The Making of the Madras Working Class 9380118163, 978938011816
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Table of contents :
Title Page
Copyright Page
Contents
‘Dilip’ Veeraraghavan (1958–2009) A.R. Venkatachalapathy
1. Introduction
2. Industrial Development and Labour Conditions in Madras
3. Early Struggles
4. Formation of Unions, 1918
5. First Organized Struggles, 1918–1922
6. Indian National Congress, Home Rulers and the Labour Movement
7. Disunity in the Ranks, Worker Militancy and Labour Unrest
8. The Period of Ebb and Quiescence, 1922–1933
9. Emergence of Left Forces, 1933–1937
10. The Congress Ministry and the Working Class, 1937–1939
11. Conclusion
Appendices
1. Press Communiqué Issued by the Government of Madras in Connection with Industrial Labour
2. Strikes in the Madras Presidency and Madras City. Trend during 1920–1939
3. Biographical Notes
Notes
Index
Citation preview
The Making of the Madras Working Class
The Making of the Madras Working Class
D. Veeraraghavan
Print edition first published in February 2013
E-book published in August 2017
LeftWord Books
2254/2A, Shadi Khampur
New Ranjit Nagar
New Delhi 110008
INDIA
LeftWord Books is a division of
Naya Rasta Publishers Pvt. Ltd.
leftword.com
© 2013, Dr. Dilip Veeraraghavan Memorial Trust
Contents
‘Dilip’ Veeraraghavan (1958–2009)
A.R. Venkatachalapathy
THE MAKING OF THE MADRAS WORKING CLASS
1.
Introduction
2.
Industrial Development and Labour Conditions in Madras
3.
Early Struggles
4.
Formation of Unions, 1918
5.
First Organized Struggles, 1918–1922
6.
Indian National Congress, Home Rulers and the Labour Movement
7.
Disunity in the Ranks, Worker Militancy and Labour Unrest
8.
The Period of Ebb and Quiescence, 1922–1933
9.
Emergence of Left Forces, 1933–1937
10.
The Congress Ministry and the Working Class, 1937–1939
11.
Conclusion
Appendices
1. Press Communiqué Issued by the Government of Madras in Connection with Industrial Labour
2. Strikes in the Madras Presidency and Madras City. Trend during 1920– 1939
3. Biographical Notes
Notes
Index
A.R. Venkatachalapathy
‘Dilip’ Veeraraghavan (1958–2009)
The Madras Labour Union, founded in April 1918, is the first organized labour union in India. It was in Napier’s Park, Madras, in 1923 that May Day, led by M. Singaravelu Chettiar, was first celebrated in India. These are well-attested facts in the histories of the labour movement in India. But there was no coherent account of the labour movement in Madras until D. Veeraraghavan wrote this book. Originally titled ‘The Rise and Growth of the Labour Movement in the City of Madras and its Environs, 1918–1939’, his
doctoral
dissertation
was
submitted
to
the
Indian
Institute
of
Technology, Madras, in 1987.
Veeraraghavan’s study is based on an exhaustive study of the voluminous documents
in
the
colonial
archive
lodged
in
the
Tamilnadu
Archives,
Chennai. This was supplemented by research in the National Archives of India and other copious reports produced by the colonial government. In addition
to
this
Veeraraghavan
made
extensive
use
of
contemporary
newspapers such as The Hindu, New India, Swadesamitran and Navasakthi. He unearthed the Swadharma, the first periodical exclusively devoted to
labour issues in India, and exploited to the full his access to leading labour and communist leaders including G. Selvapathy Chetty, C.S. Subramanyam, P.
Ramamurthi,
V.P.
Chintan,
K.
Murugesan,
Gajapathi,
and
others.
Veeraraghavan pursued much of his research in the 1980s; unfortunately none
of
these
stalwarts
is
any
more
with
us
and
this
book
remains
an
indispensable analytical record of their experiences. Further some of the records that he consulted have also been lost. Even by the time of his search, the records in the B. and C. Mills had been swept away in a major flood in 1975. The sheer documentary foundation on which this book is based alone makes
it
worthwhile
and
the
value
of
this
book
cannot
therefore
be
overestimated.
Veeraraghavan was no dry, careerist historian. He was steeped in the left movement
and
the
choice
of
his
topic
derived
from
his
political
commitment. Well versed in the Marxist classics he was also thoroughly read in
labour
history.
His
knowledge
of
the
minutiae
of
the
history
of
the
communist party and its ideological strands and internal differences could be
quite
dazzling.
Understandably
he
was
drawn
to
the
British
Marxist
historians but his thesis is more influenced by Jean Chesneaux than by E.P. Thompson. This book is animated by Veeraraghavan’s deep faith in the revolutionary potential of the working class, however unfashionable such a faith may now be.
Veeraraghavan
wrote
little.
His
M.Phil
thesis,
though
somewhat
uninterestingly titled ‘Modified Scheme of Elementary Education of Madras State in the Year 1953 and its Impact’ is actually a mature and politically informed study of Rajaji’s infamous ‘kulakalvi’ scheme which mandated that primary school students spend half a day learning their father’s hereditary
trade
–
an
episode
that
marks
a
watershed
in
the
history
of
post-
Independence Tamilnadu. Veeraraghavan was diffident about writing and consequently published few papers; among these one must count an essay published in the Indo-British Review in his research supervisor’s name.
I first got to know Veeraraghavan in 1984. I had entered the musty corridors of the Tamilnadu Archives as a seventeen-year old. If I found the writings in the colonial archives exciting, the discussions at the plebeian canteen sipping cups of tea were even more exhilarating. The research hall then teemed with old and young scholars – ranging from the septuagenarian C.S.
Subramanyam,
a
founding
member
of
the
communist
party
in
Tamilnadu who was then carrying out a study of M.P.T. Acharya, to college teachers, doctoral students, and independent scholars. An especially active group were the doctoral students from the department of humanities and social sciences of IIT Madras, all of whom worked uniformly on the interWar period under the mentorship of S. Ambirajan. Ambirajan had returned
from
the
University
of
New
South
Wales
and
was
just
deeply
dissatisfied with the work emanating from the Western academia, especially from
Australia,
perceived
an
which
was
imperialist
then slant
focused and
on
wanted
the to
inter-War correct
period.
the
He
balance.
Veeraraghavan chose to study the history of labour struggles during the inter-War period. While he focused on the city of Madras, another student, T. Thankappan, worked on labour in the rest of Tamilnadu.
As we chatted and debated at the canteen Veeraraghavan would seldom join
us.
He
would
remain
huddled
in
a
corner
poring
over
piles
of
government orders of the Government of Madras. Since he paid the research assistant from his modest stipend, his reluctance to join us for tea was quite
understandable. Veeraraghavan had no eyesight and was fully dependent on assistance. The statement of this disability is only a matter of fact and is no invitation
to
concession.
He
was
the
first
visually
challenged
person
to
acquire a doctoral degree in Tamilnadu. While he was in the forefront for struggles for the rights of the differently-abled he detested patronizing and gratuitous
praise.
university
teacher
Veeraraghavan
was
in
He
Tamilnadu.
certainly had
an
more
almost
well
read
insatiable
than
any
thirst
for
knowledge, and could never have enough of assistance to read. He had an amazing memory and would recall even minute details from the documents that he had consulted. By any reckoning his doctoral thesis is one of the finest produced in the social sciences in the last few decades in this part of the country.
Veeraraghavan was born in an orthodox Iyengar family in Kumbakonam on 8 October 1958. Symptoms of retinitis pigmentosa, an eye disease known to afflict the offspring of close kinship marriages, were diagnosed at an early age. An incurable ailment, he gradually lost his sight and by the time of his school final had lost all vision.
Veeraraghavan then moved to Chennai and studied B.A. (History) at the R.K.M. Vivekananda College, M.A. at the Presidency College (1978–80), and M.Phil at Pachaiyappa’s College (1980–81). In 1982 he joined IIT Madras for Ph.D and submitted his thesis in 1987. The next year he joined its faculty and taught there until his death.
It was in his college student days that he was introduced to Marxism and was active in the Students’ Federation of India. He was close to the CPI (M) and
maintained
fairly
close
relationships
in
the
party
ranging
from
P.
Ramamurthi to younger leaders. He would attend various party meetings
and workers meetings, and taught theoretical classes. During his later years, however, he developed a distance from the party mainly because of his changed
position
regarding
environmental
issues.
The
break-up
of
the
Soviet Union took its toll, and he was ill at ease with the way the party coped with this debacle.
The
social
technology
sciences
students
and
put
up
humanities with
are
courses
poor
in
cousins
them
as
a
in
IITs,
and
necessary
evil.
Veeraraghavan was an inspiring teacher, and he weaned away a number of students from technology and engineering. Many of those who went on to become technocrats were sensitized to social issues. Students were fond of him, and many of them donated considerable sums of money which he used for various charitable educational purposes.
When one speaks of Veeraraghavan one name comes to mind instantly. S.S. Kannan, a committed Marxist and founder of the Karl Marx Library, nurtured
Veeraraghavan.
He
was
the
cornerstone
of
Veeraraghavan’s
life
from his student days and played a central role in his research and writing. Enriching
his
library
with
important
acquisitions
primarily
for
Veeraraghavan’s benefit, he also helped in the writing of the thesis. Later, despite his advanced age, he brought out a Tamil version of this thesis. It is his lasting regret that Veeraraghavan did not continue his history of the Madras working class even though all the source material for the 1940s had been collected.
Veeraraghavan was a great music aficionado and would spend hours listening to Carnatic music. He was a regular in the Chennai music concerts and,
as
the
music
historian
V.
Sriram
once
remarked,
few
among
the
concert-going fans knew of his academic accomplishments. It is my lasting regret that he did not write a social history of Carnatic music.
Veeraraghavan maintained indifferent health all his life. A poor eater, he also suffered from juvenile rheumatoid arthritis. He belongs to a strand in the Indian left which aspires to a Gandhian austerity. Though he could afford a car he insisted on taking public transport. Given his disability he suffered much as a result, and was once nearly gored by a street cow. His austerity would often border on masochism. A year before his death doctors diagnosed him with tuberculosis of the large intestine. After pumping him with a variety of drugs they changed their diagnosis to cancer. His already weakened body could not take the virulent drugs. His last months were spent in pain and he passed away on 5 February 2009.
No tribute to Veeraraghavan could be complete without a mention of V.R. Muraleedharan. They met as doctoral students at IIT. Two more diverse personalities
cannot
be
imagined.
What
held
them
together
remains
a
mystery to me. It was a deep bond, and Muralee stood by Veeraraghavan till fate conspired.
Muralee
has
Veeraraghavan
since
taken
Memorial
Trust.
the
initiative
to
Veeraraghavan’s
form
parents,
The the
Dr legal
Dilip heirs,
have turned in all his savings and posthumous service benefits to this trust which
provides
scholarships
to
visually
challenged
and
poor
students.
Muralee is also organizing annual lectures and concerts in his memory.
Over the last two decades or so I had been persuading Veeraraghavan to publish
his
study,
but
he
remained
diffident.
The
idea
of
converting
Veeraraghavan’s thesis into a book to commemorate his memory emerged
from
discussions
with
Muralee.
I
took
up
the
task
of
preparing
the
manuscript for publication. Veeraraghavan wrote clearly and lucidly, and I have therefore restricted myself to removing infelicities common to thesiswriting, polishing the manuscript, and cleaning up the notes and references. Gita
Jayaraj
has
done
a
fine
job
of
copy-editing
the
manuscript.
The
publication of this book under the LeftWord imprint would have gladdened Veeraraghavan’s heart, and therefore thanks are due to Sudhanva Deshpande for the enthusiasm with which he has taken up this project. The title has been provided by me and pays homage to E.P. Thompson. The photographs on the cover are from the Centenary Handbook of the Madras Chamber of Commerce, published in 1936. We thank D. Krishnan, Photo Editor, The Hindu,
for
sourcing
these
images
and
the
Chamber
of
Commerce
and
Industry for making them available.
The world has changed much since the writing of this thesis. In the realm
of
historical
Symptomatic
scholarship
perhaps
of
this
labour
history
change,
a
has
labour
taken
a
backseat.
historian
whom
Veeraraghavan respected much called her work ‘Lost Worlds’!
Such
dismalness
notwithstanding
this
book
bears
testimony
to
Veeraraghavan’s scholarship and will remain the standard reference for any history of the working class in south India.
A Bibliography of Veeraraghavan’s Publications
Book
Chennai Perunagara Thozhirchanga Varalaru (translated into Tamil by S.S. Kannan and Puduvai Gnanam, Alaigal Veliyeettagam, Chennai, 2003)
Articles
‘Colonialism,
Nationalism
and
Labour:
A
Study
of
Nationalist
Politics
and
Labour
Movement in the Madras Presidency, 1918-1922’, Indo-British Review, XIII (1), Jan-Jun 1987 (co-authored with C. Ramachandran)
‘Genesis
of
the
Modified
Education
Scheme
of
Madras
State
1953’,
Rajaji
th
110
Birth
Anniversary Celebrations Volume
‘Class Conflict and the Colonial State in Madras Presidency Up to 1918’, South Asia Bulletin, 10 (1), 1990
‘Anti-Malarial Policy in the Madras Presidency: An Overview of the early decades of the twentieth century’, Medical History, Volume 32, Number, 3, 1992 (co-authored with V.R. Muraleedharan)
‘Congress, the Left and the Working Class: The Case of Madras Press Labour Union 1937th
1939’, Proceedings of the 54
Annual Conference of the Indian History Congress, Mysore,
December 25-27, 1994 (co-authored with C. Ramachandran)
‘Disease, Death and Local Administration: Madras City in the Early 1900s’, Radical Journal of Health, 1(1) (New Series) January 1995 (co-authored with VR Muraleedharan)
Book Reviews
Eugene F. Irschick, Tamil Revivalism in 1930s, IESHR, 25 (3), 1988
Deepak Kumar (ed.), Science and Empire: Essays in Indian Context, IESHR, 30 (2), 1993
V.D. Divekar, South India in 1857: War of Independence, IESHR, 32 (3), 1995
CHAPTER I
Introduction
Until recently, Indian history has been concerned mainly with political and
administrative
changes
in
society,
namely
constitutional
reforms,
electoral battles, political agitations and activities of political groups and public
figures.
Socio-economic
developments
did
not
receive
sufficient
attention from scholars of historical research. Even in social history, ‘the history of the historyless’ – the anonymous people who, in their collective acts, their work, daily lives and fellowship, have forged our society through 1
the centuries’
The
– was often neglected.
rapid
industrialization
of
India
since
Independence
was
accompanied by a phenomenal increase in the strength of the working class. Working class discontent found its expression in strikes and other forms of protest
that
growing
affected
interest
in
the
normal
the
working
functioning class,
its
of
industry.
temper
and
This its
led
to
mood,
a
its
comprehension of its situation and its level of consciousness. As a result, sociological and socio-psychological studies of present-day Indian labour have
been
undertaken
on
a
considerable
scale.
But
these
studies
of
contemporary conditions are not adequate by themselves. They need to be supplemented by a historical analysis of the rise and growth of working class movements in India from their earliest beginnings. And it falls to labour history to fulfill this task.
Labour
history,
the
term
applied
to
studies
of
the
history
of
labour
movements, is a relatively recent phenomenon in India. Labour history, as it has evolved so far, may be classified under three broad categories. To the first category belong those works that concentrate on all India organizations of labour and on the life and work of important labour leaders. The history presented
in
these
works
is
thus
institutional
history.
Important
in
this
category are the works of S.C. Jha, C.J. Revri, V.B. Karnik, S.D. Punekar and 2
Sukomal Sen.
These works are all based on published documents and trace
the emergence and progress of trade unionism at the macro-level. Though they describe some of the most important strikes, their main concern is the history of all-India trade union organizations.
The
second
category
of
works
have
concentrated
on
trade
disputes.
Their concern has been the manifestation of working class discontent and the actions taken by the state, such as legislation and the setting up of administrative mechanisms to defuse or resolve the conflicts. The history presented in these works is thus, more or less, a macro-level history of 3
legislations and measures for the resolution of conflicts.
The third category of works differ from the above two categories in that they are micro-level studies as against the nationwide or state-wide studies of
the
former.
These
are
confined
either
to
a
specific
industry
or
to
occurrences in a particular area over a brief period. Among these microlevel studies, there are different strands. One tends to concentrate on the
structure of the labour force and labour market, and be concerned with a detailed
analysis
of
the
structure
of
the
occupations
of
work
force,
the
sources of labour supply, the composition of workforce according to caste, religion and sex, and the role of intermediaries in the recruitment, training and disciplining of labour. The works of M.D. Morris are typical of this 4
trend.
While Morris assumes a perfect play of market forces, Ranjit Das
Gupta and Chitra Joshi emphasise the role of extra-economic factors on the structurization of labour and seek to underline the fragmented character of the
labour
5
market.
Lalitha
Chakrabarthi’s
work
demonstrates
how
the
push-factor has operated in regions characterized by subsistence agriculture with surplus labour and how ecological factors play an important part in 6
determining labour catchment areas. is
concerned
with
localized
protest
Another strand of micro-level studies movements 7
relationship with wider national developments,
of
labour
in
their
inter-
while yet another focuses
attention on the leadership of trade unions. Newman overplays the patronclient relationship between the union leader and the worker in the Bombay 8
textile industry.
Certain other authors have sought to analyse the interplay
of local traditional values and the universal values of industrialism and the extent
to
which
one
set
of
values
has
subsumed
the
9
other.
These
are
sociological or socio-psychological studies rather than purely historical.
Compared to the number of works on the labour movement in Bombay and Calcutta, there are only a few on the labour movement in Madras Presidency.
E.D. Murphy in his work Unions in Conflict has analyzed the emergence of trade unions in the textile mills of Madras, Coimbatore, Madurai and 10
Ambasamudram.
This
work
reveals
that
the
operation
of
caste
and
communal factors in Madurai and Ambasamudram acted as impediments to
the
healthy
consciousness.
growth The
of
trade
analysis
unions
and
underplays
the
the
development
involvement
of
of
class-
workers
in
political movements, especially in the Indian National Movement. Besides, the linkages of political movements with trade union movements have also not
received
sufficient
attention.
And
even
the
few
instances
of
their
influence wherever discussed seem to have been judged as impediments to the healthy growth of trade union movement. It can be seen that the work is informed by an underlying philosophy of economism.
C.S. Krishna, in his two articles in Social Scientist, has discussed in some detail
the
strikes
in
the
11
Railways in 1932–33
workshops
12
British
Madras
and
Southern
Mahratta
and those in the textile mills of Madras, Madurai and
Ambasamudram during 1929–33. between
of
employers
and
In the case studied, the conflicts were
workers
led
by
Gandhian
or
moderate
nationalists, with the colonial state standing solidly behind the employers. The
author
points
out
that
even
though
the
workers
were
free
from
dissensions based on caste, creed and religion, and showed a high degree of militancy,
the
struggles
were
only
economic
and
that
the
leaders
were
satisfied with the promotion of trade union consciousness and did not seek to rouse political or revolutionary consciousness.
Chelladurai’s Genesis
of
Labour 13
Presidency. the
entitled
Movement
‘Context
in
Tamil
of
Russian
Nadu’
tries
Revolution to
cover
the
in
the
entire
He discusses the impact of the Russian Revolution of 1917 on
nationalist
movement
article
movement
through
the
in
India
medium
and of
indirectly the
on
the
Nationalist
working
Movement.
class He
recognizes that objective conditions existed already for the sprouting of a
working class movement and that all that was necessary was a leadership capable of organizing the discontented workers. He holds that though this leadership was provided by certain nationalist leaders in whom interest in the condition and potential of the workers was awakened by the Russian Revolution, the trade union movement did not go beyond the limits of economism.
These earlier studies have drawn different conclusions on the factors affecting the growth of trade unionism in the presidency. Murphy is of the opinion that the participation of nationalists in the trade union movement had only an adverse effect on the healthy growth of trade unionism. In his view,
internal
force
behind
leadership successful
and trade
economism unions.
alone
Krishna
had
been
the
sustaining
and
Chelladurai
on
the
contrary, consider that the nationalists, both moderates and extremists, had been very helpful in organizing a hitherto leaderless working class that could not organize by itself. They however note that the nationalists failed to take the movement beyond the stage of economism.
All these earlier studies though presidency-wide in scope are confined either to short periods of conflict and strife or to a specific industry such as the textiles. Similarly, studies on a national scale barely mention events in Madras barring the founding in 1918 of the first organized trade union, the Madras Labour Union. Actions of workers in other industries in the city of Madras are ignored. The present study therefore attempts to cover all the trade
union
movements
in
diverse
industries
in
a
selected
area,
namely
Madras city and its environs, from their origins to the outbreak of the World War II.
The nations
historiography might
development
be
of
of
of
use
labour
labour to
movement
some
movement
extent in
in
for
India.
the an
As
highly
industrialized
understanding
Pelling
points
of
the
out,
the
concept of a separate organization of employed workers to determine wages and conditions by negotiations with their employers had no place in the medieval system of industry in which the guilds performed those functions. As modern industry developed, the guild system declined and a need arose for
workers
to
combine
separately
from
their
14
masters.
Initially
these
combinations (as these organizations of workers were then called) were used for petitioning the Parliament for the redress of their grievances but later it was used for enforcing wage demands by direct sanction. The employers reacted by coming together themselves for the purpose of repressing the workers.
The
combinations
of
workers
then
constituted
themselves
into
groups or associations and in the face of united actions of the employers the maintenance of the association became more necessary to the workers than that of enforcing wages. Analyzing this process, Karl Marx sums up:
Economic conditions had first transformed the mass of people of the country into workers. The domination of capital had created for this mass a common situation, common interests. This mass is thus already a class against capital but not yet for itself. In the struggle . . . this mass becomes united and constitutes itself as a class-for-itself. The interests it defends become class interests. But the struggle of class against class is a 15
political struggle.
The
Chartist
Movement,
confused
and
inchoate
though
it
was,
had
ambitious national aims based upon a belief in the identity of interests of
the entire working class and had raised high hopes about the possibility of 16
politicization of the working class.
In his early works, Marx envisaged that
the passage from the stage of class-in-itself to that of class-for-itself i.e., from a
movement
for
pure
and
simple
economic
demands
to
one
for
a
transformation of the social system, would take place by itself in the course of
the
struggles.
workers
would
He get
felt
that
the
if
worst
economic of
it
and
depression would
persisted
have
to
long,
struggle
the
very
unsuccessfully against reduction of wages. He hoped that the activity of the unions
would
then
be
carried
over
to
the
political
17
field.
But
the
development of trade union movement in Britain belied these hopes. Trade unions became the preserves of a small minority of highly skilled workers, 18
‘an aristocracy of labour.
Marx’s efforts through the First International to
politicize the working class movement did not meet with much success in Britain.
The
socialist
movement
developed
distinctly
from
the
trade
union
movement, though the latter was much influenced by the former. The wave of ‘New Unionism’ in the last decades of the nineteenth century owed much 19
to the influence of socialism.
Thus there came into being two distinct arms
of the working class movement, one giving primacy to economic issues and 20
the other to the issue of political power.
The former represented a lower
level, ‘trade union consciousness’ and the latter a higher level, ‘revolutionary class
consciousness’.
Analyzing
the
trends
in
the
growth
of
class
consciousness, Lenin concluded that the working class could exclusively by its own effort develop only trade union consciousness and that the higher level
revolutionary
working
class
only
class by
consciousness
interaction
could
with
and
be
developed
under
the
among
influence
the of
a
revolutionary social democratic political movement, which he called the 21
vanguard of the proletariat.
Antony
Giddens
has
developed
a
typology
to
map
the
levels
of
consciousness of the working class. In the three-tier system outlined by him, the
first
two,
namely
the
consciousness
of
identity
of
interest
and
the
awareness of conflict, correspond to the ‘trade union consciousness’ defined by Lenin. The third, ‘revolutionary political consciousness’, corresponding to
the
revolutionary
class
consciousness
defined
by
Lenin,
involves
a
recognition of the possibility of an overall reorganization in the institutional mediation of power and a belief that such a reorganization could be brought about through class action. Giddens disagrees with Lenin’s view that the transcendence to revolutionary class consciousness depends on the nature of political leadership. He locates the source of this consciousness in the actual conditions of labour. Labour movement tends to be socialist in orientation when it is formed in a society in which there are fairly important post-feudal elements and in which the working class is not incorporated into the civil society. Thus revolutionary political consciousness is more likely to develop 22
in the early ages of industrial development than in its advanced stages.
Giavanno Arrighi, in his analysis of the development of Italian labour movement, identifies three distinct phases: First came the political phase followed
by
the
second
phase
of
agitation
for
economic
demands.
The
second phase persisted for a long period until it was undertaken by the third phase
of
‘social’
labour
movement.
The
third
phase
was
marked
by
23
confrontations, often violent and unruly, on the shop floor.
Muto Ichiyo in his survey of the labour movement in Japan after World War II compares the development in Japan to that in Italy and concludes
that
the
former
corresponding
movement
to
the
followed
a
technological
parallel
trajectory
development
and
up
to
the
a
point
consequent
changes in the technical division of labour. The third phase in the case of Japan is marked by the rise of a corporatist labour movement. Corporatism integrates the trade union movement with the interests of the employers who
have
learnt
to
manage
industrial
conflicts
successfully
to
the
24
disadvantage of labour.
Selig Perlman, the historian of the American labour movement, also empasises
that
the
natural
development
of
the
working
class
is
towards
economism and that political consciousness being an ideology injected by intellectuals not belonging to the working class is alien to labour. According to him the efforts of these outsiders were bound to fail as had been amply demonstrated in the case of the German trade union movement in which the ‘home-grown’ working class ideology of economism prevailed over the alien
ideologies
of
the
intellectuals.
Perlman
acknowledges
the
role
of
political radicalism in certain countries in the organization of trade unions but considers that the true interests of workers lie in liberating the trade union movement from such influences and asserting its ‘natural’ ‘homegrown’ ideology of economism. Economism is and should be the be-all and 25
end-all of genuine labour movements.
When
the
historiography
of
the
labour
movements
in
the
advanced
countries is used in analyzing the development of labour movement in the colonies of imperialist nations, certain specific features of the colonial set up 26
are to be taken into consideration.
1.
The
multi-structural
character
of
the
economy
in
colonial
India
imparts a special complexity to the class structure and renders difficult the perception of classes.
2.
The
carry-over
prevailing
in
the
of
communal,
rural
caste
catchment
and
areas
other
is
divisive
likely
to
tendencies
occlude
class
consciousness and impede class cohesion.
3. The stratification within the working class and the differentials in wages
are
not
as
significant
as
in
advanced
industrial
countries.
Therefore, the social distance between the skilled and the unskilled is not as great as in the West. This impediment to class cohesion is therefore absent.
4. Racial discrimination prevailing in European-owned factories breeds conflict consciousness of non-economic origin, which however, is likely to be expressed in terms of economism.
5.
Anti-imperialist
liberation
movements
are
bound
to
rouse
the
political consciousness of the people in general; the workers are likely to be as much influenced by the slogans of these movements as the other classes; an atmosphere congenial to the promotion of consciousness of one’s basic rights as citizens is also likely to promote aspirations for better living conditions and thereby generate trade union consciousness. However, as the rising bourgeoisie is likely to be the natural leader of nationalist movements, it is likely to promote an ideology subordinating inter-class conflicts to the supra-class contradiction between the alien imperialism
and
the
national
interests.
To
this
extent
the
development of working class consciousness is likely to be blocked.
full
6. In its role as the protector of imperial interests, the State is likely to play an active part in the suppression of working class discontent that is likely to create a ‘law and order’ problem and threaten the authority of the State as working class discontent has the potential of revolution. The State may also provide a framework for the expression of discontent in order to defuse the conflict before it intensifies. The State may go a step further and create certain institutions (such as the Labour Office), which by assuming the function of redressing grievance at the incipient stage itself, forestall trade union action and cut the ground from under the feet of trade union leaders.
Labour history may be classified under the category of subaltern studies whose scope and objectives have been outlined in Antonio Gramsci’s ‘Notes 27
on Italian History’.
The growth and development of the labour movement
cannot be considered in isolation as an autonomous process. Its interaction with political movements under non-working class leadership, the impact of the changes in the economic situation and technologies on the objective formation of the working class, the attempts of the State to suppress, control or co-opt the labour movement, the influence of the various formations that relate their activities to the control and leadership of the labour movement – all these aspects are to be taken into account.
The methodology adopted is therefore to describe the various actions of the working class in its efforts to preserve its class interests and relate them to the actions of employers, the State and the political parties. Considering that
the
period
of
study
coincides
with
the
Gandhian
phase
of
the
nationalist movement, the interaction between the nationalist movement
and the labour movement has been given due importance. Local events and episodes are presented as far as possible in the background of provincial, national and even international developments in political movements as well as in the labour movement.
Gramsci’s remark about the history of subaltern social groups, that it is necessarily
fragmented
and
episodic,
would
apply
to
the
history
of
the
labour movement in colonial India. Only those actions of labour, which disturb the peace and calm in industry or public life get into records and reports. Besides, as has been pointed out by Jean Chesneaux in the preface to his classic work on the Chinese labour movement, the main difficulty for the 28
labour historian lies in the inadequacy of the available documentation.
Some important sources such as the archives of the British Government and personal
papers
of
British
administration
in
India
are
inaccessible
to
a
researcher working in India. Some sources like the records of Binny and Co. have been lost in a disastrous flood in 1975.
The
present
work
is
based
mainly
on
primary
sources
such
as
the
historical documents of the British India preserved in the Tamilnadu State Archives, Madras and in the National Archives of India, New Delhi. Among these, the Government Orders of the various departments of the Provincial Government such as Public, Home, Judicial, Public Works and Labour, Law (General), addition
to
Revenue these,
and
annual
Development
contain
administrative
reports
useful of
the
information. Government
In of
Madras, Fortnightly Reports, Police Reports, Native Newspaper Reports and the
Proceedings
of
Madras
Legislative
Council
and
Assembly
have
been
found useful. The Report of the Royal Commission on Labour in India (1929–1931) and the volumes of evidence submitted to that commission
throw light on the general conditions of the workers, the wages and living conditions, as well as the contradictions between the employers and the workers.
The
appointed
reports
of
the
Labour
by
the
Government
understanding
the
conditions
Commission.
The
evidence
of
in
Investigations
India
the
have
period
submitted
Committee
been
found
subsequent
before
the
to
Indian
(1944)
useful the
in
Royal
Industrial
Commission (1918) has been useful in analyzing the patterns of ownership in
the
textile
industry.
Census
reports
have
also
been
of
much
help
in
studying the distribution of workers according to occupation and caste.
An attempt has been made to consult the private papers of important political and labour leaders available in the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, the P.C. Joshi Archives in Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, and the Adyar Archives at the Theosophical Society, Madras. Besides, the private papers of G. Selvapathy Chetty, T.S. Ramanujam, P.R.K. Sharma and E.L. Iyer available with the respective families of these leaders have also been consulted. A few documents have also been obtained from the
Press
Labour
Union,
the
Employers’
Federation
of
South
India,
the
Madras Labour Union, the Madras Chamber of Commerce and the Servants of India Society, Madras.
Back issues of newspapers like The Hindu, New
India,
Madras
Mail,
Justice, Desabhakthan, Swadesamitran and of journals like Navasakthi, Jana Sakthi, India Thozilali and Swadharma (the last mentioned being the first Indian
journal
in
English
wholly
devoted
to
labour)
have
also
been
consulted.
Besides, interviews were obtained from the leaders associated with the labour movement in Madras at various stages such as G. Selvapathy, Rudra
Kuppusamy,
P.
Ramamurthi,
K.
Murugesan,
C.S.
Subramaniam,
K.
Govindaswami, as also a few shop-floor leaders like Gajapathi and Arjunan.
This study aims to trace the rise and growth of labour movement in the city of Madras and its environs from 1918 to 1939. The year 1918 has been taken as a starting point because it was then that the first ever formally organized and constituted labour union in India was founded in Madras city. Though 1918 has been chosen as the starting point for this reason, working class struggles prior to this date are briefly described in order to comprehend the conditions preceding the birth of the first union. Although various dates could have been chosen as the end date for the study, 1939 has been
chosen
for
two
reasons.
First,
it
was
the
year
the
World
War
II
commenced. With its outbreak, the expediency of the War prevailed over all other
considerations.
The
Government
of
India
assumed
extraordinary
powers, and sought to reorient the economy of the country and increase industrial production to meet war needs. It intervened in a big way in the running of industries and in the management of capital-labour relations. Hence
the
conditions
for
the
functioning
of
labour
movement
were
drastically altered. Another reason for the choice of 1939 as the terminating point is that by this year trade unionism in Madras had become established.
The present study is divided into nine main chapters, apart from the Introduction and Conclusion. Chapter II gives a short history of the city of Madras since its founding by the East India Company, surveys the industrial development in the city, and examines the origins of the working class, its structure and the working and living conditions of the workers. Chapter III describes some of the forms of protest and resistance during the early phases
of industrialization and discusses a few struggles that took place prior to 1918 that had prepared the ground for the birth of unionism in Madras.
The following four chapters deals with the period 1918–1922. Chapter IV describes the circumstances in which the first formally constituted union, the Madras Labour Union, was born. Chapter V discusses the first organised workers’
struggles
that
took
place
during
this
period.
The
contribution
made by the leaders of the Home Rule Movement during the first two years and the part played by the leaders of Non-Cooperation Movement in the later years are analyzed in Chapter VI, while the next chapter discusses the disunity and unrest in the ranks of the workers. These five years, from 1918 to 1922, were the most eventful in the entire inter-war period.
Chapter VIII covers quite a long period from 1922 through 1933. This was a period of ebb and quiescence for the labour movement. A revival of trade union activity took place after 1924, stimulated by the enactment of the Indian Trade Union Act and under the impact of the Great Depression that erupted in 1929. The following chapter covers the years 1933–1937. During this period the left forces were strengthened by the merging of three streams of radicalism in Madras, namely, the Self Respect Movement, the Congress Socialist Party and the communist movement. At the same time the labour movement was affected with constitutionalism stimulated by the constitutional reforms introduced by the British Government. Chapter X covers the period of the first Congress Government in Madras Presidency under
the
Chief
Ministership
of
C.
Rajagopalachari
from
July
1937
to
October 1939. The period was marked by a tremendous upsurge in militant working class activity. The chapter discusses the various struggles waged by
the working class during this period and the evolution of the labour policy of the Congress ministry.
CHAPTER II
Industrial Development and Labour Conditions in Madras
The
city
of
Madras
at
the
turn
of
the
century
was,
as
Susan
Neild
categorized, a typical ‘colonial port city of Asia.’ These colonial port cities were founded by Europeans or developed by them as central links in a world-wide colonial, political and economic network. ‘Their foreign origins or control, their coastal locations, their central positions within European colonial systems, their emphasis on commercial rather than ritual activities and their ethnic and cultural heterogeneity are important features which distinguish colonial
them
cities
from
during
agglomerations
of
most
the
urban,
indigenous
early
years
suburban
of
cities growth
and
even
in
1
Asia.’
were rural
Many
‘hardly
of
more
settlements
these than
drawn
2
together in differing degrees by colonial policies and practices.’
Susan J. Lewandowski, in her comparative study of the ceremonial city of Madurai and the colonial port city of Madras, says of the latter: ‘Over time its form and functions became a direct reflection of its foreign origins
and as such it represented the microcosm of the larger colonial empire of 3
which it was a product.’
Madras city was thus created ‘by the English and for the English’ from an agglomeration of villages, hamlets and small townships with the objective of carrying on trade between Europe, India and East Indies (present day Indonesia), after attempts to establish trading posts on the Coromandel Coast near Masulipatnam had failed. Its transformation as the capital for the whole of British South India, as a political, social and cultural centre, was a result of the transformation of the East India Company from a mere trading
concern
to
a
political
force
in
the
eighteenth
and
nineteenth
centuries.
The geographical location of the city is on the coast of the Bay of Bengal 4
between 13° and 13°9 North and 80°13 and 80°19 East.
It has grown from a
small nucleus known as Madrasapatnam where Francis Day of East India Company
landed
in
1639
in
search
of
a
site
to
establish
a
factory.
Madrasapatnam was a cloth-producing centre and the cloth produced here 5
was cheaper than that produced in Armagon in Andhra.
Out of this small
nucleus grew the city of Madras. In course of time, a fort was built and the surrounding
villages
were
absorbed.
The
first
stage
of
expansion
was
confined to meet the principal function of trade and commerce. The White Town developed to the north of the fort housing the European, Eurasian and
native
Christian
population
and
the
Black
Town,
the
extension
of
Madrasapatnam was the residential quarters for the indigenous merchants and
6
dubashes.
Later,
the
Europeans
seeking
to
create
a
lifestyle
commensurate with their growing political and economic power acquired landed property in the nearby villages. These villages then became part of
7
the city.
With the city becoming the capital of Madras Presidency after the
four Mysore Wars, and with the diversion of trade to Calcutta as a result of the unsettled conditions in Madras, its political and administrative roles overshadowed its commercial role. As the premier city of the presidency, and
with
the
establishment
of
many
colleges,
the
incorporation
of
the
University of Madras (1857) and the starting of newspapers and journals it became also an educational and cultural centre.
The population of Madras increased due to the influx of immigrants from the districts. The inflow was initially in response to the demands of commerce and trade; later it was to meet the needs of administration and educational
institutions;
and
finally
to
cater
to
the
daily
needs
of
the
population itself. From 3,97,552 people in 1871, the population increased to 5,26,911 in 1921 and to 6,47,230 in 1931; an overall increase of 62.8 per cent in sixty years. According to 1931 Census Report, nearly 35 per cent of the city’s
population
had 8
moved into the city.
been
born
outside
the
city
and
had
subsequently
Nearly one-eighth of the population belonged to the 9
adi-dravida community or the depressed class.
The character of the industrial development in the city and its suburbs was determined mainly by its role as a centre of trade and commerce and as a centre of political, administrative and educational activities. Madras city, as
Loganathan
points
out,
has
been
growing
on
residential
rather
than
industrial lines and the industries, such as they are, reflect largely this aspect of
city
life
and
serve
to
meet
what
are
predominantly
local
10
needs.
Industrial development has therefore been mainly in infrastructure, trade and services.
The
reason
for
the
absence
of
any
large-scale
major
industry
in
or
around the capital city was the non-availability of coal and iron in close proximity
or
even
within
the
presidency,
and
the
lack
of
cheap
electric
power.
The
East
India
Company’s
choice
of
Madras
for
the
location
of
its
factory or trading post was based not only on its proximity to handlooms but
also
on
its
geographical
position
in
the
Bay
of
Bengal, 11
favourable for trade with Burma, Singapore and the Far East.
which
was
One would
therefore expect the Port of Madras to have been the seat of intense activity, and one that would have been developed rapidly. But Madras did not have a natural harbour and in 1889, 250 years after the city was founded, the harbour was built to protect ships from cyclonic storms. The port was then developed so that it served not only as a shelter during storms but also performed
its
function
of
moving
cargo
between
ship
and
shore
easily,
12
quickly and without undue damage.
The main improvements effected during the development of the port were:
1.
protection
against
the
silting
of
the
mouth
of
the
harbour
by
closing the eastern entrance and opening up the northern one;
2.
erection of additional sheds and wharfs, jetties, cranes and weigh
bridges;
3.
improvement
of
ship
quays
to
handle
coal
and
to
haul
vessels
weighing up to 500 tons.
With these improvements the harbour’s traffic reached nearly 8,00,000 tons a year by 1913–14 and touched a million tons at the close of World War
13
I.
The harbour provided employment to more than 3,000 workers, most of 14
them manual workers and coolies.
The railways were vital for ensuring the trade traffic of the port, for transporting imported goods to the interiors of the country and for carrying raw materials from the interiors to the port. They were also indispensable for the quick movement of the army to quell rebellions. At the turn of the century,
South
India
was
served
by
three
railway
companies,
the
South
Indian Railway (1891), the Madras Railway Company and the Southern Mahratta
Railway
Southern
Mahratta
Company. Railway
The
Madras
Company
Railway
merged 15
Southern Mahratta Railway Company in 1903.
to
Company
form
the
and
the
Madras
and
The railway lines of both
the companies terminated in Madras. The first broad gauge railway line 16
connecting Madras to Arcot was opened in July 1856.
The South Indian 17
Railway extended the metre gauge line up to Madras in 1876.
The railways set up workshops to service the rolling stock. The South Indian Railway had its workshops at Negapatam (Nagapattinam) for metre gauge
rolling
stock
and
at
Podanur
for
broad
gauge
rolling
stock.
The
Madras and Southern Mahratta Railways (henceforth M. and S.M. Railways) set up their major workshops at Perambur on the outskirts of Madras in 18
1873. By 1914 over 5500 workers were employed in this workshop.
Two
smaller workshops were situated at Arkonam and at Hubli each.
City commuters were also serviced by the tramway. The first train line opened in 1895, 6 years before electric tram cars were running anywhere else 19
in India, or even in London.
The Madras Electric Tramways Company
took over the tramways in 1904 and by the close of 1919 there were 11 miles 20
of double track and 5 ¼ miles of single track.
Initially, the conduit system
had been adopted but was converted to the overhead system after a few years as floods caused extensive damage to the underground cables. The tramways had their own maintenance and repair sheds. There were in 1919 about 1200 21
workers of whom about 400 worked in the shed
and the others worked as
line operators.
Another suburban
service
electric
intended
train
for
service
the
city’s
between
commuting
Madras
Beach
traffic and
was
the
Tambaram,
which opened in 1931 following the electrification of the railway lines in this 22
section.
The automobile bus service for the city’s commuting public did not seem
to
have
worked
even
though
Simpson
and
Co.
had
taken
a
keen
interest in it since 1910. The few bus services that operated were badly financed and badly organized and the buses themselves left much to be desired in terms of speed, safety and comfort. The first real attempt at organizing bus transport was undertaken by the Madras Electric Tramways, which operated a fleet of 50 motor buses between 1925 and 1927. But they had
to
abandon
it
in
1928
as
they
were
unable
to
compete
against
the
23
unorganized bus owners.
Electric power supply was undertaken by the Madras Electric Supply Corporation Limited formed in 1906. It commenced commercial operation in August 1907 and supplied all of the power required by the Government, the Port Trust, the Railways, the Tramways, the Corporation and other chief 24
undertakings. 25
house.
It employed about 400 workers, most of them in the power
Telephone services were first introduced in 1893 and operated by the Orient Telephone Electric Company until they were taken over in 1923 by 26
the newly formed Madras Telephone Company. been
established
even
earlier.
The
express
The telegraph services had
telegraph
between
Madras-
27
Bombay-Calcutta was completed in 1855.
Besides these infrastructural services, the oil distribution companies had installations at the harbour and at Tondiarpet in North Madras. Best and Co. had begun to distribute and market kerosene in 1889. Spencer and Co. had
been
retailing
American
kerosene
even
earlier.
In
1906,
the
Asian
Petroleum Co. took over the interests of the earlier companies while the Burmah Oil Company had erected tanks as early as 1905. Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Company was the agent in India for all British oil 28
companies.
29
The tank installations employed over 775 workers.
The development of the city as a centre of political, administrative and educational activities led to the growth of the printing industry in the city. Of course, the first printing works were those of the Christian missionaries. The
Society
for
Promoting 30
established as early as 1711.
Christian
Knowledge
(SPCK)
Press
was
But the larger presses were established in the
19th century and later. The Government Press established in the mid-1850s 31
was the largest printing press, employing over 1500 workers.
The Addison
Press, the M. and S.M. Railway Press, and the Associated Printers were the other big presses besides presses of The Hindu and Madras Mail. There were 32
20 private presses in the city in 1915 employing over 5,000 men.
Most of
the presses were small establishments.
Light engineering works undertaking small repairs and structural work came up in the wake of other development activities. Massey and Co., set up
in
1870,
was
Department
one
of
(PWD)
the also
most had
important their 34
Madras, employing about 500 men.
of
33
these.
workshops
at
The
Public
Royapuram
in
Works North
The Madras Corporation had its own
35
workshop, employing 350 workers.
Besides
these
establishments
infrastructural
such
as
tailoring
industries
shops,
and
jewellery
and
services, goldsmith
small shops,
furniture shops, brassware shops, hotels and bakeries, all belonging to the unorganized sector, sought to meet the predominantly local needs of the 36
city’s population.
The development of large processing and manufacturing industries in the city had been deplorable. The only industries of note were the cotton textiles,
handloom
weaving,
tanneries,
matches
and
aluminiumware.
Of
these, handloom weaving was generally a household industry, though there were about 9,000 looms in and around the city during the early years of this 37
century.
The
reasons
for
the
poor
industrial
development
have
already
been
noted. It is not that there were no efforts to industrialize. In fact, the Madras Government was a pioneer in undertaking industrial experiments even as 38
early as 1898.
Alfred Chatterton as Superintendent of the School of Arts
began experiments in the manufacture of aluminium vessels with imported aluminium sheets. The encouraging results of his experiment led to his appointment
as
a
full
time
officer
to
stimulate
industrial
and
technical
education in the presidency. Chatterton developed a full-fledged plant for the manufacture of aluminium hollowware. The plant was sold in 1903 to the Indian Aluminium Company owned by Eardley Norton, the famous 39
barrister.
40
This was the only aluminiumware factory in the city.
Chatterton
also
made
a
success
of
the
chrome
tanning
41
process.
Though this had no immediate impact, Parrys set up the leather factory at Chromepet, which was the largest of its kind in the East. Madras city by then had over 200 small tanneries in its outskirts, on the north, west and south of the city, employing 5,000 workers. The owners were mostly Muslims while 42
the workers were predominantly low-caste Hindus.
The early efforts of the Government of Madras to pioneer industrial development,
though
not
very
ambitious
in
scale,
were
resisted
by
the
European businessmen in the Madras Chamber of Commerce, and were squashed by Lord Morley, Secretary of State for India. The first Industries Department
was
recommendations
wound of
the
up
in
Indian
43
1910.
Industrial
However,
following
Commission,
the
the
Madras
Government under the Dyarchy passed the State Aid to Industries Act. This Act
provided
financial
guarantees
or
guarantees
for
the
supply
of
raw
materials on favourable terms from government sources to new or nascent 44
industries.
Pioneer manufacture on a commercial scale was to be left to
private enterprise; the Department of Industries would concentrate on rural and village industries as subsidiary occupations for agriculturists. This left out major industries. Thus the whole exercise of the Government of Madras 45
was more or less futile.
One industry of importance that emerged in Madras and flourished due to national and international developments was the cotton textile industry. Madras Presidency was a major producer of cotton. When the American Civil War broke out in 1861, India became the major supplier of cotton to Lancashire. Cotton prices rose over threefold and cotton traders became prosperous. When the American Civil War ended and normalcy returned,
the traders invested their surplus in the industry and started cotton textile mills in Bombay, Ahmedabad, and Nagpur. In Madras, a Parsi capitalist started the Southern India Spinning and Weaving Mills in 1874 near the Elephant Gate investing Rs 5,00,000. The managerial staff here were Parsi and the technical executives, European. The mills produced yarn for export to China, but could not survive competition for long and ceased operating 46
sometime after 1892.
Binny and Co., an old and reputed business house, promoted the next mill, the Buckingham Mill Co., in 1876. They had business relationships with the province even before the mill was established. The mill itself was registered on August 17, 1876, with the objective of working a spinning and weaving
mill,
buying
cotton,
wool
and
other
fibres
and
spinning
and
weaving the same, and marketing the materials so manufactured. Initially it was started with a share capital of Rs 5,00,000 divided into 500 shares of Rs 1,000 each. Subsequently, in November 1876, the capital was increased to Rs 7,00,000. Perambur
The in
mill
commenced
January
1878.
working
By
June
on
the
that
site
year,
it
now
15,000
occupies
spindles
in
were
operational. From then, the number of spindles gradually increased until 1890
when
35,000
spindles
were
at
work.
In
1893
weaving
in
the
Buckingham Mills started with 600 power looms. This is the only textile mill 47
from that time which remained in operation for over a century.
Soon Binny and Co. started a sister mill known as the Carnatic Mills in 1884. Otteri Nallah that also provided them with water separated the two mills, which were amalgamated as the Buckingham and Carnatic Mills (B. 48
and C. Mills) in 1920.
In 1938 the Buckingham Mill and the Carnatic Mill 49
employed 4,549 and 4,327 workers respectively.
The next mill was started in 1875 by Soonderdas Moolji and was called Madras United Spinning and Weaving Company Ltd., popularly known as the
Choolai
Mills.
Soonderdas,
son
of
a
well-known
Bhatia
merchant,
Moolji Jaitha, was a shrewd and far-sighted merchant and had started the Soonderdas Mills in 1872 in Bombay, the Jalgaon Mills in Khandesh and the 50
Madras United Mills in Madras.
The Choolai Mills employed over 2,000
51
workers.
Apart from these, efforts were made in vain to start more textile mills. The ARASM Mills proved short lived, and the plan to start another mill did 52
not quite take off.
Besides textile mills, another important employer of the city was the Western India Match Company (WIMCO) started with Swedish capital in 1928 to manufacture safety matches. WIMCO setting up an industry in India was a clear case of foreign capital taking advantage of the limited protection
that
was
afforded
by
the
levy
of
an
import
duty
by
the
53
Government of India.
The first cement factory in India was built in Madras by South India Industrial Ltd. Its basic raw material was shell and its capacity only 10,000 tons per year. The factory known as Madras Portland Cement Co. employed about 220 workers. The company became defunct a few years after the end 54
of the World War I, sometime in 1924–25.
The
tobacco
Washermanpet
industry
area)
(beedi
provided
industry
employment
mostly for
4,000
in
Triplicane 55
workers.
and
Mainly
children were employed in this industry and work was carried on in the homes of contractors.
The employers in most of the important industries were Europeans, mainly British capitalists. In the Buckingham and Carnatic Mills (B. and C. Mills), investment by Indian businessmen was less than 20 per cent of the 56
total capital invested.
Only the Choolai Mills was owned by an Indian.
Even in this case, the capital and management of the mill were in the hands of Parsis. The Indian Aluminium Company, the Madras Electric Tramways, the Madras Electric Supply Corporation, the oil distributing companies, Madras Telephones, Massey and Co., Beehive Engineering Co. and other leading engineering works, and the Premier Leather Factory, were all owned and managed by the British. The WIMCO match factory, started in late 57
twenties, was a Swedish company.
The government was British and the government undertakings like the Government Press and PWD workshops had British superintendents and managers. Even the Choolai Mills had European engineers. Racial divide was thus a predominant feature in the industry in the colonial period.
Only small establishments such as printing presses, beedi factories, and tanneries were owned and managed by Indians. Even then, in the case of printing presses, the more important presses were run either by the British 58
or by foreign Christian missions.
The Madras Chamber of Commerce was dominated by British business. Indeed its objective was to protect the interests of the European commercial 59
community.
That it had considerable influence with the Government has
been noted in the instance of the squashing of Chatterton’s mild programme for industrialization.
While capital and management were predominantly British, and foreign, labour was almost all Indian, and local. The 1921 Census of India classifies employees
into
five
categories:
managerial,
supervisory
and
technical,
clerical, skilled, and unskilled workers. Of these, a considerable number of Europeans and Anglo-Indians were in managerial, supervisory and technical cadres.
Among
Europeans
and
the
skilled
workers,
Anglo-Indians,
in
there such
were
a
significant
establishments
as
number
of
engineering 60
workshops, particularly of the railways, port trust, and automobile shops.
Otherwise, the vast majority of workers were Indians from the city and surrounding districts. This was quite in contrast to the situation in Bombay and Calcutta where the labour force was drawn from far-off provinces such as Bihar and the United Provinces. During the initial stages the promoters of industry, particularly textile, solved the problem of scarcity of skilled labour by
importing
trained
and
experienced 61
sometimes even from England.
workers
from
Bombay
and
This was also true of mechanics, fitters,
machine men, and turners. Skilled personnel for trades such as carpentry and weaving were recruited from among local artisans. Unskilled workers were mostly local, people who had come to the city from the villages in the 62
adjoining districts to seek a livelihood. been
agriculturists
but
had
lost
A large number of them had once
their
means
of
livelihood
due
indebtedness, drought, etc. There were also the depressed classes of
to the
villages who had migrated to the city in search of a better life and were making
a
precarious
living
in
the
city
as
labourers,
coolies,
sweepers,
cobblers, etc. Unlike the displaced agriculturists who, though working in the city, maintained links with the villages, the depressed classes cut themselves off from their roots and settled permanently in the city.
63
The
recruitment
Information
about
of
workers
vacancies
was
in
mostly
the
shops
through would
informal
spread
channels.
through
the
workmen to those in the neighbourhood. In establishments like the PWD 64
workshops, a notice put up on the notice board advertised vacancies. job
seekers
or
candidates
were
not
examined
or
tested
directly
by
The the
managers or supervisors who were either Europeans or were from outside the province and could not communicate directly with the candidates. The management took recourse to an intermediary called the jobber, whose role in
the
textile
mills
has
been
well
analyzed
by
65
others.
Binny
and
Co.
claimed to have done away with the system of recruitment and disciplining through jobbers. It was asserted that the company had always sufficient applications from sons of employees on the lists to fill normal vacancies and that these boys were usually taken as half-timers and trained in various departments. In other words, their labour was practically on a hereditary basis, there being an increasing tendency for succeeding generations of the same
family
twenties
to
work
would
in
suggest
the
66
factory.
that
this
The
high
phenomenon
turnover
was
till
the
subsequent
early
to
the
measures taken by the company after the series of strikes after World War I. But as the number of applicants was far more than the number of vacancies, bribes had to be paid to get a job, according to the evidence of the Madras Labour
67
Union.
The
Madras
United
Spinning
and
Weaving
Company
(Choolai Mills) also confirmed that the candidates presenting themselves at the mill gates got themselves introduced to the jobbers who then placed 68
them before the departmental head and got them jobs.
Open
competition
where
it
existed
was
‘the
most
primitive’,
as
the
Madras Aluminium Labour Union describes it: ‘The unemployed labourer
comes and stands at the gate of the firm, the employer admits him in if there is any vacancy and if his body is well built.’ The union complained that ‘the iron
law
of
supply
and
demand
worked
to
the
great
detriment
of
the
69
employees.’
Labour employed
contractors by
the
or
Madras
recruiting
agents
employers
as
no
do
not
serious
seem labour
to
have
been
shortage
was
experienced. There was always an army of unemployed persons moving around the city, knocking on the doors of the factories for employment.
Though there was an Apprenticeship Act in force since 1850, it remained 70
by and large only on paper.
Apprenticeship under contract or mutual
obligation does not seem to have been in vogue. As has already been noted, the mills employed boys under 14 as half-timers and the service as halftimers was deemed to be a sort of apprenticeship qualifying for adult jobs. In
printing
unpaid
establishments,
child
labour.
‘apprentice’
Even
these
was
more
apprentices 71
employers by the workers as their relatives.
of
were
an
appellation
introduced
to
for the
It was only in the railway
workshops that there was a system of proper apprenticeship. Apprentices were
drawn
from
those
who
had
finished
Trade
Schools
and
given
systematic training and later absorbed into the establishment in the lower 72
rung of technical cadres.
In the Government Press too, four apprentices
were hired and sent to England for higher training. The press ran a six months’ course for linotype operators and engaged the trainees on piece work
73
payment.
Diploma
holders
from
institutes
like
Victoria
Jubilee
Technical Institute of Bombay were taken as understudies to spinning and weaving Carnatic
masters Mills
in
(B.
Indian-owned
and
C.
Mills)
textile
ran
a
74
mills.
five-year
The
Buckingham
textile
and
and
mechanical
75
engineering course for selected workers. contract
labour
quite
frequently.
The PWD workshops resorted to
About
one
third
of
the
work
in
the
workshop was done on contract, which was essentially of two types: (a) A contractor employed his own men to do a specified piece of work with departmental machinery and material. The workshop used this option when the
number
of
departmental
staff
was
inadequate.
(b)
A
contractor
provided, for a specified rate, resources to supervise departmental labour to do the work within an allotted time. This alternative was used when there was a shortage of supervisory personnel. The labour unions considered the latter a slur on the integrity and honesty of the workers and demanded that senior
and
Despite
experienced
worker
protest,
workers the
be
contract
promoted system
to
supervisory
continued
to
76
cadre.
prevail
in
the
PWD workshops to cope with urgent or extraordinary work.
The
contract
system
also
existed
in
the
Port
Trust.
The
contractors
charged the Port Trust at the rate of Re. l-4 annas per ton and paid only 4 annas as wages to the coolies. The labour union demanded the abolition of 77
the contract system.
Decasualization of labour was also pressed for by
78
Prof. N.G. Ranga.
On
the
whole,
free
labour
market
was
not
really
in
practice
as
recruitment was either carried out through jobbers or limited to relatives and friends of employees or, as in the case of the B. and C. Mills, restricted to the heirs of existing staff. The idea of a free employment exchange was frowned
upon
by
almost
all
employers.
The
workers’
unions
however
79
welcomed it.
The diversity of caste and religion is often cited as a factor detrimental to working class solidarity and class-consciousness. Evidence relating to the
caste composition of the working class in the city is hard to come by. In the B. and C. Mills, two-thirds of the workforce in 1918 were caste Hindus and the adi-dravidas were one-fifth. One-twelfth of the workforce was Christian 80
while the Muslims were only one-twentieth. a
large
number
of
adi-dravidas
were
After the strike in 1921 when
recruited
to
break
the
strike,
the
proportion of adi-dravidas increased to 39 per cent while that of the caste 81
Hindus dropped to 46 per cent. the
neighbouring
predominantly Generally
the
This phenomenon was exceptional, for in
Indian-owned
caste
Hindus
adi-dravida
with
Choolai only
representation
a in
Mills
the
handful
of
workers
were 82
adi-dravidas.
non-traditional
occupations
exceeded their strength in the whole population (which was in the order of 12 per cent) in only a few British or government undertakings such as the railway workshops, etc. Their preponderance in tanneries (80 per cent) and in conservancy (100 per cent) of course is explained by the fact that these were their traditional trades. The conservancy staff were Telugu-speaking adi-dravidas. Similarly Muslims were predominant in the beedi industry and in tailoring; in the latter they constituted 85 per cent. Indian Christians were also well represented in the textile industry and workshops, most of which were
managed
by
Europeans,
and
in
the
printing
industry
run
by
the
missionaries. Otherwise caste Hindus were predominant as could be seen 83
from the data available in regard to tramways and oil companies.
Despite
the heterogeneous caste composition, workers had developed a common outlook and took a common interest in union activities.
Discussing
the
origins
of
the
factory
system
in
England,
Stephen
Marglin, a sociologist, demonstrates how the factory system was devised mainly to discipline and control workers. In the putting out (household
manufacture) system, workers could decide how many hours a day and how many days a week they would work. The result was that the workers chose a lot of leisure. The creation of the factory meant that capitalist employers could decide the hours of labour. Workers had to work on the capitalists’ terms, which required them to work 12 or 14 hours a day, 6 days a week. Workers could not choose to arrive late, leave early, take a day off once in a while or work fewer days on a regular basis. These and other options did not exist at all or were offences punishable with heavy fines. All such decisions 84
were left to the discretion of the employers.
When the expropriated peasants, the ruined artisans and the urban poor in and around cities took to factory work, these aspects of the factory system were felt to be the most burdensome. Indeed, until 1911, there was no legislation to limit the hours of work for working men. Before that, almost all the industries in the city worked inordinately long hours. The Morison Commission noted that workers worked 17 and 18 hours a day in ginning factories, 20 to 22 hours in rice mills and 22 hours in printing presses for 7 consecutive days. Children worked 10 to 14 hours a day. The textile mills in Madras city worked from dawn to dusk. Engineering workshops worked 85
fewer hours a day but the nature of work was more arduous and intensive.
Not only were the hours of work spread over the whole day, the recess periods for meals were too short to eat calmly in a relaxed atmosphere. One 86
had to gulp one’s meal and rush back to work.
The scandalous state of
affairs and the militant reaction to it by the working class compelled the Government of India to appoint the Indian Factory Labour Commission in 87
1908.
As a follow-up of the recommendations of this commission, the
Factory Act of 1911 was passed limiting the daily working hours to 12 for
88
men.
Recess period was extended, of course after considerable agitation on 89
the part of the working class, to one hour under the Factory Act of 1922.
A
perusal of the evidence submitted to the R.C.L., which visited Madras in 1929, would indicate that different establishments did reduce the working 90
hours to comply with the Factory Act of 1928.
The Factory Act of 1934 91
further reduced the number of hours of work to 54 a week and 9 per day.
For women and children, there were provisions in the Factory Act of 1891 restricting the maximum number of working hours for women at 11 per day and for children in the age group 9-14 at 7 per day. Women, if required to work for the maximum number of working hours per day, were entitled to a compulsory rest interval of an hour and a half. Night work was 92
prohibited for women.
The span of night work prohibition was extended
from 7 pm to 5.30 am under the Factory Act of 1922, which also raised the 93
minimum age of employment to 12 and reduced to 6 their hours of work.
In the city of Madras, child labour existed in the textile mills in the name of half-timers and in the unorganized industries like the beedi factories and the printing
presses.
Children
in
beedi
industries
were
indentured 94
pledged to the factory owner by parents for cash advances.
labour,
Many of these
were not covered by the Factory Act. Even in textile mills half-timers were 95
made to work full-time like adults.
One great difficulty that workers experienced was to arrive punctually at the factory gate from residences that were far away. Latecomers were fined or had to forfeit half a day’s wages. The grace time for late arrival was a recurrent issue between management and labour and the fines and wagecuts were sources of continued friction. The entire period of forced absence,
which
the
worker
spent
away
from
home,
including
the
time
taken
for
commuting to work, was viewed by the workers as a deprivation.
On
the
fatiguing 96
workers.
whole,
and
the
workers
attributed
to
it
felt the
that
the
long
prevalence
working
of
hours
intemperance
were
among
The high level of absenteeism that followed paydays was also an 97
indicator of this fatigue and the need for leisure.
Even as early as in 1878
Winn, the European Engineer of Buckingham Mills, threatened to quit if he had to work from 5.30 am to 7pm and was placated with reduced working 98
hours (7 a.m. to 5 p.m.).
Until the Factory Act of 1891, a seven-day week appeared to have been the norm. One of the first strikes was over a demand for the closure of the mill at noon every Sunday. Sunday became an unpaid holiday for the dailyrated
99
workers.
During
the
early
period
of
industrialization
workers
seemed to have preferred longer leaves of absence at their choice and even proceeded
on
leave
as
and
when
they
needed
to,
regardless
of
the
100
disapproval of the manager.
Wage
cuts
and
punishments
for
such
absence
and
overstayal
were
frequent causes of conflict between managers and workmen. This lack of 101
commitment to factory work has been well analyzed by other authors.
The employers’ attempts to overcome it purely by disciplinary measures only accentuated the conflict situation. The employers resorted to incentives such as gratuity schemes and the induction of workers’ children as halftimers in order to promote commitment to a factory career and thus ensure a permanent working force. The workers’ attitude to such measures can be gauged from the remarks of a retired weaving master of the B. and C. Mills 102
that the gratuity scheme was a golden fetter.
The general attitude of the
workers to the alienating factory work exasperated the European managers and supervisors who resorted to brutal physical assaults on the workers to 103
establish their authority. reaction
of
the
workers
Given the bipartite situation of racial divide, the
to
the
brutalizing
atmosphere
was
to
alienate
themselves more and more from factory work. The issue of human dignity overshadowed
even
economic
demands.
Humiliation
at
the
gate,
humiliation at the manager’s office and humiliation on the shop floor – such was the lot of the workers who had once been free peasants and artisans.
The work process and the work site were also discouraging. While the B. and C. Mills had a modernized factory with better ventilation, conditions in other factories were quite unsatisfactory for health and safety. The kerosene oil workers complained of the ill effects of working with the oil as its fumes 104
affected their eyes.
The printing presses were hazardous for health. Lead
poisoning was a common disease to which compositors and type casters 105
often fell victim. Sanitary and drinking water facilities were apallaing.
Even government presses were housed in ill-ventilated, ill-lit rooms with machinery so crowded as to pose danger to workers’ health. The atmosphere 106
was heavy and impure.
The conditions in smaller presses would have
been even worse.
One feature of industrial work was the increasing number of accidents. The number of accidents in the registered factories in the city and in the adjacent district of Chingleput (Chengalpet) increased from 143 in 1901 to 202 in 1915, 462 in 1920, and 814 in 1929. (In the entire presidency the increase was from 217 in 1901 to 340 in 1915, 744 in 1920, and 1559 in l929.) The rate per 100 workmen also showed an increase from 0.44 in 1910 to 0.73 in 1920, to 1.09 in 1929, and 1.52 in 1930, for the entire presidency
107
thereby indicating a definite increase both relatively and absolutely.
The
overwhelming
and
majority
of
these
accidents
were
classified
as
minor
trivial, i.e., involving only absence from work for a couple of days. The actual number of accidents, it is suspected, may have been far higher even in the registered factories. No statistics are available for unregistered factories.
The highest accident rate was in the railway workshops, followed by the 108
cotton spinning and weaving mills.
The intensity of labour and frequent
exposure to accident-risk conditions in the workshops appear to have been far more serious than the long hours of monotonous work, in the mills. The employers had a ready explanation for the incidence of accidents: the Indian worker was naturally careless, negligent and disregarded safety rules and 109
regulations.
The Government of Madras added that the average Indian 110
worker’s psychology was not very responsive to ideas of ‘safety first’.
The
Superintendent of the Government Press opined that the workers failed to realize the imminence of danger to their person, and that physical weakness caused
many
considered
falling
that
the
weight
111
accidents.
prevention
of
accidents
The was
Government beyond
the
of
India
powers
of
employers, though in its view the placing of unskilled persons in charge of dangerous machinery – a callous disregard of dangers to which operatives 112
were subjected – was a prime cause.
Mr. Armstrong of the Madras Port
Trust was shocked at the remarkably casual way in which the Madras coolie 113
handled heavy cargo and dealt with moving railway wagons.
Thus all the
blame was laid at the door of the labourers’ Indianness.
The representatives of labour on the other hand, attributed the high accident rate to the inadequacy of safety measures, and to the fatigue and physical exhaustion suffered by the workers as a result of undernourishment
114
and long hours of dreary work amidst the roar and din of machines.
They
did not accept the management version and demanded labour participation 115
in accident analysis and prevention.
The availability of cheap labour of
course acted as a disincentive to greater investment on accident prevention.
The temporary character of the service of most workers, even after many years of service, deprived them of many benefits that might accrue to them 116
if they had been permanent. positive
involvement
supervisory managed
positions
factories
and
in
The insecurity of service was a deterrent to
work.
were
Further,
bleak
workshops
or
prospects
non-existent.
these
higher 117
reserved for Europeans or Anglo-Indians.
of
In
promotion
many
categories
of
to
Europeanposts
were
The lack of opportunities for
upward mobility resulted in virtual compartmentalization of the managerial and supervisory class from the working class.
If the working conditions were not attractive, the living conditions, to put it mildly, were hardly better. The living conditions were determined by the wages and the facilities and the socio-cultural obligations that could be met
from
these
wages.
These
included
food,
fuel,
clothing,
housing,
education, religious and social functions, etc., and the physical and social elements that constituted the minimum subsistence level for the class of workers concerned.
Unlike in agriculture where wages were usually paid either wholly in kind or partly in cash and partly in kind, the industrial establishments in the 118
city and its environs adopted almost without exception cash payment.
Payment in most of the establishments was direct without an intermediary 119
between the management and the worker. to
a
certain
extent
in
such
establishments
Contract systems were in force as
PWD
workshops
and
the
120
harbour.
The beedi industry had its own unique system of indirect wage
121
payment.
Otherwise, the vast majority of workers came under the system
of direct cash payment.
There were two systems of wages, the time rate and the piece rate. In the former,
the
worker
had
to
work
for
a
stipulated
period
every
day
and
received wages at a daily rate. In the latter, the worker was paid on the number of units of product produced. Both systems coexisted in the same establishment. In the textile mills in Madras, where the time rate system was predominant, piece rates were adopted in the weaving department. Piece rates were also adopted for jobbers and tenters in other departments, so that they would exercise strict supervision over the workers of the group under their
control
and
extract
the
desired
122
outturn.
Even
time
rate
was
sometimes linked to outturn; for example, in the so-called task system the full
daily
rate
was
granted
only
if
the
outturn
exceeded
a
specified
minimum. There was even a rule stating that a compositor failing to reach 123
the minimum outturn might not be retained.
This system was introduced
in the Government Press in 1861 and was the cause of a prolonged strike, which is discussed in the next chapter.
The wage rates were determined by market conditions. According to Binny and Co., they fixed the wage rates with reference to the rates for agricultural 124
Madras.
labour
prevalent
in
the
labour
catchment
areas
around
Their rates for skilled labour were claimed to be three times the 125
rate received by agricultural labour.
The minimum rates for coolies were
fixed well above the agricultural wages. However, according to the workers’ representatives, the average wages were far below the living wage, i.e., the wage
at
which
subsistence
living
was
possible.
For
example,
when
the
average monthly wage was about Rs 9/-the cost of living was about Rs l2/per month and when the average wage had increased to over Rs 20/- the cost 126
of living was already Rs 30/-.
Even if these figures were questionable, it
could be accepted that in the years preceding 1918, the wages were below the subsistence level even in B. and C. Mills whose wage rates were well above those of other establishments.
Wage rates were not uniform all over the city. Even within the textile industry, the Choolai Mill workers were paid less than their counterparts in 127
the B. and C. Mills.
In the printing presses, the widely varying rates
caused large employee turnover with workers leaving one press and joining 128
another that paid better.
The non-uniform and non-standard wage rates
were a source of discontent and the workers welcomed the proposal for a 129
Minimum Wages Act. Employers were however opposed to such an Act.
The Employees’ Federation argued that if a minimum wage was fixed by legislative enactment, employers would in self-defense be obliged to replace all
slow
working
Workers’
Union
men
by
others
demanded
a
more
minimum
efficient. monthly
The
Government
wage
of
Rs
40/-
Press for
a
compositor, as against Rs 25/-, which they were receiving under the task 130
system.
This discrepancy between the concept of a living wage and that of
a wage consistent with efficiency or a productivity-linked wage was and is, even now, a source of perennial conflict between capital and labour.
The wage differentials between the skilled and the unskilled and between various trades in the industry did not seem to have evoked any significant discontent except that the rates paid to Europeans and Anglo-Indians, which were in some cases two to three times that of the Indian worker, caused 131
considerable heart burn and dissatisfaction among the Indian workers.
This
glaring
discrimination
was
not
based
on
any
considerations
of
efficiency or even skill but on the concept of a ‘living wage’ that a European would find acceptable in order to migrate to India. The mode of payment also
varied
very
much
in
the
same
establishment.
In
most
of
the
large
industrial establishments, wages whether daily rated or monthly rated, were disbursed
once
a
month. 132
payments were made.
In
some
of
the
smaller
concerns
fortnightly
Daily payments were only for casual labour on
piece rate. Monthly payments were made about two weeks after the last day of the month. There was no fixed day for the disbursement of wages even in a well-run establishment such as the B. and C. Mills. The workers were terribly monthly
inconvenienced payment
and
and
put
welcomed
to
hardship
the
by
suggestion
the
to
unpunctuality
enact
a
law
for
of the
payment of wages. Employers were averse to fixing the date of payment by law. In their view, each establishment had its own specific problems in the 133
calculation of deductions from salary and no time limit was workable.
The workers were more particular about the receiving their wages on time
rather
than
the 134
instead of monthly.
periodicity
of
payment,
i.e.,
weekly
or
fortnightly
The disadvantage in the monthly payment was the
long waiting period after a worker’s resources were exhausted. This forced workers into indebtedness, which could have been avoided if credit facilities for purchase of necessities had been available.
Labour
has
always
felt
that
the
wage
paid
immediately
after
the
performance of work is only a part of what labour is honestly entitled to and that it is just and fair to expect more in forms other than the immediate wage payment. Even employers recognized this and gifts were made on the occasion of festivals, weddings and such annual social gatherings to promote
bonhomie. This tradition could not be done away with by the capitalists who were functioning in a predominantly agricultural set-up with strong links to tradition. However, the capitalists could not refrain from linking such bounties to their production requirements. Thus bonus, an annual or half-yearly payment over and above the actual wages, was linked to better attendance where absenteeism was high and to increased production and 135
higher profits where the productivity was below par.
Further, the problem
of labour turnover, i.e., desertion by large sections of workers unable to stand the factory discipline and pace of work, was sought to be mitigated by gratuity schemes offering deferred payments if the worker stuck to the job 136
for five years or more.
Further, in factories producing consumer goods,
the workers would be offered a few pieces either as gratis or at concessional prices, thereby mitigating the sense of alienation associated with commodity 137
production.
There
were
instances
of
some
or
all
of
these
forms
of
supplementary wages in a number of industrial establishments in the city, most notably in the largest enterprise, the B. and C. Mills. The mills had the following schemes:
(a) a half-yearly cash bonus equal to 10 per cent of the wages when a dividend of 10 per cent was paid to the shareholders.
(b) a graded gratuity scheme for workers drawing less than Rs 100 p.m.
i. for the first 10 years, a contribution at 5 per cent of the total wages earned by each worker was credited to his account at the end of each half year and the accumulated amount was payable at the end of 10 years’ continuous service.
ii. For the next 7 years, the rate of contribution was 7 ½ per cent
iii. For the next 5 years, the rate was 10 per cent
iv. Finally for the final 5 years the rate was 10 per cent.
th
Accumulations could thus be drawn at the end of the 10 th
27
th
, 17
nd
, 22
and
year respectively. If conditions were satisfactory during a half-year, the 138
company’s contribution was doubled.
These schemes were not treated as
rights, accruing to the worker but only as ex-gratia payments made at the discretion of the employer, who withheld the benefits or even deprived them of it, if, in his opinion, the worker had misbehaved. The workers therefore 139
viewed these as devices to hold them in the employer’s grip.
Workers
sought to convert these into rights unfettered by employers’ conditions.
Provident Fund (PF) schemes were available only to certain sections of railway
employees
month’s
wages 141
industries.
and
per
tramway
year
of
140
men.
service
were
Gratuity in
schemes
vogue
in
with
most
half-a-
organized
Workers in government undertakings were not entitled to a
bonus. In some industries instead of the half-yearly or annual bonus for regular attendance, a regularity allowance was paid as a percentage of the monthly wages if the worker was not absent from work any day or for more 142
than a day.
The Dearness Allowance (DA) to compensate for the rising cost of living 143
made its appearance in 1907. 144
World War I. other
Some establishments opened fair price shops where rice and
commodities
establishments,
It was in the form of a rice allowance during
the
were
sold
workers
at
received 145
occasion of religious festivals.
subsidized gifts
of
rates.
clothes
In
once
some a
year
Indian on
the
Factories and workshops governed by the Factories Act gave overtime pay
for
the
work
hours
that
exceeded
the
normal
hours
of
146
work.
Overtime work was common in the printing industry where rush jobs were often undertaken. In the Government Press overtime work was unavoidable on
the
days
payment
for
preceding overtime
the
day
work
of
were
publication often
the
of
the
source
of
Gazette. conflict
Rates
of
between
workers and management.
These supplementary payments were intended to act as incentives for greater commitment to work on the part of the workers. But obviously the incentives were not very effective. For employers relied more on deterrent actions to reduce absenteeism and enforce discipline. Fines were levied on the
workers
for
being
unpunctual,
for
poor
workmanship,
for
causing
damage to equipment or wasting raw material, for infringement of factory discipline such as sleeping or smoking during hours of duty. Deductions from pay, far in excess of the actual hours or days of work lost, were made for coming late to work and absence without leave. Fines were imposed in the tramways on the running staff for violation of traffic regulations, wrong punching of tickets and insolence. Deductions from pay were made in the 147
case of collections falling short.
Fines and penal deductions from wages
were very unpopular. The workers considered most fining unjust, arbitrary and excessive, even though the employers produced statistics to show that fines were only 0.19 per cent of total wage bill in such a large concern as the 148
B. and C. Mills, and rarely exceeded 2 per cent.
It would appear that the
workers objected more to the arbitrariness of fining and the supervisory level at which fining and penal deductions were ordered.
The
take-home
deductions
of
dues
wage to
packet
factory
was
stores,
further of
reduced
on
contributions
to
account
of
community
celebrations and festivals such as the Ayuda Pooja and of contributions to the Provident Fund where it existed.
That the total wages, both the nominal wages and the supplementary allowances such as overtime, bonus, etc., were inadequate for decent living conditions had been admitted by the employers as early as 1908, though they attributed the lack of improvement in living standards to the evils of 149
drink.
There
seem
to
have
been
no
systematic
enquiry
into
the
living
conditions of the working class in Madras city until the survey of the Family Budgets of Industrial Workers in Madras city was undertaken in 1935. Some investigations
into
the
cost
of
living
and
the
minimum
income
for
subsistence were undertaken in 1917 and 1920 by Dr. Gilbert Slater and the 150
Rev. W.G.M. Leith of Kellet Institute.
The 1917 study indicated that a
family consisting of husband, wife and two children needed a minimum income
of
Rs
17/-
per
month
to
subsist
in
the
city.
The
1920
study
undertaken by the same group after the steep rise in prices in 1918 and 1919 gave a figure of Rs 22-8-0 per month as the minimum for subsistence. This figure was however considered too low for many reasons:
(i) it assumed a rent of Rs 1-8-0 while the average rent was Rs 3-0-0;
(ii) the estimate for food was based on the price of articles of jail diet;
(iii)
no
provision
was
made
for
the
worked out to about Rs 8/-. per family;
consumption
of
liquor,
which
(iv) allowances for rent, clothing and miscellaneous items were too low;
151
(v) expenses needed to meet social obligations were excluded.
In short, the Slater-Leith minimum was the physical limit indispensable for bare subsistence and reproducing. The first official investigation into family budgets in Madras was undertaken in 1930 by the Commissioner of Labour, Mr. Gray, in response to a request from the R.C.L. in India, which wanted
the
particulars
to
fill
the
gap
in
the
evidence
collected
by
152
it.
Enquiry was limited in scope and intensity due to the short time within which it had to be completed and the Government of Madras expressed its inability to draw any conclusions from the enquiry. The 1935 enquiry was the first ‘thorough’ enquiry into family budgets of industrial workers in 153
Madras city.
The family budget survey sought to analyse what a working
class family actually spent, not only on the bare necessities of life but also on the social obligations, on ‘the satisfaction of certain wants springing from the social conditions in which people were placed and reared up.’ The data pertained to conditions that prevailed in 1935, i.e., at the end of the period considered
for
pertaining
to
study
in
conditions
this in
work. the
In
early
the part
absence of
this
of
any
similar
century
or
at
data the
commencement of the period under study, the 1935 survey is utilized to the extent feasible to get an insight into the living conditions of the working class during the period.
As C.W. Ranson points out, considering that the figures furnished by Binny and Co. for 1919 were average wages and that there must have been many employees who received less than the average, a very large number of
the
workers
should
have
been
living
under
what
were
virtually
famine
154
conditions.
According to Ernest Engels, the high percentage of income spent on food
is
considered
as
an
indicator
of
the
proximity
of
the
family
to
subsistence level of existence. According to Slater and Leith, out of Rs 22-102, the subsistence income Rs 17-10-4 would be spent on food, i.e., nearly 78 per cent for a jail diet. The 1930 rapid survey confirms that the expenditure on
food
is
in
the
order
of
60
to
65
per
cent
of
total
monthly
family
expenditure, which includes under the head Miscellaneous, interest on debt, drink,
tobacco,
improvement in
etc.
The
1930
survey
suggests
that
there
real living conditions when compared to the
was
no
period
of
Slater-Leith study. Table 1 (overleaf ) has the conclusions drawn by the 1935 155
enquiry as regards the nutritive value of the food.
The food consumed by the worker was insufficient in terms of calories, and deficient in proteins, fat, minerals and vitamins except B1. The amount spent on food per unit of consumption per month was Rs 3-10-8 as against Rs 6 per unit of consumption per month required for the Diet No. 1. Thus even in 1935 the workers and their families were underfed, undernourished and starving. The conditions in 1918 would have been far worse. As Shiva Rao notes, the convicts in prisons were much better off than the working 156
classes as far as nutrition was concerned.
TABLE 1
Diet No. 1
Diet No. 2
Protein
79 gm
47
Fat
80 gm
25
441 gm
496
Calories
2800
2404
Calcium
1.10 gm
0.28
Phosphorous
1.59 gm
1.03
Iron
7.57 gm
19.04
7568
800 (min.)
Bl: I.U
432
546 (min.)
C: I.U
184
36 (min.)
Carbohydrate
Vitamin A: I.U
Housing conditions were no better. The R.C.L. in India found that in the city, 25,000 one-roomed dwellings sheltered 1,50,000 persons about onefourth of the city’s population and that many hundreds of workers were entirely
homeless 157
godowns.
and
lived
on
the
streets,
or
in
the
verandahs
of
The conditions in the industrial areas were worse, as can be 158
seen from Table 2, extracted from the Census Report of 1931.
The 1935 Survey of Family Budgets indicates that 25 per cent of the families lived in one-room tenements or huts paying a monthly rent of less than Rs 3 and nearly 51 per cent lived in portions occupying a room paying 159
a monthly rent of Rs 3 and more but less than Rs 6.
The cheris or slums in which the poorest workers lived consisted of huts constructed using mud and thatch or old kerosene tins, without any vents for light or air. The average dimensions of the hut were 9x8 feet. Water
supply was inadequate. One-third of the city’s population obtained less than 160
a twentieth of the corporation’s water supply.
There was little or no conservancy; 71 slums had no latrines at all and the other 109 slums had a total of 1,200 seats, although according to the standards prescribed by the Factories Act, the slums should have had at least 161
10,000 seats.
The drainage was poor. During rainy season, water entered 162
the houses, and the whole area turned swampy.
TABLE 2
Ward no.
Locality
No. of houses
No. of house-holds
No. of persons
6
Vyasarpadi
2508
4869
24788
11
Muthialpet
1452
5096
26191
13
Kachaleswarar
873
2963
12793
17
Choolai
2641
9940
52977
18
Pulianthope
2966
8172
44194
10
Perambur
5585
5960
29505
24
Kusapet
2723
8591
39634
Even this deplorably filthy ‘amenity’ was denied to thousands of workers who were homeless and lived on the pavements or on the verandahs of godowns. According to the census taken on behalf of the Special Housing Committee employment homeless
of
Madras
and
3,358
persons,
who
Corporation casual slept
in
1934,
labourers
on
4,734
belonged
pavements,
persons to
platforms,
the
in
regular
category
pyols
of
of
vacant
houses or plank projections in front of shops. Most of them worked in the harbour and in the Kotwaal Bazaar, a wholesale grain and vegetables market 163
for city of Madras.
The
ones
fortunate
to
have
a
roof
over
their
heads
were
fleeced
by
landlords. The lowest income group spent 16.34 per cent on rent for their 164
lowly hovels.
There was no security of tenure. According to Ranson, a
sense of impermanence coloured the outlook and behaviour of the Madras labourer, with a very precarious hold on the site he occupied and with the 165
threat of eviction hanging over him.
This sense of impermanence was
reflected in his utter indifference to the dirt and squalor in which he lived, his utter lack of will to improve the conditions and the total absence of a sense of civic pride.
Few employers made any arrangements for housing their workers. The one exception was Binny and Co. who had built four model colonies for the 166
workers of the B and C Mills.
But these were more of a show piece, for 167
out of 8,876 workers in the mills only 659 were housed in these colonies.
Rent was nominal being only Rs 1-8-0 per month. WIMCO also built a colony for its staff but the rents were so high that only better paid clerical 168
staff could afford them.
Company-owned housing had the disadvantage
that the workers already suffering the iron discipline of the factory would be living perpetually under the constant control of the employer. There was always the risk of being evicted if workers went on strike. Their movements 169
even during ‘peace time’ would be under constant surveillance.
It was
therefore natural that the union desired a scheme, which would enable the 170
workers to own their houses.
Thus
the
overwhelming
majority
of
workers
lived
in
overcrowded,
unventilated, ill-lit and insanitary slums. Such horrible housing combined with the malnutrition on account of inadequate wages and onerous working
conditions with long hours of work had an extremely adverse effect on the health of the workers.
As early as 1918, Sir Norman White corroborated the view when he wrote: ‘A more confined atmosphere, crowded insanitary dwellings, lack of outdoor recreation are certain to exercise a baneful influence and render the factory
employee
more
prone
to
fresh
infections
and
to
upset
the
compromise that his body has been able to effect with the parasites that it harbours’ and added ‘the efficiency of Indian labour is almost entirely a 171
health
problem.’
Malaria,
hookworm
and
tuberculosis
were
the
three
diseases that afflicted the city’s factory labourer. The President of Madras Labour Union, B. Shiva Rao recognized the importance of this problem, and he devoted six pages to the question of health in his evidence before the 172
R.C.L.
A
committee
that
was
appointed
in
1927
to
study
the
city’s
high
mortality rate pointed out, ‘The evil conditions arising from overcrowding are largely responsible for much of the sickness and mortality arising from 173
respiratory diseases in general and tuberculosis in particular.’
The total
death
estimated
rate
for
the
city
in
1934
was
34.2
per
1,000
of
the
population. In the same year, the death rate from respiratory diseases was 174
8.4 per 1,000.
Besides the objective factors listed above, another factor,
subjective if it may be so described, contributed to the deterioration in the health of the workers, namely, alcohol. The long strenuous hours of physical labour
and
the
otherwise
bleak
socio-cultural
life
led
to
the
spread
of
alcohol addiction among the workers, helped further by the existence of toddy and arrack shops in the proximity of the mills and the harbour. The harbour coolies spent as much on liquor as on rice and cereals, nearly 25 per
175
cent of their income.
According to Madras Labour Union there were
some workers who spent as much as 30 to 40 per cent of their earnings on drink.
The
Union
wanted
all
liquor
shops
to
be
removed
neighbourhood of the mills and areas where workers lived.
176
from
the
Temperance
propaganda was carried on by the early friends of labour who later founded 177
the Madras Labour Union. an
exaggerated
The drink factor should not however be given
importance.
The
1935
Family
Budget
Survey
put
the
expenditure of cotton mill workers on liquor at 5.09 per cent of their total 178
expenditure on food.
Of
greater
importance
to
the
working
class
family
budget
was
the
expenditure incurred for the satisfaction of certain wants springing from the social conditions in which they were brought up. Uprooted from one’s land, displaced
from
one’s
village,
submerged
in
a
vast
city
population
and
incorporated in the industrial machine as a cog in the wheel, the peasantturned-industrial observing
all
worker
social
nevertheless
customs
and
maintained
religious
rites.
links The
with
the
Madras
past
by
industrial
workers did not proletarianize themselves completely and did not settle in exclusively working class areas. Outside the factory, they maintained their caste and religious identities and settled among non-workers of their own caste
or
religion.
They
participated
in
religious
singing
and
discourses
organized by their own communities. In their family life, they spent liberally on the ceremonies associated with the various rites of passage such as the ear-piercing ceremony, puberty rites, marriages and funerals. But as the wages they were earning were inadequate even to satisfy the physical needs of
subsistence
living,
it
was
inevitable
that
they
borrowed
heavily
and
through these loans met the obligations demanded by social custom and
tradition. The result was that over 90 per cent of workers were in debt; the extent of indebtedness being on the average six to seven times the average 179
monthly income.
Marriages and social functions were not the only cause of indebtedness, though their contribution to indebtedness was in the order of 42.83 per 180
cent.
181
Workers had to borrow to meet their ordinary daily needs as well.
One fifth of the total borrowing was for this purpose. Other reasons for indebtedness
included 182
house repairs (l5.19).
sickness
(7.02),
repayment
of
debts
(12.89)
and
As Shiva Rao has noted, the worker was drawn into 183
the debt trap from the very day of his arrival in the city.
The money lenders were mainly marwaris who charged anything from 184
12 to 150 per cent per annum.
One anna per rupee per month (75 per
cent per annum) was the most typical rate. The high rates of interest made it impossible for the worker to extricate himself from the burden of debt in his life time. As Shiva Rao points out, ‘many were born in debt, and it was pathetic
to
see
how
faithfully
a
worker
strove
to
discharge
a
185
obligation notwithstanding fraud on the part of the creditor.’
parental Indebted
and ruined, they had left the village and come to the city in search of redemption. Indebted they remained, with redemption still out of sight.
The very adverse working and living conditions of the Indian worker came
to
be
recognized
by
both
the
employers
and
the
Government
of
Madras quite unconsciously when the question of industrial efficiency came up for discussion. Binny and Co. compared the efficiency of the Indian worker to his European counterpart and attributed the relative inefficiency of the Indian worker to the following factors: (i) The Indian textile worker has not the stamina or powers of endurance and resistance to disease that
the European worker has. (ii) The European worker had better education than the Indian worker. (iii) The low standard of living, inadequate housing, the entire lack of sanitary provision, the primitive washing and bathing facilities, the lack of potable drinking water coupled with the fact that the Indian diet was not as nourishing and sustaining as the European affected the relative efficiency. (iv) Continuous application to routine work in hot climate
tended
to
slackness
186
and
inattention.
The
poor
diet
was
also
blamed by Brevet Col. McCarrison who explained that the Tibetan Bhutia and the Punjabi peasant did arduous work efficiently because his diet had 187
more
protein.
Mr.
Green,
the
Superintendent
of
Government
Press,
however, in a comparative analysis of the outturn of American and Indian printers established that the outturn of the Indian printer was better than the American as regards quantity though it was inferior as regards quality, which he attributed to lack of education, unfamiliarity with the language 188
and a lack of craft pride.
The obsession with quantity in preference to
quality might have been due to the wage system as well. Binny and Co. contradicted production
themselves
and
in
the
when same
they
breath,
suggested lamented
piece that
rate
the
less
to
increase
responsible
among their workers had a tendency to take more leave when they got more 189
wages.
A similar charge was made by the management of Choolai Mills
that their workers indulged in entertainment and dissipation when they got more
money
instead
of
improving
their
190
physique.
The
problem
of
inefficiency was far more complex than was understood by the employers. There had developed among the workers a sense of alienation and aversion to the conditions in which they lived and which they thought could not be resolved within the framework of capitalist management.
One
European
manager
had
questioned
the
wisdom
of
making
an
unfavourable comparison between the outturn of the Indian and the English 191
textile worker.
He pointed out that the average count spun in England
was 50s while it was 16s or lower in India and that as a result, Indian mills had to lay out a greater number of machines of the same class in the cycle of manufacture necessitating the employment of a larger number of hands. ‘The Indian operative was not so inefficient as has been made out and with good
conditions
to
work
under,
regular
hours
of
work
and
rest
and
elementary education he should advance considerably and prove a valuable asset to the millowner.’
Summing up, the working and living conditions of the workers in the city and the environs were not conducive to their health, efficiency and productivity. Forced out of traditional ways of life, pushed into a totally new and alien industrial situation, the first generation of factory workers were far from reconciled to the new environment. The impersonal wage nexus in place
of
the
traditional
feudal
personal
ties,
the
exacting
long
hours
of
monotonous toil, the accelerated pace of work, the rigorous discipline and close supervision, the punishments both in the form of fines and deductions and in the form of physical assault further embittered their relations with the employers. Low wages, inadequate housing, insanitary living conditions, heavily overcrowded urban residential areas, conflict between work life and social obligations of a past traditional life, consequent indebtedness from which no redemption was in sight, all made the transition to urban life extremely
hard
and
unpleasant.
Transplanted
to
a
new
way
of
life,
the
bewildered working class clung as tenaciously as it could to whatever it could salvage of a prior way of life but the contradictions inherent in the
mode of production expressed itself overtly or covertly almost immediately after induction to the new way of life. The struggle for a better life took varied forms from the very beginning of industrial life.
CHAPTER III
Early Struggles
The lot of the worker was, by and large, an unhappy one. The arduous living and working conditions, the humiliation at the work place and the feeling of alienation caused discontent among the workers. Trade unionism was as yet unknown. In the circumstances, the first reaction of the worker to the process of managerial control – over his body and life at the work place – in the early stages of industrial development was a refusal to adapt to the process, to resist it overtly or covertly, to evade or alter the work situation. Such a resistance to the disciplining process might find expression in many forms, as Leslie Macfarlene has noted:
1.
Gutting
down
on
the
amount
of
the
time
spent
on
working
–
absenteeism, malingering, idling, taking unauthorized breaks, bad timekeeping.
2. Exerting some control over the work process – fixing one’s own work standards, pace of work, manner of working.
3.
Expressions
of
resentment
and
dissatisfaction
–
deliberate
bad
1
workmanship or damage to goods, abuse of supervisors, theft.
These acts of self-assertion and defiance might appear to have been isolated and individual, but were often infectious and widespread becoming the common practice of groups of workmen. For the most part, these were not registered even in factory records, and may have been kept at higher managerial levels thus remaining outside the pale of written history. They are
discernible
only
indirectly
through
investigations
of
high
levels
of
2
absenteeism, late coming, large scale pilferage, etc.
Alongside the above mentioned individual acts, there existed modes of collective action, which usually assumed two forms. The first was informal action
devoted
to
gaining
control
over
the
work
process
by
mutual
understanding, unwritten conventions, etc. The second form of collective action
was
outbursts,
sudden which
stoppage
were
of
usually
work,
rioting,
culminations
and
of
such
spontaneous
innumerable
acts
of
individual protest.
In 1892 the Government of Madras, on instructions from the Secretary of State, issued a questionnaire to various employers asking for particulars regarding
the
conditions
of
labour
employed
by
them
with
a
view
to
comparing these with the conditions of labour in Lancashire, which was facing competition from Indian Textiles. From the response provided by Binny and Co. it is seen that ‘absenteeism was in the order of 10 per cent diem’,
that
the
application
to
work
by
piece
workers
was
far
from
continuous, that fines were imposed for bad workmanship particularly in
the case of weavers, and that absence from work without leave attracted the punishment of stoppage.
High
turnover
or
migration
was
another
indicator
of
the
refusal
of
labour to accept the working conditions. In the B. and C. Mills nearly the entire work force, judged merely by numbers, changed once a year. Workers left the mills when they liked and returned when they liked. Workmen were leaving in spite of inducements to stay, such as the gratuity fund. There were 3,607 passbook holders in both the mills in 1904, but only 1,069 at the end of 1907. C.B. Simpson, Managing Director of Binny and Co., lamented that though
the
efficiency
Madras
as
an
workman
artisan,
there
was
steadily
was
no
increasing
improvement
in
in
dexterity
and
attendance
and
3
application.
Alienated
workers
resorted
to
thievery.
The
District
Magistrate,
Chingleput, reporting to the Chief Secretary of the Government of Madras on the riots in the Perambur workshops wrote: ‘It was found that coolies arriving
at
half-past
six
and
admitted
into
the
factory
wandered
about
without any control, stole nuts and bolts and various other property of the company and threw them out of windows to be subsequently taken away by 4
accomplices. Thefts of this kind were very frequent.’
To an extent, these acts
of thievery resemble the incidents of dacoity and train wrecking in the East Indian Railways in the late nineteenth century, which has been well analyzed by Dipesh Chakraborthy. He concluded that the problem was partly one that arose out of ‘disciplining’ the labour force:
What we had here were some of the instinctive responses of the first groups
of
men
coming
into
the
situation
of
industrial
work,
their
‘instincts’
developing
out
of
an
interaction
between
their
new
work
situation and the different alternative modes of behaviour that their 5
traditional culture offered to them.
* * *
Strikes and riots have been the predominant forms of collective action. Binny and Co. in their response to a questionnaire from the British Royal Commission on Labour (R.C.L.) in 1892 reported that strikes and lockouts occurred at intervals generally of two years and that in the most serious strike 400 workers were involved and another 800 were thrown out of the work
due
to
the
interruption
of
6
process.
The
Manager,
South
India
Spinning and Weaving Mills Co., Royapuram, in his response to the same questionnaire stated that five strikes each lasting three to four days took 7
place between 1881 and 1890.
The twin B. and C. Mills had experienced a number of strikes. The first strike in the Buckingham Mill was on June 26, 1878, within a few months of its
establishment.
The
workers
demanded
that
the
mills
should
close
at
noon on Sundays and that surplus hands not required for cleaning should not be utilized elsewhere. The management broke the strike by importing outside labour from Bombay and then dismissed the ‘ringleaders’ of the 8
strike.
Early in 1889, there was a strike in the Carnatic Mills demanding a weekly holiday. The workers in the Buckingham Mills went on sympathetic strike.
The
men
refused
to
work
on
Sundays
and
became
violent.
The
management called in the police to subdue the violence and then resorted to
the usual tactic of importing outside labour from Pondicherry and Bombay 9
to break the strike.
10
In September 1902 there was rioting in the Buckingham Mills.
The
weavers were not able to maintain their usual level of production due to flaws
in
the
yarn
and
defects
in
the
weaving
looms.
The
management
refused to consider their plea and cut their pay. This sparked off a fight between the weavers and the European officers of the mill. The management called in the police and the army to evict the weavers. Workers in other departments rallied to the support of the weavers and rioted. Once again the employers relied on the police to preserve law and order inside the factory.
* * *
Press workers employed in the Government Press, Madras, were among the first to wake up to the need for unity and struggle. They were being worked
for
long
hours
without
respite.
Their
first
strike
was
in
1895,
reportedly on the question of hours of employment, which according to the government spokesman tendering evidence before the R.C.L., appeared to have
been
available.
‘indefinite It
is
and
inferred
11
excessive’. however
Details
that
the
of
this
first
Government
strike issued
are
not
orders
discontinuing night work for printing the Gazette as far as possible. There seems to have been some sort of passive resistance subsequent to the strike in the form of reduced outturn. The Superintendent of the Government Press, Mr. Hill, was agitated over the gradually reduced outturn per actual working hour by the men between 1898 and 1902 and proposed to the government to introduce a task work system similar to that in force in
Allahabad and Bombay presses but modified to suit Madras conditions to lessen
the
overtime 12
working hours.
charges
caused
by
the
reduced
outturn
in
ordinary
Earlier in February 1903, the workers had submitted a
petition to the Chief Secretary to the Government demanding:
1. A period of rest for 15 minutes before 9 am and two hours after 5 pm when
overtime
work
became
necessary
before
or
after
the
normal
working hours, which should be 9 am – 5 pm.
2.
Casual
leave
as
in
other
government
services
without
having
to
produce a medical certificate and forfeit pay.
3. Observance of the spirit of the Government Order in regard to Hindu festival holidays and holidays under the Negotiable Instruments Act IV, and the extension of the privilege of holiday on the last Saturday of the month.
4. Observance of the Government of India Orders in the matter of fines, 13
which were then excessive.
The Superintendent was trying to get extra work between 5 and 7 pm without overtime pay, thereby forcing the workers to compensate for the lower outturn during the normal working hours. The workmen refuted the charge
of
lower
superintendent
outturn
for
poor
during
planning.
normal They
working
asserted
hours
their
blaming
right
to
rest
the and
leisure as also their right to holidays.
The Government approved the Superintendent’s proposal regarding task 14
work and passed orders.
The task work system applied only to the press
and machine men. The others would continue on the time-rates. According to the task work system, the workers would receive the same rate of monthly pay for the full outturn as prescribed by the Government and would be paid pro-rata for any extra work done even if no overtime was worked. The Government conceded overtime pay for work done beyond 5.30 pm and for work done on holidays and Saturday afternoons. It specified periods of rest during overtime work. It conceded the principle of compensatory holiday for staff not entitled to overtime. But it did not yield on the question of fines.
The new system was announced on December 21, 1903, and was to come into effect from January 1, 1904. The workers were however unwilling to work under the task work system, which would increase the pace of work. Work in the press came to a grinding halt. The men formally lodged a written protest on December 31, 1903, and refused to work on January 2, 1904, the day on which the new system came into force. It was not only the men directly affected by the new system who refused to work. Even others like the binders, type cutters who stood to benefit from the new system struck work in solidarity; their excuse for refusing to work being the denial of a one-hour lunch break. Those who came under the task work system stated
that
they
would
no
longer
work
overtime,
and
if
in
any
special
instance they had to do overtime, they would work fewer hours the next 15
day; they were not interested in the payment for overtime work.
The right
to leisure could not have been expressed in clearer terms than this.
The Superintendent reacted by summarily dismissing all the protesters – 326 permanent and 55 temporary workmen the same day, on grounds of insubordination. Many of these permanent workers had put in over 15 years
of service and some even as many as 30 years. And all of them were sacked 16
without even a ritual of explanation or enquiry.
On January 27, 1903 the workers sought an interview with the Chief Secretary. On January 29, 1903, a delegation of six representatives drawn from all sections of the press and led by machine man, P. Raju, met the Chief Secretary. A clumsy attempt by the Superintendent to exclude the binders and the typecasters, i.e., the sections not affected adversely by the new
scheme,
was
defeated
by
the
alert
workers.
The
Chief
Secretary
interviewed each of the six members of the delegation separately though in the presence of the others. He tried to convince them that they would get more pay if only they worked the new norms, but in vain. As press man Krishnaswamy Mudali and binder Arunagiri pointed out, the task work was obnoxious as it reduced them to the status of coolies. They insisted that overtime
should
not
be
forced
on
them
and
even
suggested
that
the
Government could recruit additional hands to do the extra work. ‘There must be a limit to every work’, ‘we cannot go on doing this work’. ‘There is a limit to the physical capacities of every man’ – these were assertions repeated by more than one member of the delegation. They also wanted to be entitled to casual leave. The Chief Secretary was firm that the Government had the right to demand overtime work if exigencies of work so demanded and that no casual leave would be given. He finally warned them as follows: ‘I will rd
give you time till next Wednesday, that will be of February 3
. On the
morning of this date at 10 am, if you do not come back, you will never come 17
back and we shall get on without you.’
The men did not go back. They wanted time to submit a ‘memorial’, which
was
refused.
The
Government
went
ahead
with
what
it
called
‘permanent arrangements’ to fill up the vacant posts and get work done. The Chief Secretary’s analysis of the psychology of the striking men was: ‘The longer they wait, the better chance they think they have, as our arrears accumulated. Of course they know this perfectly well and hoped to weary 18
us.’
The Honourable Member agreed with the Chief Secretary and noted:
‘the strikers must understand, the sooner the better, that we are not to 19
recede from the principle of payment by results.’
The
Government
inducted
up
to 20
Penitentiary to work as machine men. from
Colombo
wages,
21
etc.
It
and
31
men
distributed
from
work
150
25
from
the
Madras
In March 1904 it brought 10 men
Rangoon,
to
convicts
with
printing
inducements
presses
in
of
extra
Madras
and
diverted some work to the government presses at Bombay, Calcutta and Simla.
The resources of the striking men must have been exhausted by May 30, 1904, when the workers petitioned the Governor to pay them pension or gratuity for the long years of service they had put in. In his endorsement on the
petition
the
Superintendent
pointed
out
that
the
men
were
not
repentant for their act of insubordination and had also ignored the offer of the Government to take them back if they reported back for duty expressing willingness to work under the new scheme. Based on this recommendation the Government rejected the petition on June 8, 1904 and ordered that the claims for gratuity, etc., would be duly considered on their merit at the time 22
of their retirement from service, if only any of them were re-employed.
This was apparently another method to put pressure on the workmen to return to work.
The strike lasted till August 1904 when a majority of the men applied for re-employment, with the press and the machine men accepting the task work system and overtime work, and the other men agreeing to the rules 23
then in force.
The Government was glad that it was, after all, able to
enforce the task work system, which, it may be noted, was kept in abeyance during the period of strike. It had won the battle of attrition.
However, the seven month-long pressmans’ strike of 1904 demonstrated a high degree of working class solidarity and staying power despite there being
no
organized
trade
union
at
the
time.
They
rose
above
sectional
interests. Even those who benefited from the new scheme joined the strike in support of those adversely affected. The issue on which they struck work, the right to leisure and control over the work process, revealed a high level of
working
class
consciousness,
characteristic
of
a
situation
in
which
craftsmanship or skill of the artisan had not become degraded.
The manner in which the Government handled the worker’s protest demonstrated that the Government as an employer was no different from a private capitalist. It went to the extent of enlisting convict labour to break the
strike
and
importing
labour
from
places
as
far
as
Rangoon
and
Colombo, a device that no private capitalist would normally have access to.
It is noteworthy that the workers negotiated directly with their employer, and the spokesman of their cause was one among them. The Chief Secretary was able to confuse the representatives over the issue and force them to take a defensive attitude, but he could not with all his show of authority and power
intimidate
them
to
submission.
The
language
of
the
worker’s
memorial suggests that its author might have been an advocate. However,
there is no evidence in regard to the role he played in the organization of the strike and its termination.
* * *
Yet another instance of early collective action on the part of the working class came from the workers of the railway workshops in Perambur. The railways being the first manifestation of industrialization in India, it is but natural that the railway workers would have been the first to wake up to the need
for
collective
action.
Therefore
some
of
the
earliest
working
class
24
struggles were those of railway men.
The first recorded strike in the Perambur workshops, a wing of the then Madras Railway Company with over 3,000 workers, took place in May 1898 25
when the company tried to reduce the number of working hours.
Again in
1905,
wages.
there
was
a
sit-down
strike
to
press
for
an
increase
in
26
Narasimha Reddy also refers to a week-long strike in 1912 at the Perambur workshops following actions in other branches of the railway. The strike referred to may be the one in June 1913 when the workers of Perambur workshops struck work to express solidarity with the running staff, mostly Anglo-Indians,
who
were
on
strike
under
the
leadership
of
the
Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants in India (ASRSI) and were joined 27
by Indian staff on the initiative of Gooty P. Kesava Pillai.
The strike lasted
just two days, June 4-5, 1913. The repercussions of the May-June strike of the railway men would to be felt in December 1913.
The Madras Railway merged with the Southern Mahratta Railway to form the Madras and Southern Mahratta Railway (M. and S.M. Railway) in
1908. Soon after the May–June 1913 strike, the railway authorities issued an order asking men to sign a fresh service agreement on grounds that their earlier agreement with the Madras Railway was no longer in force. The agreement was obnoxious to the workmen for various reasons:
1.
It denied them security of service, their engagement being from
month to month.
2.
It gave the employer the right to deduct fines not only from the
workman’s salary but also from money standing at the workmen’s credit in the hands of the company, which meant that the provident fund was forfeitable.
3.
28
It denied them the right to strike.
In short, it was one-sided,
favouring the employer, with the Damocles’ sword of dismissal always hanging over the workmen’s head.
Since the order directing the workmen to sign the agreement was timed immediately after the May 1913 strike, it was construed that the authorities proposed to use it to punish the workers. The ASRSI’s propaganda against the agreement had little effect on the authorities.
In the last week of November 1913, when the workmen of the carriagebuilding shop refused to sign the agreement, 43 of them with less than a year’s service were served notices of discharge. They demanded their pay, which
was
November
refused. 28,
About
1913,
and
700 the
workmen strike
went
turned
on
a
lightning
violent.
The
strike
on
Locomotive
Superintendent and Works Manager pacified the men and withdrew the notices
of
29
discharge.
On
an
invitation
from
the
Locomotive
Superintendent, 10 worker delegates met him on December 1, 1913, but the meeting proved futile. He asked them to select their representatives and return for discussions. Fearing victimization, the workers expressed their unwillingness to meet him again.
While discontent over the service agreement was brewing, there was an order restoring the original timing of keeping the time office open from 6.30 to 6.45 am and again from 12 to 12.15 pm, thereby curtailing the time allowed
for
the
workmen
to
pass
through
the
gangway
from
30
to
15
minutes. This order, issued on November 13, 1913, appears to have caused much hardship to the workmen, especially those in the carriage-building shop, as they found it impossible to reach the shop on time.
The workmen had also been allowed five minutes time to reach their respective shops from the time office. Until November 1913 the foremen were not very strict about this five-minute specification and allowed some grace time according to the distance of the shops from the time office. Sometimes they allowed about eight minutes. Along with the reduction of the time allotted for passing through the gangway, the five-minute rule was also strictly enforced. Those who reached the shop late lost half an hour’s pay. Naturally, the workmen were aggrieved and felt that they were being 30
penalized even when they had reported to the time office on time.
Thus
three
factors
combined
to
produce
an
explosive
situation:
the
service agreement, which the European and Eurasian employees had signed while the Indian workers were resisting its imposition; the reduction in the time allowed to pass through the gangway; and the rigorous enforcement of the five-minute rule with the associated stringent penalty.
The workmen most affected by the new timings, the carpenters in the carriage-building shop, apparently decided that it was time to voice their protest. The notices of discharge issued to the 41 new workers who had refused to sign the agreement had not been cancelled as was promised on November 13, 1913, and time was running out. On December 18, a number of carpenters were late after the lunch break and were, in the words of The 31
Madras Mail, ‘mulcted in their wages’.
The next day a notice was put up in
their shop by the carpenters appealing to all workers in the shop not to return to work at the prescribed time after the lunch break. Accordingly, after the lunch break on December 19, workers in the carriage building shop, en bloc, with very few exceptions, did not place their tickets in the box kept for those who came in time, but insisted upon returning their tickets in the late box to prove the insufficiency of the time allowed to them to reach 32
the shop.
This was clearly intended as a demonstration of their protest at
what they deemed as unjust rules. The nonplussed shop Foreman contacted the Works Manager. By 2.30 pm, news spread that all of them were to be fined half an hour’s pay. A riot broke out. The workers first attacked the Assistant Foreman. They blew whistles, which served as a signal for the whole shop to revolt. The Works Manager who came to pacify them was chased into his office and hit on his head. Arming themselves with tools from the tool box, they chased all the European Officers, some of who took shelter in the Works Manager’s office room. The crowd surrounded the office room. The officers opened fire causing the death of one Natesa Mudali and injuring three or four others, of whom one Seeyalan died later. The workshop’s Volunteer Force consisting of Anglo-Indian and European Staff was
also
mobilized.
The
police
arrived
and
dispersed
the
crowd.
The
workshop was closed the next day and was reopened only on January 2, 33
1914.
The
police
and
the
District
Magistrate
justified
the
shooting
by
the
European Officers as an act of self-defence and did not file a case. The Indian Patriot and The Hindu demanded public enquiry. The Indian Patriot asked whether Volunteers could be called out and armed by the officers without 34
the intervention of the police or the magistrate.
The Hindu pointed out
that an ordinary citizen or a group of citizens did not ordinarily possess the power to take the law into their own hands and undertake to quell a riot by giving orders or by resorting to shooting, which even the magistrate could 35
resort to only as a last remedy.
The Governor-in-Council absolving the
Europeans of any criminal act stated in his report to the Government of India:
The Governor-in-Council is of the opinion that the disturbance was to some
extent
due
to
mismanagement
on
the
part
of
the
Railway
administration. In view of the strike of last June and the general unrest among
railway
employees
throughout
India
considerable
tact
and
a
scrupulous avoidance of all grounds for friction for some considerable time
to
come
was
manifestly
called
for.
Enquiries
by
the
Inspector
General of Police have failed to elicit evidence that the outbreak was engineered from outside by professional agitators but that this was so is the
opinion
of
the
Company’s
Agent.
The
disturbance
once
having
broken out, the General-in-Council is of opinion that the officers who 36
fired on the rioters did so justifiably in defence of life and property.
The
acting
Inspector-General
of
Police
in
his
report
to
the
Chief
Secretary put the blame on the ‘upper subordinate officers’ for the trouble, remarking:
‘The
treatment
they
[the
workers]
receive
from
the
upper
37
subordinate officers must be very irritating.’
The railway authorities accepted their own guilt when they restored the 30-minute time allowance for passing through the gangway and altered the timings of closure of the checks board to allow workers the actual time required to reach the shop from the time office. The agent stayed the issue of service agreements, refunded the deductions made towards stamp duty, and expressed his readiness to cancel or modify those clauses which had been 38
represented as being against the interests of the workshop employees.
However, 18 persons were prosecuted for rioting, among whom were a few of the 41 temporary workers whose services were terminated for nonexecution
of
the
agreement.
Of
the
18
prosecuted
workers,
12
were
39
convicted and discharged.
It
can
themselves
be
inferred
on
their
from
own,
this
though
episode in
an
that
informal
the
workers
manner,
for
organized collective
action to protest against humiliating work conditions. The investigation by the Government confirmed that the workers acted on their own without any instigation
by
outsiders.
However
the
Agent
of
the
Railway
Company
appeared to have been of the view that the workers acted under instigation by one Rogers of the Amalgamated Society of Railwaymen in India and Burma, basing himself on the coincidence of Rogers’ arrival in Madras and the eruption of riot on the same day. But police investigation definitely ruled 40
out this connection. The workers had never heard of Rogers.
Another
characteristic
of
the 41
called ‘pre-industrial’ period, destruction,
when
the
collective
action
of
what
George
Rudé
was the sudden outburst of violence and
system
lacked
the
institutional
safety
valves
of
grievance settlement procedures.
An aspect that is brought into sharp relief by this episode is the colonial 42
bipartite situation in race relations.
The cleavage between the Europeans
and Eurasians on the one hand and the Indians on the other was so deep that
the
two
sides
viewed
each
other
with
suspicion,
disgust
and
bitter
dislike. The overbearing and insolent attitude of the European supervisory staff towards the Indians made the latter harbour deep ill will towards the former that it could take such a violent form of expression. The bipartite situation
in
race
relations
is
further
emphasized
by
the
fact
that
the
Europeans and Eurasians were permitted to arm themselves and use these arms in ‘self defence’, while the Indians were kept disarmed and their lives were considered less precious, and the death of the two workers at the hands of the European officers was condoned as ‘natural and justified’ by the two 43
arms of the State, the Court and the Government.
Another important strike of the period was that of the delivery peons in 44
1908, simultaneous with those of their comrades in Bombay, and Calcutta. The complete details of this strike are not available.
These struggles of the working class predating formal organizations like the trade unions indicate clearly that it was in no mood to acquiesce to its exploitation and to the perpetuation of the workers’ appalling conditions. The very fact that there were strikes and riots points to the existence of informal mechanisms of mobilization. Archival evidence does not throw light on these informal mechanisms. In most of these collective actions, it
was the skilled workmen (weavers of the B. and C. Mills, machine men of the Government Press and carpenters of the Perambur workshops) who spearheaded artisans
the
playing
acquiescent
struggles. a
leading
unskilled
Similar role
labour
instances
of
in
early
labour
have
been
noted
skilled
struggles by
a
craftsmen in
and
contrast
number
of
to
labour
45
historians.
These struggles of the workers provoked an immediate response on the part of the employers and the state. The capitalists, almost wholly European, reacted
to
the
struggles
in
a
characteristic
manner
by
resorting
to
recruitment of strikebreakers. The State as an employer was no different, and even went further by inducting convicts. The colonial state was ever ready to come to the assistance of the capitalists whenever the latter looked to
them
for
help.
The
European
officers
of
the
Government
and
even
European judiciary readily upheld European managers resorting to fire arms when labour unrest threatened to take a violent turn (Madras and Southern Mahratta Hallway 1913).
The
early
struggles
of
the
working
class
went
unnoticed
by
the
nationalist leaders. The general attitude of the nationalist leaders towards labour was negative, as was evident from their reaction to the proposed legislation in regard to Factory Labour between 1881 and 1891. The Hindu, then edited by G. Subramania Iyer, wrote on May 17, 1889: ‘All the so-called 46
hardships of the factory men are a fiction.’
In 1903, after G. Subramania
Iyer had left its service, The Hindu made a scathing attack on the Madras Planter’s
Labour
Act
1903
for
its
anti
labour
pro-planter
bias.
But
its
arguments revealed that it was not true sympathy for labour but hatred for the Europeans that lay behind its stance. It wrote, ‘There need be no class
legislation even in regard of the Indian coolies, who if they can be made slaves to European planters may not improperly be made slaves to Indian 47
agriculturists. The Indian coolies are not made to slave for one class alone.’ 48
The Swadesamitran made a similar plea.
The pro-labour sympathies of the
Indian national leadership were aroused primarily because of the foreign character of the capitalist enterprise, an aspect of nationalism that became 49
predominant post World War I.
G. Subramania Iyer, who was the editor of The Hindu with its antilabour stand in the 1880s and 90s, became by 1903 the first national leader to try to look at the question from a consistently pro-labour angle. He took to
task
the
Government
and
the
Indian
National
Congress
(INC)
for
neglecting the welfare of industrial workers. He foresaw the day when Indian workers would rise up and win political rights, the right to combine as well 50
as higher wages.
He wanted the workers to combine and form their own
organizations in order to protect their interests against the encroachments 51
of employers.
The Russian Revolution of 1905 and the part played by the working class in that revolution inspired many nationalist leaders to think of enlisting the support
of
the
workers
in
the
fight
for
independence.
For
instance,
Subramanya Siva’s speeches in 1908 during the strike by the workers of British-owned Coral Mills in Tuticorin were replete with references to the Russian Revolution and to the general strike as a potent weapon against the 52
Raj.
The
However, there is no evidence of a similar trend in the city of Madras.
visit
of
Keir
Hardie,
the
Labour
leader
of
Britain,
to
Madras 53
almost unnoticed as far as the working class was concerned. solitary
exception
was
G.
Subramania
Iyer
who
held
a
went
The one
meeting
on
September 21, 1907, outside the Perambur Railway workshops in order to 54
propagate the swadeshi ideology.
An active interaction between the labour
movement and the national movement had to await the conjuncture of events
at
the
movement conditions
close
took of
commodities.
of
place
labour
World
War
I
when
simultaneously
due
to
a
steep
a
with
increase
resurgence the in
of
the
worsening the
prices
of
national
of
living
essential
CHAPTER IV
Formation of Unions, 1918
World War I (1914–1919) had a deep impact on Indian people in several aspects. It provided a stimulus to Indian industry, benefitting both Indian and foreign capital. This led to a serious situation for the Indian masses, especially the workers. ‘Prices of goods were put up and incredible dividends were declared. But the workers, whose labour produced these dividends and profit, saw little change in their miserable conditions. Their wages went up a little but the prices of the necessaries of life went up far more and so their position affected
actually Indian
became
life
1
worse.’
through
As
massive
Sumit
Sarkar
recruitments,
points heavy
out,
taxes
the
war
and
war
loans, and a very sharp rise in prices. During the war, the drain of wealth took on the character of massive plunder in terms of Indian human and material
2
resources.
The
official
statistical
abstract
on
prices
gave
the
3
following all India price indices.
Index Number (1873-100)
1913
1914
143
147
1915 152
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
184
196
235
276
281
Madras city was no exception to the global effects of this war. Not only was there a steep rise in the prices of essential commodities (despite the relative stagnation of wages) but the basic necessities of life were also in short supply. The price index of common rice in Madras city (1873-100) rose
from
219
in
1914
to
258
in
1918
and
354
in
4
1919.
Inflation was
particularly steep in 1918-1919. Food shortages added to the unrest. The intensity of the distress and hardship experienced by the working people could be gauged from the ferocity and frequency of food riots in 1918. There were 22 incidents of looting and attempts to loot on September 8, 9, and 10, 1918 in various parts of the city. Grain shops and godowns were the main targets of attack, although shops that sold cloth and fruit were also not spared. Even toddy shops were attacked. British troops were brought in from Bangalore to restore order and maintain peace. According to The Madras Mail dated September 9, 1918 the root cause of the riot was the sudden rise 5
in the price of rice from 4½ measures a rupee to 3 measures a rupee.
According to the Commissioner of Police, the riots, though simultaneous in many
parts
of
the
city,
were
not
preplanned
or
organized
and
the
mill
workers were not particularly involved, although here and there a few mill hands were present in the local crowds, which participated in the looting. He reported: ‘That there was no organisation seems indicated by the fact that
the
cotton
mill
hands
and
Perambur
workshop
employees
did
not
operate as a body; that the harbour coolies, a rough lot living in hamlets of Royapuram
locality 6
disturbances.’
did
not
Labourers,
join
coolies,
and
Triplicane
handcart
was
pullers
almost
and
the
free
from
unemployed
poor belonging to what is now classified as the unorganized sector were the chief
participants
in
the
riots.
The
rioters,
according
to
New
India, 7
compelled shop keepers to sell rice at 4 measures or more for a rupee.
While the scarcity of essential goods and the steep rise in prices were causing immense hardship and misery to the working people, an epidemic of influenza broke out all over the world. In India, it took 18 million lives and left the survivors seriously debilitated. Madras city too was affected by 8
this global catastrophe.
While the conditions of the working people deteriorated considerably during World War I, those of the Indian bourgeoisie improved remarkably. ‘The capitalists prospered greatly and accumulated huge profits, which they wanted to reinvest in industry. For the first time Indian capitalists were in a position to talk to the Government from a position of strength. Apart from this pressure, the march of events also forced the British Government to 9
help Indian Industry during wartime.’
A change was taking place in the
British industrial policy in India. In 1916, an Indian Industrial Commission was
appointed.
This
Commission
recommended
the
industrialization
of
India, the mechanization of agriculture, and the introduction of universal primary
education.
However,
it
was
not
a
totally
independent
Indian
capitalism that Britain wanted to develop in India. They wanted the real control of the new industry to remain in the hands of British capitalists who would
obligingly
concern.
But
the
take
the
Indian
Indian
capitalist
capitalists
and
as
upper
a
junior
partner
bourgeoisie
had
in
the
grown
sufficiently in strength during the war to demand a say in the governance of the
country.
Politically,
the
dormancy
and
inactivity
that
marked
the
national movement since the suppression of the first outburst of extremist nationalism in 1905–1908 – with all extremist leaders thrown into prison to undergo long sentences of rigorous imprisonment – came to an end with Bal Gangadhar Tilak’s release and the arrival of Annie Besant in India. Both
Tilak and Besant started separately a Home Rule League with the avowed aim of winning self-government. The Lucknow Congress of 1916 marked the revival of the National Congress.
In Madras, the Home Rule movement under the dynamic leadership of Besant galvanized the educated middle classes into action. Branches of the Home Rule League were formed in all parts of the country. The two organs of the League, the daily New India, and the weekly Commonweal propagated the
demand 10
securities.
for
self-government
and
were
repeatedly
called
to
furnish
Besant and her two associates, G.S. Arundale, Theosophist and
Home Ruler, and B.P. Wadia, Theosophist and soon to be labour activist 11
were interned on June 17 in Ootacumund.
The internment only helped
further the cause of Home Rule Movement as it aroused a strong reaction across
the
country.
Besant’s
popularity
was
at
its
peak.
She
was
elected
12
President of the National Congress for the 1917 Calcutta session.
The British Government pursued a carrot and stick policy. On the one hand, it was severe with the extremists. Tilak was externed from the Punjab and Delhi, Besant interned in Ootacumund, and the Defence of India Act 13
was vigorously clamped everywhere. the
moderates
the
carrot
of
On the other hand, it dangled before Montague-Chelmsford
Report
on
Constitutional Reforms. The Reforms were expected to extend franchise to a 14
section of the workers.
It
was
only
natural
therefore
that
the
political
circles would take an interest in the affairs of the would-be electorate.
There was the expectation that the Labour Party would soon come to power
in
Britain.
An
Indian
party
with
substantial
grassroots
support
among workers and with a stable labour wing, it was believed, would be in a
better position to win the support of the British Labour Party in wresting 15
Home Rule.
Extremist leaders of the Indian national movement like Subramanya Siva and V.O. Chidambaram Pillai held the view since 1905 that the colonial government could be pressurized by mobilizing workers in key sectors of industry
and
services
and
by
organizing
a
general
16
strike.
They
were
therefore interested in the awakening of the workers in the post-war period and were ready to play an active role in their organization. Even B.P. Wadia, felt
that
‘it
is
very
necessary
to
recognise
the
Labour
Movement
as
an
integral part of the National Movement. The latter will not succeed in the right direction if Indian working classes are not enabled to organise their 17
own forces and come into their own.’
The
Bolshevik
Revolution
of
1917
also
had
a
great
impact
on
the
national leaders in making them realise the revolutionary potentialities of the working class. V. Kalyanasundara Mudaliar (popularly known as Thiru. Vi. Ka. and hereafter referred to as such), who was to play a leading role in the
founding
autobiography Subramanya
of
the
that
Madras
he
Bharathi,
was
the
Labour
attracted
nationalist
Union, by
poet,
the
acknowledges tidings
penned
a
in
his 18
from
Russia.
powerful
poem
in
19
praise of the Russian Revolution.
While humanitarian and philanthropic motives also played a part and the nationalist leaders were drawn towards labour for various reasons, the workers themselves, in their search to find a way out of their suffering and hardship, interest.
were
There
drawn were
towards
many
the
reasons
nationalist for
this.
movement
First,
they
in
were
their
own
unable
to
organise on their own and face their employers, as they feared victimization.
Further, they were diffident about their ability to formulate their demands 20
and argue their case before the employers and the government.
Above all,
they realized that in their struggle against capital, they needed allies who could mobilise popular support through the media and organizations at their command.
The cause of industrial labour was espoused not only by the nationalist leaders but also by certain leaders of the Justice Party. The Justice Party was the
off-shoot
brahmins
of
from
non-brahmin the
centres
movement,
of
power
which
and
aimed
authority
to
in
dethrone
public
life
the and
government service. Justice Party leaders could not make much headway in Madras
where
the
workers
had
already
come
under
the
spell
of
the
nationalists. But in Madurai, the first union formed in the districts was led 21
by a Justice Party activist.
Even though the Justice Party did not establish
adequate rapport with the workers of Madras, they had some influence among certain sections of labour. This had to be taken into account by the 22
nationalist leaders when they founded the Madras Labour Union.
* * *
The
first
trade 23
circumstances.
union
was
born
in
rather
quiet
and
unobtrusive
Close to the B. and C. Mills in Perambur, on D’Mello’s
Road in Perambur Barracks, two young men, G. Selvapathi Chettiar and G. Ramanjulu Naidu, ran a cloth shop and a rice shop respectively, in the same premises. The shops were patronized by the mill workers and Selvapathi Chettiar was able to learn from them about their lives and the hardships they had to undergo in the mills. Selvapathi Chettiar was shocked by the
harrowing
tales
he
heard
from
the
workmen.
One
incident
in
1917
particularly shocked his sensibilities. A worker who was refused permission to answer an urgent call of nature defecated at the work spot itself. He was forced to clean the place he had dirtied, an act which no caste Hindu would normally perform. Selvapathi Chettiar decided that something had to be done to ameliorate the sufferings of these workmen. He caused a write-up to appear on the incident and highlighted the sufferings of the mill workers in the Indian Patriot and Swadesamitran.
Selvapathi
Chettiar
also
managed
a
religious
institution
called
Sri
Venkatesa Gunamritha Varshini Sabha founded by his grandfather. This was also housed in the same premises as his shop. Under the auspices of the Sabha, religious discourses would be conducted by guest speakers of note such
as
Thiru.
Vi.
Ka.,
and
the
Vaishnava
preacher,
N.C.
Kannabiran
Mudaliar. Mill workers also used to attend these discourses and bhajans.
It struck Selvapathi Chettiar that the forum of the Sabha could be used to gather the workers and organise them in the way Gandhi was doing in South Africa. He took into confidence his friend Ramanjulu Naidu. They began to record the grievances of workers who visited his shop and prepare individual petitions to the mill authorities. Small benefits were obtained in this manner. Encouraged by the response, the two friends held a small group meeting consisting of about 30 workers on Vijayadasami Day in 1917 under the auspices of the Sabha. Kannabiran Mudaliar gave a discourse on the Mahabharata and explained the need for starting a labour union. It was decided that those who were willing to join a labour union should sign the register kept at Ramanjulu Naidu’s shop. The response from the workers was
encouraging.
The
two
friends
then
proposed
to
call
a
public
meeting
presided over by a leading public figure.
Selvapathi
Chettiar
invited
T.
Rangachariar
(hereafter
Rangachari),
a
leading advocate and member of the legislative (central) assembly, to preside over a public meeting of mill workers under the auspices of the Sabha. But there was opposition to this from supporters of the Justice Party on the grounds
that
the
invitee
was
a
Brahmin.
Selvapathi
Chettiar
had
to
withdraw the invitation, apologizing to Rangachari for the embarrassment caused.
Finally the meeting was held in March, 1918, at Janga Ramayammal Gardens on Stathams’ Road with Sudarsana Mudaliar, Honorary Magistrate, presiding.
About
10,000
workers
from
both
the
mills
and
from
outside
attended the meeting. Thiru. Vi. Ka. made a powerful speech in chaste but simple Tamil, which was much applauded. The other speaker was Gulam Mohammed, an officer of the Cooperative Department. Sudarsana Mudaliar in
his
presidential
remarks
criticized
Thiru.
Vi.
Ka.’s
speech.
Selvapathi
Chettiar had to refute Sudarsana Mudaliar when he paid the vote of thanks. This
public
meeting
aroused
great
enthusiasm
among
the
workers
who
looked forward eagerly to the formal inauguration of the trade union. The Government
got
wind
of
Selvapathi
Chettiar’s
activities
and
the
police
harassed him. The C.I.D. officials even brought pressure on the landlord of the premises to evict the Sabha but the landlord refused to comply with their demand. The management of B. and C. Mills on its part warned the workers through its supervisory staff not to have anything to do with the proposed union. Thus the State and the employers acted in collusion to nip in the bud, the first trade union of India.
Selvapathi Chettiar realised that if his effort to organise a trade union was to bear fruit he should involve public figures more closely with the union. Thiru. Vi. Ka. was also of the same view and their first choice was Gooty P. Kesava Pillai who was then highlighting the grievances of workers in
the
journal
Ramanjulu
Indian
Naidu
Patriot
through
and
his
was
close
son-in-law
to
Selvapathi
Lakshmana
Chettiar
Mudaliar.
and
Kesava
Pillai declined as he was not a resident of Madras. Instead he took Selvapathi Chettiar and Ramanjulu Naidu to meet Besant, then the most popular and powerful public figure in Madras. Besant was not available in her office at that
time
and
they
met
B.P.
Wadia.
This
was
the
meeting
that
was
to
transform Wadia, who had ‘till then vaguely heard of the B. and C. Mills and knew less than little of it,’ into the first president of the first trade union 24
within weeks.
From April 13, 1918, Wadia addressed the workers in English every Saturday, with Thiru. Vi. Ka. interpreting his speeches in Tamil. At the third meeting held on April 27, 1918, the Madras Labour Union was formally set 25
up.
Workers in other industries and services soon followed the example of the textile workers and set up unions. Workers in the tramways, electric supply
corporation,
M.
and
S.M.
Railway
workshops,
printing
presses,
kerosene oil distribution companies, aluminium vessel manufacturers were among the first industrial workers to set up unions. Barbers, scavengers, rickshawwallahs,
and
domestic
workers
working
in
the
residences
of
Europeans also formed their own unions. Even policemen and postmen formed associations.
The
presidents
of
all
these
new
trade
unions
were
‘outsiders’
from
among the prominent Home Rulers or nationalists like Wadia, Thiru. Vi. Ka., E.L. Iyer (hereafter Iyer), Kasturi Ranga Iyengar, C. Rajagopalachariar (hereafter
Rajagopalachari),
N.Dandapani
(hereafter
Sarvottama
V.
Chetty. mostly
The
vice
outsiders.
belonging
to
Rao),
presidents, Only
the
the
Chakkarai
general executive
particular
Pillai,
Chettiar
secretaries
or
and
and
committee
industry
Hari
Sarvottama A.
trade.
Kumarasami
treasurers
members These
Rao
were
were
also
workers
unions
had
constitutions or bye-laws with rules regarding membership, subscription, election of office bearers, management of funds, etc.
A feature of these early unions was that they were industry- or tradebased and not craft-based. However, craftsmen or skilled workmen were the most active participants in union activity, executive members were drawn from each craft or section or unit or department in large undertakings.
An important feature of the early trade union movement, particularly the Madras Labour Union, was the role played by the jobbers or maistries or foremen who were the immediate Indian superiors for the workers. The labour recruitment policy of Binny and Co. eliminated the role played by jobbers reducing the authority of the latter to shop-level supervision and discipline.
The
patron-client
relationship
between
them
and
ordinary
workers was therefore weak. Consequently, as E.D. Murphy points out, ‘the jobbers could more closely identify themselves with the other workers and did not consider the trade union a challenge to their vested interests.’ They still
commanded
respect
among
workers
and
the
unions
26
support in order to make the workers join the union.
enlisted
their
It would be seen that the formation of the first trade union owed much to the religious, philanthropic and humanitarian spirit of its two promoters Selvapathi Chettiar and Ramanjulu Naidu. Even in the case of Wadia, Thiru. Vi. Ka. and other nationalists, the initial impulse was humanitarian rather than
consciously
national
political
movement.
and
Wadia
viewed
himself 27
better of my political duties.’
the
says
role
‘My
of
labour
theosophical
in
the
spirit
larger
got
the
Activity among the poor and downtrodden
labour was thus initially understood as a kind of social work. The union platforms were often utilized to preach virtues of temperence, thrift and such middle class values.
The humanitarian instinct itself was perhaps roused more in reaction to the degradation that caste Hindu workers were driven to by factory work in the
mills.
They
would
otherwise
have
lived
respectably
as
peasants
or
independent craftsmen. The political factor came into being because the mills
were
owned
by
foreign
capitalists,
who
represented
foreign
imperialism in the economic sphere. Had the capitalists been Indian rather than
European,
the
humanitarianism
would
have
been
attenuated.
The
political factor, though insignificant in the nascent stage of the unions was to become dominant later in the course of struggles that inevitably followed the formation of unions.
The Madras Labour Union did not engage itself in any militant activity for some time. In fact, Wadia was not for any action that would affect war production in the mills. The union was engaged in such welfare activities as running
a
fair
price
rice
shop,
a
reading
room
and 28
meetings of spiritual elevation, and conscientisation.
conducting
weekly
Wadia was obviously
treading carefully to avoid a confrontation with the Government and the capitalists.
The
Government
and
the
employers
were
not
taken
in
by
these
apparently peaceful activities of the union. The very existence of the union with a leadership independent of the management was considered a grave threat to law and order and unhindered war production. Lord Pentland, the Governor of Madras, twice called Wadia to his chambers on May 18 and 21, 1918,
and 29
meetings.
admonished
him
for
his
activities,
particularly,
the
weekly
At the Governor’s instance Wadia met A.P. Symonds, one of the
Directors of Binny and Co., on May 24, and visited the mills. Following his discussions with Symonds, Wadia formulated the grievances of the workers and forwarded them to Symonds for redressal.
Apart from purely economic demands such as a general rise in wages by 20 per cent, non-deduction of wages for stoppages due to machine troubles, th
and the payment of wages on the 7
of each month, there were the demands
for an increase in the midday recess period to one hour and for considerate treatment of Indian workers by European officers. It was also demanded that the powers to dismiss workers should be vested only with the manager and
not
with
petty
officials.
Wadia
agreed
to
discontinue
the
weekly
meetings of the union while these demands were being considered by Sir Clement Simpson, the local agent of Binny and Co. and Symonds.
Wadia kept his promise and discontinued the weekly meetings of the union after May 25. But Symonds did not even acknowledge the letter, despite
Wadia
reminding
him
through
the
Private
Secretary
to
the
Governor. The meetings were therefore resumed from July 13, when Wadia explained to the workers why he had suspended the meetings and what had
taken place in the six weeks since the last meeting. Wadia revealed that the mill workers had twice presented him with a petition to launch a strike. He appealed to them to withhold the strike until the end of the World War I as 30
victory of the Allies was of paramount importance.
Wadia was under great pressure. The Anglo-Indian press was demanding stern
action
against
Wadia
and
the
union.
The
Madras
Mail
published
details of a new rule issued under the Defence of India Act according to which
anyone
responsible
for
stirring
industrial
agitation
among
classes
engaged in war production would be liable for a penalty of three years 31
imprisonment with a fine.
The indication was clear: if Wadia continued to
address the workers, he ran the risk of being thrown into prison under the rule. Wadia made it plain to the workers that he would not like to court imprisonment violating this rule when his services were needed more
important
fight,
namely
the
fight
for
Home
Rule
for
for
the
India.
He
32
therefore appealed to the workers to show restraint.
Despite this extreme caution, Wadia got into trouble for some remarks he made at the meeting in reply to one K.C. Desikachari who had challenged Wadia to prove that the workers of the New India press were better off than the
B.
and
C.
Mills
workers
whose
cause
Wadia
was
so
enthusiastically
espousing. Wadia had contrasted the mutual respect and love prevailing between him and his staff to the soul-killing terror that prevailed in the 33
mills. Binny and Co. reacted by threatening to sue Wadia for defamation.
The intent was clearly to silence him. Under the directions of Besant, Wadia unconditionally withdrew his remarks. Besant wrote an editorial note on the above issue in New India datelined July 31. The note, entitled ‘Not on Side
Issues’, reveals the attitude of the Home Rulers towards the place of labour in the Movement:
In the great struggle for Indian Freedom, we cannot spare our bravest soldiers from the battle-front except for the sake of that Freedom. They must not be captured on side issues. The labour struggle, important as it is, is, in this great campaign, a side issue. Winning Home Rule, Labour wins its Freedom. Till it is won, Labour’s champions if Home Rulers, 34
will be struck down under any convenient pretext.
* * *
Whether it was to disprove the allegation that the union was concerned only with harassing European employers or the logic of trade unionism prevailed, efforts were directed to bringing under the union the workers of the Indian owned and managed Madras United Spinning and Weaving Mills (popularly known as Choolai Mills). The grievances of the workers were highlighted
in
the
columns
of
the
New India
and
the
Indian
Patriot
by
Kesava Pillai by drawing an unfavourable comparison with the conditions in the B. and C. Mills. On July 5, 1918, workers walked out when they were working
overtime
as
a
protest
against
the
conditions
of
service.
The
manager of the mills sought police assistance, as he was apprehensive of a strike the following day. However, no strike took place. It would appear that 35
Wadia had intervened and averted the confrontation.
On
July
21,
sixty
maistries
and
twenty
mill
workers
visited
the
Theosophical Society. After consultations with Wadia, they chalked out a
plan
to
organise
the
collection
of
funds,
increase
attendance
at
labour
meetings, distribute leaflets in Tamil and make special endeavours to extend their activities to the Choolai Mills and the Perambur Railway Workshops. The
news
of
the
meeting
of
their
workers
with
Wadia
frightened
the
authorities of the three mills. They feared trouble on July 22, but it did not 36
materialise.
Workers continued to be restive, and tension prevailed, with
the possibility of trouble erupting any time. On September 25 and 26, at B. and C. Mills, crowds of workers had to be cleared with the assistance of the 37
police and the closure of the mills seemed inevitable.
But it was the management of B. and C. Mills that went on the offensive to teach the workers a lesson. They declared a lockout on October 28. They had previously indicated to the munition board on July 16 the imminence of a lockout because of the troubles they feared due to the labour agitation. They alleged in the letter dated October 31, 1918, to the Commissioner of Police that the union was behind the frequent interruptions in work in different departments of the mills and that the weavers were the main source of trouble. It was contended that the lockout was the culmination of this 38
trend of indiscipline and their effort to enforce strict discipline.
Though the working hours of the mills were from 6 am to 6 pm, workers were
allowed
some
grace
time
in
the
morning.
The
weavers
who
were
essentially piece workers were admitted to work even after half an hour. It was alleged that this concession led to discontent among other sections, particularly the spinners, and that the management had to put up a notice on Saturday, October 26, that the gates would be closed punctually at 6.15 am
from
weavers
Monday,
came
late
October as
usual
28.
On
and
the
were
th
28
kept
,
about
out
as
half the
the gate
number was
of
closed
promptly at 6.15 a.m. The weavers who had entered on time stopped work as a protest against the action of the management. The company declared a lockout, till the labourers were prepared to come punctually. The workers contended that some of them who lived far away from the mills could not reach their workplace on time.
th
On the evening of the 28 nationalist,
but
could
not
the workers met at the residence of Iyer, a
arrive
at
any
decision.
On
the
th
29
,
Wadia
appealed to the workers to return to work. He had already told them a few months earlier that as long as the war lasted and as long as the two mills were engaged in war production, they were not to strike. So it was his advice that they not get provoked on any account and that they implicitly obey the orders
of
the
management
and
turn
up
for
work
at
whatever
time
the
management stipulated. The men obeyed Wadia, although reluctantly, and 39
the lockout was lifted on October 31, 1918.
Even though on the face of it, the management had won a victory in getting the men to comply with its order, it was really the union that had won. It was not the management’s order that the men obeyed but that of Wadia, the union leader, thereby undermining the management’s authority. Again
the
union
successfully
resisted
provocation.
After
all,
the
management’s intention, if one followed its logic of reasoning since the inception of the union, was to provoke workers to strike and thereby invite repression under the Defence of India Rules.
The mills reopened but the workers remained sullen and restive. The victory celebration at which the management distributed presents and gifts to workers did not evoke a cheerful response. There was only dissatisfaction. The weavers who were piece workers tried to regain, by scamping, the wages
they had lost on account of the lockout. But the management viewed this with disfavour and considerable friction developed between the weavers and the supervisory staff. The simmering discontent would soon explode.
In November 1918, some European officials were assaulted. The weaving th
master of the Carnatic Mills was assaulted on the 25 accountant assailants
of
the
could
Buckingham
not
be
Mills
identified.
were
On
and the manager and
assaulted
November
on
27,
th 40
the
the
26
.
The
management
declared a lockout on the pretext that the workers did not cooperate in tracing the assailants. This move was clearly directed at the union. The management believed that the union would stand to lose either way: a) if it traced the culprits and made them surrender to the police, in the eyes of the workers, it would be seen as a weakling incapable of defending the workers, or b) if it refused to do so and denied responsibility, it would be exposed as an irresponsible violent organization in the eyes of the public.
The union denied responsibility for the assaults and considered it to be the work of a few irresponsible individuals. It recorded with extreme regret the reported assaults on the European officers and appealed to its members to help the police trace the culprits. At the same time, it considered that it was
totally
unjust
and
unfair
to
penalise
the
vast
majority
of
innocent
workers for the fault of a handful of men and therefore demanded the lifting 41
of the lockout.
The mills did not respond favourably. On the contrary, it
issued a notice on November 30, deducting one-fourth of the amount from the
gratuity
fund
against
the
name
of
each
and
every
employee
in
the
weaving department as they had breached the conditions of the Gratuity 42
Fund and failed to render assistance to identify the assailants.
The union
took measures to carry on a prolonged fight. It set up an Employment
Bureau to secure alternative employment for the locked out employees and 43
floated a relief fund to raise funds for the men.
Hundreds of men had given a petition to Wadia on the very first day of the lockout asking him to request Gandhi to come to Madras to assist them 44
in their hour of crisis.
Gandhi had successfully obtained a settlement of
the labour dispute in the Ahmedabad Mills and it was hoped that he could repeat the miracle here. Gandhi expressed his inability to come as he was unwell, but sent C.F. Andrews to negotiate a settlement.
The management had obviously realized that their lockout of the entire mill for a stray incident in one department could not be justified. They issued a notice on December 5 announcing that all departments in the mill, except the weaving department, would run from 6 am till 12 noon and that a full day’s wages would be allowed. The weaving shed would remain closed until
a
sufficient
number
of
weavers
agreed
to
express
regret
for
their
45
misconduct and signify their willingness to work and obey orders.
The workers saw through the game of the management to break their unity. On December 6, they set up a negotiating committee consisting of 18 men, 9 from each of the mills, to negotiate with the authorities and bring 46
about an amicable settlement. same
day
and
placed
three
The committee met the management the
requests:
non-victimization,
pay
for
lockout
period and withdrawal of the notice deducting a part of their gratuity funds. The management refused to accede to these demands. The union made arrangements to mobilize public opinion in a big way by holding a public 47
meeting at Gokhale Hall on December 15.
On December 10, Andrews
arrived in Madras at the behest of Gandhi. The same day, the management came out with an elaborate statement, which was published in The Madras
Mail,
to
justify
describing
it
as
48
its
action.
an
act
of
It
justified
sympathy
its
and
lockout
pointed
in
out
October that
if
1918
it
had
by not
declared the lockout, the workers would have gone on strike and forfeited their right to gratuity funds. It argued that the lockout of November 1918 had been lifted by the notice issued on December 5, but that the lockout had become
a
strike
with
the
presentation
of
demands
by
the
IB
member
committee. It further alleged that the agitation was the work of the Home Rulers for political ends.
The
management
conveyed
its
terms
through
Andrews.
The
union
responded positively. It agreed to express regret for the recent assault on the Europeans and promised to do its utmost to avoid similar recurrences. It wanted the manager to promise to do his utmost to promote good will and act impartially and strictly on all workers’ complaints of ill treatment. It demanded an undertaking that there would be no victimization and the restoration of the quarter-share of the gratuity fund that the management had
deducted,
subject
to
the
behaviour
of
the
workers
being
found
satisfactory for 12 months from the day of resumption of work. The mills would resume work on 24 hours’ notice if these terms were accepted by the 49
management.
The union did not pursue its claim for pay during the lockout period. Nor
did
it
make
it
a
condition
that
the
dismissed
men
be
reinstated.
Andrews was requested to intercede on their behalf after the mills had been reopened.
The Andrews
management to
intercede,
refused as
that
to
accept
would
the
union’s
amount
to
proposal
acceptance
to
of
allow
outside
arbitration. However, a settlement was finally reached through the good
offices of Andrews, the terms being more or less what the union had already accepted, except that the management did not give any undertaking not to victimise. Nor was any specific reference made to the proper behaviour of the manager in dealing with complaints. The mills reopened on December 50
17, 1918.
Even though the management refused to accede to the request for pay during
the
lockout
period,
Sir
Simpson
agreed
to
make
an
ex-gratia
payment of seven-days’ wages, which incidentally corresponds to the period when in the opinion of the management the mills were locked out. The mills also refused to take back the two dismissed men taking the stand that these two men were dismissed not for the offence of assault but for neglect of 51
duty.
Thus the second attempt of Binny and Co. to cow down its workers and destroy their union did not succeed. They could not make a dent in the unity
and
solidarity
of
the
workers
who
stood
together
despite
all
the
hardships and suffering. The union came out stronger and more than a thousand workers joined. Even though the management rejected arbitration in principle, it accepted the good offices of Andrews as a conciliator and provided him a cottage near the mills. It had to accept the existence of the union as a fact even though it did not formally recognize the union and did not hold talks with its office bearers. The 18 delegates of the union were only given the status of individual employees. They were not even given seats to 52
sit down during the discussions.
Thereby the management satisfied its
vanity, but lost the goodwill it would have earned had it treated them in a dignified manner.
The management was forced to compete with the union to win the workers over. It has already been noted that the union organized a number of welfare activities like fair price shops and reading rooms in the initial phase, and launched self-help schemes like the Employment Bureau, Relief Fund,
etc.,
during
the
lockout.
A
large
53
uncommitted, flocked to the union.
number
of
workers,
hitherto
The management started an Institute
on the model of the Railway Institutes where workers could spend their 54
leisure time.
It screened films on Saturdays, the day when the union held
its meetings, with the hope that it would lure the workers away from the 55
meetings.
But these moves did not have any effect. After the lockout, the
union arranged to subsidise the price of rice with the money raised through the
Relief
Fund
arrangements
and
with
the
sell
rice
at
Royapettah
3½
measures
Bank
Limited
a to
56
rupee. open
a
It
made
branch
at
Choolai and advance loans to workers at an interest less than 2 paise per rupee (one per cent). The loan scheme was to be managed by the workers’ 57
representatives. and
Co.
had
58
It contemplated opening an Ayurvedic dispensary.
taken
objection
to
the
credit
scheme
and
even
Binny
considered
starting a similar scheme of its own. It realized that it had to outbid the union if it was to retain the workers’ loyalty. The union too was trying to compete with the management in the matter of welfare activities.
Another consequence of the lockout was the spread of working class consciousness and a spirit of solidarity. The Madras Labour Union received support from the Negapatam railwaymen, Madras tramway men and other 59
workers in the city.
This support from other workers contributed to a high
morale among the mill workers. The lockout led to the galvanizing of the unity and solidarity of the workers throughout the province of Madras.
That
some
workers
resorted
to
assaulting
the
supervisory
staff,
an
elemental form of protest, was itself a commentary on the inept handling of industrial relations by the management and the pyrrhic nature of its earlier success
in
its
confrontation
with
the
union
in
October
1918.
On
that
occasion when the mills reopened, nearly 2,000 workers hesitated to enter the gates and were shut out till noon. This indicated the resentment felt by a section of the workers at what they considered as the union’s surrender to the intimidation of the management. A measure of the bitterness (created by the bipartite race relations at the shop floor combined with the capitalistic methods of disciplining) could be gauged from the workers’ refusal despite all pressures to betray those who had been responsible for the assault and the solidarity they demonstrated during the lockout. In both the episodes in 1918, the immediate causes of strife were not economic in the sense of disputes
over
wages,
but
social
as
in
the
aggression
on
human
dignity
associated with the process of disciplining. The management also realized this
when
they
complained
that
the
workers’
demands
related
solely
to
disciplinary measures. It would appear that the workers had also understood the larger aspect of the issues involved in the conflict between labour and capital. In the words of Wadia, ‘the great factor which dominated both sides now
taking
part
in
this
struggle
is
whether
Indian
Labourers
or
Indian
Capitalists will succeed in the first struggle between labour and capital in India. It has little to do with stocks. It has little to do with the wages. It has little to do even with the ill treatment . . . the central fact is this – that when labour has been for the first time organized in India, the capitalists who in this particular instance happen to be foreigners are fighting a hard strenuous 60
fight . . .’.
The preservation of the union, the first to be formed in India,
was the main concern of the workers.
Another important aspect of the struggle was the involvement of the public in a big way. The workers’ cause was espoused by the nationalist press,
The
Hindu,
the
New
India
and
Desabakthan.
Besant
and
other
nationalist leaders addressed the public meeting held at Gokhale Hall on December 15 and helped raise funds for relief. The Anglo-Indian Press, The Madras Mail and the Madras Times took the side of the capitalists. They attributed the conflict to politically motivated instigators of the nationalist movement
and
criticized
Dravidian,
an
organ
politicians
in
the
of
the
the
labour
stirring
Justice
up
Party,
movement
and
of
racial
criticized wanted
61
animosity.
the
The
interference
workers
to
of
organise
62
themselves on their own.
The Government stood exposed as the defender of the capitalists. Wadia was quick to point out: ‘for six days now the lock out had been continuing in the city of Madras. I want to know what Lord Pentland, his Executive Government and his administrators are doing on your behalf. Remember that in this hour of trial, for six days, when the mills have been closed and workers thrown out, none of this official people have come out giving you 63
help or enquiring after you or asking your conditions.’
This indifference arose out of the policy of non-intervention in labourcapital conflict except when law and order were endangered, i.e., except when capital was threatened. As a policy, however, it stood discredited.
Thus the lockout declared by the management to teach the union and the workers a lesson was really educative to the workers. Only the lessons learnt were different.
CHAPTER V
First Organized Struggles, 1918– 1922
The formation of the Madras Labour Union motivated other sections of the working class in Madras city to organize themselves into trade unions. In
contrast
workers’
to
the
union,
rather
which
passive
even
and
before
it
gradual could
termination
formulate
of
proper
the
textile
economic
demands and launch a struggle, had to withstand the provocations of the employers and refrain from launching a strike on its own lest it be destroyed in
its
infancy,
workers,
burst
the
other
into
unions,
action
inspired
almost
by
the
simultaneously
example with
of
their
the
textile
formation,
putting forward mainly economic demands.
On August 3, 1918, some motor men and conductors of the Madras Electric Tramways met Kesava Pillai. At his instance they met Wadia, who advised them to have patience and warned them against strike actions. The th
tramway men on 16
petitioned
the
Tramway
Company
demanding 1
increase in pay, an 8-hour duty and one month’s leave with pay.
an
On the
th
18
, the men met at Iyer’s residence and took preliminary steps to form a 2
union.
The men sent a reminder to the authorities restating their demands
and asking for redressal within 24 hours, failing which they threatened to go th
on strike. The men went on strike on the 28
against the advice of Iyer. The
Hindu and The New India pointed out the just nature of the demands made 3
and urged popular public support.
The strike was by no means total and
the company managed to put on rails a few tramcars with the help of the inspectors. The company pleaded ignorance regarding the demands of men and pretended that it was a wildcat strike. The strikers sent another petition restating their grievances and waited for the joint manager’s response. The company, probably with a view to breaking the unity of the tramway men, offered to enhance, by Rs 3, the wages of conductors and drivers if the men 4
returned to work at once.
But the strikers refused to return until all their
demands, covering all sections of workers, were either granted or at least referred to an arbitration board consisting of the representatives elected by the employers and employees presided over by an Indian Judge of the High Court or a member of the Legislative Council. They also demanded wages for the strike period and sought assurance that the activists would not be 5
victimized.
The
strikers,
however,
could
not
hold
on
and
some
of
the
strikers returned to work and tram services improved. On the advice of Iyer, who felt probably powerless in the face of the stubborn attitude of the company, the men returned to work on September 4. The notice put up by the joint manager that day threatening dismissal of the strikers who did not 6
return to work by September 6 must have weighed heavily on Iyer.
This
struggle did not get the men immediate relief. Two key figures in the strike were dismissed.
After this strike, the tramway men formally organized themselves into a union
with
Kumarasami
Chetty
as
the
President.
This
union
started 7
functioning in its own premises at Chintadripet from December 5, 1918.
They continued to hold periodical meetings, which were addressed by a range of nationalists with differing views like Wadia, Thiru. Vi. Ka. at the one
end,
and
leaders
like
Chidambaram 8
Subramanya Siva at the other.
Pillai,
Sarvottama
Rao
and
In their speeches, these leaders stressed the
importance of unity and related the experiences of the working class in other parts of the world. The need for a strike-fund to sustain the workers while on strike was repeatedly stressed.
The
discontent
of
the
tramway
men
persisted
as
only
a
section
of
workers, namely non-workshop employees, got a paltry increase of Rs 3, while most of the other demands remained unrealized. The Union President submitted a petition to the Joint Manager demanding:
1.
The supply of three khaki suits instead of two and the cancellation
of the order requiring the return of the old ones when receiving new supply.
2.
Grant of one month’s leave with pay.
3.
Payment of gratuity calculated at one month’s pay for each year of
service to the men who have put in five years service in the event of their 9
leaving the company.
These
demands
were
repeated
subsequently,
authorities apparently took no notice of the demands.
but
the
company
th
The workers therefore decided on the 10
to send their final list of
demands to the authorities demanding immediate redress. This included three sets of uniforms for traffic staff as against two hitherto supplied, and rescinding the condition that old uniforms should be surrendered; a bonus to be paid at retirement (a month’s salary for every year’s service for those who have served five years and more); privilege leave to be increased to a month; salary increase of two annas per diem to be paid to the workers in the workshop; workshop staff to be eligible for the bonus; decrease working 10
hours by one hour.
As the efforts to meet Sir Simpson, the final authority at Madras, proved futile, the workers decided at a midnight meeting to strike work from March 11,
1919,
although
Kumarasami
Chetty
advised
them
against
going
on
11
strike, pointing out the difficulties they would have to face.
The President of the Union, in his letters to the authorities, demanded immediate redress of grievances. He assured the company on behalf of men that they were ready to return to work at four hours’ notice, as they were keen
on
minimizing
inconvenience
to
the
public
during
the
Mylapore
Kapaleeswarar Temple Festival for which the company had notified that it 12
would run special trips.
The company rejected, for one reason or other, 13
the demands of the workers through a statement in the press.
On
turning
communiqué
down
that
it
all
had
these invited
demands a
the
deputation
company of
men
to
stated discuss
in
its
their
grievances on receipt of the five sets of demands, but this had not been responded to. Moreover, it stated that the tramway men had not even a shadow of grievance and the demands were advanced with a view to getting whatever concession they could wrest from the company. It further stated
that the company had not been unmindful of the increase in the cost of living and had granted increases in pay from time to time and provided the 14
statistics of such increments.
The tramway men held on grimly. They held meetings twice a day. These meetings were addressed by the leaders and the striking men themselves. They exhorted the workers to remain united. They criticized the attitude of the company towards the union. The Corporation too came in for severe 15
criticism for its inaction.
The interest of the public in this strike was far greater than seen in other industrial disputes as the strike caused considerable inconvenience to them. Their attitude as reflected in the press was divided generally on political lines. The Madras Times on March 14, 1919, commented favourably on a suggestion
made
by
a
correspondent
to
replace
the
striking
men
by
European pensioners and Anglo-Indians and ex-servicemen. The Madras 16
Mail took a hostile attitude towards the strike. India
and
The
Hindu
the
strike
and
the
On the other hand in New
strike
meetings
were
given 17
prominent coverage and editorials were written in support of the strike.
The attitude of the Justice was equivocal. While it conceded that the workers experienced
difficulties
because
of
high
prices
and
scarcity
of
goods,
it
warned the authorities against the threat from the Bolsheviks who might 18
take advantage of such unrest.
The
Congress
and
the
Home
Rulers
extended
their
support
to
the
strikers. Many of their leaders took part in the strike meetings. Two public meetings were held, the first meeting on March 23 and the second on April 19
3, where strong support was expressed for the striking tramway workers.
Resolutions were passed expressing their sympathy with the strikers, calling
for the support of the public to sustain the workers during the strike period, criticizing
the
hostile
attitude
of
the
company
towards
the
union
and
demanding the Government to set up an arbitration board to settle the dispute.
The striking tramway men looked to the nationalists (Congress) as their natural allies and leaders in their fight against British capital. They went on 20
a procession to receive Gandhi on March 18 at the railway station
. Gandhi
st
addressed them on the morning of the 21
. He assumed that their demands
were just and hence was sure that they were quite justified in going on strike. He advised them to carry on through alternative employment during the 21
strike.
During this struggle the morale of the striking tramway men remained very high. In addition to the support they received from political figures, they got promises of help from other sections, for instance the merchants of 22
Chintadripet. A sum of Rs 1,217 was subscribed to a relief fund.
Religious
idioms, imageries, symbols and practices were utilized in support of the strikers. Bhajans and processions were held to collect funds. The Union President too advised them to assemble in numbers on the occasion of the Aruvathu Moovar
(a
religious
function
of
the
Mylapore
Temple)
and
to
circumambulate the temple by singing bhajans to evoke God’s grace so that their demands would be satisfied by the company. A worker addressing a meeting
declared
that
if
any
of
them
broke
the
strike,
they
would
be
23
committing a cardinal sin inviting divine punishment.
The firmness of the men of the one hand, and the stubborn attitude of the company on the other, prolonged the strike and caused much suffering to the commuting public. Efforts were undertaken in different quarters to
explore the possibility of getting the two sides in this industrial conflict to a discussion. On March 18, H. Monahan and W.J. Turnbridge, two Christian 24
missionaries, sought to end the dispute by mediation.
They advised the
men to withdraw the strike if the company came forward to recognise their union.
This,
they
contended,
would
pave
the
way
for
settlement
of
the
dispute through collective bargaining. But the tramway men rejected these terms and insisted on their demands being conceded by the company. The tramway strike was discussed at a meeting of the Madras Corporation on March
25,
25
1919.
A
resolution
by
one
Vijayaraghavalu
suggesting
Government’s intervention in the tramway strike was ruled out. Rangachari too raised the issue. Sir Simpson informed the Corporation through the President, J.C. Molony, I.C.S., the terms offered by the company to end the 26
strike.
The company would grant one day’s leave without pay every week but abolish the 14 days’ privilege leave then in force. Compensatory holiday would be granted to those working on Sundays. Employees required to work on recognised holidays other than Sundays would be eligible for not less than fourteen days’ holidays. These days would have to be arranged with the head of the department. Workers who were paid on a monthy basis would not suffer any loss of emoluments for weekly holidays while staff on daily wages would be paid on the basis of days actually worked.
The company expressed its inability to accept the demand for three shifts as well as the demands for increase in pay for workshop workers, for reduction of working hours from nine to eight and for supply of uniforms to line cleaners and points-men. It relaxed the rule regarding the surrender of old uniform at the time of the issue of new ones. It would be sufficient if
they were produced for verification. Uniforms were to be surrendered only when a worker left company service. The company also agreed to supply raincoats for line staff, which however would remain company property. As regards the Provident Fund, a matter beyond the powers of the local agent, it was promised that Sir Simpson would take it up with the Directors in London during his ensuing visit. The company undertook that there would be no reprisals against any employee who had taken a prominent part in the present dispute.
The communication stated quite clearly that those who were willing to accept these terms would have to register their names before March 28, 1919,
and
considered
those
failing
reasonable
to
by
do
so
would
Molony,
the
be
replaced.
President,
These
and
terms
were
Rangachari,
the
Councillor. But the striking men rejected these terms on the grounds that the communication was not addressed to the union and no recognition was 27
given to the union as then constituted.
It passed the following resolution.
Resolved that the meeting agrees not to answer the fourteen points put forward by Sir Clement Simpson through the President of the Madras Corporation
and
leaves
that
work
to
Mr.
Kumaraswami
Chetty,
the
President of the Union and hereby begs to draw the attention of the Municipal Commissioner to the fact that in its opinion the recognition of the Union and its officials is of paramount importance and requests the
municipal
commissioner
to
take
note
of
that
fact
and
exert
themselves in the interests of the suffering men on strike as those of the daily life of Madras.
But by April 3, some trams began to run as some of the men returned to work. The company and the men were persuaded to refer the outstanding issues to an arbitration board consisting of Rangachari and Molony. In this move, the Commissioner of Police and Rangachari, Municipal Councillor, 28
played a significant part. regarding
an
increase
of
The strike ended on April 5, with the issues wages
to
the
workshop
employees
and
the
reduction of working hours being referred to the arbitration board. The Government and the Corporation played some part, though behind the scenes, in getting this idea of arbitration accepted by both the men and the company.
The arbitration board gave its award in favour of the men. The wages were to be raised substantially. Working hours were to be reduced from 9 to 8½ on weekdays and 5½ to 5 hours on Saturdays making a working week of 47½ hours. Saturdays were to be counted as full day for wages. Hours of work
of
Permanent
Way
department
(already
8
hours)
were
not
to
be
changed. Night work would be for 8 hours. Overtime pay would be given for hours in excess of 47½ hours (45 hours in the case of Permanent Way staff ). 29
The dearness allowance of Rs 3 granted earlier would be merged with pay.
The significance of the tramway men’s strikes of 1919 lies in that it was for the first time that the demand for arbitration and for recognition of the union was made and accepted by an employer. The same employer who adopted a repressive policy in the B. and C. Mills had to make concessions for public opinion as the industry was a public utility one. The strike also exposed the limitation of the middle-class nationalist labour leadership. The leaders, both Iyer and Kumarasami Chetty, acting on humanitarian instinct, were
concerned
about
the
suffering
to
which
the
workers
would
be
subjected during the strike by punitive measures such as dismissals and victimization. They, therefore, tried to curb the militancy of the workers who
united
to
force
the
hand
of
their
leadership.
Another
significant
development was the workers agreeing to a condition insisted upon by the management that office bearers should not be outsiders and agreeing to elect the personal assistant to the Joint Manager as the Union President, which
would
virtually
reduce
the
union
to
the
status
of
a
wing
of
the
administration. But this may have been a tactical step to get the union recognized by the employer.
* * *
During this period the labour unrest spread to other small undertakings. A strike took place in the last week of June 1918 in the Cigar Factory of 30
McDowell and Co., George Town, Madras.
The firm had granted a bonus
of 2 months’ salary to the clerical staff. The cigar rollers of the firm who were
piece
workers
demanded
the
same
concession.
Since
the
firm
had
already granted an increase of 4 annas on the piece rate for 1,000 cigars and overtime
allowance
was
also
being
given,
the
management
refused
the
demand for bonus, and was prepared to pay a lump sum of Rs 5 per head. The strike lasted till July 19 after assurance from the management that their demand would be considered sympathetically. New India congratulated the 31
management on their tact and good sense.
According to police reports,
Wadia had been supplying strikers with provisions and money and thus 32
helped them to sustain for a while.
It could be inferred from this that the
non-unionized workers had the backing of the Home Rulers and that a
satisfactory
and
harmonious
settlement
was
possible
due
to
their
good
offices.
The closure of the Burma Oil Company’s Harbour installation resulting in the retrenchment of 70 workmen was the cause of yet another strike by the non-unionized workers of the Burma Oil Company. The strike lasted 33
from February 1 to 3, 1919.
Another important strike of this period by non-unionized workers took place in the Beehive Foundries and Engineering workshops of Madras Oakes and Co. on February 3, 1919. They had failed to get a satisfactory reply to 34
the demands submitted to the authorities a fortnight earlier.
They had
demanded a 25 per cent increase in wages, payment of bonus at 50 per cent of the wages as paid to the clerical establishment the previous Christmas, and prior consultations with maistries before employment.
On January 31, 1919, a notice was put up by the companies offering workmen only a 15 per cent increase in wages and the other 2 demands relating to the bonus and to the employment of labour from outside were turned down, the latter on the ground that the company had resorted to that measure only due to the non-availability of suitable local men.
On February 3 the workshop men struck work, as they were dissatisfied with
the
terms
offered
by
the
company.
The
company
reissued
another
notice stating that the terms offered were final. The Malayalee workmen, whose recruitment was one of the issues under contention, continued to work, staying within the premises of the workshop. The strikers approached Wadia and also dashed off a telegram to Andrews. But all this was of little use as almost all the strikers (except 50) resumed work on February 7,
following a threat from the authorities that the strikers who failed to resume th
their work on the 7
35
would be considered new recruits.
In 1919, the mini presses in Madras represented a microcosm of the industrial world in the number of strikes, the range of causes for strike action,
the
spontaneity
of
the
protest,
the
formation
of
the
union,
the
tenuous links they forged with nationalist politicians and the reaction of the employees.
One of the first strikes to be recorded took place in the Society for 36
Promoting Christian Knowledge (SPCK) Press.
When the authorities of
SPCK Press (Christian Missionaries) did not declare Tamil New Year’s day April 14, 1919, to be a holiday, the men did not turn up for work. This followed in the wake of the formation of the Madras Printing Pressmen’s Union at a meeting on April 13, attended by more than hundred workmen from different presses in the city. It is of interest to note that Gandhi was elected
Honorary
President
and
K.M.
Subrahmanya
Aiyar
(of
the
Tramwaymen’s Union) Vice President, indicating the workers’ perception of 37
their interest being linked with the fortunes of the national movement.
At another meeting of the press labourers at Triplicane Beach held on April 20, it was proposed that the men of the Government Press should also organise
themselves
into
a
union
and
that
Sarvottama
Rao,
a
notable
38
nationalist leader should be the President of the Union.
Another strike took place in the Addison and Co. Press on May 13, but the workers resumed work the following day after the Managing Director 39
promised to give them an increase in pay.
On May 16, however, they again
resolved to go on strike as they were informed that the ten per cent increase
in pay promised would only apply to those with long service. Sarvottama Rao prevailed upon the workers to go back to work as usual and took responsibility for pursuing the matter. But a strike was precipitated by the action of the management in dismissing a foreman on May 17, suspecting him to be at the bottom of the recent trouble, although the explanation for dismissal
was
that
he
had
failed
to
carry
out
the
orders
of
the
Superintendent with regard to some urgent work.
The firm offered the men certain terms including the following:
1. An increase of ten per cent for all employees who had completed an year’s service and whose pay did not exceed Rs 40 per month.
2. The rice allowance would continue till price and supply of food stuff became normal.
3. All recent employees would be eligible for reengagement.
4. No register would be opened.
40
5. Men might return to work with the acceptance of the union.
On May 23, the workers returned to work. This was probably one of the earliest instances of defacto recognition of the union. There were further strikes
by
press
men
the
following
month.
In
the
Christian
Literature
Society, a strike took place when a compositor refused to do the duty of an absent wheeler on May 26. Then the strikers demanded a 10 per cent wage increase, 15-days’ leave with pay, a one-hour break for tiffin and a Christmas allowance.
The
management
refused
these
demands
initially.
Later
it
conceded an increase in wages, holidays, and a one-hour interval. The men 41
returned to work on July 26.
As this strike was in progress, another strike threatened to erupt in the Madras Times Press over a new order that deducted two days’ pay for a day’s 42
absence without leave. Printing
Works, 43
without leave.
A second strike took place at Addison and Co.
because
one
of
the
workers
was
dismissed
for
absence
About the same time there was another strike in the Hoe 44
and Co. Printing Works.
The workers demanded increased war allowance,
reduction in working hours, increased number of holidays, overtime wages, holidays in lieu of holidays falling on Sundays and increase of pay in January every year. But the management continued their operations with the help of new
men.
The
men
who
held
out
for
more
than
one
month
returned
45
unconditionally to work on July 23, 1919.
There were also a few one-day strikes in the Commercial Press on July 2 46
and in South Indian People’s Association on July 11.
A
close
study
of
these
strikes
indicates
that
most
of
them
were
in
response to the unbearable conditions of service. Many of these strikes arose over the immediate issue of the dismissal of the workers revealing the spirit of camaraderie that existed among them. Some other strikes were caused by disciplinary regulations on fines and holidays, but all of them involved a demand for monetary advances like increased pay, war allowance, overtime allowance and others, testifying to the unbearable conditions, the suffering being heightened by the post-war economic crisis. These strikes occurring as they did in one press or another at different times led the employers to form an organization to respond unitedly to the claims of the printers. They
formed a Madras Presidency Master Printers’ Association with the following objects:
1. To promote and protect the interests of the printing and allied trades of
presidency
and
to
adopt
an
equitable
and
uniform
system
of
management among the members.
2. To safeguard the interests and welfare of all employees of the firms that are members of the association.
3. To formulate and carry into effect rules and by laws for the better working
of
the
printing
and
allied
trades
of
the
Presidency
and
to
establish and adopt the principles, rules and regulations controlling the federation of Master Printers in England so far as they are applicable to the
condition
in
the
Madras
Presidency
and
to
carry
into
effect
arrangements for the welfare and the continuance of the Association.
4.
To
consider
and
provide
advice
on
all
questions
relating
to
the
printing and allied trades in Madras Presidency as well as the hours of business, wages, holidays, etc.
5. To consider and promote or oppose any measure taken for or against the interests of printing in the Presidency.
6.
To
collect
and
circulate
information
to
promote
and
protect
the
interests of the Association; and
7. To do all such other things as are incidental and conducive to the 47
attainment of the above objects.
The owners of the Addison and Co. Press sought the help of the union for a few additional hands to work in their firm indicating that some of the 48
press owners at least had built a working relationship with the union.
And
the fact that the union was led by ‘ex-political convict’ Sarvottama Rao did not stand in the way of maintaining a reasonable relationship with them.
* * *
About 226 workshop men of the Madras Corporation struck work on March 19, 1919, when the Superintendent dismissed a maistry and six men because
the
workers’
moulds
in
explanations
reinstatement
of
the
the
were
Casting not
Department 49
satisfactory.
dismissed
workers.
were
The
Salla
damaged
men
and
the
insisted
on
the
Swami
Chetty,
Guru
Municipal Councillor, who was the President of the Union interviewed the Superintendent and advised the workers to return to work. The men had a discussion with the Superintendent on March 21, 1919 and it was hoped that
they
determined whose
would to
return
hold
intervention
consideration
of
out was
their
to till
work they
also
immediately.
succeeded.
sought
demand
if
they
by
The
men
But
the
Corporation
promised
returned
strikers
to
work
a
were
President
sympathetic
on
March
27,
50
1919.
Even labouring men were caught by the unionization wave. Rickshawpullers struck work on June 10, 1918, when the owners raised the daily rent from 4 to 5 annas. They formed a union under the guidance of the Home Rulers. Besant addressed the striking workers on July 2, 1918. The union was gifted two rickshaws to be rented to the members at 4 annas per diem. Later,
the
union
also 51
supervision.
arranged
to
distribute
rice
at
fair
price
under
Iyer’s
CHAPTER VI
Indian National Congress, Home Rulers and the Labour Movement
During this phase of the labour movement, the nationalist leaders, both from
the
Home
Rulers
under
Besant’s
leadership
and
those
looking
to
Gandhi for guidance, took interest in the labour movement as individuals moved by humanitarianism. They helped the workers organize themselves in trade unions and most of the leaders held positions in the trade unions. While
they
helped
the
workers
formulate
their
grievances
clearly
and
publicise these in the press and in public meetings, they also generally acted as
a
brake
on
working
class
militancy,
counselling
against
strikes
and
confrontations. They were anxious that the workers should not suffer undue hardship on account of strikes and lockouts. When strikes and lockouts took place, they arranged relief measures. In this early phase, the leaders drawn from diverse political groups did not carry their party antagonisms into the 1
trade union.
The workers became politicized to some extent in the process of their association
with
nationalist
leaders.
Issues
of
national
importance
were
discussed at labour meetings. Working class support to political demands was
mobilized.
At
a
workers’
meeting
held
on
November
23,
1918,
a
declaration was signed by the audience demanding the abolition of the Press Act, an end to racial discrimination, the repeal of the Arms Act, an end to the practice of imprisonment without trial and the abolition of whipping as 2
a form of punishment.
Tramway men and textile workers took out a big
procession on April 6, 1919 to Triplicane Beach to observe the Satyagraha Day organized by the Congress to protest against the Rowlatt Act. At the 3
meeting there, separate platforms were provided for the workers.
Again on
October 17, 1919 workers attended in large number a public meeting held to 4
observe the Khilafat Day.
* * *
The government policy during this phase, when Lord Pentland was the Governor, recognized that the discontent among the workers was a natural effect of the inflation, a scarcity of essential goods and a fall in real wages, but took notice at the same time of a possibility of the exploitation of this 5
discontent by political agitators.
The government therefore tried to nip in
the bud any effort to give shape to this discontent. Selvapathi Chettiar was harassed
by
the 6
admonished.
police,
while
Wadia
was
called
by
the
Governor
and
It viewed the whole situation as a law and order problem and
even contemplated the use of the Defence of India Act, 1915, to prohibit meetings or processions likely to cause disaffection or to have the effect of 7
impeding the production of war materials.
It did not deem it necessary to
intervene
and
arbitrate
in
industrial
disputes.
In
short,
Lord
Pentland’s
policy was purely negative. Lord Willingdon who succeeded Lord Pentland on April 10, 1919, did not initiate a new policy until the political situation in the country compelled the government to confront its adversaries on all fronts. This phase will be discussed in succeeding sections.
The
events
of
1919
caused
a
profound
change
in
the
political
atmosphere. The Martial Law in the Punjab and its punitive consequences, the
defeat
of
Chelmsford
Turkey
reforms
and and
its
imminent
their
dismemberment,
unsatisfactory
character,
the
Montague-
when
added
to
economic ills following in the wake of a terrible war and the impact of the tremendous revolution in Russia with its explosive ideology, generated on the one hand a discontent of enormous magnitude among the people and, on
the
other,
deepened 8
political groups.
the
ideological
differences
between
the
various
If, in 1918, everyone from Gandhi to Besant and even
Tilak were united in making their contributions to the success of the Allies in the War, and pleading for self-government, in 1919 they were to part company. Besant was perturbed over Gandhi’s ways of voicing protest and even resigned from the Provincial Congress Committee on March 18, 1919 9
along with her associates.
She was for the acceptance and working of the
reforms under the Government of India Act 1919. At the other extreme Chittaranjan
Das
was
for
its
total 10
unsatisfactory and disappointing.’
rejection
as
it
was
‘inadequate,
Gandhi played a moderating role and at
his instance, at the Amritsar session of the Indian National Congress (INC) held
in
December
1919,
Das’s
resolution
was
amended
providing
for
working the reforms. Gandhi was still not willing or ready for a break with 11
the Government.
But events moved faster and Gandhi was compelled by
circumstances to opt for the Non-Cooperation Movement in 1920 under 12
pressure from the Khilafat Movement.
The Amritsar Session of the Congress was significant not so much for the
political
Congress
resolution
with
the
as
creation
for
the
organizational
of
the
Congress
restructuring
Working
of
the
Committee,
the
formation of Provincial Committees on a linguistic basis and reorganization of the All India Congress Committee on a population basis. ‘In a nutshell, the base of the Congress was widened and its Committees were entrusted 13
with the task of translating policies into action.’
The Amritsar Session of the INC was also significant in that for the first time the Congress as an organization enunciated its policy towards labour. The resolution stated:
This
Congress
urges
its
provincial
committees
and
other
affiliated
organizations to promote labour unions throughout the country with the view of improving the social, economic and political conditions of the labouring masses and securing for them a fair standard of living and 14
a proper place in the body-politic of India.
This resolution provoked a vehement protest from Besant. In a signed editorial in the New India on January 20, 1920, she denounced the move as a new form of exploitation of labour for the gaining of the political ends of non-labourers. In her view, the politician was more dangerous than the capitalist, for the capitalist at least gave the existing pittance whereas the 15
politician gave nothing.
The
Home
discontent,
Rulers’
which
was
policy
in
already
regard
to
reformist,
the
channelization
became
even
more
of
labour
reformist.
Besant’s associates like Arundale who were leading the M. and S.M. Railway Workers Union and the Madras Labour Union advocated moderation and sought redress only of economic grievances utilizing wherever possible the good offices of the Labour Commissioner and even of the Governor, Lord Willingdon, who in the earlier phase of his reign, was inclined to defuse the situation by the institutionalization of grievance settlement. It must however be stated that the political differences did not lead to splits in the unions and that leaders of diverse political affiliations continued to work jointly in the same
unions 16
then.
and
organizations,
even
though
rivalry
surfaced
now
and
Abstention or renunciation was preferred to confrontation.
Congress members imbued with the Amritsar spirit took seriously the resolution on labour and began to implement it with vigour and zeal. They helped
to
found
a
number 17
unorganized sectors.
of
labour
unions
in
what
were
hitherto
After a large number of unions had sprouted, it was
felt that the time had arrived to set up a coordinating agency. Accordingly, the first presidency-wide Labour Conference was convened on March 21, 1920
under 18
Bahadur. Labour
Union,
Tramway
Press
Factory
Men’s
Employees’
presidentship
of
Kesava
Pillai
who
was
by
now
Dewan
This Conference brought together over thirteen unions: Madras
Aluminium
Railway
the
Workers’ Labour
Union,
Union,
Workshop
M.
Union,
Union,
M.E.S.C.
and
Union,
S.M. S.I.
Iron
and
Metal
Government
Workers’
Railway Railway
Press
Union,
Workers’
Union,
Union,
Madras
Kerosene
Employees’
Union,
Union,
and
M.
Oil
Tank
Negapatam
S.M.
Railway
Gangmen’s Union, Scavengers’ Union, Corporation Pumping Station Staff
Union and Domestic Workers’ Union. Among the leaders who participated in
the
conference
were
leading
Congressmen
like
Rajagopalachari,
Sarvottama Rao, M.S. Subramania Iyer, T. Audinarayana Chetty, U. Rama Rao, Sister Balambal, Lord Govindaa, Thiru. Vi. Ka., Kumarasami Chetty, Chakkarai
Chettiar,
Gurusami
Naidu,
Sri
Rudrakoteeswarar,
and
public
figures like M.C. Rajah. Prominent Home Rulers were conspicuous by their absence.
Representatives
of
European
employers
such
as
A.T.
Luker
of
Addison and Co., Robertson of Orr and Sons, Binstead, Mcdougall and Kenneth were also present during the inauguration.
The major achievement of the conference was the creation of a Central Labour
Board
to
which
all
labour
unions
in
the
presidency
would
be
affiliated. The main function of the board was to coordinate the work of the affiliate unions and to render financial assistance to the needy unions. The draft constitution of the board provided for a working committee and for entrusting every member of the committee with responsibility for a specific portfolio such as grievance, statistics, finance, organization, cooperatives, 19
legislation etc. the
Congress,
Modelled more or less on the Gandhian reconstitution of
it
was
hoped
that
the
board
would
galvanize
the
labour
movement in a big way.
Two other resolutions passed at the Conference pressed for the extension of
labour
labour
franchise
unions
in
to
the
the
Madras
Legislative
Presidency
Councils.
and
One
for
representation
resolution
criticized
of the
opposition of employers to outsiders as office bearers of the unions. Wages for
Sundays
and
other
holidays,
an
end
to
the
misuse
of
the
overtime
systems, longer breaks for lunch, minimum wage legislation and an enquiry
into
the
conditions
of
women
workers
were
demanded
in
other
20
resolutions.
The Central Labour Board came into being on July 4, 1920. Thiru. Vi. Ka.
was
elected
President,
Mrinalini
Chattopadhyaya,
Secretary,
and
Kumarasami Chetty, Treasurer. The other Executive Committee members 21
included Rajagopalachari, Chakkarai Chettiar, Iyer, and Rajah.
Not only
were prominent Home Rulers absent on the committee but there was also a definite opposition to their entry. It was feared that Thiru. Vi. Ka. would be forced to resign the presidentship to make way for Wadia when the latter returned from his tour abroad. So an assurance was sought from Thiru. Vi. 22
Ka. that he would not do so.
Mrinalini Chattopadhyaya, the sole exception
among the Home Rulers to be included in the Board, was also suspect in the eyes of the Congress members but Thiru. Vi. Ka. prevailed on them to accept her as the concept of the Central Labour Board was conceived by her. The
Central
Labour
Board
conducted
weekly
meetings
at
the
Marina.
Workers would march in procession to the meeting carrying their banners. Their volunteers maintained discipline during the meeting. The spirit of unity that prevailed at that time is graphically described by Thiru. Vi. Ka.:
If a strike or lockout took place in a factory of any one union all the other unions would come to their help. They would participate in the procession
and
meetings.
They
would
even
be
prepared
to
go
on
a
23
general strike. Fear struck the capitalists and the officials.
The Government response to these developments was at first an attempt to
defuse
the
situation
by
institutionalization
of
grievance
redress.
Lord
Willingdon recognized that the root cause of the unrest was economic and that labour demands should be met halfway, as could be seen for instance in 24
his intervention in the tramway strike of January 1920.
At about the same time, the Government of India, in pursuance of its commitments under the Treaty of Versailles and the Washington Conference of
1919,
had
to
collect
statistics
about
labour
and
for
this
purpose
Government of Madras created the post of Labour Commissioner.
25
the
Even
though this post was intended mainly for the collection of statistics and conduct of wage census etc., George F. Paddison, the incumbent of the post, tried to intervene in some of the labour disputes in his individual capacity. He was able to persuade the Government of Madras to set up a Board of Enquiry to go into the dispute between the B. and C. Mills and the Madras 26
Labour Union with a view to averting an imminent strike.
Similar Boards
of Enquiry were set up when disputes arose in the Madras Electric Supply 27
Corporation and in the oil installations.
Since the awards of these Boards
of Enquiry were not mandatory, they could not be implemented. In the case of the Madras Electric Supply Corporation, the workers rejected the award 28
and went on strike.
In the case of B. and C. Mills, and the oil installations,
managements sought to interpret the awards differently and strike broke out. Thus the Boards of Enquiry failed to fulfill the purpose for which they were created.
The
militancy
of
the
workers,
especially
the
lightning
strike
of
the
Madras Electric Supply Corporation workers, followed by strikes in the oil installations, caused panic among the employers and the Government. The employers were not happy with the efforts of Paddison. The employers met and appealed to the Government to take stern action against the illegal acts
of the workers. Thereupon, the Government announced the appointment of a
committee
of
enquiry
to
investigate
the
conditions
of
life
of
workers,
report the causes of labour discontent and recommend measures to secure harmonious working between capital and labour. The committee was to have three representatives each from capital and labour and the Labour Commissioner.
Justice
C.V.
Kumaraswamy
Sastriyar
was
named
the
29
Chairman.
The Central Labour Board took strong objection to the appointment of Justice Sastriyar as he was earlier associated with the Rowlatt Committee. It organized meetings all over the province to condemn his appointment as 30
Chairman.
Lord
Willingdon
tried
in
vain
to
influence
the
workers
to
support the Government but finally had to drop the idea of constituting the committee
as
the
Central
Labour
Board
refused
to
nominate
its
own
31
representatives to it.
Even though it was frustrated in its attempt to constitute an Enquiry Committee, the Government of Madras continued to explore other ways of defusing the growing labour unrest. A perusal of notes circulated among members
of
the
Governor-in-Council
reveals
that
such
measures
as
enactment of a law to regulate the recognition of trade unions, formation of joint committees and the constitution of a conciliation panel were being 32
considered by the Government.
Lord Willingdon’s efforts to wean the labour away from the influence of the nationalists through these measures failed. The labour movement under the leadership of the nationalists became more militant and identified with the non-cooperation movement. As a result, Lord Willingdon gave up his earlier policy and resorted to blatant repression. It became virtually a ‘they
or we ‘ question and the Government stood solidly behind the capitalists in their offensive against the awakened labour.
* * *
The
year
explosive
1919
was
situation
on
relatively March
peaceful
15,
1919,
at
B.
which
and
C.
Mills
was
however
but
for
an
defused
by
prompt intervention on the part of Sir Simpson. A pre-planned reduction of staff
in
the
overmanned
spinning
and
carding
departments
sparked
off
shop-level discontent as its implementation led to the termination of the services of senior workers on grounds of irregular attendance, overstayal of leave, etc., while junior workers were retained. The workers alleged that by dismissing them just before they could complete the requisite minimum period of service, the managers sought to deny them gratuity that they would on completion be entitled to. A sectional strike was mooted as the lower level management refused to entertain shop-level representations and taunted the men to get the gratuity from Wadia. Wadia, on his part, refused to be drawn in another struggle when he was occupied with the tramway men’s
strike.
managers,
Sir
took
Simpson back
the
in
a
similar
unjustly
mood,
retrenched
overruled workers
the
and
shop-level
directed
the
managers to retrench the junior-most staff only if there was a real need to 33
reduce staff.
It
is
significant
that
the
only
information
available
on
the
above
situation was from a police informer obviously planted inside the mills. The report enables one to get an insight into the psychology of the workers. The affected workers did not belong to the union or were indifferent in paying
their subscriptions to the union. The union did not therefore take up their cause. It was rumoured that the head jobbers of these departments were indifferent towards the union and that the weavers who were the pillars of the union sought to teach the jobbers a lesson by creating trouble. Third, the workers thought that a disturbance at that time – the management of Binny and Co. was confronted with the tramway men’s strike – would be effective 34
in making the management climb down.
It would appear that the leaders of the union as well as the management, both already preoccupied with tramway men’s strike, sought to defuse the situation, each for their own reasons. The trade union policy at the time was that when workers in one industry struck work those in other industries would
not
go
on
strike
so
that
they
could
extend
financial
support
to
strikers. Simpson, on his part, would have been concerned about the bad public image created by simultaneous strikes in all the industries under his control.
Wadia
left
for
Europe 35
President of the Union.
in
May
1919
and
Arundale
took
over
as
the
There was little activity until February 2, 1920,
when the workers of the two mills belonging to the union met and drew up a list of demands including a demand for increase in wages to match the steep increase in the cost of living. The management’s response to the union representation was just a query whether the union consisted only of its employees. The workers resented this response. On February 8, two firemen who were detailed for work on Sunday just stayed away from work without any explanation for their absence. Arundale disapproved of this form of 36
protest.
On February 12, the representatives of the mill workers interviewed the directors who promised the following concessions:
1. An increase of 10 per cent to those who earned Re.1 and above per day. An increase of 15 per cent to those who earned between 9 annas and Re.1 and of 20 per cent to those who earned less than 9 annas.
2. Rice allowance at 2 annas per rupee to those who earned between Rs 25 and Rs 75 per month and 3 annas for those earning up to Rs 25.
3. Houses to be built for mill employees.
4. Gazetted holidays and 6 to 15 days privilege leave.
5. Bonus to be increased from 5 to 10 per cent.
At
the
same
time,
the
management
expressed
its
displeasure
at
the
presence of outsiders in the union and asked the workers to demonstrate their cooperation by turning out better work. It was also stipulated that no further
increase
dissatisfied
with
would the
be
granted
conditions,
for
another
proposed
to
go
two on
years.
strike
The
but
men,
Arundale
37
dissuaded them.
When
Paddison,
developments,
he
the
Labour
intervened
Commissioner, to
avert
the
came
to
imminent
know
of
strike.
these After
considerable discussions the Labour Commissioner persuaded the Governor and the Executive Council to agree to set up a Board of Enquiry on the model of the Industrial Courts Act of 1919 in England, to enquire into the disputes on both the management and the men agreeing to refer the dispute to the Court. It was explicitly stated that this move of the Government
would
not
set
a
precedent.
A
court
of
enquiry
comprising
S.
Srinivasa
38
Iyengar, Michael and Simpson, was set up.
The
court
made
the
following
recommendations:
wages
were
to
be
increased by 20 per cent for the highest paid and 30 per cent for the lowest. Rice allowance was to be 6 annas per rupee. The minimum wage was not to be less than 9 annas 7 pies. Full wages were to be paid for gazetted holidays. After
five
years
of
service,
14
days’
privilege
leave
and
a
contributory 39
provident fund in lieu of the gratuity fund were also recommended.
However there was some disagreement over the interpretation of the recommendations. The management declared on March 23 that they would not grant gratuity to men with less than 10 years’ service and that the 4 40
annas rice allowance would take effect only from March 15.
The union,
which had accepted the award of the Court of Enquiry of March 8, 1920, 41
insisted that rice allowance be paid from February.
As
an
agreement
could
not
42
management, on March 23,
be
reached
in
the
meeting
with
the
the workers went on strike. Arundale, the
President of the Union, did not approve and sought to persuade them to return to work and offered to represent their case to the Governor. The Labour Commissioner took a similar stand. After holding out for 3 days, on March
27,
the
workers
withdrew
the
strike
and
agreed
to
accept
the
43
interpretation of the Labour Commissioner.
It was the first strike in the B. and C. Mills after the union was formed. This strike indicated many features that were to become prominent during later
strikes.
The
strike
was
a
self-willed
and
spontaneous
act.
The
leadership’s support was half-hearted and it wanted the men to go back to
work immediately. It sought to find a solution to the problem, through the good offices of the Labour Commissioner and the Governor. The militant section
of
the
workers
did
not
like
the
compromising
attitude
of
the
leadership.
The strike infused the workers with self-confidence. At the same time, the
animosity
management
of
the
began
to
management seriously
towards
think
about
the
union
curbing
increased.
the
growth
The
of
the
union even if it were not possible to eliminate it altogether. The war orders had expired and there was no need for restraint. High prices and war profits had augmented the financial resources of the firm, which could therefore 44
confront the union with strength and confidence.
The
first
opportunity
arose
when
promotions
to
the
cadre
of
side
jobbers were decided. Members of the Executive Committee of the union were overlooked for promotions or even demoted. One Natesa Mudali was overlooked for promotion to the post of side jobber. Another was reduced in rank from the position of head jobber to side jobber. A third, a head jobber 45
of 35 years’ standing, was dismissed.
The workers responded by expressing solidarity with the victimized. The jobbers who were offered promotion to the posts, which the victimized union officials should have got by right, refused the offer of promotion. The management reacted by dismissing the jobbers who refused the promotions. The weavers then refused to work on the dobby loom without the head jobbers
pleading
that
they
were
new
to
that
type
of
work.
They
were
compelled to go on leave without pay from October 15, 1920, as they could not
continue
the
work.
On
the
morning
of
October
20,
twenty
other
permanent weavers pleaded the same difficulty and requested the manager
to
arrange
for
rectifying
defects
in
the
looms
so
that
they
could
work
uninterrupted. Their request was ignored. The weavers who were forced to take leave without pay and were without work pleaded with the Weaving Master, Bentley, to do something for them. There are two versions of what happened thereafter. According to the workers, Bentley kicked four of them and as the men still persisted in pleading, he threatened to shoot them with his revolver. Two weavers bared their chests and challenged him to shoot while a third, fearing that he might in his state of temper shoot, caught hold of Bentley’s hand, whereupon he threw away the revolver and walked out. The revolver was picked up by a weaver and handed over to the union, for 46
presenting it as an exhibit.
The management’s version was that the weavers
surrounded Bentley in his office and assaulted him as he tried to get out of his office. They snatched his revolver from his hands and chased him to the 47
manager’s office.
Binny
and 48
October 21.
Co.
declared
a
lockout
of
the
Buckingham
Mills
from
The union set up a ten-member Lockout Committee with
Wadia as Chairman. The other members were Thiru. Vi. Ka., Ramanjulu Naidu, Vedam, Natesa Mudali, Varadhalu Naiker, Kesava Pillai, Syed Jalal, Natesa Naicker and Namasiva Pillai. Daily meetings were held and workers were exhorted to remain united. Wadia who had left for Bombay to attend the founding of All India Trade Union Congress (AITUC) succeeded in enlisting support from his friends there. With monetary help, the union set 49
up a few looms in its premises and gave employment to a few weavers.
Funds were raised through contributions from the workers of Choolai Mills and Carnatic Mills and from the public in Madras and Bombay. With these
funds, the locked out workers got some relief, which helped them stand with 50
determination.
Faced with the determination of the workers, the management resorted to a series of measures to divide the workers, intimidate its leaders and break their
will.
To
divide
the
workers,
it
put
up
a
notice
on
November
1,
dismissing all the weavers on the roll as on October 20 and offering fresh employment to weavers with effect from November 2. It announced that the reengaged weavers would be reinstated with interest to the extent of 50 per cent on the present gratuity fund, to be increased to 75 per cent by the end of 1921 subject to good conduct throughout 1921. This offer was rejected by 51
the workers who saw through the game of the management.
To intimidate and silence the leadership and thereby deprive workers of their
guidance,
Binny
and
Co.
instituted
court
proceedings
against
the
members of the Lockout Committee. They demanded an interim injunction against Wadia, Thiru. Vi. Ka. and six others restraining them from holding meetings for the mill workers. They also claimed a damage of Rs 75,000 as compensation for the losses caused. The High Court granted the injunction and
thus
helped
silence
the
union
52
leaders.
The
repercussions
of
this
judgement were to be felt in due course.
Besides these tactics of intimidation and divide and rule, Binny and Co. resorted 53
mills.
to
the
recruitment
of
fresh
workers
from
outside
to
work
the
The locked-out workers naturally tried to prevent these blacklegs
from entering the mills, by picketing. Stray cases of assault and intimidation were reported. After the adverse judgement of the High Court, the workers’ feelings ran high and acts of violence against the blacklegs increased. On December 9, a clash occurred when, according to the union report, blacklegs
escorted by the police made obscene gestures and provoked the picketers to 54
violence.
The
police
opened
fire
killing
two
and
injuring
many.
Immediately after this incident Wadia was warned by the Governor that he 55
would be held responsible for any further trouble in Perambur.
Having thus disabled by legal action the union leadership and terrorized the workmen with a show of force, the Company felt confident to intensify its offensive against the locked-out workers. It issued a notice on December 7 stating the terms on which the Company was willing to reopen the mills.
1. Workers must realise that in matters of appointments, promotions, discipline
and
general
discipline,
the
management
must
have
entire
discretion.
2.
There
would
be
no
reinstatement
of
workers
dismissed
prior
to
October 20, 1920.
3.
The
services
of
112
workers
in
the
weaving
department,
15
side
jobbers and 15 persons in other departments whose card numbers were notified would no longer be required.
4. For the weaving department, the year 1920 would not count as service for the purpose of gratuity fund and the Company’s contribution for the year would have to be forfeited.
th
5. If the mill was able to resume work on or before the 10 except
those
in
weaving
department
would
receive
full
, all workers
pay
and
rice
allowance up to October 31, 1920.
6.
If
only
a
partial
opening
of
the
mill
were
possible,
subsistence
allowance would be given to those for whom no work could be found
for such period after the mill reopened as might be decided.
7. Weavers would be paid only for work done up to October 20, 1920.
8. Half-yearly bonus was to be forfeited by all weavers. If other workers resumed
work
on
or
before
December
10,
the
bonus
would
not
be
withheld but if the strike continued they would also have to forfeit the 56
bonus.
The notice implied that the mill workers were on strike rather than the mill being locked out. Again the management tried to divide the workers by promising amnesty to non-weavers and penalizing only the weavers. The workers reacted by submitting on December 11, a memorandum signed by 3,956
men
in
which
they
stated
their
terms
57
clearly.
The
mills
should
recognize the union as it was constituted. The management should take steps
to
withdraw
the
‘gag
order’
and
the
lawsuit.
There
should
be
no
penalizing of workers in general or an individual worker in particular.
The workers rejected the management’s view that they were on strike and not locked out. They challenged the management to place the whole case
before
the
public,
from
the
supersession
of
Natesa
Mudali
to
the
December 6 notice with the interlude of Bentley’s revolver performance and the curious lawsuit. They were determined not to be intimidated.
With Wadia and other leaders gagged, the Congress members stepped in to
organise
public
opinion.
The
Congress
held
a
public
meeting
on
December 15, condemning the police firing and demanding an independent enquiry. It set up a committee consisting of Guru Swami Chetty, Moosa Sait, A.
Rangaswami
Iyengar,
T.
Prakasam,
Rajagopalachari
and
Duraiswami
58
Iyer.
Another committee was set up at another meeting of the Madras
Provincial Congress Committee to raise funds towards financial aid for the 59
locked-out men.
The
Municipal
Corporation 60
impartial enquiry into the police firing.
of
Madras
demanded
an
The nationalist press denounced 61
the police firing. The Hindu called it the ‘New Jallianwallah Bagh’.
The workers were by then convinced that they could not expect any justice from the Government, which was supporting the capitalists. They accepted
the
hand
of
friendship
extended
by
the
non-cooperators
and
responded by joining in large numbers the demonstrations organized by the Congress on January 10, 1921, on the occasion of the arrival of the Duke of 62
Connaught.
Despite the efforts of well-intentioned persons from many quarters to bring about settlement through mediation, the lockout continued and both sides remained firm in their respective stands. The workers of the Carnatic Mills who had hitherto been working and extending financial help to their locked
out
brethren
decided
on
January
17
to
go
on
a
strike
if
the
Buckingham Mills did not take back all the men. They lay down tools on 63
January 24.
In the meanwhile, Wadia was under great pressure. Serious differences appeared
to
have
developed
between
him
and
certain
others
in
the
Theosophical Society over matters internal to the Society and his departure 64
from Madras was being forced.
He resigned from the Madras Provincial
Congress Committee. In the labour movement, the non-cooperators were threatening to take over the leadership and Binny and Co.’s management was forcing him out through the legal proceedings. The crisis in the mills area was deepening with the workers of the Carnatic Mills going on strike.
The workers of the Buckingham Mills had by then been out of work for over three months. Wadia would have liked a settlement of the dispute before he left for Europe.
To extricate her protégé from the predicament he had landed in, Besant requested that secret talks be held between Wadia and Symonds of Binny and Co. Finally on January 26, 1921, an agreement was reached to which Besant, Wadia, Sir Simpson, Symonds and Purushottam Das Thakurdoss, a Bombay
industrialist
and
friend
of
Lord
Willingdon,
were
65
parties.
According to this agreement whose terms were to become controversial, Binny and Co. agreed to withdraw their lawsuit against Wadia and nine others and to take back all but 13 of the dismissed workers subject to the condition that the workers recognized the right of the Company to appoint, promote and dismiss men at their discretion. Binny and Co. also agreed to recognise the right of the employees to form a union on the condition that it should consist only of mill employees. The same day Wadia announced to the workers that the company had agreed to recognise the union as then constituted and to take back immediately all but 13 dismissed workers and that the 13 persons would be taken back in a few weeks. He appealed to the workers to return to work. The workers returned to work on January 27, 66
and thus ended a 3-month-long lockout-cum-strike.
The terms of agreement were published in the New India the same day and it became clear that Wadia had not been entirely truthful in what he had said in regard to the company’s recognition of the union as then constituted and that the agreement deprived the workers of the right to choose their 67
office bearers as they wished.
V.L. Sastri, a nationalist labour leader, wrote
an open letter to Wadia criticizing him for surrendering the right of the
workers to elect outsiders as union officials. Sastri pointed out the irony in a group of ‘outsiders’ imposing on workers the principle that they should not have outsiders as union officials. He argued that to deprive workers of the benefit of outside leadership would completely finish the union off at that stage. Wadia replied that long before even the lockout, he had drafted rules stating that the union should be governed only by the workers but advice and guidance could be provided by experts who were not members. He further added that the new rules would take effect the following March when the new office bearers would be elected. Till then he would continue 68
to be the President.
Symonds seized the fact that Wadia had not resigned the presidentship of the union and that he was going to Europe with credentials from the union to do what little he could with the British Trade Union Congress and the
Labour
Party.
He
argued
with
Besant
that
Wadia
had
violated
the
agreement and that Binny and Co. would not be bound by the agreement (which stipulated the withdrawal of the lawsuit against union leaders) unless all
outsiders
including
Wadia
resigned
their
positions
in
the
69
union.
Symonds refused to entertain any correspondence with Thiru. Vi. Ka., when he wrote to the Company on the advice of Besant. Thiru. Vi. Ka. forwarded to Wadia a copy of Symond’s letter to Besant. In a letter to Besant, Wadia pointed out that the terms of settlement did not include the resignation of outsiders from the union and that Symonds had agreed to see Thiru. Vi. Ka. in due course. He criticized Symonds for insisting on it just to humiliate workers. However he also sent a blank sheet of paper with his signature and requested
her
to
use
it
for
putting
in
his
resignation
if
she
thought
it
desirable. He also sent his resignation from the Presidentship of the Central
Labour Board. He regretted that Symonds should so unwisely drive him out of the Central Labour Board as the result would only be that Iyer and others 70
would take his place.
Wadia was obviously exhausted. In his reply to Sastri, he had expressed the view that it was time to bring the labourers and their masters in a closer harmonious relationship and that even if the employers were not willing to take the first step, which would open an era of peace and goodwill, those who were trying to help labour should also not be obdurate without taking a step in the direction of harmony. He visualized a new era in which the ugly 71
feature of lockouts and strikes would be absent.
It should be remembered,
he added, that none of the confrontations in the B. and C. Mills was of his making and that his hand was forced by the spontaneous actions of workers in response to the capitalist offensive.
A close reading of the various letters, newspaper articles, etc., reveal that it was the fear of a takeover by the non-cooperators and other extremists that impelled Besant and Binny and Co. to conclude the agreement.
But the workers, though they obeyed the call to return to work, did not reconcile themselves to the terms of the agreement. The recognition of the union as it was constituted had been their main demand. They had returned to work because Wadia had stated that this demand had been agreed to by the
Company.
announced
by
They
therefore
Wadia
at
the
decided meeting.
to
stand
They
only
elected
by
the
Thiru.
terms
Vi.
Ka.
as as
72
President and Chakkarai Chettiar as Vice President of the Union.
Binny and Co. eventually did not carry out the threat to pursue the 73
lawsuit and finally withdrew it on August 9, 1921.
This was consequent on
the public pressure in India and Britain compelling the Government India
to
contemplate 74
harassment.
legislation
to
protect
trade
unions
from
of
such
CHAPTER VII
Disunity in the Ranks, Worker Militancy and Labour Unrest
The 3 month-long lockout caused considerable hardship to all workers, despite the best efforts of the union to mitigate hardship by doles. Among the workers, the adi-dravidas suffered the most, as they had no avenues of alternative employment either in the city or in the villages. Even public charity benefited the caste Hindu workmen. The adi-dravida workers were reduced to penury and their morale was therefore relatively low. Further, the frequent calls for participation in Khilafat and nationalist demonstrations and meetings did not make much sense to them, as these were not related to 1
their immediate demands. rest
of
the
developed,
workers, was
the
weakened
As they lived in cheris or slums isolated from the feeling
of
class
considerably
by
identity, the
which
alienation
the
workplace
outside.
Their
reluctance to join the anti-government demonstrations was viewed with disfavour by the caste-Hindu and Muslim workers who were emotionally involved
in
the
Khilafat
and
the
Non-Cooperation
Movements.
Thus
gradually and steadily, a rift developed between the caste Hindu and Muslim workers on the one hand and the adi-dravida workers on the other. This affected the course of the class struggle in the next phase.
The dissatisfaction with the terms of agreement was reflected in the workers’ resistance to the enforcement of discipline on the shop floor. The management
considered
the
agreement
as
a
triumph
for
its
policy
and
began to use demonstratively its prerogative to appoint, dismiss and enforce discipline. With the union temporarily immobilized partly under the threat of the lawsuit and partly on account of the rift in leadership on account of political differences, the management thought that the time was opportune for tightening discipline and reducing the work force to pre-war levels.
Wildcat strikes broke out frequently because of disputes over refusal of leave,
overstayal
of
leave
or
absenteeism.
On
April
19,
1921,
about
900
workers of the Carnatic Mills went on a one-day strike when an adi-dravida worker was fined and served with a month’s notice of discharge for applying 2
for a day’s leave to attend the funeral of a relative. of
the
Buckingham
Mills
went
on
strike
On May 3, 800 workers
protesting
the
dismissal
of
4
workers for unauthorized absence. On the same day, 700 workers of the carding section in the Carnatic Mills lay down tools but returned to work 3
the same day.
The workers of Buckingham Mills returned to work on May
5. On May 9, 800 workers from the Buckingham Mills walked out and 4
returned to work the next day.
In all these cases, the union disapproved of
departmental strikes and persuaded the workers to return to duty. Indeed, the union in its propaganda highlighted its conciliatory role. Editorials in Swadharma repeatedly pointed out how the union leaders sought to pacify 5
workers and make them go back to work.
The workers of the Carnatic Mills submitted to the management a list of 21
demands
relating
to
wages,
leave
and
6
dismissed during the October lockout.
reinstatement
of
the
13
men
The management did not provide a
satisfactory reply. Workers in the carding department of the Mill struck work on May 20. This strike also affected the work in the spinning, winding, sizing, weaving and dyeing departments. Workers in the Mechanical and 7
Building Departments also stopped work. The company declared a lockout.
On May 26, the management indicated the terms on which the workers 8
would be taken back.
There would be no pay for the period of strike. The
workers would have to forfeit the half-yearly bonus, which they would have been
entitled
to
had
they
worked
quietly
and
satisfactorily.
Leave
rules
would be modified.
The union made efforts to settle the dispute through the good offices of the
Labour
Commissioner,
but
in
vain.
The
workers
resented
the
management’s intransigence, and on June 3, the workers of Buckingham Mills decided to go on a sympathetic strike from the 20, if no settlement was 9
reached by then.
At this meeting, Jalil Khan, a Vice-President of the Union,
informed that the INC had promised to help them with hand spinning wheels
and
10
looms.
Rumours
were
soon
afloat
that
the
Congress
had
provided financial help in a big way. The Madras Mail alleged that Thiru. Vi. Ka. had received a lakh of rupees as aid to the workers on strike. Thiru. Vi. 11
Ka. denied the report and threatened to sue the Mail for libel.
A similar
report appeared in New India. Jalil Khan denied that the workers were acting on the strength of promises made by political parties and asserted that they 12
had gone on strike out of their own free will.
The
management
Buckingham 13
decided.
Mills
remained
struck
work
adamant
in
and
sympathy
with
the
workers
the
Carnatic
of
the
Mills
as
But this time they were not united. A considerable section of the
workers belonging to adi-dravida community did not join the strike. The adi-dravida workers held a meeting on June 19, in their cheries and decided to inform the union of their inability to join the strike. Adi-dravida caste leaders
like
Rajah
and
Desikananda
and
the
Assistant
Commissioner 14
Labour, S.K. Sundaracharulu were present at this meeting.
of
Desikananda
later affirmed that he had convened the meeting along with Madurai Pillai 15
and Rajah.
The nationalist press and the union strongly criticized the
Labour Commissioner for the misuse of his office to recruit strikebreakers 16
for Binny and Co.
(The Labour Commissioner was also in charge of the
welfare of depressed classes).
Although the caste leaders and the Assistant Commissioner of Labour played
a
great
experience
of
part the
in
influencing
adi-dravida
the
workers
decision during
of
the
the
adi-dravidas,
the
3-month-long-lockout
must have weighed equally in the decision-making. The adi-dravidas were not prepared for another long period of unemployment and suffering.
So,
on
June
20,
about
700
adi-dravida
workers
marched
to 17
Buckingham Mill defying the union’s call for a sympathetic strike. this,
they
changed
the
course
of
the
workers’
struggle;
a
the
With
struggle
demonstrating solidarity and unity was transformed into a struggle against strikebreakers, and because of the caste of the strikebreakers, into an intercaste conflict. Binny and Co. and the Government could not have been happier.
The
striking
workers
resorted
to
picketing
and
were
accused
of
intimidating and assaulting the strikebreakers, en route to work. The adidravida workers armed themselves with crudely-fashioned swords, knives 18
and sticks and marched in groups from their cheries to work.
Jalil Khan made a passionate appeal to the adi-dravida workers and their caste
leader,
Rajah,
not
to
bring
about
a
split
among
the
workers.
He
pointed out that the adi-dravidas had come to share the various benefits successively wrested from their employers through the common struggles under the banner of the union and appealed to them to share the common 19
privation and suffering to end the present slavery.
The appeal went unheeded. One provocation led to another, and clashes between
strikers
and
strikebreakers
in
the
mill
area
became
a
regular
occurrence. Not all clashes could be attributed to the strike. Some might have been caused by earlier conflicts stemming from other reasons. For example, when the adi-dravidas refused to participate in a hartal called by the Congress to protest against the arrest of Yakub Hassan, a prominent Khilafat leader, the ensuing clash resulted in the death of an adi-dravida and 20
the burning of four Muslim huts in retaliation.
On June 29, there was a fire in the Pulianthope adi-dravida cheri. A 21
number of huts were gutted.
The striking workers were accused of arson.
The caste Hindus contended that the adi-dravidas had themselves set fire to their huts in the hope of pressurizing the Government to build pucca houses 22
and sanction the funds for buildings, which had been withheld till then.
The adi-dravidas whose huts were gutted in the fire were accommodated in two bungalows in Vyasarpadi and provided free food, clothing and shelter 23
by the Government.
The strikers
mill
area
and
the
witnessed
virtually
strikebreakers.
The
a
communal
police
force
conflict that
was
between sent
to
the the
disturbed area to maintain order was reinforced by a contingent of police 24
from the mofussil on July 1.
25
called out to assist the police.
Troops from Fort Saint George were also The situation became so critical that Lord
Willingdon started back from the Nilgiri Hills on July 3. He visited the disturbed area and the refugees’ camp at Vyasarpadi.
On July 5, the leaders of the union were summoned to the Government House. The Governor made his anger very clear to them. He told them that they would be held responsible for the trouble and that if the unsettled 26
situations were to continue they would even be externed.
On July 8, a
meeting was held in the Government House attended among
others by
Lionel Davidson, Habibullah Saheb, K. Srinivasa Iyengar, A.R. Knapp, V.R. Naidu,
P.
Ramarayaigar,
T.E.
Moir,
Sundaracharulu,
Thiru.
Vi.
Ka.,
Chakkarai Chettiar, Jalil Khan, Natesa Mudali and M. Kuppuswamy.
Lord Willingdon in a long speech defended Binny and Co. and placed the blame squarely on the union and the non-cooperators. He spelt out the terms of the company for men to join work.
1. The mills authorities reserve and will exercise their right to admit or exclude such workmen as they think fit.
2. The conditions as to forfeiture of bonus conditionally promised for July to September 1920 to the Buckingham Mill Weavers shall stand good.
3. Under no circumstances will the management grant a strike pay.
4. The mills will reopen in all sections on Monday, July 11, provided the firemen return to duty on Sunday, July 10.
5. This offer of re-admission will hold good in respect of all of whom the management are prepared to re-entertain until Saturday, July 16. Any employee who fails to return to duty by that date will be considered dismissed.
6. Wages will be paid to the workmen of each mill for the days they worked to the dates of the strikes.
7. The bonus if any for the second half year of 1921 will not be affected if 27
the above conditions are accepted.
Having spelt out the terms, he advised men to accept the conditions offered by the management. He warned them that if they did not accept the terms the Government would merely confine itself to enforcement of law and order.
The mills’ offers were rejected by the union executive, which put forward its own counter proposals. The union did not accept the management’s right to reemploy only those they deemed fit. There should be no victimization or reprisals
on
any
grounds.
They
demanded
pay
for
the
entire
period
of
closure as also half yearly bonuses for both halves of the year. They insisted that the main cause of all mischief, Bentley, should be removed from the scene. The case against the workers arrested during the struggle should be withdrawn. The damages to the union premises caused by the police and the military
should
be
recompensed
by
the
Government.
The
management
should withdraw the damage suit for Rs 75,000 filed against Wadia and
other union leaders. They should also reinstate the workers dismissed from the Buckingham Mills. The Labour Union as it was then constituted should be recognized and a written agreement ‘in black and white’ must be signed by
the
management
and
the
union.
The
Government
should
appoint
a
28
Conciliation Board.
29
On July 11, the Carnatic Mill was also reopened.
Both the mills were
manned mainly by the adi-dravidas, who were escorted to the mills and back to the camp by the police. This quite naturally led to clashes between the strikers, i.e., the caste Hindus and Muslims on the one side and the adidravidas and the police on the other side.
Assaults, stoning, stabbing and arson were resorted to by both parties. The
Government
enquire
into
the
set
up
a
committee 30
disturbance.
The
headed
union
by
Sir
refused
William
to
Ayling
participate
in
to the
enquiry because the industrial dispute between them and the Company was excluded from the terms of the reference to the Committee. It repudiated 31
any connection with the disturbance as had taken place.
The
disturbances
communiqué punitive
warned
police 32
ratepayers.
in
But
continued the
the
these
unabated.
residents
locality
and
measures
of it
had
the
The
locality
would little
Government that
recover
effect
and
it
the
would cost
there
in
station
from
were
a
the
many
violent clashes between the two communities. The police had to open fire at least three times on August 29, September 19, and October 5, claiming at least 9 lives, 7 in the first and 1 in each of the other firings. On the police 33
side, a sergeant and a constable lost their lives.
These events in the mill area evoked considerable interest among the public
and
the
press.
The
Congress 34
consistently pro-union stand.
and
the
pro-Congress
press
took
a
They blamed the Government, particularly
the Commissioner of Labour, who was also the custodian of the interests of the depressed classes for his role in provoking and maintaining the conflict between the two sections of the workers. They vehemently condemned the police
excesses.
At
the
same
time
they
deplored
the
acts
of
violence
perpetrated on the adi-dravidas. The Congress also promised some help to the strikers who were experiencing considerable hardship.
In the early stages of the strike, the Justice Party did not evince much interest in the strike. But when the clashes between the strikers and the strikebreakers turned ugly and transformed into a caste war, the Justice Party began to take notice. When the Government proposed to recover the cost
of
the
punitive
police
stationed
in
the
disturbed
area
from
the
ratepayers of the locality (who incidentally were mostly caste Hindus) the 35
Justice Party became very critical of the Government.
Thanikachalam Chettiar, a leading Justice Party leader was aggressive in his denouncement of the role of the Labour Commissioner and his staff in the conflict. He accused them and the police of siding with the company and 36
being partial to the adi-dravidas.
He moved an adjournment motion on 37
the city disturbances in the Legislative Council on October 12, 1921.
The Corporation of Madras too deplored the development in the mill area
at
its
meeting
on
October
38
4.
The
New
India
condemned
the
Government for its handling of the situation. At the same time, it criticized the Congress and the non-cooperation movement for seeking to use labour 39
discontent for political purposes.
In an editorial the New India demanded
a clear stand from the Justice Party especially its role in the Government and its
leader’s
memorandum
to
the
Governor,
criticizing
strongly
the
40
Government’s stand on the issue.
The ratepayers of the locality protested against the Government moves 41
to recover the cost of the punitive police from them.
The Corporation of Madras tried to resolve differences and set up a 42
committee for that purpose. But the company refused to cooperate.
Many
individuals offered to mediate; for instance, Professor Gilbert Slater offered 43
his offices but did not receive any support.
An effort was made by the
business community of Madras too to bring about some understanding 44
between the parties. But this effort too failed.
The strikers who had placed
considerable hope on Gandhi’s visit to Madras, were disappointed at his address in which he exhorted men to remain non-violent, and improve the 45
treatment of the adi-dravidas.
Binny and Co.’s intransigence, disunity in their ranks, the desertion of the adi-dravidas (who offered themselves as blacklegs) from the union, the armed might of the state, the lukewarm financial support of the Congress, the privation consequent on the long drawn out strike compelled the men, 46
virtually, to surrender on October 21.
Many of the men, about 2,000,
could not get their jobs back as Binny and Co. refused to dispense with the 47
adi-dravidas whom it had recruited during the strike. disappointed
with
the
union
and
the
leadership,
The workers were while
the
leaders
complained against the Congress for not keeping its promise of financial help to the strike.
Binny and Co. succeeded in crushing the union with the assistance of the state, by promoting communal divisions among the workers. The Madras Labour
Union
and
the
labour
movement
in
the
city
in
general
took
considerable time to recover from this catastrophic defeat.
* * *
The Madras Electric Supply Corporation was a sterling company with its headquarters in London, and Binny and Co. as their local agent. Electricity was generated in a coal-burning thermal power house at Basin Bridge in North
Madras
and
supplied
to
the
various
industries,
tramways
and
domestic consumers.
Workmen of this power station formed themselves into a union in 1920 with
Arundale
as
the
48
President.
Arundale,
a
moderate
and
staunch
believer in class collaboration, repeatedly stressed that the union should not be an instrument of class struggle. He was against strikes, conceding the use of
strike
weapon
only
as
a
last
resort.
He
dissuaded
the
workers
from
striking when they wanted to go on a sympathetic strike with the tramway 49
men who were on strike from January 26, 1920.
The ten-day strike of the
tramway men had its repercussions in the Electric Supply undertakings. The management Supply
had
granted
Corporation
some
workers
increase
but
the
in
men
pay
to
were
the not
Madras
Electric
satisfied.
They
considered that their work was more difficult than that of the tramway men and
demanded
a
higher
scale
of
pay
and
allowance.
They
repeatedly
petitioned the authorities to redress their grievances. Even though some of their old demands (namely, those relating to free tramway passes, overcoats
for outdoor employees in the rainy weather and leave of absence for three days on just cause) had been met, they were discontented over the question of equitable pay. They contended that while the tramway men had won substantial
increase
in
pay
through
three
strikes,
they
did
not
receive
a
corresponding increase in pay to maintain parity. Besides this main demand for parity, they put forward other demands such as a gratuity or provident fund, a grain allowance of 4 annas, sick leave on time scale, privilege leave for 1 month instead of the existing 14 days, electric fans for employees, housing for all employees who go home late at night, a shirt and a pair of trousers for each employee, increasing the minimum pay for switchboard attendants from Rs 10 to Rs 15 a month, injury leave at full pay in case of th
accidents, disbursement of pay before the 14 reading
room,
increased
pay
for
night
duty
, provision for library and
(4.30
pm
to
7
am)
for
the
breakdown gang from Rs 2 to Rs. 2-12-0 or Rs 3 a week). Other minor demands included raising the roof of the blacksmith’s workshops, putting up
tiles
on
the
company
instead
of
the
existing
two
zinc
sheets
and
improving latrines. They also demanded the reinstatement of a dismissed 50
employee.
Apprehending
a
strike
in
the
vital
sector,
a
Court
of
Enquiry
was
constituted at the instance of the Commissioner for Labour to enquire into the dispute. James F. Simpson, Habibullah Saheb and C.P. Ramaswami Aiyar th
formed the court. The court after examining the employees on the 17 th
the company on the 18 demands
of
preferential
men.
It
treatment
and
submitted its report. It rejected almost all the
held and
that
no
wages
case
had
higher
been
than
made
their
out
to
confreres
justify in
the
tramways doing the same kind of work, especially when the wage scale of the
latter had been arrived at as a result of strikes and consequent mediations and
51
adjustments.
The
electricity
workers
were
dissatisfied
with
the
recommendations of the Court of Enquiry. The Executive Committee of the Union
that
met
on
May
24,
expressed
its
disappointment
with
the
th
recommendations of the court and reiterated its demands. On the 25
the 52
workers struck work in spite of the advice of Arundale to the contrary. Arundale
resigned
from
the
Presidentship
of
the
Union.
The
militant
workers were led in this struggle by M.S. Kamath, Kumarasami Chetty and Subramaniya Iyer. The strike plunged the city into darkness for a day or two but supply was resumed with the help of a few blacklegs and that of the labour corps of Pallavaram. The Corporation directly got in touch with the military authorities. The Government of Madras was also consulted over 53
this move to obtain military coolies.
The
striking
workers
resented
this
direct
intervention
of
the
Government, and the latter came in for severe criticism over this move in the
daily
strike
54
meetings.
The
strikers
held
on
grimly
and
sought
to
counter the moves of the Madras Electric Supply Corporation to resume supply
with
the
help
of
blacklegs
and
military
coolies,
by
sabotage
and
intimidation (for instance by tampering with the overhead lines, removal of fuse from the main, damaging
the
insulators
and
by
collective
coercion
55
against the strike breakers).
Other
labour
condemned
unions
strongly
the
extended
support
Government’s
action
to in
the
striking
obtaining
men
the
and
military
coolies to break the strike. A meeting of the workers passed a resolution pointing out that the police were at present needlessly interfering on the side of capitalists in labour disputes, and requesting the Government to confine
their activities to their legitimate function of protecting the person and 56
property and maintaining order.
This strike of the workers, coming as it did at the time of general labour unrest and after the award of the court of enquiry, caused a stir in different quarters. As a strike in a public utility services, it served as an immediate cause
to
the
capitalists
to
come
together
and
to
take
preliminary
steps
towards the formation of Employers’ Federation of India.
On
June
8,
35
employers
met
and
demanded
of
the
Government
immediate legislative action to prevent lightning strikes in public utility companies. They also wanted the Government to set up a commission to enquire into the conditions of labour and the root causes of the unrest. The Madras Chamber of Commerce extended its support to the above demands. The Madras Traders’ Association urged upon the Government to strengthen the European Military force in the city and protect life and property. The Government responded favourably to these requests and decided to set up a 57
commission.
Labour was quick to react to these moves of the employers. A workers’ meeting
held
on
June
22,
expressed
its
opposition
to
the
contemplated
legislation as well as the proposed commission of enquiry, and demanded that
if
there
was
to
be
any
such
commission,
it
should
have
equal
representation for labour. It pointed out that the only legislation needed was for fixing minimum wage and hours of labour, for regulating woman and child
labour
and
for
ensuring
58
housing.
Some
speakers 59
called for a general strike to oppose the employers’ move.
at
the
meeting
How this move
of the Government was aborted has already been described in an earlier section.
The Central Labour Board sent cables to the Secretary, British Labour Party, and others protesting the assistance given by the Government to the capitalists
to
60
crush
unions.
Acting
on
the
telegram,
Labour
members
raised the issue in the House of Commons. The attitude of the Madras Governor to the strike in Madras Electric Supply Corporation, its rendering assistance to the Company, the requisition of the military coolies in the Labour Corporations to keep the power station in operation all came in for 61
critical questioning.
Faced
with
an
intransigent
employer
who
was
strengthened
by
the
induction of military coolies, with a hostile Government, which looked to the maintenance of law and order and the maintenance of public utility services
as
its
only
task
rather
than
labour
interests,
with
the
public
apathetic to it on account of the inconvenience, the grim and heroic 53-day struggle
of
the
Madras
Electric
Supply
Corporation
workers
ultimately
62
collapsed.
* * *
There was a strike in the tramways on January 26, 1920. The tramway men were generally dissatisfied with a statement issued by the company that it had suffered a loss in the previous year. They further alleged that the promised pay hikes were not made. Considerable resentment was also felt at the
dismissal
authorities beginning
of
a
few
anticipated of
the
a
ticket strike
Christmas
collectors on
the
season,
on
part
one
of
charges of
the
the
of
peculation.
tramway
busiest
men
seasons
The
at
the
for
the
tramway company. But it did not materialise though there was some trouble
in
the
workshop
on
one
63
day.
At
their
meetings,
the
tramway
men
highlighted the grievances and referred to a possibility of a strike action.
On January 26, 1920, the apprehended strike took place at about 12.30 64
pm with men leaving their trams on the roads.
The strike was precipitated
by the rejection of the union’s demands by Symonds the local agent of Madras
Electric
Tramways
and
a
director
of
Binny
and
Co.
The
main
demands of the workers were economic; namely, a wage increase of 2 annas a day, a compensation allowance of 25 per cent to meet increased rice price, and a bonus of one month’s wages for every year of service. Other demands were for welfare measures such as cooperative stores, provision of bunks, uniforms, provision of drinking water and lavatory facilities at all termini, free travel permits for two men in each car, etc. The issue of discipline also figured in the list of demands. An enquiry into recent suspensions and dismissals was demanded. Pay for the strike period was also demanded.
The strike lasted more than a week. It was almost total and remained peaceful throughout. As the men going on strike abandoned the trams on the roads at 12.30 pm on January 26, the company had great problems in picking them up and returning them to the sheds. Only on January 30 did the company manage to retreive all the trams with the assistance of new recruits, mainly demobilized Anglo-Indians. The following day (Saturday) 65
about 15 trams were run with police protection.
The authorities suspected that the workshop men were at the bottom of this strike as they had not received any increase in wages after the previous strike.
The
strikers
held
daily
meetings,
which
were
addressed
by
many
Congress leaders. On January 31, 1920, a meeting of all the labourers of Madras took place at Triplicane Beach to express solidarity with the striking 66
tramway men.
The meeting, while calling on the public to extend financial
help to the strikers and demanding a general wage rise in keeping with the rise
in
prices,
requested
the
Government
to
remove
restrictions
on
the
movement of food stuffs in order to contain price rise. Meanwhile, the strike dragged
on.
There
were
rumours
that
the
Madras
Electric
Supply
Company’s and B. and C. Mills’ workers might join the striking tramway men. Arundale, the leader of both unions, came out in the open against a 67
sympathetic strike.
A dramatic change in the situation occurred when the striking workers and the management met the Governor, Lord Willingdon. The men agreed to
waive
their
demand
for
pay
during
the
strike
period.
The
company
announced an immediate increase in wages, 10 per cent for men drawing a rupee and over per day and 15 per cent for those drawing less than a rupee per day with effect from January 1, 1920. It agreed to distribute rice at 4 measures per rupee up to Rs 5 worth per month until cooperative stores were started. As an alternative, a rice allowance of 2 annas per day per head would be paid till rice became available at 4 measures a rupee in the market. A non-contributory gratuity fund at 5 per cent of pay would be started, but with
no
retrospective
effect,
from
January
1,
1920.
The
union
also
negotiated a further concession of an immediate wage increase of 20 per 68
cent for workers drawing less than 8 annas per day. work
on
February
69
5.
After
the
third
strike,
the
The strikers resumed
tramway
men’s
union
maintained fairly cordial relations with the employers. The government also
did not treat it the same way as it treated the Madras Labour Union, which it viewed as too political. Issues and conflicts did crop up from time to time. For instance on March 6, there was a lightning strike over the suspension of an inspector named Jahannadas, but this sectional strike ended when the 70
company agreed to review its decision.
The company also agreed to institute a gratuity scheme, according to which workmen of five years standing were entitled to, as gratuity, a sum equal to fifteen days wages per year for the total number of years of service. Further, in future, the gratuity amount could be calculated at the rate of five per cent of the total earnings each year. But one of the rules in the scheme 71
sought to take away the right to strike.
The union took strong exception to
this move of the company.
The
tramway
management worker’s contented
men’s
sought
strike
with
themselves
to
union crush
maintained the
assistance with
a
Madras
from
passing
the
low
profile
Electric
Supply
labour
resolutions
protesting 72
73
the
same
Corporation
corporations.
company’s move and the attitude of the Government. to help the striking workers
when
They
against
the
They raised Rs 800
and protested strongly against the move of the
Government to set up a labour investigation committee with Justice Sastri as 74
its chairman, because of his role in the Rowlatt Committee.
There was considerable labour unrest in Madras in January 1921. The Buckingham Mill men had been out for more than two months. Binny and Co. had successfully secured an interim injunction against Wadia and other labour leaders with the assistance of the High Court of Madras. The coercive arm of the State too turned on the workers when on December 9, 1920, the police started firing on the workers.
It was in this tense atmosphere that the Duke of Connaught visited on January 10, 1921. As part of the Non-Cooperation Movement, the Congress issued a call to boycott the Duke’s visit. The Madras workers responded to the
call
in
a
big
way.
On
January
th
9
,
they
joined,
in
thousands,
the
procession organized by the Congress carrying banners calling people to boycott
the
Duke’s
visit
and
declaring
‘Swaraj
First
and
All
After
That’.
Leaflets urging people to observe a hartal on the January 10 and to attend 75
the public meeting at the beach in the evening were distributed.
Efforts
76
were also made to organise a general strike on January 10.
In the meantime, the tramway men had been seeking redressal for their grievances. enquiry
First,
and
to
they
wanted
suspend
all
to
such
end
indiscriminate
orders
already
dismissals
issued.
Other
without demands
included better leave facilities, changes in rules governing gratuity and the continuance of the two minutes pause for drivers and conductors to ease themselves.
There
was
no
satisfactory
reply
from
the
management
and
hence at a meeting held on January 9, they decided to go on strike from the 77
following day, despite a warning from the Labour Commissioner.
Even
though the demands were economic, the political significance of the timing of the strike on the day of the Duke’s visit could not be underrated.
The men went on strike on January 10. The management asked them to return to work immediately and promised to reply to their communication 78
on grievances within a week from the day of their rejoining duty.
But the
workers did not return to work. The company hired fresh workers and there 79
was some violence.
The company was determined to starve the strikers to
submission. Congress members supported the strikers and held a public meeting
on
February
13,
in
which
important
Congress
leaders
like
Rajagopalachari,
S.
Srinivasa 80
Venkatrama Iyer participated. to
the
strikers.
Even
the
Iyengar,
Chakkarai
Chettiar
and
T.V.
Other labour unions also extended support
jutkawallahs
(horse-cart
drivers)
assisted
the
81
tramway men.
In spite of all the support, the strike collapsed and the strikers returned to
work
unconditionally
on
February
26.
They
had
to
submit
to
the 82
company’s condition that they would be reemployed only as fresh hands. After
this
unsuccessful
strike
lasting
45
days,
the
tramway
men’s
union
lapsed to inactivity. The company also started operating bus services in the 83
city.
* * *
Reference has already been made in an earlier section to the struggles of the workers of Kerosene Oil Distributors Installations. These struggles had taken
place
before
the
union
was
formed.
The
Kerosene
Oil
Tanks
Employees’ Union was formed on March 16, 1920, with Chakkarai Chettiar as President, Kumarasami Chetty and A.S. Ramulu as Vice-Presidents, and 84
A. Subramani Naicker as Secretary.
Immediately after the formation of the
union, it submitted a memorial to the companies detailing the grievances of the men and proposing remedial measures. The company, however, ignored 85
this memorial.
Trouble between the men and the company came to a head on April 21. A brick layer maistry, Subbaraya Naicker, was dismissed from the Burmah Oil Company (BOC) for allegedly assaulting the watchman who arrested a coolie suspected of stealing and carrying away some brass tubes belonging
to the company. The management turned down the workmen’s demand to reinstate the maistry. The workers went on strike from April 24, 1920. They demanded, besides the reinstatement of the maistry, a 50 per cent increase in wages, one month’s pay as bonus, overtime at double wages, 15 days’ privilege leave a year, all Government holidays to be paid holidays and better facilities.
Pay
for
the
lockout
period
and
non-victimization
were
also
86
demanded.
The workers of the Asiatic Petroleum Company (APC) followed suit when they went on strike after the expiry of a three-hour notice given to the management
on
April
29,
in
which
they
had
demanded
an
increase
in
wages. About 200 workers of Standard Oil Company (SOC) joined the strike when they stayed away from work on May 4, without giving any notice. Thus
all
meetings
the
oil
and
distribution
took
out
agencies
processions
were
singing
87
affected.
bhajans.
The This
workers aspect
of
held the
movement indicates the extent to which religion played a part in the making their consciousness.
The employers were not in favour of referring the dispute to the Court of
Enquiry
as
suggested
by
the
Labour
88
Commissioner.
However,
they
accepted the commissioner’s good offices and effected a settlement with the workers. BOC agreed to take back the maistry on his tendering an apology. All the companies promised not to victimise anyone for the strike. The companies also conceded many economic demands, such as an increase in gross wages (including a rice allowance and regularity allowance by 16.5 per cent for the highest paid and by 44 per cent for the lowest paid), a minimum gross wage of 11 annas a day, overtime pay at 1½ times normal rate for work on Sundays and nights, a batta for out-of-headquarters work at one rupee
per day for fitters and Rs l-4-0 for maistries, 7 days’ leave with full pay every year. The hours of commencement of work in APC was fixed as 8:00 am in line
with
BOC.
A
medical
officer
would
be
appointed
for
all
the
three
installations.
The question of provident fund would be referred to their Head Offices in Calcutta or America. The companies however turned down the demand for formal recognition of the union as there were outsiders in the union executive. The union was also unable to obtain the gratuity of one and a half month’s pay for one year service, accident compensation, pay for Sundays 89
and for strike period. The men resumed work on May 15, 1920.
To
break
the
strike,
the
company
had
originally
got
Pathans
from
northern India to man the installations. This was done against the advice of the Police Commissioner. This naturally caused resentment among workers and the Pathans were assaulted. When the Pathans continued in service even after the men returned to work, it further exacerbated the tension. On May 17, in a clash between the Pathans and the oil company workers, one Pathan 90
was killed and about ten men on both sides were seriously injured.
May 26 witnessed another strike over non-compliance of terms by the company. The oil men contended that all the terms of the agreement arrived at
after
the
strike
were
not
put
up
on
the
notice
boards
and
that
the
company’s notification of the percentages of wage increases did not agree with
those
settled
before
the
Labour
Commissioner.
The
men
had
understood that the percentage agreed upon referred to the net wages and 91
not to gross, as notified by the company.
Attempts were made by the Labour Commissioner and some labour 92
leaders like Iyer and Kesava Pillai and Chakkarai Chettiar.
At the strike
meeting the recognition of the union was put forth as one of the major 93
demands.
The strikers finally returned to work on June 8, and a Court of
Enquiry was set up with A.Y.G. Cambell, Kesava Pillai and P. Thyagaraya 94
Chettiar.
During this strike, the strikers resorted to picketing. A few cases
of stone throwing were also reported to have taken place.
The company alleged that they were not provided adequate protection during the strike and the Commissioner of Police replied to some of these charges. He stressed that the police had taken sufficient safety measures and exposed the utter falsity of some of the allegations made by the company against the workmen. The Court of Enquiry after thoroughly examining 95
both sides gave its recommendations on August 4, 1920.
The important
conditions of the award were: wages would be revised on the basis of the prewar
standard
and
everyone
would
get
a
uniform
increase
over
that
standard; also that a provident fund would be instituted for the workers.
On August 7, the employees worked in accordance with the hours fixed by
the
Court
of
Enquiry’s
recommendations,
apparently
under
the
impression that by so doing they intimated their acceptance of the award. On August 9, they requested that they might be paid as per the terms of the 96
agreement.
The
companies
promised
to
take
such
action
as
would
be
considered necessary on acceptance of the award by their Head Offices to whom they had referred the matter. Besides they had no official information as
to
the
attitude
of
the
men
towards
the
award.
On
August
16,
the
companies explained to the president their position in regard to the award and asked him to ascertain the men’s attitude. The president sent for the
workers’
representatives
the
following
day
and
told
them
that
the
managements were prepared to accept the award. The men signified their assent with some reservation as to the interpretation of the terms of award in respect of wages. This was communicated to the companies on August 18, 1920.
The
companies
then
informed
the
president
that
they
had
not
expressed acceptance of the award in so far as it related to provident fund, 97
and that they were still awaiting instructions from their Head Offices.
In
the meantime a number of workers were also dismissed on disciplinary grounds. On August 18, an employee of the APC was dismissed for having been involved in the misappropriation of some material belonging to the company. This man happened to be one of the signatories to the acceptance of the award. The men demanded his reinstatement. The company refused and thereupon the men again lay down tools on August 19, but resumed 98
work the same evening at the instance of the Labour Commissioner.
The
President
and
of
the
Court
again
interviewed
the
men
on
August
21,
explained to them the position regarding the provident fund to clear any misunderstanding. On August 26, the men informed the president that they could not accept the award except in its entirety. The president notified this to the companies the following day.
On August 31, the company reacted by issuing a notice that with effect from September 1, only those men willing to work on the scale of wages and rice allowance as recommended by the Court of Enquiry would remain employed. Those not willing to do so would be paid off as on August 31 at the agreed wages after deducting any advance they may have taken, and terminated rejected
from
the
employment.
award
of
the
The
Court
company of
held
Enquiry,
that
the
refusing
workers
to
accept
had its
recommendation
on
the
issue
of
provident
99
fund.
The
company
also
dismissed a few workers and claimed unchallenged right to hire and fire. This move of all the oil companies met with disapproval even from the 100
Government.
The dismissed workers held their meetings every day and
took out processions to maintain their morale. They organized picketing to prevent blacklegging.
The company sought to break the unity of the workers by recruiting new men. The union also alleged that the police went to the residence of the workers and harassed them to return to work. These moves by the police on the
grounds
of
maintaining
law
and
order
culminated
in
a
clash
on
September 10 between the strikers and the staff of the company. Police 101
resorted to firing to clear the crowd. the
clash.
A
notice
was
served
on
One of the staff was also stabbed in
Chakkarai
Chettiar
and
A.S.
Ramulu
Naidu by the Police Commissioner of Madras, under Section 41A of the City Police Act prohibiting the holding of meetings or processions connected 102
with the Oil Company strike, with effect from September 11. action
came
in
for
considerable
criticism
from
the
public,
government defended the police in a special communiqué.
When
such
efforts
were
being
made
to
terrorise
Such police but
the
103
the
workers
into
submission by the police, the Labour Commissioner made efforts to bring about
a
Calcutta
settlement Head
to
Office
the and
dispute. got
an
He
communicated
assurance
from
directly
them
that
with
they
the
were
prepared to adhere to the terms of the award with the exception of the provident
fund
clause;
but
at
the
same
time
they
positively
and
firmly
asserted their right to control the staff employed by the companies. The Labour Commissioner wanted to reach an agreement, which would have on
the one hand ensured to the workmen reasonable safety from vindictive dismissal and would have on the other hand maintained the authority of the company.
Mr.
Paddison
went
to
Calcutta
and
on
September
22,
the
companies’ representatives from Calcutta came to Madras to confer with 104
their local agents.
The strike had in the meanwhile attracted public notice
on
disturbances,
account
of
the
which
resulted
from
such
a
protracted
deadlock. Lord Willingdon came down from Ooty and conferred with the company’s representatives from Calcutta. The companies made it clear that provided
their
right
to
exact
discipline
was
placed
beyond
doubt,
they
would in no way deal harshly with the men and would not entertain any vindictive ideas. They agreed to abide by the award except the provident fund clause, that they would reconsider the case of the dismissed men and also withdraw the notice given to some others except four men whose cases were
105
closed.
position
of
advantage
The
the
of
same
day,
companies
the
liberal
to
terms
the the
Governor men
offered
and
by
the
personally advised
explained
the
companies
men
and
to
not
the take
to
be
carried away by petty grievances. The Governor warned the men that their refusal
to
accept
the
above
conditions
would
result
in
alienating
the
sympathies of the Government who would then do everything in its power 106
to help the employers viewing the industry as a public utility. Governor’s
advice,
which
was
actually
a
thinly
veiled
threat,
On the
the
men
rejoined duty on September 24, 1920, and thus the third strike of kerosene oil workers came to an end.
* * *
Press workers, whose militant actions in the earlier periods have been noted in the previous chapters, were active during this phase as well, though their activities were not so widespread as before. There were two strikes in Ananda Press and Thomson and Company in 1920, one from March 26 to 107
31, and the other from June 5 to July 1.
The first was demanding wages at
one-and-a-half times the normal rate for working Sunday and overtime. They got increases ranging from 10 to 20 per cent. Through the second strike,
which
started
comprehensive
with
settlement
a
demand
was
reached
for
an
extra
regarding
holiday,
working
a
more
hours,
casual
leave and sick leave. The Government Press was affected by a week-long strike from April 6 to 13, when the management procrastinated on their demand members
for
revision
for
alleged
of
piece
rates
and
suspended
108
insubordination.
The
one
authorities
of
the
union
threatened
the
strikers that they would have to forfeit their past services for pension. The men
returned
to
work.
An
increase
of
50
per
cent
was
granted
to
compositors. Workmen of the Scottish Press, High Court Branch Press, and Vest and Company went on strike from May 17 to July 22, demanding 109
increase in pay and overtime rate.
The terms of settlement are not known.
A 6-hour stoppage of work at India Printing Works on May 17 won for the 110
workers the consolidation of batta with pay.
Besides
economic
demands,
some
strikes,
notably
those
which
took
place at the SPCK Press from June 3 to September 17, were to resist new 111
regulations for the enforcement of discipline.
The SPCK Press Committee
and the Master Printers Association had drawn up a new set of regulations for employment, which they wanted to introduce in the various presses. The new regulations would, in the view of the workers, make them entirely
helpless vis-à-vis the power of the management. After more than a threemonth
lock
out,
the
management
withdrew
the
new
regulations
and
112
conceded an increase in pay.
The introduction of the new regulations, which contemplated a graded scale of pay that would facilitate better discipline and extraction of work, was also the cause of a prolonged strike in the Methodist Press from July 16 113
to October 1, 1920.
Twenty men were dismissed for refusing to work
according to the new regulations. The strike was successful to the extent that the management abandoned the new regulations, but the workers had to forego strike pay and agree to the reinstatement of only 16 out of the 20 dismissed workers.
The SPCK Press strike evoked a solidarity strike at the Government 114
Press.
The
SPCK
Press
was
the
regular
contractor
to
the
Madras
University. But as its workers were on strike, the university transferred the orders
to
the
Government
Press.
Around
400
Compositors
in
the
Government Press refused to do the work and struck work from July 15, 1920. The usual threat of having to forfeit their past services for pension did not
work.
Nor
were
the
compositors
convinced
by
the
management’s
assurance that by undertaking the university work they were in no way helping the SPCK Press. The strike ended by September 7, petering out with 115
about 100 compositors resuming duty in August itself. Government
Press
workers
is
noteworthy
for
the
The strike by the
high
level
of
class
consciousness of the compositors who considered that it would amount to strike breaking if they undertook the work, which their fellow press workers at SPCK would normally have done. It might be recalled that when the Government
Press
workers
were
on
strike
in
1904,
the
Government
distributed its printing work to 25 private presses. Diversion of work was therefore viewed as a measure aimed to break the strike. Press workers’ agitation was underplayed and even ignored by the press, including the nationalist press, probably because their own workers were involved. Strikes had occurred in the presses in which The Hindu, Justice and the publications 116
of Theosophical Society were printed.
The workers in the light engineering industry also bestirred themselves and formed the Iron and Metal Workers Union on January 4, 1920 with B. Shiva Rao as Chairman and Selvapathi Chettiar as Secretary. The union functioned from the premises of Madras Labour Union. Workers of Massey and Co. played a leading role in the founding of this union, which was 117
blessed by Thiru. Vi. Ka. and Kamath.
On March 30, Natesan, a worker in
the South Indian Industrial’s Reliance Foundry was suspended for taking leave on false grounds while he had actually gone to meet Paddison, the Commissioner of Labour, to represent the grievances of the workers. The workers walked out in protest. The management refused to consider the demands unless the workers renounced their union. The demands were for an increase in wages by 25 per cent, a rice allowance of 4 annas on a rupee and security service. The reinstatement of Natesan was also demanded. The 118
Commissioner of Labour pleaded helplessness.
The workers held on for 5
weeks and returned to work unconditionally on May 3. The management however granted a pay increase of 1 anna per head and a famine allowance 119
of 2 annas per rupee.
Another
unsuccessful
strike
took
place
in
the
Madras
Engineering
Works. The workers demanded an increase in wages by 30 to 50 per cent, a famine allowance of 25 per cent, an allowance of 12.5 per cent for regular
attendance, double wages for overtime and the continuance of batta for night duty at 5 annas. The men were out from June 2 to July 10. The Labour Commissioner
pleaded
helplessness
and
the
men
returned
to
work
120
unconditionally.
Yet another unsuccessful strike over the demand for an increase in piece rates took place in the Oakes Cigar Factory in Guindy. The factory closed from December 15, 1920, and on the failure to arrive at a settlement, shifted 121
to Dindugal in Madurai District.
This event went unnoticed in the press,
preoccupied as it was with the tense situation in Perambur. Another strike that
ended
in
failure
was
by
49
workers
of
Madras
Pencil
Factory
who
walked out on May 13, 1921, demanding an increase in wages and 15 days’ casual leave per year. By July, 25 workers had returned to work on the management’s terms and new hands were recruited in the place of others. A minor strike took place in Simpson and Co. from March 28 to 31, with the workmen demanding pay for the festival holiday on March 26. The demand was acceded to.
The retrenchment of 24 workers for want of work was the cause of stoppage
in
the
PWD
Workshops
on
August
9,
1920.
The
General
Superintendent agreed to take back the workmen and told the men that work would be so distributed among workmen that each man would be entitled to a full wage on turning out a stipulated amount of work. This task work arrangement satisfied the men who resumed work the same day.
There was a three-day strike in the Indian Aluminium Company in May 1920 over the cancellation of the orders of a suspension of a worker for a week consequent on his absence without leave. The manager reduced the period of suspension to three days, which did not satisfy the workers who
then
struck
work
on
May
18.
By
the
time
the
Labour
Commissioner
intervened and initiated a dialogue between the manager and the strikers the three-day period was over, the man was taken back and the men returned to 122
duty.
There were two strikes at the Army Clothing Factory during the year 1920, both over the issue of increase in wages. The first strike was by 31 123
cutters and lasted from January 7 to 12.
The men wanted a 25 per cent
increase in wage to compensate for increase in prices. In the alternative, they would be satisfied if the management supplied provisions at cheap prices or if at least overtime work was arranged. The strike failed and 8 men were dismissed. A second strike by 68 workers lasted ten days from August 18 to 27,
the
men 124
revised.
returning
to
work
on
the
assurance
that
wages
would
be
One thousand gang coolies on two sections of the M. and S.M.
Railways went on strike on June 20, demanding the cancellation of transfer 125
order served on one of the men and an increase in wages.
With the
authorities resorting to recruitment of new hands, about 500 men returned to work but the other 500 stayed out. There were allegations that the strikers were removing keys from the line and thus endangering the permanent way. There
were
however
no
accidents.
The
strike
petered
out
by
the
first
fortnight of August. By this time all vacancies had been filled up by new 126
men and by men who had returned to work.
The
Arkonam
and
Perambur
Workshops
were
also
affected.
Notices
were served on 98 men in Arkonam Workshops proposing to discharge them from June 13, 1920, for unsatisfactory work but were subsequently 127
cancelled in respect of senior hands.
A strike was threatened on June 14 at
Perambur Workshops but the situation was defused by an announcement
from the Agent about the concessions he was granting. Arundale and the 128
union took credit for averting the strike.
Thirty-five scavengers of Perambur Railway Workshops struck work on June 27, demanding an increase in pay and returned to duty on February 1, 129
1921. The terms of settlement are not known.
Three thousand scavengers of the Madras Corporation struck work on February 18, 1920, and immediately formed the Madras Scavengers’ Union with
Sarvottama
Rao
as
130
President.
The
strike
was
settled
the
same
evening with the authorities promising to increase pay by one rupee with effect from February 1920. The union then submitted a list of demands. It demanded an increase in pay by three rupees a month, a rice allowance of two annas, or as an alternative, supply of rice at four measures a rupee, establishment of a provisions store, permanency of service, sick leave, one month’s bonus to all those who had put in five years’ service, reasonable 131
notice before discharge or dismissal, etc. as
Madigas,
Malas,
Erikalas,
Voddas
Scavengers of various castes such
and
Sudras
met
on
March
3
and
132
restated their demands.
* * *
The wave of unionization and strike actions caught not only the various sections of industrial workers but also Government employees who were equally affected by inflation, scarcity of goods, even though they were not touched very much by the spirit of nationalism. These employees repeatedly petitioned to the authorities pointing out the inadequacy of their pay to meet the increasing cost of living caused by the steep price rice and house
rent hike. Other demands were to remove stagnation in service and grant retirement benefits.
The Non-Gazetted Government Officers’ Association and the Secretariat Staff Association agitated for a revision of their pay scale. A conference of the non-gazetted officers was held in Madras to press their claims. They were not satisfied with the recommendations of the Salaries Committee, 133
constituted by the Government to revise their pay scales.
Various categories of postal employees formed their own organizations to press for higher pay and better working conditions. The Postmen’s Union comprising of postmen and menials was formed on February 8, 1920, with Kumarasami Chetty as President. It demanded a better scale of pay i.e., from Rs
20-140
to
25-1-155,
an
annual
increment
of
one
rupee,
house
rent
allowance, reduction of working hours and the abolition of orders requiring them
to
stay
compulsorily 134
workers to be employed.
during
nights.
The
union
also
wanted
more
Another category of postal staff formed a staff 135
association at a conference held on April 2, 1920.
The agitation of the postal employees led to the Postmaster General deciding to give a month’s salary as interim relief. But this offer was rejected by the postmen who at a meeting held on July 7, 1920, decided to go on a 136
strike from August 5, if their demands were not met.
The warning
postal that
authorities they
would
reacted not
to
only
this
threat
lose
their
of
strike
security
by but
issuing also
137
imprisonment and fine under Section 50 of the Post Office Act.
a
face
To avert
the threatened strike, a communiqué was issued from Simla stating that an increase has been sanctioned in pay and the Postmaster General was doing
his best to expedite matters. Consequently Kumarasami Chetty advised the men
to
postpone
the
138
strike.
The
strike
was
averted
due
to
the
intervention of the Raja of Ramnad who advised them not to precipitate matters. The Postmaster General agreed to consider sympathetically the case of postmen who were unjustly treated in the increase of pay recently granted 139
when compared to the men in Calcutta.
There seems to have been little
improvement in their conditions as would be seen from the proceedings of the
conference
held
on
October
31,
1920,
especially
from
the
welcome
140
address delivered by Sastri, President of the Union.
* * *
Policemen too felt the economic consequences of World War I acutely. Constables,
whose
social
background
was
similar
to
that
of
industrial
workers, felt more keenly than the latter the deteriorating standard of living. In
the
pre-war
days,
the
policemen’s
protest
against
their
conditions
of
work, the severe discipline and vigorous training, inadequate pay, and long hours of work took the form of slackness at work, indiscipline, desertion, or 141
forcing the authorities to discharge them
Under
the
changed
post-war
conditions,
these
forms
of
individual
protest gave way to collective action through the formation of the union. Their grievances were: inadequacy of pay, duty allowances and travelling allowances (batta), non-reimbursement of washing and ironing expenses incurred to keep the white uniform spotless, the corporation charges for water
and
conservancy,
poor
housing,
unsatisfactory
prospects
for
promotion and such other difficulties. The union was formed with the help
of nationalist politicians at a meeting held on March 10, 1920, at People’s Park opposite the Band Stand. The policemen elected Kasturi Ranga Iyengar, editor
of
The
Rangaswamy
Hindu
Iyengar
and and
a
prominent
Thiru.
Vi.
Congress
Ka.
as
leader
as
President,
Vice-Presidents,
Selvapathi
142
Chettiar as Secretary, and Audinarayana Chetty as Treasurer.
The police authorities tried to prevent the formation of the union by issuing mobilization orders at the same hour that the union meetings were scheduled to be held. The authorities did not respond to the two memorials of the union. They declared that the Government would not recognize any organization, which included among its members or office bearers, persons 143
who were not members of the services to which the association belonged. Consequently
the
union
elected
Ibrahim
Saheb
as
its
President
and
144
Madhava Naidu as its Secretary.
The Government, acutely aware of the importance of a contented police force especially at the time of acute labour trouble and nationalist agitation, granted some increase in pay. At the end of November 1920, Knapp finally recommended to the Government a minimum pay of Rs 17 per month for constables and Rs 26 for head constables. The constable’s pay was later raised
to
Rs
145
18.
But
the
policemen
found
the
increase
inadequate:
consequently they refused to draw their salaries at the end of December. There were also rumours that they would strike work on the occasion of the 146
visit of Duke of Connaught on January 10, 1921. unfounded;
some
more
minor
concessions
were
But
the
granted,
fears
like
were
waiving
charges for water supply and scavenging and increasing dhobi allowance, 147
and a change in the uniform.
But the disaffection seems to have persisted.
There
was
a
renewed
threat
of
strike
when
the
Prince
of
Wales
visited
148
Madras on January 13, 1922.
The
Government
contingency.
The
took
police
all
strike
precautionary
in
Madras
did
measures not
to
meet
materialise.
An
the extra
battalion of Indian infantry was brought to Madras from Secunderabad and arrangements were made with the military authorities under which further reinforcements could be obtained if necessary. The Commissioner of Police then interviewed representatives of the men and demanded a direct answer to the question whether they intended to strike. They said that they had no such intention. He informed them that if they formulated their grievances, an
inquiry
would
be
held
by
the
Finance
Committee
of
the
Legislative
149
Council.
As a result of these agitations, the police were granted some increase in pay and certain other minor concessions. Their right to form an association was conceded, though, subject to certain conditions such as the exclusion of outsiders from membership and the executive, the renunciation of strike action (including threatening to strike) and an undertaking not to raise 150
questions about discipline and promotion.
* * *
These militant struggles of the workers of Madras city were not isolated, exceptional events, but formed part of the general awakening and militancy of labour all over India following the decisions of the Amritsar Session of the
INC
to
involve
Congressmen
in
the
labour
movement.
Just
as
the
founding of the Central Labour Board in Madras followed the sprouting of
numerous labour unions in various industries, services and public utilities in the city, so too at the all-India level, the All India Trade Union Congress (AITUC) came into being on October 31, 1920, following the sprouting of trade
unions
in
various
parts
of
151
the
country.
But
unlike
the
Central
Labour Board, which was set up mainly to aid the weaker unions in their struggles
against
the
capitalists
and
coordinate
the
struggles
of
various
sections of the working class, the formation of the AITUC was impelled by the necessity to claim the right of nomination to the International Labour Organisation (ILO) set up by the League of Nations.
The AITUC.
trade Eight
unions
of
unions
Madras
including
City the
took
part
Madras
in
the
Labour
founding Union
of
the
affiliated
themselves with the AITUC, while eight others expressed their support but did not affiliate. Wadia and Besant attended the first session held in Bombay on October 31, 1920. Wadia was elected as adviser to Lala Lajpat Rai, who was elected as the workers’ delegate to the Conference of the International 152
Labour Organization.
The second session of the AITUC was held in Jharia on November 30, 153
1921.
The Central Labour Board affiliated itself with the AITUC and
elected Iyer and Jalil Khan to represent Madras Labour at the Jharia session. The unions affiliated to the Central Labour Board were asked to contribute Rs 10 each to meet the expenses of Jalil Khan. The Central Labour Board 154
also decided to invite the AITUC to hold its next session in Madras.
At the Jharia Congress urged by Jalil Khan and Iyer, a resolution was passed condemning the action of the Government of Madras in openly siding with the B. and C. Mills and calling for the abolition of the Madras Labour Office, which at the suggestion of the Commissioner
of
Labour
155
recruited blacklegs and created a split in the Madras Labour Union.
Iyer
also seconded the main resolution of the session on Swaraj which stated:
This Trade Union Congress declares that the time has now arrived for the attainment of swarajya by the People of India.
Iyer
referred
to
the
hostile
attitude
of
the
provincial
governments
towards labour as evidenced in the cases of the Surma Valley, the Tea Estate strike in Bengal, the Madras Electricity Supply Corporation strike, the B. and C. Mills’ strike in Madras and the support given to the mine owners at 156
Jharia to thwart the session, and stated that swaraj was the only solution. The
Madras
High
Court
judgement
in
the
lawsuit
against
the
Madras
Labour Union was also referred to by many speakers such as Muhammed 157
Dawood of the seamen’s union.
One
notable
contribution
of
Madras
to
the
Indian
trade
union
movement was the starting of the English weekly Swadharma by Iyer on 158
April 17, 1921. grievances articles
on
and
The sixteen-page journal gave wide coverage to labour
union
trade
activities
unionism,
all
labour
over
India
and
the
world.
legislation,
and
problems
It
carried
concerning
labour. Iyer being a nationalist, the journal propagated the ideals of swaraj and non-cooperation.
The Non-Cooperation Movement led not only to the intensification of the activities of non-cooperators among labour but also to the withdrawal of Congressmen from advisory committees and such bodies in which they had been
cooperating
with
the
Government
to
ameliorate
the
conditions
of
labour and the poor. Thus C. Rajagopalachari resigned on August 9, 1920,
from the Labour Advisory Board in pursuance of the programme of non159
cooperation.
In
his
illustration
letter of
of
the
resignation
Gandhian
to
spirit
the of
Governor
of
Madras,
non-cooperation,
a
classic
Rajagopalachari
made it clear that it was not out of any dissatisfaction with any particular situation that he resigned but on the call of national self-respect and sense of duty. He was all in praise of the sympathy and friendliness displayed by Paddison as Chairman of the Board, which reinforced his hope that he would be able to serve the cause of labour in the capacity of a member of the board. But as the Government had refused to undo the capital wrongs for which it was responsible he could not continue to actively support it.
Not all non-cooperators were of the mould of C. Rajagopalachari, as could be gleaned from the fiery speeches of V.O. Chidambaram Pillai. At a meeting in Negapatam on April 14, 1920, he declared:
Postal, Telegraph, Police and Railways are the four walls of the British Government and of these if one wall collapses, the British Government 160
will at once collapse. You are like the foundation of the Government.
Again
on
June
24,
1920
at
the
Tirunelveli
Provincial
Conference,
Chidambaram Pillai said:
If the Government did not act upto what people say, we must induce these unions (Railway, Postal, Police and Telegraph Workers’ Unions) to strike work . . . . If you have these unions under your control, you will 161
have ‘Swaraj’ the moment you desire for it.
Further,
the
animosity
towards
Besant
and
the
Home
Rulers
that
developed among a section of the non-cooperators led to a crisis in the affairs of the Central Labour Board. Thiru. Vi. Ka. who had been elected President of the Central Labour Board when Wadia was abroad resigned the Presidentship on Wadia’s return, obviously to make way for Wadia to take his ‘rightful place’. Sensing the opposition from the non-cooperators, the Secretary, Mrinalini Chattapadhyaya, so manipulated the election that noncooperators were kept ignorant of the meeting and Wadia was declared duly elected unopposed. The non-cooperators protested that the notice of the meeting was not sent to them and convened another meeting at which the election
of
Wadia
was
nullified
and
Chakkarai
Chettiar
was
elected
as
President of the Board since Thiru. Vi. Ka. was stubborn in his decision to quit. Wadia did not make an issue of it, telling Thiru. Vi. Ka. that the work of the two big unions was burden enough for them and that they did not 162
need the Central Labour Board.
The domination of the Central Labour Board by the non-cooperators was the result of the intense politicization of the labour movement under the impact of the Khilafat and the non-cooperation movements. Labour participated in meetings organized by the Congress. For instance on March 19, 1920, workers of the Madras Labour Union, the Aluminium Company and the tramway men participated in the big procession to the Khilafat Day 163
meeting shouting ‘Hindu Mussalman ki Jai’.
They participated again in
the hartal organised to boycott the visit of the Duke of Connaught the next 164
day.
Again when the Khilafat leader, Yakub Hasan, was imprisoned, the
workers
observed
involvement
of
the
hartal workers
on in
February nationalist
27,
165
1921.
politics
The
during
the
increasing protracted
struggle between May and October 1921 at the B. and C. Mills came in for considerable 166
India.
It
criticism was
from
alleged
the
that
pro-government
the
strike
was
press
and
engineered
from
New
the
non-
by
cooperators for their own political ends.
If the workers rallied to the support of the national struggle in a big way, resorting even to violent acts as during the boycott of the visit of the Prince of Wales to Madras in January 1922, the Congress members did not go the whole hog with the workers in their struggle. While they conducted rallies and meetings to express sympathy and support to the striking workers, they did
not
keep
their
leadership
pleaded
leadership
had
not
promises
of
helplessness yet
financial as
the
materialized.
assistance.
promised At
the
aid
The
local
from
meeting
of
Congress
the the
national Executive
Committee of the provincial congress held in November 1920 at Madras, a resolution seeking immediate grant of financial aid to the B. and C. Mills workers was opposed on grounds that the proposal had not been routed 167
through the proper channel.
The hesitation on the part of the Congress leadership to extend full support to the workers might be explained as the increasing apprehension of the
Congress
leadership
that
the
militancy
of
the
workers
would,
if
encouraged, lead to violent forms of protest, which were anathema to the devotees of non-violence. The violent acts of the mill workers during the hartal for the boycott of the visit of the Prince of Wales – a number of trams were damaged by stone throwing – came as a shock to the leaders. T.S.S. Rajan and Audinarayana Chetty had a difficult time persuading the crowd to 168
disperse.
The police had declared the assembly unlawful and a violent
clash was imminent. There could be no underestimation of the fervour of
the working class during those heady days. Even policemen were affected and there was a rumour that they would also join the hartal. Fortunately for 169
the Government, what they feared did not happen.
A study of the various struggles waged by the different segments of the industrial workforce in the city indicates that almost all sections of the working class resorted to strikes for redressal of their economic grievances. Though
these
struggles
started
mainly
with
economic
demands,
soon,
during the course of the struggle, other issues like the recognition of the union and the reinstatement of victimized union activists overshadowed the original points of dispute. In some of these struggles, demands like holiday with
pay,
privilege
leave,
sick
leave,
provision
for
provident
fund
and
gratuity were made showing early that the working class had not merely agitated
for
an
immediate
rise
in
wages
but
fought
for
better
overall
conditions of work and life. These struggles were not just reactive. The capitalists as a class were, even if hesitant, willing to grant the economic demands but were adamant in their refusal to recognise the union as the representative of workers. They were also equally stubborn in refusing to accede to workers’ demand for control over their working conditions.
They resorted to every measure to curtail the labour movement. They gagged
the
leaders
of
the
trade
union
movement
by
means
of
a
court
injunction. They victimized activists and even utilized every division in the ranks of the workers to disrupt the unity of the working class. Some of them introduced welfare measures and set up their own machinery of grievance settlement parallel
to
counter
centre
of
the
popularity
authority
implicit
of in
the the
unions
and
growth
of
the
the
threat
unions.
of
a
The
colonial state stood solidly behind the employers. The police harassed union
organizers.
Union
meetings
were
banned
more
than
once.
The
police
resorted to firing a number of times. Strikebreakers were encouraged, given protection,
and
conducted
to
externment and imprisonment
work were
safely
held
by
out
the
against
police. the
Threats
leaders
of
of the
union to browbeat them to submission.
The leaders of the union in the later phase were mainly drawn from the INC. They played an important part in organizing the workers and getting support to the struggling workers from other sections. But the dissimilar class position and understanding and their ideology acted as brakes on the militancy of the workers. In more than one instance, they advised caution when
the
workers
expressed
their
readiness
to
engage
in
protracted
struggles. The nationalist leadership were prepared to assign to the workers only an auxiliary role in the freedom struggle. Whenever the working class resorted
to
independent
action,
the
union
leadership
was
either
forced
against its will to go along with the workers or it extended to the workers halfhearted support advising compromise or surrender. The limitations of such a middle class leadership are analyzed by Palme Dutt as follows:
There was not yet any political movement on the basis of socialism, of the
conceptions
consequence,
of
the
the
working
so-called
class,
‘outsiders’
and
or
the
helpers
class from
struggle. other
In
class
elements who came forward for varying reasons, to give their assistance in
the
work
of
organization,
and
whose
assistance
was
in
fact
indispensable in this initial period came without understanding of the aims and needs of the labour movement and brought with them the conception
of
middle
class
politics.
Whether
their
aims
were
philanthropist, as in some cases, careerist as in others, or actuated by devotion to the national political struggle, as in others, they brought with them an alien outlook, and were incapable of guiding the young working class movement on the basis of the class struggles which the 170
workers were in fact waging.
Lacking
a
fully
committed
leadership,
which
lacked
a
working
class
outlook, and pitted against a powerful repressive colonial state unreservedly backing the intransigent employers, the working class movement in the city of Madras suffered a serious setback from which it took a long time to recover.
The
sudden
withdrawal
of
the
Non-Cooperation
Movement
in
February 1922 by Gandhi – ‘the sudden bottling up of a great movement’ as 171
Jawaharlal Nehru put it
– caused frustration and demoralization among
the people and there followed a long period of depression when, as Lajpat Rai was to remark, ‘everything seemed to be in a state of disintegration and 172
dissolution’.
The working class movement in Madras shared this common
fate and a period of lull and quiescence set in.
CHAPTER VIII
The Period of Ebb and Quiescence, 1922–1933
The period of lull and quiescence that followed the collapse of the big strike actions of the working class and of the militant political action of the masses, consequent on the withdrawal of the non-cooperation movement by Gandhi in 1922, was quite prolonged.
The Congress was riven into two factions. The ‘no-changers’ stood for continued
non-cooperation
and
for
the
boycott
of
legislatures.
On
withdrawing from the agitational movement, they engaged themselves in the constructive programme drawn up by Gandhi. The other faction, the Swarajists, wanted to utilize the opportunities afforded by the MontagueChelmsford Reforms and to enter the legislatures and local bodies and carry 1
on political agitation in the precincts of legislative councils and assemblies. The
latter
option
required
participation
in
elections
and
the
inevitable
preoccupation with electoral politics, strategies and tactics. In Madras, the non-cooperators who had taken an active interest in the labour movement
during the later phase of the post-World War I upsurge virtually withdrew from the labour scene. Their interest had diminished and waned. For the Swarajists, however, labour had a limited utility. Though labour vote was not
very
significant
legislatures
were
as
far
as
concerned,
it
elections had
to
the
immense
central
and
importance
in
provincial municipal
elections as the few workers who were entitled to vote were concentrated in compact areas or wards. Further, electioneering required the mobilization of people
outside
the
electorate
as
well,
to
create
the
proper
temper
and
excitement necessary for arousing the electorate. Unionised labour could be mobilized for electioneering. Thus the workers, frustrated by their defeat at the hands of the capitalists and looking for direction, found sublimation in electoral activity during the period of lull. But the association with middleclass
electoral
factionalism
politics
and
the
brought culture
into of
the
fold
electoral
of
the
working
manoeuvring,
class
intrigue
the and
animosity, characteristic of middle-class politics.
In 1924, the Madras Labour Union, just back on its feet, threw its weight behind the Swaraj Party candidates Chakkarai Chettiar and Bhaktavatsalam Naidu in the Choolai and Perambur wards and helped them win, the latter 2
against V.L. Sastry, a Congress labour leader of the 1921 strike. Swarajists
in
the
Corporation
evinced
little
interest
in
But the
labour,
which
wreaked its vengeance during the following elections in 1927 by putting up its own candidates against the Swaraj Party candidates. The Swaraj Party suffered a disastrous defeat in all the wards where labour vote was effective. Among the victorious candidates were Selvapathi Chettiar and Chakkarai Chettiar, both of whom had earlier resigned from the Congress, the former 3
on the issue of nomination and the latter over the Shermadevi issue.
For
the
first
time,
labour
emerged
as
an
independent
political
force
to
be
reckoned with though in the very limited arena of municipal politics.
Another
development
during
this
period
was
the
appearance
of
left
radicalism represented by Singaravelu who had been championing the cause of labour at the time of the 1921 strike, taking part in public meetings and demonstrations and writing articles in support of labour. His polemics with Slater were significant. However, he did not hold an office in any of the unions, which had sprung up then. It was solely at his initiative that Madras achieved the distinction of having celebrated the first ever May Day in India on May 1, 1923. On the same day, he launched the Labour-Kisan Party of Hindustan as a distinct political party of labour and for labour, with a ‘politico-economic opportunism,
policy
which
for
labour,
characterised
all
free
other
from parties
mere in
reformism
the
4
country.’
or His
move however had a hostile reception from the then established labour leaders, like Chakkarai Chettiar, Iyer, Thiru Vi. Ka. and from Sriramulu Naidu, who had been with Singaravelu in the beginning, but turned hostile 5
as he considered the Labour-Kisan Party a rival to the Congress.
A mass
meeting of the workers of Madras was convened to repudiate all connection with
the
Labour-Kisan
6
party.
The Swadharma
with
all
its
international
coverage took him to task for trying to plant exotic ideas and theories in India and held that only the AITUC had the right to represent the workers of India. The nationalist trade union leaders considered the Labour-Kisan 7
Party as distractive and disruptive and wanted it to be ‘nipped in the bud.’
Singaravelu’s efforts to build an independent working class party were nipped in the bud not so much by these leaders but by the Government, which arrested him on March 6, 1924, as one of the accused in the Kanpur
8
Communist Conspiracy Case.
The long-term significance of Singaravelu’s
venture is discussed in the following chapter. It is sufficient here to remark that the Labour-Kisan Party episode underlined not only the importance of having a firm base in trade union movement before one could think of starting a party of labour but also the sensitivity of established trade union bosses
to
any
attempt
at
an
intrusion
into
their
domain
and
their
apprehension of real politicization of the working class.
If the defeats suffered by the unions at the hands of the employers had driven the trade union movement into dormancy, even the little successes it scored had resulted in preventing a quick revival. For the struggles of the years 1918–22 had won for the working class substantial wage increases, which,
though
not
adequate
at
that
time
to
lift
the
workers
above
the
subsistence level, helped to ameliorate their living conditions when prices of commodities began to decline. The prices of essential commodities, which registered a very steep increase in 1918–19 at the close of World War I, 9
declined by about 12 per cent in the 1920s (Table 1).
TABLE 1. Weighted index of all commodities
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
301
302
273
266
259
257
265
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
260
258
261
254
213
157
149
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
139
136
149
150
155
147
157
TABLE 2. Real wages in Madras. 1900 = 100
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
77
70
76
88
96
106
104
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
106
106
112
118
116
124
140
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
136
128
132
126
123
123
128
As Shiva Rao points out, a worker buying small quantities on credit from retail shops would not get the full benefit of the fall in wholesale or even
retail
10
prices.
There
were
instances
of
adverse
price
fluctuations
during this period, which had sparked off industrial unrest. However, on the whole, it would appear that real wages in Madras were not adversely affected 11
during the period of lull and quiescence (Table 2).
The level of trade union activity in the city as noted previously was to a very great extent determined by the state of affairs of the Madras Labour Union in the B. and C. Mills. Following its success in repressing the workers’ struggle in 1921 by means fair and foul, Binny and Co. pursued a labour policy with the sole aim of liquidating the base of the Madras Labour Union in its precincts. Towards this objective, it set up a welfare committee in 1922. In the same year, a provisions store was opened. An athletic association (l922),
a
dramatic
society
(1923),
a
village
committee
(l923),
a
literary
society (1926), an ambulance corps (l926) a cooperative credit society (l927) and an indoor games club (1928) were the various schemes launched by the 12
management.
The
welfare
committee
had
as
its
superintendent
K.O.
Antony, a former Crime Investigation Department (C.I.D.) Sub-Inspector, 13
who while in service took a prominent part in breaking the strike in 1920.
The constitution of the welfare committee was so designed as to perpetuate the
caste
and
representation
communal
was
given
to
divisions Muslims
among and
the
workers;
adi-dravidas
in
the
separate weaving
department.
Further awkward
the
welfare
position.
committee
Though
they
activities
detested
placed
the
the
workers
management-run
in
an
welfare
committee they could not afford to ignore it.
The welfare committee processed the individual and group grievances of workers and used its good offices with the management to redress them. If a worker failed to utilize the good offices of the welfare committee he became suspect in the eyes of the management and ran the risk of harassment and 14
victimization.
Instances of such wanton harassment have been given by
the Madras Labour Union in its evidence before the R.C.L. For example, when
the
Madras
Labour
Union
took
up
the
workmen’s
compensation
cases, the welfare committee followed suit and forced workers to have the claims processed through the latter. When workers persisted in using the union, the management, which till then had been paying directly to the injured even full wage for the period of disablement, stopped the practice and deposited with the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation only the amount they were legally bound to pay. The worker was thus denied a 15
benefit he had enjoyed and was very much inconvenienced.
Again when
the Madras Labour Union conducted a survey in 1926 on the conditions of working women, Binny retrenched all the 250 women workers as surplus. They were taken back after they had resigned from the union and accepted 16
the good offices of the welfare committee.
These two instances are glorified in the official history of the house of Binny’s
as
‘a
piece
Outmanoeuvred,
of
the
logical
Madras
strategy’ Labour
and
Union
‘a
neat
was
17
tactical
forced
to
victory.’
be
on
the
defensive and maintain a low profile. The workers lived under a perpetual threat of victimization with golden fetters on their hands and a Damocles’ sword over their heads.
With the leading union virtually out of commission, most of the other unions in the city that sprung up during the period of upsurge became defunct
by
1922.
The
few
that
managed
to
survive
just
marked
their
presence by holding periodic meetings, which were poorly attended, making representations to the authorities on minor grievances, and seeking in vain formal or de facto recognition from the authorities. For the last favour, some of them were even ready to exclude ‘outsiders’ from their executive 18
committees, elevating the outsiders to the status of patrons or advisors.
The pathetic state to which the unions were reduced could be gauged by the condescension with which the Madras Tramway Company agreed to receive 19
Iyer as ‘a private gentleman’ and not as President of the Union. relatively
active
union,
M.
and
S.M.
Railway
Union,
Perambur,
The one was
an
exception to the general state of affairs in that it was able to increase its membership strength and made frantic efforts to obtain recognition from the agent. It reconstituted its executive committee excluding ‘outsiders’. It redrafted its constitution to meet the conditions stipulated by the agent. It even tried to satisfy the demand to include Anglo-Indians in its fold. Yet recognition was not forthcoming and new excuses were trotted out to delay recognition. The Commissioner of Labour was waiting for the enactment of the
Indian
Trade
Union
Act
for
Recognition
of
Trade
Union.
This
frustrating experience of the then most active union was placed before the All India Railwaymen’s Federation (AIRF) and the AITUC. Both of them 20
passed resolutions deploring the agent’s delaying tactics.
The extent to
which the fear of victimization prevailed could be determined from the following
instances:
the
refusal
of
the
M.
and
S.M.
Railway
Workshop
Employees’ Union to furnish the names of its office bearers even to the Assistant Electrical Engineer of the Workshop; the refusal of workshop men to
elect
representatives
for
each
21
department;
and
the
refusal
of
some
affected workers of Addison and Co. to stand up at the union meeting and state
their
grievances.
Even
wage
cuts
and
dismissals
did
not
rouse
the 22
unions to mobilise and fight back. Such was the depth of demoralization.
It should not however be understood that everything was dark. There were a few exceptions. The scavengers of Madras Corporation, for instance, struck work for two days in April 1924 demanding an increase in wage by Re.1 and supply of 4 measures of rice. The scavengers of the Port Trust 23
struck work in sympathy.
But when the port trust scavengers struck work
from March 17 to 31, 1926, in protest against a dismissal, the corporation scavengers
did
not
strike
in
sympathy
as
expected,
and
the
port
trust
scavengers’ strike collapsed. To contain the militancy of the city scavengers, an independent body was created to look after city sanitation, namely the Madras
Sanitary
Corporation,
which
would
be
closed
to
all
the
24
‘troublesome’ and ‘disorderly’ scavengers.
The printing press workers also had a few strikes to their credit. Scottish Press workers in the High Court premises went on a week-long strike from August 24 to 30, 1922, in protest against the non-payment of the allowances due to compositors and won a partial victory thanks to the intervention of
the
Chief 25
period.
Justice.
A
significant
victory
was
the
half-pay
for
the
strike
There was a two-day strike in Addison and Co. in November 1922
when the company sought to change the working hours. A settlement to the 26
mutual satisfaction of the employers and the workmen was arrived at.
The
Diocesan Press saw a strike in July 1923 when men struck work in protest against retrenchment. The strike was a failure; 54 men were not taken back 27
when they returned to work after 3 days.
The workers of Madras Printing
Works who were not paid their wages for September 1923 went on a ‘nowork’ agitation from October 20 to November 6, 1923, until they were paid the wages due to them. They signed the attendance registers but did not 28
work. The press however closed its binding section.
Workers in A.R.A.S.M. Spinning Mills, a sick unit, went on strike quite 29
frequently, though all their strikes were failures. strike
was
breakdown
for of
wages
during
machinery.
the
In
period
October
of
In May 1922 the two-day
stoppage
1922,
a
of
the
week-long
mills
strike
due was
to for
increase in wages to match an increase in profits. The strike ended with 20 men losing their jobs. Seventy women workers in the mill struck work for two days in April 1923 in protest against the reduction in wages. The strike failed and they had to accept reduced wages. There was a lightning 8-hour strike in Choolai Mills on November 1, 1923, as rumours spread that the usual annual bonus would not be paid. The workers submitted to union 30
orders and returned to work.
Engineering workers of Gopala Nayakar and Sons Foundry went on a two-day strike in June 1922 for an increase in wages but returned to work on 31
a promise of sympathetic consideration of their demand.
But when the
moulders in the same foundry went on strike in November 1922 in protest
against the dismissal of a fellow worker, they had to return to work with 3 more
‘ring
leaders’
dismissed
from
32
services.
The
moulders
of
Madras
Engineering Works were equally unsuccessful when they went on strike in May 1923 in protest against the introduction of piece rates in lieu of time 33
rates. Rather than accept the new rates, 32 moulders left service.
The longest strike during the period, from May 17 to September 5, 1922, was by workers of Indian Aluminium Company for an increase in wages. 34
This strike was also a failure with only 70 out of 300 men taken back.
The
tinkers of Asiatic Petroleum Company met the same fate as the moulders of Gopala
Nayakar
Foundry
when
they
struck
work
in
November
1922
to
protest against the dismissal of fellow workers. The services of all those 35
striking were terminated on the second day of the strike.
Another strike that failed was that of the Port Trust coolies in February 1924 against the reduction in workforce. The coolies surrendered after two days when the chairman of the Port Trust upheld the retrenchment and 36
threatened to let the work on contract.
It may be noted that compared to the earlier period there were very few strikes (only 24 in 5 years) and that most of them ended in failure, which reflected the general state of affairs in the labour movement during the 37
period.
An
end
to
the
frustrating
experience
of
general
apathy
and
poor
mobilization was in sight when the AITUC decided to hold its sixth annual session
at
Madras.
On
the
initiative
of
Panchaksharam,
the
provincial
AITUC Secretary, a meeting of the representatives of all trade unions was held on August 2, 1925 and a provincial committee of AITUC was formed.
On October 4, 1925 a reception committee was elected with Panchaksharam as
chairman.
The
various
unions
including
the
Madras
Labour
Union
bestirred themselves and organized meetings to create enthusiasm among 38
the workers for the AITUC session.
The AITUC session was held in Madras on January 9 and 10, 1926. The 39
week ending January 10, 1926 was celebrated as Labour Week.
M. and
S.M. Railway Workers’ Union held their first conference on January 6 and 7. 40
The AIRF held its first convention on January 8.
While the conference and
conventions were confined to delegates numbering only about 50 in the AIRF convention and 110 in the AITUC session, public meetings and open sessions attracted large gatherings. About 3500 people rallied to the M. and S.M. Railwaymen’s convention on the May 2, while 3000 people attended 41
the public meeting on the closing day of the AITUC session.
Throughout
the week, processions were taken and demonstrations held in which mostly railway men participated. At the public meeting on January 10 ,there were a 42
large number of textile workers.
The mobilization when compared with
the hectic days of 1918-1921 was rather moderate.
The AITUC session concerned itself mostly with major national and international issues such as the anti-Asiatic legislation of South Africa, the demand for Swaraj, representation for labour in the Central and Provincial legislature through election, formation of a labour party, the Bombay Textile strike legislation on an 8-hour day, maternity benefit, minimum wage, etc. Resolutions
were
also
passed
on
the
demands
of
railway
workers,
43
tramwaymen, corporation employees and harbour workers.
While the AITUC session helped to reactivate many of the dormant unions, the process of reactivation was accelerated by the imminence of the
enactment of the Indian Trade Unions Act. The Government of Madras reported that old unions were being revived, existing unions strengthened and amalgamations pushed up. It however would not give credit to the workers for the process. In its view, the moving spirit behind the operation was
interested 44
concerned.
outsiders
and
not,
as
a
rule,
members
of
any
of
trades
The truth was rather that workers virtually fettered after the
failure of the first wave of struggles, hoped to be able to organise freely and without fear once the Trade Union Act became law and to be able to settle grievances that had accumulated over the years.
The Indian Trade Union Act of 1926, which came into force from June 1927 was not a magna carta for trade unions, nor was it intended to be. The intention was to exercise rigid control of the trade unions so that they developed along an officially charted line. The only benefit was that the union registered under the Act would have the right to corporate existence and could function legally. For this benefit, the unions would have to a) satisfy the governor as regards matters of constitution and properly audited accounts, b) limit the number of outsiders to 50 per cent of the executive of a
union
and
c)
spend
the
general
funds
only
for
legitimate
objects
as
stipulated. Further subscript to the political fund of the union was on the basis of ‘contracting in’ i.e., a written acceptance had to be obtained from 45
each member for collecting a levy from him to the political fund.
The Act created two categories of unions, registered and unregistered. Collective activities of the unregistered unions were illegal and liable for action
under
Section
120
of
the
Indian
Penal
Code.
Registered
or
unregistered, the unions were not granted immunity from civil and criminal
liability for acts done in furtherance of trade disputes and other legitimate 46
bonafide trade union activities.
Despite all these limitations, the Trade Union Act did raise some hope among the workers. They believed that once they registered their union, they would be able to carry on trade union activity more freely and openly and that registration would lead to recognition by the employers. These hopes were belied soon and the working class had to make sacrifices as before as they continued to struggle for their rights.
If the enactment of the Trade Union Act of 1926 raised hopes among the workers that they could reactivate their unions and function effectively to get
redress
of
their
accumulated
grievances,
the
imminence
of
the
civic
elections roused the leaders of the various dormant unions to activity. The year 1927 witnessed a revival of the labour movement and a number of confrontations and strikes took place.
The first symptoms of the impending eruption of working class struggles were spontaneous actions by the tramwaymen and Choolai workers. On January
17,
afternoon
as
1927, a
250
protest
tramwaymen against
the
refused dismissal
to
report
of
a
for
duty
conductor
in
the
and
the
suspension of a driver. On January 27, 1927 the workers of the Choolai Mills struck work all of a sudden as the management had not responded to their demands,
submitted
sometime
earlier.
Both
the
wildcat
strikes
were
immediately withdrawn on the advice of the union leaders. Despite this restraint on the part of the unions, the police viewed these incidents as ‘symptomatic of the growing tendency among the extremists to make use of 47
labour grievances, real or fictitious in their political activity.’
The first major struggle of the year was the strike on April 19, 1927 by the workers of the Burmah Oil Company, reminiscent of the strikes of the 48
post-World War I period.
The immediate issue was the retrenchment of
112 men, tinkers and solderers. Other grievances were the dismissal of 3 workers on March 23, 1927, the reduction of the grade of tinkers to that of daily coolies with lower wages, the removal of benches intended for tinkers and the assault on a worker by the European manager. The management would not talk to the union and the Labour Commissioner’s efforts were in vain, as the management turned down the workmen’s demand even when the
representation
was
made
directly
by
a
worker
deputation.
In
the
meantime, the Asiatic Petroleum Workers went on a sympathetic strike on 49
May 9, 1927.
On May 10, workers blockaded tankers leaving the factory.
One European official of the company opened fire on the workers who, inflamed
by
this
outrageous
act,
set
fire
to
the
tankers.
This
incident
provoked a sympathetic strike by the workers of Standard Oil Company on May 11. The Perambur Workshop workers also threatened to follow suit. The nationalist press and the AICC condemned the act of the European 50
official in taking law into his own hands and firing on the workers. rapid
deterioration
in
the
situation
and
the
possibility
of
it
The
becoming
explosive if the management tried to bring in new workers compelled His Excellency the Governor himself to return to Madras from Ootacumund. Heavy pressure was brought on the management to climb down and on the workers
too
to
compromise.
The
management
agreed
to
cancel
the
retrenchment orders and to take back the 3 dismissed men as coolies. It restored the tinkers to their old grade and wages. The workers in turn, agreed
to
a
daily
outturn
of
3000
tons
for
a
week
upon
which
the
management would restore the benches. The strike ended on May 19, 1927.
One
irritating
Singaravelu
factor
Chettiar
for
the
had
over
Labour the
Commissioner
workers
because
was
of
the
which
hold the
that
earlier
51
efforts at compromise proved futile.
The
strikes
of
the
oil
workers
were
followed
by
other
strikes
of
considerable importance, in the Diocesan Press, in the engineering works of Massey and Co. and in the Government PWD Workshops. The strike in PWD
Workshops
ended
in
a
few
days
but
the
strikes
in
the
other
two
concerns lasted a few months. All the strikes commenced in May 1927.
The PWD Workshop workers had organized themselves into a union in 1926 in order to face the threat of an extension of the ‘contract system’. The union sent a representation in August 1926 listing their grievances. The main demand was an end to contract system within the workshops and to the practice of entrusting works to private workshops, thereby increasing the scope of employment for departmental workers and terminating the turn work
system,
demands
which
were
the
reduced
the
earnings
implementation
of
of
individual
Workmen’s
workers.
Compensation
Other Act
of
1924, grant of annual increments, earned leave with pay for 15 days a year, wages
for
Government
holidays,
old
age
pension,
free
medical
aid
for
injuries sustained while on duty, one month’s notice before termination of service and payment of two hours’ extra wage on Saturdays even when a 52
workmen took leave during the week.
Since the Government did not recognise the union whose president was an outsider, a Congress member, P.M. Audikesavalu, the representation lay unanswered.
In
the
tense
situation
prevailing
in
the
city
in
May
1927,
consequent on strikes of the oil workers and the Massey and Co. workers, the PWD workers too went on a strike on May 31, 1927, but returned to
duty
on
June
2,
when
the
superintendent
promised
to
forward
their
demands to the Government. He even offered to pay the day’s wages for the 53
June 2 if the workers resumed work before 12.30 p.m. that day.
This offer
of the superintendent was criticized by the Madras Chamber of Commerce and the Employer’s Federation of Southern India who were unconvinced by the Government’s explanation in regard to the need for such concession as a 54
part of settlement and reiterated their protest.
Trouble
in
PWD
Workshops
surfaced
again
when
on
June
8,
the
superintendent announced annual increments to only 342 men out of a total of 672 men in the workshops and to 81 men out of 178 in the PWD Stores. The workers struck work on June 9 demanding grant of annual increments to all and the payment of full wages for Saturday even if a worker was on leave
during
the
week.
The
strike
continued
for
six
days
with
workers
returning to duty on June 16, 1927 on an assurance by the Minister for Development
that
their
demands
would
be
looked
into
and
that
the
55
Government would reply shortly.
The strike at Massey and Co. occurred immediately after the formation of the union on May 23, 1927, when the management reacted the next day by retrenching 29 workmen as surplus. The union contended that this really was
victimization
grievances.
It
did
of
workers
not
accept
who the
had
signed
the
management’s
memorandum
argument
that
of the
retrenchment on May 24 was similar to that on April 30 when 38 men were discharged. All the 650 workers excluding foremen struck work on May 28. The union demanded the reinstatement of the dismissed men as well as an increase in pay, full wages for holidays and Saturdays, the abolition of the
system of deducting two day’s wages for one day’s absence and security of 56
service.
The company threatened to withhold gratuity and pension if they did not return to work by June 1, 1927. The men did not submit to the threat and the company closed the factory indefinitely with effect from June 1, 1927, Workers resorted to picketing, demonstrations and processions. The police
imposed
a
ban
on
strike
processions
in
the
factory
area
and
the
workers were compelled to drop mass picketing. Newly recruited workers were taken in lorries under police protection. The police backing for the employer was condemned by the workers’ leaders. Chakkarai Chettiar and Singaravelu called on the Corporation of Madras to boycott the company and
deny
the
Corporation
company
should
contracts.
revoke
the
Singaravelu
license
given
also to
the
suggested
that
workshop.
the
Diwan
Bahadur G.N. Chetty, the President of the Corporation, was unmoved and advised the workers to go back to work. A threat was made that a citywide, general strike would take place if an amicable settlement was not reached 57
quickly.
Finally,
Sir
James
F.
Simpson,
former
Chairman
of
Madras
Chamber of Commerce, spoke to Mr. Simmons of the company and a few leaders
of
the
workmen
and
brought
about
a
settlement
by
which
the
company agreed to take back immediately 45 of the strikers and reemploy the others within six weeks as and when it found work. The strike ended on 58
July 17, 1927 but the workers were not taken back even in September 1927.
The other prolonged strike was at the Diocesan Press; it commenced on May 2, 1927, in protest against the dismissal of three compositors. Soon other
demands
were
added
to
the
demand
for
the
reinstatement
of
the
dismissed: the removal of the works manager responsible for the dismissals,
the abolition of piecework and an increase in the pay of compositors. The management rejected the demands and decided to recruit new hands and carry on the work. It brought in 14 workers from Bangalore to supplement 59
the few non-strikers, about 20 (out of the total of 240 workers).
The strikers displayed great militancy in the early phase of the struggle. On June 8, a torch-light procession was taken out. A mass meeting attended by over 1000 workers was held. The idea of a general strike in support of the workers of the Diocesan Press and Massey and Co. was mooted. Scavengers of
the
City
Corporation
management
was
threatened
unmoved.
to
Mediation
go
on
a
efforts
sympathetic by
the
strike.
Assistant
The
Labour
60
Commissioner and by Sir James Simpson were spurned.
After 112 days of struggle, the workmen yielded and called off the strike, unconditionally. Only 100 out of the 200 and odd strikers reported at the gate on August 22, 1927. But the management took only 43 persons and the 61
rest were sent away on the excuse that there was no work.”
There was an unpleasant repercussion of the industrial unrest on the city police. Constables in some divisions refused their pay, perturbed over an anonymous circular surreptitiously thrown into the police stations or pasted on station walls. On July 3, 1927, a circular issued by the Commissioner of 62
Police was explained to the constables and the crisis resolved.
Another significant occurrence during the year was the lightning strike by the scavengers on August 21, 1927 asking for an increase in pay. The Corporation
Council 63
increase of pay.
held
a
special
meeting
and
resolved
to
grant
the
The strike wave of 1927 was reminiscent of the 1920 strike wave and there was a demand for an Enquiry Committee from the representatives of labour as well as from a retired Deputy Superintendent of Police. The Law Member, Sir C.P. Ramaswami Iyer turned down the demand remarking that the unrest was due to the imminence of the corporation elections and the desire of the political parties to capture labour votes by advocating the cause 64
of labour. He forecast that the unrest would subside after the elections.
Though the law member’s prediction proved right, his reasoning does not appear to be sustainable on the basis of the facts that (i) the strikes were mostly spontaneous reactions to the employer’s offensive, which took the forms of retrenchment, wage cuts, dismissals, victimization etc.; (ii) in these strikes the established union leaders including the probable contestants in the ensuing elections came into the picture only after the commencement of the
struggle
negotiated
and
played
settlement
–
a
restraining
the
only
role;
they
intransigence
were
very
reported
was
keen that
on of
a
M.
Singaravelu, the harbinger of left radicalism derisively referred to in the Fortnightly
Reports
as
the
‘local
communist,’
‘our
communist’
etc.;
(iii)
when the survival of jobs itself was threatened, the usual economic reasons naturally became secondary; hence the absence of economic reasons cannot by itself justify the conclusion that the strikes were politically motivated; (iv) the sweep of the strike wave was not as widespread as in the period 1920–21.
As
in
1918–21,
employers.
The
this
police
time
actively
too
the
Government
intervened
on
the
stood
side
of
solidly the
by
the
employers,
escorting strikebreakers to the factory, removing by force the picket lines of strikers, and banning meetings and processions in the strike-affected areas.
The years that followed were significant on account of resurgence of political activity all over the country and the global economic crisis, World Depression.
The
repercussions
of
both
these
were
felt
in
Madras
to
a
noticeable extent.On November 8, 1927, an Indian Statutory Commission headed by Sir John Simon was appointed to investigate the working of the dyarchy and to suggest further constitutional reforms. This Parliamentary Commission consisted of only Britishers; Indians were excluded. Such utter disregard of the right of self-determination shocked not only the nationalists but also the Justice Party, as well as Besant. The Madras Legislative Council passed a resolution on January 25, 1928 proscribing the legislature from 65
cooperating with the Commission.
The INC in its annual session held at
Madras in December 1927 resolved to boycott the Commission; it decided to
hold
mass
demonstrations
on
the
day
of
the
arrival
of
the
Simon
Commission in India and to carry out protests in the cities of India, which the commission might visit. The boycott of the commission became the 66
single preoccupation of the country.
The
Madras
session
of
the
INC
1927
was
also
noteworthy
for
the
declaration of ‘Complete National Independence’ as the goal of the Indian People.
This
resolution
moved
by
Jawaharlal
Nehru,
who
had
just
then
arrived from Europe after attending the Conference of the League against Imperialism,
and
that
on
the
boycott
of
the
Simon
Commission
67
transformed the political atmosphere.
Holding the session at Madras helped to politicize the youth of Madras and
to
revive
grassroots
level
political
activity
in
the
city.
Students
and
workers were drawn to the various organizational activities associated with
the session. Youth Associations sprang up and were available to mobilise for direct action.
The arrival of the Simon Commission in India on February 3, 1928 sparked off hartals and black-flag demonstrations all over India. In Madras, shops were picketed, trams were stopped and bus services halted by midmorning.
Thousands
congregated
in
of
demonstrators,
Broadway.
Students
mostly
had
from
already
the
gathered
working near
class,
the
Law
College. The two demonstrations merged and the protestors surrounded a police
post
demanding
the
release
of
those
arrested
by
the
police.
The
Commissioner of Police and the Chief Presidency Magistrate arrived and ordered firing. One protestor was killed on the spot; two others died in hospital. Despite this, the demonstrators became more defiant and the army had to be called in. When the crowds finally dissolved, it was only to regroup at the public meeting at the Triplicane Beach in a huge gathering of over 68
10,000 people.
Madras commission
observed visited
complete
the
city.
hartal
Police
on
February
arrangements
26,
had
1928
been
when
the
tightened
to
prevent a recurrence of the events of February 3. The Simon Commission revisited the city on February 18, 1929 during its second tour of India; once again
Madras
demonstrated
its
attitude 69
manner both spontaneous and striking.
to
the
Simon
Commission
in
a
A hartal, complete as far as Indian
business was concerned, a black-flag procession and a mass meeting marked the day.
The demonstrations against the Simon Commission elsewhere in India met with brutal repression. Lajpat Rai in Lahore, Govind Vallabh Pant and Jawaharlal Nehru in Lucknow were beaten up by the police. A few weeks
later,
Lajpat
Rai
died
due
to
the
injuries
he
sustained.
These
acts
of
repression roused the anger of the people all over India. The heroic deeds of Bhagat Singh and his comrades of the Hindustan Socialist Republican Army avenging the assault on Lajpat Rai and other acts of repression caught the imagination of the Indian youth all over the country; 1928 and 1929 were years that saw many student and youth conferences and associations. A wave 70
of militancy spread all over India.
The leadership of the national movement however alternated between constitutionalism and mass action, between pacts, round table conferences and civil disobedience movements. At the provincial level, the Congress Party was riven with factionalism. The temptation to accept office under the reforms
proved
January
1929
to
all
be
strong.
over
the
The
Independence
country
by
lakhs
of
Day
pledge
people
taken
declared
on
their
determination to prepare for civil disobedience. Gandhi launched his Salt Satyagraha in March 1930. The civil disobedience movement, of which the Salt Satyagraha was a symbolic expression, included in its programme, the boycott of foreign cloth, the picketing of liquor shops, boycott of elections and
the
response
non-payment from
of
business
revenue. groups
This
and
movement
large
obtained
sections
of
a
massive
peasantry
upto
September 1930. With the enthusiasm of urban merchants and mill owners waning,
there
were
signs
of
a
second
wave
taking
less
manageable
and
socially dangerous forms like no rent and tribal rebellion. After a period of uneasy truce in 1931, following the Gandhi-Irwin Pact and the failure of the round
table
conference,
the
second
civil
disobedience
movement
was
virtually forced on the Congress by the Government launching its offensive on January 4, 1932 with the promulgation of a battery of ordinances, the
banning of Congress organizations at all levels, arrest of its leaders, activists and
sympathisers.
The
second
civil
disobedience
movement
had
to
be
conducted in conditions very different from the earlier ones. Civil liberties had almost totally been suppressed and many forms of protest had become illegal.
The
civil
disobedience
movement
declined
in
the
face
of
overwhelming repression and the collaborationist pull of business interests pushing
the
agitation
Congress
towards
towards
a
change
constitutionalism.
in
its
Gandhi
policy
away
from
suspended
mass
the
civil
disobedience movement of May 1933 and finally withdrew it formally in 71
April 1934. Imperial
The collapse of the second wave of mass agitation against the
Government
during
the
inter-War
period
had
far
reaching
repercussions on the political movement, of which the emergence of the left forces was important.
Tamil Nadu Congress leaders were wholly out of step with the national developments. While at the national level a new boycott of the legislatures was
being
mooted,
Congress
members
in
Tamil
Nadu
were
busy
electioneering and were not enthusiastic about civil disobedience. Yet, they had to fall in line with the national leadership. The Swarajists gave way to the no-changers and Rajagopalachari took over the presidentship of Tamil Nadu Congress Committee. Very much like Gandhi’s march to Dandi, he organized a march from Tiruchirappalli to Vedaranyam on the sea coast. The Salt Satyagraha organized by Rajagopalachari thus virtually shunned 72
Madras city.
It
was
Nageswara symbolic
left
to
Rao
Pantulu
actions
the
in
Andhra to
April
leaders,
organise 1930
a
Prakasam,
Salt
provoked
Smt.
Satyagraha the
in
Durgabai the
Government
to
city.
and
Their
order
the
attachment of their cars and to arrest Nageswara Rao. His arrest in turn provoked a hartal and demonstration on April 22, in which thousands of workers
from
the
Choolai
Mills,
then
on
strike,
participated.
Mounted
police was employed to disperse the demonstrators. A public meeting was organized
on
April
27,
at
the
Madras
Beach
to
protest
against
police
brutality. Over 5,000 striking workers from the Choolai Mills came to the meeting. The Commissioner of Police himself led the charge against the crowd
and
finally
ordered
firing
in
which
3
people
were
73
killed.
The
participation of the Choolai Mill workers in the meeting and their defiant confrontation with the police were not at the instance of their union. They were
the
spontaneous
reactions
to
a
frustrating
struggle
they
had
been
waging against their employers, who ware scheming to pass off on to the shoulders
of
depression.
the
The
working
class,
Congress
the
members
burden were
imposed
nervous
of
by
the
this
economic
unexpected
support and were relieved to see the workers return to work.
Other than this militant action of the Choolai Mill workers, the working class involvement in the civil disobedience movement was quite insignificant in comparison with the very active and militant role they played during the hectic years 1918–1921. This relative indifference of the working class suited the Congress, which was as apprehensive as the Government of the rise of labour.
Workers’
grievances
did
not
find
place
in
the
Eleven
Points
of
Gandhi. A ‘controlled’ mass agitation like the one Gandhi had in view could not risk the explosion that active working class participation might trigger off. Factionalism within the reformist leadership of the labour movement also prevented any mobilization of the working class for political action.
The one person who tried to radically politicize the labour movement, Singaravelu, was removed from the scene by his arrest on July 23, 1928 for 74
his active role in the South Indian Railway Workers’ strike in 1928.
This
strike was a part of the massive labour upsurge all over India, particularly in the Railways, Bombay Textiles, and Bengal Jute Industries; the upsurge was accompanied by Communist penetration into trade unions.
The Government of India (GoI) viewed with alarm the ascendance of the left in the labour movement and took prompt measures to abort the process. On the one hand, it adopted repressive measures. It armed itself with the Public Safety Ordinance in 1929 allowing itself power to deport agitators or undesirable people – who being British subjects were helping communists in trade union activities – and to confiscate funds sent from abroad to the Indian working class. It had already launched in March 1929, the
famous
Meerut
Conspiracy
Case
against 75
communist labour leaders and supporters.
31
leading
leftist
and
It enacted the Trade Disputes
Act 1928, which prohibited all strikes in the Railways and other public utility services.
The
GoI
also
sought
to
impose
heavy
penalties
on
all
strikes
suspected of having any political actions and characterized as illegal, general strikes and other such ‘coercive’ actions, which might inflict ‘severe general 76
and prolonged’ hardship to the community.
While thus arming itself with draconian powers to suppress all militant struggles of the working class, the GoI offered a hand of friendship to the reformist labour leaders. It appointed the Royal Commission on Labour (R.C.L.) in July 1929 to enquire into the conditions of labour in India and suggest measures of ameliorate the same. ‘The real objective in launching forth this commission at this particular juncture’ was, as pointed out by R.S.
Ruikar, ‘to undermine the solidarity of the Indian working class and to 77
whitewash the repressive policy of the Government.’
Jawaharlal Nehru considered it utterly wrong to offer any cooperation or to
look
for
any
substantial
relief
from
the
78
commission.
But
reformist
leaders, like Chamanlal, V.V. Giri, N.M. Joshi, and Shiva Rao thought that it was essential in the interests of the working class to tender evidence before 79
the R.C.L. and cooperate with the commission.
The AITUC split on this
issue. Subsequently the reformists formed the Indian Federation of Trade 80
Unions (IFTU) on July 20, 1930. under
the
leadership
of
Most of the unions in Madras city, being
reformists
like
Shiva
Rao,
cooperated
with
the
R.C.L.
A second split occurred in 1931 at the Calcutta session of the AITUC 81
when the communists seceded and set up the Red Trade Union Congress.
The two splits weakened the working-class movement so much so that it became extremely difficult and sometimes almost impossible to withstand employer attacks on the workers’ standard of life.
In the circumstances, working-class unity became the main concern of the trade union movement. Efforts were made to reunite the various noncommunist groups on a common platform of unity. A Trade Union Unity Conference was held on July 14–15, 1932 in Madras, just before the IFTU held the first session but this failed to achieve anything as the divergence of views between the AITUC and IFTU on such issues as the attitude to ILO affiliation 82
bridged.
to
the
Amsterdam
International,
etc.,
was
too
wide
to
be
These unity conferences as well as the sessions of the IFTU and AITUC seem to have met with very limited response from the workers. There were no
mass
rallies
even
distantly
reminiscent
of
the
1918–21
years.
The
reformist leaders were more interested in constitutional work, international conferences, and depositions before commissions and committees set up by the government than in genuinely building up the workers’ movement.
It is indeed tragic that the disunity and cleavage in the organization and movement should have befallen the working class at such a juncture in history when an unprecedented crisis shook the world capitalist economy and its tremors pushed the already tattered colonial economy of India to the verge
of
destruction.
unemployment,
This
large-scale
crisis
brought
retrenchment
and
in
its
wake
drastic
widespread
wage
cuts.
The
situation demanded the highest type of organizational unity of the working class for putting up a stiff resistance against the onslaught, but at this very 83
moment the labour movement was split into three factions.
The World Depression affected adversely, the city’s trade and industry albeit indirectly. Agricultural prices declined sharply with the onset of the depression. The agriculturists who had borrowed heavily during the early twenties
when
prices
were
high
and
squandered
the
loans
on
non-
productive expenditure were unable to repay the loans. As a result, there was a serious dislocation in the rural credit system, leading in turn to further deterioration in the rural economy and in the purchasing power of the rural 84
society.
The handloom industry also passed through a deep crisis from which it could not recover. Industry and trade in the city, which depended a lot on
the
rural
market
experienced
serious
difficulties
in
maintaining
their
financial viability.
During
the
period
of
1927–32
in
which
the
Bombay
cotton
textile
workers went on a general strike twice in quick succession (in 1928 and 1929), the jute workers of Calcutta launched a general strike in 1929, the railway workers all over India fought bitter struggles, Madras city itself was relatively
quiet
and
uneventful.
The
textile
workers
under
reformist
leadership had reactivated the Madras Labour Union and registered it under the Trade Union Act of 1926 in the hope that recognition by the employers would follow. But Binny and Co. forestalled such an event by creating in 1926,
a
rival
union,
the
B.
and
C.
Mills
Employees
Union,
getting
it
registered earlier (June 20, 1927) and according recognition to it as the sole 85
spokesman of its workers.
The glowing tribute the company paid to the B. and C. Mills Employees Union they had created, in their memorandum to R.C.L., is rather overdone and expresses the true character of the employees’ union. The company used the existence of this rival union to deny recognition to the Madras Labour Union. Efforts were made at the instance of Mr. Tom Shaw, leader of the International Textile Delegation, to amalgamate the two unions, but failed, as
the
B.
and
preconditions amalgamated
C. that
Mills
Employees
Choolai
union
and
Mill
that
Union
workers
Shiva
Rao
refused
should should
to
be not
comply
excluded insist
on
with
the
from
the
being
the
86
President.
Binny and Co. had been refusing to recognize the Madras Labour Union on
grounds
that
outsiders
were
on
its
executive
committee.
But
this
objection lost its force with the passing of the Trade Union Act of 1926,
which allowed for the presence of outsiders in the existing committee. The visit
of
the
R.C.L.,
the
appointment
of
Shiva
Rao
as
acting
Royal
Commissioner of Labour, the criticism by both the R.C.L. and the press of the untenability of Binny and Co.’s stand on recognition, the failure of the stooge union to expand its base among the workers and finally a certain estrangement
between
the
adi-dravida
workers
and
the
management
consequent to the failure of Binny and Co. to provide them with housing as it had promised, the shift in the political loyalty of the adi-dravida leader Rajah, all paved way for a rapproachement between the Madras Labour Union and Binny and Co. The Madras Labour Union was very anxious to win recognition and agreed to the conditions stipulated by Binny and Co.:
1. The Madras Labour Union was to have three subcommittees, one each for Buckingham Mills, Carnatic Mills and Choolai Mills.
2. Only workers were to be members and officials of the subcommittee.
3. The union executive was to have one committee member for every 100 members.
4. Outsiders in the Executive Committee were not to exceed one-third its total strength.
5.
The
number
of
B.
and
C.
Mills
employees
on
the
Executive
Committee was to exceed that of Choolai Mill workers.
6.
There
was
to
be
no
public
criticism
of
the
management
when
negotiations were in progress.
7. Assurance was to be given that sympathetic strikes would not be resorted to in support of Choolai Mills workers.
8.
Representations
concerned
to
mill
sub-committee
management although
the
may
be
made
only
by
outsider
union
official
the may
accompany the sub-committee.
Recognition was accorded in April 1933 after the Madras Labour Union amended its constitution to be in line with the conditions laid down for recognition.
The
recognition
did
not
however
help
in
any
way
in
strengthening the Madras Labour Union. The stooge union also continued to be a recognized union until its disappearance in 1944.
While all was quiet in the B. and C. Mills, a storm was raging in the Choolai Mills, with whose management the Madras Labour Union had very good relations.
Choolai Mills was an inefficiently managed unit. Discipline was lax. Pay and conditions of service were worse than the B. and C. Mills. This badly run enterprise could not withstand the adverse effects of depression and the management tried to pass the burden on to the workers.
In August 1927, they introduced the piece work system in the spinning and
carding
departments.
The
workers
complained
that
they
got
lesser
wages than before. The management argued that the reduction of wages was due
to
poor
outturn
of
work.
The
two
parties
accused
each
other
of
cheating. The company then tried to introduce the two-loom system, with 50 per cent extra pay for looking after a second loom. They also increased the
piece
rate
by
10
per
cent
provisionally
for
six
months
to
allay
the
discontent in the spinning and carding departments. The workers were not satisfied. The two-loom system was opposed. It was contended that bad mixing of cotton, poor thread, non-supply of rewound weft, etc., made it
very difficult to manage more than one loom. The weavers alone struck work on August 17, 1928, but returned to work the next day when the management agreed to enhance the extra pay to 60 per cent and to attend to 87
the other complaints.
An
expert
committee
was
set
up
in
January
1929
consisting
of
the
Government textile expert, Mr. Amalsad, the Manager of Carnatic Mills, Mr. Hargreaves, and an industrialist, V. Radhakrishnan to go into the issues relating
to
the
two-loom
system.
This
committee
made
many
recommendations of a technical nature to assure work of better quality and less
strain.
welcomed
It
also
the
suggested
report
of
the
an
extra
pay
committee.
of
The
80
per
cent.
management
The
union
rejected
the
suggestion to enhance extra pay to 80 per cent, which was more than the 75 per cent demanded by the union. The Labour Commissioner pressed for the implementation of the recommendations of the committee for the extra pay of
80
per
cent
to
be
given
with
retrospective 88
introduction of the two-loom system.
effect
from
the
date
of
The union however agreed to accept
75 per cent extra pay if its other demands such as 15 days’ privilege leave, maternity mixing union
benefit,
sick
department also
leave,
and
increase
contributory
demanded
the
in
pay
of
provident
women fund
implementation
workers
were
of
in
fulfilled.
the
the The
technical
recommendations and the payment of an allowance when work stoppage occurred due to no fault of the worker.
The company agreed to all but two demands: sick leave and contributory provident fund. It qualified the grant of privilege leave with the condition that the employee should have been regular and punctual throughout. The
Labour
Commissioner
played
an
active
part
in
bringing
about
the
89
settlement.
But discontent continued to prevail. The company’s contention that the five-year period of service for eligibility to privilege leave would be counted only from 1929 i.e., eligibility would arise only in 1934 caused considerable resentment. The adoption of piece rate on the speed frames had resulted in augmenting the output so much that it involved additional work in the blowroom and in carding and spinning departments, for which the workers demanded a 25 per cent wage increase. The company announced an increase of pay on March 25, 1929 for about 60 per cent of the men for whom the increased wage was demanded.
On
March
30,
1929,
2200
workers
went
on
strike,
disregarding
the
resolution of the union executive committee against the strike. On April 5, the Directors of the company arrived from Bombay and held talks with the workers. An agreement was reached on the issue of privilege leave and the wage question was left to the labour commissioner. Privilege leave eligibility was
to
be
counted
accumulated
except
from in
the
cases
date
of
when
entering such
service,
leave
had
but
been
could
not
refused.
be
The
company also granted an increase of four annas to the doffers and banters. 90
The workmen returned to work on April 12.
The peace thus restored was however short-lived. Another strike broke out on June 12, 1929 when a worker was assaulted by a gurkha watchman. Workers
demanded
the
dismissal
of
all
gurkhas.
The
union
intervened,
obtained the discharge of the offender and persuaded the workers to return 91
to work.
The
union
management
continued
and
was
to
press
successful
for
in
further
winning
concessions
many
of
them.
from
the
Only
the
demand for general increase in wages remained unfulfilled. In April 1930, the
union
demanded
a
court
of
enquiry
to
be
set
up
under
the
Trade
Disputes Act.
Workers did not wait for the process of enquiry and award. Learning that the demands would not be accepted by the management, the workers in the carding and blowing sections went on strike on April 14. Workers of the spinning
department
joined
the
strike
in
sympathy.
The
management
declared a lockout. It would reopen the mills only after getting rid of what they considered to be ‘troublesome elements’. In its view the union was impotent
to
control
these
elements
and
prevent
wildcat
strikes.
It
was
during this period of lockout that the workers of this mill participated in the political
demonstrations
and
mass
meetings,
which
resulted
in
violent
clashes.
At last the mills reopened on May 1, 1930. The 14 ringleaders were also taken back on condition that the management could proceed against any of them in future for misconduct. The union had to drop the two applications 92
it had made for setting up a Court of Enquiry.
The main issues on which
the strike took place were left unresolved.
There was virtually no militant activity on the part of the union for another seven years. The one exception was a wildcat strike by 153 workers of
the
roving
department
on
May
25,
1932
in
protest
against
the
punishment of a worker for irregular attendance. The next day a tool down strike was resorted to. The management locked out all 2,154 hands. The workers returned to work unconditionally on May 28, 1932.
93
The remarkable feature of the strikes and protest actions of the Choolai Mill
workers
during
this
period
was
that
these
were
organized
by
the
workers on their own, with the union either opposing the actions or falling in line later under the force of circumstances. The union lost its credibility not only with the workers but also with the management, which considered it useless for purposes of negotiation.
The
spontaneity
of
the
protest
also
expressed
itself
in
the
primitive
forms of protest normally associated with the pre-unionisation period, such as tampering with counters to make up the loss in wages, which the piece work system forced on them.
The case of the M. and S.M. Railwaymen’s Union was quite the reverse. The union was at the head of all the struggles of the railway workers against retrenchment. The Indian Railways were badly affected by the economic depression. Goods traffic had decreased and the revenues of the railways fell. The Railway Board had to cut down their expenditure by Rs 5.5 crore. One of the economizing measures was retrenchment. Retrenchment, which had already started in late 1930, was carried out on a vast scale in the first half of 1931 in a well-planned manner. Between March 31 and July 7, 1931 over 40,500
men
were
94
retrenched.
The
All
India
Railwaymen’s
Federation
protested and applied for a reference to a Board of Conciliation under the Trade Disputes Act of 1929. The Government of India appointed a Court of Enquiry on August 13, 1931. But its terms of references were quite limited. It was conceded that the retrenchment was necessary and that the only thing to be examined was whether the retrenchment had been carried out in a fair and
reasonable
manner
to
the
minimum
extent
possible
after
taking
recourse to such other alternatives as the stoppage of recruitment, working
short time, the operation of normal wastage, retirement or transfers, and without
imposing
additional
work
load
on
the
unretrenched
as
might
violate the Geneva and Washington Conventions of ILO. This court gave its findings
on
February
administration
27,
except
1932.
certain
It
of
virtually those
endorsed
the
retrenchments
actions
on
of
grounds
the of
‘inefficiency’ and noted that the methods of spreading work such as working 95
short time had not at all been adopted by the various administrations.
Directed by the Railway Board to cut its expenditure by Rs 52 lakh the M. and S.M. Railway administration effected the saving mainly by carrying out
retrenchment
in
the
workshops
at
Perambur
and
Arkonam.
At
Perambur new and better equipments had been installed resulting in more economical working, and thus there was already a scope for reducing the strength of the workforce.
Perambur thus was on the same footing as Golden Rock of South Indian Railway where in 1928, retrenchment for similar reasons had been the cause of a bitter strike led by Singaravelu. At that time the M. and S.M. Railway Union under the reformist leadership did not extend its support to the cause of South Indian Railway workers just because it did not like the leadership. Now its turn had come to wage a similar struggle.
In the M. and S.M. Railway, retrenchment and reduction of wages by reduction of the hours of work as measures of economy had commenced in 1928 itself. Then the union was satisfied with sending deputations to meet the
agent
and
make
96
representations.
From
late
1930,
the
process
of
retrenchment in M. and S.M. Railway workers at Perambur and Arkonam was
accelerated
offering
special
by
inducing
terms.
In
all
people 720
to
go
voluntary
on
voluntary
resignations
retirement were
by
obtained.
Besides
these
voluntary
resignations,
the
administration
resorted
to
discharging the inefficient and the less efficient. A total of 312 men were discharged of whom 109 belonged to Perambur, 168 to Arkonam and 35 to the
Electrical
Shops.
Of
these
about
25
men
nearing
the
age
of
superannuation were also discharged. Only 188 of the 1032 men discharged resigned voluntarily or were temporary employees. About 639 of them had put in more than 10 years of service. As another means of retrenchment short time working was enforced in the Loco and Carriage and Wagon Shop at Perambur and in the Engineering Department at Arkonam. This process 97
of retrenchment went on till July 7, 1931.
The
first
occasion
retrenchment
when
offensive
of
the
the
union
acted
administration
in
retaliation
was
when
against
50
men
the
were
discharged on June 16, 1931 with a 24-hour notice. On June 17, the men observed
a
sit-in
strike
as
a
protest
against
the
dismissals.
They
administration threatened to cut their pay and added that only those who promised in writing to work would be admitted into the shops next day. The men signed the undertaking but went on a sit-in strike after entering the shops on June 18. Of the 6100 workers in the shops, 5625 were on strike. Only
405
Anglo-Indians
administration
closed
and
the
70
doors
Indians to
all
were
except
working. the
475
On
June
loyal
19
men.
the
Giri,
President of the M. and S.M. Railway Union, intervened and at his request and on his assurance the agent allowed the men to return to work on June 23,
1931.
Thus
the
first 98
demonstration of protest.
strike
against
retrenchment
ended
as
a
mere
The issue remained unresolved.
The Railway Board suspended the process of retrenchment for a period of four months till October 1931. The M. and S.M. Railway and the South
Indian Railways however were exempted from this moratorium and given freedom to carry out the arrangements already in progress for the reduction of about 300 and 800 employees respectively. By January 1932 all surplus staff had been retrenched. Yet another 110 workshop hands were liable to 99
become surplus by June 1932 on completion of the remodelling scheme.
The union had been making repeated representations against the policy of
compulsory
discharge
of
workers.
It
requested
that
the
principle
of
spreading work be applied not only to avoid further compulsory discharges in
future
but
also
to
facilitate
the
reinstatement
of
the
93
workers
compulsorily discharged in 1931 in the Perambur workshops.
The agent assured on July 30, 1933 that the 110 men employed on the remodelling scheme, almost all being permanent employees, would revert to the workshops on completion of the work and that there would be no block retrenchment of men. The union was thus given the impression that the only issue to be settled was the reinstatement of the 93 men compulsorily discharged in 1931. The union was invited for discussions on September 13, 1932. But the talks never began as the agent insisted on the presence of a nominated representative of non-trade unionists and on his right to setup his
own
conventions.
representatives
left
the
The
union 100
meeting.
was A
thus
week
snubbed
later,
on
and
the
September
union
19
,
the
administration made the announcement that the number of men becoming surplus on the closure of the remodelling scheme was 160 and not 110 as stated earlier and that on the transfer of these men to other shops, there would be surplus staff in the workshops who would have to be discharged unless men accepted short time or leave by rotation. Even then the surplus staff
in
excess
of
the
twenty
per
cent
ceiling
would
be
discharged.
No
mention was made then about the actual number of surplus hands. But later it was stated that 474 men were surplus on the basis of the estimate made in February 1931 according to which the surplus was 1241 of whom 775 had been discharged. The union showed that 1302 vacancies had occurred in the shop
since
February
1921
upto
October
31,
1932
and
that
instead
of
a
surplus there was a deficit of 53 hands. The Chief Mechanical Engineer then came out with his own calculations and indicated the surplus to be about 239
hands
contradicting
thereby
the
earlier
statement
of
the
Railway
Administration. The union used this contradiction to affirm that the figures of surplus were deliberately exaggerated and that not only the 93 men of 1931
retrenchment
could
be
reinstated
but
even
another
hundred
men
could be absorbed. It wanted the administration to stop further proceedings and threatened to refer the issue to a conciliation board. But the company went ahead and introduced short time with effect from October 21, 1932. The workers had no option except to take a strike ballot and on October 21, 101
1932 the union decided to go on strike from October 24, 1932.
The strike commenced on October 24, 1932. 5,357 men out of 5,686 in the shops, and 434 out of 475 in the Electrical Department joined the strike. The strike spread to the clerical cadre who joined the strike on October 26. Giri sought in vain the support of the Anglo-Indian staff who had been equally affected by the retrenchment (24 out of the 93 retrenched in 1931 were Anglo-Indians). There were a few Anglo-Indians among the strikers and these were called upon by the Anglo-Indian and domiciled European Association
to
return
to
102
work.
The
strike
spread
to
the
Arkonam
Workshop when a majority of the workers struck work on November 3, 1932 after a visit by Giri to the place. At Hubli out of 2,988 workers 911
joined
the
strike
on
November
19.
Around
90
per
cent
of
the
Muslim
103
workers did not join the strike.
On November 21, the agent issued a notification that any one absent from work without leave on or after November 22 would be deemed to have left the company’s service.
The Government threw its weight behind the administration. Jamnadas Mehta,
President
of
AIRF
and
other
leaders
were
banned
from
making
speeches in public. The police were asked to eject any picket found within railway
premises.
The
Criminal
Settlement
Officer
at
Hubli
induced
104
workmen belonging to ‘criminal tribes’ to return to work.
The
administration
adopted
many
unfair
means
to
pressurize
the
workers. The Chairman of the Railway Cooperative Stores refused to give credit to the strikers but the directors voted against this and restored credit. The
administration
threatened
to
evict
the
workers
from
the
railway
quarters. Threat was also made that the strikers were liable to forfeit their claims to provident fund, gratuity and bonus as they had not given the one 105
month’s notice required under the terms of contract.
The administration carried on a vigorous propaganda against the strike. It purchased some members of the union and sent them out on the line to carry
on
propaganda
against
the
union.
Notices
were
dropped
from
an
aeroplane on villages near Arkonam and Perambur appealing to the workers to return to work. Bills were displayed at all railway stations and in the 106
workshops.
TABLE 3.
On strike Perambur Mechanical Workshops
At work
5,300
430
Perambur Electrical
450
35
Arkonam
750
100
1380
1600
70
110
Hubli Mechanical Hubli Electrical
Not only threats and persuasions, but inducements were also resorted to. A notice was put up enhancing the wages of non-striking daily rated men by nearly 25 per cent with effect from November 23. At Arkonam, 44 of the men retrenched in 1931 were taken back and the remaining vacancies filled 107
up by new hands.
But these threats, persuasions and inducements were not of much avail. The
strikers
remained
firm.
The
situation
as
on
December
8,
1932,
is
108
tabulated in Table 3.
Workers
from
different
parts
of
India
and
abroad
expressed
their
solidarity with the strikers. South Indian Railway Workers Union observed the M. and S.M. Railway strike week from November 21 to 27 and raised funds. The International Transport Worker’s Federation, Amsterdam sent a cable to Giri extending support. The Madras Corporation voted to give Rs. 5000 to the strike fund of the railway workers, the Sembiam Panchayat also resolved
to
give
Rs.
2000.
The
Government
of
Madras
vetoed
these
resolutions. The public, traders, mill workers and sister unions contributed 109
generously to the strike fund.
The railway administration too stood firm. The union decided to extend the strike to other sections and gave notice to the administration that all the 110
employees would go on a general strike on December 24, 1932.
Many
fresh issues were raised in the strike notice such as the stagnation among loco and running staff, non-introduction of provident fund for gangmen, non-implementation
of
the
recommendations
of
R.C.L.
and
the
conventions of Washington and Geneva, appropriation of profit in excess of 4.5 per cent, unnecessary wage cut, etc. The agent contended that the strike notice was illegal being in contravention of Section 15 of Trade Disputes Act of 1939, which required individual notices from employees.
Members of the public undertook efforts at compromise. The Madras Chamber of Commerce, at the instance of the agent, tried to intervene but 111
was rebuffed by the union. This was in October. union
had
become
exhausted
and
welcomed
the
But by December the
efforts
of
the
Citizen’s
Committee consisting of three Indians and of three Europeans convened by the Sheriff of Madras. The committee sat from December 18 to 23. After having
obtained
the
views
of
the
administration
and
the
union,
the
committee informed the union on December 23, the terms of settlement, which according to the committee were acceptable to the administration. These
were:
(l)
The
administration
alone
had
the
right
to
decide
the
quantum of surplus labour. (2) The union should not oppose discharges that might become necessary on a review in August the following year. (3) The administration assured the union that only the absolutely minimum surplus
staff
would
be
discharged.
(4)
The
union
should
withdraw
the
demand for the reinstatement of men discharged in 1931 who would be put on a waiting list and offered employment against future vacancies. (5) No
outside recruitment would be made to fill up vacancies. (6) There would be no pay for strike period. (7) Privileges such as provident fund, gratuity would not be affected except to the extent that the strike period would be 112
treated as ‘dies non’ (no-work, no-pay).
The
union
consideration
decided
of
the
on
terms
December of
23,
settlement
to
call
received
off
the
from
strike
the
in
citizens
113
committee. The notice of general strike was also withdrawn.
The agent did not stand by the terms of settlement. On December 24, the works manager at Arkonam announced that those strikers whose places had been filled up permanently by others would not be taken back. As a result, the men did not return to work at Perambur. But as the final day fixed for their return to work i.e., January 10 neared, the union yielded further and called on the workers to return to work on January 9, 1933. The union was to take legal steps to secure the reinstatement of the strikers at Arkonam
and
114
Hubli.
This
decision
to
terminate
the
strike
without
achieving anything significant was a hard one for the union. Many members of the Central Executive Committee wanted to continue the strike but Giri and Mehta prevailed upon them to end the strike.
The
administration
continued
its
offensive
against
the
union.
J.D.
Francis, Secretary of the Perambur Branch, was suspended on January 10, 1933 for not being prompt in presenting himself before his superior when 115
called.
Disciplinary proceedings were set in motion in April 1933 against
G. Krishnamurthy, Secretary of the Union for giving notice of the lawsuit against the agent and for not resigning the post of union secretaryship. 116
Finally he was dismissed on July 11, 1933.
The workers, though defeated, continued to be defiant. Many incidents occurred at shop level where they vented their wrath against the blacklegs 117
who continued in service.
The workers had shown remarkable unity and solidarity throughout the period of strike. Even though only a tiny fraction of the workforce (less than 2.5 per cent according to the Court of Enquiry) was affected, the entire workforce
stood
behind
them
and
fought
against
retrenchment.
They
received generous financial help from other workers and the public, which enabled them to hold out for over two months.
The M. and S.M. Railway Union was organized on Gandhian lines with full faith in constitutional and democratic methods. The form of agitation was often satyagraha or passive resistance. The ‘sit-in’ strikes were described as satyagraha. The top leaders, Giri and Jamnadas Mehta, belonged to the reformist wing that split from the AITUC and formed the IFTU. Giri was a firm believer in conciliation and from the very beginning was trying to have a Board of Conciliation set up. The Government, instead, set up a Court of Enquiry, which because of its very terms of reference could not achieve anything. Giri had to be satisfied with the dubious Citizen’s Committee, which represented no one, was responsible to no one and hence could get away
with
double-dealing.
Another
illusion
was
that
justice
could
be
obtained through the court. Giri’s lawsuit against the agent for breach of contract did not make even a start. Only the loyal Secretary of the Union, G. Krishnamurthy, was dismissed from service for filing the lawsuit. Giri also placed much store in the high connections he had as an all-India leader, for instance, with Bhore, the Railway Member in the Viceroy’s Council.
But, these could not help them when the local agent was just carrying out the policy of the Railway Board. Finally the hopes placed in the AIRF, in the magic that its annual conference and top bodies would perform, only resulted in procrastination. It was never serious in the threat to call for a general strike and this was well understood by the railway administration. The limitations of an isolated economic struggle, however well organized and whatever be the decree of solidarity on the part of the workers, are well brought out in this episode.
The failure of the strike cannot be attributed wholly to the naïveté of the leadership or its reformism. All the strikes of railwaymen in India, from 1927 through 1932, against retrenchment and wage cuts had failed.
The Raven Committee suggested in 1926 massive retrenchment to solve the financial difficulties of the railways consequent to trade depression. The Railway Board was careful in implementing it in stages, spreading it over time and space, first in one railway, then another and so on, in such a way that it would not have to face a countrywide resistance that a simultaneous implementation
would
have
provoked.
The
workers’
struggle
against
retrenchment should have been organized on an All-India basis and a joint strike of railwaymen throughout the country called. But the trade union movement was unequal to this task after the splits it suffered in Nagpur and Calcutta. The leadership of the AIRF lacked the will and determination as well as the organizing ability and resources to carry out the task.
In fact, the objective conditions of the world economic depression were such that mere defensive economic struggles could not have succeeded in protecting the workers’ interests. The situation demanded united political action by all sections of the people affected by the crisis to opt out of the
system that had bred the crisis. But political leadership for such an allembracing struggle was lacking.
The militancy of the railway workers engaging in isolated struggles was therefore of no avail. The tragic failure of the M. and S.M. Railway strike of 1932 was foredoomed. The administration continued its offensive and the workers expressed their protest now and then at the shop floor level. But the union lost strength. Its membership dwindled from 32,000 to 800 and it 118
took a decade for it to stand up again.
Besides the textile workers of Choolai and the railway workers of M. and S.M.
Railway,
Engineering
workers
in
both
government
and
private
undertakings had to launch struggles against retrenchment and wage cuts. Reference has been made earlier to the struggle of the workers in June 1927 in PWD workshops. The Government’s ‘expeditious’ reply to the workers’ demands came in January 1929. The main demands of the workers for the abolition of the contract system within the workshops, and of the turn work system when full work was available, were rejected; the latter allegedly in the interests of the workmen themselves. Other government departments were advised to get a clearance from PWD workshops before placing orders with private firms. The Government also turned down the demand for a general increase of wages to all workers and for full day’s wages on Saturdays even when absent on other days. However it was conceded that a worker who was absent with permission for not more than a day in a week would be eligible for 7 hours wages for six hours work on Saturdays. A 10-day leave with wages was granted to those with more than three years’ continuous service as
against
15
days’
leave
demanded
by
the
workers.
Two
government
holidays a year would be with wages, gratuity would be allowed to those in
continuous service for more than fifteen years, at the rate of one month’s wages for those with 15 years service, two months’ wages for less than 20 years’ service, three month’s wages for less than 30 years service. Gratuity was subject to the condition that the worker should not have participated in a strike and his work should have been efficient. One week’s notice would be given before terminating the services of workmen who had put in more than two
years’
service.
Workers
had
demanded
one
month’s
notice.
The
Government informed that the PWD workshop staff were eligible for the benefits of the Workman’s Compensation Act and free medical aid.
119
The Government’s refusal to abolish the contract system was a source of continued
discontent.
There
was
a
demonstrative
one-day
strike
on
February 12, 1930 when two workers refused to work when assigned to a contractor and the entire workforce in the machineshop went on strike 120
when the two workers were proceeded against for disobeying orders.
With the onset of depression, retrenchment started. At first voluntary retirement was encouraged, which brought the issue of gratuity to the fore. The Government agreed that participation in strike prior to January 29, 1929,
would
not
debar
the
persons
retiring
voluntarily
from
gratuity
benefits. Block retrenchment was carried out in July 1932 when 107 workers were sent home. A month later, when the workshops received orders from the Post and Telegraph Department, 45 men were called back. However, the workers demanded the reinstatement of all the 107 and the grant of leave by rotation to ensure work for all. Thereupon the workshops were locked out on August 10, 1932. The lockout lasted till August 18, 1932. While the Government refused to cancel the orders of retrenchment, it agreed to give work to all with effect from August 24, 1932 until the completion of the
orders
on
hand,
subject
to
the
condition
that
the
workers
accepted
the
reduced wages. The gratuity terms offered for voluntary retirement were 121
extended for two more months.
Retrenchment was also the issue in Gopal Nayakar’s Foundry in Basin Bridge, which employed 150 workers. In December 1930, the management proposed to cut the workforce by half and extend the working hours on Saturdays by half an hour. The workers protested and went on strike from December
6,
1930.
They
returned
to
work
on
December
19,
with
the
proprietor taking back all of them and the workers agreeing to be paid on the
basis
of
the
actual
number
of
hours
worked
per
122
day.
But
the
proprietor started dismissing workers now and then on one pretext or other. Strike broke out again when on February 10, 1931, 4 men were dismissed for negligence
at
work
and
for
causing
damage
to
a
mould.
The
union
demanded the reinstatement of all workers and also an end to the turn system, which was no longer necessary there being sufficient work for the shop.
Other
dismissal
of
demands any
were:
worker,
prior
overtime,
consultation recognition
with
of
the
the
union
union,
before
retirement
benefits, full days’ wages for Saturdays, stoppage of the practice of deduction of
subscription
threatened
to
closure.
charities, Strike
etc.
ended
The on
proprietor March
3,
refused
1932
to
with
yield
97
and
workers
returning to work. Thus another struggle against retrenchment ended in 123
failure.
Retrenchment was also an issue between the Port Trust and the union when in March 1932, 70 men in Port Trust Workshop were discharged. The union
demanded
discharged.
The
turn
system
union’s
and
appeal
gratuity to
the
and
provident
Provincial
fund
to
Government
the for
intervention
was
rejected
on
grounds
that
the
Port
Trust
was
an
124
independent authority. The workers resigned themselves to their fate.
Workers economic
in
the
oil
depression.
distribution About
35
companies women
were
coolies
also were
affected
by
the
discharged
in
September 1930 and another 45 men in October 1931. Again 300 men were retrenched in July 1932 in the Burmah Oil Company. The workers resorted to satyagraha. A settlement was reached according to which the company 125
agreed to pay gratuity to the discharged men.
The Standard Oil Company
workers also struck work when the company discharged 107 men on July 22 giving one month’s pay in lieu of notice. Workers demanded gratuity to be 126
paid. The workers returned to work unconditionally on August 1.
Another enterprise affected by the economic depression was the Western Indian Match Company (WIMCO) at Tirovottiyur. From its very start in 1923, labour relations at the factory were never happy. There had been a three-day strike for higher wages even before there was a union. The union came into existence on the eve of the R.C.L.’s visit to Madras and was one of the few unions fortunate enough to be recognised by the employer. There was a strike in 1929 against the introduction of piece work in the labelling 127
department.
On April 13, 1932, the company notified that all the workers would be discharged by May 15 and that only a few of them would be reemployed. The workers had already a long list of grievances to be redressed. Only two months
earlier
they 128
imposition of fine.
had
gone
on
3-day
strike
in
protest
against
the
The notice of block retrenchment was the last straw
and the workers decided to go on strike from May 4, 1932. They demanded the
withdrawal
of
the
notice
of
retrenchment
and
suggested
that
retrenchment
should
be
avoided
by
any
one
of
the
following
measures:
reducing working hours from 9 to 8 per day, declaring Saturdays as a holiday without wages, working a 4-day week, and adopting turn system. Other demands were 15 days’ casual leave, 15 days’ sick leave, maternity benefits 129
for women workers and half-yearly bonus as profit-sharing.
The union sought in vain the intervention of the Government under the Trade Disputes Act of 1928. The strike dragged on. The workers did not resort immediately to picketing even when the company began bringing in outside labour. When it decided to picket after a few days, it found the ‘nonintervening’ Government ranged against it. A police officer moved about in 130
a company car harassing the strikers.
The strike came to an end after 28 days on June 2, 1932. Retrenchment was postponed by 3 months in the case of fitters and carpenters by adopting turn system, and employing a minimum of 30 men during each shift. After 3 months, 34 men were retrenched and only 23 retained. In the case of other workers, the factory worked in full strength for the next two months, after which about 80 men were retrenched. Outside labour recruited during strike were discharged. Retrenchment compensation was agreed to in principle, the
details
being
referred
to
their
headquarters.
Piece
work
rates
were
131
reduced. Women workers were granted maternity benefits.
On the expiry of the 2-month period, the company discharged 27 men mainly from the workshop, and turned down the plea of the union for gratuity on grounds that the workers had put in only 3 years of service, and the
company
had
commenced
production
only
recently.
The
workers
remained discontented and sullen. A 1-day strike on October 24, to protest
against
the
dismissal
of
a
fellow
worker
was
an
expression
of
this
132
discontent.
A number of brief strikes in other industries during this period could be traced to the conditions arising out of the economic depression e.g., at Richardson and Cruddas for immediate payment of a Deepavali Bonus, at Commercial Press over long delay in payment of wages, at the Madras Pencil Factory
against
retrenchment
and
at
the
Madras
Mail
Press
against
the
restriction of number of holidays. In the last case, all the employees were 133
dismissed and new hands taken.
On the whole, the phase of economic depression was marked by militant struggles by the workers against the efforts of employers to pass on the burden
to
the
workers
by
means
of
wage
cuts,
retrenchment
or
intensification of labour. These struggles were mostly spontaneous, with the unions intervening after the outbreak of the strike. Even in the case of the M.
and
S.M.
Railway,
it
was
the
pressure
from
the
rank
and
file
that
compelled the union leadership to launch a strike in 1932. In sharp contrast to
the
workers’
militancy
the
union
leaderships,
which
were
mainly
reformist proved weak and vacillating. The Government continued its policy of laissez-faire, intervening in labour disputes only to maintain law and order, which in practice meant breaking the strike. It turned a deaf ear to requests by the unions for intervention under the provision of the Trade Disputes Act.
The situation created by the world economic crisis was so managed by the colonial power as to maintain itself and protect the interests of capital. Mere economic struggles however well organized and widespread could not have beaten back the state-supported offensive of capital. The need of the
hour was an all-embracing political struggle that would have resulted in the country opting out of the world imperialist system. Political forces with the potential for leading such a struggle were still in an embryonic stage and their emergence deserves to be examined.
CHAPTER IX
Emergence of Left Forces, 1933– 1937
The political
thesis
that
liberation
the of
salvation
the
of
country
the
had
working been
put
class
depended
forward
from
on
the
the very
beginnings of the labour movement. In 1918, Wadia spoke glowingly of Home Rule. In 1921, the non-cooperators promised heaven on earth for the workers under the Swaraj they were fighting for. In either case the inference was that the political struggle would be waged by other classes with the working class playing at best a supporting role. The potential of the working class as the striking force was recognized by a few nationalist leaders like Chidambaram and Subramanya Siva with syndicalist illusions as early as 1908 and re-emphasized during the non-cooperation days. Despite this, it was
viewed
as
an
auxiliary
force
in
the
freedom
struggle.
Even
Rajagopalachari toyed with the idea of a general strike on the railways to 1
coincide with the civil disobedience movement of 1930.
The desirability of organizing an independent labour party more or less on the lines of the British Labour Party whose influence in Britain was in ascendance in the twenties, was often discussed in trade union circles at the conferences Cooperation
of
the
AITUC,
Movement,
especially
and
the
after
the
reemergence
collapse of
of
the
Non-
constitutionalism
in
Indian politics. The efforts were geared towards mobilizing labour votes in support of this or that political faction when electoral battles loomed. This was further confirmed in the thirties when on the eve of the elections held under the Government of India Act of 1935 there was a spate of ‘labour political parties’ started by the various factional labour leaders to stabilise or expand their electoral bases.
In contrast to these constitutionalist activities were the activities of left radical elements, which drew inspiration from the Russian Revolution of 1917
and
devoted
themselves
to
the
cause
of
building
a
revolutionary
working class movement. The earliest leader of some stature to espouse the cause of the revolutionary working class movement was Singaravelu whose work in the cause of labour in Madras has been noted earlier. He had met S.A. Dange of Bombay in 1922, and had been in constant touch with M.N. 2
Roy whose programme of 1922 impressed him very much.
In 1923, he
celebrated May Day and launched the Labour Kisan Party of Hindustan (LKPH) with a radical programme. Singaravelu edited and published an English fortnightly Labour Kisan Gazette and a Tamil weekly Thozilalal (The 3
Worker).
Bolshevik
He was arrested in March 1924 and was an accused in the Kanpur Conspiracy
Case,
but 4
because of his prolonged illness.
proceedings
against
him
were
dropped
In December 1925, he presided over the 5
first communist conference in Kanpur.
In 1927, he was active in the Bengal-
Nagpur Railway Strike and in 1928, he led the historic South Indian Railway Strike.
He
was
sentenced
to
10
years’
rigorous
imprisonment
in
the
conspiracy case foisted on the leaders of the South Indian Railway Strike. The
sentence
was
subsequently
reduced
and
he
was
released
in
August
6
1930.
Apart from his active participation in the workers’ strikes in Madras City and
the
S.I.
Railway,
Singaravelu
relentlessly
propagated
the
cause
of
communism through his journals, the articles he submitted to newspapers, and his public meetings. Besides the observance of May Day and Peace Day, he organized a protest meeting in August 1927 against the execution of 7
Sacco and Vanzetti.
When Shapurji Saklatwala, British Communist parliamentarian, visited Madras in 1927, the Madras Corporation gave him a welcome address at Singaravelu’s meetings
instance.
addressed
by
Singaravelu Saklatwala
also
acted
whose
as
visit
translator
helped
to
at
the
public
popularise
the
achievements of the Soviet Union and to provide a better understanding of 8
the communist programme.
The 1927 session of the INC held in Madras played a significant role in rousing the interest of the city youth in left nationalism. Singaravelu and the communist
delegates
from
North
India
participated
actively 9
proceedings of the Congress presided over by Jawaharlal Nehru
in
the
who had
just returned from Europe full of ideas dominant then in European socialist and
communist
including
the 10
Congress.
circles.
declaration
He
pushed
of
complete
through
many
independence
leftist as
the
resolutions goal
of
the
Yet all these events and the hectic activities of Singaravelu in the twenties did not result in the constitution of an organized socialist or communist group in the city. The credit for organizing the first communist group goes to
a
Pathan
from
the
north-western
province,
an
ex-seaman
turned
communist, Amir Haider Khan.
Khan travelled extensively and came into contact first with the Ghadar Party and then with European communists who arranged to send him to Moscow for training in revolutionary work. He came back to India in 1928 and was engaged in spreading the communist literature that he had got from abroad. He was listed as one of the communist conspirators in the Meerut Conspiracy
Case
but
evaded
arrest
and
escaped
to
the
Soviet
11
Union.
Returning to India in February 1931, he was deputed to work in Madras by Comrade
Lund,
then
representing
the
Communist
International
(later
Comintern) in India. Remaining ‘underground’ and taking different names as the occasion demanded, he was able to gather round him a small group consisting of students and workers like V.K. Narasimhan, K.Bashyam, K. Satyanarayana, P. Sundararama Reddi (P. Sundarayya – who went on to play a leading role in the Telengana armed peasant uprising), Rajavadivelu and ‘Russia’ Manickam, the last two being press workers. With their help he founded, in 1932, the Young Workers League. The league celebrated May Day in 1932. It published leaflets on communism, on Bhagat Singh and on the need for working-class unity. The political line propagated followed that of the Comintern evolved at its sixth congress in 1926. ‘Russia’ Manickam at that time ran a hand-operated press and brought out a journal Jana Mitran. At
Narasimhan’s
Munnetram
suggestion
(Progress).
The
the
name
group
of
the
translated
journal
Khan’s
was
articles
changed into
to
Tamil.
Khan,
then
important
known
mills.
as
He
Shankar,
also
sent,
established
secretly,
one
communist Jeyaraman
cells to
in
three
Moscow
for
12
training in revolutionary work.
Khan and his comrades were arrested in May 1932. Khan was sentenced to
18
months
rigorous
13
imprisonment.
Released
on
July
20,
1934,
he
returned to his activities in August but his spell of freedom was short-lived. He was arrested again on August 31, 1934 and kept as a State Prisoner under Regulation II of 1819 in the Coimbatore Central Jail. He was later removed 14
to Rajamundhry Jail and finally released in 1938.
Khan’s
arrest
caused
a
setback
to
the
building
of
a
communist
movement in Madras. The Communist Party was itself declared illegal in 15
July 1934 and the Young Workers League banned. removed
from
the
scene
the
torch
lit
by
him
Even though Khan was
was
carried
forward
by
Sundarayya and his comrades.
Sundarayya and Satyanarayana were typical of the younger Congress cadres who were active participants in the various Congress struggles of those
days,
such
Disobedience accounts,
as
boycotting
Movement.
and
had
been
They jolted
the had by
Simon
Commission
suffered
the
sudden
and
imprisonment suspension
of
the
Civil
on
those
the
latter
movement, the signing of the Gandhi-Irwin Pact and the hanging of Bhagat Singh and his comrades in March 1931. When after the fiasco of the Second Round Table Conference, the civil disobedience movement was revived only to face severe repression, these Congress youth found themselves back in prison where they came into contact with the revolutionaries from North India
who
were
kept
in
various
Madras
Presidency
prisons
on
considerations of security. Many of the revolutionaries who had believed in
individual terrorism had turned to communism and in turn the Congress youth who had come into contact with them in the prisons were converted 16
to socialism.
Another factor that contributed to the popularity of socialism was the great progress which the Soviet Union was making under the Five Year Plans while the rest of the world under capitalist domination was crippled by economic depression. Millions of workers were thrown out of jobs, while ‘overproduced’ goods were destroyed for want of purchasers. The concrete success of the socialist alternative inspired many young Congressmen in prison to consider the creation of a socialist party. The revival of the right wing Swaraj Party in March 1934 made it urgent for the socialists to come together
and
the 17
October 1934.
Congress
A
few
Socialist
months
Party
earlier
in
was July
inaugurated 1934,
Jai
in
Patna
Prakash
in
Narain
arrived in Madras to canvass support for the proposed Socialist Party. A local unit of the party was formed on July 27, 1934 with about 100 Congress 18
members.
While
Congress
members
disillusioned
with
Gandhian
policies
and
attracted to socialism were thus groping their way to form a socialist party, the Self-Respect Movement started by E.V. Ramaswami Naicker for social justice and to fight casteism underwent a transformation after his visit to the Soviet Union in 1932. On his return Naicker chalked out a new sociopolitical programme for the movement in collaboration with Singaravelu. According to this programme known as the Erode Path, the Self-Respect Movement was to have two wings. One, the Self-Respect Party, which would devote itself solely to social reform and the other, the Samadharma Party of India
or
the
Self-Respect
League,
which
as
the
political
wing
of
the
movement
would
participate
in
19
political
activities.
Singaravelu
and
Jeevanandam took prominent roles in the political wing. They published low-priced books and pamphlets in Tamil on communism and the Soviet Union,
biographies
of
Marx
and
Lenin,
the
first
Soviet
Five
Year
Plan.
Second, a number of Tamil weeklies were started in which articles were published pointing out the similarity in ideology between the Self-Respect Movement
and
Communism.
Kudi
Arasu
(Republic)
the
official
organ
carried a special article by Singaravelu. Third, May Day celebrations were popularized. On this day the Self-Respecters took a pledge to unite workers and depressed classes and lead them to socialism. Fourth, Naicker toured the 20
Tamil districts and propagated communist ideology and class struggle.
The Government of Madras viewed with concern these developments and proceeded against the printer and publisher of Kudi Arasu and against Naicker for the seditious articles. Naicker was sentenced to nine months’ imprisonment
on
December
30,
21
1933.
The
movement,
however,
continued its communist propaganda through another newly-established journal, Puratchi (Revolution). But after the banning of the Communist Party of India and the Young Workers League in July 1934, Naicker was concerned
about
the
possible
ban
on
the
Self-Respect
Movement
and
decided against any further confrontation with the government. The Erode Programme was dropped. Support was extended to the Justice Party in the 1934 elections. It was even stated that the programme of the Self-Respecters would
be
better
implemented
under
the
guidance
of
the
British
22
Government.
This change in direction by Naicker led to the exit of Jeevanandam and other committed youth from the Self-Respect Movement. The dissenters
formed the Tamil Nadu Self-Respect Samadharma Party, expressed their views through the new journal Pudiya Ulagam (New World), and finally held
a
conference 23
Dange.
at
Tiruchirapalli
on
November
1,
1936
addressed
by
They decided to join the Congress Socialist Party, which was by
then virtually the legal front for the communists.
After banned,
the the
Communist communists
Party set
up
and the
the
Young
Labour
Workers
Protection
League
League.
were
A.S.K.
Iyengar (hereafter Iyengar) joined Sundarayya and the other associates of 24
Khan.
The Labour Protection League organized the corporation sweepers,
press workers and snuff workers.
The seventh congress of the Communist International held in August 1935 reversed the earlier left-sectarian line and called for the formation of broad
united
fronts 25
imperialist forces.
to
fight
fascism
and
reaction
and
to
rally
all
anti-
The implementation of the new line was entrusted to
S.V. Ghate of Bombay who came to Madras at the special request of Jai Prakash
Narain
to
build
the
Congress
26
Socialist
Party.
Thanks
to
his
indefatigable efforts all the left streams in Madras Presidency, namely the Left-oriented members within the Congress, the Jeevanandam group of SelfRespecters, and the Communists of the Labour Protection League merged in 27
the Congress Socialist Party.
Ghate took over the English monthly New Age 28
from the radical Congress member H.D. Rajah.
A Tamil newspaper Jana
29
Sakthi (People’s Power) was also started in 1937. Communist Socialist
Party
Party)
coordinating
Centre
(camouflaged
functioned
activities
over
effectively the
entire
under and
Madras
Ghate saw to it that the the
name
regularly,
of
Congress
planning
Presidency.
The
and
Centre,
located in the office of Congress Socialist Party, was a beehive of activity
with workers from various unions streaming in to discuss their problems 30
and seek guidance.
While the left forces were thus organizing themselves, interacting with the working class and reviving its militancy, the reformist leaderships were preoccupied with council elections, representations and commissions. The government, which wielded the stick to beat the militant working class to submission,
dangled
the
carrot
of
parliamentary
democracy
before
the
leadership. The R.C.L. recommended that trade unions should be given representation in the legislature. Under the Constitution of 1919 there was no
representation
for
labour
in
the
Provincial
Council
of
Madras
Presidency. C. Basudev, the reformist labour leader, was nominated to the provincial council in 1930 when the Justice Party was in power.
As
a
follow
recommendations, Congress
up
of
Round
participated
the
Table
only
in
Statutory
Conferences
the
second
(Simon)
were
held
conference
Commission’s in
and
London. boycotted
The the
other two. Joshi, already a nominated member of the Central Assembly, attended
all
these
conferences,
and
Giri,
the
Congress
labour
leader
accompanied him to the second conference in which Gandhi participated. 31
Shiva Rao assisted Joshi at the all the conferences.
The participation of
labour leaders at the Round Table Conferences came in for criticism as it amounted to the acquiescence in the British Government plot to denigrate the Congress to the status of just one group among many.
In the process of Constitution making, the Indian Franchise (Lothian) Committee and the Delimitation Committee were set up for the purpose of deciding leaders
the
nature
participated
and in
dimensions
the
of
proceedings
the of
32
electorate. these
The
committees
reformist and
the
divergence of views on labour representation reflected the divergence of personal interests of the various leaders. The B. and C. Employees’ Union, which
reflected
the
views
of
the
employers
more
than
those
of
labour,
opposed ‘outsiders’ representing labour and contended that representation through trade union constituencies, though sound in principle would be unfair in practice, as the vast majority of workers were not in the trade unions. Basudev argued for non-union labour constituencies and got one 33
for the Coimbatore-Malabar District where he had nurtured support.
The
National Trade Union Federation and Shiva Rao argued vehemently against non-union special labour constituencies. In their view the argument that vast
sections
of
labour
would
go
unrepresented
was
not
valid
as
the
electorate for the general constituencies was only 11 per cent of the adult 34
population. Committee
The Provincial Government recommended to the Franchise
two
seats
for
labour
in
a
house
of
210
members
and
was
opposed to trade union constituencies, when the Delimitation Committee 35
called for its views.
Finally, six labour constituencies were created for the
Madras Presidency, of which two were trade union constituencies (one for Madras textile labour and the other for railways), four non-union special labour constituencies (one for textile labour in Coimbatore-Malabar, one for Madras City dock and factory labour, one for Vizagapatnam Godavari dock
and
factory
labour
and
one
for
West
Godavari
Kistna
factory
36
labour).
Factional
squabbles
arose
between
the
leaders,
on
the
occasion
of
nominating a representative to the ILO session at Geneva in 1932. Shiva Rao was
accused
of
having 37
Selvapathi Chettiar.
used
his
influence
to
get
Basudev
defeated
by
This factionalism manifested itself in the years 1933–
36. Basudev had his Madras Presidency Labour Political Party; Selvapathi Chettiar and the Madras Labour Union, the South Indian Labour Political 38
Party; and V.M. Ramasami Mudaliar, the Provincial Labour Party. factional
squabbles
increased
as
the
elections
under
the
The
Government
of
India Act 1935 drew nearer. Thus the reformist leadership, because of their extreme
proneness
to
join
commissions,
committees
and
international
conferences and to seek offices, played into the hands of the government that was maneuvering to create a trusted leadership in the labour movement that would be cooperative and acquiescing.
The
workers
were
not
however
much
influenced
by
the
factional
squabbles among the reformist leaders. Many of the unions had only a formal
existence.
Only
a
fraction
of
the
workforce
retained
their
membership of the unions. Union meetings were poorly attended and were rather ritualistic exercises of leadership to mark their presence and canvass support for their electoral battles. In this period when reformism prevailed and the left forces were still emerging, most of the recorded working class struggles by workers were either unorganized or in the process of being organized. The unionized industries were relatively quiescent.
From July 1–7, 1933, 3,000 bus workers in the city went on strike in protest against police harassment for technical traffic violations. It would appear
that
the
bus
owners
themselves
engineered
the
strike.
Over
200
owners operated in the city and environs. The competition was stiff and unless they violated traffic rules such as overloading, it was not possible to survive.
After
the
commencement
of
the
strike,
it
was
a
deputation
of
owners headed by Abdul Hamid Khan, Member of the Legislative Council
(MLC) that met the Commissioner of Police with a list of grievances. The 39
strike ended without achieving anything.
The workers in a number of small engineering and manufacturing firms had to use the strike as a weapon to fight against wage cuts and disciplinary measures. August
In
Jamal
24-28,
Glass
1933,
in
at
Tondiarpet,
protest
against
120
the
workers
dismissal
struck
of
two
work
from
workers
for
neglect of work and disobedience of orders. The non-unionized workers sought the assistance of P.R.K. Sarma, President of the M. and S.M. Railway Union.
Besides
holidays
on
Sundays
and
casual
leave
privileges,
they
demanded provision of boots, treatment of workmen injured during work at the cost of the management, and grant of full pay during the period of treatment. Obviously the Workman’s Compensation Act was not in force. The management did not yield and carried on with workmen from Bombay and
20
new
workers.
The
striking
workers
returned
unconditionally
to
40
work.
A strike took place at the Madras Pencil Factory at Washermanpet on January 8, 1934. The issue was the dismissal of a maistry on suspicion of being a mischief-maker instigating workmen to refuse to receive their wages in protest against the omission to claim a day’s wages in respect of a worker. The strike resulted in the management replacing the work force completely 41
by April 1934 and continuing operation.
Yet another strike that failed was by 190 workers of Addison and Co.’s workshop
in
Mount
Road.
They
struck
work
on
January
26,
1934,
demanding partial restoration of the wage cuts effected over the previous 3 years. The management refused to discuss the matter with ‘outsiders’, i.e., the President of the Autoworkers Union and V.K. Ramaswamy Mudaliar,
MLC. On intervention by the Commissioner of Labour, the company took back 150 strikers in the second week of February 1934 and the remaining 42
workers by the first week of March without conceding their demand.
The strike at Spencer and Co.’s Furnishing Department in April 1934 in which 56 carpenters were involved was over the issue of a change in terms of employment to the disadvantage of the workers. On grounds that there was a systematic loss of company tools from the workshops, the carpenters were directed to bring their own tools from April 2, 1934. The carpenters refused to comply with the order and struck work. The management engaged 24 new carpenters and carried on. Nineteen strikers returned to work on the company’s terms. The company kept its doors open to the other strikers 43
who might be willing to bring their own tools.
Workers
of
PWD
workshops
struck
work
from
November
29
to
December 2, 1935, protesting against retrenchment, consequent to work being
let
on
contract
and
demanding
the
reinstatement
of
two
men
discharged for breaking a machine. The management agreed not to give any more work to contractors as far as possible, to permit the union to form gangs, and do the work on contract basis. The two dismissed workers were taken back after they tendered an apology. Retrenchment of 16 workers was 44
deferred until December 23, 1935.
Another engineering workers’ strike
took place on January 8, 1936, when the workers of Government Industrial Engineering Works downed tools demanding redress of their grievances, namely, full work for all week days as against four days, grant of overdue increments, 10 days’ casual leave with pay and pay for government holidays. They
ended
redressing
their
their
stay-in
grievances.
strike As
when
nothing
the was
Director done
in
assured this
them
regard,
of
they
resorted to another stay-in strike on July 15, 1936, but were persuaded to 45
return to work next day by the President of the Union.
It was in the tanneries that the agitation was the most widespread. The adi-dravida workers in the tanneries had a number of grievances such as poor pay, heavy fines and assaults on human dignity. The last was a sensitive issue. They were abused by their maistries in vulgar and obscene language. Protests against these conditions of service took the form of strikes in 1934 and 1935. In Madavaram, strike commenced in two tanneries on August 19, 1934, and spread to another five tanneries by August 22, involving over 500 workers. The adi-dravida leader, J. Sivashanmugam Pillai, intervened in the dispute
in
his
capacity
as
the
President
of
Madras
Presidency
Tannery
Workers’ Union. But his advice to return to work was not immediately accepted.
The
strikers
took
to
acts
of
rowdyism
but
were
suppressed
promptly by the police. Workmen resumed work unconditionally on August 46
27.
There was a strike on January 17, 1935, in a Madavaram tannery
owned by Mohammad Hussain Sahib when the workers were not satisfied with the Pongal presents given by the owner. The workers returned to work 47
after two days.
The
strike
at
the
Roshan
and
Co.
tannery
in
Meenambakkam
on
February 8, 1935, threatened to take a serious turn when the proprietor tried to carry on work with 20 loyal workers. The strikers numbering over 200 and
armed
Chingleput, arrested. written
with
sticks
rushed
The
workers
undertaking
workers’
to
grievances
besieged the
spot
returned
that were
they
the and
to
tannery. restored
work
would
insufficient
not
The
District
order.
Two
unconditionally resort
work
to
leading
strike to
Magistrate,
persons after in
were
giving
future.
insufficient
a
The
wages,
excessive task work, unnecessary detention at the tannery without work, and the use of abusive language by the agents. The proprietor did not yield on 48
any demand.
The failure of the proprietor to make the customary Tamil New Year’s Day advance was the cause of a strike on April 15, 1935, in a tannery in Pammal owned by Ghani Mohammed Issac Sattar. The strikers resisted the attempt of the proprietor to carry on work with outside labour by throwing stones at the blacklegs. They were dispersed with the help of the police. The strikers returned to work unconditionally next day, signing an agreement 49
not to strike work in future.
Among
other
classes
of
workers
fighting
for
higher
wages
were
the
handloom weavers of Chingleput district who went on strike frequently from January 1934 for higher wages. The first strike that commenced in January
1934
with
the
participation
of
1,000
weavers
in
Arni
and
its
neighbourhood spread to Saidapet and other areas involving 2,200 weavers. 50
The strike ended by March 15, 1934, with a partial victory.
But soon after,
local strikes in Chingleput district continued beyond June 1934, apparently with some success as could be gleaned from the report that there was a successful strike against a wage cut from Rs 7 to Rs 6, in 1937 between May 51
21 and 27.
The workers’ struggles were out of sync with the dominant trend in the nationalist
movement,
which,
despite
all
its
protestations,
was
veering
towards constitutionalism. Though the Congress rejected the Government of India Act of 1935 in its entirety at its Lucknow session in April 1936, branding it as a tool ‘designed to facilitate and perpetuate the domination 52
and exploitation of the people of India’,
it decided to contest the elections
to be held under this Act while deferring the question of acceptance of office.
The
right
rapprochement
wing
within
between
the
the
Congress
advocates
of
consolidated
conventional
itself
with
the
assembly-politics 53
and Gandhian constructive workers and with G.D. Birla.
It was the right
wing that ultimately had its ‘socialist’ Congress president, Jawaharlal Nehru, and the left had to be content with their radical speeches and programmatic declarations.
But even this little opening to the left was of some help in spreading socialist ideology among the masses. Jawaharlal Nehru as President of the Congress at both the Lucknow session in April 1936 and the Faizpur session in December 1936 delivered presidential addresses hailing socialism. The Faizpur session adopted an agrarian programme incorporating some of the 54
minimum demands of the kisan manifesto of the All-Indian Kisan Sabha.
The socio-economic clauses of the Congress Election Manifesto (August 1936) held out great promises to labour. It promised:
To secure to industrial workers a decent standard of living, hours of work
and
economic Standards;
conditions
of
Labour,
conditions
in
the
suitable
in
conformity,
country
machinery
for
permitted
settlement
of
as
far
with
as
the
new
International
disputes
between
employers and workmen, protection against the economic consequences of old age, sickness and unemployment; and the right of the workers to 55
strive for protection to their interests.
The Tamilnadu Congress leadership was so hostile to socialism that even a Congress Working Committee (CWC) member, Achyut Patwardhan, was
refused use of the premises of the Congress office during his visit to Madras just
because
he
was
a
Congress
56
Socialist. 57
socialism was not the Congress creed.
Satyamurthi
affirmed
that
Rajagopalachari, a member of the
CWC, was a signatory to the collective letter of resignation from the working committee sent to Jawaharlal Nehru by the right wingers protesting against 58
his advocacy of socialism.
Nehru’s
election
tour
did
much
to
strengthen
the
hands
of
the
left
groups against the anti-socialist forces and mobilize people’s support for socialism
and
a
left
radical
programme.
He
addressed
a
7,000-strong
workers’ meeting arranged by the Madras Labour Union on October 7, 59
1936.
His
visit
stimulated
leftist
activity.
The
Congress
Socialist
Party
opened a number of branches all over the province. The communists and Congress Socialists made vigorous attempts to establish influential contacts with the labour and the youth through various organizations like Youth Leagues and Workers’ Unions.
The radical stance of the Congress under Jawaharlal Nehru raised the hopes of the labouring masses that their emancipation would be ensured by the success of the Congress at the polls. The AITUC extended its support to the
Congress
candidates
except
in
certain
constituencies
in
Nagpur
and
60
Bombay.
The immense sympathy for the suffering and sacrifice undergone by Congress
members
during
the
civil
disobedience
movements,
the
great
hopes of socio-economic change, which the election manifesto and Nehru’s speeches raised, and the wider franchise, all contributed to the grand success of the Congress in the 1937 elections, particularly in the Madras Province where it won 159 out of the 215 seats routing the Justice Party, which had
been in power for the previous fifteen years. The Congress also made a clean 61
sweep of all the 6 seats reserved for labour.
Once the elections were over, the issue of acceptance of office became a dominant
issue.
Nehru
and
the
left
were
vehemently
against
office
acceptance but the views of the right wing prevailed. Rajagopalachari was for the acceptance of office. Gandhi wanted a firm commitment from the British that the governors would not use their special powers. A settlement could not be reached in time with the result that the new constitution was inaugurated in Madras on April 1, 1937, by installing an interim caretaker ministry with Sir Kumara Venkata Reddy Naidu as the acting Chief Minister. The interim ministry lasted till July 15, 1937, when the Congress took office 62
with Rajagopalachari as the Chief Minister of the Madras Presidency.
The communists had been active among labour through the Madras Labour Protection League formed on July 19, 1935, by Sundarayya, A.K.S. 63
Iyengar, P. Ramamurthi and Jeevanandam. the
Madras
Madras
Workers’
Aluminium
Employees’ Secretary
Press
Union.
of
the
Union
Workers’ One
of
Madras
and
Union
the
league
Electric
The League gained control of
had
established
and
the
M.
members
Tramway
contact
and
S.M.
became
Workers’
with
the
the
Railway Assistant
64
Union.
Taking
advantage of a spontaneous strike in a snuff factory, a league activist, B. Srinivasa Rao, organized a trade union for snuff workers in Madras city in 65
November 1935.
The
communists’
involvement
in
the
press
workers’
movement
intensified on the return of Sundarayya from Bombay after attending the meeting
of
the
executive
committee
of
the
All
India
Press
Workers’
Federation on November 2 and 3, 1935. Thanks to his efforts, the second
session of the All India Press Workers Federation was held at Madras on 66
January 5, 1936.
Among those who attended this conference was Ghate,
who was to play thereafter a crucial role in the communist labour movement in Madras. The Madras Press Workers’ Union took up the cause of the Tamil Nadu Press Workers when a partial strike occurred on March 11, 1936, on the issue of non-payment of monthly wages on the prescribed date. The management
disbursed
the
wages
immediately
and
dispensed
with
the
services of the strikers. But its efforts to carry on with outside labour did not 67
succeed and the strikers were reinstated on March 21, 1936.
Another strike
took place on April 15, 1936 in the Telugu section of the same press in protest against the management’s refusal to remove from service the editor of Andhra Praja who was ill-treating the compositors. The Andhra Praja 68
ceased publication and the Telugu section of the press was closed.
Ill-treatment of a compositor by a foreman was again the cause of a strike in Andhra Patrika press on May 5, 1936, by 40 compositors who also demanded the grant of wage increments. The strike ended on May 8, 1936 with the proprietor agreeing to grant 15 days’ casual leave a year, and pay wages
for
the
strike
period
and
guaranteeing
proper
treatment
of
the
compositors. During their strike, the members of the Press Workers’ Union 69
assisted in the picketing and were prosecuted under the Madras Police Act.
The readiness with which the communists volunteered to assist workers soon made the office of the Congress Socialist Party at 2/65, Broadway, Madras,
famous
as
‘the
strike
70
office’.
Whenever
a
strike
situation
developed anywhere in Madras, the concerned workers would stream in to the strike office to seek counsel.
One such visit to the strike office was by toddy tappers in the later half of December 1936 to meet Ghate. Ghate deputed Ramamurthi, K. Murugesan and Jai Singh Bhatia to organize the toddy tappers’ union. The union was soon
formed
with
Ramamurthi
as
President,
Natesa
Gramani,
a
toddy 71
tapper, as General Secretary, and Murugesan assisting him as Secretary. two
months
about
2,000
members
were
enrolled.
Not
a
day
In
passed
thereafter without some strike taking place in one grove or other for better wages
and
against
victimization.
The
union
then
decided
to
organise
a
general strike with a charter of demands. They were: minimum wage Re 1; workload of 15 trees a day; accident compensation and leave facilities. The strike commenced on March 2, 1937, with 2,400 toddy tappers joining the strike. Jeevanandam, Iyengar, Ramamurthi, Murugesan and B. Srinivasa Rao addressed involved crush
a
in
the
number
of
conducting strike;
public the
leaders
meetings.
strike.
were
Hundreds
Repressive
arrested;
of
measures
section
144
volunteers were
was
were
adopted
to
promulgated.
Picketing near the coconut groves was prohibited. Processions and meetings were banned. The toddy contractors began to import blacklegs from the districts.
Over
procession
to
1,000 the
strikers
groves
and
defied
the
chased
the
prohibitory blacklegs.
orders, A
went
leaseholder
in
a
who
threatened to open fire was overpowered and his gun seized. When the victorious procession was returning the police descended upon them and made a lathi charge. Over 500 strikers including Murugesan were arrested, prosecuted and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. The Madras Provincial Trade Union Congress, the Congress Socialist Party, the Madras Press Workers’ Union, the Madras Tramway and Electric Supply Workers Union and other unions organized relief to aid the families of the strikers. The strike dragged on for two months and was withdrawn on April 29.
Hundreds of strikers were victimized and were not paid even for the days they had worked prior to the commencement of strike. Even their tools were 72
not returned.
The strike exposed not only the repressive character of the State but also the psychology of the Congress members who were waiting to take power. Rajagopalachari
refused
to
help
the
starving
families
of
the
strikers
on
grounds that the Congress, which stood for eliminating the evil of drinking, could
not
support
those
engaged
in
the
industry
that
produced
it.
He
argued: ‘Tomorrow, you will organize the prostitutes against the brothel 73
keepers for better wages.’
A similar remark was made by Acharya Kripalani
on the question of affiliating workers’ and peasants’ mass organizations with the Congress: ‘Tomorrow you may demand affiliation for the organization 74
of dancing girls.’
These remarks betray the aversion the right-wing leaders
had for anything associated with the left. This aversion was so strong that they were insensitive to the sufferings of the affected poor workers.
Another strike in which the Congress Socialists took an active part was by the workers of South Indian Export Company’s Leather Boiling Press, Madras. About 100 workers of the Leather Boiling Press struck work on February 16, 1937, in protest against the introduction of the twin system. They returned to work on February 19 on the understanding that their grievances would be settled. The grievances were redressed but four men 75
were sent out.
The workmen struck work again on February 27, and stayed
out until April 6, 1937, when the management agreed to reemploy as many 76
strikers as possible when vacancies arose.
meetings on behalf of the striking workers.
The Congress Socialists arranged
Another strike in which the Congress Socialists were involved was the lightning strike by 250 men of the running staff in the Madras Tramways on March 2, 1937, in protest against the dismissal of a tramways conductor V. Somasundaram,
secretary
of
the
unrecognized
union.
The
spontaneous
sectional strike failed to spread to other sections. The union did not arrange picketing and the strike ended in a week’s time. Five more union officials were
dismissed.
Three
days’
wages
were
cut
for
all
strikers.
Annual
increment was withheld. This defeat caused much bitterness among the 77
workers and was to erupt into an agitation an year later.
Besides
these
strikes
in
which
direct
involvement
of
the
Congress
Socialists was significant, there were many other struggles and strikes during this phase. For example 95 Saidapet Municipal scavengers struck work on April 1, 1937, against the reduction of wages to scavengers reemployed after earlier retrenchment, but they returned after two days upon assurance from 78
the Municipal Commissioner to look into the matter.
There was also a
strike at the Ganesar Aluminium Factory, Royapuram, from June 22 to July 6,
1937,
in
behaviour.
protest The
against
strike
the
ended
dismissal
with
one
of of
79
reemployed on his tendering an apology.
two the
workers dismissed
for
insolent
men
being
The strike was to be resumed
later after the Congress Ministry took power.
Workers were mobilized in February and March 1936 to protest against the amendment to the Payment of Wages Bill moved by H.P. Mody at the Central Assembly. The Mody amendment sought to penalize strikes without notice. Many unions passed condemnatory resolutions and the communists organized a joint meeting of the workers. Signatures were also obtained on a memorial
to
the
Viceroy
against
the
Mody
amendment.
The
Congress
Labour Committee and Congress legislators did not come out against the 80
bill. This was strongly condemned by labour.
The Congress Socialists were also active in mobilizing labour on political issues. January 26, 1936 (Independence Day), was celebrated and the Soviet form of government commended. Labour week was celebrated in February 81
1936.
Meetings were held on ‘Anti Repression Day’, ‘Anti War Day’ and 82
‘Unemployment Day’. on
May
socialism
20,
1936,
provoked
Satyamurthy’s speech at the European Association
declaring strong
that
protest 83
protest meeting on May 28.
the
Congress
from
Party
Congress
had
Socialists
not
accepted
who
held
a
Visits of important Congress socialist leaders
like Sampurnanand and Achyut Patwardhan were utilized for popularizing socialist
ideology
among
the
workers.
The
Hunger
March
of
the
unemployed organized by the Congress Socialists from Malabar reached Madras on August 24, 1936. Attempts were made to hold a big reception 84
and demonstration of the occasion, but they were thwarted by the police.
Meetings were also organized to express solidarity with the Bengal-Nagpur 85
Railway Workers then on strike.
The Congress Socialists also campaigned
vigorously against office acceptance. The political exercise of the Congress Socialists did not however get a massive response from labour. Only the more politically committed workers rallied to these meetings.
Summing up, this phase in the labour movement was marked by the emergence of a left group committed firmly and totally to the cause of the working class and the ideals of socialism. Initially, the communists followed the policy of the Sixth Congress of the Communist International, which was based on the view that the national bourgeoisie had on the whole lost its 86
importance as a force against imperlialism.
This was reflected in a totally
anti-Congress,
anti-Gandhi
attitude
during
this
period.
Later,
after
the
Seventh Congress of the Communist International and the Ben BradleyDutt
thesis
in
Labour
Monthly,
which
recommended
that
the
Indian
communists should work inside the Indian National Congress and build a broad united anti-imperialist people’s front, the communists worked inside 87
the Congress as members of the Congress Socialist Party. however,
was
veering
towards
the
right
despite
The Congress,
Jawaharlal
Nehru
being
President. Right-wing Congress members took an anti-labour, anti-socialist stand on many occasions, which was in a way portentous. The colonial government also viewed the emergence of left forces with alarm and leading Congress Socialists and communists were prosecuted and sent to prison. Despite
these
adverse
conditions,
left-wing
forces
were
able
to
exert
a
regenerating influence on the working class movement. New sections of the working class were brought into unions while the existing unions – to the extent the left forces could get control of them – were activated. However, partly because of the adverse conditions of repression and semi-illegality in which they had to work and partly because of the adherence to the policy of united front, which ruled out confrontations with reformist leaderships to the point of split, left-wing forces were not able to make much headway in the industries in which reformist leaderships were in control of the unions.
One feature of the industrial strife of 1936–1937 was the beginning of concerted action by workers in unorganized trade and labouring men such as toddy tappers and weavers. These workers demonstrated in a way that the need of the hour was concerted action in the form of general strike rather than isolated local struggles.
CHAPTER X
The Congress Ministry and the Working Class, 1937–1939
The period 1937–1939, when the Congress Ministries were in power, has been
the
movement
most and
important
phase
working-class
in
the
development
consciousness
in
India.
of
The
trade
union
formation
of
popular ministries stimulated labour organization. The workers had voted for
the
Congress
because
they
saw
it
as
an
organization
fighting
alien
imperialism. The Congress election manifesto had promised the workers a few basic things. In Madras, the Congress Labour Minister was V.V. Giri, a reputed leader, who had only recently been associated with the strike of the Bengal-Nagpur Railway workers. It was therefore natural for the workers to expect that the Congress Government would stand by them in their struggle against the capitalists, particularly, the European capitalists who had been enjoying the full support of an alien government in their offensive against labour.
Almost since 1921, labour had been on retreat in the face of the capitalist offensive to pass on the burden of the economic crisis to the working class. The
occasional
battles
it
had
waged
against
wage-cuts,
retrenchments,
intensification of work and such capitalist manouevres had almost all failed to register any significant success. State repression had been effective in containing
working
class
action
and
frustrating
the
workers’
efforts
to
defend their own interests.
The economic situation had changed for the better from the dismal period of the Depression. The economic recovery was accompanied by a general
price
rise.
The
working
class,
hitherto
bound
by
the
objective
conditions of the Depression and state repression in support of capitalist offensive,
went
on
the
offensive
for
the
restoration
of
wages
and
lost
employment opportunities, now that popular democratic governments had been installed in office.
The left forces, particularly the communists, could move about more freely than before, though the ban on the Communist Party continued to be in
force.
Their
relative
freedom
was
however
circumscribed
by
the
government’s surveillance. They were shadowed by the police, and their speeches were reported to the government by the Criminal Investigation Department
(C.I.D.)
From
the
early
days
of
his
Chief
Ministership,
Rajagopalachari took a keen interest in the police reports on communists and
those
harassment
on
his
and
own
party’s
persecution,
left
left
1
wing.
forces
were
Despite able
to
this utilize
surveillance, the
relative
freedom to mobilise the working class. The period was, therefore, marked by an
upsurge
in
the
number
presidency and in the city.
and
frequency
of
industrial
disputes
in
the
The Congress Party had, on the one hand, an obligation to the people who had voted them to power to fulfill their aspirations. People had been under a long reign of repression and civil liberties had been denied. Their economic
condition
had
worsened
during
the
years
of
depression.
Indebtedness in the rural areas had increased and so had unemployment. Even those who were employed were on starvation wages. People hoped for better days under the Congress, or at least for some relief. On the other hand, the Congress Government would also have needed to function in such a way as to cause a deadlock in the working of the hated new constitution and to smash it from within. It would need to pave the way for the inevitable final showdown with the British Government, for the final struggle that would
overthrow
the
imperialist
power.
There
was
another,
a
third
compulsion. It was necessary to demonstrate to the British that Indians could
govern
themselves
independence. British
as
purpose
it
This
demanded
administrators, would
Government,
have
which
and
as
were of
the
to
to
for
full
Congress
preservers
needed
sought
fit
of
law
continue
ensure
self-governance
that and
the
it
should
order,
policies
conditions
of
and
of
and
excel for
the
tranquility
the that
British when
objective socio-economic conditions tended to provoke disorder and revolt. This
last
compulsion,
administrators, interest
to
would
examine
in
that negate the
is the
light
to
imitate
first of
two
these
and
excel
obligations.
constraints
the It
the
British
would policy
be of
as of the
Congress ministry towards the struggles of the working class.
It was during a strike in a small enterprise that the Congress ministry came out with its policy intentions. Sri Ganesar Aluminium Works was a factory employing 350 workers. The employer-employee relations had been
none too happy for quite sometime. There had been a month-long strike in February 1937, which ended when the employer promised to increase wages after a month. This promise was not kept by the management, which began to adopt terror tactics to subdue the workers and destroy the union. The workers were treated badly and dismissals became the order of the day. Three workers were dismissed one after another in June–July 1937. When on July
23,
one
negligence
more
and
for
worker causing
in
the
willful
rolling damage
department to
the
was
tumblers,
charged the
for
workers
protested and argued that the damage was due to bad material and not due to any fault of the worker. They also pleaded for the reinstatement of those who had been dismissed earlier. The management’s response was to dismiss the
6
workers
who
came
to
represent
the
grievances.
On
July
29,
the
management tried to recruit fresh hands against the vacancies caused by the dismissal. The workers downed tools. Giri, the Labour Minister, tried his best to effect an internal settlement, as he believed that that alone would be permanent in character. Thanks to his efforts, a settlement was reached. The management agreed to take back all the striking workers including the 7 from the rolling department and also agreed to recognize the union. The two parties agreed to the appointment of a Board of Conciliation under the Trade Disputes Act. Upon this settlement, a Board of Conciliation was set up with a lawyer, Jagannath Das, as the Conciliator. The Conciliator gave his recommendations. The workers were to be given wage increases. As regards dismissals,
he
suggested
that
the
management
should
put
in
place
a
procedure of calling for explanation and giving the worker a reasonable opportunity to defend himself. The Conciliator also recommended 5 paid holidays in a year besides 5 days’ casual leave for those with more than 2 2
years’ service.
The peace brought about thus lasted till March 11, 1938, when a weeklong strike took place on the issue of the re-engagement of a former worker. The management insisted on treating him as a fresh employee. Finally, it agreed
not
only
to
the
workers’
demand
but
also
to
adopt
a
grievance
redressal procedure by which workers would meet the management once a week, to represent their grievances. The workers in turn agreed to refrain 3
from strike action.
Giri’s
intervention
in
the
Sri
Ganesar
Aluminium
Works
strike
was
significant in that the provisions of the Trade Dispute Act of 1927 for the appointment of Board of Conciliation were put into force for the first time since
its
enactment.
The
promotion
of
internal
settlement
of
industrial
disputes by direct negotiations between the parties, with the government intervening under Trade Disputes Act, only when direct negotiations failed, was to be the cornerstone of the labour policy of the Congress ministry.
The B. and C. Mills had been strike-free for nearly 15 years. Binny and Co. had under the ‘dynamic’ leadership of the Chairman, Kenneth Kay, who had the reputation of a martinet, adopted a dual policy of enforcement of discipline at shop-floor level and execution of welfare measures to neutralise worker resistance. The mills were able to tide over the crisis caused by the Depression, partly by better organization of production and sales and partly by transferring the burden to the workers. In 1931, the mill management had resorted to short-time work and a 5-day week for a month. Workers had to endure a wage freeze lasting several years. When the 54-hour week was introduced under the Factories Act of 1934, the working hours were reduced by 4 hours. Unauthorized work intervals were eliminated and a tougher leave policy adopted. Wages for piece workers dropped. Then fines were
abolished, and in their place was instituted a system of official warnings leading to dismissal if a third warning became necessary. There was general 4
labour dissatisfaction on account of these measures.
The workers felt helpless to organize a full-scale strike for fear that such a strike may end in communal and caste conflicts, as in 1921. Their protests were often in the form of short-lived sectional strikes or shop-floor level actions, which were easily contained. The only way they could show their discontent without any confrontation with the management was by working for the candidates sponsored by the Madras Labour Union and getting them elected at the municipal and council elections. They also participated from time
to
time
in
the
nationalist
demonstrations
looking
upon
the
anti-
imperialist movement as an ally in their own struggle against British capital.
The assumption of office by the Congress with the veteran trade union leader Giri as the Labour Minister emboldened the workers to revive their militancy. Giri himself addressed a meeting of the Madras Labour Union on August
5,
1937,
and
declared
that
the
government
would
not
permit
5
employers to harass union activists.
The workers in the carding section of the Carnatic Mills also had cause for discontent. The number of workers required to attend a machine had been reduced from three to two, without a corresponding increase in wages. The
workers
had
made
a
demand
for
a
raise
in
January
1937
itself.
Exasperated by the refusal of the management to consider their demand, they
had
resorted
to
temporary
stoppages
of
work
in
July,
August
and
September. Their efforts to get redressal through the welfare committee were to
no
avail.
On
October
2,
1937,
more
than
500
young
workers
of
the
carding department went on a lightning stay-in strike without informing
either
the
union
or
the
management.
The
management
threatened
to
dismiss them if they did not resume work on October 5, which was the next th
working day. But the workers persisted in the stay-in strike on the 5 were
physically
removed
with
help
from
the
police.
The
and
management
dismissed all the striking workers and dispensed with the services of another 7
350 workers from other departments for want of work.
The union was in a predicament. They could not support the illegal wildcat strike; nor could they let down the young militant workers. Their advice to the young men to return to work went unheeded. Rajagopalachari, to
whom
they
turned
for
support,
rudely
refused
8
to
intervene.
The
Congress Socialists on their part organized a public meeting on October 9, under the auspices of the Madras Provincial Trade Union Congress and other
allied
unions
to
express
support
to
the
strikers.
They
advised
the
strikers to form a strike committee, as the union leadership was too timid to act.
Finally
Giri,
management
who
and
the
not
only
union
arranged
but
also
for
came
negotiations out
with
a
between
the
government
communiqué on October 22, 1937, which satisfied the management rescued the
union
leaders.
In
this
communiqué
the
government
expressed 9
disapproval of lightning strikes and recommended internal settlement.
its
The
Madras Labour Union endorsed the communiqué and made it clear that it did
not
approve
management, against
of
having
wildcat
the
action
extracted
strikes
and
of
from
from
the
the the
workers
on
government
union
a
a
October policy
statement
2.
The
statement
disowning
the
workers, ‘magnanimously’ took back all the strikers without loss of service 10
and benefits. Thus the strike ended on October 22, 1937.
The government’s handling of this strike allayed the fears of the British and Indian capitalists regarding the Congress government’s labour policy. The labour movement on the other hand was stunned by the explicitly antilabour stand taken by the government.
The young workers were not happy. They continued to be restive and turbulent, provoking the authorities to resort to all methods of disciplining. On February 14, 1938, a young worker in the spinning department of the Buckingham Mills was branded at the behest of the spinning master Reilly. The workers protested against the brutality and demanded action against 11
the spinning master but the management did not oblige.
On February 24,
another boy was ill treated and abused by the maistry. On February 28, when a worker named Kuppusamy represented to the management that the half-timers
had
to
work
extra
because
of
the
absence
of
a
number
of
workers, and requested extra payment, he was dismissed. The half-timers 12
went on a sit-in strike.
The welfare committee had already expressed its
inability to help. The Madras Labour Union bound by its adherence to the government communiqué could only advise the boys to return to work. (The boys, being minors, were not its members). The boys ignored the advice
and
continued
responsible
for
the
their
unrest,
sit-in
strike.
and
warned
Binny that
and the
Co.
held
offenders
the
union
would
be
dismissed if they persisted in their insubordination. The company printed in thousands
the
government
communiqué
of
October
22,
1937
and
distributed it among the workers. On March 4, the company dismissed 120 13
half-timers.
On March 6, the company brought in fresh hands, all Muslims. The striking half-timers attacked the new hands with a shower of bobbins. Even
Bentley, the manager, was subjected to a barrage of bobbins when he sought to pacify the boys. The police was brought in to clear out the defiant boys and 255 workers were dismissed. The scenes were repeated on March 7 and 8. The management closed the department and threw out 1,200 men in other
departments
who
could
not
be
provided
14
work.
The
union
condemned the management for its harsh treatment of the young immature boys
and
for
bringing
in
Muslim
boys.
It
accused
the
management
of
planning a lockout.
The young workers demanded an extension of the strike to all sections. The government would not intervene in the dispute. (The intervention of 15
the police was justified as ‘a measure of law and order’.)
The union opened
negotiations with the management. The management refused to take back all the boys. They were willing to re-engage and that too as fresh hands, only some of those they considered potentially reliable, and reinstate their past service after a 2-month probation. The union insisted on all the boys being taken. It was ready to give an undertaking as to the future conduct of the boys
and
to
agree
to
any
future 16
resorted to a wildcat strike.
action
by
the
management
if
the
boys
The management did not agree. The union’s
application to the government to institute a Board of Conciliation was to no avail. It organized a massive demonstration before the Legislative Assembly and a colossal meeting at the Marina on March 26, but the government 17
would not budge from its policy as outlined in its October communiqué.
The union was thus compelled to settle with the management on the latter’s terms. All but 30 boys were taken back, 200 of them as fresh hands with no 18
benefit of previous service. The strike ended on April 1, 1938.
Certain aspects of the strike are worth noting. First, the wildcat strike was initiated by the younger elements, who were not members of the union and who came to the union only after their efforts to move the welfare committee failed. The older workers did not however dare go against the younger workers.
Second, the illegality of the strike and the fact of the strikers being ineligible
to
be
members
put
the
union
in
an
uncomfortable
position,
unable either to go against the boys or support them wholeheartedly. The only course open to the union was to try to involve the government, which however refused to side with the workers because of their violation of the government
policy
of
October
22,
1937.
The
union
was
ultimately
compelled to agree to an ‘internal settlement’ on the company’s terms.
Third,
both
the
management
and
the
union
kept
the
Minister
for
Labour and the Chief Minister informed of the situation. The management made the workers an offer on March 17, at the behest of Rajagopalachari, 19
whom it had met the same day.
While the management was able at every
stage to get a hearing from the Chief Minister and obtain his approval for the action contemplated by them, the union leaders seemed to have met only with rebuffs.
Fourth, the union appeared to have been more concerned about
its
rivalry with the welfare committee than with the immediate problem. What roused
it
to
agitational
action
however
was
the
acceptance
by
Rajagopalachari of the invitation from the welfare committee to preside over the Annual Sports Day. At the meeting on the Marina, the union resolved on a
satyagraha
if
Rajagopalachari
decided
to
attend 20
Rajagopalachari had to cancel his visit to Binny and Co.
the
function.
Fifth, the use of police to expel the striking boys from the mill premises and
the
Congress
defence
of
police
government
action
from
the
by
the
working
Chief
Minister
alienated
class.
Rajagopalachari
the
would
believe rather the ‘very full and clear’ report of the Inspector General of Police than the union’s representation.
Sixth,
a
rift
developed
between
the
Madras
Labour
Union
and
the
Congress on this account, which widened during the municipal elections of October 1938. Finally, the ineffectualness of the union drove a number of young workers to seek guidance from the communists and other militant forces.
The Madras Labour Union found itself again in the same unenviable predicament as during the B. and C. Mills strike when a crisis overtook the Choolai Mills. Unlike in the B. and C. Mills, the union had a good rapport with the management of the Choolai Mills. It was a recognized union and the bulk of its membership was from this mill. It had collaborated with the employers in the management of the problems arising from the Depression. Instead of wage cuts and retrenchment, the Choolai Mills resorted to the expedient
of
having
a
class
of
workers
called
substitute
workers.
The
permanent workers numbering 1,550 continued to get the same wages and enjoy all the privileges they were entitled to prior to 1932. New workers taken in place of retired permanent men were not entitled to the privileges of bonus, sick leave and privilege leave, though the wage rates were the same as those of permanent men except, in the spinning department. Thus the burden of the economic depression was shifted on to new workers. The reduction of the weekly hours of work to 54 under the Factory Act of 1934 21
further caused reduction in the earnings of piece rate workers.
Naturally, there was discontent among the temporary workers who were underpaid and remained without privileges even though they did the same work as the permanent men and had put in quite a number of years of service. They demanded that their temporary status be made permanent. The company pleaded its inability to concede this demand, as the additional financial burden could not be borne by the company, which was already running at a loss.
The capacity to pay became the main issue, which was referred to a Board of Conciliation, consisting of a retired Judge Dewan Bahadur C.V. Viswanatha Mayor
of
Sastry,
Madras.
contention
that
obligations
arising
K.
Sriramulu
The
its
Board
financial out
of
Naidu
of
Sivashanmugam
Conciliation
position
the
and
would
granting
of
accepted
not
permit
permanency
the it
to
Pillai,
the
company’s
to
meet
all
the
substitute
22
workers, even though the workers’ grievances were legitimate.
The workers were disappointed. They suspected the credentials of the members
of
maintained
the
that
board the
who
board
were,
had
not
in
their
opinion,
scrutinized
the
anti-labour.
company’s
They
accounts
properly but had merely accepted the company’s statement. On June 10, 1938,
the
23
union
gave
a
notice
of
strike
to
commence
from
June
17.
Rajagopalachari sent a telegram summoning Giri to Madras to persuade the union against its unwise decision, as he believed that ‘Labour should respect the
sanctity 24
Convention’.
of
the
first
effort
establishing
Court
of
Enquiry
and
The management had locked out the workers on June 17.
With Giri’s intervention and prolonged negotiations, it was agreed that the Labour
Commissioner
S.V.
Ramamurthy
would
examine
the
company’s
capacity
to
pay
and
submit
a
report
to
the
Government.
The
workers
25
returned to work on July 20, 1938.
The
Labour
Commissioner’s
report
on
November
21,
1938,
was
in
favour of the employer. It reaffirmed the Conciliation Board’s conclusion that the mills did not have the capacity to pay increased wages. The report 26
was not published, but the findings were made known to the union.
The union leadership was in a quandary. If it accepted the report it would be acquiescing in the perpetuation of the injustice to the ‘substitute workers’. It would have to take the plunge and organise a strike. This would further worsen the financial position of the company and cause its collapse.
Politically, the union had fallen out of favour with the Congress. In the municipal
elections
of
October
1938,
the
Congress
did
not
choose
Selvapathi Chettiar, the union leader and sitting Congress Councillor, as its candidate.
An
influential
businessman
was
chosen
instead.
Selvapathi
Chettiar stood for elections as an independent candidate supported by the Madras Labour Union, and won by a narrow majority against the official Congress nominee. The Congress expelled him and asked to resign his seat in the Legislature Assembly, which he had won as a Congress candidate. The union protested arguing that his election was in recognition of his services to the cause of labour as the union leader, and that there was no need for him to resign his seat in the assembly, as long as he enjoyed the confidence of the union. He did not therefore resign his seat. But he had by these 27
actions become a persona non grata with the Congress.
In these circumstances, the union could not count on the support of the Congress
ministry.
Things
dragged
on
until
on
February
9,
1939,
the
temporary hands went on a stay-in-strike on their own. The management called in the police to evict the workers. The explosive situation was defused by the intervention of the Labour Minister Giri, who tactfully persuaded the workers to leave the premises, and promised to correspond with the owners at Bombay and let the workers know of the position in a week or 10 days. 28
The workers resumed work on February 11.
On February 21, the Minister
informed the union that the owners had expressed their inability to meet any of the demands of the workers. On February 22, the general body of the union met and decided to serve the company with a 24 hours’ notice of strike. Selvapathi Chettiar and the moderate leadership did not attend this meeting. Thiru. Vi. Ka. arrived late for the meeting, which was presided in 29
his absence by Chakkarai Chettiar. It was clearly the militants’ day.
The strike commenced the next day. The strikers resorted to picketing. The picketers were arrested and charged under Section 341 of Indian Penal Code and Sections 75 and 71, Clause 11, of the City Police Act. Over a hundred
picketers
were
arrested
in
the
very
first
30
fortnight.
The
government, which was helpless in getting redress of any of the grievances of the workers, came out with a long press communiqué on March 5, 1939, in which the various steps taken by the government were described and the workers
were
criticized
for
going
on
strike
and
resorting
to
‘intense
picketing’ which was in violation of the well-recognized practice accepted by all labour organizations’. The communiqué did not give particulars of the workers’ demands. The union issued a rejoinder to this communiqué on March 5. It criticized the government’s condemnation of picketing when the 31
cases against the arrested picketers were being tried in courts.
The strike continued. The union stopped picketing on March 24 upon being informed by the Labour Commissioner that the management had expressed
its
intention
to
the
government
not
to
run
the
mills
till
a
32
settlement was reached with the workers.
On
April
1,
1939,
the
Commissioner
of
Police
reported
that
the
management had decided to close down the mills and wind up the business. Rajagopalachari
asked
communication
that
communication
would
Giri
they
to
had
help
to
get
from
decided inform
the
to
management
close
the
the
labourers
a
definite
business. that
Such
there
was
a
no
further use in protesting and that the strikers could go home or find other employment instead of carrying on demonstrations. On April 6, 1939, the government issued a press note informing that the Board of Directors of the mills were convening a meeting of the shareholders on May 3, 1939, to 33
consider the winding up of the company.
This announcement was a knockout blow to the union and the workers. It was not then known that the company’s decision to close the mills had been taken long before the strike commenced, and that the strike was just an excuse. The union leadership was blamed for the disaster that had overtaken the
workers.
Congressmen
campaigned
among
the
workers
to
convince
them that the government had done all it could and that the union leaders 34
alone were to blame. politics
had
Over 2,000 workers were on the streets but ugly party
extinguished
all
humanism,
as
Thiru.
Vi.
Ka.
rued
in
his
35
memoirs.
The
Choolai
Mills
strike
demonstrated
the
limitations
of
the
labour
policy of the Congress ministry. The process of conciliation boards, and courts of enquiry, the sanctity of which was so much spoken of, did not run
smoothly and was not effective, unless the workers submitted tamely to the denial of their just rights. Indeed the justice of the cause for which workers were
fighting
was
put
in
the
background
and
forgotten.
The
forms
of
struggle and the sanctity of procedures were all that mattered. The outburst against workers’ picketing sounded ironical when it came from those who had only a few years earlier indulged in intensive picketing of toddy shops and textile shops. The advice to workers to go home and not waste time in demonstrations betrayed callousness. The government failed to take any positive step to prevent the closure of the mills.
Rajagopalachari’s attendance at the 1939 Annual Sports Day conducted by the welfare committee of B. and C. Mills, coming at a time when the Choolai Mills strike was in progress, might have been intended to taunt the Madras Labour Union, which had parted ways with the Congress and failed to uphold the sanctity of the conciliation process, and it caused considerable 36
heartburn among the workers.
For the union, it was a very serious setback
and a near debacle; it lost its main base; still it was not destroyed. It would appear that the workers in the textile mills were more disillusioned with the government than with the union leadership and resolved to remain united against the combination of the employer and the government. The strikes in the Madras Textile Mills had on the whole helped to raise working class consciousness.
Reference has been made in the previous chapter to the partial strike of Madras Tramway workers on March 2, 1937, in protest against the dismissal of the General Secretary, S. Somasundaram, from service a day earlier. That strike failed and eight persons including five office bearers of the union were dismissed. Basudev was able to get the three non-office bearers reinstated on
the plea that they were misled by trained communist propagandists and 37
were more sinned against than sinners.
After the Congress ministry took power, the union redoubled its efforts to get the five office bearers reinstated, but its petitions were of no avail; the five dismissed men went on a hunger strike on February 28, 1938, outside 38
Fort St. George.
This drew support from other workers. Workers marched
in procession on March 2 with Congress flags to a meeting organized by the Madras Provincial Federation of Trade Unions. One leader of the toddy tappers
union,
processions
Samarapuri,
and
demonstration
meetings
was
also took
organized
in
joined place
which
the
hunger
daily. all
On
the
trade
39
strike.
March
5,
unions
in
Similar a
huge
the
city
participated. Carrying Congress flags and red flags, 5,000 workers marched from the Napier’s Park to the Assembly Compound where Giri addressed the workers. The leaders of the various unions appealed to those on hunger strike to end their fast and promised to call a general strike, if the demand for their reinstatement was not conceded. The workers ended their hunger 40
strike.
The
tramway
workers
took
a
strike
ballot
on
March
11
and
voted
overwhelmingly for a general strike. A petition containing 42 grievances including the main demand for reinstatement of the victimized was sent to 41
the agent and the labour commissioner.
The President and Vice President of the Union, K. Venkatasamy Naidu and Sarma respectively, as well as other union leaders held talks with the agent,
Birkinshaw,
on
March
22,
but
the
agent 42
demand. Nor would he agree to arbitration.
refused
to
concede
any
The workers held general
body meetings on March 22, 23 and 24 and decided to give notice of strike.
43
Sarma appealed to Giri to intervene;
the union did not want to give room
for a complaint that it failed to explore, even at the eleventh hour, a chance for settlement.
On April 9, the government issued a press communiqué appealing to the workers not to go on a strike. In its opinion, the omission to reinstate a few persons could not be a justification for disorganizing public service even for 44
a day.
The government then tried to make the agent agree to arbitration.
Finally, the agent yielded but would have only the issue of reinstatement referred to the arbitrator. The union, on its part, agreed to this and the government, with the concurrence of the Chief Justice, appointed Justice V. Panduranga Rao to arbitrate in the dispute on May 3.
On June 22, the arbitrator ruled in favour of the union. He concluded that this was a clear case of victimization for associating with the labour 45
union and the strike of March 2, 1937.
The agent, Birkinshaw, accepted the ruling and not only reinstated the five office bearers but also agreed to grant the dismissed workers pay for the period they were unemployed. He also refunded the annual increments that the workers had had to forfeit following the strike of March 2, as also the 46
fine of three days’ wages imposed on all strikers.
News of the management accepting the award both in letter and spirit and
carrying
it
out
to
its
logical
consequences
was
such
a
surprise
to
Rajagopalachari that he commented in the file, ‘If this is true I should say Mr.
Birkinshaw
is
an
extraordinary
man’
and
went
further
to
issue
a
government communiqué on July 16, recording the appreciation of the loyal way in which the management had carried out the award of the arbitrator to
47
its logical consequences.
The
acknowledgement
of
surprise
and
public
appreciation of the management’s compliance implied that the government was not normally able to enforce awards when they were not in favour of the management. As the arbitrator had pointed out, the dismissals were made without notice or enquiry, without giving the workers an opportunity to defend themselves. Worse still, they were not even told ex / post facto why they had been condemned. In order to undo this injustice, the workers had to mobilize on a great scale and threaten a general strike. In order to get the management agree to arbitration they had to drop all other demands, which the agent refused to submit to arbitration. These ‘sacrifices’ on the part of the workers were ‘natural’ and ‘common’ and hence would not require any special communiqué of appreciation.
The union started by the communists was under their effective control even though the President and the Vice President were Congressmen. In the events of 1938, it avoided the mistakes committed in March 1937, namely, the non-mobilization of all the workers of the company. The hunger-strike technique combined with processions and meetings was used to achieve the maximum mobilization possible, not only of the employees of the company but of all trade unions in the city. The newspapers the Indian Express and 48
The Hindu had also been favourable to the cause of the workers.
The
union’s membership grew to 1,503 while the rival old union’s membership 49
shrank to 45.
In
his
arguments
before
the
arbitrator,
the
advocate
for
the
management, Nugent Grant, claimed that the agent enjoyed in March 1937 the freedom to victimize and the changed political conditions had deprived 50
him of this freedom.
The absolute right to dismiss one’s employees had
been claimed by Binny and Co. when it refused to submit to arbitration the dispute arising out of the half-timers’ strike. In this case the dismissals were sought to be defended as arising out of normal managerial review of the performance of duties by workers. That this was not so was successfully proved during the hearings and the verdict of ‘victimization’ was inevitable. The legal right to victimize, sought to be claimed by Grant, could not be sustained. To that extent the case was a victory for the workers.
The
workers
in
the
printing
presses
of
Madras
had
the
most
well-
organized union under the leadership of the communists like Ghate and Iyengar. Originally known as Madras Press Workers Union when it was founded by the Madras Labour Protection League, it was reorganized on July 31, 1937, under the guidance of Iyengar, C.P. Ilango, Jeevanandam and others and was registered under the Trade Unions Act as the Madras Press 51
Labour Union on April 26, 1938.
It had a democratic constitution. Each
printing press had its own press committee consisting of workers employed therein. These press committees functioned under the executive committee of the union. As the union’s activities were spreading from press to press, the owners
of
harassed
the
printing
union
activists
presses and
did
not
dismissed
take those
kindly they
to
its
growth.
considered
the
They most
troublesome. The workers were thus forced to struggle in order defend their right to trade union activity and against victimization. The union actively intervened.
In
a
few
cases,
like
the
Progressive
Printers,
the
union
was
successful in getting redressal immediately without resorting to a prolonged 52
strike. In many other cases the battles were long and bitter.
The strike at the Good Pastor Press on September 10, 1937, was one such. The press dismissed three workers including one Arogyaswamy with
30 years’ service, ostensibly for misbehaviour, but really for union activities. The missionaries who ran the press tried to run the press by bringing in outsiders under police protection. The workers resorted to picketing, and five workers including the union secretary were sent to prison. After 25 days, the workers returned to work on October 5 on the proprietor’s assurance to 53
reinstate the dismissed men when new vacancies arose.
Another strike at the Guardian Press on May 19, 1938, was against the dismissal of a workman. The workman, who had absented himself for 25 days without leave had been dismissed on May 15. The strike ended on May 25 with the dispute being referred to the Mayor of Madras, Venkataswami Naidu. The arbitrator recommended the reinstatement of the worker, the recognition of the union and an end to the practice of victimization. The 54
workers however had to forego pay for the strike period.
The most prolonged and bitter conflict was the one that was fought out between
the
management
of
the
Diocesan
Press
and
its
workers.
The
management had conceded, under pressure from the union, a number of workers’ demands such as monthly pay instead of piece rates, 6 days’ casual leave and 7 days’ sick leave. But as payback they discharged 10 workmen whom
they
considered
surplus
on
May
14,
1938.
The
union
protested,
contending that it was victimization for union activity. As the management did
not
yield,
the
workers
took
a
strike
ballot
on
May
23,
which
was
overwhelmingly in favour of a strike. The Commissioner for Labour who was asked by the Labour Minister to enquire into the case endorsed the management’s contention that only workers with less than 3 years’ service had been discharged. The workers struck work on June 5 and resorted to
picketing. Over 50 picketers were arrested on the first two days of picketing. 55
A long struggle appeared to be in store for the workmen.
Thanks to the efforts of Iyengar and Giri and the intervention of the Rajagopalachari, the two parties agreed to settlement through a Court of Enquiry. The strike was withdrawn on July 11, and a court of enquiry was 56
set up on August 3 with S.V. Ramamurthy as the Commissioner of Labour.
Giving its findings, the court concluded that there were no surplus hands as contended by the management. Hence the discharge of the ten men on these 57
grounds was not justified.
The management repudiated the findings of the court. It claimed an unquestionable absolute right to decide the number of men required for their work and questioned the competence of the court to pass judgement on this matter. The government then came out with a special communiqué explaining that the issue before the court was not whether the master who paid was and must be the sole judge of the number of workers required for the business, but whether, on the facts stated and admissions made by the management,
the
discharge
of
the
men
was
justified.
It
advised
the
58
management to accept the finding of the court.
The management did not relent and the workers went on strike from January 31, 1939, demanding the implementation of the findings of the court of enquiry and the cancellation of the new system brought into force on June 1, 1938. Picketing was resorted to and 10 picketers were arrested. 59
The management declared a lockout from February 2, 1939.
The management’s attitude was criticized by the Tamil Nadu Congress Committee. The workers of the Associate Printers struck work on February
9 as they suspected their employers of executing orders for the Diocesan Press.
They
returned
the
next
day
on
their
employer’s
denial
of
the
60
rumour.
The management sought to divide the workers by offering to reopen the press on February 13, 1939. This brought forth strong protests from the union, which issued a call for a general strike. The Labour Minister was annoyed that the management was virtually challenging the government’s policy in regard to trade disputes and that the bad example of Diocesan Press was being followed by other press owners leading to trouble in many 61
presses.
At long last the management yielded. Two of the discharged men had died
in
the
meantime.
The
management
took
back
the
other
eight
discharged men and the strike ended on March 2, 1939. Rajagopalachari took an active interest in the ending of the dispute and was successful in bringing around the management whose stand was undermining the labour policy
of
the
government.
The
union
on
its
part
had
left
unsettled
all
62
grievances other than the reinstatement of ten men.
Yet another strike that broke out on the issue of victimization was the one in Hoe and Co. Six leading members of the union were dismissed on January 1, 1939. The union’s efforts to get the order rescinded were in vain and the workers struck work on January 26. Picketing was resorted to and 39 workers were arrested. The strike was brought to an immediate end by mutual agreement, with T.T. Krishnamachari, Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA), and Ghate, the communist leader, acting as conciliators. The six dismissed men were taken back and workers were paid wages for the strike
period.
The
union
was
again
granted
recognition
and
the
management promised not to resort to victimization. The management and the union together made a joint appeal to the government to release all 63
convicted picketers.
This was one case in which the union was able to
follow up the settlement of the main issue with the settlement of other grievances such as 5 days’ festival holidays, 15 days’ casual leave, gratuity, etc.
Another case of settlement through direct negotiations, albeit after a reference to a court of enquiry, was the dispute between Kesari Printing Works and its workers in May 1939 over the discharge of six workers. The union did not accept the management’s contention that the discharge was due to recession in trade. It demanded their continuance in service. The two parties appealed to the government jointly on May 3 to set up a court of arbitration. Accordingly the government set up on May 5 a court of enquiry consisting
of
Venkataswami
Naidu,
Krishnamachari
and
C.G.
Reddy,
Assistant Chief Inspector of Factories. But when the court met on May 14, the management and the Madras Press Labour Union informed it that they had come to an agreement by which all the six discharged workers would be taken
back
and
appointment
of
the a
period court
of of
absence
treated
arbitration
64
as
on
duty.
seemed
to
have
The made
very the
management review its untenable stand.
The longest strike in the printing industry during this phase occurred at the Madras Publishing House in February 1939 when Duraiswami, an active union
member,
was
served
with
a
notice
of
dismissal
for
alleged
insubordination. The union had been pressing for recognition and for other demands such as the cancellation of the shift system, wage increments, 15 days’ casual leave and one month’s sick leave. The management refused to
consider these demands, which in its opinion required clearance with the Federation of Master Printers. The strike commenced on February 24. The management sought to carry on the work with the help of supervisors, loyal workers
and
new
recruits.
The
night
work
it
arranged
for
this
purpose
violated the Factories Act and the strikers brought the fact to the attention of the Inspector of Factories, who threatened to prosecute the press based on 65
this information.
Workers also resorted to picketing and by February 27, 53 workers were thrown behind bars. A gruesome tragedy occurred during picketing when Appu, a gardener, threw himself before the car carrying blacklegs, and was run
over
and
grievously
66
injured.
‘The
Labour
Commissioner’s
intervention was of no avail and even the Labour Minister could do nothing. The management was stubborn and planned to restart the press from March 67
16 with fresh hands. But the workers thwarted the move.
Giri personally
intervened and made the management agree to certain terms, but on March 22
the
management
went
back
on
the
agreement
and
announced
their
decision to close the press. Giri was annoyed at having to deal with the most unbelievable
and
unbusiness-like
people.
He
asked
the
Inspector
of
Factories not to give the management any assistance if it tried to reopen the press. The management was in fact prevented from reopening when it tried 68
to do so on April 24.
The workers were able to hold out for long because of the great help in kind they received from the people through the union. At long last the strike was brought to an end on June 12, 1939, through the good offices of S. Venkataraman, Secretary of Madras Mahajana Sabha and member of the Madras District Congress Labour Subcommittee. The management agreed
to take back all strikers without any victimization. The workers agreed that the management had the sole choice in determining the work on hand and the number of workmen required for the work. However, Venkataraman, in consultation with the management and the Press Committee of the Madras Press Labour Union, would have to draw up a seniority list. A six-month moratorium
on
retrenchment
was
agreed
to.
One
month’s
extra
wages
would be paid to those workers who could not be taken back before June 30, 69
1939.
If the strike in Madras Publishing House was the longest, that in the Free Press (India) Ltd., where the Indian Express, the Dinamani and the Andhra Prabha were printed, was the fiercest. The proprietor of the press, Ramnath Goenka, was ruthless. The Madras Press Labour Union had been pressing for recognition and for redress of many grievances such as heavy fines for little offences. The proprietor was trying to have a pocket company union of 70
his own and was determined to crush the press’ labour union.
Three workers were dismissed in quick succession within a period of 20 days in May 1939. On June 16, the General Secretary and Ramamurthi, Secretary
of
Madras
Provincial
Trade
Union
Congress,
held
talks
with
Goenka. According to Iyengar, Goenka agreed to take the three men back on their expressing regret. But Goenka denied any formal binding undertaking, as the talks were purely informal and personal. His grievance was that ever since the workers began to join the union they had become defiant and insolent. In any case he would not take back Elumalai who was leading union processions and shouting abusive slogans. He warned Iyengar, ‘Please take
finally
from
me
that
if
the
workers
will
be
so
unreasonable
as
to
continue the demonstrations and processions led by Elumalai, I shall be
forced to dispense with the services of such persons who will be a party to this kind of indiscipline.’ He was willing to have the whole case referred to 71
the Commissioner of Labour or the Labour Minister.
But when the union asked him if a joint application could be made, he did
not
reply.
That
would
amount
to
recognition
of
the
union
as
representative of his workers.
Even as arbitration was being discussed, the management continued its offensive against union members. Three more cycle-peons were discharged on June 24 for not getting their own cycles. The union had no alternative 72
but to go on a strike from June 27.
The management used all tactics to break the strike. It brought 28 new workers into the press and made them stay inside for the whole week. The machine men were made to stay in for over ten hours during the day. All these flagrant breaches of the Factory Act were brought to the notice of the Inspector of Factories by the Union. The Inspectorate, however, did not take 73
any action.
The management floated a rival union and campaigned through notices 74
and leaflets for support to the rival union.
The management used the columns of the newspapers under its control to fulminate against the union. The Indian Express invited the government to save the workers who like dumb cattle were being driven by irresponsible labour leadership from its pernicious influence. Rajagopalachari made a wry comment, ‘This wisdom will last only until the present strike.’ Giri agreed and commented, ‘They would have given a different advice if they were on a 75
strike in any other industry. They were our worst critics before.’
Obviously
the high-handed manner in which Goenka was handling the dispute did not meet with their approval.
Notwithstanding this, the government extended full support to Goenka by arresting the picketers, by imposing Section 144 and by condoning the violations of the Factory Act. Over 85 workers were imprisoned and the area around the press was barred to strikers by the imposition of Section 144. 76
Processionists were attacked by the police and beaten with belts.
The management adopted a deceptively conciliatory posture in agreeing to refer the dispute to arbitration by Jagannatha Das. But its tactics were exposed when it wanted the arbitrator to include the question as to whether the management could not also dismiss 28 men from among the strikers so as to enable them to retain the services of the 28 newly recruited men. The union
could
not
management
and
had
a
did
right
not to
accept
this
victimise
offer,
and
which
employ
implied 77
blacklegs.
that
the
That
no
blackleg could have a right to displace a striker had been one of the main demands of the trade union movement.
Iyengar
wrote
to
the
Congress
President
Rajendra
Prasad
about
the
police assistance to break the strike. Rajendra Prasad requested Giri to look 78
into the complaint.
The
police
repression,
the
splitting
tactics,
the
massive
counter-
propaganda, the inability to extend the strike to all sections of the press all wore
down
the
workers
and
the
strike
was
called
off
on
July
27,
1939.
Goenka had informally agreed to take back all the affected workers except 79
Elumalai and by September, 50 out of the 83 strikers had been reinstated.
The strike exposed the real nature of the ‘nationalist’ press, which was as anti-labour as any other employer when their own workers were involved. It also underlined the uphill task workers’ unions would have to face when they
confronted
an
employer
capable
of
using
all
the
weapons
at
his
command – State support, money power, newspapers, unscrupulous tactics of ‘divide and rule’.
While
most
of
these
strikes
led
by
the
communists
were
against
victimization, a strike of a different kind took place in the Government Press in September when in protest against the promotion of an Anglo-Indian overlooking
the
claims
of
others,
250
men
in
the
machine
department
staged a stay-in strike on September 23 and were joined the next day by all the workers. The strike ended on September 30 on the assurance of the Chief Minister that their demands would be considered sympathetically and the dismissal orders served on the workers would be withdrawn. Sarma led 80
the Government Press Workers Union.
A strike for economic demands occurred in May 1938 in WIMCO. The WIMCO
Workers’
Union,
formed
on
the
eve
of
the
visit
of
the
Royal
Commission on Labour and active in the early thirties, had become defunct, leading to the cancellation of its registration. With the assumption of office by the Congress, WIMCO workers revived the defunct union under Sarma and reregistered it on March 17, 1938. The union raised demands for better pay and other facilities, which the company rejected as the conditions of service in WIMCO were better than those elsewhere. The workers struck 81
work on May 12.
The
company
spurned
all
efforts
at
conciliation
and
reference
to
arbitration on the part of the government. Even a modest suggestion by the
Commissioner of Labour to grant ten days’ casual leave was turned down. The government persisted in its efforts and finally set up on July 30 a court of enquiry with Khan Bahadur Javad Hussain and Khan Sahib Bahadur. The 82
workers returned to work on August 3.
The court rejected all workers’ demands except the one for the grant of ten
days’
casual
83
leave.
The
workers
were
dissatisfied
with
the
court’s
findings and vented their discontent through sectional strikes and go-slow agitation. Three lining workers in the packing department demanded an increase in wages on January 23, 1939. The demand was turned down and the workers stopped work forcing the whole factory to be closed as the process of manufacture was interrupted. Work was resumed the next day but
the
February
workers 7
to
the
slowed
down
84
work.
Commissioner
of
The
Labour
company that
complained
production
was
on
being
crippled by the workers’ go-slow tactics. Production was down by 70 per cent. There were also acts of arson and when the officers tried to put out a 85
fire they were obstructed.
The union accused the company of setting fire
to claim insurance. It demanded an impartial enquiry into the fire accidents in the factory and pleaded for the release of workers arrested on suspicion. The company had closed down certain sections of the factory affected by the fires.
Many
workers
were
laid
off.
In
April,
the
union
demanded
compensation in the form of advance of money for the workers still out of work. With great reluctance the company agreed to pay an advance of Rs15 to every worker not yet reemployed other than the 18 men under trial, on the clear understanding that the company was making no commitment to 86
reemploy any particular recipient of advance.
The month of June went by and 124 workers were still out of work. They decided
to
intention
go to
on the
a
fast
unto
death
government
and
from to
July
the
10
and
Congress
intimated
their
President.
The
government intervened quickly and averted the hunger strike by getting the management to agree to pay an advance of Rs 7.8.0 per mensem until the 87
date of reemployment and to absorb all of them within three months.
The struggle that began as a strike for economic demands took, on its failure to achieve them through the normal process of arbitration, the forms of shop-floor resistance and minor acts of sabotage. The company took advantage of this to close the factory partially and lay off the workers. The struggle
then
was
compensation.
transformed
The
union’s
to
one
demand
for for
reinstatement
and
non-recoverable
lay-off lay-off
compensation was not accepted by the company, nor was it pressed when the company agreed to pay only an advance recoverable in installments after 88
reinstatement.
The company tried to utilize the closure to browbeat the union to accept a long list of conditions relating to the functioning of the union and the resort to strike as a precondition for the grant of advance to workmen 89
proposed by it on May 1, 1939.
Engineering workers were also very active during this period. The PWD workshops saw a number of strikes. The first occurred immediately after the Congress ministry was installed in office. On July 12, 1937, 189 out of the 397 workers struck work in protest against the introduction of piece rate system
and
the
turn
system.
Other
demands
included
the
revision
of
gratuity rules and introduction of a provident fund. The strike was called off on July 22 with the government cancelling the turn system and promising to
90
examine the other demands.
The workshop workers went on strike again
on July 4, 1938, in protest against the withholding of increment due to the workers. The workers returned to work the next day on the advice of the 91
Superintendent to refer the question of increments to the government.
Another one-day stay-in strike occurred on December 23, 1938, in protest against the refusal of the superintendent of the workshops who was also the president of the cooperative society to grant fresh loans and against the delay
in
giving
effect
to
the
half-an-anna
increment
sanctioned
by 92
government. The union president advised the workers to resume work. these
strikes
were
spontaneous
actions
of
workers
with
the
the All
union
intervening after the commencement of the strike. The first strike ended after the union president met the PWD Minister, Yakub Hasan, and got an assurance to cancel the turn system and consider the other demands.
But the turn system was introduced again in July 1939 and workers went on strike again on July 24. The union had discussions with the authorities and called off the strike on August 9 when they found no alternative to the 93
turn system until more work could be found in the workshop.
The PWD
Workshop workers thus continued to be victims of underemployment.
The turn system was again the cause of a strike in Saraswathi Foundry whose 75 workers stayed out on July 16, 1939. They were getting only 3 days’ work in a week. The strike ended the next day on the assurance of the management to abolish the system and instead to reduce the working hours 94
from 8 to 6, a gain for the workers when compared to the turn system.
If the workers of PWD workshops and Saraswathi Foundry struck work in protest against the turn system, the workers of Richardson and Cruddas went on strike demanding the introduction of the turn system to avoid the
lay
off
of
36
workers
proposed
by
the
management.
The
management
wanted the workers to help themselves mutually by taking leave in turns. 121 out of 150 workers struck work from January 25, 1939. They resorted to picketing, demonstrations and processions. The management tried to split the workers by reopening the factory on January 30. No striker turned up and the management engaged new hands. This provoked the strikers to intensify picketing and 40 strikers were arrested and convicted on January 95
31, and 37 were arrested on February 2. general
strike
for
one
day
on
February
The repression triggered a mini1
by
workers
belonging
to 96
foundries. The workers went in a huge procession in the Choolai area.
10
The
director of the company arrived from Bombay on February 3 and held talks with Sarma, the union president. The management agreed to take back all workers
who
had
been
laid
off,
to
introduce
the
shift
system
as
an
experimental measure and to discharge all the new hands recruited during the strike. 58 workers returned to work on February 6, and the other 77 on 97
their release from prison under the orders of the government. demonstrated
a
high
level
of
class
consciousness
not
only
This strike
among
the
striking workers but also among the engineering workers in the area who struck work for a day in solidarity with the strikers.
Type foundries occupied an intermediate position between engineering works and printing presses, their entire production being oriented to supply the presses. The workers in these foundries were unorganized. When a strike took place in two small type foundries, Standard Foundry and Arumugam Foundry on March 1, 1938, over the issue of grant of advance of pay, it was the
Madras
Press
Labour
Union
that
took
up
their
issue
and
tried
to
organise a union for type foundry workers. The strike in the two foundries
lasted till the end of March when a settlement was reached between the managements and the Press Labour Union according to which nearly half the number of workers were taken back immediately and the balance were 98
to be taken in due course.
The workers of South Indian Galvanising Works, under the leadership of Albert Jesudasan, won a reduction in the number of working hours by going 99
on a one-day strike on May 2, 1938.
A prolonged strike took place in Jamal Glass Works in 1938. Ten workers had
absented
themselves
on
May
11
and
when
an
explanation
was
demanded of them 87 out of the 124 workers struck work from May 12. The issue
involved
was
not
very
clear.
Ill-treatment
and
habitual
assault
on
workmen appeared to be the cause behind the strike. The Commissioner of Labour visited the factory and concluded that the dispute was a matter of personal
quarrels
and
government
intervention
was
not
called
for.
The
strike was called off unconditionally by August 2. The union was led by 100
Sarma.
The drivers and conductors of all the bus transport companies in the city of Madras struck work on August 25, 1938, demanding better wages and shorter
working
hours.
The
Deputy
Commissioner
of
Police
(Traffic)
intervened and the strike was called off on an assurance that there would be no victimization. But the owners did not honour the understanding and the workers struck work again on September 5 in protest against victimization. The strike dragged on and petered out by the third week of November 1938. The cause of the failure would appear to be the lack of proper organization 101
and staying power.
The strike fever affected even cottage industries. Workers in 11 button factories in Royapuram, Washermanpet and Tondiarpet, numbering 80 in all, went on strike from July 24, 1937, when the proprietors did not honour the promise to grant an increase of one anna in their wages. The workers took out processions and held meetings. Sarma organized these workers into a union after the commencement of the strike and negotiated with employers.
Seven
proprietors
executed
agreements
on
day
one
to
the
pay
a
minimum wage of 7 annas. Four proprietors refused to fall in line and replaced the 15 strikers with new ones. The strike ended thus, as a partial 102
success, on August 10, 1937.
To sum up, the formation of the popular Congress ministry aroused great
hopes
among
the
working
people
and
initially
stimulated
labour
organization and militancy. Defunct trade unions were revived and new trade unions sprang up in many hitherto unorganized industries. Trade union membership increased. The workers went on the offensive and the number
of
strikes
shot
up.
An
air
of
militancy
prevailed.
Picketing,
processions and demonstrations became common.
Even backward trades and unorganized industries were engulfed by the upsurge. For example, workers belonging to a number of button factories joined Madras
together
to
Printing
organise
Labour
a
strike.
Union,
for
Industry-wise example,
unionism
brought
grew.
together
The
workers
belonging to a large number of printing presses and even type foundries.
The rise of trade unionism was viewed with alarm by the capitalists who refused to recognise unions and resorted to victimization of union activists. As a result, most strikes were against victimization and for the recognition of
the
unions.
Even
strikes
which
commenced
with
economic
demands
ended up with demands for reinstatement of victimized workers. Thus in many cases the original demands were often forgotten and only the issue of victimization remained. Certain industries faced a trade recession on the eve of
the
World
War
II
and
the
workers
had
to
wage
bitter
struggles
for
salvaging their jobs or for equitable sharing of the adversity.
This period was noteworthy for the rise and spread of socialist thought and
for
the
communists
deep
in
the
commitment trade
union
and
involvement
movement.
They
of
socialists
provided
a
and
militant
leadership to many a struggle. The impact of this militancy was not confined to the unions under their control but also permeated unions under known reformist leadership. As a result, the strikers belonging to reformist unions also exhibited a high level of class consciousness and solidarity. Sectional strikes and even actions by small groups were transformed to general strikes at least at the factory level.
The developments in the city trade union movement were part of the province-wide and countrywide upsurge in trade union militancy. It has however to be stated that while there was on the average a high percentage of success among the strikes all over the country, the strikes in the city were for the most part either unsuccessful or only partially successful. A big set back was the closure of the Choolai Mills throwing over 2500 workers out of a job. Threat of closure and temporary closure were the tactics employed by the employers to beat down the workers to a less favourable compromise, in addition
to
the
traditional
tactics
of
blacklegging,
promotion
of
pocket
unions and indenting the help of the police.
Even though the Congress had accepted office in order to destroy the new constitution from within, the Congress ministry, under the helm of
Rajagopalachari, forgot this major issue and began to function in such a way as to prove its administrative capability to the public and the British. The government’s labour policy incorporating the trade union philosophy of Giri was intended to channelise worker’s discontent into class collaboration and put down working class militancy. The boards of conciliation and the courts of enquiry helped to mitigate the conflict between capital and labour and
to
obtain
for
labour
certain
limited
concessions.
Yet
the
recommendations of the conciliation boards and the findings of the courts of
enquiry
were
not
mandatory
and
the
managements
often
refused
to
accept or implement them with the result that labour was forced to militant action to enforce the findings of the courts of enquiry and the awards of arbitrators. The government, which was usually helpless in the face of the recalcitrance
of
circumstances
the
employers,
forced
the
latter
was
to
stern
stage
towards
stay-in
the
strikes
or
workers go
on
when
wildcat
strikes or resort to picketing of blacklegs. The large scale arrest of picketers, the imposition of section 144 in the areas close to the factory, the banning of processions measures shadowed
and
meetings
intended labour
to
under
curb
leaders,
the
the
City
Police
militancy
particularly
of
Act
the
communists.
were
all
workers. Their
repressive
The
police
speeches
were
reported to the government. When a police officer complained about the virulent
attack
on
the
police
officials
in
the
speeches
of
labour
leaders
Murugesan and others, Rajagopalachari approved of the defamation case foisted against them and had them convicted in a court of law. He called from
the
police
verbatim
reports
of
speeches 103
substantiate a case for prosecuting him.
of
Iyengar
in
order
to
The arrest of Soli Batliwala, a
Bombay socialist, in October 1937 was the earliest sign of the anti-left policy of the ministry. Giri justified the arrest, saying that the Madras government
believed in the maxim; ‘Govern or get out’ and that the ways and methods of communists went beyond the limits of constitutional propriety and they 104
had to be tackled in an effective manner.
The Congress ministry’s labour policy did not run smoothly. That policy had in view mainly the settlement of disputes over economic demands. But in practice most disputes arose over the question of victimization of trade union activitists. The protection of trade union members and office bearers from victimization needed to be ensured if the policy of internal settlement was to succeed. Realizing this, Krishnamurthy, a Congress labour MLA, gave notice of a private member bill, seeking to define and protect the rights and 105
privileges of members of registered trade unions.
The principles underlying the bill were: (i) to ensure by legislation that no member of a registered union could lose his job or suffer any lesser penalty such as reduction in rank etc. merely because he was a member of a union and had taken part in a strike agitation or negotiation in furtherance of the interests of the union; (ii) the trade union would be given due notice of and have the right to be consulted before any general change in the conditions of service was introduced; (iii) trade union representatives would have access to employers’ premises for the purpose of union activities; (iv) the union would be entitled to collect subscriptions and hold meetings in the
employers
premises;
and
(v)
trade
unions
would
have
the
right
of
affiliation.
The bill was welcomed by the city trade unions but opposed by the employers. The employers argued that the effect of the provincial legislation on
the
competitive
power
of
the
industries
should
be
taken
into
consideration and hence any legislation should be passed only by the central
106
government.
Finally, Krishnamurthy was persuaded to withdraw the bill,
after being assured that the government would come with a bill of its own. Rajagopalachari was particular that the considered views of all the major employers
should
be
ascertained
confidentially
before
formulating
the
107
government’s attitude.
Early
in
1939,
the
labour
minister
prepared
two
notes,
one
on
the
recognition of unions and settlement of trade disputes and the other on unemployment relief, and circulated it for the comments of employers and unions. He even convened conferences of employers to discuss these notes. The
notes
contemplated
the
following
stages
in
the
settlement
of
trade
disputes:
(i) reference of all disputes in the first instance to conciliators working under the commissioner of labour;
(ii) secrecy of the report of the conciliator except when the government considered that its publication would influence public opinion and thus pressurize the recalcitrant party;
(iii) reference to industrial courts headed by a district judge and assisted by representatives of labour and capital as assessors;
(iv) compulsory arbitration if the government so considered it necessary in public interest; and
(v) ban on strikes and lockouts during the above process. The note also contemplated the following principles to be adopted for the recognition of the unions:
(i) The Government would recognize a union to be representative if it had a certain percentage of the workforce as its members.
(ii)
Consultation
with
the
government-recognized
union
would
be
compulsory, even though the employer might also negotiate with nonrecognized unions.
(iii) No alteration in working conditions would be permitted without consulting the recognized union.
(iv)
Statistics
prevalent
in
would the
be
trade
gathered or
in
industry
regard to
to
form
working the
conditions
basis
of
any
108
negotiations.
25 trade unions in the province including the left-controlled unions such as the Madras Press Labour Union submitted a memorandum of their own in answer to the note. They stressed the need to incorporate a provision for
the
protection
of
union
members
against
victimization
and
for
the
banning the employment of blacklegs during strikes. They reiterated the principles contained in the private member bill but omitted in the Labour Ministry note. The Madras Labour Union submitted a separate statement of objections. According to it, the note fell short of the expectations of labour, being motivated by old-fashioned liberalism. It wanted a non-official to preside over the industrial courts. It objected to the government recognition of unions. As the government was itself partisan, such a move would result only
in
government-controlled 109
artibration.
unions.
It
also
criticized
compulsory
The
employers
Krishnamurthy’s
bill.
repeated In
their
the
objections
opinion,
the
they
bill
was
had
raised
premature.
to The
government should first take steps to create ‘sound trade unions’ before thinking of such a bill to regulate disputes. The possible adverse effect of a provincial
legislation
on
the
competitiveness
of
the
industry
was
110
reiterated.
Both sides also criticized the second note on unemployment relief. The unions were dissatisfied that it was limited to only one industry (namely the textile industry) and the relief was limited only to layoffs and retrenchments. They wanted it to be extended to cases of discharge, dismissal and forced 111
resignations consequent to strikes and disputes.
The employers, on their
part, thought it would be an unbearable burden on the textile industry 112
affecting its competitiveness in the world market.
The Congress ministry itself went out of office in October 1939 before 113
the two bills could take shape.
But this still-born legislation is of interest
because it presaged many of the latter-day legislations in free India.
Chapter XI
Conclusion
The British first developed Madras city purely as a trading centre and then
as
the
administrative
capital
of
the
presidency.
The
character
of
industrial development was determined by the role of the city as trading port and administrative capital and as a centre of higher education with the founding of the university. Absence of iron ore and coal deposits in the presidency
and
non-availability
of
cheap
electric
power
ruled
out
the
possibility of developing heavy industry such as mining, or the manufacture of
heavy
machinery.
The
development
was
therefore
directed
mainly
towards infrastructural industries, trade and services. The one exception was the
textile
industry,
which
too
did
not
expand
beyond
the
three
mills
established in the nineteenth century. It was however the biggest employer of labour.
Other employers of sizable workforces were the railway workshops at Perambur,
the
Madras
Port
Trust,
the
Madras
Electric
Supply
and
Tramways, the Government Press and the oil distributing companies. The Corporation
of
Madras
employed
a
large
number
of
conservancy
and
sanitation workers besides workers in the workshops. The Public Works Department
also
had
a
workshop
employing
a
considerable
number
of
engineering workers. Otherwise the pattern was one of small units each employing
at
most
a
few
hundred
workers
such
as
the
match
factory,
printing presses, tanneries and small engineering workshops.
Besides these workers who could be classified as proletariat, there were labouring men like rickshaw pullers and toddy tappers. In a way, the city was a microcosm of the stunted industrial growth in a colonial framework.
Most
of
particularly
the
large
undertakings
the
British.
European
were
owned
personnel
and
also
run
by
managed
Europeans, government
undertakings such as the press. The government itself was foreign, and the rulers,
employers,
shop-level
managers
and
supervisors
were
European
while the workers were Indian and local. The natural contradiction between capital and labour was thus accentuated by the contradiction arising out of the racial divide, the bipartite situation in race relations that prevailed at the shop-floor level.
The working conditions were arduous. Workers had to toil from dawn to dusk and even longer with very little time for lunch or tea breaks. The workers, viewed
who
as
an
were
mostly
affront
to
expropriated
human
dignity
peasants the
and
methods
ruined used
to
artisans, enforce
punctuality and regular attendance, such as heavy fines, wage deductions, the
denial
of
leave
and
holidays,
and
physical
assaults
on
workmen
by
supervisors.
While wages were inadequate even for subsistence, the living conditions of workers were appalling. The overwhelming majority of workers lived in
overcrowded, unventilated, ill-lit, unsanitary slums. The long hours of work and the poor housing conditions had an adverse effect on the health of the workers
who
contracted
tuberculosis
and
other
diseases.
The
social
obligations on the workers’ family and the addiction to liquor as an escape from the brutal reality also contributed to heavy indebtedness from which no redemption appeared to be possible.
The workers’ struggles for the amelioration of their working and living conditions commenced from the very early years of the establishment of industries.
These
struggles
were
not
so
much
for
better
wages
and
emoluments as for easier working conditions commensurate with respect for
human
dignity.
They
demanded
intervals,
weekly
holidays,
festival
protested
against
humiliating
shorter
working
holidays,
leave
treatment,
rigorous
hours,
longer
facilities, discipline
etc., and
rest and
racist
attitude. The forms of protest included not only such indirect individual level actions as absenteeism, high turn over, thievery, etc., but also collective actions
like
riots
and
strikes.
Though
unions
had
not
yet
come
into
existence, the workers organized themselves on their own in an informal manner
for
collective
action
to
protest
against
the
humiliating
working
conditions. The leadership of these collective actions was in the hands of the skilled craftsmen, weavers, carpenters and skilled mechanics drawn from the artisan
communities
negotiations
with
the
of
old.
Again
employers
the
without
workers the
help
carried of
on
direct
outsiders.
They
demonstrated a high degree of unity and solidarity. On the one hand, they had
to
face
the
disruptive
tactics
of
the
employers
(both
private
and
government) who resorted to dismissals and victimisation and brought in outside labour to break strikes; on the other, they had to stand up to the
repressive
machinery
of
the
colonial
government,
which
stood
solidly
behind the employers. In this early period, the nationalist leaders stayed out without involving themselves in the struggles between capital and labour.
With the revival of nationalist activities during the post World War I period, a section of the nationalist leaders, particularly the Home Rulers, started evincing keen interest in the welfare of labour out of political and humanitarian
considerations.
In
fact,
they
themselves
were
to
a
certain
extent inspired by the example of the Russian Revolution, which highlighted the potential of the working class as a force behind political transformation. Trade
unions
started
springing
up
in
many
establishments
and
workers
launched struggles that were mostly reactive and not proactive, in as much as their aim was to neutralise the adverse after-effects of World War I. The employers were hostile to the trade union movement and the administration of Lord Pentland also was apathetic to the problem of labour. As a result, the trade unions had to fight for recognition, i.e., for the right to be heard by their employers. While the employers were prepared to meet them half way on the issue of economic demands, they were firm in their rejection of the demand for recognition. They resorted to victimization, which triggered many more struggles.
It
was
at
the
Amritsar
session
in
1919
that
the
Congress
adopted,
formally for the first time, a resolution on its policy towards labour. This resolution called on the provincial Congress committees and other affiliated organisations to promote labour unions throughout the country. However, by this time, the rift between Besant who wanted the total acceptance of the reforms bill and the other nationalists had widened and was reflected in the labour
movement
in
Madras.
The
Home
Rulers
who
were
until
then
dominant in the trade union movement vehemently opposed the Amritsar resolution
and
the
activities
of
Congress
members
among
workers.
The
subsequent adoption of the programme of non-cooperation by the INC in 1920 further embittered the relations between the two sections.
The
employers
reacted
to
the
strike
wave
by
forming
employers’
federation and urged the government to put down the militant workers and maintain law and order. The government on its part sought to defuse the situation by the institutionalization of grievance settlement. The post of a Commissioner constituted.
of
But
Labour as
the
was
created
and
recommendations
of
boards these
of
enquiry
boards
were
were not
mandatory, they themselves became issues of contention. This short exercise in active mediation was soon given up as the political situation changed. A policy of repression followed. Employers on their part resorted to strike breaking, utilizing caste and communal factors and were actively assisted in these efforts by the government. With the sudden withdrawal of the noncooperation movement by Gandhi and the sense of frustration that ensued, the working class movement also suffered a serious setback. Thus this phase of the labour movement, which at times exhibited a considerable level of politicization, came to an end, and a period of quiescence set in.
The period of lull lasted till 1926 when a number of factors contributed to a revival of trade union activity in a milder form. First, there was a downward trend in world economy culminating in the Great Depression, which
also
had
its
impact
on
the
Indian
economy.
Workers
resorted
to
defensive actions in the face of retrenchment and wage cuts. Second, under pressure from the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the national level labour leadership, the Government of India introduced a series of Acts
related
to
(R.C.L.)
trade
This
leadership,
unions
led
to
which
and
the
appointed
revival
gained
of
a
Royal
Commission
trade
union
activity
ascendency
as
the
on
under
government
Labour
reformist unleashed
repression on communists. The second wave of the national movement, which
commenced
with
the
boycott
of
the
Simon
Commission
and
culminated in the Civil Disobedience Movement did not evoke as intense a response
from
the
working
class
as
in
the
days
of
non-cooperation
movement, because of economic factors and reformist leadership.
The post-1933 period was marked by a slow recovery of the economy, the emergence of the left with the formation of the Congress Socialist Party and the adoption on international scale of a united front strategy by the communists. However, with the repression of the communist movement at the national level by the government, the reformist leadership continued to dominate the major unions and left forces were not able to make much headway.
With the Congress coming to power in 1937, the working class asserted itself and fought militant struggles to recover what they had lost during the period of Depression. The Congress government evolved a labour policy to contain
militancy
by
providing
for
courts
of
enquiry
and
boards
of
conciliation and promoting arbitration on the one hand and by resorting to harassment and repression of leftist forces and using police to break picket lines on the other.
Some historiographers of labour movements have attempted to identify the
different
stages
of
development
of
the
labour
movement
by
certain
features such as the nature of demands, the scope of demands, forms of protest and strategies adopted by the working class to preserve or expand its
interests, the levels of militancy or aggressiveness, the spirit of unity and solidarity during protest actions and the degree of participation in socio1
political movements seeking to reform or transform the society.
Some of
these features have been referred to in the Introduction as well as in other chapters while analyzing the various strikes and protest actions. It may be relevant to sum up these observations. As regards the nature of demands, in countries that have gone through a process of industrialization the trend has moved from purely economic requirements to those relating to working conditions and then to requests relating to security and human dignity. Once unions were formed, calls were made for the recognition of the union as an agency of collective bargaining. In the case of Madras city and its environs, the earliest struggles were for better working conditions such as the right to leisure, control over work process, and in defence of human dignity, characteristic of situations in which artisanal craftsmanship had not become degraded. When prices rose steeply near the close of World War I, economic demands took precedence. In the years of the Depression, the struggles were against wage cuts and retrenchment. In the years preceding World
War
II,
many
struggles
commenced
with
economic
demands,
particularly demands for the restoration of wages cut during the years of Depression, but ended as struggles against victimization and dismissals and for the workers’ right to organise. The demand for the recognition of the union was raised in almost all struggles.
The
scope
of
demand
was
widened
to
include
almost
all
aspects
of
conditions of service even during the struggles immediately following World War I. Workers realised that the wage and allowances were only part of the price for their labour power and that it was quite legitimate to demand
deferred payment of the balance due to their labour power in the form of bonus, gratuity and other facilities. The widening of the scope of demands cannot be wholly attributed to an autonomous increase in the awareness of the workers. The international contacts established by union leaders from the very outset enabled them to draw on the experiences of unions abroad.
The British employers too had the benefit of the British experience in handling labour. Their immediate problem was the creation of a stable and disciplined workforce. For this purpose, they introduced on the one hand, gratuity and bonus systems, which acted as deterrents to absenteeism and turnover. On the other, they resorted to fines, penalties and even dismissals from service. Many struggles of the workers were naturally directed against these measures particularly when they were used to penalise workers for participation in strikes. Non-forfeiture of gratuity and bonus on the one hand and wages for the period of strike on the other became important issues in the course of many struggles.
In 1920 Binny and Co. employed the tactics of suing the union leaders for instigating a strike. This action of the employer was inspired by a British example,
the
famous
Taft
Vale
Case
of
2
1901.
Trade
union
rights
thus
became an issue, which was taken up by the Madras Labour Union with the British Labour Movement.
As regards the forms of protest, the primitive forms of protest continued to
exist
even
after
unions
had
been
formed.
In
fact,
individual
acts
of
indiscipline at the shop-floor level preceded many a collective action. Even these collective actions like ‘go slow tactics’ were informally organized at shop-floor level. Union leadership was often compelled to fall in line with these wildcat strikes on the part of workers. Only a few strikes could strictly
be called union-led strikes, for example the strikes in M. and S.M. Railways Workshops and some of the strikes organised by the left in the thirties. The non-recognition of the unions by the employers and the absence of facilities for collective bargaining were the causes for this state of affairs. Once strikes commenced, employers resorted to recruitment of outside labour to break the strike. The workers then resorted to picketing, resulting often in clashes between
the
workers
and
the
strikebreakers
and
clashes
with
the
police
which came to protect the strikebreakers. Picketing heightened the level of conflict consciousness among the workers. The employment of the police to break strikes helped impart some political consciousness among the strikers to the extent that it made them understand the nature of the forces ranged against them as a class.
Almost all strikes during this period were isolated actions confined to a particular factory or unit. There was no general strike though it was mooted on many occasions. There were industrywise general or widespread strikes in tanneries and in the handloom industry. The only instance of a neargeneral strike was by the workers of foundries in north Madras in sympathy with
the
striking
workers
of
Richardson-Cruddas.
There
were,
however,
many sympathetic strikes. Notable among these were the couple of protest strikes by printing workers when they suspected that their managements were
accepting
orders
on
behalf
of
a
press
on
strike.
Barring
these
few
instances of direct action, the workers usually expressed their solidarity with the striking brethren by contributing to strike funds and by participation in mass demonstrations and public meetings organized to express support to workers on strike. Unions and collective bodies set up by the unions, like the Central Labour Board, played a great role in mobilizing public support to
the cause of striking workers. Political parties, particularly the Congress in the days of Non-Cooperation Movement and the Congress Socialist Party and
the
support
communists during
in
strikes.
the
late
This
thirties,
interaction
also
helped
with
to
political
mobilise
parties
public
helped
to
politicise the workers for the moment.
Workers
participated
in
great
numbers
in
political
demonstrations
organized by the Congress during the Non-Cooperation days in the early twenties and during the boycott of the Simon Commission. The striking Choolai Mill workers’ participation in the demonstration protesting against the arrest of Congress leaders during the Salt Satyagraha was noteworthy. The Madras city working class did not however go over to the stage of leading other sections of the people in any political action.
Chesneaux refers to the observance of commemoration days specific to the working class such as May Day, Martyrs Day, etc., as a sign of its level of 3
class consciousness.
In Madras, Singaravelu initiated the observance of May
Day in 1923 and followed it up with observance of other important dates like
the
Russian
Revolution
Day.
Later
the
Congress
Socialist
Party
continued this practice. These celebrations however did not mobilise any mass
support
from
the
working
class;
only
the
most
politically
active
sections rallied to these meetings.
There
has
been
some
significant
activity
on
the
part
of
the
unions
during the period of this study to initiate legislative action in regard to the working and living conditions of labour, the recognition of unions and the regulation of industrial disputes. Unions had taken up issues concerning legislation for the recognition of trade unions, the Maternity Benefits Act, the Workmen’s Compensation Act, and the regulation of working hours in
factories. A trade union representative in the Madras Legislative Assembly even brought forward a bill on trade union recognition. Most of the unions under the reformist leadership tendered evidence before the R.C.L. They also
voiced
their
views
before
the
Franchise
Committee
and
the
Delimitation Committee. The impact of these activities of the leaders of the unions on the consciousness of the working class was quite marginal.
The degree of unionization, i.e., the ratio of the number of members in unions to the total number of workers is usually considered as an index of trade union consciousness. The unions in Madras experienced very wide fluctuations in their membership. It shot up during strikes and declined considerably
when
the
strikes
failed.
But
low
membership
was
not
associated with low participation in union activity. Workers viewed union subscription to be a sort of contribution to strike fund and defaulted in payment of subscription during the periods of industrial peace.
One concern that had experienced the most violent industrial conflict during the early years of unionization but later enjoyed a relative calm, free from strikes for fifteen years, was the B. and C. Mills. The management had taken a number of measures to neutralise the influence of the union. A series
of
welfare
measures
were
launched.
A
welfare
committee
was
constituted to oversee these measures. A pocket union or a pro-management union as a rival to the Madras Labour Union was promoted. More than all these, the caste and communal division among the workers created by the induction of a large number of strikebreakers belonging to the depressed classes, which led to serious riots in 1921, acted as an effective deterrent to any union militancy. The B. and C. Mills was the one exception in which caste
and
communal
division
was
successfully
employed
to
break
class
solidarity. The management failed, however, to win the absolute loyalty of the workers. The workers voted for the candidates sponsored by the Madras Labour Union in the municipal elections and the assembly elections of 1937. One point worthy of note is the rejection by the workers of all pocket unions promoted by the employers.
Summing up, the inter-war period marked the birth of organized labour movement and its growth and consolidation in the city and its environs. Trade unionism had come to stay, however much loathed by the employers and the government. The working class did not however transcend beyond the second of Giddensian stages of working class consciousness, namely identity of interest and conflict consciousness. In Lenin’s terminology, it remained at the level of trade union consciousness. The failure to reach revolutionary class consciousness may be attributed to the following factors:
(a) The national movement led by the INC was bourgeois in character and gave primacy to the struggle against the colonial government and glossed
over
among
the
internal
peasants
conflicts or
the
based
working
on
class
class.
contradictions
The
initial
whether
enthusiasm
to
mobilise the working class for the political struggles of the national movement appears to have faded away as there appeared the danger of the awakened labour passing under the sway of socialist and communist leadership.
(b) Government repression was successful in containing leftist forces, with the result that the moderate reformist leaders were able to retain their hold on trade unions, steer them away from political action and confine them to economism.
(c) The Congress Socialist Party and the communists, arriving late and working under the handicap of repression, were not able to dislodge the moderate reformists from the leadership of major trade unions.
(d)
Since
Indian
characteristic
of
society
such
a
was
society
multistructural,
under
the
influence
the of
weaknesses pre-capitalist
social formations, such as communal and caste differences, persisted right
through
consciousness.
and
impeded
the
development
of
revolutionary
class
Appendices
Appendix 1. Press Communiqués Issued by the Government of Madras in Connection with Industrial Labour
Dated Fort St. George, the 22nd Oct. 1937.
The Madras Government note with regret that there have been recently a number of strikes in the province and that instances have occurred of labour giving room for complaint on the part of the employers concerned that adequate time was not previously given for a consideration of any alleged grievances. While it is not the intention of the Government to curtail in any way the rights of the workers, the Government feel it incumbent on them to declare clearly their attitude in regard to trade disputes. It does not help the interests
of
labour
to
resort
to
strikes
without
prior
representation
and
negotiations. The Government strongly disapprove of strikes when all other available methods of representation have not been exhausted. They are not unaware that whether due to ignorance or fear of victimization there has been reluctance in certain cases, for leaders among the workers to approach
the
employers
direct.
Whether
this
fear
is
groundless
or
not,
the
Government will always be glad, in such cases, to help workers and their representatives
to
have
their
point
of
view
prominently
brought
to
the
notice of their employers. The declared policy of the Government is that ‘internal settlement’ is preferable to ‘external settlement’ of trade disputes. The Government will therefore be glad, if those concerned co-operate with them and see that they are not called upon to intercede in strikes declared before exhausting all avenues of negotiations between the employer and the employed.
The Government desire to point out that major issues giving rise to any strikes are jeopardized by side issues that always arise out of any hasty resort to direct action. The Government would much desire that there should be no disturbance of the industrial organization of the province and appeal for harmonious cooperation between labour and industrial managers; and that workers who should have every confidence in the Government may not resort to strikes unless the issues are very grave and even then not until every other possible way out has been tried. The Government therefore trust that those who have the welfare of industries and labour will see that this, their declared policy is implemented.
Source: Govt. of Madras, Madras - Labour (July 1937 - October 1938) (Madras, 1933), p. 284.
Appendix 2. Strikes in the Madras Presidency and Madras City. Trend during 1920–1939
From the author’s typescript.
Appendix 3. Biographical Notes
CHAKKARAI CHETTIAR, V. (1878–1958). A veteran trade unionist, ardent nationalist
and
devout
Christian,
Chakkarai
Chettiar
was
born
on
December 12, 1878, and graduated from Madras Christian College when Rev.
Dr.
studying.
Miller In
was
1907,
the
he
principal.
attended
the
He rd
23
converted session
of
to
Christianity
the
Indian
while
National
Congress (INC) at Surat. Chakkarai Chettiar was with the extremist faction led by Bal Gangadhar Tilak and was active in the Home Rule movement of Dr. Annie Besant. He left his lucrative practice at the Bar and took part in the Rowlatt Satyagraha and in the Non-Cooperation Movement launched by Gandhi in 1920. After the withdrawal of the non-cooperation movement, he was with the Swarajists. In 1927, he left the Congress in protest against the Shermadevi affair and was with the Justice Party till August 21, 1928. As one of the pioneers of the labour movement in Madras, he was the Vice President of the Madras Labour Union, the President of the Kerosene Oil Workers’ Union from 1920 to 1927, and the President of the Central Labour Board after Thiru Vi. Ka.’s resignation. Later he was President of the Madras Provincial Trade Union Congress from 1943 to 1958 and the President of AITUC from 1949 to 1957. From 1924 to 1948, Chettiar was active in the civic affairs of Madras City as Councillor, as Alderman in 1937, and from
1942 to 1948 as Mayor of Madras City Corporation. He was member of the Madras Legislative Council from 1952 until his death on June 15, 1958.
GIRI, V.V. (1894–1980). A veteran labour leader who rose to the highest position in the country as the President of the Indian Republic, Varaharagiri Venkata
Giri
was
born
at
Berhampur
on
August
10,
1894.
He
did
not
undergo university education in India and studied law in Ireland (1913– 1916). In Ireland he was attracted to the Sinn Féin movement and joined the Anarchical Society, an organization of Indian students, which sought to overthrow
the
British
rule
through
armed
struggle.
Back
in
India,
he
practised law along with his father at Berhampur. He declined an offer of appointment as District Munsif on grounds that he had taken a vow not to take up government service before India was free. He joined the Indian National
Congress
(INC)
and
was
convicted
for
participating
in
the
satyagraha in 1922. On his release he took up the cause of the BengalNagpur
Railway
workers.
As
one
of
the
founders
of
the
All
India
Railwaymen’s Federation (AIRF) in 1924, he was also its General Secretary. Though principally a leader of the Bengal-Nagpur railway workers, he was connected with railwaymen’s unions all over India, including the M. and S.M. Railways Employees Union, of which he was President from 1929 to 1934. He was a member of the Central Legislative Assembly (1935–1937), and then Labour Minister in the Congress Ministry in Madras from 1937 to 1939. As Labour Minister, he tried to implement a labour policy based on the principle of internal settlement and mutually agreed arbitration. He was arrested during World War II in August 1942 and released in 1945. After his release he was the Labour Minister in the Prakasam Ministry (1946–1947) followed by a stint as Indian High Commissioner in Ceylon (1947–50). He
was Labour Minister in the Union Government from 1952 to 1954, when he resigned on the issue of amending the award of the industrial appellate tribunal in the disputes between the banks and their employees. He was elected Vice President of India in 1961, and President in 1969. Giri was the Indian representative at the ILO Conference at Geneva (1927), and attended the second round table conference as labour representative in 1931.
He
represented India at the first Asian Regional Conference of the ILO at New Delhi (1947). Giri was specially invited to address the ILO conference at Geneva in 1970. He inaugurated the Labour Party of India on October 2, 1978. He died on June 24, 1980.
HARI SARVOTTAMA RAO (1883–1960). Often referred to as an ex-political convict in the police reports of the twenties, Sarvottama Rao had plunged into nationalist politics even as a student. Born on September 14, 1883, at Kurnool College.
(now He
Andhra
was
Pradesh),
rusticated
in
he
1907
graduated from
the
from
Madras
Rajahmundry
Christian
College
for
arranging a reception for Bipan Chandra Pal and convicted for sedition for his editorial in a Telugu weekly in 1903. He was a member of the All India Congress Committee till 1934, and a member of the Madras Legislative Council
from
1927
to
1930.
Sarvottama
Rao
was
an
educationist,
a
promoter of village industries, and a fighter for the cause of women for whom he published a journal, Soundarya Valli. He was active in the trade union movement of the city in the early twenties and later shifted to Telugu districts, where his work among handloom workers was noteworthy. He died on February 29, 1960.
IYENGAR, A.S.K. (1907–1978). Popularly known as ASK, Iyengar hailed from the
Nizam
State
of
Hyderabad
and
took
his
M.A.
Degree
in
English
Literature. He came to Madras in 1935 and was one of the founders of the Labour
Protection
League.
Iyengar
organized
the
press
workers
and
the
tramway workers and during the initial period of World War II, he was interned in the Deoli camp. After the war, he took an active part in the Madras harbour strike in 1946, the All India Dock and Port Workers’ strike in 1958, and the Central Government Employees’ strike in 1960. Iyengar was the General Secretary of the Madras Harbour Workers Union, and editor of the journal Harbour Worker in English and Tamil for over 24 years. His biography of E.V. Ramasamy Naicker is considered a classic. He died on June 27, 1978.
IYER,
E.L.
Ellupai
(also
village
spelt in
Aiyar)
North
(1885–1941).
Arcot,
Iyer
Born
graduated
on
August
from
24,
Madras
1885,
in
Christian
College and studied law in England. Called to the Bar in 1911, he was attached to the famous barrister Nugent Grant. He supported the Home Rule movement and went to England to move a writ of habeas corpus before the King’s Bench to quash the internment of Besant and her associates in Ootacumund in 1917. While in England, he took interest in the labour movement and on his return to Madras, he gave up his practice in 1920 in response to Gandhi’s call for non-cooperation. Iyer was actively associated with the trade union movement and his residence was the centre of activity of many trade unions in the city, particularly the Madras tramway workers and rickshaw wallahs unions. His one signal contribution to the cause of labour was the English weekly Swadharma on April 14, 1921. He ran the journal for four years incurring a heavy loss. He represented Madras labour
in the AITUC in the early twenties and was actively associated with the Jharia Colliery strike (1921) and the East Indian Railway Strike (also 1921). Iyer was elected Councillor to the Corporation of Madras from Kilpauk in 1925
and
served
till
1928.
In
the
thirties,
he
returned
to
the
Bar
and
appeared for Amir Haider Khan. He was instrumental in securing for the Choolai Mills workers their arrears of wages after the closure of the mills. Iyer devoted his later years to law journalism and his book on criminal law is considered a classic. He died on October 5, 1941.
JEEVANANDAM, P. (1905–1963). Known universally as Jeeva and adored for his
oratory
and
erudition
in
Tamil,
Jeevanandam
was
one
of
the
most
powerful spokesmen for labour from the mid-thirties. Born in Boothapandi in Kanyakumari district on June 21, 1905, he entered politics while still in his teens. He participated in the Vaikam Satyagraha in 1924. He was a very active
Congress
Jeevananadam
worker
was
and
ran
imprisoned
in
the
Gandhi
1932
Ashram
during
the
near
Civil
Karaikudi.
Disobedience
Movement. He then joined the Self-Respect Movement. He was externed from
Madras
Presidency
during
the
initial
phase
of
World
War
II.
The
further course of his political career is described in Chapter VIII. He was a member of the Madras Legislative Assembly between 1952 and 1957. He was the
General
Secretary
of
the
Tamil
Nadu
Provincial
Committee
of
the
Communist Party of India at the time of his death on January 18, 1963.
KALYANASUNDARA MUDALIAR, V. (1883–1953). Popularly known as Thiru Vi. Ka., Mudaliar was a teacher-turned-journalist, Tamil scholar, politician and trade unionist. Born on August 26, 1883, he had his education at Wesley College where he later became the Head of the Tamil Department. He was
associated
as
Editor
with
the
nationalist
journals
Desabhakthan
and
Navasakthi. A chance meeting with Keir Hardie, a leader of the Labour Party,
kindled
his
interest
in
the
labour
movement.
He
was
the
Vice
President of the Madras Labour Union and became the President of the union after Wadia’s departure. Being a great Tamil scholar, he sought to blend socialism and Gandhism and Saiva Siddantha. Thiru Vi. Ka.’s work in the trade union movement is detailed in Chapters III to VI. He died on September 17, 1953.
KRISHNAMURTHY, G. (1905–1970). Born at Komal in Thanjavur district on July 15, 1905, he joined the Perambur Railway Workshops as an apprentice in mechanica1 engineering and was then appointed as boiler maker in 1928 in M. and S.M. Railway Workshops, Perambur. He was first the Secretary of the Perambur Branch of the Union, then General Secretary of the M. and S.M. Railway Workers’ Union from 1931. He was dismissed from service in 1933
for
Assembly
leading
the
from
1937
constituency.
He
was
strike. to
He
1946
reinstated
was
member
representing in
June
of the
1941
the
Madras
Railway
and
sent
to
Legislative
Trade
Union
England
for
training under the Bevin Scheme. He was Vice President of the M. and S.M. Railway Employees’ Union until he was promoted to Regional Personnel Officer.
RAMANJULU NAIDU, G.T. (1886–1959). A close associate of G. Selvapathi Chettiar and a trader by occupation, Ramanjulu Naidu collaborated with Selvapathi Chettiar in the founding of the Madras Labour Union and was its General
Secretary
collaboration
along
earned
for
with them
the the
latter.
Their
honorific
close
‘Twins
friendship of
Trade
and
Union
Movement’ and the building of the Madras Labour Union was aptly named ‘Chelvapathy
Ramanjulu
Nilayam’.
Born
on
July
9,
1886,
and
died
on
October 21, 1959.
SARMA, P.R.K. (1903–1951). Born on April 15, 1903, he graduated from Pachayappas’s College in 1926 and qualified to be a pleader in 1928. But Sarma never practised law. Instead he became a full-time worker in the labour
movement
along
with
Giri.
He
participated
in
the
satyagraha
movement and was convicted in the Sembiam picketing case in 1932. For years, he was a member of the Tamil Nadu Congress Committee and the Madras
Mahajana
Sabha.
He
was
Secretary
of
M.
and
S.M.
Railway
Employees’ Union from 1928. In the thirties he was President of as many as eight unions and office bearer in three others. He was General Secretary of the
Madras
Provincial
Trade
Union
Federation.
He
was
member
of
the
Madras Legislative Assembly representing the Madras City General Workers constituency from 1937 to 1939, and member of the Madras Legislative Council
in
the
post-independence
years.
He
organized
a
Co-operative
Credit Bank for the workers in the PWD Workshop. He was adviser to the Indian workers’ delegation to the ILO conference held in Paris in 1945. He edited
a
number
of
labour
journals,
such
as
the
monthly
M.
and
S.M.
Railwayman, and weeklies Labour Times and Thozhilalar Murasu. Later he conducted the socialist weekly Jananayagam. In the trade union movement, he
stood
(IFTU).
by Two
movement disputes
Giri
and
major
were:
through
(1)
others
of
the
contributions upholding
direct
Indian
that
the
Federation
Sarma
principle
negotiations
and
made of
to
of
Trade
the
settlement
collective
Unions
trade of
union
industrial
bargaining,
and
(2)
upholding the independence of the trade union movement from political control even of the Congress. He died on July 31, 1951.
SASTRI, V.L. (1890–1962). A close associate of T. Prakasam, the foremost leader of the Congress in Telugu districts, Sastri studied law in Bombay but renouncing practice plunged into the non-cooperation movement. He was a staunch nationalist. He took an active interest in the labour movement in the early twenties, organized the Scavengers’ Union and was the FounderPresident
of
the
Madras
Corporation
Workers’
Union
and
the
Madras
Postmen and Lower Grade Staff Union. He was a vehement critic of Wadia’s handling of the 1921 B. and C. Mill workers’ strike. He stood against the official Congress candidate in the corporation elections in 1924 and lost. During the Salt Satyagraha movement, he was the ‘third dictator’, the first two being Prakasam and Nageswara Rao. In his later years, he was associated with the South Indian Chamber of Commerce and the Andhra Chamber of Commerce.
He
was
Editor-in-Chief
of
the
Encyclopedia
of
Madras
Presidency. He died on July 20, 1962.
SELVAPATHI
CHETTIAR,
merchant-turned-trade
G.
(also
known
unionist,
as
Chelvapathi)
Selvapathi
Chettiar
(1892–1985). was
born
A on
September 9, 1892. His role in the founding of the Madras Labour Union is described in Chapter III. He was General Secretary of Madras Labour Union for 25 years. Selvapathi Chettiar played an active role in promoting the formation of trade unions in the early twenties. In 1927, he was elected Corporation Councillor from Perambur and was an active Councillor till 1948. He was once elected Deputy Mayor. He resigned from the Congress in 1938
when
the
party
refused
to
nominate
him
as
candidate
in
the
corporation elections. He was elected member of the Madras Legislative Assembly in 1937 from the textile workers’ trade union constituency. When the AITUC split in 1929, Selvapathi Chettiar threw his lot with the reformist leaders
Shiva
Commission
Rao for
and
N.M.
Labour
Joshi.
(R.C.L.)
He in
gave
evidence
1929.
He
before
was
the
India’s
Royal labour
representative at the ILO conference held in 1936 at Geneva. In 1937, he participated in the Asian Labour Union Conference held at Tokyo and was associated with the Madras Labour Union organ, Indiya Thozhilali, started in 1933. He died on January 5, 1985.
SHIVA RAO, B. (1891–1975). A Home Ruler, a journalist of high order and top trade union leader, Shiva Rao was born in Mangalore on February 26, 1891. He graduated from Presidency College and joined the Central Hindu School at Varanasi under Besant in 1916. Around 1918, he joined New India as sub-editor. He was associated with the city trade union movement from 1920 to 1935. He was President of the Madras Labour Union from 1926 to 1936. He was one of the leaders of the IFTU, which split from AITUC. Shiva Rao was actively associated with the R.C.L. in India. He was a member of the ILO conference at Geneva in 1929-30. He represented labour at the first Round Table Conference (1930) and was a spokesman for labour before the Indian Franchise Commission, the Delimitation Commission, etc. He joined The Hindu as its Delhi correspondent and remained with the paper until his death.
He
was
a
member
of
the
Constituent
Assembly
(1946),
India’s
delegate to the U.N. General Assembly (1952–57) and one of the General Secretaries of the Asian Relations Conference, New Delhi (1947). He also was a member of the Lok Sabha (1952–57), of the Rajya Sabha (1957–60) and of the University Grants Commission (1962-68).
SINGARAVELU,
M.
(1860–1946).
Hailed
as
the
first
communist
of
south
India, Singaravelu was born on February 18, 1860, in a family of fishermen. He graduated from Presidency College in the 1890s and later studied law. He practised in the Madras High Court from 1907. In 1902 he went to England in connection with trade and attended the World Buddhist Conference, then in session in London. He promoted the Maha Bodhi Society in Madras. An ardent social worker, he organized relief during the plague and influenza epidemics. It was only after the coming of Gandhi that he began to take an active part in the national and labour movements when he was past sixty. His role in the labour and communist movements is described in Chapters VII and VIII. He died on February 11, 1946.
WADIA, B.P. (1881–1958). The first President of the first trade union in India, Wadia was born on October 3, 1881. He joined the Theosophical Society in 1907, and came to Madras in 1910 to work with Mrs. Besant. He was Assistant Editor of New India, the daily run by Mrs. Besant to propagate the Home Rule movement. He was interned at Ootacumund in 1917 along with
Besant
and
Arundale.
Wadia
was
the
President
of
Madras
Labour
Union from its formation in April 1913 to 1921, when he left Madras owing to differences with Besant over the affairs of the Theosophical Society. He went to Europe and the United States in 1919. He gave evidence on behalf of Indian Labour before the Joint Select Committee of the British Parliament set up in connection with the Montague-Chelmsford Reforms Bill. Wadia participated in the ILO conference held in Washington, as adviser to the Indian delegate Joshi. His role in the B. and C. Mill Workers’ strikes of 1920 and 1921 is described in Chapter III.
Notes
I. INTRODUCTION
1
Manifesto
of
Bhattacharya,
Radical
Historians
Presidential
and
Address,
Social
Scientists
Proceedings
of
of
the
1970
Forty
quoted Third
by
Sabayasachi
Session
of
Indian
S.C. Jha, The Indian Trade Union Movement (Calcutta, 1970). C. Revri, The
Indian
History Congress (Kurukshetra University, 1982) p. 398. 2
Trade
Union
Movement:
An
Outline
History,
1880–1947
(Delhi,
1972).
V.B.
Karnik,
Indian Trade Unions, A Survey (Bombay 1960). S.D. Punekar, Trade Unionism in India (Bombay
1948).
Sukomal
Sen,
Working
Class
of
India:
History
of
Emergence
and
Movement 1830–1970 (Calcutta 1979).
3
4
E.A. Ramaswamy, Power and Justice: The State in Industrial Relations (Delhi, 1984).
M.D. Morris, Emergence of an Industrial Labour Force in India: A Study of the Bombay Cotton Mills, 1854–1947 (Berkley 1965).
5
Ranjit Das Gupta, ‘Factory Labour in Eastern India; Sources of Supply, 1865– 1947’ Indian
Economic
and
Social
History
Review
(hereafter
IESHR),
XI
September
1976.
Chitra Joshi, ‘Kanpur Textiles Labour: Some Structural Features of Formative Years’, Economic and Political Weekly (hereafter EPW) XVI, No. 44–6, 1981.
6
Lalitha Chakravarthy, ‘Emergence of a Labour Force in a Dual Economy 1880–1920’, IESHR XV July 1978.
7
Sabayasachi Bhattacharya, ‘Capital and Labour in Bombay City, 1928–1929’, EPW XVI No. 42–43 October, 1981. G.K. Lieton, ‘Strikers and Strike Breakers: Bombay Textile Mills Strike, 1929’, EPW XVII No. 14–16: April 1982.
8
R.K. Newman, Workers and Unions in Bombay 1918–1929: A Study of Organization in Cotton Mills (Canberra, 1981).
9
Uma Ramaswamy, Work, Union and Community: Industrial Man in South India (Delhi, 1983).
10
E.D. Murphy, Unions in Conflict: A Comparative Study of Four South Indian Textile Centres 1918–39 (hereafter Unions in Conflict) (New Delhi, 1981).
11
C.S. Krishna, ‘The Madras and Southern Mahratta Railway Strikes, 1932–33,’ Social Scientist, Vol. 8, No. 1 (No. 93) April, 1980.
12
C.S. Krishna, ‘Struggles of Textile Mill Workers in Madras Presidency’ Social Scientist, Vol. 7, No. 11, (No. 83), June 1979.
13
P. Chelladurai, ‘Context of Russian Revolution in the Genesis of Labour Movement in Tamil Nadu’ Social Scientist, Vol. 11, No. 11 (No. 123), November, 1983.
14
H.
Pelling,
A
History
of
British
Trade
Unionism
(hereafter
History
of
British
Trade
Unionism), (Harmondsworth, 1974), pp. 17–18. 15
16
17
Karl Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy (Moscow, 1975)
Pelling, History of British Trade Unionism, p. 42
Karl Marx, ‘Panic on the London Stock Exchange, Strikes’, New York Daily Tribune, October 17, 1853, Reprinted Collected Works, Vol. 12, p. 334.
18
Hal Draper: Karl
Marx’s
Theory
of
Revolution:
Vol
II:
The
Politics
of
Social
Classes
(hereafter Marx’s Theory of Revolution) (New York, 1978), pp 105–6. 19
20
21
22
Pelling, History of British Trade Unionism, p. 103.
Draper, Marx’s Theory of Revolution, pp. 127–132
Lenin, What is to be done? (Moscow, 1978).
Antony Giddens, The Class Structure of Advanced Societies (London, 1973), pp. 112–114 and p. 207. Michael Mann speaks of four aspects of class consciousness: Class identity, class
opposition,
class
totality
and
class
alternative.
The
first
three
correspond
to
Gidden’s first two levels of consciousness, the third aspect approximates to Lenin’s ‘trade
union
consciousness’.
The
last
aspect
corresponds
to
Gidden’s
final
level
of
consciousness. Michael Mann, Consciousness and Action among the Western Working Class, (London, 1973) p. 13 quoted by M.J. Haynes, ‘Strikes’ in J. Benson (ed.) The Working Class in England, 1875–1914 (London, 1985), p. 112.
23
Giavanno Arrighi, ‘The Labour Movement in Twentieth Century Western Europe’ in Immanuel Wallerstein (ed.) Labour in the Social Structure (Beverly Hills, 1983), pp. 44– 57.
24
Muto Ichiyo, ‘Class Struggle on the Shop Floor: The Japanese Case, 1954– 1984’ AMPO Vol. 16, No. 3, 1984.
25
26
Selig Perlman, Theory of Labour Movement (New York, 1928: rept 1949).
The first features are mentioned by S. Bhattacharya in his article, ‘Capital and Labour in Bombay City’ see footnote no. 7 above.
27
28
Antonio Gramsci, Selections from Prison Note Books (London, 1971), p. 52.
Jean Chesneaux, The Chinese Labour Movement, 1919–27 (Stanford, 1968), p. vi.
II. INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND LABOUR CONDITIONS IN MADRAS
1
Susan
M.
Neild,
Eighteenth
and
‘Colonial
Nineteenth
Urbanism: Centuries.’
The
Development
hereafter
‘Colonial
of
Madras
Urbanism’,
City
in
Modern
the
Asian
Studies, 13, 2 (1979), p. 217. 2
3
Ibid., p. 218.
Susan
J.
Lewandowski,
‘Changing
Form
and
Function
in
the
Ceremonial
and
the
Colonial Port City in India: An Historical Analysis of Madurai and Madras’ (hereafter ‘Changing Form and Function’) in K. N. Chaudhuri and Clive J. Dewey (ed.) Economy and Society, (Delhi, 1979), p. 311. 4
5
1951 Census Hand Book: Madras District (Madras, 1953), p. 1.
C.S. Srinivasachari, History of Madras (Madras, 1939), pp. 1–5. Also A.S. Krishnaswami Aiyangar,
‘The
Character
and
Significance
of
the
Foundation
of
Madras’,
Madras
Tercentenary Commemoration Volume (hereafter MTCV) (Madras, 1939), pp. 39–40.
6
7
8
Lewandowski, ‘Changing Form and Function’ p. 314.
Neild, ‘Colonial Urbanism’ p. 224.
C.W. Ranson, A City in Transition (Madras, 1938) pp. 41–42. The first immigrants were weavers and artisans who were attracted not only by the prospect of trade but also by
the fact that a 30-year exemption from tax was granted to those who settled near the fort. Ibid., p. 9. 9
10
Ibid., p. 31.
P.S. Loganathan, ‘The Industries of Madras,’ (hereafter ‘Industries of Madras’), Journal of Madras Geographical Association, (hereafter JMGA), 1939, p. 155.
11
Loganathan, ‘Industries of Madras,’ p. 155. Also L.B. Green, ‘Industries’, Appendix I to Census of India, Volume XIV, Part I, 1921, pp. 206–207. Also C.W. Ranson, ‘The Growth of Population’, in MTCV, p. 321.
12
13
14
15
16
17
C. C. Armstrong, ‘Port of Madras’, JMGA, 1939, pp. 146–154.
R. Tirumalai, The Voice of Enterprise (Madras, 1986), pp.102–103 and pp. 142–143.
Census of India 1921, Madras (hereafter Census 1921), XIII, Part-II, p. 193.
Government of India (hereafter GoI), History of Indian Railways (Shimla, 1919), p. 81.
Srinivasachari, History of Madras, p. 263.
H.H.
Chapman,
Communication
‘A in
Short
Madras
Account from
1639
of to
Development 1939’
of
(hereafter
Road
Transport
‘Development
of
and Road
Transport and Communication’), MTCV, p. 220. 18
Somerset Playne, Southern India. History, People Commerce and Industrial Resources (London, 1914), p. 538.
19
20
Chapman, ‘Development of Road Transport and Communication’, p. 22.
Ibid. According to Srinivasachari, there were 9 miles of double track and 75 km of single track by 1938. Srinivasachari, History of Madras, p. 301.
21
Tamil Nadu Archives (hereafter TNA), Madras Government Order (hereafter G.O.) 24l (Public, hereafter Pub) (Confidential, hereafter Conf ), April 30, 1919.
22
23
24
25
Tirumalai, The Voice of Enterprise, p. 149.
Chapman, ‘Development of Road Transport and Communication’, pp. 222– 223.
Srinivasachari, History of Madras, p. 313.
TNA. G.O. 1386 (Development hereafter Dev.), July 11, 1930.
26
27
28
29
30
31
Tirumalai, The Voice of Enterprise, p. 152.
Ibid., p. 43.
Srinivasachari, History of Madras, pp. 313–314.
Census 1921, XIII, Part II, p. 324.
Srinivasachari, History of Madras, p. 334.
Evidence by C. Basudev to Royal Commission on Labour in India (hereafter R.C.L.) Vol. VII, Part I, p. 289.
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
TNA, G.O. 1386 (Dev.).
Tirumalai, The Voice of Enterprise, p. 87.
TNA., G.O. 1386 (Dev.).
Ibid.
Loganathan, ‘Industries of Madras,’ pp. 160–163.
Ibid., pp. 156–157.
Tirumalai, The Voice of Enterprise, p. 118.
A.K. Bagchi, Private Investments in India 1900–1939 (New Delhi, 1975, rept. 1980), pp. 51–52.
40
41
42
43
Loganathan, ‘Industries of Madras,’ p. 158.
Tirumalai, The Voice of Enterprise, p. 118.
Loganathan, ‘Industries of Madras,’ 157-158.
Bagchi,
Private
Investments
in
India
1900–1939.
p.
52
and
Tirumalai,
The
Voice
of
Enterprise, p. 119. 44
45
46
Tirumalai, The Voice of Enterprise, p. 191.
Ibid., p. 200.
N. C. Bhogendranath, Development of Textile Industry in Madras upto 1950 (hereafter Development of Textile Industry in Madras) (Madras, 1957), p. 9. The exact date of
cessation of operation is not available. But the Mills had submitted a Memorandum to R.C.L. of Britain in 1892. (TNA, G.O. 1243 (Judicial hereafter Jud), July 6, 1892). 47
48
49
Bhogendranath, Development of Textile Industry in Madras, p. 9-10.
F. De Souza, The House of Binny (Madras, not dated), p. 90 and p. 92.
Report on the Enquiry into the Family Budget of Industrial Workers in Madras City (Madras, 1938) (hereafter, 1935 Family Budget Enquiry).
50
51
52
Bhogendranath, Development of Textile Industry in Madras, p. 9.
1935 Family Budget Enquiry, p. 3.
TNA,
G.O.
977
(Dev.),
July
10,
1923.
Date
of
establishment
is
furnished
as
1921,
according to G.O. 977 (Dev.), June 30, 1927. The company has ceased to work. 53
GoI, Report of an Enquiry into Conditions of Labour in Match Industry in India (Labour Investigation Committee, Simla, 1945), p. 1.
54
Bagchi,
Private
Investments
in
India
1900–1939,
p.
353.
The
last
reference
to
the
existence of this factory is made in the Annual Report of the Working of Factories Act for the year 1924. TNA, G.O. 880 (Dev), June 17, 1925. 55
56
Loganathan, ‘Industries of Madras,’ p. 161.
Report of the Indian Industrial Commission 1916–18, III Minutes of Evidence (London, 1919), p. 208.
57
58
Bhogendranath, Development of Textile Industry in Madras, p. 9.
Census
1921,
Companies
XXII,
and
14
Part
III,
privately
pp
306-311,
owned
records
European/
5
European
Anglo-Indian
owned
Printing
Registered
Press
in
the
presidency. 59
60
61
62
Tirumalai, The Voice of Enterprise, p. 36.
Census 1921, XIII, p. 291 and pages that follow (hereafter ff ).
Evidence by B. and C. Mills Employee’s Union, R.C.L., Vol. VII, Part I, p. 212.
Evidence by Employer’s Federation of Southern India, and Madras United Spinning and Weaving Mills (hereafter MUS&W), R.C.L. Vol. VII, Part I, p. 204 and p. 278.
63
64
Evidence by N.G. Ranga, R.C.L. Vol. VII, Part I, pp. 322–323.
Evidence by PWD Worker’s Union, R.C.L. Vol. VII, Part I, p. 329. In the Government Press applications were registered by a registrar and the applications sent for when required. Evidence by A.C. Green, Supt. Govt. Press, R.C.L., Vol. VII, Part I, p. 263.
65
Murphy,
Unions
in
Conflict
(1981)
and
Richard
Newman,
Workers
and
Unions
in
Bombay (1981) have discussed the role of jobbers in detail. 66
67
68
69
70
71
72
Evidence by Binny and Co., R.C.L. Vol. VII, part I, pp. 132–133.
Evidence by the Madras Labour Union (hereafter MLU), ibid., p. 164.
Evidence by MUS&W, ibid., p. 278.
Evidence by the Madras Aluminium Labour Union (hereafter MALU), ibid., p. 283.
Evidence by Diwan Bahadur A. Appadurai Pillai, ibid., p. 270.
Evidence by A.C. Green, ibid., p. 263.
Evidence by A. Appadurai, ibid., p. 270. The apprenticeship in PWD Workshops did not lead to employment. Evidence by PWD Worker’s Union, ibid., p.329.
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
Evidence by A.C. Green, ibid., p. 263; by C. Basudev, ibid., p. 289.
Evidence by A. Appadurai, ibid., p. 270.
Evidence by Binny and Co., ibid., p. 141.
Evidence by PWD Worker’s Union, ibid., p. 330.
Evidence by Madras Port Trust and Harbour Workers, ibid., p. 129.
Evidence by N.G. Ranga, ibid., p.324.
Evidence by Employer’s Federation of Southern India, ibid., p. 204. Binny and Co., ibid., p. 133. MUSW, ibid., p. 278. The reasons for their opposition were: (l) there was no dearth of labour and (2) exchanges should wait till better labour became available. The
workers
believed
that
public
employment
agencies
would
do
away
with
the
corruption involved in the existing system. Evidence by MLU, ibid., p. 164. MALU, ibid., p. 283. PWD Workers preferred to have joint committees, ibid., p. 329.
80
Murphy, Unions in Conflict, p. 42.
81
82
83
84
Ibid., p. 56.
Ibid., p. 43.
Census 1921, XIIV, Parts IV and V, pp. 316 ff.
Stephen Marglin, ‘What Do Bosses Do? The Origins and Functions of Hierarchy in Capitalist Production’, Review of Radical Political Economics, 6, No. 2; pp. 33–60, quoted in Dan Clawson, Bureaucracy and Labour Process (New York, 1980), pp. 43–44.
85
Report of the Indian Factory Commission, (hereafter IFLC Report) 1908, Vol. I, Section IV, p. 6, p. 8 and, p. 10.
86
Ibid.,
p.
12.
The
Commission
had
remarked:
‘The
Law
prescribing
half
an
hour’s
interval is not observed in the cotton mills and it is not generally disregarded in rice mills, ginning factories, presses and flour mills throughout India’. See also, B.P. Wadia, Labour in Madras (Madras, 1921). 87
TNA,
G.O.
89
Commander
Sir
(Jud), H.P.
12
Jan.
1907.
Freer-Smith,
The
Supt.
GoI,
appointed
Factory
Inspector
a
committee
for
headed
Dangerous
Trade
by in
England, with Lt. Col. McLaren, Civil Surgeon, Allahabad, and J.A. Turner, Health Officer, Bombay Municipality as members. The Indian Factory Labour Commission headed by Morison was appointed in 1908 to enquire into the recommendations of the Freer-Smith Committee. C. Revri, IFC Report, p. 41. 88
M. Arokiaswami and T.M. Royappa, The Modern Economic History of lndia (hereafter Modern Economic History) (Madras, 1949), p. 154. The Factory Act 1911 was based on the
dissenting
note
of
Dr.
Nair
rather
than
on
the
recommendations
of
the
Commission.
89
90
91
92
Ibid., p. 155.
R.C.L. Vol. VII, Part I, p. 172, p. 221 and p. 285.
Arokiaswamy and Royappa, Modern Economic History, p. 156.
Ibid., p. 54. Binny and Co., would do away with women labour rather than comply with the rule on noon interval for women. Evidence by C.B. Simpson, Report of the Indian Factory Labour Commission, (hereafter IFLC Report) 1908. Vol. II, p. 316.
93
Arokiaswamy and Royappa, Modern Economic History, p. 155.
94
GoI,
Report
of
the
Court
of
Enquiry
into
Labour
Conditions
in
Beedi,
Cigar,
Snuff,
Tobacco-Curing and Jamming Industries (hereafter Report on Labour Conditions in Beedi, Cigar, Snuff, Tobacco-Curing and Jamming Industries). (Madras, 1947), p. 14. 95
96
97
98
99
100
101
Evidence by MLU, R.C.L. Vol. VII, Part I, p. 173.
Evidence by B. and C. Mills Employee’s Union, ibid., p. 218.
Evidence by MLU, ibid., p. 165.
De Souza, The House of Binny, p. 88.
Ibid., p. 88.
R.C.L. Vol. VII, Part I, p. 204.
Charles A. Myers, Labour Problems in the Industrialization of India (Harvard, 1958), p. 45.
Subbiah
Kannappan,
‘Labour
Force
Commitment
in
Early
Stages
of
Industrialization’, Indian Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol 3, (January 1970), pp. 299– 349.
102
103
N.C. Sitaraman in New India, June 8, 1918. st
Evidence of J. Hargreaves and W.E. Bentley before R.C.L., 91
Meeting March 5, 1930.
R.C.L. Vol. VII, Part 2, p. 174, Q. 1925–1928, Hargreaves figured in police courts more than once on the charge of assault on workmen. A European assistant was fined Rs 30 for branding a worker with red-hot iron. 104
Evidence by Kerosene Oil Worker’s Union, (hereafter KOWU) R.C.L. Vol. VII, Part I, p. 125.
105
106
107
108
Evidence by C. Basudev, ibid., p. 291. A.C. Green, ibid., p. 264.
Evidence by C. Basudev, ibid., p. 290.
Factory Act reports for the years 1901, 1915, 1920, 1929 and 1930.
The accident rate in the railways workshop was as high as 4.25 per cent and that in cotton textiles about 0.7 percent; TNA, G. O. 1087-88 (Dev.), June 27, 1929.
109
110
R.C.L. Vol. VII, part I, p.144.
TNA Letter No. 2684 I (PWL), Sept. 20, 1929, Memorandum of Government of Madras to R.C.L., p. 17.
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
Evidence by A.C. Green, R.C. L. Vol. VII, part I, p. 265.
India 1926–1927, quoted by R. Suryanarayana, R.C.L. Vol. III, Part I, p. 320.
Evidence by Armstrong, ibid., p. 275.
Evidence by MLU, ibid., p. 172, and B. and C. Mill Employees Union, ibid., p. 217.
Ibid.
Evidence by Port Trust Workers, ibid., p. 128.
Evidence by M. and S.M. Railways Employees Union, R.C.L. Vol. VIII, Part I, p. 549. Census 1921, Vol. XIII, Part II; Table XXIV of Part IV confirms this.
118
Evidence by Employee’s Federation of Southern India, R.C.L. Vol. VII, Part I, pp. 208– 209 and by MLU, ibid., p. 178.
119
120
121
Evidence by PWD Worker’ s Union, ibid., p. 329, and by Armstrong, ibid., p. 275.
Evidence by PWD Worker’s Union, ibid., p. 329, and by Armstrong, ibid., p. 275.
GoI, Report of the Enquiry into the conditions of Labour in Beedi, Cigar and Cigarette Industries’, Labour Investigation Committee, Shimla 1946, pp. 25– 27.
122
123
124
125
126
Evidence by MLU, R.C.L. Vol. VII, Part I, p. 165.
Evidence by A.C. Green, ibid., p. 264.
TNA, G.O. 1243 (Jud), July 6, 1892.
Ibid.
Evidence by B. and C. Mill Employees Union, R.C.L. Vol.VII, Part I, p. 219. MLU estimated the living wage at Rs 35 per month. Evidence by MLU, ibid., p. 173.
127
128
129
130
131
Evidence by MLU, ibid., p. 173.
Evidence by A.C. Green, ibid., p. 264.
Evidence by Employer’s Federation of Southern India, ibid., p. 209.
Evidence by C. Basudev, ibid., p. 289.
Evidence by S.V. Aiyar, Editor, Indian Railway Magazine, R.C.L. Vol. VIII, Part I, p. 578, by All-India Railwaymen’s Federation, ibid., p. 634. According to Aiyar, Europeans
monopolized virtually 80 to 90 percent of posts of foreman; the few non-Europeans were
Anglo-Indians.
Indians
doing
the
same
kind
of
work
as
Anglo-Indians
were
designated at lower grades and paid half to one-third of what Anglo-Indians were paid. 132
TNA,
Letter
No.
2684
(PWL),
Sept.
20,
1929,
Memorandum of the Government of
Madras to R.C.L., para 30-31.
133
Evidence by Binny and Co., R.C.L. Vol. VII. Part I, p. 148; B. and C. Mill Employee’s Union, ibid., p. 220, presents the worker’s point of view.
134
135
TNA Letter No. 2684 L (PWL), Sept. 20, 1929.
Chesneaux,
The
Chinese
Labour
Movement,
1919–27
(hereafter
Chinese
Labour
Movement), p. 91.
136
Evidence
by
Binny
and
Co.,
R.C.L.
Vol.
VII,
Part
I,
p.
134
and
evidence
by
C.B.
Simpson, IFLC Report, 1908, Part II, p. 307. 137
138
139
Chesneaux, Chinese Labour Movement, p. 91.
Evidence by Binny and Co., R. C.L. Vol.VII, Part I, p. 143, and p. 149.
M.C. Sitaraman, Retired Weaving Master, in New India June 8, 1918. Also evidence of MALU, R.C.L. Vol. VII, Part I, p. 286.
140
141
Evidence by Binny and Co. ibid., p. 149 and Port Trust, ibid., p. 277.
TNA Letter No. 2684 (PWL), Memorandum of the Govt.of Madras to R.C.L., para 30– 31.
142
Ibid. Bonus for production above stipulated outturn was offered in some printing presses. Evidence by A.C. Green, ibid., p. 268.
143
144
Evidence by A.C. Green, ibid., p. 267.
Enhancement of this war-time allowance was a common demand of all city workers in the post-war period. See chapter III.
145
146
147
TNA Letter No. 2684 L (PWL), para 30–31.
Evidence by Employers Federation of Southern India, R.C.L. Vol. VII, Part I, p. 209.
TNA, G.O. 241 (Pub) April 30, 1919.
148
149
150
Evidence by Binny and Co., R.C.L. Vol. VII, Part I, p. 148.
C.B. Simpson of Binny and Co., Evidence, IFLC Report, 1908, Vol. II, p. 316.
TNA. Letter No. 2634 (PWL), Memorandum of the Govt.of Madras to R.C.L., para 30– 31.
151
152
Ibid.
Letter from S. Lall, Joint Secretary, R.C.L., to all local governments and administration No. LC 5(l) April 7, 1930; R.C.L. Vol. XI Part I.
153
154
155
1935 Family Budget Enquiry.
Ranson, A City in Transition, p. 171.
Diet
No.
1
is
based
on
the
well-balanced
diet
recommended
by
Dr.
Aykroyd
but
adjusted to reach a calorie content of 2800. Diet No. 2 is the ill-balanced diet of the Madras Industrial Workers. Refer 1935 Family Budget Enquiry, p. 131.
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
B. Shiva Rao, The Industrial Worker in India. (London, 1939), p. 68.
Report of the Royal Commission on Labour in India, (London 1931), p. 274.
Census Tables City of Madras; 1931. XIV(2) (Madras, 1932).
1935 Family Budget Enquiry, p. 37.
Ranson, A City in Transition, p. 108.
Shiva Rao, The Industrial Worker in India, p. 110.
Ranson, A City in Transition, pp. 111–112.
Ibid., p. 147.
1935 Family Budget Enquiry, p. 20.
Ranson, A City in Transition, pp. 126–127.
Ibid., p. 94.
Evidence by Binny and Co., R.C.L. Vol. VII, Part I, p. 136.
Evidence by Workers of Western India Match Factory (hereafter WIMCO), ibid., pp. 130–131.
169
170
171
Shiva Rao, The Industrial Worker in India, p. 105.
Evidence by MLU, R.C.L. Vol. VII Part I, pp 167–168.
Norman White, Appendix to the Report of the Indian Industrial Commission of 1916– 1918 (London. 1919).
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
Evidence by Shiva Rao, R.C.L. Vol. VII, Part I, pp.187–192.
Report of the City High Mortality Committee, 1927, Part I, pp. 22–23.
Ranson, A City in Transition, p.132.
1935 Family Budget Enquiry, pp. 124–125.
Evidence by MLU, R.C.L. Vol.VII, Part I, p. 169.
Interview with G. Selvapathi Chettiar, August 8, 1983.
1935 Family Budget Enquiry, p. 83.
Ibid., p. 39.
Ibid., p. 40.
Ranson, A City in Transition, p. 201.
1935 Family Budget Enquiry, p. 40.
Shiva Rao, The Industrial Worker in India, p. 131.
1935 Family Budget Survey, p. 40.
Shiva Rao. The Industrial Worker in India, p. 139.
Evidence by Binny and Co., R.C.L. Vol. VII, Part I, pp. 149–150.
Brevet Colonel R. McCarrison, Memorandum on the Relation of Food to the Physical Efficiency of Indian Workers, ibid., p. 237.
188
189
190
191
Evidence by A.C. Green, ibid., pp. 268–269.
Evidence by Binny and Co., ibid., p. 150.
Evidence by the MUS&W, ibid., p. 250.
A. Rockley, Evidence, IFLC Report. 1908, Vol.1, pp. 319–320.
III. EARLY STRUGGLES
1
2
Leslie J. Macfarlene, The Right to Strike. Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1981.
These
are
Company
confirmed before
the
later
by
R.C.L.
the
1908:
actual
figures
12.40(7.86):
in
percentage
1913:
as
12.86(6.75)
furnished 1928:
6.25
by
the
(1.07)
Figures within bracket indicate absentees without leave. R.C.L. Volume Vll, part I, page 134. 3
The figures furnished by Binny and Co. to the R.C.L. regarding the migration are striking: 1908:4501–5,633, 1928: 4704–768, ibid.
4
Letter from District Magistrate, Chingleput, to Chief Secretary, Government of Madras, dtd December 22, 1913, TNA, G.O. 195–196 (Jud), Jan. 27, 1914.
5
Dipesh
Chakrabarthy
‘Early
Railway
Men
in
India:
Dacoity
and
Train
Wrecking
c.
1860–1900’ in Essays in Honour of Prof. S.C. Sarkar (Delhi, 1976), p. 539. 6
7
8
9
10
11
TNA, G.O. No. 1243 (Jud), July 6, 1892.
Ibid.
De Souza, The House of Binny, p. 88.
Ibid., p. 114.
The Hindu, September 15, 1902, p. 5.
Evidence by A.C. Green, Superintendent, Government Press, R.C.L. Volume VII; Part I, p. 269. The year of the strike is given as 1897. But the workers in their memorial to the Chief Secretary had given 1895 as the year of strike.
12
13
14
TNA, G.O. 195–196 (Jud).
Ibid.
Notification by Superintendent, Govt. Press, Madras, Dec. 21, 1903, TNA, G.O. 95 (Pub), February 4, 1904.
15
16
17
TNA, G.O. 195–196 (Jud).
Ibid.
Chief Secretary’s General remarks to men. TNA, G.O. 95, (Pub), February 4, 1904.
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
Chief Secretary’s Note to Hon’ble Member. Ibid.
Ibid.
TNA, G.O. 295 (Pub), March 30, 1904.
TNA, G.O. No. 306 (Pub), April 4, 1904 and TNA G.O. 909 (Pub), November 11, 1904.
TNA, G.O. 499 (Pub), June 8, 1904.
TNA, G.O. 909 (Pub). th
Ian J. Kerr, ‘Working Class Protest in 19
Century India: Example of Railway Workers’,
EPW, Volume XX, No. 4, January 26, 1985, pp. PE 34–40. 25
Times of India, May 7, 1898. Madras Mail, May 7, 1898, p. 5 quoted by Kerr. Ibid., p. PE 38.
26
D. Narasimha Reddy, ‘Growth and Structure of Unions in Southern Railway’. EPW, Volume XV, No. 39, September 27, 1980 p. 1619. Reddy has relied on the souvenir entitled. ‘The Role of Railway Men in the Freedom Struggle’ published by the Southern Railway
Employees’
Sangh.
The
reports
in
regards
to
1905
and
1912
are
not
corroborated by any archival evidence. 27
28
TNA, G.O. 1276 (Jud), June 26, 1913. Also Indian Patriot, April 29, 1913.
Annexure to Letter December 20, 1913 from the District Magistrate, Chingleput, to the Chief Secretary Madras TNA, G.O. 195–196 (Jud).
29
Letter of C.H. Rogers, General Secretary of ASRSI in Bombay Chronicles December 29, 1913 reproduced in The Hindu, January 2, 1914.
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
TNA, G.O. 195–196. (Jud).
The Madras Mail, December 20, 1913.
Ibid.
TNA, G.O. 195–196 (Jud).
The Indian Patriot. December 25, 1913.
The Hindu, January 10, 1914.
TNA, G.O. 195–196 (Jud).
37
Letter dtd January 1914 from the Inspector General of Police to the Chief Secretary, ibid.
38
Letter dtd January 10, 1914 from C.L. Magniac Acting Agent M. and S.M. Railway to the Chief Secretary, Ibid.
39
40
TNA, G.O. 1303 (Jud), June 5, 1914.
Letter dtd January 7, 1914 from Acting I.G. of Police to the Chief Secretary, TNA, G.O. 195–196 (Jud).
41
42
43
G. Rudé, The Crowd in History (London, 1981) pp. 5–6.
Oliver Cox, Caste, Class and Race (New York, 1948), p.363.
David Arnold, ‘Industrial Violence in Colonial India’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol.22 (1980), pp. 251–252.
44
Bengalee, March 5, 1908 quoted in Sumit Sarkar, The Swadeshi Movement in Bengal 1903–1908 (New Delhi, 1973) Footnote No. 269, p. 240.
45
G. Rudé, The Crowd in History, p. 68. Also William Sewell Jr. ‘Social Change and the Rise of Working Class Politics in Nineteenth Century Marseille’, Past and Present, No. 65, 1974.
46
Bipan Chandra, The Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism in India (New Delhi, 1969), p. 346.
47
48
49
50
51
Ibid., p. 379.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 378.
Ibid., p. 388.
G. Subramania Iyer, Some Economic Aspects of British Rule in India (Madras, 1903), pp. 218–219.
52
History of Political Disturbances in Tinnevelly and Tuticorin in March 1908: Calcutta Records, GOI, Home Department Political, National Archives of India, 1908, 7 and 8.
53
Thiru. Vi. Ka., Vazhkkai Kurippugal (Autobiography) (Madras, 1944, Rept. 1982), pp. 371–372.
54
TNA
Diary
of
Events:
Madras
Presidency
1907,
Director
of
Criminal
Intelligence,
Shimla. Cited by C.S. Subramaniam, Lajpat Rai Centenary Lectures 1982/83, University of Madras, Type Script, p. 5.
IV. FORMATION OF UNIONS, 1918
1
2
3
Jawaharlal Nehru, Glimpses of World History (Delhi, 1983), p. 670.
Sumit Sarkar, Modern India (Delhi, 1983), pp. 168–169.
Michelle McAlpin, ‘Price Movements and Fluctuations in Economic Activity (1860– 1947)’, in Dharma Kumar (Ed.) Cambridge Economic History of India, Vol. II (Delhi. l984), p. 904.
4
E.D. Murphy, ‘Class and Community in India: The Madras Labour Union, 1918–1921’ (hereafter ‘Class and Community in India’), IESHR, Vol. XIV, No. 3, July–September 1977, p. 303.
5
TNA, G.O. 922 (Pub), October 8, 1918, and TNA, G.O. 2303 (Home) (Jud), October 11, 1918.
6
7
8
Letter R. C. 718/Gen1/8, dtd October 2, 1918, TNA, G.O. 922 (Pub).
New India. September 10, 1918.
I.D. Mills, ‘The 1918–1919 Influenza Pandemic: The Indian Experience’, IESHR, Vol. XXII No. l, Jan–Mar 1986, p.10. Also see Report of the City High Mortality Committee, April 1927. The death rate in the city shot up from 38.4 in 1917 to 60.3 in 1918.
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
Nehru, Glimpses of World History, p. 670
C.P. Ramaswamy Aiyar, Annie Besant (Delhi, 1963), p. 71.
B. Pattabhi Sitarammayya, History of Indian National Congress (Madras 1935), p. 221.
Ibid., p. 251.
Ibid., p. 254.
TNA, Letter 63 (Pub) (Confidential), February 12, 1919.
New India, July 3, 1918.
TNA, G.O.1524 (Jud) (Confidential), October 3, 1911.
17
18
19
20
21
22
B.P. Wadia, Labour in Madras (Madras, 192l), p. xvi.
Thiru. Vi. Ka., Vazhkkai Kurippukhal, p. 373
Subramanya Bharathiar, Desiya Geethangal (National Songs) (Madras, 1934), p. 34.
TNA, G.O. 2626 (Revenue, hereafter Rev), November 3, 1920.
The Madras Mail, June 5, 1928.
G. Selvapathi Chettiar, Indiaya Thozhilali Iyakkam Thonria Varalaru (History of the Origins of Indian Labour Movement) (Vikramasingapuram, 1961).
23
Selvapathi Chettiar Papers Manuscript, The History of the Formation of the Madras Labour Union is contained in a 40-page notebook in Chettiar’s hand.
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
B.P. Wadia, Labour in Madras, p. xiv.
Ibid., p. 8.
Murphy, ‘Class and Community in India’, p. 297.
Wadia, Labour in Madras, xiv.
Ibid., p. 13
Ibid., p. 22
Ibid., p. 26, 30.
Ibid., p. 33.
Ibid., p. 35.
Ibid., p. 31 and p. 37.
New India, July 31, 1928.
TNA, Fundamental Rule I (hereafter FR I), June 18, Letter No. 2376 w–1 June 17, 1918. Wadia’s intervention is alluded to in his Labour in Madras, p. 106. ‘My method has been one of compromise to bring about a harmonious and amicable settlement I did it at the Choolai Mills with the help of the Indian employers to the satisfaction of both parties.
36
TNA, Fundamental Rule II (hereafter FR II), July 1918, Letter No. 2556 w–1, August 1, 1918.
37
38
TNA, FR II, September 1918, Letter No. 3421 w–1, October 1, 1918.
Letter from Binny and Co. to the Commissioner of Police, Madras, dtd October 31, 1918. TNA, G.O. 1929 (Pub) (Confidential), November 9, 1918.
39
Wadia, Labour in Madras, pp. 42–50. The workers were not very happy about the advice and wryly commented that they could have done that without all those meetings.
40
Statement
by
the
Binny
and
Co.
in
The
Hindu.
December
10,
1918.
TNA
FR
II,
November 1918, Letter No. 4364 w–1 dtd December 1, 1918. 41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
Wadia, Labour in Madras, p. 60. Also New India, November 29, 1918.
Justice, December 2, 1918.
Wadia, Labour in Madras, p. 66, Speech delivered on December 2, 1918.
Ibid., p. 61, Speech delivered on November 28, 1928.
Ibid., p. 73.
Ibid., p. 77, Speech delivered on December 6, 1928.
Ibid., p. 82.
The Madras Mail, December 10, 1928 reproduced in Wadia, Labour in Madras, pp. 93– 100.
49
50
51
52
53
Ibid., pp. 86–87.
TNA, G. O. 388 (Pub) (Conf ), July 8, 1919.
Wadia, Labour in Madras, p. 90.
Ibid., p. 114.
TNA, FR I, December 1918, Letter No. 4543 w–1, December 16, 1918 and TNA, G.O. 388 (Pub) (Conf ).
54
55
56
Evidence by Binny and Co., R.C.L. Vol. VII 1, pp. 139–140.
TNA, G.O. 388 (Pub) (Conf ).
Wadia, Labour in Madras, p. 118.
57
TNA, G.O. 388 (Pub) (Conf ). The opening of the Labour Union Branch of Royapettah Bank was viewed with displeasure by Simpson of Binny and Co. who wrote to Inns, the Director of Industries, to do what he could to prevent it. Mr. Inns replied that he would try to bring pressure upon the bank through the Registrar of Cooperatives and that in case
they
could
not
succeed
he
would
suggest
to
Sir
Clement
to
start
his
own
cooperatives. 58
59
60
61
62
63
Wadia, Labour in Madras, p. 120.
Ibid., p. 74.
Ibid., p. 113.
TNA, G.O. No. 741 (Pub) (Ordinary, hereafter Ord), December 22, 1919.
The Dravidian, Madras Native News Paper Reports, 1918. (MNNR).
Wadia, Labour in Madras, p. 68.
V. FIRST ORGANIZED STRUGGLES, 1918–1922
1
2
3
4
5
6
TNA, FR I, August 1918, Letter No. 2755 w–1, August 20, 1918.
New India, August 19, 1918.
New India, August 28, 1918.
New India, August 31, 1918.
Ibid.
TNA, FR I, Sept 1918. Letter No. 3181 w–1, September 18, 1918. According to the C.I.D. Report
E.L.
According
Iyer
to
and
Mrs.
other
Besant,
Home the
Rulers
were
Tramwaymen’s
advising Union
the
and
strikers
E.L.
Iyer
to
hold
firm.
persuaded
the
workmen to return to work. The latter version is more plausible. 7
8
9
10
New India, December 6, 1918.
New India, January 17, 1919, January 28, 1919.
New India, March 11, 1919 refers to letters sent on January 20, 1919 and March 3, 1919.
New India, March 10, 1919.
11
12
13
14
New India, March 10, 1919.
New India, March 11, 1919.
G.O. No. 241(Public), 30 April 1919. The Hindu. 1 March 1919.
Ibid. The statistics sought to prove that the average wage of the Indian employees had increased from Rs 14-0-8 in 1912 to Rs 20-4-3 in 1919.
15
16
17
Letter from a correspondent in The Hindu, March 14, 1919
Madras Times, 14 March 1919.
G.O. No. 241 (Pub). The Hindu March 12, 14, 17, 13, 22 and 24, 1919. New India, March 12, 20, and 25, 1919.
18
19
20
21
22
Justice, March 12, 1919 and TNA, G.O. 241 (Pub).
The Hindu, March 24, 1919.
New India, March 18, 1919.
New India, March 22, 1919.
New India, March 17, 1919. One Kesava Mudaliar announced at the Tramway men’s Meeting the support of Merchant Community to strikers, TNA FR II March 1919. D.O. 1007, w–1 (Pub), April 2, 1919.
23
24
25
26
New India, March 14, 1919.
The Hindu, March 17, 1919.
The Madras Mail, March 25, 1919, New India, March 26, 1919.
‘Tramway strike and Sir Clement Simpson’s Fourteen Points’, New India, March 26, 1919.
27
28
29
30
31
New India, March 28, 1919.
New India, April 3, 1919 and April 5, 1919.
New India, April 15, 1919.
TNA, G.O. 699 (Pub), August 7, 1919.
New India, July 20, 1918.
32
33
Letter No. 115/ID, dtd July 17, 1918 from the Commissioner of Police, Madras City.
TNA, FR I, February 1919, Demi Official Letter No. (hereafter D.O.) 414 w– 1 (Pub), February 18, 1919.
34
Report No. 232/ID, February 5, 1919 from the Commissioner of Police, Madras city, TNA, G.O. 388 (Pub) (Conf ).
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
TNA, FR I February 1919, D.O. 414 w–1 (Pub) February 18, 1919.
TNA, FR II, April 1919, D.O. 1418 w–1 (Pub), May 4, 1919. Ibid.
Ibid.
New India, May 14, 1919.
New India 19 May 1919. Also TNA FR II May 1919, D.O. 1699 w–1 (Pub), June 4, 1919.
TNA, FR I, June 1919, D.O. 2024 w–1 (Pub), June 20, 1919.
Ibid.
TNA, FR II, June 1919, D.O. 2301 w–1 (Pub), July 3, 1919.
Ibid.
Ibid.
TNA, FR I, July 1919, D.O. 2546 w–1 (Pub), July 18, 1919.
Ibid.
TNA, FR I, September 1919, D.O. 3536 w–1 (Pub), 17 September 1919.
TNA, FR II, March 1919, D.O. 1007 w–l (Pub).
TNA, FR I, April 1919, D.O. 1199 w–1 (Pub), 2l April 1919.
New India, June 10, 1919, June 12, 1919 and July 2, 1919.
Thiru. Vi.Ka., Vazhkkai Kurippukhal, p. 371.
VI. INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS, HOME RULERS AND THE LABOUR MOVEMENT
1
2
TNA, G.O. 388 (Pub) (Conf ).
Thiru. Vi. Ka, Vazhkkai Kurippukhal, p. 253
3
C.I.D.
Report,
October
20,
1919,
History
of
Freedom
Movement,
Bundle
No.
81
(Compiled by TNA). 4
5
Letter No. 63 (Pub) (Conf ), February 12, 1919.
G. Selvapathi Chettiar, Indiaya Thozhilali Iyakkam Thonria Varalaru
(History
of
the
Origins of Indian Labour Movement) Vikramasingapuram, 1961, p. 5 and Wadia. Labour in Madras, p. 22. 6
7
Letter No. 63 (Pub) (Conf ).
Tara Chand, History of the Freedom Movement in India, Vol. III. (New Delhi, 1972), p. 486.
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
David Arnold, The Congress in Tamilnad (Delhi, 1977), p. 28.
Sitarammayya, History of Indian National Congress, p. 304.
Ibid., p. 307.
Ibid., pp. 334–336.
Tara Chand, History of the Freedom Movement in India, p. 487.
P.P. Lakshman, Congress and Labour Movement in India, (Allahabad, 1947), p. 12.
New India, January 20, 1920.
Thiru.
Vi.
Ka.,
Vazhkkai
Kurippukhal,
p.377.
It
is
however
reported
that
V.O.
Chidambaram made an unsuccessful attempt to organise a rival union among M. and S.M. Railway workers. TNA, FR II February 1920, D. O. 830 W–l (Pub), March 5, 1920. 16
Fortnightly Reports from January 1, 1920 onwards carried references to these efforts of the Congress members. For example: ‘There is no doubt that extremist politicians are determined to foster all the unrest they can find anywhere and to make a grand show.’ (D. O. 21 w–l (Pub), January l, 1920).’
17
‘It
is
not
to
be
supposed
that
the
extremists
having
found
a
body
of
men
as
yet
unexplored by the Besant Party will relax their efforts to create trouble’ (D. O. 1209 w–l (Pub) April 3 1920). 18
19
New India, March 22, 1920.
New India, March 23, 1920.
20
21
22
23
24
25
Ibid.
New India, July 8, 1920.
Thiru. Vi. Ka., Vazhkkai Kurippukhal, p. 379.
Ibid., p. 380.
New India, February 2, 1920.
TNA, G.O. 271 (Rev), February 2, 1920. Actually the already existing post of special officer for Depressed Classes was redesignated as Commissioner for Labour as it at it was
felt
‘necessary
to
include
within
the
scope
of
his
duties
all
the
depressed
and
backward classes,, in other words, Labour in General.’ The same G.O. contemplated the setting up of a Labour Advisory Board. The Board was formed in May 1920 by G.O. 1071 (Rev), May 10, 1920 26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
TNA, G.O. No. 423 (Rev), February 20, 1920.
New India, May 21, 1920 and August 6, 1920.
New India, May 24 ,1920 and May 29, 1920.
TNA, G.O. 1688 (Rev), July 13, 1920.
New India, August 5, 1920. Thiru. Vi. Ka., Vazhkkai Kurippukhal. p. 381.
TNA, G.O. 2129 (Rev), August 31, 1920.
TNA, G.O. 120 (Law) (General, hereafter Gen), January 12, 1923.
TNA, G.O. 388 (Pub) (Conf ), July 8, 1919 Report No. 530/ID, March 15, 1919 and No.55l/ID, March 18, 1919 from the Commissioner of Police to the Chief Secretary Government of Madras.
34
Ibid., Letter No. 224 224 c 19.3.1919 from Personal Assistant to Deputy Inspector General CID Department.
35
36
37
Evidence by MLU before R.C.L., op. cit. pp. 182–183.
TNA, FR I, February 1920, D. O. No. 669 w–l (Pub) February 19, 1920.
TNA, G.O. 3346 L (PWL), Memorandum of Government of Madras to R.C.L. Addenda to Part I. November 18, 1929.
38
39
40
TNA, G.O. 423(Rev), February 20, 1920.
New India, March 9, 1920.
TNA, G.O. 3346 L (PWL), Memorandum of Government of Madras to R.C.L. Addenda to Part I, November 18, 1929, p. 184.
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
New India, March 24, 1920.
New India, March 25, 1920.
TNA, G.O. 3346L (PWL).
Murphy, ‘Class and Community in India’ pp. 291–321.
New India, October 27, 1920.
Ibid.
TNA, G.O. 3346L (PWL).
New India, October 22, 1920.
New India, November 4, 1920 and November 18, 1920.
TNA, FR I December 1920, D.O. 4860–1 (Pub), December 17, 1920.
New India, November 5, 1920.
New India, November 18, 1920 and December 2, 1920.
TNA, G.O. No. 3346 L (PWL).
TNA, G.O. 779 (Pub), December 14, 1920 and New India December 10, 1920. The two versions differ. While the police alleged that the picketeers deliberately assaulted the blacklegs, New India blamed the blacklegs for provocation.
55
56
57
58
59
60
New India, December 11, 1920.
New India, December 14, 1920.
Ibid.
New India, December 16, 1920.
New India, December 24, 1920.
New India, January 19, 1921.
61
62
63
TNA, FR I, December 1920, D.O. 4860–1 (Pub).
New India, January 10, 1921.
New India, January 21, 1921 and TNA, FR I, and II, January 1921, D.O. 181– 1 (Pub), January 24, 1921 and No.482–1 (Pub), February 2, 1921.
64
B.P. Wadia’s letter, March 2, 1921 from Nice, France to Mrs. Besant. Theosophical Society
Archives
(hereafter
TS
Archives).
Part
II.
Subject
Files
(c)
Reforms:
60;
Correspondence relating to the Madras Labour Union 1919– 1921. ‘I am not quite sure if you have fully grasped the awkwardness of the situation. I have reasons to believe that powers of evil are endeavouring to cause a split between you and me and some friends are
utilised
for
the
purpose:
their
exaggerated
sense
of
what
they
call
loyalty
and
devotion to you and some kind of feeling better be left undescribed against me has given a handle to those who would see us apart rather than working together. I would only ask you one thing – please trust me do not go by or draw conclusions from statements against me made to you. For some I am too ambitious: for others I am under the influence of darker powers; all I can say is that I am watching myself more keenly than people give credit for. I am doing my work and living my life and feel the peace and power. I am willing to make room for any one anywhere, at Adyar or abroad; more one
can
not
do.’
Kalyanasundara
Mudaliar
has
also
alluded
to
these
differences.
Vazhkkai Kurippugal, p. 391. 65
66
67
TNA, FR II, January 1921, D.O. 4821–1 (Pub).
Thiru. Vi. Ka., Vazhkkai Kurippugal, p. 386.
New
India,
reasonable
January men
of
27,
1921
opposing
in
its
views
editorial, come
praised
together
the in
agreement
roundtable
stating: meeting,
‘when good
invariably results.’ It also noted that Binny and Co. had agreed to recognise the right of the workers to combine in an union but also stated, ‘Mr. Wadia who is going to Europe resigns from all connection with the Union which will in future consist only of Mill Employees.’ TS Archives. 68
Sastri’s
open
letter
and
Wadia’s
reply
appeared
in
New
India
January
31,
1921.
Kalyanasundara Mudaliar made similar allegations. Navasakthi March 25, 1921. Also see, Vazkkai Kurippugal pp. 386–391.
69
70
71
72
73
74
Letter, February 5, 1921 from A.P. Symonds to Mrs. Besant, TS Archives.
Wadia’s letter to Mrs. Besant, March 2, 1921 (TS Archives).
New India, January 31, 1921.
G. Selvapathi Chettiar, interview on August 8, 1983.
New India, August 11, 1921.
Thiru. Vi. Ka., Vazhkkai Kurippugal, p. 391–392.
VII. DISUNITY IN THE RANKS, WORKER MILITANCY AND LABOUR UNREST
1
TNA,
G.O.
671
(Pub),
October
7,
1921
‘Evidence
of
Natesan
before
the
Ayling
Committee on August 12, 1921’ and M.C. Rajah Speech in the Legislative Council on October 12, 1921, Proceedings of Madras Legislative Council (hereafter MLCP) 1921, Vol. III, p. 312. Also TNA, FR II, April 1921, D.O. 36/0–1 (Pub), May 3, 1921. 2
3
TNA, G.O. 671 (Pub). Also Swadharma, April 24, 1921, p. 20.
Swadharma May 8, 19 21, p. 59. The union leaders again persuaded the boys to go back to work.
4
5
TNA, G.O. 671 (Pub).
Swadharma among
April
many
to
24,
1921,
disprove
p.
the
20.
The
utter
Journal
falsity
of
commented:
the
news
that
‘Here
is
outside
one
instance,
leaders
stir
up
trouble.’ Again on May 15, 1921 it commented: ‘Here again is an instance of the spirit of moderation and reasonableness which are the characteristics of the Labour leaders in Madras
in
flagrant
contrast
to
the
wily
views
of
the
capitalists
and
the
police.’
Swadharma, August 16 1921, p. 75.
6
7
8
9
New India, May 31, 1921.
Jalil Khan’s statement in Swadharma, May 22, 1921, Vol. I, p. 124.
Swadharma, June 12, 1921, Vol. I, pp. 161–162.
Swadharma, June 26, 1921, Vol. I, p. 202, Letter June 20, 1921 from Vice President, Madras Labour Union.
10
The Hindu, June 18, 1921 statement by the Madras Labour Union.
11
Madras Mail, July 14, 1921 and Kalyanasundara Mudaliar’s statement in New India, July 16, 1921.
12
13
14
New India, June 25, 1921.
TNA, FR II, June 1921, D.O. 845/0–1 (Pub), July 2, 1921.
TNA, G.O. 1912 (Law) (Gen), June 27, 1924. Statement by M.C. Rajah Proceedings of Legislative Council Vol. VII No. 1, p. 10–11.
15
Evidence of Swami Desikananda before the Ayling Committee by G.O. 671 (Pub), October 7, 1921.
16
17
Swadharma, Vol. I, p. 141, 181 and 200.
Murphy, ‘Class and Community in India,’ p. 313. The figure of 700 is contradicted by other sources. According to the Fortnightly report ‘a certain number of Adi-Dravida work men have been induced to continue working.’ According to Jalil Khan, ‘The AdiDravida members have stood by the rest of the mill hands except about 40 or 50 of them. The remaining Adi-Dravidas who were taken to the mills escorted by the police are outsiders and not members of the Union.’ Swadharma, Vol.I, p. 230. V.L. Sastri, a Congress Labour leader also claims that the bulk of the adi-dravidas stood by the union. (Swadharma, Vol. I, p. 237). T. V. Kalyanasundaram is also of the same view. (Thiru. Vi. Ka, Vazhkkai Kurippugal, p. 396). A statement by the union published in The Hindu July 16, 1921 refers to a separate meeting of adi-dravida union members held on June 16, 1921 expressing their solidarity with other workers. It may therefore be surmised that those who marched to the Mills on June 20, 1921 were mostly new recruits.
18
19
20
Murphy, ‘Class and Community in India,’ p. 314.
New India, June 24, 1921.
Petition of Adi-dravidas of Pulianthope to Lord Willingdon. TNA, G.O. 1844 (Law) (Gen.), August 2, 1922.
21
22
TNA, FR l, July 1921. D.O. 953/0–l (Pub), July 19, 1921.
O.
Thanikachalam
Chettiar,
Speech
in
M.L.C.
October
Debates, Vol. III, No. l, p. 1007. 23
TNA, G.O. 1844 (Law) (Gen.), New India, July 2, 1921.
12,
1921,
MLCP
Council
24
TNA, FR 1 July 1921. D. O. 953/0–1 (Pub), July 19, l921. Thiru. Vi. Ka., Vazhkkai Kurippugal, p. 404. Kalyanasundara Mudaliar opines that the district police was called because local police were unionized under the leadership of the non-cooperators.
25
26
Ibid.
Thiru. Vi. Ka., Vazhkkai Kurippugal, p. 398. According to him, Lord Willingdon had threatened to deport Kalyanasundara Mudaliar but was restrained by the Justice Party leaders from doing so.
27
28
29
30
31
32
New India, July 9, 1921. Ibid.
New India, July 11, 1921.
TNA, FR II, July 1921, D.O. 3313–1 (Pub), August 4, 1921.
TNA, G.O. 453 (Pub), July 20, 1921.
TNA, G.O. 1957 (Law) (Gen), November 21, 1921.
TNA, FR I, July 1921. D.O. 953/0–1 (Pub), July 19, 1921. The punitive tax was imposed only
in
September
1921,
TNA,
G.O.
629,
(Law)
(Gen),
September
19,
1921
(Swadharma, Vol. I, p. 351 and 373). 33
New India, August 23, 26 and 29,, September 20 and October 6, 1921. Police reports refer only to the firings on August 29, (D.O. 4057–1 (Pub)), September 3 and 19, 1921). Six men and one woman were killed in the firing on August 29 and one man on September 19. One man was seriously injured on October 5. In all 40 persons were seriously injured in the firing, all of them caste Hindus. (O. Thanikachalam’s, speech at the Madras Council). (Swadharma, Vol. I, pp. 402–403).
34
35
Swadharma regularly carried editorial comments criticizing Mr. Moir.
Swadharma, Vol. I, pp. 332 ff. P. Thyagaraya Chettiar and other Justice Party leaders visited the troubled area on August 28, 1921 and submitted a note to the Governor. The Government issued a Press Communiqué on 6 September 21 as a rejoinder to the note.
36
The Hindu, October 6, 1921. TNA, G.O. 2078, (Law) (Gen.), December 2, 1921. Also Swadharma, Vol. I, p. 379.
37
MLCP III No. l, October 12, 1921, pp. 1006–1010, Also Swadharma, Vol. I, p. 396.
38
39
40
41
42
43
New India, October 5, 1921.
New India, September 6, 1921.
New India, October 13, 1921.
Swadharma, October 20, 1921, Vol. I, p. 377.
New India, July 30, 1921.
Gilbert Slater, Southern India: Its Political and Economic Problems, (London, 1936), p. 330.
44
45
New India, September 9, 1921.
Swadharma, Vol. I, p. 341 for Gandhi’s speech in full. Gandhi condemned the use of force against the strikebreakers by the strikers. Further he advised the worker to seek a supplementary occupation instead of picketing at the mill gates: ‘You will make up your minds not to go near the mills, not to seek collision with Panchama brethren’. The sullen reaction to Gandhi’s speech is not in Madras Mail, September 17, 1921. Murphy, ‘Class and Community in India’, p. 3.
46
Thiru. Vi, Ka., Vazhkkai Kurippugal, p. 402. Thiru. Vi. Ka. gives credit to P.T. Chetty for bringing about the surrender. P.T. Chetty is said to have advised the workers, ‘You should be tactful. Fresh hands are being recruited. In a few months, they will become skilled. Then you would lose your jobs forever. You can’t cross the police and military barricades and stop the blacklegs. If however, you rejoin duty now, the blacklegs will be sent home. Your union will not perish.’ Thiru. Vi. Ka. has not however made any reference to the meeting with P.T. Chetty in the appeal he had issued to the public following the refusal of Binny and Co. to take back about 5,000 workers. ‘After 150 days of struggle, starvation, harassment and suffering the workers felt among themselves that it would be too cruel to keep back those who had reached their last resources from joining the Mills. They therefore met in their union on Thursday 20 October 1921 and declared that those who were willing to go back to mills might join work and the rest might stay out and find some other work.’ Swadharma, Vol. I, p. 435. Evidence of the lukewarm financial support from the Congress is available in the proceedings of the meeting of T.N.C.C. Executive Committee when it discussed the question of financial aid to the workers. The Secretary had just filed the resolution received from the South
Arcot
District
Conference,
as
it
was
not
routed
through
proper
channel.
Rajagopalachari revealed that there was no indication as to whether the grant of Rs 30,000 requested of Gandhi would ever be received. (Swadharma, Vol. I, pp. 473–474). 47
TNA, FR I, November 1921, D.O. 6185 (Pub), November 19, 1921. The number of men refused work was estimated at 5000 by the union.
48
49
50
New India, January 10, 1920.
New India, January 27, 1920.
New India, February 16, 1920. The demands were first made in January 1920 restated later.
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
New India, May 21, 1920.
New India, May 24, 1920 and May 29, 1920.
TNA, G.O. 562 (Pub), September 7, 1920.
New India, June 4 and 14, 1920.
TNA, G.O. 562 (Pub).
New India, June 18, 1920.
TNA, G.O. 1688 (Rev), July 13, 1920.
New India, June 23, 1920.
TNA, FR II, June 1920, D.O. 2508–l (Pub), July 1, 1920.
New India, June 29, 1920.
TNA, G.O. No. 562 (Pub), September 7, 1920.
TNA, FR I, July 1920 D.O. No. 2740–1 (Pub), July 19, 1920.
TNA, FR I and II, December 1919. D.O. 4964–w–l, (Pub), December 18, 1919 and D.O. 21w–l (Pub), January 1920.
64
TNA, FR II, January 1920, D.O. 126 w–1 (Pub), February 4, 1920, and New India, January 27, 1920.
65
TNA, FR II, January l920, D.O. l25 w–1 (Pub), February 4, 1920.
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
New India, February 1, 1920.
TNA, FR II, January 1920, D.O. 126 w–l (Pub).
New India, February 3, 1920.
TNA, FR I, February 1920, D.O. No. 669 w–l (Pub), February 19, 1920.
New India, March 6, 1920.
New India, June 21, 1920. th
New India, June 19, 1920. The tramwaymen met on 28
to consider the question of a
sympathetic strike but voted against it. ‘The refusal of the Tramwaymen to come out on a sympathetic strike has been a great blow to the men of Electric Corporation.’ TNA, FR I, July 1920, D.O. No. 2740–1 (Pub), July 19, 1920. Also New India, June 29, 1920. 73
74
75
76
77
78
New India, June 21, 1920.
New India, June 23, 1920.
New India, January 10, 1921.
TNA, FR I Jan. 1921, D.O. 181–1 (Pub), January 24, 1921.
New India, January 10, 1921.
New India, January 14, 1921. A reply was given to the Company by the Union. It demanded to know the Company’s stand on their demand for a review of the dismissals.
79
80
81
82
TNA, FR II, February 1921, D.O. 880–1 (Pub), March 1, 1921.
New India, February 14, 1921.
New India, January 17, 1921 and February 4, 1921.
TNA,
FR
II,
February
1921.
D.O.
880–l
(Pub).
Traffic
men
were
the
first
to
yield
returning to work by February 25, 1921. Workshop men held on for a day longer.
83
84
85
Swadharma, Vol. II, No. 24, October 15, 1922, p. 278.
New India, March 16, 1920.
TNA, G.O. L (PWL), November 18, 1929. Note on unregistered unions: Kerosene Oil Workers’ Union.
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
Ibid., and New India, April 24, 1920.
TNA, G.O. 3346 L (PWL), November 18, 1929.
New India, May 10 1920.
New India, May 15 1920.
TNA, FR II, May 1920, D.O. 2171–1, (Pub), June 1, 1920.
TNA, G.O. 3346 L (PWL), November 18, 1920.
New India, June 1, 1920.
New India, June 4, 1920.
TNA, G.O. 3346 L (PWL), November 18, 1929.
New India, August 6, 1920.
TNA, G.O. 3346 L (PWL).
Ibid.
Ibid.
New India, September 1, 1920.
TNA,
FR
I,
Sept
1920,
D.O.
3538-1
(Pub),
September
17,
1920.
The
police
commissioner’s remarks were: ‘The stoppage is due therefore rather to a lock out than to a strike and the general impression is that the company have not done all they might to avoid it . . . . There is no justification for their (Company’s) assumption that the men have rejected the award.’ 101
102
103
104
105
106
107
Ibid. Also Thiru. Vi. Ka., Vazhkkai Kurippugal, p. 452.
New India, September 15, 1920.
Ibid.
TNA, G.O. 3346 (PWL), November 18, 1929.
TNA, FR II, Sept. 1920, D.O. 3698–1 (Pub) October 4, 1920.
New India, September 23, 1920.
TNA, G.O. 1846 (Law) (Gen), November 7, 1921.
108
109
110
111
112
TNA, FR I, April 1920, D.O. l675-2 (Pub), April 20, 1920.
TNA, G.O. 1846 (Law) (Gen.).
Ibid.
New India, June 4, 1920.
TNA, FR II, July and FR II, Sept. 1920, D.O. 2897–1 (Pub), August 2, 1920, and D.O. 3698-1 (Pub), October 4, 1920.
113
114
115
116
TNA, G.O. 1846 Law (G) November 7, 1921.
TNA, FR I, July 1920, D.O. 2740–1 (Pub), July 19, 1920.
TNA, FR I, Sept. 1920, D.O. 3538–1 (Pub), Sept. 17, 1920.
Reference to a strike in The Hindu is made by a printing worker Loganathan speaking at a public meeting held on January 31, 1920 in support of tramway men’s strike. New India, February 1, 1920. TNA, FR I, Sept. 1920. D.O. 3538–1 (Pub), makes a reference to the strike in Theosophical Society Press details of which are not available. The strike affecting the Justice is referred to in earlier section.
117
118
119
120
121
New India, January 5, 1920.
New India, April 17, 1920.
TNA, G.O. 1846 (Law) (Gen), November 7, 1921.
New India, June 4, 1920.
TNA, G.O. 1846 (Law) (Gen). This G.O. contains reports on the strikes in the Madras Pencil Factory, Simpson and Co., and PWD Workshops.
122
123
124
125
126
TNA, G.O. 2636 (Law) (Gen), November 3, 1920.
Ibid.
TNA, FR II, August 1920. D.O. 3341–1 (Pub), September 2, 1920.
TNA, FR II, June 1920. D.O. 2508–1 (Pub), July 1, 1920.
TNA, FR II, July and FR I, August 1920. D.O. 2897–1 (Pub), August 2, 1920 and D.O. 3108–1, August 19, 1920.
127
TNA, FR II, June 1920. D.O. 2508–1 (Pub).
128
129
130
TNA, FR I June 1920. D.O. 2361–1 (Pub), June 17, 1920.
TNA, G.O. 1846 (Law) (Gen).
TNA, FR II, February 1920, D.O. 830 w–1 (Pub), March 5, 1920. Also New India, February 19, 1920.
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
New India, March 1, 1920.
New India, March 3, 1920.
New India, April 6, 1920.
New India, February 9, 1920.
New India, April 2, 1920.
New India, June 21, 1920.
TNA, FR I, July 1920, D.O. 27401–1 (Pub), July 19, 1920.
TNA, FR II, July 1920. D.O. 2897–1 (Pub), August 2, 1920.
TNA, FR I, October 1920. D.O. 3934–1 (Pub), October l6, 1920.
New India, November 1, 1920.
David Arnold. ‘Bureaucratic Recruitment and Subordination in Colonial India: The Madras Constabulary 1859-1947’ (hereafter ‘The Madras Constabulary’) in R. Guha (ed) Subaltern Studies IV, (Delhi: 1985), p. 24.
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
New India, March 11, 1920.
TNA, G.O. 1818 (Pub), March 15, 1920.
G. Selvapathy Chetty, Thozhilala Iyakkam Thondria Varalaru, p. 11.
Knapp’s Report, November 27, 1920 in TNA, G.O. 679 Home (Jud), March 28, 1921.
TNA, FR I, January 1921. D.O. 181–1 (Pub), January 24, 1921.
TNA, G.O. 679 Home (Jud), March 28, 1921.
Arnold, ‘The Madras Constabulary’, p. 29.
TNA, FRI, January 1922, D.O. 385–1(Pub), Jan. 20, 1922. Ibid.
TNA, G.O. 772 (Pub), November 9, 1921.
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
Prem Sagar Gupta, A Short History of A.I.T.U.C. (1920-1947) (New Delhi, 1980), p. 13.
Ibid., pp. 15–17.
Ibid., p. 21.
Swadharma, Vol. I, p. 473.
Swadharma, Vol. I, p. 565.
Swadharma, Vol. I, pp. 544–545.
Swadharma, Vol. I, p. 546.
Swadharma, 17 April 1921.
TNA, G.O. 2138 (Rev), September 1, 1920.
TNA, Under Secretary Safe Secrets (hereafter USS), No. 137(A) (L), December 23, 1920.
161
162
163
New India, June 24, 1920.
Thiru. Vi. Ka., Vazhkkai Kurippugal, p. 383.
C.I.D Report March 20, 1920 History of Freedom Movement Bundle No. 81 (compiled by TNA).
164
165
166
167
168
TNA, FR I, January 1921. D.O. 181–1. (Pub), January 24, 1921.
Madras Mail, February 28, 1921.
Madras Mail, July 14,1921. New India, June 25, 1921.
Swadharma, Vol. I, pp. 473–474.
TNA,
FR
I,
January
1922,
D.O.
385–l
(Pub),
January
20,
Ninaivu Alaigal. Also TNA, G.O. 342, (Jud), March 13, 1922. 169
170
171
172
Ibid.
Rajani Palme Dutt, India Today (Calcutta, 1947, rept. 1979).
Jawaharlal Nehru, Autobiography (London, 1936).
Dutt, India Today, p. 353.
1922.
Also
T.S.S.
Rajan,
VIII. THE PERIOD OF EBB AND QUIESCENCE, 1922–1933
1
2
3
4
Tara Chand, History of the Freedom Movement in India, Vol. IV, (Delhi, 1972), p. 3.
Murphy, ‘Class and Community in India,’ p. 103.
Ibid., p. 105. Also Arnold, ‘The Madras Constabulary’, p. 106.
K. Murugesan and C.S. Subramanyam, Singaravelu: First Communist in South India (Delhi, 1975), pp. 40–41, and pp. 169–187. Also, Swadharma, Vol. II, p. 227.
5
Swadharma, Vol. III, p. 251. The hostility of these leaders to Singaravelu would appear to have its origin in their differences with him over the administration of the labour relief
fund
raised
in
1921
to
help
the
B.
and
C.
Mill
workers.
Murugesan
and
Subramanyam, Singaravelu: First Communist in South India, p. 41. 6
7
8
9
Swadharma, Vol. III, p. 244.
Ibid., p. 244 and p. 219.
Murugesan and Subramanyam, Singaravelu: First Communist in South India, p. 43.
Michelle Mcalpin. ‘Price Movements and Fluctuations in Economic Activity (1860– 1947)’, in Dharma Kumar (ed.) The Cambridge Economic History of India, Vol. II, p. 904.
10
11
Shiva Rao, The Industrial Worker in India, p. 130.
Jurgen Kuczynski, ‘Condition of Workers, (1880–1950)’, in V.B. Singh (ed.) Economic History of India, 1857–1956 (Delhi, 1965 rept. 1978), p. 635.
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
Evidence by Binny and Co., R.C.L. Vol. VII, Part I, pp. 138–139.
Evidence by MLU, ibid., p. 171.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 185.
Ibid., pp. 186–187.
De Souza, The House of Binny, p. 207.
TNA,
Labour
Organisation
Ordinary), April 16 1924.
Report
(hereafter
LOR),
March
1924,
G.O.
134l
(Law
19
20
21
22
23
TNA, LOR October 1925. Lr. No. 3497 (Law) (Gen), November 20, 1925.
TNA, LOR January 1926, Lr. No. 520 (Law) (Gen), February 18, 1926.
TNA, LOR May 1924, G.O. 1364 (Law) (Gen), June 21, 1924.
TNA, LOR November 1925. Lr. No. 3768 (Law) (Gen) Dec. 17, 1925.
The strike lasted from April 20 to 22. The Port Trust Scavengers struck work on the st
21
and
returned
to
work
rd
on
23
.
TNA,
Labour
Dept.
Administration
Report
(hereafter LAR) 1924–25, G.O. 2914 (Law) (Gen), September 21, 1925.
24
TNA, LOR March 1926, Lr. No. 1352 (Law) (Gen), April 23, 1926 and TNA, LAR 1925– 26, G.O. 1700L, (Law) (Gen), Nov. 11, 1926.
25
26
27
28
29
TNA, LAR 1922–23, G.O. 2416 (Law) (Gen) October l5, 1923.
Ibid.
TNA, LAR, 1923–24, G.O. 3348 (Law) (Gen), November 27, 1924.
Ibid.
TNA, LAR. 1922–23, G.O. 2496 (Law) (Gen), October l5, 1923, and TNA LAR 1923–24 G.O. 3348 (Law) (Gen), November 27, 1924.
30
TNA, LAR 1922–23, G.O. 2496 (Law) (Gen), and TNA LOR Nov. 19 23, G.O. 3033 (Law) (Gen), December 18, 1923.
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
TNA, LAR 1922–23, G.O. 2495 (Law) (Gen), October l5, 1923.
Ibid.
TNA, LAR 1923–24, G.O. 3348 (Law) (Gen), December 18, 1923.
TNA, LAR 1922–23, G.O. 2496 (Law) (Gen).
Ibid.
TNA, LAR 1923–24, G.O. 3348(Law) (Gen).
The
table
below
is
based
on
the
particulars
available
in
the
Labour
Department
Administration Reports for the years 1922–23, 1923–24, 1924–25, 1925–26 and 1926– 27:
NUMBER OF STRIKES IN THE CITY 1922-26
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
Total
Textiles
2
3
-
-
-
5
Printing
2
2
-
-
-
4
Engg.
5
1
-
-
-
6
Corporation
-
1
2
-
-
3
Port Trust
-
1
1
-
2
4
Oil Distribution
-
-
-
-
-
1
Others
1
-
-
-
-
1
11
8
3
-
2
24
Total
38
39
Gupta, A Short History of A.I.T.U.C., p. 65.
TNA, LOR Jan. 1926, 520 (Law) (Gen), February, 18, 1926 and TNA, FR I January 1926. D.C. No. 221–1 (Pub), January 17 1926.
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
TNA, LOR Jan. 1926, 520 (Law) (Gen).
Ibid.
TNA, FR I, January 1926. D.O. No. 221–1 (Pub).
Gupta. A Short History of A.I.T.U.C., pp. 73–78.
TNA, FR I, Aug. 1926, D.O. 3823–1 (Pub), August 16 1926.
Revri, IFC Report, pp. 118–119.
Ibid., p. 119.
TNA, FR II, January 1927, 3.0. No. 2781 (Pub), February 2,1927.
TNA, FR II, April 1927, D.O. 710–1 (Pub), May 2, 1927.
Letter No. 41/27, dtd May 11, 1927 from the Commissioner of Labour to the Secretary to Govt. PWD Dept., TNA, G.O. 1261L (PWL), June 9, 1927.
50
D.O. 869, dtd May 11, 1927 from the Commissioner of Police to the Chief Secretary to the
Government,
for
a
report
on
the
incidents.
Protests
were
made
by
Dewan
Chamanlal, N.M. Joshi, Abdul Hamid Khan in telegrams. TNA, G.O. 1261L (PWL) June 9, 1927. 51
Letter
No.
866/27,
dtd
May
20,
1927
from
the
Commissioner
of
Labour
to
the
Secretary, (PWL), G.O. 1261L.
52
Letter
dtd
August
21,
1926
from
Adikesvalu
Naicker,
President,
PWD
Workshops
Union to the Superintendent, PWD Workshops. TNA, G.O. l532L (PWL). July 15, 1927. 53
Letter
No.
W/1133M,
dtd
May
31,
1927
from
the
General
Superintendent,
PWD
Workshops to the Commissioner for Labour, TNA, G.O. 1532L cited above. 54
Letter
from
the
Secretary,
the
Chamber
of
Commerce
Madras
to
the
Secretary
to
Government, PWL, June 30, 1927 and Reply Letter No. 334/27–2, dtd July 13, 1927 from the PWL Secretary. TNA, G.O. 1532L cited above.
55
D.O.
Letter
from
A.
Ranganatha
Mudaliar,
Minister
for
Development,
to
Sir
C.P.
Ramaswamy Iyer, Law Member, Governor’s Executive Council, June 16, 1927. TNA, G.O. 1532L cited above. The Government reply was given only on June 9, 1929. TNA, G.O. 46L (PWL), January 9, 1929. 56
57
TNA, G.O. 1668L, (PWL), August 2 1927.
The Hindu, May 27, 1927, June 1, 1927, July 6, 1927 and July 11, 1927 (TNA, G.O. 1668L (PWL) above).
58
Letter. No. D. Dis. No. 1356/27, July 22, 1927 from the Commissioner of Labour to the Secretary, PWL (TNA, G.O. 1668L (PWL)). TNA, FR I, September 1927, D.O. 4360–1 (Pub), September 16 1927.
59
60
61
62
63
64
TNA, FR I, May 1927, D.O. 15/0–1 (Pub), May 16, 1927.
TNA, FR II, July 1927, D.O. 110/0–1 (Pub), August 4, 1927.
TNA, FR II, August 1927, D.O. 4086–1 (Pub), September 2, 1927.
TNA, FRI, July 1927, D.O. 10120–1 (Pub), July 19, 1927.
TNA, FRI II, August 1927, D.O. 4086–1 (Pub), September 2, 1927.
Minutes of Sir C.P. Ramaswami Iyer, Law Member, June 22, 1927, on Office Note, TNA, G.O. 1505L (PWL), July 11, 1927.
65
66
67
68
Sitarammayya, History of Indian National Congress, pp. 538–539.
Ibid., p. 542.
Ibid., p. 541.
Brian Stoddart, ‘The Unwanted Commission: National Agitation and Local Politics in Madras City, 1928’, South Asia, December 5, 1975, pp. 48–50.
69
R. Parthasarathi, A Hundred Years of the Hindu. The Epic Story of Indian Nationalism (Madras, 1979), p. 358.
70
71
Sarkar, Modern India, p. 266.
Sitarammayya, History of Indian National Congress, p. 938, and p. 953. For an analysis of the course of events leading to the suspension and final withdrawal of the Civil Disobedience Movement, see Sarkar, Modern India, pp. 325–327.
72
73
74
Arnold, ‘The Madras Constabulary’, pp. 118–119.
Ibid., pp. 124–125, also Murphy, ‘Class and Community in India’, p. 106.
Nrisingha Chakrabarty, History of Railway Trade Union Movement, A Study
(Delhi.
1985), p. 32. 75
76
77
78
Sen, Working Class of India, p. 292.
Revri, IFC Report, p. 159.
Gupta, A Short History of A.I.T.U.C, p. 155.
Nehru, Presidential Address to the Tenth Session of AITUC, 28 November 1929, quoted in Ibid., p. 164.
79
80
81
82
83
84
Ibid, p. 166.
Revri, IFC Report, p. 195.
Gupta, A Short History of A.I.T.U.C., p. 195.
Ibid., p. 197 and p. 210.
Sen, Working Class of India, pp. 310–311.
C.J. Baker, An Indian Rural Economy, 1880-1955: The Tamil Nadu Countryside (hereafter An Indian Rural Economy) (Delhi, 1984), p. 311. Also see G. Rajendran and Badri
Narayanan. ‘Dislocation and Experiment in Madras Agriculture during the Inter-War Period: A Study of Tanjore and Ramnad Districts.’ Indo-British Review, Vol. XIII, No. Jan–June l, 1987, p. 79. 85
86
Evidence by Binny and Co., R.C.L. Vo1. VII, Part I, p. 152.
For details of the efforts taken to amalgamate the two unions: Evidence by MLU, ibid., p.175, and p. 188 and Evidence by B. and C. Mill Employees Union, ibid., p. 223.
87
Letters from the Commissioner of Labour to the Secretary to Govt. 2536/28, July 16, 1928, No. l, August 9 1928, August 17, 1928, and August 18, 1928. TNA, G.O. 120L (PWL), January 17,1929.
88
Letter to the Editor, The Hindu, by Shiva Rao, President, MLU. The Hindu. October 17, 1928 and Letter No. 13528/28 (Confidential) October 2, 1928 from the Commissioner to the MUS&W Mills, TNA, G.O. 120L (PWL), January 17,1929.
89
Letter No. 13528/28, October 26, 1928 from Commissioner of Labour to the MUS&W Mills, and Reply from the Mills, October 26 1928, (TNA G.O. No. 120L (PWL), January 17,1929).
90
91
92
93
94
TNA, G. O. 1405L (PWL) May 6, 1929.
TNA, G. O. 1861–L (PWL) June 25, 1929.
TNA, G.O. 1366 (l-5)–L (PWL) May 1, 1930.
TNA, FR II May 1932, D.O. No. P 4–11 (Pub) (Gen) June 4, 1932.
Report
of
the
Court
of
Enquiry
to
investigate
certain
matters
connected
with
staff
retrenchments in Indian Railways, 1932. (Calcutta, 1932) pp. 2–5. (hereafter Report of Court of Enquiry, 1932).
95
Letter from the Secretary to Government of India, (Industries and Labour) to All India Railwaymen’s Federation, L.1174, July 18, 1931 (TNA, G.O. No. 2044L (PWL) August 11, 1931) and Report of Court of Enquiry, ibid., Chapter IV, pp. 58 ff.
96
Report of Court of Enquiry, 1932, p. 16, Also Memorandum of Government of Madras to R.C.L., Section 15, Appendix-B, R.C.L., Vol. VII, Part I, p. 29.
97
Report of Court of Enquiry, 1932, pp 16–17.
98
99
TNA, G.O. 1686L (PWL), July 2, 1931.
Report of Court of Enquiry 1932, p. 4 and Press Communiqué of the M. and S.M. Railway Employee’s Union, October 21 1932, TNA, G.O. 597 (Railways) (PWL), March 10, 1933.
100
101
102
Ibid.
Ibid.
Letter from Agent, M. and S.M. Railway to the Govt. of Madras (PWL) October 25, 1952.
Anglo-Indian
Association’s
appeal,
refer
DIO
Police
Rys
Lr.
No.
3479/c,
November 7, 1932 (T.N.A., G.O. 597 (Railways) (PWL), March 10, 1933).
103
TNA, FR I and FR II November 1932, D.O. No. P4–22 (Pub) (Gen), November 18, 1932 and D.O. P4-23 (Pub) (Gen) December 3, 1932.
104
105
India, November 25, and December 5, 1932, TNA, Native News Paper Reports, p. 925.
D.I.G. Police (Rys), Letter No. 3563/C, November 15, 1932 (TNA, G.O. No. 597 (PWL) March 10, 1933.
106
V. Yesubakthan, ‘Labour Movement in the Railways in Madras Presidency 1919–1933’ (hereafter
Labour
Movement
in
the
Railways
in
Madras;
unpublished
M.
Phil
dissertation, Madras Univ. 1985), pp. 133–134. 107
108
Ibid., pp. 134–135.
Intelligence Summary No. 32, December 8, 1932. TNA, G.O. 597 (Railway) PWL, March 10, 1933.
109
Giri, My Life and Times, Vol. 1 (Madras, 1976), p. 83. Also Intelligence Summary No. 37 and No. 38 14/15 December 1932. G.O. 597 (Railway) (PWL) March 10, 1933 refers to the resolution of Corporation of Madras.
110
TNA,
FR
I,
Dec.
1932,
D.O.
No.
P.4–24
(Pub)
(Gen),
December
19,
1932.
Also
Yesubakthan, ‘Labour Movement in the Railways in Madras’, pp. 136– 137. 111
112
TNA, FR II, October 1932, D.O. P 4–21 (Pub) (Gen), November 3, 1932.
Intelligence Summary No. 43, December 23, 1932 TNA, G.O. 597 (Railway) (PWL) March 10, 1933.
113
Intelligence
Summary
No.
44,
December
24,
1932
TNA,
G.O.
No.
597
(Railway)
(PWL). 114
D.I.G. (Railway), Letter. No. 58/c, January 8 1933 and Letter. No. 59/c, dtd January 9, 1933 to Chief Secretary, TNA, G.O. 597 (Railway) (PWL).
115
D.I.G. (Railway), Letter. No. 84/C, dtd January 11, 1933 to Chief Secretary, TNA, G.O. No. 597 (Railway) (PWL).
116
TNA, FR II, April 1933, D.O. P4–9 (Pub) (Gen), May 4, 1933 and TNA, FR I, July 1933, D.O. P4–0–14 (Pub) (Gen), July 20, 1933.
117
TNA, FR I, and II, February 1933, D.O. P4–4 (Pub) (Gen), February 18, 1933 and P4–5 (Pub) (Gen), Mar 4, 1933, FR I May 1933, D.O. P4–10, May 18, 1933.
118
Giri, My Life and Times, Vol. 1, p. 84. Giri’s figure of 800 is not substantiated by any official data but it was natural that there was a sharp decline in membership after the failure of a prolonged strike.
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
TNA, G.O. 46L (PWL) January 9, 1929.
TNA, G.O. 665L, (PWL), February 24,1930.
TNA. G.O. 2100 L (PWL), October 7, 1932.
TNA, G.O. 3218 (PWL), December 21, 1930.
TNA, G.O. 713 (PWL), March 13,1931.
TNA, G.O. 1620D (PWL) August 1, 1932.
TNA FR II September 1930, D.O. P4–19 (Pub) (Gen), October 3, 1930 TNA, FR II, October 1931, D.O. P4–21, November 4, 1931, TNA, FR I, July 1932, D.O. P4-14, (Pub) (Gen) July 19, 1932.
126
TNA, FR II, July 1932. D.O. P4–15 (Pub) (Gen), Aug 4, 1932 and FR I. August 1932, D.O. P4–16 (Pub) (Gen), August 20 ,1932.
127
Indian Factory Act Administration Report 1929, TNA, G.O. 1254–55 (Dev), June 20, 1930.
128
TNA, FR I March 1932, D.O. P4-6 (Pub) (Gen), March 19, 1932. The lightning strike on March 11, 1932 was over the issue of a fine of Re.1 of workers for negligence.
129
Statement of M.S. Kotiswaran, President, WIMCO Worker’s Union, TNA, G.O. 1354L (Pub) June 23, 1932.
130
V.M. Ramasami Mudaliar put questions in the Madras Legislative Council about the Police harassment of picketeers. Legislative Council Question No. 157, August 2 1932. TNA, G.O. 2610L (Pub), December 8, 1932.
131
Letter from M.S. Kotiswaran to the Commissioner of Labour, August 4, 1932. TNA, G.O. 2150 L (PWL), October 15, 1932.
132
133
TNA, LAR. 1932-33, G.O. 373L (PWL), February 14, 1934.
Ibid.
IX. EMERGENCE OF LEFT FORCES, 1933–1937
1
Giri, My Life and Times, Vol. 1, p. 165. Giri claims to have convinced Rajaji of the risk involved in such a general strike, which may lead to incidents similar to those witnessed in Chauri-Chaura.
2
TNA, USS, No. 493, July 9, 1924, for copies of letter exchanged by Singaravelu with Roy and Dange. Also C.A. Perumal and V.K. Pamanabhan, ‘Communism in Tamil Nadu’, Journal of Madras University, LIV (2), July 1982.
3
R. Murugesan and C.S Subramanyam, Singaravelu: First Communist in South India, p. 25.
4
5
Ibid., p. 43.
G. Adhikari, (ed)., Documents of the History of the Communist Party of India, Vol. II, 1923–25 (Delhi, 1974), p. 613 ff.
6
7
8
Murugesan and Subramanyam, Singaravelu: First Communist in South India, pp. 55–56.
TNA, FR II, August 1927, D.O. 4086-1, (Pub), September 2, 1927.
Murugesan and Subramanyam, Singaravelu: First Communist in South India, pp. 112– 113.
9
Ibid, p. 31. Also Adhikari, Documents of the History of the Communist Party of India, Vol. III (Delhi, 1979), p. 118.
10
11
Nehru, An Autobiography, (London, 1936, rept. 1947), pp. 166–167.
TNA, G.O. Ms. No. 946 (Pub) (Gen), September 10, 1934. Also see Govt. of India, Home/Political/f44/92: Letter No. 401–S (Pub) 3 September 1934 published in Subodh Roy (ed), Communism in India: Unpublished Documents 1925-34. (Calcutta, 1972), pp. 219–227: Other biographical details are available in Amir Hyer Khan, My Discovery of South India, Original Manuscript available at the Institute of South Indian Studies, Madras.
12
13
A.K. Khan, My Discovery of South India, pp. 13–15.
K. Murugesan, ‘Comrade Ghate, Four Fruitful Years in Madras’, in C.S. Subramanyan (ed), S.V. Ghate: Our First General Secretary. (Delhi, 1971) (Tamil Translation, Madras 1977), pp. 124–126.
14
15
Perumal and Padmanabhan, ‘Communism in Tamil Nadu’, p. 14.
TNA, G.O. 813 (Pub) (Gen) August 4, 1934, containing extract from Gazette of India, September 28, 1934.
16
Letter
No.
109-S,
dtd
March
7,
1934
from
Govt
of
Madras
to
the
Secretary
to
Government of India, Home, TNA, USS, No. 897, December 20, 1934. 17
18
19
Sarkar, Modern India, pp. 331–332.
Perumal and Padmanabhan, ‘Communism in Tamil Nadu’, p. 15.
E. Sa. Viswanathan, The Political Career of E.V. Ramasami Naicker (Madras, 1983), pp. 146–149.
20
21
22
23
24
Ibid., pp. 153–154.
Ibid., p. 155.
Kudi Arasu, March 31, 1935, TNA G.O. 470 (Pub) (Gen), March 22, 1935.
TNA, G.O. 1867 (Pub), November 23, 1936.
TNA, HFM (101) (1936-40): Selected Extracts from Confidential Files Relating to the Origin and Activities of Labour Unions, Youth Leagues and Leftists Parties in Madras Presidency.
25
O.V. Martyshin, ‘The Comintern and the Problem of a United Anti-Imperialist Front in India’, in R.A. Ulyanovsky (ed), The Comintern and the East, (Moscow, 1979), pp. 449– 450. R. Palme Dutt and Ben Bradley, ‘The Anti-Imperialist Front’, International Press Correspondence (IMPRECOR), 1936, Vol. 16, No.11, pp. 297–300.
26
27
28
29
TNA, G.O. 2213 (Pub) (Gen), December 12, 1939.
Perumal and Padmanabhan, ‘Communism in Tamil Nadu’, p. 16.
Ibid., p. 17.
K. Murugesan, ‘Comrade Ghate, Four Fruitful years in Madras’, in C.S. Subramanyam (ed), S.V. Ghate: Our First General Secretary (Delhi, 1971) (Tamil Translation, Madras 1977), pp. 124–126.
30
31
32
Ibid., p. 113.
Murphy, ‘Class and Community in India’, p. 108.
Report of the Indian Franchise Committee, Vol. I (Calcutta, 1932) and Report of the Indian Delimitation Committee (Delhi, 1936).
33
34
35
Ibid., p. 253.
Ibid., pp. 227–231 and p. 237. Also Shiva Rao, The Industrial Worker in India, p. 223.
Report
of
the
Indian
Franchise
Committee,
Vol.
I.
Report:
Chapter
IX,
Para
257
(Calcutta, 1932), p. 100.
36
Ibid. Para 276, p. 107. Also Indian Delimitation Committee, Vol. II: Appendix IV (Delhi, 1936), p. 16.
37
38
Murphy, ‘Class and Community in India’, p. 111.
TNA, FR I, 1933, D.O. P4-1 (Pub) (Gen) August 22, 1933, Provincial Labour Party, sponsored by Giri, Mehta and V.M. Ramaswami. TNA, FR II 1934, D.O. P4–11 (Pub) (Gen), June 5, 1934. (Selvapathi Chettiar’s South Indian Labour Political Party). The Hindu, March 31, 1935 (Basu Dev’s Labour Political Party).
39
TNA, FR I, July 1933, D.O. P4–14 (Pub), July 20, 1933 and TNA, G.O. 854L (PWL), May 7, 1934.
40
Ibid. Also see. TNA, FR II Aug. 1933, D.O. No. P4–17 (Pub) 5 Sept. 1933 and TNA, LAR 1933–1934, G.O. 274L (PWL), December 14, 1934. Also TNA, G.O. 854L (PWL).
41
TNA, FR I, January 1934, D.O. P4-2 (Pub), January 18, 1934 and TNA Strikes and Lockouts, Weekly Reports (hereafter SLWR) 1934, G.O. 1602 (PWL), July 15, 1935.
42
TNA, LAR, 1933-1934, G.O. 2741 (PWL), July 14,1935 and TNA, SLWR 1934, G.O. 1602 (PWL).
43
44
45
46
47
TNA, SLWR 1934, G.O 1602 (PWL).
TNA, SLWR 1935, G.O. 66 (PWL), January 8, 1935.
TNA, SLWR 1936, G.O. 350 (Dev), February 12, 1937.
TNA, SLWR 1934, G.O. 1602 (PWL).
TNA, LAR 1934-35, G.O. 2507L (PWL), November 20, 1935 and TNA, SLWR 1935, G.O. 66 L (PWL).
48
49
50
Ibid.
Ibid.
D. Dis. No. 1982/34–C1, April 12, 1934 from the District Magistrate, Chingleput, to the Commissioner of Labour, TNA, SLWR 1934, G.O. No. 1602L (PWL), July 15, 1935. The District Magistrate reported with sense of relief that there was no attempt to form a trade union.
51
Continued unrest is reported in TNA, FR II, May 1934 and D.O. No. P4–11 (Pub), June 5, 1934 and TNA, FR I, June 1934, D.O. No. P4–12 (Pub), June 19, 1934. Regarding 1937 strike see TNA, SLWR 1937, G.O. 448 (Dev), February 21, 1938. The crisis in the Handloom Industry during the 1930s is well analyzed in C.J. Baker, An Indian Rural Economy, pp. 400 ff.
52
53
54
55
Tara Chand, History of the Freedom Movement in India, Vol. IV, pp. 212–213.
Sarkar, Modern India, pp. 344–346.
Sarkar, Modern India, p. 338 and pp. 343–344.
K.T. Shah (ed), National (Bombay, 1947), p. 29.
Planning
Committee:
Report
of
Sub
Committee
on
Labour
56
57
Murphy, ‘Class and Community in India’, p. 137.
Claude
Markovits,
Indian
Business
and
Nationalist
Politics:
1931–39,
(Cambridge,
1985), p. 114.
58
59
Ibid, p. 115.
TNA, History of the Freedom Movement, Bundle No. 101, 1936–1942 (Extracts from Confidential Files).
60
61
62
63
64
65
Gupta, A Short History of A.I.T.U.C., p. 290.
TNA, G.O. 710, (Pub) (Election), April 9, 1937.
Arnold, ‘The Madras Constabulary’, p. 183. Giri, My Life and Times, p. 111.
TNA, History of Freedom Movement, 1936-1942, Bundle No. 101.
Ibid.
TNA, FR II, Nov. 1935, D.O. P4-22 (Pub), December 4, 1935. Also R. Nallakkannu, B.S.R. Vazhkaivaralaru (Tamil) (Madras, 1975), p. 40.
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
TNA, History of Freedom Movement 1936-1942, Bundle No. 101.
TNA, SLWR 1936, G.O. No. 350 (Dev).
Ibid.
Ibid.
K. Murugesan, ‘Comrade Ghate, Four Fruitful years in Madras’, p. 113.
Ibid., p. 113.
Ibid., pp. 113–120. Also TNA, SLWR 1937, G.O. No. 448, (Dev).
Speech by A.S.K. Iyengar, August 31, 1937. T.N.A. G.O. 1917 (Pub), October 8, 1937.
K. Murugesan, ‘Comrade Ghate, Four Fruitful years in Madras’, p. 119.
TNA, SLWR 1937, G.O. 448 (Dev).
Ibid.
Ibid. Also Murugesan, ‘Comrade Ghate, Four Fruitful years in Madras’, pp.121–122. The
frustrated
workers
were
reported
to
have
obstructed
Ghate
from
entering
the
Union Office. Ghate pointed out the organizational failures on the part of the strikers and pacified the workers. 78
79
80
TNA, SLWR 1937, G.O. No. 448 (Dev).
Ibid.
TNA, FR II, February 1936, D.O. P4-4 (Pub), March 3, 1936 and TNA, FR I March 1936, D.O. P4-5, March 18, 1936. TNA, LOR, March 1936, Lr. No. 657 (Dev) April 27, 1936. The ambivalent Congress stand can be seen in Giri My Life and Times, p. 100 and p. 104.
81
Interview with C.S. Subramaniam, January 7, 1984. A.S.K. Iyengar was prosecuted for the speech on January 26, 1936, convicted and sentenced to 6 months of Rigorous Imprisonment. TNA, G.O. 1917 (Pub).
82
Interview
with
P.
Ramamurthi,
2
November
1984.
Also
K.
Murugesan
and
C.S.
Subramanyam, Singaravelu: First Communist in South India, p. 134. 83
84
85
Markovits, Indian Business and Nationalist Politics: 1931–39, p. 114.
A.K. Gopalan, In the Cause of the People (Madras, 1976), p. 83.
TNA, LOR December 1936, G.O. 174 (Dev), January 22, 1937 and LOR January 1937, G.O. 511 (Dev.), March 2, 1937.
86
B.N. Ponomarev (ed), The International Working Class Movement, Vol. 5 (Moscow, 1985), pp.502–503.
87
Martyshin, ‘The Comintern and the Problem of a United Anti-Imperialist Front in India’, pp. 449–450. Dutt and Bradley, ‘The Anti-Imperialist Front’, pp. 297–300.
X. THE CONGRESS MINISTRY AND THE WORKING CLASS, 1937–1939
1
2
David Arnold, Police Power and Colonial Rule, Madras 1859-1947 (Delhi, 1986), p. 220.
TNA, G.O. 1965 (Dev), Aug 27, 1937, Government of Madras, Madras Labour: Note on labour Policy and Labour Disputes (Madras, 1938), Appendix II.
3
4
TNA, SLWR, G.O. 86 (Dev), June 10, 1939.
De Souza, House of Binny, pp. 244–246.
5
7
8
9
The Hindu, August 6, 1937.
Ibid. Also The Hindu, October 5, 6, and 9, 1937.
The Hindu, October 8 and 10, 1937.
Press Communiqué, Fort St. George, October 22, 1937, Government of Madras, Madras Labour, Appendix IX–XII.
10
11
Ibid. TNA, FR II, October 1937 D.O. P4–20 (Pub), Nov. 5, 1937.
Letter from Madras Labour Union to Binny and Co., March 9 ,1938, TNA, G.O. 1117 (Dev), April 29, 1938.
12
13
Ibid.
Letter from Binny and Co., to V.V. Giri, Minister for Labour, March 4, 1938, TNA, G.O. 1117 (Dev).
14
TNA, FR I. March 1938, D.O. P4–5 (Pub), March 19, 1938. Letter from Binny and Co. to Giri, March 5, 1938. Letter from Binny and Co. to MLU, March 5, 1938. TNA, G.O. 1117 (Dev), April 29, 1938.
15
16
Murphy, ‘Class and Community in India’, p. 157.
Letter from Binny and Co. to MLU, April 17, 1938 and Union’s letter to Binny, March 19, 1938. TNA, G.O. 1117 (Dev), April 29, 1938.
17
18
19
Thiru. Vi. Ka., Vazhkkai Kurippugal, p. 429.
TNA, LAR 1937–38, G.O. No. 2196 (Dev), September 5, 1938.
Letter from Binny and Co. to the Prime Minister. March 18, 1938. TNA G.O. 1117 (Dev.), April 29, 1938.
20
Thiru. Vi. Ka., Vazhkkai Kurippugal, p. 430. Rajagopalachari later attended the Sports Day Meet held in 1939. De Souza, The House of Binny, p. 247.
21
Letter No. C–4–6340/37 January 25, 1938 from the Commissioner of Labour to the Secretary to Government (Dev), TNA, G.O. 384 (Dev) February 11, 1938.
22
23
Govt. of Madras, Madras Labour, p. 239.
TNA, G.O. 1876 (Dev), August 2, 1938.
24
25
26
27
Ibid.
The Hindu, July 20, 1938.
TNA, G.O. 3010 (Dev), December 5, 1938.
The Hindu, October 15, 1938, Selvapathy got 790 votes and his Congress opponent 712 votes. There were over 600 mill workers in the electorate.
28
29
Giri, My Life and Times, pp. 143–144.
TNA, G.O. 1327 (Dev), May 22, 1939, Thiru. Vi. Ka., Vazhkkai Kurippugal, pp. 432– 433.
30
TNA, FR I, March 1939, D.O. P4–5(Pub), March, 18 1939. Also The Hindu, February 23, 1939.
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
TNA, G.O. 1327 (Dev).
Ibid. Letter from MLU to the Commissioner of Labour, March 24, 1939.
Ibid.
TNA, FR II, April 1939, D.O. P4–8 (Pub), May 5, 1939.
Thiru. Vi. Ka., Vazhkkai Kurippugal, pp. 433–434.
Ibid., p. 434.
Award of Justice V. Pandurang Row on the Madras Tramways Arbitration, Madras Labour, Appendix VIII, p. 249.
38
39
40
41
TNA, G.O. 1289 (Dev), May 19, 1938. Extract from Indian Express. March 1, 1938.
Extract from Indian Express, March 3, 1938 (G.O. 1289).
Extract from The Hindu, 6 March 1938 (G.O. 1289).
Letter from the Union to the Prime Minister, March 14, 1938. (G.O. 1289). Also TNA, FR I, March 1928, D.O. P4–5 (Pub), March 19, 1938.
42
43
44
Letter from the Union to the Labour Minister, March 25, 1938 (G.O. 1289).
Ibid.
Press Communiqué PC No. 19/38, April 9, 1938. (G.O. 1289).
45
The appointment of Justice Pandurang Rao as Arbitrator is communicated in Memo No. 1364 IV 38.5, May 3, 1938. (G.O. 1289). The award of the arbitrator is published in G.O. 1532 (Dev), June 22, 1938. (reprinted in Madras Labour, pp 245 ff ).
46
Extracts from Secret Abstracts of Intelligence No. 23, (Pub) June 18, 1938, para 215. (TNA, G.O. 1532).
47
48
49
50
51
Ibid.
TNA, G.O. 1289 (Dev).
TNA, Indian Trade Union Act Working Report, G.O. 47 (Dev), January 6, 1939.
Madras Labour, p. 251.
A.S.K. Iyengar, Madras Press Labour Union Varalaru (History of the Madras Press Labour Union), Silver Jubilee Souvenir (Madras, 1963), pp 1–2.
52
53
Madras Press Labour Union, Annual Report 1937–38 (MPLU Papers).
TNA, LAR, 1937–38, G.O. 2196 (Dev), September 5, 1938. Also A.S.K. Iyengar, Madras Press Labour Union Varalaru, p. 3.
54
TNA, SLWR, 1938, G.O. 86 (Dev), January 10, 1939 and TNA, LAR, 1938–39, G.O. 2109, (Dev), August 25, 1939.
55
56
57
58
59
60
TNA, G.O. 1896 (Dev), August 3, 1938.
Ibid.
Madras Labour, Appendix XI, 277.
Press Communiqué dated Fort St. George, October 13, 1938, ibid., p. 284.
TNA, G.O. 687 (Dev.), March 20, 1939. Appeal by A.S.K. Iyengar, February 19, 1939.
For
TNCC
Resolution,
see
‘Report
of
the
General
Secretary,
Madras
Press
Labour
Union, for the year I937–38 (MPLU Papers, Madras). Associated Printers Strike: TNA, LAR 1938–39, G.O. 2109 (Dev), August 25 1939. 61
Giri’s noting on the Union’s letter to the Prime Minister, February 13, 1929. TNA, G.O. 687 (Dev), March 20, 1939.
62
Ibid.
63
Report of the General Secretary, Madras Press Labour Union for the year 1938–39, (MPLU Papers, Madras) pp 8–9.
64
65
66
TNA, G.O. 1185 (Dev), May 5 1939 and TNA, G.O. 1372 (Dev), May 26, 1939.
TNA, G.O. 1314 (Dev), May 19, 1939.
Report of the General Secretary of the Madras Press Labour Union for the year 1938– 39. (MPLU Papers), p. 12.
67
Proceedings of the Meeting of the Board of Directors of Madras Publishing House, March 13, 1939 and Report of the Commissioner of Labour to the Secretary Development, March 20 1939. TNA, G.O. 1314 (Dev).
68
Giri’s noting on file dtd March 24, 1939 and letter from the Commissioner of Labour to the Secretary to Government (Dev), April 27, 1939. (TNA, G.O. 1314 (Dev.)). Giri’s stand in the present instance and a very closely similar one in the case of Diocesan Press strike testify to his anxiety to get the managements fall in line with the Labour Policy of the
Government.
The
most
classic
example
of
this
approach
of
course
was
the
imposition of Section 144 against the Harveys at Madura in April 1938. (Giri, My Life and Times, p. 134). 69
Letter from A.S.K. Iyengar to the Minister for Labour, June 12, 1939 (TNA, G.O. 1314 (Dev)).
70
Letter from A.S.K. Iyengar to Ramnath Goenka, June 19, 1939 in TNA, G.O. No. 1969 (Dev), 9 August 1939.
71
72
Letter from Goenka to A.S.K. Iyengar, June 20, 1939 (TNA, G.O. 1969).
Letter
from
A.S.K.
Iyengar
to
V.V.
Giri,
June
4,
1939
and
from
A.S.K.
Iyengar
to
Goenka, June 27, 1939 (TNA, G.O. 1969). 73
Letter from K. Murugesan, Secretary, Madras Press Labour Union, to the Inspector of Factories, July 10, 1939 (TNA, G.O. 1969).
74
Madras Press Labour Union leaflet, July 3 1939 ‘Who Refused Arbitration.’ (TNA, G.O. 1969).
75
Margin notes of Rajagopalachari, and Giri in file on the editorial in Indian Express, July 4, 1939 (TNA, G.O. 1969).
76
77
78
79
A.S.K. Iyengar, Madras Press Labour Union Varalaru, p. 4.
MPLU leaflet, July 3 1939 (TNA, G.O. 1969), 9 Aug 1939.
Rajendra Prasad to Giri, July 15, 1939 (TNA, G.O. 1969).
Commissioner
of
Labour
to
Secretary
to
Government
(Dev),
04
No.3465/39,
dtd
September 12, 1939 from A.S.K. Iyengar to Goenka, July 28, 1939 (TNA, G.O. 1969). 80
81
TNA, LAR 1938–39, G.O. 2109 (Dev), August 25, 1939.
TNA, G.O. 47 (Dev), January 6, 1939 and TNA, SLWR, G.O. 86 (Dev), January 10, 1939.
82
Govt. of Madras Press Communiqué, July 30, 1938. During the strike, a number of workers
were
arrested
and
prosecuted
under
the
Town
Nuisance
Act.
On
the
appointment of the court of enquiry, the union requested the government to withdraw the cases and cancel convictions. Rajagopalachari agreed to withdraw only pending cases and wanted that all convictions should stand. He noted, ‘We cannot afford to create the impression that strikers may do anything they like and at the end of it when the
strike
is
ended
all
persons
will
be
let
off
and
all
convictions
cancelled
by
the
Ministry. We shall be certainly encouraging violence if we did so.’ Giri agreed. Note dtd August 22, 1938. TNA, G.O. 4225 (Home), September 1, 1938. 83
84
85
86
Madras Labour, Appendix X, p. 268.
TNA, SLWR, G.O. 294 (Dev), February 8, 1940.
TNA, G.O. 895. (Pub), June 2, 1939.
Letter from P.R.K. Sarma to C. Rajagopalachari dtd March 4, 1939 (TNA, G.O. 895). A letter from Sarma to Giri dtd April 10, 1939 and letter from WIMCO to President WIM Factory workers’ Union dtd May 1, 1939 (TNA, G.O. 1315 (Dev), May 19, 1939).
87
Joint Letter of 104 workers to the Director, WIMCO dtd July 1, 1939. Letter from Commissioner of Labour, C4–No. 3466/39, dtd July 8, 1939 (TNA, G.O. 1830 (Dev), July 20, 1939.
88
89
Ibid.
Company’s letter to the President, WIMCO Factory Workers’ Union dtd May 1, 1939. (TNA, G.O. 1315 (Dev)).
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
TNA, SLWR, 1937, G.O. 448 (Dev), February 21, 1938.
TNA, SLWR, 1938, G.O. 86 (Dev), January 10, 1939
Ibid.
TNA SLWR I939, G.O. 294 (Dev), February 8, 1940.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
The
eight
foundries
in
Choolai
area
affected
by
the
sympathetic
strike
were
Saraswathi, Nataraj, Durga, Beehive, Dhanalakshmi and Standard Engineering Works. 97
98
99
100
101
Ibid.
TNA, SLWR 1938, G.O. 86 (Dev), January 10, 1939.
Ibid.
Ibid.
The Hindu, August 27 and 29, September 2 and 6, 1938. Four bus drivers were removed from their buses with police help and new drivers took charge. According to TNA, SLWR 1938, G.O. 86 (Dev), the strike fizzled out by November 18, 1938.
102
103
TNA, SLWR 1937, G.O. 448, (Dev).
TNA,
G.O.
1992
(Pub)
(Confidential),
November
15,
1939.
Sanctioning
the
prosecution of K. Murugesan and K. Varadarajulu for slandering the police. TNA, G.O. 1917 (Pub), October 8, 1937 and TNA, G.O. 1886 (Pub), October 2, 1937.
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
Giri, My Life and Times, p. 128.
TNA, G.O. 1097 (Dev), April 26, 1938.
Ibid.
Ibid.
TNA, G.O. 1380 (Dev), May 27, 1939.
Ibid.
TNA, G.O. 629 (Dev), March 14, 1939.
111
112
TNA, G.O. 1380 (Dev), May 27, 1939.
Employers’ Federation of South India, Annual Report for 1939, EFSI Papers Madras Chamber of Commerce.
113
TNA,
FR
II,
October
1939,
G.O.
P4–20
(Pub),
November
3,
1939.
The
Ministry
resigned on October 27, 1939 in protest against the action of the British government in involving India in the World War II without her consent.
XI. CONCLUSION
1
Chesneaux, Chinese Labour Movement, pp. 372–393. B.N. Ponomarev, ‘Introduction’, The International Working-Class Movement, Vol. 1, pp. 13–14 (Moscow, 1980).
2
3
Pelling, History of British Trade Unionism, pp. 123–125.
Chesneaux, Chinese Labour Movement p. 394.
Index
8-hour day, 184
absenteeism, 44, 51, 53, 64, 65, 137, 279, 283
Acharya, M.P.T., 9
Addison and Co., 112, 113, 114, 120, 181, 229
Addison Press, 33
adi-dravida, 30, 41, 42, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 142, 143, 144, 179, 199, 230
Adyar Archives, 25
agricultural labour, 48, 49
agricultural wages, 49
agriculture, 16
Ahmedabad, 35, 96
Aiyar, K.M. Subrahmanya, 112
alienation, 51, 62, 64, 136
All India Dock and Port Workers’ strike (1958), 294
All India Press Workers’ Federation, 234
All India Railwaymen’s Federation (AIRF), 181, 183, 208, 212, 213, 292
All India Trade Union Congress (AITUC), 128, 167, 177, 181, 183, 184, 197, 212, 219, 233, 291, 294, 298, 299
Calcutta session, 197
Jharia session, 168
Madras session, 183
Allahabad, 68
Aluminium Company, 170
Aluminium Factory Labour Union, 120
Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants in India (ASRSI), 73
Amalgamated Society of Railwaymen in India and Burma, 77
Amalsad, 201
Ambirajan, S., 9
American Civil War, 35
Amsterdam, 197, 209
Ananda Press, 158
Andhra Patrika, 235
Andhra Prabha, 263
Andhra Pradesh, 293
Andhra Praja, 235
Andrews, C.F., 96
Anglo-Indians, 38, 47, 49, 73, 105, 149, 180, 206, 208
Antony, K.O., 179
Apprenticeship Act, 40
ARASM Spinning Mills, 37, 182
Arcot, 31, 294
Arjunan, 25
Arkonam, 32, 205, 208, 209, 211
Workshop, 162
Armagon, 29
Arms Act, 116
Army Clothing Factory, 162
Arogyaswamy, 258
Arrighi, Giavanno, 20
artisans, 38, 43, 45, 78, 278
Arumugam Foundry, 269
Arunagiri, 70
Arundale, G.S., 84, 119, 125, 126, 145, 146, 150, 163, 299
Asian Relations Conference, 299
Asiatic Petroleum Company (APC), 33, 153, 183
Workers, 186
Associated Printers, 33, 260
Audikesavalu, P.M., 188
Australia, 9
Autoworkers Union, 229
Ayling, Sir William, 142
B. and C. Mills (Buckingham and Carnatic Mills), 37, 41, 45, 49, 50, 58, 65, 67, 78, 86, 87, 88, 92, 93, 109, 122, 124, 127, 134, 150, 168, 171, 178, 198, 200, 244, 250, 254, 286 1920 strike in, 125, 126, 127, 128
Employees Union, 199
strikes in, 300
see also Buckingham Mills;
Carnatic Mills
Balambal, Sister, 120
Bangalore, 82, 189
Bashyam, K., 221, 222
Basudev, C., 226, 227, 255
batta (travelling allowance), 154, 159, 161, 165
Bay of Bengal, 29, 30
beedi, 37, 38, 42, 44, 48
Beehive Foundries and Engineering, 37, 110
Bengal-Nagpur Railway, 241, 292 1927 strike in, 220
Workers, 238
Bentley, 248
Besant, Annie, 83, 84, 88, 92, 100, 115, 116, 118, 119, 132, 133, 134, 167, 170, 191, 280, 291, 294, 298, 299, 300
Best and Co., 33
Bhagat Singh, 193, 222, 223
Bhatia, Jai Singh, 235
Bhore, 212
Bihar, 38
Binny and Co., 24, 36, 39, 48, 55, 58, 61, 65, 66, 89, 90, 91, 92, 98, 99, 124, 128, 129, 132, 133, 134, 135, 138, 139, 140, 144, 149, 151, 178, 198, 199, 244, 247, 249, 257, 283
Binstead, 120
Birkinshaw, 255, 256
Birla, G.D., 232
blacklegs, 129, 144, 146, 168, 211, 231, 236, 262, 265, 273, 275
Board of Conciliation, 204, 212, 244, 248, 250, 251
Bolsheviks, 106
Bombay, 33, 35, 36, 38, 40, 67, 68, 71, 78, 128, 129, 132, 167, 184, 196, 202, 220, 225, 228, 233, 234, 252, 269, 273, 297
cotton textile workers of, 198
labour movement in, 16
bonus, 51, 52, 53, 104, 110, 111, 130, 138, 141, 149, 153, 163, 182, 208, 217, 250, 283
Boothapandi, 295
bourgeoisie, 22, 83, 239
Bradley-Dutt thesis, 239
Britain, 80, 83, 84, 135, 219
trade union movement in, 19
British
capital, 245
Government, 24, 27, 83, 84, 169, 224, 226, 242, 243
Labour Party, 84
British Trade Union Congress, 133
Buckingham and Carnatic Mills, see B. and C. Mills
Buckingham Mill, 36, 44, 67, 95, 128, 132, 137, 138, 139, 141, 142, 151, 199, 247
see also B. and C. Mills; Carnatic Mills
Burma, 30
Burmah Oil Company, 33, 110, 153, 186, 216
Calcutta, 29, 33, 38, 71, 78, 84, 154, 157, 158, 164, 198, 213
labour movement in, 16
Cambell, A.Y.G., 155
capital, 19, 26, 29, 30, 36, 38, 49, 85, 100, 101, 106, 123, 169, 218, 272, 274, 278, 279
foreign, 37, 81, 90
capitalists, 37, 42, 50, 51, 79, 83, 90, 100, 121, 123, 131, 147, 148, 167, 172, 176, 241, 247, 271
Carnatic Mills, 36, 37, 41, 67, 95, 128, 129, 132, 137, 138, 142, 199, 199, 201, 245
see also B. and C. Mills;
Buckingham Mills
Carnatic music, 11
carpentry, 38
caste, 15, 16, 17, 22, 24, 41, 42, 60, 86, 90, 136, 138, 139, 140, 142, 143, 179, 245, 280, 286, 287
cement, 37
Census of India, 38, 57, 122
Central Government Employees’ strike, 1960, 294
Central Labour Board, 120, 121, 123, 134, 148, 167, 168, 170, 284, 291
Chakrabarthi, Lalitha, 16
Chakraborthy, Dipesh, 66
Chamanlal, 197
Chartist Movement, 19
Chatterton, Alfred, 34, 38
Chattopadhyaya, Mrinalini, 121
Chelladurai, 17
Chengalpet, 46
Chennai, 7, 10, 11
cheris (slums), 56, 136
Chesneaux, Jean, 8, 24, 285
Chettiar, G. Selvapathi, 7, 25, 86, 87, 88, 89, 117, 160, 165, 176, 227, 251, 252, 296, 298
Chettiar, M. Singaravelu, 7, 176, 177, 187, 189, 191, 196, 205, 220, 221, 223, 224, 285, 299
Chettiar, P. Thyagaraya, 155
Chettiar, Thanikachalam, 143
Chettiar, V. Chakkarai, 89, 120, 121, 135, 140, 152, 153, 155, 157, 170, 176, 177, 189, 252, 291
Chetty, A. Kumarasami, 89, 103, 108, 109, 120, 121, 146, 153, 164
Chetty, Diwan Bahadur G.N., 189
Chetty, Salla Guru Swami, 115, 131
Chetty, T. Audinarayana, 120, 165, 171
child labour, 40, 44, 148
China, 36 labour movement in, 24
Chingleput (Chengalpet), 46, 66, 231
Chintadripet, 103, 106
Chintan, V.P., 7
Choolai Mills (Madras United Spinning and Weaving Company), 36, 37, 39, 42, 49, 61, 92, 93, 128, 182, 186, 195, 199, 200, 203, 250, 254, 272, 285, 294
Choolai, 213
Christian Literature Society, 113
Christian missions, 38
Christians, 42
Chromepet, 34
City Police Act, 157, 252, 273
Civil Disobedience Movement, 222, 295
civil society, 20
class
cohesion, 22
collaboration, 145, 272
conflict, 22
consciousness, 20, 22, 72, 99, 160, 241, 254, 269, 272, 285, 287
-for-itself, 19
-in-itself, 19
struggle, 136, 145, 173, 224
cobblers, 39
Coimbatore-Malabar District, 227
collective action, 65, 66, 72, 77, 165, 279, 283
Colombo, 71, 72
colonial government, 7, 84, 239, 279, 287
Comintern, see Communist International
Commercial Press, 113, 218
Commonweal, 83
communal conflict, 140
communism, 220, 222, 223, 224
Communist International, 221, 222, 225, 239
First International, 19
communist movement, 222, 281, 299
Communist Party of India (CPI), 222, 224, 225, 242, 295
Communist Party of India (Marxist), 10
Conference of the League against Imperialism, 192
Congress (I.N.C.), 79, 80, 84, 106, 117–21, 138, 139, 142–44, 149, 151, 152, 165, 170, 171, 175–77, 188, 193–95, 221–23, 225, 226, 231–34, 236–39, 241–45, 247, 250–52, 254; 255, 265–67, 281, 285, 297, 298
All India Congress Committee, 293
Amritsar Session, 118, 119, 167, 280
Election Manifesto, 232
Government, 27, 241, 242, 249
Labour Committee, 238
Lucknow session, 83, 232
Madras session, 192, 221
ministry, 27, 238, 241, 243, 244, 252, 254, 255, 267, 271–73, 276, 292
Surat session, 291
Working Committee, 118, 232
Congress Socialist Party, 27, 223, 225, 233, 235, 236, 239, 281, 285, 287
Congress Socialists, 233, 237, 238, 246
Connaught, Duke of, 132, 151, 166, 170
conservancy, 42, 56, 165, 277
Constituent Assembly, 299
constitutional reforms, 14, 27, 191
constitutionalism, 27, 193, 194, 219, 231
contract system, 41, 187, 213, 214
coolies, 31, 39, 41, 49, 59, 66, 70, 79, 82, 147, 148, 183, 186, 187, 216 military, 146
Coral Mills, 80
Coromandel Coast, 29
Corporation Pumping Station Staff Union, 120
cotton textiles, 34
Criminal Investigation Department (C.I.D.), 242
criminal tribes, 208
Dandi, 194
Dange, S.A., 220, 225
Das Gupta, Ranjit, 15
Das, Jagannath, 244, 264
Davidson, Lionel, 140
Dawood, Muhammed, 168
Dearness Allowance, 52
Defence of India Act, 84, 91, 117
Defence of India Rules, 94
Delhi, 25, 84, 299
Delimitation Committee, 226, 227, 286, 299
Deoli, 293
Department of Industries, 35
depressed classes, 39, 139, 142, 224, 286
Desabhakthan, 295
Desikachari, K.C., 92
Desikananda, 138
Dinamani, 263
Dindugal, 161
Diocesan Press, 182, 187, 189, 190, 259, 260
divide and rule, 129, 265
Domestic Workers’ Union, 120
Dravidian, 100
Duraiswami Iyer, 131, 261
Durgabai, Smt., 195
Dyarchy, 35
East India Company, 26, 29, 30
East Indian Railways, 66
East Indies, 28
economic depression, 19, 195, 200, 204, 213, 216, 218, 223, 250
see also Great Depression; World Depression
economism, 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 287
Elephant Gate, 35
Employer’s Federation of Southern India, 188
Employers’ Federation of India, 147
engineering works, 33, 37, 38, 187, 269
England, 38, 40, 42, 62, 114, 126, 294, 296, 299
Erikalas, 163
Erode
Path, 223
Programme, 224
essential goods, 82, 117
Europe, 28, 125, 132, 133, 192, 221, 300
extremists, 17, 84, 134, 186
Factories Act, 262, 264
of 1891, 44
of 1911, 43
of 1922, 43, 44
of 1928, 43
of 1934, 43, 245, 250
factory system, 42, 43
fair price shops, 52, 98
family budget survey, 54
Family Budgets of Industrial Workers, 53
famine, 55, 161
Far East, the, 30
fitters, 38, 154, 217
Five Year Plans, 223, 224
five-minute rule, 74, 75
food riots, 82
Fort St. George, 140, 255, 288
Franchise Committee, 227, 286, 299
Francis, J.D., 211
Gajapathy, 7, 25
Gandhi Ashram, 295
Gandhi, M.K., 86, 96, 106, 111, 116, 118, 144, 174, 175, 193, 194, 195, 226, 234, 239, 281, 291, 294, 299
Eleven Points of, 195
-Irwin Pact, 194, 223
Gandhian, 11, 17, 23, 120, 169, 211, 223, 232
Gandhism, 295
Ganesar Aluminium Factory, 237
gang coolies, 162
general strike, 80, 84, 121, 148, 151, 189, 190, 198, 209, 210, 212, 219, 235, 240, 255, 257, 260, 269, 284
Geneva, 204, 210, 227, 293, 298, 299
Germany, 21
Ghaddar Party, 221
Ghate, S.V., 225, 234, 235, 258, 261
Giddens, Anthony, 20
Giri, V.V., 197, 206, 208, 209, 211, 212, 226, 241, 243, 244, 245, 246, 251, 252, 253, 255, 259, 262, 264, 265, 272, 273, 292, 293, 296, 297
Goenka, Ramnath, 263, 264, 265
Good Pastor Press, 258
Gopala Nayakar and Sons Foundry, 182, 183, 215
Government Industrial Engineering Works, 230
Government of India Act of 1919, 118 of 1935, 227, 231
Government of India, 24, 25, 37, 43, 46, 68, 76, 122, 135, 196, 204, 220, 281
Government Press, 33, 37, 40, 46, 48, 52, 61, 67, 68, 78, 112, 158, 159, 160, 265, 277
Workers’ Union, 49, 120
Governor-in-Council, 76, 123
Govindaa, Lord, 120
Govindaswami, K., 25
Gramani, Natesa, 235
Gramsci, Antonio, 23
Grant, Nugent, 257, 294
gratuity, 45, 51, 65, 71, 95, 96, 97, 104, 124, 126, 129, 130, 145, 150, 152, 154, 172, 189, 208, 210, 214, 215, 216, 217, 261, 268, 283
Great Depression, 26, 281
see also economic depression;
World Depression
Guardian Press, 258
guild system, 18
Guindy, 161
Gulam Mohammed, 87
Gurusami Naidu, 120
Habibullah Saheb, 140, 146
handloom, 34, 198, 231, 284, 293
Harbour Worker, 294
Hardie, Keir, 80, 295
Hargreaves, 201
Hasan, Yakub, 139, 171, 268
High Court Branch Press, 159
Hindus, 41, 42, 140, 142, 143
low-caste, 35
Hindustan Socialist Republican Army, 193
Hoe and Co., 113, 260
Home Rule, 83, 84, 91, 92, 219, 291, 294, 299
League, 83
Movement, 26, 84
Home Rulers, 84, 88, 92, 97, 106, 110, 115, 116, 119, 120, 121, 170, 279, 280, 298
hookworm, 58
Housing, 56
Hunger March, 238
Hussain Sahib, Mohammad, 230
Hussain, Khan Bahadur Javad, 266
Ibrahim Saheb, 166
Ichiyo, Muto, 21
imperialist nations, 21
indentured labour, 44
India Printing Works, 159
India Thozilali, 25
India, Independence of, 8, 192, 193
Indian Aluminium Company, 34, 37, 162, 183
Indian Express, 257, 263, 264
Indian Factory Labour Commission, 1908, 43
Indian Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU), 197, 212, 297, 298
Indian Franchise (Lothian) Committee, 226
Indian Industrial Commission (1918), 24, 35, 83
Indian Institute of Technology, Madras, 7, 9, 10, 11
Indian Patriot, 76, 86, 88, 92
Indian Trade Union Act, 26, 180, 184, 185
Indiya Thozhilali, 298
Indonesia, 28
Industrial Courts Act, 1919, 126
industrial development, 20, 26, 30, 34, 35, 64, 277
industrial workers, 54, 59, 80, 88, 163, 165, 232
industrialization, 14, 26, 38, 45, 72, 83, 282
Industries Department, 35
inflation, 82, 117, 163
influenza, 82, 299
intemperance, 44
International Labour Organization (ILO), 167, 197, 204, 227, 281, 293, 297, 298, 299, 300
International Transport Worker’s Federation, 209
Ireland, 292
Iron and Metal Workers’ Union, 120, 160
Italy, 20, 21
Iyengar, A. Rangaswami, 131
Iyengar, A.S.K., 225, 234, 236, 258, 259, 263, 265, 273, 293
Iyengar, K. Srinivasa, 140
Iyengar, Kasturi Ranga, 88, 165
Iyengar, Rangaswamy, 165
Iyengar, S. Srinivasa, 126, 152
Iyer, E.L., 25, 88, 94, 102, 103, 109, 115, 121, 134, 155, 168, 177, 180, 294
Iyer, G. Subramania, 79, 80
Iyer, M. S. Subramania, 120
Iyer, Sir C.P. Ramaswami, 146, 190
Iyer, Subramaniya 146
Iyer, T.V. Venkatrama, 152
Jahannadas, 150
Jaitha, Moolji, 36
Jalal, Syed, 128
Jalgaon Mills, 36
Jallianwallah Bagh, 131
Jana Mitran, 222
Jananayagam, 297
Janasakthi, 225
Janga Ramayammal Gardens, 87
Japan, 21
Jawaharlal Nehru University, 25
Jeevanandam, 224, 225, 234, 236, 258, 295
Jesudasan, Albert, 270
Jeyaraman, 222
Jha, S.C., 15
Jharia, 168
Colliery strike of 1921, 294
jobber, 39, 127
Joshi, Chitra, 15
Joshi, N.M., 197, 226, 298, 300
Justice Party, 85, 87, 143, 224, 226, 233, 291
Justice, 25, 105, 160
Kamath, M.S., 146, 160
Kannabiran Mudaliar, N.C., 86, 87
Kannan, S.S., 11
Kanpur Communist Conspiracy Case, 177
Kanyakumari, 295
Karl Marx Library, 11
Karnik, V.B., 15
Kellet Institute, 54
Kenneth, 120
Kerosene Oil Distributors Installations, 152
Kerosene Oil Tanks Employees’ Union, 120, 153
Khan, Abdul Hamid, 228
Khan, Amir Haider, 221, 294
Khan, Jalil, 138, 139, 140, 168
Khandesh, 36
Khilafat, 117, 136, 139
Day, 170
Movement, 118
Knapp, A.R., 140, 166
Kripalani, Acharya, 236
Krishna, C.S., 16, 17
Krishnamachari, T.T., 261
Krishnamurthy, G., 211, 212, 273, 274, 276
Krishnan, D., 12
Kudi Arasu, 224
Kumbakonam, 10
Kuppusamy, 247
Kuppusamy, Rudra, 25
Kuppuswamy, M., 140
Kurnool, 293
labour
constituencies, 227
force, 15, 38, 66
historian, 12
history, 8, 14
market, 15, 16, 41
movement, corporatist, 21
surplus, 16, 210
turnover, 51
Labour Advisory Board, 169
Labour Conference, 1920, 120, 121
Labour Investigations Committee (1944), 24
Labour Kisan Gazette, 220
Labour Kisan Party of Hindustan (LKPH), 177, 220
Labour Monthly, 239
Labour Office, 23, 168
Labour Party of India, 293
Labour Party, 84, 133, 148, 219, 295
Labour Protection League, 225, 293
Labour Times, 297
Lahore, 193
Lajpat Rai, Lala, 167, 174, 193
Lancashire, 35, 65
Law College, 192
left forces, 27, 194, 225, 228, 239, 242, 281
leisure, 42, 44, 69, 72, 98, 282
Leith, Rev. W.G.M., 54, 55
Lenin, V.I., 20, 224, 287
Lewandowski, Susan J., 28
lockouts, 66, 116, 134, 275
Loganathan, 30
Lok Sabha, 299
London, 32, 108, 144, 226, 299
Luker, A.T., 120
Lund, Comrade, 221
M. and S.M. (Madras and Southern Mahratta) Railway, 32, 33, 73, 88, 119, 120, 162, 180, 181, 183, 204, 205, 206, 209, 213, 218, 284, 292
Employees’ Union, 120, 234, 296
Gangmen’s Union, 120
Press, 33
Workers Union, 119, 204, 211, 228, 296
M. and S.M. Railwayman, 297
Macfarlene, Leslie, 64
machine men, 38, 69, 71, 78, 264
Madavaram tannery, 230
Madigas, 163
Madras, 7, 32–34, 37, 40, 48, 57, 59, 66, 68, 71, 77, 80, 81, 83, 85, 88, 90, 96, 104, 108, 110, 111, 122, 129, 132, 144, 151, 157, 164, 166, 168, 171, 174, 175, 177, 178, 183, 187, 191–
93, 195, 197, 198, 216, 220–23, 233, 235, 237, 238, 241, 251, 257, 270, 280, 282, 284–86, 293, 299, 300
Basin Bridge, 144, 215
Black Town, 29
city, 18, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 35, 43, 44, 53, 54, 82, 100, 102, 167, 234, 277
Government of, 9, 24, 35, 46, 54, 61, 65, 66, 122, 123, 146, 168, 184, 209, 224, 289
harbour, 294
Legislative Assembly, 24, 285, 295, 296, 297, 298
Legislative Council, 24, 191, 292, 293, 297
Presidency, 16, 17, 27, 29, 35, 114, 121, 223, 225–27, 234, 295
Mayor of, 251, 258, 291
Port, 30
Provincial Congress Committee, 118
Triplicane, 37, 82, 112, 117, 149, 193
University of, 29, 159, 160
Washermanpet, 37, 229, 270
White Town, 29
Madras Aluminium Labour Union, 40, 234
Madras and Southern Mahratta Hallway, 79
Madras and Southern Mahratta Railways, 17, 31, 32
Madras Chamber of Commerce, 12, 25, 35, 38, 147, 188, 189, 210
Madras Christian College, 291, 293, 294
Madras Corporation, 34, 107, 108, 115, 143, 163, 181, 189, 209, 221, 277, 294
Workers’ Union, 297
Madras District Congress Labour Subcommittee, 262
Madras Electric Supply Corporation Limited, 32, 37, 122, 144, 145, 146, 148, 151, 168
Madras Electric Tramways Company, 32, 37, 102, 149
Workers’ Union, 234
Madras Engineering Works, 161, 182
Madras Government, 34, 35, 288
Madras Harbour Workers Union, 294
Madras High Court, 168, 299
Madras Labour Protection League, 234, 258
Madras Labour Union, 7, 18, 25, 26, 39, 58, 59, 85, 88, 89, 90, 99, 102, 119, 120, 122, 144, 150, 160, 167, 168, 170, 176, 178, 179, 180, 183, 198, 199, 200, 227, 233, 245, 246, 247, 249, 250, 252, 254, 275, 283, 286, 291, 295, 296, 298, 300
Madras Mahajana Sabha, 262, 296
Madras Mail Press, 218
Madras Mail, 25, 33, 75, 82, 91, 96, 100, 105, 138
Madras Oakes and Co., 110
Madras Pencil Factory, 161, 218, 229
Madras Planter’s Labour Act, 1903, 79
Madras Police Act, 235
Madras Portland Cement Co., 37
Madras Postmen and Lower Grade Staff Union, 297
Madras Presidency Labour Political Party, 227
Madras Presidency Master Printers’ Association, 114
Madras Presidency Tannery Workers’ Union, 230
Madras Printing Pressmen’s Union, 111
Madras Printing Works, 182
Madras Provincial Congress Committee, 131, 132
Madras Provincial Trade Union Congress, 236, 246, 263, 291
Madras Provincial Trade Union Federation, 297
Madras Publishing House, 261, 263
Madras Railway Company, 31, 73
Madras Sanitary Corporation, 181
Madras Scavengers’ Union, 163
Madras Telephone Company, 33, 37
Madras Times, 100, 105 Press, 113
Madras Traders’ Association, 147
Madras Tramway and Electric Supply Workers Union, 236
Madras Tramway Company, 180 Men’s Union, 120
Madras United Spinning and Weaving Company, see Choolai Mills
Madurai, 16, 28, 85, 161
Malaria, 58
Malas, 163
Manickam, ‘Russia’, 222
Marglin, Stephen, 42
Martial Law, 117
marwaris, 60
Marx, Karl, 18, 19, 224
Massey and Co., 34, 37, 160, 187, 188, 190
Master Printers Association, 159
Masulipatnam, 29
maternity benefit, 184, 201
Maternity Benefits Act, 285
May Day, 7, 177, 220, 222, 224, 285
McDougall, 120
McDowell and Co, 110
Meenambakkam, 230
Meerut Conspiracy Case, 196, 221
Mehta, Jamnadas, 208, 211, 212
MESC Workers’ Union, 120
Methodist Press, 159
Michael, 126
migration, 65
minimum wage, 121, 126, 147, 184, 235, 271
Minimum Wages Act, 49
missionaries, 42, 107, 258
moderates, 17, 84
Mody, H.P., 238
Moir, T.E., 140
Molony, J.C., 107, 108, 109
Monahan, H., 107
Montague-Chelmsford Reforms, 117, 175, 300
Montague-Chelmsford Report on Constitutional Reforms, 84
Moolji, Soonderdas, 36
Morison Commission, 43
Morley, Lord, 35
Morris, M.D., 15
Mudali, Krishnaswamy, 70
Mudali, Natesa, 76, 127, 128, 131, 140
Mudaliar, Lakshmana, 88
Mudaliar, Sudarsana, 87
Mudaliar, V. Kalyanasundara, see Thiru. Vi. Ka.
Mudaliar, V.K. Ramaswamy, 229
Mudaliar, V.M. Ramasami, 227
Municipal Corporation of Madras, 131
Munnetram, 222
Muraleedharan, V.R., 11
Murphy, E.D., 16, 89
Murugesan, K., 7, 25, 235, 236
Muslims, 42, 142, 179, 247
Mylapore Temple, 106
Festival, 105
Mysore Wars, 29
Nagpur, 35, 213, 233
Naicker, A. Subramani, 153
Naicker, E.V. Ramaswami, 223, 224, 294
Naicker, Natesa, 128
Naicker, Subbaraya, 153
Naidu, Bhaktavatsalam, 176
Naidu, G. T. Ramanjulu, 86, 87, 88, 89, 128, 296
Naidu, K. Sriramulu, 250
Naidu, K. Venkatasamy, 255
Naidu, Madhava, 166
Naidu, Sir Kumara Venkata Reddy, 234
Naidu, V.R., 140
Naidu, Venkataswami, 258, 261
Naiker, Varadhalu, 128
Narain, Jai Prakash, 223, 225
National Archives of India, 7, 24
National Trade Union Federation, 227
nationalists, 17, 18, 85, 88, 89, 103, 106, 123, 191, 280
Nava Sakthi, 7, 25, 295
Negapatam (Nagapattinam), 31, 99, 169
Negapatam Railway Workshop Union, 120
Nehru, Jawaharlal, 174, 192, 193, 197, 221, 232, 233, 239
Neild, Susan, 28
New Age, 225
New Delhi, 24, 25, 293, 299
New India, 7, 25, 82, 83, 92, 100, 102, 105, 110, 119, 133, 138, 143, 171, 298, 299
New Unionism, 19
Newman, 16
night work, 44, 68, 262
non-brahmin movement, 85
Non-Cooperation Movement, 26, 118, 123, 136, 143, 151, 169, 174, 175, 219, 281, 285, 291, 297
Non-Gazetted Government Officers’ Association, 163
non-violence, 171
Norton, Eardley, 34
Oakes Cigar Factory, 161
oil companies, 42, 156
Ootacumund, 84, 187, 294
Orr and Sons, 120
Otteri Nallah, 36
overtime, 53, 69, 70, 71, 93, 110, 113, 121, 153, 158, 159, 161, 162, 215
pay, 52, 68, 69, 154
P.C. Joshi Archives, 25
Pachayappas’s College, 296
Paddison, George F., 122, 126, 157, 160, 169
Pal, Bipan Chandra, 293
Pallavaram, 146
Palme Dutt, Rajni, 173
Pammal, 231
Panchaksharam, 183
Pant, Govind Vallabh, 193
Pantulu, Nageswara Rao, 195
Parrys, 34
Patna, 223
Patwardhan, Achyut, 233, 238
Payment of Wages Bill, 238
peasants, 43, 45, 90, 236, 278, 287
Pelling, 18
pension, 71, 159, 160, 187, 189
Pentland, Lord, 90, 100, 117, 280
Perambur, 32, 36, 66, 72, 73, 78, 80, 82, 86, 93, 130, 161, 163, 176, 180, 186, 205, 206, 209, 211, 277, 298
Barracks, 86
Railway Workshops, 93, 162, 163, 296
Perlman, Selig, 21
picketing, 129, 139, 155, 157, 189, 193, 217, 235, 236, 237, 252, 253, 254, 258, 259, 262, 269, 273, 284, 296
piece rate, 48, 50, 61, 110, 159, 161, 182, 201, 202, 250, 259, 268
Pillai, Gooty P. Kesava, 73, 88, 92, 102, 120, 128, 155
Pillai, Madurai, 138
Pillai, N. Dandapani, 88, 89
Pillai, Namasiva, 128
Pillai, Sivashanmugam, 230, 251
Pillai, V.O. Chidambaram, 84, 103, 169, 219
Podanur, 31
police strike, 166
political power, 19
Pondicherry, 67
Pongal, 230
Port Trust, 32, 41, 47, 181, 183, 216, 277
Postmen’s Union, 164
Prakasam, T., 131, 195, 292, 297
Prasad, Rajendra, 265
Premier Leather Factory, 37
Presidency College, 10, 298, 299
Press Act, 116
Press Labour Union, 25, 258, 261, 263, 269, 270, 275
Press Workers’ Union, 120, 234, 235, 236
pressmans’ strike of 1904, 71
price index, 82
Prince of Wales, 166, 171
printing industry, 33, 42, 52, 261
productivity, 49, 51, 62
provident fund (PF), 52, 53, 108, 73, 126, 145, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 172, 201, 202, 208, 210, 216, 268
Provincial Labour Party, 227
Public Safety Ordinance, 1929, 196
Public Works Department, 34, 277
Pudiya Ulagam, 225
Pulianthope, 140
Punekar, S.D., 15
Punjab, 84, 117
Puratchi, 224
PWD workshops, 37, 39, 41, 48, 161, 187, 188, 213, 214, 229, 267, 268
Radhakrishnan, V., 201
radicalism, 21, 27, 176, 191
Railway Institutes, 98
railways, 31, 32, 40, 42, 46, 47, 52, 72, 73, 76, 77, 106, 184, 198, 204, 208, 209, 212, 213, 277, 292
Rajagopalachari, C., 8, 27, 88, 120, 121, 131, 152, 169, 194, 195, 219, 233, 234, 236, 242, 246, 249, 251, 253, 254, 256, 259, 260, 264, 272, 273, 274
Rajah, H.D., 225
Rajah, M.C., 120, 121, 138, 139, 199
Rajahmundry College, 293
Rajan, T.S.S., 171
Rajavadivelu, 222
Rajya Sabha, 299
Rama Rao, U., 120
Ramamurthi, P., 10, 25, 234, 235, 236, 263
Ramamurthy, S.V., 251, 259
Ramanujam, T.S., 25
Ramarayaigar, P., 140
Ramnad, Raja of, 164
Ramulu, A.S., 153, 157
Ranga, Prof. N.G., 41
Rangachari (T. Rangachariar), 87, 107, 108, 109
Rangoon, 71, 72
Ranson, C.W., 55, 57
Rao, B. Srinivasa, 234, 236
Rao, Hari Sarvottama, 89, 103, 112, 115, 120, 163, 293
Rao, Justice V. Panduranga, 256
Raven Committee, 212
Red Trade Union Congress, 197
Reddy, C.G., 261
reformism, 177, 212, 228
religion, 15, 17, 41, 60, 153
Revri, C.J., 15
rice allowance, 52, 112, 125, 126, 130, 150, 154, 156, 161, 163
rice mills, 43
Richardson and Cruddas, 218, 269, 284
Robertson, 120
Roshan and Co., 230
Round Table Conference, Second, 223
Rowlatt
Act, 117
Committee, 123, 151
Satyagraha, 291
Roy, M.N., 220
Royal Commission of Labour (R.C.L.), 43, 54, 56, 58, 66, 68, 179, 196, 197, 199, 210, 216, 226, 266, 281, 286, 298, 299
Royapettah Bank Limited, 98
Royapuram, 34, 66, 82, 237, 270
Rudé, George, 77
Ruikar, R.S., 196
Russian Revolution
of 1905, 80
of 1917, 17, 84, 85, 118, 220, 279, 285
S.I. Railway Union, 120
Sacco and Vanzetti, 220
Saidapet, 231, 237
Sait, Moosa, 131
Saklatwala, Shapurji, 221
Salaries Committee, 164
Salt Satyagraha, 193, 195, 285, 297
Samadharma Party of India, 224
Samarapuri, 255
Sampurnanand, 238
Saraswathi Foundry, 268
Sarkar, Sumit, 81
Sarma, P.R.K., 25, 228, 255, 265, 266, 269, 270, 296, 297
Sastri, Justice, 151
Sastri, V.L., 133, 134, 165, 176, 297
Sastriyar, Justice C.V. Kumaraswamy, 123
Sastry, Dewan Bahadur C.V. Viswanatha, 250
Sattar, Ghani Mohammed Issac, 231
satyagraha, 211, 212, 216, 249, 292, 296
Satyamurthi, 233, 238
Satyanarayana, K., 222
scavengers, 88, 120, 163, 181, 190, 237
Scavengers’ Union, 120, 297
School of Arts, 34
Scottish Press, 159, 181
seamen’s union, 168
Secretariat Staff Association, 164
Secretary of State, 35, 65
Secunderabad, 166
security of service, 73, 189
Self-Respect
League, 224
Movement, 27, 223, 224, 225
Party, 224
Sen, Sukomal, 15
Servants of India Society, 25
seven-day week, 44
Shaw, Tom, 199
Shermadevi issue, 176, 291
Shiva Rao, B., 56, 58, 60, 160, 178, 197, 199, 226, 227, 298, 299
sick leave, 145, 158, 163, 172, 201, 217, 250, 259, 262
Simla, 71, 164
Simon Commission, 192, 193, 222, 226, 281, 285
Simon, Sir John, 191
Simpson and Co., 32, 161
Simpson, C.B., 65
Simpson, Sir Clement, 91, 97, 104, 107, 108, 124, 125, 126, 132
Simpson, Sir James F., 146, 189, 190
Singapore, 30
Sinn Féin movement, 292
Siva, Subramanya, 80, 84, 103, 219
Slater, Dr. Gilbert, 54, 55, 144, 176
Slater-Leith minimum, 54
Slater-Leith study, 55
socialism, 19, 173, 223, 224, 232, 233, 238, 239, 295
socialist movement, 19
Socialist Party, 223, 225
Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 33, 111
Somasundaram, V., 237
Soonderdas Mills, 36
Soundarya Valli, 293
South Africa, 86, 184
South India Industrial Ltd., 37
South India Spinning and Weaving Mills Co., 66
South Indian Export Company’s Leather Boiling Press, 237
South Indian Galvanising Works, 270
South Indian Industrial’s Reliance Foundry, 160
South Indian Labour Political Party, 227
South Indian People’s Association, 113
South Indian Railway Workers, 196 Strike of 1928, 220 Union, 209
Southern India Spinning and Weaving Mills, 35
Southern Mahratta Railway Company, 31
Southern Mahratta Railway, 31, 73
Soviet Union, 10, 221, 223, 224
SPCK Press Committee, 159
Special Housing Committee of Madras Corporation (1934), 57
Spencer and Co., 33, 229
Sri Ganesar Aluminium Works, 243, 244
Sri Rudrakoteeswarar, 120
Sri Venkatesa Gunamritha Varshini Sabha, 86, 87
Sriram, V., 11
Standard Foundry, 269
Standard Oil Company (SOC), 153, 186, 216
State Aid to Industries Act, 35
strike
right to, 73, 151
wildcat, 103, 137, 203, 246, 248, 284
strikebreakers, 79, 138, 139, 140, 143, 172, 191, 284, 286
subaltern studies, 23
Subramaniam, C.S., 7, 9, 25
Subramanya Bharathi, 85
subsistence allowance, 130
Sudras, 163
Sundaracharulu, S.K., 138, 140
Sundarayya, P., 222, 225, 234
Surma Valley, 168
Survey of Family Budgets, 56
Swadesamitran, 7, 25, 79, 86
Swadharma, 7, 25, 137, 168, 177, 294
Swaraj Party, 176, 223
Swarajists, 175, 176, 194, 291
sweepers, 39, 225
Symonds, A.P., 90, 91, 132, 133, 134, 149
Taft Vale Case, 283
Tambaram, 32
Tamil Nadu Congress Committee, 194, 232, 260, 296
Tamil Nadu Self-Respect Samadharma Party, 225
Tamil, 11, 17, 24, 88, 93, 111, 220, 222, 224, 225, 294, 295
Tamilnadu Archives, Chennai, 7, 8
Tamilnadu, 7, 8, 9
tanneries, 34, 35, 38, 42, 230, 277, 284
task work system, 68, 69, 71
Tea Estate Strike in Bengal, 168
textile industry, 24, 35, 42, 49, 276, 277
textile mills
of Ambasamudram, 16, 17
of Coimbatore, 16
of Madras, 16, 17
of Madurai 16, 17
Thakurdoss, Purushottam Das, 132
Thankappan, T., 9
The Hindu, 12, 25, 33, 76, 79, 100, 102, 105, 131, 160, 165, 257, 299
Theosophical Society, 25, 93, 132, 160, 299, 300
Theosophist, 84
Thiru. Vi. Ka. (V. Kalyanasundara Mudaliar), 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 103, 120, 121, 128, 129, 134, 135, 138, 140, 160, 165, 170, 252, 254, 291
Thompson, E.P., 8, 12
Thomson and Company, 158
Thozhilalar Murasu, 297
Tilak, Bal Gangadhar, 83, 84, 118, 291
time rate, 48, 182
Tiruchirappalli, 195
Provincial Conference, 169
tobacco, 37, 55
toddy tappers’ union, 235
Tondiarpet, 33, 228, 270
tool down strike, 203
Trade Disputes Act, 196, 203, 204, 210, 217, 218, 244
Trade Schools, 40
trade union
consciousness, 17, 20, 22, 286, 287
constituencies, 226, 227
movement, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 89, 172, 177, 197, 213, 241, 265, 271, 272, 280, 293, 294, 295, 297, 298
organizations, 15
trade unionism, 15, 17, 64, 92, 168, 271, 287
tramways, 32, 42, 53, 88, 144, 146, 148, 237
men’s union, 112, 150, 151, 152
strike, 107, 122, 124, 125
Treaty of Versailles, 122
tuberculosis, 11, 58, 59, 278
Turnbridge, W.J., 107
turners, 38
Tuticorin, 80
U.N. General Assembly, 299
United Provinces, 38
University Grants Commission, 299
University of New South Wales, 9
unorganized sector, 34, 82, 119
urban poor, 43
Vaikam Satyagraha, 295
Vedam, 128
Vedaranyam, 195
Veeraraghavan, D., 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12
Venkataraman, S., 262, 263
Vest and Company, 159
Victoria Jubilee Technical Institute, 40
Vijayaraghavalu, 107
Voddas, 163
Vyasarpadi, 140
Wadia, B.P., 84, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 100, 102, 103, 110, 111, 117, 121, 124, 125, 128, 129, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 142, 151, 167, 170, 219, 295, 297, 299, 300
wage, 18, 19, 22, 24, 41, 44, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 55, 58, 60, 61, 62, 71, 73, 75, 80, 81, 91, 95, 96, 98, 99, 100, 103, 107, 109, 111, 113, 114, 117, 125, 126, 137, 146, 149, 150, 153, 154, 155, 156, 158, 160, 161, 162, 172, 178, 182, 183, 186, 187, 188, 189, 200, 202, 204, 205, 209, 214, 215, 216, 217, 234, 235, 236, 237, 242, 243, 246, 251, 256, 261, 263, 266, 270, 278, 279, 283, 294 cuts, 181, 191, 198, 210, 212, 213, 218, 228, 229, 231, 250, 281, 282
demands, 18
differentials, 49
living, 49, 50
war loans, 81
war production, 90, 91, 94
Washington Conference, 122
weaving, 34, 36, 38, 40, 45, 46, 48, 67, 95, 96, 130, 137, 179
Wesley College, 295
Western India Match Company (WIMCO), 37, 58, 216
Workers’ Union, 266
White, Sir Norman, 58
Willingdon, Lord, 117, 119, 122, 123, 132, 140, 150, 157
Winn, 44
workers, unskilled, 38
working class discontent, 15, 22
family budget, 59
militancy, 116, 272
movement, 14, 17, 19, 173, 174, 220, 239, 281
struggles, 25, 72, 185, 228
origins of, 26
working conditions, 47, 58, 64, 65, 164, 172, 275, 278, 279, 282
working hours, 43, 44, 68, 69, 73, 93, 104, 107, 109, 113, 158, 164, 181, 215, 217, 245, 268, 270, 279, 285
Workman’s Compensation Act (1924), 187, 214, 228, 285
World Depression, 191, 198, 281, 242, 282
see also economic depression
World War I, 31, 37, 39, 52, 79, 80, 81, 83, 91, 165, 175, 178, 186, 279, 282, 283
World War II, 18, 21, 25, 271, 282, 292, 293, 295
Young Workers League, 222, 224, 225
Youth Associations, 192
LeftWord Books is a New Delhi-based publishing house that seeks to reflect the views of the left in India and South Asia. We publish critical and analytical works on a range of subjects, and pay special attention to works on Marxist theory. We project the interests of the working people and movements for social transformation.
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