The Metaphysics of Religion: Lucian Blaga and Contemporary Philosophy 0838641008, 9780838641002, 2006011716

Table of contents :
Contents
Acknowledgments
List of
Abbreviations
Introduction
Blaga the Philosopher
Blaga’s Philosophy of Philosophy
Blaga’s Metaphysics
Blaga’s Epistemology
Blaga’s Philosophy of Culture
Blaga’s Philosophy of Religion
The Nature of Philosophy of Religion
The Problem of Religious Language
The Question of Religious Knowledge
The Justification of Religious Belief(s)
The Existence and Nature of God
Religion and Science, Religion vs. Science
The Problem of Interreligious Communication
The Problem of Religious Pluralism
Conclusion
Glossary
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

The Metaphysics of Religion

The Metaphysics of Religion Lucian Blaga and Contemporary Philosophy

Michael S. Jones

Madison • Teaneck Fairleigh Dickinson University Press

 2006 by Rosemont Publishing & Printing Corp. All rights reserved. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use, or the internal or personal use of specific clients, is granted by the copyright owner, provided that a base fee of $10.00, plus eight cents per page, per copy is paid directly to the Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, Massachusetts 01923. [0-8386-4100-8/06 $10.00 + 8¢ pp, pc.]

Associated University Presses 2010 Eastpark Boulevard Cranbury, NJ 08512

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Jones, Michael S., 1964– The metaphysics of religion : Lucian Blaga and contemporary philosophy / Michael S. Jones. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 978-0-8386-4100-2 (alk. paper) ISBN-10: 0-8386-4100-8 1. Blaga, Lucian, 1895–1961. 2. Religion—Philosophy. I. Title. B4825.B554J66 2006 199′.498—dc22 2006011716

printed in the united states of america

Contents Acknowledgments List of Abbreviations

7 9

Outline of Blaga’s Life

13

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Part I: Exposition of Blaga’s Philosophy Introduction Blaga the Philosopher Blaga’s Philosophy of Philosophy Blaga’s Metaphysics Blaga’s Epistemology Blaga’s Philosophy of Culture Blaga’s Philosophy of Religion

19 22 42 58 88 119 137

8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

Part II: Application of Blaga’s Philosophy The Nature of Philosophy of Religion The Problem of Religious Language The Question of Religious Knowledge The Justification of Religious Belief(s) The Existence and Nature of God Religion and Science, Religion vs. Science The Problem of Interreligious Communication The Problem of Religious Pluralism Conclusion

155 170 182 196 207 217 227 234 248

Glossary Bibliography Index

252 258 279 5

Acknowledgments Many people have contributed to the success of this book. The members of my doctoral dissertation committee, including Drs. Leonard Swidler, Virgil Nemoianu, Joseph Margolis, and most especially Thomas Dean, have been encouraging and have refined the book through extensive comments and correspondence. The Religion Department of Temple University has been supportive. The Philosophy Department and the Department of Letters of Babe¸s-Bolyai University, and in particular Drs. Ion Copoeru and George Irimia¸s, were very welcoming. My relatives and my home church, Cross Roads Baptist Church of Allentown, Pennsylvania, have been supportive in spiritual and material ways. Numerous friends, both personal and academic, have also contributed to the researching of this project, including students and professors from the University of Bucharest, the Lucian Blaga University of Sibiu, Emanuel University of Oradea, and others. I am grateful to FDUP/AUP and Cathy Slovensky for their help in preparing the final version of this manuscript. Major financial support came from the Fulbright Commission, without which this project would not have been possible. Without a doubt, those who gave the most to make this book possible are my wife and sons, Laura, Nate, and Zach. They cheerfully moved overseas and endured the stretching of a ten-month grant to last twenty-one months. They have also put up with a dad who is always asking inane questions and who, when not at work or school, spends most of his time at the computer typing. Acknowledgment must also be made to God, who performed a miracle in enabling a mediocre undergraduate agriculture student to progress through graduate degrees in theology and philosophy and ultimately to a PhD. “With man, this is impossible, but with God, all things are possible.”

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Abbreviations Blaga’s works frequently cited throughout the book and in the notes have been identified by the following abbreviations: AA

Aspecte antropologice. Cluj: Uniunea na¸tional˘a a studen¸tilor din Romˆania, Centrul studen¸tesc Cluj, 1948. AV Art˘a s¸i valoare. Bucharest: Funda¸tia pentru literatur˘a s¸i art˘a “Regele Carol II,” 1939. CC Cultur˘a s¸i cuno¸stin¸ta˘ . Cluj: Editura Justitul de arte grafice “Ardealul,” 1922. CFR Curs de filosofia religiei. Edited by Dorli Blaga et al. Alba Iulia and Paris: Editura Fronde, 1994. CL Cunoa¸sterea luciferic˘a. Sibiu: Tiparul Institutului de arte grafice “Dacia Traian˘a,” 1933. ˆ CT Cenzura transcendent˘a: Incercare metafizic˘a. Bucharest: Cartea Romˆaneasc˘a, 1934. DCF Despre con¸stiin¸ta filosofic˘a. Cluj: Lito-Schildkraut, 1947. DD Diferen¸tialele divine. Bucharest: Funda¸tia pentru literatur˘a s¸i art˘a “Regale Carol II,” 1940. ED Eonul dogmatic. Bucharest: Cartea Romˆaneasc˘a, 1931. ESM Experimentul s¸i spiritul matematic. Bucharest: Editura s¸tiin¸tific˘a, 1969. FC Ferestre colorate. Arad: Editura Libr˘ariei Diecezane, 1929. FI Fiin¸ta istoric˘a. Cluj: Editura Dacia, 1977. GMR Gˆandire magic˘a s¸i religie. In vol. 10 of Opere, edited by Dorli Blaga. Bucharest: Editura Minerva, 1987. GMSC Geneza metaforei s¸i sensul culturii. Bucharest: Funda¸tia pentru literatur˘a s¸i art˘a “Regele Carul II,” 1937. HCV Hronicul s¸i cˆantecul vˆarstelor. Vol. 6 in Opere. Edited by Dorli Blaga. Bucharest: Editura Minerva, 1979. OS Orizont s¸i stil. Bucharest: Funda¸tia pentru literatur˘a s¸i art˘a “Regele Carol II,” 1935. S¸ C S¸ tiin¸ta˘ s¸i crea¸tie. Sibiu: Editura “Dacia Traian˘a,” 1942. SM Spa¸tiul mioritic. Bucharest: Cartea Romˆaneasc˘a, 1936. 9

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Note on Text The use of the often-interchangeable letters aˆ and ˆı in Romanian has varied according to historical era and geographic location. It has become standard practice in contemporary Romanian to use aˆ whenever possible. This practice extends even to the republication of texts that were originally published utilizing the letter ˆı. For this reason the letter aˆ has been used wherever possible in the present work as well.

The Metaphysics of Religion

Outline of Blaga’s Life D.

Vatamaniuc includes a very detailed chronology of the events of Blaga’s life, including significant events that preceded Blaga’s life, in his book Lucian Blaga, 1895–1961: Biobibliografie.1 A more condensed chronology, in English, is prefaced to Brenda Walker’s translation of Blaga’s poetry.2 The following time line of Blaga’s life is drawn primarily from these two sources. May 9, 1895: Lucian Blaga is born in Lancr˘am to Isidor and Ana (Moga) Blaga. 1901: Begins elementary school at the village school in Lancr˘am.3 1902: Begins study at the German elementary school in Sebe¸s. 1906: Begins study at the Liceu Saguna ¸ in Bra¸sov. 1908: Death of Isidor Blaga, Lucian’s father. 1909: Ana sells the family holdings in Lancr˘am and moves the family to Sebe¸s. 1910: Blaga’s first published poem, “Pe ¸tarm” (On the Shore), appears in the literary magazine Tribuna. 1914: March: Blaga’s first published philosophy article, “Reflec¸tii asupra intui¸tiei lui Bergson” (Some Thoughts on Bergson’s Concept of Intuition), appears in the journal Romˆanul under the pseudonym Ion Alba. June: graduates from Liceu Saguna ¸ with a thesis on relativity and non-Euclidean geometry. September: Enrolls in the Orthodox seminary in Sibiu. 1917: May: Graduates from the Orthodox seminary (temporarily housed in Oradea). Fall: Begins doctoral studies at the University of Vienna.

1. Vatamaniuc, Lucian Blaga, 189–1961: Biobibliografie, xxi–li. 2. Magda Teodorescu, “Chronology: Lucian Blaga’s Life and Works,” in Brenda Walker, Complete Poetical Works of Lucian Blaga, 11–17. 3. Balu, Via¸ta lui Lucian Blaga, vol. 1, 61. This is omitted from both Teodorescu’s summary and Vatamaniuc’s very detailed chronology.

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1919: Blaga’s first books are published: Poeme luminii (Poems of Light) and Pietre pentru templul meu (Stones for My Temple). The former is a collection of his poems, and the latter a collection of his aphorisms. 1920: November: Graduates from University of Vienna with doctoral thesis “Kultur und Erkenntnis” (Culture and Knowledge). December: Marries Cornelia Brediceanu, a Romanian medical student at the University of Vienna and the daughter of a prominent Romanian politician. 1921: May: Is a cofounder of the well-received journal Gˆandirea. June: Is awarded by the Romanian Academy for his first two books. July: Is nominated to the Society of Romanian Writers. 1922: January: Begins diplomacy career. May: Doctoral dissertation is published in Romanian. 1924: First book of philosophy is published: Filosofia stilului (The Philosophy of Style). 1930: Daughter Dorli is born. 1933: Death of Ana, his mother. 1935: Again receives an award from the Romanian Academy, this time for his recent theatrical and poetic works. 1936: Inducted into the Romanian Academy. 1938: Blaga is appointed to a special chair for philosophy of culture in the Department of Philosophy at the Romanian University of Cluj.4 His inaugural essay is titled “Despre plenitudinea istoric˘a” (Concerning Historical Fullness). 1943: February: Founds the philosophy journal Seaculum. August: The first of his trilogies is published, Trilogia cunoa¸sterii (Trilogy of Knowledge). 1949: He is removed from the university by the new socialist government. He is allowed to work as a researcher and translator at the Institute of History and Philosophy in Cluj and the Cluj branch of the Romanian Academy (the Department of Literary History and Folklore). 4. During his lifetime, the name of the university where Blaga taught was Universitatea romaneasc˘a din Cluj [Romanian University of Cluj]. This university was founded in 1919. After World War II it was given the name Universitatea Babe¸s din Cluj, and in 1959 it was merged with the Hungarian-language Bolyai University to form Universitatea Babe¸s-Bolyai, the name that it bears today. See Universitatea Babe¸s-Bolyai, “Istoricul Universit˘a¸tii,” http://www.ubbcluj.ro/despre univ/istoric.html (accessed October 23, 2003).

outline of blaga’s life

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1955: Publishes the first Romanian translation of Faust. May 6, 1961: Dies in Cluj. May 9, 1961: Is interred in Lancr˘am, exactly sixty-six years after his birth.

A number of Blaga’s books of philosophy and poetry, and his only novel, were published posthumously, due to the socialist government prohibiting Blaga from publishing during his lifetime.

Part I Exposition of Blaga’s Philosophy

1 Introduction Lucian Blaga was an early- and mid-twentieth-century European philosopher whose work was suppressed at the height of his career by the ascension to power of the Romanian Communist Party and the subsequent creation of the Romanian Popular Republic. Because of historical circumstances, Blaga’s philosophy has not become known outside of his own country, although within Romania it continues to be read and discussed.1 This is unfortunate, for two reasons: first, because Blaga’s philosophy is a thing of beauty that would be appreciated by many outside of Romania, and second, because Blaga’s philosophy can shed light on issues that are still discussed in philosophy today. Blaga’s philosophy is a powerful, broad, and systematic attempt at accounting for all of human experience.2 The thesis of this book is that Blaga’s philosophy has contemporary relevance to Anglo-American philosophy. Two steps are necessary to support this thesis. First, Blaga’s philosophical system must be introduced and explained in sufficient detail as to enable its subsequent application to a variety of philosophical issues. This will be accomplished in the first part of the book, which relates Blaga’s life and work, his philosophy of philosophy, his metaphysical system, his epistemology, his philosophy of culture, and his philosophy of religion. Second, Blaga’s philosophy must be applied to issues discussed in contem1. Ioan Ic˘a states that Blaga’s work continues to be fairly influential in Romania, even among young thinkers; Ioan I. Ic˘a, “Filosofia lui Lucian Blaga din perspectiv˘a teologic˘a: Reconsiderarea unei polemici,” in Eonul Blaga: Sntˆaiul veac, ed. Mircea Borcil˘a (Bucharest: Editura Albatros, 1997), 383. 2. Mircea Eliade states that Blaga had the courage to create a philosophy that attempted to address all the aspects of systematic philosophy, something that no European philosopher has tried since Hegel; Mircea Eliade, “Convorbiri cu Lucian Blaga,” in Lucian Blaga: Cunoa¸stere s¸i crea¸tie; Culegere de studii, ed. Dumitru Ghi¸se, Angela Botez, and Victor Botez (Bucharest: Cartea Romˆaneasc˘a, 1987), 483. (Eliade’s statement about the lack of systematic philosophy after Hegal is open to dispute.) In his entry on Romanian philosophy in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Eliade states that Blaga was “The most gifted and critical original thinker” in the history of Romanian philosophy; Mircea Eliade, “Rumanian Philosophy,” in Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan and the Free Press, 1967), 233–34.

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porary Anglo-American philosophy in order to see how it can productively contribute to contemporary issues in this domain. This will be attempted in the second part of the book. The final chapter is a brief conclusion. Blaga’s philosophy may have contemporary relevance to a variety of philosophical fields: philosophy of science, philosophy of history, philosophical anthropology, aesthetics, and so on. The field to which it will be applied in this book is philosophy of religion, an arena of contemporary philosophy that is the scene of much lively debate. The chapters beginning with chapter 8 attempt to apply Blaga’s philosophical insights to issues in this field. They are, in order, the nature of philosophy of religion, the problem of religious language, the question of religious knowledge, the justification of religious belief(s), the existence and nature of God, religion and science, the problem of interreligious communication, and the problem of religious pluralism. The goal of this book is not to introduce the entirety of Blaga’s philosophical system, but rather to put Blaga’s philosophy into play with contemporary issues in Anglo-American philosophy of religion in order to demonstrate its continuing relevance. In order to accomplish this goal it is necessary that Blaga’s epistemology be explained, and it is also necessary that several other closely related parts of his philosophy be explained: his philosophy of philosophy, his metaphysics, and his philosophy of culture. Other areas of philosophy, to which Blaga devoted considerable effort (such as philosophy of science, philosophical anthropology, and aesthetics), although not irrelevant, have been passed over as not having a direct impact on the goal of this study. Some of the main features of Blaga’s thought in these areas can be inferred from what is said about the areas of Blaga’s philosophy that this book does address. In the course of the presentation of his philosophy Blaga discusses how it is supported: the various justification strategies that undergird the claim of his philosophy to truthfulness. He sustains his many philosophical proposals with a variety of arguments, some of which are discussed here. However, it is not my goal to prove the truthfulness of Blaga’s philosophy. Such an attempt would involve a lengthy metadiscussion on the possibility of proving philosophical systems and on the possible methods of accomplishing such a task, in addition to a necessarily lengthy discussion of supporting arguments and responses to counterarguments. This would exhaust the space allocated to the application of Blaga’s philosophy to contemporary issues in philosophy of religion, which is essential to the expressed purpose of this book. Therefore brief discussions of the various types of support that Blaga marshals in favor of his system will be presented, and thereafter I will proceed as if these arguments sufficiently establish the plausibility of Blaga’s positions.

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It should perhaps be noted, however, that a successful application of Blaga’s philosophy to contemporary issues would justify that philosophy according to Blaga’s own criteria of justification. Chapter 3 of this book will introduce Blaga’s understanding of the pragmatic justification of philosophical statements. Chapter 5 will discuss his pragmatic approach to verification. If Blaga’s views on justification and verification are correct, then according to his own standards, his philosophy will be justified by its fruitfulness in application to a variety of philosophical problems. Therefore a successful application of Blaga’s philosophy to issues in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy of religion might, in effect, provide a justification of Blaga’s philosophy. In order to accomplish the goal of demonstrating the contemporary relevance of Blaga’s philosophy it is necessary that considerable space be given to an expository introduction of Blaga’s system. However, it is not my goal to provide an exhaustive introduction to Blaga’s system, but rather to show its contemporary relevance. Therefore certain interesting aspects of Blaga’s philosophy have been largely omitted as not bearing directly on the application of his philosophy to contemporary philosophy of religion. Likewise, it is deemed expedient to the interpretation and appreciation of Blaga’s philosophy that the exposition of his system begin with a brief introduction to his life and work. However, a number of interesting aspects of his life that are not directly relevant to his philosophical work (for example, his diplomatic career and his nonphilosophical literary works) are only mentioned in passing. The purpose of all these omissions is to sharpen the focus on those aspects of Blaga’s philosophy that are most directly relevant to the goal of demonstrating the continuing relevance of Blaga’s philosophy to contemporary discussions. Virtually none of Blaga’s philosophy has been translated into English. Therefore all translations of Blaga’s work found in this book are my own unless otherwise stated.

2 Blaga the Philosopher An introduction to Blaga’s philosophy might best begin with an introduction to Blaga. The introduction provided here is selective, emphasizing those elements of Blaga’s life that have the most direct bearing on his philosophy. The introduction is divided into two parts: an introduction to various factors that influenced Blaga’s philosophical development and a summary of the sources available for the study of Blaga’s philosophy. The former includes discussions of cultural and educational elements that are significant to providing a backdrop for Blaga’s philosophy, while the latter section discusses primary and secondary sources for the study of Blaga’s philosophical work and includes a chronological list of these. Blaga is an unknown figure outside of Romania. Within Romania, Blaga is so well known that his name is a household term. He is best known, however, for his poetry,1 and this in spite of the fact that he viewed himself first and foremost as a philosopher. Although he is treated with respect by the Romanian philosophical community, the current generation of philosophy students prefers to study the great names from outside of their own country more than the great philosophers of their own past. 1. It is my impression that this is the case not because Blaga’s poetry is particularly outstanding: other Romanian poets receive greater acclaim for their poetry than Blaga. I believe that the reason that Romanians think of Blaga as a poet is because Romanians are themselves unusually poetic people. Romanians, by and large, are highly interested in poetry, and most Romanians have secretly or openly tried their hand at poetry writing. That Blaga’s poetry is much more widely read than his philosophy is no reflection of the quality or merit of either his poetry or his philosophy: it is a result of the proclivities of the Romanian people. Furthermore, Blaga’s philosophy is generally conceded to be difficult reading. This is true for several reasons: Blaga incorporates in his philosophy numerous elements of European thought that are foreign to many Romanians; his works are systematic and build upon each other, so that one cannot fully understand his later books unless one has read those that precede it; and he creates his own vocabulary for expressing key elements of his philosophical system, which is explained as it is introduced but is assumed in later works. Blaga’s language also contains both stylistic innovations and archaic grammatical and vocabulary elements that make it difficult for the average Romanian reader.

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There is a Lucian Blaga Society dedicated to the study of Blaga’s work. This society holds an annual conference in Cluj-Napoca and publishes books and articles dedicated to the study of Blaga’s work. Its members include many of Romania’s leading philosophers as well as specialists from other European countries. It also includes academics from disciplines other than philosophy. The work of the society is somewhat unevenly divided between Blaga’s philosophy and his literary writings, the latter receiving more attention than the former. Thus it is that Blaga the philosopher is little known both inside and outside of Romania, and an introduction to his life is a befitting preface to an exposition of his work.2

Blaga’s Background and Intellectual Formation A brief introduction to Blaga’s background will facilitate the understanding and appreciation of his philosophy. A variety of cultural factors guided Blaga’s philosophical development. These factors are of more than merely historical interest: they help one understand the context of Blaga’s arguments and sometimes the motives of his theories. Furthermore, a brief introduction to the cultural influences on Blaga’s philosophizing is a necessity in order to be consistent with Blaga’s own philosophy: an analysis of and emphasis on the role of culture in determining beliefs of all sorts is one of its most prominent features. A number of biographies and other studies on the life of Lucian Blaga have been published. Of particular interest is Blaga’s autobiography, Hronicul s¸i cˆıntecul vˆırstelor (The Chronicle and the Song of the Ages). In utilizing this source, however, it must be kept in mind that according to Blaga himself this work is more than a history of his life: it is the historical story of his life, and as such bears a resemblance to historical fiction.3 2. This impression is confirmed by Stefan Augustin Doinas in Victor Botez’s article, “Blaga—omul—a¸sa cum l-au cunoscut,” in Lucian Blaga: Cunoa¸stere si crea¸tie, ed. Dumitru Ghi¸se, Angela Botez, and Victor Botez (Bucharest: Cartea Romˆaneasc˘a, 1987), 501. 3. I. Opri¸san, Lucian Blaga printre Contemporani: Dialoguri Adnotate (Bucharest: Minerva, 1987), 7. Hronicul s¸i cˆantecul vˆarstelor, ed. Dorli Blaga, vol. 6 in Opere (Bucharest: Editura Minerva, 1979; hereafter referred to as HCV) reads like a historical novel. This book is very informational, and much of its content can be corroborated by other sources. Also of considerable usefulness in understanding the specifically Romanian aspects of Blaga’s work is Vasile B˘ancil˘a, Lucian Blaga: Energie romˆaneasc˘a, 2nd ed. (Timi¸soara, RO: Editura Marineasa, 1995), which offers a unique presentation of Blaga’s philosophy emphasizing Blaga’s biography and the cultural elements of his work. Ion Balu’s fourvolume biography of Blaga’s life must be mentioned as the most exhaustive contribution to the subject.

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Transylvania Blaga was born on the May 8, 1895. He was born and raised in the village of Lancr˘am, which is located in the central plateau of the Carpathian Mountains in Transylvania, the westernmost province of modern Romania.4 The formative importance of the Romanian, and in particular the Transylvanian, situation in which Blaga spent most of his life is suggested by several authors writing in English (Virgil Nemoianu and Andrei Oi¸steanu)5 and is emphasized repeatedly in Vasile B˘ancil˘a’s book (in Romanian) Lucian Blaga: Energie romˆaneasc˘a. While eastern Romania was for long periods of its history under the influence of the Ottoman Empire, Transylvania was more often under the influence of European powers, most notably Hungary and the AustroHungarian Empire. In order to strengthen Transylvania as a buffer between itself and the Ottoman Turks, the Hungarian rulers encouraged the establishment of numerous Hungarian towns and cities in Transylvania, and encouraged German settlements in Transylvania as well.6 These communities coexisted in close proximity to each other without losing their respective cultural distinctness. In some periods the Hungarians and Germans were given political and educational privileges that were not given to the Romanians. Therefore the Hungarian and German cities became the centers of higher education and culture in Transylvania. Blaga grew up in a part of Transylvania that was populated by ethnic Germans and Romanians. The centers of education were located in German-dominated cites like Bra¸sov and Sibiu. These cities were modern metropolises. A large portion of the ethnic Romanian population lived in rural towns and villages, however, like Blaga’s natal village. These villages were far from modern: they were largely untouched by the Industrial Revolution; their economy was dominated by agriculture, which was practiced as it had been for centuries, without the benefit of modern machinery; and they had a strong sense of tradition and timelessness that was almost 4. During Blaga’s childhood, Transylvania was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, separate from the country of Romania, although Romanians made up a majority of the population. Transylvania was joined to Romania at the end of World War I. 5. See Virgil Nemoianu, “The Dialectics of Imperfection,” in A Theory of the Secondary (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 153–70; Virgil Nemoianu, “Mihai Sora ¸ and the Traditions of Romanian Philosophy,” Review of Metaphysics 43 (March 1990): 591–605. See also Andrei Oi¸steanu, “The Anthropology of Traditional Habitation: Man Between Nature and Culture,” in Cosmos vs. Chaos: Myth and Magic in Romanian Traditional Culture (Bucharest: Romanian Cultural Foundation Publishing House, 1999), 221–31. 6. In Blaga’s time there were also significant populations of Gypsies, Jews, MacedoRomanians, and Armenians in Transylvania.

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antithetical to modernity.7 This contrast between the modern urban centers and the traditional village, as well as the contrast between neighboring but distinct ethnic cultures, played a role in shaping Blaga’s personality and his philosophy. Blaga commented that when he left the village to attend school in one of the Transylvanian cities, it was as if he had entered another world. This unusual environment influenced Blaga in several important ways. First, it led him to acquire a proficiency in German. Transylvanians who wanted a higher education in some field other than Orthodox theology had little choice other than to learn either German or Hungarian, since these were the languages used in the leading schools of the region. Blaga’s ability in German facilitated his reading of German philosophy and his eventual doctoral studies in Vienna. The long-term result of this seemingly minor factor is that Blaga’s philosophy interacts with and resembles German philosophy much more than do the philosophical works of many other twentieth-century Romanian philosophers, who tended to be more influenced by French authors.8 Secondly, and perhaps no less important, is the effect of the metropolis/ village contrast itself. Rather than embracing one and rejecting the other in a reactionary fashion, Blaga sees the values of both the modern city and the traditional village. This leads Blaga to develop a philosophy that embraces both the old and the new, both modern logic and traditional wisdom, both science and aesthetics/myth/religion. Blaga’s philosophy makes space for both aspects of humanity, since both are legitimate human modes of approaching existence.9 Finally, the juxtaposition of very diverse cultures in close geographical proximity bore fruit in Blaga’s philosophy of culture. This phenomenon led Blaga to propose a theory of culture that provides explanation of the origins of the similarities and differences between human cultures, a theory of the source and development of culture, and a theory of the role that culture plays in shaping human beliefs. Blaga provides a book-length analysis of Romanian culture as an example of how his philosophy suc7. The depth of Blaga’s feelings about the Romanian village is reflected in what is perhaps his most quoted line of verse: “I believe that eternity was born in the village” [Eu cred c˘a ve¸snicia s-a nascut la sat]. Lucian Blaga, “Sufletul satului,” in Opera poetic˘a, ed. George Gan˘a and Dorli Blaga (Bucharest: Humanitas, 1995), 130. Blaga discusses the philosophical and spiritual riches of the Romanian village in his inaugural lecture “Eulogy to the Romanian Village” [Elogiul satului romˆanesc], in Isvoade: Eseuri, conferin¸te, articole, ed. Dorli Blaga and Petre Nicolau (Bucharest: Editura Minerva, 1972), 33– 48. 8. See Bazil Munteanu, “Lucian Blaga: Metafizician al misterului s¸i filosof al culturii,” in Dimensiunea metifizic˘a a operei lui Lucian Blaga, ed. A. Botez and A. Firu¸ta˘ (Bucharest: Editura Stiin¸ ¸ tific˘a, 1996), 204 –5. 9. See Nemoianu, A Theory of the Secondary, 163, 228n21.

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ceeds in explaining actual cultural phenomena.10 His philosophy does not apply merely to Romanian culture, however, but rather is equally applicable to other cultures. Blaga’s ability to devise such a widely applicable philosophy may be a result of his long and personal firsthand experience with divergent cultures in his Transylvanian homeland.

Blaga’s Family Blaga’s home life also provided impetus for his philosophical prolificacy.11 His father, Isidor, was an Orthodox priest in a family with a long tradition of priests. As a child, Isidor had been a very good student. He attended and excelled at the German schools in Sebe¸s and Sibiu. He aspired to further studies, but circumstances prevented his fulfilling these aspirations and instead he accepted the position of priest in the Orthodox church in Lancr˘am, which had remained vacant since the death of his own father.12 He was an honest man, with a great interest in the economic wellbeing of the villagers.13 It is reported that even as a priest he had a great interest in philosophy, and was sometimes found in his study reading Kant, Schopenhauer, Hegel, Nietzsche, and Romanian philosophers during times when it was supposed that he was preparing his sermons.14 He had a great love of books, especially those by German authors.15 His intelligence was such that one Romanian historian supposedly referred to him as “The priest with the hair of silver and with the mind of gold.”16 He seems to never have overcome the frustration of being unable to pursue a more intellectual career, which lent a melancholy tenor to his personage. Sadly, Isidor died of tuberculosis in 1908, when Lucian was thirteen years old.17 Blaga’s mother, Ana (Moga), was the daughter of an Orthodox priest in a family with an equally long tradition of priests, mostly in the larger 10. Lucian Blaga, Spa¸tiul mioritic (Bucharest: Cartea Romˆaneasc˘a, 1936), hereafter referred to as SM. According to Vasile Musc˘a, Blaga’s work represents the beginning of serious thought about Romanian culture; see Vasile Musc˘a, “Specificul crea¸tiei culturale romˆane¸sti ˆın cˆampul filosofiei,” in Lucian Blaga, ed. Ghi¸se, Botez, and Botez, 463–64. 11. Lilia Rugescu’s book Cu Lucian Blaga [With Lucian Blaga] (Cluj-Napoca, RO: Editura Dacia, 1985) is largely dedicated to the study of Blaga’s extended family, and ends with detailed family trees for both of his parents. Lilia was Blaga’s niece. 12. Ibid., 118–119. 13. Rugescu comments that his interest in their economic well-being was greater than his interest in their religious life. Rugescu, Cu Lucian Blaga, 124. 14. Ibid., 122. 15. HCV, 16–17. 16. Rugescu, Cu Lucian Blaga, 123. Rugescu does not mention who this historian was. 17. HCV, 90.

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town of Sebe¸s, south of Lancr˘am. Although she was not of an intellectual inclination, she was very diligent and industrious, and Lucian accords to her much of the credit for the exceptional talents of her children.18 Lucian Blaga had six brothers and two sisters, among whom he was the youngest.19 With a large family and the somewhat small salary of a village priest, economic hardships were a regular part of Lucian’s early life. Tuition for an education at good schools was costly, but the Blaga family sacrificed so that Lucian and his brothers were able to attend private schools. Lucian’s sister, Leti¸tia, was less well educated, as was the usual practice, though she did attend school in Lancr˘am and even studied briefly in Sebe¸s and Bra¸sov. Leti¸tia was an intelligent and self-willed person, an elementary school teacher and mother. Lucian’s brother Tit Liviu was a high school teacher and published many articles and a high school textbook on mathematical physics. Lionel was a lawyer and served briefly as the mayor of Sebe¸s at the end of World War I. Longin studied commerce in Bra¸sov, but did not complete the degree. He served in the army in the Balkan war and in World War I, rising through the ranks to become an officer. He eventually left the army and became the accountant for a business owned by his wife’s family. Liciniu was a pharmacist, trained in Bucharest.20 Blaga’s family tree contains many people of considerable education and accomplishment, testimony to the native intelligence of the Blaga family. His relatives included many priests, bishops, theologians, professors, educators, medical doctors, and engineers. Many of Blaga’s relatives were people of great renown within Romania.21 Lucian Blaga was born on May 9, 1895, in the village of Lancr˘am in the same house as the eight siblings who preceded him. During his life he lived in several Transylvanian cities: Bra¸sov while in high school, Sibiu as a theology student and later as a professor, and for twenty-two years in Cluj as a professor and then as a historical researcher. He also spent several periods outside of Transylvania: he lived in Oradea (now one of the westernmost cities in Romania) while finishing his degree in theology, in Vienna while earning his PhD and later as a part of the Romanian embassy, in Lugoj (Romania), in Prague as a press attach´e, and in Lisbon as the Romanian ambassador. He died in Cluj on May 6, 1961, and was interred in Lancr˘am on the 9th, exactly sixty-six years after his birth. 18. Rugescu, Cu Lucian Blaga, 122, 132. 19. Their names were, in order of age, Leti¸tia, Tit Liviu, Leon, Lionel, Florin, Longin, Liciniu, and Lelia. Leon, Florin, and Lelia died in their childhoods, before Lucian was born. Rugescu, Cu Lucian Blaga, 120–21, 127, 130. 20. This information is taken from Rugescu, Cu Lucian Blaga, 118–70. 21. Ibid., 209–10.

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Religious Influences One would expect Blaga’s philosophy to be heavily influenced by the Orthodox theology of his country (85 percent of Romanians consider themselves part of the Orthodox Church), of his father (who was an Orthodox priest), and of his undergraduate education (his undergraduate degree was received from the Orthodox seminary of Sibiu). In fact, certain aspects of his system do seem to strongly reflect Christian theology in general and Orthodox theology in particular.22 In several places he discusses differences between Orthodox Christianity and Protestant and Catholic Christianity and shows a preference for Orthodoxy.23 It is also clear, however, that Blaga knowingly distanced himself from Orthodox theology in several important respects. These include rejection of the Orthodox view on the inspiration of Scripture, rejection of the Orthodox view of human destiny, and the proposal of a radically unChristian view of salvation. These departures from views that were virtually universally accepted in Romania caused a deep rift between Blaga and not a few of his contemporary intellectuals, most notably the eminent Orthodox theologian Dumitru St˘aniloae. St˘aniloae eventually published a widely read book detailing the most important differences between Blaga and Orthodoxy.24 While Blaga’s philosophy may appear to one raised in the West as being heavily influenced by Orthodoxy, to those raised in Orthodoxy it seems to be heavily influenced by Protestantism. More than one Romanian philosopher has remarked upon the Protestant flavor of Blaga’s philosophy.25 Blaga’s philosophy is indeed influenced by many of the philosophers who 22. The most striking of these aspects is Blaga’s theory of a single originator of the universe, an originator that surpasses human cognitive ability. This doctrine is compatible with the God of Christian theology in general, but Orthodoxy places greater emphasis on the transcendence and inscrutability of God than do the other branches of Christianity. B˘ancil˘a argues that the importance of Orthodoxy as a factor in influencing Blaga’s philosophy is also seen in Blaga’s arguments in favor of supralogical thought, which is a feature of Orthodox theology in contrast to the rationalism of Catholic thought. B˘ancil˘a, Lucian Blaga: Energie romˆaneasc˘a, 80. 23. This seems to show throughout chapter 10 of Orizont s¸i stil (hereafter referred to as OS). Also, in Geneza metaforei s¸i sensul culturii (hereafter referred to as GMSC), on pp. 460–61 Blaga argues that the icons of the Orthodox Church are a religious attempt to creatively reveal the transcendent, that iconoclasm is anticreative, and that Protestant Calvinism tends to be iconoclastic. 24. Dumitru St˘aniloae, Pozi¸tia dlui Lucian Blaga fa¸ta˘ de Cre¸stinism s¸i Ortodoxie [The Position of Mr. Lucian Blaga toward Christianity and Orthodoxy] (Sibiu, RO: Tiparul Tipografiei Arhidicezane, 1942). 25. For example, Mircea Flonta, a leading expert in Blaga’s philosophy, made such a comment to the present writer.

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influenced nineteenth- and twentieth-century Protestant theology. Furthermore, his near rejection of divine revelation, his rejection of the deity of Jesus of Nazareth, and his radical revision of the traditional Christian views on salvation is certainly more in line with liberal Protestantism than with Orthodoxy or early twentieth-century Catholicism.26 Blaga wrote in his autobiography that the Bible stories told to him by his mother are the building blocks of his personality.27 At the same time, he mentions the folktales and quasi-religious myths of which she was also fond, and the influence of these is ubiquitous in his poetry. While it may be safe to assert that Christianity had more of an influence on Blaga’s philosophy than did any other religion, a perusal of Blaga’s writings on philosophy of religion and philosophy of culture shows that Blaga was familiar with a very wide spectrum of religions from various times and from around the world. This familiarity no doubt contributed to the objectivity with which he treated all religions. It is also possible that some of his philosophical ideas were suggested to him by his study of other religions.28

Blaga’s Education Blaga’s formal education began at the Romanian school in Lancr˘am at the age of six.29 After the first year, he began study at the German academy in the nearby town of Sebe¸s.30 This academy was more academic than the village school, and Isidor Blaga sent all of his sons to study there. Blaga’s teachers in Sebe¸s were educated at German universities, and he notes that the school had a decidedly Schillerian atmosphere.31 Blaga excelled as a student, finishing at the head of the class three times and once as second in the class.32 He studied four years in Sebe¸s. At the age of eleven Blaga was sent to the city of Bra¸sov to study at the highly regarded private high school “Liceul Andrei Saguna.” ¸ In addition to Romanian he had the opportunity to study German, Hungarian, Latin, and Greek.33 He was particularly interested in the natural sciences and philoso26. These points will be discussed in the section on Blaga’s philosophy of religion. 27. HCV, 34. 28. For example, there are several books and articles that address parallels between Blaga’s philosophy and Indian thought. 29. HCV, 32. 30. Ibid., 33. 31. Ibid., 52. 32. Mircea Vaida, Pe urmele lui Lucian Blaga (Bucharest: Sport-Tourism, 1982), 3. 33. His autobiography hints that he may have also known Italian, and his autobiography and philosophical writings hint at a knowledge of French (as does Ion Balu, Via¸ta lui Lucian Blaga, vol. 1 [Bucharest: Editura Libra, 1995], 156).

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phy of science, as well as philosophy in general and world religions.34 For a variety of reasons he was not always able to attend the lectures in Bra¸sov, and sometimes stayed at his mother’s house in Sebe¸s, studying on his own using books from his father’s library and books borrowed from friends and from his alma mater in Sebe¸s.35 He graduated from Saguna ¸ in 1914 with a final thesis on Einstein’s relativity and Poincar´e’s non-Euclidean geometry.36 Upon graduation from Saguna, ¸ Blaga had hoped to study at the University of Jena in Germany, but this desire was thwarted by the onset of World War I.37 Blaga eventually opted to settle for one of the few higher educations available to him: a degree in theology from the Orthodox seminary in Sibiu, an intellectually important Transylvanian city. He was to a large extent motivated to accept this solution by the ability that it afforded him to avoid being drafted into the Austro-Hungarian army. He was also benefited by a scholarship underwriting his studies.38 Blaga writes that his studies at the Orthodox seminary were hampered by a dislike of traditional theology. Several of his professors allowed him the liberty to pursue more philosophical interests, however, and during this period he acquired an interest in philosophy of religion.39 He also read much on art history. He was able to read widely in the collection of the Bruckenthal library in Sibiu, pursuing subjects of personal interest. During this period he made his first visit to Vienna, where he made contacts at the University of Vienna and utilized the university library.40 Toward the end of World War I the Orthodox seminary was evacuated from Sibiu and moved to Oradea, further from the eastern front. Blaga left Vienna to finish his undergraduate degree in Oradea.41 Blaga records in his autobiography that during his final examinations he surpassed all of his colleagues in theology but passed the examination on church liturgy only through the leniency of one of his professors.42 He graduated from the Orthodox seminary in 1917. 34. HCV, 80, 138. Blaga states that his favorite lectures were on philosophy (HCV, 103), and opines that Ramakrishna (1836–86) was the most wonderful religious appearance of the nineteenth century and that Vedanta looks similar to Christianity when compared to naturalism (ibid., 95ff.). 35. In his father’s library he discoverd Goethe’s Faust, a book that considerably influenced his thinking (HCV, 87). Much later in life, after Blaga had been removed from his chair at the University of Cluj, he authored the first translation of Faust into Romanian. 36. Ibid., 140. 37. Ibid., 141– 42. 38. Ibid., 146–51. 39. Ibid., 160–61. 40. Ibid., 164ff.; second trip, 171; reads Indian philosophy, 174. 41. Ibid., 183ff. 42. Ibid., 192.

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In the fall of 1917 Blaga began his doctoral studies in the philosophy department of the University of Vienna.43 It was a time of severe food shortages in Vienna (due to the war).44 Blaga frequented lectures on subjects other than philosophy: in particular, he was interested by courses on science and art history.45 He returned to Transylvania during the time of the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the union of Transylvania with Romania. During this time his first two books were published, Poemele luminii (Poems of Light) and Pietre pentru templul meu (Stones for my Temple). These are a collection of poetry and a collection of aphorisms. They sold out quickly, and the money from their second edition allowed him to return to Vienna to finish his studies.46 Blaga chose to write his doctoral dissertation on epistemology. It is titled “Kultur und Erkenntnis.” It was successfully defended on November 26, 1920, and is signed by Alphonso Dopsch, Carol Liuk, and Stefan Meyer.47

Philosophical Influences The philosophical influences on Blaga are many and varied. In his writings he quotes from a wide array of authors, ancient and contemporary, from the East and the West. Different parts of his system reveal the influences of different thinkers. Plato and various Neoplatonist influences are clearly reflected in Blaga’s metaphysics, as well as certain Leibnizian influences; Kant casts a large shadow in Blaga’s theory of knowledge; the influence of Oswald Spengler on Blaga’s philosophy of culture is widely recognized;48 43. Balu, Via¸ta lui Lucian Blaga, 168; HCV, 196; Vaida, Pe urmele lui Lucian Blaga, 132. Teodorescu’s time line in Brenda Walker’s translation of Blaga’s poetry cites the date of the inception of Blaga’s doctoral studies as 1918 (Lucian Blaga, Complete Poetical Works of Lucian Blaga, trans. Brenda Walker [Ia¸si, Romania, Oxford, UK, Portland, OR: Center for Romanian Studies, 2001], 12); Vatamaniuc’s time line sites it as Feburary 1918 (D. Vatamaniuc, Lucian Blaga, 1895–1961: Biobibliografie [Bucharest: Editura Stiin¸ ¸ tific˘a s¸i Enciclopedic˘a, 1977], xxvii). 44. Because of the shortage of food, Blaga returned to Transylvania at roughly twomonth intervals to obtain food supplies. During one of these trips he stayed for several weeks in a small mountain village, where he was housed with the village schoolteacher and the priest, and served as the bell-ringer for the village church. HCV, 196, 209. 45. HCV, 204. He comments that it is during this period that his study of science leads him to develop his idea of “minus-cognition.” 46. These books were received as if they were a gift from Transylvania to Romania at the unification of the Romanian people, and they made Blaga famous in Romania overnight. HCV, 226, 224, 236. 47. HCV, 260. 48. Nemoianu, “Mihai Sora ¸ and the Traditions of Romanian Philosophy,” Review of Metaphysics 43 (March 1990): 594. This was pointed out by Nemoianu in an e-mail to the present author dated July 22, 2003. Blaga alludes to the influence of Kant and also of

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and Goethe’s imprint upon Blaga’s aesthetics is unmistakable. Other very important formative influences include German romanticism, Freudian psychoanalysis, Darwinian evolution, and the naturalistic tendency of early twentieth-century European thought in general.49 Descartes is one of the most influential figures in modern European philosophy, and his influence clearly extends to Blaga as well. In particular, it has been argued that Descartes is the major inspiration for the Great Anonymous concept in Blaga’s metaphysics.50 Blaga interacted with a number of contemporary movements and thinkers of his day.51 Among these the work of Henri Bergson ranks highly: although Blaga sometimes reacted against Bergson’s ideas, he accorded to Bergson the epithet “most significant philosopher of the time.”52 Similarly, Blaga interacted with early phenomenology and early American pragmatism, criticizing these movements but also being influenced by them. Blaga had a very strong interest in theoretical developments in the natural sciences. Related to this, it is purported that in his adolescence he was briefly attracted to positivism, but early in his adulthood he turned strongly against it.53 Blaga was also a serious student of aesthetic theory and engaged contemporary theories of aesthetics in his writings.54 Marburg neo-Kantianism in his autobiography, HCV, 129. Kant’s influence on Blaga is very clearly seen on p. 56 of Cultur˘a s¸i cuno¸stin¸ta˘ , where Blaga writes that the most significant problem in the theory of knowledge is that of the categories. Blaga devotes a whole chapter of this book to this problem; “Categoriile,” in Cultur˘a s¸i cuno¸stin¸ta˘ , book 1 in vol. 7 of Opere, ed. Dorli Blaga (Bucharest: Editura Minerva, 1980), 39–50. The relation of Spengler’s thought to Blaga’s philosophy is discussed in chapter 6 of this book. Blaga’s philosophy of culture can be viewed as a further development of some of Spengler’s ideas, but there are aspects of Blaga’s philosophy of culture that distinguish his ideas from Spengler’s. See also Alexandru Boboc, “Blaga, Nietzsche s¸i Spengler: Demersuri moderne asupr˘a paradigmei ‘stil’,” Seaculum, serie nou˘a 1, nos. 3– 4 (1995): 28–34. 49. Musc˘a, “Specificul crea¸tiei culturale romˆane¸sti ˆın cˆampul filosofiei,” 468– 469; Liviu Antonesei, “Repere pentru o filosofie a culturii,” in Lucian Blaga, ed. Ghi¸se, Botez, and Botez, 402ff.; Musc˘a, “Specificul crea¸tiei culturale romˆane¸sti ˆın cˆampul filosofiei,” 471, 473. Musc˘a also mentions Rousseau’s utopian philosophy as exercising some influence on Blaga’s work. 50. Marta Petreu, “De la Dumnezeul cel bun la Dumnezeul cel r˘au,” in Meridian Blaga, ed. Irina Petra¸s, vol. 2, (Cluj-Napoca, Romania: Casa C˘ar¸tii de Stiin¸ ¸ ta˘ , 2002), 30– 46. 51. A number of articles have been written on this subject, including Alexandru Surdu, “Aspecte moderniste ale filosofiei lui Blaga,” and Ionel Nari¸ta, “Elemente de epistemologie ˆın lucr˘arile timpurii ale lui Lucian Blaga,” in Meridian Blaga, ed. Irina Petra¸s, vol. 1 (Cluj-Napoca, Romania: Casa C˘ar¸tii de Stiin¸ ¸ ta˘ , 2000); and Constantin Noica, “Viziunea metafizic˘a a lui Lucian Blaga s¸i veacul al XX-lea,” in Dimensiunea metafizic˘a a operei lui Lucian Blaga, ed. A. Botez and A. Firu¸ta˘ (Bucharest: Editura Stiin¸ ¸ tific˘a, 1996). 52. HCV, 130; see also 116. 53. B˘ancil˘a, Lucian Blaga: Energie romˆaneasc˘a, 80. 54. As a practicing artist (a poet and playwright), Blaga had a very personal interest in aesthetic theory.

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Blaga’s philosophy is not, however, merely an attempted synthesis of elements borrowed from this wide array of world philosophers. A mere synthesis of such disparate elements would result in numerous inconsistencies if not outright contradictions. Blaga’s philosophy, inspired and molded by the philosophies and philosophers with whom he interacted, is a systematic and integrated attempt to address the issues that interested the leading minds of his day.

Blaga’s Contemporaries Blaga lived during a time of considerable philosophical tumult. He knew of, and/or personally interacted with, the intellectual leaders of the day. Major philosophers/thinkers who were contemporary with Blaga and whose thoughts he engaged include William James, Frege, Freud, Husserl, Bergson, Russell, Jung, Tillich, Heidegger, Eliade, and Hempel. Blaga cites and refers to many lesser-known contemporaries as well, thinkers who were seen as important in their respective fields during the first half of the twentieth century but are less well known today. Additionally, Blaga was a personal acquaintance of the other leading Romanian thinkers of his day, including the Romanian philosopher Constantin Noica, well-known Romanian expatriates such as Eliade and Emil Cioran, and the most renowned of Romanian Orthodox theologians, Dumitru St˘aniloae. Blaga’s autobiography is admittedly more than merely an attempt at an objective history of his life. Blaga allowed a certain amount of mystery to exist about his own person and his academic work.55 Therefore others have undertaken the task of writing biographies based on contributions from Blaga’s acquaintances. The contributors to this effort include some of the better-known Romanian intellectuals of Blaga’s day, including Vasile B˘ancil˘a, Mircea Eliade, Sandu Bologa, Stefan Augustin Doinas, Ovidiu Drimba, Maria Enescu, Oliviu Gherman, Edgar Papu, Liviu Rusu, and Ion D. Sˆırbu.56

Sources for the Study of Blaga’s Philosophy Blaga was a prolific writer. His published writings include many volumes of poetry, aphorisms, theatrical pieces, philosophy, a book on the intellectual history of Transylvania, an autobiography, and one novel. He also published many periodical articles. Much of his work has been collected in 55. Opri¸san, Lucian Blaga printre Contemporani, 7–8. 56. Ibid., 47–110. Victor Botez, “Blaga—omul—a¸sa cum l-au cunoscut,” in Lucian Blaga, ed. Ghi¸se, Botez, and Botez, 479–524.

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a twelve-volume set of collected works titled Opere. In addition, several collections of his private correspondence have been published. Several questions regarding the relevance to the study of Blaga’s philosophy of some of these primary sources must be addressed. The first concerns the consistency of Blaga’s thought over time. Some have asserted that there is a shift in Blaga’s thought during the time when he worked at the Romanian Academy in Cluj. The argument is that in his later period he was more interested in science and less reserved about the possibility of scientific progress than in his earlier period. Evidence for this interpretation includes Blaga’s late book, Experimentul s¸i spiritul matematic, published posthumously in 1969, and also the significant decrease in the occurrence of poetic language in his later works. This position seems to be somewhat of an overstatement. While there are certain changes in style and emphasis, the overall consistency of Blaga’s work, from his presystematic publications up until the time of his death, is supported by several convincing arguments.57 The most significant of these is Blaga’s own “editorial testimony,” written in 1959.58 According to this testimony, fifteen books of Blaga’s philosophy form the unitary system that is his systematic philosophy. The earliest of these books was published in 1931. The latest was completed in 1959 and published posthumously in 1967. This includes the bulk of his philosophical writing and seems to indicate that Blaga considered his writings to be consistently intercompatible. Furthermore, in his “philosophical self-portrait” (written in 1937), he explains and defends his earlier works, thus showing that he has not as of 1937 abandoned the views expressed therein.59 The suggestion that Blaga had a greater interest in science later in his life than in his earlier stages (during which he was recognized as a poet but not a philosopher) overlooks Blaga’s biography. Early in his life, especially during high school, philosophy of science was his greatest academic interest. Blaga’s love of science and his love of poetry coexisted without conflict.60 His interest in epistemology and philosophy of science predate his interest in metaphysics, aesthetics, and philosophy of religion, which really didn’t bloom until his undergraduate years of university study. A final argument for the unity of Blaga’s philosophical writings is the complementary nature of the earlier book S¸ tiin¸ta˘ s¸i crea¸tie (1942) and 57. A more detailed discussion of this is Mircea Flonta’s “Unitatea sistematica a filosofiei lui Lucian Blaga,” in Meridian Blaga, ed. Irina Petra¸s, 2:7–29. 58. Lucian Blaga, vol. 8 in Opere, ed. Dorli Blaga, 57–58. 59. Lucian Blaga, “Schi¸ta unei autoprezent˘ari filosofice,” Manuscriptum 17, no. 3 (1986): 59–67, reprinted in Diaconu and Diaconu, Dic¸tionar de termeni filosofici ai lui Lucian Blaga (Bucharest: Univers Enciclopedia, 2000). 60. This is consistent with his eventual philosophical explanation of science and art as equally valid attempts at “revealing mystery.”

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the later book Experimentul s¸i spiritul matematic (written after Blaga was removed from his teaching post and published posthumously in 1969). Both of these books explore the constructive nature of scientific investigation. There are, however, certain undeniable changes in Blaga’s philosophy from his earliest publications to his later years. The most comprehensive of these is a merely stylistic change. In his early and middle works, Blaga exhibits a considerable attraction to metaphorical language. In his latest works he seems to strive to avoid this recourse where possible.61 One example of this is the change from the metaphorical terms “paradisaic cognition” and “luciferic cognition” in his earlier systematic works to the use of the terms “type I cognition” and “type II cognition” to denote the same phenomena in his later writing. A more substantive change is the development in his understanding of the role of the “formative aspiration” (nazuin¸ta formativ˘a) in Blaga’s philosophy of culture. In an early work, Blaga wrote that the formative aspiration is the single stylistic category affecting all cultural creations. In his later works he posits four major stylistic categories forming a stylistic matrix that affect cultural creations.62 Blaga also admits other developments in his philosophy from his earliest works (including his doctoral dissertation) to his systematic works, but they do not undermine the central tenets of his system. Such developments are to be expected in the lifework of one who published his first philosophical pieces while a mere high school student. The second question that needs to be discussed is the usefulness of Blaga’s nonphilosophical writings to the study of his philosophy. Blaga’s philosophy is reflected in his poetry, theater, and other writings.63 However, Blaga’s fiction does not clearly reveal his philosophical thought, does not provide the argumentation that substantiates his positions, and is of a very different style than his philosophical writing. Having read all of Blaga’s poetry early on in my study of his philosophy, it is my opinion that one cannot decipher his philosophy from his poetry alone. On the other hand, his philosophy is quite accessible through his philosophical writings, and therefore recourse to his poetry and other literary writings is not necessary.64 Blaga himself makes a clear distinction between his philoso61. See Mircea Flonta’s discussion of this in “Unitatea sistematic˘a a filosofiei lui Lucian Blaga,” in Meridian Blaga, ed. Irina Petra¸s, 2:8–14. 62. Diaconu and Diaconu, Dictionar de termeni filosofici ai lui Lucian Blaga, 203. The formative aspiration is discussed again in the chapter on Blaga’s philosophy of culture. 63. Aurel Codoban, “Un Blaga ignorat: Filosoful religiei,” in Eonul Blaga: Sntˆaiul veac, ed. Mircea Borcila (Bucharest: Editura Albatros, 1997), 381–82. 64. For a discussion of this, see Alexandru T˘anase, Lucian Blaga: Filosoful poet, poetul filosof (Bucharest: Cartea Romˆaneasc˘a, 1977), chapters 11 and 12.

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phy on the one hand and his poetry and drama on the other. He states that while the latter contain elements of mysticism that are fitting to their genres, his philosophy does not contain mysticism.65

Primary Sources Other than his doctoral dissertation, which was written in German, all of Blaga’s major philosophical work is in Romanian. Although all of Blaga’s poetry has been translated into English, only a few small fragments of his philosophy have been translated. There are several reasons that Blaga’s philosophy has not been translated. Blaga himself harbored reservations about the possibility of adequately translating his philosophy. Because of his highly nuanced use of Romanian, Blaga did not believe that a translation would be able to effectively convey what he was trying to express.66 Furthermore, Blaga had reservations about the ability of his philosophy to speak to those who do not share his own Romanian stylistic matrix.67 After World War II, when Blaga should have been at the height of his publishing career, he was censured by the socialist government of Romania and was only allowed to publish occasional poems and translations of other peoples’ works. Although after his death the Romanian government permitted the publication of his works, his fame within Romania as a philosopher had already begun to wane and has even now only partially recovered. Many of Blaga’s philosophical works are still available in Romanian, however, having been reprinted after the fall of the socialist government. Blaga’s books of philosophy number thirty-four in total, including his doctoral dissertation and several collections of articles that were published posthumously. Most of these books are somewhat short, being around two hundred pages on average. Ten of these are considered his “presystematic works.” His systematic works are organized into four trilogies: the Trilogy of Knowledge (Eonul dogmatic, Cunoa¸sterea luciferic˘a, and Cenzura transcendent˘a), the Trilogy of Culture (Orizont s¸i stil, Spa¸tiul mioritic, and Geneza metaforei s¸i sensul culturii), the Trilogy of Values (¸Stiin¸ta˘ s¸i crea¸tie, Gˆandire magic˘a s¸i religie, and Art˘a s¸i valoare), and the Trilogy of Cosmology (Diferen¸tialele divine, Aspecte antropologice, and Fiin¸ta istoric˘a).68 The Trilogy of Knowledge contains a total of five books, Despre 65. Blaga, “Schi¸ta unei autoprezent˘ari filosofice,” Manuscriptum 17, no. 3 (1986); reprinted in Diaconu and Diaconu, Dic¸tionar de termeni filosofici ai lui Lucian Blaga, 12. 66. This is discussed in Mircea Flonta, “Blaga, Lucian.” In Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online, ed. E. Craig (London: Routledge, 2004). Retrieved January 3, 2006, from http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/N109. 67. Blaga, S¸ tiin¸ta˘ si crea¸tie, 178–80. Hereafter referred to as S¸ C. 68. Blaga had originally intended to write a minimum of five trilogies, but he revised this plan, deeming it more expedient to deal with certain issues (such as ethics and paranor-

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con¸stiin¸ta filosofic˘a being prefaced to the trilogy and Experimentul s¸i spiritul matematic being appended to it. The Trilogy of Values actually contains four books, the book Gˆandire magica s¸i religie being a composite of two earlier books, Despre gˆandirea magic˘a and Religie s¸i spirit. There are also books of philosophy that were written during the time of his systematic philosophy that do not form a part of the four trilogies. A chronological list of Blaga’s books of philosophy is given below. For full publishing information, please refer to the bibliography.

A Chronological List of Blaga’s Books of Philosophy:69 Pietre pentru templul meu [Stones for My Temple], 1919. This is a collection of aphorisms. Cultur˘a s¸i cuno¸stin¸ta˘ [Culture and Knowledge], 1922. This is the Romanian version of Blaga’s doctoral dissertation. It attempts to demonstrate that knowledge is determined by cultural categories. Probleme estetice [Aesthetical Problems], 1924.70 This is a discussion of several contemporary issues and movements in philosophical aesthetics. Filosofia stilului [The Philosophy of Style], 1924. This is a collection of philosophical essays concerning style in literature and art. Fe¸tele unui veac [The Faces of an Age], 1925. This is a collection of essays about romanticism, naturalism, and impressionism. Fenomenul originar [The Original Phenomenon], 1925. This is an analysis of the concept urphanomen [original phenomenon] in Goethe, Schelling, Strindberg, Nietzsche, Spengler, and others. Ferestre colorate [Painted Windows], 1926. This is a collection of essays on aesthetics. Daimonion [Evil Genius], 1930. This book explores the relation between intuition and reason. Eonul dogmatic [The Dogmatic Age], 1931. This book advocates application of a certain epistemological strategy (“minus-cognition”) in situations of apparent antinomy. Cunoa¸sterea luciferic˘a [Luciferic Cognition], 1933. This book explains the important distinction between type I cognition and type II cognition, also called paradisaical cognition and luciferic cognition. mal phenomena) in books of aphorisms, dialogues, and fiction; see vol. 8 in Opere, ed. Dorli Blaga, 58–59. What Blaga’s systematic ethics might have been like is discussed by ˆ aiul veac, ed. Mircea Dan Santa, “Lucian Blaga s¸i universul Gnostic,” in Eonul Blaga: Intˆ Borcila (Bucharest: Editura Albatros, 1997), 396– 400. 69. This list has been complied using the bibliographies provided in Mircea Flonta, “Blaga, Lucian,” in The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online, and in Vatamaniuc, Lucian Blaga, 1895–1961, 17–29. Information about books not found in these bibliographies was taken from the books themselves. 70. This publication is included in vol. 7 of Opere, ed. Dorli Blaga, 83–131, but information about the original publication other than the date is not provided.

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ˆ Cenzura transcendent˘a: Incercare metafizic˘a [Transcendent Censorship: A Metaphysical Attempt], 1934. This book provides a “metaphysics of knowledge” complementary to the epistemology provided in the two previous works. Orizont s¸i stil [Horizon and Style], 1935. This book discusses the subconscious structures (the “stylistic matrix”) that model all cultural creations: myth, religion, art, philosophy, and even theoretical science. Spa¸tiul mioritic [The Ewe-Space], 1936. This book describes the stylistic matrix of popular Romanian culture. Geneza metaforei s¸i sensul culturii [The Genesis of Metaphor and the Meaning of Culture], 1937. This book analyzes the relationship between metaphor and culture and the relationship of culture to “history.” Elogiul satului romˆanesc [Eulogy to the Romanian Village], 1937. This is the paper that Blaga presented at his acceptance into the Romanian Academy. Art˘a s¸i valoare [Art and Value], 1939. This book argues that art is a form of revealing mystery. Diferen¸tialele divine. [Divine Differentials], 1940. This is a more general presentation of Blaga’s metaphysics and a detailed presentation of his cosmology. Despre gˆandirea magic˘a [Concerning Magical Thinking], 1941. This book argues that myths are stylistically structured attempts at revealing mystery. Religie s¸i spirit [Religion and Spirit], 1942. This book argues that religions are cultural creations, and as such are valid attempts to reveal mystery but do not escape the historicity of the human situation. S¸ tiin¸ta˘ s¸i crea¸tie [Science and Creation], 1942. This book argues that theoretical science is also culturally (and therefore historically) determined. Discobolul: Aforisme s¸i ˆınsemn˘ari [Discobolus: Aphorisms and Notes], 1945. This is a collection of aphorisms and short commentaries. Despre con¸stiin¸ta filosofic˘a [Concerning Philosophical Consciousness], 1947. This is an introduction to philosophy according to Blaga’s understanding of the philosophical discipline. Aspecte antropologice [Anthropological Aspects], 1948. This book discusses how anthropology is integrated into Blaga’s metaphysical and cosmological vision. Gˆandiria romˆaneasc˘a ˆın Transilvania ˆın secolul al XVIII-lea [Romanian Thinking in Transylvania in the Eighteenth Century], 1966. This is a historical/philosophical study of the social and political ideas in Transylvania during the eighteenth century. Z˘ari s¸i etape: Studii, aforisme, ˆınsemn˘ari. [Horizons and Stages: Studies, Aphorisms, Notes], 1968. This is a collection of short pieces written between 1919 and 1930, collected into a volume by Blaga in 1945 and published posthumously by Dorli Blaga. Experimentul s¸i spiritul matematic [The Experiment and the Mathematical Spirit], 1969. This is a philosophical analysis of the epistemological methods of the natural sciences. Scrieri despre art˘a [Writings about Art], 1970. This is an anthology of Blaga’s writings on art and aesthetics edited by Dumitru Micu. Isvoade: Eseuri, conferin¸te, articole [Manuscripts: Essays, Conferences, Articles], 1972. This is a collection of essays, papers, and articles on a variety of philosophical subjects published posthumously by Dorli Blaga and Petre Nicolau.

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Ceasornicul de nisip [The Hourglass], 1973. This is a large collection of short pieces on philosophical issues and people edited by Mircea Popa. Fiin¸ta istoric˘a [The Historical Being], 1977. This book identifies as historical all phenomena that bear the imprint of culture and characterizes humanity as “historical beings.” The last chapter of this book contains a summary of Blaga’s systematic philosophy. Elanul insulei: Aforisme s¸i ˆınsemn˘ari [The Upsurge of the Island: Aphorisms and Notes], 1977. This is a further collection of Blaga’s aphorisms and notes on various philosophical and cultural issues, published posthumously by Dorli Blaga and George Gan˘a. ˆ Incerc˘ ari filosofice [Philosophical Attempts], 1977. This is a collection of articles written by Blaga primarily in the early part of his philosophical writing and published mainly in the Romanian Banat. It is edited by Anton Ilica. Vederi s¸i istorie [Perspectives and History], 1992. This is a collection of short pieces edited by Mircea Popa that continues the collection begun in Ceasornicul de nisip (1973). It contains articles on culture, politics, society, religion, and literature that were not in the first volume. Curs de filosofia religiei [Course on the Philosophy of Religion], 1994. This book discusses a wide array of religions and demonstrates that all are influenced by the cultures in which they were created.

(Please note that because of the large number of references to Blaga’s books throughout this book, these books will often be referred to in this text using the initials of their titles in the original language. A list of these abbreviations is provided following the table of contents in the front matter of this volume.) In addition to his thirty-four books of philosophy, Blaga authored and published many periodical articles. A select list of his philosophy articles that were published in academic journals is included in the bibliography at the end of this work. While little of Blaga’s philosophy exists in English, a not insignificant portion of it has been translated into other European languages. The following is a list of translations of Blaga’s philosophical works. Orizzonte e stile, ed. Antonio Banfi. Milan: Minuziano Editore, 1946. Zum Wesen der rumanischen Volkseele, ed. Mircea Flonta. Bucharest: Editura Minerva, 1982. L’Eon dogmatique, L’Age d’Homme, trans. Jessie Marin, Raoul Marin, Mariana Danesco, and Georges Danesco. Lausanne: Editions l’Age d’Home, 1988. L’Eloge du village roumain, ed. Jessie Marin and Raoul Marin. Paris: Librairie du Savoir, 1989. L’Etre historique, trans. Mariana Danesco. Paris: Librairie du Savoir, 1990. Les Differentielles divines, trans. Thomas Bazin, Raoul Marin, and Georges Danesco. Paris: Librairie du Savoir, 1990. La trilogie de la connaissance, trans. Rauol Marin and Georges Piscoci-Danescu. Paris: Librairie du Savoir, 1992.

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Trilogia della cultura: Lo spazio mioritico, trans. Ricardo Busetto and Marco Cugno. Alessandria, Italy: Editionni dell’Orso, 1994.

Secondary Sources There is a fairly substantial body of secondary literature in Romanian on Blaga’s philosophy. This includes books, collections of papers presented at conferences, two large bibliographies, and numerous periodical articles. In contrast to the wealth of resources on Blaga in Romanian, there is very little published in English on Blaga’s philosophy. One of the earliest sources is Eliade’s brief discussion of Blaga in his entry on “Rumanian Philosophy” in Macmillan’s Encyclopedia of Philosophy.71 Virgil Nemoianu has two short but insightful discussions of Blaga’s philosophy. The first is contained in the article “Mihai Sora and the Traditions of Romanian Philosophy” in the Review of Metaphysics.72 The second is the chapter “The Dialectics of Imperfection” in Nemoianu’s book A Theory of the Secondary.73 The Bucharest philosopher Angela Botez has published several articles introducing Blaga’s thought and comparing Blaga with better-known philosophers. These articles are “Lucian Blaga and the Complementary Spiritual Paradigm of the 20th Century,” “Comparativist and Valuational Reflections on Blaga’s Philosophy,” and “The Postmodern Antirepresentationalism (Polanyi, Blaga, Rorty),”74 all of which appeared in the journal Revue Roumaine de Philosophie et Logique. Another Romanian academic, Bazil Munteanu, has published an article introducing Blaga’s philosophy in the same journal, “Lucian Blaga, Metaphysican of Mystery and Philosopher of Culture.”75 Several other articles in English on Blaga are listed in the bibliography at the end of this book. The most detailed piece to date on Blaga and his philosophical work is Keith Hitchins’ introduction to Brenda Walker’s translation of Blaga’s poetry.76 This piece is twenty-six pages long, and although it is not devoted 71. Mircea Eliade, “Rumanian Philosophy,” in Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan and the Free Press, 1967). 72. Nemoianu, “Mihai Sora ¸ and the Traditions of Romanian Philosophy,” 591–605. 73. Nemoianu, A Theory of the Secondary: Literature, Progress, and Reaction, 153–70. 74. Angela Botez, “Lucian Blaga and the Complementary Spiritual Paradigm of the 20th Century,” Revue Roumaine de Philosophie et Logique 37 (1993): 51–55; “Comparativist and Valuational Reflections on Blaga’s Philosophy,” Revue Roumaine de Philosophie et Logique 40 (1996): 153–62; “The Postmodern Antirepresentationalism (Polanyi, Blaga, Rorty),” Revue Roumaine de Philosophie et Logique 41 (1997): 59–70. 75. Bazil Munteanu, “Lucian Blaga, Metaphysician of Mystery and Philosopher of Culture,” Revue Roumaine de Philosophie et Logique 39 (1995): 43– 46. 76. Keith Hitchins, introduction to Complete Poetical Works of Lucian Blaga, trans. Brenda Walker, 23– 48. My single reservation about Hitchins’ introduction is regarding the

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exclusively to Blaga’s philosophy, it provides an excellent general introduction to Blaga’s thought. A shorter but strictly philosophical resource is Mircea Flonta’s entry on Blaga in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online.77 Additional secondary resources are available in Continental European languages. There is a larger body of secondary materials in French than in English. Although Blaga’s second language was German, and although he studied in Austria and wrote his doctoral dissertation in German, more of his philosophy and more articles about his philosophy are available in French than in German. This is because of the historic links between Romania and France: many Romanian scholars have emigrated to France, and it is these more than the French themselves who have promoted the translation and discussion of Blaga’s work. Some articles on Blaga’s philosophy can also be found in German, Italian, and Hungarian.

assertion on p. 24 that “Blaga sought to ground his own theories not on language or religion or race but rather on the traditions and spirit of the village and on the collective unconscious that emanated from it.” 77. Mircea Flonta, “Blaga, Lucian,” in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online, ed. E. Craig (London: Routledge, 2004). Retrieved January 3, 2006, from http:// www.rep.routledge.com/article/N109.

3 Blaga’s Philosophy of Philosophy Blaga’s Understanding of the Philosophical Task

Blaga is a philosopher who is very aware of the usefulness of a critical reflection on the nature of the philosophical enterprise.1 In his book Despre con¸stiin¸ta filosofic˘a (Concerning Philosophical Consciousness) Blaga discusses his conception of philosophy and what it means to philosophize.2 He supports his interpretation of the philosophical task with many illustrations taken from the history of philosophy. He draws many of his illustrations from modern European philosophy and many from ancient Greek philosophy, but also refers to philosophers from the Middle Ages, American pragmatism, and philosophers from the Orient.3 He also draws arguments and illustrations from the intellectual heritage of the sciences, the arts, and religion. Blaga views philosophy, as he views all human endeavors to understand reality, as a creative construction, an attempt to portray (Blaga often uses the word “reveal”) reality using human patterns of thought and language.4 1. It is possible to see all of Blaga’s philosophy as being first and foremost a metaphilosophy, an analysis of what philosophy is and a proposal of how philosophy should operate. Ioan Biris argues for this view in his article “Dogma s¸i transcendenta la Lucian Blaga,” Arad Revista de Cultur˘a 5, no. 7–9 (1994): 32–37. 2. Lucian Blaga, Despre con¸stiin¸ta filosofic˘a, in vol. 8 of Opere, ed. Dorli Blaga (Bucharest: Editura Minerva, 1983); hereafter referred to as DCF. 3. Blaga’s sources from European philosophy include Avenarius, Bergson, Berkeley, Bruno, Carnap, Comte, Descartes, Fichte, Haeckel, Hegel, Heidegger, Hume, Husserl, Kant, Keyserling, Kierkegaard, Leibniz, Leonardo, Locke, logical positivism, Mach, Montaigne, Nietzsche, Novalis, Ostwald, Pascal, Reichenbach, Schelling, Schlick, Schopenhauer, Spencer, Spinoza, Steiner, and Swedenborg (plus important thinkers who are not usually considered philosophers, such as Darwin, Einstein, Galileo, Newton, and Max Planck). Sources from ancient Greek philosophy include Anaxagoras, Aristotle, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Pythagoras, Plato, Thales, and Zeno. Sources from the Middle Ages include Augustine, Cusanus, and Plotinus, while sources from American Pragmatism and from the Orient include James, Lao-tzu, Zoroaster, the Vedantins, and Gandhi. 4. In Blaga, “revelation” usually signifies a human attempt to portray, explicate, or understand something that is difficult or even impossible to express or grasp. Revelation is

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The coronation of philosophy is, therefore, the creation of a metaphysical system.5 The sciences and the arts are also attempts at “revealing the mystery of existence” (this is one of the ways that Blaga describes human inquiries). Science sits at one extreme of these attempts, being rather closely tied to empirical observation and more tightly controlled by its own presuppositions.6 Art is located toward the other extreme being much less controlled by methodological presuppositions, and having a much more subtle relationship with empirical observation.7 He locates philosophy between science and art, being less constrained than the former and less subjective than the latter.8 Blaga describes philosophy as an inherently creative yet critical assessment of what is, a rigorous attempt to understand or come to terms with the whole of human existence.9 It is not the casual and almost universal attempt of the common man to provide an explanation of the events of life.10 It is a particular approach to understanding the human situation and formulating this understanding in human terms. In analyzing the nature of the philosophical task, he discusses the awakening of the philosophical consciousness in ancient Greece.11 The Homeric cosmological vision a creative human activity. Blaga writes, “The philosopher is compelled to convert a mystery as full and deep as all existence into terms that are accessible to the human understanding.” DCF, 94. As will be explained in the chapter on philosophy of religion, Blaga does not rule out the possibility of a divine revelation, but expresses strong reservations about it, and asserts that even a divine revelation would involve human “revelation” (as defined above) in the attempt at understanding. 5. DCF, 107. 6. DCF, chapters 4 and 5, “Philosophy, Science, and Experience” and “Philosophical Problems and Scientific Problems.” See also Lucian Blaga, “The mathematization of the methods of scientific research and philosophical pan-mathematicism,” in Experimentul s¸i spiritual matematic, in vol. 8 of Opere, ed. Dorli Blaga, 657–74. Hereafter referred to as ESM. 7. DCF, chapter 15, “Philosophy and Art.” 8. This will be elaborated later. 9. Creative: “The philosopher aspires to become the author of a world.” DCF, 94. Critical: ibid., 189. Global: Philosophy is “one of the fundamental human modes of resolving the relations with that which ‘is’ ” (ibid., 190); it has as its goal “the revelation of the mystery of existence in its totality” (ibid., 107). It will be seen later that this goal is never completely achieved, but it is important nonetheless because of its value-motivating and life-directing force. 10. Philosophy is, on the other hand, akin to the childhood propensity to ask “why?” at every new phenomenon. Blaga states that adults have “castrated” their curiosity in assuming that things are naturally understood in themselves. He lauds children for their lack of inhibition in asking questions, and affirms that philosophers should follow their example and not be too timid to ask “why are things the way they are, and not otherwise?” In this respect, according to Blaga, “philosophy is childhood without exit.” Blaga, Diferen¸tialele divine, in vol. 11 of Opere, ed. Dorli Blaga, 105; hereafter referred to as DD. 11. DCF, 68–72. Blaga borrows the image of awakening from Kant, as is explained on p. 67.

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dominant in ancient Greek in the time of the philosopher Thales had a fairy-tale-like atmosphere, the world being a closed space surrounded by water, populated and manipulated by a multitude of gods and demons that furnished explanations for the ordinary and extraordinary phenomena of daily life. Thales suggested for the first time a form of monistic cosmology: all existing things are composed of different forms of one substance, water. Through this extremely suggestive metaphysical vision Thales radically changed the Greek perspective about reality, redirecting the Greek intellectual current from an approach that has been characterized as “mythopoetic” to one that is recognizably philosophical.12 Many subsequent thinkers have been preoccupied with discovering the “true” underlying substance of reality (and proving or disproving monist cosmology). Thales provoked an awakening in Greek philosophy: an awakening to the possibility of understanding the nature of our world. Although in the end Blaga rejects the possibility of an ultimate analysis of reality, he sees this as an important moment in the development of philosophy.13 According to Blaga, although we never fully awaken from our “spiritual slumber,” we come closest in moments when new intellectual movements are begun, as in the example of Thales. The philosophical approach to inquiry can be employed by almost anyone—it is a mode of investigation that can be intentionally cultivated.14 Philosophies appear in a wide variety of forms, from poetic and aphoristic to rigorously systematic.15 The style in which a particular philosopher formulates his thought is determined by the philosopher’s “theoretical situation” (the total of the claimed knowledge, methods, and tools of cognition of the philosopher’s own milieu), the philosopher’s own spiritual and intellectual makeup, and his vision of the world (152–62). There is no one correct style of philosophizing (65).16 A philosophy can be “visionary” or “critical,” visionary philosophies attempting to comprise all existence within one great philosophical system, while critical philoso12. Antony Flew, A Dictionary of Philosophy, rev. 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1979), 351. 13. This rejection will be explained in subsequent chapters. 14. Flew, A Dictionary of Philosophy, 63. 15. Blaga exalts Lao-tzu as the most successful philosopher at expressing his philosophy through aphorisms, but also discusses the aphorisms of Heraclitus, Pascal, Nietzsche, and Novalis. He mentions the following as systematic philosophers: Melissus, Plato, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Fichte, Hegel, and Schopenhauer. He calls Kant’s system a “colossal torso” (DCF, 163). He mentions Novalis as succeeding without a system, and Schelling as creator of a plurality of systems (ibid., 164). He opposes what he sees as an antisystematic movement in Kierkegaard and existentialism (ibid., 165). Further references to DCF will be given by page number in the text. 16. “Thoughts and Systems,” in DCF, 158–66. Blaga does state that large philosophical visions are better suited to systematic elaboration than to aphoristic suggestion (DCF, 162).

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phies focus on specific problems of human existence (70–71). Yet all philosophies have in common both the purpose of seeking ultimate explanations and the method of a critical and provisional mode of inquiry.

Blaga’s Understanding of Philosophical Methodology The “philosophical method” uniformly incorporates certain features (such as the utilization of logic and the attempt at objectivity).17 Within this broad framework philosophers have the liberty of employing a variety of methodological strategies. In contrast to the natural sciences, where the methods of inquiry are seldom disputed and are generally handed down from one generation to the next, philosophers often feel the need to begin their investigations from scratch, reinvestigating the question of philosophical method, in addition to the questions to which this method will be applied. Philosophers have sometimes thought themselves able to make a clean start, without presuppositional baggage. Blaga says that this is not possible: even if all else is put aside, the starting point itself is necessarily unjustified at the time of the start and is only justified (if justified at all) a posteriori by its ability to organize data and “to construct a world.” Other philosophers have sought to employ some single philosophical method able to consistently produce dependable results. Blaga calls this “methodological purism” (108). Blaga gives Parmenides as a striking example of methodological purism. Parmenides’ contemporaries assumed the validity of sensory data and of reason, the legitimacy of imagination, and certain mythical beliefs. Parmenides pointed out the gross fallibility of sensory data and the unreliability of myths evidenced by the fact that they vary greatly from one people to another. Therefore Parmenides concluded that the only absolutely reliable philosophical method is pure reason. He concluded that the only beliefs that can be considered true are those that can be conceived purely conceptually and without contradiction, and furthermore that these are all that really exists, the rest of the alleged world being mere illusion. Zeno carried Parmenides’ thought even further, reaching logical but unlikely extremes. Conversely, Henri Bergson, also seeking methodological purism, reacts in the opposite direction, concluding that what is most philosophically reliable is intuition, and what really exists is the illogical 17. Blaga accepts the usefulness of logic, but reserves the right to reject the application of logic in appropriate circumstances. The important place of the nonrational in Blaga’s philosophy gives rise to some interesting points of tension, as discussed in Leonard Gavriliu’s interesting chapter “Locul ra¸tiunii” [The place of reason], in Incon¸stientul ˆın viziunea lui Lucian Blaga: Preludii la o Noologie Abisal˘a (Bucharest: Editura Iri, 1997), 155–62; on objectivity see DCF, 190.

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(109–10). These attempts at methodological purism are not successful. Blaga judges that the contemporary philosophical landscape is tending more toward “methodological expansionism”: the inclusion of different philosophical and epistemological methodologies appropriate to different problems of investigation, returning to the methodological approach of Plato (112–15). According to Blaga, every philosophical system has some central point that is treated as if it somehow coincides with ultimate reality, some point that is treated as a certain central thesis. This thesis guides and colors the whole system. Blaga names the particular slant or emphasis that this thesis gives to the philosophical system “the transcendental accent.”18 All systems have a transcendental accent, and naturally strive to avoid judgments that conflict with it (145– 46). Some examples of transcendental emphases in various philosophical systems are: in Plato, the knowledge of the Ideals; in Plotinus, ecstasy; in the Abrahamic religions, revelation; Descartes (the most important example, according to Blaga), rationalism operating through concepts; Spinoza, mystical rationalism; Leibniz, rational imagination; Locke, rational empiricism; Hume, skeptical empiricism; Berkeley, Christian empiricism; Kant, ethics (primarily the ideas of God, immortality, and liberty; Kant also has a secondary transcendental accent that enables knowledge in general); Hegel, dialectical thought; Schopenhauer, interior intuition/universal will; Bergson and Husserl, intuition; Avenarius and Mach, sensation; Novalis, poetic imagination; and in Swedenborg, clairvoyance (147–51).19 Awareness of the transcendental emphases of different philosophical systems facilitates the process of analysis and comparison (152). Blaga notes that there are certain important “motifs” that recur in disparate philosophical systems. How these motifs are adopted and adapted so that they harmonize with systems that are significantly different is of philosophical interest. Blaga states that the sum of all the claimed knowledge of the age wherein a given philosopher works, the theoretical methods and tools of cognition, and the “stylistic field” of the age all affect how a philosopher adapts important motifs to his/her own system. (The sum of all these factors Blaga calls the “theoretical situation” of the philosopher [153].) Each thinker uses these motifs differently within his/her system, each more or less successful in constructing a coherent system that 18. Blaga’s use of the term “transcendental” differs from that of Kant. According to Blaga, in Kant the term “transcendental” refers to any knowledge of the implicit conditions that make possible a priori knowledge, and to a unique method of explaining these conditions. DCF, 149. 19. According to Blaga, the natural sciences also have a transcendental accent, but over the last centuries this accent has been very stable and uniform, in contrast to the variety found in philosophy.

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contains important similar elements and important elements that are seemingly irreconcilable. As examples of this Blaga cites Parmenides, the Vedantins, and Spinoza’s adaptations of the motif “the characteristic unity of existence”; Plato and Leibniz’s adaptations of the motif “the pluralism of existence”; and the different adaptations of “becoming” as a motif in Heraclitus and Hegel. Blaga discusses at some length the use of variations on “ego sum cogitans” in the philosophies of Augustine, Descartes, Kant, and Fichte (153–57). Awareness of the existence and creative adaptation of philosophical motifs has two important benefits: it provides a common ground for comparative philosophy, and it protects students of philosophy from concluding too hastily that “there is nothing new under the sun” (152, 158).

Blaga on the Relationship of Philosophy and Common Sense Twentieth-century studies in anthropology, psychology, and philosophy have tended to relativize and diminish the value of commonsense beliefs.20 A key observation in the critique of common sense is that the rejection of something may be accepted as common sense in one culture while the acceptance of that same thing is viewed as common sense in another. However, common sense also has its contemporary defenders. In the 2005 Aquinas lecture of the National Honor Society for Philosophy, Nicholas Rescher presented a defense of the role of common sense in cognition and in philosophy.21 Some philosophers have centered their work on the attempt to defend “common sense.” However, philosophical motifs, or the way in which philosophical motifs are fitted into a system, often go against the commonsense perspective. Blaga is keenly aware of this, and takes a balanced position on the issue that could serve as an example to others. Describing common sense, Blaga seems to grant to it a great deal of legitimacy: Common sense appears as a psychological/spiritual reality. Common sense represents a balanced average of the intellectual reactions of collective humanity, understood more as a homogenous mass, diffuse and without precise limits, than as a distinct structure with a profile fully described. Common sense is constituted in virtue of some ideas assimilated by individual persons, little by little, through living together with others. Common sense is, therefore, an 20. See, for example, Shawn W. Rosenberg, The Not So Common Sense: Differences in How People Judge Social and Political Life (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002). 21. Nicholas Rescher, Common-sense: A New Look at an Old Philosophical Tradition (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 2005).

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exponent of the sociability of the individual and is manifested in a number of attitudes and judgments that implicate specific norms adopted by collective humanity. These norms are usually imposed upon the collectivity without the collectivity being aware of it. To the extent to which the implicit norms of the intellectual reactions engage a more vast collectivity, common sense becomes an even more redoubtable factor in the daily life of the individual who is part of the collectivity. (81)

He follows this accommodating description with the caution that, while he recognizes the “redoubtability” of common sense, he has not yet uttered any judgment with respect to its legitimacy. Fundamentally, he states, common sense could be a body of mistakes entered into the collective unconscious. Blaga points out that scientific findings sometimes disagree with the rulings of common sense, but he argues that philosophy disagrees with its actual nature. It is not merely the particular prejudices of common sense that philosophy objects to, but rather philosophy objects to its method, its “equipment” (82). Whereas common sense is methodologically tied to a conformist impulse, the philosopher declares himself independent of the collectivity and its prejudgments (81). This is evident even in one of the definitions that Blaga gives for the philosophic task: “to philosophize means, therefore, to keep yourself available for modes of thinking that structurally are not a part of common sense” (91–92).22 It is often the case that a philosopher finds it necessary to attack a commonly accepted point of view in order to create new ideological space within which to work (82). According to Blaga, there exists not a single constitutive element of common sense that has not been contested at one time or another by philosophy (82). Blaga supports this assertion, and his general attack on common sense, with a variety of examples culled from the history of philosophy.23 One example that he discusses is the variety of philosophical approaches to truth that are at odds with common sense. Something roughly corresponding to a noncritical version of the correspondence theory of truth is “the supreme value under the shield of which sits common sense” (90). As early as Parmenides this conception was radically modified, Parmenides asserting that what is true is limited to logical concepts. 22. According to Traian Pop, Blaga’s position is not so much a critique of common sense as it is a proposal that philosophy requires a “critical detachment” from common sense. Traian Pop, Introducere ˆın filosofia lui Lucian Blaga (Cluj-Napoca, Romania: Editura Dacia, 2001), 40. Traian has an entire chapter on Blaga’s view of common sense. 23. These are: the cosmologies of Parmenides and Zeno, Hindu anthropology, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Hume on causality, Fichte’s reconstruction of the object, stasis and process in Heraclitus, stasis and creation in Descartes, and Hegel’s turning the tables on noncontradiction (Blaga labels the latter one of the most cherished principles of common sense). DCF, 83–90.

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In Plato, truth is a fruit of the human spirit, because only as spirits can humans have had access to the Ideal Forms. In Lao-tzu ultimate truth is paradoxical. Many other philosophers have suggested other theories of truth (90–91). Concerning common sense, Blaga concludes that while it is important in daily life, philosophy is not constrained by it, and need not be. At times science also works outside of the bounds of common sense. At these times science approaches philosophy (92). On the other hand, there are elements of the mythic and magic in philosophy.24 Even the most rationalist philosophers (e.g., Spinoza, Leibniz, Hegel) do not elude the mythic, and it appears not merely on the fringes of their systems, but as a fundamental aspect of their structure. Nor do materialists elude the mythic. Therefore, suggests Blaga, mythical and magical elements seem to be necessary to any philosophy that aspires to explain existence. While a scientific account of existence may someday be possible, in the meantime humanity must try to explain existence with the resources at hand (134 – 44).25

Blaga on the Justification of Philosophy and Philosophical Propositions In light of the supposed task of explaining existence, it is relevant to ask how the success of philosophy can be measured. Blaga proposes that philosophy is justified pragmatically, by a variety of uses and successes, even if all of the solutions that it proposes were to turn out to be illusory.26 24. Mythical language is valued by Blaga as an expression of things that are difficult to articulate. Mythical explanations are subject to refinement and replacement by more refined or more complete explanations. While a philosophical vision can contain myths, these myths must not be in clear contradiction of reasonably interpreted experience. According to Blaga, mythic thought is another attempt at understanding the mystery of existence. Mythic thinking is very imaginative, and while it does not “adequately” explain the mysteries of existence, it does succeed to a degree in satisfying the inquisitive human spirit. Mythical explanations have the characteristic of being at one and the same time explanation and argument; thus myth escapes the need for rigorous proof and allows the imagination liberal creative latitude. Magic is an even less adequate revelation of mystery, being nonrational and by nature paradoxical. The strength of magical explanation is its acceptance of the paradoxes of existence, but it errs in finding paradoxes in almost everything. See Blaga, DD, 188; Lucian Blaga, Gˆandire magic˘a s¸i religie, in vol. 10 of Opere, ed. Dorli Blaga (Bucharest: Editura Minerva, 1987). Hereafter referred to as GMR. 25. Blaga asserts that humanity cannot happily renounce the task of explaining reality: to strive for this understanding is in our nature. 26. The pragmatism of certain aspects of Blaga’s philosophy is very much in keeping with the trend in American philosophy at the end of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first centuries. Blaga criticized American pragmatism as reducing philosophy almost to the point of scientific analysis, which deprives philosophy of the ability to address

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He argues that the effort of the philosophical task yields dividends of deepening and adding details to the human understanding of the “problematic of the human spirit.” Philosophical solutions, even if mistaken, are likened to leaves that fall to the ground, fertilizing the soil in which new, greater solutions will grow (71). Blaga asserts that no person can live entirely apart from metaphysical speculation, and criticizes Kant for trying to limit or interdict metaphysical speculation (169).27 Just as in science theories replace each other in an endless sequence, but are justified because of their usefulness, fruitfulness, and as stages toward a fuller understanding, so is philosophy justified by its fruits without the need for its theories to be ultimate descriptions of reality. Science, guided by the mathematical/mechanical principles espoused by Leonardo, Galileo, and Descartes, has had great material utility. Similarly philosophy, guided by other principles, has had great utility in art, literature, politics, and social arenas. Philosophy is justified by its fruitfulness, vision, internal logic, suggestiveness, foresight, and how it stirs the soul, even if its theories are destined to always fall short of perfection (74, 170–72). Philosophy moves history in a way that science and other human endeavors cannot (173). Philosophical systems are also evaluated “dimensionally,” in terms of depth, height, shallowness, breadth, and so on. That philosophies are evaluated using metaphorical language hints at the fact that they are attempts at describing a transcendent reality (116–117). This fact also may give a clue as to why the empirical has such a great impact on most metaphysical constructions (ibid.). Those aspects of a system that are discussed using horizontal metaphors (e.g., broad, narrow, etc.) are more purely descriptive, whereas those aspects that are discussed using vertical metaphors (e.g., deep, shallow, lofty, etc.) are the aspects that are philosophically creative (120). Science usually functions along descriptive, horizontal lines; metaphysics usually functions along vertical lines. It can be easily observed why a philosophical system that methodologically tries to imitate other needs of the human spirit. Unfortunately, Blaga does not cite any specific pragmatist philosophers. It is possible that his knowledge of pragmatism was very limited. Had he had a firsthand acquaintance with the works of the founders of pragmatism in America, especially those of William James, he might have had another opinion. 27. Kant criticized speculative metaphysics as leading to antinomies. Blaga replies that this is not always the case, and that antinomies are not always bad (he cites the particle wave theory of light as an example of a usefully productive antinomy), 75–76. For a full development of the potential usefulness of antinomies see Lucian Blaga, Eonul dogmatic, in vol. 8 of Opere, ed. Dorli Blaga (Bucharest: Editura Minerva, 1983); hereafter referred to as ED. He also criticizes Kant for overlooking the importance of “the horizon of mystery,” which Blaga finds to be essential to human growth and fulfillment (DCF, 168). Finally, in contrast to Kant, Blaga proposes that metaphysical systems can be appreciated for their quality as creations regardless of their ability or inability to grasp reality (HCV, 132).

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science will result in a shallow system in comparison to metaphysical philosophies that embrace a broader, more liberal methodology (125). In the evaluation of philosophical systems, “deep” is not equated with “true.” A philosophical system can be deep without being true. A philosophical system can be appreciated in itself without reference to truth. If it were necessary to know the truth of a system in order to appraise its depth, it would not be possible to evaluate the depth of any system (124 –25).

Blaga on the Relationship of Philosophy and Science Philosophical inquiry has many parallels to and differences from scientific inquiry, and Blaga discusses these at length.28 He explains that the difference between the methods employed in solving problems in science and the methods employed in solving problems in philosophy is more significant for distinguishing between science and philosophy than is the difference of the problems that each poses. Through its terms and its intellectual content, the way that a problem is posed anticipates and influences the eventual resolution of the problem. Any problem begins with a certain set of objective data that is exterior to the posing of the problem. This Blaga terms the aria of the problem. However, at the beginning there is also a factor that is not the aria, and this factor plays an important role in the guiding or influencing of how the problem is posed and resolved. This factor Blaga calls the “interior horizon” of the problem (101). The interior horizon is described as “a conceptual content that will guide us in the process of posing the problem and that will therefore determine, to a greater or lesser extent, the very content of the solution that will be given to the problem . . . the content that we don’t find among the objective data of the problem, and that prefigures up to a point the very response. . . .” (ibid.). According to Blaga, it is the aria and the interior horizon that differentiate the scientific methodology from that of philosophy. In science, the aria of a problem is very specific, and the interior horizon is very detailed and complex. In contrast, the aria of a philosophic problem is the whole world, and the interior horizon is broadly or even vaguely defined (104). This methodological distinction results in a very important difference between 28. The difference between philosophy and science is a very important and a very contemporary issue. Many philosophers in the analytic tradition tend to gravitate toward a scientific approach to philosophy, while philosophers in some other traditions exhibit a tendency to view philosophy as an artistic expression. Four chapters in DCF deal with this distinction between philosophy and science: chapter 2, “Philosophical Autonomy and Metaphysical Creation”; chapter 4, “Philosophy, Science, Experience”; chapter 5, “The Philosophical Problem and the Scientific Problem”; and chapter 8, “Concerning Scientism.” Blaga addresses this issue in many of his other books as well.

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science and philosophy. Because of its very specific and limited initial data, and its very specific and detailed interior horizon, a scientific investigation is closely controlled by initial presuppositions (103). This is not a bad thing; it is merely the nature of science. It has the positive result that the findings of a scientific inquiry will be closely related to accepted controlling ideas that are basic to the scientific enterprise. It prevents scientific inquiry from straying into fancy and wild speculation. On the other hand, it clearly limits the type of creative thinking that can be brought to bear upon the problem at hand (103– 4).29 In philosophical inquiries, the initial datum is so broad and the interior horizon is sufficiently general that almost any solution to a particular problem is possible as a working hypothesis (to be later confirmed or discarded based upon its fruitfulness). The guiding principles of a philosophical inquiry are often mere categories of the understanding, very broad principles such as existence, substance, cause, number, and so on. Blaga believes that here he has found a new insight into the function of categories in human understanding: philosophers (metaphysicians, especially) constitute their systems around one or another of the categories of the understanding, which in a very general way guides/determines the resulting system (106).30 Thus it can be seen that both scientific inquiry and philosophical inquiry anticipate their solutions. Yet a major distinction between science and philosophy is that philosophy anticipates its solution as little as possible when posing its problems, whereas science methodologically anticipates its solutions as a matter of course (105, 107).31 These are characteristics inherent to each particular sphere of inquiry and should not be 29. It is important to note that Blaga is here discussing science as it operates under normal conditions (an important distinction elaborated by more recent philosophers of science such as Thomas Kuhn). Blaga is very aware that there are stages of scientific investigation in which science is a highly imaginative and creative enterprise, and sometimes proceeds more like a “revolution” than is generally recognized. See, for instance, his chapter “Experiment and Theory,” and his critique of logical positivism in the chapter “The Intuitiveness of Science and the Positivist Error,” both in ESM. 30. Whereas Kant wrote about the role that the categories of understanding play in human understanding in general, Blaga writes specifically about the role that they play in the philosophical enterprise. The category or categories selected serve as laws that guide the philosopher in his interpretation of data, giving shape to the resulting philosophy. Kant (and subsequent people who further developed and applied his system) discussed the role of categories in understanding in general. Blaga applies their insight specifically to metaphysics—the creation of a metaphysical explanation guided by a principle that is qualified to act in this role because it is a category of the human understanding. Blaga is not claiming to be the first to use this approach, but rather the first to notice that this is how metaphysicians operate. 31. Blaga states, illuminatingly, that “It could be said that the philosopher would be guided by the secret desire to propose his/her problems using a more pure question, as naked of any content as possible” (DCF, 105).

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viewed as improper but rather as features that are proper to each respective methodology. Blaga supports this thesis of methodological distinction with examples drawn from science and philosophy. From the history of philosophy he elaborates Thales’ proposal that the fundamental substance of which the material world is composed is water. According to Blaga, Thales’ aria is the entire world, and his interior horizon is the presupposition that the world is in fact material and composed of one or more substances. Thales’ aria is almost as inclusive as can be imagined, and his interior horizon is a broad category of the understanding, substance (102– 4). From the history of science, Blaga uses the example of the problem of the nature of sound (he also briefly discusses examples from the scientific investigations of Aristotle and Goethe [106–7]). The aria is the acoustic phenomenon of sound itself, the interior horizon used by physicists in understanding the nature of sound is mechanics (understood as being mathematically determinable). Not only is the solution that is accepted, that sound is a vibratory motion that occurs in a medium, consistent with the premise of the interior horizon, but all solutions that are not consistent with this premise are excluded (103– 4). Because the premises of scientific investigations such as this are of a much more specific nature than are those of philosophical investigations, the conclusions of science are much more guided/ predetermined by these premises. The data with which philosophical and scientific investigations begin, the aria, is generally of an experiential nature. Experience plays an important role in both domains of research. But the role of experience in philosophy differs significantly from that which it has in science. According to Blaga, philosophy is the creator of a world, not merely a researcher of one (94). Thus while experience serves as an indispensable starting point and check of philosophical theorizing, it is in the very nature of the philosophical task to probe beyond experience, asking questions that do not have empirical solutions and providing possible answers that are not empirically verifiable (92, 96). Whereas science is most often concerned with the task of analyzing the world through the accumulation of experiential data (what Blaga calls “paradisaic cognition”), philosophy is concerned with the task of deepening the understanding of existence through exploring possible solutions to empirical and also non-empirical problems (or “luciferic cognition”), and constructing a worldview that reaches beyond particular experiences, synthesizing experiential data and theoretical solutions into a speculative whole (95–96).32 Thus there is a strong connection between experience 32. Luciferic and paradisaic cognition will be explained in detail when exploring Blaga’s views on epistemology.

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and philosophy, but it is not the same connection that exists between experience and science. Blaga points out that experience (or perhaps it would be better to say interpretations of experience) is amazingly plastic from the point of view of its plasticity in conforming to different philosophical systems.33 The same experiences can be reinterpreted to fit into many different philosophies. But there are also times when experiential data result in major philosophical changes—Blaga uses the terms “overthrow” and “revolution.”34 For instance, the evidence that has led to the widespread acceptance of the theory of evolution has gradually also led to a replacement of the once widely held philosophical position on the immutability of forms of life. The data opposing this traditional view was accepted by some thinkers who proposed ways of resolving the tension between the data and the traditional position without overthrowing the traditional position, but eventually the traditional position was abandoned in favor of one that more easily accounts for the experiential data. According to Blaga, these kinds of revolutions occur in both science and philosophy, but because philosophy is less tightly tied to experience than is science, the drama and play of the conflict between experiential data and theoretical explanation is larger and more visible in philosophy than it is in science (97–99).35 The existence of such revolutions in philosophy highlights a peculiar characteristic of philosophy: it is at one and the same time both more spontaneous and speculative than is science, and more conservative than science. Philosophy often runs ahead of scientific investigation, imaginatively anticipating theories that are later accepted by science. On the other hand, philosophical theories persist for ages, being modified but resisting final overthrow. This is part of the nature of philosophy, which distinguishes it from science and distinguishes its relation to experience from the relation of science to experience (99). 33. Blaga is a sort of neo-Kantian, and holds to what is sometimes called the “veil of appearance,” according to which the knowing subject has access to objects only through the filter of experience. Blaga points out that experiences are themselves also objects of cognition and are therefore subject to the same veil. Thus I believe that when Blaga states that experience is plastic, what he is really saying is that the interpretations that are assigned to experiences are plastic. See DD, 58: “The data of experience are also themselves susceptible to interpretation. Experience, through its empirical aspect giving place to various possibilities of interpretation, is naturally not to be able to put at our disposition a criterion of absolute control.” 34. “Resturnare” and “revolu¸tie,” in DCF, 97–98. 35. Blaga seems to anticipate some very important insights of later philosophers of science such as Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, though Blaga’s emphasis is on the role of revolutions in philosophy rather than in science. See Angela Botez’ article comparing Blaga and Kuhn, “Comparativist and Valuational Reflections on Blaga’s Philosophy,” Revue Roumaine de Philosophie et Logique 40 (1996): 153–62.

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Certain thinkers have thought it necessary or useful, or have exhibited an unconscious tendency, to remake philosophy so that it is more like science. Blaga mentions Husserl, Kant, logical positivism, Einstein, Newton, Galileo, Descartes, Darwin, Spencer, Haeckel, Ostwald, and Rudolf Steiner as thinkers who in various ways embodied this tendency (73, 77, 128–30, 133). Blaga had a great appreciation for the scientific method, but considers that it has achieved its remarkable success in part because it has operated within areas of research that are fitting to its nature. He labels the mistaken attempt to apply scientific methods and/or attitudes to nonscientific domains “scientism.” Scientism itself can be a philosophy, according to Blaga. It is a philosophy not based on the scientific method but rather on faith in the scientific method, which is an important distinction (126–27). The possibility that there are truths that lie beyond the reach of the scientific method is one that philosophers must accept at all times, maintaining an attitude of open-minded objectivity toward possible alternative interpretations of existence. Therefore excessive skepticism is as objectionable as excessive gullibility: the philosopher must remain open-minded, and cannot allow himself to be diverted from open-mindedness “neither by accepted theories nor by empirical phenomena, no matter how unusual” (133). For that reason, and also because of the distinct natures of different domains of research, philosophy and the philosopher necessarily operate autonomously from other disciplines, and while their findings may be corroborated by other disciplines, they are not dependent upon them (72– 74).

Blaga on the Relationship of Philosophy and Art In addition to discussing the relationship between philosophy and science, Blaga also discusses the relationship between philosophy and art.36 As in his discussion of philosophy and science, Blaga maintains that philosophy and art are autonomous activities with various similarities and areas of overlap. Although philosophy, and especially metaphysics, is a very creative activity, attempts to reduce philosophy to art are misguided.37 While some styles of philosophizing are undoubtedly artistic, that which is artistic in them is not the element that makes them philosophy. While both philosophy and art may be seen as attempts to establish a rapport between the human spirit and its environment, they are distinct attempts 36. Three chapters in DCF deal with aspects of the relationship between philosophy and art: chapter 2, “Philosophical Autonomy and Metaphysical Creation,” chapter 14, “Philosophy and Style,” and chapter 15, “Philosophy and Art.” 37. For example, Schelling, Novalis, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche, DCF, 185; Hermann Keyserling, DCF, 73, 186–88; logical positivism, DCF, 185.

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(185–86). Blaga enumerates numerous essential distinctions between philosophy and art: philosophy and art have different motives and means; the former strives for objectivity while the later is openly subjective; philosophy is abstract while art is concrete; philosophy strives to formulate universal postulates while art creates personal aesthetic experiences, and so on. Blaga acknowledges the similarities and overlaps of the two endeavors, but insists that they are fundamentally distinct in their essence (187–90). One area of overlap between art and philosophy that Blaga considers to be essential to the study of philosophy is style (175). According to Blaga, style extends to all human creations, even in their structure. This includes philosophy as well as art (and even science) (174, 188). Historical examples of parallels between cultural style and philosophical style occurring within the same contexts include the parallels between ancient Greek art and philosophy, between the baroque music of Bach and the intricate philosophy of Leibniz, and between the impressionism of Rodin and the intuitionism of Bergson (176–83). According to Blaga, this phenomenon is best explained as the result of the expression of a common unconscious spiritual tendency shared by the philosophers and artists of an age whose works exhibit parallels (178).

Conclusion Philosophy is, according to Blaga, a higher, more critically reflective state of consciousness. Philosophy of philosophy, or “philosophical consciousness,” is furthermore a higher, more critically reflective state of philosophy. If philosophy is an attempt to understand “that which is,” philosophical consciousness is an attempt to understand philosophy.38 If philosophy hopes to aid in overcoming problems of human understanding, the purpose of philosophy of philosophy is to aid in overcoming problems of philosophy (190–92). Therefore Blaga closes his philosophy of philosophy with the following eleven questions, aimed at improving and enriching every philosophers’ practice of the craft: (1) In what measure does the thinker awaken us from our “spiritual slumber”? (2) How is his/her philosophy autonomous from science, art, and other creative disciplines? (3) What are the “aria” and the “interior horizon” of his/her problematic? (4) What methodological innovations does s/he use? (5) How is s/he the author of a world? (6) What dimensions does his/her philosophical vision have? (7) What scientific, mythic, and magical elements remain in his/her system? (8) On what elements does s/he place the “transcendental accent”? (9) 38. “Ceea ce ‘este’,” in DCF, 190.

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What motifs are in his/her philosophy, and how does s/he adapt them? (10) What form does the drive to systemize take in his/her work? (11) How is s/he integrated into a style (193)? With these eleven questions Blaga restates his philosophy of philosophy in a form intended to aid and enrich future philosophizing so that it is better able to achieve the goals of philosophy (72, 194).

4 Blaga’s Metaphysics Introduction: Sources, Goals, Style of Writing

Aspects of Blaga’s metaphysical thought are reflected in virtually all of his philosophical works, from his PhD thesis on culture and knowledge to the final chapter of his last book, Fiin¸ta istoric˘a (The Historical Being). His metaphysics can also be glimpsed in some of his other writings: his aphorisms, poetry, theater, and fiction. According to Blaga himself, his main book on the subject is Diferen¸tialele divine (The Divine Differentials), which is the first of three books forming his Trilogy of ˆ Cosmology.1 Cenzura transcendent˘a: Incercare metafizic˘a (Transcendent Censorship: A Metaphysical Attempt), the third book in his Trilogy of Knowledge, is devoted to an exposition of his metaphysical system, but from the perspective of providing a theoretical metaphysics that could accompany the theory of knowledge detailed in the first two books of the trilogy.2 Many of the ideas first described in Cenzura transcendent˘a are enlarged upon in Diferen¸tialele divine. His other works that contain significant amounts of metaphysics include Aspecte antropologice (Anthropological Aspects) and Fiin¸ta istoric˘a (The Historical Being), which are the second and third books of his Trilogy of Cosmology; the third book from his Trilogy of Culture, Geneza metaforii s¸i sensul culturii (The Genesis of 1. DD, 51. The title of this book presents a problem to would-be translators. The title plays mathematical and religious elements against each other (see 68 and 73), but Blaga’s metaphysics is neither particularly religious nor particularly mathematical. The term “divine” (an adjective in this context) is clearly one of many metaphors that Blaga employs in trying to express things that he deems transcend human language. The term “differentials” is more difficult to explain. According to one Romanian scholar, “Blaga had chosen ‘differentials’ as a strictly mathematical term but as a metaphor for what he was up to . . . in Romanian (and at the given time) the term would have been perceived as challenging and ‘outrageous’ . . .” Virgil Nemoianu, e-mail message to the author, December 16, 2002. 2. Lucian Blaga, Cenzura transcendent˘a, in vol. 8 of Opere, ed. Dorli Blaga; hereafter referred to as CT. That is Blaga’s own description of what he does in CT. He describes the book as providing a possible theory of metaphysics to accompany the theory of knowledge found in his book Cunoa¸sterea luciferic˘a (hereafter referred to as CL); see CT, 446. DD, On

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Metaphor and the Meaning of Culture); and the third book of his Trilogy of Values, Art˘a s¸i valoare (Art and Value).3 Metaphysics is the crown of philosophy, according to Blaga.4 He characterizes it as “the most noble risk” because, according to his description, metaphysics is a human attempt to think beyond that which is testable.5 It is a risk because it is an attempt to reach beyond the sensorial to know things that are not only non-sensory, but which are also to a greater or lesser extent unverifiable, and in some senses even unknowable.6 Metaphysics is “noble” because it is a valiant (though never fully successful) attempt to sketch a theory that encompasses all of existence and all realms of knowledge.7 Metaphysical theories have a different relationship to experience than do scientific theories: whereas scientific theories are framed by experience, drawing their meaning from experience, metaphysical theories frame experience, giving to experience meaning (significance) and a larger context.8 Thus while both are interpretations of experience, metathe other hand, Blaga claims to be the first application of the “minus-cognition” epistemology detailed in ED and CL; see DD, 52–53. Blaga views his epistemology as standing regardless of the success of his metaphysics; however, since his epistemological theories are supported by proofs independent of his metaphysics, see CL, 447. 3. These last two are mentioned by Blaga in his introduction to DD (51) as being significantly metaphysical, although their main subjects are, respectively, the philosophy of culture and philosophical aesthetics. In them Blaga includes a sketch of a possible metaphysical theory compatible with his aesthetics and philosophy of culture, just as in CT he outlines a possible metaphysics to accompany his epistemology. 4. Lucian Blaga, Fiin¸ta istoric˘a, in vol. 11 of Opere, ed. Dorli Blaga, 487; hereafter referred to as FI. Mircea Flonta, professor of philosophy at the University of Bucharest and a leading expert on Blaga, compares Blaga’s exalted view of metaphysics with how metaphysics has been viewed by other leading Western philosophers, in his chapter “Metafizica a cunoa¸sterii s¸i sistem metafizic la Lucian Blaga,” in Meridian Blaga, vol. 1, ed. Irina Petra¸s (Cluj-Napoca, Romania: Casa C˘ar¸tii de Stiin¸ ¸ ta˘ , 2000), 63–81. 5. CT, 439. He also characterized metaphysics, in “Schi¸ta unei autopresent˘ari filosofice,” as “a jump into the unverifiable” (reprinted in Diaconu and Diaconu, Dic¸tionar de termeni filosofici ai lui Lucian Blaga, 14). 6. Blaga asserts that conflict between metaphysical and scientific cosmologies is not necessarily unavoidable, since they do not have the same object. A metaphysical cosmology precedes the beginning of a scientific cosmology, and is deeper and more hidden (DD, 79). Ionel Nari¸ta discusses the relationship between metaphysics and science in Blaga’s philosophy in “Elemente de epistemologie ˆın lucr˘arile timpurii ale lui Lucian Blaga,” in Meridian Blaga, vol. 1, ed. Irina Petra¸s, 272–76. For a comparison between Blaga’s model of metaphysics and those of other Western philosophers, with an emphasis on the transcendent as it appears (or fails to appear) in European philosophy, see Vasile Fr˘ateanu, “Lucian Blaga, un model metafizic,” in Eonul Blaga: Iˆntˆaiul veac, ed. Mircea Borcila (Bucharest: Editura Albatros, 1997), 329–39. 7. FI, 487–88. 8. CT, 441. According to Blaga, the difference between science and metaphysics is not that the former has in view only certain aspects of existence while metaphysics deals with

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physical visions have a dimension that scientific theories lack: what Blaga calls the “vertical dimension.” According to Blaga, metaphysical visions resonate with the human spirit because they are “deep” and/or “high.” Scientific theories, on the other hand, aim at being true but are largely unaffected by the vertical dimension.9 This vertical dimension, which appeals to the human desire to penetrate the deepest mysteries of human existence, causes metaphysics to be both dangerous and irresistibly appealing at the same time.10 Because of this vertical dimension of metaphysics, a metaphysical vision can be deep or high without being true. The best metaphysical vision is one that is both deep and true at the same time. Because the goal of metaphysics is the expression of a system of thought that is intended to characterize all of existence, and because existence supposedly contains elements that exceed the abilities of human understanding, it is inevitable that in certain circumstances Blaga makes use of expressions that are very metaphorical while trying to put his system into words.11 This necessity is not viewed by Blaga as being undesirable though necessary: the use of artistic and expressive elements is quite consistent with his philosophy.12 At the same time, Blaga desired (and succeeded, in my estimation) to write his philosophy systematically.13 Thus, while he was theoretically in favor of the appearance of artistic all of existence, but rather the difference relates to the interior constructions of the two disciplines and how they are conducted (CT, 443). This distinction is discussed in my chapter on Blaga’s philosophy of philosophy. 9. CT, 443. 10. FI, 488. In a beautiful passage in the introduction to Censura transcendent˘a Blaga writes the following: “Metaphysical thoughts are profoundly disturbing. Disturbing because they remove us from within the peacefulness, full of security, of our shells, disturbing because they compel the betrayal of the dust with which we were cursed to nourish ourselves; disturbing, because they often make us lift up an illuminating word against ourselves, disturbing because they threaten us with stigmatization, disturbing because, risking insanity, they snatch the soul from the purely biological horizon, to place it between story and prophecy; disturbing, because under their magic power we pull up our roots from the earth in order to turn them toward the azure sky in which nothing can breathe except the stars.” CT, 446. 11. Blaga discusses this on pages 91 and 118 of DD. It is often supposed that Blaga’s frequent use of metaphor in the expression of his philosophy is simply a result of the fact that Blaga was a poet as well as a philosopher. I believe this view is mistaken. While his poetic ability certainly adds to the artfulness of the way that he used his metaphors, the use of metaphor itself is virtually necessitated by the nature of the task that Blaga undertook. Poet or not, Blaga had no choice but to use metaphorical language to express some of the things that he wished to express in his metaphysics. 12. It is also consistant with some recent work on philosophical language: see Carl G. Vaught, Metaphor, Analogy, and the Place of Places: Where Religion and Philosophy Meet (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2004). 13. “One of my perpetual preoccupations was always to not merely write philosophy, but to write it as beautifully as possible, without compromising the thought itself. If this is a

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style in philosophy (and also of subjectivity in appropriate contexts), Blaga’s own style is actually objective and rather analytic.14 He sometimes makes use of figurative language, he occasionally demands that the reader accept unproven postulates in order to see where they will lead, and he speculates about solutions to problems that lie beyond the realm of perception, but these factors do not make him less than objective. When he uses metaphor, he is consistent in explaining why it is necessary and to what it is intended to refer.15 When he demands that the reader temporarily grant him an unproven postulate, it is with the intent of showing that this presupposition can be justified ex post facto. Furthermore, while Blaga’s philosophizing is certainly speculative in that it proposes solutions to certain large problems, these solutions being neither merely observations nor deductions from observations, it is not speculative in the sense of being “mere unsupported speculation”: Blaga is serious in his attempt to provide realistic and rational accounts and analyses of the problems he addresses, and the solutions that he proposes are rationally described and logically argued for. Some of his solutions do entail acceptance of the existence of things that transcend human understanding, but when this is so, Blaga endeavors to show that it is so using reasoned argumentation. Ultimately, however, Blaga views metaphysics as a construct, a general vision of existence composed from a creative blend of philosophy and myth that gives vent to the human need to come to grips with one’s environment. In this Blaga’s thought is in harmony with many recent constructivist philosophers, including European postmodernists and North American neopragmatists. This view of metaphysics protects the philosopher from the temptation of dogmatic certainty and also yields a breathing space for metaphysical creativity. It also makes it clear that metaphysics does NOT represent a perfect and objective knowledge of what reality is really like.16 The philosophical reasons why Blaga views metaphysics in this way will become apparent in the following elaboration of his metaphysics. These views will be seen to be products of his metaphysics itself, as internally consistent elements of his metaphysical theory and entire philosophy. defect, for my part I would wish this defect to as many Romanian philosophers as possible.” “Schi¸ta unei autoprezent˘ari filosofice,” in Diaconu and Diaconu, Dic¸tionar de termeni filosofici ai lui Lucian Blaga, 18. 14. My attention was drawn to this distinction by Cornel H˘ar˘angu¸s’ article “Metafizica lui Blaga: Procedee de elaborare,” in Caietele Lucian Blaga 11 (May 2001), and I am in agreement with his analysis on pages 16–17. 15. Which, admittedly, he does often—so often that one recent book about his philosophy is titled Philosophy Through Metaphors. Geo S˘avulescu, Lucian Blaga: Filosofia prin metafore (Bucharest: A. B. Romania, 2000). 16. FI, 488.

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Metaphysical Method As mentioned earlier, Blaga’s metaphysic is sometimes characterized as “speculative.” This should be understood as a methodological contrast with empirical approaches to doing metaphysics.17 The method of philosophizing employed by Blaga in expounding his metaphysics is not empirical, although Blaga accords a significant role to experience in the testing of metaphysical theories. Blaga is firmly persuaded that metaphysical theories are not (and cannot be) proven empirically.18 Blaga does not believe that a purely observation-based approach to understanding existence can succeed in analyzing and solving the deeper problems of metaphysics. Blaga’s method more closely resembles what is called the hypothetico-deductive approach to solving problems in the natural sciences. In the hypothetico-deductive approach to problem solving, a theoretically possible solution to a problem is granted as a working hypothesis, and then the consequences of this hypothesis are deduced, in order to determine whether the consequences of the hypothesis are compatible with generally accepted theory. If they are, then the hypothesis stands as provisionally vindicated, despite the fact that the hypothesis itself has not been directly verified empirically.19 Blaga’s approach to metaphysics is similar to this. He openly states that metaphysical starting points are presupposed at the outset of the metaphysical investigation and are only subsequently justified by their ability to organize data and to “construct a world.”20 In explicating his metaphysical vision, Blaga does not start from some apodictically certain, properly basic, or widely accepted first premise. Rather, he proposes a cluster of premises that are essential to the system he intends to promulgate, and then elaborates how these form the basis of a system that provides or enables the resolution of certain important problems heretofore not satisfactorily resolved by other metaphysical systems.21 The proof of his system is not found at the beginning of his system, being derived from the certainty or reasonableness of the initial premises, nor is it found in the middle of his system, being derived from a demonstration of internal coherence, but rather the proof of Blaga’s system comes at 17. The term “speculative” is sometimes used in this way in contemporary philosophy; see, for instance Ed. L. Miller and Jon Jensen, Questions that Matter: An Invitation to Philosophy, 5th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004), 12–13. 18. CT, 441. 19. James K. Feibleman, Scientific Method: The Hypothetico-Experimental Laboratory Procedure of the Physical Sciences (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972). 20. DCF, 108. 21. “Forced to choose between incomplete justifications, we can make a concession to the critic, namely that of viewing the proposition of the Great Anonymous as a simple point of view. The value of this point of view will be measured through the results which it has the gift to bring.” CT, 450 (italics Blaga’s).

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the end of the explication of his system, and consists in the fruitfulness of the system in clarifying previously unexplained anomalies and in enabling solutions to problems that would otherwise remain unsolvable (and also from the system’s aesthetic appeal, its ability to fulfill a need of the human spirit). The initial premises are not proved or justified by their own status as apodictically certain, properly basic, or widely accepted, nor are they proved or justified by their own fruitfulness. The initial premises are justified by the fruitfulness of the system of which they are an essential part.22 The fact that the primary argument in support of Blaga’s metaphysics is its ability to serve as a heuristic does not at all rule out the possibility of marshaling other arguments in its favor. As mentioned in the preceding paragraph, Blaga believes that one of the arguments in favor of his system is its aesthetic or spiritual appeal. On occasion Blaga presents his ideas without providing any real argument for them, seeming to rely on their intuitive plausibility as a sufficient argument. Another strategy often employed is that of eliminating other possible explanatory hypotheses. Blaga often attempts to show that the other leading metaphysical theories are unable to account for all the evidence or address all the facets of an issue, leaving his own system in the position of appearing to be the only viable current contender.23 (Blaga would never claim that other more successful explanations are impossible in the future.)24 22. In contrast to classical metaphysics, which are usually justified using either foundationalist or coherentist strategies, Blaga’s approach to the justification of his metaphysics is much closer to American pragmatism and the consequentialism of pragmatist philosophers such as William James, and also to the perspectivism of certain Continental philosophers such as Nietzsche. On foundationalism and its rivals, see Timo Airaksinen, “On Nonfoundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 19 (1981): 403–12, and “Five Types of Knowledge,” American Philosophical Quarterly 15, no. 4 (October 1978): 263–74. On foundationalism versus pragmatism, see Joseph Margolis, “Skepticism, Foundationalism, and Pragmatism,” American Philosophical Quarterly 14, no. 2 (April 1977): 119–27. 23. This type of strategy can be viewed as an employment of a disjunctive syllogism: (AvBvCvD)vE, ∼E, :.(AvBvCvD); (AvBvC)vD, ∼D, :.(AvBvC); (AvB)vC, ∼C, :.(AvB); AvB, ∼B, :.A. The difficulty with this type of argument is in verifying that all the possible candidates have been included. Because of this difficulty, Blaga refrains from saying that his position is proven by this strategy and puts forth the more modest claim that his position is the best of those currently available. One of the best examples of the employment of this strategy is Blaga’s lengthy analysis and critique of both Darwinian evolution and the entelechy theory of Driesch as being unable to account for the appearance of design (in the case of the former) and thwarted design (in the case of the latter) in the world. See especially the chapter “Finalit˘a¸ti s¸i Parafinalit˘a¸ti,” in DD. Blaga also briefly addresses vitalism and Lamarckism in this context. 24. In fact, he specifically rebuffs this claim: “We do not at all claim to have found the single and ultimate possible metaphysical theory, because we have long ago left the phase of belief in a single salvific and privileged theory. Nevertheless, in today’s theoretical

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Blaga points out that there are many elements external to a metaphysical system that affect its success as a metaphysical vision.25 These include, for example, the quality of the resonance between the vision and the spirit of its recipient,26 underlying temperament of the age and of the readers, the needs of the moment in history, individual needs, caprices, and the magic of expression. According to Blaga, these subjective elements play a much greater role in metaphysics than they do in the natural sciences. This is appropriate, since according to Blaga’s understanding of metaphysics, metaphysics is even more of a human creative enterprise than is science.

On the Possibility of Doing Metaphysics An important question that must be addressed by any would-be metaphysician is whether it is even possible to do metaphysics. Skepticism regarding the viability of metaphysics is common in post-Kantian philosophy.27 For Blaga this is a particularly important issue, since (as will be seen) his epistemology describes the human ability of accurately knowing any potential object of cognition as being limited. Therefore the definition of the metaphysical task and the description of metaphysical method are crucially important elements that can enable or disable the possibility of doing metaphysics.28 It is widely acknowledged that Blaga accepts and works within a sort of neo-Kantian idealism, wherein the actual existence of an external world is accepted as a necessary metaphysical corollary even though an external world is not directly knowable epistemologically.29 If doing metaphysics situation, and taking into account the known facts, we do not see any other simpler and more synthetic explanatory theory than that which we have determined to propose.” DD, 105–6. 25. CT, 442. 26. This is purported to be one of the reasons that Blaga was not interested in having his philosophy translated and published in other languages: he thought that his philosophy was too Romanian to resonate within the hearts of a non-Romanian readership. 27. Examples of antimetaphysical thought include the work of Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, the various schools of positivism, and many within contemporary analytic philosophy. 28. Methodologically speaking, Blaga says that his metaphysics is an example of minuscognition, an epistemological strategy described in his epistemological writings (ED and CL), DD, 52–53. Minus-cognition will be described in chapter 5. 29. For a discussion of the Kantian influences on Blaga’s philosophy, see Petru Ioan, “Matricea Kantian˘a a filosofiei lui Blaga,” Revista de Filosofie 44 (1997): 213–21. Metaphysically speaking, it is clear that Blaga is a realist (although he shows great appreciation for Berkeley; see DD, 62–63, and CT, 475). Epistemologically, however, Blaga believes that interpretations intervene between the subject and the object, which makes him an epistemological idealist (DD, 58–59). On pages 170–71 of DD he discusses the intuition of space and rejects both idealism and naive realism. The “alternative” that he proposes seems to be a moderate form of idealism integrated into his theory of knowledge and metaphysics.

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would be defined along realist lines, as a description of how the world is known to actually be, then Blaga would not be able to do metaphysics, since according to his epistemology humanity cannot have perfect knowledge of objects of cognition.30 If metaphysics would be construed as an exhaustive schematization of the empirical world, then Blaga would not be able to do metaphysics, because he believes that metaphysics extends beyond the empirical.31 If metaphysical methodology were strictly empirical, then Blaga would perforce exclude himself from doing metaphysics on methodological grounds, since according to his own philosophy the ultimate aspects of existence are unobservable. However, because Blaga views metaphysics as a creative endeavor that tries to reach beyond the empirical and provide an explanation for all of existence, an endeavor that is closely related to experience but not limited to it, metaphysics is possible.32 So far from avoiding metaphysics, Blaga states in several places that, for humans, metaphysics is unavoidable. A metaphysic, “declared or latent,” is essential to being human.33 He argues that it is an expression of the very existential constitution of humanity, which is evidenced in the fact that history shows humanity continually struggling with explanations of existence. He observes that when experience contradicts a particular metaphysical system, humanity does not abandon the attempt to understand existence, but rather attempts a new metaphysics. This is because metaphysics is part of human nature. Metaphysics is not justified by its ability to reach its object, nor because of some subjective need of the individual, but rather it is justified foremost because it is a result of an essential aspect of human nature.34 According to Blaga’s anthropology, it is living in the 30. Humanity cannot have what Blaga calls “positive-adequate knowledge.” The term “adequate” does not signify knowledge that is adequate to human purposes, but rather knowledge that is adequate to the object of cognition, that corresponds to the object. 31. DD, 59. 32. Ibid., 65. Here Blaga rejects the possibility of an adequate cosmology based only upon the empirical. Empirically based cosmologies typically rely on a single metaphor drawn from one aspect of the empirical world (e.g., reproduction, craftsmanship, emanation, dreams, hallucinations, etc.). Considering that the world has many very different aspects, Blaga rejects basing his metaphysics on a metaphor drawn from any single aspect, and states that his proposal will be a theoretical construction based on a metaphor that is both more detailed and more distant than are metaphors drawn from immediate experience. DD, 60–65. As mentioned in the preceding chapter, according to Blaga, a metaphysical theory can be falsified by experience but cannot by verified by experience. Metaphysical theories must not contradict experience, but they may go beyond the data provided by experience. DD, 58, 118; Diaconu and Diaconu, Dic¸tionar de termeni filosofici ai lui Lucian Blaga, 14. 33. This seems to be one of the main points of Robert C. Trundle Jr.’s recent work, From Physics to Politics: The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Philosophy (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1999). 34. DD, 59.

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presence of mystery and attempting to fathom mystery that distinguishes humanity from the other higher animals.35 Therefore not only is the attempt to do metaphysics justified, but the lack of metaphysical thinking is criticized as timidity and as a sign of infirmity.36

The Origin of the Cosmos The “Anonymous Fund” One of the first issues addressed in Blaga’s metaphysical writings is the question of the origin of the cosmos. It is conceivable that the cosmos has no origin, and that it has always existed. Alternatively, it is possible that the cosmos has a specific origin. Blaga discusses these possibilities and concludes that, while both are conceptually possible, the latter view “enormously facilitates approaching cosmological problems” and is therefore to be preferred.37 Based on this pragmatic justification, he proceeds to construct his metaphysics around a postulated beginning and source of the world. That both the origin and the source of the cosmos are unknown is admitted by Blaga. Therefore one of the ways that he refers to the source is “The Anonymous Fund.” The Anonymous Fund (Fondul Anonim, hereafter abbreviated “FA”) is a self-sufficient, autonomous singularity of maximum substantial and structural complexity.38 Regarding the origin of the cosmos, logically the cosmos must be in some way a result of the FA (that is the meaning of Blaga’s word “fund”—something that is a source). The cosmos could be a result of one or more creative acts of the FA, it could be an emanation of the FA, or it could be a reproduction of the FA. Blaga rejects the possibility of creation using sources outside of the FA, presumably because this would entail the existence of a cosmos that precedes the creation of the present cosmos, introducing a regress that thwarts the solving of the problems that Blaga is addressing. He also rejects the possibility of creation ex nihilo. Nor is the possibility of an emanation that involves the diminution of the FA acceptable, since any diminishing of the 35. FI, 492. 36. DD, 55. Blaga views Kant as being in part responsible for the recent lack of metaphysical philosophizing, but sees that as an unfortunate result of Kant’s critical work. Blaga views Kant’s work as being a beneficial counterbalance to the human creative and visionary drive, a counterbalance producing an equilibrium that results in greater philosophical and metaphysical depth/height, “reciprocally held in equilibrium . . . (as) the tension of a high vault” (DD, 56). 37. DD, 59–60. 38. DD, 66–67. I believe the first occurrence of the term Fondul Anonim is on page 66 of DD.

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FA would have the potential of disrupting the equilibrium of existence (as will be explained later). Blaga opts for a theory of emanation similar to that proposed by Plotinus,39 an emanation wherein the FA reproduces itself endlessly without diminishing itself in any way.40 Blaga proposes that the FA be viewed as having, due to its own “fullness,” the capacity of infinite self-replication.41 This infinite self-replication would result in an infinite number of central metaphysical principles, which would result in a destabilizing of existence (if there is more than one center, and all are equal, then none are really central).42 Therefore the FA does not reproduce itself this way. The FA limits/modifies its own reproduction so that it will not destabilize existence. (Blaga grants that there is a lot of metaphorical and anthropomorphic language at play here, which is unavoidable in this sort of discourse, but should be limited as much as possible.)43 But it is the nature of the Anonymous Fund to create/ reproduce (again, this is inherent in the meaning of Fund); therefore it allows itself to reproduce, but only in a specific mode that assures the longevity and greatest success of its reproductive acts. This controlled reproduction is the best compromise between the FA’s capacity for replication and the necessity of safeguarding the centrality of existence.44 Had such precautions not been taken, the result of the FA’s creative capacity 39. Blaga’s theory differs from Plotinus’ theory in at least three ways: 1. While Plotinus proposes that the emanated entities are inferior to the original, Blaga argues that, if entities such as Plotinus is proposing were actually emanated, they would be identical to the FA; 2. In Blaga’s theory, replicas of the FA are never actually realized, while Plotinus’ entities are realized (according to his theory); and 3. Blaga’s actual emanations are not replicas of the FA but rather small particles of the FA that no longer resemble the FA, while Plotinus’ entities are only slightly degraded versions of the original (DD, 71–72). Although emanation is seldom encountered in modern Western cosmology, it remains a current position in some Eastern thought and has some Western advocates. See Alan G. Hefner, “Cosmology, Hinduism,” in The Mystica, 2005, www.themystica.com/ mystica/ articles/c/cosmology—hinduism.html (accessed September 24, 2005); K. Knight, “Cosmology,” in The Catholic Encyclopedia, online edition, vol. 4, 2003, www.newadvent.org/ cathen/04413a.htm (accessed September 24, 2005); and M. Alan Kazev, “Emanation,” in Kheper: Transformation—evolution—metamorphosis, 2004, www.kheper.net/topics/ cosmology/emanation.htm (accessed September 24, 2005). 40. DD, 68ff., 189. Blaga says that there are two possible accounts of the method of reproduction of the FA: 1. Unlimited reproduction through emanation, similar to the emanationist theory of Plotinus; or 2. Unlimited reproduction through the power of Divine thought turned upon itself, similar to the theories of some Gnostics. Blaga prefers the former theory, but explains both as being possibilities (DD, 90ff.). 41. Blaga says that this proposal is neither theological dogma nor an inductive conclusion, but rather is an anticipation of a broad metaphysical vision, which, once progressively elaborated, will be seen to be in harmony with experience. DD, 67–68. 42. DD, 71. 43. Ibid., 69, 91. 44. Ibid., 70, 76; FI, 489ff.

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would be a series of competing FAs, rather than the present world. What is remarkable, according to Blaga, is not so much that the present world exists, but that a series of competing FAs does not exist. The present world is a result of the FA’s own self-limitation, of the partial thwarting of the FA’s natural creativity, as will now be seen.45 The “Differentials” The form that the controlled reproduction of the FA takes is that of creation through “differentials.”46 Differentials are minute particles emanated from the FA.47 They are exact replicas of minute aspects of the FA, and are emanated in endless numbers.48 There are different types of differentials, each corresponding to a different part of the FA.49 These differentials have a natural propensity to combine with each other, forming new subcreations. The most central differentials are withheld from emanation in order to prevent the recombination of differentials into a reconstituted copy of the FA. Through the recombination of the emitted differentials is created the present world in its ever-changing forms.50 This schema depicts the 45. DD, 76–77. Poetically, Blaga writes, “the world is nothing but the sediment of radically and deeply thwarted theo-genetic processes.” See also p. 78, “The effort exerted by The Great Anonymous in the generation of the world is not an effort of creation, but an effort of a halting of ‘the greater’ possible” (italics Blaga’s). 46. On Blaga’s use of the term “differential,” see footnote 1 in this chapter. While differentials may seem similar to Leibniz’s monads, there are at least three important differences: 1. While no two monads are identical, differentials are emitted in homogenous series, and therefore there are many differentials that are identical to others; 2. While monads are empirical entities, differentials are more basic than the empirical world, and underlie the empirical, the psychic, and the spiritual; and 3. While monads are closed worlds without interrelations (no windows), differentials interrelate, resulting in “formative units.” DD, 95, 165ff. 47. Blaga states that none of the usual terms for this creation (birth, emission, emanation, creation, etc.) are fitting to the cosmogenic process, because of the inherent limits of human language. Although his cosmology looks to be emissionist, he distinguishes it from the emissionist theories of India, Islam, Neoplatonism, and Leibniz on the grounds that these theories involve a denaturing of the creator in the created that is not present in his theory. DD, 91–92. 48. DD, 93, 96. 49. While Blaga does say a variety of things about the differentials, he also states that they are unimaginable, even conceptually. They are an initial concept that is necessary to cosmology, but this status of being initial renders them problematic to the understanding, a situation that Blaga says is true of all initial concepts. Their status is more that of a postulate than of something understood, but Blaga states that this situation does not prevent them being approached intellectually. DD, 94. 50. Blaga states that the substance of the differentials is not an empirical substance. The differentials are more basic than quanta, which are complex energy entities and are composed of differentials. All material, psychical, and spiritual entities are composed of differentials. DD, 95–96.

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origin of the world as taking place in three phases: 1. The precosmic phase, which is the operation of limiting the generative possibilities of the FA; 2. The direct genesis phase, wherein the differentials are emitted; and 3. The indirect genesis phase, wherein the differentials create more complex beings through integration.51 It also depicts the creation of the world as being based upon two fundamental factors: 1. The FA’s reproductive potential; and 2. The FA’s success in directing this potential into creating in a manner that preserves the FA’s own hegemony as metaphysical center of the universe.52 The third phase of creation, that of indirect genesis through integration of differentials, is not directly controlled by the FA, but rather occurs spontaneously.53 It is not necessary that the FA directly govern this integration because the FA has already taken sufficient measures to assure that the integration will not threaten the order of existence.54 Integration is a natural result of the fact that the differentials are, in their structure, particles of one integrated whole.55 But integration does not occur on the basis of a perfect match between differentials: if it did, there would only be one line of integration that would result in only one type of created being. Integration takes place on the basis of a merely sufficient match between differentials. This allows for a vast number of different integrations, which explains such empirical phenomena as the existence of sometimes similar, sometimes identical or parallel features in entities that belong to different kingdoms, classes, phyla, and species.56 How differentials reintegrate is dependent on a number of variables, including the types of differentials present in a given proximity and the environment in which the process takes place.57 Differentials are described as being structurally simple, infinitesimal bearers of “divinity.” Complex beings are created only indirectly, through the integration of differentials.58 These more complex beings lack indi51. DD, 79. These phases are logical, not chronological. Stages 2 and 3 are continuous and therefore overlap. 52. DD, 77. 53. Blaga contrasts the philosophy of history that results from this theory of indirect creation with the Christian philosophy of history of Augustine. According to Augustine, God repeatedly intervenes in history, effecting positive changes whenever necessary. According to Blaga, the FA intervenes only once in history, at the beginning when it limits its own generative activity and initiates the process of creation through differentials. This one intervention affects the entire course of history, efficaciously accomplishing the FA’s goals without the need of subsequent interventions. FI, 499–503. 54. DD, 147. 55. Ibid., 106. 56. Ibid., 146. 57. Ibid., 143. 58. Ibid., 82.

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visibility, superlative size, and indestructibility. Differentials alone among created entities are indestructible, being simple and the only direct creations of the FA. They are also autarchic (self-governing), but their autarchy is so attenuated as to dovetail perfectly with the intentions of the FA.59 Blaga offers the following empirical analysis in support of his theory that the world is composed of differentials. Upon close inspection, it can be observed that all empirical existents display at least three types of discontinuity: 1. Structural discontinuity: some existents are very simple structurally, others are very complex; 2. Intrinsic discontinuity: existents are at one and the same time independent and interdependent; and 3. Discontinuity of repetition: groups of existents of the same type are composed of individuals. These phenomena are explained by the existence of discontinuity in the very heart of the empirical world. This fundamental discontinuity is a result of the empirical world being composed of a multitude of diverse differentials, variously integrated and organized.60 Furthermore, Blaga argues that two lines of empirical proof show that creation takes place through something akin to differentials: 1. The widespread consistency of certain structures plus the equally widespread variability of others indicates that there is a discontinuity of elements at the base of existence, which elements are capable of a variety of different combinations; and 2. The presence of similar or identical features in entities that are otherwise very different from each other likewise indicates that existence is composed of a variety of elements capable of forming a variety of combinations.61 Blaga examines these phenomena in some detail in chapters 5 and 6 of DD.

The Originator of the Cosmos Blaga writes that one cannot discuss the origination of the world without granting the existence of a metaphysical source or originator that is other than the world.62 He assigns to this source many denominators, including the Anonymous Fund (Fondul Anonim), the Great Anonymous (Marele Anonim, hereafter abbreviated MA), Creator, Generator, and God.63 In 59. Ibid., 83, 153. 60. Ibid., 84 –86. Blaga asserts that this discontinuity would be inexplicable if the world were directly created. 61. DD, 105. Blaga sees this as another indication of the falsity of the slogan “ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny.” DD, 149–50. 62. DD, 65. 63. These can be found used and explained in DD chapters 2 and 10, among other places.

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general he chooses to use the most abstract and neutral term, the Great Anonymous, believing that this term, although not having great demonstrative value, will pique the reader’s imaginative capacity.64 The idea of a Great Anonymous is not a direct product of observation or revelation, but rather is itself a product of human imagination, writes Blaga (though he does not say that the source of the world is itself imaginary). The Great Anonymous is a “metaphysical myth” which is permitted for its philosophical utility.65 It is called Great because it is a unitary whole of maximum structural and substantial complexity, and furthermore because it is the source of all other existence.66 It is called Anonymous because it is separate and hidden from creation; it is secret from its own creation (for reasons that will be detailed later). He describes the Great Anonymous as “the existence which holds us at the periphery, which refuses us, which imposes limits on us, but to which is owed every other existence.”67 That Blaga uses the term “The Great Anonymous” metaphorically is clear.68 What is less clear is how Blaga conceives that to which the term refers. There are two extremes of interpretation on this issue. On the one hand there are some who view the term as a philosophical appellation for what most Romanians refer to simply as God (keeping in mind that the Romanian Orthodox conception of God strongly emphasizes God’s transcendence and the human inability to comprehend the Divine). One advocate of this interpretation of Blaga’s position is Constantin Valter Nicula, an Orthodox priest affiliated with the Faculty of Orthodox Theology at Lucian Blaga University in Sibiu, Romania. Nicula argues that Blaga’s utilization of the “Great Anonymous” terminology was a concession to the European philosophical currents of his day, but that Blaga himself was a believer in God, albeit one who did not adhere strictly to the Orthodox system. In support of this interpretation he cites the evidence of the books 64. CT, 449. Although this term has been used already by Dionysius the PseudoAreopagite, Blaga states that his use of the term differs radically from how Dionysius used it. Blaga, Art˘a s¸i valoare, in vol. 10 of Opere, ed. Dorli Blaga (Bucharest: Editura Minerva, 1987), 630; hereafter referred to as AV. 65. DD, 67; FI, 488. That Blaga views his proposal as being similar to a myth does not necessarily imply that there is in reality no entity that fulfils the role of the Great Anonymous. Myths may have a basis in fact, and are useful for their expressiveness, but only when they are not in contradiction to experience. DD, 118. Blaga writes that the idea of the Great Anonymous “does not have the pretensions of theology, in the usual sense, nor as of a supreme result of some inductions. It represents merely an anticipation, which can demand the consent of the readers only progressively and to the degree in which it will be in a position to organize a metaphysical vision of great scope without arriving in conflict with the results of experience.” DD, 67. 66. Ibid. 67. Ibid., 66. 68. Blaga says so himself in DD, 68 and CT, 449.

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that Blaga selected for reading while he was a student in Sibiu, the passages he underlined in these books, and the notes that he made in their margins. Nicula says that this evidence reveals the great influence that Christian writings had on Blaga and that he possessed a deep spiritual interest.69 Also in support of this interpretation can be mentioned Blaga’s positive evaluations of mystical thinkers such as Dionysius the PseudoAreopagite and Meister Eckehart, although Blaga makes it clear that he himself is not a mystic.70 Without a doubt there are parallels between Blaga’s writings and those of monotheistic mysticism.71 On the other end of the spectrum of interpretations is the view that Blaga’s term represents a purely philosophical conception of a possible original source of the universe, which although expressed in the metaphorical language natural to one who grew up in a culture steeped in Christian tradition, who was the son of an Orthodox priest, and who studied theology during a formative period of his education, does not bear any relation to the God of Christian theology and experience.72 According to this view, when Blaga uses theological language to metaphorically express aspects of his metaphysical system, that to which he is referring has no relation to what the language refers to in its usual theological context. That Blaga chooses to use theological language in expressing these difficult concepts is a result of his own culture and background, and is a situation that should not be allowed to prejudice the mind toward interpreting his system religiously.73 69. These points were made in a personal discussion with Costantin Valter Nicula on the campus of Lucian Blaga University, May 2002. 70. ED, 241 and ESM, 567. Also, see “Schi¸ta unei autopresent˘ari filosofice,” in Diaconu and Diaconu, Dic¸tionar de termini filosofici ai lui Lucian Blaga, 12, and FI, 503– 4. Blaga appreciates the emphasis that mystics place on the human inability to cognitively grasp the source of existence, but he disagrees with their view that one can be united with this source in a mystical state of ecstasy. 71. Nemoianu opines that Orthodoxy is a main channel through which Neoplatonic philosophy influenced the entire “Romanian school of philosophy,” including Blaga. Nemoianu, “Mihai Sora ¸ and the Traditions of Romanian Philosophy,” 594. It seems likely that the mystic and Neoplatonic elements of Romanian religious culture influenced Blaga’s creativity; see Nemoianu, A Theory of the Secondary (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 164 –66. On the other hand, Blaga specifically states that what he means by his use of the term “Anonymous” to designate the source of existence differs radically from what the mystic Dionysius meant by the term. AV, 630. 72. Marta Petreu has argued forcefully that the best context for understanding Blaga’s use of the term Great Anonymous is from his graduate studies in philosophy at the University of Vienna, where he spent a considerable amount of time studying Descartes. According to Petreu, Descartes’ use of the God and demiurge concepts in philosophizing are the most likely influences on Blaga’s development of the Great Anonymous. Marta Petreu, “De la Dumnezeul cel bun la Dumnezeul cel r˘au,” 30– 40. 73. Dr. Sandu Frunz˘a, professor of philosophy at Babe¸s-Bolyai University, expresses this view in his paper “Aspecte ale polemicii Blaga-St˘aniloae ˆın jurul definirii religiei” (presented at the Twelfth International Lucian Blaga Festival, Cluj-Napoca, Romania, May

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Blaga himself discusses how the Great Anonymous concept differs from and is similar to the Christian conception of God. Both are conceived as being the source of all else, both are conceived as being the most central of all existents, both are conceived as being the greatest existent, to the extent that their own existence surpasses all others in both extent and in quality. However, Blaga states that he hesitates to use the term God to refer to his conception of the central metaphysical entity both because there are significant differences between his own conception and that of traditional theology, and because attributes are usually ascribed to God that Blaga believes it impossible to know whether or not they apply to the Great Anonymous.74 He grants that the term “God” could be used as a synonym for the Great Anonymous, since according to his metaphysics there is nothing in existence that is more central than the Great Anonymous.75 But Blaga will not even affirm that the Great Anonymous is a being in the usual sense, saying rather that conceiving it thus is merely a “crutch” used by the understanding.76 Perhaps a third interpretation of the problem of whether Blaga’s central metaphysical principle is something akin to the God of monotheistic religion would be closer to Blaga’s own philosophical system. As will be seen later, according to Blaga’s system, knowledge of ultimate things, including the ultimate source of existence, is not within the reach of humanity. Therefore it is neither possible to know that the central metaphysical existent is the God of monotheistic religion, nor that it is not. While arguments concerning Blaga’s own background or spirituality could lead to conclusions about how Blaga would picture this entity in his own nonphilosophical thinking or how he would be guided by his emotions, in his philosophy, the Great Anonymous can be nothing other than that: anonymous. Basing the interpretation on Blaga’s philosophical writings it can be said that the Great Anonymous could be God, or could be some13, 2002). In a personal e-mail Frunz˘a reemphasized his opinion that the Great Anonymous “does not have anything to do with any sort of divinity that could be associated with Christian religious experience” [el nu are nimic de a face cu vreun soi de divinitate ce ar putea fi asociat˘a experien¸tei religioase cre¸stine]. It does seem to me that Blaga postulates an unbridgeable divide between humanity and its originator, one that is neither bridged by providential acts of the originator nor by any act(s) conceivable on the part of humanity (see, for example, DD, 158). 74. DD, 104. Blaga warns that “it is not advisable to concede some preconceived opinions (of theologians)” (DD, 159); see also CT, 542, where he states that he avoids using the term because of its accumulated baggage. See also DD, 66. 75. Ibid., 67. 76. CT, 449. Some theologians assert that the same is true about God: that the human use of terminology to describe God is always inadequate to the task of describing its object. See, for examples ancient and contemporary, Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite, The Complete Works, trans. Colm Lubheid (London: SPCK, 1987), especially the chapter “Mystical Theology”; John Hick, Philosophy of Religion, 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall, 1990), 349ff.

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thing completely other than God as usually conceived: something impersonal but generative. According to Blaga, there is no way to know for certain which is the case.77 Can anything be known about the nature of the originator of the cosmos? As already seen, Blaga does think that some things can be postulated about the MA: that it is the source of all else, that it is the most central and greatest existent, that it has the ability of self-replication, and so on. It is also possible to posit certain abilities and limits of the MA, such as the ability to generate new beings, its ability to limit this generation, and its inability to self-replicate without disturbing the balance of existence. Furthermore, it is possible to know things about some of the MA’s actions, such as its actions in relation to the limiting of its creative acts, its selfreplication, and creation through differentials. Blaga states that these actions hint that the nature of the MA includes elements both divine and demonic (which will be discussed later). However, all of this knowledge about the FA is tentative, partial, and fails to accurately grasp its object. This is because the FA is “anonymous,” it keeps itself hidden from human understanding, as will be explained presently.78

Dis-analogy between Creator and Creation According to the preceding description of the origin of the cosmos, there is a large degree of discontinuity or dis-analogy between the FA and that which is a result of the FA. That there is discontinuity between the cosmic source and the cosmos has been remarked by a number of thinkers. According to some Gnostic and Neoplatonic thinkers, any product is inferior to its producer, and therefore the world is necessarily dis-analogous to its 77. This is my own interpretation, but it was confirmed by Dr. Virgil Nemoianu in e-mail correspondence on November 30, 2002. This interpretation is supported by passages such as the following, in which Blaga shows himself aware of the danger inherent in pushing his own metaphysics beyond its inherent limits: “For example, no one should await a discourse on our part, as erudite as it is inconsistent, concerning the ‘infinite’ and ‘absolute’ attributes of the Great Anonymous. We are not at all predisposed to follow the example of the classical metaphysicians who, falling to temptation, launched themselves into the play of blind antinomies.” DD, 67. An important recent work that follows a procedure similar to Blaga’s is Jean-Luc Marion, God Without Being: Hors-Texte. Marion argues that our concepts can themselves become idols. In trying to avoid making God mundane through the utilization of ordinary concepts, Marion observes that he has gone “from idolatry to conceptual atheism in order to bring to light the idolatrous presupposition of every conceptual discourse on God, even the positive.” Jean-Luc Marion, God Without Being: HorsTexte (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 9, 33. Marion goes on to discuss how and in what areas this voluntary conceptual atheism might be confined in order to facilitate discussion about God. 78. DD, 66–67.

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source. According to Christian theology, there exists great discontinuity between God and creation because of the misuse of free will and the resulting fall of man, which affected all of creation. According to Plato, the discontinuity from Form to object is a result of the inability of material to receive the perfection of the Form. Blaga criticizes these proposals on the grounds that each gives to a second element, in addition to the FA, a key role in the formation of the cosmos. He also objects to the latent potential for overcoming of the Creator-creation discontinuity found in each of these proposals.79 Blaga’s own view (which, again, is necessarily a tentative hypothesis only pragmatically justified,80 but which he sees as being a result of deductions from certain empirical observations) is that the product of the self-reproduction of the FA is necessarily differentiated from the FA in order to preserve the order of the cosmos. This differentiation is done by the FA itself, in a very precise way (through reproducing only via differentials and the nonemission of the most central differentials), and in order to achieve a specific goal.81 The goal and benefits of differentiated creation include: 1. Facilitation of the fulfillment of the FA’s generative nature; 2. The avoidance of genesis of innumerable identical “hypostases”; 3. The avoidance of the genesis of complex, indivisible, and indestructible existents that would have too great an autarchic potential; 4. The generation of complex existents that do not infringe upon numbers 2 and 3 listed above; 5. The genesis of an immense variety of existents and beings; 6. A proportioning of existents between those that are simple and those that are more complex; and 7. The generation of beings with cognitive capacity while at the same time censoring that capacity so as to protect both the beings and the order of the universe.82 Blaga believes that his proposal shows that the FA has employed a means of genesis that achieves a maximum number of advantages (Blaga lists eight) through the employment of a minimum number of measures (he lists three).83 Blaga states that the existence of dis-analogy between Creator and creation is paradoxical.84 It is paradoxical because the expected result of an Anonymous Fund as postulated by Blaga would be the production of other entities like itself, the production of identical self-replications. Blaga finds it surprising but empirically evident that this self-replication does not take place. The explanation for this surprising nonoccurrence is the necessity of thwarting “theo-geneses” in order to preserve the necessary order of exis79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84.

Ibid., 158. Ibid., 154, 159. Ibid., 157, 159. This will be explained in the section on transcendent censorship. DD, 185. Ibid., 190.

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tence. Thus the apparent paradox is only an initial paradox, which is seen to be resolvable through the means of minus-cognition (which will be discussed in chapter 5).85

Transcendent Censorship In Blaga’s metaphysics there are two important measures employed by the source of the cosmos in preservation of cosmic equilibrium. One of these has already been discussed: differentiated creation. The other is transcendent censorship, the main subject of his book by the same title.86 While many metaphysicians have struggled with the question “what is the nature of existence?” and many epistemologists have struggled with “what are the methods of knowledge?” relatively few have sought to answer the question “what is it that impedes our answering of these fundamental questions?” Blaga states that this “prohibitive factor” is one of the factors of existence that philosophy has yet to reckon with. Blaga proposes that ultimate questions are difficult to answer, and in some sense unanswerable, because in addition to the ontological limit that the FA has imposed upon creation (through the means of differentiated creation), the FA has also imposed a cognitive limit on creation. This was done at the time of the creation of the cosmos, and is now an inherent aspect, affecting all modes of cognition.87 Blaga refers to this limit as “transcendent censorship.”88 This censorship is accomplished via a network of factors, including obligatory epistemic reliance on the concrete, the intervention of cognitive structures, the resulting “dissimulation of the transcendent,” and “the illusion of adequacy.”89 Transcendent censorship 85. Ibid., 192. 86. Vasile B˘ancil˘a writes that transcendent censorship is the backbone of Blaga’s metaphysics (B˘ancil˘a, Lucian Blaga: Energie romˆaneasc˘a, 52). Many have made the assessment that the concept of “mystery” is the central concept of Blaga’s philosophy; transcendent censorship is one of the most important and most interesting aspects of Blaga’s conceptualization of mystery. 87. CT, 453. Transcendent censorship was enacted in the precosmic stage of genesis, and is not now accomplished through direct intervention, nor is it repeated. Its results also affect animals insofar as animals are capable of cognition. DD, 184 –85. 88. This censorship is “transcendent” because it was initiated beyond the human “spatio-temporal horizon” (CT, 451). See also CL, 404. 89. Regarding reliance on the concrete, see CT, 456. Regarding the intervention of cognitive structures, in distinction from Kant, Blaga says that the categories of the understanding are subjective, and that their number is not fixed. This is one of the central theses of his PhD dissertation, and is also found in CT, 511, and in greater detail in the subchapter “The categorical concepts—subjective or objective” in S¸ C. Blaga uses the term “stylistic brakes” (frˆanele stilistice) to indicate the limiting effect of culture on human cognition. While culture is appreciated by humans as a thing of value (and indeed, may well be

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not only prevents humans from having positive-adequate knowledge of mysteries of existence, it prevents them from having “positive-adequate” knowledge of any object of cognition whatsoever. Blaga points out that this view has an interesting difference from the Kantian/neo-Kantian view. In Kant’s epistemology, existence is passive in the cognitive event; according to Blaga’s theory, existence is active in preventing itself from being known.90 One of the lines of reasoning that Blaga employs to support his transcendent censorship thesis is that this censorship explains the evident fact that an ultimate cognitive grasp of reality eludes humanity. Blaga argues that since every cognitive structure or system results in a different view of a given object of cognition, and since the object itself does not change, it must be the cognitive structure that causes cognitive dissimulation.91 However, since individuals cannot step out of their cognitive structures in order to ascertain dissimulation, cognition is inescapably dissimulated. On a naturalist theory one would expect to find compatibility between cognition and its object. The theory that the world is a product of a fund that creates in a way intended to preserve the stability of its own creation naturally suggests the imposition of certain protective limits on creation. Thus the existence of intransigent cognitive problems supports theses like that of a transcendent censorship.92 According to Blaga, the result of transcendent censorship is that all human knowledge is either dissimulation (in which objects of cognition are represented as being other than they really are), or negative cognition (in which antinomian elements of a cognitive problem are reconciled appreciated by the FA as an aspect of creation and human creativity), it is also a limiting factor in human cognition, since all cognition takes place within a cultural milieu and is culturally conditioned. According to Blaga, a result of the stylistic halting is that human interpretations of the world are as much an expression of style as they are mirrors of objective reality (¸SC, 160–61). This interpretation of “stylistic brakes” as a subaspect of transcendent censorship has been confirmed in personal e-mails by Ion Copoeru of Universitatea Babe¸s-Bolyai (February 24, 2003) and Mircea and George Flonta of the University of Bucharest (March 15, 2003). Regarding the dissimilation of the transcendent, see CT, 468. Regading the illusion of adequacy see CT, 450ff. and 488–89. All these points are also discussed in the chapter “Fenomene, cunoa¸steri, cordoane cenzoriale” in FI. 90. CT, 452, 456–59. 91. The term “dissimulation” (disimulare) describes an attribute of sensory cognition wherein sensations are viewed as “signs” of the object rather than as a means of direct cognition of the object. Important differences exist between an object and its sign. The cognitive subject does not usually distinguish between the sign and the object that it represents, therefore s/he is not aware that the object is not cognized directly and is unaware of differences between the object itself and the sign by which the object is cognized. FI, 470. 92. CT, 468–69. Quasi-cognition, negative cognition, and related topics are discussed in more detail in the chapter on Blaga’s epistemology.

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through the employment of a heuristic “theory idea,” which leads to a deepened understanding of the problem without resulting in its complete elimination), or a combination of these.93 This does not indicate that Blaga is a skeptic: in fact, Blaga rejects skepticism as being too simplistic. He allows that both subjectivism and objectivism have strengths and weaknesses, argues that all cognition is subjective, and explains how cognition succeeds in spite of its subjective elements.94 Even the “mysteries” of existence are approachable through the strategy that Blaga names “luciferic cognition,” although they are not actually reachable.95 Blaga says that the Anonymous Fund has absolute knowledge, but this statement is only made with the awareness that it is a “mythical” statement aimed at bridging the gap between how words and concepts apply to humans and how they apply to the FA.96 He describes the FA’s knowledge as supralogical and absolute.97 The FA’s creation of humanity with an insatiable drive for truth that is forever blocked from ultimate satisfaction may reflect something of the FA’s own divine-demonic nature. Whether the FA is divine, demonic, or something in between cannot be known, for that knowledge is also censored.98 It is important that the concept of cognitive censorship be distinguished from mere cognitive error. An ordinary cognitive error can be discovered and may possibly be corrected. Transcendent censorship cannot be ascertained by the one being censored: the individual cannot step outside of the censorship in order to ascertain that it is in fact censorship. Nor is it possible for such a one to compare the censored cognitive acts with other noncensored acts in order to discern and correct them, since the cognitive subject has no noncensored acts at its disposal, and if it did, it would not be able to determine which acts are the noncensored ones. Blaga’s own arrival at the conclusion that censorship exists is a deduction utilizing the fact that the source of the dissimulation of cognitive objects must reside in the human cognitive structures, as mentioned above.99 Even this conclusion is not a noncensored act: it is merely a tentative conclusion reflecting a subjective understanding. 93. CT, chapters 3 and 5 and pp. 516ff. Blaga also calls dissimulation “quasi-cognition” and calls negative cognition “luciferic cognition.” 94. CT, 507–8 and 512. 95. Ibid., 502. 96. Ibid., 540. 97. Ibid., 541. 98. Ibid., 542. A surprisingly similar proposal is argued for in David F. Haight and Marjorie A. Haight, The Scandal of Reason or Shadow of God (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2004). 99. CT, 468.

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The reasons that the FA would impose censorship upon its creation are similar to the reasons for its dissimulation of creation. Blaga lists the following four reasons for transcendent censorship:100 1. Human possession of perfect knowledge would upset the equilibrium of existence by bestowing perfection on limited beings; 2. Human possession of perfect knowledge might threaten the benign governance of the universe by introducing the possibility of a human cognitive rival to the FA;101 3. Possession of absolute knowledge would ossify the human spirit, quenching human creativity; and 4. Censorship spurs human creativity and exertion, giving humanity its raison d’ˆetre.102 To this list could be added the explanation that human creativity is one indirect outlet of the creativity of the FA, and anything that lessens human creativity is an attack on the creative intentions of the FA. The responsibility for the human inability to arrive at an absolute understanding of existence therefore rests squarely upon the FA, for benevolent reasons. This is in striking contrast to the philosophical system of Descartes, wherein God’s righteousness and benevolence are made the foundation of all sure knowledge. In Blaga’s system, the benevolence and wisdom of the FA result in the prevention of sure knowledge.103

The Composition and Organization of the Cosmos It is clear that Blaga’s metaphysical system can say relatively little about the actual structure of the universe, because according to this system such knowledge is structurally secluded from human cognition. Blaga’s system does allow for metaphysical postulation, however, and these postulates can be supported or substantiated by experience and by pragmatic arguments. Thus Blaga justifies himself in asserting that the cosmos has a center, and that this center is the FA. He then proposes this postulate as the foundation of his metaphysical cosmology, defining the present mission of meta100. Ibid., 483. “The Great Anonymous cares for the dosing of the spirit through the work of a transcendent censorship for the advantage of and the heightening and enriching of life, and for the defense and reinforcement of the existential equilibrium” (CT, 539). 101. CT, 484 –87. Blaga states that not every perfect knowledge would pose a threat to existence, but that transcendent censorship is applied to the structure of knowledge and therefore affects all of knowledge. On 484 –86 he gives two examples of knowledge endangering the knower and/or the object, one from psychology and the other from death studies. 102. CT, 543– 44; GMSC, 449. See Cristian Petru’s discussion of these four points in his article “Cunoa¸stere s¸i existen¸ta creatoare,” in Lucian Blaga, ed. Ghi¸se, Botez, and Botez. 103. CT, 481.

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physics as constructing a worldview consistent with the thesis of the centrality of the FA.104 Blaga’s system does lead him to take stands on several of the standard issues of cosmology. Blaga rejects both naive realism and idealism, opting for a neo-Kantian critical realism, with some modifications.105 With regards to the monism-pluralism controversy, Blaga is clearly a pluralist. While the cosmos is a result of one single entity, and is composed of pieces emitted from that one entity, these pieces (the differentials) are separate, distinct entities in their own right. They are permanent and unchanging, and are the building blocks of all else that exists. Blaga’s account of the origin and nature of the cosmos provides an explanation of why and how there came to be a great multiplicity of existents from one single cause. Blaga compares his proposal with other metaphysical attempts to answer this question, showing that his proposal is superior to those of Plato, Aristotle, Neoplatonism, Fichte, Hegel, and Leibniz.106 Blaga is a realist and a pluralist, but he is not a materialist. Differentials are not material, but rather are submaterial. They underlie all material existents, but underlie nonmaterial realities as well.107 All that is, is composed of differentials (excluding the FA). Blaga also rejects vitalism (as defended by his contemporaries Hans Driesch and Henri Bergson, the latter being one of Blaga’s favorite interlocutors). Materialism views all reality as composed of one type of entity; vitalism adds a second immaterial type of entity to this, proposing that living beings are animated by some immaterial element that inanimate material objects lack. In contrast to these, Blaga’s cosmology proposes a large number of types of fundamental entities as the building blocks of reality—the heterogeneous differentials.108 According to Blaga, there have been numerous attempts to understand the organization of space utilizing the tools of mathematics, and some have 104. Blaga writes that the history of metaphysics is a catalog of attempts of just the opposite nature: explanations of existence relying on Ideas, Forms, and so on, which are all things that the FA could create if it chose to, but which it does not create because of the undesirable consequences of allowing a multitude of existents of such magnitude and/or perfection. DD, 160. 105. One of the differences between Kant and Blaga is the latter’s strongly emphasized point that neither what the mind supplies nor the data received through sensory intuition corresponds to the object of cognition because both are “censored” by the FA. Thus Blaga rejects what is sometimes called “the neglected alternative”: the possibility that the categories of understanding accurately correspond to their objects. Blaga states that there is an external object, and that sensory intuition is a sign of this object, but sensory intuition is a “censored” form of cognition, and therefore only reveals its object in a relative way. DD, 170–72. 106. DD, 160ff. 107. Such as “psycho-spiritual regions” (DD, 173). 108. DD, 107ff.

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approached the problem from an epistemological point of view (one may suppose that he is referring to Kant here, though he does not specifically say so). Blaga writes that few have approached the problem metaphysically, but that the problem demands a metaphysical-epistemological solution. Since space is an empirical reality, it cannot be structurally simple. Therefore it cannot be a single differential: it must be a collection of differentials, one of the complex existents of the cosmos.109 The differentials of which space is composed are much less integrated than are those that form other, more complex empirical objects. They are differentials poised for integration into more complex structures. Space is not, in fact, one large entity, as it is usually taken to be: it is many small adjacent spaces, continually involved in the process of integration, disintegration, and reintegration with which differentials are always involved.110 Thus it can be seen that all of the cosmos, including space, material objects, and any immaterial entities, are organizations of differentials, organized according to greater and lesser degrees of “sufficient match.”

The Appearance of Teleology Blaga takes very seriously the appearance of teleology, or purpose, in the world. He examines this phenomenon in great detail in DD, first in the chapter titled “Finalities and para-finalities,” and then returning to the issue in several subsequent chapters.111 Blaga seems to see this issue as providing one of the strongest arguments for his metaphysical vision. Many observers, not all of them religious, have believed that they detect evidence of a plan reflected in the order of the material world. Others have argued that teleological accounts are interpretations projected onto the data. The ambiguity of this problem is famously illustrated in the “parable of the garden,” first told by John Wisdom and later expanded by Antony Flew.112 Blaga is aware that such phenomena can be interpreted in ways 109. Therefore space is full, not an empty void (DD, 173). As to how material objects can move through space, Blaga states that this is possible because the differentials of which space is composed are not yet organized into objects or energy that would resist the progress of other objects (DD, 104). 110. DD, 170ff. 111. The issue is also discussed in considerable detail in Lucian Blaga, Aspecte antropologice, in vol. 11 of Opere, ed. Dorli Blaga (Bucharest: Editura Minerva, 1988); hereafter referred to as AA. 112. In this parable two observers of a garden interpret the same data differently and therefore come to opposite conclusions regarding the presence or absence of a gardener. Antony Flew, “Theology and Falsification: A Symposium,” in New Essays in Philosophical Theology, ed. Antony Flew and Alasdair MacIntyre (London: SCM Press, 1955), 13– 15.

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that are often opposites to each other.113 He sides with those who interpret the data as evidence of design in the world, but rather than using design as an argument for the existence of God, Blaga turns it into an argument for the existence of differentials and for his theory that the differentials are the building blocks of the world. According to Blaga, the clearest examples of teleology are in biology. Blaga gives many examples of biological phenomena that, according to him, bear the stamp of teleology, such as the eye, the shivering of an animal when it is cold, blood platelets, and skin pigmentation.114 The leading theory that seeks to explain such teleological phenomena without reference to purpose is Darwinian evolution. The essence of the Darwinian explanation is that the phenomena that appear to exhibit teleology are the result of chance happenings. Blaga summarizes the view thus: “any organic modification of life, which by chance happens to be finalist, has the chance to be preserved through natural selection. Any biological finality would be thus an accidental ‘lucky’ modification, among innumerable other nonfinalist modifications” (italics Blaga’s).115 The Darwinian explanation is an attempt at a mechanist explanation of the appearance of teleology. Blaga grants that Darwin’s theory is admirable, powerful and seductive, but argues that it is not in accord with experience. He argues that Darwin’s theory supposes that life occurs amid an infinite number of nonfinalist alterations. It is probable that among such a vast number of nonfinalist alterations there would also accidentally appear an occasional finalist alteration. But this huge number of alterations is essential for the unlikely event of a finalist alteration to occur, in Darwin’s theory. If the presupposition of an infinite number of nonfinalist alterations is insupportable, then the theory fails. An infinite (or even extraordinarily large) number of nonfinalist alterations is nowhere found in biology; on the contrary, the majority of alterations exhibit finality. Therefore the Darwinian explanation of apparently purposeful phenomena fails.116 Seeing the problems of the mechanical model, the biologist and philosopher Hans Driesch proposed a vitalist alternative that has as one of its 113. “The divergence is large, because the facts of biological finality themselves permit, at least at a glance, diametrically opposed explanations” [Si ¸ divergen¸ta e grav˘a, c˘aci faptele ˆın sine ale finalit˘a¸tii biologice, permit, cel pu¸tin la prima vedere, explica¸tii diametral opuse] (DD, 109). Blaga’s statement that “In reality nature changes its appearance, somehow appropriating to itself the charecteristic tendencies of the art of the times” seems to reflect a very similar problem in the domain of aesthetics; see Blaga, Ferestre colorate, in vol. 7 of Opere, ed. Dorli Blaga (Bucharest: Editura Minerva, 1980), 360; hereafter referred to as FC. 114. These four examples are discussed in DD, 108–9. 115. DD, 109–10. 116. Ibid., 110–11. Blaga also briefly discusses the Lamarckian explanation in DD, 109, and in more detail in AA, 197–206.

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features an explanation of teleology based on the proposed existence of “entelechy” (a concept borrowed and modified from Aristotle). In one of his experiments, Driesch produces, from a single fertilized egg, two complete animals. Driesch reasons that according to the mechanical model, the result of his experiment should have been two half-animals, that is, rather than two complete individuals, the mechanical model would predict two partially formed but incomplete individuals. The unexpected result equals a counterfactual against the mechanist explanation. In its day, this experiment was a very important step in biology, and had the result of divorcing biology from mechanist philosophy. Having found the mechanist explanation to be untenable, Driesch reaches back into the history of philosophical biology. He resuscitates and modernizes the Aristotelian theory of entelechy. According to Driesch’s theory, entelechy is the factor that organizes living beings. It is nonspatial and therefore able to be manifest in all beings simultaneously. Entelechy accounts for the ability of one cell to divide and still produce two complete animals. It is also the reason for the ability of an organism to regenerate lost appendages. Entelechy is the source of order in living organisms, and is therefore also the source of the appearance of teleology.117 One major problem with the theory of entelechy, however, is that it is irreconcilable with the phenomenon of multiple limb regeneration and other abnormal mutations. If there is such an organizing and guiding factor as entelechy, a factor that is responsible for the evidence of design seen (by some) in many biological phenomena, one would expect all biological phenomena to reflect its influence. Occurrences of “thwarted design” are inexplicable in Driesch’s theory.118 Blaga believes that his theory of differentials accounts for both teleology and thwarted teleology. According to Blaga’s theory, all existents are composite beings made up of a number of differentials emitted by the Anonymous Fund and integrated together on the basis of a merely adequate match. That a match is possible is a result of the means of generation of the differentials: being emissions of the FA, they are in fact minute copies of particles of the FA, and therefore are capable of reintegration into larger units that reflect the organization of the FA. (Reintegration into a second FA is thwarted by the nonemission of certain nuclear differentials.) Any reintegration on this basis will reflect teleology because it reflects something of the original order of the FA. Because the integration is on the basis of a merely adequate match, sometimes the integrations will result in strange or bizarre occurrences (mutations, etc.). Beings composed of differentials are susceptible to dis-integration of their comprising differentials, at which 117. DD, 111–13. 118. Ibid., 114 –16.

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time the differentials may reintegrate with other differentials and form a new being, exhibiting new teleological traits or thwarted teleology. It is because of the fact that the FA is only indirectly involved with the creation of compound existents that the creation of defective creatures is possible. Blaga says that such creatures could be termed “hyperpurposed”—their very imperfection reveals the great extent to which the FA’s purpose effects creation.119 It is the ultimate teleology.120 Darwinian evolution cannot account for teleology, and the entelechy theory cannot account for thwarted teleology. Since neither of the two leading alternates to Blaga’s theory can account for both of these phenomena, Blaga believes that his theory of differentials is shown to be the best current solution.121 The ultimate source of teleology, according to Blaga, is the plan and method of cosmic generation employed by the FA in fulfillment of its own creative nature. Creation reflects both the generative nature of the FA and its self-limitation in order to preserve the order of existence and preserve its creations.122

The Place of Humanity Like all complex existents, humanity is an indirect creation of the FA, created through complex organizations of the differentials. According to Blaga, humanity is, in a sense, the very pinnacle of creation, because the human conscious is the most complex organization of differentials permitted by the FA.123 There is also another sense in which humanity is the pinnacle of creation: more than any other complex created existent, humanity has the ability to further the FA’s creative activity.124 Humans are naturally creative, and their creations can be viewed as secondary creations of the FA.125 Human existence is characterized by two modes of existence, the “para119. Ibid., 119, 186–88. 120. Ibid., 189. 121. Ibid., 118–19. 122. Ibid., 189. 123. Ibid., 166, 182, 183; GMSC, chapter 11. 124. According to Elena Gheorghe, a senior researcher with the Romanian Academy, Blaga’s discussion of the importance of cultural creativity as a major factor distinguishing mankind from other animal species is a major theoretical contribution to the defining of the human race. See Angela Botez, “Comparativist and Valuational Reflections on Blaga’s Philosophy,” 157–58. 125. The creative destiny of mankind is both planned by the FA and limited by the FA, in order to achieve the FA’s great purposes. See Blaga, “Impasurile destinului creator,” in GMSC, chapter 10.

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disaic” mode, which is the normal state of life in the world, and the “luciferic” mode, which is life lived in the presence of mystery and for the purpose of “revealing” (grappling with, trying to make understandable) mystery.126 The latter mode results in an “ontological mutation” that is unique in the universe and essential to full humanness.127 “Mystery” is a result of the protective limits imposed on creation by the FA (transcendent censorship and the discontinuity between creator and creation). Through these means the FA gives to humanity its destiny and its purpose in life: its purpose is to create; its destiny is to strive (through creating) to reveal the mysteries of existence. Since the mysteries of existence are not ultimately fathomable by humans, humanity is doomed to a continual striving to reveal them, sometimes experiencing partial successes, but never reaching the ultimate goal. In Blaga’s vision, human history becomes an endless, permanent creative state, never reaching its goal (the absolute), but never exhausting its source of motivation and meaningfulness either.128 Through this artifice, the FA gives to humanity a goal, a purpose, and gives humanity the unique historicity that makes humanity so culturally rich.129 Thus historicity is one of the greatest dimensions of human existence.130 It is seen to be a dimension of “luciferic” humanness.131 Likewise, the “principle of conservation of 126. These will be examined from an epistemological perspective in chapter 5. 127. FI, 491–92. Blaga names the result of this mutation “the luciferic human,” “the complete human,” “the human of mode II,” and “the total human.” The “ontological mutation” is a transformation from being a mere living organism (“the paradisaic human”) to being an organism that lives “in the horizon of mystery,” with the awareness of mystery, ever provoked by this awareness to reach beyond itself, to transcend its inherent limits, and to strive to fathom the depths of the unknown. This transforms humanity into a race of beings that create culture, and sets them apart from other living beings. Up to this point, humans do not differ significantly from other animals; the ontological mutation turns humans into the highest living creatures. Diaconu and Diaconu, Dic¸tionar de termeni filosofici ai lui Lucian Blaga, 209–11. 128. FI, 499–503. 129. Ibid., 503. 130. DD, 175. 131. In this context, “luciferic” does not mean “satanic,” as the term is often used in religious contexts, but rather has reference to the state of unfulfilled or incomplete creative drive that spurs the individual and the human race on to ever new creative efforts (FI, 492). This is “luciferic” because in this creativity humanity strives to make itself equal to the FA, both creatively and cognitively assailing the transcendent. “History” is not merely a chronology of events, otherwise any succession of phenomena would be history. “History” is the specifically human mode of existing in the horizon of mystery. A human viewed biologically as an animal doesn’t have history; it is only with the appearance of the mode of living in the horizon of mystery that humanity becomes a historical race. With the appearance of history there appears at last the full, specifically human mode of existence (DD, 178). This will be discussed further in chapter 6.

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mystery,” which was made part of the very fiber of existence in order to preserve the centrality of the MA from the ambitions of created beings, is seen to be one of the chief metaphysical conditions of the historicity of humanity.132 This description highlights the two opposing components that shape human history: the inner human desire to creatively reveal mystery and the necessity of the FA to thwart this desire.133 The reasons that this desire cannot be allowed to be fulfilled have been explained in this chapter. This desire and its lack of fulfillment are here seen as essential both to the historicity of humanity and to full humanness, since they provide the peaks and valleys of failed attempts and renewed aspirations toward the absolute of which human history is composed.134 The human inability to have absolute knowledge is often viewed as a failure, shortcoming, or handicap. Blaga reverses this evaluation, making human subjectivity and relativity essential to humanness and the glory of the human situation: according to Blaga, these factors give humanity its role and place in a great ontological scheme. Humans are not the deplorable victims of their own limits that they are sometimes supposed to be; rather, they are the servants of a system that is so great it surpasses them.135 Humanity was created to create. In Blaga’s vision, creation is the highest moral virtue, one that is shared by the FA and humanity. The FA created humans with a creative pattern in their souls, so that humans would participate in and perpetuate the FA’s creative work. Individual cognition, so far from being secularized as some suggest, turns out to be intimately involved with the transcendent, and not in spite of its relativity, but exactly because of it.136 The FA designed individual cognition, with its abilities and limits, and designed it in such a way as to maximize the advantages for both humanity and all of existence. Human cognition continually brushes up against the transcendent, fails to conquer it, but is drawn to explore it, to “reveal” it, creatively. 132. FI, 490–91; DD, 176, 180. C. H˘ar˘angu¸s discusses Blaga’s philosophy of history in comparison to that of R. G. Collingwood in his chapter “Blaga: Filosof al istoriei,” in Meridian Blaga, ed. Irina Petra¸s (Cluj-Napoca, Romania: Casa Car¸tii de Stiin¸ ¸ ta˘ , 2000), 1:189–94. Blaga himself contrasts his philosophy of history with that of Hegel, whom Blaga views as the acme of idealism. Blaga praises Hegel for overcoming the static quality of Platonic philosophy, but also criticizes his philosophy on several accounts. In comparison to Hegel, Blaga’s philosophy puts greater limits on the human ability to comprehend the mysterious, and puts a greater emphasis on the existential role of style and cultural historicity. DD, 505–9. 133. FI, 511. 134. Ibid., 493. 135. CT, 543. 136. Ibid.

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Freedom AND Determinism According to Blaga’s metaphysical vision, creation is a process set in motion by a central metaphysical principle, the Anonymous Fund. This Fund determines the material of creation, the method of creation, and the limits of creation. It directly creates the differentials, and through them all else that is created. There appears to be a great deal of determinism in this vision. There is also room in Blaga’s metaphysics for freedom. Blaga emphasizes that the FA maintains distance from the indirect creative process of integration of differentials, which is how all compound existents are created. The FA allows the differentials to integrate according to their random juxtaposition—according to chance. The FA does not directly control their integration. What is determined is that they will integrate. Exactly how they integrate is purposefully left undetermined. There is a “vast, subtle metaphysical-cosmological” plan that determines the broad details of history.137 At the same time, “coincidence is allowed to play its role.”138 This same pattern is seen in the sphere of human activity. The destiny of humanity as a race of creative beings, infinitely seeking to reveal that which is censored and therefore beyond revelation, is dictated by the MA from creation. How each individual reacts to that destiny is not predetermined, but rather is left up to his/her own creativity. Each individual creates according to a random juxtaposition of elements: abilities, culture, history, and materials. The MA maintains its distance from this creative process, allowing the expression of the individuals to carry out the MA’s plan of creation through indirect creation.

What Lies Outside the Cosmos The final question of cosmology might be, “Is there anything beyond the cosmos?” Transcendent censorship does not prevent Blaga from having an answer to this question. All that exists is either one of two things: a structure of differentials emitted by the FA, or the FA itself. The cosmos is composed of differentials, as discussed above. The FA, on the other hand, is not composed of differentials. Therefore the FA is not part of the cosmos. The answer to this question, then, is that there is something “beyond” the cosmos, but only one thing: the FA. 137. DD, 188. 138. Ibid., 189, paraphrased.

5 Blaga’s Epistemology Introduction: Sources, Method, and Style

The primary sources for an analysis of Blaga’s epistemology are the three books of his Trilogy of Knowledge.1 These are Eonul dogmatic (The Dogmatic Age, the term “dogmatic” here meaning “theological” [as in dogma] rather than as a reference to an inflexible mental attitude), Cunoa¸sterea luciferic˘a (Luciferic Cognition), and Cenzura transcendent˘a (Transcendent Censorship).2 The first of these is an investigation into the role and place of the unknown (“mystery”) in human cognition, and the strategies by which the unknown can be approached. The second book is a comparison and analysis of the normal modes of human cognition to the mode of cognition that Blaga names “luciferic cognition.” The third book is a suggested metaphysical system that would complement the epistemological theory elaborated in the first two. Appended to the Trilogy of Knowledge is a book that discusses some epistemological issues in the natural sciences, Experimentul s¸i spiritul matematic (Experiment and the Mathematical Spirit).3 Many of Blaga’s other books also contain materials relevant to epistemology. Of greatest importance among these is Blaga’s doctoral dissertation, Cultur˘a s¸i cuno¸stin¸ta˘ (Culture and Knowledge), which has been published as a book bearing the same title and also as a chapter in Eseuri (Essays), which is volume 7 of Blaga’s collected works. Also incorporated 1. In English the term “epistemology” has acquired the broad connotation of the general study of the theory of knowledge. In Romanian, “epistemologie” is usually confined to the theory of knowledge in the physical sciences, and the broader term “teorie cunoa¸sterii” (theory of knowledge) is used to refer to the more general field of inquiry. Since this book is written in English, I will use the term “epistemology” with the broader sense. 2. According to Blaga, the title “Luciferic Cognition” is purely symbolic. The term “luciferic cognition” is coined by Blaga to describe one particular cognitive strategy that he explores; Diaconu and Diaconu, Dic¸tionar de termeni filosofici ai lui Lucian Blaga, 12. This will be explained in depth later in this chapter. 3. Although published posthumously in 1969, it was appended to the Trilogy of Knowledge according to the directions left by Blaga in his authorial testament; see vol. 8 of Opere, 57–58.

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into volume 7 is the small book Daimonion, which is a study on the relation between intuition and reason.4 S¸ tiin¸ta˘ s¸i crea¸tie (Science and Creation) and Gˆandire magic˘a s¸i religie (Magical Thought and Religion), the first two books in his Trilogy of Values, also contain a significant amount of epistemological material.5 There are two secondary sources that should be mentioned as valuable introductions to what is a very large epistemological system. Both appear in Meridian Blaga, vol. 1. Ioana Lipovanu’s article, “Lucian Blaga s¸i s¸chema tuturor cuno¸stin¸telor” (Lucian Blaga and the Outline of All Knowledge) provides a helpful outline of Blaga’s theory of knowledge.6 Ionel Narita’s article, “Elemente de espistemologie ˆın lucr˘arile timpurii ale lui Lucian Blaga” (Elements of Epistemology in the Early Works of Lucian Blaga) provides a concise summary of Blaga’s interaction with the major epistemological currents of his day.7 Whereas in his metaphysical system Blaga’s creativity seems to be in large measure tied to the speculative nature of his methodology,8 in his epistemology his creative insights are arrived at through close philosophi4. The word “daimonion” as it is used by Blaga is somewhat difficult to translate. The word may be inspired by similar terms in Socrates and Goethe, but in Blaga the term becomes a synonym for the Great Anonymous. According to Blaga’s (colorful and metaphorical) conception, the MA is somewhere in between God and the devil: it is the good Creator of existence, but it achieves its ends through a utilization of certain strategies that are not likely to be appreciated by those that are subjected to them. One example of this is that humanity is created with the desire to penetrate mystery, but is also prevented from doing so (at least in an ultimate sense), so that humanity is forever instilled with a creative drive. This drive gives humanity purpose in life, and at the same time it furthers the indirect genesis aspect of the MA’s overall plan. Thus the term daimonion refers to the MA conceived as something like “God with a dark side,” and would perhaps be best translated “evil genius” or “diabolical genius.” One of Blaga’s early books was given the title Daimonion. This book discusses the use of the term in the history of philosophy, including Goethe and more contemporary thinkers such as Carl Jaspers and Paul Tillich. Alexandru T˘anase has a good discussion of the use of the term in Socrates, Goethe, and other important thinkers in Lucian Blaga: Filosoful poet, poetul filosof, 198–209. 5. The title of S¸ C is very well chosen. “Stiin¸ ¸ ta˘ ” has become the Romanian word for science, but historically it has been one of the many Romanian words for knowledge in a more general sense; see Dic¸tionarul explicativ al limbii romˆane (Bucharest: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste Romˆania, 1975), s.v. “Stiin¸ ¸ ta˘ .” The “creation” referred to is human cultural creation. One key aspect of Blaga’s epistemology is the degree to which knowing is viewed as a creative activity. In S¸ tiin¸ta˘ s¸i crea¸tie Blaga argues that scientific knowledge is also a creative construction. 6. Ioana Lipovanu, “Lucian Blaga s¸i schema tuturor cuno¸stin¸telor,” in Meridian Blaga, ed. Irina Petra¸s (Cluj-Napoca, Romania: Casa C˘ar¸tii de Stiin¸ ¸ ta˘ , 2000), 1:213–37. 7. Ionel Nari¸ta, “Elemente de epistemologie in lucr˘arile timpurii ale lui Lucian Blaga,” 213–37. 8. The basic philosophical strategy that Blaga employs in his metaphysics is to propose a solution and then attempt to justify his proposal by analyzing its results. Proposals that are found to be philosophically fruitful are taken to be justified a posteriori.

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cal analysis. Nonetheless Blaga’s epistemology is creative, and one aspect of this creative originality is the creation of a large philosophical vocabulary. Blaga invents and utilizes some new terms in his metaphysics—the Great Anonymous, Divine differentials, and so on—but this is far surpassed by the number of terms that he creates and employs in his epistemology. It will be necessary to introduce and explain many of these terms in the course of the chapter. In order to avoid misunderstandings and obfuscation, a glossary of these terms has been provided at the end of this book. The style and method of Blaga’s epistemological work tends to be more descriptive than normative. That is, rather than setting rules for cognition in an a priori fashion, Blaga analyzes interesting cases of cognition and generalizes from these analyses to discover principles that are applicable to other cases. This strategy leads Blaga to a broad system of epistemology that accounts for both the normal and unusual modes of cognition.9

Blaga’s Outline of Epistemology Blaga provides numerous tables and diagrams to help explain his analysis of the human epistemological situation. The most general and inclusive of these is found at the end of CT.10 This table is broken down into three subtables, each of which itemizes a number of elements of the epistemological situation. As this table provides an inclusive outline of the possible modes of cognition according to Blaga’s epistemology, we will allow its outline to guide us in our explication of Blaga’s analysis. The table is as follows: Table 1: The possible modes of individual cognition 1. Positive-adequate cognition.* 2. Quasi-cognition. 3. Negative cognition. 4. Cognition that is in part positive-adequate and in part quasi-cognition. 9. This is nicely illustrated by Blaga’s critique of positivism. Positivism can be characterized as in some instances imposing a priori rules or criteria upon phenomena and investigative disciplines (for example, the across-the-board application of the verification principle both within and outside of the natural sciences by some logical positivists). Blaga makes an examination and analysis of various scientific breakthroughs, after which he criticizes positivists for overlooking the importance of creative imagination in the successes of science (“many errors have been more fertile for the development of science than have many well-established facts”). Thus Blaga’s inductive methodology leads him to be at odds with the normative approach sometimes employed by positivism, and he writes, “positivism is equivalent to a grave amputation of cognitive possibilities” (ESM, 655). 10. CT, 545– 46. These tables are first introduced and explained on 529ff.

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5. Cognition that is in part positive-adequate and in part negative cognition. 6. Cognition that is in part positive-adequate, in part quasi-cognition, and in part negative cognition. 7. Cognition that is in part quasi-cognition and in part negative cognition. * No. 1 is hypothetically attributed to the Great Anonymous. Transcendent censorship permits to humanity only no. 2 and no. 7. Table 2: Divisions and subdivisions of human individual cognition 1. Concrete cognition. 2. Paradisaic cognition. 3. Luciferic cognition. A. plus-cognition. B. zero-cognition. C. minus-cognition. 4. Mythic cognition.11 5. Occult cognition. (1, 2, 4, and 5 are divisions of no. 2 from table 1; 3 represents the divisions of no. 7 from table 1.)12 Table 3: Metaphysical forms of cognition 1. Positive-adequate and unlimited cognition (pertaining only to the Great Anonymous). 2. Censured cognition, in principle unlimited (a factor in individual knowledge). 3. Positive-adequate cognition, strictly limited (a factor in creative secondary replications).

The Possible Modes of Individual Cognition According to Blaga’s analysis, there are seven modes of cognition that are at least theoretically possible. Because of transcendent censorship (explained in chapter 4) and the inherent limits of the human condition, some of these modes are not actualized in human cognition. Those that are humanly attainable are further analyzed into subtypes of cognition, as is seen in table 2. Our exposition will cover all the types of possible cognition, but will go into greater detail on those types that are humanly attainable.13 The idea that there are limits on human cognition is not at all new. Much more interesting is Blaga’s explanation of these limits and his hypothesis 11. On p. 517 of CT Blaga includes mythic cognition with concrete and paradisaic cognition as a type of quasi-cognition. 12. This comment comes from my own analysis, and is not found in the tables as presented by Blaga. 13. Blaga also lists five kinds of error, each corresponding to one of the five divisions of human individual cognition (CT, 469).

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about their source and purpose. According to Blaga, the existence of the ability of human cognition and the limits imposed upon this ability are results of the “grace” extended to creation and care exercised over creation by the Great Anonymous. The purpose of these measures is the protection, preservation, and promotion of creation. Individual cognition is permitted within very specific limits: when knowledge is of a type that is “positiveadequate” it is strictly limited with regard to its extent. When knowledge is of a type that is in principle unlimited, it is strictly censored in regard to its accuracy.14 The limits imposed upon human cognition not only shape cognition, they actually facilitate its fruitfulness.15 There are very specific modes of cognition permitted to humanity that allow humans to approach the unknown, to approach mystery. These approaches do not eliminate mystery, but they allow a deeper understanding of mystery or an accumulation of information about the mysterious. Thus they fulfill the MA’s purpose of spurring human creativity, they pacify the inner human yearning, and at the same time they preserve the order of the cosmos. Blaga’s epistemology focuses on analyzing these sometimes overlooked approaches. These and the other central features of Blaga’s epistemology will be explained in the exposition of Blaga’s tables. Positive-Adequate Cognition Positive-adequate cognition is that mode of cognition that accurately grasps its object in all of the object’s aspects and details. Blaga also refers to this as “absolute cognition.” Using language common in analytic philosophy, positive-adequate cognition is that cognition that has a 100 percent correspondence to its object. Unlimited positive-adequate cognition is not actualized by humans, due to reasons mentioned in chapter 4.16 In the version of the tables found on p. 529, Blaga states that this type of cognition is hypothetically attributed to the Great Anonymous. Some living organisms evidence a sort of limited positive-adequate cognition that governs certain biological functions, such as the regeneration of lost append14. This is discussed at length in CT and more briefly on 529ff. of CL. 15. CT, 461: “Although water fights against the riverbanks, without the banks the river would no longer be a river.” 16. On pp. 505–6 of CT Blaga articulates a different argument for the thesis that humans do not have positive-adequate cognition. In brief, his argument is that, by definition, cognition is an act wherein the subject surpasses itself in possessing the cognitive object. By definition a phenomenon is an existence centered in itself. Therefore cognition cannot be a phenomenon. This leaves two possible conclusions regarding cognition: either it is something paradoxical, an existent nonphenomenon, or it does not exist. Blaga favors the latter conclusion, and argues that all human “cognition” is mere quasi-cognition, either distorting its objects or incomplete in its grasp of them.

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ages. This is not cognition in the usual sense of the term, but it does involve some form of accurate information that guides the regenerative process.17 This description of knowledge raises the question of theories of truth and of verification.18 Blaga briefly discusses the three leading rivals: correspondence, coherence, and pragmatic justification. He writes that a theory is verified by both internal (coherence) and external (correspondence and pragmatic) criteria. Blaga observes that internal criteria of verification are limited to showing that a theory cannot be verified: coherence never serves as a positive mode of verification.19 Therefore it seems that Blaga views coherence as a necessary but not sufficient criterion of truthfulness. Correspondence, on the other hand, seems to be viewed by Blaga as a sufficient but not necessary criterion of truth. That is, if a statement can be shown to correspond to what it is describing, it stands as verified; the inability to show that this relation pertains does not falsify the theory. (A positive showing that the relation does not pertain would falsify the theory, of course, though most counterfactuals result in revisions rather than repudiations.)20 This seems to be what Blaga is addressing on p. 381 of CL, where he discusses what appears to be in part a correspondence theory of truth as an external criterion. He writes, “The external criterion consists in a relation of the theory to plan A effectively realized.” A difficulty with correspondence theories of truth is how the relationship of correspondence is to be verified. Blaga’s phrase “effectively realized” hints at his answer to this question: there is a distinctly pragmatic aspect to Blaga’s view of verification. His criterion for judging correspondence is pragmatic, as is seen on p. 409 of CL, “Verifiability consists, as was proved, in the ‘actualization’ of the empirical potential of a theory. This signifies something completely different than the correspondence of the theory to a ‘reality in 17. CT, 524 –28. This type of “cognition” is not instinct, which Blaga discusses on p. 528. Instinct is, according to Blaga, a mixture of censured-but-unlimited and adequate-butlimited knowledge. Blaga notes that to creatures to whom is permitted more adequate-butlimited cognition is permitted less censured-but-unlimited cognition, and to creatures to whom is permitted less adequate-but-limited cognition is permitted more censured-butunlimited cognition. There is a proportioning of the type and amount of knowledge that is permitted by transcendent censorship. 18. Blaga does observe that the understanding of the concept of “truth” varies from one culture to another, and he contrasts how the term was understood in ancient Greece, India, and medieval and modern Europe (FI, 263–66). 19. CL, 381. 20. Blaga has surprisingly contemporary discussions of these and similar issues in his writings on philosophy of science, but that is outside the scope of this book. His contributions to the philosophy of science are discussed in an article by Angela Botez published in English, “The Postmodern Antirepresentationalism (Polanyi, Blaga, Rorty),” 59–70.

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itself.’ ”21 Blaga is definitely concerned that statements have the correct relationship to “external” reality, but he is aware that verifying this relationship is problematic, and consists of a tentative evaluation based on the success or failure of the statement when put into application.22 Thus while Blaga may have a correspondence theory of truth, he clearly disavows correspondence as a criterion of verification.23 This understanding of truth and verification seems to be consistent with Blaga’s own practice. One can clearly see that Blaga has made a major attempt at internal consistency in the writing of his systematic philosophy. Yet he does not appeal to this consistency in support of the truthfulness of his system. He often discusses empirical issues while elaborating his system, but not as direct proofs of his system. Rather, he discusses empirical issues as problems demanding resolution, and then shows that his philosophy facilitates the resolution of these problems. In this manner he tentatively verifies his philosophical hypotheses by showing that they work when applied to actual problems.24 21. The italicization of empirical potential and the quotes around “reality in itself ” are Blaga’s. 22. See especially GMSC, 417, “There certainly exists a nominal definition of truth, understood as the equation between an idea and reality. But this ideal definition is equivalent to a simple postulate, for the realization of which no certainty is given to us, nor any criteria of judgment nor possibility of a control.” This same approach to verification is seen in Blaga’s philosophy of science. In one passage, commenting on the nature of scientific progress, he writes, “With what right does he (Einstein) transform a ‘paradoxical finding’ into a ‘principle’? With one single right. With the right that is given to him by the theoretical fruits that this change of accent has been able to bear.” SC, 162. Nonetheless, Blaga is also aware that pragmatic validation is not inerrant: on FI, 465, he argues that pragmatic successes are sometimes achieved using erroneous premises. 23. Also on p. 409 of CL he writes, “Let us presuppose that in truth there exists a ‘reality in itself ’. . . . The single thing that can be affirmed about knowledge in relation to a reality in itself is that we cannot know whether knowledge is able to contain reality in itself, nor whether it is not.” While Blaga admits some importance to a correspondence between propositions and that which they are attempting to describe, his advocating of the theory of transcendent censorship proves that he does not believe that a proposition can ultimately correspond to reality (whatever that would entail). This is made clear in CT, 506, where he describes cognition as a “catching hold of ” an object, and says that such an act is only incompletely possible. 24. It may seem anachronistic to interpret Blaga’s philosophy as relativist, pragmatist, or as anticipating aspects of the currently influential postmodernism, but these features are unmistakable in Blaga’s writing and have been commented on by several philosophers. See, for example, Virgil Nemoianu’s book A Theory of the Secondary, wherein he writes, “It should be clear from this cursory account that Blaga’s philosophy could fit into the family of thinking of which the writings of Saul Kripke, Thomas Kuhn, Nelson Goodman, and Paul Feyerabend are also a part: paradigmatic, pluralist, and mildly relativist.” Nemoianu goes on to distance Blaga from the “neo-skeptical and agnostic orientations” of some postmodernists, and states that “Blaga’s unexpected twist to modern relativism adds a more constructive and optimistic dimension to it. . . .” Nemoianu, A Theory of the Secondary,

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That this verification is tentative is a very important point. Human knowledge does not attain the status of “positive-adequate” cognition, and therefore all human cognition is in some way limited. The tentative nature of verification is one kind of limit: limited certainty.25 Quasi-cognition Quasi-cognition is similar to positive-adequate cognition, except that it occurs within the cognitive boundaries of what is permitted to humanity. Blaga writes that it is the MA’s compromise between transcendent censorship and the human drive for knowledge. Quasi-cognition is censored as to quality but unlimited with regards to quantity.26 This means that quasicognition does not have a completely accurate grasp of its object (does not correspond 100 percent to its object), but has a potentially unlimited number of objects. It is this aspect that gives quasi-cognition its name: it is not complete cognition of an object, but it is some cognition of an object—it is semi- or quasi-cognition of the object. Quasi-cognition takes the place of positive cognition, and is semiobjective. To be semiobjective means to provide some useful knowledge of objects of cognition without actually attaining the goal of complete objectivity. Blaga writes that “quasi-cognition does not arrive at its object,” but that it “seduces” us at every step to take it to be pure cognition.27 Therefore we accept quasi-cognition and are able to function within its limits and to find (at least partial) fulfillment in its achievements. All human cognition is at least in part quasi-cognition, and therefore is subject to some degree of censorship and does not attain 100 percent correspondence to its object. Quasi-cognition is divided into four subtypes: concrete cognition, paradisaic cognition, mythic cognition, and occult cognition. Explaining these subtypes of quasi-cognition will illuminate the nature of quasi-cognition. Concrete Cognition Concrete cognition is the source of raw material for all intellectual elaboration, imperfectly realizable since the concrete we have access to is only a sign of how the concrete is shown to us. The results of concrete cognition 165. See also Alexandru Surdu, “Aspecte moderniste ale filosifiei lui Blaga,” in Meridian Blaga, 1:281–82, and Angela Botez, “The Postmodern Antirepresentationalism (Polanyi, Blaga, Rorty),” 59–70. 25. Gavriliu’s criticisms of Blaga in this area (found in the chapter “Adevarul: O valuare pierdut˘a ˆın orizontul misterului” [Truth: A value lost in the horizon of mystery] in Incon¸stientul ˆın viziunea lui Lucian Blaga: Preludii la o Noologie Abisal˘a) lack philosophical sophistication. 26. CT, 529. 27. Ibid., 514 –15.

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are signs of objects that are otherwise than they are conceived (this distortion is, however, important to our functioning in the world).28 Concrete cognition does not give the subject direct access to the object, but rather it provides access through the mediation of various intuitions (including sensory intuition).29 Intuitions are always conceptually determined when used in knowledge.30 The attempt to purify intuitions of concepts (as sometimes found in positivism) is hopeless, but the categories by which an intuition is determined can be modified in luciferic cognition.31 Transcendent censorship prevents concrete cognition from providing direct access to the object itself.32 Concrete cognition does not provide an understanding of its objects— that would require intellectual interpretation and elaboration, like that which takes place in paradisaic cognition and luciferic cognition. Concrete cognition merely provides the raw data that paradisaic and luciferic cognition use as their starting points. Paradisaic Cognition Paradisaic cognition is a form of quasi-cognition that provides a degree of understanding of its object. Therefore paradisaic cognition is described as one of the two forms of “understanding cognition” (cunoa¸stere ˆın¸telegatoare—as usual it sounds better in the original language than in translation).33 Paradisaic cognition is the most common type of “understanding cognition,” and represents what is often taken to be the normal approach to knowledge acquisition. Its goal is the quantitative or numerical reduction of the mysteries of existence by adding new facts to human knowledge. Paradisaic cognition does not eliminate mystery. 28. Ibid., 456ff. 29. Ibid., 456–59. 30. CL, 357. 31. Ibid., 359; S¸ C, 192. This is a very controversial suggestion, and will be explored further in chapter 6. The chief place where Blaga discusses this is in GMSC, chapter 5, “Categoriile abisale,” wherein he distinguishes between the cognitive categories affecting paradisaic cognition and the abyssal categories affecting luciferic cognition. 32. “The neglected alternative” sometimes discussed in Kant studies, the possibility that the object and how it is perceived coincide, is not a possible alternative in Blaga’s system, because the discontinuity between a cognition and its object is guaranteed by the MA through transcendent censorship; see S¸ C, 186. Geo S˘avulescu, in Lucian Blaga: Filosofia prin metafore, 50–51, seems to argue that Blaga, in contrast to other neo-Kantians, shows that the object and its perception do coincide. This is exactly the opposite of how I interpret Blaga on this point. 33. CT, 459. The other form of understanding cognition is luciferic cognition. At times Blaga refers to these two types of understanding cognition as type I and type II cognition (e.g., SC, 164). Blaga writes that the distinction between paradisaic and luciferic cognition is almost but not quite captured by translating them as “descriptive cognition” and “explanatory cognition.” Neither is more empirical than the other (CL, 434).

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Paradisaic cognition operates through the application of the categories of understanding to the material provided by concrete cognition (and therefore incorporates the limited access to objects of cognition contained in concrete cognition). It views the objects of cognition as “given,” as passive in the cognitive process, being given to the subject through intuition, abstraction, or imagination.34 Paradisaic cognition is a function of what Blaga calls the “enstatic intellect,” which is the human intellect in its ordinary mode of operation (the other mode of operation, the “ecstatic intellect,” will be introduced presently).35 In this mode, the intellect seeks knowledge without attempting to transcend logic. There are, however, elements of nonrationality/irrationality in paradisaic cognition, and these elements play an important role. The strategy employed by paradisaic cognition is the apprehension of concrete existence through an infinite series of conceptual determinations. Such a series surpasses any single rational act, and is the first instance of the irrational within paradisaic cognition. Other instances of the irrational in paradisaic cognition include the emergence of antinomies, the existence of anything infinite, and the equation of concepts or categories to the concrete. This last instance of irrationality affects all paradisaic cognition.36 At the most, therefore, it can be said that the process of paradisaic cognition is rational, but not that result. Cognition (paradisaic and luciferic) reduces irrationals to more elementary irrationals, but not to rationals.37 These proposals and conclusions about the limits and nonrational and irrational aspects of paradisaic cognition are not intended to be a “critique” of paradisaic cognition, but rather an analysis of paradisaic cognition. Blaga has no argument with paradisaic cognition, but resisting naive realism, he subjects paradisaic cognition to philosophical analysis, which forces him to acknowledge that paradisaic cognition has limits as well as strengths and leads him to acknowledge its significant, but overlooked, nonrational aspects.38 Mythic Cognition Mythic thought is an attempt to reveal mystery using the medium of imagination.39 Myths are symbolic (Blaga says “iconic”) expressions of perceptions “wrested” from existence; they are creative elaborations built 34. CL, 315. 35. Ibid., 315–16, 434, 459ff. 36. Ibid., 422–23. 37. Ibid., 424 –25. Blaga analyzes knowledge into seven kinds of irrational results, and says that no place is left for a rational result (CL, 424). 38. Ibid., 429. Virgil Nemoianu discusses this briefly in the chapter “The Dialectics of Imperfection,” in A Theory of the Secondary, 153–70. 39. GMR, 219.

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upon a core of elements drawn from experience. How these core elements are elaborated is dependent on cultural and circumstantial factors. The abstract meaning of a myth, its core element, may be foreign to the creators of the myth: the creators of myths may view the myths as being “more real than reality itself.” However, viewing a myth with more cultural distance facilitates the observation of the core elements upon which the myth is built. At times an analysis of a myth leads to an interpretation or exegesis of the myth that makes plain the core experiences that gave rise to the myth, perhaps yielding a fruitful moral or metaphysical insight. At other times myths resist analysis. At such times it is possible that the myths in question are pointing to a truth that transcends ordinary experience.40 Myth has a suggestiveness and power of persuasion that is not found in any other type of thought. It concentrates, in one flexible medium, human experiences combined with the human power of prognostication, summarizing deeply felt intuitions in a form that graphically expresses things that resist verbalization. This is why myths have a power similar to argument without the need of recourse to proofs: myths are accepted at their word because they resonate with a human experience that is both universal (or taken to be universal) and felt to transcend normal understanding.41 The grasp of the transcendent achieved through mythic cognition is limited by the allegorical nature of mythic communication. Myths express a sense, but they express it “only in the measure in which they also hide it.”42 Being faced with the choice between dissimulated expressing or not expressing at all, the authors of myth choose (perhaps unconsciously) to express with dissimulation. Mythic cognition is an important mode of cognition, both because it is an avenue of (limited) access to the transcendent and because it is more common than is often realized.43 Blaga writes that mythic cognition has the gift of penetrating all the other modes of cognition—even what is held to be “pure experience” is impregnated with myths. Also, “so-called natural science” is dominated by certain structures that are derived from mythology.44 He declares that the modern world has not left myth behind, but 40. CT, 462–63. Blaga analyzes myth into two broad categories: myths that attempt to signify something that can have a logical equivalent and myths that are trans-significative, that attempt to reveal something that has no logical equivalent (GMSC, 367). Recent work on the unique cognitive value of myth is Phillip Stambovsky, Myth and the Limits of Reason, rev. ed. (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2003). 41. GMR, 218. 42. CT, 463. 43. Ibid., 461–62. 44. Ibid., 462. Blaga discusses the similarities and differences between mythical thinking and scientific thinking in the first chapter, “Myth and Thought,” of the book Daimo-

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rather that myth remains an important part of modern culture, and furthermore, an important mode of cognition. It is not at all true that rationality has done away with myth: rather, rationality has criticized and overthrown portions of myth, leaving other portions untouched. The modern situation is not one of rational mythlessness. The modern situation, according to Blaga, is a chaotic admixture of fragments from many myths (in contrast to the situation in antiquity, wherein one unitary myth dominated each particular culture).45 Occult Cognition “Occult cognition” is the term that Blaga uses to refer to extrasensory phenomena such as clairvoyance. He acknowledges that philosophy is usually skeptical about such phenomena, but he asserts that both the results of parapsychological research and the widespread occurrence of such phenomena necessitate that they be taken seriously. He divides clairvoyance into three types: 1. Clairvoyance that provides ordinary knowledge of hidden things in the past or present, or of things in the future; 2. Clairvoyance that claims to provide knowledge of facts that cannot be ascertained with the five ordinary senses; and 3. Clairvoyance that claims to provide knowledge of transcendent facts that would explain various occult phenomena.46 Blaga points out that the first type of clairvoyance provides knowledge that is in its essence the same as the knowledge provided by paradisaic cognition. If the second type of clairvoyance exists, it only increases the extent of our contact with the mystery of existence, showing that there are things other than those that are given to us through the senses. Neither of these types overcome the limits of transcendent censorship.47 The third type of clairvoyance claims to provide explanations of facts, which makes this type of clairvoyance more interesting. Blaga’s examination of this type of clairvoyance, however, shows that the explanations are attributable at least in part to factors in the unconscious mind of the voyeur. These unconscious elements can be the subject of psychological study. Therefore, he concludes, if this type of cognition does exist, it also does not provide knowledge that is in its essence different from that gained through paradisaic cognition.48 nion, in vol. 7 of Opere, ed. Dorli Blaga, 285–89, and in the chapter “Concerning Myths” in GMSC, 365–85. See also Traian Pop, Introducere ˆın filosofia lui Lucian Blaga (ClujNapoca, RO: Editura Dacia, 2001), 148. 45. CT, 462. 46. Ibid., 464. 47. Ibid., 465. 48. Ibid., 465– 67.

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According to Blaga’s analysis, therefore, all forms of occult cognition, assuming that they are legitimate, are subject to transcendent censorship and represent types of quasi-cognition. The results of occult cognition are, at best, dissimulated knowledge.49 Negative Cognition “Negative cognition” is an “act of transcendence” (self-transcendence) of the knowing subject.50 As mentioned previously, this entails that negative cognition is not truly cognition (see footnote 16 in this chapter). It is something more like a cognition of the inability to know, a cognition that approaches but does not surpass the boundaries of transcendent censorship. Blaga writes: There exists a single “objective” idea that does not contravene the intentions of transcendent censorship: the idea of existential mystery as such. However, this idea is, we repeat, a negative idea. It contains the existential mystery, without revealing it. It indicates mystery as such, without disclosing it in a positive way, or as we have already said, through a comparison, which has also given us the term: it relates to the transcendent as the “negative” relates to the “object” in bronze sculpting.51

Thus, as in negative theology, negative cognition gives a suggestion of its object without actually revealing that object. Like quasi-cognition, negative cognition is censored with regards to its objectivity and correspondence, but unlimited with regard to its extent.52 Although it is theoretically possible that negative cognition could be realized independently of quasi-cognition, within the realm of human cognition it is realized only in combination with quasi-cognition. This will be explained more in the section on luciferic cognition, which is quasicognition built upon the idea of mystery.53 49. Ibid., 467–68. Leonard Gavriliu (a psychologist and author who has also studied philosophy and literature) has a chapter on Blaga’s analysis of occult cognition in his book Inconstientul ˆın viziunea lui Lucian Blaga: Preludii la o Noologie Abisal˘a, in which he provides a concise summary and several criticisms of Blaga’s thought on the subject. It appears to me that Gavriliu has not mastered in detail certain aspects of Blaga’s epistemological system; most of his criticisms seem to be the result of misunderstandings. 50. CT, 506. 51. Ibid., 515. I translate the phrase “tehnica plastic˘a,” literally “sculpture technique,” as “bronze sculpting” in order to make the picture of the use of a negative more clear in the translation. 52. CT, 529. 53. Ibid., 516.

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Composite Forms of Cognition Blaga states that there are a number of theoretically possible forms of cognition that are composites of the above-mentioned forms (positiveadequate cognition, quasi-cognition, and negative cognition). These theoretically possible forms are: 1. Cognition that is part positive-adequate cognition and part quasi-cognition; 2. Cognition that is part positiveadequate and part negative cognition; 3. Cognition that is part positiveadequate, part quasi-cognition, and in part negative cognition; and 4. Cognition that is part quasi-cognition and part negative cognition. Of these four theoretically possible forms, only the fourth is realizable by humans. This is because the first three forms include elements of positive-adequate cognition, which transcendent censorship prevents humans from having.54 Blaga gives to the cognition that is part quasi-cognition and part negative cognition the name “luciferic cognition” or “type II cognition.” Luciferic cognition is a method of deepening the understanding of phenomena that involve antinomies. It operates through attempting to resolve paradoxes that arise in paradisaic cognition.55 The paradisaic objects are viewed as signs of the mystery that is the actual object. This mystery is partly revealed and partly concealed through paradisaic cognition. When a latent antinomy is discovered in the object,56 luciferic cognition approaches the antinomy with the tools of negative cognition, attempting to lessen the unknown elements of the mystery (this is called “attenuation of the mystery”). Sometimes an unexpected result is achieved: the mystery is determined to be impenetrable (“permanentization of the mystery”), or more rarely, the method of luciferic cognition finds the mystery to be even more mysterious than previously understood (“intensification of the mystery”).57 Luciferic cognition is the mode of cognition wherein the most difficult problems of understanding are addressed. It and its subdivisions are a key element of Blaga’s epistemology, and as such will be explained in more detail later in this chapter.

The Metaphysical Forms of Cognition Blaga observes that, viewed from a metaphysical perspective, cognition can be analyzed into three types: 1. Cognition that is positive-adequate and 54. Ibid., 516. 55. CL, 349. 56. A helpful article on the important place of antinomies in Blaga’s epistemology is Stefan ¸ Afloroaei, “Antinomii ale intelectului ecstatic” in Lucian Blaga, ed. Ghi¸se, Botez, and Botez. 57. CL, 325, 434.

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unlimited; 2. Cognition that is censured but in principle unlimited; and 3. Cognition that is positive-adequate but strictly limited. The first of these is possessed only by the Great Anonymous. The third is possessed by simple organisms and enables them to perform functions such as the replication of lost appendages. It is within the second type of cognition that human cognition falls: humans have a potentially unlimited access to new knowledge, but all of it is subject to transcendent censorship. No human knowledge exactly reflects its object, no human belief exactly corresponds to a mind-independent reality, and no human cognition penetrates all the depths of mystery. Mystery, and the transcendent censorship that is the cause of mystery, are central to Blaga’s epistemology, and to his whole philosophical system.58 The reason for transcendent censorship was explained in the preceding chapter on metaphysics. The means of transcendent censorship will be explained in the following chapter on Blaga’s philosophy of culture.

Key Elements and Innovations of Blaga’s Epistemology There are at least five important features of Blaga’s epistemology that are innovative, to a greater or lesser degree, and that are significant epistemological contributions. The first of these is the placing of his epistemology within a complementary and explicatory metaphysical system. Although Blaga states that his epistemological insights are argued independently of his metaphysics and stand regardless of the success of his metaphysical speculation, the positing of a complementary metaphysical system elucidates many aspects of his epistemology that would not be brought out by a typical analysis of human cognition. This feature of Blaga’s philosophy enables it to go beyond the “what” questions and provide tentative answers to “why” and “how.” Blaga’s metaphysical speculation provides answers to such epistemologically relevant questions as what are the material, efficient, and final causes of the human epistemological situation, why this situation pertains, how it was implemented, and how it is preserved. Blaga’s answers to these questions revolve around the hypothesized Great Anonymous, its purposes in creating and preserving its creation, its method of preserving creation, including the necessity of limiting its creativity in order to preserve creation and/or the order of creation, and the steps that the Great Anonymous has taken in order to achieve its goals. By answering these secondary epistemological questions, Blaga puts his epistemology into a framework 58. Blaga himself places mystery at the center of his epistemology and metaphysics (CT, 491).

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that turns his epistemology into more than just an analysis of cognition: his epistemology becomes an integral part of a worldview. A second important feature of Blaga’s epistemology is his emphasis on the important role played in human cognition by culture. The role of culture in cognition has gained a much wider acknowledgment by the beginning of the twenty-first century than it had in the early part of the twentieth. One of the leading philosophical movements of Blaga’s day was positivism (in various forms), which sought to exclude cultural elements from cognition. Blaga explicitly opposes positivism in his writings, and opposes other philosophies that deny the historicity of thought and the role of culture in cognition. According to Blaga, even the categories of cognition are culturally affected.59 Blaga’s explication of the role of culture in cognition brings out both the limits and the potency of human cognitive ability.60 It shows that there are both subjective and beautifully creative aspects of human cognition, but also that human cognition is not thwarted by its historicity, but rather empowered by it. These important issues will be discussed in the following chapter. The third and fourth important contributions of Blaga’s epistemology are his analysis of the two types of cognition that he calls “luciferic cognition” and “minus-cognition.” Luciferic cognition has already been briefly introduced. Minus-cognition is a subcategory of luciferic cognition, and will soon be discussed. Blaga devoted an entire book of his epistemological trilogy to minus-cognition (ED), and another is largely devoted to luciferic cognition (CL). In his elucidation of these two types of cognition, Blaga uncovers methods of problem solving that heretofore have been largely overlooked in Western epistemology. These two epistemological methods will prove to be fruitful in approaching several vexing problems in philosophy of religion. We will return to these two methods and explain them in more detail before closing this chapter. A fifth important aspect of Blaga’s epistemology is its constructivism. Constructivism, the view that human knowledge is a human construction, is a ubiquitous element of Blaga’s philosophy. This constructivism was seen in our elaboration of Blaga’s philosophy of philosophy, it is seen in his freely creative metaphysics, and it is reflected in his epistemology in 59. Lucian Blaga, Cultur˘a s¸i cuno¸stin¸ta˘ , in vol. 7 of Opere, ed. Dorli Blaga, 46ff.; S¸ C, 181ff. 60. Ioan Biri¸s, in his chapter “Criza intelectual˘a s¸i transcenden¸ta,” in Meridian Blaga, vol. 2, explains the important place that the Judeo-Christian idea of human intellectual “failure” has in Blaga’s philosophy. He argues that acceptance of this idea of failure has certain philosophical advantages not found in some nonoccidental philosophies (Taoism and Buddhism). (In his analysis Biri¸s states that Blaga’s “dogma” resembles Hegel’s “reason,” but does not mention what Blaga himself considered to be very significant differences between the two [62]).

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the role accorded to culture and in the analyses of mythic, occult, paradisaic, and luciferic cognition. It will be seen again in the chapters on philosophy of culture and philosophy of religion. That human knowledge would be a human creative construct is no surprise once one understands Blaga’s metaphysics. The human destiny to be a creator, ever provoked to this effort by the abilities and limits given to humanity by the Great Anonymous, leaves no option but that humanity will strive to cognize the unknown without ever quite reaching it. This scenario may sound sadistic, but seen from within Blaga’s metaphysics it becomes a gift to humanity and to creation: to humanity, because it gives humanity purpose and pleasure; to creation, because it perpetuates creativity while at the same time protecting creation from potential selfdestruction. There have been numerous other constructivist philosophers, and it cannot be said that Blaga was the first. Nonetheless, there are several important things about Blaga’s constructivism that make it particularly noteworthy. The first of these is how neatly and consistently constructivism fits within the larger philosophical picture that Blaga paints. Blaga’s philosophical system gives constructivism a context, an explanation, and a purpose that are sometimes lacking in other constructivist philosophies. A second noteworthy aspect of Blaga’s constructivism is that it is argued for in a wide variety of cognitive contexts: Blaga shows that human thought is constructivist whether it occurs in math, the natural sciences, philosophy, theology, the arts, or in any other cognitive context.61 A third important aspect of Blaga’s constructivism is how it is argued: Blaga does not cease being a constructivist when he argues for his own philosophical system. He views his own system as merely a possible thesis supported (but not proved) by evidence and pragmatic utility. Therefore he does not seek a foundationalist justification of his system: he argues for his system using evidences and illustrations taken from a wide variety of intellectual domains, and by showing the fruitfulness of his proposals for further philosophical research. He does not try to prove his system beyond all possible doubt. Were he to attempt to show that his theory is apodictically certain, he would be inconsistent with his own system. But that he does not argue for the certainty of his system does not indicate that he does not believe his system to be correct. On the contrary, it indicates that he views his system 61. See Traian Pop, “Inteligen¸ta˘ s¸i intui¸tie ˆın cunoa¸stere,” in Introducere ˆın filosofia lui Lucian Blaga, 141– 46. Although each of these modes of cognition is unique in comparison to the others, they also share certain elements, including constructivism, and Blaga considers them to be equally valid ways of approaching mystery (FI, 508). The section “Cunoa¸stere s¸tiin¸tific˘a s¸i crea¸tie cultural˘a,” in Lucian Blaga, ed. Ghi¸se, Botez, and Botez, contains articles by many authors discussing the relation of science and math to culture and human creativity.

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as correct, and that because it is correct, he must conduct his philosophizing as a constructivist, which entails viewing his own system as a human construct.

Luciferic Cognition Revisited It is necessary that more be said about luciferic cognition, since this is one of the key insights of Blaga’s epistemology. According to Blaga, the important distinction between paradisaic and luciferic cognition has largely been overlooked.62 Paradisaic cognition, as already stated, attempts to quantitatively reduce the mysteries of existence. Its progress is linear, adding new facts to the existent body of knowledge.63 Luciferic cognition, on the other hand, seeks to qualitatively reduce mystery, through attenuation, or if that is not possible, through permanentization or intensification of the mysterious.64 Its progress is inward, deepening and intensifying knowledge of the hidden essence of the cognitive object.65 Every step of progress leads to another step, ad infinitum, and thus luciferic cognition is never totally successful in grasping its object, but it is successful in providing new understanding of the layers and aspects of the mystery of its being.66 Luciferic cognition does not trespass the boundary of transcendent censorship, it does not eliminate mystery, but it does explore the boundaries of cognition and reconnoiter the limits that transcendent censorship has imposed.67 Blaga concludes that epistemology that fails to take into account the important difference between paradisaic and luciferic cognition will necessarily result in confusion.68 62. CL, 307–8. Blaga sometimes refers to these as type I and type II cognition. He says that viewing cognition as one linear process, and failing to distinguish between paradisaic and luciferic cognition caused the failure of Kant, positivism, phenomenology, and other epistemological movements, because they were compelled to attempt to turn luciferic cognition back into paradisaic cognition, something that can never be accomplished (CL, 434). 63. CL, 323. 64. CT, 461; CL, 325. Attenuation and permanentization of cognitive mysteries are operations of the “enstatic intellect”; intensification of a mystery is an operation of the “ecstatic intellect” (CL, 495). 65. CL, 332 (footnote). 66. This process need not continue ad infinitum: sometimes it stops at zero-cognition or minus-cognition (CL, 329). Also see CL, 323. To solve a problem in luciferic cognition means to remove the object from crisis “momentarily” by revealing the cryptic. It is momentary because the revelation of the cryptic reveals a new layer of cryptic aspects (CL, 333). 67. CT, 461. 68. CL, 308. Blaga asserts that his explication of the rationalizing of experience in paradisaic and luciferic cognition distinguishes his own epistemology from all other epistemologies (CL, 364).

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Luciferic cognition can be described as a hybrid form of cognition, being part quasi-cognition and part negative cognition (which are discussed earlier in this chapter). That luciferic cognition is in part quasicognition is in large measure due to its initial dependence on paradisaic cognition. Luciferic cognition is dependent on paradisaic cognition for its starting point, the empirical, conceptual, or imaginary data that Blaga calls “phanic material.”69 It then “provokes a crisis” in the phanic material through bringing out the mysteries inherent in the object. Whereas paradisaic cognition views objects of cognition as “given,” luciferic cognition views them as partly given, but also partly hidden.70 Paradisaic cognition is primarily concerned with determining an object or accumulating conceptual knowledge of an object. It is subject to the “illusion of adequacy”—the mistaken belief that the object is as it is perceived to be, or more precisely, the mistaken belief that paradisaic cognition is able to grasp the object as it really is. Luciferic cognition begins with the removal of this illusion.71 Luciferic cognition is concerned with the internal crisis of an object, with deepening the understanding of an object, and with probing possible problems associated with the object.72 An investigation that stops at the mere defining of an object as it is “given” overlooks a potentially multitudinous number of other facets of knowledge about the object. The benefit of luciferic cognition is that it goes beyond this stopping point of paradisaic cognition. Every object can be viewed from both the perspective of luciferic cognition and that of paradisaic cognition; the latter perspective is essential to the former, but the former is deeper than the latter.73 The distinction between the object of paradisaic cognition and the object of luciferic cognition bears a resemblance to Kant’s phenomena-noumena distinction, but has several important differences. One significant difference is that the Kantian noumenon is an object that is one single mystery; the luciferic object is a long series of latent mysteries. An even more important difference is that whereas the Kantian noumenon is not available to human cognition, Blaganian luciferic objects are available to luciferic cognition 69. The term “phanic” and its opposite, “cryptic,” are taken from Greek; see Teodore ˆ aiul veac (BuchaDima, “Ideea teoric˘a: Fundament cognitiv general,” in Eonul Blaga: Intˆ rest: Editura Albatros, 1997), 340. The “phanic aspect” of an object of cognition is the visible, apparent aspect, the “known facts,” whether empirical, conceptual, or imaginary (CL, 320, 332). It is also called the “aria” of a problem (DCF, 101). 70. CL, 316. According to Blaga’s proposed metaphysic, objects of cognition are partly hidden, by the Great Anonymous, and for very specific reasons. This was explained in the chapter on Blaga’s metaphysics. 71. CT, 489–91. 72. CL, 319. 73. Furthermore, Blaga states that paradisaic and luciferic cognition correct each other reciprocally (CL, 361).

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(but are not cognized in the same way as objects are cognized in paradisaic cognition).74 The process of luciferic cognition begins when a perception of an object is interpreted as a sign or “symptom” of the object rather than as a perception of the object itself.75 This move causes a “crisis in the object.” Blaga considers this crisis to be the central phenomenon of luciferic cognition.76 The crux of this crisis is the realization that the cognitive object is not what it appears, that there is mystery latent in the object.77 This first step of luciferic cognition is called the “posing of the problem” and the “opening of the mystery.”78 A luciferic problem is “posed” (or “the mystery is opened”) when an attempt is made to deepen the understanding of the phanic material and the discovery is made that the cognitive object also has a “cryptic” aspect, an aspect that is hidden from investigation.79 It is this cryptic aspect that is the proper object of luciferic cognition. Luciferic cognition tries to analyze and reveal the secrets of the cryptic. In analyzing the cryptic, luciferic cognition is guided by a “theory idea.”80 This is an already well-established principle that the researcher uses to guide himself/herself in the postulating of an interpretation of the cryptic. Blaga gives inertia as an example of a principle that can serve as a theory idea: the idea of inertia is not abstracted directly from any phanic material, but neither is it an a priori. It is a tool created by an intellect trying to overcome a luciferic crisis.81 He notes that the theory idea both conceptually anticipates the form that the final solution will take and at the same time provides support for the researcher’s conclusion in favor of his/her interpretation.82 Blaga calls the act of proposing an interpretation of the cryptic, which interpretation is in accord with and guided by the theory 74. Ibid., 320–322. 75. Ibid., 320. 76. Ibid., 319. 77. Ibid., 316. 78. Ibid., 321–22. Blaga uses three different phrases to describe this phenomenon: “to pose a problem,” “to open a mystery,” and “to provoke a crisis in the object.” These signify the act of initiating the process of luciferic cognition by distinguishing between the phanic and the cryptic aspects of the cognitive object. CL, 327, 363. 79. CL, 320, 332. Blaga states that the distinction between the phanic and the cryptic is not the phenomena-noumena distinction found in Kant. CL, 387. 80. Also called, metaphorically, a “springboard,” because it helps the researcher to make the leap from what is given (the phanic) to a hypothesis about what is not given (the cryptic) (CL, 334ff., 339). The theory idea can be a principle, a law, a category, or a common concept (ibid., 349). The theory idea is similar to the “supramethod” discussed by Blaga in his philosophy of science. 81. CL, 354. 82. Ibid., 334, 369, 378. In his writings on philosophy of science Blaga uses the term “supramethod” instead of “theory idea”; see ESM, chapter 3.

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idea, “directed observation.” Directed observation is looking at the cognitive object through the lens of the theory idea.83 There exists a sense of tension between the phanic material and the theory idea being employed to solve the posed problem. Blaga calls this the “interior tension” of the problem.84 This tension is removed by an explanation of how the phanic material and the theory idea harmonize in solving the problem. This explanation of the harmonic relation between the phanic material and the theory idea is called the “theoretic construction.”85 A theoretic construction is a postulate that eliminates or diminishes the interior tension between the phanic material and the theory idea, yielding a more profound understanding of the problem and the relationship between the phanic and the theory idea.86 It is a result of directed observation. It is in the theoretic construction that the resolution of the problem is found (and the “mystery is revealed”).87 The theoretic construction is a postulate based on the phanic material and the theory idea, but it is not a necessary conclusion drawn from them, and therefore a number of different theoretic constructions could be proposed as possible resolutions of any single luciferic problem.88 In some instances additional “theoretic accessories” are necessary in order to resolve additional problems associated with the theoretic construction. These theoretic accessories are secondary explanatory hypotheses that, like the theoretic construction itself, are not implicit in the theory idea.89 The path from the phanic material through the theory idea to the eventual resolution of the luciferic problem in the theoretic construction and the theoretic accessories is called the “inner horizon” of the problem.90 This represents the aspects of the problem that are not the data of the phanic material.91 The greater the inner tension of a problem, the larger this horizon is. The greater the amount of empirical data involved in a theory, the greater will be the theory’s susceptibility to external corroboration (and rebuttal). This inherent degree of ability of a theory to be empirically 83. CL, 372–75. A category of the understanding may serve as a theory idea in luciferic cognition, and may thus serve as a tool for attenuating problems of cognition, whereas in paradisaic cognition the categories establish the framework wherein facts about the world are interpreted and integrated. CL, 347. 84. CL, 337ff. 85. Or “interior construction” (CL, 339ff.). 86. On “interior tension” (tensiune interioar˘a), see CL, 337, 342. The action wherein the problem of luciferic cognition is resolved is called “revelation of the cryptic,” because it uncovers the hidden aspects of the object of cognition through the postulation of a theory that explains the relevant phenomena or provides the missing data (CL, 381). 87. Ibid., 339, 366. 88. Ibid., 366. 89. Ibid., 342, 350. 90. “Zarea interioar˘a” (CL, 365ff.). 91. DCF, 101.

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corroborated is called its “empirical potential.” Having a greater empirical potential does not make a theory more probable, but it does make a theory more testable.92 The capacity that a given theory idea has to resolve different problems, its capacity to be employed in the resolution of a variety of different luciferic cognitions, is called the “theory capacity.”93 The uniting of a number of problems and theoretic constructions on the basis of the theory capacity of a single theory idea results in a “theoretic system.”94 Luciferic cognition tends to systematize its constructions, but since there does not seem to exist a universally applicable theory idea, luciferic cognition creates a multiplicity of systems rather than uniting all theoretic systems into one all-inclusive system.95 The displacing of the original categorical construction of phanic material by new categories in the theoretic construction is called “categorical dislocation.”96 A categorical dislocation of any other revelation of a cryptic aspect of an object of cognition wherein the conceptual result is the opposite of the original conceptual understanding provided with the phanic aspect is called a “Copernican inversion of the object.”97 The “revelation of the cryptic” in luciferic cognition can take three different forms. These are: 1. Plus-cognition (also called “attenuation of the mystery”); 2. Zero-cognition (also called “permanentization of the mystery”); and 3. Minus-cognition (also called “intensification of the mystery”). Of the three, Blaga devotes the most time to minus-cognition, it being the main subject of his book Eonul dogmatic. Minus-cognition is the least common and perhaps the most controversial of the three types of luciferic cognition. Plus-cognition Plus-cognition is the most usual mode of luciferic cognition. It “attenuates” the mystery of the cognitive object through deepening the understanding of the object itself, but it does not completely do away with the mystery of the object.98 Rather, it leads to the discovery of new mysteries 92. CL, 382–83. 93. Ibid., 353. 94. Ibid., 355. 95. Ibid., 356. 96. Ibid., 358. 97. Ibid., 363. 98. Blaga has an interesting discussion of causality, subsumption under generalization (as in Hempel’s “covering law” theory), and the nature of explanation; see CL, 412ff. Blaga holds that subsumption results in an actual explanation only when subsumption results in the attenuation of an opened mystery. CL, 415. He illustrates his point by discussing the

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anterior to the original mystery, which can themselves subsequently be treated as objects of luciferic cognition. Analysis of these subsequent mysteries will usually reveal more mysteries, ad infinitum.99 Occasionally these secondary (or tertiary, or later) analyses will result in the permanentization or intensification of the mystery (as explained in the sections on zero- and minus-cognition).100 Plus-cognition proceeds according to the steps of luciferic cognition previously described: phanic material—cryptic aspect—opening of the mystery/posing of the problem—theory idea—theoretic construction/ revelation of the cryptic—interior tension—theoretic accessories.101 In plus-cognition the result of the procedure of luciferic cognition is the removal of one layer of mystery.102 In Cunoa¸sterea luciferic˘a Blaga gives a variety of examples of pluscognition. In order to illustrate how plus-cognition works, one of these examples will be related here. The example is taken from Newton’s theoretic solution of the problem of refraction.103 Newton’s solution was widely accepted by his contemporaries. The eventual replacement in science of the corpuscular theory of light by the particle wave theory necessitated major modifications to Newton’s original proposal, but this can be viewed as consistent with the recessive nature of luciferic cognition, if the move from corpuscular to particulate is taken as an example of an analysis of a secondary mystery in luciferic cognition.104 The following is a numbered breakdown of the steps taken in the process of plus-cognition used in resolving the problem of refraction. 1. Phanic material: The empirical data—White light passing through a prism refracts into colors. 2. Cryptic aspect: The true nature of light. 3. The mystery opened: The problem of how to account for spectral refraction. Light appears to be simple and colorless. How does it become multiple and colored? 4. Theory idea (the springboard): Mechanism—scientific phenomena are reducible to mass, motion, and the mathematical relationship of the two. phenomenon of red shift and its explanation through the Doppler principle. There are other types of explanations besides subsumption. Subsumption corresponds to plus-cognition; there are also explanations that correspond to zero-cognition and minus-cognition. CL, 418. 99. CL, 325ff.; ED, 274 –75. 100. CL, 329. 101. Blaga actually lists nine steps, which I have simplified to these seven (CL, 368). 102. The theory idea chosen to resolve a problem limits the possible solutions of that problem. Anything beyond the scope of that theory idea constitutes a new problem to be solved. This gives luciferic cognition the appearance of progressing in stages. CL, 369. 103. CL, 351–52. 104. These comments on the replacement of the corpuscular theory by the particle wave theory are my own, not Blaga’s.

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5. Theoretic construction/revelation of the cryptic: Light is a movement of material corpuscles (the theory idea is implicit in this construction: light is reduced to mass and motion). 6. Interior tension: Tension exists between 1 and 4, since the phanic aspect of light manifests neither mass nor motion. 7. Theoretic accessories: (Indirect) accord is created through the proposal that white light is actually composed of corpuscles that have different sizes corresponding to their colors; the smaller ones are more affected by passing through the prism (they are redirected by the material particles that make up the prism), which causes a greater change in their direction of travel.

This example demonstrates the plus-cognition form of luciferic cognition. The mystery of light refraction is attenuated—it is made less mysterious, more intelligible. Mystery is not totally eliminated, however, for explaining refraction by reference to phenomena such as movement, material corpuscles, and the differentiation of size by a prism yields a whole new crop of mysteries to be opened. Blaga discusses numerous other instances of plus-cognition, including examples taken from Copernicus, Galileo, Freud, Goethe, and Lavoisier.105 The fact that luciferic cognition results in a potentially infinite regress of mysteries to be solved may seem like a detriment to some. Two arguments can be marshaled in defense of this aspect of luciferic cognition: first, gaining some new knowledge is preferable to gaining no new knowledge at all. Luciferic cognition does provide a method of obtaining some new knowledge, and it is knowledge that is unobtainable through the process of paradisaic cognition. Second, a process that leads to ever new avenues of cognitive advance is a beneficial thing. Discovering new problems to be solved is a necessary part of solving new problems. This is, in fact, the way that the natural sciences usually work: with every new scientific discovery comes an array of new questions to be answered and new problems to be resolved. Zero-Cognition Zero-cognition106 is a less common mode of luciferic cognition than pluscognition, but it is more common than minus-cognition. Zero-cognition is 105. CL, 357, 374, 358, 366, 377–78. Blaga proposes his own version of Kant’s phenomena-noumena distinction. According to Blaga, the phanic aspect of a cognitive object corresponds to Kant’s “phenomenon.” Kant’s noumenon corresponds to the permanentized mystery of zero-cognition. The cryptic aspect of a cognitive object is neither Kant’s phenomenon nor Kant’s noumenon, but rather it is a mystery that is to be revealed if possible (whereas Kant’s noumenon can never be revealed). CL, 387–89. 106. Blaga occasionally also uses the term zero-cognition to refer to the point from which luciferic cognition begins.

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the result that is achieved when in the process of luciferic cognition it is realized that no further cognitive gains can be made in researching a cognitive object, neither through the usual method of attenuating mystery employed in plus-cognition, nor through the unusual method of intensifying mystery employed in minus-cognition. At this point it is said that the mystery is “permanentized.”107 Examples of zero-cognition given by Blaga include the change of state from inorganic to organic, how atoms produce consciousness in the mind, the essence of God, and the Kantian “thing in itself.”108 A “permanentized” mystery may later be reopened as a subject of investigation. This can occur when changes occur relating to the perception of the phanic material or when new theory ideas become available that offer the possibility of renewed attempts at approaching the mystery. Minus-cognition Minus-cognition is the third type of luciferic cognition. Its result is the intensification of mystery, rather than attenuation or permanentization. Minus-cognition is an epistemological strategy sometimes employed in theology, but unfortunately largely neglected by philosophy.109 It is a way of creatively approaching cognitive problems that goes beyond the limits of ordinary analysis.110 It specifically addresses those problems that resist logical analysis.111 A minus-cognition solution is an intellectual formulation that postulates an answer that transcends logic.112 107. ED, 274 –75; CL, 384ff. 108. CL, 385–86. 109. In ED Blaga uses the term “dogma” to refer to minus-cognition (on 200 he distinguishes his use of the terms “dogma” and “dogmatic” from Kant’s use of the terms, and on 291 he recommends substituting the term “minus-cognition” for “dogma” because of the undesirable baggage associated with the latter). He observes that only history and theology have taken the dogmatic method seriously, and that neither has capitalized on its potential. Historians have merely studied dogma as a historical phenomenon, while theologians have turned the results of the method of dogma into static beliefs (dogma in the negative sense). Blaga sees an opportunity here for philosophy: if philosophy can successfully employ the method of dogma without the stagnation associated with its theological applications, it could open a whole new chapter in the history of philosophy. ED, 197– 98, 297, 302– 4. 110. ED, 199. 111. In ED Blaga investigates several case studies where problems of investigation seem insoluble, leading to a self-evasion of the intellect and the taking refuge on the part of the intellect in structures that are inaccessible to logic (ED, 203). Many of these case studies come from theology, but some are derived from philosophy, mathematics, and the natural sciences. 112. ED, 206. In minus-cognition, paradox takes priority over logic. According to Blaga, there is a priority of paradox over logic at the very foundation of human cognition

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The earliest example of minus-cognition that Blaga examines is the attempt by Philo to reconcile Greek cosmology and Hebrew theology in his own cosmology. Philo accepted the Greek doctrine of secondary emanations and the Hebrew doctrine of an immutable God. (It is important to note that he accepted these doctrines on the basis of some of the most convincing argumentation of his day, and therefore he was justified in holding these beliefs.) He equated the Hebrew God with the primary substance from which all other substances are derived in Greek cosmology. This put Philo in the difficult position of needing to explain how secondary emanations are possible without necessitating a division or diminution of the primary substance (God). As a result of this antinomy, his solution consciously includes a paradox: secondary existents are emanated from God without any quantitative or qualitative diminution of God. This hypothesis, regardless of its correspondence or lack of correspondence to reality, is in itself antinomic. Philo “heroically” accepts this antinomy as the best available interpretation of the relevant data.113 Blaga discusses numerous other theological examples of minus-cognition as well, most of them taken from the history of Christian theology.114 He dwells at length on the doctrine of the Trinity as one of the best examples of this method, returning to it in several chapters.115 According to Blaga, the approach that he labels minus-cognition was preferred in early Christian theology not because of its adroit philosophical syntheses, but because it is able to articulate mystery without eliminating its mysteriousness.116 Blaga also finds a similar strategy (perhaps not identical) applied occasionally in the natural sciences and in math.117 Blaga finds in (CL, 314). This is seen in three basic “licenses” of the intellect: categorical subsumption of intuitions (CL, 308–11), the elevating of the irrational to the status of rational through the construction of concepts (e.g., becoming; CL, 312), and the positing of infinite series as a result of finite experiences (CL, 313). 113. ED, 204 –7. Blaga observes that the fact that an antinomy appears absurd is not sufficient grounds to reject it (225). He briefly mentions Kant’s use of antinomies in this context (270). For an interesting study of the important role of paradox in breaking through to new understanding, see John Wisdom, Paradox and Discovery (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970). 114. Blaga states that the examples of minus-cognition found in patristic theology contain elements of abstract, magic, and mythic thinking, and that they are outdated but can still serve to illustrate how to use the method of minus-cognition to construct a new metaphysic fitting to the spirit of this age. ED, 226. 115. ED, 216. Blaga does not state whether or not he himself believes in the veridicality of Trinitarianism. 116. ED, 215. 117. Ibid., 246ff. In the chapter of ED titled “The Perspectives of Minus-Cognition,” Blaga discusses parallels to minus-cognition found in the natural sciences, including various understandings of the theory of relativity and quantum theory, and the phenomenon of scientific revolutions (284 –90). In his writings on philosophy of science Blaga discusses

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the mathematical approach to theorizing about the infinite an exact parallel to the methodology applied by Philo to the antinomy of divine cosmogenesis.118 According to Blaga, minus-cognition is neither an irrational nor an antirational way of handling mystery; rather it is a suprarational way of handling mystery.119 Nor is minus-cognition antilogical: it is a positive methodology that suggests solutions that lie beyond the limits of human understanding (Blaga says it is “meta-logical” rather than antilogical).120 Viewed from this perspective, what would normally be seen as a shortcoming (failure to adhere to the axioms of conventional logic) becomes a virtue.121 Blaga asserts that this kind of attempt to linguistically formulate problems that lie beyond the understanding is the boldest thinking ever attempted by humanity.122 Minus-cognition attacks the logical relations of ideas, as if in addition to their logical function, ideas have a function of articulating something that transcends intellect and intuition.123 This antinomic aspect of minusat length the role of a “supramethod” in overcoming antinomies in the natural sciences, a discussion that might still be of interest today in that field (see especially Blaga, ESM). For his discussion of the application of a similar method in math, see ED, 249ff., 288. 118. ED, 252–54. 119. One the one hand, Blaga argues that, ultimately, all cognitions contain irrational elements (CT, 498). On the other hand, Blaga argues that there are multiple ways of being rational, and that all of these are culturally conditioned (ESM, chapter 6). Therefore Blaga does not label those with whom he disagrees “irrational.” His observation that “The domination of one mode of rationality over another is a fact the explanation of which occasions a return to the factor ‘style.’ However, the factor ‘style’ brings into history an unusual variety and gives a very zigzag profile to the process of the development of human thought.” This stands as a warning against judging another to be irrational. ESM, 685. Blaga mentions Tertullian, Pascal, Kierkegaard, and Barth as possible anti-rationalists. ED, 262, 212–13. Blaga writes that instead of rationality being a bridge between humanity and ultimate reality, as it has traditionally been conceived in the Western philosophical tradition, it is more of an isolating element, a structure imprinted on human cognition by transcendent censorship. CL, 500. 120. Blaga discusses Bergson as an example of a thinker whose system reduces logic to the status of fiction, and includes pure positivism and intuitionism as sharing similar tendencies. ED, 230–31 and 224, although on 213 he states that it has an antilogical character. Other thinkers, such as Kierkegaard, Barth, and Brunner, have written about the antinomies of contradictory experiences, but Blaga focuses on logically contradictory antinomies, which focus yields new insight into epistemological methodology (ED, 228). Blaga discusses the attitudes of many philosophers toward paradox, including Zeno, Aristotle, Hegel, and Bergson (ED, 227ff.), as well as the treatment of paradox in the Western mystical tradition (Dionysus, Cusanus; ED, 241ff.), in the Indian philosophical tradition (especially Sankara, ED, 237ff.), and in Taoism (ED, 240). 121. ED, 222. 122. Ibid., 224. Blaga observes that this is a particular type of boldness that is lacking in philosophy, in spite of being found in theology. 123. ED, 219.

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cognition has two distinct aspects: the separation or disassociation of logically related concepts from each other (e.g., emanation is separated from diminution, although the latter is usually taken to be necessarily associated with the former), and the “transfiguration” of the antinomy into something expressible but incomprehensible, through the use of carefully chosen contrasting terminology.124 Through this approach the antinomy is not removed, it is “reconfigured” and “intensified,” revealing new aspects of the mystery.125 “Transfiguration” of a paradox126 does not represent a complete solution of an antinomy, but rather takes the place of such a solution. In the place of a normal solution, “transfiguration” postulates an unfathomable solution.127 Blaga writes that “the solution of the paradox of dogma is unrealizable to cognition, it is postulated in the transcendent.”128 In this context “transcendent” means beyond logic and therefore beyond human comprehension. Thus the solution offered in minus-cognition differs radically from that offered through dialectical reason, though the latter also deals with apparent paradoxes. The dialectical solution is a synthesis of the thesis and the antithesis. The solution of minus-cognition is a postulate that accepts the paradoxical nature of the phenomenon as either a possible state of reality or as a boundary of human cognitive ability. Under normal conditions, the human intellect operates within the bounds of logic. Blaga calls this normal mode of functioning the “enstatic intellect.” When the intellect is confronted by an antinomic situation that forces it to postulate a solution that transcends the intellect’s normal mode of operation, the intellect enters a mode of operation that Blaga names the “ecstatic intellect.”129 The term “ecstatic” is not intended to have any connotation of ecstasy as found in Neoplatonic mystical union. “Ecstatic” refers to the state (hence “-static”) wherein the intellect functions outside (hence “ec-”) of its norm. The intellect can be driven to this recourse by revelation, as is often the case in dogma, or by experiential antinomies, which is the case in philosophy and science.130 It is the close and detailed 124. Ibid., 220, 222. 125. Ibid., 223, 275. 126. Blaga lists a variety of different types of paradoxes. An absolute paradox, according to Blaga, results in nonsense. The paradox of minus-cognition is nearly as extreme, and is different only in that it postulates a solution beyond logic and experience, turning nonsense into Ultimate Sense that is inaccessible to logic (ED, 243– 44). This is in harmony with Blaga’s postulate of transcendent censorship and other key aspects of Blaga’s metaphysical system. 127. ED, 224. 128. Ibid., 234. 129. Ibid., 264ff. Blaga declares that the enstatic-ecstatic distinction is the pivot point of Eonul dogmatic. 130. ED, 266, 268.

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examination of experience that brings philosophy to the point of postulating a solution that transcends logic. Therefore the ecstatic state is necessarily based on a thorough, exhausting employment of the enstatic intellect.131 Blaga discusses the movement from enstatic intellect to ecstatic intellect as an “ecstatic leap.” This leap is not like the leap to faith of Kierkegaardian existentialism, which is compelled by a deep inner unction. The ecstatic leap is compelled by external empirical data, and by the choice to accept all of that data rather than reject one or the other pole of the antinomy.132 Blaga asserts that all metaphysical systems composed by the enstatic intellect contain inner tensions, points of contradiction.133 Therefore all enstatic metaphysical systems contain in themselves the possibility of moving to the ecstatic intellect. This involves the choice of accepting a state of antinomy rather than overriding the empirical out of allegiance to logic. The question of whether it is better to adhere strictly to logic and therefore reject some part of the empirical data, or to abandon logic and embrace an antinomy, is not easily resolved. Blaga concedes that the separation of intellect and belief would amount to the “suicide of philosophy.”134 Therefore the philosopher must exhaust every possible means of reconciling an antinomy and reserve the method of minus-cognition as a last resort.135 However, Blaga argues that in order to be true to experience, the intellect must be open to the possibility of breaking from the strictures of logic when necessary. Logic may be, after all, more a reflection of how the mind thinks than of how external reality is in itself.136 The only mode of the intellect that is capable, to some small degree, of stepping out of its logic-oriented self and in reaching something external to itself is the ecstatic intellect. The enstatic intellect betrays external reality in favor of its own logic: “The intellect that, for the love of its logic, negates the concrete . . . disinteresting itself from the latent antinomies of the concrete . . . is always enstatic intellect.”137 But the reach of even the ecstatic intellect does not extend to overcoming transcendent censorship, for the solutions that the ecstatic intellect provides are postulates that are beyond the limits of human understanding.138 131. Ibid., 268, 278. 132. Ibid., 267–68. 133. Ibid., 294. 134. Ibid., 262. 135. Ibid., 272. 136. Phillip Stambovsky’s previously mentioned work Myth and the Limits of Reason contains some similar exploration of the limits of reason. 137. ED, 265. 138. Blaga lists five different views on knowing the transcendent that are held by philosophers: 1. The transcendent is rationalizable and can be formulated (the Eleatics,

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The postulates of minus-cognition are neither directly verifiable nor directly falsifiable by experience, despite the fact that they are in part based on and arrived at through experience. This is because the postulates of minus-cognition surpass experience; they encompass things that are supposed to transcend experience. But the postulates of minus-cognition can be indirectly justified by experience, through equal justification of two experiential phenomena that the enstatic intellect cannot reconcile to each other. If both poles of the antinomy are equally justified, then the resort to minus-cognition is justified.139 Blaga concludes that the method of minus-cognition has the capacity to reshape metaphysics, and could power a whole new age in philosophy.140 It offers the benefits of increased open-mindedness to all possible solutions and systems, and of a more truly empirical approach to metaphysics.141 With this tool philosophy can dare to propose solutions to a whole host of problems that surpass ordinary enstatic analysis, leading the way for the other cognitive disciplines to follow.142 ***

Summary Blaga’s epistemology is intended to be a comprehensive categorization and analysis of all theoretically possible modes of cognition. He analyzes human cognition into two modes (quasi-cognition and part quasi-part negative cognition) according to how each apprehends its object. These two modes are further analyzed into divisions according to how the object Aristotle, Spinoza, Leibniz); 2. The transcendent is livable, through a kind of intellectual intuition, and is metaphorically or negatively describable (Plotinus, Schelling, Bergson, Goethe); 3. The transcendent is dialectically rationalizable and can be formulated (Hegel); 4.The transcendent is not rationalizable and cannot be formulated (agnostics, Kant); and 5. The transcendent is not rationalizable but can be formulated (Philo, Gnostics, Christians). He discusses each of these views and the metaphysical systems associated with them, and accepts the final view as the most fruitful. ED, 269ff. 139. ED, 279. In the example of Philo (given earlier), Greek cosmology and Hebrew theology are the two equally justified poles of the antinomy. A scientific example is that taken from L. de Broglie’s particle wave explanation of the nature of light. Both the corpuscular and the undulatory theories are supported by evidence, have the ability to explain certain phenomena, and are unable to explain other phenomena. Broglie’s combination of the two approaches the limits of rationality, but preserves both theories and provides a solution that has subsequently received pragmatic scientific justification. ED, 290–92. 140. ED, 294 –99, 302– 4. Blaga describes the possibilities of minus-cognition as “breathtaking,” (ED, 294 –95). 141. ED, 296. 142. Blaga notes that science, in particular, is more and more often facing problems that exceed the enstatic intellect. ED, 294.

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is interpreted: the divisions of quasi-cognition are concrete cognition, paradisaic cognition, mythic cognition, and occult cognition, while the divisions of quasi-negative cognition are the subdivisions of luciferic cognition: plus-cognition, zero-cognition, and minus-cognition. In addition to his descriptive analysis of cognition, Blaga’s philosophy places epistemology within a speculative metaphysical framework that suggests answers to questions such as why human cognition is limited, what causes these limits, and to what degree the limits can be overcome.143 It also provides answers to questions of the purpose and motive of human cognitive enterprise. Both the former analyses, which shed light on often overlooked modes of human cognition, and the later speculative proposals, which fill in the void found in most analytic epistemologies, make Blaga’s epistemology a unique and valuable philosophical contribution. How these insights can be applied fruitfully to current philosophical issues will be seen in the second half of this book.

143. The question of how human cognition is limited will be addressed in the next chapter.

6 Blaga’s Philosophy of Culture Introduction: Place, Sources, Method

The philosophy of culture occupies a place of great importance in Blaga’s philosophy.1 It could even be considered to occupy the central place. Although Blaga considers metaphysics to be the coronation of philosophy, and although he opens his systematic philosophy with a detailed treatment of epistemology, it could be argued that his thinking on philosophy of culture is that aspect of his philosophical system that most influences the rest of the system. The philosophy of culture is interwoven throughout all the areas of his philosophy: not only his metaphysics and epistemology, but also his philosophy of science, philosophy of religion, aesthetics, philosophy of history, and philosophical anthropology. Philosophy of culture is Blaga’s true area of specialization. This contention is supported by the fact that a special chair for philosophy of culture was created for Blaga at the Romanian University of Cluj. It is further supported by the fact that the address that he delivered at his induction into the Romanian Academy was on Romanian culture (“Elogiul satului romˆanesc”). It is also supported by the abundance of his writing on the subject. From his doctoral dissertation (Culture and Knowledge) to the penultimate chapter of his final book (“Oswald Spengler and the Philosophy of History,” in FI), Blaga is repeatedly found exploring the issues of philosophy of culture. Thus it is no surprise that in his philosophical writings more space is devoted to the philosophy of culture than to any other single area of philosophical inquiry. Blaga sees culture as the single most important factor that distinguishes humanity (and all that humanity creates) from the rest of existence. Culture influences, according to Blaga’s theory, all human activity.2 Therefore every aspect of philosophy is also impacted by culture. Because of this, all of Blaga’s writings deal to 1. In Blaga’s philosophy, “culture” refers to the collective product of human creativity actuated through a given “stylistic matrix” and within a particular set of concrete circumstances. This definition will be elaborated throughout this chapter. 2. FI, 406.

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some degree with the philosophy of culture, and all of his writings are sources in the study of his ideas on this subject. The most important sources for Blaga’s philosophy of culture are the three books composing his Trilogy of Culture, which is volume 9 in his collected works (Opere). These books are Orizont s¸i stil (Horizon and Style), Spa¸tiul mioritic (The Ewe-Space), and Geneza metaforei s¸i sensul culturii (The Genesis of Metaphor and the Sense of Culture). The middle of these books, Spa¸tiul mioritic, is an illustration of Blaga’s philosophy of culture by applying his theory to Romanian culture. As such it is a sort of extended argument for Blaga’s theory. Of almost equal importance is Fiin¸ta istoric˘a (The Historical Being), the final book in Blaga’s Trilogy of Cosmology (Opere, vol. 11). The most important of Blaga’s other writings that deal with philosophy of culture are Cultur˘a s¸i cuno¸stin¸ta˘ (Culture and Knowledge); the little book Filosofia stilului (The Philosophy of Style), published early in Blaga’s career (1924) and later republished in the book Incerc˘ari filosofice (Philosophical Attempts); several chapters in Fenomenul originar (especially the chapter on Oswald Spengler) and in Daimonion (these two books are included in volume 7 of Opere); the later chapters in S¸ tiin¸ta˘ s¸i crea¸tie (Science and Creation), several chapters in Gˆandire magic˘a s¸i religie (Magical Thought and Religion), and all of Art˘a s¸i valoare (Art and Value) (these three books form Blaga’s Trilogy of Values, vol. 10 of Opere); and the chapters at the end of Aspecte antropologice (Anthropological Aspects, in vol. 11 of Opere). The books of the Trilogy of Values can be viewed as applications of Blaga’s philosophy of culture to science, religion, and art, respectively. It can be seen that Blaga’s works contain at least five books devoted to the subject of philosophy of culture and many other books that contain sections on this subject. In contrast, Blaga’s works contain only two books devoted to metaphysics,3 two devoted to epistemology,4 three to aesthetics,5 two to philosophical anthropology,6 two to philosophy of science,7 and two to philosophy of religion.8 In a period in which many of the most notable thinkers were inclined toward the attempt at purging the 3. Cenzura transcendent˘a and Diferen¸tialele divine. 4. Eonul dogmatic and Cunoa¸sterea luciferic˘a. 5. Fe¸tele unui veac, Ferestre colorate, and Art˘a s¸i valoare. 6. Aspecte antropologice and Fiin¸ta istoric˘a. 7. Experimentul s¸i spiritul matematic and S¸ tiin¸ta˘ s¸i crea¸tie. 8. Gˆandire magic˘a s¸i religie and Filosofia religiei. Many of Blaga’s works interweave different aspects of his philosophy (e.g., philosophy of culture and epistemology, as in Cultur˘a s¸i cuno¸stin¸ta˘ ). Therefore the characterizations of some of these works as being devoted to the particular area of philosophy to which I assign them are tentative.

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cultural and subjective from philosophy, Blaga spoke out loud and clear in favor of culture as a fundamental and pervasive human enterprise. Blaga indicates that his philosophy of culture is a current in the stream of philosophy of culture initiated in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by philosophers and thinkers such as Nietzsche, Simmel, Riegl, Worringer, Frobenius, Dvoˇra´ k, Spengler, Keyserling, and others.9 It includes a further development of the philosophy of culture expounded by Alois Riegl, Leo Frobenius, and especially Oswald Spengler, as Blaga himself acknowledges.10 Blaga’s philosophy of culture is more than a simple restatement or synthesis of the insights of these other thinkers.11 Blaga offers new insights of his own, and integrates his philosophy of culture as a vital part of a complete philosophical system.12 Blaga’s writings on philosophy of culture cover a wide variety of issues. This introduction to his system will omit certain prominent aspects of Blaga’s treatment that are, in their essence, illustrations and/or applications 9. OS, 75. For a discussion of some of the similarities and differences between Nietzsche, Spengler, and Blaga, see Alexandru Boboc’s chapter “Blaga, Nietzsche, s¸i Spengler,” in Dimensiunea metafizic˘a a operei lui Lucian Blaga, ed. A. Botez and A. Firu¸ta˘ , 276–80. 10. OS, 102ff. 11. It is sometimes alleged that Blaga’s philosophy of culture is little more than a rehashing of Spengler’s philosophy of culture, or an application of Spengler’s philosophy to the particularities of Romanian culture. The latter view would be understandable if one were to read only Spa¸tiul mioritic, but a full reading of Blaga’s works on philosophy of culture does not permit such an interpretation. Blaga himself acknowledges his indebtedness to Spengler, but he also criticizes Spengler on many points. Spengler’s exposition of his philosophy of culture is perhaps more detailed than is Blaga’s (see Oswald Spengler, Decline of the West: Form and Actuality, authorized translation by Charles Francis Atkinson [New York: Alfred A. Knopf, vol. 1, 1926; vol. 2, 1928]), but he does not succeed at integrating philosophy of culture into a general systematic philosophy, as does Blaga. There are also several very specific differences between Spengler’s and Blaga’s philosophy of culture, including what Blaga indicates is an overestimation of the importance of spatial conceptions on the part of Spengler; see OS, 180. Mircea Muthu discusses the similarities and differences between Spengler and Blaga in the chapter “Prospec¸tiuni morfologice: L. Blaga s¸i O. Spengler,” in Lucian Blaga: Dimensiuni r˘as˘aritene (Pite¸sti, Romania: Editura Paralela 45, 2000), 57–65, as does Viorel Coltescu in “Lucian Blaga s¸i morfologia spenglerian˘a a culturii,” in Lucian Blaga, ed. Ghi¸se, Botez and Botez, 357–79. The differences between Spengler and Blaga are also the subject of my own article, “Blaga’s Philosophy of Culture: More than a Spenglerian Adaptation,” Studia Universitatis Babe¸sBolyai, seria Philosophia, 48, nos. 1–2 (2003). In “Matricea stilistic˘a s¸i structura semantic˘a,” in Dimensiunea metafizic˜a a operei lui Lucian Blaga, ed. A. Botez and A. Firu¸ta˘ , 298–302, Aurel Codoban argues that Blaga’s philosophy of culture is actually more akin to French structuralism (`a la Levi-Strauss) than to morphology (`a la Spengler). 12. See Dumitru Micu, “Lucian Blaga: Un sistem filosofic axat pe cultur˘a,” in Dimensiunea metafizic˘a a operei lui Lucian Blaga, ed. A. Botez and A. Firu¸ta˘ , 231–38. The wellknown Mircea Eliade also acknowledged the originality and systematicity of Blaga’s philosophy of culture; see Lucian Blaga, ed. Ghi¸se, Botez, and Botez, 482–85.

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of his thought, in order to focus on the elements of his treatment that are central to his analysis of culture itself. For instance, Blaga discusses at length the spatial horizons of a variety of cultures, including that of the Romanian people. Although his work in this area is interesting and can be seen as supporting his general theory of culture, an examination of these analyses is not essential to understanding Blaga’s philosophy of culture. Similarly, while Blaga devotes whole books to analyzing the relationship of culture to science, religion, and art, the basic thrust of his writings on these issues could be inferred once his philosophy of culture is understood, and therefore these relationships will not be elaborated here. Blaga’s method of presenting and arguing for his philosophy of culture is similar to that employed in presenting his epistemology. He develops his system in interaction with a wide range of other thinkers in the field, from ancient Greek philosophers to contemporary thinkers from a variety of specialized domains. At times he adopts certain elements of their systems; at other times he criticizes their findings and offers alternatives. Consistent with his pragmatic and coherence approaches to justification, Blaga does not try to prove his system but instead substantiates it by showing how it can be fruitfully applied to various actual cultural phenomena.13

What Culture Is Blaga observes that the twin phenomena of style and culture have often been studied, but only as of secondary importance.14 Blaga grants to them signal importance, making culture one of the most important elements of his philosophy and, more importantly, of human existence. Culture is, according to Blaga, the sine qua non of humanness.15 It is culture more than anything else that distinguishes humanity from other forms of animal life.16 Likewise, it is culture that distinguishes historical events from all other events that occur in time and space.17 According to Blaga’s analysis, a culture is a collective product of human creativity actuated through a given “stylistic matrix” and within a particular set of concrete circumstances (the concept “stylistic matrix” and what is 13. As Blaga points out, logical arguments are not exempt from the influence of culture and therefore must intimately involve a “stylistic field” if they are to avoid being mere tautologies. Therefore Blaga’s philosophy will only satisfy those who share a sufficient amount of his own structural affinity. S¸ C, 178–80. 14. FI, 498. On Blaga’s analysis, culture has two fundamental components: style and metaphor (GMSC, 386). This explains why he often uses the term “style” as a synonym for culture (e.g., OS, 183). 15. FI, 292. 16. Ibid., 498. 17. Ibid., 371, 497.

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meant by “concrete circumstances” will be explained presently). Culture is a “precipitate” of the fullness of human existence.18 Full human existence involves living in the face of mystery and for the revelation thereof. Therefore culture is the direct result of human life. It is a result of the human attempt to reveal/depict/grasp mystery, an attempt that is an irresistible part of human destiny. Culture includes all human fabrications that bear the mark of human creativity (“style”). These include works of art, philosophy, mythology, science, historiography, and other human creative acts, everything from the creation of simple utensils to the advanced philosophical creations of Leibniz and Newton. All of these activities involve the attempt to reveal mystery.19 Every cultural creation involves three essential elements: concrete material, metaphorical expression, and style (analyzable into a matrix of elements). The concrete materials of a culture are the physical, intellectual, or spiritual materials that humans utilize in their creations. These are used metaphorically to express ideas, emotions, or intuitions that transcend the mere material itself. The particular way that the concrete is metaphorically used reflects the style of the user, which is the product of a number of factors called the “stylistic matrix.”

The Categories of the Understanding and the Abyssal Categories A very important aspect of Blaga’s philosophy of culture is his original analysis of the categories of the human mind and how these categories relate to human culture. Although the Kantian influence on this area of Blaga’s thought is unmistakable (Blaga interacts with the ideas of Kant at length in this context), Blaga departs radically from Kant’s understanding of the categories.20 According to Blaga’s theory, humans are equipped with not one but two sets of intellectual categories. The first of these he names “the categories of the understanding.” These categories correspond fairly closely to the Kantian categories. Their role is the organization of sensory data in type I cognition (“paradisaic cognition”).21 18. Diaconu and Diaconu, Dic¸tionar de termeni filosofici ai lui Lucian Blaga, 72. 19. S¸ C, 151; FI, 496–97, 510. 20. See especially S¸ C chapters 18 (“Cˆateva probleme de teoria cunoa¸sterii”) and 19 (“Doua tipuri de cunoa¸stere”). “Categoriile,” the fifth chapter of Cultur˘a s¸i cuno¸stin¸ta˘ (hereafter referred to as CC) is also interesting in this regard, but has been somewhat superseded by Blaga’s systematic writings. 21. S¸ C, 176; GMSC, 407.

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Contrary to many scientists, who take categories such as time and space to be objective realities, Blaga agrees with Kant that the categories of the understanding are subjective. Kant’s reason for drawing this conclusion is that the conceptual contents of the categories surpass the contents of experiential data, and therefore cannot themselves be a product of experience, and thus must have their source in the mind itself. Blaga writes that the climate (influenced by the Enlightenment and the growing influence of natural science) within which Kant worked prevented him from positing a supernatural source of the categories, and therefore Kant concluded that if they are a product of the mind, then they must be subjective.22 Nonetheless, the conclusion that subjectivity is the only alternative left after the elimination of the possibility of an experiential origin of the categories is mistaken. There remains the possibility that the categories are the product of a supernatural source, and furthermore that this source created them as objective. In Blaga’s view, the categories are in fact the result of a supernatural source: the MA. However, Blaga is in agreement with Kant that the categories are subjective. Blaga’s reason for this interpretation of the categories is quite different from Kant’s, and has to do with the structure and purpose of cognition. Blaga’s reason for believing the categories to be subjective is that, according to his proposed metaphysics, in order to further its purposes in creation, the MA does not permit humans to have objective (“positiveadequate”) cognition. The categories are one of the means utilized by the MA to guarantee that humanity does not achieve objective cognition. The categories act as both facilitators of cognition and as limits to cognition, enabling subjective knowledge but preventing objective knowledge.23 According to Kant, the categories of the understanding are a fixed set that is necessarily possessed by all people. In other words, according to Kant all people have the same immutable categories of the understanding. Spengler argued, contra Kant, that no particular sentiment of spatiality is universal to all humanity, but rather that particular sentiments of spatiality are culturally relative. He argues that there are at least nine different space/ time sentiments that are found in different cultures.24 In reflecting on these views, Blaga observes that, while the perceptions of space, time, and so on appear to be universal, space and time are also constructed differently in different cultures.25 The categories of the understanding, though subjective, are not affected by culture (and do not bear the 22. S¸ C, 184 –85. 23. S¸ C, 185–86. 24. OS, 101–2, 108, 136. Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West, see vol. 1, ch. 4, “Makrokosmos: The Symbolism of the World-picture and the Space Problem,” especially the subchapter “Spatial Depth as ‘Time Become Rigid’: The prime symbol.” 25. OS, 137–38.

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imprint of style) because they are not human creations—they are created by the MA.26 He accounts for the apparent variability of the categories by proposing that humans have two sets of categories, not one: the cognitive categories of the conscious and the abyssal categories of the subconscious (also called the “stylistic categories”).27 The former are invariable, but the latter are quite variable. Space and time (as determined by the cognitive categories) are universal concrete horizons of the conscious. However, their “texture” is determined by the abyssal categories of each individual’s subconscious, and is therefore variable. For example, space can be conceived as being tridimensional, flat, undulatory, arched, or other ways.28 Based on its particular set of abyssal categories, the human subconscious attributes to space and time details of structure that are similar to but more determined than the indeterminate structures of space and time in the conscious.29 The abyssal categories are both functionally and structurally different from the cognitive categories.30 Functionally, the abyssal categories lie at the base of all cultural creations.31 They form a complex that Blaga names the “stylistic matrix.”32 The immense number of combinations of the stylistic categories possible within an individual’s stylistic matrix accounts for the plethora of possible and actual cultures.33 Because of this important role in forming culture, the abyssal categories are constitutive of the substance of humanity, whereas the cognitive categories merely enable the 26. GMSC, 402; S¸ C, 199, 211. According to Blaga, Nietzsche argued that the categories are human creations and are influenced by culture (¸SC, 164). 27. Blaga was a contemporary of Freud and Jung and interacts with their views on the subconscious. While the existence of a subconscious within the mind is generally taken for granted today, in Blaga’s day it was still a controversial issue. Blaga views the existence of the subconscious as a postulate based upon the need to explain observed psychological phenomena. OS, 97. Geo S˘avulescu shows that the idea of the subconscious developed by Blaga has roots in Plato, Augustine, Aquinas, Kant, and Goethe, see S˘avulescu, “Incon¸stientul, purt˘ator al matricei stilistice,” in Lucian Blaga: Filosofia prin metafore, 28– 40. Vasile Dem. Zamfirescu contrasts Blaga with Freud and Jung in his chapter “Filosofia culturii s¸i psihoanaliz˘a la Lucian Blaga,” in Dimensiunea metafizic˜a a operei lui Lucian Blaga, ed. A. Botez and A. Firu¸ta˘ , 271–75. Regarding the stylistic categories, see S¸ C, 174 – 76, and ch. 9 (“Doua tipuri de cunoa¸stere”); and GMSC, ch. 5 (“Categoriile abisale”). As Vasile Musc˘a puts it, with the introduction of the stylistic categories, “Blaga operates a transfer of criticism from the upper level of the conscience, the seat of the cognitive activities the analysis of which preoccupied Kant, to the dark basement of the subconscious, the hearth of creative activity.” Vasile Musc˘a, “Specificul crea¸tiei culturale romˆane¸sti ˆın cˆampul filosofiei,” in Lucian Blaga, ed. Ghi¸se, Botez, and Botez, 469. 28. GMSC, 413. 29. OS, 109. 30. GMSC, chapter 5, especially p. 409. 31. FI, 498. 32. GMSC, 409. 33. Ibid., 412–13.

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integration of objects to the conscious.34 The cognitive categories have more to do with survival and the abyssal categories have more to do with creativity.35 Structurally, the details of the cognitive categories are immutable and universal, while the details of the abyssal categories are variable and individual.36 It is sometimes the case that there are parallel cognitive and abyssal categories, such as in the case of time and space. These are what Blaga calls “doublets of horizons.”37 The two categories of a doublet are complementary but differ from each other in detail. Both cognitive and abyssal categories are part of the MA’s plan for protecting and enhancing created existence. While the specific cognitive categories are direct creations of the MA, the specific stylistic categories are human creations. The cognitive categories are one way that the MA implements transcendent censorship, while the abyssal categories are a means of implementing “transcendent braking.” The two types of categories working together to fulfill the FA’s “principle of the conservation of mystery.”38

The Stylistic Matrix and its Key Components Each human subconscious possesses a set of stylistic categories that determine the results of its creative endeavors. This set is what Blaga calls the “stylistic matrix.”39 A stylistic matrix is defined as a group or constellation of factors that together determine the style of the creations of a person or group of people.40 It is the sum of all the stylistic categories and their influences upon a person’s creativity.41 This matrix is composed of four 34. OS, 133. Gavriliu finds the abyssal categories of the subconscious to be the “keystone” of Blaga’s whole philosophical system. Leonard Gavriliu, Incon¸stientul ˆın viziunea lui Lucian Blaga, 148. 35. GMSC, 414. 36. Ibid., 414. 37. OS, ch. 7, “Teoria dubletelor.” 38. FI, 490, 502–3; S¸ C, 176 (footnote). 39. In his earlier systematic writings on philosophy of culture, the term “stylistic matrix” occurs and the term “stylistic field” (campul stylistic) is missing. In his later systematic writings the terms stylistic field and stylistic matrix are used synonymously, as in FI, ch. 5, “Campurile stilistice”; see also FI, 420, 485. Ioan Biri¸s has stated that the term “stylistic matrix” reflects the structure involved, while the term “stylistic field” reflects how the matrix is used (notes from the 2001 Blaga Festival, Cluj-Napoca, Romania, Spring 2001). Liviu Antonesei’s chapter “Repere pentru o filosofie a culturii,” in Lucian Blaga, ed. Ghi¸se, Botez, and Botez, 399– 411, is a very nice study of the importance of the “stylistic matrix” concept to Blaga’s philosophy of culture and the influences of psychoanalysis, morphology, and neo-Kantianism in the development of the concept. 40. OS, 176. 41. S¸ C, 177–78.

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primary factors and an unspecified number of secondary factors.42 Two different creative styles can be separated by as little as one of these secondary factors.43 The idea of a stylistic matrix explains why and how creations within a particular culture bear certain similarities and also why they are not identical.44 It is furthermore that which enables a creation to have a sense of fittingness and context.45 A judgment that a particular creation “lacks style” may be nothing more than an indication that there are subtle differences between the matrices of the creator and the critic.46 Conversely, the ability of one culture to appreciate the creations of another is explained by the shared elements of their stylistic matrices, which can enable reciprocal understanding.47 Stylistic matrices are shaped by the physical and spiritual environment in which the person or community lives.48 They are usually conservative by nature, however: they are resistant to criticism and change.49 This explains why two different cultures sometimes coexist within the same physical environment: their stylistic matrices were formed at a time when the cultures were geographically separate, and although they are not indifferent to their current cultural setting, they do retain much of their old cultural formation.50 It is possible for the factors that make up a particular stylistic matrix to change, which leads to a change in the stylistic matrix itself.51 The four primary components of any stylistic matrix are: 1. The horizon of the subconscious; 2. An axiological accent; 3. A particular sense of destiny; and 4. A particular formative aspiration (nazuin¸ta formativ˘a).52 The first of these, the horizon of the subconscious, refers to the particular way that a person’s subconscious mind structures space and time, and 42. In some places (e.g., OS, 177) Blaga lists five factors, listing the spatial and temporal horizons of the subconscious separately. In other places he includes the spatial and temporal horizons under the single heading “horizon of the subconscious” (e.g., OS, 175). I follow this later practice in my enumeration of four factors. 43. OS, 175. 44. Ibid., 177, 182–83; FI, 420–39. 45. OS, 178. 46. Ibid., 177. 47. Ibid., 184 –85. The chapter “Interferen¸te stilistice” in FI discusses the different ways that stylistic matrices relate to each other. 48. Diaconu and Diaconu, Dic¸tionar de termeni de filosofice ai lui Lucian Blaga, 218. In the seventh chapter of Fenomenul originar, the first chapter of Ferestre colorate, and the last chapter of OS, Blaga seems to hint that the impact of one’s physical environment on one’s stylistic matrix is rather limited. 49. OS, 179. 50. As an example of this Blaga discusses the coexistence of Saxon and Romanian culture in Transylvania. OS, 115. 51. For example, the temporal horizon of a particular matrix can change from a future horizon to a past horizon. This is the subject of the chapter “Durata factorilor stilistici,” in FI. 52. OS, 152ff., 175, 179; GMSC, 410.

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therefore the particular forms of the abyssal categories that imprint the spatial and temporal aspects of a person’s creations.53 A variety of spatial horizons are possible. Blaga gives the following examples of spatial horizons of particular cultures: Arabian culture—veiled space; Babylonian culture—twin space; Chinese culture—rolled space; Greek culture— spherical space; popular Romanian culture—undulatory space; Saxon culture—infinite, tridimensional space.54 There are at least three possible temporal horizons of the subconscious: past (pictured as an artesian well), present (pictured as a waterfall), and future (pictured as a stream).55 These horizons sometimes combine and overlap, causing blurring or hybridizing of the horizon.56 The temporal horizon of a culture is reflected in the creative constructions of that culture, including its histories and its metaphysical creations.57 Blaga mentions as a particularly European view (and a naive one at that) the idea that there exists a clear history that can be understood by anyone.58 Each view of history is a “possible perspective” that will appear true to the extent that it resonates with the subconscious matrix of the beholder.59 It is thus that stylistic matrices become, for Blaga, the basis of history (as well as a major force in historiography).60 The second component of a stylistic matrix, the “axiological accent,” refers to an attitudinal reflex of the subconscious that is superimposed upon the spatial and temporal horizons. Although the subconscious is intrinsically united with its horizons, it is not always in complete accord with them.61 The axiological accent is a valuation of the respective horizons of the subconscious, an evaluation that is positive, negative, or neutral, resulting in an affirmation of, negation of, or neutrality toward the spatial or temporal horizon. A particular horizon can have different senses depending on the accent it receives.62 A negative axiological accent does not result in 53. OS, 109, 179; concerning space see OS, ch. 4 (“Cultur˘a s¸i spatiu”) and ch. 5 (“Intre peisaj s¸i orizont incon¸stient”); concerning time see OS, ch. 6 (“Orizonturi temporale”). 54. OS, 107 (footnote), 117. 55. Ibid., 120–21. 56. Ibid., 127. 57. The first chapter of FI contains a long analysis of the interaction of the stylistic matrices and historiographies of various cultures: Egyptian, Persian, Indian, Chinese, Greek, and medieval and modern Europe. FI, 354 –66. 58. OS, 127–28 59. Ibid., 130. 60. FI, 509. Blaga contrasts this part of his philosophy with that of Hegel, who sees “Ideas” as the basis of history. Blaga states that his whole theory of history is concentrated in the single flexible term “stylistic field.” FI, 498. 61. OS, 141. Although this suggestion may sound somewhat odd, Blaga points out that there are numerous common examples of similar phenomena. For example, a person is intrinsically linked to his/her self, but this does not entail that s/he positively values all of his/her qualities. 62. OS, 150.

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the annulling of the particular horizon, but rather in that horizon being used in a negative way in the construction of cultural creations.63 As an example of different axiological accents Blaga mentions Europe and India, which share a similar spatial vision but value it differently. Both have a spatial horizon that can be characterized as “infinite space.” European culture has a positive axiological accent, while the Indian axiological accent is negative. This results in very different cultural productions, as is seen in their works of art and in their respective metaphysical systems. The European positive accent results in metaphysical systems that are based on the physical realm or make the verification of the physical one of their main goals. The Indian negative accent results in metaphysical systems that are suspicious of the physical realm and either focus on the spiritual or treat the physical as primarily a means to another end.64 The third component of a stylistic matrix, the “sense of destiny,” refers to the attitude or predisposition of the subconscious that influences how it views life as a trajectory within the horizon of the subconscious.65 This movement can be one of advancing toward the horizon (which Blaga labels “anabasic”), one of withdrawal from the horizon (“catabasic”), or it can be static (“neutral” or “vegetative”).66 Blaga gives several examples of the sense of destiny in different cultures. According to Blaga, Europe has the following components to its stylistic matrix: an infinite horizon (spatial and temporal), a positive axiological accent, and an anabasic sense of destiny.67 India has an infinite horizon (spatial and temporal), a negative axiological accent, and a catabasic sense of destiny. On Blaga’s analysis nihilism would have a negative axiological accent but an anabasic sense of destiny.68 Ethiopians have an infinite horizon and a neutral sense of destiny, while the ancient Egyptians have a pronounced catabasic sense of destiny, which Blaga compares to Heidegger’s “existence towards death.”69 The fourth of the key components of the stylistic matrix, the “formative aspiration,” refers to the human drive to imprint one’s own inner form on the things around oneself.70 This drive takes different forms in different cultures. Blaga notes three distinct possible forms that the formative aspiration takes: individualized, standardized, and elementized.71 63. Ibid., 142. 64. Ibid., 142–51. 65. Here Blaga is again forced to make recourse to metaphoric language to express his concepts. 66. OS, 152. 67. Ibid., 152. 68. Ibid., 153–54. 69. Ibid., 154 –55. 70. Ibid., 157. 71. Ibid., 158: modul individualizant, modul tipizant, modul stihial (elementarizant).

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Through each of these approaches those that employ them aspire to reveal “truth,” to portray through their creativity things as they really are. Each believes that his/her respective approach is the correct approach.72 To the question whether their attempts reflect objective reality or a “style of thought” Blaga affirms the latter.73 In the individualized form of the formative aspiration the emphasis is on the expression of the individual and the individual’s perspective. Blaga gives as examples of individualized formative aspiration German culture, and specifically mentions Shakespeare, Leibniz, the physician Pauli, Goethe, Fichte, Kant, the Reformation, and above all, Rembrandt.74 In the standardized form the emphasis is on the expression of the universal element of a type of phenomenon. The best example of this is Plato, with his elevation of the form over the individual. Other examples include the Renaissance and Catholic theology.75 The elementized form emphasizes the conceptually fundamental aspect of a phenomenon. It reduces phenomena of the same type to their ideal expression, eliminating incidental variations and producing representations of the phenomena that surpass the objects themselves. Examples of the elementized form include Egyptian and Byzantine art and Byzantine metaphysics.76 These four primary components and an unnumbered quantity of secondary components make up the stylistic matrix of the subconscious. The stylistic matrix is the inner horizon of the subconscious, and it functions according to its own norms, relatively independent of the conscious. The stylistic matrix is responsible for the unity of attitudes, accents, and aspirations that distinguish one culture from another and that give to a person’s conscious the support of continuity and to a person’s subconscious the connection to a collectivity.77 Furthermore, the existence of stylistic matrices witnesses to the creative destiny given to humanity by the MA.78

Philosophy of Culture and Blaga’s Epistemology Blaga’s philosophy of culture has a direct impact on his epistemology. According to Blaga’s analysis, there are two types of cognition: type I 72. Ibid., 158. See also Blaga, FC, 359. 73. OS, 161–62. 74. Ibid., 159–63. 75. Ibid., 163–64. 76. Ibid., 164 –70. Blaga remarks that the sense of a Byzantine painting is only appreciated when one steps out of the habitual mode of observation (individualized or standardized) and views it from its own, elementized perspective. OS, 167. 77. OS, 186. 78. GMSC, 414.

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cognition (paradisaic) and type II cognition (luciferic). Type I cognition increases knowledge quantitatively, through the numerical reduction of the mysteries of existence by adding new facts to human knowledge. It utilizes the cognitive categories. Type II cognition increases knowledge qualitatively, through deepening the understanding of the mystery of a cognitive object. This deepening of the understanding involves creative constructs that provide theoretical explanations of the phenomena in question. Since all creative acts are affected by a stylistic matrix, these acts of type II cognition are as well. They operate through the application of both the cognitive and the stylistic (abyssal) categories. Type I cognition is limited by transcendent censorship via the cognitive categories. The abyssal categories do not affect type I cognition.79 Type II cognition is limited by both transcendent censorship and the “stylistic brakes,” which are the abyssal categories. Therefore all knowledge acquired via type II cognition is culturally relative.80 The abyssal categories function both positively and negatively in cognition, and these two functions are intrinsically related. They function as a structural medium for revelation of mystery and as a limit to this revelation (“stylistic brakes”). Thus the abyssal categories both lead humans to create and prevent human creativity from reaching absolute adequacy.81 Corresponding to the two types of cognition and the two types of limits on cognition, there are two definitions of truth that spring from Blaga’s philosophy of culture. In type I cognition, truth consists in a relation of correspondence between an idea and reality.82 This is what Blaga names “natural truth.” This type of truth involves the application of the cognitive categories to empirical data. Because the cognitive categories are not influenced by culture, “natural truth” is not subject to cultural influences.83 What is judged to be true in type II cognition, on the other hand, is relative to one’s stylistic matrix. What is judged to be true does not depend only upon the criteria of logic and concrete intuition. It involves style, culture, and a feeling of resonance between the proposition and the cognitive subject.84 “Judgments of appreciation, which refer to ‘constructed’ truths, will vary therefore according to how the people’s stylistic ma79. This does not imply that type I cognition is not interpretive—all human knowledge of this world is interpretive, even type I cognition, which interprets based on the cognitive categories. ESM, 657. 80. S¸ C, 199, 211. 81. FI, 492–94. 82. “ecua¸tie intre idee s¸i realitate” (GMSC, 417). Blaga is well aware that this definition of truth raises a critiriological issue, as discussed in the preceding chapter. 83. GMSC, 417–18. Both types of cognition attempt to reveal mystery. The former does so in a cognitive way that is subject to specific limits, and the latter does so in a cognitiveconstructive way that is subject to additional limits. GMSC, 447, 449ff. 84. GMSC, 417–18; see also S¸ C, 180.

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trices vary, from region to region, from epoch to epoch.”85 This is because what is being judged is not the relation between an idea and a (supposedly) observable reality, but the relation between an idea that is a construct and a reality that is known to be hidden. The fact that the reality is hidden necessitates that constructive nature of the idea. The constructive nature of the idea implicates the incorporation of culture (since all constructs are cultural constructs according to Blaga’s analysis). The incorporation of culture implicates the employment of the stylistic categories, as much in the appreciation/evaluation of the idea as in its construction. That type II cognition involves culture in its truth-judgments has implications that reach far beyond philosophy. Even science is affected by this conception, since scientific hypotheses and theories are constructs that involve type II cognition.86 The extent to which Blaga was convinced of this is revealed in his startling statement that “the new physics . . . is more the expression of our kind of thinking and of our style, than the reflection of an objective reality.”87 Furthermore, he argues that the domination of one mode of rationalization over others within science, and the overthrow of one mode of rationalization by another, provide an argument for the significance of style as a factor in scientific change.88 Both type I and type II cognition operate by utilizing categories. The categories both facilitate and limit cognition. In this way the two types of categories work together to fulfill the MA’s “principle of the conservation of mystery.”89

Philosophy of Culture and Blaga’s Metaphysics Blaga’s philosophy of culture dovetails with his metaphysics. Blaga’s metaphysical system posits the existence of a single source of all other existents and that this source created the cosmos in such a way as to both perpetuate and preserve creation. It created humanity with specific abil85. GMSC, 418. 86. Ibid., 417–18. A brief but useful discussion of Blaga’s writings on philosophy of science and culture is Mircea Flonta’s article, “Analiza cultural˘a a cunoa¸sterii pozitive,” in Dimensiunea metafizic˘a a operei lui Lucian Blaga, ed. A. Botez and A. Firu¸ta˘ , 257–60. 87. S¸ C, 160–61. See also Angela Botez, “Campul stilistic s¸i evolu¸tia s¸tiin¸tei” in Dimensiunea metafizic˘a a operei lui Lucian Blaga, ed. A. Botez and A. Firu¸ta˘ , 261–66, where Botez compares Blaga’s philosophy of science to that of Thomas Kuhn and other recent thinkers. 88. ESM, 685. 89. FI, 490, 502–3; S¸ C, 176 (footnote).

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ities and limits that both motivate and enable humanity to approach mystery, but that also prevent humanity from eliminating mystery.90 Blaga’s philosophy of culture elaborates one of the devices that the originator of the cosmos put in place to accomplish these goals. That device is style, or culture understood as a collection of stylistic factors. Culture is key to perpetuating through humanity the MA’s creative act, for culture is essential to human creativity. Culture is also key to preserving creation, for it prevents humanity from accurately revealing mystery through humanity’s creative acts, which (according to Blaga) could endanger the cosmos by allowing a cognitive rival to the MA. The MA protects itself from the possibility of human rivalry by the stylistic limiting (“halting” or “braking”) of human revelatory acts. The MA also prevents this rivalry by creating humanity in such a way that humans put a positive value on style rather than viewing style and culture as limits imposed upon humanity by the Creator (Blaga calls this tactic “transcendent conversion”).91 According to Blaga’s metaphysics culture is a positive value, but it is also a necessary and useful limit upon human revelation of the mysterious. The stylistic categories function both positively and as “brakes.” This positive/negative duality fuels humanity’s creativity—spiritual, mythical, religious, philosophical, scientific, and artistic.92 The limits set on humanity are a source of both disappointment and of rejoicing: the former when the impotence and transience of all human creation is recognized, the latter because there is some success, some limited access to the absolute.93 Thus the relativity that culture imposes upon all human creations has the perhaps tragic effect of isolating humanity from the absolute, but Blaga asserts that at the same time it gives humanity a dignity beyond comparison.94 It is culture more than anything else that differentiates humanity from other living beings, and culture is essential to full humanness.95 An “on90. The MA uses the cognitive categories to limit cognition and the stylistic categories to limit construction. When humanity tries to penetrate mystery, it turns to the immediate, but this way is blocked by transcendent censorship. Humanity therefore turns to creative constructs, but that way is blocked by stylistic braking. Therefore humanity never completely succeeds in penetrating mystery. In this way humanity is maintained in its permanently creative state. GMSC, 450–51. 91. DD, 179 and AV, 631–32. 92. FI, 510. 93. Ibid., 493, 503. 94. Ibid., 293, 467 (“tragic and wonderful destiny” [destinul tragic s¸i mare¸t]); GMSC, 459. 95. GMSC, 441, 442. Blaga writes that culture is at least as essential to humanness as is the physical human form (GMSC, 443), and that it is the sine qua non of humanness (ibid., 446). He insists that no other animal life-forms create culture, and that this phenomenon makes humanity unique in the world. See GMSC, ch. 11, “Singularitatea omului.”

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tological mutation” took place at the very moment when humanity started down the path of creating culture. This mutation transformed humanity from mere animal to a higher form of being.96 At the point when humans began to live with an awareness of and desire to penetrate mystery, humanity figuratively left the Garden of Eden and became what Blaga calls “luciferic man.”97 Up to this point humanity was incompletely human— with the inception of life in the horizon of mystery and for the revelation thereof and the appearance of the stylistic categories in the structure of humanity, humanity is completed.98

Claimed Practical Benefits of Blaga’s Philosophy of Culture A practical benefit of Blaga’s philosophy of culture is that it yields a number of explanations to perennially vexing problems. For example, Blaga’s theory provides an explanation of how styles are originated. Two views on the origin of style are widely accepted. It is often supposed that a particular style is initiated by an individual and then others imitate that style, causing its spread. Conversely, it is sometimes held that a style exists independently of any individuals and imposes itself upon individuals.99 Blaga rejects both of these views. Against the first view he points out that expressionist painters, Bergson’s psychology, and Mach’s physics all reflect the same fundamental style, but that they were ignorant of each other’s work, therefore imitation cannot be the explanation of how they came to share the same style. Blaga’s theory of a subconscious stylistic matrix, however, nicely explains this parallelism: the appearances of the same style in the works of people within the same culture who are not aware of each other’s works are due to their shared stylistic matrices. Differences between their works are explained by variations between the particular secondary categories within the stylistic matrix of each individual.100 Similarly, Blaga’s theory of style illuminates the nature of the relationship between an individual and a collective group. The problem involves questions such as, what is the relationship between an individual and a 96. GMSC, 444 – 45, 353. Blaga states that there are few forms of existence in the universe (he lists inanimate material, plant, animal, and human) and therefore the appearance of this new mode of existence is very significant. 97. FI, 496 (omul luciferic). Blaga defends his use of such myths in expressing his ideas on 456–57 of GMSC. 98. FI, 498. 99. Blaga states that the second of these views is a development of a Hegelian view on one of the attributes of the Idea. OS, 181. 100. OS, 181–83.

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collectivity to which that individual belongs? What distinguishes an individual as belonging to one collectivity rather than another? What is it that distinguishes between different collectivities? Why are there differences between individuals within the same group? Is a collective group a real unit, or is it nothing more than a collection of individuals, the latter being the real existent? Or are individuals merely exponents of the group, and the group the real existent? Blaga reviews and rejects the solutions proposed by romanticism, positivism, and naturalism. His own partial solution to the problem (he grants that there are other aspects in addition to the stylistic one) sees the collectivity as a community of individuals with a shared complex of abyssal categories (a shared stylistic matrix).101 The individual, on Blaga’s view, shares in these categories and has additional categories that are unique to that individual. Particularly individualistic people can, moreover, reject some of the categories shared by that individual’s group. Therefore the individual is neither merely a component of the collectivity, nor is the community merely a conglomeration of individuals. Seen through the lens of Blaga’s philosophy of culture, the distinguishing characteristics and “familial resemblances” of both the individual and the group are seen to result not from one or the other being a “real existent” but from shared and not-shared abyssal categories.102 This explanation of the relationship between individuals and communities leads to an elucidation of a further problem: the problem of crosscultural communication. The question of whether it is really possible to overcome cultural barriers and have effective cross-cultural communication is not a new one.103 Many have argued that cross-cultural communication is doomed to produce misunderstanding. Blaga takes it as evident that this is not always the case. He argues that any overlapping elements of two different stylistic matrices facilitate communication between the matrices. He states that points in common can be sufficient not only for communication between the two, but also make possible the influencing of one culture by another and the “contaminating” of one culture by another.104 A further benefit of Blaga’s philosophy of culture, and in particular his view on the thwarting of the human aspiration toward the transcendent, is that it confers meaning upon the relativity of all human productions. That human creations are always of finite scope, limited duration, and mitigated 101. GMSC, 439. 102. Ibid., 437–39; OS, 184ff. 103. Blaga writes that Spengler is among those who believe that all cross-cultural communication results in misunderstanding. He states that Spengler did little more than transpose Leibniz’ metaphysics onto a philosophy of culture, making cultures comparable to monads without windows, and therefore incommensurable. OS, 184 –85. 104. OS, 185.

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success is often viewed as a human shortcoming. Blaga’s philosophy of culture provides an explanation for these “shortcomings” that shows their value and removes their condemnation. Humanity’s aspiration toward the transcendent is laudable, and the failure to reach this goal is a result of important factors that are necessarily beyond the human reach.105 The MA’s creation of humanity with an insatiable desire for the transcendent is, according to Blaga’s philosophy of culture, an expression of the MA’s care for creation.106

105. This philosophy was perhaps of some comfort to Blaga himself, whose struggle to reach God or grasp the ultimate meanings of the universe is reflected in both his poetry and his philosophy, as is explained in Keith Hitchins’ introduction to Brenda Walker’s translation, Complete Poetical Works of Lucian Blaga, 45– 48. 106. GMSC, 452.

7 Blaga’s Philosophy of Religion Introduction: Sources and Method

Religion and religious themes are found throughout Blaga’s works. The main philosophical analysis of religion as a phenomenon occurs in the two books: Gˆandire magic˘a s¸i religie (Magical Thought and Religion) and Curs de filosofia religiei (Course on the Philosophy of Religion). The former is a part of Blaga’s third trilogy, the Trilogy of Values (volume 10 in Opere).1 The latter is based on the manuscript of a course that Blaga taught at the Romanian University of Cluj in 1940. It was published posthumously as a single volume in 1994. GMR is the most important source for Blaga’s philosophy of religion. It contains discussions of a variety of religious phenomena, analyses of the essential aspects of religion with a view toward defining religion, and an analysis of the relation of religion and culture.2 Curs de filosofia religiei is much less important as a source, containing exegeses of many different religions with relatively little admixture of Blaga’s own philosophy.3 Blaga’s writings on metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of culture also contain materials that reflect on his philosophy of religion.4 In fact, his philosophy of religion should be seen as a corollary of his metaphysics and 1. GMR was originally published as two separate books, Despre gˆandirea magic˜a [Concerning Magical Thought] (1941) and Religie s¸i spirit [Religion and Spirit] (1942). 2. GMR contains chapters on Indian religions, Chinese religions, Persian religion, Greek religions, various forms of Islam, Christianity (including Christian mystics), mystical experience contrasted with ordinary faith, Kierkegaard, and Goethe. 3. Curs de filosofia religiei, ed. Dorli Blaga, Christu Nastu, and G. Piscoci Danescu (Alba Iulia and Paris: Editura Fronde, 1994), hereafter referred to as CFR, contains chapters on Rig-Vedic religion, Brahmanism, reincarnation, Buddhism, Jainism, Sankhya, Yoga and Vedanta, Taoism, Confucius, Babylonian religion, Judaism, Zoroastrianism, Manichaeism, Greek mythology, Plotinus and Neoplatonism, early Christianity, Origen, PseudoDionysius, Meister Eckehart, Islam, Goethe, Kierkegaard, dialectical theology (Schleiermacher and Barth), Nietzsche, and mysticism. 4. See especially DD and CT (metaphysics); ED and CL (epistemology); and chapter 10 of OS, various chapters in SM, and chapters 3, 9, 10, and 11 of GMSC (philosophy of culture).

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philosophy of culture. Several chapters in the early work Daimonion are also of some interest.5 In the introductory chapter of CFR Blaga describes the method that he employs in his philosophy of religion. According to his own testimony, his approach is to “exposit the religious doctrines, and the sort of religious life, from diverse historical epochs and various cultural spheres, as a necessary basis for proceeding to the philosophical analysis of the religious phenomenon as such.”6 He goes on to divide his philosophizing about religion into three steps: 1. An examination and exposition of a wide variety of religious forms with an emphasis on aspects that are of interest to the work of philosophy of religion; 2. A philosophical analysis of the data gleaned from the preceding step, leading to a definition of religion and the rudiments of a philosophy of religion; and 3. A discussion of popular Romanian religion in light of his proposed philosophy of religion.7 This basic procedure is followed in both GMR and CFR. The latter has an extensive investigation of religions as described in step 1, but only one brief chapter of the type of analysis described in step 2. GMR has less of step 1 but much more of step 2. Step 3 is not significantly pursued in either work, but is touched on in SM. It can be seen that Blaga’s approach to philosophy of religion has a significantly empirical basis. Nonetheless, when reading Blaga’s writings one gets the clear impression that the driving force behind his religious exegesis is his metaphysical vision. His approach to philosophy of religion is to examine empirically a range of religious phenomena in order to highlight certain key observations that support the integration of religion into his metaphysics/philosophy of culture. His empirical findings support this philosophical move. In addition to empirical justification of his interpretation of religion, Blaga’s philosophy of religion also enjoys coherentist and pragmatic support. Blaga’s interpretation of religion makes religion an integral part of a unified interpretation of human experience and makes philosophy of religion an integral member of his philosophical system. Pragmatically, Blaga’s approach to philosophy of religion is supported by the fact that his philosophy accounts for both the diversity and the similarities found in the wide religious spectrum, that his philosophy facilitates the appraisal or valuation of religion as a phenomenon, and that it does the latter from a philosophical and religiously nonpartisan point of view.8 Although the bulk of Blaga’s writing on philosophy of religion consists 5. These include the final chapter, which contains a discussion of some points in the thought of Paul Tillich. 6. CFR, 12; see also GMR, 429–30. 7. CFR, 13. 8. Ibid., CFR, 12.

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of descriptions and analyses of actual religious phenomena, the analysis of his philosophy of religion presented here will focus on the systematic aspects of his philosophy and related issues. This is due to the fact that Blaga’s lengthy analyses of particular religious phenomena are interpreted as an argument for Blaga’s system rather than as ends in themselves.

Definition of Religion Blaga’s goal in seeking a definition of religion is to find a definition that is in accord with the empirical phenomena that are conventionally labeled “religious” and with the previous conclusions of his philosophical system.9 He discusses and rejects Schleiermacher’s definition of religion as a feeling of unconditional dependence on the absolute, since there are religions (most notably Buddhism and Taoism) that lack either belief in an absolute or a feeling of dependence on the absolute.10 He rejects Max Scheler’s and Paul Tillich’s definitions, since the former could also describe poetry and the latter could apply to metaphysics.11 He discusses problems with the psychoanalytic explanations of religion proposed by Freud and others, listing four attributes of religion that distinguish it from other psychological phenomena.12 The definition that Blaga settles on is the following: “Religion circumscribes, in any of its variants, the capacity of self-summation or selfsurpassing of the human being in ideal correlation with all existence, but especially in ideal correlation with the ultimate elements or coordinates of existential mystery in general, which man both reveals and/or considers revealed through constructs of a stylistic nature.”13 Several aspects of this 9. GMR, 467. 10. Ibid., 467–68. 11. Blaga, GMR, 469. Blaga gives Scheler’s definition of religion, found in Scheler’s Vom Ewigen im Menschen, as “Through the capacity of the naturally religious act, in and through everything the human person observes, thinks, and experiences as existing and existing thus, there is in principle revealed to him a Being . . . which has at least two essential characteristics: it absolutely exists and it is holy.” [Vermoge der naturlichen religiosen Akte schaut, denkt und fuhlt der Mensch prinzipiell an allem und durch alles, was ihm sonst als daseiend und soseiend gegeben ist, sich ihm ein Seiendes erschliessen . . . das mindestens zwei Wesensbestimmungen besitzt: es ist absolut seiend und es ist heilig.] (Translation by Leonard Swidler.) He gives Tillich’s definition as “religion is the orientation toward the unconditioned,” from Tillich’s book Religionsphilosophie. 12. Blaga claims that, contra the conclusions of many psychoanalysts, the basic characteristic of religion (the tendency toward self-summation and/or self-surpassing in correlation with the ultimate elements of existential mystery) is supremely normal for humans. GMR, 476–77. 13. GMR, 470. As T˘anase points out, this definition is liable to be viewed as unacceptable by many religious practitioners, since it seems to humanize and secularize religion; T˘anase, Lucian Blaga: Filosoful poet, poetul filosof, 142.

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definition require further elucidation, especially the terms “self-summation” and “self-surpassing,” and the state of “ideal correlation.” The capacities of self-summation (autototalizare) and self-surpassing (autodepa¸sire) are described, respectively, as the lower and upper limits of religiousness.14 Self-summation approaches the revelation of the ultimate using all of the human faculties and aptitudes, cognitive, emotional, volitional, intuitive, and imaginative, in the effort to reveal the transcendent. Self-surpassing religion, on the other hand, attempts to transcend the inherent limitations of these human faculties and aptitudes. Although Blaga does not give a specific example of self-summarizing religion, he discusses mysticism as an example of self-surpassing religion. Most actual religious practice falls somewhere between these two extremes.15 The phrase “ideal correlation with the ultimate elements . . . of existential mystery” could be taken to suggest that through religion humanity succeeds in grasping the transcendent. That this is not Blaga’s intent is clear from the subsequent reaffirmation that all revelation of existential mystery occurs through stylistic constructs. Immediately after giving this definition, Blaga reiterates his metaphysical scheme, according to which humanity exists in the horizon of mystery and for the revelation thereof, and according to which all human attempts at revelation of mystery are limited by the framework of style and therefore do not fully attain their goal.16 According to Blaga, all religions are constructs and are therefore subject to stylistic determinants. He draws this conclusion not solely on the basis of the dictates of his philosophical system, but also on the basis of his empirical analysis of world religions, which indicates that all religions are influenced by cultural/stylistic factors.17 What Blaga refers to as “ideal correlation with the ultimate elements or coordinates of existential mystery” is a state of reciprocity that exists between the subconscious elements that affect the processes of selfsummation and self-surpassing and the manner in which humanity reveals ultimate mystery in religion.18 According to this theory religion is a human creation, but humanity is also molded and shaped by religion. The influences are reciprocal, and because of this reciprocity, humanity and religion 14. Blaga does not make explicit what he means by “upper” and “lower” limits. Mircea and George Flonta have suggested that Blaga may be saying that self-summation, the lower limit, is the minimum of religiosity; that if self-summation does not exist religiosity does not exist. The upper limit of religiosity, according to this interpretation of Blaga’s terms, is the pinnacle of religious experience attained by only a few (George Flonta, e-mail message to author, September 17, 2003). An alternative interpretation is that Blaga is intending to say that self-summation is the more earthly, natural form of religion, while self-surpassing is the more otherworldly or heavenly form. 15. GMR, 472. 16. Ibid., 470. 17. Ibid., 471. 18. This is also explained in Codoban, “Un Blaga ignorat: Filosoful religiei,” 377–78.

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are matched to each other. Because of this reciprocity any metaphysical or mythical creation of religion corresponds (more or less) to the being of its human creator, while at the same time having the tendency to mold its creator to its own image.19 According to Blaga, this reciprocity is unusually important to the understanding of religion.20 The specific abyssal categories that structure particular religions vary from region to region, epoch to epoch, and people to people. Therefore every religion is unique. Nevertheless all share in certain core elements that are reflected in the definition of religion itself.21 Blaga’s definition of religion is, on his own account, “algebraic,” meaning that it allows the particulars of religion (the stylistic elements) to vary from one religion to another while maintaining the immutable aspects central to the substance of religion (self-summation/self-surpassing in correlation with mystery).22

Religion and Culture It is sometimes thought that religion is not a part of culture or is not influenced by culture. It is supposed that religion is a direct product of God or that divine revelation shelters religion from culture’s influence. Blaga argues (at length and repeatedly) that religion is influenced by culture, and that religion itself is a human cultural production.23 This is one of the main purposes of the large number of chapters in his writings on philosophy of religion that are devoted to the description of various religions. His descriptions highlight the way each religion is at least in part a product of the culture in which it is found.24 19. GMR, 473–74. 20. The eminent Romanian Orthodox theologian Dumitru St˘aniloae has criticized Blaga for making style/culture more fundamental to humanity than religion (St˘aniloae, Pozi¸tia domnului Lucian Blaga fa¸ta˘ de Cre¸stinism s¸i Ortodoxie, 13). This criticism may perhaps be guilty of overlooking the reciprocity between human religious creations and style. This reciprocity seems to indicate that religion and style influence each other, which is in fact consistent with Blaga’s philosophy of culture. In several places Blaga indicates that religion is one of the basic expressions of the human soul (see, for instance, GMR, 505). What is culturally relative is not the phenomenon of religion, but rather the particular form that this phenomenon takes in a given setting. (For a similar argument, see T˘anase, Lucian Blaga, 143.) 21. GMR, 475. 22. Ibid., 475, 480–81. 23. On page 352 of GMR Blaga states that religious phenomena inevitably have a stylistic structure. On page 478 of GMR he argues that religion, like any other cultural creation, is always under the influence of the stylistic categories, no matter how complex or intellectual the religion is. Even the extremely rationalist religion of Kant is subject to stylistic formation (GMR, 475). See also GMR, 488. 24. GMR, 447– 48. Most of this work is accomplished in GMR and CFR, but on page 390 of FI Blaga discusses the influence of ancient mythology on popular Romanian Christianity. On page 171 of OS he discusses the influence on religion of the abyssal category that he names “formative aspiration.”

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Blaga argues that mysticism is the form of religious experience most likely to be free from culture’s influence, since mystical experience is purported to involve direct experience of the transcendent or even a state of unity with the transcendent.25 In order to ascertain whether a religious experience free of the mediation of culture is possible, he analyzes a variety of forms of mysticism including Neoplatonism, Sufism, Brahmanic, and Christian mysticism, as well as specific mystics like Lao-tzu in the East and Dyonisius the Pseudo-Areopagite, Meister Eckehart, Maximus the Confessor, and Pascal in the West.26 Blaga does not question the authenticity of mystical experiences, but questions whether they are unadulterated experiences of the absolute.27 He points out that for a mystical experience to be unaffected by culture it would be necessary for the experience to be acosmic and suprahistorical. Since the ecstatic states and claimed unions of mystics with God that Blaga has reviewed exhibit the marks of style from the culture in which they take place, they cannot be examples of escaping history into the Absolute.28 Therefore, concludes Blaga, they are not an exception to the historical nature of human existence but rather are at least in part human cultural creations.29

Religion and Metaphysics The general outline of Blaga’s philosophy of religion could be anticipated by anyone familiar with his metaphysical vision. According to this vision, all of existence is the result of a single cause, which Blaga names the Great Anonymous (MA) and the Anonymous Fund (FA). This first cause has arranged its creation in such a way as to both preserve the original creation and perpetuate further creation. Two of the chief strategies employed in accomplishing this are “transcendent censorship” and “stylistic brakes.” The former limits the cognitive capacity of created beings, while the latter limits their creative capacity. Humanity is the pinnacle of creation, and has the greatest cognitive and 25. Early in his career some were of the opinion that Blaga harbored mystical tendencies. He himself admits to utilizing mystical style as a tool in his poetry, but his philosophical writings on mysticism make it clear that he is not a mystic. This is argued at greater length in Munteanu, “Lucian Blaga: Metafizician al misterului s¸i filosof al culturii,” 205. 26. GMR, chapter 18, 19, and 20, and pp. 415–16, 373, 387ff., 431–37; FI, 503, and GMR, 493–94. Blaga also mentions St. Francis of Assisi, St. Teresa of Avila, St. Catherine of Sienna, and St. John of the Cross. Blaga, GMR, 492. 27. GMR, 426. At one point Blaga does write that an ecstatic union with God cannot take place except through the self-deception of the mystic, because there does not exist permeability between humanity and the MA. 28. FI, 503; GMR, 373, 417, 439. 29. FI, 504; GMR, 426.

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creative capacity of any created species. The most notable attributes that distinguish humanity from other created forms of life are the aspiration to reveal the transcendent and the drive to create. However, even the human cognitive and creative capacities are subject to transcendent censorship and stylistic brakes. The MA has limited humanity in this way in order to protect its own supremacy within the natural order of creation, and in order to perpetuate its own creative activity through its creations. Religion is one manifestation of the human drive to reveal and create. As such, it is subject to transcendent censorship and stylistic braking. This limits the efficaciousness of the human attempts, entailing that religions remain culturally relative creations aspiring toward the transcendent, rather than achieving the status of suprahistorical revelations of ultimate reality.30 Although all religion is relative, like any other manifestation of culture, and although it bears the mark of the isolation from the absolute caused by transcendent censorship, it can be viewed positively as a sign of the supreme destiny of humanity to strive to reveal mystery. Furthermore, religion is positive in that it is a response to permanent inner needs of the human being.31 According to Blaga, religion remains one of the perennial manifestations of the human spirit because it circumscribes the human tendency of self-summation/self-surpassing in correlation with the supposed ultimate coordinates of existence, in the horizon of which humanity is permanently ontologically situated.32 Whether the MA of Blaga’s metaphysics can be equated with the Godconcept of monotheistic religions has previously been discussed, and the conclusion has been drawn that it would not be consistent with Blaga’s epistemology to state either that it can or that it cannot. While Blaga’s metaphysics gives an important place to the concept of the MA, his definition of religion does not emphasize the existence of a deity or deities. Consistent with this, and also with Blaga’s tolerant attitude toward world religions, it could be said both that belief in an ultimate existential entity is not important to Blaga’s understanding of religion in general, and that belief in an ultimate existential entity is important to Blaga’s own personal religion.33 Blaga’s metaphysics yields a theodicy that combines an element of distance between the creator and creation and elements of the type of theodicy often referred to as a “greatest possible good” theodicy.34 He argues, on the one hand, that the MA does not exercise direct control over 30. FI, 503. 31. GMR, 480. 32. Ibid., 474. 33. See Ioan I. Ica, “Filosofia lui Blaga din perspectiva teologic˘a: Reconsiderarea unei polemici,” in Mircea Borcila, Eonul Blaga: Iˆntˆaiul veac (Bucharest: Editura Albatros, 1997), 383–95. 34. DD, 86, 154.

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the creation process, but rather emitted the differentials and allows them to combine/interact almost randomly. On the other hand he argues that the existing world represents the best solution to a “grave impasse”: how to create the greatest possible world without endowing it to such a degree that it has the ability to destroy itself. The solution to this impasse opted for by the MA, according to Blaga’s metaphysical speculation, is the endowment of creation with creative and revelatory desires and abilities while at the same time limiting the successes achievable in response to these desires. Thus while the world may seem to be a very imperfect place, it is in fact the best world possible given the goals of the MA: perpetual creation and preservation of that which is created.

Revelation The possibility of divine revelation is an important issue in many philosophies of religion. Blaga views his ideas on this issue as direct implications of his metaphysical and epistemological systems. Blaga views the prevention of positive-adequate human knowledge of the transcendent as one of the primary purposes for the imposition of transcendent censorship and stylistic braking. Therefore Blaga believes that the MA is oriented toward preventing human knowledge of the transcendent rather than abetting it. Because of this he has reservations about the likelihood of the existence of divine revelation.35 If Blaga is reserved about the possibility of divine revelation, he is skeptical about the possibility of any divine revelation being unaffected by culture. In his writings on philosophy of religion he examines a variety of claimed revelations and finds that all of them exhibit cultural influences. Since culture is a transient human creation, the supposed revelations must also be at least in part transient human creations. Therefore religions based on supposed divine revelation do not succeed in escaping the inherent historicity of the human situation.36 This leads him to the conclusion that either the supposed revelations are not revelation or that revelation so adapts itself to the human condition that it is as variable as any completely human creation.37 Although Blaga sometimes demonstrates an appreciation of Christianity, it is clear that as a result of the forgoing considerations he rejects 35. GMR, 479. 36. Ibid., 479. 37. Ibid., 441. Blaga notes that the incompatibility of different supposed revelations poses a challenge to the veracity of the revelations. He further states that this is not a problem to theologians or to philosophers: both have resolved the issue in peremptory and diametrically opposed ways. GMR, 447– 48.

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the traditional view of the inspiration of the Christian Bible.38 This rejection is reflected in his discussion of several other philosophical issues. One of these occurs in ED, where he writes that while the Bible was at one time sufficient to provoke the theological intellect to the special cognitive state that he names “the ecstatic intellect,” it is an insufficient stimulus for provoking this state in the philosophical intellect, and is replaced by the examination of experience.39 Another occurs in CT, where Blaga links belief in the necessary truthfulness of God, belief in the perspicuity of Christian revelation, and the inability to see the subjectivity of cognition.40 Blaga himself embraces and makes frequent use of the term “revelation” in his philosophical writings. However, the sense of this term when used by Blaga is quite different from the sense that it has when used by most theologians. Blaga uses the term to denote “any . . . positive display of an existential mystery in the spotlight of human cognition.”41 Considering how broad a realm of cognitive objects is circumscribed by the phrase “existential mystery” in Blaga’s philosophy, it is evident that Blaga considers all human cognition to be revelation. Additionally, he considers all creative constructs to be revelations, whether they occur in the arts or in theoretical studies.42 In Blaga’s writings, the term revelation is a metaphor for any attempt at approaching external reality. He adds that none of these attempts is completely successful, but that this does not preclude partial successes within the limits of transcendent censorship.43 On Blaga’s analysis, “spiritual revelations” have nothing to do with divine revelation, 38. In one place Blaga asserts that Christianity is a myth affected by the Greek synthesis of religion and culture (ED, 202–3). Blaga’s rejection of the inspiration of the Christian Bible was one of the main sources of the bitter dispute that occurred between Blaga and the Romanian Orthodox theologians who were his contemporaries, especially D. St˘aniloae. In Ioan I. Ic˘a’s article “Filosofia lui Blaga din perspectiva teologic˘a: Reconsiderarea unei polemici,” 383–95, Ic˘a discusses this situation and concludes that the polemical atmosphere that evolved between Blaga and the theologians prevented the dialogue that might have resulted in a better understanding of the extent to which Blaga’s philosophy and Orthodox theology could be reconciled on this issue. 39. ED, 268. 40. CT, 470, 480–81. Blaga repudiates Descartes’ belief that God would not deceive his creatures, and argues that toward humanity the MA has a tactic rather than a morality (ibid.). Marta Petreu discusses at length the influence of Descartes on Blaga’s philosophy and the various ways that Blaga turns Descartes on his head, including this rejection of the veracity of God, which is one of the foundations of Descartes’ philosophy. See Petreu, “De la Dumnezeul cel bun la Dumnezeul cel r˘au,” 30– 46. 41. CT, 454. 42. Blaga theorizes that humanity attempts to reveal mystery through various types of creative constructions, and that these constructions are affected by the abyssal stylistic categories that structure this revelation, both enabling it and ultimately preventing its success. GMR, 470–71. 43. CT, 454 –55.

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because the former are (at least in large measure) productions of the human spirit.44 In Blaga’s schematization, human creative acts take the place of revelation in the conventional sense. Through creative constructs humanity grapples with and comes to a greater appreciation/understanding of mystery.45 This could be viewed as an indirect revelation instigated by the MA, since in Blaga’s metaphysics human creativity is a result of the MA’s grand plan for creation and is framed by the cognitive/creative limits imposed therein. This brings Blaga’s use of the term “revelation” somewhat closer to the traditional theological usage, but only infinitesimally so. Blaga is not unaware of the possibility for contradictory revelations latent in his use of the term revelation. In the context of his philosophy of art he notes the polyvalence of nature, commenting that, “In reality, nature changes its appearance, somehow taking to itself the characteristic tendencies of the art of the time.”46 This is consistent with his implicit view that his philosophy of religion provides a better explanation of the phenomenon of religious diversity than does the traditional view of religion as being revealed by God. There are differences between human creative revelation as it is found in religion and other types of human creative revelation of mystery (e.g., metaphysics, science, art). Most human attempts at revelation, such as those of art and the natural sciences, indiscriminately address any mystery whatsoever. Both religion and metaphysics focus exclusively on the ultimate mysteries of existence. As discussed earlier, however, religion aspires to reveal mystery through the means of self-summation and selfsurpassing in correlation with the decisive coordinates of existential mystery.47 Certainty A sentiment of certainty regarding religious beliefs, sometimes referred to as a feeling of “conviction,” is one of the more philosophically interesting aspects of religion. Blaga discusses certainty in the final chapter of GMR. Mysticism in particular is often accompanied by an intensified sentiment of certainty, but many other forms of religiosity also involve conviction about religious beliefs. Blaga examines the basis of the claim to certainty on the part of the mystics, since it represents what may perhaps be the most extreme case. He concludes that although mystical certainty may be more 44. FI, 502; Ion Manzat, “Elemente de psihologia religiei,” in Dimensiunea metafizic˘a a operei lui Lucian Blaga, ed. A. Botez and A. Firu¸ta˘ , 283. 45. GMSC, 457–58. 46. FC, 360. Blaga is quoting or paraphrasing Oscar Wilde, but does not reference his source. 47. GMR, 471–72.

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intense than ordinary certainty, it is not more objective. He argues that the apparent subjectivity of mystical experience is an indication that it, too, is subject to transcendent censorship and stylistic braking.48 Blaga makes no argument against the feeling of certainty that often accompanies religious belief. On the other hand, it is clear that Blaga’s epistemology and proposed metaphysical system leave no room for apodictic certainty in any religion or in any other sphere of human cognition.49 Transcendent censorship and stylistic braking together thwart any possibility of human knowledge reaching a state wherein cognitive error is not at least a possibility.50 Using the terminology of Blaga’s epistemology, “paradisaic” cognition is limited to organizing “the given world” through the employment of categories of understanding. These shape all paradisaic cognition, distorting its objects. Luciferic cognition, on the other hand, reaches beyond the given to creatively address other problems. Luciferic cognition employs stylistic categories, however, and these shape all luciferic cognition, distorting its objects as well.51 This lack of apodictic certainty pertaining to religious beliefs does not undermine the justification of religion, according to Blaga. The subjectivity of religious beliefs puts them on par with all other types of human belief. Religion needs neither objectivity nor apodicity to be legitimate. According to Blaga, religion is legitimated by two other considerations: 1. its status as a cultural creation, an attempt at revelation of mystery in accord with human destiny; and 2. its status as a manifestation of the human tendency to self-summation and self-surpassing in correlation with the ultimate mysteries of existence.52 Perhaps it could be stated that, according to Blaga, religion is not validated by its grasp of the transcendent but rather by its reach for it. 48. Ibid., 493–95. 49. St˘aniloae argues in several chapters (St˘aniloae, chapters 3, 5, 6, 7) that Blaga’s philosophy excludes the possibility of religious knowledge. He argues that Blaga’s philosophy is therefore anti-Christian, since it makes all knowledge relative, whereas Christianity (and especially Orthodoxy) is based on the certainty of revealed truth. St˘aniloae seems to be correct in his conclusion that Blaga’s philosophy does not allow for apodictic certainty, not even in the sphere of religious belief. However, some might argue that Blaga’s view of the human predicament and the resultant epistemological modesty that this view suggests are in fact more in keeping with the Christian view of the inherent limits of created beings, the cognitive consequences of the fall, and the nature of saving faith than are the perhaps immodest epistemological views of theologians like St˘aniloae. 50. This opposition to the possibility of apodictic certainty is in harmony with the present state of postfoundationalist epistemology. 51. FI, 492; DD, 184. 52. GMR, 488–89. In the twelfth chapter of GMR Blaga discusses the attempt of Rudolf Otto to establish the objectivity of religion by making the sense of the sacred a category of cognition. Blaga shows some affinity with certain aspects of Otto’s thought, but concludes that his attempt at establishing the objectivity of religion is unsuccessful. GMR, 481–89.

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Theology Blaga’s thoughts on theology, and on its uses, limits, and justification, reflect his conclusions regarding religious certainty. In one of his earliest systematic works, Eonul dogmatic, Blaga demonstrates great respect for some of the theoretical methods utilized by theology. He uses theological reflection as an example of how human cognition can reach beyond the given and explore issues that transcend the limits of empirical cognition and even human logic. For example, in Cunoa¸sterea luciferic˘a he argues that the theological understanding of miracles is a good example of minuscognition and of the transcending of the laws of nature.53 He writes that the difference between theology and philosophy is not doctrinal, since they sometimes arrive at the same conclusions, but rather methodological. While philosophy does not presuppose the truth of any particular ideological system, theology begins from the presupposition that some particular religion is revealed truth, and develops its ideas based on that premise.54 The very nature of the theological project necessitates that it be a creative enterprise, however, and this precludes the possibility of it attaining a state of apodictic certainty in any of its conclusions. Using the terminology of Blaga’s epistemology, theology is luciferic cognition and is therefore subject to stylistic braking. Theological ideas are creations of the human spirit, creations that develop over time and are influenced by the culture in which they are found.55 Theological ideas are expressions of the creativity of the human spirit and show the potency of the human drive to reveal the transcendent. There is evidence that these expressions are found even in the distant ancestors of humanity—Homo neanderthalensis and early Homo sapiens.56 They are also found in the most modern of thought systems. The sense of the sacred that is expressed in theology is transferred from one object to another— 53. CL, 400– 401. He also writes that the Christian doctrine of the two natures of Christ is an abuse of minus-cognition. CL, 399– 400. 54. GMR, 342– 43. Blaga states that the presupposition of the truth of a particular religion is totally legitimate for the theology of any religion (CFR, 12). Some might object that philosophy’s rejection of initial premises is itself a premise and an ideology, but Blaga does not comment on this possibility. 55. ED, 209; GMR, 344. 56. According to Blaga, protohumans (e.g., Homo neanderthalensis) achieved spiritual dignity and creative stature by escaping the given world into the transcendent through religious ritual. Blaga states that Homo neanderthalensis had a strong sense of mystery and tried to reveal the mysterious through myth and magic (FI, 495). He also asserts that the magical and mythical thought of early Homo sapiens is witnessed in their tools, rituals, and artistic creations, showing their interest in the transcendent as well as their creations achieved within stylistic fields. FI, 496.

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from rock to tree to gods to God to morality and to other ideals, in the case of the West—but Blaga observes that it never completely disappears.57 The language of theology is often thought to involve special problems, since it involves an attempt to describe something that transcends normal human experience, but must use vocabulary that was developed for and is normally applied to ordinary human experience. Blaga himself encounters this problem when trying to discuss his theory of the origin of the cosmos. He describes the situation in terms similar to those utilized in many theological prolegomena. He writes that the terms he uses have a role similar to that of directional signs pointing toward what is being discussed. They do not conceptually identify what they refer to, but rather are “a gesture of human language suddenly overcome in a painful terminological deficiency.”58 In Blaga’s system, this predicament may not be unique to theological language. The fact that Blaga’s metaphysics indicates that all of existence transcends human cognitive ability implies that all human language faces similar limitations. The bifurcation that separates sense and referent in theological language would seem to be a universal linguistic phenomenon. The aspiration to reveal existential truths through language is blocked by the MA, not to the point where humanity cannot function, but to the point where humanity cannot achieve perfection.59 Salvation and Human Destiny Among the most noted features of any religion is its soteriology and personal eschatology. In his discussions of religions (in GMR and CFR) Blaga describes a wide variety of theories concerning whether and how salvation is accomplished and concerning the present and ultimate destinies of individual humans and of humanity. His own views on these issues, however, do not coincide with those of any of the religions that he discusses. It could be said that Blaga creates his own religion, one that he believes to be more in harmony with the rest of his philosophical system.60 The traditional Christian soteriological position is that at one time humanity enjoyed a rich relationship with the transcendent (God), that this 57. GMR, 486. 58. “un gest ar˘at˘ator al limbii omene¸sti ajuns˘a dintr-o dat˘a intr-o penibil˘a caren¸ta˘ terminologic˘a.” DD, 91. 59. The motives for this have been discussed previously. The contents of this paragraph are my speculations about the implications of Blaga’s philosophy, and are not explicitly found in any of Blaga’s works. 60. Blaga clearly believes that his views on these and other issues in philosophy of religion are implied by his general philosophical system. It might be fair to say that they are not entailed by his system, although they are compatible with it and complementary to it.

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relationship was ended (“the fall”), that restoration of this relationship is theoretically possible (salvation), and that the transcendent has taken the initiative to make this restoration actual (atonement). One result of this initiative is eternal life (life after death). Blaga proposes a very different construal of the human soteriological situation. According to Blaga, a human is not a being fallen from a rich relationship with the MA (the Transcendent) that will or can be raised up again into relationship with the MA. A human is an earthly, historical being whose own acts aspire to transcendence but are relative and greatly limited. While they exceed the abilities of any other terrestrial creature, they never reach the MA itself.61 The MA does not initiate a salvation wherein humanity is or can be reunited with itself, but on the contrary has taken steps to ensure that humanity cannot itself ascend to transcendence. These steps, as previously explained, were taken for the benefit of humanity and of all existence. This doctrine can be viewed as taking the place of the traditional Christian soteriology. According to Blaga’s doctrine, the MA has provided for the well-being of humanity and of all existence, collectively and as individuals. This prevention of the human aspiration to transcendence bestows upon individuals a cognitive and creative drive that gives them purpose and nobility in life, and protects existence from the possibly destabilizing effects of multiple transcendent beings. Blaga’s writings on philosophy of religion contain very little about personal eschatology, but because of his views on human destiny, he does opine that if there is life after death, it cannot be superior to earthly life. He says that he is “inclined” to think that if there is existence after death, it is probably more like the ancient pagan Greek conception of a “shade,” or almost a nonexistence, rather than the Christian conception of a heavenly life that surpasses the earthly one. Blaga conditions his statement by saying that in describing the afterlife in this way he is speaking poetically.62 Blaga describes his view on the destiny of the human race and of human individuals clearly, and highlights how his view differs from the Christian tradition. Blaga summarizes the traditional Christian view as holding that earthly life is a preparatory stage, and that the ultimate goal and eternal destiny of human beings is life in heaven in fellowship with the Creator. In contrast to this view, Blaga sees human destiny as being played out entirely on earth. According to Blaga, humanity finds its fulfillment in approaching the transcendent through cognition and creation. Human destiny is earthly and historical. Because of this it is also relative, being limited by transcendent censorship and stylistic braking. The human is eternally destined to 61. FI, 504. 62. Ibid., 504 –5.

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find fulfillment on earth as a creative being, ever thwarted from complete fulfillment, but ever anew inspired to creativity and achievement.63 Blaga writes that paradise and hell are not the final destiny of humanity, but rather are metaphors for two different aspects of human historicity: the ability to create and to reveal mystery and (conversely) the inability to create anything that fully and adequately reveals mystery.64 The statement is primarily intended to be a poetic metaphor expressing the potency of Blaga’s sentiment of human creativity and the benefits and burdens of the destiny of humanity. It seems likely that it also reflects an underlying disbelief in the traditional doctrines of heaven and hell. No Single Religion In his writings on philosophy of religion, Blaga describes and analyzes a wide range of religions and religious phenomena. He treats all of the religions that he investigates fairly and evenhandedly. It seems likely that this is at least in part a result of his belief that a philosophical analysis should not presuppose the truth of any particular religion and should remain open-minded toward all theoretical possibilities.65 Blaga’s attitude toward world religions seems to go beyond mere philosophical detachment, however. Blaga consistently displays a very great respect for every religion he investigates. This could be a result of his view that all religions are legitimate cultural attempts to reveal the transcendent.66 It could also be related to his views that all human beliefs are relative, that all knowledge involves constructs that are at best tentatively validated, and that experience is subject to a plurality of legitimate interpretations.67 Blaga’s own theology has similarities to deism, of a very philosophical sort,68 though it must be said that the most theological of his statements are intended as metaphorical expressions of things that transcend human lan63. Ibid., 504. 64. “And if it is permitted to us to resort to the images of folk mythology in order to characterize the successes and failures of humanity, we would maintain that hell and paradise are not final destinations of human destiny, but rather permanent aspects of our historicity.” FI, 494. 65. GMR, 342– 43. 66. Ibid., 180. 67. These points have been discussed in preceding chapters, especially chapter 5. On the polyvalence of experience, see FC, 360. 68. HCV, 55. Blaga’s theology is most similar to deism when it posits a supreme Creator who initiated creation in such a way that the Creator’s continual intervention is not necessary. It is unlike classical deism in that it proposes that the Creator is continually creating by continually emitting additional “differentials.” S˘avulescu argues, in Lucian Blaga (50ff.), that Blaga held that God cannot be understood but can be “known,” and that therefore Blaga was a theist.

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guage, and perhaps therefore have more of an appearance of theology than Blaga actually intends. On the other hand, Blaga writes that the idea of God is “one of the most deeply seated of human ideas.”69 At the same time, he does not utterly reject those religions (like Buddhism, for example) that do not affirm the existence of a single supreme deity, but rather sees in them an alternate interpretation of a reality that surpasses human cognition. Although mystery is a central theme in Blaga’s philosophy, he openly declares that he is not a mystic.70 He grants that some of his drama and poetry has mystical elements, but states that this is because mysticism is fitting to poetry and drama.71 His writings on mysticism in his works on philosophy of religion make clear his reservations about mystical experience,72 and his metaphysics and epistemology make it clear that he does not believe that it is possible for humans to penetrate ultimate existential mysteries. Blaga remarks that Greek, Western, and Eastern philosophy and religion are very different but are coming together, becoming more similar. This observation was made in the first third of the twentieth century (the book in which it occurs, ED, was first published in 1931).73 Perhaps it is even truer today, at the beginning of the twenty-first century. If Blaga’s theory of religion and philosophy of culture are correct, as culture becomes more globalized, the thought-systems that it shapes will tend to become more alike. Perhaps there is evidence of this trend in the growing rapprochement of the ecumenical movement and other transreligious phenomena.

69. GMR, 367. 70. Many have said that mystery is the central theme in Blaga’s philosophy. Examples are Diaconu and Diaconu, who state that mystery is the central and pivotal point of Blaga’s epistemology and his metaphysics (191); Bazil Munteanu, who in “Lucian Blaga: Metafizician al misterului s¸i filosof al culturii” implies that the exploration of mystery is Blaga’s key innovation (203–5); and Blaga himself, in a letter reprinted in Diaconu and Diaconu, where he states that mystery is the central idea of his first two trilogies (12). 71. Diaconu and Diaconu, 12. 72. See especially Daimonion, in vol. 7 of Opere, ed. Dorli Blaga, 341– 42; GMR, chapters 18, 19, 20, 24, and 26; and CFR, chapters 16, 19, 20, 21, and 26. 73. ED, 201.

Part II Application of Blaga’s Philosophy: Blaganian Solutions to Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Religion

8 The Nature of Philosophy of Religion As stated in the introduction, the purpose of this book is both to introduce Blaga’s philosophy and to show its relevance to issues in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy. The goal of this section of this volume is to apply the philosophy described the preceding chapters to a variety of issues in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy of religion. It is not the purpose of this book to prove the truthfulness or accuracy of Blaga’s philosophy. However, a successful application of Blaga’s philosophy to contemporary issues will justify that philosophy according to Blaga’s own criteria of justification. Chapter 3 of this book introduced Blaga’s understanding of the pragmatic justification of philosophical statements. Chapter 5 discussed his pragmatic approach to verification. If Blaga’s views on justification and verification are correct, then according to Blaga’s own standards, his philosophy will be justified by its fruitfulness in application to a variety of philosophical problems. Therefore the following application of Blaga’s philosophy to issues in contemporary AngloAmerican philosophy of religion may, in effect, provide a justification of Blaga’s philosophy. Some of the most persistently vexing problems of philosophy occur in the area of philosophy of religion. Therefore philosophy of religion provides a good testing ground for the utility of Blaga’s philosophy. A number of the difficult issues discussed in contemporary philosophy of religion will be introduced in order to see whether Blaga’s philosophy can provide cogent resolutions of these problems. It will be shown that Blaga’s philosophy can make significant contributions to a wide variety of contemporary issues within this field. The first issue that must be addressed when approaching issues of philosophy of religion is the question of the nature of philosophy of religion itself. This “prolegomenon” to philosophy of religion has been discussed by numerous recent authors working in the field. John Hick begins his oft-reprinted book on philosophy of religion in the Foundation of Philosophy Series with such a discussion. Hick describes a shift in the understanding of the nature of philosophy of religion that has taken place. According to Hick, there has been a shift from viewing the task of philoso155

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phy of religion as involving what are today called “natural theology” and “apologetics” to a model of philosophy of religion that parallels philosophy of science and similar interfaces between philosophy and other areas of human discourse. According to this model, philosophy of religion is “philosophical thinking about religion.”1 Others working in the field have made similar suggestions. Peterson, Hasker, Reichenbach, and Basinger, in a subchapter entitled “What is Philosophy of Religion?” state that “the relationship in which philosophy stands to religion . . . is on equal footing with . . . philosophy of art, philosophy of science, philosophy of history, and a number of other studies in which, again, philosophy thoroughly inspects a stated subject matter.”2 In his introduction to philosophy of religion, Frederick Ferre argues similarly, labeling philosophy of religion “metareligion.”3 Nonetheless, most philosophers of religion, the aforementioned authors included, continue to include a considerable amount of natural theology and apologetics in their published works on the subject. Therefore the questions of the nature of philosophy of religion, its purpose and method, continue to have great pertinence. Blaga’s answers to these questions, as well as his contribution to the definition of religion itself, are philosophically astute and contribute beneficially to this ongoing discussion.

The Purpose of Philosophy of Religion One of the earliest occupations with which philosophy of religion has been engaged is natural theology. Natural theology is the practice of constructing a theology without appealing to miracles or supernatural revelation. Natural theology (though not named as such) is seen in Plato’s Laws, when the Athenian argues that the existence of motion proves that there exists a first cause of all subsequent motion. In this passage Plato’s character uses an argument similar to the familiar cosmological proof of the existence of God in order to demonstrate the existence of gods. Aristotle takes a similar approach in Metaphysics XII, where he argues that since things do not 1. Hick, Philosophy of Religion, 1. 2. Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, and David Bassinger, eds., Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 8. 3. “All the fields, indeed, which are labeled ‘philosophy of . . .’ operate at one or more removes from the boundaries of their subject matter. They are found on what has come to be called the ‘meta-level’; that is, the level ‘after’ or ‘behind’ the level of the subject in question. Thus philosophy of science, in recent days, has in some quarters been termed ‘metascience.’ It is not itself an inquiry located in any science, but takes the sciences as its object for reflection and analysis. Philosophy of religion might analogously be called ‘metareligion.’ ” Frederick Ferre, Basic Modern Philosophy of Religion (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1967), 9–10.

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move themselves and since there cannot be an infinite regression of causes of motion, the existence of motion indicates that there exists some first mover. Subsequent thinkers have proposed additional arguments for the existence of God(s), such as Cicero’s argument from the universality of religious belief and his teleological argument, Anselm’s ontological argument, and Kant’s moral argument.4 These arguments are still being used and debated in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy of religion. This is seen both in the inclusion of these classical texts in recent anthologies on philosophy of religion and also in the large number of articles and books still being published discussing these types of proofs. Natural theology is not limited to proofs of the existence of God. Natural theology can and has been used to argue for other religious beliefs such as the creation of the world, the general existence of things supernatural, and life after death. Numerous authors, including Kant, have written about the dangers of the natural theology approach. Many have argued that the various arguments for the existence of God fail to attain their goal. Still others have defended natural theology and have championed one or another of the proofs of God’s existence.5 Natural theology, regardless of its success or lack thereof, has played a prominent role in the history of philosophy of religion. However, should natural theology be rejected as methodologically untenable, this would not be likely to lead to a general demise of philosophy of religion. Therefore natural theology should be viewed as only one possible aspect of philosophy of religion. It would appear that the primary purpose of philosophy of religion is not to construct a theology free of appeals to miracles and supernatural revelation. Another philosophical enterprise with which philosophers of religion have often been occupied is apologetics, the philosophical defense of religious belief and particular religious beliefs. Every intellectually developed religion has its apologists. They utilize philosophical-style methods and arguments in order to defend their particular religion and its beliefs. 4. See Cicero, The Nature of the Gods, trans. Horace C. P. McGregor (Baltimore, MD: Penguin Books, 1972), 87–90 and 138– 40 (book 1, paragraphs 43– 49 and book 2, paragraphs 41– 42). For related texts and discussion of the teleological argument, see John Hick, ed., Classical and Contemporary Readings in the Philosophy of Religion (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1964), 468–69, 78–116, 147–65, 290–311, 195–99. For text, commentary, and discussion particular to Anselm and Kant, see Hick, ibid., 465–66, 28– 42, 63–67, 147–65 (Anselm), and 470, 166–74, 268–73 (Kant). 5. Anthologies like Douglas Geivett and Brendan Sweetman, eds., Contemporary Perspectives on Religious Epistemology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), and Peterson et al., Philosophy of Religion, juxtapose articles arguing for and against natural theology and the proofs of God’s existence.

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Whether apologetics properly belongs to the philosophical discipline or to theology is a debated subject. It has sometimes been proposed that the distinction between philosophy and theology lies chiefly in the fact that theology presupposes the truth of some particular (religious) system, while philosophy does not.6 It could therefore be argued that apologetics properly pertains to theology, since apologetics presupposes the truth of the beliefs that it defends. This is not necessarily so, however. It may be possible for a philosophical system to begin without presupposing the truth of any religious belief, to arrive at the conclusion that a certain religious belief is in fact true, and then turn to apologetics in order to demonstrate the truth of this belief. In this case the commitment to the truth of the belief would precede the apologetics project but would not be a presupposition of the philosophical project. Therefore the apologetics effort would be a philosophical one, being one part of a larger philosophical project.7 Like natural theology, apologetics has a very long history. Also like natural theology, apologetics is still practiced today. Apologetics arguments are in use in the defense of religious beliefs and also of beliefs that are often considered to be nonreligious, such as atheism.8 The appropriateness of philosophical proof in the realm of religious belief has been criticized by thinkers dating at least as far back as Tertullian.9 Contemporary thinkers have also written on this subject.10 Attempted proofs and arguments are an essential part of philosophy, however. Therefore philosophical proofs and argumentation are also essential to philosophy of religion. Thus it would seem that apologetics is an appropriate task for philosophy of religion. At the same time, it can readily be observed that apologetics is a conservative gesture: it does not originate religious concepts, nor does it clarify them, but rather it defends them, attempting to preserve their legitimacy in the face of hostile skepticism. If philosophy of religion is conceived of as a constructive project, as involv6. Blaga himself makes this distinction in GMR, 342– 43. 7. Examples of this abound in the history, and include Descartes, who attempted to build a philosophy free of presuppositions but eventually introduced apologetic arguments, and Kant, who introduced his moral apologetics late in his philosophical system. 8. See, for example, section 1, “Atheism,” in Geivett and Sweetman, Contemporary Perspectives. This contains three apologetics articles defending atheism: Antony Flew, “The Presumption of Atheism,” William L. Rowe, “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,” and Michael Martin, “Atheistic Teleological Arguments.” It also contains one rebuttal article, Scott A. Shalkowski, “Atheological Apologetics.” 9. Tertullian, “The Prescription against the Heretics,” in Helm, Faith and Reason, 61– 64. 10. A classical statement on the subject is Søren Kierkegaard’s, “The Absolute Paradox: A Metaphysical Crotchet,” in Philosophical Fragments, trans. David Swenson, 2nd ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962), 46–60. A more contemporary text is Steven M. Cahn, “The Irrelevance to Religion of Philosophic Proofs for the Existence of God,” reprinted in Geivett and Sweetman, 241– 45.

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ing more than just the defense of existing beliefs, then philosophy of religion can include, but cannot be reduced to, apologetics. A third long-standing interpretation is that the primary function of philosophy of religion is the clarification of religious terms and concepts. This approach to philosophy of religion is practiced both by religious and by secular philosophers. It is this basic approach that, at least since the time of Anselm, has been characterized as “faith seeking understanding.”11 For the religious, this approach offers clarification of the contents of their beliefs and can provide answers to questions about the “why” and “how” of certain issues related to their religion. This approach to philosophy of religion is not restricted to those who are already committed to the truth of the object of investigation, however. Skeptics can utilize concept clarification in their attempts to critique religion, and neutral observers can utilize concept clarification in their efforts to accurately understand religious beliefs.12 There is a tendency within analytic philosophy to reduce all philosophy, including philosophy of religion, to conceptual analysis and clarification. This is most evident in those philosophers associated with logical positivism.13 The appeal and the following of this restriction of the philosophical task are small, however. Most philosophers take conceptual analysis to be one aspect of the philosophical task that, while crucially essential, is merely a prerequisite to “more substantive considerations of truth and reasonableness.”14 It does not seem inappropriate that once the issues and concepts have been made clear philosophy would proceed to attempt to evaluate the appropriateness or veridicality of the concepts and suggest solutions to the issues. A fourth understanding of the task of philosophy of religion utilizes an empirical or quasi-scientific study of religion(s) in order to come to gener11. St. Anselm, Proslogium, in Anselm of Canterbury, trans. Jasper Hopkins and Herbert Richardson, vol. 1 (New York: Edwin Mellon Press, 1974), “For I do not seek to understand in order to believe but I believe in order to understand. For I believe even this: that I shall not understand unless I believe” (93). An earlier example of this approach is Aristotle’s conceptual analysis of divine thought, in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 12.9, trans. Richard Hope (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952), 265–66. Anselm’s ontological argument is clearly an apologetical excercise, but it has as its primary goal the better understanding of the object of faith, and therefore is thought by Anselm to be compatible with this understanding of philosophy of religion; see M. J. Charlesworth, Philosophy of Religion: The Historical Approaches (London: Macmillan, 1972), 155–57. 12. A possible example of the latter is the phenomenological examination of religious phenomena while bracketing off the question of the veridicality of any associated truthclaims. 13. This is briefly discussed in Peterson, Reason and Religious Belief, 8. A. J. Ayer’s Language, Truth and Logic and Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations are mentioned on page 12 as classic texts in the tradition of philosophy as conceptual analysis. 14. Peterson, Reason and Religious Belief, 8.

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alized insights about religion as a generic phenomenon. These inductive conclusions about religion are then sometimes used to formulate conclusions applying to specific religions. According to this understanding of the task of philosophy of religion, the purpose of philosophy of religion is to achieve a more accurate and more sophisticated empirical understanding of religion and religions. Methodologically, this approach to philosophy of religion resembles anthropology, the chief differences being the inclinations toward treating issues that are prominent in the history of philosophy of religion and toward interacting with thinkers and movements in that tradition. Examples of philosophers who have followed this approach are Mircea Eliade, Ninian Smart, and John Hick (in some of his writings).15 Blaga’s philosophy of religion can be viewed as containing elements of all of the preceding understandings of philosophy of religion. Although there is little in his philosophy that resembles traditional natural theology, his postulation and philosophical defense of the existence of a “Great Anonymous” as the source and designer of all else and his subsequent development of a teleology of creation (see chapter 4) resemble the cosmological and teleological arguments for the existence of God. His argument that religion is “one of the most deeply seated of human ideas,”16 used in support of the legitimacy of religion (see end of chapter 7), is similar to Cicero’s argument from the universality of belief. These factors can be viewed as elements of natural theology within Blaga’s philosophy, elements that lead to a particularly philosophical religion. However, it is clear that Blaga does not view natural theology as the main purpose of philosophy of religion. Blaga does not hesitate to substantiate his beliefs using a wide variety of proofs. The methods of substantiation that he advocates are described in chapters 3 and 5 of this book. He does not, however, engage in traditional apologetics. Although he does show great respect for religion, he does not attempt to prove the truth of any particular religious tradition or belief. On the contrary, Blaga’s view of religion is that it is a human creation, a culturally mediated attempt to creatively reveal the transcendent (as was discussed in chapter 7). As such, all religions are legitimate, but none are 15. See, for example, Mircea Eliade, A History of Religious Ideas, trans. Willard R. Trask (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978); Myth and Reality, trans. Willard R. Trask (New York: Harper & Row, 1963); and The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion, trans. Willard R. Trask (New York: Harcourt and Brace, 1959). For Ninian Smart, see The Phenomenon of Religion (New York: Herder and Herder, 1973) and The World’s Religions, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998). For John Hick, see An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989). 16. GMR, 367.

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ultimate truth. Therefore the role of apologetics is extremely attenuated in Blaga’s philosophy of religion. Although it is appropriate to advance reasoned arguments in support of one’s religious beliefs, it is impossible for any such argument to prove the veridicality of any single tradition. The analysis and clarification of concepts plays a role in virtually all philosophy of religion. Blaga is not excepted from this. Blaga analyzes terms, phrases, concepts, and beliefs both in his many chapters on specific religions and in his several more general chapters on philosophy of religion. Sometimes it seems as if a particular analysis is performed solely to better understand the object at hand. Much more often the analysis has a more distant goal. This goal could be a better understanding of some religion or some particular feature of religion in general, an evaluation of the plausibility or effectiveness of a particular point of view, or the building of a case for one of Blaga’s own philosophical positions. It is clear that Blaga’s view of philosophy of religion allows for much more than the mere analysis and clarification of concepts. On the other hand, a presuppositional approach to philosophy of religion such as that suggested by Anselm’s “faith seeking understanding” is clearly not compatible with Blaga’s view of philosophy. According to Blaga, one of the key distinctions between philosophy of religion and theology is that the former is open to any consideration, while the latter presupposes the truth of a particular religion (see chapter 7).17 Therefore a presuppositional approach is legitimate for theology, but not for philosophy. The approach to conceptual analysis that presupposes the truth of the concepts being analyzed (as well as the similarly presuppositional approach to apologetics) would be more aptly named “philosophical theology” than philosophy of religion. Of the four approaches to philosophy of religion mentioned, the fourth comes closest to Blaga’s own practice. Blaga often makes empirical or quasi-scientific examinations of religions for the specific purpose of enabling him to generalize about religion as a generic phenomenon. This is, in fact, the dominant method in his writings on philosophy of religion. The purpose of his many chapters on specific religions is not simply to achieve a more accurate and more sophisticated empirical understanding of religions and religion, however. Blaga is much less the anthropologist than is Eliade. Although Blaga’s philosophy of religion contains elements of all of the preceding understandings of philosophy of religion, his main purpose for philosophy is not any one of these. Nor is it an admixture of them. The main purpose of Blaga’s philosophy of religion is the provision of a holistic interpretation of human experience, the completion of a systematic 17. Ibid., 342– 43.

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philosophy. Blaga views religion as an important mode of the human interaction with the transcendent. Philosophy of religion is the part of philosophy that interprets this particular mode of human existence. In order to have a complete philosophy, there must be philosophy of religion. No philosophical system would be complete without addressing the issue of religion. Blaga is not the first philosopher to assign this significance to philosophy of religion. Many other philosophers, from Aristotle to Hegel, have included philosophy of religion as an important and integral part of a comprehensive philosophical system. Recent philosophers, however, have shied away from constructing systematic philosophies, and recent philosophers of religion have shown little interest in integrating their philosophies of religion into comprehensive philosophical systems. In fact, Eliade states that, since Hegel, no European philosopher except Blaga has had the courage to create a comprehensive systematic philosophy.18 Furthermore, Blaga’s philosophy of religion and the systematic philosophy into which it is incorporated offer a unique combination of analysis, arguments, and interpretations heretofore unseen in Euro-American philosophy. Blaga’s approach has several advantages over the other understandings of the task of philosophy of religion discussed here. The first advantage is that his view incorporates all of the other purposes of philosophy of religion. A philosophy of religion that forms a part of an effort to construct a comprehensive account of human experience can (and probably will) include elements of natural theology, apologetics, conceptual analysis, and the empirical study of religious phenomena. Another advantage is that it broadens the application of philosophy of religion, bringing the scrutiny of philosophical investigation to bear on a wider range of issues than is indicated by any of the other proposed purposes of philosophy of religion.19 Furthermore, the integration of a philosophy of religion into a systematic philosophy facilitates the evaluation of that philosophy of religion using the criterion of coherence (discussed in chapter 5).

The Method of Philosophy of Religion In his book referenced above, Hick describes philosophy of religion in terms that portray philosophy of religion as an empirically oriented philo18. Mircea Eliade, “Convorbiri cu Lucian Blaga,” in Lucian Blaga, ed. Ghi¸se, Botez, and Botez, 483. 19. That is to say that those issues that are the unique focus of each of the four approaches mentioned are combined in Blaga’s approach, and in addition Blaga’s approach addresses issues of systematicity and the problems unique to a global theory of human experience of the transcendent.

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sophical enterprise. According to Hick, philosophy of religion “studies the concepts and belief systems of the religions as well as the prior phenomena of religious experience and the activities of worship and meditation on which these belief systems rest and out of which they have arisen.”20 Because it is an empirical study, like science and history, philosophy of religion (on Hick’s model) as a field of inquiry is open to religious and nonreligious people alike.21 It is the methodology of philosophy of religion that makes it a philosophical activity rather than a religious one. This empirical approach to philosophy of religion is not the only approach that has been advocated, however. Many, perhaps even most, practitioners of philosophy of religion have favored other approaches. Not few in number have been the advocates of an approach to philosophy of religion that is oriented around issues and utilizes a purely rational methodology. From the great classical philosophers like Plato, to medievals such as Anselm, through early modern philosophers like Spinoza and Hegel, to contemporary philosophers like Antony Flew and Keith Ward, many thinkers have attempted to address the issues of philosophy of religion through logical analysis.22 This approach shares with the more empirical approach the benefit of offering a methodology for the study of religious issues that is available to both believer and unbeliever, offering a philosophy of religion that is a philosophical activity rather than a religious one. It tends to be oriented toward issues rather than toward actual religions. It approaches these issues using logical reasoning in order to analyze them and probe for possible solutions. Kant provides a critique of this type of application of pure reason in his chapter “The Antinomy of Pure Reason” in Critique of Pure Reason. Kant discusses a number of antinomies in order to illustrate that pure reason alone is not a reliable cognitive source. His goal is to undermine the use of pure reason by showing that it leads to antinomies. Blaga observes, however, that antinomies are sometimes legitimate and unavoidable (as, for example, in the case of quantum mechanics).23 Therefore the mere fact that pure reason can lead to antinomies does not prove the inappropriateness of its use. There is an alternative to the empirical and rationalist methodologies that does not boast of being available to both believers and unbelievers and yet is very widely embraced. This is the method of examining religious issues in the light of divine revelation. 20. Hick, Philosophy of Religion, 1. 21. Ibid. 22. See Antony Flew, God and Philosophy (New York: Harcourt & World, 1966), and Keith Ward, Religion and Revelation: A Theology of Revelation in the World’s Religion (Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). 23. See ED and chapter 5 of this book.

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One might ask what distinguishes the revelation-based approach to philosophy of religion from theology. From one perspective, it is a way of doing theology: both attempt to analyze and understand existence, and both make revelation their final authority. But looked at in another way, it is possible to distinguish the two disciplines. The traditions within which they operate are different, philosophy of religion reacting to a long history of its own and theology reacting within another equally long tradition. Also, philosophy of religion has certain traditional issues that it deals with, issues that make it a particular subdivision of philosophy, whereas theology deals with a broader spectrum of issues that are traditional to its history of inquiry. Revelation-based philosophy of religion generally deals with the same issues that rationalist and empiricist philosophy of religion deal with, but rather than turning to experience or rational argumentation to resolve issues, revelation-based philosophers of religion turn to the particular revelation that they embrace. Whether this revelation needs justification, whether it is justified, and how it is justified are questions whose answers vary from one revelation-based philosopher to another. Whether revelation-based philosophy of religion can be differentiated from philosophical theology is a difficult question. If Blaga’s suggestion that the presupposition of the truth of some particular religious tradition (or authority) is appropriate for theology but not for philosophy is accepted, then any revelation-based philosophy of religion that simply presupposes the truth of a revelation would probably be considered philosophical theology rather than philosophy of religion. If, on the other hand, the revelation utilized is not simply presupposed but rather is accepted on the basis of philosophical investigation, after which the revelation is utilized as a source for philosophical solutions, the inquiry would probably qualify as philosophy of religion. Advocates of the revelation-based approach to philosophy of religion date back at least as far as Philo of Alexandria and Tertullian. More recent advocates include Barth and Brunner, and contemporary advocates of this approach can be found in the reformed epistemology movement within analytic philosophy.24 24. See, for example, Karl Barth, The Word of God and the Word of Man, trans. Douglas Horton (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1928), and The Doctrine of the Word of God: Prolegomena to Church Dogmatics, authorized translation by G. T. Thomson (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1936); Emil Brunner, “Philosophy and Theology,” in Problems and Perspectives in the Philosophy of Religion, ed. Mavrodes and Hackett (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1967), 73–79; and Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Nicholas Wolterstorff, Reason within the Bounds of Religion (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1976), and Divine Discourse: Philosophical Reflections on the Claim that God Speaks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

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Blaga’s reservation about the possibility or likelihood of divine revelation (see chapter 7) would prevent him both from utilizing and from condoning the revelation-based approach to philosophy of religion. It seems likely that Blaga would reject any philosophical investigation resulting in the acceptance of a divine revelation as a basis for resolving philosophical problems. While the empirical approach to philosophy of religion does not exclude investigations into those nonempirical issues (such as the arguments for the existence of God or theodical explanations of the existence of evil) that have traditionally played such a big role in philosophy of religion, they do seem to be marginalized within this approach. Such issues can only be analyzed as historical phenomena that occur within particular religious traditions. Nonetheless, those who, like Hick, advocate an empirical philosophy of religion, almost always produce philosophies of religion that analytically discuss such systematic issues to varying degrees. Similarly, those who take a more analytical and issues-oriented tack do not operate strictly within the bounds of abstract reasoning, but rather support their theses with references to actual religious phenomena. Thus, to one degree or another, both methodological schools of thought borrow from each other. Both methods discuss empirical phenomena and rational arguments. What is lacking is a systematic justification of this practice. That is what Blaga provides. The bulk of Blaga’s writings on philosophy of religion consists of empirical investigations of particular religions, as was noted in chapter 7. These investigations are an exercise in what Blaga terms paradisaic cognition (see chapter 5). The purpose of these investigations, beyond the simple usefulness of an empirical examination of religions, is the provision of data from which generalizations and insights can be drawn regarding larger philosophical issues (also as noted in chapter 7). However, Blaga also treats many of the issues addressed in the more rationalist tradition of philosophy of religion: the question of the existence of a Creator, the problem of evil, the nature of human destiny, and similar issues. These he addresses in his metaphysical writings. He addresses them as metaphysical issues rather than religious ones, and often in a way that is more akin to rationalist philosophy than to empiricism (see chapter 4). The empirical data of Blaga’s investigations is used two different ways, and therefore there are two different aspects to the relationship between empiricism and rationalism in Blaga’s philosophy. First, the empirical data serves as the “phanic” material that provokes a crisis of the intellect leading to luciferic cognition. As was explained in the section on Blaga’s epistemology, luciferic cognition is the cognitive method employed when attempting to resolve cognitive problems that surpass empirical investigation. Luciferic cognition proceeds by first acknowledging the problems

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latent in the “phanic” material and then proposing a “theory idea” that facilitates the explanation of these problems. The resolution of the problem under investigation is found by viewing the phanic material in the light of this theory idea (a process that Blaga calls “directed observation”). The functioning of luciferic cognition is explained in more detail in chapter 5 of this book. Second, empirical data is used in validating the proposed resolution of a problem. The methodology employed by Blaga in his metaphysics (where he answers many of the questions of traditional philosophy of religion) involves an approach to theory validation that is similar to that propounded by American pragmatism. Blaga proposes an elaborate metaphysical system containing discussions of a wide array of problems and containing proposed solutions to many philosophical issues. The system is constructed abstractly, with some, but not a great deal of, empirical involvement. The system is not justified foundationally or on the basis of its internal consistency, but rather is justified a posteriori by its fruitfulness and beauty as a system (see chapter 4). The ascertainment of the fruitfulness of the system, however, necessarily entails a great deal of empirical investigation. The insights achieved through Blaga’s empirical investigations in philosophy of religion (as well as those that result from his investigations in other empirical domains, such as science, art, etc.) are used to confirm the hypothesis of his metaphysics. Viewed in this way, it can be seen that the methodology utilized by Blaga in his philosophy of religion is the second part of a hypothetico-deductive investigation. The hypothesis formulated in his metaphysics and frequently supported there with abstract rational arguments are validated in the empirical findings of his philosophy of religion. This approach to investigating and resolving the issues of philosophy of religion, and of substantiating the solutions to these issues, is in keeping with Blaga’s theory of knowledge. According to Blaga’s epistemology, problems of theoretical knowledge first arise when one is confronted with intransigent problems of empirical (paradisaic) investigation. Such problems can only be resolved through luciferic cognition. Luciferic cognition involves positing theoretical constructs that are not directly open to empirical verification. The resultant noetic system is validated pragmatically, based on its fruitfulness, and aesthetically, based on its beauty and similar subjective criteria.25 The end result is a solution to the problem under investigation that is empirically based while transcending 25. Pragmatic justification is discussed in chapters 3 and 5. Aesthetic or subjective justification is discussed in chapters 5 and 6. A system is also evaluated on the basis of its internal consistency, but this provides only a negative criterion of evaluation, as discussed in chapters 4 and 5.

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the limits of empiricism and that is justified without claiming apodictic certainty.

The Scope of Philosophy of Religion: The Definition of Religion The scope of philosophy of religion is determined by two things: the purpose of philosophy and the definition of religion. Blaga’s view on the purpose of philosophy and his definition of religion have been presented in chapter 7. Philosophy of religion has proposed many definitions of religion. In the West, these definitions have typically involved reference to a deity or deities. This reference may be oblique, as in the following definition in a contemporary philosophy of religion text: “Religion is constituted by a set of beliefs, actions, and emotions, both personal and corporate, organized around the concept of an Ultimate Reality.”26 The problem with this type of definition is that it definitionally excludes many phenomena which are usually taken to be religions but that are not theistic. Attempts have been made to define religion in a more inclusive way. Typical of such inclusive definitions is the following, found in a recent text on philosophy of religion: “Religion is one’s way of valuing most comprehensively and intensively.”27 One might question whether this definition doesn’t go too far in secularizing the definition of religion. This impression is reinforced by the apparent reintroduction of elements similar to theism in the text’s explanation of the definition.28 That a religion is necessarily comprehensive or intense seems to be questionable as well. There appear to be many people who hold to their religion in a moderate way and also many people whose understanding of their religion does not comprehensively affect all areas of belief and action. The difficulty in assigning a definition to such disparate phenomena as religion has led at least one contemporary philosopher of religion to take a very different approach to the problem. Hick has proposed that Wittgenstein’s “family resemblance” analogy accurately describes the predicament faced when trying to define religion. According to Hick, “a more realistic view is that the word ‘religion’ does not have a single correct meaning but that the many different phenomena subsumed under it are related in the way that the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein has charac26. Peterson, Reason and Religious Belief, 4. 27. Ferre, Basic Modern Philosophy of Religion, 69. 28. Ibid., 108–9.

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terized as family resemblance . . . whether a movement is religious is not an all-or-nothing matter but a question of degree within a widely spreading network of resemblances and differences.”29 It is tempting to agree with Hick, in light of the extreme diversity of what can be (and has been) labeled “religion.” Hick and others have even included secular ideologies such as Marxism within the broad circle of religion. However, Hick’s approach to the problem of defining religion makes it difficult to assign any precise definition to the term, and therefore makes it difficult to delimit this boundary of philosophy of religion. The dilemma, then, is that it is difficult to define religion in such a way that no phenomenon that should legitimately be included is excluded, while not proposing a definition that is so broad that it includes phenomena that are not actually religions, and that pinpoints those factors that enable the differentiation between the two. Perhaps the definition proposed by Blaga succeeds in escaping between the horns of this dilemma. As stated earlier, Blaga’s definition of religion is, “Religion circumscribes, in any of its variants, the capacity of self-summation or selfsurpassing of the human being in ideal correlation with all existence, but especially in ideal correlation with the ultimate elements or coordinates of existential mystery in general, which man both reveals and/or considers revealed through constructs of a stylistic nature.”30 This definition is proposed after a lengthy empirical examination of the world’s religions, and Blaga finds that it is broad enough to include all of the religions examined. It does not, however, admit phenomena that are generally not considered religions, such as metaphysics and poetry.31 It emphasizes the elements that are unique to religion but common to all religions. Blaga’s definition is subject to the criticism that it humanizes religion, that it makes religion a human product or activity. This could be viewed as a degradation or secularizing of religion, and would probably be viewed as unacceptable by many religious people.32 That religion is viewed as a human creation is in fact consistent with the rest of Blaga’s philosophy, however. In Blaga’s philosophy, the human ability and drive to create are virtues. That religion is a human creation is not viewed by Blaga as degrading to religion: it is viewed first of all as a factual assessment of how things really are, and second, as a desirable and laudable state of affairs. 29. Hick, Philosophy of Religion, 2–3. Rem Edwards discusses the “family resemblance” approach to defining religion and offers several criticisms of his own, in Rem B. Edwards, Reason and Religion: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion (New York: Harcourt Brace Javanovich, 1972), 14 –38. 30. GMR, 470. 31. Ibid., 469. 32. T˘anase, Lucian Blaga: Filosoful poet, poetul filosof, 142.

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Furthermore, a deeper understanding of Blaga’s philosophy leads to the conclusion that, rather than secularizing religion, Blaga’s philosophy makes much human activity religious. According to Blaga, all human creative activities are human attempts at revealing existential mystery. When viewed in this light, it seems as though Blaga’s definition of religion extends the sphere of religion to include all human attempts at revealing “ultimate existential mystery.”33 It can be argued, therefore, that a deeper understanding of Blaga’s definition does not secularize religion at all.

33. This extension of the sphere of religion does not cause Blaga’s definition to fall afoul of the problem of defining religion in terms that are so broad that they include within religion phenomena that are not properly religions. All and only those phenomena that aim at ultimate existential mystery are religions, according to Blaga’s definition.

9 The Problem of Religious Language The Problem and some Proposed Solutions

The problem of using human language to discuss things that supposedly transcend human experience has vexed theologians and philosophers for ages. One way of posing the problem is to observe that in the great majority of cases human language is used in application to ordinary things. The typical uses of most terms and phrases are in application to relatively ordinary objects and occurrences. However, existential mystery (God/Ultimate Reality/the Transcendent or whatever phrase is preferred) is extraordinary. A problem is thought to arise when ordinary terms are utilized in the attempt to discuss the extraordinary: for example, when the ordinary term “good” is used in an attempt to describe the superlative goodness of God. It might seem that it is not possible for ordinary language to apply to an extraordinary reality. However, people DO use ordinary language to talk about the transcendent. How this is possible (if it actually is possible) is the problem of religious language. How can and how does human language apply to the transcendent? How can applying mundane predicates to the Supramundane accurately say things about the Supramundane? Is it possible to avoid anthropomorphism? Is it necessary or desirable to avoid anthropomorphism? If it is not possible to avoid anthropomorphism, does anthropomorphic language succeed in speaking about God? If not, are there other alternatives, or is it more appropriate to remain silent (as advised by the early Wittgenstein)? Does this situation necessitate a linguistic equivalent of agnosticism? Alternatively, is it possible and desirable to give up or moderate the idea of God’s transcendence so that language formed in the mundane world can apply to God? These are some of the questions that have arisen in the history of the discussion of this issue. A variety of answers have been proposed. The fifth-century mystic Pseudo-Dionysius advocated a very high view of God’s transcendence. According to Dionysius, God is inscrutable, completely beyond the rationality of created beings. Human words cannot attain to the inexpressible “Good.” Human language completely falls short 170

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of the glory of God. Therefore in all God-talk it is necessary to be aware that what is being attempted is the transcending of the bounds of human language. This transcending is not possible, and cannot actually succeed. Dionysius does not advocate the cessation of this attempt at transcending language, but rather an increased awareness of the fact that human language does not accurately describe transcendent reality. Transcendent reality is even greater than the most successful human attempts at describing it.1 In his Summa Theologica, Thomas Aquinas suggested that talk about God is “analogical predication”: for example, God is “good” and the cause of goodness in creatures, but we cannot comprehend what goodness fully means when predicated of God. The term “good,” when applied to humans and to God, refers to similar properties, but is not used univocally (not with the exact same meaning). Neither is the term used equivocally (with a different meaning). The term is used analogically: analogies can be used between creaturely goodness and Divine goodness because what is called “goodness” in creatures preexists in God in some higher way.2 An implication of Aquinas’ view is that there is a significant degree of similarity between God and humans. This is in keeping with most Christian theology. However, Christian and non-Christian theology also contains strands that emphasize the radical difference between humanity and the Transcendent. If this difference were to be emphasized rather than the similarity, Aquinas’ theory of analogical predication might not fare as well. Nonetheless, analogies are applied with great flexibility in ordinary language, even in situations where ordinary things differ greatly, so Aquinas’ proposal is not out of the question. It is important to note that analogical predication is not a theory of how knowledge about God is arrived at, but rather about how religious language functions.3 David Hume saw the implication of the mystical insistence that we cannot speak about God. According to Hume, there is little difference between the pious “not able to speak about God,” and the skeptical “God is not able to be spoken about.”4 Recourse to some theory like that of Aquinas is necessary if skepticism about religious speech is to be avoided. Hume is not convinced that such recourse can be successful. According to 1. Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite, The Complete Works, trans. Colm Lubheid (London: SPCK, 1987); Dionysius, “Knowing God,” in Paul Helm, Faith and Reason, 76–78. 2. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 1:1, in Introduction to St. Thomas Aquinas, ed. Anton C. Pegis (New York: Modern Library, 1948), 15–17. 3. A contemporary analytic proposal similar to Aquinas’ is Thomas McPherson, “Assertation and Analogy,” in New Essays on Religious Language, ed. Dallas M. High (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), 198–214. 4. David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, ed. Richard H. Popkin (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1980), 28.

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Hume, God’s attributes must be so different from human attributes that any attempt to apply the same adjectives to both is doomed.5 A descendant of Humean skepticism is the movement in twentiethcentury philosophy called logical positivism. A key component of logical positivism was the “verification principle,” according to which (as formulated by A. J. Ayer) it is necessary in order for a statement to have factual significance that it be possible to say what empirical observations would count decisively for or against its truth.6 The application of this extremely stringent criterion to religious language leads to the conclusion that theological statements are factually insignificant, since statements about nonempirical entities are not verifiable by empirical observation.7 Wittgenstein, in his early stage (the stage of the Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus), was influenced by logical positivism. The Tractatus concludes that “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.”8 This seems to rule out a number of types of discourse, including talk about ultimate reality, since ultimate reality is ineffable. In distinction from many positivists, however, Wittgenstein thought that these things about which nothing can be said are of the greatest importance. Later reformulations of the verification principle along falsificationist lines did not improve the prospects of religious language. Antony Flew, using John Wisdom’s parable of the “Invisible Gardener,” argued that assertoric religious statements are factually vacuous because they cannot be falsified.9 Furthermore, he argues that in their resistance to falsification, religious believers cause their statements to die the “death by a thousand qualifications.”10 Tailcoating on Wisdom’s example, Flew asks how an invisible, eternally elusive gardener could be known to be different from no gardener at all. The original gardener hypothesis was straightforward, reasonable, and easily falsifiable. However, repeated qualification of the hypothesis intended to protect it from falsification reduced it to the point where nothing of the original statement remained. According to Flew, the original statement is so eroded by qualifications that it no longer asserts anything. Flew argues that many religious statements suffer the same fate. 5. Terrence W. Tilley, Talking of God: An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis of Religious Language (New York: Paulist Press, 1978), 7. 6. A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 2nd ed. (New York: Dover Publications, 1946), 5–6, 35. 7. Ibid., 115. 8. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1922), 189. 9. Antony Flew, “Can Theological Statements be Tested Empirically?” in Religious Belief and Philosophical Thought: Readings in the Philosophy of Religion, ed. William P. Alston (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1963), 275–77. 10. Ibid., 276.

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Religious statements cannot be utterly sheltered from the possibility of falsification if they are to remain meaningful. R. M. Hare responded to Flew’s falsificationism with a parable of his own, a story of a paranoid Oxford lunatic who cannot be dissuaded from the belief that the professors are out to get him. Hare argues that although religious language doesn’t reveal anything empirically verifiable/falsifiable, it is still meaningful. According to Hare, religious language reveals a “blik,” a deeply seated worldview that cannot be empirically unseated. All people have such bliks of one sort or another. No empirical evidence counts against a blik: all such evidence can be rationalized. Thus while religious language does not meet the positivist criteria of meaningful, it can be seen to be meaningful nonetheless.11 Basil Mitchell also responded to Flew’s falsification challenge, but in a manner slightly different from Hare. Using a parable of an underground resistance fighter who meets and develops an unshakable faith in a stranger who claims to be a leader of the underground movement, Hare argues that religious statements, like historical interpretations and scientific paradigms, are not conclusively falsifiable. However, he argues, certain empirical facts (e.g., suffering, unanswered prayer) do count against religious statements, and therefore religious statements are factually significant and meaningful.12 John Hick (using yet another parable) suggested another response to positivism: eschatological verification. Hick argues that if religion is true, then religious language will be verified eschatologically, and if it is false, it will be falsified eschatologically. This maneuver does seem to fulfill the requirements of the verificationists/ falsificationists, but it does not provide any means of knowing today whether a statement is true or not. Therefore, if the positivist challenge is accepted, Hick’s move shows that religious language is meaningful, but Hick’s strategy addresses neither the truthfulness nor the efficacy of religious statements.13 Hick has also proposed a nonpositivist explanation of how religious language works. Hick’s account relies on the Kantian distinction between noumena and phenomena. According to Hick, the relationship between 11. R. M. Hare, in “Theological Statements,” 277–79. A possible problem with Hare’s account is that people often change or exchange their bliks, sometimes even in response to empirical evidence. 12. Basil Mitchell, in “Theological Statements,” 279–81. 13. John Hick, Faith and Knowledge, 2nd edition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966), 169–99. That such a reply to positivism is successful may be a hint that there is a problem with the positivist criterion. Today logical positivism has fallen into disrepute, in part because its own criterion is neither verifiable nor falsifiable. The criterion is therefore self-referentially inconsistent. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that there are a variety of nonempirical statements that have factual significance, including statements about numbers, logical concepts, fictional characters, and so on.

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God and our talk about God is like the relationship between noumenal reality and the perceptual phenomena. Human language has developed within the phenomenal realm, and it is to this that language literally applies. Human language cannot apply to a noumenal reality that is not even partly formed by human concepts. Therefore statements about God’s Self exceed the limits of human language. On the other hand, statements about God’s actions can successfully refer to those actions. Therefore these statements are literal (e.g., “God brought Israel out of Egypt” is a literal bringing). Statements about God’s Self or God’s character are analogical, not literal (“God is a person,” “God is good,” “God is loving”)—they exceed the ordinary usage of the language.14 Explanations that utilize Aquinas’ idea of analogy rely on the supposition of similarities between the Creator and creation. A view that does not rely on such a presupposition is that of Paul Tillich. Tillich proposed an explanation of religious language that is further from literalness than is analogy. He argued that religious language is symbolic. A symbol is a sign that points beyond itself to some reality for which it stands, signifying and at the same time participating in the power and meaning of that which it signifies. Tillich states that through this participation, language is able to open the soul to the deepest level of reality—the reality of God, the ground of all being. Since everything participates in this ground, anything can be a symbol, but what is symbolized transcends the symbol. Therefore symbols cannot be empirically verified or falsified. Questions of the truth and falsity of theological statements are a misunderstanding of the function of such statements: they serve as immanent pointers to a transcendent reality.15 Wittgenstein, in his later work, saw that language has more uses than just describing facts. The task of philosophy is the description of the various “language-games” in which humans are involved. We learn the meanings of religious “language-games” by examining (or experiencing) the contexts in which they are used. Religious statements are expressions of commitment to a system of values and function to orient the believer’s life in a way appropriate to her particular religious community. Because religious statements are not statements about facts, they are neither true nor false.16 More recent analytic philosophers have developed similar theories, which as a group are sometimes labeled “functionalism.” Accord14. John Hick, God Has Many Names (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1980), 79–87. 15. Paul Tillich, “The Nature of Religious Language,” in The Christian Scholar 38:3 (September 1955), excerpted in Peterson et al., Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings. One might want to ask whether instead of “truth” and “falsity,” such symbol-statements can be evaluated for “accuracy” or “inaccuracy.” 16. Patrick Sherry, Religion, Truth, and Language-Games (New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1977), 1–20.

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ing to functionalism, religious language is functional rather than cognitive. This enables functionalists to recover the meaningfulness of religious language without the necessity of defending the truthfulness, verifiability, or falsifiability of religious statements.17 Several objections to the functionalist interpretation seem possible. First, the characterization of religious statements as expressions of commitment to a value system, reminiscent of Hare’s theory of “bliks,” seems to reduce all types of religious statements to the single type that functions in a life-orienting way. However, while many religious statements may have this function, it seems that many other religious statements are not limited to this. As Flew pointed out, many religious statements are assertoric; other types of religious statements exist as well. This leads to the second objection: since some religious statements are assertoric, at least some religious statements are potentially true or false. A third objection is that functionalism seems to make religious statements incorrigible, but in fact many people do change their beliefs and their resulting statements as a result of evidence. Therefore, in at least some cases religious statements are not incorrigible. William Alston, a contemporary analytic philosopher, has done a considerable amount of work on the subject of religious language. Alston addresses the question of whether “positive intrinsic predicates” can be applied to God. He argues that the mundane origin of our vocabulary is not incompatible with the later development of technical applications in theology, since this pattern is seen in many fields where common terms are adapted and applied with special significance. In response to the argument that “positive intrinsic predication” requires corporeality, since a thing’s attributes and actions are (usually) known through observing their external behavior, he argues that since there are other ways of apprehending actions and attributes, corporeality is not essential to predication. Therefore the mere fact of incorporeality does not prevent us from applying predicates literally to God. Finally, he grants that if we cannot talk literally about the person of God, we can at least talk literally about God’s manifestations and the manifestations of God’s actions.18 Through these arguments Alston aims to remove the barrier between the ordinary object of language and the extraordinary object of religious language. His arguments might be accused of begging the question, if it can be shown that his arguments rely on a presupposed analogy between ordinary language and religious language. 17. See R. B. Braithwaite, An Empiricist’s View of the Nature of Religious Belief (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955); Paul Van Buren, The Secular Meaning of the Gospel (New York: Macmillian, 1963). 18. William P. Alston, Divine Nature and Human Language (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989).

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Blaganian Contributions to the Discussion This broad array of approaches to the problem of religious language offers useful suggestions about how religious language works and how it is to be valued. It seems obvious that religious language is, in some way, meaningful (as has been argued by Wittgenstein, Hick, Alston, and others). How it is meaningful is a result of our “language-games,” as Wittgenstein pointed out. Wittgenstein does not explain how assertoric statements work, however. Aquinas and Tillich seem to have made useful suggestions in this area. Tillich’s proposal stops short of providing an account of how religious statements can be veridical. Aquinas’ proposal seems in danger of being impaled on the horns of a dilemma resulting from the disparity between humanity and the Transcendent. There are two possible ways of evading the horns of this dilemma: either through ducking the horn of transcendence, or by finding a more suitable stratagem than analogy. The first of these two options can be done two ways: either by raising humanity to a level of comparison with Divinity (as Aquinas himself did, via the Imago Dei), or by lowering God to a more approachable level, as have some process theologians and advocates of the “openness” of God. Blaga’s theory of cosmogenesis through the emission of divine differentials might be thought to provide such a bridge of the gap between humanity and the Transcendent by raising humanity to a level closer to divinity. That is, it might be thought that since humanity is a product of particles emanated from the Divine, humanity reflects the Divine nature. However, according to Blaga, cosmogenesis is carried out in such a way that what is created is intentionally unlike the Creator, and transcendent censorship is preserved and even furthered. The result of the creation strategies employed by the MA is a protective differentiation between the MA and its creation (see chapter 4). Therefore the strategy for resolving the problem of religious language by lessening the gap between God and humanity is not compatible with Blaganian philosophy. The second of the two options, that of finding a more suitable stratagem than analogy, can be accomplished only through finding an alternative explanation that does not rely on a supposed similarity between God and humanity. It is this strategy that Blaga’s philosophy facilitates, as will be seen. In the preceding discussion of the problem(s) of religious language, two main problems or clusters of issues have been discussed: 1. If and how ordinary language can successfully refer to the transcendent; and 2. Can religious language be verified/falsified, and if it cannot, how is it really meaningful? Blaga’s philosophy can make contributions to the understanding of both of these problems. In response to the first problem, it must be pointed out that Blaga viewed this problem as stemming from one that faces all language, not merely

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religious language. To use the terminology of contemporary analytic philosophy, all language is faced with a problem of predication.19 Ordinary language succeeds, perhaps not perfectly, but well enough to make communication possible. If it can be explained how ordinary language overcomes this impasse, it may be easier to see how religious language is possible. Blaga proposes that language can succeed in referring to and attributing characteristics to objects because all language is inherently metaphorical.20 Humanity, forced by its spiritual constitution to express the concrete world through abstraction (which would require an infinite series of statements and qualifications thereof ), creates an organ of direct reference: metaphor. The appearance of metaphor, therefore, is not a chance occurrence. It is a necessity of the human constitution.21 Metaphors are used in situations where it is necessary to be descriptively tentative, but wherein there is nonetheless a desire to make some kind of assertoric statement. Humanity, viewed from the structural and the existential perspectives, is seen to be in a situation twice precarious: on the one hand a person lives in a concrete world that cannot be expressed using the ordinary means available, and on the other hand s/he lives in the horizon of mystery that s/he cannot reveal. Metaphor is a complementary ontological moment that attempts to address both aspects of this situation.22 According to Blaga, there are two types of metaphor: plastic (plasticizante) and revelatory (revelatorii).23 Plastic metaphor attempts to sidestep the limitation of human language in referring to empirical objects. Plastic metaphors do not add to the understanding of the objects to which they refer. They attempt to complete the expression of some empirical fact that the speaker is unable to completely express, by substituting a second term in place of the first, transferring the meaning of the second onto the first and thereby completing the expression. For a plastic metaphor to succeed it is necessary both that there be some similarity between the two 19. That the particular problems of religious language may not in fact be unique to religious language has also been remarked by Basil Mitchell in The Justification of Religious Belief (New York: Seabury Press, 1973), 2. “Religion is too often discussed as if the intellectual difficulties associated with it were entirely peculiar to it; as if, outside the religious sphere, men were faced only with problems to which clear and straightforward solutions could in principle be found, however intractable they might prove in practice. The programme of logical positivism gained much of its appeal from the proposal to mark a sharp distinction between the realm of science and common sense on the one hand and the region of theology and metaphysics on the other, and the temptation still persists.” 20. Blaga uses “metaphor” to describe some nonverbal expression as well, such as sculpture and painting. 21. GMSC, 352. 22. This is almost a translation of what Blaga himself says in GMSC, 365. 23. GMSC, 350. There is also a third kind of metaphor, the mere play on words (GMSC, 358), that can sometimes be abused (GMSC, 363).

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objects of reference and that the second term be malleable (hence the term “plastic”). With this strategy the plastic metaphor is able to express concisely what would otherwise require a very lengthy (or even infinite) explanation, and fills the void that exists between abstract expression and the concrete world. The direct expression of the object does not succeed in expressing the nature of the object. Metaphor compensates for this deficiency, indirectly expressing what direct expression cannot.24 Plastic metaphor is similar to analogy in its requirement of a degree of similarity between the term of the first object and the term of the second object. Because of this, and because plastic metaphor applies only to empirical description, plastic metaphor is not relevant to religious language involving the Transcendent. The origin of revelatory metaphor goes beyond the mere attempt to reconcile concrete object and abstract expression. Revelatory metaphor springs from the specific human mode of existence in the presence of mystery and for the revelation thereof (see chapter 4).25 Revelatory metaphor attempts to reveal a hidden mystery. In contrast to plastic metaphor, which does not add to the understanding of the referent, revelatory metaphor enriches the understanding of the referent through giving expression to aspects of the referent that could otherwise be neither conceptually formulated nor expressed. Revelatory metaphor, like plastic metaphor, utilizes empirical means (“the concrete world, sensible experience, and the imaginary world”),26 but expresses insights that penetrate beyond the limits of direct reference. Revelatory metaphor annuls the ordinary understanding of the objects, substituting a new understanding in its place. Whereas the plastic metaphor stretches the meaning of the second term in order to apply it to the original object, revelatory metaphor suspends the meaning of the first term and substitutes the meaning of the second in its place. Whereas plastic metaphor relies on a degree of similitude between the term used metaphorically and the referent, in revelatory metaphor (especially when occurring in science, philosophy, or theology, even more than in poetry and myth) a dissimilarity between the two is the norm. Blaga gives as an example of revelatory metaphor the explanation of sound as vibration. Sound, as it is experienced, does not resemble vibration at all. By substituting the concept associated with vibration for the usual 24. GMSC, 350–52; Diaconu and Diaconu, s.vv. “Metafora plasticizant˘a s¸i metafora revelatoriu,” and “Metaforic.” On the origin of plastic metaphor Blaga writes, “Plastic metaphors are resorted to from the thirst to restore the congruence between concrete and abstract” (GMSC, 351). 25. For this reason Blaga changes Aristotle’s definition of human as the political animal to human as the metaphorical animal (GMSC, 357). 26. GMSC, 354; [lumea concret˘a, experien¸ta sensibil˘a s¸i lumea imaginar˘a].

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understanding of sound, a new understanding of the nature of sound is achieved.27 Revelatory metaphors, like luciferic cognitions, are impregnated with the imprint of stylistic categories (see chapters 5 and 6).28 Therefore the selection and application of a metaphor is influenced by the cultural matrix of the speaker. Revelatory metaphors, like luciferic cognitions, reflect the culture of the speaker as well as the nature of the object. Assertoric religious language functions similarly to the scientific use of revelatory metaphor. In the example of the understanding of sound as vibration, the referent (sound) is understood in a new way, as vibration, even though sound does not appear to be vibration in the ordinary sense of the term. (Further explanations of how sound is vibration are possible: this further explanation would be what Blaga names a “theoretic accessory” in his epistemology; see chapter 5.) The second term is applied to the referent without complete understanding of how the two are related, and in this way illuminates heretofore hidden aspects of the referent (though without giving complete understanding of the referent). In religious language, ordinary terms like “loving,” “righteous,” and “powerful” are applied to the Transcendent, even though the Transcendent is believed to transcend the ordinary. Just as sound does not appear to be vibration in the ordinary sense of that term, the Transcendent does not seem to be “loving,” “righteous,” and “powerful” in the ordinary sense of these terms.29 These terms are applied to the Transcendent without complete understanding of how the term and the referent are related (which is consistent with transcendent censorship), but they do illuminate heretofore hidden aspects of the Transcendent, just as “vibration” illuminates heretofore hidden aspects of sound. Further explanation of how these terms apply to the Transcendent is not possible, however, in contrast to the case of the vibration explanation of sound. This is because religious language is an example of the zerocognition form of luciferic cognition, while the vibration understanding of sound is an example of plus-cognition (see chapter 5). Subsequent philosophical work on the role of metaphor in language supports Blaga’s insights. Philip Wheelwright’s book Metaphor and Reality reads as if Wheelwright is aware of Blaga’s work, although Blaga is not listed in the bibliography. Among other shared themes, Wheelwright suggests his own versions of transcendent censorship, epistemological modesty, perspectivism, and constructivism. He also preserves a unique and 27. Ibid., 354 –65; Diaconu and Diaconu, s.vv. “Limbaj,” “Metafora plasticizant˘a s¸i metafora revelatorie,” and “Metaforic.” 28. GMSC, 364 –65. 29. God’s love, righteousness, and power are commonly said to transcend the ordinary understandings of these terms.

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valued space for mythic thought.30 Most significantly for this discussion, he devotes an entire chapter to the analysis of metaphor into two types, which he names “epiphore” (taken from Aristotle) and “diaphor.” Epiphor involves the extension of meaning through metaphoric comparison, and corresponds to Blaga’s “plastic” metaphor. Diaphor involves the creation of new meaning by juxtaposition of dissimilar objects or concepts in such a way as to provoke a new synthesis.31 This is remarkably similar to Blaga’s concept of “revelatory” metaphor. Carl G. Vaught’s recent book Metaphor, Analogy, and the Place of Places: Where Religion and Philosophy Meet argues that metaphor may be the key to resolving the difficulties of traditional theories of truth. According to Vaught, the various meanings of “truth” in science and in religion and the various theories about truth (primarily the correspondence, coherence, and pragmatic theories) each focus on a particular aspect of the truth question. Metaphor, according to Vaught, is unique in having the ability to bring all of these aspects together in a single phenomenon. He observes that the classical theories of truth are themselves metaphorical descriptions, and that they become ineffective when their metaphorical nature is forgotten or overlooked. Metaphorical discourse, according to Vaught, avoids this failure by binding together the otherness of the correspondence theory, the intelligible structure of the coherence theory, and the openness of pragmatism that are essential to a comprehensive analysis of truth. He concludes, “The superiority of metaphorical discourse as a mode of access to Truth lies in the fact that it can become a microcosm in which determinacy, indeterminacy, and tension exist together as a unified phenomenon. In this way, all the elements that are necessary for Truth as the idealist and pragmatist understand it are present in a metaphor and are accessible to the cognitive consciousness in a tensional unity.”32 The understanding of the metaphorical functionality of religious language proposed by Blaga bears some resemblance to the proposals of Aquinas and Hick, but with greater regard for the differences between the created world and the Transcendent Creator. It also bears some resemblance to Tillich’s proposal, but opens the door to an explanation of the veridicality of religious assertions. Metaphors point toward something without ever reaching it. However, that an expression is metaphorical does not mean that it is not referential, or that it is not true or false. Tillich’s proposal seems to call into question the validity of the project of assessing the truth of religious assertions. Blaga’s theory, however, facilitates such a 30. Philip Wheelwright, Metaphor and Reality (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962), 20, 173. 31. Ibid., 70–91. 32. Vaught, 170.

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project and even provides the epistemological methodology necessary for its implementation. The revelatory metaphorical statements of luciferic cognition, whether used in science, religion, or some other domain, have a particular justification appropriate to their cognitive structure. As has been previously discussed (in chapters 2 and 5, and in chapter 11 with specific reference to religious cognition), luciferic cognitions are subject to only minimal empirical corroboration. They are also only minimally corroborated on the basis of internal coherence, coherence being in general a necessary but not sufficient criterion of justification (see chapter 3). The main method of corroboration of luciferic cognitions and their accompanying metaphorical statements is pragmatism (see chapters 3, 4, and 11). There is also an aesthetic element to the corroboration of luciferic cognitions (ibid.). Since religious revelatory metaphors involve a referent that supposedly transcends ordinary experience, empirical corroboration is all the more minimized, and the need for pragmatic and aesthetic corroboration is all the more heightened. Assertoric religious metaphors cannot be conclusively justified, only tentatively so. Nor can they be conclusively falsified. They do, nonetheless, succeed in expressing something meaningful about their referent, through a strategy that is utilized not only in religion but also in science, art, and other domains that involve luciferic cognition.33 Furthermore, and regardless of their pragmatic and aesthetic corroboration, assertoric religious metaphors are meaningful as a fulfillment of the human destiny to attempt to reveal the mysteries of existence through cultural creation within the limits of transcendent censorship and stylistic braking (chapter 7).

33. DD, 90–94.

10 The Question of Religious Knowledge A great many of the issues of Anglo-American philosophy of religion involve questions concerning religious knowledge: whether it is possible, what its nature is, what its limits are, and how it is attained. There are books and collections of articles devoted specifically to these issues.1 They typically receive extensive treatment in more general books on philosophy of religion, and they form an important part of many books on other issues in philosophy of religion.2 These issues have a long history and are still of great interest to many scholars. It will be fruitful to apply Blaga’s system to these issues in order to see if he can provide useful insights in this area of philosophy of religion.

Is Religious Knowledge Possible? It may well be the case that the great majority of people assume that religious knowledge of one sort or another is in fact possible. This seems to be indicated by the widespread phenomenon of religious belief. However, 1. For example: John Hick, Faith and Knowledge; H. H. Price, Belief; Louis Jacobs, Faith; James Kellenberger, Religious Discovery, Faith, and Knowledge; C. B. Martin, Religious Belief; Jerry H. Gill, The Possibility of Religious Knowledge; James William McClendon Jr., and James M. Smith, Understanding Religious Convictions; Terence Penelhum, Problems of Religious Knowledge; Thomas Dean, ed., Religious Pluralism and Truth: Essays on Cross-Cultural Philosophy of Religion; Paul Helm, ed., Faith and Reason; Douglas R. Geivett and Brendan Sweetman, eds., Contemporary Perspectives on Religious Epistemology; Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, and David Bassinger, eds., Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings. 2. For instance, in Hick’s Philosophy of Religion there are three chapters dealing with these issues; in Peterson et al., Reason and Religious Belief: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, there are also three chapters on these issues; and in Ferre, Basic Modern Philosophy of Religion, there are six chapters dealing with the issues of religious epistemology. In terms of other issues in philosophy of religion, the issue of religious knowledge forms an important part of Leonard Swidler’s book on interreligious dialogue, After the Absolute, and it is also important to investigations of religious language such as Patrick Sherry’s Religion, Truth, and Language-Games and Ronald E. Santoni’s Religious Language and the Problem of Religious Knowledge.

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among philosophers there is a much larger degree of reservation on this subject. The philosophical case against the possibility of religious knowledge has been building from the early modern period of philosophy up to today. Hume is one of the most important figures in Anglo-American philosophy, and is also one of the most prominent skeptics when it comes to religious knowledge. In books like An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding and Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, he advances a number of skeptical lines of thought.3 He argues that no amount of historical evidence is sufficient to justify belief in an event that supposedly transcends history, and that historical events cannot provide a basis for beliefs about the superhistorical (this is a two-part argument against miracles as a justification for religious belief ); that knowledge about something infinite (such as God) cannot be inferred from observations of finite objects (a criticism of the teleological argument); that it is impossible to know a cause through its effects (a criticism of the cosmological argument); and that it is just as legitimate to deny as it is to affirm the existence of any possible existential entity (a criticism of the ontological argument). The influence of Hume’s skepticism is still felt today, as is witnessed in the works of contemporary skeptical philosophers like Antony Flew.4 Kant was also influenced by Hume, but he developed his own skepticism somewhat differently. Kant’s objection is that all human knowledge must have a phenomenal element; it can never be purely rational. God, however, is entirely beyond the phenomenal world, on Kant’s account. Therefore it is not possible for humans to have knowledge of God.5 An heir to both Humean and Kantian skepticism is the movement known as positivism. This movement, in various forms, has had considerable influence in Anglo-American philosophy. Positivism allows as knowledge only those beliefs that are based squarely on observation. Positivists are not unaware of Kant’s insight into the important role played in cognition by categories of the understanding. Positivism proposes that the categories of the understanding correspond to laws of nature and are acquired through observation of regularities, that they are generalizations based on repeated 3. David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Charles W. Hendel (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1995), and Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion and the Posthumous Essays, ed. Richard H. Popkin (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1980). 4. See Antony Flew, Hume’s Philosophy of Belief: A Study of His First Inquiry (New York: Humanities Press, 1961), God and Philosophy: An Audit of the Case for Christian Theism (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966), and with Gary Habermas, Did Jesus Rise from the Dead? The Resurrection Debate, ed. Terry L. Miethe (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987). 5. Immanual Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1996), 609–16.

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observations of phenomena. Proposed explanations that cannot be reduced to observations and laws of nature, such as those proposed in religion (and often in metaphysics), are not knowledge.6 Numerous other philosophers have defended the possibility of religious knowledge, however. As persuasive as the arguments against the possibility of religious knowledge may seem, subsequent philosophers and theologians have subjected them to critiques that render the answer to the question of the possibility of religious knowledge far from certain.7 This state of affairs, wherein skeptics and defenders of religious knowledge seem to have battled to a stalemate, is what one would expect if one grants Blaga’s metaphysical vision.8 According to Blaga, humanity is created with a need to try to reveal the transcendent, but the success of this effort is ultimately thwarted by the Creator. This situation results in everrenewed efforts at revelation, an eternal process of reaching for the transcendent without ever quite grasping it. Because of this very situation the answer to the question of whether or not ultimate existential mystery can be the object of human knowledge is that some knowledge is possible, depending on how knowledge is defined, but positive-adequate cognition of ultimate mystery is not possible. Nonetheless humanity will strive to increase that form of knowledge that is possible, and furthermore will strive to attain even the forbidden positive-adequate cognition of existential mystery. The possibility and impossibility of the human cognitive situation is ever before us. Blaga’s metaphysical vision may itself be viewed as a kind of religious knowledge, since it is a proposal concerning cosmic and human existence and is certainly itself an attempt at revealing existential mystery. Therefore Blaga’s own system stands as proof (to Blaga, and to all others who accept his philosophy as a success) that religious knowledge is possible. It must be born in mind, however, that Blaga viewed his philosophy as a proposal, not as positive-adequate cognition of reality. Blaga viewed even his own 6. See A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (New York: Dover Publications, 1936), ch. 1, “The Elimination of Metaphysics” and ch. 6, “Critique of Ethics and Theology.” 7. Responses to the arguments of skeptical philosophers can be found in abundance in texts on theology, texts and anthologies on philosophy of religion, and books on apologetics. Examples include Edward John Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1956); Stephen T. Davis, Logic and the Nature of God (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1983); Timothy R. Phillips and Dennis L. Okholm, eds., Christian Apologetics in the Postmodern World (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1995); and Peter van Inwagen, The Possibility of Resurrection and Other Essays in Christian Apologetics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998). 8. “Stalemate” is the term used by Jerry H. Gill to describe this situation, in The Possibility of Religious Knowledge (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1971), part 1, 13–90.

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system as being subject to the limits of transcendent censorship and transcendent braking.

“Justified True Belief ” and the Nature of Religious Knowledge Whether or not religious knowledge is realizable depends in some measure on how religious knowledge is defined. A. J. Ayer, a leading figure in logical positivism, asserted that “It is now generally admitted, at any rate by philosophers, that the existence of a being having the attributes which define the god of any non-animistic religion cannot be demonstratively proved.”9 Whether this assertion, if granted, rules out the possibility of religious knowledge depends on how the two terms “religion” and “knowledge” are defined, or in other words, on how one construes the nature of religious knowledge. As discussed earlier, Blaga defines religion as “the capacity of selfsummation or self-surpassing of the human being in ideal correlation with all existence, but especially in ideal correlation with the ultimate elements or co-ordinates of existential mystery in general, which man both reveals and/or considers revealed through constructs of a stylistic nature.”10 According to this definition, religion involves cognition of or an attempt at cognition of ultimate existential mystery. This could be construed as corresponding to knowledge of God. Therefore Ayer’s statement concerning religious knowledge could apply to religious knowledge as religion is defined by Blaga. In the Anglo-American philosophical tradition, the “standard analysis” of the term “knowledge” is “justified true belief,” often referred to as JTB.11 According to this analysis, one has propositional knowledge if one: 1. believes that a; 2. is justified in believing that a; and, 3. a is true. A number of criticisms of the standard analysis have been raised, and a variety of responses to these criticisms have been made.12 Of noteworthy significance is the fact that the standard analysis does not require apodictic certainty for a belief to qualify as knowledge. It requires that the belief be true, but not that the one holding it be infallibly certain that it is true. It does 9. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 114. Ayer seems to be asserting that the existence of God cannot be proved deductively; however, he seems to believe that some other existential statements can be proved deductively. 10. GMR, 470. 11. See Paul K. Moser, “tripartite definition of knowledge,” in A Companion to Epistemology, ed. Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998), 509. 12. Most notably that which has come to be known as the Gettier problem; see Paul K. Moser, “Gettier Problem,” in A Companion to Epistemology, 157–59.

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require that the person holding the belief be justified in holding that belief, and the nature and method of this justification is a much-discussed issue. This introduces two important definitional distinctions. The first involves the difference between a belief and knowledge. The standard analysis of the term “belief ” is that a belief is a cognitive content accompanied by an affirmative attitude toward that content.13 In contrast to the JTB understanding of knowledge, a belief may be unjustified and may be false, whereas a belief that qualifies as knowledge must be both justified and true.14 The second distinction is that between two senses of the word “certainty.” Ordinary certainty is what might be called “psychological certainty”: a feeling of certainty about some belief, which feeling may or may not be justified and which may or may not coincide with the truth of the belief. It is possible and not at all uncommon for one to have this type of feeling of certainty and still be wrong about the belief. Apodictic certainty, on the other hand, is certainty beyond the possibility of being mistaken. If one is apodictically certain of some belief, then it is not possible for that belief to be false. The classic example of this comes from Descartes cogito, ergo sum: Descartes thought that his belief in his own existence was apodictically certain. If the JTB definition of knowledge is adopted, and if one sets the standard of justification at the level of apodictic certainty, then it may be the case that religious knowledge is not possible.15 This may be what Ayer was intending to suggest. However, many postfoundationalist philosophers would object that apodictic certainty is too high a standard of justification, not only in the realm of religious belief, but also in the realm of belief in general. Very few if any beliefs are candidates for apodictic certainty—even Descartes’ cogito, ergo sum has been questioned.16 If it is the case that no beliefs would qualify as knowledge when apodictic certainty is made the criterion of justification, then either there can be no knowledge, the definition of knowledge must be changed, or the standard of justification must be changed. In regards to the first of these options, that knowledge exists seems more likely to be true than not: otherwise one would have to say that people universally misuse the term “knowledge,” thinking that it has some referent when it actually does not. 13. John Heil, “belief,” in Moser, A Companion to Epsitemology, 45– 48. 14. This distinction between belief and knowledge is discussed in more detail in H. H. Price, Belief (New York: Humanities Press, 1969), 72–91, and in specifically religious contexts in James Kellenberger, Religious Discovery, Faith, and Knowledge (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1972), 69–83. 15. The line of reasoning pursued here is expanded in Terence Penelhum, Problems of Religious Knowledge (New York: Herder and Herder, 1971), 41–65. 16. See Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Difficulties in Finding Enough Propositions to Belong to the Foundation,” in Reason within the Bounds of Religion (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1976), 42–51.

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Regarding the second option, the JTB analysis of knowledge seems to be the best working definition proposed to date, despite its possible deficiencies, and therefore should be retained. Therefore the third option, the revision of the standard of justification, seems to be the best choice. Numerous proposals regarding how beliefs are justified have been made. Foundationalism is the classical approach, illustrated most famously in the work of Descartes, and elaborated systematically by Robert Chisholm.17 Classical foundationalism aimed at apodictic certainty, but the problem of the justification of the initial foundational beliefs has resisted resolution. Therefore other recent versions have abandoned this high goal and have proposed a variety of theories of justification that incorporate elements of classical foundationalism while also including elements from other theories of justification.18 Alternative proposals for the justification of beliefs include coherentist, pragmatic, psychological, and perspectivist theories, to name a few.19 Each of these candidates has proponents and critics, and each has strengths and weaknesses. 17. See Roderick M. Chisholm, The Foundations of Knowing (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), Theory of Knowledge, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall, 1989). 18. As, for instance, Susan Haack’s “foundherentism”: beliefs are justified within a system, but some beliefs within that system are intrinsically more justified than others. See Timm Triplett, “Recent Work on Foundationalism,” American Philosophical Quarterly 27, no. 2 (April 1990): 107–8. 19. For coherentist theories, see See Keith Lehrer and Stewart Cohen, “Justification, Truth, and Coherence,” in Paul K. Moser and Arnold vander Nat, Human Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Approaches (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), and Keith Lehrer, Theory of Knowledge (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990). For pragmatic theories, see William James, The Works of William James: The Will To Believe, ed. Frederick Burkhardt (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979); also Joseph Margolis, Historied Thought, Constructed World (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995), especially the chapter “Epistemic Competence,” 82–100 (but see also 109–10). For psychological theories, see W. V. Quine, “Epistemology Naturalized,” in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), 69–90. For perspectivist theories, see Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1974), 121–22, and Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), 315–56. For a general discussion of the views, see Timo Airaksinen, “On Nonfoundationalistic Theories of Epistemic Justification,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 19 (1981): 403–12. Perspectivist theories of justification argue that there can be no completely objective justification of beliefs: beliefs and their justifications are both subjective, and therefore always represent particular perspectives. This is why Nietzsche described knowledge as historically conditioned interpretation. It does seem that if apodictic certainty is impossible, then subjectivity seems unavoidable. Perspectivism seems to make the relationship between beliefs and truth very uncertain, but this may accurately reflect the actual state of affairs. This does not rule out the possibility of evaluating the likeliness of particular beliefs.

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In addition to the definition of “belief ” and the method and/or criterion of “justification,” something should be said about the component “true” in the standard analysis of knowledge. The traditional analysis of “truth” in the Western philosophical tradition has revolved around a supposed relationship of correspondence between a proposition or belief and that to which it refers. Correspondence is sometimes taken to be a criterion by which beliefs or propositions can be evaluated; at other times it is proposed as a description of the ideal abstract nature of truth. The correspondence theory of truth has been criticized and defended, and although it is sometimes referred to as “the discredited correspondence theory of truth,” it is still widely in use.20 Blaga does not specifically discuss the JTB analysis of knowledge in his writings. He does discuss justification, truth, and belief. As discussed in chapter 5, Blaga’s own practice and his discussion of the issue suggest that he accepts correspondence as a description of truth but not as a criterion for judging truth-claims. However, this acceptance would seem to prevent certain types of religious propositions or beliefs from being described as “true” according to Blaga’s metaphysics: any propositions concerning ultimate reality would be censored by the MA, and would not be able to arrive at the status of true (see chapter 4). Blaga would probably allow that such propositions could contain partial truths, although they are prevented from completely grasping the truth (see chapter 5). This will be discussed further at a later point in this chapter. Concerning the justification of propositions, Blaga clearly advocates a pragmatist and esthetical approach, as was discussed in chapter 5 and elsewhere. Because of this, and because of the limits of transcendent censorship and stylistic braking, Blaga views justification as provisional. Broadly speaking, these points are no less true of religious propositions than they are of any other type of proposition. Because the question of the justification of specifically religious truth-claims is a very large and complex issue, it will be given a chapter of its own (chapter 11). That religious beliefs exist goes without saying. As explained earlier, beliefs can be wrong and still qualify as beliefs. The question being addressed here is whether a religious belief can qualify as “knowledge.” If (for lack of a better definition) the JTB analysis of knowledge is granted as a tentative working definition, then any belief that claims to also be knowledge would have to be both justified and true. According to Blaga’s view of justification, such a candidate would need to be justified pragmatically and/or aesthetically. Many have argued that religious beliefs are so justi20. Richard Rorty, Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), i. Regarding the widespread continued use of correspondence, see Richard L. Kirkham, Theories of Truth: A Critical Introduction (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), 119–40.

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fied, and others have argued that they are not.21 Blaga seems to side with those who believe that they are. Pragmatic and aesthetic justification cannot provide apodictic certainty about the truthfulness of any belief. This is consistent with Blaga’s metaphysics and epistemology: according to Blaga’s metaphysics, apodictic certainty is not possible because of the dis-analogy between Creator and creation (see chapter 4) and because of the limits that the MA imposes upon human cognition in order to protect creation. According to Blaga’s epistemology, neither of the two modes of human cognition, paradisaic and luciferic, are able to completely grasp their objects. Thus according to Blaga’s view of justification, Blaga’s metaphysics, and Blaga’s epistemology, religious beliefs cannot be apodictically certain. This situation might be thought to rule out the possibility of religious beliefs qualifying as knowledge in the JTB sense, since no religious believer can have apodictic certainty about the truth of his/her belief. It does not, however, rule out the possibility that the belief will correspond to reality, but rather only rules out the possibility of the believer knowing apodictically that the belief corresponds to reality. A belief might be true (in the correspondence sense) even when no one is in a position to know for certain that it is true. Such a belief might also happen to be justified: the coincidence might occur that one and the same religious belief is both justified and true. This would be a “justified true belief,” and on the JTB analysis would qualify as knowledge. It appears that Blaga’s ideas of belief, knowledge, justification, and truth all allow for the possibility of religious knowledge (construed along the lines of JTB). However, the Blaganian limits on human cognition of truth mentioned several paragraphs earlier entail that there will be limits on religious knowledge, which will now be discussed.

The Limits of Religious Knowledge Ordinary cognition relies in large part on the senses and the faculty of reason. The senses are suited to providing the raw data for cognitions that regard the observable world. Together with the empirical data provided by the senses, the faculty of reason can provide cognitions of empirical en21. The classic example of a pragmatic defense of religion is William James; see Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking (New York: Longmans, Green, 1907), 33, 145; The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy and Human Immortality (New York: Dover Publications, 1956), 13; The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature (New York: Collier Books, 1961), 57, 297, 396– 402. A more recent discussion is Pragmatism, Neo-Pragmatism, and Religion: Conversations with Richard Rorty, ed. Charley D. Hardwick and Donald A. Crosby (New York: Peter Lang, 1997), see especially 64, 212.

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tities that cannot themselves be observed. But religion is often supposed to involve entities of a nonempirical nature. How are these to be cognized? The faculty of pure reason has sometimes been utilized in the attempt to cognize nonempirical cognitive objects. As has been previously discussed, this approach has been criticized by Kant and others, and also has its defenders. This type of cognition, if valid, does not usually pretend to surpass the bounds of ordinary human cognitive ability.22 It is not unusual for religious believers to claim to have access to modes of cognition or types of knowledge that are not available to nonreligious people. The Gnostic religions of the first millennium were based on this premise, as are many mystical religions. The claim is sometimes made that this religious knowledge surpasses the bounds of ordinary human cognition, grasping ultimate realities or truths. Another claimed source of religious knowledge that is often supposed to surpass the limits of ordinary cognition is divine revelation. Many religions are based, at least in part, on claimed revelations. These are declared to be the source of knowledge of a variety of truths, some of which are believed to surpass ordinary human cognition. Conversely, it is sometimes claimed (by some mystics and other religious people) that God or other religious truths so far surpass human nature that it is impossible for them to be objects of human cognition. Blaga himself suggests something to this effect, though in a nonreligious context, when discussing the dis-analogy between the created world and its source (see chapter 4). In Blaga’s view this limit does not preclude all cognition of the transcendent, but does preclude positive-adequate cognition of the transcendent.23 The limitation of human cognition of the transcendent is chiefly implemented through two means: transcendent censorship and stylistic braking.24 Transcendent censorship limits the cognitive potential of paradisaic cognition. The effect of transcendent censorship, discussed in chapter 4, is that all paradisaic cognition operates through the cognitive categories. Thus all that is cognized paradisaically bears the imprint of these categories. Paradisaic cognition operates through the application of the categories of understanding to the material provided by concrete cognition in order to bring about the quantitative or numerical reduction of the myster22. See Peterson, et al., Reason and Religious Belief, 32– 44. 23. Similarly, Hick writes that “we must not rule out a priori that one might be able to be aware of the presence of God, to identify an act of God, and to recognize God’s rule, without being able fully to define or comprehend the divine nature.” Hick, Faith and Knowledge, 198. 24. Stylistic braking can be viewed as transcendent censorship applied to luciferic cognition, rather than viewing transcendent censorship and stylistic breaking as two completely separate phenomena.

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ies of existence (as stated in chapter 5). Therefore paradisaic cognition incorporates the limited access to objects of cognition contained in concrete cognition. Since paradisiac cognition is dependent on concrete cognition, it is at most able to apprehend the actions, results, or influences of the transcendent. It cannot directly have the transcendent as its object. Furthermore, it can only apprehend the actions, results, or influences in such a way that the apprehension of them bears the imprint of the cognitive categories. Stylistic braking (discussed in chapter 6) applies to luciferic cognition, limiting its cognitive potential in a way similar to how transcendent censorship limits paradisaic cognition. As was discussed in chapter 5, luciferic cognition is theoretical cognition, cognition that probes deeper than the empirical data, seeking understanding of the unseen aspects of existential mystery. It is a constructivist enterprise that takes place in every area of theoretical research: science, history, philosophy, religion, and so on. The effect of stylistic braking on luciferic cognition is that all luciferic cognition operates through the stylistic/abyssal categories. Thus all that is cognized luciferically bears the imprint of these categories. Luciferic cognition is dependent on paradisaic cognition for its starting point, the empirical, conceptual, or imaginary data that Blaga calls “phanic material,” and is therefore also subject to transcendent censorship (through its use of paradisaic cognition). Luciferic cognition proceeds via “directed observation,” a process in which the cognitive object is approached from the perspective of a chosen “theory idea.” The conciliation of the cognitive object and the theory idea is brought about by means of a “theoretic construction” (see chapter 5). Both the choosing of the theory idea and the creation of the theoretic construction are subject to cultural influences. Therefore luciferic cognition is not a route to unmediated or positive-absolute cognition of the transcendent. The distortion of cognition that occurs through the introduction of cultural elements in the theory idea and the theoretic construction affects luciferic cognition no more and no less than paradisaic cognition is distorted by the cognitive categories with which it functions: both are shaped by the necessary components of their processes, without being prevented from accomplishing their roles. If these are the only two modes of cognition open to humanity, as Blaga argues, then all human cognition, religious and otherwise, is subject to distortion. This does not entail that all human cognition is useless. Both paradisaic and luciferic cognition are capable of performing their respective tasks: both are able to cognize objects in their respective ways. Neither, however, is able to attain to the status of positive-adequate cognition (to use Blaga’s terminology) or apodictically certain knowledge of the truth (to use contemporary Anglo-American terminology). Several contemporary Anglo-American philosophers of religion have

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written about the deabsolutizing of religious belief and the important consequences that this has.25 It has been argued that deabsolutizing religious belief is in keeping with the core tenets of many major religions and leads to greater interreligious tolerance. Blaga’s epistemology clearly leads to such a deabsolutizing of religious beliefs. This should not be mistaken for a deabsolutizing of religion or of the transcendent. It is in fact a deabsolutizing and humbling of humanity and human cognition. The limits of religious knowledge, then, are transcendent censorship and stylistic braking, which apply to the two primary methods of religious knowledge: paradisaic and luciferic cognition. What these methods are capable of and how they are applied to religion will now be examined.

The Methods of Religious Knowledge Theological works frequently discuss two sources of religious knowledge: natural cognition and supernatural revelation. A variety of forms of the latter have been argued for, including innate knowledge, inscripturation, visions/dreams/apparitions, and mystical experience. Excerpts from classical and contemporary texts discussing these forms of supernatural cognition can be found in Paul Helm, Faith and Reason. Blaga also discusses these forms of cognition. Blaga discusses innate knowledge in his works on epistemology. According to Blaga’s discussion, such “knowledge” exists and functions only at a subconscious level, and is therefore entirely distinct from understanding cognition. This kind of knowledge is not the type of knowledge discussed in philosophy of religion, but rather is at most akin to what are often called “instincts.” Blaga also discusses religious scriptures as a possible source of religious knowledge. As was explained in chapter 7, Blaga’s doctrine of transcendent censorship precludes the possibility of any scripture containing positive-absolute knowledge of ultimate existential mystery. This does not entail the conclusion that no scripture is divinely revealed, but Blaga himself viewed the idea of divine revelation as at odds with the program of the MA, whereby creation is protected and continued through thwarting all possibility of positive-absolute cognition. As Blaga put it, “Since, after our conception, all the care of the Great Anonymous is exactly that of impeding the human being (through transcendent censorship and through the transcendent brakes) from translating for itself the mysteries of existence in positive-adequate terms, we don’t really see what role a revelation, whose initiative must be taken by the same Great Anonymous, could possibly have.”26 Furthermore, Blaga’s analysis of various claimed re25. See especially Leonard Swidler, After the Absolute: The Dialogical Future of Religious Reflection (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1990). 26. GMR, 479–80 (footnote).

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vealed scriptures showed that all contain elements of the culture in which they were recorded. While this does not preclude the possibility of Divine involvement in the revelation process (indeed, contemporary theologies typically argue that God’s self-revelations to humanity must necessarily be cultural in order to be received and understood),27 it does indicate that the revelations in question are not purely divine, but rather contain at least some human contribution. Similar arguments weigh in against visions/dreams/apparitions and against mysticism. First, no vision or experience can trespass the limit of transcendent censorship. Therefore, if authentic revelations of this type do exist, they cannot attain to positive-adequate cognition. Second, both evidence the influence of human culture and therefore cannot possibly be entirely divine products.28 As was mentioned in chapter 7, Blaga views mysticism as the most likely source of culture-free religious knowledge. After an empirical analysis of a variety of mystical accounts, however, Blaga concludes that mystical experiences also involve culture, and are therefore at least in part culturally mediated human creations.29 Neither inscripturation, visions/dreams/apparitions, nor mystical experience are ruled out as possible sources of religious knowledge on Blaga’s account, but some doubt is cast upon all, and all are evaluated as unable to provide positive-adequate religious cognition. Thus while supernatural revelation is not entirely ruled out as a possible source of religious knowledge, Blaga’s philosophy attenuates the importance of this traditionally very significant source. On the other hand, Blaga’s philosophy elevates the significance of natural cognition. It does this by expanding the possibilities of natural cognition beyond its traditional boundaries. According to Blaga’s epistemology, there are two types of understanding cognition available to human inquiry: paradisaic and luciferic. Both of these are forms of what is referred to in the preceding paragraphs as “natural cognition” because they do not involve divine revelation. The basic form of paradisaic cognition and of luciferic cognition is explained in chapter 5. 27. See, for instance, William J. Larkin Jr., Culture and Biblical Hermeneutics: Interpreting and Applying the Authoritative Word in a Relativistic Age (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1988). 28. Perhaps it could be argued that God creates these revelations and includes in them their cultural elements. In this case they would evidence human culture and would still be entirely divine products. This move, however, gains little, since such a revelation would, because of the presence of the elements that give it the appearance of human culture, be subject to stylistic braking, and therefore could not be positive-adequate cognition. 29. Philosophers and philosophical theologians in the Anglo-American tradition have also discussed the important place of culture in religion. See Richard Kroner, Culture and Faith (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), and some of the contributions to the large collection of essays Religion and Culture: Essays in Honor of Paul Tillich, ed. Walter Leibrecht (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959).

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Paradisaic cognition is the most common type of “understanding cognition,” and represents what is often taken to be the normal approach to knowledge acquisition. Its goal is the quantitative or numerical reduction of the mysteries of existence by adding new facts to human knowledge. Although paradisaic cognition does add to a person’s body of knowledge, it does not eliminate mystery. It operates through the application of the cognitive categories to the material provided by concrete cognition, and therefore it incorporates the limited access to objects of cognition contained in concrete cognition. It views the objects of cognition as “given,” as passive in the cognitive process, being given to the subject through intuition, abstraction, or imagination. It is evident that paradisaic cognition cannot provide knowledge of the transcendent, since it is by definition involved with the immanent. Paradisaic cognition can be of some use to religion, however. Paradisaic cognition is the type of cognition used in much anthropological research of religion. It is used in the compilation of data about religious beliefs and practices, and the effects of religious belief upon the believer. It is also used in collecting evidence about claimed supernatural occurrences. Furthermore, paradisaic cognition is the essential first step of luciferic cognition. Luciferic cognition offers a deeper mode of religious cognition. It is able to probe problems and offer solutions that go beyond the limits of paradisaic cognition. Luciferic cognition is a method of deepening the understanding of phenomena of paradisaic cognition that involve antinomies. It attempts to resolve paradoxes of these antinomies.30 The paradisaic object is viewed as a sign of the mystery that is the actual object. When the latent mystery of the object is discovered, luciferic cognition attempts to lesson the unknown elements of the mystery (“attenuation of the mystery”) by adopting a guiding theory idea that facilitates the proposal of a theoretical construction explaining the mystery. Sometimes this yields the unexpected result of an impenetrable mystery (“permanentization of the mystery”). More rarely, it heightens the mystery (“intensification of the mystery”). Most often it provides a solution to the mystery that not only explains the present problem but also leads to new areas of theoretical research. In ED, one of Blaga’s earliest works, he tries to show that there exists a mode of cognition that is used in theology and science but usually overlooked in philosophy.31 This mode is luciferic cognition. Although ED is 30. Much has been written about the role of paradox in human cognition. One contribution by a philosopher in the Anglo-American tradition that supports the beneficiality of paradox is John Wisdom, Paradox and Discovery (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), especially 114 –38. 31. Ronald W. Hepburn has a discussion of paradox in theology and science that is similar to Blaga’s but much more brief. Hepburn, Christianity and Paradox: Critical Studies in Twentieth-Century Theology (London: Watts, 1958), 16–23.

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not intended to be a book on religious epistemology, Blaga discusses examples of actual religious epistemology in order to make his case for the utilization of luciferic cognition in philosophy. He demonstrates that luciferic cognition can be fruitfully employed as a means of gaining religious knowledge. He uses theological reflection as an example of how human cognition can reach beyond the given and explore issues that transcend the limits of empirical cognition and even the limits of human logic. In CL he argues that the theological understanding of miracles is a good example of the minus-cognition form of luciferic cognition (and also of transcending the laws of nature).32 Blaga shows that theology employs an epistemological method that is in some ways similar to the theoretical constructs employed in theoretical science. Both are creative and interpretative human enterprises. Theological cognitions are cultural constructs, as are all other human cognitions. They qualify as knowledge in the same way as scientific constructs and other constructive forms of human cognition do. Theology is essentially involved with the attempt to apprehend the transcendent. The very nature of the theological project necessitates that it be a creative enterprise, since only through the employment of interpretative constructs can understanding of that which transcends experience be achieved. This is exactly what luciferic cognition is. Therefore all theology is luciferic cognition. There are, then, two modes for the acquisition of religious knowledge. There are likewise two somewhat different approaches to the justification of religious beliefs. The justification of the results of paradisaic cognition and of the results of luciferic cognition each requires its own methodology. This will be discussed in the following chapter.

32. CL, 400– 401. Minus-cognition, discussed in chapter 5, is the type of luciferic cognition that results in an intensification of cognitive mystery. Blaga also writes that the Christian doctrine of the two natures of Christ is an abuse of minus-cognition. CL, 399– 400.

11 The Justification of Religious Belief(s) A very controversial issue in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy is the issue of the means of justification of belief(s). Blaga has his own views on this issue, as has already been seen. A comparison of Blaga’s views with the proposals of contemporary philosophy may prove interesting. The epistemological question of justification has received much attention in the Anglo-American philosophical tradition. Much of this attention has been directed at the question of how particular beliefs are/can be/ should be justified. A perhaps related but somewhat separate issue involves the justification of religious belief itself. The justification of religion as a human activity, and the justification of particular religious beliefs, will here be treated as two different issues. Justification of Religious Beliefs A number of important theories of belief justification have been proposed in analytic philosophy. Philosophers working in the field of philosophy of religion have applied most of these theories to religious beliefs. It will be useful to review these epistemological proposals and the corresponding religious applications before turning to a discussion of what contributions Blaga’s philosophy can make in this field. Foundationalism Foundationalism is the classic theory of justification, found in Aristotle, Descartes, and many other leading philosophers.1 The thesis of foundationalism can be summarized as “any justified proposition is either basic or appropriately related to a proposition that is basic.”2 A basic proposition is one that is indubitable to the person holding it. From a small set of basic 1. See Moser and vander Nat, Human Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Approaches, 26. 2. Timm Triplett, “Recent Work on Foundationalism,” 96.

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propositions other propositions can be deduced. The latter derive their justification from their relation to the former. Descartes used foundationalism as a strategy to achieve apodictic certainty for a wide variety of beliefs. His most basic proposition was the famous cogito, ergo sum.3 Many have attacked the status of this as a properly basic proposition, but some have risen to its defense. The main problem for Descartes, as well as subsequent foundationalists, is that very little can be deduced or inferred from such propositions as the “cogito.” Roderick Chisholm, the leading contemporary proponent of foundationalism, was very aware of this problem, and successive revisions have brought his epistemology closer and closer to coherentism.4 Recent “modest” versions of foundationalism succeed (if they succeed at all) only by exchanging “apodictic certainty” for “warranted assertability.”5 This is a change that Descartes would certainly reject, as apodictic certainty was the raison d’ˆetre of Cartesian foundationalism. Others who are more inclined to settle for probability in place of certainty might not see this as a problem.6 Foundationalism has played a prominent role among strategies of justification in the Western philosophical tradition. Therefore it is no surprise that many attempts to justify religious beliefs have assumed the form of foundationalist arguments. The same challenges that face foundationalism face any foundationalist defense of religious beliefs: the limited number of foundational premises (if any), the inability to deduce or infer other meaningful beliefs from these premises, and the shift toward probability rather than certainty.7 Some recent philosophers of religion, notably those in the movement known as “reformed epistemology,” have proposed that for some people the proposition “God exists” is one of the basic propositions of their noetic 3. “The statement ‘I am, I exist’ is necessarily true every time it is uttered by me or conceived in my mind,” Ren´e Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. Donald A. Cress (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1983), 17. 4. See Chisholm, The Foundations of Knowing, 13, 24, 26. 5. See, for example, Mark Pastin, “Modest Foundationalism and Self-Warrant,” in Essays on Knowledge and Justification, ed. George S. Pappas and Marshall Swain (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), 279–88. 6. Such as Joseph Butler, The Analogy of Religion (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1961); and more recently, Mitchell, The Justification of Religious Belief, 39–58; and William J. Abraham, “Soft Rationalism,” in Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings, ed. Michael Peterson et al., 84 –94. 7. The shift from apodictic certainty to probability is a problem for religious beliefs because of the tendency among religions to view their tenets as certain. This problem might possibly be resolved through a greater awareness of the distinction between psychological certainty and apodictic certainty: it is possible and perhaps appropriate for a person to feel certain about his/her religious beliefs, even if it is not possible for her/him to be apodictically certain about them.

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structure. This has the benefit of justifying both belief in God and also a variety of other propositions that can be deduced from “God exists” (along with other basic propositions).8 There are problems with reformed epistemology. Basing a theory on the foundationalism of Chisholm, which has been thoroughly criticized, opens the theory to the same criticisms. Chisholm’s theory of justification has gotten so far from showing that beliefs are apodictically certain that it no longer appears to show that beliefs are even justified. The reformed epistemology adaptation does not attempt to show that religious beliefs are true, merely that they are reasonable, whereas most religions clearly claim to be true. Therefore reformed epistemology is not up to the task of justifying the beliefs of most of the world’s religions, or alternatively, most of the world’s religions need to be seriously reformulated in order for their beliefs to be justified. Of course, some reformed epistemologists (and some other types of religious people) may not be interested in proving that religious beliefs are true, deeming such proof to be the providence of God; but to many critical thinkers, such proof seems necessary in order to take religious claims seriously. Finally, it seems that most people who believe in the existence of God do so on the basis of some sort of evidence, whether that evidence be societal, rational, testimony, or whatever. Even those who believe in God “basically,” upon reflection, may find that there are explanations for why they do so. These explanations (and the reasons that they include) can be evaluated. Therefore even basic beliefs can be evaluated as to whether or not they are justified: they are not justified simply because they are basic. It seems possible that a belief can be both basic and mistaken. Reformed epistemology (and some other versions of foundationalism) provides no means for evaluating the truth of beliefs that are basic in one’s noetic structure.9 Coherentism Coherentism is the leading alternative to foundationalism. Coherentism is the thesis that a belief is justified on the basis of its consistency (coherence) within a system of beliefs.10 Unlike foundationalism, coherentism is able to provide justification for the majority of human beliefs. Furthermore, it seems in agreement with ordinary epistemic experience/practice. 8. See Alvin Plantinga, “Reason and Belief in God,” in Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God, ed. Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), 16–93; and Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Can Belief in God Be Rational If It Has No Foundation?” in Faith and Rationality, ed. Plantinga and Wolterstorff, 135–86. 9. Louis P. Pojman mentions this and other problems in Religious Belief and the Will (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986), 136–37. 10. Keith Lehrer, “Coherentism,” in A Companion to Epistemology, ed. Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1992), 67.

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A major problem with coherentism is that it does not seem humanly possible to determine if a system is completely consistent. Because of this, the standard of coherence is reduced to “seems to be consistent.” Therefore coherentism is not unable to provide apodictic certainty.11 It might even be possible to construct a multiplicity of seemingly internally consistent belief systems. Coherentism does not provide a means of choosing between such rival internally consistent belief systems. Furthermore, it has been suggested that a system could be internally consistent while being constructed entirely of false propositions.12 Also, coherentism does not explain the phenomenon that some beliefs actually do seem to enjoy a special status within a belief system.13 A number of philosophical theologians have advocated an approach to the justification of religious beliefs based on a coherentist model of justification. The method of Christian apologetics known as “presuppositionalism” is one such approach. The term “presuppositionalism” is used to signify a variety of approaches to apologetics. Here it is used to signify that method of justification that posits theistic belief as a heuristic principle and then tests the resulting noetic structure for internal consistency. Presuppositionalists propose that only by positing the existence of a Supreme Being can a consistent system of beliefs account for all reality.14 The problems with presuppositionalism parallel the problems of coherentism. First, although internal consistency is certainly desirable, it seems insufficient as a test of truth, since it seems possible that a belief system could be both internally consistent and false at the same time. Second, a belief can be knowledge without fitting consistently into a person’s overall belief system, in the case where there are other problems within that belief system. Finally, the task of achieving a perfectly consistent system, or of perfectly evaluating the consistency of any system, is certainly very daunting, a task that is probably beyond human ability. Evidentialism Evidentialism is the theory that beliefs are justified by the quality and/or quantity of evidence that supports them.15 Hume spoke like an evidentialist when he said, “A wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to the 11. Roderick Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall, 1989), 62. To this it could be responded that apodictic certainty is not an appropriate goal. 12. Bertrand Russell, Philosophy (New York: W. W. Norton, 1927), 136. 13. Ernest Sosa, “Epistemology Today: A Perspective in Retrospect,” in Philosophical Studies 40 (1981): 323. 14. See Cornelius Van Til, Why I Believe in God (Philadelphia: Committee on Christian Education of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church, n.d.), 18–20. 15. Richard Feldman and Earl Conee, “Evidentialism,” in Human Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Approaches, ed. Moser and vander Nat, 334.

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evidence.”16 Evidence plays a very important role in all theories of justification, more so than is sometimes apparent in the discussions of views like foundationalism and coherentism. The evidentialist approach to justification seems to be too simplistic, however, in that it fails to explain how the beliefs offered as evidence are justified. Standard works on apologetics often employ a simplistic evidentialist approach to belief justification.17 These works are no doubt convincing to many, but their lack of epistemological depth undermines their attempts. Some have argued that the evidence for and against religious belief is ambiguous, and that therefore evidentialism fails as a method of belief justification for religious beliefs.18 Others have argued that faith specifically involves belief when there is a lack of evidence or when the evidence supports the conclusion that religious beliefs are false.19 In both of these cases, it is argued, a person is justified in his/her religious beliefs in spite of the lack of evidential support. Reliabilism Reliabilism (or “causalism”) is the theory that a belief is justified if it is arrived at through generally reliable cognitive processes.20 This is usually considered to be a pragmatic approach to justification, since processes are deemed reliable based on their success at attaining desired goals. While it seems reasonable that beliefs that are arrived at through means that have been experienced to be reliable are prima facie justified, reliable means sometimes do admit exceptions, and under certain circumstances can become unreliable (e.g., when one is under the influence of alcohol or possessed by demons). Another problem with reliablism is the apparent cir16. David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 118. (On the other hand, on 141 he states that “upon the whole, we may conclude that the Christian religion not only was at first attended with miracles, but even at this day cannot be believed by any reasonable person without one. Mere reason is insufficient to convince us of its veracity. And whoever is moved by faith to assent to it is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person which subverts all the principles of his understanding and gives him a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience.”) 17. See, for example, Norman Geisler, Christian Apologetics (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1976). Geisler’s book is not unusual in containing many arguments but no discussion of the nature of belief justification. 18. John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, 153–71. 19. Søren Kierkegaard, On Authority and Revelation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955), 60. “Every defense of Christianity which understands what it would accomplish must behave exactly conversely, maintaining with might and main by qualitative dialectic that Christianity is implausible” (emphasis Kierkegaard’s). 20. See Ernest Sosa, “The Raft and the Pyramid,” in Moser and vander Nat, Human Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Approaches, 323ff.; and Alvin I. Goldman, “Reliabilism,” in A Companion to Epistemology, ed. Dancy and Sosa, 433.

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cularity of the means justifying the beliefs, and the beliefs justifying the means. Consequentialism A more successful pragmatic approach to justification is consequentialism. Consequentialism proposes that a belief is justified if it produces desirable consequences. This is the classical pragmatist approach to justification, as found in William James.21 Its strengths are that it provides a means of adjudicating between conflicting belief systems (in a situation of competing beliefs, the one that produces the most desirable consequences, or most consistently produces desirable consequences, is justified),22 and that it provides for the justification of both empirical and nonempirical beliefs. It does not provide apodictic certainty about the truth of beliefs: a belief could be justified (consequentially) without being true (in the correspondence sense).23 Conversely, it might even be the case that a true (correspondent) belief could have undesirable consequences.24 In response to this, consequentialists argue that in the long run the belief that is true (or most true) will be the most fruitful, even if in the short-term it is not. James and other pragmatists have applied their theory to religious belief. According to James, the good consequences of religious belief(s) in an individual’s life constitute prima facie consequentialist evidence in favor of those beliefs.25 He also argues that consequentialist considerations are the only method of adjudicating between competing religious views.26 21. William James, Essays in Radical Empiricism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), 123; James, Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking, 204. 22. For instance, the geocentric and heliocentric cosmologies, which were in competition with each other for centuries. 23. A classic example of this is Aristotelian science, which is no longer believed to be an accurate understanding of the world, but which worked adequately as a science in its day. Another example, one used effectively by Thomas Kuhn, is Ptolemaic astronomy, which was worked out in great detail, but which has been radically overthrown by Copernicus’ heliocentric astronomy. Both Aristotelian science and Ptolemaic astronomy “worked,” but now are not believed to correspond to the way things really are. 24. James alludes to this possibility in The Varieties of Religious Experience, 298. 25. Ellen Kappy Suckiel, Heaven’s Champion (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996), 12–13. 26. He argues that whether an effect is from a good cause or an evil cause cannot be determined by reference to some system of theology (which would be question-begging); James, Varieties of Religious Experience, 198–99. Rather, “out of an aggregate of piecemeal judgments as to the value of this and that experience—judgments in which our general philosophic prejudices, our instincts, and our common sense are our only guides— we decide that on the whole one type of religion is approved by its fruits, and another type condemned” (ibid., 261–62).

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Naturalized Epistemology W. V. Quine has argued for a naturalized epistemology.27 Quine’s argument is that justification of beliefs is a psychological phenomenon, and should be discussed descriptively rather than normatively. With this move, Quine seeks to address the psychological dimensions sometimes overlooked by other philosophers. However, in reducing epistemology to what appears to be descriptive psychology, Quine fails to address the normative dimensions of justification. Such an approach has parallels in religious anthropology and in psychology of religion, but seems to fall outside of the realm of philosophy of religion. Perspectivism Several philosophers have advocated what has become known as perspectivism: the idea that there can be no completely objective justification of beliefs, that beliefs and their justifications are both subjective, and therefore always represent particular perspectives.28 This proposal seems to entail an inescapable relativism. Perspectivism doesn’t rule out the possibility of evaluating the likeliness of particular beliefs, since beliefs can still be evaluated subjectively. Nor does it rule out comparative evaluations of different beliefs. If apodictic certainty is impossible (as the failure of foundationalism is often taken to indicate), then such perspectival subjectivity seems unavoidable. There is an apparent difficulty with perspectivism: if perspectivism is right, then it also is (merely) a perspective. Several contemporary philosophers of religion have adopted perspectival approaches to religious truth. These thinkers use this epistemology as one of the arguments for greater tolerance between religions and as an argument for interreligious dialogue.29 Contextualism, Foundherentism, and Negative Coherence Theory Contextualism is the theory that differing strategies of justification are appropriate in different contexts.30 This simple observation seems almost 27. William Van Orman Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), 69–90. 28. Nietzsche is often interpreted as a perspecitivist because he held that knowledge is historically conditioned interpretation. See Frederich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 121–22. A contemporary perspectivist is Joseph Margolis, Historied Thought, Constructed World: A Conceptual Primer for the Turn of the Millennium, 302: “The entire universe is interpreted, textual, historicized, constructed: in a word, Intentional.” 29. See, for instance, Leonard Swidler, “Deabsolutizing Truth,” and Hans Kung, “On the Way to an Even Greater Truth,” in Toward a Universal Theology of Religion, ed. Leonard Swidler (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1987), 7–13, 249–50. 30. Timo Airaksinen, “Five Types of Knowledge,” American Philosophical Quarterly 15, no. 4 (October 1978): 263–74.

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self-evident once suggested, and shows how the strengths of the other views can be capitalized on within one theory. A question about this theory that remains to be addressed is how it can be determined which strategy to employ in specific situations. Another important question concerns the justification of each strategy employed. Hybrid theories that seek to combine the strengths of several approaches to justification include Susan Haack’s foundherentism and John Pollock’s negative coherence theory.31 According to Haack, beliefs are justified within a system (`a la coherentism), but some beliefs within that system are intrinsically more justified than others (`a la foundationalism). J. Pollock’s approach combines coherentism with a falsification evidentialism: any belief is prima facie justified unless it is called into question by another belief. These theories combine the strengths of the other theories, but are subject to some of the same criticisms. Blaga’s epistemology, and his religious epistemology, combine elements found in several of the above proposals into a system of justification that is integrated with complete epistemological and metaphysical worldview. Blaga’s religious epistemology could be characterized as “contextual,” since like contextualism it proposes that different strategies of justification are appropriate to different contexts. These contexts, according to Blaga, are those of the two different types of human cognition: paradisaic and luciferic. Paradisaic cognition is the type of cognition employed in contexts of empirical investigation, as was explained in chapter 5. Paradisaic cognitions are justified evidentially (see chapter 6). However, such justification is always tentative, because empirical knowledge is never apodictic. Any object of paradisaic cognition is a mere sign of the actual object, and can be a launching point for luciferic cognition (see chapter 4). Certain facts about religion/religions, and even certain aspects of issues that arise in philosophy of religion, fall within the sphere of paradisaic cognition. Questions of historical fact, of religious experiences or practices, and of actual beliefs are examples of this. The answers to these questions can be verified empirically. Luciferic cognition is more complex than paradisaic cognition and has a more complex structure of justification. Luciferic cognitions are based on paradisaic cognitions, and therefore share an element of empirical corroboration. In addition to the empirical element, however, luciferic cognitions are theoretical constructs, and as such are subject to the cultural categories of the stylistic matrix (see chapter 6). Because they are human constructions and are influenced by the culture of the people who construct them, luciferic cognitions represent the perspective of their creators. 31. For Haack, see Triplett, “Recent Work on Foundationalism,” 107–8; also see John Pollock, “A Plethora of Epistemological Theories,” in Justification and Knowledge, ed. G. S. Pappas (Dordrecht, Netherlands: D. Reidel, n.d.), 105, quoted in Triplett, “Recent Work on Foundationalism,” 107.

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Therefore it is fair to say that this part of Blaga’s epistemology is perspectival (as described above). Blaga would readily agree that there can be no completely objective justification of luciferic cognitions, that such cognitions and their justifications are both subjective (see chapter 4). Blaga goes beyond the mere assertion of subjectivity, however, and provides methods for comparing and justifying luciferic beliefs, to the extent that such justification is possible. (Apodictic certainty about such justification will never be reached.) Blaga sees three criteria of justification that are appropriate to luciferic cognition. These are coherence, pragmatic, and aesthetic justification. As discussed in chapter 3, coherence (internal consistency) is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the justification of any belief. However, there are certain beliefs that involve antinomies that will not exhibit complete coherence, but that one may still be justified in embracing (see chapter 5 under “minus-cognition”). Blaga’s main positive criterion of justification is pragmatic, of the type mentioned above as “consequentialism.”32 Both in his epistemology and in his actual practice, Blaga defends the idea that luciferic cognitions are justified by their fruitfulness in solving problems (see chapters 3 and 4). As in consequentialism, this sort of justification does not aim at or provide apodictic certainty. Such a goal would be incompatible with Blaga’s metaphysics.33 It does allow for the useful evaluation of theories, and it enables progress toward the goal of truth. Blaga also mentions an aesthetic criterion of verification. In the context of the justification of his metaphysical system he mentions that there are many elements external to a metaphysical system that affect its success. These elements include the quality of the resonance between a vision and the spirit of its recipient, the underlying temperament of the age and of the readers, the needs of the moment in history, individual needs, caprices, and the magic of expression (chapters 3 and 4).34 On an individual and completely subjective basis, then, it could be suggested that luciferic cognitions are justified for an individual based on their aesthetic satisfaction to 32. Blaga’s pragmatism may be surprising in a European philosopher of his time, yet it is in keeping with the constructivism of his philosophy. 33. Keith Ward has also observed that a consistent Kantianism results in a pragmatic theory of justification, “once all knowledge of the noumenal is renounced, all criteria of the adequacy of religious beliefs must operate simply on a pragmatic basis.” Keith Ward, “Divine Ineffability,” in God, Truth and Reality: Essays in Honour of John Hick, ed. Arvin Sharma (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 220. Ward intends this as a critique, but his critique rests on a questionable interpretation of pragmatism. 34. A very interesting discussion of cultural influences on justification of religious beliefs is James William McClendon Jr. and James M. Smith, Understanding Religious Conviction (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), section 6, “The Process of Justification,” and chapter 3, “The Social Matrix of the Process,” 171–83.

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that individual. This would be appropriate in view of the creativity that Blaga asserts is involved in luciferic cognition: luciferic cognitions are to some degree expressions of those who create them, and as such bear some analogy to works of art. This is another perspectivist element in Blaga’s theory of justification, and may be a more radical one than that mentioned above. Many religious beliefs are of the luciferic cognition type. Beliefs such as those in the existence of a Creator of the universe, in the incarnation of God in Jesus Christ, and in the cycle of samsara all involve theoretical proposals that go well beyond the limits of empirical observation. These beliefs cannot be justified empirically. They can be judged on the basis of their internal consistency, their pragmatic utility, and their aesthetic appeal. The first criterion may not be applicable to beliefs that are claimed to transcend logic, but even these can be evaluated on the basis of the latter two criteria. Again, none of these criteria can assure the apodictic certainty of any religious belief. Since apodictic certainty is not compatible with Blaga’s metaphysics, this inability may be viewed as one of the strengths of these criteria.

Justification of Religious Belief The justification of particular religious beliefs, and the justification of religious belief, may be considered as two separate issues. It is often supposed that the justification of religious belief occurs only through the justification of religious beliefs: that religious belief is justified only if one’s actual religious beliefs are justified. This view is reflected by the lack of separate discussion of the justification of religious belief in many texts on philosophy of religion. It is conceivable that none of one’s religious beliefs are justified and that at the same time one’s religious belief is justified. That is, it is possible for one to believe a number of religious propositions that one is not justified in believing, and at the same time be justified in being a religious person. Therefore the justification of particular beliefs and the justification of belief must be treated as two separate issues. In order to make this distinction more clear it is useful to distinguish between religious beliefs and believing religiously. The former is an object: a body of beliefs. The latter is an activity. All religious people have a body (large or small) of religious beliefs. These beliefs may be justified, or they may not be, and the manner of their justification is as discussed in the preceding section. All religious people also are involved in the cognitive activity of believing. It is the justification of this cognitive activity that is now in question.

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Two philosophers who have addressed the issue of the justification of religious belief are William James and John Hick.35 James proposes that religious belief is justified pragmatically, on the basis of the beneficial results that this belief has in the life of the believing individual. Hick proposes that religious belief is justified as a legitimate response to the uncertainties of the human experience of a noumenal Transcendent. Although Blaga probably would not disagree with either of these proposals, he proposes a different justification of religious belief. A person who “believes religiously” participates in a particular type of cognitive activity: religious belief. This cognitive activity is not merely descriptive: it is creative. As was mentioned in chapter 7, Blaga views religion itself, apart from any particular doctrine, as justified by two factors: religion’s status as a cultural creation, an attempt at revelation of mystery in accord with human destiny, and religion’s status as a manifestation of the human tendency to self-summation and self-surpassing in correlation with the ultimate mysteries of existence. Religion is justified because of its status as a creative activity of the human spirit, and this regardless of its success or failure as an attempt to accurately translate existential mystery. It is also justified because of its role in the destiny of humanity: religion is one aspect of the human striving to reach beyond itself and grasp the transcendent. According to Blaga’s metaphysic, it is human destiny to strive to reveal to ourselves the mysteries of existence. These attempts are prevented from succeeding by the MA through the agency of transcendent censorship and stylistic braking. All human creative activities, including all the attempts of luciferic cognition, are attempts at creatively revealing mystery. All of these activities are prevented, by the MA, from completely penetrating mystery. This includes religion as well as philosophy, science, and all other human intellectual activities. None of these activities can succeed in positively revealing ultimate existential mystery. Nonetheless, they are all justified attempts. As an attempt at revealing mystery, religion finds its justification independent from the justifications applicable to specific religious beliefs. However, the attempt to grasp the transcendent, and belief in one specific ultimate Transcendent, are often intertwined. The question of whether this Transcendent can be said to exist, and what can be known about its nature, must now be addressed.

35. James, Varieties of Religious Experience; John Hick, Philosophy of Religion, 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1990), 68–81; and An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989), 5– 8, 210–77.

12 The Existence and Nature of God Arguments for the Existence of God

One of the perennial and most prominent questions in Western philosophy of religion regards the existence of God. Traditional arguments for the existence of God—the cosmological argument, the teleological argument, the ontological argument, the moral argument, arguments from religious experience and from supposed miracles, and other similar arguments—have a long history and continue to enjoy considerable support. The cosmological argument argues that there must be an originator of the universe since the only alternative explanation for the existence of the universe is an infinite regress.1 The teleological argument argues that there must be a designer of the universe, since the universe exhibits the characteristics of something that was designed rather than of something that occurred accidentally.2 The ontological argument argues that God is the being greater than which none can be conceived, and that since an existent being is greater than a nonexistent one, God must exist, otherwise it would be possible to conceive of a being greater than God.3 The moral argument argues that morality presupposes an objective standard of right and wrong, and that such a standard necessitates the existence of a transcendent source of moral standards.4 Arguments from experience typically follow lines of 1. See, for example, Aristotle, Metaphysics, book 2, chapter 2, and book 11, chapter 6, in Aristotle: On Man in the Universe, ed. Louise Ropes Loomis (Roslyn, NY: Walter J. Black, 1943), 13–14, 33–34; J. P. Moreland, Scaling the Secular City: A Defense of Christianity (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1987), 15– 42. 2. See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, part 1, question 1, in Introduction to St. Thomas Aquinas, ed. Anton C. Pegis (New York: Modern Library, 1948), 20–27, especially his “fifth way,” 27; Moreland, Scaling the Secular City, 43–75. 3. See Gregory Schufreider, An Introduction to Anselm’s Argument (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978); John Hick and Arthur C. McGill, eds., The Many-faced Argument (New York: Macmillan, 1967); Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), 85–112. 4. See Kant, “The Canon of Pure Reason,” section 2: “On the Ideal of the Highest Good, As a Determining Basis of the Ultimate Purpose of Pure Reason,” in Critique of Pure Reason, 735– 46; C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (New York: Macmillan, 1952), 31–35; Moreland, Scaling the Secular City, 105–32.

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reasoning that are basically empirical, arguing that the best possible explanation of religious experiences is that they are experiences of something transcendent, just as immanent experiences are usually understood as experiences of immanent objects.5 The arguments from miracles argue that miracles have a supernatural source; assisted by other specific details it is often argued that this source is God.6 The above arguments have all been challenged by philosophers who question their validity or conclusiveness.7 Neither the supporters nor the opponents of the traditional theistic proofs have been able to present a case that satisfies all or even most of the parties involved in the discussion. The conclusiveness of the theistic proofs remains an open question. In addition to those who argue that the theistic arguments are unable to prove the existence of God, there are philosophers who, for a variety of reasons, argue that theistic proofs are inappropriate or pointless. Perhaps the most famous such objection is Kierkegaard’s. According to Kierkegaard, the type of belief in God that is really important involves an active choice to believe, in spite of evidence contrary to what is being believed. Therefore, according to Kierkegaard, the attempt to rationally ground religious belief is playing into the hands of the enemy, and is mistaken, inappropriate, and futile. It is mistaken because it believes that the type of belief that is involved is evidential. It is inappropriate because it tries to provide evidence for something that necessarily involves a lack of evidence. It is futile because even if evidence can be provided, such evidence can never result in the requisite type of belief. According to Kierkegaard, God does exist, but the belief that God exists is a choice of the will.8 A recent proposal by a group of analytic philosophers from a Reformed Christian background also calls into question the propriety of theistic proofs. According to Reformed epistemology, belief in God is “properly basic” and therefore occurs at the foundation of one’s noetic structure. Such basic beliefs are not and do not need to be supported by evidence.9 According to the proponents of Reformed epistemology, God exists, but the belief that God exists (or knowledge of God’s existence) is implanted in the believer by God. 5. See “Religious Experience: What Does it Mean to Encounter the Divine?” ch. 2 in Reason and Religious Belief, Peterson et al., eds.; James, The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature, 74 –5, 326–31. 6. See, for example, Butler, “Of Revealed Religion,” section 2 in The Analogy of Religion, 125–259; Gary Habermas, The Resurrection of Jesus: An Apologetic (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1980). 7. See, for example, Flew, God and Philosophy, which criticizes all of the above arguments. 8. Kierkegaard, On Authority and Revelation, 57–68. 9. This is the main point of Wolterstorff, Reason within the Bounds of Religion.

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A third position opposing the traditional theistic proofs argues that such proofs are irrelevant to religion itself, that actual religious people are not religious because of the theistic proofs, and that if the proofs were to be shown to be invalid, there would be little effect on religion and religious belief. Since religious people do not base their belief on the theistic arguments, the failure of such arguments would (it is argued) have little impact. The theistic arguments are of interest to philosophers, but their success would not significantly increase religious belief, nor would their failure disprove belief in God.10 Three central questions regarding the existence of God have been discussed here. They are: Is it appropriate to attempt to prove that God exists? Can it be proved that God exists? Does God exist? The weighty intellectual exertion that these questions have provoked throughout the history of philosophy is an indication that this is an important philosophical issue. Many solutions to these problems have been suggested. Blaga’s philosophical system suggests solutions to these problems that have certain advantages over other solutions that have been suggested. In this discussion it will be assumed that there is a sufficient parallel between the general concept “God” and Blaga’s “MA” in order to apply what Blaga says about the latter to the general philosophical discussion of the former. That Blaga’s conception of the MA is not exactly the same as the Christian conception of God is readily admitted.11 Regarding the propriety of the theistic arguments, it is clear that Blaga is neither a Kierkegaardian existentialist nor a Reformed epistemologist. Nor would Blaga dismiss proof as irrelevant to religion. Blaga’s metaphysical vision pictures humanity as drawn to the transcendent (see chapters 3 and 4). This drawing results in attempts to “reveal” the transcendent in ways that include the cognitive tools available to humans (chapter 5). Evidence and proof are common elements of human attempts to fathom existence. That they are applied to the question of the existence of God is not surprising, and is probably not inappropriate. The answer to the first question, therefore, is “yes, it is appropriate to attempt to prove that God exists.” Whether they can succeed in this attempt is a separate issue. Blaga might object that Kierkegaard’s position, that belief that is based on evidence is not true religious belief, grants too much authority to the evidence involved (as will be seen, on Blaga’s philosophy such evidence has very little authority). He might object that the Reformed epistemology position is incorrect if it assumes that all belief in God occurs at the foundation of a person’s noetic structure or if it asserts that all belief in God 10. Steven Cahn, “The Irrelevance to Religion of Philosophic Proofs for the Existence of God,” American Philosophical Quarterly 6, no. 2 (April 1969): 170–72. 11. See chapter 4.

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should occur at the foundation of a person’s noetic structure (in Blaga’s case, the MA postulate does not seem to be properly basic). He would probably point out that the position that says that proofs are irrelevant to religion errs by overlooking those religious people to whom such proofs are an important part of their religious experience. For some reason, throughout history a very significant number of people have felt compelled to attempt to prove (or at least substantiate) the existence of God. Some of these people have been among the most creative and intelligent of thinkers. Blaga’s metaphysics provides the reason for this collective effort, giving it meaning, legitimizing it, and praising it for the height of its reach. Regarding the possibility of proving the existence of God, it is clear that according to Blaga’s system God’s existence cannot be proved in any fashion that would lead to apodictic certainty (see chapter 4). Therefore any argument posed in a deductive format or claiming to lead to conclusions that are certain will be rejected by Blaga. This can be viewed as a virtue of Blaga’s system, since such epistemological restraint is consistent with contemporary postfoundationalist analytic epistemology. On Blaga’s epistemology, it does not seem that the existence of God (or of the MA) could be an object of paradisaic cognition, though perhaps some of the actions of God could be. Therefore empirical arguments by themselves cannot show the existence of God. On the other hand, the existence of God could be an object of luciferic cognition, and therefore God’s existence can be postulated, and this postulate could be corroborated pragmatically and aesthetically (see chapter 5). This form of theistic argument is unlike any of those mentioned. It is more like the hypothetico-deductive method utilized in some scientific investigations. This approach to belief in God’s existence is very contemporary: John Hick, after a lengthy discussion of religious epistemology, seems to suggest a similar approach to belief in God in his 1989 book An Interpretation of Religion.12 Regarding the final question (Does God Exist?), it seems that the answer of Blaga the philosopher would be a somewhat tentative “yes.”13 Blaga does not attempt to prove the existence of the MA. He does, however, posit the MA’s existence, and then constructs a lengthy argument for this hypothesis based on its philosophical fruitfulness. It is almost the case that 12. Hick, chapter 13, “The Rationality of Religious Belief,” in An Interpretation of Religion, 210–32. The use that Basil Mitchell makes of the classical theistic proofs in The Justification of Religious Belief also bears some resemblance to Blaga’s approach: “Thus although the cosmological and teleological arguments do not (if our criticism of them was correct) prove that there must be a transcendent creator of the world, they do make explicit one way (arguably the best way) in which the existence and nature of the universe can be explained. . . .” 40– 41. 13. This is again based on the assumption that there is a sufficient parallel between the general concept “God” and Blaga’s “MA” in order to apply what Blaga says about the latter to the general philosophical discussion of the former.

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Blaga’s entire system is an argument for the existence of the MA, inasmuch as his system is a unitary whole whose pieces justify each other by their coherence and by their fruitfulness as a system explaining a variety of phenomena and resolving an array of problems. That this possibly controversial interpretation of Blaga’s view on the existence of God is correct is perhaps corroborated by his positive attitude toward religion in general, and by his own religiosity at various points in his life. That Blaga’s belief in the existence of God is tentative is a result of his acute awareness of the limitations of human cognition and in his belief in the transcendence of the MA, a transcendence that removes the MA from direct human contact. Thus Blaga’s belief in the existence of God exhibits two epistemological virtues: it is based on an epistemology that is very appealing from a contemporary point of view, and it is appropriately modest, which is laudatory from both an epistemological and a theological perspective.

Evil: The Argument Against God The problem of the existence of evil is “widely recognized as the most serious rational objection to belief in God.”14 Almost all introductory texts on philosophy of religion discuss the problem of evil as an objection to the existence of God as usually conceived. The general thrust of the argument is that if an omnipotent and benevolent God exists, as is believed in the major monotheistic religions, then this God would be both able and willing to prevent the occurrence of evil. Since evil does occur, such a God must not exist. Thinkers sympathetic to the theistic position have generally recognized the seriousness of this objection. Earnest attempts at responding to the problem have been made. One response has come to be known as the “free will defense.” According to the free will defense, the evil that exists is a result of the free choices of volitional beings other than God. God created these beings with free will, and cannot prevent them from doing evil without depriving them of their freedom. Although God created them volitional, God is not responsible for their free choices. The possibility of them making choices that have evil consequences is a necessary part of them having free will. This explanation elucidates a type of situation that would motivate an omnipotent and benevolent God to permit the existence of evil.15 Another response to the problem of evil is the proposal that God allows 14. Peterson, Reason and Religious Belief, xiii. 15. Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, 7–74. Hick discusses the history of this theodicy, which he characterizes as “Augustinian,” in John Hick, Evil and the God of Love (Cleveland, OH: Collins World, 1977), 43–206, 262–78.

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particular instances of evil only when he foreknows that by allowing this evil a greater good will result. This is sometimes referred to as the “greater good” argument.16 The greater good argument can also be formulated so as to propose that the total sum of all good will exceed the total sum of all evil at some future time of (final) reckoning. The free will defense can be viewed as a type of greater good argument: the good of free will is seen to be greater than is the bad of the possibility of evil (or the actuality of evil, if one grants to God complete foreknowledge). Blaga’s theodicy seems to combine elements of both of the above strategies, and it adds several ingredients of its own. Blaga’s theodicy begins with the proposal found in his metaphysics that there is a considerable distance between the MA and the rest of creation. He argues, on the one hand, that the MA does not exercise direct control over the creation process, but rather creates through an emission of differentials that are allowed to combine/interact freely. This approach to creation allows for a great deal of freedom on the part of those things created by the interactions of the differentials. This bears some resemblance to the free will defense. The reason for this distance between the MA and the creation process is that it maximizes secondary creativity while protecting the centrality of the MA in the universe, something that Blaga argues is essential to the preservation of the universe itself. Blaga also argues that this mode of creation and the world that results from it represent the best solution to the dilemma of how to create the greatest possible world without endowing it to such a degree that it has the ability to destroy itself. The solution to this impasse opted for by the MA, according to Blaga’s metaphysical speculation, is the endowment of creation with creative and revelatory desires and abilities while at the same time limiting the successes achievable in response to these desires. Although it is undeniable that evil exists in the world, it is in fact the best possible world given the goals of the MA: perpetual creation and preservation of that which is created. This strongly resembles a “greatest possible good” theodicy.17 One of the benefits of Blaga’s approach to theodicy is that it is not merely a defensive postulate, not merely an argument resorted to because of the need to reconcile the existence of an omnipotent, righteous, and loving Being with the presence of evil and suffering in the world. Blaga’s 16. Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 207–65. Hick traces the history of this theodicy from Paul through Irenaeus to the twentieth century, and names it the “Irenaean type of theodicy.” Leibniz’ “best possible world” theodicy is a very influential formulation of this type of argument, see Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, “A Vindication of God’s Justice Reconciled with His Other Perfections and All His Actions,” in Leibniz, Monadology and Other Philosophical Essays, trans. Paul Schrecker and Anne Martin Schrecker (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), 114 – 47. 17. Blaga’s theodicy has already been introduced in chapters 4 and 7.

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theodicy is a positive proposal, advanced as part of a systematic attempt at explaining human experience. It is an integral part of and a logical result of Blaga’s metaphysical system, and as such is supported by the arguments that support the system An interesting point of Blaga’s theodicy is that it occurs in the context of a philosophical, rather than theological, system. Because of this, the specifically epistemological aspects of theodicy come to the forefront. Whereas many theological theodicies are strongly tied to practical issues, Blaga’s theodicy provides an explanation of why humanity cannot reach the transcendent toward which it feels drawn and why any cognitive success that humans experience is always partial.

The Nature of God The Method for Discovering Divine Attributes Having concluded that, on Blaga’s system, something like God can be said to exist, it remains to be seen what the actual nature of this being is. This poses a significant problem, however. Both the transcendence of the MA and the protective/defensive measures taken by the MA against human cognition (transcendent censorship and stylistic braking) impede the human ability to know the nature of the MA. Therefore a brief discussion of the methodology for discovering the attributes of the MA is necessary. The usual approach to discovering the attributes of God is to consult divine revelation. Blaga argues that the MA has prioritized preventing human cognition of the transcendent over assisting human cognition of the transcendent, and therefore is unlikely to give such a revelation (see chapter 7). An alternative approach is that of philosophical theology. Philosophical theology attempts to deduce or infer the attributes of God without resorting to revelation. The deductions or inferences of philosophical theology are usually based on which attributes seem most consistent with other philosophical considerations, such as ethics or metaphysics.18 Blaga’s philosophy contains certain elements that strongly resemble the philosophical theology approach to knowing the attributes of the MA. In Blaga’s case, these attributes are either inferred from other elements of his metaphysics or are postulated and then confirmed according to the methodology of luciferic cognition (see chapters 5 and 10). The conclusions of this part of Blaga’s philosophy are sparse (in comparison with traditional 18. These two approaches are utilized in many texts on the attributes of God. See Edward R. Wierenga, The Nature of God: An Inquiry into Divine Attributes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989); Ed. L. Miller, ed., God and Reason: A Historical Approach to Philosophical Theology (New York: Macmillan, 1972), especially 21.

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theology) and are viewed by Blaga as tentative, in keeping with the limits of transcendent censorship. The Divine Attributes Theologians, usually relying heavily on supernatural revelation, have put great effort into describing the attributes of God. A typical text on Christian theology includes explanation and defense of such doctrines as God’s personhood, self-existence, simplicity, immutability, trinity, holiness, lovingness, sovereignty, truthfulness, eternality, omnipresence, omnipotence, omniscience, and omnisapience.19 Because of Blaga’s reservations about the likelihood of divine revelation and about viability of divine revelation as a source of knowledge of the transcendent, these conclusions of the theological approach to knowing the nature of God are not available to Blaganian philosophy of religion. Philosophers have also speculated about the nature of God. In general, philosophers have attempted to analyze the probable nature of God without resorting to divine revelation. Philosophers have discussed and taken a variety of positions on divine attributes such as singularity, self-existence, infiniteness, personhood, lovingness, goodness, holiness, perfection, omnipotence, omniscience, timelessness, and sovereignty.20 Although Blaga is hesitant to follow down the path of rational speculation about the nature of God,21 his metaphysics does lead him to draw certain conclusions regarding the nature of the MA. In contrast to theologians and some philosophers of religion, who have expended great effort in expounding upon the nature of God, Blaga emphasizes the transcendence and resultant hiddenness of God, and therefore the human inability to know God’s nature.22 The term “anonymous,” which makes up half of the name MA that Blaga chooses to use to designate the Transcendent source of the universe, indicates the transcendence and will19. See Augustus H. Strong, Systematic Theology: A Compendium (Valley Forge, PA: Judson Press, 1985), 249–352; Henry C. Thiessen, Lectures in Systematic Theology, rev. ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1979), 75–132. 20. On omniscience, see, for instance, Hick, Philosophy of Religion, 5–14; Peterson et al., eds., Reason and Religious Belief, 48–67; Richard Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 97–298; on timelessness, see Nelson Pike, God and Timelessness (New York: Schocken Books, 1970); William Lane Craig, Time and Eternity: Exploring God’s Relationship to Time (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2001); on sovereignty, see Paul Helm, The Providence of God (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1994); Clark Pinnock et al., The Openness of God (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1994). 21. DD, 67. 22. In this Blaga is not unlike Dionysius and some others within monotheistic religions who have emphasized that the greatness of God so far exceeds human cognitive ability that God’s nature cannot be comprehended.

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ful inscrutability of the MA. Thus it can be said, at the least, that the MA is transcendent and inscrutable. However, this inscrutability does not entail that no attributes of the MA can be postulated.23 In order to fulfill its role in Blaga’s metaphysics, the MA must necessarily be both the source of all other existents and the orderer of the universe. Thus some sort of sovereignty can also be attributed to the MA. As stated in chapter 4, corollaries of Blaga’s explanation of creation are the conclusions that the MA both has the ability of self-replication and is not able to self-replicate without disturbing the balance of existence. That the MA refrains from this destabilizing self-replication may be an indication that the MA cares about the welfare of existence, thus indicating a degree of benevolence. The MA also has the ability to generate new beings, as well as the ability to limit this generation. Blaga speculates that the MA has a creative nature, and chooses to create in such a way as to efficiently produce the maximum creative effect with the minimum effort. These indicate divine attributes of creativity and efficiency. The MA’s censorship of human cognition is a further indication of the MA’s benevolence toward creation. One might also conclude from the cleverness and intricacy of the plan employed by the MA in creating and sustaining the universe that the MA is very wise and intelligent. The endowing of humanity with a creative/cognitive drive but subject to transcendent censorship and stylistic braking is a strategy employed both for the benefit of humanity and for the furthering of the MA’s own creativity. This reveals that the plans of the MA take into account equally the desires of the MA and the well-being of other creatures. This could indicate (as Blaga himself observes) that the nature of the MA includes elements that are both divine and demonic in comparison to the traditional way that God is conceived as being. There exists an undeniable tension within any philosophy or religion that posits the existence of a transcendent being and then proceeds to elaborate the attributes of that being.24 Blaga emphasizes the transcendence of the MA, and thus heightens the tension. He attenuates the tension, however, by making the entire MA hypothesis, including both the existence and the attributes of the MA, a tentative philosophical postulate rather than a dogmatic doctrine. In Blaga’s philosophy, the existence of the MA cannot be conclusively known, but it can be postulated, and this postulate can be pragmatically confirmed. Likewise the attributes of the MA cannot be conclusively known, but can be postulated and pragmatically confirmed. 23. A similar argument regarding ineffability and limited theoretical postulation is found in Ward, “Divine Ineffability,” 210–20, where Ward argues that God’s ineffability is not like the ineffability of Kantian noumena, which cannot be apprehended at all. 24. Blaga himself mentions this tension on page 67 of DD.

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Some religious practitioners make a distinction between “knowing things about God” and “knowing God.” According to some, the latter may be possible even if the former is not. That is, although God may transcend human comprehension, having a relationship with God may be possible. This is because relationships, while possibly involving cognitive states, may be distinct from them and may precede them.25 Blaga’s insistence that human knowledge of the MA is censored does not eliminate the possibility of humans having a relationship with the MA. In his discussions of mystical experiences Blaga concludes that mystical experiences do not lead to a cognition of transcendent reality that is free of the influence of the culture of the cognizing subject. He does not, however, deny that mystical experiences exist, and though one might think that one detects some reservation on Blaga’s part concerning the genuineness of such experiences, he never concludes that they are fake. Therefore there may be room in Blaga’s philosophy for “knowing God” even where there is very little room for knowing “about God.”

25. This distinction can be found in Eastern Orthodoxy, where the strong emphasis on the transcendence of God is not thought to prevent knowing (having a relationship to) God. It is also commonly made in Evangelical Christianity, wherein the strong emphasis on the importance of a personal relationship to God is not thought to negate the fact of God’s transcendence.

13 Religion and Science, Religion vs. Science The last several centuries have witnessed a steady increase in the prestige of the scientific method of knowledge acquisition. Today science has won such respect that it is sometimes taken to be a paradigm of responsible cognition. The increase in the perceived stature of science has come at the expense of the perceived stature of religion. This is largely because science and religion are viewed as incompatible approaches to answering the same questions. According to this view of the sciencereligion relationship, if one of the two approaches is found to be successful, this success shows that the other is unsuccessful. There are, however, other ways of viewing the relationship between science and religion.1 The preceding description portrays science and religion as competing enterprises. Other interpretations view them as complementary or entirely unrelated (compartmentalized).2 At issue are the answers to several questions: what is the object and method of scientific cognition, what is the object and method of religious cognition, and the questions of the existence, nature, and degree of overlap of science and religion. Each interpretation of the relationship of science and religion has its own set of answers to these questions.

The Relation of Religion and Science: The Contemporary Debate The two extremes of interpreting the relation between science and religion include, on the one hand, the view that religion and science both have to do with reality and things in the world: rocks, vegetation, molecules, and the like on the part of science, a Being that creates, and the things that are 1. See Peterson et al., eds., Reason and Religious Belief, 196–218; Ferre, Basic Modern Philosophy of Religion, 301–34; Moreland, Scaling the Secular City, 185–224; and the articles in William P. Alston, Religious Belief and Philosophical Thought: Readings in the Philosophy of Religion (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1963), 493–542. 2. Peterson et al., eds., Reason and Religious Belief, 199–200.

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created, on the part of religion. According to this view, there is no relevant metaphysical distinction between God and his creation, nor is there a large methodological difference between how science approaches the understanding of empirical reality and how religion approaches the understanding of spiritual reality.3 This understanding of the relationship of science and religion is sometimes reflected in the stances taken by religious proponents of creation science and by scriptural exegetes who interpret ancient texts literally and apply what some would consider to be spiritual passages to issues in the natural sciences. Problems for this view include the possibility of undermining of the transcendence of God and a possible tendency toward material reductionism in explaining religious phenomena. On the other hand is the extreme of interpretation that takes religion and science to be entirely distinct spheres that have little to no overlap at all. According to this view, science deals with the immanent, religion deals with the transcendent, and the categories of immanent and transcendent are mutually exclusive. This view posits a difference of kind between Creator and created that understands the latter as being entirely dissimilar to the former. It also posits a methodological distinction wherein science and religion are seen as two completely different ways of gaining knowledge (or sometimes wherein religion is not involved with knowledge at all).4 This understanding of the relation of science and religion is sometimes reflected in statements made by religious people who oppose creation science (for example, the statement sometimes heard that the Bible is about spiritual issues not scientific ones) and in statements by those who believe that a person’s religious views should not affect a person’s political positions. Problems for this view include the question of how the Creator could create and/or govern a world so foreign to and separate from Itself, and the question of how the religion of immanent human beings can have any relation to a Creator who is entirely transcendent. Common to both of these views is the assumption of the realism of the natural sciences. Throughout most of the history of science in the West, science has been viewed as a realist endeavor. Laypeople, practicing scientists, and even many philosophers have viewed the goal of science as being the discovery of how things really are. There has been a small but vocal minority that has protested this traditional view of the natural sciences, but even today they have not succeeded in unseating the prevailing presumption of scientific realism.5 If both science and religion are realist enter3. An articulate expression of a view that seems very close to this extreme is Moreland, Scaling the Secular City, 185–208. 4. Peterson et al., mention four different schools of thought that compartmentalize science and religion: theistic existentialism, neoorthodoxy, logical positivism, and ordinary language philosophy. See Peterson et al., Reason and Religious Belief, 200–202. 5. See Moreland, Scaling the Secular City, 185–97. Idealists and pragmatists have proposed nonrealist interpretations of science, but have been largely ignored. Thomas Kuhn

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prises, then the relationship between them could be viewed as one of overlap, with scientific discoveries having the potential of furthering theological knowledge and theological insights having the potential to further scientific understanding. This situation would also open the way for mutual falsification: it would be possible for scientific knowledge to disprove the claims of theology and vice versa.6 If, on the other hand, one of these disciplines is realist and the other nonrealist, then there is no overlap between them, and the relationship between them is significantly diminished in comparison to the situation discussed above. Scientific theories would have no bearing on religious beliefs, and religious beliefs would not affect scientific investigations. Neither could aid, confirm, or falsify the other.7 Since there are realist interpretations of both science and religion, and nonrealist interpretations of both science and religion, either could be the realist party in this scenario, and either could be the non-realist. However, interpretations wherein religion is viewed as a realist endeavor and science is viewed as nonrealist seem less common than interpretations wherein science is viewed as realist and religion as nonrealist.8 If both science and religion are viewed as nonrealist enterprises, then it is once again a possibility for science and religion to overlap and to interrelate. The nature and extent of this overlap depends on the respective nonrealist construals involved.9 Blaga is Kantian in both his metaphysics (where he is a realist) and his epistemology (where he is a constructivist). These positions have a direct bearing on his understanding of the scientific and religious enterprises, and have implications that directly affect the understanding of the sciencereligion relationship. Blaga’s philosophy describes science and religion such that important similarities and differences between them come to light. and other recent philosophers of science have fared somewhat better, weathering harsh criticisms but drawing some attention to the subjective aspects of the scientific enterprise; see Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970); Paul Feyerabend, Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge (London: Verso, 1978); and many of the essays in chapters 4 and 5 of Janet A. Kourany, Scientific Knowledge: Basic Issues in the Philosophy of Science (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1987). 6. See Moreland, Scaling the Secular City, 204 –8. 7. See, for example, Who Says God Created . . . Has Science Proved the Bible Obsolete? ed. Fritz Ridenour (Glendale, CA: G/L Regal Books, 1967), 172–74. 8. There have long been thinkers, perhaps even more in the East than in the West, who have argued that religion deals with true reality and that the objects of scientific inquiry are transitive and illusory. Tillich is one Western thinker who at least sometimes seems to advocate such a view; see Paul Tillich, The System of the Sciences according to Objects and Methods (Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press, 1981), especially 154 –56. 9. See, for one example, Bill McKee, Is Objectivity Faith? A Reconciliation of Science and Religion, 2nd ed. (Kearney, NE: Morris Publishing, 1997).

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Blaga on Religion and Science: The Difference As stated above, Blaga is a metaphysical realist. This means that he believes in the existence of real entities outside of the mind. In this he is in agreement with what is generally accepted, especially among nonphilosophers. However, Blaga is not a materialist: he does not reduce all existence to material existents. Blaga grants not only the possibility of the existence of nonmaterial entities, but also the actual existence of at least one important nonmaterial entity: the MA (see chapter 4). Blaga takes a realist position toward the existence of both the world and its source (the MA): he views them both as mind-independent existents. This does not entail, however, that both can be known empirically. If one accepts the thesis that the MA is Blaga’s conception of God, then it can be seen that religious knowledge (at least in theistic contexts) is not empirical. An object that transcends the empirical world cannot be cognized empirically. God/the MA transcends the empirical world. Therefore God/the MA cannot be cognized empirically (see chapter 4).10 Belief in or belief about God is the central element of religious knowledge (in theistic contexts). Because the central element of religious knowledge is nonempirical, religious knowledge is not empirical (in theistic contexts). Science, on the other hand, is a method of cognition that is very significantly empirical (according to most analyses, including Blaga’s).11 The goal of science is to better understand the physical world (usually in order to accomplish a variety of practical aims).12 The physical world can be an object of empirical cognition. Science exploits the availability of the physical world to empirical cognition in order to amass data on the physical world. This yields the most basic type of scientific knowledge, as found in noted empiricists such as Aristotle and Bacon. More advanced scientific cognition involves a form of Blaga’s luciferic cognition (see chapter 5 and S¸ C, 151ff.). Theoretic science begins with empirical data but is not content with mere cataloging. It proceeds to the explanatory phase of science, suggesting explanations of problems discovered in the empirical data. These explanations are not the empirical data itself. Nonetheless, even theoretical science begins with and has an important relationship with empirical data. In comparison to religious 10. Blaga specifically states that even the hypothesis that there is an MA is not empirical (DD, 104). 11. See chapters 3 and 5, DCF, 92–99, and ESM, 685–92. Empiricism is especially characteristic of science of the paradisaic cognition type, but there is also science of the luciferic cognition type, which is theoretical by nature and therefore slightly less tied to empirical observation; see S¸ C, 193–210. 12. Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim, “Studies in the Logic of Explanation,” Philosophy of Science 15 (1948): 135.

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knowledge, therefore, it can be said that scientific knowledge is significantly empirical because its object is empirical. It seems, then, that there is an important difference between religious knowledge and scientific knowledge. This difference is the nature of their objects. The object of religious knowledge is nonempirical, and therefore cannot be known empirically. The object of science, on the other hand, is empirical, and empirical cognition plays a major role in cognizing the object of science.

Blaga on Religion and Science: The Similarity Despite the significant differences in the objects of religious and scientific cognition, there are interesting and important methodological similarities. In order to see this it will be necessary to revisit the respective methods of scientific and religious cognition. Theoretical science proceeds via a process of investigation that significantly surpasses the empirical base of scientific investigation. This is because science is incurably involved with probing the mysteries of existence. Some of these mysteries are latent in the very empirical objects themselves. Like Kant, Blaga believes that the empirical object cannot be apprehended directly—one cannot know the thing in itself. Empirical cognition takes the subject partway toward the object, but not all the way. The subject itself contributes what is lacking on the part of the cognitive object, via the categories of the understanding. Therefore no human cognition has the empirical object as its pure object. Scientific knowledge, even of the Baconian kind, is not purely empirical: there is always a human contribution, and always a remnant of mystery to be solved. Thus while Blaga is a realist metaphysically, he is a constructivist epistemologically, even when it comes to scientific cognition.13 Theoretical science proceeds beyond Baconian science in its attempt to penetrate the mysteries latent in empirical objects. It proposes theoretical solutions to scientific problems, and then tests these solutions by their ability to account for empirical phenomena. The solutions suggested are, like empirical observations, also a mixture of empirical data and human contribution. In the case of solutions proposed in theoretical science, the human contribution bares the form of the abyssal categories (see chapter 6). The data-collecting methodology of Baconian science is an example of what Blaga terms paradisaic cognition (see chapter 5). The hypotheticodeductive methodology of theoretical science is an example of what Blaga 13. Blaga’s constructivist view of science is evident in several places: DCF, 92–107, ESM, 586–644 and 692–706, and S¸ C, 154 –206. The fifteenth chapter of S¸ C is specifically titled “Constructivism” (¸SC, 154 –62).

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terms luciferic cognition (ibid.). Luciferic cognition facilitates the addressing of problems that cannot be resolved empirically. Religious knowledge can be classified into two different types: that which involves cognition of empirical facts and that which involves cognition of the transcendent. In this it would seem to be similar to science. Examples of the former type of religious knowledge include some religious anthropology, some religious historiography, the categorization of religious phenomena when this categorization does not include any attempt to explain the phenomena, and knowledge of what scriptures say if this knowledge is not taken to reflect upon any transcendent reality. All of these examples of religious knowledge are examples of what Blaga terms paradisaic cognition. The latter type of religious knowledge, that which involves cognition of the transcendent, is what is often taken to be problematic, and is what is most contrasted to scientific knowledge. The contrast is understandable, scientific cognition being intimately involved with the immanent and empirical, while the latter type of religious cognition has as its object something that is just the opposite: the transcendent. The difference is less than it at first appears, however. Both are involved with the attempt to cognize mystery, and therefore both are applications of luciferic cognition. Religious knowledge of the transcendent begins with empirical facts, as does theoretical science. Examples of the empirical facts of religious knowledge include religious experiences, inspirational statements of religious people, and the statements of scriptures. These facts are the phanic material for processes of luciferic cognition that result in religious knowledge. The discovery of the mystery latent in these facts causes a crisis in the phanic material, revealing the cryptic aspect of the phanic material. This crisis results in an attempt at revelation of the mystery of the cryptic. This attempt is made through the employment of a theoretical construction guided by a theory idea. The theory ideas are informed by abyssal categories.14 The results of these acts of luciferic cognition are instances of tentative knowledge of the transcendent. Religious knowledge of the transcendent, achieved through application of what Blaga has described as the method of luciferic cognition, is a human construct. It is a human construct not because it fails to apprehend its object (though Blaga would certainly say that it does not positiveadequately apprehend its object), but because it apprehends its object by combining the phanic material with theoretical elements contributed by the subject and molded by the subject’s abyssal categories. The mystery of its 14. This process of luciferic cognition is explained in chapter 5. Examples of the application of luciferic cognition to religious questions are found in Blaga’s book ED, and the contribution of the abyssal categories to religious cognition is discussed in GMR and CC.

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object is not completely removed, and the conclusions that it reaches are not apodictically certain. In a very similar way, theoretical scientific knowledge, which is also achieved through luciferic cognition, is a human construct. It, too, apprehends its object by combining the phanic material with theoretical elements contributed by the subject and molded by the subject’s abyssal categories. Like religious cognition, scientific cognition does not positiveadequately cognize its object. The mystery of its object is not completely removed, and the conclusions that it reaches are, like those of religious cognition, never apodictically certain. It can be seen, then, that while there is a significant difference between scientific knowledge and religious knowledge in regards to the nature of the objects of their respective inquiries, there is also a great deal of similarity when it comes to the methods that they employ in approaching their objects. This similarity stems from the censored nature of both objects. This censorship can, in both instances, be only partially overcome. In both instances this partial overcoming is achieved through the methodology of luciferic cognition. The result of any act of luciferic cognition is a construct. All such constructs are influenced by culture via the abyssal categories, and in no instance is such a construct apodictically certain. The similarity and the difference between science and religion can be summarized as follows: theoretical science begins with empirical data and moves to exploration of immanent mystery, while religious knowledge of the transcendent begins with empirical data and moves to exploration of transcendent mystery. This understanding of the natures of scientific knowledge and religious knowledge has direct implications on the discussion of the relationship between religion and science.

Implications of Blaga’s View for Religion and Science The problem introduced at the outset of this chapter was that of the nature of the relationship between religion and science. The question posed is whether this relationship is one of competition, complimentarity, or compartmentalization. In order for there to be competition between religion and science, there must exist some degree of overlap between them. If no overlap exists at all, then they are completely compartmentalized and cannot be in competition with one another. Whether or not there is overlap between science and religion is a question about their respective objects and their respective methodologies. It was stated earlier that there are two extremes of interpretation of the nature and degree of overlap between religion and science. At one end of the spectrum is the view that there is neither a significant metaphysical nor

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a significant methodological difference between scientific cognition and religious cognition. This view allows for both competition and complimentarity. At the other end of the spectrum is the view that the relationship between religion and science is one of total compartmentalization, that each has a unique object and methodology not shared by the other. If the latter is the case, the results of scientific cognition and religious cognition could still be viewed as complementary, but they will not be in competition, since they do not overlap. It is possible to view scientific cognition and religious cognition as having either real objects or nonreal objects, and it is possible to view scientific cognition and religious cognition as employing either realist methodologies (epistemologies) or nonrealist methodologies. The most common interpretations of science and religion view science as a realist enterprise and religion as metaphysically realist but methodologically either realist or nonrealist. Common to both of these views is the assumption of the methodological realism of science. When both science and religion are viewed as methodologically realist, then there is a great degree of overlap between them. It is this sort of scenario that results in the oft-heard discussions of conflict between science and religion. This view also permits complimentarity between the disciplines: since they are addressing similar issues using similar methods, they can guide and correct each other. When science is viewed as realist but religion is viewed as methodologically nonrealist, there is less overlap between them and less potential for conflict. In such a situation the results of the two endeavors are expected to be distinct, and therefore differences between them are not a surprise. It may still be possible to view the results of the two to be complementary, since one can be viewed as supplying empirical knowledge of things immanent while the other can be viewed as supplying theoretical knowledge of things that are not immanent. Blaga’s philosophy, however, provides a different perspective on the relation of science and religion. Blaga rejects methodological realism both in scientific cognition and in religious cognition. As discussed previously, Blaga views the objects of both science and religion as being real. However, he views the methodologies employed by both as being very significantly antirealist. According to Blaga, both science and religion are epistemologically constructivist. The above comments yield the following analysis of the similarities and differences of scientific and religious cognition. The objects of Baconian science and empirical religious cognition are real and have the potential for considerable overlap. The methods employed in Baconian science and in empirical religious cognition are constructivist, employ the same categories of the understanding, and therefore overlap methodologically. The objects of theoretical science and religious cognition of the transcendent

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are real, but do not overlap, since the former are immanent whereas the latter is transcendent. The methods employed in theoretical science and in religious cognition of the transcendent are constructivist, employ the abyssal categories, and therefore overlap methodologically. According to this analysis of the situation, the significant difference between scientific cognition and religious cognition is the immanence or transcendence of their respective object(s) in the most advanced or theoretical state of scientific and religious cognition. Only in this one aspect is there compartmentalization of the disciplines. Baconian science and empirical religious cognition have the potential of conflict and of the type of complimentarity that can lead to mutual correction. Theoretical science and religious cognition of the transcendent share the same (or similar) methodology, but because of the difference of their object they cannot come into conflict. They can be viewed as complementary if one accepts that science provides useful cognition of the immanent aspects of human existence while religion provides useful cognition of the transcendent aspects of human existence. The great success of theoretical science, which has led to a tremendous increase in the prestige accorded to the natural sciences, is perhaps responsible for a corresponding decrease in the prestige accorded to theology. This is largely because science and religion are viewed as incompatible approaches to answering the same questions. The success of science is thought to indicate a corresponding failure on the part of religious cognition. If, as Blaga’s philosophy indicates, theoretical science and religious cognition do not share the same object, then the conclusion that the successes of theoretical science disprove the claims of religious cognition is erroneous. Furthermore, if Blaga’s philosophy is correct, the success of the methodology of theoretical science, which has won science such acclaim, actually bolsters the claims of religious cognition of the transcendent, since theoretical science and religious cognition of the transcendent utilize related methodologies (both utilize versions of luciferic cognition). Finally, because theoretical science and religious cognition of the transcendent apprehend real but distinct aspects of human existence, they should be viewed as complementary human inquiries leading to equally valid though different cognitions of their distinct objects. At the beginning of this chapter were mentioned several problems related to the two polar positions taken on the relation of religion and science. The problems associated with the view that there is no relevant metaphysical or epistemological distinction between God and creation that were mentioned are: 1. The possibility of undermining of the transcendence of God; and 2. A possible tendency toward material reductionism in explaining religious phenomena. Blaga’s analysis of the science-religion situation preserves the transcendence of God and at the same time avoids

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reductionist explanations of religious phenomena. The problems mentioned associated with the view that religion and science are entirely distinct spheres that do not overlap are: 1. The question of how the Creator could create and/or govern a world so foreign to and separate from Itself; and 2. The question of how the religion of immanent human beings can have any relation to a Creator who is entirely transcendent. Blaga’s metaphysics provides an elaborate explanation of how the MA could create, perpetuate, and regulate a world that the MA completely transcends (see chapter 4). It must be admitted that Blaga’s philosophy allows for only an extremely limited cognitive relationship between humans and their Creator—they can posit the existence of a Creator and creatively attempt to reveal the Creator’s attributes and desires, but all such attempts are at best partially successful because of the limits imposed by transcendent censorship and stylistic breaking (see chapters 4, 6, and 7). Nonetheless, Blaga’s epistemology does provide a unique explanation of the cognitive strategy employed in attempting to apprehend the transcendent, and does provide means for validating the results of such attempts. In addition, Blaga’s philosophy gives the religious attempts of human beings meaning within the plan of the MA. Religion is part of the creative drive that the MA has bestowed upon humanity. While it cannot positive-adequately attain its goal, it does attain the MA’s goal (chapters 4, 6, and 7).

14 The Problem of Interreligious Communication The Contemporary Debate

There is a debate in contemporary philosophy over the possibility or impossibility of interreligious understanding and communication. This problem is perhaps more widely acknowledged in the Continental than in the analytic tradition, but has also received some attention in English-language philosophy of religion.1 Interreligious dialogue has become a very important theater of religious and philosophical reflection. However, frustration is a common experience in interreligious dialogue. This has led to a dialogue about dialogue.2 Some have suggested that even dialogue does not guarantee the ability of overcoming the barriers to interreligious communication, and therefore such frustration may always be part of some attempts at interreligious communications.3 The question of the existence and size of such a communicational chasm is the subject of this chapter, as well as the question of whether such a chasm (if one truly exists) can be overcome. That there exist a number of religions and ideologies that are so different 1. Influential Continental philosophers have written on the topic of interideological communication; see, for example, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: Seabury Press, 1975), and Philosophical Hermeneutics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976); Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), and Margins of Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); and J¨urgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), and Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987). For views from English-language philosophy of religion, see many of the contributions to Religious Pluralism and Truth: Essays on Cross-Cultural Philosophy of Religion, ed. Thomas Dean (New York: State University of New York Press, 1995), and some of the contributions to Toward a Universal Theology of Religion, ed. Leonard Swidler (New York: Orbis Books, 1987). 2. A dialogue about dialogue is what takes place in Toward a Universal Theology of Religion, ed. Leonard Swidler, especially sections 3, 4, and 5, 118–250. 3. See, for example, Norbert M. Samuelson, “The Logic of Interreligious Dialogue,” in Religious Pluralism and Truth, ed. Thomas Dean, 146; and Raimundo Panikkar, “The Invisible Harmony: A Universal Theory of Religion or a Cosmic Confidence in Reality?” in Toward a Universal Theology of Religion, ed. Leonard Swindler, 124 –32.

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from each other that they encounter difficulties in communicating with each other is not disputed.4 The nature of this diversity will be discussed in the following chapter. It is possible to view the differences between these belief systems as insignificant and surmountable, as significant but surmountable, or as significant and insurmountable. If the differences between these belief systems are accepted as being significant, it is possible to view the conflicting beliefs involved either as truly incompatible or as complementary. It is possible to view religious diversity positively or negatively. Positively, many view diversity as having aesthetic benefit. Some also view diversity as having pragmatic benefits. Negatively, it could be argued that among multiple incompatible beliefs on a given subject only one of them can be correct, and that therefore diversity often points to widespread cognitive error. It can also be pointed out that diversity often leads to conflict. Interreligious communication is useful, perhaps even critical, to avoiding conflict between groups holding to different beliefs. It would seem that since all humans are probably descended from common ancestors and since all humans inhabit largely similar environments, all human belief systems should be reducible to a set of common elements. If, on the other hand, real pluralism (multiple incompatible systems) exists, then there can be no inclusive reconciliation except at the cost of the elimination of pluralism.5 The diversity of existent belief systems could be a result of a situation in which a variety of distinct equally valid interpretations is possible, or it could simply be an indication that human cognition is prone to error. That disparate beliefs are as widely held and pervasively defended as they are has been taken to suggest that there is more than one possible and accurate way of interpreting reality. On the other hand, it could be an indication of the extent of human cognitive error. It has been suggested that if all belief systems are reducible to a set of common elements, then there exist sufficient commonalties within the nonreduced systems to enable communication.6 If, on the other hand, real pluralism exists, interideological communication may not be possible. 4. In this context the term “ideology” is being used to refer to any systematic body of beliefs, including religions and belief systems that are not usually considered religions but that share significant similarities with religion, such as Marxism, scientism, humanism, and other such systems. This use of the term “ideology” has precedent in the World Council of Churches’ Guidelines on Dialogue with People of Living Faiths and Ideologies (Geneva: WCC, 1979) and in other publications of the World Council of Churches. 5. “The striving for categorial unity between different worlds necessarily leads to reductionism either in the form of semantic/ontological imperialism or of abstract synthesism.” Ashok K. Gangadean, “The Hermeneutics of Comparative Ontology and Comparative Theology,” in Religious Pluralism and Truth, ed. Thomas Dean, 228. 6. This has been argued by Noam Chomsky; see Chomsky, Rules and Representations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 206–15, 226, 232–34, and many other passages.

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In addition to these epistemological facets of the problem of interreligious communication there is an aesthetic aspect to the problem. It can be argued that the valuation of truth-criteria is aesthetic: that the valuation of homogeneity or consistency over diversity or paradox, and vice versa, is an aesthetic judgment. It is also possible that the weight given to certain kinds of support in one tradition versus other types of support in another tradition (e.g., historical evidence rather than contemplative experience) is based on aesthetic criteria, and that allegiance to a system is sometimes a result of the personal appeal and satisfaction of a system, which may vary from one individual to another. The price of unity may be the loss of diversity or of individual identity, and vice versa. So, what might seem like gain to one may seem like loss to another. Furthermore, the price of diversity and/or individual identity may be the loss of universal intelligibility (it has been argued that diversity entails incommensurability).7 If that is the case, then interreligious communication may only be possible at the cost of diversity and individuality. It has been argued, from the perspective of hermeneutics, that the meanings of terms are strictly relative to the belief systems in which they are used.8 Some have argued that because of this, belief systems can only be understood from within, and therefore there can be no objective comparison or evaluation of such systems.9 This argument may err in viewing such understanding as an “all-or-nothing” affair. It may be more accurate to view understanding as occurring in degrees (that is, understanding might better be viewed as being shallow, poor, good, better, profound, etc.). If that is the case, it still may be possible that systems of belief can only be well understood when understood from within. A number of thinkers have also argued that there is no neutral ground from which competing truth-claims can be viewed—no “God’s-eye perspective”—and that therefore it is not possible to have an objective evaluative comparison of the truth-claims of different belief systems. However, this argument may overlook the significant distinction between 7. Margolis, Historied Thought, Constructed World, 169; Gangadean, “The Hermeneutics of Comparative Ontology and Comparative Theology,” in Religious Pluralism and Truth, ed. Thomas Dean, 229. 8. Ashok K. Gangadean, “The Hermeneutics of Comparative Ontology and Comparative Theology,” 225–26. 9. This is argued by Michel Foucault in “What is Enlightenment?” in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 32–50. A similar line of thought is applied to religions by Panikkar, in “The Invisible Harmony: A Universal Theory of Religion or a Cosmic Confidence in Reality?” in Toward a Universal Theology of Religion, ed. Leonard Swidler, 118–53, and perhaps in Dean’s “Universal Theology and Dialogical Dialogue” (ibid.), where he states that “Theology, as a human, cultural, historical enterprise, can be done only from some particular perspective or other, and any claims to be able to dispense with such a perspective or to universalize it must simply be rejected” (173).

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truth-claims and truth-criteria. While truth-claims differ in such situations, truth-criteria might possibly be the same, which might make possible the evaluation of the truth-claims of adherents to various belief systems. Ninian Smart has analyzed a variety of attitudes toward religious diversity and criteria by which religions can be evaluationally compared, and has concluded that although there are no absolutely neutral arenas of comparison, there are at least seven valid interreligious evaluative criteria.10 William Wainright, sympathetic to Smart’s analysis, has proposed additional criteria.11 Additionally, it is possible that all belief-systems share at least some minimal number of common elements (common experiences, common communicative elements, etc.). These shared elements may enable interreligious communication,12 but more than that, how successfully these common elements are accounted for by each system can be a criterion of evaluation. Central to the issue of the possibility of interreligious communication, then, are two important and interrelated questions: 1. Which is more significant, the shared elements of human belief systems or the differences between human belief systems? and 2. Do the shared elements of human belief systems provide a basis for interreligious communication, or do the differences between them prevent such communication? Some have argued that the two opposing forces (difference and commonality, or communication and estrangement) may exist simultaneously, and that the concurrence of the two may in fact be a primary factor in dialogue.13 No accord has been reached about the possibility of such a resolution of this dilemma: the questions of the commensurability and the communicability of belief systems continue to be discussed by philosophers, religious scholars, and linguists. 10. Ninian Smart, “Truth, Criteria, and Dialogue,” in Religious Pluralism and Truth, ed. Thomas Dean, 67–71. The seven criteria that Smart lists are: 1. The appeal to religious experience; 2. The appeal to history; 3. The appeal to charismatic authority; 4. The appeal of ethical fruits; 5. The appeal of “modernity”; 6. The appeal to psychological relevance; and 7. The appeal to aesthetic properties. 11. William Wainright, “Doctrinal Schemes, Metaphysics and Propositional Truth,” in Religious Pluralism and Truth, ed. Thomas Dean, 73–86. Wainright’s additional criteria are internal consistency, coherence, simplicity, scope, explanatory adequacy, and existential or pragmatic utility (81). 12. As is argued in Habermas’ theory of “universal pragmatics,” and also in Gadamer’s understanding of philosophical hermeneutics, see Mary Ann Stenger, “Gadamer’s Hermeneutics as a Model for Cross-Cultural Understanding and Truth in Religion,” in Religious Pluralism and Truth, ed. Thomas Dean, 156–62. 13. Dean discusses the significance of religions being open to dialogue and simultaneously being opaque from the point of view of being understood by other religions in “Universal Theology and Dialogical Dialogue,” in Toward a Universal Theology of Religion, ed. Leonard Swidler, 170.

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Blaganian Contributions Blaga seems to be aware of the problem of communication between differing belief systems. This is seen in his statements to the effect that cultural and subjective factors play a large role in determining the reception or rejection of metaphysical systems. Blaga addresses the issue more directly in a short discussion of the supposed “impermeability of cultures” in OS.14 In light of Blaga’s emphasis on the role of culture in cognition, his constructivism, and his epistemological modesty with regard to the knowledge of other kinds of cognitive objects, it would be no surprise if he sees interideological communication as being potentially problematic. According to Blaga’s philosophy, the probable reason for the problematic nature of communication between belief systems is stylistic braking, which is explained in chapter 6. Stylistic braking is a method employed by the MA for the purpose of preserving its own hegemony and thereby preserving the order of creation. Stylistic braking operates by necessitating that all human creations, including belief systems, occur through the guiding and molding influences of stylistic matrices. Religions and other similar ideological systems involve both type I (paradisaic) and type II (luciferic) cognition. Luciferic cognitions involve creative constructs that provide theoretical explanations of the issues relevant to the particular system. Since all creative acts are affected by a stylistic matrix, the creative constructs of type II cognition are as well. Therefore the theoretical explanations offered by any religion are affected by the culture of the people involved in constructing that religion. The belief system of any religion is not a single construct: it is a complex of constructs. Religions involve a complex interweaving of large numbers of elements derived at least in part from the historical cultural settings of the people who have constructed them. Here it becomes important to point out that stylistic matrices affect not only the production of stylistic creations, but also their reception. As was stated earlier (in chapter 6), luciferic cognition is limited by both transcendent censorship and the “stylistic brakes,” which are the abyssal categories that comprise any stylistic matrix. Therefore all luciferic cognition is culturally relative.15 The abyssal categories function both positively and negatively in cognition, and these two functions are intrinsically related. They function as a structural medium for the theoretical cognition, and as a limit to this cognition (the latter is properly the “stylistic brakes”). Thus, as 14. “Impermeabilitatea culturilor,” OS, 184. In this context Blaga criticizes Spengler for supporting the view of such impermeability, accusing Spengler of transposing Leibniz’ metaphysics onto a philosophy of culture, and thus making cultures comparable to monads without windows (OS, 184 –85). 15. S¸ C, 199, 211.

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previously stated, the abyssal categories both facilitate human creativity and prevent human creativity from reaching absolute adequacy.16 Likewise, the abyssal categories both facilitate theoretical cognition and prevent such cognition from being positive-adequate. The fact that human theoretical constructs are so intrinsically cultural may explain why different belief systems sometimes seem to each other to be opaque. Understanding a belief system or the statements of its adherents is not so simple and straightforward as it at first appears. Understanding a belief system involves sharing in or at least understanding the cultural matrix that produced it. This involves the sharing or at least understanding of a whole complex network of cultural and historical elements that may be largely foreign to the person trying to do the understanding. The heightened emphasis that Blaga places on the cultural factors in cognition and creation might make it seem that interreligious understanding is doomed to failure, or at best to very moderate success. According to Blaga, however, it is the very same cultural factors that render interreligious understanding problematic that also make it possible. According to Blaga, all (complete) humans have a cultural (stylistic) matrix.17 This matrix is defined as a group or constellation of factors that together determine the style of the creations of a person or society. It is the sum of all the stylistic categories and their influences upon a person’s creativity. A cultural matrix is composed of four primary factors and an unspecified number of secondary factors (as is explained in chapter 6). Two different creative styles can be separated by as little as one of these secondary factors. It is theoretically possible, then, that two belief systems could be truly incommensurable, if their respective matrices share no common factors (neither primary nor secondary). In reality, however, this is not the case. Stylistic categories are shaped by the environment in which one lives. Environmental commonalties can lead to similarities in stylistic matrices. Since all humans share some environmental commonalties, it seems that there will always be at least some areas of overlap between their stylistic matrices. Just as differences in matrices are responsible (at least in part) for the difficulties of interreligious communication, overlapping areas of matrices are what enables interreligious communication.18 Since all humans have at 16. FI, 492–94. 17. Blaga does not directly address the question of the status of those humans who, because of a mental disability, are not able to function on the level of luciferic cognition. His writings make it clear that he views luciferic creativity as the acme of humanness. They might also be taken to imply that luciferic creativity is necessary to full human personhood. 18. It seems possible that some instances of communicative difficulty may be caused by simple accidental misunderstanding. Likewise, it seems possible that some instances of communicative success may be due simply to happy accident.

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least some areas of overlap between their stylistic matrices, there is always a foothold for interreligious communication. It is the existence of commonalties between stylistic matrices that enables understanding and communication between cultures. According to Blaga, the extent of theoretical commensurability resulting from intermatricial overlap goes beyond mere understanding and communication: he states that it enables “contamination” of one culture by another.19 The questions with which this chapter opened involved the existence and extent of the communicational chasm between religions and the question of whether such a chasm (if one exists) can be overcome. In attempting to answer these questions two related issues surfaced: 1. Which is more significant, the shared elements of human belief systems or the differences between human belief systems? and 2. Do the shared elements of human belief systems provide a basis for interreligious communication or do the differences between them prevent such communication? Blaga’s philosophy has provided tentative answers to all of these questions. According to Blaga’s philosophy, the differences between belief systems are significant. They are the significant expressions of the culture and the creativity of those who are their creators. These differences form a chasm between the belief systems. They impede interreligious understanding. However, regardless of the differences or similarities between religions, Blaga would doubtless say that positive-adequate cognition of a religion is not possible. However, according to Blaga’s analysis, the differences that separate religions only account for half of the situation. The other half of the situation involves the commonalties between the abyssal matrices that shape religions as human creations. These commonalties enable people from different religions to begin to understand each other and to communicate. Thus it can be seen that both the differences and the commonalties between belief systems are significant. Neither seems more significant than the other within Blaga’s system. The commonalties are effective in providing a basis of interreligious communication, but they do not eliminate the differences between belief systems, nor do they guarantee that interreligious communication will be easy.

19. “Teorea noastr˘a despre ‘matricea stilistic˘a’, ˆın ˆınteles de complex incon¸stient de factori determinan¸ti discontinui, care pot fi izola¸ti, lamure¸ste modul cum, cu toata specificitatea unei culturi sau a unui stil, e totu¸si posibil˘a s¸i contaminarea de la cultur˘a la cultur˘a, de la stil la stil” (OS, 185).

15 The Problem of Religious Pluralism The so-called “problem of religious pluralism” is the following: all religions claim to be true. However, significant doctrines of most of the world’s religious appear to be, at least prima facie, incompatible with each other. Therefore (accepting the principle of noncontradiction and the incommensurability of religions) either only one religion is true or none are. It does not seem possible that all of the world’s religions are true. This is a problem for several reasons. First, it is a problem because each religion has arguments in its favor, which seems to indicate that each might be true, which would necessitate a state in which multiple incompatible theses are true. Second, it is a problem because if only one religion is true, then there may be dire consequences for the very many adherents of all the other religions.1 Third, because if no religion is true, then almost all of humanity has bought into a cognitive mistake, and in a very large way. However, some have disputed an underlying premise of this construal of the situation, the premise that the world’s religions are in the final analysis incompatible. Several alternative interpretations of the situation have been proposed. Some of these interpretations view the plurality of religions as a situation of complementarity in diversity; others see it as a case of irreconcilable diversity but without contradiction. 1. Norman Solomon discusses the question of whether religious plurality is problematic, and points out that 1. Religious pluralism only poses a problem when the truth-claims of the different religions are discussed; and that 2. The soteriological aspect of the problem only arises in contexts where the acceptance of such truth-claims is considered essential to salvation. Solomon argues that in religions where salvation is not believed to be determined by correct belief this aspect of the problem does not arise. However, one might argue that the problem arises in any instance where there are significant soteriological differences between religions. For example, noncognitive soteriologies based on an attitude of trust in God, righteous living, or performance of rituals also seem mutually exclusive. This calls into question Solomon’s suggestion that the soteriological aspect of the problem is tied to a particular type of cognitively oriented soteriology, and perhaps also his suggestion that the problem of religious pluralism only arises when the truth-claims of religions are discussed. Normon Solomon, “Is the Plurality of Faiths Problematic?” in God, Truth and Reality: Essays in Honour of John Hick, ed. Arvind Sharma (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 189–99.

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A successful theory, in addition to providing an explanation of the relationship between the world’s religions, must provide an account of both the numerous differences and the striking similarities between the world’s religions. Blaga’s philosophy can make useful contributions to this discussion on several levels. It can provide explanations of both the similarities and the differences between world religions, and it can provide an explanation of the relationship between the world’s religions. Furthermore, Blaga’s philosophy can provide a theoretical background that will facilitate a better understanding and an appropriate valuation of the issue, and an epistemological framework to guide the investigation. In some ways Blaga’s thought in this area is similar to that of several contemporary philosophers of religion. In other ways Blaga’s thought seems to be completely original.

Four Contemporary Views of Religious Pluralism Perhaps the most traditional view of religious diversity is the one that has come to be labeled “exclusivism.”2 This is the view that the differences between religions are real and significant, and that only one of the world’s religions can be true. This view does not necessarily affirm that all of the teachings of other religions are false, but it does affirm that the central theses of the world’s religions are incommensurable and therefore only one of them can be true.3 Adherents to the world’s religions often view the relationship between their religion and the world’s other religions in an exclusivist way. Many or perhaps most religious people view their own religion as true and, coupling this belief with an intuition of incommensurability, therefore view all other religions as false. It is sometimes the case that exclusivist adherents of a particular religion view their religion as the only salvifically efficacious religion. However, this is not always the case: sometimes exclusivist adherents of a particular religion view their religion as the only true religion but do not make a connection between veracity and soteriology, and therefore do not view the adherents of other religions as inevitably lacking salvation. One philosophical example of religious exclusivism is Albert Schweitzer’s book Christianity and the Religions of the World.4 Schweitzer 2. See John Hick, ed., Problems of Religious Pluralism (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1985), 28–66; Peterson et al. eds., Reason and Religious Belief, 221. 3. Peterson et al., eds., Reason and Religious Belief, 222; Calvin E. Shenk, Who Do You Say That I AM? Christians Encounter Other Religions (Scottdale, PA: Herald Press, 1997), 98–109. 4. Albert Schweitzer, Christianity and the Religions of the World (New York: Macmillian, 1950). There are many other contemporary examples of exclusivism: see, for

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discusses the central ideals of the world’s religions and evaluates them according to their originality, depth, and ethical impulse.5 Although Schweitzer concludes that the great Eastern religions are philosophically profound, he finds that Christianity is unique and superior because it is inherently and profoundly an ethical religion.6 There are many contemporary philosophical and theological defenders of exclusivism. Their arguments are sometimes of an a priori nature, arguing for the truth of one religion and inferring from this the untruth of all others. Exclusivists often argue in an a posteriori fashion, however, examining the differences between religions and arguing that their significance prevents more than one religion from being true. Exclusivists take the differences between religions very seriously. On the other hand, some might accuse exclusivists of not sufficiently taking into account the similarities between religions.7 Other objections to exclusivism are possible as well, including objections to the underlying bivalent logic employed, hermeneutical objections to the possibility of objectively comparing religions, and epistemological objections to the possibility of any religion adequately grasping its object. One alternative to exclusivism is the view sometimes referred to as “inclusivism.” Inclusivism is the view that regardless of the differences between the world’s great religions, they all spring from (or lead to) the same source. According to this view, the world’s great religions can ultimately be reconciled or at minimum point toward the same reality. What exactly that reality is believed to be differs according to the particular inclusivist account involved. This view is “inclusive” because its advocates try to show how the world’s other religions can be included within his or her own religion. Several religions have inclusivism as one of their central tenets. These include some versions of Hinduism, Jainism, the Baha’i faith, some versions of the Quaker movement, and Unitarian Universalism. There are inclusivist groups within many other religious movements as well. Within Christianity, inclusivism has a history dating back at least as far as Irenaeus. Several early Christian theologians wrote that other religions instance, Earnst Troeltsch, The Absoluteness of Christianity and the History of Religions (Richmond, VA: John Knox Press, 1971); S. Mark Heim, Is Christ the Only Way? Christian Faith in a Pluralistic World (Valley Forge, PA: Judson Press, 1985); James Borland, “A Theologian Looks at the Gospel and World Religions,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 33, no. 1 (March 1990): 3–11; and Shenk, Who Do You Say That I AM? 5. Schweitzer, Christianity and the Religions of the World, 32, 37, 72. Schweitzer specifically disavows evaluating religions based on their implementation of these ideals (35). 6. Ibid., 73ff. 7. See, for example, Schweitzer, Christianity and the Religions of the World, 43, 47ff., 57, where he dismisses similarities between Christianity and other religions.

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and belief systems do contain some truth. The source of this truth is general revelation, viewed as the work of the preincarnate Logos, whereas the source of the truths of Christianity is special revelation, especially in the person of the incarnate Logos, Christ. This distinction between general and supernatural revelation, which can also be found in the Bible, allowed these early Christian thinkers to acknowledge the good in other religions while maintaining the ultimate superiority of Christianity.8 One contemporary Christian theologian who advocates this approach to inclusivism is Clark Pinnock.9 Pinnock has argued that the “wideness” of God’s mercy extends to the unevangelized as well as to Christians, that because of this the Christian understanding of the meaning of the term “revelation” includes revelations received by non-Christians as well as Christians, and that the Spirit of God is the instrument of both types of revelation.10 A philosophical example of religious inclusivism is Karl Rahner’s chapter “Christianity and the Non-Christian Religions.”11 Rahner argues that some members of religions other than Christianity are in fact redeemed through Christ. He supports this thesis with the following line of reasoning: the Bible seems to indicate that prior to the coming of Christ it was possible to be saved without having specific knowledge of Christ. Before Christianity, there were other religions that had some knowledge of God 8. For example, compare the writings of the apostle Paul in Romans 1:18–20 and Ephesians 3:3. See also John B. Cobb Jr., Beyond Dialogue: Toward a Mutual Transformation of Christianity and Buddhism (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982), 2–15. Cobb mentions Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria, Irenaeus, Augustine, and Basil of Caesarea as advocating this view (to differing extents). 9. Pinnock is a Protestant theologian. A similar position from a Roman Catholic perspective is found in Henri de Lubac, Catholicism: A Study of Dogma in Relation to the Corporate Destiny of Mankind (London: Burns & Oats, 1950), 107–25. 10. See Clark H. Pinnock, A Wideness in God’s Mercy: The Finality of Jesus Christ in a World of Religions (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1992), 149–80; The Scripture Principle (Vancouver, BC: Regent College Publishing, 1984), 3–20; and Clark H. Pinnock, Flame of Love: A Theology of the Holy Spirit (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1996), 185– 214. 11. Karl Rahner, “Christianity and the Non-Christian Religions,” in Christianity and Other Religions, ed. John Hick and Brian Hebblethwaite (Glasgow: William Collins Sons & Co., 1980), 52–79. Other examples of inclusivism found in this book include “Vatican II: Declaration on the Relation of the Church to Non-Christian Religions,” 80–86, and Raimundo Panikkar, “The Unknown Christ of Hinduism,” 122–50. See also Raimundo Panikkar, A Dwelling Place for Wisdom (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1993), 148– 53; Willard G. Oxtoby, ed., Religious Diversity: Essays by Wilfred Cantwell Smith (New York: Harper and Row, 1976); and Francis X. Clooney, “Reading the World in Christ: From Comparison to Inclusivism,” and M. M. Thomas, “A Christ-Centered Humanist Approach to Other Religions in the Indian Pluralistic Context,” in Christian Uniqueness Reconsidered: The Myth of a Pluralistic Theology of Religions, ed. Gavin D’Costa (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1990), 63–80 and 49–62.

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and received God’s grace. God’s grace (mediated through Christ) extended to all those who responded to God’s moving. This is because “God desires the salvation of everyone” (probably a reference to 2 Peter 3:9 in the New Testament).12 Post-Advent religions are in a similar situation. God’s love continues to extend to all people. Non-Christian religions continue to have some truths. Non-Christian people continue to be drawn by God and to respond to this drawing. According to Rahner, the saving grace of God extends to these people just as it extended to non-Christian people prior to the Advent, saving them through Christ without their having specific knowledge of Christ. Therefore Rahner proposes that such people be considered “anonymous Christians.” Inclusivism is able to accept both the similarities and differences between religions without showing preference to either the similarities or the differences. The similarities can be attributed to cultural elements and to the ubiquitous moving of God. The differences can be attributed to cultural elements and to resistance to God’s leading. Other criticisms of inclusivism are possible, however. It seems clear that inclusivism privileges one religion above all others, which would likely be objectionable to the adherents of the other religions. If a religion’s doctrinal system is such that being a subset of another religion is contradictory or somehow incompatible with the first religion, then it may not be possible for an inclusivist religion or ideology to subsume this religion. This would lead to an at least partial failure of inclusivism. This may in fact be the case with many religions: many (perhaps most) religions include a doctrine about their own uniqueness and superiority. For such a religion to accept a position of subsumption under another religion within an inclusivist schema would entail a relinquishing or drastic alteration of this aspect of its self-perception. This might well entail such a radical revision of that religion that it is no longer truly the same religion. Another alternative to exclusivism is the view that could perhaps be well described as “soft pluralism.” Soft pluralism is the view that although the differences between the world’s religions are significant, ultimately the world’s religions can be reconciled or point toward the same ultimate reality. This is pluralistic in that it recognizes real diversity and does not privilege one religion over others. It is “soft” because it does not view the relationship between religions as one of incorrigibility: religions are different but all relate to the same ultimate reality. One philosophical example of soft religious pluralism is John Hick’s article, “Whatever Path Men Choose is Mine.”13 Hick argues that all of the 12. Rahner, “Christianity and the Non-Christian Religions,” 63. 13. John Hick, “Whatever Path Men Choose is Mine,” in Hick and Hebblethwaite, Christianity and Other Religions, 171–90. Hick has published four books dealing specifi-

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world’s major religions are (legitimate) responses to a single ultimate reality. At the same time he makes it clear that his version of pluralism values and seeks to preserve religious diversity. Hick’s solution to the problem of religious diversity hinges on an adaptation of Kant’s epistemology.14 According to Kant, the knowing subject does not have direct access to or knowledge of things in themselves, what he calls “noumena.” What the subject experiences are called “phenomena.” Phenomena are the experiences that the noumena cause in the person experiencing them. Phenomenal experiences are subjective, being constructs composed of empirical inputs as processed by the faculty of human understanding. How the subject experiences a particular object depends on the categories of the understanding and on the circumstances of the subject and the experience. The categories of the understanding, according to Kant, are universal: they are the same in all people. On the other hand, the circumstances in which the subject experiences the object can vary considerably. This accounts for the great diversity of experiences that an object can cause in different subjects or in the same subject at different times. Kant himself did not apply this aspect of his epistemology to religion because he was convinced that God cannot be an object of experience. However, Hick observes that many people do in fact claim to have experiences of God. He affirms that this large body of evidence should not be simply ignored. Therefore Hick considers himself justified in applying Kant’s epistemology to claimed experiences of God. Although Kant cannot, according to his own theory, empirically prove that the noumenal object exists, because he does not have direct access to any thing-in-itself, he asserts that one is justified in positing the existence of the noumenal in order to explain the existence of the phenomenal. Hick uses a very similar strategy in his philosophy of religion. He posits the existence of a transcendent reality, God. This God cannot be experienced directly, since it is transcendent. But it can be experienced as a phenomenon. These phenomenal experiences of the transcendent are what are commonly called “religious experiences.” They are the experiences caused in the subject by the noumenal object, which experiences are constructs cally with this issue: God and the Universe of Faiths: Essays in the Philosophy of Religion (London: Macmillan Press, 1973), God Has Many Names (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1982), Problems of Religious Pluralism (London: Macmillan Press, 1985), and An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent (London: Macmillan Press, 1989). The very titles seem to suggest Hick’s mildly pluralistic approach to religious diversity. See also Frithjof Schuon, The Transcendent Unity of Religions (Wheaton, IL: Theosophical Publishing House, 1984); and Paul F. Knitter, No Other Name? (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1985), 1–20. 14. This is best seen in Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, chapter 14, “The Pluralistic Hypothesis,” 233–51.

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composed of inputs that are processed by the faculty of human understanding according to its categories and the circumstances in which the experience takes place. This epistemological framework provides Hick with a means of answering various questions relating to religious diversity, such as those mentioned above. If there exists a transcendent being, and if this being is available to human experience, then we should expect to see many experiences of this being occurring throughout the world. Furthermore, if these experiences exist throughout the world, then they will necessarily occur in a variety of different contexts. If our knowledge of this being is constructed from these experiences and the categories of the understanding plus other circumstantial factors, as in the Kantian epistemology, then we should expect to see beliefs about the transcendent being that reflect many different points of view. These points of view, or “interpretations of the transcendent,” to use one of Hick’s phrases, should be expected to contain both similarities and differences, as a result of the similarities and differences of the contexts in which the experiences have taken place. All of these interpretations of the transcendent are legitimate, regardless of their differences. Through this strategic adaptation of Kant’s epistemology Hick believes that both the unity and diversity of religions is both explained and preserved. The benefits of Hick’s solution are numerous: it provides an inclusive account of the relationship between the world’s religions that explains both their similarities and their differences without privileging any one religion over the others and perhaps without offending the adherents of any. Furthermore, it accomplishes this through the application of a widely respected (though also widely criticized) epistemology to the issue. However, Hick’s proposal may be vulnerable at a few points. The first of these is the adoption of Kant’s fairly controversial epistemology. It seems fair to say that Hick’s proposal rises and falls with the success of Kant’s epistemology. The second is the application of Kant’s epistemology to God, an object to which Kant would not have applied it. Whether or not this application is appropriate is subject to debate. Finally, it might be objected that the differences between the world’s religions are more radical than Hick’s theory would lead one to believe. This final objection to Hick’s proposal comes from those who advocate what is in some ways the most polar alternative to exclusivism: strong pluralism. Strong pluralism is the view that the differences between the world’s religions are significant and justified and the world’s religions are incommensurable. This points toward a unique aspect of this position: it suggests that multiple incompatible beliefs are justified. One contemporary philosopher who advocates a strong pluralist view is William P. Alston. In his article “Religious Experience and Religious

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Belief,” Alston discusses the role of religious experience in the justification of particular religions.15 By comparing the justification provided by religious experience to that provided by nonreligious experience, he provides an analysis of the question whether direct religious experiences in a variety of traditions are able to justify those traditions. According to Alston, each of the world’s major religions includes accounts of direct religious experiences. These experiences are admittedly tradition-bound. There are, however, a variety of reasons to suppose that they are valid when compared to the means of validating nonreligious experiences. Nonetheless, at least some of these tradition-bound experiences provide incompatible accounts of reality. Therefore they cannot all be true. Because each of them is confronted with uneliminated alternatives, no one is justified in holding to any of them if there are no independent reasons for preferring one of them over the others. Therefore what is needed for any of the traditions involved to be validated by their respective experiences is a reason independent of the experiences for preferring one of the traditions over the others. Alston finds two possible reasons for preferring one direct-religiousexperience including religious tradition over others: 1. A tradition would be preferred over other equally valid traditions if there is fulfillment in the lives of practitioners of the promises that the tradition represents God as making (growth in sanctity, love, joy, etc.); and 2. By an analogy with diverse ways of constructing sensory experience (Aristotelian, Cartesian, Whiteheadian), Alston argues that it is more practical to abide in one’s tradition than to attempt to switch traditions, and that this same practicality provides a reason for the adherents of one tradition to prefer it over others. However, Alston quickly admits that both of these apply to all religious traditions incorporating direct religious experience. Therefore, he concludes, all such traditions are justified for those that are in them. It is perhaps the case that strong pluralism, like exclusivism, is guilty of underestimating the similarities between the world’s religions (whereas inclusivism and soft pluralism might be accused of overemphasizing these similarities). It might also be objected that both soft pluralism and strong pluralism are versions of inclusivism, versions wherein philosophy of religion is the archreligion subsuming all other religions. 15. William P. Alston, “Religious Experience and Religious Belief,” Nous 16, no. 1 (Spring 1982): 3–12. Other advocates of strong pluralism include William James, who argued that any religion that fulfills a purpose is pragmatically justified, see William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature, 297; Conrad Hyers, “Rethinking the Doctrine of Double-Truth: Ambiguity, Relativity and Universality,” in Religious Pluralism and Truth, ed. Thomas Dean, 171–88; and perhaps Raimundo Panikkar in his article “The Invisible Harmony: A Universal Theory of Religion or a Cosmic Confidence in Reality?” in Toward a Universal Theology of Religion, ed. Leonard Swidler (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1987), 118–53.

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Exclusivism views the differences between religions as significant, the world’s religions as incommensurable, and only one of them (at most) as justified. Similarly, and quite differently, strong pluralism views the differences between religions as significant, the world’s religions as incommensurable, and concludes that all of the world’s religions are justified. Inclusivism and soft pluralism both regard the differences between religions as significant and justified but deny incommensurability. The former finds the commensuration of the world’s religions in a single actual religion; the latter finds it in no particular religion but rather in some common source or goal.

A Blaganian View of Religious Pluralism Blaga does not discuss the problem of religious pluralism as it appears in Anglo-American philosophy. He does discuss a wide variety of religions and religious phenomena. At various points he makes judgments of particular religious claims based on their internal consistency, or on empirical, aesthetic, or pragmatic criteria. He does not hesitate to reject views that he does not find defensible. On the other hand, he does not reject any particular religion outright. His attitude is one of critical openness to all religions. Therefore it seems that, were Blaga to be engaged in the debate over theories of religious pluralism, exclusivism would not be the position that Blaga would defend. This is in harmony with his epistemology and metaphysics, according to which all human belief systems are limited and are cultural constructs, each having its own particular strengths and weaknesses. This may not rule out the possibility of one religion having more strengths and less weaknesses than all others and therefore of being preferable to others. Such a view would be compatible with some forms of inclusivism, and could perhaps be referred to as “soft inclusivism.” It might also be compatible with soft pluralism and strong pluralism. According to Blaga’s epistemology, no human cognition succeeds in perfectly grasping its object. Therefore no religious cognition perfectly grasps its object. Epistemological modesty is called for in all religious beliefs (see chapter 10). However, it may also be the case that no religious cognition completely fails to grasp its object. Religious cognition, according to Blaga’s understanding, seems to avoid the pitfall of bivalent logic. This also might incline one toward seeing Blaga’s view on religious pluralism as being more favorable toward inclusivism or pluralism than toward exclusivism, since the latter views one religion as being true and the others as false. As was mentioned earlier, Blaga mentions the polyvalence of experience in one of his early works.16 If Blaga views religious experiences as 16. FC, 360.

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also susceptible to multiple justifiable interpretations, this would seem to indicate that he would view religions as justified even when their beliefs differ from each other. This would probably be the case even if these beliefs are mutually incompatible. This aspect of Blaga’s philosophy seems to resemble Alston’s strong pluralism, though it is also compatible with soft pluralism. However, it seems clear that in Blaga’s system of philosophy religions are not incommensurable. This can be seen at several points within his system. First and foremost, all religions are a response to existential mystery. All religions, according to Blaga, are attempts to grasp the mysteries of existence. These attempts are both instigated and thwarted by the MA, and thus have the MA as their source. Second, all religions are human cultural creations. Because of this fact, all religions share at least some common structural and ontological features. They are all shaped by abyssal categories (see chapter 6) and are all at least in part the products of the history of their creators. This denial of the incommensurability makes it necessary to state that strong pluralism would not be the position that Blaga would defend were he involved in the issue of religious pluralism. Having thus ruled out exclusivism and strong pluralism as possible Blaganian accounts of religious pluralism, the options remaining are inclusivism, soft pluralism, or some account not yet mentioned. Since Blaga does not endorse any one religion as being the most preferable, it seems probable that he would not be an inclusivist. There are good reasons to think that Blaga would have been a soft pluralist. As in soft pluralism, Blaga views all religions as interpretations of or responses to the same ultimate reality—the MA. Like soft pluralism, Blaga respects all religions without privileging any one over the others. Also like soft pluralism, Blaga shows great respect for both the differences and the similarities between religions. In Blaga’s philosophy, similarities and differences in religious constructions are to be expected. In fact, the theory of religious pluralism that one would expect to develop in the context of Blaga’s philosophy is remarkably similar to the theory proposed by John Hick, as described above. Like Hick, Blaga clearly works within a neo-Kantian framework, though he has proposed modifications to Kant’s epistemology and a metaphysic unlike anything found in Kant.17 Blaga embraces the key aspects of the Kantian epistemology that enable Hick to reconcile religious diversity and commonality. Like Hick, Blaga does not shy away from applying this epistemology to the transcendent (see chapter 7). 17. Blaga roundly criticizes Kant in many passages. Nonetheless, the Kantian influence is undeniable (see, for example, the description of the distinction between cunoa¸sterea luciferic˘a and cunoa¸sterea paradisiac˘a on p. 320 of CL). Blaga also praises Kant when he deems it appropriate. Blaga discusses some of the differences and commonalties between his philosophy and that of Kant in the chapter “Eficien¸te” in DCF.

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However, the soft pluralism that one might detect in Blaga is not exactly like Hick’s. In fact, the Blaganian explanation goes beyond that proposed by Hick. Blaga’s modifications of the Kantian epistemology can be used to enhance Hick’s interpretation of the situation, leading to greater insights into the problem of religious pluralism, as will now be seen.

Blaga and Hick Hick has written extensively advocating the “pluralistic hypothesis,” his version of soft pluralism.18 Much of what has been written is argumentation for his view and explication of its benefits and its applications. However, apart from the initial adaptation of the neo-Kantian epistemology, Hick has done little to expand the understanding of the theory of knowledge that underlies his view, to explicate the details of Kant’s epistemology. What seems to be a notable deficiency in Hick’s proposal is a significant lack of details regarding precisely this aspect of his theory: epistemology. Epistemology, however, is the keystone of the theory. As it appears in the writings of Hick, Kant’s theory of knowledge is quite sparse. Blaga, on the other hand, has proposed a significant further development of Kant’s theory of knowledge. Some of Blaga’s insights are very applicable to the issue of religious diversity, and in ways that are compatible with Hick’s pluralistic hypothesis. Applying Blaga’s epistemology to Hick’s pluralistic hypothesis yields a more detailed, philosophically stronger pluralistic hypothesis. It is clear that, like Hick, Blaga is in many ways himself a neo-Kantian. The distinction between objects as they are in themselves, and objects as they are known, is retained in Blaga’s philosophy, as is the constructivist element wherein empirical data is known through the medium of categories of the understanding. As in Kant, objects are not known directly, but rather are known through the mediation of experiences and ideas superimposed upon these experiences. These Kantian elements are important to Hick’s theory. The distinction between the object of religion and the human understanding of this object, and the view that religious knowledge, like empirical knowledge, involves construction and categories of the understanding, are the primary elements that allow Hick to reconcile the differences between religions with the hypothesis that they are all interpretations of the same ultimate reality. These similarities between Blaga’s epistemology and Hick’s pluralistic hypothesis enable the application of Blaga’s expanded epistemology to Hick’s theory. In his book Luciferic Cognition (Cunoa¸sterea luciferic˘a), Blaga details 18. “The pluralistic hypothesis” is a name Hick sometimes gives to his view; see An Interpretation of Religion, 233.

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the method of resolving problems that is itself named “luciferic cognition.” This is a method for deepening understanding of paradoxical problems of inquiry, rather than a method of accumulating new facts.19 The problem of religious pluralism, as it is found in the work of Hick, is a problem of the type that is well suited to the method of luciferic cognition. It is well suited to this method because the problem of religious pluralism involves an attempt to reconcile at least two paradoxical factors: the widespread existence of experiences of a supposedly transcendent being, and the puzzling diversity of the forms or interpretations of these experiences. As was explained in chapter 5, luciferic cognition proceeds according to the following steps: it begins with empirical data (called “phanic material”), which can be sensory, conceptual, or imaginary.20 Next, the problem to be resolved is “posed” (or “the mystery is opened”) when an attempt is made to deepen the understanding of the phanic material and it is discovered that the problem also has a “cryptic” aspect, an aspect which is hidden from investigation.21 The attempt to understand the cryptic is guided by a “theory idea,” a well-established principle that guides the researcher in his interpretation of the cryptic, and that also supports his conclusion in favor of this interpretation.22 With the help of this theory idea, the researcher proposes a “theoretical construction” that explains the relation between the phanic material and the theory idea, thus resolving the problem (or “revealing the mystery”).23 The theoretical construction is a postulate that eliminates or diminishes the interior tension between the phanic material and the theory idea,24 yielding a more profound understanding of the problem and the relationship between the phanic and the theory idea. This interior tension is a feeling of disaccord between the phanic and the theory idea. It is relieved when the relationship is explained with the help of the theoretical construction plus other “theoretical accessories.”25 This epistemological elaboration can be used to gain further understanding of Hick’s solution to the problem of religious pluralism. The phanic material of this problem is the vast body of religious experiences. The problem posed, or the mystery opened, would be that mentioned already: what is the relationship between the world’s religions? The theory idea that guides the solution of this issue would be Blaga’s idea of transcendent censorship. Guided by this idea, a possible theoretical construction would 19. CL, 316–18, 349. 20. Ibid., 320, 332. 21. Ibid. See pages 320–21, 327, 332, 363. Blaga states that the distinction between the phanic and the cryptic is not the phenomena-noumena distinction found in Kant (387). 22. CL, 334, 369, 378. 23. Ibid., 339, 366. 24. Called “tensiunea interioar˘a”; CL, 337. 25. CL, 342.

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be Hick’s neo-Kantian theory that knowledge of the transcendent (in Blaga’s terms, the MA) is necessarily always a creative attempt at disclosing that which cannot be known in its own essence. This theory has an interior tension between the phanic material (the wealth of religious experiences) and the theory idea (transcendent censorship), namely, if knowledge of the transcendent is “censored,” how can religious experiences take place? Blaga’s philosophy provides several theoretical accessories that serve to attenuate this tension. One of these is his idea of the destiny of humanity as creators furthering the creativity of the MA. According to Blaga, the MA created humanity with an inner drive to creatively reveal mystery. Furthermore, through transcendent censorship the MA allows limited human cognition of the transcendent. This is done in order to enable the MA’s plan for continued creation. Human creativity and transcendent censorship together play an important role in this destiny as the causes of the striving of humanity to disclose the mysteries of existence. As Blaga’s epistemology predicts, the solution of one problem of luciferic cognition does not lead to the elimination of mystery. In this case, mystery was attenuated: one aspect of the immediate problem has been addressed, but the solution offered raises new issues that in turn demand to be addressed via new attempts at luciferic cognition. Two of these problems are the question of the explanation of the similarities and the differences between the world’s religions and the question of whether religious diversity is something to be appreciated or a problem to be overcome.26 Through the use of Blaga’s method it is seen that religious experiences are responses to a single transcendent reality, just as in the solution suggested by Hick. The answer to the question, “what is the relationship between the world’s religions,” would be that all people are responding to the same transcendent reality, and that their responses to this reality all reflect the same human destiny to strive to understand the mysteries of existence. Blaga’s philosophy, his metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of culture, can provide answers to further problems as well. The answer to the question, “what is the explanation of their similarities and their differences,” without going into all the detail of the process of luciferic cognition that leads to this conclusion, would be that this diversity is a result of the human striving to reveal the transcendent within different historical and cultural contexts and through the utilization of different abyssal categories. Likewise, the short answer to the question of whether religious diversity is something to be appreciated or a problem to be 26. Without going into a detailed explanation of the process of luciferic cognition used to answer these questions, it can be briefly stated that the Blaganian answer to the first question hinges on the role of the abyssal categories, and the answer to the second is: sometimes the former and sometimes also the latter.

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overcome would be that religious diversity should be appreciated as a demonstration of the creative genius of humanity. However, it should not be viewed as a final state of successful revelation of mystery, but rather should be continually subjected to further creative analysis and development in order to refine and improve religious beliefs and practices.

16 Conclusion The thesis of this book, as stated in the introduction, is that the philosophy of the late Romanian philosopher Lucian Blaga has contemporary relevance to Anglo-American philosophy. In other words, Blaga’s philosophy contains insights that can help us to better understand and perhaps even resolve some of the very issues that current Anglo-American philosophy is wrestling with. In order to sustain this thesis it has been necessary to introduce and explain Blaga’s philosophy and to attempt to apply this philosophy to issues discussed in contemporary AngloAmerican philosophy. Blaga’s philosophy was introduced in the early chapters of this book. The first of these, chapter 2, gave a summary of Blaga’s intellectual formation and of the bibliographical material relevant to the study of his philosophy. The five following chapters were devoted to an exegesis of those aspects of his philosophy most relevant to its application to the chosen philosophical specialization. Chapter 3 explained Blaga’s philosophy of philosophy, relating his understanding of the philosophical task, of the methodology of philosophy, and of philosophical justification, and discussing Blaga’s views on the relationship of philosophy to common sense, science, and art. Chapter 4 introduced Blaga’s metaphysics, which is a broad and creative attempt to account for existence and its anomalies. Chapter 5 outlined Blaga’s epistemology, introducing the theoretically possible forms of cognition and then focusing on those forms that are possible for humans. Special attention was paid to what Blaga terms “luciferic cognition” and its three varients: plus-cognition, zero-cognition, and minus-cognition. Chapter 6 explained Blaga’s philosophy of culture, expounding the role of culture in cognition and creative production and showing the relationship of culture to Blaga’s metaphysics. Chapter 7 discussed Blaga’s philosophy of religion, giving a definition of religion and exploring the implications of the forgoing metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of culture for religion and philosophy of religion. In order to show the contemporary relevance of Blaga’s philosophy it was necessary that its insights be successfully applied to contemporary philosophical issues. It is not possible to apply Blaga’s philosophy to every 248

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aspect of contemporary Anglo-American philosophy within the confines of a single book. Therefore it has been necessary to select a single area of contemporary Anglo-American philosophy for this attempt. The area chosen was philosophy of religion. This area is the scene of considerable contemporary activity. Eight specific issues within philosophy of religion were discussed. Chapter 8 discussed the nature of philosophy of religion, investigating its purpose, method, and scope. Blaga’s proposal that the most important goal of philosophy of religion is the contribution to a holistic interpretation of human existence, the completion of a systematic philosophy, was seen to combine the strengths of the other proposals and go beyond them by integrating philosophy of religion into a comprehensive philosophical system. Blaga’s empirical and pragmatic methodology in philosophy of religion, based on the insights of his epistemology, was seen to provide an empirically based methodology that is able to transcend the limits of empiricism. It was also seen to provide for the justification of religious beliefs without allowing dogmatic claims of apodictic certainty. Blaga’s understanding of the scope of philosophy of religion was seen to be broad enough as to include all religious phenomena without being so broad that it also incorporates nonreligious phenomena. Chapter 9 discussed the problem of religious language. After discussing a variety of contemporary approaches to the issue, two main questions were isolated: 1. Can, and how does, ordinary language successfully refer to the transcendent; and 2. Can religious language be verified/falsified, and if it cannot, how can it be meaningful? Blaga’s view that all language, including religious language, is metaphorical was suggested as providing an answer to these questions. Significant to this answer is his identification and explication of two types of metaphor, “plastic” and “revelatory.” As in the language of theoretical science, metaphorical religious language was seen to be meaningful even when it does not literally describe its referent. Also like theoretical science, such religious language is justified pragmatically, aesthetically, and by its internal coherence. Chapter 10 discussed the question of religious knowledge. After discussing the contributions of classical and contemporary philosophers, Blaga’s contributions to the understanding of the nature, possibility, and limits of religious knowledge were introduced. Blaga’s analysis shows that religious knowledge is possible, but only within definite limits. Consistent with the trend toward epistemological modesty in contemporary philosophy of religion, Blaga’s analysis of religious knowledge rules out the possibility of apodictic certainty while not ruling out the possibility of knowledge. His discussion of the methods of religious knowledge was seen to harmonize theological methodology within a comprehensive epistemology.

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Chapter 11 discussed the issue of the justification of religious beliefs and of religious belief itself. Through a review of contemporary proposals for the justification of beliefs, ranging from foundationalism to fideism, the conclusion was reached that the most promising approach would combine the strengths of several of the proposals in a system that is flexible enough to take into account varying contexts. It was then shown how Blaga’s epistemology provides just such a system, incorporating elements of empiricism, coherentism, pragmatism, and aestheticism appropriate to particular contexts of paradisaic or luciferic cognition. Blaga’s metaphysics was seen to provide a philosophical justification of religious belief as an aspect of the human destiny to strive for creative revelation of mystery. Chapter 12 delved into the thorny issue of the existence and nature of God. Three central issues emerged related to the existence of God: the question of the appropriateness of apologetic proofs, the question of the success of such proofs, and the question of the existence of God. It was seen that Blaga’s philosophy throws light on all three of these issues. The conclusion was drawn that while apologetic proofs are probably appropriate, they are unlikely to succeed to the degree that their proponents usually desire. Nonetheless, Blaga’s philosophy was interpreted as providing an epistemological methodology that can lead to the justified conclusion that God exists. Additionally, the theodicy inherent in Blaga’s metaphysics was discussed as a reply to a leading argument against belief in the existence of God. Blaga’s philosophy was also interpreted as providing a methodology for (limited) postulates about the nature of God. Chapter 13 discussed the relation of religion and science. Religion and science are sometimes viewed as complementary disciplines, sometimes as competitive with each other, and sometimes as isolated from each other (compartmentalized). Blaga’s analysis was shown to bring out both important similarities and important differences between religion and science. According to Blaga, both science and religion are realist with regard to their object and constructivist with regard to their methodology, but the object of the latter is in some instances transcendent while the object of the former is immanent. Science and religion are viewed as complementary disciplines that overlap on some occasions and address separate issues on other occasions. Thus it was seen that Blaga’s philosophy provides a useful analysis of the cognitive status and the relation of religion and science. Chapter 14 discussed the problem of interreligious communication. The question of whether the shared elements of human belief systems provide a basis for interreligious communication or whether the differences between human belief systems prevent such communication was considered. It was seen that Blaga’s philosophy provides an explanation of the source of interreligious communicative obstruction (“stylistic braking”). It was also

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seen that Blaga’s philosophy provides an explanation of the source of cultural similarities (overlapping “stylistic matrices”) that make interreligious communication possible. It was seen that Blaga’s philosophy accounts for both the similarities and the differences between varying belief systems and values both, but concludes that interreligious communication is possible. Chapter 15 discussed the problem of religious pluralism. Four main approaches to this problem were reviewed: exclusivism, inclusivism, soft pluralism, and strong pluralism. Blaga’s writings on the issue were discussed and the conclusion was drawn that Blaga’s view should be interpreted as being a form of soft pluralism, similar to the view proposed by John Hick. It was suggested that Blaga’s epistemology, specifically the strategy that Blaga names “luciferic cognition,” could be fruitfully utilized to further elaborate the Hickian explanation of the phenomenon of religious pluralism. Having discussed a range of issues in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy of religion, and having found that Blaga’s philosophy yields useful insights into each of them, the conclusion can be drawn that Blaga’s philosophy can make useful contributions to issues currently being discussed in Anglo-American philosophy of religion. By extension the conclusion can be drawn that Blaga’s philosophy can make useful contributions to issues currently being discussed in Anglo-American philosophy. From this it can be concluded that Blaga’s philosophy has continuing relevance to contemporary Anglo-American philosophy.

Glossary Much of the terminology employed in Blaga’s metaphysics and epistemology has a theological flavor, although the argument is philosophical and many of the arguments and illustrations are drawn from the natural sciences. One of the reasons for the theological flavor is evident in the book Eonul dogmatic, where Blaga argues that there is an epistemological methodology that is sometimes used in theology that could be profitably employed in other domains as well.* Another reason is that Blaga is firmly convinced that much of philosophy’s language is unavoidably oblique and succeeds only through the use of metaphor. Therefore he feels justified in employing blatantly metaphoric language in his own philosophy. This brief glossary of Blaga’s terminology lists words and phrases in alphabetical order according to the way the terms are spelled in Romanian. An English translation of each term is provided in parentheses following the Romanian. Also provided are references to pages in Blaga’s works where these terms are defined, described, or used. accesorii teoretice (theoretic accessories): Explanatory hypotheses that are secondary to the theoretic construction and enable agreement between the theoretic construction and the phanic material (CL, 342). The theoretic accessories are not implicit in the theory idea. antinomie transfigurat˘a (transfigured antinomy): The result of separating two terms that are normally conceived as being logically related. It is the opposite of an antinomy, and occurs in the process of minus-cognition (CL, 394). aria (the aria): The objective data possessed at the outset of an operation of luciferic cognition (synonymous with the term “phanic material”) (DCF, 101). aspectul criptic (the cryptic aspect): The hidden aspects of an object of luciferic cognition that luciferic cognition tries to reveal/discover (CL, 320, 332). *This is the method of minus-cognition.

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aspectul fanic (the “phanic” or shown aspect): The visible aspects of an object of luciferic cognition, the “known facts,” empirical, conceptual, or imaginary (CL, 320, 332). NOTE: The phanic/cryptic distinction is not the Kantian distinction between phenomena and noumena (CL, 387). atenuare (attenuation): The route to the diminishing of the impenetrability of the “opened mystery” in luciferic cognition or the result of taking this route (CL, 352, 369). See “plus-cunoa¸stere.” capacitatea teoric˘a (theory capacity): The amount of ability that a theory idea has to resolve a variety of problems or to be used in resolving a variety of dilemmas (CL, 353). cenzura transcendent˘a (transcendent censorship): The limit imposed upon human cognition by the Anonymous Fund, and also the act of the Anonymous Fund whereby this limit is imposed (CT, chapter 2). criza ˆın obiect (crisis in the object): The central phenomena of luciferic cognition (CL, 319). It is an inner crisis caused in our understanding of an object when our understanding of it is divided into two aspects (phanic and cryptic) and the inner tension of our understanding of the object is brought out. This tension is caused by the understanding that what we know is only a sign or symptom of the object, not the object itself (CL, 316). concept catagorial (categorical concept): One type of “theory idea” (CL, 341ff., 349, 355). construc¸tie teoretic˘a or construc¸tie interioar˘a (theoretic construction or interior construction): The explanation of how the “phanic” and the “idee teorica” are reconciled, overcoming the “interior tension” (CL, 339ff.). It is distinct from the “accesorii teoretice” (CL, 349), although both help resolve the inner tension (CL, 350) and both correspond, in a way, to the cryptic (CL, 351). Many different theoretic constructions may be possible from a single theory idea, since the theoretic construction is a postulate that is not implicit in the theory idea (CL, 366). cunoa¸stere concret˘a (concrete cognition): The source of raw material for intellectual elaboration, imperfectly realizable since the concrete we have access to is only a sign of how the cognitive object is shown to us (transcendent censorship prevents access to the actual cognitive object) (CT, 456–59). Concrete cognition is one of the four modes of personal cognition, the other three being understanding cognition, mythic cognition, and occult cognition. cunoa¸stere individuat˘a (personal cognition): An act of knowing realized or realizable by any individual (CT, 449). cunoa¸stere ˆın¸telegatoare (understanding or “sympathetic” cognition): Cognition that goes beyond the data provided by concrete cognition in attempting to understand the cognitive object. There are two types of understanding cognition: paradisaic cognition reduces the number of the

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mysteries of existence, but doesn’t eliminate mystery (CT, 459ff.); luciferic cognition qualitatively reduces mystery, through attenuation (or if necessary, permanentization or intensification) but doesn’t eliminate it (CT, 461). “Understanding cognition” is one of four modes of personal cognition, the other three being concrete cognition, mythic cognition, and occult cognition. cunoa¸stere luciferic˘a (luciferic cognition): One of two modes of “understanding cognition” (the other being paradisaic cognition), luciferic cognition functions through the reconciliation of antinomies (CL, 349). Objects are viewed as mere signs of the thing known, as “mysteries.” “Mysteries” are part revealed, part hidden. Knowledge increases through deepening the understanding of the cognitive object, and is a function of the “ecstatic intellect” (introduced in Eonul dogmatic). Luciferic cognition and paradisaic cognition begin with the same cognitive object, but differ in how they handle it. Whereas in paradisaic cognition the unknown object is merely absent, in luciferic cognition the unknown object is hidden (CL, 316ff.). The basic function of luciferic cognition is the qualitative attenuation of “opened mysteries” (CL, 434). Luciferic cognition is characterized as a “dramatic invasion” of the field of paradisaic cognition (CL, 435). It is called “luciferic” because of its strong predisposition toward luciferic vanity (CT, 491, footnote). cunoa¸stere mitic˘a (mythic cognition): Cognition that attempts to describe experiences that transcend description by using imagination and symbolism. It is one of the four modes of personal cognition, the other three being concrete cognition, understanding cognition, and occult cognition (CT, 461ff.). cunoa¸stere paradisiac˘a (paradisaic cognition): One of the two modes of “understanding cognition” (the other being luciferic cognition). It is the usual approach to knowledge. Knowledge is gained through “intuition” (sensory or otherwise), abstraction, or imagination. Paradisaic cognition views the object of cognition as “given.” It increases through accumulation of facts, and is a function of the “enstatic intellect” (introduced in Eonul dogmatic) (CL, 315–16). Its basic function is the numeric reducing of the latent mysteries of existence (CT, 434). cunoa¸stere ocult˘a (occult cognition): Cognition through clairvoyance or other supernatural means. It is one of the four modes of personal cognition, the other three being concrete cognition, understanding cognition, and mythic cognition (CT, 464ff.). dislocare categorial˘a (categorical dislocation): The displacing of the original categorical construction of the phanic material by the new categories of the theoretic construction of luciferic cognition (CL, 358). idee teoric˘a (theory idea): The principle that guides the researcher in forming his theory of how the cryptic should be understood (the “revela-

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tion of the cryptic”), allowing him to “jump” from the phanic into the cryptic (see “scandur˘a de salt”) (CL, 334ff., 369). A theoretic construction can involve more than one theory idea (CL, 378). iluzia adecva¸tiei (the illusion of adequacy): The mistaken belief on the part of the knowing subject that knowledge accurately grasps the object of cognition (CT, 489). Removal of the illusion of adequacy is the first step of luciferic cognition (CT, 491). intelect ecstatic (ecstatic intellect): An abnormal state of the cognitive faculty wherein the attempt is made to work outside the restrictions of logic (CL, 429). It is a climax state, and cannot be consistently or permanently maintained (CL, 398). intelect enstatic (enstatic intellect): The normal cognitive state wherein the mind acquires knowledge cumulatively and in accord with the rules of logic (CL, 398). This is the state of the mind in paradisaic cognition and also in luciferic cognition when operating through attenuation or permanentization (CT, 495). inversiune copernican˘a (Copernican inversion): Any revelation of the cryptic of an “opened mystery” through a theoretic construction wherein the conceptual result is the opposite of the original conceptual understanding solicited by the phanic material (CL, 363). Marele Anonim (the Great Anonymous): The hypothetical source of all other existents. Synonyms for the Great Anonymous include the Anonymous Fund, Creator, Generator, and God (CT, 539ff.). minus-cunoa¸stere (minus-cognition): The intensification of a problem that results when the attempt to resolve the problem causes the problem to become even more of a mystery (CL, 325ff.). The product of minuscognition is a “transfigured antinomy” (CL, 390). Minus-cognition is characterized by antinomies and by the analysis of the cryptic in turn yielding an even deeper cryptic (CL, 393). It is the least common type of luciferic cognition (CL, 390). It is a synonym for the term “dogma” as used in Eonul dogmatic. mister (mystery): An unsolved problem of understanding. Mystery is the central issue in the theory of knowledge and also in the metaphysics of knowledge (CT, 491), because the idea of mystery is the single idea that penetrates the “front” (military front line) of transcendent censorship (CT, 491). The idea of mystery expresses consciousness of an essential absence of knowledge (CT, 492). mister deschis (opened mystery): A problem of the understanding posed for solving. It is “opened” as a subject of investigation (CL, 321). “To pose a problem,” “to provoke a crises in an object,” and “to open a mystery” are synonyms (CL, 327) signifying the act of provoking a crisis in an object of cognition by separating conceptually the phanic aspect and the cryptic aspect of the object (CL, 363).

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motiv filosofic (philosophical motif ): An idea (or group of ideas) that appears in many philosophical systems. The study of philosophical motifs is valuable in comparing philosophies (DCF, 152). observa¸tie dirijat˘a (directed observation): The act of interpreting phanic material according to the theory idea (CL, 372), thus revealing the cryptic (CL, 373). A directed observation can take the place of a theory, or of an observation not yet realized or unrealizable (CL, 375). plus-cunoa¸stere (plus-cognition): The attenuation of a problem caused by its successful resolution, the most common result of opening a mystery (CL, 325ff.). [Note: This “successful” resolution often leads to another belief that can in turn be transformed into an “object in crisis” (but not always—sometimes it ends in zero-cognition or minus-cognition; CL, 329)]. Plus-cognition is one of the three types of luciferic cognition. poten¸tial empiric (empirical potential): The inherent ability of a theory to be corroborated by reference to external empirical evidence. The empirical potential increases as the amount of empirical data involved in the theory increases, but having a higher empirical potential does not indicate that the theory is more likely to be true (CL, 382). See Blaga’s discussion of verification in CL, 383. revela¸tie cripticului (revelation of the cryptic): The action that removes the object of luciferic cognition from crisis, resolving the problem posed, by constructing a theory that brings to light the hidden elements of the mystery/problem posed (CL, 381). It is accomplished with the help of a “springboard” (the “theory idea”) that facilitates the “jump into the cryptic.” scˆandur˘a de salt (springboard): A synonym for the “theory idea” that anticipates the form that the final solution of the problem will take (and thus helps shape the final solution), and allows the researcher to postulate a solution that accounts for the elements that cause the problem. This allows the researcher to “jump into” the cryptic (CL, 334ff.). si¸tua¸tie teoretic˘a (theoretic situation): All of the claimed knowledge, methods, and tools of cognition, and the stylistic field of a particular time in which a thinker works (DCF, 152, 162). sistem teoretic (theoretic system): The union of problems and theoretic constructions on the basis of a single theory idea’s “theory capacity” (CL, 355). Luciferic cognition tends toward systematizing, but lacking a universally applicable theory idea, creates multiple systems instead of uniting all thought into one theoretic system (CL, 356). tensiunea interioar˘a (interior tension): A feeling of discrepancy between the “phanic” of a problem and the “theory idea” used in formulating the solution (CL, 337ff.).

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teorie (theory):A system composed of all the elements of a resolution of a problem through the process of luciferic cognition (CL, 368–70). variere (variation): The term that designates the change that takes place when a problem of luciferic cognition is researched. There are three directions in which this change can occur: attenuation (or plus-cognition), permanentization (or zero-cognition), and intensification (or minuscognition) (CL, 324ff.). zarea interioar˘a (inner or interior horizon): A very metaphorical expression describing the “path” from the phanic material and the problem posed to the solution of the problem. It is the part of the initial problem that is not the aria, not the objective data (it is similar to the “theory idea”) (DCF, 101). The greater the inner tension, the more difficult/longer/convoluted will be the path (i.e., the greater number of theoretic accessories will be needed) (CL, 365ff.). zero-cunoa¸stere (zero-cognition): The term “zero-cognition” is used to represent two distinct concepts: both the point from which luciferic cognition begins, and also the resulting state when the problem is neither attenuated or intensified, but rather is “permanentized,” staying the same, unresolved (CL, 325ff., 384ff.). It is one of three types of luciferic cognition.

Bibliography Chronological List of Blaga’s Books of Philosophy Blaga, Lucian. Pietre pentru templul meu [Stones for my Temple]. Sibiu: Biroul de Imprimate “Cosˆanzean˘a,” 1919. ———. “Kultur und Erkenntnis” [Culture and Knowledge]. PhD diss., University of Vienna, 1920. ———. Cultur˘a s¸i cuno¸stin¸ta˘ [Culture and Knowledge]. Cluj: Editura Justitul de arte grafice “Ardealul,” 1922. ———. “Categoriile” [The Categories]. In Cultur˘a s¸i cuno¸stin¸ta˘ . Cluj: Editura Justitul de arte grafice “Ardealul,” 1922. ———. Probleme estetice [Aesthetic Problems]. 1924.* ———. Filosofia stilului [The Philosophy of Style]. Bucharest: Cultura Nationala, 1924. ———. Fe¸tele unui veac [The Faces of an Age]. Arad: Editura Librariei Diecezane, 1925. ———. Fenomenul originar [The Original Phenomenon]. Bucharest: Editura Funda¸tia Culturale “Principele Carol,” 1925. ———. Ferestre colorate [Painted Windows]. Arad: Editura Libr˘ariei Diecezane, 1926. ———. Daimonion [Evil Genius]. Cluj: Editura Revistei “Societatea de Mˆaine,” 1930. ———. Eonul dogmatic [The Dogmatic Age]. Bucharest: Cartea Romˆaneasc˘a, 1931. ———. Cunoa¸sterea luciferic˘a [Luciferic Knowledge]. Sibiu: Tiparul Institutului de arte grafice “Dacia Traian˘a,” 1933. ˆ ———. Cenzura transcendent˘a: Incercare metafizic˘a. [Transcendent Censorship: A Metaphysical Attempt]. Bucharest: Cartea Romˆaneasc˘a, 1934. ———. Orizont s¸i stil [Horizon and Style]. Bucharest: Funda¸tia pentru literatur˘a s¸i art˘a “Regele Carol II,” 1935. ———. Spa¸tiul mioritic [The Ewe-Space]. Bucharest: Cartea Romˆaneasc˘a, 1936. ———. Geneza metaforei s¸i sensul culturii [The Genesis of Metaphor and the Meaning of Culture]. Bucharest: Funda¸tia pentru literatur˘a s¸i art˘a “Regele Carol II,” 1937. ———. Elogiul satului romˆanesc [Eulogy to the Romanian Village]. Bucharest: Monitorul Oficial s¸i Imprimeriile Statului, Imprimeria Na¸tional˘a, 1937. ———. Art˘a s¸i valoare [Art and Value]. Bucharest: Funda¸tia pentru literatur˘a s¸i art˘a “Regele Carol II,” 1939. *This publication is included in vol. 7 of Opere, ed. Dorli Blaga, 83–131, but information about the original publication other than the date is not provided.

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———. Diferen¸tialele divine [The Divine Differentials]. Bucharest: Funda¸tia pentru literatur˘a s¸i art˘a “Regele Carol II,” 1940. ———. Despre gˆandirea magic˘a [Concerning Magical Thinking]. Bucharest: Funda¸tia regal˘a pentru literatur˘a s¸i art˘a, 1941. ———. Religie s¸i spirit [Religion and Spirit]. Sibiu: Editura “Dacia Traian˘a,” 1942. ———. S¸ tiin¸ta˘ s¸i crea¸tie [Science and Creation]. Sibiu: Editura “Dacia Traian˘a,” 1942. ———. Discobolul: Aforisme s¸i ˆınsemn˘ari [The Discus Thrower: Aphorisms and Notes]. Bucharest: Editura “Publicom,” 1945. ———. Despre con¸stiin¸ta filosofic˘a [Concerning Philosophical Consciousness]. Cluj: Lito-Schildkraut, 1947. ———. Aspecte antropologice [Anthropological Aspects]. Cluj: Uniunea na¸tional˘a a studen¸tilor din Romˆania, Centrul studen¸tesc Cluj, 1948. ———. Gˆandirea romˆaneasc˘a ˆın Transilvania ˆın secolul al XVIII-lea [Romanian Thinking in Transylvania in the Eighteenth Century]. Bucharest: Editura s¸tiin¸tific˘a, 1966. ———. Z˘ari s¸i etape: Studii, aforisme, ˆınsemn˘ari [Horizons and Stages: Studies, Aphorisms, and Notes]. Bucharest: Editura pentru Literatur˘a, 1968. ———. Experimentul s¸i spiritul mathematic [Experiment and the Mathematical Spirit]. Bucharest: Editura s¸tiin¸tific˘a, 1969. ———. Scrieri despre art˘a [Writings about Art]. Bucharest: Editura Meridiane, 1970. ———. Isvoade: Eseuri, conferin¸te, articole [Sources: Essays, Conferences, Articles]. Edited by Dorli Blaga and Petre Nicolau. Bucharest: Editura Minerva, 1972. ———. Ceasornicul de nisip [The Hourglass]. Edited by Mircea Popa. Cluj: Editura Dacia, 1973. ———. Fiin¸ta istoric˘a [The Historical Being]. Cluj: Editura Dacia, 1977. ———. Elanul insulei: Aforisme s¸i ˆınsemn˘ari [The Upsurge of the Island: Aphorisms and Notes]. Edited by Dorli Blaga and George Gana. Cluj: Editura Dacia, 1977. ˆ ———. Incerc˘ ari filosofice [Philosphical Attempts]. Edited by Anton Ilica. Timi¸soara: Editura Facla, 1977. ———. Hronicul s¸i cˆantecul vˆarstelor [The Chronicle and the Song of the Ages]. Edited by Dorli Blaga. Vol. 6 of Opere. Bucharest: Editura Minerva, 1979. ———. Eseuri [Essays]. Edited by Dorli Blaga. Vol. 7 of Opere. Bucharest: Editura Minerva, 1980. ———. Trilogia Cunoa¸sterii [The Trilogy of Knowledge]. Edited by Dorli Blaga. Vol. 8 of Opere. Bucharest: Editura Minerva, 1983. ———. Trilogia Culturii [The Trilogy of Culture]. Edited by Dorli Blaga. Vol. 9 of Opere. Bucharest: Editura Minerva, 1985. ———. Trilogia Valorilor [The Trilogy of Values]. Edited by Dorli Blaga. Vol. 10 of Opere. Bucharest: Editura Minerva, 1987. ———. Gˆandire magic˘a s¸i religie [Magical Thought and Religion]. Edited by Dorli Blaga. Vol. 10 of Opere. Bucharest: Editura Minerva, 1987. ———. Trilogia Cosmologic˘a [The Trilogy of Cosmology]. Edited by Dorli Blaga. Vol. 11 of Opere. Bucharest: Editura Minerva, 1988. ———. Vederi s¸i istorie [Views and History]. Edited by Mircea Popa. Gala¸ti: Editura Porto-Franco, 1992. ———. Curs de filosofia religiei [Course on the Philosophy of Religion]. Edited by Dorli Blaga, Christu Nastu, and G. Poscoci D˘anescu. Alba Iulia: Editura Fronde, 1994. ———. Opera poetic˘a [Poetic Work]. Edited by George Gan˘a and Dorli Blaga. Bucharest: Humanitas, 1995.

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Select List of Blaga’s Philosophy Articles The following sample of the philosophy articles that Blaga published in books and in a variety of journals has been taken primarily from the extensive bibliography compiled and published by D. Vatamaniuc.† The articles selected for this abbreviated list are those that have the most relevance to theory of knowledge and/or philosophy of religion. “Reflexii asupra intui¸tiei lui Bergson de H.R.” Romˆanul 4, no. 57 (March 1914): 1–2. “Mister.” Romˆanul 5, no. 238 (November 1915): 7. “Eroism ˆın gˆandire.” Romˆanul 5, no. 261 (November/December 1915): 8. “Concep¸tia despre lume s¸i s¸tiin¸ta˘ .” Romˆanul 6, no. 12 (January 1916): 7. “Intelectualismul ˆın filozofie.” Convorbiri literare 50, no. 2 (February 1916): 197–206. “Mit s¸i cuno¸stin¸ta˘ .” Pagini literare 1, no. 2 (March 15, 1916). “Dou˘a tendin¸te ˆın teoria cuno¸stin¸tei.” Pagini literare 1, no. 3 (April 1916): 58–59. “Ipoteze indiferente.” Pagini literare 1, no. 6 (May 1916): 119–20. “Probleme fantome.” Pagini literare 1, nos. 9–10 (June 1916): 185–86. “Ceva despre ras˘a.” Via¸ta social-literar˘a 1, no. 1 (February 1921): 6–7. “Art˘a s¸i stiluri.” Gˆandirea 1, no. 6 (July 1921): 110. “Ideile s¸i valabilitatea lor func¸tional˘a: Fragment.” Gˆandirea 1, no. 20 (February 1922): 378–80. “Romantism.” Patrea 5, no. 89 (April 1923): 1. “Schimb˘ari la fa¸ta˘ .” L˘amura 4, no. 8 (May 1923): 401– 4. Cuvˆantul, no. 292 (October 1925): 1. “Pe margina romantismului.” L˘amura 5, nos. 1–2 (October 1923): 12–14. “Silogismul slav.” Gˆandirea 3, no. 6 (November 1923): 113–15. “Le mouvement philosophique.” Cultura 1, no. 2 (March 1924): 193–94. “Povestea unor metode.” Gˆandirea 4, no. 6 (January 1925): 187. “Simboluri spa¸tiale.” Darul vremii 1, no. 405 (May–June 1930): 97–99. “Pitorescul ca revela¸tie.” Calendarul 1, no. 32 (February 1932): 1. “Metafizic˘a s¸i s¸tiin¸ta˘ : Introducere la studiul ‘Cenzura transcendent˘a.’ ” Vremea 7, no. 331 (March 1934): 7. “Nietzsche.” Vestul 5, no. 10 (April 1934): 1–2. “Teoria dubletelor” [The Theory of Duplicates]. In Orizont s¸i stil. Bucharest: Funda¸tia pentru literatur˘a s¸i art˘a “Regele Carol II,” 1935. “Cultur˘a s¸i spatiu” [Culture and Space]. In Orizont s¸i stil. Bucharest: Funda¸tia pentru literatur˘a s¸i art˘a “Regele Carol II,” 1935. “Intre peisaj s¸i orizont incon¸stient” [Between Scenery and Unconscious Horizon]. In Orizont s¸i stil. Bucharest: Funda¸tia pentru literatur˘a s¸i art˘a “Regele Carol II,” 1935. “Orizonturi temporale” [Temporal Horizons]. In Orizont s¸i stil. Bucharest: Funda¸tia pentru literatur˘a s¸i art˘a “Regele Carol II,” 1935. “Temele sacrale s¸i spiritul etnic.” Gˆandirea 14, no. 1 (January 1935): 1–5. “Despre cˆateva excese de erudi¸tie: Un raspuns lui I. Brucar.” Gˆandirea 14, no. 2 (February 1935): 150–55. “Despre ras˘a s¸i stil.” Gˆandirea 14, no. 2 (February 1935): 69–73. †Vatamaniuc, Lucian Blaga, 1895–1961: Biobibliografie, 90–149.

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“Spa¸tiul mioritic: Lui Vasile B˘ancil˘a.” Gˆandirea 14, no. 5 (May 1935): 321–30. “Fenomenul stilului s¸i metodologi˘a: Introducere la studiul Orizont s¸i stil.” Gˆandirea romˆanesc 3, nos. 7–8 (July–August 1935): 321–30. “Spiritualit˘a¸ti bipolare.” Gˆandirea 15, no. 2 (February 1936): 57–69. “Perspectiva sofianic˘a.” Gˆandirea 15, no. 3 (March 1936): 130– 41. “Categoriile spontaneit˘a¸tii.” Gˆandirea 15, no. 9 (November 1936): 425–31. “Despre mituri: Lui Basil Munteanu.” Gˆandirea 15, no. 10 (December 1936): 473–84. “Categoriile abisale” [The Abyssal Categories]. In Geneza metaforei s¸i sensul culturii. Bucharest: Funda¸tia pentru literatur˘a s¸i art˘a “Regele Carol II,” 1937. “Despre mituri” [Concerning Myths]. In Geneza metaforei s¸i sensul culturii. Bucharest: Funda¸tia pentru literatur˘a s¸i art˘a “Regele Carol II,” 1937. “Singularitatea omului” [The Singularity of Humanity]. In Geneza metaforei s¸i sensul culturii. Bucharest: Funda¸tia pentru literatur˘a s¸i art˘a “Regele Carol II,” 1937. “Geneza metaforei.” Gˆandirea 16, no. 5 (Mai 1937): 201–11. “Despre plenitudinea istoric˘a.” Gˆandirea romˆanesc 7, nos. 1–6 (1939): 3–15. (Lecture given at the opening of the course on philosophy of culture at Universitatea Bobe¸sBolyai, November 17, 1938.) “Modelele genezei.” Universul literar 48, no. 51 (December 1939): 1–12. “Cˆateva probleme de teoria cunoa¸sterii” [Some Problems of the Theory of Knowledge]. In S¸ tiin¸ta˘ s¸i crea¸tie. Sibiu: Editura “Dacia Traian˘a,” 1942. “Doua tipuri de cunoa¸stere” [Two Types of Knowledge]. In S¸ tiin¸ta˘ s¸i crea¸tie. Sibiu: Editura “Dacia Traian˘a,” 1942. “Critica literar˘a s¸i filosofia.” Saeculum 1, no. 1 (1943): 1–15. “Existantialism sau neputin¸ta de a crea?” Saeculum 1, no. 2 (1943): 110–12. (Also in his book Isvoade). “Despre permamen¸ta˘ preistoriei.” Saeculum 1, no. 5 (1943): 3–5. “Despre istoriografie.” Saeculum 1, no. 6 (1943): 3–17. “Neopozitivismul.” Saeculum 1, no. 6 (1943): 94 –96. “Fenomenul istoric.” Saeculum 2, no. 1 (1944): 3–21. “Kant s¸i metafizica.” Saeculum 2, no. 1 (1944): 75–77. “Sancta simplicitas.” Saeculum 2, no. 1 (1944): 87. “Reconstruc¸tia filosofic˘a.” Saeculum 2, no. 2 (1944): 73–74. “Wundt s¸i Bergson.” Saeculum 2, no. 2 (1944): 73. “Eficien¸te” [Efficiencies]. In Despre con¸stiin¸ta filosofic˘a. Cluj: Lito-Schildkraut, 1947. “Introducere la cursul de filosofia religiei.” Manuscriptum 4, no. 4 (1973): 107–11. “Durata factorilor stilistici” [The Duration of the Stylistic Factors]. In Fiin¸ta istoric˘a. Cluj: Editura Dacia, 1977. “Interferen¸te stilistice” [Stylistic Interferences]. In Fiin¸ta istoric˘a. Cluj: Editura Dacia, 1977. “Cˆampurile stilistice” [Stylistic Fields]. In Fiin¸ta istoric˘a. Cluj: Editura Dacia, 1977. “Oswald Spengler s¸i filosofia istoriei” [Oswald Spengler and the Philosophy of History]. In Fiin¸ta istoric˘a. Cluj: Editura Dacia, 1977. “Mit s¸i Gˆandire” [Myth and Thought]. In Eseuri, edited by Dorli Blaga. Vol. 7 of Opere. Bucharest: Editura Minerva, 1980.

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“Schi¸ta unei autoprezent˘ari filosofice” [Outline of a Philosphical Self-Presentation]. In Manuscriptum 17, no. 3 (1986): 59–67. Reprinted in Diaconu and Diaconu, Dic¸tionar de termeni filosofici ai lui Lucian Blaga. Bucharest: Univers Enciclopedia, 2000.

Works on Blaga Afloroaei, Stefan. ¸ “Antinomii ale intelectului ecstatic.” In Lucian Blaga: Cunoa¸stere s¸i crea¸tie; culegere de studii, edited by Dumitru Ghi¸se, Angela Botez, and Victor Botez. Bucharest: Cartea Romˆaneasc˘a, 1987. Alexandru, Teodorescu. Lucian Blaga s¸i Cultura Popular˘a Romˆaneasc˘a. Ia¸si, Romania: Junimea, 1983. Aluceai, Aurora. Lucian Blaga, 1895–1961: Biobibliografie. Ia¸si, Romania: Biblioteca Central˘a Universitar˘a “Mihai Eminescu” Ia¸si, 1979. Antonesei, Liviu. “Repere pentru o filosofie a culturii.” In Lucian Blaga: Cunoa¸stere s¸i Crea¸tie, edited by Dumitru Ghi¸se, Angela Botez, and Victor Botez. Bucharest: Cartea Romˆaneasc˘a, 1987. Apostol, Pavel. “Gnoseologia Mistic˘a a lui Lucian Blaga.” Cercet˘ari Filozofice 4, no. 5 (May 1957): 103–22. Balu, Ion. Lucian Blaga. Bucharest: Editura Albatros, 1986. ———. Via¸ta lui Lucian Blaga. Bucharest: Editura Libra, 1995. B˘ancil˘a, Vasile. Lucian Blaga: Energie romˆaneasc˘a. Timi¸soara, Romania: Editura Marineasa, 1995. Banfi, Antonio, ed. Orizzonte e stile. Milano: Minuziano Editore, 1946. Barbu, Zevedei. “Metafizicul ca func¸tiune integral˘a a spiritului.” Saeculum 1, no. 1 (January–February 1943): 50–76. Bazin, Thomas, Raoul Marin, and Georges Piscoci-Danesco, trans. Les Differentielles divines. Paris: Librairie du Savoir, 1990. Biri¸s, Ioan. “Criza intelectual˘a s¸i transcenden¸ta.” In Meridian Blaga, edited by Irina Petra¸s. Vol. 2. Cluj-Napoca, Romania: Casa C˘ar¸tii de Stiin¸ ¸ ta˘ , 2002. ———. “Dogma s¸i transcenden¸ta la Lucian Blaga.” Arad Revista de Cultur˘a 5, nos. 7–9 (1994): 32–37. Boboc, Alexandru. “Blaga, Nietzsche, s¸i Spengler: Demersuri moderne asupra paradigmei ‘stil.’ ” Seaculum, serie nou˘a 1, nos. 3– 4 (1995): 28–34. ———. “Blaga, Nietzsche, s¸i Spengler.” In Dimensiunea metafizic˘a a operei lui Lucian Blaga, edited by Angela Botez and Argentina Firu¸ta˘ , 276-80. Bucharest: Editura Stiin¸ ¸tific˘a, 1996. Borcea, M., and V. Soran. “The Romanian Philosopher Lucian Blaga on the General Problems of Biology.” Noesis 17 (1991): 125–36. ˆ aiul veac. Bucharest: Editura Albatros, 1997. Borcila, Mircea. Eonul Blaga: Intˆ Botez, Angela. “Cˆampul stilistic s¸i evolu¸tia s¸tiin¸tei.” In Dimensiunea metafizic˘a a operei lui Lucian Blaga, edited by Angela Botez and Argentina Firu¸ta˘ , 261–66. Bucharest: Editura Stiin¸ ¸ tific˘a, 1996. ———. “La Categorie Essentielle de la Spatialite dans la Philosophie de Lucian Blaga.” Revue Roumaine de Philosophie et Logique 39 (1995): 221–27. ———. “Comparativist and Valuational Reflections on Blaga’s Philosophy.” Revue Roumaine de Philosophie et Logique 40 (1996): 153–62.

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———. “Lucian Blaga and the Complementary Spiritual Paradigm of the 20th Century.” Revue Roumaine de Philosophie et Logique 37 (1993): 51–55. ———. “The Postmodern Antirepresentationalism (Polanyi, Blaga, Rorty).” Revue Roumaine de Philosophie et Logique 41 (1997): 59–70. Botez, Angela, and Argentina Firu¸ta˘ , ed. Dimensiunea metafizic˘a a operei lui Lucian Blaga. Bucharest: Editura Stiin¸ ¸ tific˘a, 1996. Botez, Victor. “Blaga—omul—a¸sa cum l-au cunoscut.” In Lucian Blaga: Cunoa¸stere s¸i crea¸tie, edited by Dumitru Ghi¸se, Angela Botez, and Victor Botez. Bucharest: Cartea Romˆaneasc˘a, 1987. Brucar, I. “Filosoful Lucian Blaga.” Gˆandirea 13, no. 8 (December 1934): 314 –27. ———. “Lucian Blaga: ‘Eonul Dogmatic.’ ” Romˆania literar˘a 2, no. 56 (March 11, 1933): 1–2. Busetto, Ricardo, and Marco Cugno, trans. Trilogia della cultura: Lo spazio mioritico. Alessandria, Italy: Editionni dell’Orso, 1994. Cazan, Gh. Al. “Lucian Blaga: Cunoa¸stere s¸i crea¸tie; Culegere de studii.” In Lucian Blaga: Cunoa¸stere s¸i crea¸tie, edited by Dumitru Ghi¸se, Angela Botez, and Victor Botez. Bucharest: Cartea Romˆaneasc˘a, 1987. ———. “Lucian Blaga sau Metafizica ˆımpotriv˘a scientismului.” Analele Universit˘a¸tii din Bucure¸sti, seria Filosofie 40 (1991): 46–54. Cimpoi, M. “Lucian Blaga, filosof al valorilor.” Steaua 44 (1993): 19–20. Cioran, Emil. “Lucian Blaga: ‘Eonul Dogmatic.’ ” Revista de Filosofie 16, nos. 3– 4 (July– December 1931): 349–50. ˆ aiul veac, edited Codoban, Aurel. “Un Blaga ignorat: Filosoful religiei.” In Eonul Blaga: Intˆ by Mircea Borcila, 381–82. Bucharest: Editura Albatros, 1997. ———. “Blaga s¸i Eliade: Itinerare echivelente spre misterul unic al lumii.” In Meridian Blaga edited by Irina Petra¸s. Vol. 1. Cluj-Napoca, Romania: Casa C˘ar¸tii de Stiin¸ ¸ ta˘ , 2000. ———. “Matricea stilistic˘a s¸i structura semantic˘a.” In Dimensiunea metafizic˘a a operei lui Lucian Blaga, edited by Angela Botez and Argentina Firu¸ta˘ , 298–302. Bucharest: Editura Stiin¸ ¸ tific˘a, 1996. ———. Sacru s¸i Ontofanie: Pentru o noua filosofie a religiilor. Ia¸si, Romania: Polirom, 1998. Coltescu, Viorel. “Lucian Blaga s¸i morfologia spenglerian˘a a culturii.” In Lucian Blaga: Cunoa¸stere s¸i crea¸tie; Culegere de studii, edited by Dumitru Ghi¸se, Angela Botez, and Victor Botez, 357–79. Bucharest: Cartea Romˆaneasc˘a, 1987. Comarnescu, Petru. “Lucian Blaga: ‘Cunoa¸sterea luciferic˘a’; Studiu filosofic.” Revista de Filosofie 18, no. 2 (April–June 1933): 254 –57. Constandache, G. G. “Critique of the Unconscious: Kantian Influences in the Works of Lucian Blaga.” Man and World 30 (1997): 445–52. ———. “Lucian Blaga. Filosofie romˆaneasc˘a ˆın context universal.” Via¸ta Romˆaneasc˘a 90 (1995): 16–27. Dadarlat, C. M. “Mit deschis ˆın ‘Zamolxe’ de Lucian Blaga.” Revista de Filosofie 6 (1989): 249–55. Danesco, Mariana, trans. L’Etre historique. Paris: Librairie du Savoir, 1990. Diaconu, Florica, and Marin Diaconu. Dic¸tionar de termeni filosofici ai lui Lucian Blaga. Bucharest: Univers Enciclopedia, 2000. Dima, Teodore. “Ideea teoric˘a: Fundament cognitiv general.” In Eonul Blaga: Iˆntˆaiul veac, edited by Mircea Borcila. Bucharest: Editura Albatros, 1997.

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Index abstraction, 97 aesthetics: and epistemology, 82 n. 113, 120; and religion, 166, 181, 188, 204 – 5, 210, 228–29 Afloroaei, Stefan, ¸ 101 n. 56 agnosticism, 94 n. 24, 116 n. 138, 170 Airaksinen, Timo, 187 n. 19 allegory, 98 Altson, William P., 175, 176, 240– 41, 243 anabasic movement, 129 analogical predication, 171 analytic: Blaga’s style, 61; school of philosophy, 64 n. 27, 159, 196–203, 227 Anonymous Fund, 66–79, 142. See also God, Great Anonymous Anselm, St., 157, 159, 161, 163, 207 n. 3 anthropology: philosophical, 47, 65–66, 84 –86, 120, 142– 43, 160 anthropomorphism, 170 antinomy, 77, 97, 101, 113–17, 163, 194 – 95, 204 Antonesei, Liviu, 126 n. 39 apodictic certainty: in philosophy, 62, 104; in religion, 147, 148, 167, 185–91, 197, 199, 201, 204 –5, 210 apologetics, 157–62, 207–11 a posteriori, 166, 236 a priori, 107, 236 Aquinas, 125 n. 27, 171, 174, 176, 180, 207 n. 2 aria, 51, 106 n. 69. See also phanic Aristotle, 53, 80, 83, 201 n. 23, 241; anthropology, 178 n. 25; epistemology, 114 n. 120, 116 n. 138, 196, 220; and philosophy of religion, 156–57, 159 n. 11, 162, 207 n. 1 art, 42, 43, 55–56, 104, 146, 181 atheism, 158 attenuation. See under mystery

Augustine, 47, 69, 125 n. 27, 211 n. 15, 237 n. 8 Avenarius, 46 Ayer, A. J., 159 n. 13, 172, 185 axiological accent, 127–29 Bacon, Francis, 220–21, 224 Baha’i, 236 Balu, Ion, 13 n. 3, 23 n. 3 B˘ancila, Vasile, 23 n. 3, 24, 28 n. 22, 33, 76 n. 86 Barth, Karl, 114 nn. 119 and 120, 137 n. 3, 164 Basil of Caesarea, 237 n. 8 Bassinger, David, 156 belief, 186–89 Bergson, Henri: influence on Blaga, 32, 33; philosophy of, 45, 46, 80, 114 n. 120, 116 n. 138, 134 Berkeley, George, 46 Bible, 145 biology, 82–83 Biri¸s, Ioan, 42 n. 1, 103 n. 60, 126 n. 39 Blaga, Dorli, 14, 23 n. 3, 25 n. 7, 38, 39 blik, 173, 175 Bobac, Alexandru, 121 n. 9 Bologa, Sandu, 33 books, Blaga’s: philosophy, 37–39 Borcil˘a, Mircea, 19 n. 1 Borland, James, 235 n. 4 Botez, Angela, 40, 54 n. 35, 94 n. 24, 132 n. 87 Brahmanism, 137 n. 3, 142 Braithwaite, R. B., 175 n. 17 Brunner, Emil, 114 n. 120, 164 Buddhism, 103 n. 60, 137 n. 3, 139, 152 Butler, Joseph, 208 n. 6 Byzantine culture, 130

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Cahn, Steven, 158 n. 10 catabasic movement, 129 categorical dislocation, 109 categories: of the understanding, 52, 96– 97, 103, 108 n. 83, 123–26, 131, 190– 91, 221, 239; abyssal, 96 n. 31, 123–26, 131, 135, 141, 179, 191, 221–23, 231– 33, 243, 246 Catherine, St., 142 n. 26 Catholic theology, 130 causalism, 200–201 censored cognition, 91, 95. See also transcendent censorship censorship. See transcendent censorship certainty, 95, 146– 49, 185–86 chance, 87 Charlesworth, M. J., 159 n. 11 Chisholm, Robert, 187, 197 Chomsky, Noam, 228 Christ, 148 n. 53, 195 n. 32, 237–38 Christianity, 116 n. 138, 137 n. 2, 141 n. 24, 144 – 45, 147 n. 49, 149–50 Cicero, 157, 160 Cioran, Emil, 33 clairvoyance, 99 Clement of Alexandria, 237 n. 8 Cobb, John B., 237 n. 8 Codoban, Aurel, 121 n. 11, 140 n. 18 cognition: metaphysical forms of, 101–2 Cohen, Stewart, 187 n. 19 coherence, 62, 162, 204 coherentism, 63 n. 22, 93–94, 138, 166, 187, 197–99 Collingwood, R. G., 86 n. 132 Coltescu, Viorel, 121 n. 11 commensurability, 230, 233 common sense, 47– 49 communication, 227–33 concrete cognition, 91, 95–97, 190–91 Confucius, 137 n. 3 consequentialism, 201, 204 conservation. See under mystery constructivism, 42, 43 n. 9, 61, 62, 131– 32, 179; and culture, 131–32; in philosophy, 94 n. 24, 103–5, 191; in religion, 140, 191, 195, 203, 231, 244; in science, 89 n. 5, 191, 221 contextualism, 202–3 contradiction, 116 Copernican inversion, 109 Copernicus, 111, 201 n. 23

Copoeru, Ion, 76 n. 89 corpuscular theory, 110–11, 117 n. 139 correspondence, 65 n. 30, 93–94, 95, 102, 131–32, 188 corroboration, 108–9 cosmological argument, 156, 160, 207 cosmology, 44, 87, 201 n. 22 counterfactuals, 93 creation of the cosmos, 66–70, 132–33, 142– 44, 212 creativity, 86, 97–98, 103, 130–33, 148, 205–6 crisis: in luciferic cognition, 106–7, 165 criteria, 131 n. 82, 230–31 critical realism, 80 cross-cultural communication, 135 cryptic, 105–9 culture: in cognition, 76 n. 89, 93 n. 18, 98, 103, 191, 231; defined, 119 n. 1; and Blaga’s epistemology, 130–32; philosophy of, 119–36; and religion, 141– 42, 193, 243 Cusanus, 114 n. 120 Darwin, Charles, 32, 55, 63 n. 23, 82 deabsolutized belief, 192 Dean, Thomas, 227 n. 1, 229 n. 9, 230 n. 13 death of a thousand qualifications, 172 de Broglie, L., 117 n. 139 demonic, 74, 78, 215 depth, philosophical, 51, 60 Descartes, 32, 46, 47, 48 n. 23, 55, 72 n. 72, 241; contrasted with Blaga, 79, 145 n. 40; epistemology, 186–87, 196– 97; and philosophy of religion, 158 n. 7 design: in the world, 63 n. 23; thwarted, 63 n. 23, 83–84. See also teleology destiny: human, 84 n. 125, 85, 87, 104, 130, 133 n. 90, 149–51, 181; and religion, 143, 147, 206; sense of, 127, 129 determinism, 87 Diaconu, Florica and Marin, 152 n. 70 dialectical reason, 115–16 dialog, 202, 227–33 differentials, 68–70, 83–84, 144, 212 dignity, 133, 148 n. 56 Dima, Teodore, 106 n. 69 Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite, 71–73, 114 n. 120, 137 n. 3, 142, 170–71, 214 n. 22 directed observation, 108–9, 165, 191

index dis-anaology between Creator and creation, 74 –76 dissimulation of the transcendent, 76–77, 98 diversity, 229 divinity, 69 doctoral thesis: of Blaga, 13, 119 dogma, 88, 112 n. 109, 115 Doinas, Stefan Augustin, 23 n. 2, 33 Doppler principle, 109 n. 98 doublets of horizons, 126 Driesch, Hans, 63 n. 23, 80–83 Drimba, Ovidiu, 33 Dvoˇra´ k, 121 Eckehart, Meister, 72, 137 n. 3, 142 ecstatic intellect, 97, 105 n. 62, 115 Eden, 134 Edwards, Rem B., 168 n. 29 Einstein, Albert, 30, 55 Eleatics, 116 n. 138 Eliade, Mircea, 19 n. 2, 33, 40, 121 n. 12, 160–62 emanation, 66–69, 113 empirical potential, 109 empiricism, 220–21; contrasted with Blaga’s philosophy, 62, 65, 220; maximized by Blaga’s philosophy, 117; practiced in Blaga’s philosophy, 138, 166, 203 Enescu, Maria, 33 enstatic intellect, 97, 105 n. 62, 115–16 entelechy, 63 n. 23, 83 epistemology (Blaga’s): key insights of, 102–5; and religion, 147, 182–95; summarized, 117–18; in table form, 90–91; and theodicy, 213 error, 78, 91 n. 13, 147, 228 eschatological verification, 173 eschatology: personal, 149–51 evidence, 104, 198, 203, 208 evidentialism, 199–200 evolution, 63 n. 23, 82, 84 exclusivism, 63 n. 24, 235 existentialism, 44 n. 15, 116, 218 n. 4 experience, 53–54, 98, 117 expressionism, 134 extrasensory, 99 faith, 200 faith seeking understanding, 159

281

falsification, 172, 176, 181 Feyerabend, Paul, 54 n. 35, 94 n. 24, 218 n. 5 Fichte, Johann, 47, 48 n. 23, 80, 130 Flew, Antony, 81, 158 n. 8, 163, 172–73, 175, 183, 208 n. 7 Flonta, George, 76 n. 89, 140 n. 14 Flonta, Mircea, 28 n. 25, 34 n. 57, 39, 41, 140 n. 14; on Blaga’s metaphysics, 49 n. 4, 76 n. 89; science and culture, 132 n. 86 formative aspiration, 127, 129–30 Forms, 80 n. 104 Foucault, Michel, 229 n. 9 foundationalism, 63 n. 22, 104, 147 n. 50, 166, 186–87, 196–98 foundherentism, 202–3 Francis, St., 142 n. 26 Fr˘ateanu, Vasile, 59 n. 6 free will, 87 free will defense, 211–12 Frege, Gottlob, 33 Freud, Sigmund, 32, 33, 111, 125 n. 27, 139 Frobenius, Leo, 121 Frunz˘a, Sandu, 72 n. 73 functionalism, 174 –75 Gadamer, Hans-Georg, 230 n. 12 Galileo, 55, 111 Gan˘a, George, 25 n. 7, 39 gardener: invisible, 172 Gavriliu, Leonard, 45 n. 17, 95 n. 25, 100 n. 49, 126 n. 34 Geisler, Norman, 200 n. 17 Geivett, Douglas, 157 n. 5 Gheorge, Elena, 84 n. 124 Gherman, Oliviu, 33 given, the, 97, 106, 147, 148 Gnosticism, 74 –75, 116 n. 138, 190 God: and Blaga’s philosophy of religion, 143, 145– 46, 149–50, 152; existence and nature, 207–16; the Great Anonymous, 70–74, 209–10; hiddenness of, 214; knowing God, 216, 226; and language, 156–57. See also Anonymous Fund, Great Anonymous Goethe: influence on Blaga, 30 n. 35, 32, 53, 89 n. 4, 111, 116 n. 138, 130; and religion, 137 n. 2; the subconscious, 125 n. 27

282

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Goldman, Alvin I., 200 n. 20 Goodman, Nelson, 94 n. 24 grace, 92, 238 Greek mythology, 137 n. 3 Greek philosophy, 43– 44, 93 n. 18, 113, 152 Great Anonymous: and culture, 124 –26, 130; and epistemology, 102, 104; first mentioned, 32; and God, 209–10; and metaphysics, 70–76, 142; preservation of creation, 136, 142– 44, 150, 212; and religion, 142– 43, 206. See also Anonymous Fund, God greater good argument, 212 gullibility, 55 Haack, Susan, 187 n. 18, 203 Habermas, Gary, 208 n. 6 Habermas, J¨urgen, 230 n. 12 Haeckel, 55 Haight, David F. and Marjorie A., 78 n. 98 H˘ar˘angu¸s, Cornel, 61 n. 14, 86 n. 132 Hare, R. M., 173, 175 Hasker, William, 156 heaven, 151 Hegel, Georg, 19 n. 2, 26, 46, 47, 48 n. 23, 49, 103 n. 60, 116 n. 138; and paradox, 114 n. 129; philosophy of history, 80, 86 n. 132, 128 n. 60, 134 n. 99; philosophy of religion, 162–63 Heidegger, Martin, 33, 129 Heim, S. Mark, 235 n. 4 hell, 151 Helm, Paul, 192 Hempel, Carl, 33, 109 n. 98 Hepburn, Ronald W., 194 n. 31 Heraclitus, 47, 48 n. 23 hermeneutics, 229 heuristic, 62–63, 78, 199 Hick, John, 72 n. 76; definition of philosophy of religion, 155–56, 160; definition of religion, 167–68; methodology, 162– 64; natural theology, 157 n. 4; religious knowledge, 182, 190 n. 23, 206, 210; religious language, 173–74, 176, 180; religious pluralism, 238–39, 243– 47; theodicy, 211–12 Hinduism, 48 n. 23, 236 history: philosophy of, 69 n. 53, 86 n. 132, 128 historicity, 85–86, 103, 142

Hitchens, Keith, 40, 136 n. 105 horizon: inner, 108, 127–29 humanism, 228 Hume, David, 46, 48 n. 23, 171–72, 183, 199–200 Husserl, Edmund, 33, 46, 55 Hyers, Conrad, 241 n. 15 hypothetico-deductive method, 62, 166 Ic˘a, Ioan, 19 n. 1, 143 n. 33, 145 n. 38 iconic expression, 97 idealism, 64 –65, 80 ideology, 228 n. 4 Ilica, Anton, 39 Illusion of adequacy, 76, 106 imagination, 97–99, 140 impermeability of cultures, 231 inclusivism, 236–37 incommensurability, 228–29, 232, 235, 240, 243 Indian philosophy, 29 n. 28, 30 n. 40, 68 n. 47, 93 n. 18, 114 n. 120, 129 individualism, 130, 135 infinite, 97 innate knowledge, 192 inner horizon, 108 innovations: Blaga’s, 102–5 insanity, 60 n. 10 instinct, 93 n. 17, 192 intensification. See under mystery interior construction. See theoretic construction interior horizon, 51 interior tension, 108 internal consistency, 61 interreligious communication, 227–233 intuition, 89, 96, 97–98, 131, 140 Irenaeus, 236, 237 n. 8 irrational, 97, 114 Islam, 68 n. 47, 137 n. 2 Jainism, 137 n. 3, 236 James, William, 33; philosophy of religion, 187 n. 19, 189 n. 21, 201, 206, 208 n. 5, 241 n. 15 Jaspers, Carl, 89 n. 4 John of the Cross, St., 142 n. 26 Jones, Michael S., 121 n. 11 Judaism, 137 n. 3 Judeo-Christian thought, 103 n. 60 Jung, 33, 125 n. 27

index justification: of Blaga’s philosophy, 20– 21, 62–63, 66, 122, 138, 155; of luciferic cognitions, 117, 181; of philosophical systems, 45, 49–51; in religion, 147, 186–89, 196–206. See also validation, verification justified true belief, 185–89 Kant, Immanuel, 46, 112, 116 n. 138, 130, 141 n. 23, 190; contrasted with Blaga, 76–77, 80, 81, 106–7, 111 n. 105, 112 n. 109, 219–20, 243 n. 17; criticisms of, 44, 50, 55, 105 n. 62, 113 n. 113; influence on Blaga, 26, 31, 43 n. 11, 52 n. 30, 64 n. 29, 123–25, 204 n. 33, 219, 221, 243– 47; and philosophy of religion, 157–58, 163, 183, 207 n. 4, 239 Kellenberger, James, 186 n. 14 Keyserling, Hermann, 55 n. 37, 121 Kierkegaard, Søren, 44 n. 15, 114 –16, 137 n. 2, 158 n. 10, 200 n. 19, 208 Kirkham, Richard L., 188 n. 20 Knitter, Paul F., 238 n. 13 knowledge. See justified true belief Kripke, Saul, 94 n. 24 Kroner, Richard, 193 n. 29 Kuhn, Thomas, 52 nn. 29 and 35, 94 n. 24, 132 n. 87, 201 n. 23, 218 n. 5 Kung, Hans, 202 n. 29 Lamarckism, 63 n. 23, 82 language, 149, 170–81 language games, 174 Lao-tzu, 44 n. 15, 49 Larkin, William J. Jr., 193 n. 27 Lavoisier, 111 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhem, 31, 46, 47, 48 n. 23, 49, 68 n. 47, 80, 116 n. 138, 123, 130, 231 n. 14; monads, 68 n. 46, 135 n. 103; theodicy, 212 n. 16 leap, 116 Lehrer, Keith, 187 n. 19 Leibrecht, Walter, 193 n. 29 Levi-Strauss, Claud, 121 n. 11 Lipovanu, Ioana, 89 Locke, John, 46 Logic: in philosophy, 45 n. 17, 97, 112– 16, 122 n. 13; in religion, 131, 195, 205 Logos, 237 Lubac, Henri de, 237 n. 9

283

luciferic cognition: and culture, 131–32; and epistemology, 88 n. 2, 91, 96, 101, 103, 105–18; and metaphorical language, 179; and metaphysics, 78; and religion, 147, 148, 165–67, 191–95, 203–205, 210, 222, 245– 47; and science, 220–23 luciferic human, 85, 134 Mach, Ernst, 46, 134 magic, 49, 113 n. 114, 148 n. 55 Manichaeism, 137 n. 3 Manzat, Ion, 146 n. 44 Margolis, Joseph, 187 n. 19, 202 n. 28 Marion, Jean-Luc, 74 n. 77 Martin, Michael, 158 n. 8 Martyr, Justin, 237 n. 8 Marxism, 168, 228 materialism, 80, 220 mathematics, 80, 88, 104, 112–14 matrix: stylistic. See stylistic field Maximus the Confessor, 142 McClendon, James William Jr., 204 n. 34 McPherson, Thomas, 171 n. 3 metaphor, 50, 60–61, 65 n. 32, 67, 71–72, 151; and culture, 122 n. 14; and the transcendent, 116 n. 138, 177–81; two types of, 177–78, 180 metaphysics, 58–87, 132–34, 146 methodological expansionism, 46 methodological purism, 45– 46 Micu, Dumitru, 38, 121 n. 12 minus-cognition: and metaphysics, 64 n. 28, 76; in epistemology, 91, 103, 109, 112–18; in religion, 195, 204 miracles, 148, 157, 183, 208 Mitchell, Basil, 173, 177 n. 19, 210 n. 12 modes of existence, 84 –85 monism, 80 moral argument, 157, 207 Moreland, J. P., 218 n. 3 morphology, 126 n. 39 motif, 46, 47 multiplicity of systems, 109 Munteanu, Bazil, 25 n. 8, 40, 142 n. 25, 152 n. 70 Musc˘a, Vasile, 26 n. 10, 32 n. 49, 125 n. 27 Muthu, Mircea, 121 n. 11 mystery, 66, 106–7, 132–33, 222–23, 243; attenuation of, 96, 101, 105, 108–

284

index

Muthu, Mircea (continued ) 11, 118, 131, 194, 246; conservation of, 85–86, 126, 132; and human destiny, 85, 123, 151; important to Blaga’s philosophy, 43, 49 n. 24, 50 n. 27; intensification of, 101, 109, 112–18, 194; permanentization of, 101, 109, 111–12, 118, 194; purpose of, 92; revelation of, 108, 123, 139– 41, 181, 206; and transcendent censorship, 76 n. 86, 78, 99, 100, 102 Mysticism: examined, 137 n. 2; rejected, 142, 146– 47, 152, 193; mentioned, 72, 190 myth: in culture, 134 n. 97; in epistemology, 98–99; in metaphysics, 71 n. 65, 78; in philosophy, 49; in religion, 141 n. 24, 148 n. 55, 151 n. 64 mythic cognition, 91, 95, 97–99, 113 n. 114, 180 Nari¸ta, Ionel, 59 n. 6, 89 natural theology, 156, 160, 162 naturalism, 135 naturalized epistemology, 187 n. 19, 202 negative cognition, 77–78, 90, 100–101, 106 negative coherence, 202–3 negative theology, 100, 116 n. 138 neglected alternative, 80 n 105, 96 n. 32 Nemoianu, Virgil, 24 –25, 31 n. 48, 40, 58 n. 1, 72 n. 71, 74 n. 77, 94 n. 24 neo-Kantian, 64, 126 n. 39, 173–74, 246 neoorthodoxy, 218 n. 4 Neoplatonism, 31, 68 n. 47, 74 –75, 80, 115, 137 n. 3, 142 neopragmatism, 61 Newton, Isaac, 55, 110–11, 123 Nicolau, Petre, 25 n. 7, 38 Nicula, Constantin Valter, 71–72 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 26, 137 n. 3; perspectivism, 55 n. 37, 63, 64 n. 27, 121, 125, 187 n. 19, 202 n. 28 nihilism, 129 Noica, Constantin, 33 nonrational cognition, 97 n. 38 noumena. See phenomena-noumena distinction Novalis, 44 n. 15, 46, 55 n. 37

objectivism, 78 objectivity: in philosophy, 61, 76 n. 89, 124, 130; in religion, 147 n. 52, 202, 229 occult cognition, 91, 95, 99–100 Oi¸steanu, Andrei, 24 ontological argument, 157, 183, 207 ontological mutation, 85, 134 Opri¸san, I., 23 n. 3 order. See teleology Origen, 137 n. 3 origin of the cosmos, 66–70 Orthodox: seminary, 13, 30, 71; theology, 28, 72 Ostwald, 55 Otto, Rudolf, 147 n. 52 Panikkar, Raimundo, 229 n. 9, 237 n. 11, 241 n. 15 Papu, Edgar, 33 parable of the garden, 81 paradigm, 94 n. 24, 217 paradisaic cognition: and culture, 123–24, 131–32; in epistemology, 91, 95, 96– 97, 105–7, 166; and religion, 147, 165– 66, 190–95, 203, 210; and science, 220–22 paradisaic human, 85 n. 127 paradox, 75–76, 101, 112–15, 194, 229, 245 Parmenides, 45, 47, 48 particle wave theory, 110–11, 117 n. 139 Pascal, Blaise, 114 n. 119, 142 Pastin, mark, 197 n. 5 Pauli, Wolfgang, 130 Penelhum, Terence, 186 n. 15 perception, 107 permanentization, See under mystery perspectivism, 63 n. 22, 179, 187, 202–5 Peterson, Michael, 156, 157 n. 5, 159 n. 13, 218 n. 4 Petreu, Marta, 72 n. 72, 145 n. 40 Petru, Cristian, 79 n. 102 phanic material, 106–9, 165–66, 191, 222 phenomena-noumena distinction, 106–7, 111 n. 105, 173–74, 239 phenomenology, 32, 105 n. 62, 159 n. 12 Philo, 113–17, 164 philosophical method, 45– 47, 148, 158 philosophical theology, 161, 164, 213–14 philosophy of religion, 155–251. See also religion

index physics, 132, 134 Pinnock, Clark, 237 Plantinga, Alvin, 164 n. 24, 198 n. 8, 211 n. 15 Plato: influence on Blaga, 31, 46, 47, 49, 75, 80, 130; and philosophy of religion, 156, 163; the subconscious, 125 n. 27 Plotinus, 46, 67, 116 n. 138, 137 n. 3 pluralism: metaphysical, 80; philosophical, 94 n. 24, 151; religious, 228, 234 – 47. See also soft pluralism plus-cognition, 91, 109–11, 179 poetry (Blaga’s), 22, 35–36 Poincar´e, Raymond, 30 Pojman, Louis P., 198 n. 9 Polanyi, Michael, 40 Pollock, John, 203 polyvalence: of experience, 151 n. 67, 242– 43; of nature, 146 Pop, Traian, 48 n. 22, 98 n. 44, 104 n. 61 Popa, Mircea, 39 positive-adequate cognition: and culture, 124; and Blaga’s metaphysics, 65 n. 30, 77; and epistemology, 90–95; and religion, 144, 184, 190–92, 226, 231– 33 positivism, 32, 55, 64 n. 27, 90 n. 9, 96, 103, 105 n. 62; and religion, 135, 159, 172–73, 183–84, 218 n. 4 postmodernism, 61, 94 n. 24 predication: problem of, 177 pragmatism: epistemology, 42, 49–50, 63 n. 22, 93–94, 104, 187; influence on Blaga, 32; and justification, 200–1; in philosophy of religion, 138, 166, 181, 189, 204, 210, 215 presuppositionalism, 161, 199 Price, H. H., 186 n. 14 probability, 197 prognostication, 98 proof, 62–63, 98. See also religion properly basic, 62, 208–9 psychoanalysis, 126 n. 39, 139 psychology, 47, 134, 202 Ptolemy, 201 n. 23 Quaker movement, 236 quantum theory, 113 n. 117, 163 quasi-cognition, 90, 92 n. 16, 95–100, 106 Quine, W. V., 187 n. 19, 202

285

Rahner, Karl, 237–38 Ramakrishna, 30 n. 34 rationality, 97, 99, 105 n. 68, 132 realism, 64 –65, 80, 97, 218–25 reason, 89, 189–90, 198 Reformation, the, 130 reformed epistemology, 164, 197–98, 208–10 refraction, 110–11 Reichenbach, Bruce, 156 reincarnation, 137 n. 3 relativism: and epistemology, 86, 94 n. 24; and religion, 131, 134, 143, 150, 202, 229, 231 relativity, 113 n. 117 reliabilism, 200–201 religion: Blaga’s, 142, 149, 160, 184; Blaga’s philosophy of, 137–54, 161– 62; contemporary philosophy of, 155– 247; and culture, 141–2, 231; definition of, 139– 41, 167–68; empirical study of, 159–66; legitimating of, 147, 158; limits, 189–92; and metaphysics, 142– 44; positive evaluation of, 143, 151; and proof, 158–61; and science, 217– 26 religions: of the world, 29, 137, 140, 143, 151–52 religious knowledge, 182–95 Rembrandt, 130 Renaissance, the, 130 Rescher, Nicholas, 47 resonance, 64, 131–32, 204 revelation, 42 n. 4, 85–86, 115, 123, 130– 31, 213; as a metaphor, 145– 46; in religions, 139– 46, 177, 190, 237; in theology, 148– 49; in philosophy, 157, 165, 192–93 revelation of the cryptic, 105 n. 66 Riegl, Alois, 121 Rig-Veda, 137 n. 3 romanticism, 32, 135 Rorty, Richard, 40, 187 n. 19, 188 Rosenberg, Shawn W., 47 n. 20 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 32 n. 49 Rowe, William L., 158 n. 8 Russell, Bertrand, 33 Rusu, Liviu, 33 salvation, 149–51 Sankara, 114 n. 120

286

index

Sankhya, 137 n. 3 S˘avulescu, Geo, 61 n. 15, 96 n. 32, 125 n. 27, 151 n. 68 Scheler, Max, 139 Schelling, Friedrich, 44 n. 15, 55 n. 37, 116 n. 138 Schiller, Friedrich, 29 Schleiermacher, Friedrich, 137 n. 3, 139 Schopenhauer, Arthur, 55 n. 37 Schuon, Frithjof, 238 n. 13 Schweitzer, Albert, 235–36 science: constructivist, 104, 132, 195, 221–23; contrasted with philosophy, 51–55, 59–60; and culture, 120, 132 n. 86; and metaphor, 178, 181; and myth, 98; philosophy of, 30, 34, 89 n. 5, 93 n. 20, 94 n. 22, 113 n. 117, 115, 117 n. 142, 132 n. 87; realism in, 218–20; and religion, 217–26; revolutions in, 54, 113 n. 117, 132; scientific method, 43, 46 n. 19, 49, 50, 55, 113, 194, 220–21; supramethod, 107 n. 80, 107 n. 82, 113 n. 117 scientism, 55, 228 scripture, 192–3 secondary literature on Blaga, 40– 41 secularization: of religion, 168–69 self-summation, 139– 40, 147, 168, 206 self-surpassing, 139– 40, 147, 168, 206 sense and reference, 149, 179 Shakespeare, William, 130 Shalkowski, Scott A., 158 n. 8 Shenk, Calvin E., 236 Simmel, Georg, 121 sine qua non, 122, 133 STrbu, Ion D., 33 skepticism, 55, 64, 78, 94 n. 24, 183 Smart, Ninian, 160, 230 Smith, James M., 204 n. 34 Socrates, 89 n. 4 soft pluralism, 238–39, 243– 47 Solomon, Norman, 234 n. 1 Sosa, Ernest, 200 n. 20 soteriology, 149–51 sound: nature of, 53 space, 127–8 Spengler, Oswald, 31, 119, 120–21, 124, 135 n. 103, 231 n. 14 Spencer, 55 Spinoza, Baruch, 46, 47, 48 n. 23, 49, 116 n. 138, 163

spiritual slumber, 44 springboard. See theory idea Stambovsky, Phillip, 98, 116 n. 136 St˘aniloae, Dumitru, 28, 33, 141 n. 20, 145 n. 38, 147 n. 49 Steiner, Rudolf, 55 style, 56, 76 n. 89, 114 n. 119, 122–36 stylistic brakes: and Blaga’s metaphysics, 76 n. 89; and culture, 131, 133; and religion, 142– 46, 181, 184 –85, 188–92, 206, 226, 231. See also transcendent braking stylistic field, 46, 122–36, 203, 231 subconscious, 125–30, 134 subjectivism: in culture, 124; in epistemology, 103, 229; in metaphysics, 78, 86; in religion, 145, 147, 202– 4 supralogical, 78, 114 supramethod. See under science Surdu, Alexandru, 94 n. 24 Swedenborg, Emanuel, 46 Sweetman, Brendan, 157 n. 5 Swidler, Leonard, 192 n. 25, 202 n. 29, 227 n. 1 symbolic, 97–98 systems: multiplicity of, 109 T˘anase, Alexandru, 35 n. 64, 89 n. 4, 139 n. 13, 141 n. 20 Taoism, 103 n. 60, 114 n. 120, 137 n. 3, 139 teleological argument, 157, 160, 183, 207 teleology, 81–84 tension, 116 Teodorescu, Magda, 13 n. 2, 31 n. 43 Teresa, St., 142 Tertullian, 114 n. 119, 158, 164 Thales, 44, 53 theodicy, 143– 44, 211–13 theology: Blaga’s, 151–52; and epistemology, 104, 194 –95, 211; and metaphysics, 71 n. 65, 72–73; and minus cognition, 112–17; and philosophy of religion, 146, 148– 49; vs. philosophy, 158, 161 theoretic accessories, 108–11, 179 theoretic construction, 108–11, 191, 194 theoretic system, 109–11 theory capacity, 109–11 theory idea, 78, 107–12, 191, 194

index thing in itself, 112 Tillich, Paul, 33, 89 n. 4, 193 n. 29; on philosophy of religion, 138 n. 5, 139; and religious language, 174, 176, 180; on science and religion, 219 n. 9 time, 127–28 tolerance, 202 transcendence, self-, 100 transcendent, the: in Blaga’s philosophy, 76–77, 98, 116 n. 138, 136, 140, 147, 150; knowledge of, 191, 194 –95, 206, 214 –15, 225; and language, 179; in religion, 160 transcendental accent, 46 transcendent braking, 126. See also stylistic brakes transcendent censorship: and culture, 126; and epistemology, 91–92, 96, 102, 105, 114 n. 119, 116, 133 n. 90; and metaphysics, 76–79, 85; and religion, 142– 46, 184 –85, 188–92, 206, 226; and religious language, 176, 179, 181 transfiguration, 115 translations of Blaga’s works, 39– 40 trans-significative, 98 Transylvania, 24 –26, 33 Trinity, 113 Troeltsch, Ernst, 235 n. 4 true: contrasted with “deep”, 51 truth: theories of, 93–94, 130–32, 161, 180, 188, 229

universal, 98, 126 Universitatea Babe¸s-Bolyai, 14

unconscious, 99 understanding cognition, 96 undulatory theory, 117 n. 139 Unitarian Universalism, 236

Zamfirescu, Vasile, 125 n. 27 Zeno, 45, 48 n. 23, 114 n. 120 zero-cognition, 91, 109, 111–12, 179 Zoroastrianism, 137 n. 3

287

Vedanta, 30 n. 34, 47, 137 n. 3 validation, 166. See also justification, verification Van Buren, Paul, 175 n. 17 Van Til, Cornelius, 199 n. 14 Vatamaniuc, D., 13, 31 n. 43 Vaught, Carl G., 60 n. 12; 180 veil of perception, 54 n. 33 verification, 93–95. See justification, validation verification principle, 172–73, 176 vitalism, 63 n. 23, 80, 82 Wainright, William, 230 Walker, Brenda, 13, 40 Ward, Keith, 163, 204 n. 33, 215 n. 23 Wheelwright, Philip, 179–80 Wilde, Oscar, 146 n. 46 Wisdom, John, 81, 113 n. 113, 172, 194 n. 30 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 64 n. 27, 167, 186 n. 16; on religious language, 170, 172, 174 –76 Wolterstorff, Nicholas, 164 n. 24, 198 n. 8, 208 n. 9 worldview, 103 Worringer, 121 Yoga, 137 n. 3