senators. 15 A point that General Pichit made which might well represent the ideas of a number of commanding officers was that a democracy should have a lower priority than resolving poverty. He said, "If the people are still poor we cannot afford to think of much democracy. You can ask the people at the border, they need food and protection, not democracy''. His view on the necessity of a democracy thus differs from the 66/2523 group in this respect. The irresponsibility of some political parties and parliamentarians as well as the parties' link with the "dark influences" have also been recognized by the party members. A political party officer admitted that he had to choose candidates for their local influence and ability to contribute money to electwn campaigns.The parties, he claimed had no choice as they needed to win elections and as long as their finances were insecure they had to rely on wealthy people regardless of their background. 16 Most of the parties looked for finances first and as a result, the financiers were given all the privileges and rose much faster in the party hierarchy. The parties had become parties of big businesses, plagued with internal rifts among the leading members which has led to the decay of the participatory political institutions. The rotting party system was well illustrated in the political situation which led to the government defeat on the diesel motor vehicle registration fee decree on 1 May 1986 and subsequently the dissolution of the Lower House. As one political observer stated: There is no better illustration of this than the situation that led to the recent collapse of Prem's government. It had all the classic ingredients: personal revenge, rampant indiscipline, absolute self-interest and blatant vote buying. And what followed - free from legislative constraints - was equally distasteful and just as familiar: mass defections from parties and an unseeming scramble to form new alliances by the same clique of politicians. 17

This has reinforced the Army's views that an election may not necessarily be a democratic process if it cannot produce responsible and honest

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legislative members. However, they believe that appointed senators, carefully selected from all walks of life is a prerequisite of a "true" democracy.

THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF ORDER NO. 66/2523

A major political impact of Order No. 66/2523 was its use to perpetuate direct military involvement in politics and to legitimize this political role. Despite the fact that the Thai military have been involved in politics for more than fifty years, the legitimization of their political role was not seriously attempted until the issuance of this order. In the past, the Army's rationale for political intervention was based only on the civilian government's instability or on national security. Army leaders often announced during the intervention that they only stepped in to "clear up the mess" before returning the reins of government to civilians. But the order reflects the Army's new view which emphasizes the role of democratic development in achieving internal security and the armed forces' participation. The best illustration for the use of the order to justify the role in "democratic development" is the case of the Army's campaign for the constitutional amendment to extend the interim clause in early 1983. The interim clause would allow government officers both civil and military to hold cabinet posts, and it would keep the strength of the Senate. The Army in defending its position on this issue stated: The proposal of the Army is to amend the constitution in accordance with Order No. 66/2523 which emphasizes the increase in the sovereignty of the masses and the expansion of freedom of individuals. These can be achieved by increasing the authority of the Senate and making it a democratic one, by selection of its members to represent all walks of life, by democratizing the House of Representatives through free elections based on the principle of one man one vote .... These can be done only by amending the constitution to extend its interim clause. 18 The policy spelled out in Order No. 66/2523 and No. 65/2525 is a correct democratic policy and corresponds with needs of the majority of the people. This policy is aimed at not only winning over communism, but also fighting against all the wrongdoings and injustice in political, economic and social spheres which have accumulated in the past fifty years. It is aimed at developing the country and a perfect democratic system of government with the King as the head of the state in the future. 19

Both General Arthit and General Chaovalit have stressed that as long as the political system within the country is not a "perfect" democracy, the Army should act as the "builder" and not just the "protector" of democracy. When such a "perfect and absolute democratic" system is established,

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then the military would revert to being only the guardian of democracy.2° The military's commitment to this concept of democracy and to their self-appointed duty to play the leading role in promoting it was reconfirmed despite the fact that the war with the CPT, the original "rationale" for their involvement in politics, was declared to have ended. At a news conference on 17 October 1984, Lt.-Gen. Chaovalit stated that since the CPT was no longer a serious security threat, the priority in the government's anti-communist strategy would shift from military suppression to the eradication of social injustice to establish "absolute democracy" in the country. 21 Only Lt.-Gen. Pichit maintained the "orthodox" view in the political involvement of the military, that is, that everyone in the military establishment wanted a democracy and the military would not "step in" unless there was a political crisis which might jeopardize national security and the throne. However, he joined the Army's constitutional amendment campaign and this can only be explained by the fact that he agreed with the idea of strengthening the role of the Senate, a view promoted by the 6612523 group. The expanding role of the military in rural development and in organizing mass movements during the 1981-86 period were also justified by Order No. 66/2523. Rural development programmes were intended to eradicate socio-economic injustice and the influence of local business tycoons which were the main causes for the increase in communist terrorism. Mass movement programmes were designed to develop democratic organizations at the grassroot level, provide villagers with venues and opportunities to participate in democratic political processes, and educate them on the proper function of elections and how to vote properly. The role expansion spelled out in the order is in congruence with the existing policy of the Army towards assisting the people. The Army has stressed that redressing the people's grievances was one of their major responsibilities since the people and the army were inseparable: soldiers are drawn from the populace, therefore soldiers must have a duty to help the people. The Army's involvement in the civilian sphere was not considered by them as intervention. As the Army has manpower, expertise, equipment, effective organization, and technology, these should be fully utilized for the benefit of the people. Since there is no boundary between the military and civilians as they are both ''the people'', the military argument is that whatever is beneficial for the people, the military should have a right to work towards achieving it. However, the use of the order did not go uncriticized. It was branded by academics and the mass media as a new form of authoritarianism. 22 The Army was accused of being selective in applying the "political offensive" strategy on the communists as demonstrated in the arrest of communist

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leaders and "sympathizers" in 1984. 23 Some high ranking Army officers have expressed less commitment to the order such as Lt.-Gen. Pichit who maintained that development must come before democracy. General Arthit's secret alliance with SAP dissidents was also against the principle of the order, indicating his weak commitment to the "political offensive" strategy. And the abortive coup in September 1985 which emphasized economic problems as its justification revealed that there was a group of officers who did not care much for the order but preferred the orthodox military solution. Perhaps one of the reasons why the Army has not succeeded in institutionalizing the order is the relative short period of time which they have had to formulate and to implement it. It was accepted as an official government policy only in 1980 and could well need more time to be institutionalized. Despite the foregoing obstacles, the order was repeatedly emphasized as correct and all the government agencies were to strictly observe it. On 24 March 1986, Order No. 47/2529 was issued to remind government units to put all their efforts in developing a democracy as communicated in Order No. 66/2523. 24 Order No. 47/2529 calls for seriousness, continuation and adaptation in inculcating a proper democratic concept and civic consciousness in the people, emphasizing national security, sovereignty of the masses, and political freedom to elect public officers from the local to the national levels. It also strongly urges all government agencies to eradicate corruption within the government and the "dark influences" to ensure the safety and security of people's lives and property. The order stresses that conditions favourable to the CPT's exploitation still exist, thus, Order No. 66/2523 must still be observed. However, the three orders do not clearly spell how the Army intends to develop a "perfect democracy". This could be explained away in that the Army might not have been sure of the best way to achieve it. Perhaps as "perfect democracy" is difficult if not impossible to achieve, this determination of the Army can be interpreted as an excuse to perpetuate its nonmilitary role.

NOTES Lt.-Gen Chaovalit Yongchaiyuth, A Collection of Speeches and Interviews of Lt. Gen. Chaovalit Yongchaiyuth, 1980-1985 [in Thai], (Bangkok: S.S. Printing Partnership, n.d.), Preface. 2 For the details of the two orders, see the ISOC, A Summary of the Policy to Win Communism: the Order No. 6612523, No. 512524, No. 65/2525 [in Thai], (Bangkok: Au Sor Por, 1983). 3 Lt.-Gen. Chaovalit Yongchaiyuth, "Stanakan Nai Prathet Thai Pajuban" [The present situation in Thailand] in Chaovalit, op. cit., p. 177.

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4 ISOC, op. cit., p. 28. 5 Chaovalit, op. cit., p. 178. 6 Chai-Anan Samudavanija, The Thai Young Thrks (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982), p. 60. 7 Lt.-Gen. Chaovalit Yongchaiyuth, "Kanrook Tang Yuthasat Kanmuang Radupchat" [The strategy of political offensive at the national level) in Chaovalit, op. cit., p. 45. 8 Ibid., pp. 43-4. 9 !SOC, "A Lecture on Prime Ministerial Order No. 6612523" [in Thai]. Mimeographed, p. I. 10 Quoted in John McBeth, "Political Crossroads", Far Eastern Economic Review, 19 June 1986. II Chaovalit, "Stanakan Nai Prathet Thai Pajuban" in Chaovalit, op. cit., p. 197. 12 Ibid. 13 Quoted in Naewna, 21 January 1983. 14 Quoted in the Bangkok Post, 5 June 1986. 15 Interview with Lt.-Gen. Pichit Kullavanij at the First Army Headquarters on 5 August 1985. 16 Quoted in McBeth, op. cit., p. 41. 17 Ibid. 18 Royal Thai Army, The Army's Position in the Constitutional Amendment Problem [in Thai], Bangkok, 16 February 1983. 19 Ibid. 20 General Arthit Kamlang-ek, "National Security" in Pranot Nanthiyakul ed., Chitwittaya Kwam Munkong [The mass psychology for national security], (Bangkok: Chaophraya Printing, 1986) p. 199. 21 Quoted in Nation Review, 18 October 1984. 22 See "Political Thinking of General Arthit: Dictatorial Rule by Bureaucrats" [in Thai], Sao Anakot, 27 February-5 March 1983, p. 9. 23 Sayamrath Sapdavicharn, 29 July 1984, pp. 19-23. 24 Bangkok Post, 13 July 1986.

chapter six

Conclusion

THE 1986 ELECTION AND THE MILITARY'S POLITICAL ROLE

During the July 1986 general election campaign and the few weeks that followed, the Army leaders' efforts to retain the political leadership of General Prem reflected the military's determination to continue its political guardian role in participatory politics. It was widely known that General Chaovalit who has been close to the Prime Minister and has assumed the Army top post since May 1986 preferred General Prem to continue as government leader after the election to ensure political stability . 1 His aides reportedly began to lobby major political party leaders to accept General Prem since the beginning of the election campaign. It was believed that the acceptance of General Prem as Prime Minister by the leaders of the Democrats, the Chart Thai Party, the SAP and the Rasadorn Party was a result of this lobbying. 2 General Chaovalit has said that he would like to see the military withdraw from politics but the political situation in Thailand still requires the Army's involvement in the political process to help stabilize the polity. 3 This involvement would stop short of violence or other unconstitutional means. The Army leader's support for the continued leadership of General Prem was aimed at not only preserving the Army and its leader's interest but also the continuing stability of democratic rule. The military asserts that political parties are not strong enough to form an effective government; General Prem is regarded as the only leader capable of leading a coalition government because of his political finesse and flexibility. The fact that the four major parties accepted General Prem as leader of the coalition revealed that the military still had political potency. However, the Army's lobbying was by no means without difficulty. Not all of 77

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the military leaders supported General Prem. General Arthit, the Supreme Commander, was a leading opponent of the Prime Minister. Although he was dismissed as Army Chief in May 1986, General Arthit still retained influence within and without the army. A number of political parties, notably the United Democratic Party and Mass Party were under General Arthit's influence and refused to accept General Prem as the new government leader. More importantly, the opposition had launched a campaign for an elected parliamentarian as Prime Minister. This campaign captured the interest of a number of political parties and other pressure groups including the Student Federation. The issue became so popular in the Bangkok constituencies that major parties including the Democrats had to shift their position to agree with the campaign in order to gain more voters. This shift led to a rift within the Democrat Party since the party's candidates in the South still supported General Prem. General Prem's decreasing popularity in Bangkok during the election campaign was another obstacle. It appeared to be a liability for any party to campaign for a continuation of his leadership. The Prime Minister was heavily criticized in his handling of the "tantalum" case in June 1986. He was accused of being indecisive in dealing with this issue which led to rioting and the burning down of the tantalum plant in Phuket. 4 The Thais seem to tire easily of leaders who stay in power for too long, particularly leaders whom they feel are indecisive and too compromising. After having been under such leadership for some time, it seemed natural that they wanted a change in leadership style and were looking for a more decisive, aggressive, and outspoken leader. The only advantage that General Prem had was that there was no one who perfectly fitted this category. General Arthit was unpopular since he was regarded as being too abrasive, authoritarian and self-centred. Some opinion polls taken before the election rated General Arthit below General Prem for government leader notwithstanding the fact that the people were dissatisfied with the performance of Prem's government. 5 Although General Prem was nominated for the third time as Prime Minister, his political position was weakened. In 1983 opposition to his leadership was confined within a faction of the Chart Thai Party only, but in 1986 this opposition increased and for the first time several pressure groups including the Student Federation joined in protesting against his nomination. Several newspapers which had reluctantly supported a continuation of his leadership expressed concern that the Prime Minister would find an uneasy task ahead if he did not spruce up his image and be a "new Prem" .6 In their effort to support General Prem, the military leaders refrained from using mass organizations and the mass media. But this does not mean that the Army overlooked the political potency of these mass organiza-

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79

tions. On the contrary, the mass movements have been given more attention since General Chaovalit became the Army Chief but he did not use them during the election because he wanted to convince the public that when he said the Army would be neutral in the election, he meant it. On the policy of mass mobilization, the Army under General Chaovalit reiterated the continuation of the political-offensive strategy to counter the CPT, and the development of mass movements is integral to the strategy. As indicated in Order No. 47/2529 announced in March 1986 and in the Army leader's briefing to high ranking officers in August 1986, the Army is now more concerned about the CPT's "united front" .7 A tactical shift starting in 1986 is to give top priority to the issue of the "front" people, that is, those who wittingly or unwittingly help the CPT and they include capitalists, undemocratic elements, and people who create and aggravate social problems. The tactical shift became necessary as the CPT by 1986 was no longer a threat to national security. The outlawed CPT has in practical terms disintegrated. In the new policy, mass organizations will be given a more active role to counter the CPT front in businesses, national politics or local government. This policy will also strengthen the Army leaders' tie with the grassroot organizations which, in turn, will reinforce their political position as well as their ability to mobilize the masses for political purposes. The Army's role as guardian demonstrated through its support of General Prem's government would be effective only when the Army has been unified. The retirement of General Arthit from active service in August 1986 has reduced but not removed factionalism within the military establishment. As General Chaovalit was involved in politics before and was a major architect of the controversial Order No. 66/2523, his promotion to the position of the Army Chief was not without resentment. Protest emerged in the form of underground leaflets distributed within the military establishment and the mass media, accusing him of leftist leanings. Some of the leaflets attacked him and General Prem for utilizing a policy which may improve the CPT's chances of achieving its objective. 8 One set of leaflets accused General Chaovalit of having Chinese blood, that is, not "pure" Thai. He rejected this accusation by publishing his family tree tracing his family origin which not only dismissed the accusation but also revealed that one of his female ancestors was a consort of a brother of King Chulalongkorn. Most of the leaflets were distributed during the July 1986 election campaign and a few weeks after. Although there was no concrete evidence as to who was behind this smear campaign, it is believed that the leaflets were a product of discontented elements within the military establishment and some politically-oriented pressure groups who were unhappy about Chaovalit's promotion and his support for General Prem.

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Thus, the most urgent task for General Chaovalit after assuming the Army's top post was to pacify all the discontented factions in the Army. One of his efforts was to placate all Army factions including General Arthit's. He tried to balance between Lt.-Gen. Pichit and the members of Class 5, while filling his loyal friends in key positions. In the annual military reshuffle in October 1986, General Pichit was promoted to Assistant Commander-in-Chief while Lt.-Gen. Suchinda, the leader of Class 5, moved up to the post of Deputy Army Chief-of-Staff. One Assistant Army Chief's post and that of the Army Chief-of-Staff were filled by his two close friends Lt.-Gen. Sunthorn Kongsompong, the Commander of the Special Warfare Forces Command and Lt.-Gen. Wanchai Reungtrakul respectively. At the same time, the Deputy Commander of the First Army, Maj.-Gen. Watanachai Watanasiri who was close to General Pichit was appointed the First Army Commander. 9 This reshuffle put Generals Wanchai, Sunthorn and Pichit on equal footing to succeed General Pisit Hemabutr as Deputy Commander-in-Chief in October 1987. Another effort of General Chaovalit to unify the Army and to secure the political position of General Prem was the reinstatement of twentyeight Young Turk officers who were dismissed from active service without pension after their abortive coup in April 1981. These officers had earlier tried unsuccessfully to get back into the Army. It is likely that the Young Turks still retain their influence among low-ranking officers which would create disunity within the Army. More importantly, some of them have begun to establish a power base within a political party by running in the 1986 election, and three out of four won. Colonel Prachak Sawangchit won a Bangkok seat under the Chart Thai banner. Colonel Sakorn Kitviriya and Colonel Bulsak Pochareon won a seat in Trat and Singhaburi respectively, on a Democrat ticket. It was obvious that with their success in the elections, they would use their new power base in the National Assembly for political purposes. Shortly after the elections, Colonel Prachak departed from the party line in opposing the appointment of General Prem as Prime Minister calling him "untrustworthy" .10 This was not unexpected and indicated that the Young Turks would use the House of Representatives to create trouble for the government if nothing was done to appease them. Hence, the readmission of the twenty-eight Young Turks to the Army was an attempt to pacify them and to strengthen the power base of General Chaovalit and Prime Minister Prem. The Young Turks' appreciation and gratitude to the two leaders demonstrated that the healing of old wounds had begun. 11

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Conclusion

PARTY POLITICS IN THE 1986 ELECTION

While the Army began to be more unified under the leadership of General Chaovalit, the party system was still far from being institutionalized. The 1986 election revealed the weakening party system which was racked by factionalism and dominated by big businessmen who joined the parties only to protect their personal interests. Most of the leading party members and parliamentarians' objective was to join the government as cabinet members. The struggle for cabinet posts was one of the main causes of divisiveness within the major parties. The split in the Democrat Party, the oldest party in Thailand which won the largest number of seats in the 1986 election, is a case in point. In the fifth Prem cabinet (after the 1986 election), the Democrats were given 16 seats out of 45,12 As expected those who were by-passed protested. The prime mover was Chalermphan Srivikorn, one of the party's deputy leaders, an MP from Bangkok, and a major financier of the party. He was supported by a large number of Democrat parliamentarians who were dissatisfied with the cabinet line-up. 13 A cabinet post is the ultimate aim of most ambitious politicians since it will give them power, authority, prestige and financial gain. The parliamentarians' scramble for the cabinet posts has always led to party rifts and government instability as occurred in 1975-76 and early 1986 when the SAP's leading members fought each other for the cabinet posts. The Democrat Party was known to have established a system of selecting candidates for Parliament and cabinet posts. But since the party needed to win the largest number of seats in the elections, business tycoons and local leaders were drawn to the party. These newcomers demanded cabinet posts, making the selection system less effective. Chalermphan's faction, having failed in a bid for the cabinet posts, protested over the way Pichai conducted the selection process and became a sizeable dissident group within the party. The 1986 election, as several political observers agreed, saw a large amount of money spent. The fact that a sizeable number of businessmen at the national and provincial levels entered this election partly explains the increase in the spending. Out of the total number of 347 parliamentarians, 86 reported that they were businessmen. But the figure would be higher since a number who reported that they were in other professions such as lawyers, ex-civil servants, farmers and politicians could be regarded as businessmen since most of them were involved in businesses too. Most of the businessmen entertained the idea that money buys everYthing including political positions. Thus, a great deal of money was put into the election campaign including direct vote buying by most of the wealthy candidates. The politics of money was more decisive in a constituency where major candidates of different parties contested. For example, in Nakorn Sawan

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where Boonchu Rochanasathien, leader of the Community Action Party, ran against Sawat Khamprakop of the United Democratic Party, and a long-time MP, a great amount of money was spent in the campaign by both candidates. In principle, an increase in the number of wealthy businessmen joining the parties should strengthen the party system and thus representative government since this would provide more funds for the parties. However, the struggle for power within the parties often exacerbated factional conflicts. The entry into politics of wealthy businessmen was often to protect their personal interests. Many of them lack loyalty and commitment to their party. The struggle for personal gain by some party members and the excessive use of money in the election campaign invited strong criticism from the mass media, the military, academics and the politicized public. They agreed that the behaviour of these unprincipled civilian politicians was detrimental to the development of democracy in Thailand. It also provided a greater opportunity for the military to discredit the political parties, making the latter's institutionalization more difficult. The result of the 1986 election revealed the continuing fragility of the multi-party system. The strength of two major parties, for example, the SAP and the Chart Thai in terms of the number of seats in the House of Representatives was reduced considerably in this election (see Appendix I for the election result). Compared to the 1983 election, the SAP lost about 41 seats and the Chart Thai Party 10 seats partly due to internal riftsY After the election, the Democrats replaced the Chart Thai as the largest party with 100 seats in the Lower House, a gain of 44 but still 74 short of majority. This fragility of the multi-party system was further stretched by six new parties winning 94 seats or 27 per cent. With this election result, a coalition government was inevitable. A coalition of four major parties - the Democrats, the SAP, the Chart Thai and the Rasadorn Party - was formed in August 1986 with General Prem as Prime Minister. Although the government has military support and 232 seats in the Lower House with a margin of 58 above the majority, the stability of the coalition government is not ensured. The rift between the Pichai and Chalermphan factions in the Democrat Party, coupled with the lese majeste charge against Veera Musikapong have further weakened the coalition. 15 Even though the Democrats may be able to put their house in order, no one is certain that another conflict within and between the coalition partners will not recur. In fact, government stability cannot be secured unless the institutionalization of the party system is achieved, and factional conflicts and the number of the parties in the House are reduced.

83

Conclusion

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THAILAND

One of the most endemic problems in the democratic development of Thailand is the lack of institutionalized participatory institutions. Political institutionalization involves the ability of political organizations or the ruling group to entrench their position and to broaden their base. The institutionalized political organization should be able to adjust itself to the changing times and cope with increasing demands of new societal groups for participating in the political processes. 16 But in Thailand, political parties and elected parliamentarians in the past four decades have not been able to develop into major institutions. Internal rifts and the scramble for personal gains by some political parties and parliamentary politicians often led to the atrophy of the participatory institutions. The long stretch of parliamentary government from 1981-86 did not constitute the institutionalization of the party system or the elected House of Representatives. Internal disputes from the lack of party loyalty and discipline among the members were prevalent during the period. The turbulent events that led to the dissolution of the elected House in May 1986 and the mass defections, proliferation of political parties, and subsequent grouping and regrouping of political alliances exhibited the underdevelopment and fragility of the Thai party system. The crucial question is: how can the parties achieve political institutionalization? The development of the party system cannot be achieved unless its link with the masses is firmly established. The parties need strong and continuous support from the masses to increase their political representation which, in turn will lead to their institutionalization. But the military's control over the masses through its "political-offensive" strategy is a major obstacle to parties trying to expand their base. The "political-offensive" strategy indicates, at least in principle, the military's realization of the significance of mass political participation. It also demonstrates the Army's determination to encourage the people's involvement in the political processes particularly at the local level in order to help develop democracy at the grassroots. The crucial point, however, is that the mass movements and organizations established during the period (1981-86) can hardly be seen as an enhancement of voluntary political participation of the masses at the grassroot level. The emphasis on national security and the organizational link with the military have made these movements mobilization mechanisms for the military. The people would be taught democratic concepts and encouraged to participate in solving their village problems under the mass movement programmes of the military. They would become more politicized and increasingly aware of problems beyond their villages, but with bureaucratic control over their movements,

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The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86

their political consciousness can hardly be exercised independently. Further, these mobilizations can be used to counter the expansion of a political party. One such example is the Democrat Party which has developed a grassroot organization nation-wide with its strongest base in the South and has the potential of becoming the largest party in Thailand. The party suffered two set-backs in the 1985 election campaigns when the military used the mass mobilization machinery against it. Mass mobilization operations may be used as in the 1970s, to attack or destroy specific political parties and politicians whom Army leaders perceive as a threat to military institutional or personal interestsY This will retard the development of the party system in Thailand. Another obstacle to the institutionalization of the party system in Thailand is the utilization of the mass mobilization programmes and mass psychological operations by the Army to enhance the political leadership of the military leaders at the expense of political parties. The political institutionalization of the party system can hardly be achieved if the people still look to the military elites as their national leaders. In Thailand, where the lack of confidence in civilian politicians is still prevalent and a nonpartisan non-elected prime minister with a military background is more acceptable, it presages difficulties for civilian elites wanting to institutionalize their political role. This difficulty is enhanced by the Army's continuing utilization of all the mass organizations and the mass media under its control to promote its military strongman as it did for General Arthit when he was the Supreme Commander and the Army Chief. The military establishment during the period was plagued with factionalism as well and this can partly explain the seven-year stretch of parliamentary rule. While the party system was fragile, the Army, due to its internal rifts, was also weak. As a result, the balance of power between these two institutions was maintained. The factional conflicts within the military establishment also prevented General Arthit from exerting successfully his pressure on the government and the National Assembly in several economic issues. He had to resort to temporary alliances with government opponents in the SAP and other small parties to overthrow General Prem's government. The rift in the Army also prevented the September 1986 coup from succeeding. This factionalism also reveals that the military faces its own problem of political institutionalization. Several scholars on civil-military relations contend that the institutionalization of the military rule can hardly be achieved because of its inability to absorb changes and to accommodate the increasing demands of newly emerging societal groups. Some argue further, that the role expansion of the military may lead to a possibility of rank and executive command divergence, making the institutionalization of the military rule more difficult. 18 For the Thai military leaders, Order No.

Conclusion

85

66/2523 announced in 1980 has provided them with a new justification for involvement in politics which they hope would institutionalize their political role. In the past, military leaders have stressed that their political role was temporary and after clearing up the "mess" they would return to the barracks. National security was often used to justify their political intervention, but the legitimization of their role in politics was not carried out in a systematic and sustained basis. However, after the issuance of Order 66/2523, the military began to justify systematically their political role by insisting on their involvement in democratic development as a means to winning over communism. So far, this justification has neither facilitated nor institutionalized the military leaders' political involvement. The defeat of the Army in the constitutional amendment issue in 1983 is a case in point. Moreover, several senior Army officers through their public opinion and behaviour indicate reduced commitment to the order. It is possible that since the order was implemented recently, it needs more time to be institutionalized. In the past, the military gained control over the government through seizure of power or by setting up a party of their own. But what they overlooked in their attempt to institutionalize their rule was mass support, thus making the perpetuation of their political control impossible. The military leaders have now been able to establish their links with the masses, but what they lack is a strong tie with political parties. While the possibility of having a coup cannot be ruled out, it is unlikely that the present Army elites will resort to that measure to get into power since it will contradict what they have professed. It is also difficult to get support and approval from various segments of society ranging from the highest institution to the masses. Therefore, in order to institutionalize their role in politics and to gain more political control, the available option left for the military would be to work through the parliamentary system and thus, the link with the political parties is of calculated importance. However, the military's link with the political parties is not without difficulty as demonstrated in the 1981-86 period. The apprehension of the major political parties about the military's political design was evident and still exists. While political parties need the Army's support, they do not want to be subservient to military leaders. The major objective of the parties is to gain more control in the body politic and this can be achieved only by limiting the role and influence of the military. Thus, in dealing with Army leaders, the parties are often wary of the military's political role expansion. As a consequence, the link between the Army and the parties is difficult to maintain and is often only a temporary alliance for an immediate objective. It is also difficult for civilian politicians to accept the political role of the Army justified by Order No. 66/2523 as they see the political role expansion of the Army as detrimental to their interest. A con-

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nection may possibly be established between the Army leaders and a party set up by former military leaders like the Rasadorn Party led by General Tienchai and General Mana. In such a case the assistance the Army gives to the party may enable it to develop into a larger party. But the party has been cautious in dealing with the Army. Once they are in a party, the former military leaders would like to see themselves in a leading political position, not subservient to the existing military elites. Thus the Army will not find it easy to make use of the party to gain more political power. Nevertheless, the Thai military remained a formidable force throughout the period. Although its role was more constrained in the period and a coup d'etat could no longer be easily staged, it had continually exerted power as a pressure group and had succeeded considerably in establishing mass organizations. Its link with the masses are far better established than the political parties and as a result, the military's political potency cannot be ignored. What then is the likely political role of the military in the future? The most likely scenario is not a complete withdrawal from politics or a tight dictatorial rule but a continuation of the role which existed during the 1981-86 period. It is a scenario in which a political balance between the military and the political parties will be maintained though for how long is uncertain. The balance will give the civilian politicians a better chance for developing participatory institutions and to institutionalize their role. If they are able to exhibit a degree of political competence which would increase the people's trust in them, then, they would be able to tip the balance in their favour. If they fail to demonstrate their leadership and dedication to the public office which is likely to be the case, then, the institutionalization of the parliamentary rule will be delayed for a considerable time. Whatever happens, the military will exploit the delicate political balance to the fullest, albeit subtly, to achieve their political goals. The military leaders will be more cautious in promoting their leadership and protecting their individual and military institutional interests by utilizing the existing mass organizations and mass psychological operations at their disposal. Order No. 66/2523 continues to be used to justify their political role in their increasing commitment to domestic tasks and development of the mass movements. If participatory institutions are unable to strengthen themselves in the near future, the military will be able to perpetuate its role as a "builder of a perfect democracy", a role which intrudes into a wide range of political activities. Therefore, if political development in Thailand is to be a parliamentary democracy as most of the leaders have expressed, the strengthening of representative institutions is inevitable and the military bureaucracy's power must be curbed. The seven-year stretch of open politics since 1981 did not reflect an impressive increase in the strength of the participant in-

Conclusion

87

stitutions. Rather, it is the factionalism within the Army, the failure of General Arthit to challenge General Prem, and the monarchy's support for Prem's leadership which explains this durability. To cut down the influence of the military is difficult as the Army is expanding its support through various mass-mobilized organizations. It is interesting to note that the long stretch of participant politics in the 1980s did not inhibit the Army from stepping up its mass mobilization programmes, or asserting its leadership in decision-making. While the political parties have failed to institutionalize their role, the military has been able throughout the period to strengthen its tie with the masses, expand its role to cover various aspects of rural development and other non-military affairs. This role expansion of the Army has been developed to such an extent that it has enlarged the military's power base. It is likely that if the present party system fails to ensure political stability, the people will turn to the military. But military rule will not be the same as in the past. Mobilized participation of the masses will be carried out as part of a new political set-up. Considering the mass mobilization programmes- of the miJjtary, it is hard to conceive that the military will be for parliamentary democracy. It will be a mobilized system and perhaps with reforms launched from above. Thus, if civilian politicians do not dedicate themselves to the development of a democratic political system, parliamentary democracy may not have much hope of surviving.

NOTES

2 3 4

5 6 7 8

9 10 II 12

See Sayamrath Sapdavicharn, 27 July 1986, p. 4; for an interesting commentary on this issue, see "Judtang Rathavanmai Taharn Kleunwai" [The military move on forming the new government), Sayamrath Sapdavicharn, 4 August 1986, pp. 8-9. The role of the Army leaders in forming the government was confirmed by Phichai Rattakun, the leader of the Democratic Party. See the Bangkok Post, 22 September 1986, pp. 2-3. See Sayamrath Sapdavicharn, 4 August 1986, p. 8. See Sayamrath Sapdavicharn, 6 July 1986, pp. 2, 6, 7. See, for instance, a poll conducted by the Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University and Siamrath, 25 July 1986. Nation, 6 August 1986, see also Siamrath, 6 August 1986. Nation, 28 September 1986, p. 3. Several anti-Prem and Chaovalit groups issued leaflets attacking the two leaders during the July 1986 election campaign. One of them called Vihoke Saifa (a bird) accused both leaders of being helpful to the CPT by adopting Order No. 6612523. A Committee on Co-ordination of the People for Democracy also published newsletters labelling General Prem an "incapable" leader. Nation, 3 September 1986, p. 6. Matichon, 30 July 1986, p. I. Siamrath, 3 September 1986, p. I. See Eksan Khao Rathasapha (The National Assembly Newsletter), 16 August 1986, pp. 3-6.

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The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86

13 Several newspapers cover this rift in the Democrat Party, see Siamrath, 23 September 1986, Bangkok Post, 22 September 1986, the Nation, 23 September 1986, and Matichon, 23 September 1986. 14 In the 1983 elections, the SAP and the Chart Thai Party won 92 and 73 seats respectively, increasing their seats to 101 and 108 when several small parties and a number of independent parliamentarians joined them. In the 1986 election, the SAP and the Chart Thai Party won only 51 and 63 seats respectively. See Eksan Khao Rathasapha, 1 August 1986, p. 9. 15 Veera Musikapong, the Secretary-General of the Democrat Party and a former Deputy Interior Minister, was accused of having made l~se-majeste remarks while he was campaigning for the Democrat Party's candidates in Buriram. His remarks provoked protest from a group of senators led by Lt.-Gen. Pichit Kullavanij and the opposition parties. Veera's rite of atonement in the presence of the senators pacified them but the opposition continued to demand Veera's resignation from the cabinet post. He resigned on I September 1986. See the Nation, 2 September 1986, p. I. 16 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Society (New Haven: Yale University Press 1968), pp. 12-24. 17 The military's institutional interests have been the main motive for launching coups. Its interests include autonomy in conducting its own internal training, recruitment and promotion, monopoly in formulating defence and security policies, defence budget, and its prestige. See Suchit Bunbongkarn, "Political Institutions and Processes" in Somsakdi Xuto, ed., Government and Politics in Thailand (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 52-3. 18 Huntington, op. cit., chapter 4; see also Christopher Clapham and George Philip, The Political Dilemmas of Military Regimes (London: Croom Helm, 1985), pp. 2-5; Henry Bienen, "Armed Forces and National Modernization", Comparative Politics (October 1983) p. 12.

Appendices

APPENDIX 1 Results of the 1986 General Election

Party

Number of Seats Won

0/o

Democrat Chart-Thai Social Action United Democratic Prachakorn Thai Ruam Thai Rasadorn Community Action Progressive Others

100 63 51 38 24 19 18 15 9 10

28.82 18.16 14.70 10.95 6.93 5.48 5.19 4.32 2.59 2.87

Total

347

100

SouRcE: Election Division, Department of Local Administrations, Ministry of Interior.

89

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The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86

APPENDIX 2 Excerpts of Prime Ministerial Order No. 66/2523: "Policy of Struggle to Win Over Communism"

1. Overview 1.1 The world situation has greatly changed. With the passage of time, crises have taken place in all regions. These crises have arisen from such fundamental problems as lack of energy supply, growing gap in the military balance among the superpowers, and conflicts within the socialist camp. The overall situation has changed into a Cold War confrontation, greatly affecting the security of Southeast Asia and Thailand. 1.2 The Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) is still determined to carry out a revolutionary war with the objective of taking over the power of state, using mainly the democratic conditions and other factors which are available to support it. The CPT has manipulated the changing world situation to its advantage by assigning top priority to building a united front at every level to create a revolutionary situation and ideological warfare. Its major aim is to turn internal conflict into a national war. The local strategy has been changed from that of ''jungle relying on jungle" to one of "jungle relying on town" in order to co-ordinate with the united front policy. Conflict of ideas within the communist movement, particularly doubts about the possibility of a democratic revolution by the proletariat is a major weakness in the present world. 1.3 The Government is determined to maintain strictly the nation, religion, and monarchy and the democratic form of government with the King as the head of state to administer the country, taking into consideration the people's welfare; harmonize the people's interests and preserve the Thai national identity; resolve economic political, and social problems justly and peacefully, and instill in the Thais a sense of idealism, especially one which encourages the sacrifice of personal for common interest. The Government is determined to reform the bureaucracy to bring about great efficiency in serving the public in accordance with the democratic system of government. The armed forces will have as its major role the defence of the nation, the protection of national independence and democracy with the King as head of state. The Government considers as its prime and urgent task the campaign to fight and defeat communism which is the major cause undermining national security.

Appendices

91

2. Objective

To put an end in the shortest possible time the communist revolutionary war which is of the utmost significance and danger to national security. 3. Policy To fight and quickly defeat the communists by waging a continuous political offensive and putting emphasis on all operations which will undermine and destroy the united front movement and armed groups in order to eliminate the revolutionary situation. To put an end to operations aimed at creating a national war through a policy of neutrality and to reap benefits from the opportunity to transform armed struggle into peaceful struggle. 4. Operation

4.1 The struggle to win over the communists must be brought to completion quickly and protracted operations which are the objective of the enemy must be avoided. To achieve a quick victory means to take political offensive and to instill in the people's mind a recognition that this land is theirs to protect and preserve and that it is partly they who are the owners, rulers and beneficiaries. Throughout this struggle to defeat the communists, political actions must prevail, and military actions must basically be supportive of these political actions. 4.2 Social injustice must be eliminated at every level, from local to national levels. Corruption and malfeasance in the bureaucracy must be decisively prevented and suppressed. And all exploitation must be done away with and the security of the people's life and property provided. 4.3 A rule of conduct must be laid down to promote a harmony of interests among people of different classes and a sacrifice of class interests for the common good. Officials concerned must be just, understand the problems of people of all classes, and recognize that Thais from all walks of life love their country and are ready to make sacrifices in order to uphold the nation, religion, and monarchy as well as the democratic system of government with the King as the head of the state. 4.4 The ability of people of all professions to govern themselves and the opportunity for their political participation must be promoted. Ways and means must be laid out to ascertain the people's problems and the latter's wishes must be considered the foremost factor in planning operational guidelines to fulfil those wishes. 4.5 Organization of all existing democratic movements must be promoted, based on consideration of the rights and interests of such groups and on vigilance against confusion between democratic movements and communist movements which hide behind the banner of democracy.

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4.6 The tasks of civilian officials, police and military personnel in the struggle to defeat the communists include armed campaigns and political operations. The extent and degree of armed operations might differ from one case to another, but political operations, which are of central importance, must be uniform. The type, scale, and tactics of armed operations should commensurate with prevailing conditions in each area of operation, in order to pressure, cut down, and destroy armed bands on a continuous basis. 4. 7 Communist terrorists, repentant defectors or prisoners must be dealt with as fellow countrymen. The Government's policy towards this problem must be explained so that they have a clear understanding, and assistance must be provided to enable them to make a proper start to their new life in society. 4.8 The greatest importance must be attached to struggle within the town to eliminate the organization and expansion based on the strategy of ''town supporting jungle'', and to obstruct the creation of revolutionary and national war situations. A revolutionary situation is one in which the Government is isolated from the people and weakened and in which its leadership over democratic movements, a nemesis of communism,is usurped. The creation of a national war situation will rely on the united front which pervades every level, and will be aimed at leading public opinion and the nation into war with neighbours which will enable the CPT to succeed in its revolution. Should the CPT succeed in establishing and expanding the united front in the urban areas, it will be able to maintain its capacity for political offensive, to build up political uncertainty and economic upheaval, and thus create popular forces to steer them in the desired direction. It must be understood that the building up of this united front in the urban area is hard to discern clearly because the CPT will carry out its policy under the guise of various proxy organizations and will use specific issues and make them look like a general conflict which is extremely dangerous. 4.9 The dissemination of information, psychological measures and public relations are of vital importance to the success in defeating the communists. Thus, this great importance is recognized and their implementation will be carried out offensively, planned and co-ordinated operationally at every step. 5. Administration 5.1 The struggle to defeat the communists is a task of importance to national security. It is therefore the government's highest responsibility. Government ministries, bureaus, departments, and organizations are

93

Appendices

required to map out their work plan and its implementation for the achievement of the policy's objectives. 5.2 The National Security Council is responsible for advising the Cabinet on related policy matters. 5.3 Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) will be an ad hoc agency. The Director of the Prevention of Communist Activities is in charge of policy implementation, issuing directives, and co-ordinating the work of the concerned ministries, bureaus, departments, and organizations. He is also empowered to reward or punish civilian officials, police, military officers and others whom the Director has appointed from various governmental organizations. 5.4 The budgetary support for the struggle to defeat the communists is considered to be of special urgency. 5.5 All directives, rules or regulations in contravention of this order are to be replaced by this order. This order is effective from this day onward. 23 April BE 2523 (23 April 1980) [Signed] General Prem Tinsulanond Prime Minister Source: ISIS Bulletin 2, no. 1 (January 1983).

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The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86

APPENDIX 3 Excerpts of Prime Ministerial Order No. 65/2525: "Plan for Political Offensive"

1. Principles and Rationale

1.1 Pursuant to the Prime Ministerial Order No. 66/2523 of 23 April 1980 pertaining to the policy "Struggle to WiQ Over Communism" which required that the "Struggle to Win Over Communism be completed within a short period of time by conducting a continuous political offensive", the Cabinet on 20 April 1982 endorsed the recommendations put forward by the Committee on the Policy to Struggle to Win Over Communism concerning a "Plan for Political Offensive", and hereby ordered by Government agencies concerned to follow the guidelines laid out in this plan as well as other plans which the Committee may add in the future to complement it. 1.2 The important factor in the struggle to win over communism and destroy all forms of authoritarianism (totalitarianism) is the development of democracy. The people desire that the nation becomes democratic under the leadership of the monarchy, but because the political development towards democracy has been delayed and is full of shortcomings, the communists have used these conditions as the basis for a propaganda campaign to compete for the people's loyalty. However, the "democracy" spoken of by the communists is only a tactic to win over the state so that eventually a conversion can be made to socialism and communism. Therefore, better and true democracy, both strategically and tactically speaking, must be developed within a short period of time. The personnel who will be the main instrument for achieving this task, are to be government officials in every agency as well as ordinary people with idealism who are prepared to co-operate to bring about a model democracy in our society. 2. Objectives and Policy

2.1 To promote true faith and understanding that sovereignty rests with the people. 2.2 To create a balance between individual freedom and this collective sovereignty. 2.3 To destroy all forms of authoritarianism and form a democratic society under the leadership of the monarchy and based on the guidelines of democratic beliefs.

Appendices

95

3. Operational Framework An organizational unit composed of government officials and idealistic ordinary people as core members is to be created to direct the campaign. This unit is to be responsible for safeguarding the people's interests, creating true democracy and fulfilling the basic needs and desires of the people by: 3.1 Enabling the people to live in happiness and security, both personal and material, free from exploitation and repressive influences. 3.2 Enabling the people to live with honour and dignity, and to participate in and lead political processes, for they are the owners of the country. 3.3 Enabling the people to live with hope and faith in their future and their nation's security. 4. Operational Guidelines

4.1 The task of developing democracy has two parts: one is to promote faith and understanding that sovereignty rests with the people by destroying authoritarian power and influences from the local to the national level, and the other is to promote individual freedom by making laws which are laws. Due to the existence of many constraints such as resources and laws which must be amended or annulled, this task cannot be accomplished completely in a short period of time, but should be done in continuous stages with a full awareness of the special characteristics of Thai society and contextual limitations .... 4.2 In addition to the operational guidelines laid down by Order 66/2523 of 23 April 1980, the following operational guidelines are to be followed: 4.2.1 Faith in the value of democracy ... must be promoted by disseminating and improving knowledge of democracy both in theory and in application; providing true information about the prevailing situation; educating the mass media which are to act as an instrument for transmitting correct knowledge and understanding of democracy to the public at large; and ensuring that government officials conduct themselves in an exemplary and democratic manner. 4.2.2 The discharging of their respective responsibilities according to democratic principles by all state mechanisms must be accelerated at two levels. At the highest level of decision-making which involves politicians, political parties and top administrators ... policies must be laid down clearly, positively and coherently to solve the nation's fundamental problems ... strong and decisive

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response must be made to cope with day-to-day problems as they develop in accordance with principles of justice and interests of the people as a whole; opportunity must be made open for others such as academics, mass media, interest groups and various experts or specialists to partake in the solving of such problems .... The bureaucracy as a whole must be improved to strengthen the conditions for creating and developing democracy, and bureaucrats must be made to develop a conscience and sense of duty together with idealism to be responsive to the people in a responsible way, strictly to enforce the law and bring justice for one and all .... At the level of civil servants, improvements must be accelerated because all civil servants have an important role in putting into practice the national policy but at the moment are still lacking in the sense of duty and idealism necessary to promote popular sovereignty and generate respect for the law. All civil servants are to . . . search for sources of a remedy for corruption ... discharge their duties and responsibilities strictly ... and within limits ... prevent fellow civil servants from acting as lords and masters of the people and exploiting them, and at the same time bring to justice those who break rules .... [In addition] the bureaucratic system must be reformed and decentralized, delegating power and responsibility towards regions and localities ... , and sufficient salary and welfare must be provided for all civil servants, especially those at junior levels, so that they can uphold their own honour and dignity. 4.2.3 Popular participation in political activities must be promoted to enable the people to have more practical experience which can serve to strengthen their attachment to an understanding of the principles of popular sovereignty. This must be done by involving the people in activities near their places of residence such as in the tambol councils, village committees and co-operatives ... ; encouraging the use of political parties as a means of promoting their own interests at the national or local level in accordance with the principles of democracy .... 4.2.4 Activities of pressure groups and interest groups must be regulated. Pressure and interest groups can act either to reinforce or to obstruct the development of democracy. Therefore, to ensure that their role be a constructive one and to deter any such group from hindering this development, their activities must be regulated in the following ways:

Economic Groups. Because Thailand has a liberal economic system but its state mechanisms for mobilizing resources and

Appendices

97

distributing benefits are still weak, some economic groups have been able to take advantage to build up monopolistic power which inflicts social injustice and material hardship on the people, creating conditions for war. Moreover, some of these monopolist groups have been able to develop great political bargaining power which is an obstacle in the development of democracy. Although it is vital to regulate these groups, the process of regulating them should be taken step by step and in accordance with the law .... The guidelines for cutting down the monopolistic power of the economic groups are: accelerated enforcement of the law against any violation by business; use of strict legal measures to guard against and destroy monopolistic power; enhancing among traders and capitalists the feeling of social responsibility and commitment towards the collective interests of the nation, by commending those with a social conscience, education, and opening up opportunities for participation in solving problems caused by their peers, and use of appropriate monetary, fiscal, legal and administrative measures on business, industry and commerce to bring about a distribution of economic benefits among the people at large.

The Masses. Workers and farmers are important in that they form the crucial foundation for Thailand's revolution and are targets for competition among political groups including the communists. Therefore, to prevent opposition groups from winning over them, to save them from being victims of communist propaganda and to generate their support for the development of democracy, the following guidelines for action should be taken. Support should be given to mass organizations which are truly democratic to prevent their leadership from falling into the hands of opposition groups. Leadership of mass organizations should be won over to destroy the subversive power of the communists within these organizations. A political environment conducive to mass political activities based on the principles of democracy should be created and encouraged. Students. Students are a special group which has high political awareness and seeks democracy and social justice. However, because their experience is limited, they are targets for communist groups and used as a part of the united front constructed by the latter. Therefore, to utilize students as a force for democracy and to prevent them from becoming tactical tools of communists as well as other authoritarian groups, the following guidelines for action should be taken. Freedom should be given to students

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to conduct all their activities, including political activities, which are within the law and the regulations laid down by their academic institutions. Students' activities geared towards the development of democracy should be encouraged and leadership of these activities won over so that students do not become wayward and used as tools of communism. Opportunity should be given to students to participate in a joint effort with the Government to resolve the conditions which create war; to allow them to see for themselves the Government's genuine desire to solve problems as well as the practical obstacles against the solution of problems' and to promote good understanding between students and Government which will reinforce the development of democracy. And finally, correct political education should be provided, with the requirement that government and politics of democracy be incorporated in the syllabus at every level of education and appropriate textbooks prepared by academics as standard references for the future. Progressive Groups. There are now many groups which have become more politically active in urban areas, including those who have returned from "the jungle", various progressives, communists, united fronts and other democratic groups. To ensure that their activities be kept within bounds imposed by national security considerations and contribute towards the development of democracy, the following guidelines for action should be taken. Opportunities should be given to all groups to put forward ideas and suggestions within the limits of the Constitution and law. Strong democratic movements should be encouraged in accordance with the Prime Ministerial Order No. 66/2523 dated 23 April 1980. Leadership of Progressive ideas should be won over. Activities of those groups which constitute a threat to national security and the development of democracy should be closely and continuously observed and obstructed. Mass Media. The media can act either to promote or to destroy democracy. Therefore, to ensure that they are constructive for for democracy, the following guidelines of action should be taken. Members of the mass media who have democratic ideas should be commended and given support and special responsibility in providing news conducive to the development of democracy encouraged. Campaigns to use ideas as a means of promoting democracy by the mass media should be supported. The Government's mass media organizations should be used to

99

Appendices

promote democracy and counteract news which cause its destruction. News which have adverse impact on the democratic system should be curtailed by executive as well as legal measures.

Armed Forces and Formation. They should have a correct understanding of democracy and support and preserve this system. 27 May BE 2525 (27 May 1982) [Signed] General Prem Tinsulanond Prime Minister Source: ISIS Bulletin 1, no. 2 (October 1982).

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APPENDIX 4 Prime Ministerial Order No. 47/2529: Additional Explanations Regarding the Operation In the Struggle to Win Over the Communists

1. General Statement

1.1 The struggle to win over the communists, regarded as the greatest threat to the security of the nation, religion and monarchy, which has been carried out according to the Prime Ministerial Order Nos. 66/2523 dated April1980 and 5/2524 dated 13 January 1981 and including the Order No. 65/2525 dated 27 May 1982 respectively, has been successful up to the present. The revolutionary war situation of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) has been basically halted. A high degree of peace and security has been brought to all our population at all levels and professions, in both the country and all communities in every region of the nation. 1.2 The existing situation still evidences certain conditions conducive to and easy for the CPT to use political, economic and social as well as military crises to revive the armed struggle, that could lead to conflict, fighting and destruction of lives and properties, as well as national resources of the nation on a grand and incomparable scale. While fighting continues in neighbouring countries and the international problem in Indochina prevails with no end in sight in the near future, the security of the nation is affected and in danger as a whole. 2. Objectives Expand the fruits of victory gained from the present cessation of the revolutionary war situation, instigated by the communists, so that final victory can be achieved over the communists in every way and means. The nation can thus finally reach permanent security. 3. Policy

Promote the democratic system of government under the King in such a way as to accord with the aspiration of the people and Thailand's social situation, customs, traditions and cultures. Emphasis will be given to expanding personal political freedom and to sovereignty of the people in tangible manners at all levels. 4. Operations

4.1 The Prime Ministerial Orders No. 66/2523 dated 23 April 1980,

Appendices

101

No. 5/2524 dated 13 January 1981, and No. 6512525 dated 27 May 1982 will be strictly implemented. 4.2 The struggle to win over the communists as well as all terrorist movements, namely the Malay Communist Bandits, the Terrorist Bandit Movement and other illegal movements. Under the present situation, victory over the CPT receives top priority. The emphasis will continue to be on winning over the Party and the United Front which is a special task of highest priority. 4.2.1 Winning over the Party means the struggle to win over the personnel in the leading organization as well as the permanent organ of the CPT from the CPT Central Committee down to every level, including the village level and its core group. All efforts will be made to pressure the CPT so that it will not be able to resort to armed struggle and will be forced to turn to legitimate use of rights and liberty along the path of the democratic system of government under the King according to the constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand and government policies which have been declared and implemented successfully. 4.2.2 Winning over the United Front means all actions aimed at solving at their root, causes of conflict which are the basis for efforts to build unity and harmony so as to create mutual understanding among all groups of people be they in the political organizations, civil service, public sector, or any other groups. Simultaneously, increased effort will be made to eliminate influential movements, "dark influences" and all types of illegal groups which provide the social conditions conducive to the rise of adverse united fronts at all levels. In an effort to win over the United Front, the aim will be to avoid any violent situation that could occur to put the country under dictatorship. This would push a number of people into the jungle to join the CPT which is waiting for the opportunity and condition to revive the revolutionary war situation so as to reach its goal successfully. However, the CPT United Front Movement does not cover only movements and persons co-operating with the communists but includes whatever action which causes and leads to the atmosphere or situation or violent struggle by all means. The causes could be conflicting views on political, economic, social and military matters. Therefore, intelligence operations to seek out the United Front should be carried out with sensitivity, should be circumspect, and with specified targets. Intelligence data sought should be specified and clear.

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4.2.3 Winning over the Armed Bands means pressuring the remaining armed bands in each of the region in the present situation. This means resorting to proper strategy, appropriate to the military target which can be proven clearly in order to force the laying down of arms, stopping the violent struggle, and joining the people in each locality in national development of politics, local government, economy and society, as well as the proper Thai customs, traditions and cultures. 4.3 Because of the internal problems within the party rising from serious conflict of ideas among the members of the high level organization of the CPT, a crisis occurred that related to the ways of struggle as well as the organization of the party. The result has been the loss of leadership in the struggle to successfully achieve the revolution, to seize the state's power according to the process of national democratic revolution, leading to a socialist society according to communist ideology. The aforementioned situation is very beneficial to us and thus requires acceleration of the effort to destroy the party as the highest priority, above that of destroying the United Front or the remaining armed bands. Nevertheless, great circumspection must be exercised in all situations to prevent a condition from arising which the CPT can make use of by successfully employing a United Front strategy. 4.4 The ultimate struggle which will lead to unquestioned and permanent victory in every way over the communists as well as all terrorist movements depends on one decisive factor. That is the development of the democratic system of government under the King into a truly strong one so as to reach the highest objective: enable sovereignty to be in the hands of the people and expanding personal political freedom which are the basis of democracy. This has to occur in an accelerated manner. 4.5 In order to achieve success in the struggle under the present situation, there is the need to adjust the educational process in a way that accords with the democratic system of government under the King making it the most important basic factor. The people must be instilled with the consciousness that is beneficial to their homeland. The basic principles that lie at the heart of democracy must be emphasized as follows: 4.5.1 The maintenance of internal security depends most heavily on the development of the democratic system of government under the King in order to struggle against all types of threats affecting the security of nation, religion and monarchy, whether the danger should arise from all types of communist activities, or from any abuse of power.

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103

4.5.2 The people of all races, religions, sexes and ages as well as of all professions and status are important factors in the development of the democratic system of government under the King towards greater strength. It is therefore required that the consciousness be translated into reality with the people actually participating in the exercise of highest authority in the democratic system of government under the King. Every citizen has a legitimate freedom to choose the people who will serve in the various political agencies from local to national levels without falling under whatever influence in whatever form. The aim is to let the highest benefit gained from the democratic system of government under the King serve the needs of the majority of the people in a true and just manner. 4.5.3 The Communist Party and those still remaining in the communist movement, though they suffered defeat in the revolutionary war, continue to think of armed struggle which they are still unable to carry out at present and are waiting for opportunities and conditions conducive to it. There is only one important way that would completely neutralize the communist armed struggle, that is, to struggle in a peaceful and legitimate manner, along the path of the democratic system of government under the King. 4.6 Governmental machineries at all levels must accelerate their efforts to remove dishonesty, corruption, and dark influences which are dangerous to honest people in the countryside as well as in all communities. The people must be assured of the safety of their lives and properties as well as the pursuit of honest professions and must be guaranteed a secure future for themselves and their families. 5. Administrative Procedures 5.1 All administrative procedures as mentioned in the Prime Ministerial Order No. 66/2523 dated 23 April 1980 continue to be in force. 5.2 All government ministries, bureaus, departments and organizations must adhere to the procedures to be used in their planning in their relavant activities, as well as in designating the unit and/or responsible persons in the implementation of this explanation in order to achieve tangible results at all societal levels. 5.3 The Internal Security Operations Command is responsible for the implementation of all the orders and explanations already made and is the principal agency in co-ordinating the various government ministries,

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bureaus, departments and all relevant organizations in order to fully achieve the maintenance of internal security. 5.4 Budgetary support for the implementation of all orders mentioned

above is to be regarded as a special case to be given highest priority. 24 March BE 2529 (24 March 1985) [Signed] General Prem Tinsulanond Prime Minister Source: ISIS Bulletin 5, no. 2 (May 1986).

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APPENDIX 5 Prem's Coalition Government (1981-87)

First Prem Cabinet (3 March 1980 -

11 March 1981)

Coalition partners:

Social Action, Chart Thai, Democrat, Chart Prachachon and Siam Democrat

Major opposition:

Prachakorn Thai

Second Prem Cabinet (11 March 1981 - 8 December 1981) Coalition partners:

Democrat, Chart Thai and a number of smaller parties including Siam Democrat, Ruam Thai and Social Democrat

Major opposition:

Social Action and Prachakorn Thai

Third Prem Cabinet (9 December 1981 - 30 April 1983) Coalition partners:

Social Action, Democrat, Chart Thai and a number of smaller parties

Major opposition:

Prachakorn Thai

Fourth Prem Cabinet (30 April 1983 - 11 August 1986) Coalition partners:

Social Action, Democrat, Prachakorn Thai and National Democrat (replaced by the Progressive Party in September 1985)

(In January 1986, there was a reshuffle within the Social Action Party for its alloted quota of cabinet seats.) Major opposition:

Chart Thai

Fifth Prem Cabinet (11 August 1986 -

)

Coalition partners:

Democrat, Chart Thai, Social Action, Rasadorn

Major opposition:

Prachakorn Thai, United Democratic, Ruam Thai, Community Action, Progressive

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APPENDIX 6 Commanders-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Army

(1978-84)

1 General Prem Tinsulanond (1 October 1979- 26 August 1981) 2 General Prayuth Charumanee (27 August 1981 - 30 September 1982) 3 General Arthit Kamlang-ek (1 October 1982 - 25 May 1986) 4 General Chaovalit Yongchaiyuth (26 May 1986 - Present)

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APPENDIX 7 Military Positions and Ranks of

General Arthit Kamlang-ek (1981-86)

Position

Rank

Date

Deputy Commander, Second Army Region

Maj.-Gen.

October 1980 - April 1981

Commander, First Army Region and Capital Security Command

Lt.-Gen.

April 1981 - September 1981

Asst. Commander-inChief and Acting Commander, First Army Region, and Commander, CSC

General

October 1981 - September 1982

Commander-in-Chief, Royal Thai Army; Commander, CSC

General

October 1982 - September 1983

Supreme Commander, Armed Forces; Commander-in-Chief, Royal Thai Army, and Commander, CSC

General

October 1983 - May 1986

Supreme Commander, Armed Forces, and Commander, CSC

General

May 1986 - August 1987

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APPENDIX 8 Military Positions and Ranks of General Chaovalit Yongchaiyuth

Position

Rank

Date

Director of Operations

Maj.-Gen.

October 1979 - September 1982

Assistant Chief-of-Staff for Operations

Lt. Gen.

October 1982 - September 1983

Deputy Chief-of-Staff

Lt.-Gen.

October 1983 - September 1985

Chief-of-Staff

General

October 1985 - May 1986

Commander-in-Chief, Royal Thai Army

General

May 1986-

References

Government Documents and Publications

Capital City Security Command. See Pee Sontanapanhaban-meung [Four years of conversations on the country's problems]. Bangkok: Chareonwit Kanpim, 1985. ISOC. The Reservists for National Security [in Thai]. Bangkok: P. Samphanphanij, 1985. _ _ . A Summary of the Policy to Win Communism: The Orders No. 66/2523, No. 5/2524, No. 65/2525 [in Thai]. Bangkok: Au Sor Por, 1983. Office of the Prime Minister. Office of the Prime Minister's Regulations on National Defence Volunteers BE 2521. Bangkok: Local Government Department's Printing Office, 1981. Royal Thai Army. The Army and its Assistance to the People [in Thai]. Bangkok: A Samphanphanij, n.d. _ _ . The Army's Position in the Constitutional Amendment Problem [in Thai]. Bangkok, 16 February 1983.

Books

Chai-Anan Samudavanija. The Thai Young Thrks. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982. Chaovalit Yongchaiyuth, Lt.-Gen. A Collection of Speeches and Interviews of Lieutenant-General Chaovalit Yongchaiyuth 1980-1985. Bangkok: S.S. Printing, n.d. 109

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Clapham, Christopher and George Philip. The Political Dilemmas of Military Regimes. London: Croom Helm, 1985. Huntington, Samuel P. Political Order in a Changing Society. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968. ~~- and Joan M. Nelson. No Easy Choice: Political Participation in Developing Countries. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1976. Kramol Tongdhammachart. Toward a Political Party Theory in Thai Perspective. Occasional Paper No. 68. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and Maruzen Asia, 1982. Kusuma Snitwongse. "Thai Government Responses to Armed Communist and Separatist Movements". In Governments and Rebellions in Southeast Asia, edited by Chandran Jeshurun. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985. Morell, David and Chai-Anan Samudavanija. Political Conflict in Thailand· Reform, Reaction, Revolution. Cambridge, Mass: Oelegesehlager, Gunn & Hain, 1981. Pranot Nanthiyakul, ed. Chitwittaya Kwam Munkong [The mass psychology for national security]. Bangkok: Chaophraya Printing, 1986. Suchit Bunbongkarn. "Political Institutions and Processes". In Government and Politics of Thailand, edited by Somsakdi Xuto. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1987. ~--and Pornsak Phonghew. Prutikam Kanlongkananseang Khan Khonthai [Thai voting behaviour]. Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University Press, 1984. Thak Chaleomtiarana. Thailand· The Politics of Despotic Paternalism. Bangkok: Social Science Association of Thailand, 1979. Zakaria Ahmad and Harold Crouch. Military-Civil Relations in Southeast Asia. Singapore: Oxford University Press 1985.

THE AUTHOR

SUCHIT BUNBONGKARN is Associate Professor and Deputy Dean for Academic Affairs, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, where he is also Deputy Director of the Institute of Security and International Studies. He obtained his doctorate from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, USA. His research interests include comparative politics, Thai politics, political development, and international relations.