The Making of Shia Ayatollahs 1793655154, 9781793655158

Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
Title Page
Copyright Page
Dedication
Contents
Introduction
Notes
Part I: Nature and Structure
Chapter 1: From Knowledge to Jurisprudence
Fayz Kashani Debating Ghazzali
Reduction or Adaptation?
Notes
Chapter 2: Madrasa, Hawza, and Hierarchy
From Madrasa to Hawza
Structure and Organization
1. Preliminaries
2. The Critical Texts of Jurisprudence
3. The Beyond-Text Courses
Hierarchy and Titles
Major Hawzas
Najaf and Qum
Notes
Chapter 3: Ayatollah and Mujtahid
Terminology and History
Reestablishment of Usulism versus Akhbarism
Certification and Qualifications
Verities and Dynamism
Notes
Chapter 4: Jurisprudence: Significance and Becoming
Significance and Growth
The Principles of Jurisprudence
Jurisprudence
A. Acts of Worship (‘Ibadat)
B. Contracts (uqud)
C. Unilateral Obligations (Iqa’at)
D. Rules (ahkam)
The Historical Evolution
Notes
Chapter 5: Grand Ayatollahs, Marja’iyyah, and the Division of Imitated and Imitator
From Mujtahid to Marja
Practice and Reception
Maslaha, Diversity, and the Future
Notes
Part II: Dynamism and Diversity
Chapter 6: Sect-Centrism and Ecumenism
The Inner Tension of Specificity and Unity
Sect-Centrism
Ecumenicism
Conclusion
Notes
Chapter 7: Sufism and Spirituality
Fiqh, Sufism, or Both?
Anti-Sufism
Sufism as True Nature of Shia
Inner Harmony between Shari'a and Sufism
Notes
Chapter 8: Philosophy and Wisdom
Hukama Mujtahids
Anti-Hukama Mujtahids
The School of Separation (Tafkik)
Notes
Chapter 9: Modernization and the West
Four Phases of Meeting
Transforming Fiqh
Notes
Chapter 10: Politics and Government
Seclusion and Quietism
Cooperation with Shia Kings/Sultans
Supporting Constitutionalism and Anti-Absolutism
Introducing the Jurist Guardianship (Wilayat-e Faqih)
Search for New Ideas
Notes
Chapter 11: Women
Premodern Scholarship
Reformist Scholarship
Notes
Appendix 1
Appendix 2
Bibliography
Index
About the Author

Citation preview

The Making of Shia Ayatollahs

The Making of Shia Ayatollahs Sayed Hassan Akhlaq

LEXINGTON BOOKS

Lanham • Boulder • New York • London

Published by Lexington Books An imprint of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706 www​.rowman​.com 86-90 Paul Street, London EC2A 4NE Copyright © 2023 by The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote passages in a review. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Available 978-1-7936-5515-8 (cloth) 978-1-7936-5516-5 (electronic) ∞ ™ The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.

To my mother, Hawa, the embodiment of love, hope, and elegance; my father, Sayed, an autonomous “alim” eager to educate girls and build libraries for the public; and to our intellectual and religious traditions

Contents

Introduction 1 PART 1: NATURE AND STRUCTURE

9

1 From Knowledge to Jurisprudence

11

2 Madrasa, Hawza, and Hierarchy

23

3 Ayatollah and Mujtahid

60

4 Jurisprudence: Significance and Becoming

77

5 Grand Ayatollahs, Marja’iyyah, and the Division of Imitated and Imitator

99

PART 2: DYNAMISM AND DIVERSITY

123

6 Sect-Centrism and Ecumenism

125

7 Sufism and Spirituality

153

8 Philosophy and Wisdom

181

9 Modernization and the West

199

10 Politics and Government

216

11 Women244

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Contents

Appendix 1: The Geneaology of the Prophet, of the Twelve Imams, and Major Adjacent Hawzas

259

Appendix 2: Prominent Shia Ulama Since the Twelfth Imam and Their Major Contributions to Shi’a Islam

261

Bibliography265 Index 277 About the Author

289

Introduction

One of the great puzzles for scholars of Islam and Middle East experts is how the ayatollahs in Twelver Shia Islam navigate between the extreme poles of egalitarianism and hierarchy to demonstrate an image of true faith which is simultaneously ambitious and humble. During the past three centuries, both the self-conception and public reception of Ulama underwent changes facilitated by internal and external challenges. However, the division of Islam between Shia and Sunni is as old as the journey of Islam after the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632, although Shia can be traced back to the Prophet’s time. Yet, like any other faith path, including that of Sunnis, many versions of Shia appeared throughout history. Each left its mark on both the core concept of knowledge, which is explained in chapter 1, and the divide that exists between grand ayatollahs and the laity. The historically marginalized and the contemporary politicized study of Shia Islam both fail to grasp the true dynamism, potency, regional variation, and diversity inhabited in the climate that shapes what is known as “ayatollah.” The term “ayatollah” (literally “sign of God”) is the common title in use today for an established Shia jurist who represents a mixture of knowledge, theology, popularity, politics, locality, history, and piety. Examining “ayatollah” carefully requires us to consider the critical concepts of Shia, including the Imamate, theodicy, the finality of the Prophethood, and the tension between orthodoxy and orthopraxy. Shia studies have seen development in recent decades, and many aspects of its theology, politics, rituals, culture, and anthropology have been examined by experts in the field. Many studies on the power, interests, and work of ayatollahs have been undertaken, but most have concentrated on a specific aspect or region. In addition, there have been profound inquiries into the evolution of jurisprudence, the main profession of ayatollahs, and marja’iyyah (literally “the authority,” 1

2

Introduction

the relevant institution which facilitates the development of jurisprudence and relates it to the masses) in Shia, but they ignore the broader context of theology, society, and locality. For example, they concentrate solely on jurisprudence isolated from its view of other established scholarships in madrasas, Iranian contexts, Iraqi currents, or Lebanese factions. While these works help the reader greatly in terms of specifics, they fail to capture the rich, complex, diverse, and dynamic culture involved in this politico-religious reality. No single volume in the English language has attempted to tackle the position of ayatollah in all its multidimensionality and intersectionality. The existing works make up a scatter plot of the topic; this book hopes to draw a clear line through the heart of the subject, respecting and encompassing the efforts of others while attempting to illuminate each corner of an ayatollah’s world. A key piece of this book’s work is to counter the dominant stereotype that all ayatollahs promote the same concepts of Shia theology and culture. I hope to demonstrate the breadth of ideas, politics, and faith that ayatollahs have inhabited and promoted over more than 1,000 years of Shia jurisprudence and to inspire the interested reader by way of this wider and more nuanced view of the subject while doing so in an accessible way. These have been my guidelines. I’m not presenting an historical text, though I provide a brief historical context necessary to better understand each aspect of the topic. The concept of ayatollah stems from the faith and inhabits the heart of the faith. So, like all studies of faith, it deserves to be placed in its historical context, with special consideration of its evolution, fluidity, and complexity in both theory and practice. I hope that this book is also thought-provoking, both in introducing the fluidity, dynamism, and diversity inherent in the Shia authorities we encounter and in the sense of encouraging those who are interested toward a further investigation of the subject. Since this is a first-of-its-kind comprehensive survey of the shaping of ayatollahs in contemporary Islam, it intends to be an all-inclusive study—not in detail, but in critical premises. To free the study of Shia ayatollahs from marginalized or politicized perspectives requires this approach. This volume suggests paths to explore rather than conclusions to celebrate. Studying Shia ayatollahs using this methodology is very much a beginning step, and this work proudly guides the reader along these uncharted roads. Such a journey may exhaust and surprise the reader, but ultimately it aims to provide a fresh view of the subject. If the reader is at times perplexed by the complexity and density of the issue, it is my hope that the conclusions reached will be rewarding and inspiring. There is a Farsi proverb echoed in the following poem by Rumi: Still, if it is impossible to drain (drink) the Oxus, one cannot deny one’s self as much (water) as well as slake thirst.1

Introduction

3

To grasp the true and multifaceted nature of “ayatollah,” this volume is divided into two parts: “Nature and Structure” and “Dynamism and Diversity.” The first part, “Nature and Structure,” walks the reader through the nature of ijtihad. Ijtihad is the ayatollah’s profession, in which he deduces Shari’a law. Since this law targets the faithful, ijtihad links the professional with the laity. Although it has a scholarly nature, it is not merely scientific, because it is both originated in and occupied with faith. The five chapters in this part seek to explain these aspects and the intersection of faith, knowledge, law, and public reception. The first chapter, “From Knowledge to Jurisprudence,” explores how the Islamic emphasis on knowledge (ilm) paved the way for the development of jurisprudence. This chapter is a conceptual analysis which also touches on the tension between orthodoxy and orthopraxy, the secular and the sacred sciences, and Sunni and Shia positions on the subject. The second chapter, “Madrasa, Hawza, and Hierarchy,” discusses the emergence of madrasa and its transition to hawza, of which an ayatollah is its greatest product. Moreover, it explains the educational, administrative, and financial aspects of hawza, which create a specific structure of understanding ideas, connecting people, and developing a unique mix of secular and sacred knowledge. This chapter also addresses the many professions and titles hawza graduates receive upon completing their education. Finally, it illustrates the distinct characteristics of particular hawzas, focusing on Najaf, in Iraq, and Qum, in Iran. Chapter 3, “Ayatollah and Mujtahid,” illustrates the nature of ijtihad, the qualifications of an individual to become an ayatollah, the currency of the title, the complexity of the certificate of ijtihad, established ijtihad and the calls to renew it, the variety of ijtihads, and the mechanism of identifying jurisprudential candidates and ratifying their position in the community. It also cites many stories about the lives of mujtahids in order to examine them through the lens of real life. This chapter features a section on Akhbarism versus Usulism to show how this theological tension played a major role in the construction of the current concept of ijtihad. The next chapter, “Jurisprudence: Significance and Becoming,” details the two prominent sciences in hawza whose mastery transforms a scholar into a mujtahid and ayatollah: jurisprudence and its principles. Offering an overview of the evolution of jurisprudence and its constituent parts in the classical study of Islamic law, it also deals with the challenges jurisprudence and its community face in hawza. The first part of the book closes with the chapter “Grand Ayatollahs, Marja’iyyah, and the Division of Imitated and Imitator.” Focusing on the concept of grand ayatollah, this chapter distinguishes between leading and jurisprudential authorities (maraji’) as well as shows instances when certain mujtahids resisted the invitation to take the office of marja’iyyah despite being well-qualified. Further, it elaborates how this hierarchy is bound up

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Introduction

in the personal character of a grand ayatollah; in his reception by the public, which involves complicating elements of democratic, economic, ethnic, regional, and populist elements; and in the role of considering the public interest in issuing fatwas and the very concept of “most knowledgeable.” We then proceed to the book’s second part, “Dynamism and Diversity.” After learning about hawza, the structure of knowledge, and the institutionalization of jurisprudence at the heart of hawza and its special significance in making an individual a loud and just voice for Islam, this part exhibits the great diversity of grand ayatollahs’ views on the major aspects of a faithful life. This section frees the views on ayatollahs from monolithic analyses that oversimplify their perspectives for or against a particular subject. This section presents the diversity of ideas and debate among various major ayatollahs using the same sources, the Quran and Sunnah, for opposing ends. A debate which might expose the rifts within the faith can also serve as a useful guide for a Muslim to explore the diverse opportunities Islam offers. Plus, one sees how mujtahids’ educational background and personal and social experiences inspired multiple understandings of the faith. Chapter 6, “Sect-centrism and Ecumenism,” traces great Shia jurists’ views on rapprochement along two opposing poles: allying with Mutazilite on major theological themes, with minor distinctions on the Imamate, to emphasizing a sectarian identity to promote their marginalized community as a legitimate part of Islam in contrast with sectarian tension that promotes a radical exclusivism. It also touches on the impact ecumenical Ulama had on the development of jurisprudence. Chapter 7, “Sufism and Spirituality,” elucidates how religious spirituality, particularly the Imams’ virtues, motivated ayatollahs to take opposing positions on Sufism. Some considered advocating Sufism haram while others promoted it. While some ayatollahs are silent on Sufism, others, like Ayatollah Khomeini, utilized it to combine jurisprudence with politics. Chapter 8, “Philosophy and Wisdom,” discusses how philosophy (falsafa) in general—and the transcendental wisdom in particular—became a target for many grand ayatollahs. Yet other ayatollahs used philosophy to reinterpret the insights of the Imams. Chapter 9, “Modernization and the West,” deliberates on ayatollahs’ approaches to the concepts of modernity, modernization, and the West. Specific subjects like the theory of evolution, foreign languages, the relationship between reason and revelation, modernizing hawza, the house of the infidel and the house of Islam, and conscription are covered here. Chapter 10 moves to the hot topic of “Politics and Government” and reviews how the great jurists moved between quietism and activism. Activism includes multiple perspectives, such as pragmatic alignment with the government, jurisprudential justification of the government, and individual participation and promoting the political status quo. It examines how the four sources

Introduction

5

of Shari’a law gave ayatollahs the chance to variously support caliphates, sultanates, constitutionalism, and the jurist guardianship. Most importantly it highlights the variety of views not only historically, but in the contemporary era as well. The final chapter begins with the spiritual position of Fatima and Lady Zainab, the daughter and the granddaughter of the Prophet, respectively. While their major influence on Shia theology rarely trickled down to Shia jurisprudence in terms of jurists’ views of the political and social status of women in public, there are some modern ayatollahs in Qum, Najaf, and Beirut who use the classical texts and methodology to recognize more public, professional roles for women in current times. Two appendices follow, helping readers to understand both the historical context and development of Shia thought. The first is a chart that lists the twelve Imams, the Prophet, Lady Fatima, Lady Zainab, Lady Fatima Masuma, and their genealogical relationships. The second is a list of eminent Ulama. They can be called ayatollahs due to their influence on Shia jurisprudence, though the title is recent in the history of Shia. This list is composed of Ulama who are mentioned in this book and considered the most influential in shaping the current Twelver Shia faith. The diversity of viewpoints illustrated in these chapters shows that there is unity in diversity. While jurists arrive at varying and sometimes even contradictory viewpoints, simultaneously they welcome a pluralism in which each justified idea is valid religiously, deserving of a faithful reward before God. Ayatollahs believe that if a jurist deduces a correct idea on a specific issue, he will be rewarded twice before God: one for the scholarly deduction and another for deducing the right idea. But if he deduces a wrong conclusion, he still deserves a reward before God because of his scholarly work. They also write at the beginning of their manual of religious practices that following the instructions within makes the faithful free from obligation before God, because they followed a scholarly justified deduction. Equal validity belongs to the opposing view. So, if a faithful practices in accordance with an opposing scholarly view, the practitioner is not less religious or less rewarded before God. It means both the jurist and the faithful must respect the opposing view if it is produced by a qualified jurist. Scholarly opposition to a particular ayatollah does not discredit an individual’s faith. Akhund Khurasani believed that supporting Iranian constitutionalism was a religious obligation (wajib). A seminarian who was a follower of a rival ayatollah held that supporting constitutionalism was religiously prohibited (haram). This seminarian was radical in his opposition to Akhund, to the point that he would curse him. But the seminarian fell on hard times, and he became so poor that he had no choice but to go to Akhund for help. Akhund said he loved the seminarian for his piety and gave him money, adding that the seminarian was not allowed to change his ideas because of the help he

6

Introduction

received. When some objected to Akhund’s generosity toward he who had cursed him, Akhund replied that he was not able to find any statement in jurisprudential texts stating that respecting Akhund makes a seminarian qualified to receive help.2 This demonstrates the unique junction of certainty and probability, pluralism and exclusivism, and reasoning and faith which can present new opportunities and challenges—far from a black and white account. A couple of words must be added about sources and methodology, the systems of transliteration of Arabic and Persian words, and the references to the many figures and ideas found in this work. Surveying ayatollahs occurs in a religious context simply because it is a religious phenomenon. Thus, a degree of empathy was required to produce a qualitative study. I practiced empathy to ensure the subject remained comprehensible, but I have tried to avoid a propagating or seminarian work. For this study I was guided by the Spinozist motto: “Smile not, lament not, nor condemn; but understand.” I have refrained from criticizing because not enough literature on the topic exists to provide a sturdy foundation to launch such criticism. This study does not aim to offer an anthropologic, political, or even theological review. Rather, it is a phenomenological study, sharing my own experiences and understanding acquired through years of study in hawza, living with Ulama, encountering ayatollahs, and debating the issues. In order to fill the gaps in understanding the ayatollah in a fuller context, publications in English on the subject are employed, but the main focus is on Arabic and Persian references. Many anecdotes are narrated by ayatollahs themselves to provide an insider view. My target audience is scholars of Islam and professionals in Middle Eastern Studies, but also those who are interested in the history of ideas, the relevance of reasoning to faith, inter-religious studies, intra-faith dialogues, and sectarian tension. I hope also to offer insights of use to policy makers, advocates of women’s rights and human rights, and peace activists. Because of this broad intended audience, I have tried to keep technical terms to an absolute minimum, but explanatory texts in parentheses or footnotes have been provided when their usage is important enough to require the reader to acquire familiarity with them. The terms themselves are less important than gaining an understanding of what they refer to. I have attempted to transpose original ideas into meaningful English wherever possible. I have used ordinary English and have not avoided paraphrasing in the interest of clarity. Thus, with the exception of direct quotes, all translations or paraphrases are my own. Readers may fall into two categories. For those interested in Shia studies, I recommend reading the full work, while those with a more narrow professional or scholarly focus may jump into topics of interest without worrying they will miss important concepts. I do strongly recommend that this latter group read the entire first section in order to better comprehend the chapters of greatest interest.

Introduction

7

I consulted many Quranic translations but made my own when referring to Quranic verses. There are multiple transliterations of the books and individual names that appear throughout the book. I have tried to spell them in a way that echoes the pronunciations I heard in hawza without giving any initial feeling of strangeness to a native English speaker. There are many books suggesting how to spell and pronounce, but my prime concern was not linguistic. Extensive annotations are supplied in parentheses or footnotes to provide information about individuals, events, places, and terms whenever necessary. The upper case “I” in the word “Imam” is used to refer to the infallible Imam in Shia, whereas the lower case “i” is employed in its lexical meaning of a leader (imam) in some minor or major capacity, like jum’a prayer. Finally, all dates are given in the Common Era (CE), and I have provided dates and important descriptions for a scholar throughout the text wherever I believe it might provide context for readers who may focus on particular chapters of interest to their profession or field of study. Many names are repeated in several chapters, so I encourage the reader to consult the index and related pages for a deeper understanding of those figures. The same is true in terms of fundamental concepts like jurisprudence, ijtihad, Akhbarite, and marja’iyyah. So, a critical concept could receive multiple descriptions in different chapters because of its relevant aspect to a specific chapter. Thus, I highly recommend the reader track particular concepts in multiple chapters for superior comprehension. In the end, I should express my sincere gratitude and heartfelt appreciation to my friend John Seager whose keen interest, generous time, and commendable patience have made this volume possible. I appreciate his impressive accuracy, constructive comments, and his attention to detail. He read and edited it thoroughly and made invaluable suggestions. NOTES 1. Rumi, The Mathnawi of Jalal ud-din Rumi, Reynold Alleyne Nicholson, trans and ed. (Tehran: Booteh, 2002), 6:66. 2. Shubairi Zanjani, Sayed Musa, Jor’a-e az darya (A Drop of the Sea) (Qum: Muassisa-e Kitabshinasi-e Shi’a, 1389/2010), Vol. 1, pp. 524-5. An oft-repeated quote from Ayatollah Khomeini explains the issue. Addressing the question of how opposing ayatollahs must be treated, Khomeini said, “Am I a pillar of Islam?” (“Magar man usul-e dinam?”)—of which rejection requires punishment. This illustrates the true nature of Shia jurisprudence, a justified scholarly deduction of law from primary sources. It does not claim to be ultimate truth and purely divine, though it is rewarded before God. Also, it is irrelevant to the fundamental concepts of faith (usul al-din), which must be reasoned by individual Muslims. This subject is further explained in chapter 5.

Part 1

NATURE AND STRUCTURE

Chapter 1

From Knowledge to Jurisprudence

I grew up in a religious family. My father was a clergyman. When I made pilgrimages with him as a child to the shrine of Imam Rida in Mashhad, Iran, we had to walk part of the way. My father would use this time to teach me Arabic grammar from Shrah-e Amthala, the first text a seminarian needs to learn and memorize. It was a big question for a curious teenager: what is the link between Arabic grammar and becoming a prosperous Muslim who can serve the community through science? When I was older, I learned that studying and scientific inquiry can count as acts of worship in vigil during the Night of Power (Lailat al-Qadr) in the month of Ramadan. This story is a microcosm of how faith and knowledge are connected in Islam, particularly in Shia. In Western literature, Knowledge Triumphant, the Concept of Knowledge in Medieval Islam (1970) by Franz Rosenthal remains an epoch-making work. Rosenthal, a distinguished and prolific scholar of Semitic languages and Islamic civilization, argues that civilizations revolve around meaningful concepts of an abstract nature that give them their distinctive character. Knowledge (ilm) is one such concept that dominated Islam and gave Muslim civilization its distinctive shape and complexion. No other concepts, even tawhid (Oneness of God) and al-din (the true religion), can operate as a determinant of this civilization in all its aspects. “Ilm is Islam, even if the theologians have been hesitant to accept the technical correctness of this equation,” he rightly concluded.1 Rosenthal highlights four specific features of knowledge in Shia: (a) the particular virtue of the infallible Imam is his special knowledge; (b) knowledge is the foundation of faith; (c) knowledge has a hierarchical nature, and the Imam embodies its esoteric symbolism; and (d) there is a particular manner in which secular knowledge relates to religious concerns. While different sects of Shia diverge in their respective emphasis on each element, they 11

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share this foundation.2 This implies that knowledge of the evolution of Shia and the nature of this denomination will remain impossible without a deep comprehension of the significance of, and reference to, knowledge and those who transmit it within the faith. The four elements of Shia’s perception of knowledge developed throughout the history of Twelver theology and jurisprudence and translated into the characteristics enumerated by Rosenthal. If the particular virtue of the infallible Imam is his special knowledge, then one could ask which kind and what extent of knowledge does an infallible Imam enjoy? To reply to this question, Ulama reached opposing conclusions: some believed the Imam enjoys an intuitional knowledge which associates with the known itself (ilm huzuri), while others claimed the Imam enjoys a common and conceptual knowledge gifted by God. The second element, knowledge as a base of faith, led mujtahids to divide Islamic teaching into fundamental concepts and laws. Fundamental concepts consist of tawhid (Oneness of God); adalat (divine justice); nubuwwat (the prophecy); the imamate; and ma’ad (the judgment and resurrection day). Adalat and Imamate are specific to Shia creeds, while the other concepts are all shared with Sunni.3 Most mujtahids hold that a lay Muslim can’t imitate a qualified scholar in these fundamental concepts; rather, they must examine them individually using critical thinking. In contrast, laws cover matters of actions and practice. The faithful must be either a Shari’a scholar (mujtahid) or imitate a Shari’a scholar in terms of these laws. Thus, the issue of qualified scholars matters. This second element paves the path toward the third aspect, considering knowledge hierarchically. There is a difference between a qualified scholar in Shari’a law (mujtahid) and an Imam, even when they are addressing the topic of law. The infallible Imam speaks the truth, but the mujtahid speaks only his understanding of the truth. A mujtahid practices ijtihad and concludes law from its sources using a required methodology. He might arrive at a truth, or he might not. If his conclusion meets the truth, he receives two rewards from God: one for spreading the truth and one for his effort to arrive at the truth. But if his conclusion does not meet the truth, he will still receive a reward before God for his effort. Each and every mujtahid includes a statement to this effect on the first page of any book of law for practitioners: practicing in accordance with these laws will be counted before God as doing what a faithful Muslim ought to do. Shia is proud of this idea, called takhta’a (fallibilism). It contradicts taswib (infallibilism), the belief that a mujtahid reveals divine law. To conclude, the Imam tells the truth in all aspects of religious teachings,4 while the mujtahid reveals his valid conclusions about the law. The fourth element of Shia—understanding of knowledge—facilitates the search for harmony between secular and sacred knowledge. This comes through the exercise of ijtihad as well as via sacred texts and context. These

From Knowledge to Jurisprudence

13

elements have provided Shia thought a field on which to move in multiple directions and develop different ideas throughout history. The primary effect of this religious emphasis on knowledge was to mostly reduce the faith to knowledge and then distill that knowledge into jurisprudence. However, this transformation also changed the nature of jurisprudence and therefore the position of jurists in the eyes of the faithful. The relation of knowledge to piety (taqwa) and to adalat became a concern. Although the infallible Imam is the embodiment of knowledge, he is also the embodiment of all virtues, including piety and justice. Justice in Islamic jurisprudence means behaving in accordance with Shari’a, meaning observing halal and haram. Although there is a certain overlap, justice mostly refers to behaviors and functions, and piety to feelings, states, and moods. The infallible Imam is perfect in all these, but a mujtahid is not. If a mujtahid needs to prioritize, he must focus on knowledge. However, he should observe piety and just manners too. Plus, a mujtahid must be more just (a’adal) and more pious (awra’a or atqa) than a lay Muslim. Here, justice and taqwa transform from behaviors and moods to established dispositions (malaka). Contemporary discussion of the issue is often represented in the following question: if two mujtahids are equal in knowledge, which one must be imitated by laypeople? Most scholars answer the more pious one. Nevertheless, knowledge plays the principal role; for if there are two mujtahids, one the most learned and one more pious, the majority of current Ulama respond that the most learned should be followed. This preference for knowledge over religious ritual is documented in the practice of Ulama. Getting up before dawn and morning prayer and performing rituals are highly recommended for pious people. It is said that grand Ayatollah Khoei (1899–1992) would get up early and recommended his companions do the same before morning rituals (tahjjud). But he did not do them; instead, he would compose answers to legal questions (istiftas).5 Thus, while the dynamism of discussion moves among piety, justice, and knowledge, the evolution of the concept of knowledge adds sophistication. The Quran uses the term ilm in various derivations around 775 times. One hundred sixty-one of them are in reference to God. This varied application of knowledge—ranging from the divine to the secular—is reflected in the Prophet’s life, where these aspects are interlocking and interdependent.6 Ilm is the fifth most repeated term in the Quran,7 and there are abundant Quranic terms that expand on ilm such as s-w-r (perception), d-r-k (cognition), kh-b-r (inform), t-l-q (grasping an idea), b-s-r (careful seeing), n-d-r (viewing), d-n-n (speculating), f-q-h (in-depth understanding), f-h-m (comprehension), and h-k-m (wisdom). Most Ulama use the following verse of the Quran to justify dedication to jurisprudence and becoming the source of imitation in religious law: “The faithful people should not go forth altogether, rather, a party from each

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section should go forth to become well versed in the religion, and when they return to their people warn them in order that they may beware” (9:122). Here, the term yatafaqqahu (gain sound knowledge) is used. F-q-h in the Quran means deep understanding (17:44) and mostly refers to comprehension by the heart (6:23; 7:179; 9:87; 9:127; 17:46; 63:3). The dominant and most effective knowledge in Islam became fiqh, and fiqh eventually morphed into jurisprudence. While most Quranic use of fiqh was related to the insight and intuition by heart, the development of jurisprudence reduced it to common rules for deducing law from the Quran and Sunnah. A level of reductionism occurred equally in all schools of law (madahib), no matter Sunni or Shia. But in Shia, it faced more challenges because neither jurists nor the law itself could represent the infallible Imam with his special knowledge and esotericism. As we will see shortly, Fayz Kashani’s criticism of Ghazzali stems from this. Before proceeding with that story, I must mention that typically the Islamic schools of law define the word fiqh, as a branch of knowledge, as “knowledge of practical revealed rulings extracted from detailed evidence.”8 Therefore, fiqh is limited to “practical” (amaliyyah) versus theological (itiqadiyyah) issues. “Detailed evidence” refers to verses of the Quran and Sunnah (the Prophet’s sayings, actions, and approvals9). This reductionism of knowledge to fiqh and fiqh to jurisprudence had huge consequences in the history of Islam. First, it transformed Islam from an orthodoxy to an orthopraxy. Given the equal footing of faith and knowledge in Islam, many Muslims and non-Muslims today equate Islam with its law and practices rather than its doctrines and creeds. This happened despite the fact that at the beginning of Islam there was a great number of Muslims, called Murji’ah, who believed that God alone has the right to judge the faith of non-practicing believers. The Quran clearly states, “Do not say to anyone who offers you peace: You are not a faithful” (4:94). Second, becoming an alim (religious scholar) in madrasa was mostly reduced to studying jurisprudence. The other aspects of Islamic intellectualism, including kalam (theology), falsafa (philosophy), and Sufism (mysticism), were removed from the core curriculum of madrasa. Even studying the Quran and Sunnah are marginalized activities in current Shia hawza, a source of complaint from some mujtahids (we will return to this topic in chapter 4).10 The third effect of this reductionism is increasing confusion between Shari’a and fiqh. Shari’a in the Quran refers to a “revealed way of life”; thus, the path of Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus, and Muhammad are different ways of living according to revelation. Each one has his own Shari’a (42:13; 3:48; 42:21). Though it possesses a tiny reductionism, Islamic tradition technically uses Shari’a as religious law. However, the greatest reductionism occurred when many began to equate Shari’a with fiqh, contrary to classical terminology. In

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Islamic scholarship, fiqh represents the “cognitive” and human part of Islamic law, while Shari’a, by definition, represents the “heavenly” or divine part of this law. Thus, the term faqih is used for people who understand and apply the mechanism of Islamic law. It is not to be used to describe God. On the other hand, the term al-shari’, meaning “the legislature,” is a name for God and should not be applied to humans, except for the Prophet when he “conveys a message from God.” This blurring of the line between fiqh and Shari’a, as argued by Jasser Auda, gave way to claims of “divinity” and “sanctity” in human judicial deduction (ijtihad). These claims have over time resulted in two serious phenomena: mutual accusations of heresy and resistance to the idea of renewal within Islamic law.11 There are many reasons why jurisprudence became more than legal scholarship or a mere human study. Although fiqh has appeared as the core of religious knowledge in madrasas throughout history, it did not develop in isolation. Because it tries to interpret and present Shari’a, fiqh needed to have an eye toward theology and religious ethics as well. It also won an enviable reputation for explaining the acts of worship in religion. Being concerned with the hermeneutic of the text forced fiqh to acknowledge its limits and look for textual and religious justification. Thus, its human development and immersion into the study of language were associated with religious contexts and what later came to be called the objectives of Shari’a. As a result, Islamic jurisprudence found itself responsible for introducing a mechanism for moving simultaneously toward secular and sacred ends.12 The uniqueness and spirit of fiqh depend on this double move, though the layperson might see only the move toward divinity. A layperson can’t access the spirit of fiqh if they see it as Shari’a or a strategy to gain power. We will return to this subject in the chapter “Jurisprudence: Significance and Becoming” in greater detail. But for now, it will suffice to note that this complex nature of fiqh creates extra challenges in a Shia context because of the belief in infallible Imams who possess prophetic features, though they do not receive revelation (wahy). If the true nature of prophecy and the Imamate is detailing and practicing in accordance with tawhid and the judgment day and calling on people to lead a transcendental life, then a faqih should not limit his religious scholarly life to extracting detailed law from the Quran and Sunnah. The major attribute of God before a jurist is His accounting of peoples’ actions to determine whether they deserve rewards or punishments. But the Prophet and infallible Imams spoke of at least 99 names and attributes of God who forgives, blesses, covers up, and transforms many evil deeds and sins into good deeds (2:58; 3:31 and 133; 12:84; 25:70; 71:4), as long as they do not hurt other people. God supports the faithful in experiencing a new life (8:29; 16:97; 27:62; 29:69). God is not merely a neutral observer looking on from afar to judge His people in the hereafter; instead, He is closer to people than their jugular vein (50:16),

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hearing them and responding to them intimately (2:186; 58:7). The infallible Imam, like the Prophet, resembles this God too. Thus, a Shia jurist has more responsibility than his fellow Sunni to transcend the secular limits of law. The following story illustrates this topic.

FAYZ KASHANI DEBATING GHAZZALI Ghazzali (1058–1111), the prominent and influential Sunni jurist, Sufi, and theologian, held that the Islamic spiritual tradition was dying and wrote his magnum opus Ihya ulum al-din (The Revival of the Religious Sciences) to revive the spiritual knowledge of the first generation of Muslims by combining Sufism, jurisprudence, and theology. While elaborating on admired (mahmuda) and discouraged (madmuma) knowledge in Islam, Ghazzali shares two significant concerns regarding jurisprudence: one about the reduced meaning of fiqh in later Islam and the other about counting fiqh among worldly knowledge (ulum dunyawi)—meaning that fiqh is meant to promote order and law in society, not to save the faithful before God in the hereafter. Ghazzali argues that one reason Muslims became confused about admired and discouraged knowledge is the heteronym applied to opposing meanings. Fiqh is a great example.13 Using Quranic verses and many hadiths, Ghazzali argues that during the earlier Islamic era, fiqh referred to knowing the qualities of self, fighting the ego, fearing God, distancing oneself from worldly affairs, and learning about the hereafter. There, fiqh and fahm (understanding) were synonymous. But the later meaning of fiqh reflected learning law and detailed legal opinions (fatwa) on dealings with people and promoting economic activity. Ghazzali does not reject the application of earlier fiqh on the law but emphasizes that the core and margins of fiqh became reversed. Because concentrating on the hereafter is challenging and the newer meaning of fiqh comes with material benefits, such as governmental jobs and reputations, many Muslims contributed to transforming fiqh from the former meaning to the latter.14 Moreover, Ghazzali argues that fiqh (jurisprudence) in his time meant worldly knowledge that has no relation to the salvation story of Muslims in the hereafter. How did this happen? The faithful ruminate on the hereafter and eternal salvation and how, in order to arrive there, they must purify their hearts, reform their selves, and fight their egos. The current fiqh, Ghazzali writes, has no connection to these objectives. Rather, it aims to enforce law and order in society, since the absence of law and order allows people to fight against each other for their desires.15 Islam promoted fiqh not because it leads

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people to heaven, but because if people are engaged in fighting among themselves, they can’t pay heed to religious guidance. This, Ghazzali continues, is why the Companions of the Prophet disliked issuing fatwas. Instead, they preferred to answer questions about the Quran and salvation. Ghazzali proceeds to discuss three specific subjects addressed in fiqh: being a Muslim, prayer and almsgiving, and halal and haram. These all appear to be more than worldly affairs, but Ghazzali explains that all these subjects are considered in fiqh superficially. Superficiality does not save people in the hereafter. An individual who utters the two testimonial statements of the shahada16 is Muslim in accordance with jurisprudence. This pronouncement carries the individual into the realm of Muslims in terms of business and relationships but does not guarantee they are saved by these words. The same is true with regard to prayers. As long as a believer considers the etiquettes of prayer and ritual, their prayer is correct jurisprudentially, even if they pray out of habit rather than spiritual feeling. The same is true of almsgiving; it needs to be paid, no matter what the individual is thinking when they pay. Regarding halal and haram, Ghazzali argues it matters only in the case of considering a Muslim just (adil), because in many social settings like judgment and testimony, Muslims must rely on a just believer. Considering halal and haram as the foundation for a just individual is the very first level of piety. Higher levels of piety are ignored by jurists. In conclusion, Ghazzali laments that jurists who speak of piety and ethics are considered marginal to their profession. Yet, Ghazzali finishes by saying that current fiqh originated from the teachings of the Prophet, that each and every Muslim needs to learn basic fiqh to approach salvation, and that jurisprudence runs side-by-side with the hereafter path, because actions, which are discussed as fiqh, affect the heart, which is essential for salvation. Thus, jurisprudence is a religious (shar’i), although worldly, knowledge.17 Five centuries later, a Shia mujtahid named Mulla Muhsin Fayz Kashani (1598–1680) rewrote Ghazzali’s volume with a Shia flavor and called it alMahajjat al-Bayza fi Tahdib al-Iyha (The Clear Path on Refinement of the Revival).18 The main objective of this book is to suggest a Shia version of Ghazzali’s work, which meant replacing Sunni rules of rituals and hadiths with Shia ones, believing that in his time just as in Ghazzali’s time, religious knowledge was in need of a revival. Kashani said his book could also be called Reviving the Revival.19 He does not change or comment on Ghazzali’s first point, namely how the meaning of fiqh changed after the earlier generation of Islam. But he strongly opposes Ghazzali’s description of fiqh as worldly knowledge. Kashani argues that jurisprudence is the path leading the faithful to an elevated spiritual position, because purifying the heart and reforming the self are not possible except through actions according to

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Shari’a. Fiqh provides this opportunity by teaching what to perform and what to avoid. Fayz then lays out his main thesis: Ghazzali failed because he conflated the business of nubuwwah (the prophecy, but also the Imamate) with the caliphate. The former’s goal is to consider the heart, while the latter’s is to dominate people externally. Kashani uses several hadiths to illustrate the ways in which fiqh is rooted in the Quran, and thus not a worldly knowledge. This section concludes with several Shia hadiths used to explain the following verse of the Quran: “And as to the poets, those who go astray follow them” (26:224). “Poets” here refers to evil jurists (fuqaha) who are misled and misleading. They are evil because they are (a) not practicing what they preach; (b) projecting their own desires and opinions on faith; and (c) developing jurisprudence out of love of speculation and polemic. Indeed, they claim the position of the Prophet’s progeny with the aim of transporting the faithful to a higher spirituality, but in reality they are pursuing their own agenda, which is implanting law and order.20 This debate elucidates the multifaceted nature of fiqh in Shia and how it appeared to both jurists and laypeople, regardless of its actual historical trajectory. Kashani’s point is radical but substantial. He says that even if knowledge has been reduced to fiqh and fiqh to jurisprudence, the Shia concept of Imamate adds components to it. Representing the infallible Imam as the embodiment of all virtues requires a jurist to exemplify high spirituality and moral character regardless of the milieu of scholarship and madrasa in which he works. Here, subjects like maslaha (public interests), reputation, and conservative practice of faith arise. Representing the infallible Imam is also an original motive that makes Shia jurists more eager for mystical, theological, and philosophical studies. These components provide a jurist with the opportunity to learn more about the true nature of Imam, the Prophet, and God. Finally, the debate among Shia jurists and Ulama on the nature and mechanism of jurisprudence throughout history evolved in different directions and created enormous diversity among Ulama. But as we’ll see in the following chapters, the mainstream Twelver Shia madrasas took part in developing Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) and its methodology, which is called the principles of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh), and thus more or less followed their Sunni fellows. Yet, their focus was on the living jurist, a fallible version of an infallible Imam, who translates the true meaning of divine law for its followers and updates the law if needed. A living jurist could join the faithful in their time and real-life experiences and accompany them in their ups and downs. This approach provides unique opportunities and challenges both between jurists and laypeople, as well as among jurists themselves and among Ulama in general. The proceeding chapters touch on these subjects.

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REDUCTION OR ADAPTATION? As we saw above, Ghazzali and Kashani concurred in their objection to jurisprudential reductionism (takhsis); they found the jurisprudence of their respective eras to be more about daily laws than guidelines for eternal life and purifying the heart. This complaint recurs throughout the history of jurisprudence, even among jurists themselves. The reason for this can be found in the nature of jurisprudence. If it is to be a daily law, it requires professionalism. Professionalism requires concentration and dedication to structure. The future of faith, jurisprudence, and harmonizing piety with professional knowledge therefore becomes the concern of jurists. One concern is that the dedication of madrasa to jurisprudence and its methodology left out teaching hadith, which was a major part of the classical school curriculum.21 Another concern is that professionalism is oriented for consumers and for the benefits of society. There is a big risk of encouraging consumerism and populism. In a recent book, Grand Ayatollah Zanjani (b. 1927) warned that the spirit of scholarship in madrasas was changing. Previously, Ulama were occupied with two concerns: learning as a religious duty and explaining divine law exactly. Knowledge was desired in and of itself, but he said this was not the case anymore. He saw a big gap between the current jurisprudence and jurisprudence delivered just two generations earlier.22 Professionalism also widens the gap between Ulama and pious laypeople. Jurists enjoy receiving scholarly titles. Previous common titles were Shaykh, Akhund, Mulla, and Allama. Currently titles include Hujjat al-Islam, Hujjat al-Islam wal-muslimin, Ayatollah, and Ayatollah Uzma (grand ayatollah).23 We will come back to these titles in the next chapter, but it is important to know they are different from religious titles like Haji, Karbala’i, and Mashhad’i which refer to pilgrims to Mecca, Karbala, and Mashhad, respectively. Recently, Ulama have been using the title of Haji, but mostly they prefer professional titles over religious ones.24 Nowadays, they even love to have academic titles before their names and be called Doctor Hujjat al-Islam or Doctor Ayatollah. This also transformed the religious hierarchy which Shia believed in into a scholarly hierarchy and new form of secularism. Ghazzali’s view of fiqh was the beginning of a trend to pass jurisprudence from the religious to the secular realm, with the main objective of establishing law and order in society. Nevertheless, Ghazzali explicitly denied equating jurisprudence with a secular science like medicine. He compared them and concluded there are three factors that elevate jurisprudence over medicine: jurisprudence originated with the Prophet; all people need it, while only the sick require medicine; and it stands alongside otherworldly knowledge and is related to salvation.25 But after centuries of development, Ulama did not find such a big gap between jurisprudence and medicine. An ayatollah was

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once faced with the question of differences among jurists on divine law. He responded that jurists have not heard law directly and specifically from the Quran and Sunnah, but rather inferred and deduced it from diverse hadiths and verses applying methodologies and perspectives that in turn lead to contradictory ideas and law. The same is true with historians and medical professionals. When physicians interpret a disease, a fact, differently, how is that different than jurists doing the same thing with old texts? As medical experts could not leave their ideas to amateurs, the same is true with jurisprudential professionals. Thus, removing disagreements among mujtahids is neither possible nor desired. He continues by saying that because of the subjective nature of their work, it is not even possible or desirable to pronounce one jurist as the most knowledgeable (a’alam).26 In practice, on an individual level, mujtahids attempted to live a pious life. With regard to scholarship, the journey of Shia jurisprudence is not completely separate from Sunni, but mujtahids surveyed new methods to keep jurisprudence allied with the spirituality of the infallible Imams. Some contributed to Sufism, political theory, philosophy, theology, and ecumenism to make this connection. Some tried to present alternatives within the established field of jurisprudence itself. Their participation and diversity will be addressed in the second part of this book. Although the trajectory of jurisprudence in Shia thought illustrates how Fayz’s ideal jurisprudence remained elusive, his concern has remained like a Socratic gadfly to sting the steed of ayatollahs into acknowledging their proper duties and obligations. The work, impact, and evolution of ayatollahs must be understood in terms of this dynamism, far from any oversimplification. Doing the job of an infallible Imam in radically different eras with an eye to their fellow Sunnis requires ayatollahs to constantly refresh their vision and mission. Knowledge, piety, leadership, and communal responsibility overlap in shaping the phenomenon called Ayatollah. A modern exemplar is grand Ayatollah Khomeini, who represented an amalgamation of these elements that was open to opposing interpretations and analysis. Khomeini complained about two groups of ayatollahs: one, very spiritual, which abandoned sociopolitical challenges, and the second engaged in sociopolitical activities to the detriment of spiritual aspects. He called the first group “beautiful snakes” who betray the Prophet and benefit the United States through hateful secularism.27 The second group he claimed spread maximum corruption. Khomeini cited hadiths saying some clergy (ruhaniyun) are so corrupt and baneful that people not just on earth but even those in hell suffer from their influence.28 To conclude, though knowledge was reduced to jurisprudence, jurisprudence still retained the magic power of knowledge to save or destroy the faithful, both individual and communal. Thus, this reductionism becomes adaptation through its interaction with non-jurisprudential factors. The power

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of jurisprudence is spread through its nature, its structure, its relations with people, and its connection to faith. The following chapters attempt to deliver a concise picture of this dynamism.

NOTES 1. Franz Rosenthal, Knowledge Triumphant the Concept of Knowledge in Medieval Islam (Leiden: Brill, 1970), p. 2. 2. Ibid, 142-54. 3. See Najam Haider, Shi’i Islam; An Introduction (Cambridge, 2014), pp. 13-50; Allamah Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabataba’i, Shi’ite Islam, Seyyed Hossein Nasr (trans.) (State University of New York, 1977). 4. There is disagreement among Shia Ulama regarding whether the infallible Imams need to possess knowledge beyond issues of faith. Moderate Ulama such as Shaykh Tusi don’t believe so, but radical Ulama believe the Imams are omniscient. See Salihi, Qizawat, 241-94. 5. Shubairi Zanjani, Jor’a-e az darya, Vol. 4, p. 641. An original text of ayatollah Khoei is translated into English: Al-Sayyid Abu al-Qasim al-Musawi al-Khu’i, Prolegomena to the Qur’an, Abdulaziz A. Sachedina (trans.) (Oxford University Press, 1998). 6. Rosenthal, Knowledge Triumphant the Concept of Knowledge in Medieval Islam, 31. 7. The most frequent terms are: Allah (2800); qawl (1700); kawn (1300); rab (950) (Rosenthal, 20). 8. See Jasser Auda, Maqasid al-Shari’a as Philosophy of Islamic Law, (Washington: IIIT, 2008), p. 57; Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Shari’a Law Questions and Answers (London: Oneworld, 2017), p. 6; Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence According to Shi’i Law, Arif Abdul Hussain (trans. and ed.). (London: ICAS, 2003), p.39. 9. Shia adds the infallible Imams to the Prophet. 10. Shubairi Zanjani, Jor’a-e az darya, Vol. 4, pp. 395-96. 11. Auda, 57 and 59-60. 12. Further details can be found in Sayed Hassan Akhlaq, “A Hermeneutics of the Sacred and Secular in Shari’a” in The Secular and The Sacred: Complementary and/ or Conflictual? John Hogan and Sayed Hassan Akhlaq (ed.). (Washington, DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2017), pp. 383-406. 13. Ghazzali speaks of five terms suffering from the same problem. They are al-fiqh (jurisprudence), al-ilm (knowledge), al-tawhid (Oneness of God), al-tazkir (remembrance), and al-hikma (wisdom) (Abi Hamid Muhammad, Ghazzali, Ihya ulum ad-din, (Beirut: Dar Ibn Hazm, 2005) 41-9). 14. Ibid, p. 41-2. 15. Ghazzali said, “wa hasil an al-fiqh marifa turuq al-siyasa wa-l-hirasa.” “The result of the jurisprudential method is to learn the ways of leadership and guardianship” (Ghazzali, 26).

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16. They are, “There is no god but God” and “Muhammad is the messenger of God.” 17. Ibid, 25-28. 18. To review an excerpt from Kashani’s philosophy, see Shi’ism: Doctrines, Thought, and Spirituality, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Hamid Dadashi, and Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr (eds.) (State University of New York Press, 1988), pp. 309-311. 19. Muhsin Fayz Kashani, al-Mahajjat al-Bayza fi Tahdib al-Iyha, Ali Akbar alGhaffari ed. (Tehran: Maktabat al-Saduq, 1339/1960), Vol. 1, p. 3. 20. Ibid, Vol. 1. pp. 59-60. 21. Shubairi Zanjani, Jor’a-e az darya, Vol. 4, pp. 395-396. 22. Ibid, Vol. 4, p. 466. 23. It’s said that Akhund is a short form of Aqakhande, meaning “educated lord.” Mullah is a new form of Mawla (lord). Major figures like Mulla Mushim Fayz Kashani, Akhund Mulla Sadra, and Akhund Khurasani were known by these titles (see Shubairi Zanjani, Sayed Ahmad, al-Kalam yajurro al-kalam (Words Lead to More Words) (Qum: Haqbin, 1396/2017), Vol. 1, p. 93. 24. Ibid, (Qum: Haqbin, 1396/2017), Vol. 1, p. 94. 25. Ghazzali, Ihya ulum ad-din, p. 28. 26. Shubairi Zanjani, al-Kalam yajurro al-kalam, Vol. 1, pp. 120-121. 27. Ruhollah Khomeini, Sahifeh Imam (A Collection of Imam Khomeini’s Work) (Tehran: Moassisa-e tanzim va nashr-e athar Imam Khomeini, 1378/1999), pp. 277-278. 28. Ibid, Vol. 13. p. 420.

Chapter 2

Madrasa, Hawza, and Hierarchy

My father dreamed that one day I’d become a grand ayatollah. Like many parents, he had the habit of repeating his stories, details about the village where he was born and grew up, and the unimaginable scarcity of educational tools including books, notebooks, paper, pencils, and pens. He would always conclude that if he was in my place, growing up in a city with many educational tools, he would have become no less than a grand ayatollah himself. In addition, he was always ready to share other opportunities in hawza with me. Once on our walk to a religious program at the house of a fellow believer, he told me there are three options for a seminarian: to become a mujtahid, a muballigh (preacher), or a muddaris/muhaqqiq (lecturer/researcher). To supplement my public schooling, he home-schooled me as well. One of my sisters and I were in the same class to learn Minhaj al-Salihin, an Arabic jurisprudential manual by Grand Ayatollah Khoei, while my brother and another sister were studying Grand Ayatollah Khomeini’s Tahrir al-Wasila. My father’s home-schooling echoed the origin of hawza in teachers’ homes and other modest available spaces. My father also instilled in us the notion that the highest position of religious authority is open to everyone, and that there are diverse paths within hawza. He detailed the branches of scholarship in hawza and told us of every possible direction available in hawza studies. In this chapter, I will first briefly discuss the emergence and evolution of hawza. Then, focusing on the current situation, I will present an overview of the structure, organization, and operation of hawza and its effect on the shaping of ayatollahs. Then, I will elaborate on the various titles used by Ulama. Finally, I will briefly review the major hawzas in the Shia world with a focus on Qum, in Iran, and Najaf, in Iraq.

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FROM MADRASA TO HAWZA According to Shia belief, after the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632, the guidance of the ummah (Islamic community) rightfully belonged to the twelve Imams, the community as a whole, and its individual members. The Imams attempted to do their job in accordance with religious teachings in all relevant aspects of life. In the Shia view, the Imamate is the continuation of the prophecy without receiving new revelation. Providing guidance was the main objective of prophecy, as the following verse of the Quran states: “He it is Who raised among the unlettered ones a messenger of their own, to recite to them His revelations and make them grow, and to teach them the Book and the Wisdom, though they were before certainly in clear error” (62:2). From the first Imam, Ali bn Abitalib (d. 661), until the disappearance of the twelfth Imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi in 873, the main duty of the Imams was to educate and guide the community. The disappearance of the twelfth Imam signaled the beginning of ghaybat al-sughra, the minor occultation. During this period of absence, the Imam maintained contact with his community indirectly, through four successive deputies appointed to mediate between him and the faithful. Shia called these deputies sufara (ambassadors).1 With the death of the last ambassador in 941, the minor occultation came to an end and ghaybat al-kubra, the major occultation, began. This occultation continues to the present day and will end with the appearance of the Mahdi, who will replace the current oppression and corruption with justice and peace. Accordingly, in al-Mahdi’s absence, scholars, particularly fuqaha (jurists), have assumed a pastoral role in guiding the global community. This is known as the period of al-niyabat al-amma (general deputyship), whereby jurists are not specifically appointed by the hidden Imam but work on his behalf. The minor occultation was the period of al-niyabat al-khassa (specific deputyship), during which the four deputies were specifically appointed by alMahdi in his presence. Therefore, the Imams, the ambassadors, the deputies, and the disciples of Imams were responsible for guiding and educating people religiously.2 Like other Muslims during the first few centuries of the faith, Shia education took place in mosques, scholars’ homes, and maktab (Persian: maktabkhana).3 In the third Islamic century, the madrasa was added. Many cities with a big Shia population had madrasas which were managed separately. There was neither a centralized system for managing several madrasas in one city nor for overseeing madrasas in multiple cities. Just as knowledge evolved into jurisprudence (as discussed in the previous chapter), the educational systems and styles also changed over time. Murtaza Danishyar argued that the first appearance of the term hawza ilmiyyah (in full, al-hawza al-ilmiyya, pl. hawzat) came with the founding of Qum Hawza by Haeri Yazdi, which represented the transition of hawza into a modern

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educational institution.4 The word hawza is derived from the Arabic root h-w-z, meaning to obtain or possess. The verbal noun hawz in its substantive use means an enclosed area. Hawza therefore literally means an enclosure or precinct, hence the full term al-hawza al-ilmiyyah denotes an enclosure of learning.5,6 In the medieval era, the term hawza (meaning area, district) was added to Islam, kingdom, religion, and learning in Persian texts, but the term ilmiyyah was not very common.7 According to Danishyar, during the Qajar dynasty (1789–1925), modern institutions like associations, constitutionalism, literary movements, political parties, and elections arose, and hawza obtained a new meaning: an association. A new association called Hawza Islami/Islamiyyah was even formed in Tehran. Later, a new school in Tehran was called Ilmiyyah, which included secondary or high school. During the Iranian constitutional revolution at the beginning of the twentieth century, Hawza Ilmiyyah referred to the Association of Scholars (Ulama). The first use of the term hawza ilmiyyah appears to be attributed to Akhund Khurasani, a pro-constitutionalism grand ayatollah. But a linguistic debt is owed to Haeri and the establishment of Qum Hawza. Haeri brought several madrasas in Qum under single management—namely Faiziyyah, Dar al-Shafa, Mamuriyyah (Razawiyyah), Muminiyyah (Tahwilkhana), Madar-e shah, Mahdi Quli Khan, Haji, Hajj Sayed Sadiq, and Jani Khani. This was the first time in the history of Shia that multiple madrasas operated under the same management structure. Later, the management expanded to other cities like Kashan, Hamadan, and Arak. The practice of managing multiple madrasas and the expansion of branches to other cities by graduates of central madrasas were new to the Shia education system. Later a third element was added: an emphasis on independence from the values, structure, and curriculum of secular schools and colleges. While previous madrasas were more teacher-student focused and thus personal, the new approach was national and location-focused.8 Current usage of “hawza” refers to an institution of Shia religious learning which leads many madrasas, advises on the curriculum, prepares educational materials, orients seminarians, exchanges instructors, and supports them financially, all primarily under the supervision of one established individual or council of ayatollahs. In the next section, we’ll take a look at this modern phenomenon more closely.

STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION The growth of madrasa into hawza, encounters with the modern world, developments in jurisprudential studies, and responding to new needs in religious communities institutionalized the modern structure of hawza. Since hawza precedes madrasa, enrolling in a madrasa means entering hawza. In the

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current Qum and Mashhad hawzas in Iran, the hawza announces the qualifications for registration. But in Najaf, Iraq, following tradition each madrasa often announces the required qualifications for its own students. Traditionally, a male interested in studying at hawza goes to the madrasa nearest to where he lives and declares his willingness to become a talaba (seminarian, plural tullab). He might need recommendations, verbal or written, from Ulama who know him. Madrasas in villages and small cities might have only primary courses available. For advanced courses, tullab travel to larger cities. The most advanced courses are exclusively held in major hawzas like Qum, Mashhad, and Najaf, because they can be taught only by ayatollahs. Mostly, if the proper courses are available in small cities, the current hawzas of Mashhad, Qum, and Najaf do not accept seminarians from other cities. Others must first finish the primary courses in their own cities. This happens even between two major hawzas. As I will discuss in great detail later, the political and theological atmosphere in Qum is quite different from that of Najaf, and many tullab want to move from Qum to Najaf to study. Both hawzas agreed that Qum seminarians must finish part of their study locally before moving to Najaf.9 Traditionally hawzas do not require candidates to pass admission tests, nor are there examinations to determine a prospective student’s academic skills. All that is required is basic literacy. Currently, Iranian hawzas want Iranian students to have graduated at least from the middle school (grade 8) and nonIranian students to have received a high school diploma in order to register at Al-Mustafa International University. Traditionally, instruction takes place in a variety of madrasas in a classroom or in a main hall or specific room, or, outside of that, even in a teacher’s home. In major hawzas, the classes may even meet inside the adjoining shrine, like in Najaf, Karbala, Qum, and Mashhad. During the hot summers, classes may be held on the roof or in the basement. In villages and small cities, the local mosque may host the classes. Depending on the degree of modernization, the style can appear very modern. The number of students can vary from just a couple to hundreds in the most advanced courses held by grand ayatollahs in Qum and Najaf. Students are required to do some advanced reading (mutalia) before the course to prepare for instruction. They will then attend a class where the teacher asks a student to read the assigned text out loud. Other students are assigned to critique their classmate’s reading on points of Arabic grammar. Reading the Arabic texts correctly and mastering correct spelling are a time-consuming part of this earlier stage of hawza education. After the student has practiced reading, the teacher will explain the meaning of the text. After class, the student must do mubahitha (discussion), where he joins a couple of classmates to co-read and co-review the text.10 Each one in turn interprets the lesson. This last phase serves to sharpen teamwork, presentation, and debate skills. When the teacher

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finds it appropriate, he or she will touch on grammatical, rhetorical, ethical, historical, and social points, since the teaching subject is not the entire matter per se. These points remind a seminarian of his duty and also connect the subject, regardless of its content, to the overarching mission of hawza. Teaching is not organized around a class, but around the individual student. In many madrasas, seminarians sit on the ground and discuss the subject matter in pairs or in circles. Depending upon the classroom size and the number of students, the instructor may sit on the carpeted floor or on a small wooden stair (minbar), with students seated on the floor around him. A student may at the same time also act as a teacher to less advanced students. Students may choose which book, at the same level and same subject, to study, from among those deemed appropriate for their current level of knowledge; they also choose their teachers, and even the time and place of study, in agreement with the teacher. There are no specific times for learning. The students and teacher can decide together on the hours. They might meet after the morning prayer, after sunrise or sunset, or any other time. Therefore, in any given hawza one may see study circles in session throughout the day. Traditionally there is no limit on who may enter into a session. Especially when classes are held adjacent to the shrine, laypeople may join a class out of curiosity. Lessons for advanced students are held at various times—in the morning, the afternoon, and the evening, at least at the large hawzas such as those at Karbala, Qum, and Najaf—in order to enable students to attend more than one during the day. Most lessons last between an hour and an hour and a half. The advanced textbooks are either in Arabic or in Persian, because most students speak one of these languages. The preliminary course could be in any language, but the highest stage of learning (al- dars al-kharij) is held in Arabic in the Arab countries and in Persian in Iran. Single students live in dormitories usually named after the donor who funded them. The dormitories consist of buildings with small rooms for unmarried students. Each room can accommodate two or three students. Married students live outside the dormitories in homes of their own. Recently some maraji’ have built family dorms for them too. In the dormitories, one can find Afghans, Pakistanis, Iranians, and Arabs of all nationalities, young students and old, all gathered for the purpose of studying religious teachings. Hawza students do not pay a tuition fee. Indeed, they receive a stipend from their teachers and from the madrasa and hawza. Also, if a seminarian brings a Muslim countryman to the office of a marja to pay his religious tax, the seminarian will receive some of that tax. The education path in hawza leads in different directions. Most tullab finish the second stage of the following three stages, or at least the first part of the second stage. If they wish to become an ayatollah, then they must continue to the third stage. Otherwise, they may pursue other options such as scholarship in other areas of religious studies (i.e., theology, philosophy,

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history and historiography, the study of the Quran, and the study of hadith) or become a preacher. Since the main purpose of this book is the making of an ayatollah, it is vital to learn what an individual on that path studies in hawza. Briefly, the three stages are as follows:11 1. Preliminaries The first stage is preliminaries (al-muqaddamat/al-tamhidiyyah). This stage may last between three and five years, depending on the student’s aptitude. The subjects taught at this stage begin with Arabic grammar, including morphology, syntax, and rhetoric. These are followed by formal logic. Additional subjects include learning how to read and recite the Quran. Participating in basic theological, jurisprudential, and ethical courses might be required depending on the madrasa. At this stage, the student learns from certain textbooks and only rarely goes beyond them. Two of these are Ibn Ajuruum’s Al-Ajurrumiyya, which presents the rules of syntax, and Ibn Hisham alAnsari’s Qatr al-nada wa-ball al-sada (Drops of Dew and Wetting a Parched Throat), a collection of parables in common use among Arabs as examples for the rules of grammar. These are used for Arabic-speaking students. NonArabic-speaking students such as Iranians, Pakistanis, Indians, and Turks begin their studies with a textbook called Jami al-muqaddimat (Compendium of Preliminaries), a volume containing a number of compositions on Arabic morphology and syntax. Then both groups read a commentary on the 1000verse poem on the rules of Arabic grammar authored by ibn Malik al-Ta’i. Some seminarians memorize the original poem. In addition, they study at least the fourth chapter of Mughni al-labib on advanced Arabic grammar. Next, they read either Mukhtasar al-Ma’ani or al-Mutawwal, both by Sa’d al-Din Taftazani, on Arabic rhetoric and style. Many of these texts are written by prominent Sunni scholars. Jurisprudential study mostly consists of a Risala al-amaliyyah or tawzih al-masail, a manual treatise on religious law by a living marja al-taqlid (source of imitation), in order for a beginner seminarian to learn the rules of religious conduct in acts of worship and acts of business. They must also study a logical text. Most recently, this is often Mantiq al-Muzaffar. The primary theological text completely depends on the madrasa’s preference. This stage takes three to four years. 2. The Critical Texts of Jurisprudence The second stage is divided into two parts: the “surfaces of jurisprudence” (sutuh al-fiqh) and the “upper surfaces” (al-sutuh al-’ulya). Some hawzas consider the first part as a preliminary, because in this stage seminarians learn fundamental concepts about the principles of jurisprudence and

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semi-argumentative jurisprudence. This stage is concentrated on jurisprudence (fiqh) and the principle of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh), and seminarians study these subjects thoroughly. In this stage, indeed, they learn about the mechanism of jurisprudence and the use of the Quran, Sunnah, reasoning, and consensus. This stage can last between five and six years. Seminarians usually start with a text on the principles of jurisprudence written by al-Amili (d. 1602, the son al-Shahid al-Thani); Ma’alim al-din; Ali Naqi Haidari’s Usul al-istinbat; or al-Halaqat12 by Shahid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr. They then move on to Muhammad Rida al-Muzaffar’s Usul alFiqh and Shaykh al-Ansari’s Al-Rasa’il. The principle of jurisprudence study reaches its peak in this stage with the reading of Kifayat al-usul by Akhund Khurasani. The jurisprudential study begins with Al-Rawda al-bahiyya fi sharh al-lum’a al-dimashqiyya by al-Shahid al-Thani (1333–1384). Seminarians are required to read it as a prerequisite for advanced studies in jurisprudence. This is followed by al-Makasib by Shaykh al-Ansari (1799–1864). While the former treats all aspects of jurisprudence with a semi-argumentative methodology, the latter presents topics in commercial law with a purely argumentative methodology. At this stage, as in the following, students enjoy the right to criticize their teachers and to debate with them. The extent of this right depends on the student’s abilities. Its purpose is to hone the student’s powers of observation. Concentrating on fiqh and its principles provides seminarians with a clear understanding of the subject and a chance to consider whether they want to pursue it further. This is an introduction to exercising ijtihad, undertaking independent judgment of jurisprudence. Seminarians who want to return to their native cities and countries may end up studying in hawza at this level. Many foreign students return to their homelands and perform numerous tasks such as giving sermons at religious services in mosques and husayniyyas (religious houses), doing missionary work, teaching, and running religious schools. Some graduates do missionary work in the West, an activity that began in the 1970s. Today there are large numbers of hawza graduates on the Continent and in Britain who serve the needs of Shia communities there. The activities of hawza graduates in the West, as Sindawi illustrates, have a double purpose: to prevent local Shia, especially Muslim youths, from being swallowed up by Western society and to improve the acquaintance of Westerners with Shia Islam.13 If they finish the next stage and become an ayatollah, they can issue fatwas to ease the lives of Muslims in the West, since they have firsthand knowledge of the West. Before moving to the next stage, it is worth mentioning that among Shia Ulama there are those who are in favor of this system of study and the timehonored texts, where the student can choose his teacher and his study material and texts are written by known scholars. This approach has the benefit

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of keeping the traditional style of hawza alive. Others, however, believe that this method is too time-consuming, forcing some students to leave before completing their studies, and should therefore be amended and the texts simplified. Many new tullab read shortened versions of these texts, particularly to prepare for annual exams. Peripheral subjects include theology (kalam), exegeses (tafsir), hadith (including ilm al-rijal “the science of hadith transmitters” and dirayat alhadith “comprehension of hadith”), philosophy, and mysticism (irfan). These are not mandatory but, depending on the hawza, madrasa, and seminarian’s interests, could be pursued. Philosophy (falsafa) and mysticism (irfan) are not welcomed in several hawzas. 3. The Beyond-Text Courses This third stage marks a seminarian’s move toward exercising independent judgment, ijtihad, by attending a new course of study and observing the analysis of a mujtahid. Jurisprudence and its principles are taught at an advanced level during this stage. The teacher is a mujtahid, an individual who illustrates knowledge of ijtihad, knows his lessons by heart, and can quote from memory all of the traditions relevant to the subject without consulting a textbook. Therefore, this stage is known as dars kharij or bahth kharij (outside research), because the teaching mujtahid does not limit himself or his students to a particular text; the course is conducted apart from textbooks. At this stage, the student strives to complete his mastery of the subjects he learned in the previous stages. Since the teacher in this stage does not use a textbook but relies on his own memory instead, most students will independently pursue the sources mentioned by the teacher during the lesson. Each teacher has his own research and teaching style.14 The best teachers are grand ayatollahs. However, not everyone wants to attend a course delivered by a grand ayatollah. The reason is simple: the prestige and charisma of a grand ayatollah could harm a seminarian’s talent because he does not feel comfortable objecting to an issue or exercising his own critical skills. It’s common in hawza that one grand ayatollah might be famous for his scholarship on jurisprudence and another known for his mastery of the principles of jurisprudence. Many fresh seminarians in this stage prefer attending the course of a lower-level ayatollah due to the greater opportunity to practice and improve their own professional skills. These courses occur in big hawzas and may be very large, depending on the instructor’s prestige, scientific excellence, and didactic skills. The indepth studies at this stage—comparing opposing views of Ulama on the same subject and reviewing their arguments, the freedom to criticize the opinions of others, and the right to debate any proposition, whatever its source—give

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the students confidence in their own opinions and prepare them to become mujtahids and finally maraji’ al-taqlid (sources of emulation). Many seminarians would love to attempt this stage. After a few years, they will be sure whether they want to continue with this stage or to change their career path. In traditional hawza, there is no limit for years studying in these courses, and some seminarians might choose to participate in them for the rest of their lives. As noted above, there is no central text to be taught. Yet, for the organization of the course, teachers commonly arrange their courses around one of the following books: Al-Rasa’il; Kifayat al-usul; Qawanin al-Hikma fi al-usul by al-Mirza (d. 1816); al-’Urwa al-wuthqa by al-Tabataba’i al-Yazdi (d. 1918); and Jawahir al-kalam by Muhammad Hassan al-Najafi (d. 1850). In terms of jurisprudential hadiths, Wasil al-Shi’a by Shaykh Hurr Amili is a core text in these courses. During this time, the students have space to explore other aspects of Islamic education like the study of the Quran and hadith. If they prove to be skilled learners, two certificates are available for them (hawzas generally issue no official diplomas). These are two kinds of authorization: an ijazat al-ijtihad (permission of independent judgment), also known as al-shahada al-ilmiyya (a scientific testimonial), and an ijazat al-riwaya (permission of tradition transmission). These two are not linked, so a student may receive one without the other. Indeed, not all grand ayatollahs can issue ijaza al-riwaya, because it is a separate path from jurisprudence and its principles. I will talk more about these permissions in the next chapter. Students may continue to study with a certain teacher even after having received an authorization. There are extra important dimensions to the educational structure of hawza that impact the character and mindset of a future ayatollah. Traditionally, hawza students are not given examinations of the kind used in secular schools and universities. Nor are they granted diplomas testifying to their academic accomplishments. However, there is a system of monthly examinations for hawza students for those who receive a monthly stipend. In these exams, the student is asked about the classes he attended during that month’s studies. Some hawzas have institutionalized annual exams to review the educational progress of their seminarians. The system of stipends differs; for example, in Qum, seminarians receive it in accordance with the level of their education, but in Mashhad all seminarians receive the same amount. In all hawzas, married seminarians receive double the amount of their single peers, regardless of their number of children or other members of their household. The stipend comes directly from the office of the jurisprudential authorities (maraji’), though the hawza might facilitate it. Maraji’ provide stipends to seminarians based on their available funds, which mostly come from religious taxes, particularly khums (one-fifth). According to the Quranic verse 41 chapter

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8 and many hadiths, Shia believe each Muslim must pay one-fifth of their annual surplus income and excess treasure to God. The amount is divided into two halves: half of the khums belongs to poor Sayeds,15 while the other half (called sahm al-Imam or “Imam’s share”) goes to God, the Prophet, and the Imams. The mujtahid takes possession of the second half and spends it in a way which he believes will please the hidden Imam, including expenses of seminaries and seminarians; constructing mosques, libraries, and schools; and helping the needy. Maraji’ who have more followers (muqallids)16 pay a higher stipend to their seminarians because they receive more in taxes.17 Maraji’ who have few followers may pay less, or irregularly, or only once a year. Some maraji’ might even pay with food instead. In hawza, student-teacher relations are not necessarily limited to the educational context. It is said that in Qum Hawza, ties between teachers and students are not very warm, but in Najaf and Karbala teachers take a personal and fatherly interest in their students.18 Outstanding students often marry a teacher’s daughter. A well-known case is that of Ayatollah Ja’far Kashif alGhita (d. 1812) from Najaf Hawza, who married off his daughter to a student despite the protests of his nephew, who said to him: “It would be better if you would marry off your daughter according to tribal custom, within your family.” Since students have considerable choice and the leverage to leave a teacher whom they perceive as indifferent to their needs, the student-teacher relationship is fluid and can change or even end abruptly. Yet most students do in fact stay with one senior teacher whom they respect and obey until his death. The senior teachers expect their students to act only with their permission. Traditionally, a student begins to give lessons with the recommendation or permission of his teacher. Often a circle forms around an advanced study teacher. When a teacher dies, it often happens that his circle of students breaks up. The more prominent among them may set up study groups of their own, often in mutual rivalry. A student’s loyalty to his teacher is personal and after the latter’s death does not pass over to members of his family, unless perhaps they are teachers as well. Students can become overly proud of their teachers. This reflects what many scholars said about the nature of Muslim higher learning in contrast with the formal structure of the medieval European university. Linked with the more personal nature of Middle Eastern society, which is known for having more give and take between people of different stations than in a typical European medieval educational setting, this created the system of patron-client relationships which dominate almost all aspects of life in hawza.19 These relationships are usually divided into two parts. One is a smaller inner circle of older students with whom the teacher is more intimately acquainted, called khawass (exclusive members). They help the teacher

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perform his duties at the school and also provide personal assistance. The second, outer circle is larger and contains the majority of the students. There is no formal procedure for becoming a member of the khawass; joining the inner circle usually follows some years of proven merit as a student and of loyal service to one’s teachers. Where a student falls within these circles and how near or far from the teacher he sits in the classroom reflect his status and the number of years he has studied. Some mujtahid teachers maintain special study circles for their most promising students. A student may study with a number of mujtahids at the same time, but he will always be considered the student of one particular senior teacher. The upper-level courses encourage students to ask questions and to challenge their teachers’ opinions. Such “dissents” (iradat) are acceptable as long as students do not violate the ethical code by calling into question the teacher’s authority, the truth of his statements, or principles of the faith. Thus, for example, it is related that Shaykh Murtaza Ansari would pay careful attention to what his students said to him, for he had learned from experience that students of his were capable of refuting his juridical opinions. In spite of the fact that a high degree of respect for teachers promotes conservatism among seminarians, there are always vanguard seminarians who criticize core concepts their teachers try to impart. This causes a double culture in hawza: many liberal and progressive ideas are discussed, not just among khawass but also among seminarians, without sharing with the public for the interests of the whole community. Moreover, the hegemony of tradition and the dynamics of hawza do not promote an atmosphere where progressive ideas are quick to find favor. All hawzas have nearly the same official vacations, with some differences due to regional and local factors. They are the first two weeks of the month of Muharram and the last two weeks of the month of Safar, so that seminarians can take part in the mourning ceremonies for Imam Husayn and the Prophet; the month of Ramadan (preaching time for seminarians); the anniversaries of the deaths of the Prophet Muhammad, his daughter Fatima, and the dead Imams; religious holidays like Eid al-fitr, Eid al-adha, Eid al-Ghadir, the Persian New Year, the Prophet’s birthday, the Day of Revelation (bi’that), and the birthday of AIi bn Abi Talib; and a summer break. This is in addition to the hawza weekend of Thursday and Friday throughout the school year. Therefore, a considerable part of the vacations at a hawza fall on specifically Shia occasions, which contributes to the hawza teachers’ emotional and religious campaign aimed at bolstering Shia spirit and morale and at creating a single unified body of all those at the hawza. There is no single dress code in hawza. While wearing a turban and cloak are common in all hawzas, their shape, the layers, the materials, and even when a seminarian first wears them can differ. It is said that in the hawzas

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of Iraq, a student who descends from a religious family on his father’s side will wear a turban from the very first day of study. Other students will begin wearing a turban after the end of the first year of study. In the Iranian hawzas, students only begin wearing a turban after finishing the preliminary stage, whatever their family background. Active tullab everywhere are in the habit of wearing a turban. A black turban is a mark of belonging on one’s father’s side to the genealogy of the Prophet, accompanied by the title al-Sayyid (sir) in addition to any other title that may apply. Those who do not belong to the Prophet’s genealogy wear a white turban and are called al-shaykh (venerable).20 Ayatollah Muhammad Husayn Beheshti once warned against equating dressing like Ulama or performing religious rituals with being an alim. He said wearing turban and cloak was not historically specific to Ulama. Also, there has never been a religious office that banned non-Ulama from dressing like Ulama. Therefore, there is no basis beyond custom for wearing turban and cloak.21 However, conservative hawzas are sensitive to wearing traditional dress and place turbans on the heads of seminarians who pass preliminary courses in a specific ceremony. They call it the dress code of the soldiers of the Imam Zaman (the Imam of the Time). Yet, there were mujtahids who eschewed the common dress code for Ulama but still remained active in hawza. They were called mukalla (hatwearing individual), as opposed to muammam (turban-wearing individual), since wearing a hat was common among laypeople. Some examples of this are Jahangir Khan Qishqai, Haj Aqa Rahim Arbab, Abu-l Qasim Gurji, Sayed Jafar Shahidi,22 and Sayed Yahya Yasrebi. (I will discuss a few of these figures in the second part of the book.) There are some modern Ulama who do not use the turban and cloak, such as Muhammad Mujtahid Shabistari (b. 1936), Ahmad Qabil (1954–2012), and Muhsin Kadivar.23 Moreover, after the revolution the Iranian government created the Special Court for Clergies to prosecute Ulama accused of improper activity and conduct. This court sometimes bans some from wearing turban and cloak. A significant feature of hawzas is their financial independence from state institutions. Murtaza Mutahhari, comparing Shia hawza with Sunni, proudly refers to this feature as an outcome of Shia nature.24 Sindawi cites Khamenei’s reasons for why hawzas have been and must remain independent, among which he lists the following: the fate of a hawza should never be tied to that of a government; a hawza run by or associated with the state cannot fulfill its mission, since the state is sure to impose its will; and, unlike the state, hawzas as an institution have roots that go back more than a millennium and should therefore never be tied to any other institution. However, the current status of hawza in Iran contradicts both Mutahhari’s view and Khamenei’s advice. A hawza’s expenses consist of the costs of building and maintaining dormitories, students’ grants and teachers’ salaries, and publication and

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acquisition of books. A number of financial sources are available to hawzas for meeting these expenses: pledges and vows in return for recovery from sickness or deliverance from danger; endowments; charity payments and contributions from rulers and members of the community; khums; restitution for wrongs (a sum of money imposed for a wrong supposedly committed); one-third (thulth) of the “right of inheritance” (haqq al-wasiyya) from the estate of deceased persons, usually designated for a certain religious purpose with the mujtahid acting as a trustee; income from Shia endowments in Iraq, Iran, India, and other countries with a Shia population; and Oudh bequests (a very large waqf [endowment] whose income is sent to the Najaf Hawza and to the shrines of the Shia Imams from the Shia state of Oudh in northern India).25 However, the endowments are less effective at providing funds for Shia hawzas compared to their Sunni counterparts,26 and the major income of hawza derives from khums. Studies show this feature has its pros and cons. On the plus side, it keeps hawza financially separate from the state and provides independence. The downside is that it makes Ulama and even grand ayatollahs dependent on popular support, which stifles innovation and serious scholarship, leading to a more conservative stance. Since the masses tend to dislike change in their traditional view of faith and religious law, they might not tolerate an ayatollah who deduces a new law and suggests a change to established laws.27 Mutahhari cites Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi as saying upon initiating his office of jurisprudential authority (marja’iyyah) that he thought he could issue fatwas in terms of his valid deduction and the people will follow. He learned later that the case is different if a new fatwa is not consistent with the desire and mentality of the citizenry. Mutahhari shares stories about other grand ayatollahs as well.28 This feature can have additional consequences, as Meir Litvak explains.29 Unlike other centers of religious learning in the Muslim world, hawzas were not set up or sustained on a regular basis by political elites in order to provide them with legitimacy and judicial manpower. They didn’t serve primarily as an arena for stipendiary (mansab, pl. manasib) posts, and thus notables did not exploit knowledge as a form of capital to gain social and political distinction. Instead, hawzas grew “from below” by the efforts of the Ulama themselves, serving as centers for teaching and scholarship. Sustaining chiefly through canonical khums and zakat and donations from the faithful produced significant ramifications for many other aspects of hawza life, including leadership structure, student-teacher relations, the curriculum of studies, finances, and administration. All of these center on the goals of teaching and scholarly production, rather than the administration of justice or political/communal leadership. Therefore, social hierarchy and status are based on scholarship and acumen as well as charisma in building networks of patronage. Meritocracy and openness to newcomers play a greater role in

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Shia hawza than in Sunni according to Litvak, and in many of these features hawza is similar to Jewish rabbinical seminaries (yeshivoth), as both systems of learning and religious leadership grew from below and are more oriented toward the communities of the believer than toward the state.30 This makes Shia hawza more amorphous and decentralized.31 Nevertheless, certain patterns of behavior crystallized and persisted over time, resulting in institutionalization in hawza, producing a regular curriculum, and issuing certifications based on recent conventions and customs. The hegemony of conventions and customs sometimes manifested harshly in the form of excommunication (takfir) or even violence against those among the Ulama who presented a serious challenge to their collective authority or basic tenets of belief. The second part of this volume broadly addresses this issue and offers many examples. Publications by hawza graduates may take a variety of forms. Some publish texts aiming to spread the faith among the public. A few focus on new developments in sciences and technology which challenge the established intellectual and practical traditions in faithful society. The great ayatollahs do not see themselves as responsible for direct involvement in these types of publications. Mostly they address these issues in their talks, before and during their classes, or in prefaces to their manuals of jurisprudence. However, scholarly writing in the community of Ulama can be produced by many different scholars, and as in modern Western universities, it serves two goals: developing Shia intellectual trends and establishing the scholar’s status and fame among his peers. As a religious institution, the hawza enshrines continuity and tradition, but due to the informal nature of Shia religious leadership, adding to previous scholarship is also a major criterion for determining some sort of hierarchy among Ulama. Naming an alim by a book he has written is one of the highest honors. The most famous mujtahids are often identified by their book rather than by their names.32

HIERARCHY AND TITLES The core concept of knowledge in Islam divided Muslims into two groups: believers and Ulama. This is a starting point for internal ranking systems among Ulama, as Rainer Brunner argues, and invalidates the widespread opinion which says that Islam is a religion without priesthood and that the believer faces God directly without any interceding authority. This distinction led to the emergence of autonomous groups of scholars and establishment of the principle of a’alamiyyah (a’alam: most learned), which asks that a believer always seek the advice of the most learned scholar in his vicinity, upholding an internal hierarchy among the Ulama.33 There are two more

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additions in Shia. The first is that the addressed and required knowledge has exoteric and esoteric layers. Acquiring each level and layer contributes to the hierarchical system. The second is that the raising of Shia ayatollahs to the status of representing the infallible Imam encourages Ulama to strive for further study and greater in-depth investigation. This illustrates why Brunner refers to Shia as a “stratified denomination.” Within Shia, the hierarchy has led to the emergence of a politically motivated religious administration in cases where Shia aligned the state with the establishment of a religious leadership that regulates the Ulama’s internal hierarchy.34 Before the proclamation of Shia as the state religion under the Safavids, there was a position in the Abassid caliphate called niqabat that lasted through the Ottoman empire. It was initiated to ensure the special place of the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad. The Prophet’s descendants were known as ashraf, and they enjoyed special privileges including certain tax exemptions, maintaining updated lists of lineages, receiving some special funds, and undergoing separate judicial procedures in some cases.35 The head of this office was called naqib al-ashraf. Many well-known Shia Ulama served in this position, including Sharif al-Radi and Sharif Murtada as naqib al-Nuqaba. Sayed ibn Tawus was entitled naqib al-talibiyyin in Baghdad and naqib al-nuqaba of all the ‘Alids of Iraq by Hulagu Khan, a thirteenthcentury Mongul ruler of Persia.36 Abul al-Hassan Mutahhar held the position of the naqib of the Ray ‘Alids (Ray is an ancient historical district in Iran with a Shia population that traces back to the time of Imams).37 The Safavids transitioned Ulama into a radically new status and made the establishment of state-run religious institutions a necessity. The head of these institutions was called sadr (the head). While it always remained an administrative rather than a theological post, its holders belonged only to the Ulama. The duties of the sadr included appointing religious judges, those who were to take charge of religious endowments, prayer leaders, leaders of religious schools and mosques, heads of the sayyids (naqibs), and various other religious offices. Additionally, he was responsible for the propagation of Shia.38 Other new, more religious offices belonged to positions called Shaykh al-Islam, the qazi al-quzzat, and the mulla-bashi. A Shaykh al-Islam was appointed for every big city, and the Shaykh al-Islam of the Safavid capital assumed the role of primus inter pares. The main function of this office was to enforce all matters of Shari’a, especially to enjoin the good and prohibit the bad. The most noteworthy example is Allama Majlisi (1627–1699/1700), who had unprecedented power in the Safavid capital of Isfahan. Among his tasks was crowning the king. The qazi al-quzzat (chief among jurists) assumed important duties in the judiciary, for example, in the fields of contracts or personal law, although he was subordinate in rank to the sadr, the Shaykh al-Islam, and the mulla-bashi. The office of mulla-bashi, created in

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1712 at the very end of the Safavid epoch, institutionalized the Shaykh alIslam’s enormous power linking the king and the legal scholars. However, it lost much of its significance under the Qajars, who limited its function to that of the tutor of the Crown Prince.39 These official titles bestowed by the government have not survived and are uncommon today. But the religious titles have their own stories of origin and evolution. Regarding status, Shia Ulama are ranked according to the merits of their scholarship, though the meaning and significance of a title may change over time. There is a distinct though not totally clear-cut hierarchical structure whose members may all be called alim (with regard to scholarship) or clergy (with regard to religious activity).40 The main criterion for hawza students’ titles is their academic achievements. Most of these titles reflect the number of years a student has devoted to his studies and his level of achievement and therefore change with time. Many historical titles are no longer in use today, for example, thiqa (trust), ayn (eye), rafia al-manzila (of high standing), jalil al-qadr (of exalted rank), shaykh al-ashab (head of the companions), al-rais al-aqdam (the senior head), naqib al-ulama (chief scholar), al-qadi (the judge), qasi al-quzzat (judge of judges), and so on. There were titles like wa’iz (preacher) and rawda-khwan (reciter of the story of Ashura day) which remain more or less in use, although they tend to refer to the position of preaching more so than to scholarly positions.41 Although there was not a specific regulation for the use of titles and there was a certain personal judgment at play, Ulama were not liberal in conferring titles. In the past century, the following titles have been in common use: A. Al-fadil (excellent) is the title given to a seminarian upon having successfully completed the “preliminaries” stage. In Iran, the term shaykh is comparable. B. Thiqat al-Islam (trust of Islam) is used sparingly for students who have successfully completed their jurisprudence and foundation studies at the “surfaces” stage and teach them at the “preliminaries” stage. It is also used for Ulama who are experts in hadith and historiography. Originally the title thiqat al-Islam was associated specifically with Shaykh Muhammad b. Yaqub al-Kulayni for writing the al-Kafi and with other higher-ranking Ulama, but later in the twentieth century it was restricted to those mujtahids who were just one rank above the students. C. Hujjat al-Islam (proof of Islam) is the broadest title in use from after the completion of the “preliminaries” stage to involvement in outside research. The first Shia jurist who held this title was Shaykh AIi al-Karaki (d. 1534), who received the title from the Safavid Shah Tahmasp l.

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D. Hujjat al-Islam wal-muslimin (proof of Islam and Muslims) is a title reserved for seminarians at the advanced stage of sutuh and earlier stage of kharij studies and before ayatollah. They have a firm understanding of jurisprudence and its principles and are able to teach sutuh. E. Ayat Allah (sign of God, Ayatollah) is a title given only to those who have attained the level of ijtihad (individual judgment). Bearers of this title have the authority to issue religious rulings and to fill positions of religious leadership. They teach the “outside research” courses and aim to establish a scholarly reputation and pious characteristics. At this level they do not imitate a marja. The common title mujtahid reflects the degree of this educational stage. It is believed that Allama Hilli was the first scholar to be called ayatollah, though in a purely reverential sense, during his lifetime. Except for a few instances during the Safavid era, when some scholars honored their teachers by calling them ayatollah, the title was not used in any technical sense prior to the twentieth century.42 F. Ayat Allah al-uzma (greatest sign of God, grand ayatollah) is granted to great mujtahids denoting that they’ve become a marja taqlid (source of emulation). They can publish their manual of jurisprudence (risala amaliyyah), and their deduction can be followed by Shia around the world. The bearers of this title are considered the elite among Shia scholars, whose word is law in all spheres of life. They teach students at the “outside research” level at one of the large hawzas, such as those at Qum, Mashhad, Karbala, and Najaf, and also perform management and supervisory tasks there. Aqa Husayn Borujerdi (1875–1961), who was regarded as the sole marja since 1947, appears to have been the first on whom the title was bestowed. G. Marja Taqlid A’alam or Marja A’ala (the most knowledgeable source of emulation or the highest source) is rarely used, but it refers to a grand ayatollah who has the unique and highest position among all ayatollahs so that everyone listens to his advice. It is believed that Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi held this rank in his time. H. Imam (leader): Historically Shia hawza has been allergic to the title of Imam, since there is a chance of confusion about the core concept of Imamate and the Imam in Shia theology. Thus, if the term is used, it is used as a noun modifier—for example, the imam of prayer (imam jama’a), imam of Friday prayer (imam-e jum’a), and imam-e masjid (the mosque Imam). However, among non-Persian-speaking Shia, there have been exceptional uses of the title imam for great alims like the Iraqi Marja Imam Muhammad Husayn Kashif al-Ghita (1877–1953), Grand Ayatollah Sayed Muhsin Hakim (1889–1970),43 and IranianLebanese scholar Imam Musa al-Sadr (b. 1928), who disappeared under

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unclear circumstances in 1978 on a trip to Libya. It seems these rare uses occurred because of interactions with Sunni scholars and the influence of Sunni terminology. However, with Ayatollah Khomeini carrying the title of imam, use of this title for a Shia mujtahid increased greatly because of Khomeini’s position of international leadership. This use received little resistance from conservative Shia. After Khomeini’s death, a contradiction appeared. On the one hand, the followers of a few opposition mujtahids gave the title of imam to their marja and created foundations, particularly in the West, named after these imams. For example, the Imam Khoei Foundation and the Imam Shirazi World Foundation. There are some Shia clergy in the United States who call themselves imam for simplicity of communication. On the other hand, there has recently been an effort by the Iranian government to call Ayatollah Khamenei, the current supreme leader, an imam, although this attempt faces resistance. The title of Allama (polymath), which formerly was reserved for the scholar al-Hilli, is still used today in Iran to refer to an ayatollah who changed his focus from fiqh to another field of Islamic teachings like the Quran, hadith, history, and philosophy like Allama Tabataba’i and Allama Muhammad Taqi Jafari. However, among religious scholars in Iraq and Lebanon it has come to be attached to clerics in general, whatever their standing or level of religious erudition.44 There is no official ceremony to confer these titles. Most commonly, teachers or peers assign a title to a worthy individual. These are common titles used to explain an alim’s position to the masses. It is not accepted that a scholar uses a title for himself, which would be interpreted as a sign of impiety and selfishness. Promotion from one title to the next in the hawza hierarchy takes a long time, especially during the “outside research” stage. (This is why the title of ayatollah offered to Ayatollah Khamenei by the Iranian regime was received with much doubt and negative feedback from both hawza and the public.)45 Sindawi saw three factors at play for a seminarian to receive a title promotion: individual diligence, talents, and behavior (in particular his piety); the esteem in which he is held by his peers at the hawza and by the public in mosques and Husayniyyahs;46 and finally his evaluation by senior teachers.47 The Iranian Revolution added a political aspect to it. The regime generously offered or restricted the use of the title of ayatollah to Ulama in terms of their perspective on the Iranian government. When Ayatollah Muntazeri resigned from his position as Ayatollah Khomeini’s designated heir, Khomeini referred to him as Hujjat al-Islam wal-muslimin, while previously he was called grand ayatollah in regime media. And when Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani lost his role in the Iranian regime, he was called Hujjat al-Islam by governmental media though he was previously referred to as ayatollah.48 This

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manipulation of titles caused some established grand ayatollahs to drop their own titles. For example, Ayatollah Muhammad Taqi Bihjat replaced ayatollah with al-abd (the servant) before his name on the cover of his manual of jurisprudence. Grand Ayatollah Sistani removed the title of grand ayatollah from his website. Still, eschewing honorific titles has a longer tradition in Shia and is a sign of humility. Grand Ayatollah Ahmad Khonsari (1891–1985) was very careful that the publisher not include the title grand ayatollah in his works, including his manual of jurisprudence.49 Shaykh Abul-Qasim Kabir Qumi (1864–1934), a teacher of Ayatollah Khomeini, became angered if he heard somebody call him ayatollah. Qumi had the habit of saying there is only one ayatollah, Ayatollah Haeri Yazdi (1859–1937), the founder of Qum Hawza. He even canceled the publication of his own manual of jurisprudence when Haeri arrived in Qum and found him to be more learned than himself.50 As Brunner has concluded, even after the rank of marja al-taqlid had gained acceptance, scholars such as Hasan Ashtiyani (d. 1901) and Fazlullah Nuri (d. 1909) preferred to be addressed only by relatively humble titles such as aqa,51 mirza, or shaykh. Epithets like akhund or mulla, which in other contexts may even be used as pejoratives, were, for example, among the titles of the scholars Mohammad Kazim Khurasani (1839–1911) and Ahmad Naraqi (d. 1829). In addition, since there is not a clear and fixed tradition of titling, individual temperament can intervene. Grand Ayatollah Zanjani, because he was wrongly told that Murtaza Mutahhari was insufficiently strong in his devotion to the love of progeny of the Prophet, addressed Mutahhari with the title Hujjat al-Islam instead of Hujjat al-Islam wal-muslimin in a condolence message on the death of Mutahhari’s father. In his thank-you response, Mutahhari addressed Zanjani as Hujjat al-Islam wal-muslimin, despite the fact that Zanjani was a disciple of Mutahhari for a while. This caused Zanjani to feel shame.52 There are plenty of epithets and titles used by scholars to express reverence for a particularly erudite peer. For example, in his famous biographical dictionary Jame al-rowat, the author addresses his teacher, Allama Majlisi, as Shaykh al-Islam wal-muslimin khatam al-mujtahidin al-imam al-allama almuhaqqeq al-mudaqqeq. Likewise, Ali Karaki received such imposing titles as naeb-e Imam (the substitute for the Imam) or khatam al-mujtahidin (the end of mujtahids). Several scholars were addressed as sultan al-Ulama (king of Ulama), mujtahid al-zaman (the mujtahid of the time), or ra’is al-fuqaha wal-mujtahidin (the head of jurists and mujtahids). However, these titles did not yet imply any formal supremacy or institutional hierarchy, each epithet having a unique relation with the honoree. Finally, there is a specific title which appeared after the Iranian Revolution, because the leadership was headed by an ayatollah. It is rahbar-e inqelab (the

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revolution leader) or Rahbar-e Muazzam (the supreme leader). The Iranian Revolution in 1979 led to the establishment of a state based on the political theory of wilayat-e faqih (lit. “the guardianship of the jurist”), developed by Ayatollah Khomeini, which, as Brunner has explained, had serious repercussions for the Imamite hierarchy. By introducing wilayat-e mutlaqa (absolute guardianship), Khomeini expanded the power of a governing mujtahid to the point of having priority even over the “derivative commandments” like prayer (salat), fasting, or the pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj) (see chapter 10, “Politics and Government”). Khomeini’s exalted position within the hierarchy, far above the constitution and even claiming divine origin, is reflected by his honorifics naeb-e Imam and even Imam. Since Khomeini’s role appears as the necessary consequence of his theory of wilayat-e faqih, the political title rahbar-e inqelab may be interpreted as synonymous with the juridical and theological title wali-e faqih. In 1989 a constitutional amendment was passed on Khomeini’s initiative to the effect that the rank of marja was no longer mandatory for the wali-e faqih (the rahbar-e inqelab) and that the minimal qualification of mujtahid was now sufficient. Thereby the clerical hierarchy again bifurcated. Because of the wilayat-e mutlaqa of the jurist, even the traditionally religious office of marja is subjected to politics.53 A political system conducted through hawza would compromise hawza’s educational mission.

MAJOR HAWZAS The great hawzas are located next to the tombs of Imams or their offspring, like Najaf Hawza near the shrine of Imam Ali; Karbala near the shrine of Imam Husayn; Mashhad near Imam Rida; and Qum adjacent to the shrine of Hazrat Masumah, the sister of Imam Rida. In addition to perceived blessings, this has benefits for both Ulama and laypeople, since Shia pilgrims provide endowments for these shrines and the funds thus made available benefit all the adjoining institutions. It also enables pilgrims to easily submit their religious tax to maraji’ and in turn to visit grand ayatollahs and seek the advice of the seminarians there during their religious visits. While Shia was a minority inside a Sunni majority and dominant regime, the holy shrines provided a kind of sanctuary for Shia Ulama and helped them to retain a measure of independence from the state. In modern times, a hawza’s proximity to a shrine comes with an extra benefit. While many cities were subject to governmental pressure toward Westernization and modernization, being located near a shrine provided a hawza an opportunity to remain largely immune to the growing Western challenges in the region affecting national life.54 For example, even now that a religious government dominates Iran, Ulama from

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Qum or Mashhad often warn against looming liberal values (e.g., freedom of lifestyle in terms of dress, particularly hijab, or having a pet dog), arguing that a holy city can’t tolerate them. Historically, outstanding Shia jurisprudential circles existed in different places. The first school, founded by Shaykhs Kulayni and Saduq, appeared in Qum. This was followed by schools in Baghdad, founded by Shaykh Mufid and Sayed Murtada, and in Najaf, founded by Shaykh Tusi. The next schools, built by Ulama such as Ibn Idris, Sayed ibn Tawus, and Allama Hilli, developed in Hillah, on the Hillah branch of the Euphrates River, 100 km south of Baghdad. Critical scholarship then appeared in Jabal Amil in southern Lebanon, courtesy of Shahid al-awwal and later Shahid al-Thani and Muqaddas Ardabili. The Safavid dynasty eventually invited Lebanese Ulama to Isfahan in Iran and made it the center of Shia hawza. Wahid Bihbahani then further moved the outstanding hawza to Karbala, Iraq, which was then relocated again to Najaf under the oversight of Sahib al-Jawahir and Shaykh Ansari. Subsequently, Mirza Shirazi made Samarra the central hawza.55 Upon the death of Shaykh Ansari, multiple maraji’ appeared on the scene, and the major ayatollahs developed two different hawzas: Abull-Hasan Isfahani in Najaf, and Haeri and then Borujerdi in Qum. There are dozens of hawzas in the Shia world, including in India, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon where seminarians train and laypeople contribute toward their needs. However, there are two that stand above the rest, dreamed about by seminarians who are attracted to their prestige, size, and scholarship. Major ayatollahs live and teach there and lead the entire Shia world from their campuses. They are Qum, in Iran, and Najaf, in Iraq. I wish to focus on these two hawzas primarily, followed by a brief survey of a few others of note. This is not to imply that these hawzas were the largest and the most influential throughout Shia history, nor that they adhered to their original trends in accordance with rationalism or textualism. As a matter of fact, madrasas in Isfahan and Ray (Tehran) have a longer history than Qum and, throughout many dynasties, particularly the Safavid, were more powerful. Grand Ayatollah Bihbahani defeated the dominant Akhbarite school in Karbala and established the current Usuli school in all hawzas. (The following chapter will discuss these two schools in greater detail.) At the time Grand Ayatollah Mirza Shirazi issued his famous fatwa banning tobacco, he was living and teaching in Samarra, not Najaf. Najaf started as a rationalist school but has since taken a turn toward traditionalism. In contrast, Qum Hawza began as a textualist school but is currently trending more rationalist. Surveying the entire history of these institutions is beyond the scope of this book, so I will focus only on Qum and Najaf in their current state in order to provide insight into the contemporary climate in which ayatollahs are trained and teach in turn.

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NAJAF AND QUM Najaf is located at the edge of the western plateau of Iraq, 160 km south of Baghdad, 30 km north of Basra, and 10 km west of Kufa and the River Euphrates. At this location, the distance separating the two great rivers of Mesopotamia, the Tigris and the Euphrates, widens before they merge 300 km south-southeast to form the single river of Shatt al-Arab. It is said that at the moment of Imam Ali’s death, he encouraged his sons to bury him next to his brothers Ehud and Noah. Ali’s wish to be buried next to the tombs of two venerable prophets of the Old Testament reflects Islam’s view of itself as continuous with the previous monotheistic religions as well as Ali’s own desire to be associated with the example of these prophets. This belief illustrates the spiritual significance of Najaf, both for its inhabitants and for all Shias. The shrine of Imam Ali impacts all aspects of Najaf’s history, culture, and religious life. Hawza al-ilmiyyah Najaf was founded by the prominent Shia jurist and theologian Shaykh Tusi (995–1067), when he was forced to leave Baghdad over sectarian differences. Tusi was a rationalist from the Shia theological school of Baghdad, opposing the textualist schools of Qum and Kufa. He applied his rational approach to theology on jurisprudence which was previously textual. He was also a pioneer in comparative jurisprudence. Like its neighbor, the holy city of Karbala, Najaf resumed its significance during the Safavid period. But its real recovery came as a result of the revival of the ijtihad that took place after the victory of the rationalist (usuli) current over the literalist (akhbari) at the end of the eighteenth century (discussed further in the following chapter). Jurisprudential study was developed and extended by Ulama working in the school of Najaf. Promoting the concept of ijtihad led Ulama to become involved in socio-political life. The anti-Akhbari and Najafi mujtahid Jafar Al-Kashif al-Ghita (d. 1812) pioneered this involvement when he declared that it was legitimate to wage jihad against the Russians, who at that time were invading Iran, and threw his weight behind the war being fought against them by the Qajar Fath Ali Shah. Two other eminent Najafi mujtahids made major contributions to the revived usuli trend that is dominant in hawzas in current times. The first was Muhammad Hasan al-Najafi (d. 1850), who spent 30 years writing an encyclopedia of Shia jurisprudence called Jawahir al-kalam (The Jewels of Discourse). It is still in use as a work of reference at the highest levels of Shia jurisprudence today. The second was a Persian scholar, Shaykh Murtaza Ansari (d. 1864), who studied and taught in Najaf. His teachings attracted hundreds of students, and his fame crossed national borders. Among Ansari’s several works, two in particular are considered to be major contributions that are still essential reading for clerics today: one on jurisprudence called al-Makasib (The Earnings), focused on commercial law, and the second on the principles of jurisprudence

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called al-Rasa’il (The Epistles). These works were and still are considered watersheds in Shia law, and they have never really been surpassed. It was an Afghan disciple of Ansari who settled in Najaf and later took another decisive step forward in the development of the principles of Shia jurisprudence. Akhund Khurasani (d. 1911) was born in Herat and studied philosophy in Tehran before continuing his studies in Najaf. He illustrated great skill and sharp analysis in his teaching, and seminarians flocked to hear him. It is said that Khurasani had as many as 1,200 students, and he educated many renowned Ulama whose fame was celebrated by successive generations. He wrote Kifayat al-usul (Sufficiency of Principles), which later received extensive commentary.56 Along with the work of Murtaza Ansari, Kifaya is a cornerstone of advanced study in all hawzas around the world. There is a proverb among Ulama which says, “There are three things that have no end. They are Rasa’il, Makasib, and Kifaya”—meaning these works are critical for mastering the content and methodology of jurisprudence and its principles in its true depth.57 Thus, two factors make Najaf Hawza one of the two most important hawzas: the presence of grand ayatollahs in Najaf and the template it provides for current hawza curricula. In 1922 Grand Ayatollah Abd al Karim Haeri Yazdi (1859–1937) founded Qum Hawza, and many grand ayatollahs settled in Qum afterward, but this did not reduce the position of Najaf Hawza. Najaf had its ups and down due to the political environment, but Grand Ayatollah Khoei kept it alive and effective even when his opponent Khomeini gained power in Iran and focused on Qum Hawza. After Khoei, Sistani revived Najaf Hawza and made it appealing to seminarians from around the world, particularly because of the politicized status of its rival Qum. Let’s now take a glance at Qum Hawza. Qum is in central Iran, located 140 km to the south of Tehran, situated on the banks of the Qum River. It dates back to ancient times with significant archeological remains from the Seleucid and Parthian epochs, which have led to controversial debates over whether they are the remains of a Sasanian temple, a Seleucid Dionysian temple, or a Parthian complex.58 Islam arrived in Qum in 644 in the person of Abu Musa Ashari (602–665), a companion of the Prophet during the early Muslim conquest of Persia. But the first permanent settlement of Arab settlers in Qum occurred during the revolts of Mukhtar Thaqafi (622–687) against the Umayyad, which called for the establishment of an ‘Alid caliphate and retaliation for Imam Husayn’s killing. Further urban development followed when a group of Ashari Arabs, most importantly grandsons of Abu Musa, emigrated from Kufa to the region, possibly because of opposition to the Umayyad dynasty. These new residents made Shias the main religious force in the city and inspired hadith transmitters to move from Kufa to Qum. The death and burial of Lady Fatima Masuma, the sister of

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the eighth Imam Ali Rida, in 816–817 shaped the later history of Qum. She died while following her brother to Khurasan. The place of her entombment developed into a shrine from 869, gradually transforming into the current magnificent and economically important sanctuary.59 Qum played a large role in laying the foundation for the theology and jurisprudence of Shia through developing hadith literature. For example, Ibn Babawayh, known as al-Shaykh al-Saduq (923–991), wrote Man la yahzuruhu al-faqih (translated as For He Who is Not in the Presence of a Jurist), one of the Four Books of Shia in Qum.60 Shaykh Kulayni (864–941) authored another of these collections attributed to the Qum school. At the beginning of Shia scholarship, Qum was in opposition to Baghdad and Najaf. The former was literalist, and the latter two were rationalist Shia. One can see elements of this amalgamation of honoring ancient history and rebellion as well as fundamental Shia in modern Qum, too. As we discussed earlier, the modern hawza was formed by Shaykh Abulkarim Haeri Yazdi, who arrived in Qum in 1920 from Arak, where he lived and taught for eight years, having previously lived in Iraq. Though he showed concern for the fate of the Islamic faith in his homeland of Iran, Fischer argues that he was part of the exodus back to Iran by Shia leaders who were concerned that the uncertain transition between Ottoman and British rule in Iraq might jeopardize their position in the atabat (shrine towns of Iraq).61 The last name “Haeri” was taken because of his eight years living and teaching in Karbala. The special area around the grave of Imam Husayn is called al-Hair al-Husayni (“a place of safety” or “the orchard”) and is highly respected among Shias. A large number of his best students and other Ulama joined Haeri, including those who were to succeed him after his death in 1935 like Sayed Muhammad Hojjat Kuhkamari, Sayed Ruhollah Khomeini (prior to achieving the title of ayatollah), Sayed Muhammad Reza Gulpayegani, Sayed Ahmad Khunsari, Sayed Shahabuddin Mar’ashi Najafi, Sayed Muhammad Kazim Shari’atmadari, and Sayed Sadruddin Sadr.62 Haeri was not interested in taking the position of Marja’iyyat; he found teaching, managing, and development more appealing. Haeri introduced order into the curriculum of the madrasas, instituted annual examinations, fixed the monthly stipend for the tullab and was personally involved in their welfare,63 and proposed the teaching of European languages and modern sciences.64 The presence of Ulama and an increase in the number of madrasas vaulted Qum from the margins to the center, bringing it to the street and the masses. There are examples: a campaign to keep men from cutting their beards, a call for ousting the dictator Reza Shah in 1925, the clash over the veiling of royal women in the shrine, the burning of the wine shops, the opposition to modern schools, and opposition to women’s suffrage. Seminarians also spoke against the Iranian communist Tudeh party and opposed the

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introduction of cinema and television. But Ulama’s leadership also led to the construction of hospitals, welfare systems, libraries, and floodwalls. So, there was a mixture of innovation and destructive reaction. After Haeri’s death, for eight years multiple mujtahids led Qum Hawza. Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi (1875–1961), another student of Akhund Khurasani, rose to be an unparalleled mujtahid in Qum and started redeveloping the hawza starting in 1945. The next year, his peer in Najaf, Sayed AbulHasan Isfahani (1861–1946) died, and Borujerdi became the sole marja in Iran.65 Though very powerful and unique, most maraji’ in Iran were not able to lead masses in Arabic-speaking countries, including Iraq, as Tabarra’iyan illustrates. On the contrary, maraji’ who settled in Iraq, regardless of the city, had a greater impact on socio-political currents in Iran.66 However, the death of Borujerdi split the masses in Iran and caused many Ulama to consider the nature of universal marja and the possibility of its continuity. Dozens of key maraji’ in Iran emerged, including the following: Khomeini, Gulpayegani, Shari’atmadari, Mar’ashi Najafi, and Muhammad Ali Araki in Qum; Sayed Ahmad Khunsari in Tehran; Milani and Sayed Hassan Qumi in Mashhad; Shaykh Baha al-Din Muhallati in Shiraz; Hajj Rahim Arbab in Isfahan; and Abd al-Hadi Shirazi, Sayed Mahmud Shahrudi, and Sayed Abu al-Qasim Khoei in Najaf.67 This multiplicity of maraji’ made Qum Hawza more diverse. While each marja had his own madrasas which shared the core curriculum of hawza, they varied in their traditionalism, specialization, and propagation.68 Najaf and Qum Hawzas, like all traditions of knowledge and teaching, evolved throughout history. Naini and Khoei are seen as the major symbols of Najaf Hawza in recent times. The former was very involved in political thought while the latter avoided it. Haeri and Borujerdi, representatives of Qum Hawza, were both quietists,69 although Khomeini would later politicize it. Yet, there are some general points that distinguish Najaf from Qum. According to Sayed Jafar Murtaza Amili, Qum and Najaf reflected two distinct concerns. Najaf saw itself as the heir to old traditions with a responsibility to preserve its historical nature. Thus, it concentrated on jurisprudence and its principles. Qum, in contrast, acknowledging its revitalization, attempted to redefine itself in response to modern developments in knowledge and society. It welcomed nontraditional fields of study in hawza and contributed greatly to philosophy, Sufism, new theology, and new methods of research in legal study.70 Najaf Hawza, Ayatollah Muhammad Sanad Bahrani argues, did not want philosophy at the center of its teachings. It would have meant turning Imam Sadiq’s center into a Platonic and Aristotelian academy and Lyceum. Najaf’s administrators didn’t want to replace organic production with an industrialized version, in his metaphor.71 This puritanical and primordial orientation in Najaf looked down on Qum, believing Qumi seminarians read newspapers instead of core texts72 and even wished to denigrate the scholarly

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reputation of their perceived rivals in Najaf.73 It is said when Imam Musa al-Sadr went from Qum to Najaf and studied before Hakim and Khoei, these teachers acknowledged that few knowledgeable and talented seminarians existed in Qum. Khoei lamented that some of his students returned to Qum, thus missing the opportunity to actualize their jurisprudential talents accordingly in Najaf.74 More than political and traditional differences, there are some jurisprudential dissimilarities between Najaf and Qum. Najaf was inclined to concentrate on texts and transmitting narrators. There was an emphasis on axioms and principles and an inclination to reject accepted ideas (shuhrat) if they did not comport with these textual standards and axioms. These studies didn’t require uncovering every trivial truth as long as the procedures and practices undertaken were religiously satisfactory and illuminated universal truths. The only certainty that was required was a certainty of proper jurisprudential procedure. In contrast, Qumi jurisprudence gave serious consideration to the historical and social context of a text. It was believed that in order to understand hadith, one must look to the Quran and even Sunni texts for guidance. Reasonable possibility replaces certainty. Wide acceptance (shuhrat) strengthens the weakness inherent in transmission, and repeated narrations and detailed stories can help the jurist to deduce a new axiom. Finally, in this view a jurist must seek ultimate truths.75 Nowbahar argues that some mujtahids like Grand Ayatollah Mosavi Ardabili later promoted an approach to unite the conflicting directions of Najaf and Qum, a perspective he called “humanistic.”76 Notwithstanding the differing jurisprudential inclinations and other abovementioned distinctions between these two grand hawzas, overall, the structure and organization in Najaf and Qum remained the same—not only by virtue of maintaining the same curriculum, teaching styles, and mission, but also because of movement of Ulama between both schools until the Iranian Revolution. Some madrasas in Qum, such as Haqqani, were founded with the aim to modernize hawza, with similar initiatives in Najaf, where in 1930 Muhammad Rida Muzaffar opened his new school. The Haqqani madrasa failed to modernize hawza, and Muzaffar’s madrasa closed within a few years as well. However, Madrasat al-Najaf, founded in 1957 by Izz al-Din al-Jazaeri, and the Madrasat al-Ulum al-Islamiyyah, founded by Ayatollah Hakim in 1963, were built with reformist tendencies like Gulpayegani’s madrasas, Dar-al-Tabligh, and Amin al-Muminin in Qum, to serve needs not being met by the traditional system. Some added new subjects like economics77 and philosophy based on texts written by Baqir al-Sadr in Najaf or Allama Tabataba’i in Qum. Always the voice of reform in different hawzas arose but was rarely welcomed. Sayed Muhsin Amin called in his 1929 work Kashkul for a rationalization of the teaching in the al-atabat al-muqaddasa (the sacred thresholds, referring to the holy cities of Iraq, particularly Najaf and Karbala)

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without success. Previously, Muhsin Sharara’s calls for reform in Najaf had led to his excommunication by some mujtahids.78 Thus, Baqir al-Sadr sought to establish a Western-style university with regular exams and new textbooks. Due to opposition in Najaf, in 1964 al-Sadr helped establish the Usul al-din College in Baghdad and created its curriculum. The Iranian Revolution elevated the ayatollahs to power and gave them an exceptional chance to do with hawza as they wished. After 1979, hawzas in Qum and Mashhad experienced changes to their structures and culture to meet new needs. Regarding structure, hawzas’ dependence on dynamic relations among multiple maraji’ changed to a fixed structure consistent with the new government. The first step was taken by Ayatollah Khomeini, who supported Shora-e Modirriyat-e Hawza-e Ilmiyahe Qum (the Managing Council for Qum Hazwa Ilmiyyah), consisting of nine members: three of Khomeini’s representatives, three of Gulpayegani’s, and three representatives of the hawza’s instructors. They were required to offer a fresh educational system responding to modern needs. The council produced a new curriculum, adding additional subjects to the traditional jurisprudential topics. It regulated admission, gathered all preliminary seminarians in madrasas, administered organized exams, monitored moral behavior, created educational files for each seminarian, managed dormitories, and expanded connections to other cities. In the decade that followed, the new supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei took another step by initiating Shora-ae ali hawzaha-e ilmiya (the Supreme Council for Hawzas) to spearhead major plans and make policy in hawza with regard to educational, ethical, social, and financial needs, as well as propagating the faith.79 All members of the Council are Iranian citizens. The members are nominated by Jame’eh modarresin-e hawza-e ilmiya-e Qum (Qum Seminary Scholar’s Community) and are confirmed by the supreme leader and a marja who believes in the theory of jurist guardianship.80 The educational programs must support the current regime. In terms of hawza culture, first of all, new madrasas in Qum and Mashhad included modern social sciences and humanities in their curricula. Second, more female students have been admitted, albeit in segregated classes. Third, foreign seminarians were separated from Iranian students. The Markaz-e Jahani Ulum-e Islami (The World Center for Islamic Sciences) was established to lead non-Iranian seminarians separately in all relevant affairs.81 It was later renamed Al-Mustafa International University.82 The belief was that non-Iranian seminarians needed special education to fit their regional needs and to find jobs in their target countries upon graduation. For non-Iranians, this creates a perception that they can’t continue their education to the point of becoming a marja, which requires decades of study, because they are limited by the system imposed on them. Qum and Mashhad hawzas limited registration to students with Iranian citizenship who believe and practice in

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accordance with the theory of the jurist guardianship.83 These restrictions do not appear to extend to students of Al-Mustafa International University.84 Fourth, Iranian seminarians receive accreditation for their religious study. Seminarians who finish Rasa’il and Makasib with added secondary and proper texts (sath-e 2) will be accredited the same as earning a Bachelor of Arts degree. Those who finish Kifaya with added secondary and proper texts (sath-e 3) will be awarded the equivalent of a Master’s degree, and five years of dars-e kharij (sath-e 4) will result in a PhD. Fifth, computers have been introduced in the hawza religious centers, with countless religious texts and references digitized for easy reference. These reforms and adjustments changed the character of Qum and Mashhad politically and oriented them toward modern concerns, but they did not succeed in solving the critical problems faced by both institutions. Although free and unbiased surveys of hawzas face many obstacles, there is research showing that both Qum and Mashhad suffer from an economic, cultural, and educational crisis. A survey published in 2006 based on interviews with 301 advanced seminarians—146 from Qum and 155 from Mashhad—paints a concerning picture. Economic problems were identified as the most serious, which illustrates, in order of importance, a lack of supervision of finances, a poor job market, and unjust distribution of facilities. The second problem, in the view of these seminarians, is cultural, with a focus on hierarchy and excessive love of prestige. The third problem is educational: students’ time is wasted; graduates are not prepared to meet the needs of the people; abstract ideas receive too much attention; order and organization in dars-e kharij are insufficient; and research, innovation, and critical thought are all lacking. Textbooks are old-fashioned, time-consuming, and fail to prepare seminarians for jobs after graduation.85 The survey recommends reducing hawzas’ dependence on religious taxes, which have the effect of popularizing religious teachings, pulling them away from dynamism and development and toward superficiality. The current culture of hawza encourages a polemical spirit, attempts to justify or cover up mistakes, increases hierarchy and bigotry, and looks askance at less religious but more educated people. Hawza fell into a conservative bureaucratic culture which cares more about institutional concerns than it does about the faith. Therefore, the Qum reform was based more on ideology than on equipping hawza to meet the needs of the faithful in the contemporary era. Abd al-Wahab Furati, an expert in hawza study, describes a tension within Qum Hawza between the dominant national political leadership and maraji’ who have their own concerns but face limits on what they can express, while also not fully cooperating with the government’s wishes. The current Qum Hawza suffers from a lack of leadership.86 Many of the educational criticisms highlighted in the survey above echo what Sayed Baqir Sadr87 and Muhsin Sharara88 said about Najaf.89

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I would like to conclude this section with a very short review of some other major hawzas. Mashhad, or Khurasan, Hawza neighbors the Shrine of Imam Rida, the eighth Imam. In recent times, Mashhad Hawza is known for two characteristics: its strong Arabic literature component, thanks to known figures like Abd al-Jawad Abid Nishburi (d. 1926), and maktab tafkik (separation school), which separates Shia teaching from philosophical and Sufi schools of thought (I will discuss this school further in chapter 8, “Philosophy and Wisdom”). Karbala Hawza adjoins the shrine of Imam Husayn, the third Imam. It possesses three aspects worthy of note. Wahid Bihbahani (1706–1791), the founder of Usuli school, defeated the Akhbarite school and declared all who disagreed with the principles of reasoning and ijtihad an apostate, thus shaping a new concept of marja al-taqlid. The next important marja at Karbala was the Second Mirza, or the Mirza Kuchak (the “junior” Mirza, 1840–1920), who led the Iraqi revolt of 1920 against the British.90 And Haeri remained in Karbala during years of political turmoil in Najaf due to Akhund Khurasani’s involvement in the movement for constitutionalism.91 Samarra Hawza, near the shrine of Imam Hassan al-Askari, the eleventh Imam, lies 125 km north of Baghdad. Samarra was founded by the Abbasid caliph al-Mutasim for his professional Turkish army. Mirza Shirazi created this city’s hawza, which has a majority Sunni population. Sayed Muhsin Amin argues that Mirza moved to Samarra because he had grown weary of the very conservative atmosphere in Najaf, where any attempts at reform were banned.92 But his great-grandson Ayatollah Sayed Razi Shirazi believed ecumenism to be the most likely reason for Mirza’s move. Darabi, reviewing all theories about this move, concludes that Mirza’s aim of ecumenism between Sunni and Shia is the strongest.93 He also argues this motive shaped the distinct spirit of Samarra Hawza and its subsequent impact on Shia scholarship. Some of the highlights of Darabi’s findings are as follows. Because the majority of Samarra’s population was Sunni, intra-faith tension was a concern. In fact, Mirza’s son was killed in an interpersonal fight. Mirza’s position at hawza could have inflamed tensions further, but Mirza did not allow it. He even helped Sunnis create their own madrasa when they wished to compete with Shia. Moreover, Mirza did not want to remain in the circle of elites in Najaf. He wanted to get out and meet different elites, as well as the general public. Mirza loved sociability and involving himself in secular affairs. He often encouraged his tullab to study Imam Ali’s Nahj al-balgha and refused to offer permission for ijtihad to those who were not sociable.94 This context affected Mirza’s jurisprudential style and, concomitantly, the culture of Samarra Hawza. In his approach, custom (urf) played a bigger role than in Najaf, and the texts (nusus) come before the axioms. In contrast to the complex writing style of Najaf, he established a simple writing

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style in Samarra. A major effect of ecumenism was that the new tradition of encyclopedism appeared in Samarra in order to illustrate Shia’s long history of religious, cultural, and scientific contributions to Islam. Mirza loved poetry, penned poems, and held poetry festivals where he would award the best poems regardless of their authors’ denomination.95 His teaching style was such that he welcomed the views of other students before answering a question. His method was to promote dialogue, mutual understanding, and to engage with opposing views and criticism.96 Samarra Hawza did not limit seminarian study to jurisprudence and its principles but included tafsir (the Quranic exegeses), hadith, history, and the rational sciences. This also inspired the concept of political jurisprudence. Many graduates from this hawza contributed to ecumenism (Mulla Abdullah Mazendarani, Sayed Muhsin Amin, Abd al-Husayn Lari, and Sayed Hibatullah Shahrestani), the political theory of jurisprudence (Akhund Khurasani, Naini, and Sayed Kazim Yazdi), and Shia encyclopedism (Aqa Bozorg-e Tihrani, Sayed Hassan Sadr, Kashif al-Ghita, Sayed Muhsin Amin, Mir Hamid Husayn Hindi, and Shaykh Zabih Allah Askari, who wrote six volumes on female Shia scholars).97 To conclude, hawza’s nature springs from the confluence of three games: the game of knowledge, the game of faith, and the game of harmonizing the two in accordance with the masses. It creates a dynamic spectrum ranging from very liberal to very conservative, from purely spiritual to pragmatic secular concerns, and from elitism to populism. Ever dynamic, madrasas and hawzas are more than the sum of their educational components; they embody all aspects of the society in which they are situated and are constantly engaged in conversation with faith, history, culture, and the past, while laying the groundwork for the future—not just of their graduating classes, but also of the broader faith community and even beyond.98 The dynamism that exists across hawzas points to their diversity and fluidity rather than tidy, concise conclusions about each or all of them. No comprehensive list exists to cover all critical elements of a hawza. One alim suggested three reasons why it’s not possible to make such a list. First, the process of scholarship and the holiness associated with it offer a kind of self-confidence for a mujtahid to follow his own path and invite others to believe in him. In other words, every single individual in hawza can represent a trend! Second, there is freedom for a talaba to try different teachers and change his mind whenever he wants. Again, there is the personal connection and holiness associated with each teacher. These features give each seminarian a fluid identity, a mixture of all his teachers while being an exact copy of none. He can adopt the politics of one mujtahid, an idea in terms of Sufism like an opposing one, and the jurisprudential inclination of a third. This is true about a madrasa as well. And finally, the elements of maslaha (public interest), custom (urf), and politeness (adab and ta’aruf) can lead a seminarian to ignore his own

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preference or thought, and in practice function with a view toward playing a harmonizing rather than polarizing role.99 All of these complexities play a role in forming an ayatollah.

NOTES 1. They were Uthman b. Sa’id al-Amri or al-Umayrï (d. 874–875); Muhammad b. Uthman b. Sa’id al-’Amri, son of the preceding (d. 916–917); al-Husayn b. Ruh al-Nawbakhti (d. 938); and Ali b. Muhammad al-Samari (d. 940). 2. To learn more details about the doctrine of Occultation and its consequences, and signs of the return of the Imam Mahdi, see, An Introduction to Shi’i Islam, by Moojan Momen (Yale University Press, 1985), pp. 161-171; Shi’ite Islam, by Allamah Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabataba’i, trans. and ed. by Seyyed Hossein Nasr (State University of New York Press, 1977), pp. 210-214. 3. A type of elementary school primarily used for teaching children in reading, writing, grammar, and Islamic studies. When I was a little boy, I attended maktab to learn, memorize, and recite the Quran. My own teacher was an elderly woman. Maktab could be nothing more than a room adjacent to a teacher’s house or a separate building. A group of students sit on the floor in front of the teacher/Shaykh and learn. Each maktab owed its prestige, educational level, structure, and style to the principal instructor. 4. Murtaza Danishyar, “Istilah-e hawza ilmiya: tarikhche paida’i va tahawwulati-e ma’na’i,” in Pazuhishname Tarikh Tamaddun-e Islami (Tehran University, 1391/2012), Vol. 45, No. 1, p. 87. 5. Sindawi, 834. 6. Khalid Sindawi, “Hawza Instruction and Its Role in Shaping Modern Shi’ite Identity: The Hawzas of al-Najaf and Qumm as a Case Study,” in Middle Eastern Studies (Taylor & Francis, 2007), Vol. 43, No. 6, p. 834. 7. Danishyar, 84. 8. Ibid, 81-93. 9. See Shafaqna’s (Shi’a News Association) website at https://fa​.shafaqna​.com​ /news​/752878/‫ا‬-‫نجف‬-‫به‬-‫قم‬-‫علمیه‬-‫حوزه‬-‫طالب‬-‫انتقال‬-‫شرایط‬/ (Accessed on September, 30, 2022). 10. Jewish yeshiva students engage in a similar exercise (see Michael Fischer, Iran From Religious Dispute to Revolution (Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 53). 11. To cast a quick glance at courses of study, see Fischer, pp. 247-248; Moojan Momen, An Introduction to Shi’i Islam (Yale University Press, 1985), pp. 200-202. 12. It consists of three series of lessons. The first series of lessons is translated into English: Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence: According to Shi’i Law, Arif adul Hussain (ed.) (London: Islamic College for Advanced Studies Press, 2003). 13. Sindawi, 846. 14. Fischer compared grand ayatollahs on how they encouraged more or less interruption by students in their lessons. Shari’atmadari tended not to interrupt the flow of

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his discourse. He listened to interjected questions from the audience but responded to them in his own time. On the other hand, Gulpayegani stopped and listened to each question and answered it as it came up. The style of give and take also depends upon the level of the class (Fischer, 63). 15. It is spelled in multiple ways, including Sayyid and Syed, and is an Arabic honorific denoting descendants of the Prophet Muhammad. According to the jurisprudence, this title can be traced back to the descendants of Hashim ibn Abd Manaf, the Prophet’s great-grandfather. Currently, Sayed Ulama wear a black turban while non-Sayed Ulama wear a white turban. 16. With regard to current Shia Ulama, each lay person must choose a ­jurisprudential authority (mujtahid) to emulate in terms of religious laws. The outstanding mujtahid is called marja (reference) or muqallad (one who is emulated) and the follower muqallid (one who emulates). See the following chapter for more on the fundamental concepts of ijtihad. 17. The only exception to this is Ayatollah Khamenei, the supreme leader of Iran. The amount he pays monthly to seminarians reflects his political position rather than the number of his followers. 18. See Sindawi. 19. Meir Litvak, “Shi’ite Seminaries in Iraq,” in Encyclopedia Iranica (available at https://www​.iranicaonline​.org​/articles​/iraq​-xi​-shiite​-seminaries) (accessed September 30, 2022). 20. Sindawi, 843. In Afghanistan a known Sayed alim, Allama Ismail Balkhi (1918–1968), switched between white and black turbans to show the color of the turban does not matter. 21. Sayed Muhammad Husayn Hussaini Tabataba’i et  al. Bahthi darbare Marjai’yat va Ruhaniyat (A discussion on marja’iyyah and clergies) (Tehran: Shirkat-e Sahami Intishar, 1341/1962) p. 154. 22. http://tarikhirani​.ir​/fa​/news​/498/‫نکردند‬-‫تن‬-‫بر‬-‫روحانیت‬-‫لباس‬-‫که‬-‫( مجتهدانی‬accessed September 30, 2022). 23. There is a pattern of Iranian seminarians who wore turban and cloak before the revolution but abandoned it later for administrative positions, https://www.asriran. com/fa/news/295949/‫پوشند‬-‫نمی‬-‫روحانیت‬-‫لباس‬-‫که‬-‫روحانیونی‬. 24. Murtaza Mutahhari, Majmo’e athar ustad shahid mutahhari. (Tehran: Sadra, 1374/1995), Vol. 24, p. 274. 25. Sindawi, (2007). 26. See Meir Litvak, “Shi’ite Seminaries in Iraq,” in Encyclopedia Iranica. 27. Fischer, 42. 28. Mutahhari, Vol. 24. p. 500. 29. See Meir Litvak, Shi’ite Seminaries in Iraq, in Encyclopedia Iranica. 30. In his seminal work Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution, Michael Fischer makes a detailed comparison of three examples of Jewish, Christian, and Islamic seminaries: the similar methods for shaping scriptural schools; the discontinuity between scriptural and modern schools, and particularly, the commonality between the madrasa and the Jewish yeshiva in terms of the social (i.e., legislative and judicial) role of scriptural schools; the pedagogical system (sequencing, methodology,

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55

and degrees); and the evolution of the form of schooling in both its rise and its decline (32–60). He also talks about a Jewish convert to Islam, Yaqub ibn Killis, who became vizier to the Fatimid caliph in the 970s and presided over the founding of al-Azhar. The Fatimid dynasty also provided financial support to the yeshivas for a brief period (Ibid, 48). To see comparative study between Jewish and Islamic traditions of religious studies see: Religious Knowledge, Authority, and Charisma:Islamic and Jewish Perspectives, Daphna Ephrat and Meir Hatina (eds.) (The University of Utah Press, 2014). 31. Ayatollah Khomeini had a habit of complaining that many opposing Ulama were too resistant to change in hawza. He claimed that hawza’s order comes from its lack of formal organization. Khomeini even included this complaint in his will. Earlier hawzas in Iraq even adopted the following slogan: “If science organizes itself, it disperses, and if science disperses, it organizes itself” (Iranica, and see, https:// rasanews.ir/fa/news/107188/‫است‬-‫نظمی‬-‫بی‬-‫در‬-‫حوزه‬-‫)نظم‬. 32. Litvak again highlights a similarity with the Jewish rabbinate. He adds that an even greater honorific is naming entire families after the founder’s book, such as the Kashif al-Ghita or Jawaheri clans in Iraq. 33. Rainer Brunner, “Hierarchy in the Imamiyya,” in Encyclopedia Iranica (­available at https://www​.iranicaonline​.org​/articles​/shiite​-doctrine​-ii​-hierarchy​ -emamiya) (accessed September 30, 2022). 34. Since there is not a formal organization or hierarchy among the Ulama, one could describe it as a hierarchy of deference. Moojan Momen, An Introduction to Shi’i Islam (Yale University Press, 1985), p. 204. 35. For more on the emergence and evolution of this position, see The Ashraf and Naqib al-Ashraf: The Prophet’s Descendants and their Chief in Egyptian Society Under Ottoman Rule, 1517-1798, by Michael Winter (Routledge, 1992) and Sayyids and Sharifs in Muslim Societies: The Living Links to the Prophet, edited by Kazuo Morimoto. New Horizons in Islamic Studies (London: Routledge, 2012). 36. Etan Kohlberg, A Medieval Muslim Scholar at Work: Ibn Tawus and His Library (Brill, 1992), p.11. 37. Sayyed Mohammad Hosein Manzoor al-Adjdad,” The Naqib of Ray Alids and His Support of Scientists,” in Iranian Studies, 41 (4), 2008. 38. Lambton, cited by Mohammad Fazlhashemi, “Imamiyya Shia (The Twelvers),” in Handbook of Islamic Sects, Muhammad Afzal Upal and Carolee M. Cusack ed. (Leiden: Brill, 2021) p. 196; also see Michael M. J. Fischer, Iran From Religious Dispute to Revolution (Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 29. 39. Also see Brunner, “Hierarchy in the Imamiyya,” in Encyclopedia Iranica. For more detail, see Said Amir Arjomand, “The Mujtahid of the Age and the Mulla-bashi: An Intermediate State in the Institutionalization of Religious Authority in Shi’ite Iran,” in Authority and Political Culture in Shi’ism (State University of New York Press, 1988), pp. 80-97. 40. The most common current term in Persian is ruhaniyat (lit. spiritual), denoting the class of seminarians. 41. The preacher mostly stands upon a wooden stair called a minbar and preaches to the masses. What Fischer related about maraji’ who do not ascend the minbar and

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preach to the masses (Fischer 100) remains true. Maraji’ often share their ethical and religious instructions and opinions with their students in classes or through written texts. The previous three decades have seen the rise of a new group called maddah, whose members sing and recite with great emotion about Ashura and the progeny of the Prophet. Because of their emotional encouragement, they are welcomed by the masses. The Iranian government also supports them because of their ideological agenda. Recently, Grand Ayatollah Jawadi Amili warned that maddahs are replacing Ulama in preaching and are going to ruin the true nature of Islam. He encouraged upper-level Ulama to take part in preaching, reciting stories of Ashura, and delivering talks to the masses. 42. Brunner, “Hierarchy in the Imamiyya,” in Encyclopedia Iranica. 43. See Tabarra’iyan, Nihad Marjaiyyat-e Shia, pp. 84 and 86. 44. As Sindawi mentions, some of these titles and ranks are not exclusively Shia in character but are used by Sunnis as well, especially among followers of the Shafii and Hanafi schools of jurisprudence. In addition, the title of Hujjat al-Islam is generally given to Abu Hamid Ghazzali (d. 1111) and that of shaykh al-Islam to Ibn Taymiyya. Yet the modern usage does not always correspond to its traditional connotations. For example, the title of hujjat-al-Islam became customary among Shia as late as in the nineteenth century, when Muhammad-Baqir Shafti (d. 1844) became one of the earliest and most prominent men on whom this honorific was bestowed. But in the twentieth century, this expression of deep reverence had been lowered to serve as the formal title of a middle-ranking scholar (Brunner, Iranica). In general, Sunni madrasas have fewer scholarly titles and ranks. To learn more about Muhammad Baqir Shafti’s life and legal verdicts, see the earliest document Qisas al-Ulama by his contemporary scholar Mirza Muhammad Tunnikabuni in 1973–1947; Authority and Political Culture in Shi’ism, Said Amir Arjomand (ed.) (State University of New York, 1988), pp. 309-318. 45. Many Ulama reacted to this sudden offer of the title. A very famous but belated response came from Grand Ayatollah Vahid Khurasani, who is believed to be the most knowledgeable living ayatollah in Qum on the Principles of Jurisprudence. Complaining about sudden changes of title in hawza, he compared it unfavorably to jumping for fun or sport, not a scholarly reality. 46. In addition to mosques, Shias build houses of worship dedicated to Imam Husayn called Husayniyyah. In the same way, they might build religious places attributed to other holy figures such as Fatimiyyah and Zainabiyyah, respectively, in honor of Lady Fatima and Lady Zainab. 47. Sindawi, p. 845. 48. See Mubahithat (Qum: 1396/2017), Vol. 17, p. 90. 49. Shubairi Zanjani, Jor’a-e az darya, Vol. 2, p. 671. 50. Shubairi Zanjani, Jor’a-e az darya, Vol. 4, p. 485. 51. Aqa (or Aga) is a Mongolian title, essentially meaning “elder brother” and by extension “senior member of the family” (D. O. Morgan, Encyclopedia Iranica). In hawza, when it is used by itself without any name after it, it refers to the head of hawza or madrasa or an instructor. It’s an honorific equivalent to master or lord, but it is also common in public use as “sir.”

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52. Ibid, Vol. 2, p. 655. To learn more about Murtaza Mutahhari’s life and thought, see The Political Thought of Ayatullah Murtaza Mutahhari: An Iranian Theoretician of the Islamic State, by Mahmood T. Davari (Routledge, 2005). 53. Brunner, “Hierarchy in the Imamiyya,” in Encyclopedia Iranica. 54. See Khalid Sindawi, “Hawza Instruction and Its Role in Shaping Modern Shi’ite Identity: The Hawzas of al-Najaf and Qumm as a Case Study,” in Middle Eastern Studies (Taylor & Francis, 2007), Vol. 43, No. 6 and Litvak (“Shi’ite Seminaries in Iraq,” Iranica). 55. It is said the Samarra hawza had 100 mujtahids before the Ba’ath Party takeover of Iraq in 1968 (The Shi’a of Samarra: The Heritage and Politics of a Community in Iraq, edited by Imranali Panjwani (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012), p. 122. 56. Najaf, the Gate of Wisdom (Paris: UNESCO, 2014). 57. See Mosavi Isfihani: “I sharply disagree over the change of the texts” (Shafaqna, Shi’a News Association) (Available at https://fa​.shafaqna​.com​/news​ /1277956/‫کتب‬-‫تعویض‬-‫جدی‬-‫مخالفین‬-‫از‬-‫حوزه‬-‫درسی‬-‫کتب‬/). 58. Andreas Drechsler, “Qum: History to the Safavid Period,” in Encyclopedia Iranica (Available at https://www​.iranicaonline​.org​/articles​/qom​-i​-history​-safavid​ -period). 59. Ibid. 60. The Four Books (al-kutub al-Arba’ah) refers to the four best-known hadith collections in Shia. They are Kitab al-Kafi by Kulayni, Man la yahduruhu al-faqih by Ibn Babawayh, al-Shaykh al-Saduq, and Tahdhib al-al-ahkam and al-Istibsar by Shaykh Tusi. 61. Fischer, Iran From Religious Dispute to Revolution, p. 109. 62. Sayed Sadruddin Sadr (d. 1954, father of Imam Musa al-Sadr), Sayed Muhammad Hojjat Kuhkamari (1892–1952), and Sayed Muhammad Taqi Khunsari (1850– 1952) headed Qum Hawza after the death of Haeri until Borujerdi moved there. These three were called maraji’-e thalath (Three Authorities) because of their cooperation. This term maraji’-e thalath was applied previously to three grand ayatollahs including Akhund Khurasani in Najaf, who supported Iranian constitutionalism. 63. Haeri was accustomed to saying that being a better human is greater than being merely a religious scholar. His exact statement was, “to become a mullah (religious scholar) is difficult; to become a human being (adam) is impossible” (Algar, Iranica, 39). 64. Hamid Algar, Haeri, “Abd-al-karimm Yazdi,” in Encyclopedia Iranica (available at https://www​.iranicaonline​.org​/articles​/haeri) (accessed September 30, 2022). 65. Many Iranians would like to claim Borujerdi became the sole marja in the whole Shia world, but the evidence does not support it. He was not successful in attracting, for example, Iraqi muqallids. Even some Iranian Turks did not follow him. To reform the hawza, Borujerdi required seminarians to take an exam, but seminarians in Najaf protested and a grand ayatollah banned the exam. Borujerdi subsequently conceded defeat on this point (Tabarra’iyan, 37–38). 66. Safa-al-din Tabarra’iyan, Nihad-e marja’iyyat-e Shia (Aban 1325—Khurdad 1349), in Tarikh-e Ma’asir-e Iran (Tehran: Muassis-e mutali’at-e tarikh-e ma’asir-e Iran, 1387/2008), Vol. 12, No. 45, p. 37; also see The Shi’a of Samarra: The Heritage

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and Politics of a Community in Iraq, Imranali Panjwani ed., (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012). 67. Tabarra’iyan, p. 39; Fischer, p. 88. 68. See Fischer, pp. 76-86. 69. Ayatollah Zanjani Shubairi says Haeri moved from Iran to Najaf to avoid the controversy over constitutionalism. When he found the same atmosphere in Najaf, he moved to Karbala (al-Kalam, 1:104). 70. Sayed Jafar Murtaza Amuli, “The Qum hawza can play a major role to revive the old hawza of Najaf,” in Mubahithat (Qum, 1395/2016), No. 5, p. 4. 71. Sayed Muhammad Sanad Bahrani, “Radical approach has no place in the Najaf hawza,” in Mubahithat (Qum, 1396/2017), No. 14, pp. 21-30. 72. Abul Qasim Alidust, “The Jurisprudential methodology of the schools of Najaf and Qum,” in Mubahithat (Qum, 1396/2017), Vol. 17, p. 33. 73. Shubairi Zanjani, Jor’a-e az darya,Vol. 2, p. 680. 74. Shubairi Zanjani, Jor’a-e az darya,Vol. 3, pp. 733-4 and see the footnotes to the same pages. 75. Alidust, “The Jurisprudential methodology of the schools of Najaf and Qum,” pp. 28-31. 76. This humanistic approach preferred contextualism over literalism and ethics over jurisprudential formalism. It also took seriously the typology of religious orders, determining the true field of religious teachings, objectives of Shari’a, distancing initiative commands from affirmative ones, and utilitarianism (Rahim Nawbahar, Ijtihad-e Kiramat-madar, fiqh va tadbir, 523-546). 77. To review excerpt from Sadr’s book in English, see: Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Hamid Dadashi, and Seyyed Vali Nasr (eds.), Expectation of the Millennium: Shi’ism in History (State University of New York Press, 1989), pp. 117-125. 78. Sharara listed the following as the weaknesses of the Najaf educational system: no clear standards to qualify a talaba to enroll in a course, unqualified instructors, improper categories of study, focusing on abstract and imaginary ideas instead of addressing pragmatic issues, ignoring hadiths and rijal sciences, and insufficient attention paid to Arabic literature. He concluded that the prime reason for all these problems is that Ulama were too focused on enrolling more tullab in their courses for the prestige support it brought them (The Shi’a of Samarra: The Heritage and Politics of a Community in Iraq, edited by Imranali Panjwani (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012), p. 134. 79. Its bylaws are available at (http://www​.schowzeh​.ir​/fa​/law​/22). 80. Only seminarians who believe in the theory of jurist guardianship and support the current government can become members of this community. 81. See https://rc​.majlis​.ir​/fa​/law​/show​/100568 (Accessed August 2022). 82. Al-Mustafa’s website: http://en​.miu​.ac​.ir 83. See their websites: https://paziresh​.ismc​.ir​/uploads​/daftarche​_1402​-1401​_eslhi​ .pdf; https://www​.hozehkh​.com​/OneEntry​?id​=42335. 84. See http://miu​.ac​.ir​/index​.aspx​?pageid​=184 (accessed September 2022). 85. Ali Rabbani Khurasgani, “Barrasi-e Mushkilat-e Sazman-e Ruhaniyyat-e Iran ba bekargiri-e ravesh-e tahqiq amali mushrekati dar hawzaha-eilmiya-e Mashhad va

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Qum,” in Majale-ye Pazuheshi-e Danshgah-e Isfahan (ulum-e insani) (Isfahan: Isfahan University, 1384/2005), Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 119-154. 86. Abdul Wahab Furati, “Niza’e muzzir miyan-e du-qutbi-e Hashemi-Misbah dar hawza-e inqilabi,” in Mubahithat (Qum, 1395/2017), No. 10, p. 13. 87. Sayed Muhhamd Baqir al-Sadr, Durus fi ilm al-usul (Qum: Dar al-Sadr: 1436/2014), Vol. 1, pp. 17-30. 88. The Shi’a of Samarra: The Heritage and Politics of a Community in Iraq, Imranali Panjwani ed. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012), p. 134. 89. To learn more about Sadr’s reformist agenda and its implications, see Chibli Mallat, The Renewal of Islamic Law Muhammad Baqer as-Sadr, Najaf and the Shi’i International (Cambridge University Press, 1933); “A Short Biography of Martyr Ayatullah Sadr,” in Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence: According to Shi’i Law, Arif Hussain (ed.) (London: Islamic College for Advanced Studies Press, 2003), pp. 11-25. 90. The first is Mirza Shirazi (1815–1895), who is known for the Tobacco Protest in the Qajar era. 91. Shubairi Zanjani, al-Kalam yajurro al-kalam (Qum: Haqbin, 1396/2017), Vol. 1, p. 104. 92. Ayatollah Zanjani also mentions that Mirza moved from Najaf to Samarra to avoid conflict with another grand ayatollah, Sayed Husayn Kuhkamara’i (d. 1882), in the town (Jora, 2:364-5). 93. About other theories, see The Shi’a of Samarra: The Heritage and Politics of a Community in Iraq, p. 129. 94. Nahj al-balgha (The Peak of Eloquence) is a collection of Imam Ali’s talks, letters, and aphorisms. It was compiled with the aim of ecumenism between Sunni and Shia. Traditionally, it is not included with textbooks used by seminarians studying in hawza because it does not include many jurisprudential ideas. Ulama who were accustomed to studying Nahj al-Balaghah were more open to ecumenism (see also chapter 6 on Sect-centrism and Ecumenism in this book). 95. The more conservative mujtahids dislike poetry and consider it something religiously unpleasant (makruh). 96. Ayatollah Zanjani calls Mirza’s and Samarra’s style as tashkiki, meaning it compromised by including various perspectives—the opposite of Haeri’s and Qum’s style, which was very concise and clear (Jora, 3:413). 97. ‌Behnam Darabi, “Proximity Seminary of Samera and the Role of Mirzaye Shirazi,” in Mutaleat-e Taghribi-e Mazaheb-e Eslami (Tehran: University of Islamic Denominations), Vol. 8, Issues 31, pp. 39-49. 98. See Fischer, 8. 99. Furati, Mubahithat, No. 10, pp. 11-12.

Chapter 3

Ayatollah and Mujtahid

In current Shia, a layperson must emulate a marja al-taqlid (source of emulation who sets patterns for law) with regard to religious instructions. The target marja must be the most learned among living maraji’. Since the layperson is not in the position of being able to evaluate all living maraji’, some surveys are required. I remember my father’s story. On his way to Najaf, he was asked by his fellow countrymen to find out who was the most knowledgeable marja in Najaf. As he discovered, the conversation was between two figures: Khomeini (1902–1989) and Khoei (1899–1992). My father was told that the former was the more pious and the latter the most learned. Therefore, he decided to follow Aqa-ye Khoei, not Aqa-ye Khomeini1 (in those days the terms “ayatollah” and “grand ayatollah” were not very common, particularly among ordinary Shia outside of Iran). It was a complex and stimulating question for a teenager like myself to comprehend the greater weight placed on knowledge for a religious authority. The authority who must be emulated is called “mujtahid.” Its popular title is “ayatollah.” This chapter discusses the terminology of mujtahid and ayatollah, the establishment of ijtihad in Shia, the multiple levels of ijtihad, and some related concerns. TERMINOLOGY AND HISTORY In current usage, ayatollah and mujtahid refer to the same religious position in which an individual in hawza has arrived at a level of scholarship enabling him to deduce Islamic law from its main sources (the Quran, Sunnah, Reasoning, and Consensus) by applying skills mastered through the principles of jurisprudence. The two terms confer the same status but highlight distinct aspects. Surveying their literal meaning reveals this double implication. The 60

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root of the Arabic word ijtihad is j-h-d, which means exertion and effort. The term jihad (an Islamic term referring to a great effort in the path of God) emerging from this root means literally attempting and struggling. The effort for self-realization and self-improvement is called Jihad al-nafs. The individual involved with jihad (in self-improvement or in external struggle) is called mujahid. The intellectual effort is called ijtihad. Ijtihad (independent reasoning) echoes a profound process of effort in order to deduce Islamic laws. So, a mujtahid reaches a high level of expertise in this profession through mastering jurisprudence and the principles of jurisprudence. There are plenty of Quranic verses (9:122; 16:43; 39:17–18; 2:168–70; 4:83) that are used by contemporary Muslim scholars to infer that acquiring ijtihad is an Islamic obligation and that laypeople must follow a mujtahid. Given the expectations from a comprehensive Shari’a, from a pro-ijtihad perspective, the explicit statements (nass) in the Quran and Sunnah require extrapolation by a legal expert in order to meet the almost infinite possibilities that arise in the course of an individual’s life and in the context of a global community. Also, performing complex hermeneutic procedures is needed when the texts are silent, contradictory, or ambiguous. Then by placing each fact and event in its position relative to Islamic law, ijtihad emerges. In other words, a believer has two options: to deduce law to fit new events and demands or to imitate one who does so. The first is mujtahid and the second is muqallid (imitator; following the other).2 Ijtihad, indeed, has three purposes: deducing a faithful, proper manner of conduct from the four above-mentioned sources; inferring new law in terms of new emerging issues (changing styles of life, building nation-states, and using new technology are a few examples of modern issues about which a mujtahid has to make decisions in accord with Islamic law); and deciding how already established laws in Islam may change. There are several Quranic verses enlightening how Islamic laws are shaped and can be changed. Verse 106 chapter 17 suggests how the Quran was revealed to the Prophet step by step. The same thing happened in terms of Islamic law. For instance, first the Quran contrasts “intoxicant” with “good provision” (16:67). Then it states the injuries of drinking are greater than the benefits (2:219). Next, it prohibits drinking when people go to prayer (4:43). Finally, it prohibits all drinking (5:90). Similarly, the punishment for adultery changed (see 4:15; 24:2). Also, with respect to personal consultations with the Prophet, verse 12 chapter 58 asks Muslims to pay charity in advance of their meeting, only to have the obligation lifted in the next verse (also c.f. chapter 8, verses 65–66 about how different situations can change the law). While these verses highlight the mutability of law during the Prophet’s time, there are several verses that illustrate how laws always change during hard times with regard to acts of worship, like postponing the fast or changes

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in ritual washing for prayer (tayammum). These modifications occur when the original rule cannot be performed due to challenging circumstances, because God intended to make it easy for His servants to obey the law rather than making it onerous (2:185; 5:6; 22:78). This Quranic emphasis inspired the legal maxim “hardship begets facility.”3 This refers to the impact of time and space on the religious obligations of the faithful. An example of the impact of place is the different forms of performing hajj for those who live around Mecca and for those who come from far away (2:196). Moreover, the Quran credits various options in several circumstances as equivalent acts of worship. For example, feeding or clothing the poor can count as fasting in some cases (5:89). In addition, the Quran addresses how the will of the people can shift several religious obligations and commands; for example, we can make a halal thing (allowed) a haram (illegal) one if we take an oath to avoid it. It was legal because of its nature and then became illegal because of our oath. Then if we pay expiation, it becomes halal again (66:1–2). The flexibility of commands also exhibits another aspect of approaching religious texts which requires scholarship in hermeneutics. An individual cannot deduce the law or issue a fatwa (religious verdict) based on a single hadith or even a Quranic verse without examining the internal and external context. The fluidity, flexibility, and multidimensionality of Islamic law recognize human subjectivity and respect human will as a constructive matter. This inspired scholars to promote ijtihad through methodical inquiry, acknowledging real life alongside texts. As we will discuss, the next significant development of ijtihad occurred during the last couple of centuries. A common belief exists that ijtihad developed later among Shia than among Sunni, because it was not required due to the presence of Imams. If Shia faithful had a question or faced ambiguity during the time of Imams, they went to the Imams and received the right answers. However, Modarressi Tabataba’i, the recognized expert in early Shia history and the evolution of jurisprudence, argues that one can trace the concept of ijtihad back to the time of the Infallible Imams, who persistently urged their intellectual followers to both pursue rational theology and exercise ijtihad. The Imams believed their own duties lay in explaining general rules and principles, leaving the Ulama to expand on them. In Modarressi’s account of the history of jurisprudence, there were Shia Ulama during the Imams’ time with the habit of exercising ijtihad (analytical and rational thought, i.e., deductive law in Modarressi’s words) even before the Imams and occasionally against them. Yet, they did not use the term ijtihad, because it echoed the dominant meaning of ijtihad in Islam at that time, namely among Sunni. In the Sunni context, ijtihad meant using analogical reasoning (qiyas) and forming a valid opinion (ra’y) of which the believer is not fully sure (qat’a), though it makes sense (zann).4 Centuries later, rationalist Shia used the term ijtihad with an

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emphasis on their own definition, which included deductive reasoning and rational assurance (qat’a). In moving from ra’y to certainty (yaqin or qat’a), Shia ijtihad became binding, which is not the case in Sunni. Shia laity must follow a mujtahid, but Sunni laity can switch among mujtahids.5 The current and more popular title for the same profession is ayatollah. The term ayatollah is a combination of ayat and Allah, meaning the “sign of God.” Thus, a mujtahid remarks on the human aspects of the profession and an ayatollah on its divine nature. Together they believe this profession can connect people to God, interpret divine word and will, and combine humanity with divinity—much like the nature of jurisprudence (fiqh) and even the nature of Islam, which combines the secular and the sacred. Jurisprudence, the specialized subject matter of ayatollahs and mujtahids, is divine law as long as a human effort can join God’s will and word to its human potential. For instance, there are verses in the Quran commanding people to pray, but it is the Muslim jurist (mujtahid) who deduces how the prayer must be performed at various places and times and in extenuating circumstances. There are several penal codes in Islamic law, but it is the jurist who decides how, when, where, and under which conditions they should be imposed. Because of its divine aspect, the term ayatollah enjoys popularity with the masses and is viewed with reverence. Religiously speaking, every single part of creation is a sign of God. People can see and read signs of God in themselves, too. The Quranic verse states, “We shall show them all signs on the horizons and within their souls until it is clear to them then that it is the truth” (41:25). There are specific Shia contexts. A hadith from Imam Ali calls the infallible Imam an Ayatollah. In another hadith, Imam Ali calls himself the grand Ayatollah (“ana al-ayatoluzma”).6 In addition, there is a ziyara (supplication) addressing Imam Ali as grand Ayatollah. Therefore, a mujtahid is an ayatollah, a sign of God, because he manifests the qualities of piety and knowledge that signal God’s objectives in creation. However, the term encompasses more than “mujtahid.” The first use of ayatollah appears to have been coined by Shaykh Bahaii (1547–1621) and Allama Majlisi (1627–1699) for Allama Hilli (1250–1325), out of respect for his major contributions to theology and jurisprudence two centuries after his death. Then it was not used again until the twentieth century, when it was applied retroactively to the mujtahids al-Sayed Mahdi Bahr al-Ulum (1742–1797) and Shaykh Ansari (1781–1864). Its use then proliferated due to two events, one political and one religious, both related to modernization. In the wake of the movement for Iranian constitutionalism (1905–1911), both supporters and opponents bestowed the title particularly on Akhund Khurasani (1839–1911) and Abdullah Mamaqani (1870–1933).7 The religious modernizing comes as an indirect result of the reform and strengthening of the hawza in Qum initiated by Haeri (d. 1936). Algar holds

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that Haeri was the first mujtahid to bear the title of ayatollah.8 Previously, mujtahids were called hujjat al-Islam. With the emergence of influential figures such as Borujerdi and Kashani, the use of the title became increasingly common for all mujtahids. The term al-uzma (the supreme) followed in order to distinguish the most prominent mujtahids.9 (Ibid). Though ayatollah currently equates to mujtahid, some areas of confusion exist: the absence of an official titling process in hawza, politicization of the title, the great development in jurisprudence studies, and the impulse among Islamic intellectuals to give increasing attention to non-jurisprudential studies. As I discussed in the previous chapter, there are a few grand ayatollahs who reject the title, including grand Ayatollah Sistani. In sum, though the title is historically new and complicated, its concept is clear. Ayatollah refers to a mujtahid. There are two more terms for this position that can be used interchangeably depending on the situation. Since an ayatollah or mujtahid has concentrated immersion in jurisprudence, he is also called a faqih or jurist. When an ayatollah declares a new concept, particularly on a recent phenomenon, he can be called a mufti. His juristic opinion is a fatwa. In other words, a fatwa is an authoritative legal opinion deduced from Islamic sources addressing a specific subject to let the faithful know its religious status, that is, haram or halal. The emergence and establishment of ijtihad in Shia did not happen smoothly. A short review of the last major ideological clash between pro- and anti-ijtihad intellectuals can help us better understand the concept of ijtihad.

REESTABLISHMENT OF USULISM VERSUS AKHBARISM Ijtihad in the time of Imams was not the only current among Ulama, nor did it dominate Shia thought at the beginning of the occultation of the twelfth Imam in 874. Along with the companions of the Imams, who adhered to an analytical and rational approach toward legal problems while giving consideration to the general principles of the Quran and Sunnah, there was another group in the same community with a traditionalist approach centered on transmitting traditions without any further inferential derivation of law. With the occultation, the conflict between these two currents continued, though the moderate traditionalists like al-Kulayni and al-Saduq dominated Shia thought at the end of the tenth century. Subsequently, rationalists like Shaykh Mufid, Shaykh Tusi, and Allama Hilli came to dominate madrasa study, until the beginning of the seventeenth century when Mullah Muhammad Amin al-Astrabadi (d. 1626–1627) revived traditionalism under the name of Akhbarism through his masterpiece al-Fawaid al-Madaniy (The Medinan Useful Points).

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As Hobert Gleave states, the existence of a broadly traditionalist trend in Shia before Astarabadi is indisputable, but Astrabadi presented an unprecedented and sophisticated version of it, making Akhbari a proper name for a particular legal doctrinal position based on the rejection of ijtihad and the assertion of a binary epistemology between certain knowledge and ignorance. The Arabic akhbar is the plural of khabar, which in this context means tradition (Sunnah and hadith). According to the new and flexible concept of ilm (knowledge) developed during this period, it is divided into various categories based on both the subject of knowledge (the ruling itself, the indicator in the text, the most cautious course of action) and the quality of the knowledge (unqualified ilm as against al-ilm al-adi).10 In other words, Astrabadi sees Usulisim, and Allama Hilli specifically, as replicating the faults of Sunni ijtihad. Usulism takes pride in Usul al-fiqh, which attempts to fill the gaps in religious law with rationalism. Usuli is the adjective derived from usul (lit. fundamental principles), referring to those who develop the principles of jurisprudence to deduce religious law from the main sources of jurisprudence. Usulis believe that many religious laws are not stated clearly in holy texts; thus, a mujtahid is needed to deduce them through rational and analytical arguments. These rational explorations are nothing more, in the view of Astarabadi, than the opinions (ara’a, pl. of ra’y) of the Usuli mujtahids. Consequently, Usuli ijtihad leads to a preference for the human over the godly, the presumption of rationality over the Imams’ akhbar, and conjectural conclusions over certainty. Usulis’ opinions are only opinions/conjectures (zunun, pl. of zann), not the certainties (yaqin/qat’a) shared by the Imams. In ignoring certainty and welcoming probability, ijtihad replaces akhbar received from Imams with the most likely ideas and principles deduced and concluded by fuqaha.11 In place of mujtahids and fuqaha who spread their opinions, hadith experts (muhaddithun “hadith transmitters” and akhbariyun “those who both transmit and rely upon akhbar in their legal pronouncements”) are required to perform an interpretive process to comprehend the meaning of akhbar when necessary.12 The common concept of taqlid is denied, because ijtihad is ruled to be religiously invalid. Akhbarism considers the traditions of the Imams to be the main source of religious knowledge. As Gleave illustrates, there are a variety of philosophical, theological, and mystical views in Akhbarism, but all are committed to the doctrine that the Imams used language in an unambiguous manner which renders ijtihad useless.13 Astarabadi was not alone, but he came to embody the expression of a school which included both radicalism and moderation and included prominent names like Muhammad Taqi Majlisi (d. 1660), Muhsin Fayz Kashani (d. 1680), and Hurr Amili (d. 1693). Their views on the Quran and the Prophet vary; however, they might be understood through the akhbar. All Akhbaris were united in antagonism against their opponents,

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the Usulis. In Akhbarism’s call to return to akhbar, it was seen not only as a source of substantive ruling on this or that aspect of the law. The experts in akhbar promulgate Imams’ teachings to the community. Akhabrism also replaced mujtahid and faqih with mufti and qazi (judge), who gain knowledge through consultation of akhbar. They are not applying juristic practices with rationalist principles. Rather, they consult akhbar and apply interpretive skills correctly. Astarabadi lists all of the Imams’ akhbar which related to qaza (judgeship) and ifta (issuing fatwa), concluding that they all indicate that “those to whom one should refer for fatwas and legal judgements (qaza) were the transmitters (rowat, sing. rawi) of the [Imams’] reports and rulings.” The Imams either stated legal issues clearly or shared clear hermeneutic principles which, when applied, make legal judgments binding and certain because the Imams’ teachings were carefully collected and transmitted. They might not lead to absolute certainty (yaqin waqe’i) as to God’s intent, but they will surely lead to customary (adi) certainty—which is still superior to the preponderant probability of the Usulis. An interesting and controversial hadith which led to opposing interpretations by Akhbaris and Usulis is the much-cited report of Umar b. Hanzala’s maqbula.14 I will return to this hadith in chapter 10 on “Politics and Government” in the context of the theory of jurist guardianship. On the constructive side, Akhbarism promoted the principle of ihtiyat (issuing fatwa based on a mufti’s assessment of the most cautious course of action) with regard to actions, and taqiyya (precautionary dissimulation of religious belief) and tawaqquf (lack of decision) with regard to the conflicting akhbar, claiming all these maxims are rooted in akhbar themselves. In Akhabrism, following the same rules, even though these rules were established by persons now dead, is valid.15 Usulis call this taqlid al-mayyit (imitating the dead) and prohibited it. In Usulism, each generation needs its own mujtahids to deduce, interpret, and elaborate the law. The real development of Usulism can lead to a newijtihadi current, which uses modern hermeneutics as a critical theoretical tool and moves beyond the traditional view of a normative and singular reading of sacred Islamic texts accepted by classic principles of jurisprudence.16 Akhbarism dominated Shia thought for a time and continued its rule over the Iraqi shrine cities under Yusuf al-Bahrani (1695–1772). It was Aqa Muhammad Baqir Bihbahani (d. 1793–1794), a great Usuli, who harshly attacked Akhabris and called them infidels, which led occasionally to physical violence.17 Bihbahani argued that ijtihad was common among the companions of the Imams. In his view, the Imams lacked the opportunity to share the real laws (ahkam waqe’i) because of sociopolitical restrictions. Also, not all of their students were talented enough to receive Imams’ final words. He also highlighted how historical events hurt the collections of hadiths. Further, Bihbahani defended Usulis’ position about the probable conclusion and

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opinion (zann). Mujtahids have solid reasons to believe in justified opinions (zunun al-mutabara), while Akhbaris lack the power to produce certainty. Bihbahani also for the first time divided legal arguments into two sections: ijtihadi reasoning and jurisprudential (fiqhi) reasoning. By the first, he meant justified deducing from the Quran and Sunnah, and by the second, the practical principles discussed in the principles of jurisprudence when a textual source is not available. Bihbahani’s contribution to the development of Usulism was astonishing. After Bihbahani, Akhabrism was unable to dominate in major hawzas in Iraq and Iran, at least in its radical and pure form. In defending uncertainty and probable opinions (zunun), Bihbahani went so far as to say there is no certainty (ilm) nor religious indicator (emara shar’iyyah) regarding the majority of religious obligations. Thus, all opinions arrived at by mujtahids (zann-e mutlaq) are valid. Even some later generations of Usulis joined Bihbahani in this perspective.18 This happened while the current mainstream of Usulis merely accepted “specific opinion” (zann-e khas), meaning opinions based on religious indicators like khabar-e wahid. Bihbahani’s pupil Jafar Kashif al-Ghita (d. 1812) continued the campaign against Akhbaris, in particular the well-known Akhbari Mirza Muhammad Akhbari (1764–1816).19 Mirza Muhammad was forced to move to Iran and take refuge under the Qajar king. Kashif al-Ghita wrote Kashf al-ghita an mayaib Mirza Muhammad aduwwa al-ulama (Unveiling the Cover for the Flaws of Mirza Muhammad, the Enemy of Ulama) and sent it to the king. Mirza Muhammad eventually lost the king’s support, and after other mujtahids issued fatwas calling him infidel, he was murdered at the hands of a mob. After Akhbarism, Usulism dominated Shia hawza and is still operative in major madrasas. Also, mujtahids learned from Akhbaris how to run the ijaza system, which, as Gleave writes, was relatively exclusive to Akhbari teachers and pupils.20 The ijaza system is a well-established tradition in the transmission of Muslim scholarship, comparable to an informal system of tutorship by modern standards. It was obligatory for all who wished to transmit hadith to prove they are trained, tested, and qualified. Usulism instituted certification or a recommendation letter to confirm that their qualified seminarians have gained the capacity to exercise ijtihad. Interestingly, many of the earlier certifications were written in the traditionalist style, saying, “I have permitted him to transmit from me” (“ajaztu lahu an yarwiya anni”).21 The expansion of ijtihad and the development of fiqh brought Shia jurisprudence to Sunnis so that their differences have been described as not greater than those among the four Sunni schools.22 This point becomes clearer when one considers the position of zann (opinion) in the principles of jurisprudence; theories like the jurist guardianship in political jurisprudence; the element of Friday prayer, masliha (public interest), insaf (fairness), urf (custom),

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and maqasid al-Shari’a (the objectives of Shari’a) in jurisprudence.23 And finally, the expansion of ijtihad dominated Shia jurisprudential and even theological literature. Nobuaki Kondo, in comparing a book of jurisprudence from the thirteenth century with its nineteenth-century Persian translation, found evidence: the former stipulates that a qazi must have the ability to issue fatwas independently (mustaqill bi-ahliyyati al-fatwa) without using the term mujtahid directly, while the latter added a phrase to the original, “or [a qazi] must be a mujtahid (ya ’ni mujtahid budan).”24 CERTIFICATION AND QUALIFICATIONS No official process exists to name someone an ayatollah or mujtahid. It takes a couple of years and requires that the mujtahid prove his ability to deduce law and to convince both his peers and his teachers that he possesses the requisite skills. Since this takes time, it causes the candidate to acquire a habit (malika)—meaning he must show that deducing law from its sources has become second nature to him, versus an ability that is not habitual. This process of convincing comes through active participation in discussions offered by his teacher, usually a grand ayatollah; constructive propositions to the questions and challenges posed to him; leading and correcting debates among peers; mastery of sources; critical approaches to texts relevant to the issue; and training a great number of students to a high level of sutuh if not kharij (e.g., teaching Kifaya).25 There is no official certificate for arriving at the level of ijtihad, but ijaza can ease the path to public recognition. Ijaza literally means permission, so it is confusing in terms of mujtahid and ijtihad. Thus some background and clarification are needed. In general, there are three kinds of ijaza (pl. ijazat) common in current Shia hawza. The most common one is for religious affairs called umur hasbiyya and shar’iyyah. This ijaza is like a license that proves the owner can do religious work on behalf of the marja. It includes what traditionally fell under wilayat-e faqih, meaning propagating religious law, collecting religious taxes, judging and solving community conflicts, administrating divorce in particular cases, managing the affairs of orphans and minors, and so forth. The extent of the duties depends on the level of scholarship of the agent and the trust a marja can place in him. The receivers of this certificate can be mujtahids, but it isn’t required. Upon the death of the issuing marja this certificate expires, and the agent needs to acquire a new certificate from a living marja. In addition, this certificate works as a license and assures the masses that its holder represents a marja. A seminarian can receive multiple ijazas from several maraji’ to ensure a greater audience. Finally, a mujtahid or seminarian who does not wish to become involved in

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public affairs does not need this certificate, as it does not otherwise prove a higher level of education or scholarship.26 Sometimes maraji’ may issue ijaza in the interest of the community though the receiver might not deserve it.27 The second type, called ijazat riwaha (permission to transmit hadiths), is the oldest. It gives the seminarian permission to transmit traditions (hadith, khabar), particularly jurisprudential ones, in the teacher’s name. Many ijazas contain an isnad of a chain of transmitters, following the expression “I have permitted him to transmit from me and from my teachers in ijaza.” These teachers transmitted to their students the knowledge that they gained from their teachers over generations. The teachers acquire this knowledge from the Imams, and Imams obtained this knowledge from their ancestors, who, in turn, gained it from Prophet Mohammed. The Prophet received this knowledge from the Angel Jibril (Gabriel), and Jibril acquired it from God at the end of the isnad. In surveying almost all the ijazas of riwaya from the nineteenth century, Kondo found that, contrary to its name, the permission granted was not only for transmitting the traditions of the Imams, but also for transmitting all religious sciences.28 Because of the isnad, the ijaza also served as a spiritual support. The third and newest type of ijaza is ijaza of ijtihad. It is one outcome of the victory of Usulism over Akhbarism in institutionalizing the power of the mujtahid. It does not work as a prerequisite for a mujtahid, but as a certificate (tasdiq) for the scholar wanting it for recognition by the community. Allama Muhsim Amin described this ijaza as follows: It is a certificate (shahada) that states that the conferred has acquired the ability to deduce the legal rules (al-furu) from the legal sources (al-usul) and the conferred is a fair, trustworthy person from whom one can learn about the regulations correctly. It is known as a practice mostly in the cases where the conferred is a student of the conferrer.29

Kondo undertook a great case study with regard to the nineteenth century, but his main conclusions also apply to the twentieth century. The following are highlights from his studies. First, an individual becomes a mujtahid not by receiving ijaza, but rather often receives the ijaza after proving his ability to deduce law from the above-mentioned four main sources as a recommendation letter to be accepted by the community, particularly the public at large. The form of the ijazas is not fixed. There is no evidence that ijazas were systematically issued and were critically important for the mujtahids. Biographical sources rarely mention mujtahids’ ijazas of ijtihad. Surveying two critical biographical sources from the nineteenth century shows in one source, only 9 percent of the total ijazas issued were for ijtihad and 73 percent for riwaya; in another source, only 6 percent were for ijtihad. (The remaining ijazas are not specified.) In addition, a close study of two particular mujtahids’ approaches

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to ijaza of ijtihad illustrates how the recognition of their peers left them with no need to acquire ijaza in order to exercise ijtihad. On the contrary, ijazas of riwaya functioned more like systematic certifications, and because of their inclusion of isnad were more requested by mujtahids. However, ijaza of ijtihad still helped the seminarian to be recognized by his community as a mujtahid.30 There is no case study for the twentieth century available, but I believe the main points remain the same. There is one unavoidable case, however. According to the Iranian constitution, the members of the Assembly of Experts for Leadership must be mujtahids. This assembly selects and supervises the supreme leader of Iran. The Constitutional Council, which supervises the election of the assembly, announced that they do not consider ijaza of ijtihad issued by maraji’ in their qualifications for mujtahids. Rather, they have their own way of getting to know a candidate, including his degree of fame or by passing an examination offered by the Council. The materials for the exam were on Makasib, Rasa’il, and Kifaya, the highest stage of sutuh discussed in the last chapter. To reiterate, ijtihad is the established skill of deducing jurisprudential rules from legal sources using the legal methodology.31 If a mujtahid comes to recognize himself as a mujtahid on his own, he will exercise it. For the sake of public confidence in him, he might ask his teacher to provide an ijaza. Some maraji’ are very restrictive in terms of providing ijaza. Though surely an exaggeration, it is said Shaykh Ansari had 1,000 students attending his high-level course, but he did not offer an ijaza of ijtihad to any of them.32 Grand Ayatollah Zanjani complains that today many mujtahids carry only the name, not the true nature and scholarship.33 Elsewhere he adds that some receive ijaza only because they are children of a marja.34 The ijaza of ijtihad can be given orally or in written format, though it is not necessary or even enough on its own to prove one’s status as a real mujtahid. A grand ayatollah might confer the ijaza of ijtihad just by being impressed by the piety, passion, and persistence of the receiver35 or for the sake of maslaha.36 For example, Reza Shah (1878–1944) included Iranian seminarians in conscription, though mutahids were exempted. Grand Ayatollah Naini (1860–1936) conferred izaja of ijtihad on many Ulama to save hawza. Khoei cited Naini as saying, “As soon as Raza Khan [Reza Shah] is gone, I will announce the ijzajas of ijtihad I conferred between specific dates are not valid anymore.”37 A grand ayatollah might even cancel an ijaza based on mere rumors.38 VERITIES AND DYNAMISM Ijtihad is a process that requires lengthy study to master and practice. Three factors work together to establish the position of ijtihad in a mujtahid: his

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own scholarship, his status among the scholarly community, and his position in the eyes of the masses. The last factor is important if he wants to be a public-facing figure. None of these factors has a fixed and firm status. Some speak of a mujtahid muhtat (mujtahid in abeyance or reserve), meaning a mujtahid who acquired an ijaza but is not publicly recognized as a mujtahid.39 More common terms are mujtahid mutlaq (absolute mujtahid) and mujtahid mutajazzi (partial mujtahid). An absolute mujtahid is able to deduce laws in all aspects of Islamic law, while a partial mujtahid is only able to deduce law on a particular subject or subjects. The level of scholarship, including ijtihad and its popularity and reception by the scholarly community, can remain controversial. A mujtahid’s personal and educational background can add to the ambiguity. There is enormous diversity among ayatollahs with regard to their political views, philosophical perspectives, mystical approaches, and lifestyles. Many of their scholarly divergences will be the focus of discussion in the second part of this book, but here I would like to briefly touch on the matter of their personal character and varying lifestyles. It is especially important to examine this aspect, because there is a powerful attempt emanating from sources as different as Western politicians and media, which portrays all ayatollahs as one-dimensional opponents, and the Iranian government, which leverages and abuses Shia faith to create an image of monolithic political power, to paint a homogenous picture of ayatollahs. The differences among them can be so great that one mujtahid called another mujtahid infidel for his open-mindedness.40 It is said the accused mujtahid held uncommon ideas,41 insulted great Ulama,42 and expressed that he will not forswear his scholarly conclusions even if a living Imam were to come to him and oppose them.43 Ayatollah Azari Qumi (1925–1999), a founding member of the Qum Seminary Scholar’s Community, was knowledgeable but also very passionate and emotional, which he acknowledged and regretted. His strong emotion, Ayatollah Zanjani writes, made him radical as a politician on occasion. He believed the Iranian Islamic regime had the right to wrongly disrepute any of the great maraji’ if they did not support the Islamic revolution.44 There was another ayatollah with jurisprudential knowledge equal to maraji’ and exhibiting the highest level of piety (asceticism, zuhd) but with a Marxist flavor and sociopolitical interest. Grand Ayatollah Haeri believed he had a particular jurisprudence (fiqh-e makhsus) which preferred helping the poor to strict observation of acts of worship.45 There is a story of a mujtahid who once witnessed a group of people attempting to beat up a drunk. He asked the attackers to smell the drunk’s breath to ensure the mujtahid that he had been drinking. But no one would do it, because only an individual who drinks wine would understand the smell of wine on the breath, and a drinker can’t testify to the sin. When the others had left, the Shaykh

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spoke with the accused, who then repented before God and became a holy man and companion of this mujtahid.46 Ayatollah Zanjani writes of a grand ayatollah, Haj Aqa Reza Zanjani (1902–1984), who opposed both the autocracy of Reza Shah and the theocracy of Ayatollah Khomeini.47 He was the legal executor of a rich man’s estate who had died and left him many items, including some wines. A physician was searching for a particular vintage, and the ayatollah revealed that he had it. He had kept the wine as his payment for executing the will, with the intention of keeping it out of reach of the man’s inheritors. He knew that the old wine had medical benefits and argued that keeping wine is not haram, only drinking it is forbidden.48 Ijtihad is a scholarly skill, and as such can change over time. A mujtahid can lose his skill due to dementia or other afflictions. When this happens, he is no longer a mujtahid and becomes a muqallid (imitator). Wahid Bihbahani, in his last years of his life, turned to follow his disciple,49 stating he had become too old to deduce law accurately. Another marja removed his own manual on jurisprudence from the market, saying his memory no longer worked properly. If a client went to him, his response was that the previous marja does not exist anymore.50 Another mujtahid returned to the status of muqallid because he could no longer bear the mental strain required to properly consider issues of law.51 Even more exceptional is the anecdote about a grand ayatollah who was in the midst of publishing his manual book when he learned of another ayatollah who was most learned than he. Upon this realization, he collected his manual book from the printing house and began attending the course of his peer.52 Ijtihad includes a wide range of scholarship, intellectual inclinations, and sociopolitical involvements. However, the core issue is jurisprudence and deducing proper laws from the original sources. One can distinguish at least three levels of scholarship at the level of ayatollah or mujtahid: pioneering scholars like Shaykh Ansari, Akhund Khurasani, and Allama Naini, who introduce new courses of development in jurisprudence; the maraji’ taqlid (the supreme exemplars or sources of emulation), who must be imitated by the masses (which will be discussed in the next chapter); and lastly the common mujtahid or ayatollah, who exercises ijtihad and follows his own deduction of jurisprudence. NOTES 1. Aqa (also agha) has two implications currently: it is an honorific title if used alone, for example Aqa-ye Khoei; and also a polite way to address a male like “sir” or “gentleman.” Also see the previous chapter, “Madrasa, Hawza and Hierarchy.”

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2. Today’s Ulama suggest an additional option called ihtiyat (caution), whereby the believer operates in such a way as to be sure the religious duty is done properly. Since this option implies ultra-conservatism, it is not common. 3. Mohammad Hashim Kamali (Oxford: Oneworld, 2010), p. 148. 4. Hossein Modarresi Tabataba’i, An Introduction to Shi’i Law: A ­Bibliographical study (London: Ithaca Press, 1984), pp. 23-32. 5. This is because in accordance with Sunni principles of jurisprudence, ijtihad is regarded as a consultative process, not a binding force. It becomes binding if it is issued by a court. See Kamali, Shari'a Law An Introduction, p. 163; Muhammad Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society, 2003), p. 496. 6. For examples of hadiths using the term ayatollah for the Imams, see alMuhaddethoon weblog (available at http://almohaddethoon​.blogspot​.com​/2017​/06​/ blog​-post​_57​.html). To see responses from Ulama who justify using the title ayatollah for non-Imams, see the website of Theological Research Center (available at https:// www​.aqaed​.com​/faq​/4235/). 7. Rainer Brunner, “Hierarchy in the Imamiyya,” in Encyclopedia Iranica (available at https://www​.iranicaonline​.org​/articles​/shiite​-doctrine​-ii​-hierarchy​-emamiya) (accessed September 30, 2022). 8. Hamid Algar, Haeri, Abd-al-karim Yazdi, in Encyclopedia Iranica (available at https://www​.iranicaonline​.org​/articles​/haeri) (accessed September 30, 2022). 9. Ibid. 10. Robert Gleave, Scripturalist Islam: The History and Doctrines of the Akhbari Shi’i School (Leiden: Brill, 2007), pp. 100-101. 11. Mustafa Tabataba’i, Barrasi Ara-e Akhbari va Usuli (Tehran: Mustafa Tabataba’i, 1384/2005), pp. 16-17. To read Usulis’ response, see the primary text of Muqaddas Ardabili translated in “The Muqaddas al-Ardabili on Taqlid,” in Authority and Political Culture in Shi’ism, Said Amir Arjomand (ed.) (State University of New York Press, 1988), pp. 263-266; also Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudences According to Shi’i Law, Arif Hussain (tans.) (London: Islamic ­College for Advanced Studies Press, 2003), pp. 57-62. 12. Thus, as Gleave emphasizes, the distinction between mufti and layperson remains salient in Astarabadi’s view. 13. Gleave, p. 294. 14. Gleave, “The Qadi and the Mutfi in Akhbari Shi’i Jurisprudence,” in The Law Applied: Contextualizing the Islamic Shari'a (London: I.B. Tauris, 2008), pp. 39-341. 15. The Akhbari Abdullah Samahiji (d. 1723) detailed some 40 points of conflict between Usulism and Akhbarism. Mustafa Tabatabii, in his survey of all conflict among Usulis and Akhbaris, concluded the following differences: the former pays more attention to rational principles, the message of the Quran, the sense of elitism, general rules, the principle of exemption (bara’at), rational reconciliation among conflicting hadiths, multilayered nature of hadith, rijal, and the possibility of modifying a fatwa. In contrast, the latter prefers literalism in texts, hadiths, common sense, special texts, the principle of precaution (ihtiyat), taqiyyah, the explicit meaning of akhbar, tolerating rijal, and fixed rules (Tabataba’i, Barrasi Ara-e Akhbari va Usuli. p. 114).

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16. According to Takim, neo-ijtihadi thought needs to reassess the validity of preferring naql (revelation) over ‘aql (conjecture), to incorporate moral rationalist judgments in juridical decision-making, and to couch legal inferences in changes in other disciplines and sciences. He suggests a possible framework for a more ethical and just legal system, the concordance between God’s creative and legislative wills. See Liyakat Takim, Shi’ism Revisited Ijtihad and Reformation in Contemporary Times (Oxford, 2022). 17. Before Bihbahani, Akhbarism was viewed by its opponents as a matter of orientations and style (Mousavi, Iranian Studies, 38). Bihbahani announced it was haram to study before Bahrani or even to go to his madrasa. Prayer in Bahrani’s jama’a was forbidden as well. Yet, it is said that some of Bihbahani’s outstanding students would attend Bahrani’s course in secret. When Bahrani died, madrasas in Najaf and Karbala closed to show their respect. Bihbahani led the prayer at Bahrani’s funeral in accordance with the latter’s will (Tabarra’iyan, Nihad-e marja'iyyat-e Shia, p. 22, footnote 16). 18. Shubairi Zanjani, Jor’a-e az darya, Vol. 3, p. 268. 19. Mirza Muhammad Akhabri received ijaza from Bihbahani’s pupil Bahr alUlum (Mohsen Saboorian and Hamid Parsania, “The Conditions for Establishment of Shi’ite’s marja'iyyat Taqlid Institution”, in The Quarterly Journal of Islam and Social Studies (Qum: Islamic Sciences and culture Academy, 2018) Vol. 5, No. 3, p. 42. 20. Gleave, Scripturalist Islam: The History and Doctrines of the Akhbari Shi’i School, p. 173, see footnote 122. 21. Nobuaki Kondo, “Shi’i Ulama and Ijaza during the Nineteenth Century,” in Orient (The Society for Near Eastern Studies in Japan, 2009), Vol. XLIV, pp. 60-63. 22. Norman Calder, “Feqh,” in Encyclopedia Iranica (available at https://www​ .iranicaonline​.org​/articles​/feqh) (accessed September 30, 2022); Karim D. Crow and Ahmad Kazemi Moussavi, Facing One Qiblah: Legal and Doctrinal Aspects of Sunni and Shiah Muslims (Singapore: Pustaka Nasional Pte Ltd, 2005), pp. 1-29. 23. Akhbarism accused Usulism of learning the principles of jurisprudence from Sunnis, who do not follow Imams. Kashif al-Ghita responded to this objection repeatedly, saying a right-thinking individual does not abandon a correct idea just because it’s shared by one’s opponents. Ignoring the scientific accomplishments of our opponents leads to ignoring basic knowledge of humanity as well as ignoring many Islamic teachings, including positive statements Sunnis reportedly made about the Imams (cited by Tabatabii, Barrasi Ara-e Akhbari va Usuli, pp. 51-52). 24. Nobuaki Kondo, “Shi’i Ulama and Ijaza during the Nineteenth Century,” p. 58. 25. Sutuh and kharij are two stages of study in hawza with a concentration on jurisprudence (fiqh) and the principles of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh); the mechanism of jurisprudence and the use of the Quran, Sunnah, reasoning, and consensus. For further reading, see the previous chapter “Madrasa, Hawza, and Hierarchy.” 26. One case is analyzed by Rasul Jafariyyan. Jafariyan, “Yek ijazanama ba imza-e se marja al-taqlid,” in Payam-e Baharistan (Tehran: Kitabkhane, muze va markaz-e asnad-e majlis-e shura-e islami, 1387/2009), Vol. No. 1 and 2, pp. 22-25. 27. Shubairi Zanjani, Jor’a-e az darya, Vol. 2, p. 654.

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28. Kondo, “Shi’i Ulama and Ijaza during the Nineteenth Century,” p. 63. According to Allama Musin al-Amin, in ijaza of riwaya, “the only condition is that the conferred should be a mujtahid.” (cited by Kondo, 65). 29. cited by Kondo, 60-61. 30. Kondo, 55-67. 31. It’s said that in grand Ayatollah Borujerdi’s discussion of ijtihad, he listed very difficult qualifications for becoming a mujtahid. A seminarian replied to him, saying, “Sir, you limited mujtahid to one individual.” He meant Ayatollah Borujerdi (Jora, 2:574). However, Borujerdi issued some ijazas for many unscholarly factors as mentioned in this chapter. 32. Kondo, 70. 33. Shubairi Zanjani, Jor’a-e az darya, Vol. 2, p. 365. In another piece, Zanjani writes that because the true mujtahids are disappearing nowadays, ijtihad is an individual obligation (al-wajiib al-ayni) of whoever has the talent (Jor’a, Vol. 3, p. 512). The religious obligations are of two kinds: the collective obligation (al-wajib al-kifaii) and the “individual obligation.” The former obliges that if somebody undertakes it, then others are discharged of the duty. It is a duty of the whole community; someone must do it, just like the need for physicians in a community. The latter is an obligation on every single believer, and the actions of others do not relieve one of the duty, like with daily prayer. Most maraji' believe ijtihad to be a collective duty. 34. Ibid. Vol. 3, p. 512. 35. Ibid. Vol. 2, p. 565. 36. Ibid. Vol. 3, p. 513; Vol. 4, p. 558. The concept of maslaha (public interests), promoting or enacting those laws which best serve the needs and well-being of the community, does not play a big role in classic Shia jurisprudence, in contrast to its Sunni peer. Classic Shia jurisprudence rejects considering maslaha mainly for two reasons: there is an element of jurist subjectivity and inclination and its linkage with zann (conjecture), while Shia emphasizes qat’a (certainty). However, two more points are worth mentioning: as Liyakat Takim showed, maslaha is used throughout the history of jurisprudence by great jurists like Shaykh Mufid, Shaykh Tusi, and Allama Hilli, not as an independent source of law, but under extenuating circumstances. In current times, there is a greater inclination to use it. Allama Fadlallah in a controversial move used this concept to permit women to actively participate in plays and movies, including dancing and other theatrical and stage performances, as long as they do not contravene basic Islamic normative ethics and laws. He did this primarily because of the perceived cultural and social benefits of women’s participation in the arts (Liyakat Takim, Shi’ism Revisited Ijtihad & Reformations in Contemporary Times (Oxford, 2022), pp. 113-118). In the following chapter, I will provide more examples of fatwas based on maslaha, and in the chapter on politics I will discuss how Khomeini's theory of jurist guardianship brought maslaha to the heart of jurisprudence. 37. Shubairi Zanjani, Jor’a-e az darya, Vol. 2, p. 480. 38. Shubairi Zanjani, Jor’a-e az darya, Vol. 3, p. 597. 39. Cited by Kondo, p. 56. 40. Shubairi Zanjani, Jor’a-e az darya, Vol. 3, p. 339.

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41. Ibid, Vol. 3, p. 341-2. 42. Ibid, Vol. 3, p. 340. 43. Ibid, Vol. 3, p. 341. 44. Ibid, Vol. 4, p. 649-653. 45. Shubairi Zanjani, Jor’a-e az darya, Vol. 2, p. 505-506. 46. Ibid, Vol. 3, p. 331. 47. Ibid, Vol. 3, p. 615. 48. Ibid, Vol. 3, p. 620-621. The great Akhbari Astarabadi issued a fatwa responding to Safavid Shah Abbas distinguishing between serving wine and the purity of wine. He concluded wine is religiously pure so that a faithful Muslim, for example, can pray while wearing clothes soiled with wine. Robert Gleave appended the original fatwa with its English translation at the end of his book Scripturalist Islam: The History and Doctrines of the Akhabri Shi’i School (Brill, 2007), pp. 315-319. 49. Bahr al-Ulum (1742-1797). 50. Shubairi Zanjani, Jor’a-e az darya, Vol. 4, p. 409. 51. 4:458–9. 52. Ibid, Vol. 4, p. 485.

Chapter 4

Jurisprudence Significance and Becoming

How is a believer saved? In the course of becoming an adult and attempting to find a clear religious identity, I became interested in mysticism. Paying undivided attention to mysticism and transcendental motives, I found jurisprudence superficial and worldly. Once in a debate with my father, I recited chapter 29, verse 69 of the Quran, “Those who struggle in Our cause, We will surely guide them to Our ways; and God is with those who do good,” and concluded that everyone who trusts in God and strives hard for God will be guided and saved by Him. So, a direct connection and a pure and submissive heart are needed more than jurisprudential controversies and ritual pretention. My father replied that he wished divine statements were so simple, but they appear in very multiple forms, including metaphorical (majaz) and literal (haqiqa); abrogated (mansukh) and abrogator (nasikh); firm (muhkam) and ambiguous (mutashbih); universal and specific; qualified and unqualified; and so forth. An individual must study the principles of jurisprudence to conclude which statement applies in which specific form. This anecdote explains the nature of jurisprudence and its necessity. To make Shari’a available to a common Muslim, two disciplines come to the fore: jurisprudence (fiqh), which is knowledge of the practical rules of Shari’a acquired from detailed evidence in the four main sources of Shari’a law, and the principles of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh) that provides standard criteria for the correct deduction of the rules of jurisprudence from the sources of Shari’a. There is a close relationship between the two which resembles that of the rules of grammar to a language. Regardless of how much reductionism exists, in addition to the Islamic transformation from orthodoxy to orthopraxy, this illustrates why these two disciplines are at the core of hawza study and how their scholarship plays a vital role in making a seminarian into an 77

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ayatollah. No one can approach the mindset of an ayatollah without a profound understanding of these disciplines. As Meir Litvak’s analysis of the subjects of the works written by 69 leading mujtahids from the Atabat (the holy cities of Iraq), during the nineteenthcentury shows, fiqh works constituted 62.3 percent of the titles in the survey and usul works 22.5 percent, altogether amounting to 84.8 percent. Scholarly works in 11 other fields, which served mainly as auxiliary sciences, constituted only 15.2 percent.1 The story of Iran in the twentieth century is no different. There are three dominant ways in publication to illustrate proficiency in jurisprudence and its principles: commentaries (sharh pl. shuruh), glosses (hashi’ya, pl. hawashi) on important earlier works, and compilations of lecture notes (taqrirat) which students wrote and the mujtahid polished. An ayatollah could prove his qualification for this title only if he demonstrated mastery of these principles by teaching or by publishing. Technical knowledge of theology (kalam),2 exegesis (tafsir), philosophy (falsafa), Sufism (tasawwuf and irfan3), and Islamic history are pluses but not required. However, mastery of the classical Arabic language is required to enable the jurist to work with the texts (the Quran and Sunnah). Moreover, a seminarian must bring a background knowledge of formal logic in order to learn about forms of arguments and definitions of important technical terms, as discussed in the context of hawza curriculum in chapter 2. It’s not wrong to say that knowledge of hadiths and their transmitters is considerably more important than a vast knowledge of the Quran, because more laws are detailed in hadith than in the Quran.4 Given all that, this chapter aims to provide an overview of two decisive disciplines, jurisprudence and the principles of jurisprudence, along with other relevant concerns.

SIGNIFICANCE AND GROWTH Jurisprudence is among the generic knowledge that all Muslims encounter as a part of growing up. It is the main source for shaping faith practices and historically been the area of Islamic study that has produced the greatest number of Muslim scholars. Thus, jurisprudence plays a significant role in the formation of Muslim identity. The Quran and Sunnah laid the foundations for the promotion of jurisprudence, and daily life and ordinary demands spurred its development. Muslims are advised to see all aspects of their lives, no matter how trivial, as connected to God—so that there is a chance to face God in any moment of real life much more than through philosophical contemplation or mystical meditation pursued by elites. Subsequently, the effect of other Muslim scholars on the masses is not comparable to that of mujtahids, who are involved with jurisprudence. Other Ulama would adjust their ideas

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to jurisprudence and justify accordingly. For example, if a mujtahid accuses Sufis of heresy because of innovation (bid’a), for example with the dervish dance, then Sufis need to use jurisprudential language and technique to defend their practice of the dance by saying it is a good innovation which is not prohibited in jurisprudence. The continued spread of jurisprudence led to the term being conflated with Shari’a, despite important differences between the two. The former represents the human aspect of religious law, while the latter emphasizes the divine. Shari’a is an Arabic term rooted in sh-r-a, meaning the clear path which leads to a source of water. In the Quran it is used generally for all paths, especially religious paths (42:21; 7:163). The Islamic holy text recognizes the different divine paths, namely Shari’a, among the faithful—especially in the Abrahamic faiths, as the divine plan to examine how people are striving in a race to spread all virtues (5:48). Generally, and in broad usage, Shari’a is equated with religion, which the Quran applied to that of Noah, Abraham, Moses, and Jesus (42:13). Consequently, only the last form of Shari’a was revealed to the Prophet Muhammad (45:18). Muslims use the phrases “Shari’a of Moses,” “Shari’a of Jesus,” and “Shari’a of Muhammad.” In a technical and particular manner, Muslims reduce Shari’a to religious laws. As we discussed earlier, the term fiqh is also an Arabic term which means deep understanding that is used in the Quran to encourage all people to use their hearts to reach this level (7:179; 6: 69 and 98; 17:44 and 46; 63:3). Although in the first centuries of Islam, the term fiqh was used for all aspects of Islamic life, particularly in reference to Islamic doctrines such as the Greater Understanding (al-Fiqh al-Akbar), but gradually it became restricted to Islamic law and jurisprudence. Nowadays fiqh means a discipline which attempts to deduce Islamic regulations of behavior from the relevant sources. The master of fiqh is called faqih (pl. fuqaha). Faqih, mujtahid, and mufti are the same individual. As a result, Shari’a refers typically to the divine aspect of law while fiqh refers to the human aspect—meaning Shari’a has a more holy aura than fiqh, which is why the term Shari’a is more popular among Muslims. Subsequently, it is assumed that there is nothing wrong in Shari’a, but this is not the case with fiqh. Shari’a operates at a level outside of time and space, while fiqh is subject to the place, time, personality of the faqih, and other particulars.5 In addition, Shari’a is sometimes used in a broader study than fiqh; in fiqh only laws are discussed, but in Shari’a some parts of doctrines and ethics are addressed as well. Moreover, each Muslim is required to follow God’s Shari’a, although no mujtahid is required to follow another mujtahid. The Shari’a of Muhammad is the way that the Prophet practiced, confirmed, and stated the faith. The Prophet himself received instructions from God on what to do, what to say, and what to confirm in accordance with the faith.

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Many verses of the Quran revealed to the Prophet how to interpret particular events and respond to the needs of the people. The Prophet appeared for Muslims not merely as a spiritual leader, but also as a common person with whom they shared ordinary life experiences. As a flesh-and-blood person, he faced individual, family, and societal problems, engaged in management, solved conflicts, overcame unexpected circumstances, and received God’s guidelines accordingly. Subsequently, the Islamic faith emerged with a large potential for laws and regulations. The Quran had its role in constructing this expectation by encouraging believers to seek the resolution of their problems through the Prophet: “And if you have a dispute concerning any matter, refer it to God and the messenger (4:59).” These lived experiences provided an intensive foundation for law around various aspects of life: individual and family, local and international, crosscultural, and even environmental, to inspire practice of the faith in every single moment of life. This fact, for instance, created a plethora of classifications of Islamic laws, so that there has never been a general agreement as to how the different topics of jurisprudence should be categorized. I would like to present the following simple classification to provide a bird’s-eye view of the domains of jurisprudence: 1. “Worship and Affairs of Self-Perfection,” including the issues of cleanliness, salat (ritual prayer), sawm (fasting), and hajj (the pilgrimage to Mecca); 2. “Social Affairs,” including al- ‘amr bil ma’ruf wa al-nahy ‘an almunkar (exhortation to perform the good and prohibit evil doing), hijab (social clothing), mahram and non-mahram (lawful intimate sociability and unlawful intimate sociability), congregations, resolving social conflicts; 3. “Economic Affairs,” which include zakat (almsgiving), khums (a fifth share), endowment, buying and selling, riba (usury), investment, partnership, etc; 4. “Family Affairs,” including marriage, divorce, wills, and inheritance; and 5. “Political Affairs,” which include arbitration, political order and governance, Islamic punishments, shura (counsel/parliament), jihad, and so on. Indeed, this holistic feature of Islamic laws led to comprehensive and allencompassing Shari’a, meaning God has produced a law covering every action and behavior. Accordingly, every single action—from personal areas like eating, dressing, and walking, to social forms like gathering, celebrating, mourning, contracts, and the like—can be considered under one of these five

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jurisprudential categories: obligation (wajib/farz), prohibition (haram), preference (mustahab/mandub), dislike (makruh), and indifference (mubah/mujaz). This invests mujtahids with enormous power to address every single aspect of faithful life, private and public, equally. A mujtahid has vast latitude to exercise his reasoning, because every moment a new event or phenomenon appears. He helps the faithful to learn about every facet of these developments and how they should act in the eye of God. Modern questions, needs, and hesitations arose regarding some Islamic laws, necessitating a professional study of Islamic jurisprudence, its roots, methods, and objectives. Again, examining the meaning of the Quran and Sunnah was among the most significant causes to constitute fiqh and Shari’a law. The Quranic verse 7 chapter 3 explicitly divides its verses into two categories: those precise in meaning, which are fundamental concepts of faith (muhkam), and those intended to be allegorical (mutashabih) which merit a hermeneutic approach (ta’wil).

THE PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE Legal study of Shari’a is divided into two disciplines: fiqh (jurisprudence) and the principles of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh). Jurisprudence deduces Islamic regulations vis-a-vis particular events and actions from its sources, which are the Quran, Sunnah, ijma (consensus of the Muslim community), and aql (reasoning). The principles of jurisprudence examine the possibility, validity, methodology, and domains of these four sources regarding Islamic jurisprudence to lay the groundwork for fiqh. Usul al-fiqh is the science of both the sources and methodology of Islamic law.6 In the same way that the study of logic prepares students for the study of philosophy, usul al-fiqh provides scholars with a precise tool to apply in the field of fiqh. Let’s briefly examine the key sources that students of the principles of jurisprudence must grapple with. As the first source of Islam, the Quran includes roughly 500 verses related to religious laws, which is equal to one-thirteenth of its total contents. The Quran, in its apparent literal sense, has shaped the spirit and foundations of Shia law. All Ulama except Akhbaris believe in the authority of the Quranic statements as comprehended through valid methods.7 Tradition, or Sunnah, refers to the statements, deeds, and tacit consent of the Prophet and the Imams. Shia receive the traditions through the family of the Prophet. Traditions must be handed down by way of reliable narratives. With respect to this reliability, the doctrinal views of the transmitters are considered irrelevant. A tradition handed down by a reliable non-Shia is viewed as just as sound and acceptable as one transmitted by a veracious Shia. There is a division among

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Sunnah regarding the number of people who have reported it. All Ulama trust in mutawatir (successive) narration, which is conveyed by narrators so numerous and diverse that it is not conceivable that they have agreed upon a falsehood. The validity of non-mutawatir reports of the Prophet and Imams is the subject of contention. Can a single narration that relies on a strong guess be considered reliable? (Akhbaris readily accept this form of Sunnah, called khabar wahid, or a religious report that is narrated by only one transmitter.) Sunnah is considered valid as long as it supports ideas expressed in the Quran. If a Sunnah relates a message that contradicts the Quranic view, it is rendered invalid. Ulama also discuss among themselves how the contradictions in some narrations should be addressed, harmonizing them, preferring some over others, and so on. The traditions handed down from the Prophet and Imams are assembled in special collections. The most renowned of these are the following, and they are the standard reference works for jurists: 1. Kitab al-Kafi, by Abu Ja’far Mubammad b. Ya’qub al-Kulayni (d. 941) 2. Kitab Man la Yabduruh al-faqih, by Mubammad b. ‘Ali b. Babawayh al-Qummi, known as al-Saduq (d. 991–992) 3. Tahdhib al-ahkam, by Muhammad b. Hasan al-Tusi, Shaykh al-Ta’ifa (d.1067) 4. al-lstibsar, by Mubammad b. Hasan al-Tusi 5. al-Wafi, by Muhammad b. Murtaza al-Kashani , known as Muhsin alFayz (d. 1680) 6. Wasa’il al-Shi’a, by Muhammad b. Hasan al-Hurr al-Amili (d.1693) 7. Bihar al-anwar, by Muhammad Baqir b. Muhammad Taqi al-Majlisi (d. 1699) 8. Mustadrak al-Wasa’il, by Husayn b. Muhammad Taqi al-Nuri (d. 1908). The first four of these books are collectively known as al-kutub al-arba’a (the four books). In Shia legal literature, these four together hold the same position as the six famous collections of Sunni traditions (al-kutub al-sitta). The most popular jurisprudential work of reference is Wasa’il al-Shi’a, which gathers the legal traditions contained in the four books and in many other sources, and because it is limited to traditions concerned with legal subjects, it is the most convenient reference handbook for every jurist. The acceptability of any of the traditions contained in these books is subject to certain conditions. Among the above-mentioned texts, Bihar al-anwar is the most controversial. The reliability and honesty of all the narrators in a chain of transmitters of a tradition must first be proved. Two branches of scholarship deal with hadiths: ilm al-rijal (the science of transmitters), which investigates the narrators of the traditions and their biographies, and ilm al-diraya (the science of

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comprehension), which grades and divides traditions in accordance with their levels of reliability. On these bases, many traditions in the above sources are not, in the view of most jurists, sound and reliable. Ijma is the unanimity of the views of all Shia jurists on a certain legal question. It is not a source on its own, but it can become a means through which the opinion of the Imams may be discovered. Different explanations of this function of ijma have been suggested. The concept currently in favor is that since ijma is the unanimity of views of all Shia scholars, it naturally includes the views of those scholars who lived in the time of the Imams or the period quite close to it. Many of these scholars were close companions of the Imams and knew their opinions quite thoroughly. The consensus of these very early jurists, most of whom were absolute followers of the Imams, can be understood to demonstrate the view of the Imams.8 Reason (aql) as a source for Shia includes categorical judgments drawn from both pure and practical reason. It explores the rational implications of religious regulations. For example, there is a clear order in the Quran to perform daily prayer (salat), but rationally one infers from this order the necessity of devoting time for daily prayer. The correlation between the obligatoriness of an act and the obligatoriness of its prerequisites (muqaddamot al-wajib), or between prescribing something and prohibiting its opposite (mas’alat al-didd), or the impossibility of combining command and prohibition in a single case from a single standpoint (ijtimii’ al-amr wal-nahy) are all rational precepts in the principles of jurisprudence and the use of sources based on pure reason in the juridical effort to discover legal rules. Further, the principles of jurisprudence explore the position of reason to obligate people under the name of God. This issue is based on two ideas. The first is that good and evil exist in a way that reason can comprehend independently. This is a version of natural law ethics. A clear instance is the judgment of practical reason that justice is good and injustice is evil. The second is that there is a parallel between rational and religious order and judgments. In usul al-fiqh there is a principle which states that whatever is ordered by reason is also ordered by religion (“kull ma hakama bih al’aql, hakama bih al-shar’a”). This principle is known as the “rule of correlation” (qa’idat al-mulazama), whereby religious rules may be inferred from the sole verdict of reason. Since God is the chief reasoner (rais al-uqala), the creator of reasons, and the same universal intellect, He does not judge in opposition to reason at all. What is certainly good in the eyes of reason is wajib in Shari’a; what is better is mustahab; what is tolerated is makruh; and what is evil is haram with regard to the body or soul, the individual or society, worldly or otherworldly concerns. Usul al-fiqh also applies a philosophical hermeneutic to the text. For example, the meaning of a word must be examined in several steps: its meaning in the vocabulary of religious law; its literal, metaphoric, and clear use; how to

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reach its meaning through expression, indication, implication, or inference; and viewing it through the lens of its linguistic position, definitions, order, and rules. Usul al-fiqh discusses what the religious commands and imperatives entail: obligatory (wajib), desirable (mustahab), or neither? Do the commands imply immediate application or can they be performed after a delay? Does a command require repetition or only one performance? What do the negative religious imperatives entail? Do they mean forbidden (haram), undesirable but allowed (makruh), or both? For once, or forever? If there are general (aam) and particular (khas) injunctions, how must they be reconciled? What about unconditional (mutlaq) and conditional (muqayyad) commands? What is the relationship between spoken (mantuq) and implied (mafhum)? Spoken is the direct meaning of speech, but implied is the logical signification. What are the implications of a law? If we face a situation that requires us to do two different things, for example praying or cleaning the mosque, which of them has the priority, and what priority is implied? And what must a person do if they are in a situation that involves two opposing orders for the same action—for example, the overarching command to pray conflicts with the more narrow command not to pray in places where it is not permitted, such as in the household of someone whose permission has not been secured in advance.9 These are linguistic investigations that connect the principles of jurisprudence to philosophical and especially linguistic approaches. This is why some scholars believe that usul al-fiqh reflects genuine Islamic philosophy, because it grew out of a pure Islamic context and deals with practical Islamic articles of faith. However, if the legal norms cannot be directly deduced from these four sources (the Quran, Tradition, consensus, and reason), special general principles called usul al-amaliyya (procedural principles) are introduced. Thus, the second part of the principles of jurisprudence focuses on these principles. They can apply to all sections of Islamic law when the real obligation remains elusive: 1. The principle of Exemption (Bara’at), meaning that we are released from our obligation and we have no duty. This is applicable when we have no idea about what is required and there is no previous statement on the subject, such as whether a particular food is legal or illegal. 2. The principle of Precaution (Ihtiyat), which guides us to err on the side of caution. It is applicable when there is a known obligation but the situation involves two or more options. If there are two bottles and we know one of them contains alcohol, we are obliged to avoid both. 3. The principle of Choice (Takhyyir) gives us the option to choose one of two things, whichever we prefer. It applies when we have some unclear idea about the obligation but cannot perform both—for instance, we

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must go forward but don’t know which path to take. So, we are allowed to opt for one. 4. The principle of Continuance (Istishab) has us defer to the continuity of a previous state (the certainty is not lost due to doubt). It applies when we have no idea of our obligation, but we know the previous state of the subject. If we are unsure whether our hands are still clean or if they became dirty, we should continue with the status of our hands before the doubt arose.10 These practical principles encompass a very broad domain to determine the Islamic view concerning sacred and secular issues. They tend to be conservative about ibadat (the acts of worshiping, which are characterized by God, lead to God’s mercy, must be performed only for the sake of Him, and are inviolable) by applying the principle of Precaution, and be very liberal regarding acts of interaction (mu’amilat wa adat) or civil and social activities (which are based on reason and custom, leading to ease of life, and can be tolerated) by applying the principle of Exemption. This section of the principles of jurisprudence has developed significantly through the use of logical and philosophical concepts during the past century. Many recent works on the principles of jurisprudence include chapters on conflicts between laws, the qualifications of mujtahids, and the obligations of common people to imitate a mujtahid.

JURISPRUDENCE As I discussed earlier in this chapter, the concept of comprehensive Shari’a expanded jurisprudence to all aspects of faithful life, private and public. There are many forms of classifications of the subject of jurisprudence. This discussion of jurisprudence is divided into two sections: acts of worship (ibadat) and acts of interaction (mu’amilat), or partnership, with the latter divided yet further into two parts. Acts of interaction concern either the undertaking of the individuals themselves or of those which are not related to the undertaking of the individual, which include all judicial, penal, inheritance rules, and so forth. These undertakings are either unilateral (iqa’at) or bilateral (uqud). There are other codifications of jurisprudential subjects presented by many mujtahids, but I would like to refer to a classification based on the Shari’a’s objectives (Maqasid al-Shari’a). Accordingly, there are objectives that Shari’a pursues through every single law. Traditionally, it is thought that Shari’a aims to preserve and protect

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(1) faith: because humans are religious creatures by nature (30:30), there are several laws to clarify the connection between people and God and also among themselves; (2) life: since humans are God’s vice-regents on earth (2:30), the life of each individual is considered as a life of all people (5:32). There are many laws regarding human life, eating, drinking, inhabitation, and what causes harm to a community; (3) property and wealth: the Quran recognizes property as the means to maintain life (4:5) as well as a decoration from God to balance worldly and otherworldly joys (3:14), so it encourages halal business and prohibits theft, fraud, treason, and squandering; (4) reason and intellect: as humans have been bestowed with these traits (8:22), with them comes an obligation to reason and to guard against damage to the intellect through alcohol and other intoxicants, superstitions, sorcery, or acting based on dreams; (5) family and lineage: marriage is recognized as the sign of God (30:21), necessitating family laws and prohibition of sins which harm public innocence and personal honor, such as baseless accusations of adultery. In some hadiths, the believer’s reputation is equaled with the reputation of God’s holy house in Mecca. Together, these five areas of life are called kulliyat al-khams (the five universals), because they encompass the whole domain of Shari’a. Abu Ishaq al-Shatibi (d. 1388) and his unique book al-Muwafaqaat fi Usool al-Shari’a (The Reconciliation of the Fundamentals of Islamic Law) are well known for leading the way in new intellectual conversations among scholars. Unfortunately, the theory of objectives of Shari’a is not developed in Shia jurisprudence in great detail.11 However, there is an interesting classification of jurisprudential subjects by jurist and theologian Al-Fizil al-Miqdid (d. 1423) who divides fiqh into six sections. In his perspective, the objectives of religions are to protect these five basic elements of human life: faith, life, property, lineage, and reason. Those six sections are as follows: acts of worship to practice the faith; criminal law, to protect life by giving the right of retaliation to the offended person; laws regarding transactions regulating financial relations and protecting property; marriage regulations, family laws, and some penal precepts existing to support the continuation of the humanity precepts related to the prohibition of alcohol and the punishment of drinkers of alcohol and the like to protect human reason; and finally, legal precepts laid down to protect the totality of the Islamic system and to guarantee its correct application.12 No matter which classification is considered, the comprehensive concept of jurisprudence can be observed, though it does not mean that jurisprudence is fixed or holy. It is a mixture of sacred concerns and

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secular investments.13 Therefore, the comprehensive concept of jurisprudence can be used to promote the rule of law and promote an inward development in the national context of majority-Muslim countries. The chapters in jurisprudential texts are traditionally called “books” (kutub, sing. kitab), and they address various subjects on the personal and social duties of Muslims. The order of chapters can vary, but chapters on acts of worship usually come first, followed by chapters on interactions and then on inheritance and the penal code, based mostly on the importance of each issue in the eyes of the faith. Below are the contents of Shia law, according to the classification and arrangement of al-Mu’haqqiq’s Shara’i’ al-lslam, as translated by Hossein Moddarressi Tabataba’i. Brief descriptions of the less well-known chapters are included. A. Acts of Worship (‘Ibadat) 1. Kitab al-tahara (ritual purity). This first chapter includes guidance on cleansing rituals such as ablution. It also contains some laws relating to non-Muslims and the deceased. 2. Kitab al-salat (prayer). This chapter discusses how to perform prayers, along with some scientific discussions of how to determine the correct times of prayer (awqat al-salat) and the direction of prayer (qibla). There is also discussion of the social status of the jurist (faqih) and the nature of Islamic government, which touches on the issue of Friday prayer. 3. Kitab al-zakat (alms). This chapter addresses the fiscal obligation of Muslims. 4. Kitab al-khums (the one-fifth tax on all kinds of revenue14). Since khums is the principal funding for Ulama, a discussion on the authority of jurists is included. Because one of the cases where khums is levied is land sold by a Muslim to a non-Muslim, some laws relating to non-Muslim residents of Muslim territory are included. The chapter concludes with a discussion on anfal, that is, the property of the Islamic state, including all natural wealth and wastelands (see Quran 8:1). 5. Kitab al-sawm (fasting). 6. Kitab al-i’tikaf (seclusion). Seclusion is regarded as a desirable act of devotion in Islamic law and should be performed in the town mosque. 7. Kitab al-hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca during the last month of the Islamic lunar calendar). The special laws and conditions relating to the obligatory Muslim pilgrimage are outlined in this chapter. 8. Kitab al-’umra (a simpler kind of pilgrimage to Mecca which can be performed at any time of the year).

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9. Kitab al-jihad (war). The focus of this chapter is on warfare, both offensive and defensive. The latter case can include internal struggle as well as battles against external enemies. Also included is a discussion of the different categories of land within Muslim territory, the relationship between the Islamic state and non-Muslim governments, the status of non-Muslims in Muslim territory, and so on.15 10. Kitab al-amr bil-ma’ruf wa’l-nahy ‘an al-munkar (ordering what is good and forbidding what is evil). Here al-Mu’haqqiq lays out the rules and regulations of Islamic social obligations. B. Contracts (uqud) 1. Kitab al-tijara (transactions). This chapter distinguishes between valid and invalid methods of carrying out transactions, unlawful business, the right of cancellation of business agreements, conditions connected with contracts, and the like. It also includes a discussion on ownership and the fiscal system as applied to the various categories of land in Muslim territory, the legal status of working for unjust rulers and their disposal of Muslims’ wealth, and, in the legal works of the past century up to now, a study of the jurist guardianship (wilayat al-faqih). Legal discussions on subjects such as music and interest on loans appear as well. 2. Kitab al-rahn (mortgage). 3. Kitab al-mufallas (bankruptcy). This chapter addresses the responsibilities of the Islamic state when a person goes bankrupt and his assets do not balance his liabilities. 4. Kitab al-hajr (interdiction) Here we learn of cases in which an owner is legally forbidden from disposing of his own property, as is the case with minors and the insane. 5. Kitab al-zaman (suretyship for claims, transference of the liability with regard to a claim). A discussion of suretyship (guarantee) for persons (al-kafala bi-l-nafs) is also included. 6. Kitab al-sulh (conciliation) on the mutual agreement of two persons on a certain matter, the details of which are not clear; for example, the mutual agreement between the creditor and the debtor on a specified sum where the amount of the debt is not precisely known. 7. Kitab al-sharika (partnership). 8. Kitab al-Muzaraba (sleeping partnership) on when one party invests the capital and the other provides the labor. 9. Kitab al-muzara’a wa ‘l-musaqat (sharecropping) on when the landlord entrusts his land to a cultivator, or the owner of an orchard gives it to someone to look after in return for a share of the produce.

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10. Kitab al-wadi’a (deposit) on the safe-keeping of someone else’s property. 11. Kitab al-’ariya (freely lending an object to someone to make use of it). 12. Kitab al-ijara (hire and lease). Also discussed is the sale of usufruct or the hire of service. 13. Kitab al-wikala (procuration) on assigning representatives to do business on one’s behalf. 14. Kitab al-wuquf wa’l-sadaqat (endowments and charity). 15. Kitab al-sukna wa’l-tahbis (temporary donation of usufruct). 16. Kitab al-hibat (donation of objects). 17. Kitab al-sabq wa’l-rimaya (horse and camel racing and marksmanship contests) the only two cases where betting is regarded as legal, for the actual participants only. 18. Kitab al-wasaya (legacies). 19. Kitab al-nikah (marriage). C. Unilateral Obligations (Iqa’at) 1. Kitab al-talaq (divorce). 2. Kitab al-khul’ wa’l-mubara’a (two kinds of divorce by which the wife redeems herself from the marriage for a consideration). 3. Kitab al-zihar (a husband’s statement to his wife, saying she is like his mother) this was a saying occasionally used in Arab communities. This declaration requires a religious expiation (kaffara). 4. Kitab al-ila’ (a husband’s oath to abstain from marital intercourse for a period of more than four months, in which case he must either give up his oath or divorce his wife). 5. Kitab al-li’an (a husband’s affirmation, through a cursing oath and before a court of law, that his wife has been unfaithful, and a similar affirmation by his wife that the husband is lying). After such an oath and counter-affirmation, the marriage is irrevocably dissolved. 6. Kitab al-itq (the manumission of slaves). 7. Kitab al-tadbir wa’l-mukataba wa’l-istilad (three ways for slaves to acquire their freedom). Tadbir is a manumission that takes effect from the time of the owner’s death. Mukataba is a contract between the owner and the slave by which the latter acquires his freedom against a future payment. The third concept, istilad, refers to cases where a female slave gives birth to a child for her owner, in which case she becomes free on her owner’s death. 8. Kitab al-iqrar (acknowledgment of debt or addressing family relationships). A confession that one’s actions have created an obligation to redress.

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9. Kitab al-ju’ala (the undertaking by a person to pay a certain sum in return for the performance of some specific task, no matter who actually performs it). For instance, someone offers a sum as a reward for the return of some property of his which has been lost. 10. Kitab al-ayman (oaths). On undertakings stated in the name of God. 11. Kitab al-nadhr (vow). An undertaking toward God to do or not do something unconditionally or provided a certain wish comes true. D. Rules (ahkam) 1. Kitab al-sayd wa’l-dhibaba (hunting and slaughtering). 1. Kitab al-at ‘ima wa’l-ashriba (food and drinks). 2. Kitab al-ghasb (usurpation). 3. Kitab al-shuf’a (pre-emption) a co-owner’s right of first refusal to buy the other share of the property, so that he can dissolve the sale of that share and take it into his own possession if it is sold to an outsider without the co-owner’s agreement. 4. Kitab ihya’ al-mawat (reclamation of wastelands). This chapter also includes a survey of land law and is normally followed by a study of the common property of the community (mushtarakat), such as water and pasture. 5. Kitab al-luqata (trove property) obligations on found property. 6. Kitab al-fara’id (inheritance). 7. Kitab al-qada (arbitration) legal procedure. 8. Kitab al-shahadat (witnesses). 9. Kitab al-hudud wa’l-tazirat (penal law). 10. Kitab al-qisas (retaliation) on the right of the offended person or his heirs against the offender. 11. Kitab al-diyat (on blood-money and other financial compensations).16 THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION The current jurisprudence is not as old as Islam. The subject matter, methodology, and sources have all changed over time. Throughout the centuries, Ulama often divided the history of jurisprudence into two periods: ancient or early scholars (qudama or mutaqaddimun) and modern or later scholars (muta’akhkhrun). However, the time period that they meant by early or modern kept changing. There are multiple perspectives on how to categorize periods in the evolution of jurisprudence. Let’s now take a look at these periods to observe the evolution of jurisprudence through history and witness its potential. These periods include:

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1. The period of the presence of the infallible Imams from the time of the Prophet until 874. Imams encouraged their learned followers to derive details and specific laws from the general rules and principles they put forth. Many theological (kalami) disagreements occurred among the companions of the Imams, to the point that some of them accused the others of heresy, but the Imams respected all of them and urged them to honor and respect each other. Some of them did not even believe that the Imams were endowed with infallibility and impeccability (isma). In this view, the Imams were merely pious learned men (Ulama abrar). Some companions believed that the Imams, just like the jurists of those times, practiced independent judgment (ra’y) or analogical reasoning (qiyas). Thus, two traditions existed during the time of Imams among Ulama: adherents of an analytical, rational approach toward legal problems within the framework of the general principles of the Quran and Tradition; and a traditionalist approach relying on transmitting traditions without any further inferential derivation to law.17 2. The first century of the occultation. From the time of the minor occultation (874–941) until the late tenth century, three legal schools appeared in Shia. The first was called the School of the Traditionalists (Ahl al-hadith), which had moderate and radical branches. The moderates, including al-Kulayni and Shaykh al-Saduq, accepted traditions that were related by transmitters whose reliability had been thoroughly examined. They recognized and implemented those principles of jurisprudence which were contained in the traditions of the Imams. The radicals, on the other hand, followed traditions without compromise and ignored the principles of jurisprudence and the rules by which a tradition could be examined. The second group emerged later and was called Qadimayn (the Two Ancient [scholars]), consisting of two figures who each had their own approach to law: Ibn Abi Aqil al-Umani18 and Ibn alJunayd Iskafi (d. 991).19 They exercised analytical and rational thought in law and constituted the first school of Shia deductive law. The first figure did not consider traditions transmitted by one person or only by a few transmitters (akhbar al-ahad) as valid, but his contemporary Ibn al-Junayd accepted the validity of akhbar al-ahad. The latter was accused of belief in ra’y and qiyas as well.20 The third group was the intermediate school with figures like Ali b. Babawayh al-Qummi (d. 941) and Jafar b. Muhammad Qulawayh al-Qummi (d. 979–980). They formulated their juridical opinions through the process of extracting specific precepts from the general principles implied in the traditions, or through selection or reconciliation when traditions were contradictory. They also acknowledged the validity of many ahad traditions.

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3. The rationalists, represented by Shaykh Mufid and his pupil, al-Sharif Murtada, accused all Qummi traditionalists of being religious deviationists and ultimately stopped the spread of their school of thought. The approach of the rationalists relied firmly on general Quranic principles and on widely transmitted (mutawatir) traditions and excluded those traditions which didn’t provide certainty (ahad). Rather, they conformed to those legal views which were accepted and continually practiced among Shia (ijma). The process of inferring precepts from the appropriate sources was achieved through rational analysis, the procedures, and rules of conduct which were familiar to the rational theologians. 4. The School of Shaykh al-Tusi (d. 1067) attempted to retain the authority of ahad traditions as a source of law while still preserving the analytical and rational method of law, thus offering a combination of the rationalist and traditionalist methods. Shaykh Tusi integrated an important part of Sunni jurisprudence into Shia.21 Allama Hilli (d. 1277) developed and refined this method and contributed to the development of jurisprudence, particularly in two areas. He enlarged the section on legal transactions on the basis of relevant general rules mainly taken from Sunni law. He also employed advanced mathematical rules in the relevant legal subjects such as the law of inheritance, the times of prayer, and the direction of prayer. He also contributed to the criticism of the transmitters of the traditions and created a novel classification for the Shi’a traditions according to the degree of authority of their narrators. Hilli’s writings, as Moussavi shows, represent the peak of ShiaSunni theoretical legal interactions at an intellectual level. Hilli wrote Mukhtasar al-Muntaha fi-l-Usul, a commentary on a work by the Sunni scholar Ibn Hajib (d. 1429), which was praised in turn by the leading Sunni traditionalist, Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani (d. 1449).22 5. The school of al-Shahid al-Awwal (d. 1384) reformulated the fundamental rules of jurisprudence, expanded its content, and gave it an independent identity. A commentary on his masterpiece al-Lum’a alDimishqiyya is among the most important works of jurisprudence and serves as a textbook for hawza students to learn semi-argumentative jurisprudence. 6. The Safavid period. Jurisprudence was nourished in this era first by al-Muhaqqiq al-Karaki (d. 1534), due to his stringent legal reasoning and the attention he gave to certain problems which had arisen out of the new political situation with the adoption of Shi’ism as the official religion of Iran. These problems included the limits of the legal power of the faqih (jurist), the legitimacy of Friday prayer in the absence of the Imam, land tax, and so forth. Muqaddas al-Ardabili (d. 1585) then

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developed his own jurisprudential method characterized by independent rational arguments based on his personal juridical analysis, entirely ignoring the opinions and views of previous scholars. Finally, there was a revival of Akhbarism, which opposed the rational, analytical approach to the law and adhered strictly to the outward, literal meanings of the traditions.23 Amin al-Astarabadi argued against rational analysis and reasoning as a means of discovering legal norms. Like the radical wing of the early traditionalists, they considered all traditions transmitted from the Imams as authentic and rejected the validity of deductive reasoning. However, there were moderate Akhbarites like Mullah Muhsin Fayz Kashani. Allama Majlisi considered himself halfway between Usuli and Akhbarite. Shaykh Hurr Amili, the author of Wasa’il al-Shi’a, also adhered to Akhbarism. As Yusufi Ishkiwari argues, the power of the Safavids and the power of Ulama did not develop jurisprudence, but in fact led to its decline.24 7. The school of Wahid al-Bihbahani (d. 1791). Bihbahani’s strong rational arguments and analysis defeated the Akhbarites and re-established the authority of reason and rational argument in jurisprudence. Shaykh al-Ansari (d. 1864) reconstructed jurisprudence and its methodology. He greatly extended the practical principles (al-usul al-amaliyya) in usul al-fiqh and rebuilt it on a rational basis. He also developed a section on transactions using this method. His books on both jurisprudence and the principles of jurisprudence are textbooks in contemporary hawzas, where his school still remains dominant. All jurists after him, including Akhund Khurasani and Naini, are proud followers of his school. Although many future volumes on the principles of jurisprudence followed in Ansari’s footsteps, more than double that number of works on mu’amilat (acts of interactions) appeared in a short period of time. This came in response to the growing integration of the Shia world into the world economy but also paved the path toward interdependence between Ulama and the bazaar, which contributed to the Iranian revolution.25 This historical evolution of jurisprudence expanded jurisprudence and its principles as much as it transformed the meaning of faith and the life of the faithful. Neither resistance from Ulama who de-emphasized jurisprudence as the core of Islamic teachings nor jurisprudentially focused suggestions from reformist jurists changed the pathway to shaping the figure of Ayatollah. For example, when Abul-Hasan Isfahani (d. 1946) was the leading marja of the Shia world, many Ulama, some who would later become grand ayatollahs themselves, held several meetings and decided to suggest reforms to the hawza curriculum so as to address new challenges and include more theological teachings. They

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wanted to free Najaf Hawza from merely jurisprudential studies. Isfahani sent them a stern message saying that no one can change the hawza concentration on jurisprudence while he is alive. He added that religious taxes are given to tullab specifically for the study of fiqh and usul, nothing more.26 In addition to transforming Islam from orthodoxy to orthopraxy, this focus on jurisprudence brought about many more challenges. At least three criticisms from within the profession have arisen. First, no jurist can possibly master all the relevant fields of study. For example, the acts of reactions, business, and transactions are so vast and diverse that it’s impossible for one individual to understand and conclude them from the limited texts of Shari’a. Some have recommended specialization in the different branches of jurisprudence. Others talk of collective attempts and teamwork. When grand Ayatollah Borujerdi, the leading marja of Iran, passed away, many Ulama contributed to discussions on the future of Shia jurisprudence after the demise of such a great marja. Mutahhari suggested promoting professionalism by dividing the profession into many sections and also changing the individual work to institutionalized work.27 This proposition of an overarching jurisprudential institution leads to the second criticism. Each organization has to work with, within, and for a distinct plan and structure. The educational structure of hawza does not target a specific group for particular needs. Rather, Islamic jurisprudence, with its omnivorous expansion, attempts to address all matters of life, private and public, spiritual and physical, here and hereafter. Organizational work, however, not only sets boundaries but also assumes its own distinct nature. Abudiyyat, an expert in teaching philosophy in hawza, believed the attempt at accreditation and issuing degrees in Qum changed the nature of hawza. In comparing the current Qum Hawza with the time of Borujerdi, he concludes that hawza is just mimicking the western-style universities and losing its own identity. For example, in Borujerdi’s time, Qum had 3,000–4,000 talabas with 200 outstanding students like Allama Tabataba’i. Today it has more than 50,000 talabas without having even 50 like him. This new approach favored quantity over quality and degrees over knowledge.28 Grand Ayatollah Vahid Khurasani clearly and harshly criticized the new system in Qum Hawza which encourages seminarians to graduate. He said that there is no such thing as graduating from the hawza of Imam Sadiq. If faith is associated with knowledge and is a life-long journey, the sense of finality implied by graduation does not make sense. Moreover, specialization reduces a seminarian to a profession like a businessperson. A businessperson receives money in exchange for goods, but in Islam it is haram to make money from teaching religious fundamentals or issuing fatwa.29 A seminarian can request money from people, Ayatollah Zanjani wrote, only for teaching non-obligatory duties or in the case of destitution.30

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There are many occasions in jurisprudence when a seminarian deals with abstract ideas that have no pragmatic application. If they question their instructors about the benefits of learning them, they will be told it has scientific benefit (thamara ilmiyyah), meaning it sharpens the minds of students and teaches them to do speculative work. This is very useful for scientific inquiry or writing fiction, for example. But what about the faith and the urgent need for people to act faithfully? Jurisprudence’s position of privilege over its opponents in Islam, including theology, Sufism, and philosophy, was that it is down-to-earth and connects daily life and trivial issues to God. Moving toward elitist interests contradicts this and hurts the purpose of the Imamate, which guides people in real life and supports them for the betterment of the ummah.31 Finally, the reduction to jurisprudence and legal study associated with holiness provides the opportunity to spread excommunication and accuse fellow Muslims of apostasy. Subsequently, religious inclusivity diminishes while confusion among the faithful increases. There are many stories of spiritual and rational believers declared apostates by jurists. Ayatollah Sayed Muhammad Muhsin Husayni Tihrani lists a dozen mystic ayatollahs who suffered excommunication at the hands of legalistic ayatollahs obsessed with the minutiae of jurisprudence.32 Ayatollah Zanjani tells an interesting anecdote: a Shaykh was called infidel, perhaps, because of his anti-anthropomorphist theology.33 A jurist once ordered that no one should use the drinking glass he had used because he is not a Muslim. Another jurist who was present asked for the glass so that he could drink from it. The second jurist saved the Shaykh’s life.34 This is a clear example of how the tool of excommunication can be used if the religious view is reduced to a legal perspective. It also illustrates how laypeople can become confused by the contradicting acts of two jurists speaking in the name of faith. Dealing with these challenges while at the same time responding to the needs of the masses with regard to ongoing rapid developments in the world marks the next journey of mujtahids and their paths to becoming maraji’. The next chapter explores this journey. NOTES 1. Meir Litvak, “Shi’ite Seminaries in Iraq,” in Encyclopedia Iranica (available at https://www​.iranicaonline​.org​/articles​/iraq​-xi​-shiite​-seminaries) (accessed September 30, 2022). 2. Regarding a very common classification of knowledge in Islam, the subject of knowledge is either a matter of knowledge or a matter of practice. The latter deals with ethics (practices relevant to emotions and feelings) and jurisprudence (external functions). The former is either to acquire religious truths (called kalam) or to acquire

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truths by reasoning regardless of its harmony with the faith (called Philosophy), or moving beyond a conceptual knowledge, rather uniting with the truth (Sufism). The second part of the book discusses controversies among mujtahids on the topics of Sufism, philosophy, and Maktab-e Tafik (a trend of separating theology from philosophy and Sufism). 3. Sufism and Gnosticism are the same in the Islamic context. One may elaborate the distinct application of each term as follows: when the practical advice and social appearance of Sufism is considered, it is called tasawwuf (Sufism); when its worldview is concerned, it is called irfan (Gnosticism). Yet, Shia mujtahids prefer to use the term irfan with a positive connotation and tasawwuf with a negative connotation. See also chapter 7, “Sufism and Spirituality.” 4. Khalid Sindawi wrongly stated that the real reason for the absence of intensive study of the Quran in hawzas is Shia belief that the existing Quranic text is incomplete and defective (Khalid Sindawi, “Hawza Instruction and Its Role in Shaping Modern Shi’ite Identity: The Hawzas of al-Najaf and Qumm as a Case Study,” in Middle Eastern Studies (Taylor & Francis, 2007), Vol. 43, No. 6, p. 842). Though some Shia scholars contributed to this theory, they were and remain very exceptional. No contemporary grand ayatollahs in Qum, Najaf, or other parts of the Shia world hold this idea. In fact, they have written several books to refute the claim. 5. In an essay addressing grand Ayatollah Muntazeri, Abdul-karim Suroush attributes ten qualities to fiqh which make this discipline vulnerable and encourages fuqaha to update it. (1) as a man-made discipline, it is imperfect; (2) it was developed to respond to society’s need for law and order, thus it is a posterus, not a priori to a civilization; (3) because it aims to bring law and order, it is a worldly discipline; (4) it concerns external and knowable facts, not matters of intention and the heart, so it is not very religious; (5) the current jurisprudence is the product of an undeveloped community; (6) like law, it learns from other epistemologies and ontologies and anthropology and must remain open to new developments in these sciences; (7) it aims to remove conflict from society to set a minimum, neutral, foundation for improvement rather than attempting to create maximum good; (8) it is very dependent on custom, sociology, and politics; (9) the current jurisprudence is based on obligation, and as such contradicts the world, which is based on rights; (10) the current jurisprudence believes there is unknown good behind many social laws, and this dogma does not allow it to evolve radically (Abdul Karim Sorush, “Fiqh dar tarazu,” in Kiyan (Tehrand, [no date]) No. 46, p. 21. 6. See Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, (Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society, 2005), pp. 1-15; Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence According to Shi’i Law, Arif Abdul Hussain trans. & ed. (London: ICAS, 2003), pp. 39-48. 7. Akhbarism was a minor Shia school during the late Safavid period. Adherents of this school rejected the use of reasoning, ijma, and referring to the Quran for the production of Islamic regulations. They recognized Sunnah as the only source of laws, leaving no role for mujtahids. For further reading, see the previous chapter Ayatollah and Mujtahid.

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8. Hossein Modarressi Tabataba’i, An Introduction to Shi’i Law: A Bibliographical Study, (London: Ithaca Press, 1984), p. 4; also see, Esmat al-Sadat Tabatabaei Lotfi, Ijtihad in Twelver Shi’ism (a thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy) (The University of Leeds, 1999), available at https://etheses​.whiterose​.ac​.uk​ /415/. 9. Al-Sadr, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence According to Shi’i Law, pp. 63-111; Murtaza Mutahhari, Jurisprudence and Its Principles, Laleh Bakhtiar trans., (2020), 28-33. 10. Al-Sadr, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence According to Shi’i Law, pp. 112125; Murtaza Mutahhari, Jurisprudence and Its Principles, 41-46. 11. To learn about its classic and modern journey in Sunni jurisprudence see: Jasser Auda, Maqasid al-Shari'a as Philosophy of Islamic Law: A Systems Approach, (The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2008). 12. Cited by Moddarressi Tabataba’i, An Introduction to Shi’i Law . . ., p. 15. 13. See The Secular and The Sacred Complementary and/or Conflictual, John Hogan and Sayed Hassan Akhlaq (ed.) (Washington, DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2017), pp. 361-382. 14. In Sunni law, it applies only to the spoils of war and discoveries of treasure. See the debate between Sunni and Shia in the Quran, 8:41. 15. For an example of modern ijtihad on jihad by a traditional mujtahid, see Ayatollah Salehi Najafabadi, Jihad in Islam, Hamid Mavani trans., (Montreal: Organization for the Advancement of Islamic Knowledge, 2012). 16. Moddarressi Tabataba’i, An Introduction to Shi’i law .  .  . , pp. 18-22. For a comparative and modern perspective on these laws and categories, see Encyclopedia of Islamic Law A Compendium of the Major Schools, adapted by Laleh Bakhtiar (Chicago: KAZI Publications, 1996). 17. Moddarressi Tabataba’i, An Introduction to Shi’i law . . ., p. 24-32; Daieratul Ma’arif Tashayyu Tashayyu: Sayri dar farhang va tarikh-e Tashayyu, (Tehran: Muhebbi, 1373/1994), pp. 72-80. 18. He was the teacher of Ibn Qawlawayh al-Qumi and wrote Al-Tamassuk bi Habl al-Rasul and Al-Karr wa’l-Farr. 19. Not to be confused with the well-known Sufi al-Junayd al-Baghdadi (Abu al-Qasim ibn Muhammad) (830–910). Iskafi believed that Imams exercised ijtihad and thus were occasionally divided on some issues. He authored Mukhtasar alAhmadi, Tazhib al-Shi’i, and al-Asfar. But his books were abandoned because he used analogical reasoning (qiyas) in his deduction (Mahmud Ramyar, “Ijtihad and Marja’iyyat,” in Shi’ism, Thought, and Spirituality, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Hamid Dadashi, and Seyyed Vali Nasr (ed.) (State University of New York Press, 1988), p, 230. 20. Moddarressi Tabataba’i, Ibid, pp. 35-39; Daieratul Ma’arif Tashayyu, Ibid, pp. 80-83. 21. Tusi complained publicly and loudly about his fellow Ulama who ignore reasoning and focus on hadiths. He was brave enough to conclude verdicts such as considering painting and statues lawful, the earth spherical, and the clouds products of vapor (see Mahmud Ramyar, “Ijtihad and Marja’iyyat,” in Shi’ism, Thought, and

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Spirituality, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Hamid Dadashi, and Seyyed Vali Nasr (ed.) (State University of New York Press, 1988), p, 234-6. 22. Crow and Moussavi, Facing One Qiblah, p. 7. 23. Akhbarites charged Usuli Ulama with adopting Sunni concepts like the principles of ijtihad and qiyas (Crow and Moussavi, Ibid, p. 10). Also, see the section in the previous chapter on Usulism versus Akhabrism. 24. Daieratul Ma’arif Tashyyu, Ibid, p. 92. To realize the impact Shaykh Ansari had on cultivating the new image of a mujtahid in Shia Islam, see Juan R. Cole, “Imami Jurisprudence and the Role of the Ulama: Mortaza Ansari on Emulating the Supreme Exemplar,” in Religion and Politics in Iran: Shi’ism from Quietism to Revolution, Nikki R. Keddie (ed.) (Yale University Press, 1983), pp. 33-46 25. Meir Litvak, “Shi’ite Seminaries in Iraq,” in Encyclopedia Iranica. 26. Safa-al-din Tabarra’iyan, “Nihad-e marja'iyyat-e Shia (Aban 1325—Khurdad 1349)”, in Tarikh-e Ma’asir-e Iran (Tehran: Muassis-e mutali’at-e tarikh-e ma’asir-e Iran, 1387/2008), Vol. 12, No. 45, p. 34. 27. Sayed Muhammad Husayn Hussaini Tabataba’i et  al. Bahthi darbare Marjai’yat va Ruhaniyat (A discussion on marja'iyyah and clergies), (Tehran: Shirkat-e Sahami Intishar, 1341/1962) pp. 60-65. Also, Kamali reviewing diverse views on the divisibility of ijtihad in both the classic and modern worlds concludes, “The divisibility of Ijtihad would thus seem to be in greater harmony with the conditions of the research in modern times,” Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 482. 28. Abul Rasul Ubudiyyat, “No one becomes a philosopher based on the current educational methodology,” in Mubahithat (Qum, 1397/2018), No. 18, pp. 32-33. 29. Sayed Muhammad Husayn Hussaini Tabataba’i et  al. Bahthi darbare Marjai’yat va Ruhaniyat, Ibid, pp. 144-151. 30. Shubairi Zanjani, Sayed Ahmad, al-Kalam yajurro al-kalam (Qum: Haqbin, 1396/2017), Vo.1, p. 122. 31. Also see, Hussaini Tabataba’i et al. Bahthi darbare Marjai’yat va Ruhaniyat, Ibid, pp. 123-125. 32. Sayed Muhammad Husayn Husayni Tihrani, Mihr-e Tabnak (Tehran: Maktabe Wahy, 1392/2013) p. 336. 33. Anthropomorphism is the attribution of human qualities to God. The Shaykh believed that existence is not common between God and humans. God is above being and non-being! 34. Shubairi Zanjani, Jor’a-e az darya, Vol. 3, p. 339.

Chapter 5

Grand Ayatollahs, Marja’iyyah, and the Division of Imitated and Imitator

I saw several grand ayatollahs in person, but two of them remain fresh in my memory: Muhammad Ali Araki (1894–1994) and Muhammad Taqi Bihjat (1916–2009). I learned about Araki from Iranian radio and TV after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, where it was reported that he said that an imitator can continue his imitation of a marja after the marja’s death, even in the subjects he has not yet imitated.1 He was called Shaykh al-Fuqaha wal-mujtahidin. I was curious why many seminarians did not know of him! I remember he was very old and hard of hearing. A visitor asked for his jurisprudential view about reciting the Quran associated with singing (ghina).2 A companion loudly repeated the question in his ear. Araki said ghina is legal for reciting the Quran and talked about Imam Sajjad, who used to recite the Quran so beautifully that people stopped by his house to listen. When the Imam learned the crowd had swelled to the point it was blocking the road, he stopped his recitation. But the story of Ayatollah Bihjat was different. He was a marja and a mystic. I heard about him from seminarians interested in esoterism and asceticism. Bihjat did not like to preach or mix with the masses, instead preferring absolute silence. Even though he included the title of grand ayatollah in his book, he usually went by the simple term al-abd (the servant), which is the basic relation of a believer to God in Islam. Bihjat was an exemplar of nobility and humility who taught with his silence. Araki and Bihjat were grand ayatollahs, but they were not representative of the position. Yet, they had the reputation of marja, a much higher accomplishment than a regular mujtahid. As I discussed in chapter 3 “Ayatollah and Mujtahid,” the mujtahid works at the intersection of individual scholarship, status among peers and teachers, and social reception. Regional and international factors add to this mixture on the path to the position of marja. An additional ingredient is the concept of 99

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most learned (a’alam), which fuels comparisons among maraji’. Moreover, sometimes a marja can stand out from his peers and build a reputation as the sole marja. Some maraji’ do not want the responsibility of this position. Others might launch a claim to the position in advance of popular recognition. This chapter will discuss the subject from multiple angles, beginning with a brief overview of the division of Shia faithful into two groups: the marja (lit. reference and exemplar; also, technically the word muqallad can be used to mean imitated) and the muqallid (imitator). In 1963, Professor Kenneth Morgan of Colgate University asked Allama Tabataba’i to write an authentic volume on Shia representing this distinct face of Islam. Allama’s book Shi’ite Islam served to illustrate how the Shia focus on the Imams is a product of their view of religion, particularly Islam. Accordingly, there were two objectives. The first was teaching the community about the many aspects and multiple layers of faith, and the second was applying these teachings to the social order. Therefore, scientific and spiritual leadership comes prior to sociopolitical leadership. If the sociopolitical leadership, though composed of people of faith, should ever gain priority, then in Allama’s words, “the just and freedom-giving rule of Islam could gradually be converted to dictatorial rule and completely autocratic government.”3 In his study of the four years and nine months of Imam Ali’s caliphate, despite the occurrence of three civil wars among Muslims, Allama cites three achievements: reviving the Prophet’s lifestyle versus the dominant imperial grandeur of Mu’awiyah to promote justice and benevolence; enhancing the Islamic sciences including Arabic literature and metaphysics; and training a large number of religious scholars and Islamic sages who became the first teachers of jurisprudence, theology, Quranic commentary, and recitation.4 This account shines light on the Shia perspective of the Imams, regardless of their number in the order. Moreover, their quietism teaches as much as political activism. Regardless of the diverse views among Shia Ulama about the quality and quantity of Imams’ knowledge, they are in agreement that it is a high level of knowledge. This knowledge along with their piety, which was elaborated under the concept of isma (impeccability, infallibility), make Imams the role models or exemplars of pious behaviors, correct understandings, and true interpretation of the Quran and the Prophet—not only about the faith’s origin and its past but also about the present and modern developments in individual and social life. These are the key and core concepts in the development of the dichotomy of imitator and imitated in Shia. As we saw in the previous chapter, during the time of Imams, two types of Ulama appeared: traditionalists and rationalists, with rationalists being in the minority. This is why some scholars argue the substantial functions of the first Ulama were as qurrah (reciters of the Quran), or muhaddith (hadith narrator), sahabi (companion), and rawi al-hadith (reporter of the hadith). However,

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the term Ulama was common and used by the Prophet, and the Imams surely encouraged some degree of ijtihad.5 When the Imam is not accessible during occultation, who can perform this job? Mousavi counted at least 47 traditions in Wasa’il al-Shi’a in which the Imams authorized the Ulama in their roles as hujjat (proof), qazi (judge), and ruwatt ahadithina (our traditions reporters).6 The variety of terms used by Imams covers both the exoteric and esoteric religious perspectives which the Imams shared and promoted. The term hujja can be more esoteric, qazi more exoteric, and ruwwat ahadithina both. In practice, the exoteric teachings dominated Shia public life, as they did with Sunni. Therefore, as the concepts of ilm and fiqh throughout Islamic history were reduced to jurisprudence, the concepts of hujjat and qazi had the same trajectory in Shia and thus the authority of Ulama was reduced to their jurisprudential aspect. On the other hand, the concept of deferring to Ulama on controversial issues and for legal injunctions transformed to taqlid (imitation), which implies the jurists’ pronouncements set binding precedents for the laity.7 This transformation happened gradually, and, particularly in recent times, through conceptual and economic development as well as local and national issues. Among the traditions on the authorization of Ulama to act on behalf of the Imams, three followings are held to be most assertive for the referential position of the Ulama. (1) The “noble decree” (al-Tawqi’ al-Sharif) on the authority of the twelfth Imam addressed to a devoted Shia, Ishaq Ibn Yaqub. Ibn Yaqub had raised the question, “Who should be approached during your [the Imam’s] absence when at the same time some of your cousins deny your existence?” The Imam replies: “In the case of new events, you should turn for guidance to those who relate our traditions, because they are my proof to you, as I’m God’s proof to them.” (2) The acceptable (maqbula) tradition Ibn Hanzala on the authority of the sixth Imam: Whoever has had his disputes settled by the ruler of his judge, whether right or wrong, has actually had his dispute settled by the taghut (a tyrannical ruler whose rule is against the divine law) [. . .] I assigned those who report our tradition as ruling judges (hakim) among you. They know our injunctions concerning what is permitted and prohibited; thus people should comply with their rulings.

(3) The tradition of Abu Khadija on the authority of the sixth Imam who addressed his community: “Designate as judge someone among you who is acquainted with our injunctions concerning what is permitted and prohibited; for I appoint such a man as judge over you.”8 These traditions assigned a teacher-student relationship to Ulama and laity, respectively, in a spiritual manner. Earlier lay Shia consulted a wide decentralized body of scholars possessing comparable non-hierarchical legal expertise and piety.

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FROM MUJTAHID TO MARJA In the previous chapter we learned about the mujtahid, an expert in Islamic law with the skills to deduce law from its main sources, namely the Quran, Sunnah, reason, and consensus. This is just the beginning, because it is an individual development which gives the mujtahid permission to follow his own deduction of Shari’a law. Some mujtahids do not wish to become marja; some lack the talents and requisite scholarship, while this promotion evades others due to external circumstances. Among the mujtahids who acquire both a scholarly reputation and social acceptance, few make it to the select group of potential maraji’. When a mujtahid becomes a marja, he also gains the title of grand ayatollah. The most common sign of reaching this stage is publishing al-risala amaliya (the treatise on practices) or tawzih al-masa’il (explaining the articles), a manual informing the faithful of their jurisprudential responsibilities (injunctions). It is essentially a Shia version of the rites in Catholicism, with a focus on rulings and fatwas. Still, local mujtahids retain their own power independent of the maraji’ (exemplars) and develop personal styles of leadership. Before further discussion of the current characteristics of a marja, we need to contemplate the construction of the idea and culture of al-marja’iyyah (lit. the position of the exemplar). The current position of Marja’iyyat al-Taqlid (lit. the exemplar of the emulation), the supreme exemplar who sets patterns for the whole community, is the product of four elements: conceptual development in the notion of ijtihad and a’alamiyyah (the most learned); the economic implications of khums; the centralization of Ulama in al-atabat al-aliyat (lit. the lofty thresholds, namely the four holy Iraqi cities of Najaf, Karbala, Kadhimiya, and Samarra);9 and political leadership in the Iranian Revolution. Given the negative reception of the term ijtihad in Shia thought due to its attachments to qiyas and ra’y, the first lengthy discussion of ijtihad appears in Sharif al-Murtada’s (965–1044) al-Dharia, in a chapter titled Fi Sifate al-Mufti wal-Mustafti (On the Quality of the Mufti and the Seeker of Fatwa). The title of this chapter was changed to “Ijtihad and Taqlid” in future texts. According to Sayed Murtada, if a city has more than one mufti, its people can choose whom to follow. Muhaqqiq al-Hilli (1205–1277),10 who for the first time changed the common term of istinbat to ijtihad in Shia, stated that laity must follow a mufti. If there are more than one equal in knowledge and just manners (adalat), Muslims can pick the one they prefer. But if one is the most learned and another more pious, followers must be guided by the fatwa of the most learned, since the fatwas come from knowledge, not piety (wara’). This inspired all future mujtahids in their discussions of the most learned. Allama Hilli introduced the term taqlid (imitation) and instructed that imitating the most learned is allowed (ja’iz) (“al-haqq annahu yajuzu lil’ami an yuqallida al-mujtahid

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fi furu’a al-shar’a”).11 Shahid Awwal transformed jawaz (permission) into wajib (obligation), saying, “it is obligatory to follow the most knowledgeable and the most pious” (“wajaba itba’a al-alam wal-awra”).12 Later jurists claimed there is a consensus (ijma), or the custom of intellectual people (sirat al-uqala), that supports the concepts of ijtihad and taqlid. However, the notion of alamiyat (the most learned mujtahid) developed and dominated within the Usuli context of the nineteenth century.13 Mulla Ahmad Naraqi (1771–1830)14 was a Qajar jurist who introduced the theory of jurist guardianship, unprecedented in Shia thought. He claimed jurists’ rights over both governance (wilayat al-amma) and special cases of trusteeships (wilayat al-khassa). Here, the mujtahid acts as a successor to the Imam and enjoys all the power of the Imam.15 Given that, a layperson accepts the marja al-taqlid as being of the same superior level of knowledge as the Imam.16 Naraqi’s well-known disciple Shaykh Ansari (d. 1864) strongly rejected this theory of jurist guardianship but claimed ijma on the necessity of emulating the most learned mujtahid. His pioneering scholarship on jurisprudence left a firm impression on the issue. Later, Ayatollah Muhammad Kazim Tabataba’i Yazdi (1831–1919), author of al-Urwa alWuthqa,17 initiated a new beginning in collecting and categorizing jurisprudence in 3,260 articles which clearly defined the principle of a’alamiyyah, writing that it is obligatory to follow the most learned mujtahid (a’alam) of the time, the one who is most informed about the rules and sources of jurisprudence and is most capable of deducing religious ordinances. He also introduced the obligatory nature of taqlid, concluding that any religious performance by a mukallaf (obligated believer) without the guidance of a mujtahid is unacceptable.18 This conceptual development paved the path toward the current notion of marja al-taqlid and marja as a referential model for his followers. Consequently, the power of taqlid, though it was present in rudimentary form in the history of Shia after the disappearance of the Imam and developed further by the school of Hillah19 in its technical sense—that is, following the speculative opinion of a mujtahid in the absence of a specific legal rule—was refreshed and reached vast new dimensions. This conceptual development eventually resulted in the office of marja al-taqlid in 1849, when Shaykh Muhammad Hassan Najafi, known as Sahib al-Jawahir,20 emerged after the deaths of all his competitors as the sole source for emulation in 1850.21,22 He already embodied the quality of being one of the most knowledgeable mujtahids; in taking this step, he received the title “absolute” (mutlaq) or “fullfledged” and “complete/general” (tamm) marja, the result when the most learned is determined to be one figure. However, the meaning of complete marja’iyyah remained unclear, since practical concerns are more important than juridical analysis in the making of a complete marja.

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What defines a complete marja? Is it the broad acknowledgment of the Shia community? The concurrence of other Ulama?23 Or the leadership of such a marja over other mujtahids?24 Under Saykh Muhammad Hassan Najafi’s exclusive authority, marja’iyyah became an institution rather than a personal office of the chief mujtahid’s network. He not only circulated his religious manual Nijat al-Ibad25 as the most popular risala amaliya but also consolidated the various madrassas and began to delegate his authority to his students and the local Ulama in a manner which was unprecedented before. He differentiated between delegating his authority for administering justice and giving the permission of ijtihad. His contemporary Mohammad Shah (1808–1848) accused him of turning Najaf into a factory for producing mujtahids. Najafi reminded him of the necessity of such delegation. A number of local Ulama had been receiving their shares of alms based on the authority delegated to them by a marja. This process closely tied the interests of the local Ulama with the marja, because it provided stronger links between the two parties. Najafi refused to accept alms from cities where he had assigned the deputy. In one instance, he returned 30,000 Bishlak to Baghdad where his former student al-Yasin represented him. Eventually, Najafi introduced a capable successor for his position: Shaykh Murtaza Ansari. Ansari was famous for his knowledge, piety, and just character. As discussed in the previous chapter, he made major contributions to the principles of jurisprudence. His sole leadership of the institution of marja’iyya from 1849 to 1864 represented an unprecedented universal recognition, and charitable funds flowed into Najaf. However, he did not write a treatise (risala), referring his followers to Najafi’s concise book and his own commentaries on the work, nor did he name a successor to his position. After Ansari, the institution of marja’iyyah shifted between single and multiple leadership until present times, but the notion of the most learned served as a rudder to guide the institution. In practice, however, knowledge was not the only factor in a mujtahid’s elevation. Economics also played a key role. As we’ve seen, mujtahids and maraji’ by definition are responsible for practical rulings on Islamic practices that every Muslim is assigned to perform. The ritual practices (ibadat) of Muslims are traditionally categorized by Shia scholars into ten: prayer (salat), fasting (sawm), hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca), zakat (almsgiving), khums (one-fifth), jihad, enjoining good and forbidding evil (amr bi’l-mruf wa nahy an al--munkar) tawalli (loving Imams and associating oneself with those who love Imams), and tabarri (disassociating oneself from enemies of Imams). Khums is the one that played a major role in forming the current institution of marja’iyyah. Khums is mentioned just once in the Quran (8:41) in the context of ghanima (spoils of war). Shia uses the traditions of Imams to illustrate that the term encompasses all sorts of income, profits, and benefits. The majority of jurists divide khums into six

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shares: one for God, one for the Prophet, one for the progeny of the Prophet, and one each for orphans, the poor, and those facing financial troubles while traveling. The first three go to Imams and are thus called the Imam’s share (sahm al-Imam). The last three go to needy Sayeds and are called Sadat’s (pl. of Sayed) share (sahm al-Sadat). It is believed the Imams instructed their representatives to collect the khums and used the funds to promote the faith. After the major occultation, Ulama disagreed on how to pay the Imam’s share, since he was not accessible. Few held that it was not an obligation when the Imam was not present. Shaykh Mufid reported on the confusion. Should the funds be saved? Should they be hidden somewhere, so that when the Imam reappears he can recover them? Should the money be left in the care of a trustworthy individual who can arrange to hand it over once the Imam has returned? Some advised to submit all shares to Sayeds. Mufid and Allama Hilli believed the faithful could spend the Imam’s share on Sayeds too, although Allama Hilli added that a qualified jurist can manage the spending of this share on Sayeds. It seems that Shaykh Baha’i (1547–1621) was the first mufti to say that the Imam’s share must be paid to a mujtahid. The main income of Ulama and madrassas during the Safavid period came from donations, endowments, and governmental salaries. During the Qajar period, Mirza Qummi declared that it was obligatory to pay the Imam’s share to a mujtahid. Tabataba’i Yazdi (1831–1919) affirmed Qummi’s idea, though he advised spending the Imam’s share on Sadat.26 However, the mujtahid has the privilege to manage it. Finally, grand Ayatollah Abul-Hasan al-Isfahani declared that the whole khums must be delivered to the mujtahid, and this began a new but strong trend among maraji’ lasting to today to command the believer to deliver all khums, both the Imam’s and Sadat’s shares, to the mujtahid. Thus, the revolution of fatwas on khums from ibaha (unnecessary in the time of occultation), to hiding or putting it in trust, to obligatory payments to mujtahids, led to the most learned mujtahid and the marja al-taqlid to direct substantial funding toward strengthening the institution of marja’iyyah.27 But this was just one aspect of the issue. The flow of money also made an impact on who became a marja. Maraji’ spent khums in many ways to promote faith, including on stipends for seminarians.28 The tradition of salaries or regular payments existed in Shia madrassas since the time of Sharif al-Murtada. Before the Safavid period, most funds came from state grants and pious endowments, though they did not constitute an independent and stable income for the Ulama. During the late Safavid period and afterward, the development of muharram processions29 and shrine pilgrimages provided independent resources for the mujtahid, particularly those in the atabat. The development of ritual processions inspired more members of the professional classes (asnaf) to give pious devotions to the Ulama, as Mousavi argues, and in turn, Ulama began

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incorporating some popular religion like elegies and visitation to tombs into judicial works.30 This financial independence was among the motivating factors for Ulama to move to the atabat. Yet, paying stipends to seminarians secures basic income for them, so that the receivers can focus on their education. In addition, some maraji’ early in their careers only provided stipends to seminarians who attend their course. The benefit is mutual: stipends attract more students by easing their expenses, and those students might then be motivated to propagate for the marja to acquire more imitators. Practically, receiving more stipends from a marja signals that the marja has many imitators, which burnishes his reputation among the masses. As Fischer notes, “funds are a way the Muslim public votes for maraji’i taqlid.”31 This game of stipends and imitators works to establish a marja’s fame. Grand Ayatollah Zanjani references maraji’ who did not gain popularity because they did not give stipends to seminarians,32 including the son of Mirza Shirazi who issued a verdict against using tobacco.33 Zanjani reports a particular case of a highly knowledgeable marja who failed to build a public reputation because he did not like to give money to propagating seminarians,34 even though he had the support of two grand ayatollahs. When Ayatollah Haeri shared this story, he added that a marja should work from a position of optimism and trust in those who come to him, not from strict, skeptical rules.35 The triumph of Usulism over Akhabarism in Karbala, the shrines of Imams in Iraq, and the sociopolitical situation in Iran36 made the atabat the center of religious study and paved the path to the formation of the institution of marja’iyyah. Many members of the next generation of Ulama received their recommendation letters (ijaza) from Bahr al-Ulum, the disciple of Bihbahani, in Karbala. He also was the first mujtahid who appointed Ulama to his office for specific professions: one for issuing fatwa, another for leading prayer in the main mosque (masjid al-Jami), and one for judgeship (qizavat).37 Thanks to the Imam’s share, Ulama now had their own independent income adjacent to the shrines of the Imams, pilgrimage sites for devout Shia. Developments in transportation and new means of communication made it easier and more preferable for Ulama to centralize the institution of marja’iyyah, run it from a distance, and strengthen their network.38 Additionally, an agreement between the Ottoman and Iranian authorities in 1829 provided the atabat with relative stability. Mousavi concludes that this encouraged the payers of khums to see the Ulama of the atabat as the most legitimate recipients of the Imam’s shares, coining the term “mujathids of atabat.” For example, we have no evidence of any systematic payment of stipends in other cities before Najaf.39 However, the marja’iyyah has not remained in Najaf or even in the atabat at all times, nor did one leading marja lead all hawzas. Yet, Najaf also set a pattern that Qum followed. Qum also

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had a shrine, a religious history, and Haeri’s relocation made it the second largest center of religious study in the Shia world, as we have seen. Finally, the shaping marja’iyyah inspired Ulama to distinguish between jurisprudential knowledge—which, up to that point, was deemed the most significant factor—and leading the institution of marja’iyyah. The marja’iyyah requires a kind of sociocultural insight, powers of judgment, and managerial skills which traditionally were not a part of jurisprudential professionalism. It is said that when Mirza Shirazi passed away, many well-known Ulama approached grand Ayatollah Fisharaki (1837–1898), the teacher of then grand Ayatollah Haeri, to run for the complete authority (marja’iyyat al-amma). He replied, I’m not qualified for it because religious leadership (al-riyasat al-shariya) needs more than jurisprudential knowledge, including political understanding and proper responses to new phenomena. I am very cautious (waswasi) about these kinds of things, so if I enter into them I destroy them instead of reforming them. I am to limit myself to teaching.40

This anecdote shows how the emergence of marja’iyyah poses Shia thought with new challenges which are still reappearing constantly in different forms. As the shaping of the institution of marja’iyyah occurred through the intersection of conceptual development, economic independence, and territorial factors, the continuity and efficiency of marja’iyyah also depended on these factors. When a complete marja dies, many questions and suggestions arise. It fuels theological, jurisprudential, and political questions—even questions of fundamental identity. The death of Borujerdi, who was the sole marja in Iran, marked the beginning of intense internal discussions about the nature of proper Islamic leadership and the need for a formal appointment process for high-ranking positions within the religious hierarchy. Some even proposed setting up a council of distinguished Ulama to guide the community.41 Iranian Ulama face multiple issues. They operate in a system based on the theory of jurist guardianship, in which there is a supreme leader who is not required to be a marja in accordance with the amended constitution (1989) but who seeks that office in order to pursue a political ideology. Above all, they must navigate the conflicts between national interest and religious orientations. In Iraq, multiple maraji’ work together under the complete leadership of grand Ayatollah Sistani, who succeeded Khoei and is enormously popular among Shia around the world, including in Iran. Some are concerned that he will be the last traditional marja with a wide range of imitators across the globe, so the diversity and division within marja’iyyah are unlikely to end any time soon. The history and dynamism of Shia marja’iyya leave no room to predict the future with any accuracy. No one could imagine Ayatollah Khomeini would make such an impact on the history of Shia, that Ayatollah

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Khamenei could run Khomeini’s system, or that Ayatollah Sistani would play such a huge role in fighting ISIS in Iraq in the twenty-first century. Not only is the gate of ijtihad and conjectural scholarship wide open, but everyday life and ongoing circumstances continue to leave their mark on the selection of maraji’, dynamically shaping the future of the position.

PRACTICE AND RECEPTION The three issues of the most learned, the circulation of funds, and the locality associated with faith continue to impact a particular candidate for marja’iyyah over his peers and expand diversity in leadership. Thus, one can distinguish between the qualifications of a desirable marja that are laid out in theory in the risalas and how the selection is made in practice. In other words, the ambiguity of the issue and associated religious feelings open the space for money and locality to make an impact. Most contemporary jurists believe a mujtahid is qualified as a marja to imitate if he or she meets these qualifications: to be living, to be the most learned, and to possess a just manner. A majority of jurists consider being male a requirement, but as I will discuss in chapter 11, “Women,” some newer maraji’ do not require it. If candidates are equal in these qualities, the most learned is preferred. There are three ways to discern the most qualified mujtahid to imitate and make one’s preferred marja: individual certainty, the testimony of two just individuals, and agreement by a group of Ulama. There is much room for subjectivity here, including in the decision of who is the most learned. Regarding the most learned (a’alamiyat), there are at least three challenges that are very common among current Ulama. The first is that neither the concept nor the referent of the concept of a’alamiya is always clear. There were Ulama studying before multiple maraji’ who could not determine which is the most learned to introduce them as such.42 Grand Ayatollah Zanjani speaks of the most learned who did not write a risala.43 The most learned could lose his skills because of involvement with other activities, like preaching. This happened to the classmate of Shaykh al-Ansari.44 One marja may be the most learned in one aspect of law and another in a different aspect, that is, acts of worship or interactions as happened, some believe, with Naini and Abul-Hasan Isfahani.45 Should accuracy be the measure of the most learned, because jurisprudence is a science, or should it be common sense, because jurisprudence is for common people?46 Must a jurist be more accurate or more cautious? More clear or more accurate?47 Concentrated on the subject or looking at a broader context?48 The complexity of the subject can cause confusion because of the great amount of subjectivity involved.49 One mujtahid argued that disagreement over who is the most learned can never be resolved

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permanently because it is totally subjective, not objective.50 Such ambiguity among Ulama might make it understandable that even some recent maraji’ do not consider most knowledgeability as a requirement. Haeri, the founder of Qum Hawza, did not include it among the desired qualities.51 Second, as we learned from Fisharaki, the distinction between marja as jurist and marja as leading authority of a faith community poses many questions for mujtahids. To highlight the difference between two kinds of marja, one scholar referred to two grand ayatollahs, both disciples of Naini. One was concerned about whether an injunction is stated clearly in law to make sure the believers are complying with Shari’a; thus he concluded that initiating government in the time of occultation is haram. The other was concerned with the sociopolitical life of the believers and everyday matters and concluded an Islamic government is wajib. The former wanted to explore divine law and the latter wanted to see its application in real life.52 Regardless of the ayatollahs’ conclusions, their differing approaches show two totally different concerns. Maraji’ who were invested in the sociopolitical interests of the community contributed to a call to include nontraditional concerns into the qualifications of a leading marja. While the established maraji’ exercised classic jurisprudence to demonstrate knowledgeability, Khomeini, as a political marja, recommended transitioning to a new concept of ijtihad which suits social and governmental subjects along with the consideration of the umma’s masliha. “Conventional hawza-type ijtihad is not sufficient,” Khomeini continued, rather, a person who has superior knowledge in the conventional sciences of the hawzas but is incapable of identifying the welfare of society or cannot distinguish good and useful from bad people, and in general lacks correct insight and power of deciding, is not a mujtahid in social and governmental issues and cannot lead society.53

One grand ayatollah from a religious establishment, a pioneer of reform, called for the office of marja’iyyah to transcend the classical conception of the most learned in order to become an institution of knowledge production. He was Sayed Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (1935–1980), who described the current marja’iyyah as the “individualistic marja’iyyah” (marja’ya aldhatiya). The classic jurisprudential office centered on the person (dhat) of the marja, his personal accomplishments, style of teaching, leadership, crisis-management ability, and experience in political affairs. Both the production of knowledge and the connection with the community of believers happened through his individual style, his family, his hand-picked associates, agents, and advisors who would often interfere with his relationship with the public, causing confusion. Al-Sadr, in contrast, suggested a new form of marja’iyyah, called the “institutional/objective marja’iyyah” (al- marja’iyyah

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al-mawdu’iya), which like the Prophet and the Imams, acts as a shahid (witness) responsible for conveying not just jurisprudence but divine guidance to the people. This conceptual development consists of a comprehensive understanding of ilm (knowledge), meaning involvement with the humanities and social sciences. The marja is like the Prophet and the Imam, except he applies human effort and deep piety to interpret and deliver the divine message.54 Since marja’iyyah possesses a strong human aspect, it needs to learn from modern institutions of science production and community leadership. This transforms the office into an institution in which the role of marja takes precedence over the marja as a person. The institution is not assigned to any particular person, unlike the Imam and the Prophet. This institution is responsible for conducting both the required and comprehensive knowledge and two-way communication with the community.55 While the Iraqi al-Sadr had an impact on the Islamic regime of Iran, as I will discuss further in chapter 10, “Politics and Government,” the real trajectory of Islamic government in Iran under the theory of jurist guardianship divided Lebanese Ulama after Khomeini’s death. One faction supported the Lebanese marja Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah with an emphasis on a’alamiyyah (most knowledgeability), while another advocated the Iranian leader Khamenei for his political views.56 However, Fadlallah himself subscribed to neither the theory that a marja need only focus on legal knowledge nor the concept of a’alamiyyah. He believed the former excludes many aspects of faithful life, including politics, while the latter hurts Shia unity and progress. He called for removing the religious obligation to follow the most learned marja (adam wujub taqlid al-alam). Rather, the ideal marja must possess juridical, social, and political maturity. While laity can emulate his individual acts of worship and interactions with more than one jurist simultaneously, in political and international causes they must follow an ideal marja concerned with the cause of justice and fighting oppression. Fadlallah’s ideal marja is the Shia version of the modern Papacy, which is not limited to a legal understanding of faith. This pope-like marja must care about humanity regardless of their faith, consider sociopolitical developments, protect faith against materialist movements, and promote spiritual values around the world.57 Khomeini resembled this kind of marja in Shia history, in Fadlallah’s view.58 Another Lebanese mujtahid is worthy of mention in terms of ignoring most learned indirectly. He is Ayatollah Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din, who served as the president of al-Majlis al-Shi’i al-Ala (Supreme Islamic Shia Council) in Lebanon from 1978 to 2001. Though he was not a formally designated marja, he provided vital legal guidance to Syrians and Lebanese. He emphasized that mujtahids must have no political affiliation with foreign countries. A political activist would lose his adala (just manner, impartiality), which is required to be a marja. Thus, the old tension between knowledge

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and piety arises in a new form in Shia jurisprudence. Shams al-Din argues that colonial experiences teach us to weigh adala as much as alamiya. He promoted national maraji’ in places where the faithful form their views of religious leaders in connection with their national citizenry and overcome the duality of temporal and spiritual authority.59 A third challenge facing contemporary Ulama is that, according to the current constitution of Iran, the supreme leader must only be a mujtahid, not a marja. The constitution is based on Khomeini’s theory of jurist guardianship, though in Khomeini’s time the old version of the constitution assigned marja’iyyah as the quality required for the supreme leader. The Iranian regime claims it is an umm al-qura of jahan-e Islam (lit. mother of all settlements in the Islamic world), being a religious source for Muslims, or at least Shia, around the world. When the current supreme leader Ali Khamenei was selected and introduced as such, no one believed he was really a marja. His marja’iyyah is a matter of controversy among Shia, both in Iran and around the world. Subsequently, the issue of the most learned in jurisprudence was ignored, even for mujtahids. Khamenei’s sociopolitical awareness and leadership skills were preferred over his jurisprudence and even over his religious scholarship, because he was not known as an outstanding scholar in any of the rational (aqli) or transmitted (naqli) sciences commonly taught in hawza. He was selected instead for the interests of the community or nation (maslaha). While this selection was justified and rationalized by political propagation,60 hawzas’ conservatism, and the jurisprudential concept of maslaha, it created great tension outside Iran and split Shia around the world into two groups, for and against the selection.61 It was a crisis in Shia jurisprudence, which had reached its historical peak with the concept of the most learned mujtahid, particularly in situations when the old established marja had died. This split still rears its head in public from time to time on issues such as declaring the Eid day in Iran. The government announces the Eid day based on the supreme leader’s statement, but many Shia ask their own maraji’ to learn the correct day of Eid. Thus, in recent years, Muslims celebrate the first day of Eid differently in Iran. Regardless of its temporary influence on Iran, the issue of the most learned encounters many challenges among both jurists and laity. I would like to mention a couple of examples showing the role that locality plays in marja’iyyah, though detailing the issue is beyond the scope of this study. The history of great jurists in Shia illustrates a huge diversity with regard to local, ethnic, and geographical backgrounds. A study published in Tehran retrospectively applied the term marja for 58 figures through 1,000 years of the most influential jurists in Shia history, up through Borujerdi in 1947. Among them, 34 were Persian-speaking and 24 Arabic-speaking (16

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Iraqis, 7 Levantine, and 1 Omani). Regarding their country of education, 40 studied in Iraq and 14 in Iran, with 4 unknown. All those who came before Sahib al-Ma’alim, al-Hassan b. Zayn al-Din al-Amili (1552–1603) studied either in Iraq prior to the Safavids or in Isfahan in Iran during Safavid rule. After graduating and becoming an authority, 34 of the jurists resided in Iraq, 18 in Iran, and 6 in the Levant. Thirty-one of them grew up in a family of Ulama, while 27 did not. Forty-eight came from urban areas and 10 from villages. Although there are some ambiguities on the details of the survey, a similar publication in Najaf does not show much difference.62 These studies do not reflect the historical impact of location on choosing a marja, since the dichotomy of the imitated and imitator is not a millennium old. However, they tell us what we can expect when the dualism of mujtahid and muqallid emerges and religious taxes, including the Imam’s share, portray the Shia public’s vote for marja al-taqlid, in Fischer’s words.63 This is amplified in the lack of a sole charismatic marja. Muslims in each locale take their religious taxes to a mujtahid of their region or ethnicity if he is available. For example, after the demise of Shaykh al-Ansari, Arabs, Turks, and Iranians each followed a different marja.64 After the passing of Mirza Shirazi, the same split happened among these three groups.65 Haeri was a sole marja in Iran,66 but Iraqis followed Abul-Hasan Isfahani.67 While Borujerdi received almost all Turkish and Iranian muqallids, he was not successful among Arabs, particularly Iraqis.68 After his death, even Iranians were split into followers of local maraji’ in the major cities like Qum, Tehran, Mashhad, Shiraz, and Isfahan.69 Often a mild competition occurs when there are multiple maraji’ in a city,70 but sometimes it can heighten. In one case, two groups of imitators printed insulting slogans against the opponent marja on walls in Najaf using the Quranic verses “Are the blind and the seeing one alike?” (6:50) and “The wandering Arabs are more hard in disbelief and hypocrisy,” (9:97) because one marja was blind and the other was Arab.71 This diversity highlights a close connection and also a mutual impact between jurists and their followers. The upside to this relationship is a close connection between the imitator and the imitated, while the downside is the way a mujtahid can be affected by his background and network. Fischer correctly calls it a source of anti-innovative conservatism.72 Mujtahids who stand against popular customs might lose muqallids; this happened to Abul-Hasan Isfahani. He lost his imitators from Basra, Iraq, because he proclaimed that self-flagellation in mourning for the Imam Husayn is haram.73 Sayed Muhism Amin paid a higher price for opposing self-flagellation. Many Shia started cursing him publicly, and even many Ulama criticized him.74 This is reminiscent of what Murtaza Mutahhari, a jurist and the theorist of the Islamic revolution in Iran once said:

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When one compares fatwas issued by jurists and then examines their lifestyles and intellectual leanings, one will see how the subjectivity of the jurist as well as his external information influenced his fatwas, so that an Arab’s fatwa has the color of Arabic and a non-Arab’s of non-Arabic [culture]; the countryman’s fatwa has the color of the village and the city-man’s fatwa the color of the city.75

Finally, shuhra (being famous and popular) might cause a marja to gain office even though a more pious and learned figure is available. Allama Tihrani held that after the demise of grand Ayatollah Abul-Hasan Isfahani, the more pious and learned but less popular marja conceded the position to the more popular one in the interest of the preference of the masses.76 This point adds to the complexity of the subject and leads us to briefly touch on maslaha, diversity, and the future. MASLAHA, DIVERSITY, AND THE FUTURE The mutual needs of the imitator and the imitated, the overall interests of the community, pragmatism, and the conjectural nature of ijtihad lead the marja to consider maslaha. As I discussed in chapter 3, “Ayatollah and Mujtahid,” the concept of maslaha (public interests) appears not to play a large role in classical Shia jurisprudence for two reasons: maslaha involves an element of jurist subjectivity and inclination and is linked with zann (conjecture). Shia jurisprudence traditionally prefers to distance itself from both these considerations. However, throughout the history of jurisprudence, great jurists like Shaykh Mufid, Shaykh Tusi, and Allama Hilli took maslaha under consideration, not as an independent source of law but to suit their rulings to extenuating circumstances. Currently, there is a greater inclination to leverage it to attune the community of the faithful to modern life, for the Quran states, “God does not impose any hardship upon you. He wants you to have comfort” (2:185). The Lebanese grand Ayatollah Fadlallah used it to permit women to actively participate in plays and films. Ayatollah Khomeini’s theory of jurist guardianship conveyed maslaha to the core of jurisprudence to ease the jurisprudential burdens on people’s daily life experiences as well as to promote the deep sociopolitical engagement for which he is known. In chapter 3, I gave examples of how some maraji’ wrote recommendation letters for ijtihad due to maslaha. Issuing fatwa based on maslaha can happen for a variety of reasons related to the marja, the faith, or the imitators. Each case is a reminder of the complexity, fluidity, and subjectivity involved in jurists’ reasoning. For example, Haeri justified Iranian military conscription in the interest of the country, the Ulama, and the people.77 Borujerdi would protest publicly when he heard a preacher recounting ahistorical

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stories (particularly on the topic of muharram processions, to inspire more sympathy with the tragic event of Karbala, which is a very controversial issue in Shia preaching). His circle advised him that this open criticism defamed the preachers, which does not suit the faith. Borujerdi accepted and did not attend many processions so as to avoid the subject.78 He also refused, out of concern for maslaha, to assign a substitute mujtahid that his imitators referred to him, in case Borujerdi had no clear idea about an issue, out of concern for creating rivalries among his fellow mujtahids.79 It is common that a Shia marja introduces a substitute mujtahid so that his imitators can follow him in cases where the original marja had no clear fatwa. Khomeini did not write his detailed fatwa on women’s hijab in his first version of Tahrir al-Wasila out of maslaha. In contrast to the more conservative Ulama in Iran at the time, Khomeini believed that women can leave their face and hands uncovered. He was concerned that the Shah would use his fatwa for his own agenda of completely removing hijab from Iranian female dress.80 Both Naini and Abul-Hasan Isfahani announced that the hajj pilgrimage was haram at the time when the Saudi government started destroying the shrine of the Imams in Medina, hoping that their fatwas would cause the Wahhabi government to stop.81 Zanjani shares a fascinating anecdote. Once, a mujtahid announced that traveling to Mecca via a dangerous mountain path was haram, because pilgrims were dying along the way. Some faithful went to another mujtahid asking for a second opinion. He said it is not haram, because risk always accompanies a journey. They asked him to write down the fatwa. As soon as the mujtahid took out his pen to do so, he was informed that his peer mujtahid declared it haram. He put the pen aside and said, as of now the command (hukm) is changed, and it is haram because the other mujtahid issued his fatwa.82 It is said that when Ayatollah Khomeini died, some Ulama wanted to honor him with a religious program in Najaf. They invited many great Ulama but met a cold reception. They began to despair that no maraji’ would attend the program. But they saw that Khomeini’s rival, grand Ayatollah Khoei, was coming. When some of Khoei’s circle tried to prevent him from attending, Khoei replied that Khomeini was a great scholar and honoring him suits the interest of the faith.83 The traditional element of ijtihad and marja’iyyah intensifies its subjective aspect. There are two grand ayatollahs who did not do hajj but for two completely different reasons. Hajj is the religious obligation (wajib) that once in a lifetime, every Muslim who can afford his or her annual living expenses and that of the trip to Mecca must do so if he or she is physically able. AbulHasan Isfahani, the leading marja after the death of Naini, did not perform hajj because he wished to promote reconstruction of the shrines of the Imams

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in Medina during the trip. He thought it was not suitable for the interest and reputation of Shia for its sole marja to make the pilgrimage without solving this major concern. After his demise, a scholar did the hajj on behalf of Isfahani.84 But Mar’ashi Najafi, the founder of the outstanding Mar’ashi Najafi public library in Qum, did not make the pilgrimage because he was not wealthy enough to be able to pay for his travel expenses during his 93-year life. The diversity of maraji’ and their viewpoints on several topics will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapters. Not just on maslaha and practicing their marja’iyyah, but also on how they acted differently on the issue of approaching, welcoming, or rejecting the position of marja’iyyah. Sufi mujtahids like Sayed Ahmad Karbala’i, Sayed Ali Qazi Tabataba’i, and Allama Tabataba’i did not accept the position of marja’iyyah. They even refused to lead collective prayer (jama’a).85 When Karbala’i learned that his peer, the grand Ayatollah Muhammad Taqi Shirazi, recommended that the faithful refer to Karbala’i’s judgments if Shirazi’s fatwas were ever unclear, Karbala’i became angry and said he would complain before the Prophet that Shirazi tried to involve him in this way.86 When Karbala’i’s colleagues from Tehran pressed him to accept the position, he replied that he was prepared to go to hell on behalf of anyone but that he did not want to take the position of marja’iyyah.87 Moreover, there were non-Sufi mujtahids who resisted their enthusiasts’ calls to announce their marja’iyyah, including the son of Hakim88 and Fisharaki.89 Some refused so as to prevent division among their supporters.90 Aqa Ziya al-Din al-Iraqi (1861–1924) trained many maraji’ but did not himself become a marja,91 because knowledge and piety are not enough to make an individual marja.92 In the above cases, it seems their hot temperaments were an obstacle. Finally, while maslaha makes a mujtahid conservative, maraji’ are always aware of the human aspect of their ijtihad and concluded law, because of the impact it has on the masses who choose to support or not support a marja. When introducing the grandson of Mirza Shirazi, who issued the Tobacco Edict, some Ulama were fond of describing him as the grandson of the jurist who made divine halal haram!93 The diversity and dynamism of marja’iyyah originate at the intersection of intellectual, personal, social, and financial aspects.94 Any attempt to substantialize and reduce it to a particular nature or structure fails to understand it. Nor is there a fixed historical pattern to grasp. This fluidity, complexity, and multidimensionality make it impossible to predict the future of the institution. There is much speculation on the future of marja’iyyah within Shia, particularly considering that grand Ayatollah Sistani, who is now 92 years old, is the focal point of Shia in Iraq and the entire Middle East. Some, like Mahdi Khalaji, argue for the end of marja’iyyah after Sistani. This argument suffers from overestimating the Iranian effect on the process, belittling the strong imitatorimitated relationship that is rooted in the masses, and politicization of the issue.

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Others like Khadim, Slavin, and Alrebh stress the uncertainty of the scenario of succession and of the manifold possibilities. However, Alrebh overemphasizes al’alamiyah and transnationality. Yet, I agree with his attention to the transnational philanthropic foundations (like the al-Khoei Foundation, Ahl al-Bayt Institute, and I.M.A.M.) as influential elements involved in the issue.95 However, associating the future of marja’iyyah with one figure, no matter how significant a figure he may be, betrays the long history and huge diversity of jurisprudence and how, though it might be slow to adapt, it does eventually adjust itself to new needs and challenges. Plus, the rise of faith in recent decades, and of Islam in particular, encourages us to take a wider view of the matter. Doubtless, multiplicity of maraji’ is the most likely available option. New maraji’ have no other choice except to refresh jurisprudence to address a new mindset and reframe the questions of the most learned, the duality of citizenship and transnational commitment, the priority of knowledge over piety, the limited scope of jurisprudence in the field of faith, and the duality of legal marja and public authority. The dominance of multiplicity in the postmodern era has a double impact on marja’iyyah: it multiplies maraji’ and threatens uniformity while simultaneously giving more space to faith and chances for it to survive. Given the trajectory of jurisprudence within Islam and of jurists, from very basic traditionalist/deductive debaters to harsh Usulis and sophisticated grand ayatollahs who have the aim of establishing the institution of marja’iyyah, we are reminded of the need for intersectional studies. The second part of this book will provide the reader with the diverse views of mujtahids on the critical issues of Sufism and spirituality, philosophy and wisdom, politics and government, women, sect-centrism and ecumenism, and modernization and the West.

NOTES 1. A lay Shia must imitate a living ayatollah. If an ayatollah passes away, his imitator must get permission from another living ayatollah to continue imitating the deceased ayatollah. Most maraji' allow this but insist that this kind of imitating believer is allowed to continue his imitation of the deceased ayatollah only on the subjects that he had practiced while he was alive. This means he can’t imitate the ayatollah on issues he did not practice accordingly. For example, if the believer had no chance to go to hajj, he should not perform the rituals of hajj in accordance with the instructions of the deceased ayatollah. 2. The dominant definition of ghina in Shia jurisprudence is human singing produced in an undulating pattern to create the effects of the rapture that is suitable for sinful gathering. Mujtahids disagree on the details, but the dominant classic view is a negative one.

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3. Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabataba’i, Shi’ite Islam, Seyyed Hossein Nasr trans. (State University of New York Press, 1977), p. 43. 4. Ibid, pp. 54-55. 5. As discussed in the previous chapter, because the term ijtihad was associated with qiyas (analogical reasoning) and ra’y (opinion) and thus denoted conjectural understanding (zann), the early jurists like Shaykh Tusi preferred to use the term istinbat (deduction, inference). 6. Ahmad Kazemi Mousavi, “The Institutionalization of Marja’i Taqlid in the Nineteenth Century Shi’ite Community,” in The Muslim World (Hartford International University, 1994). Vol. LXXXIII, p. 279, footnote 3. 7. Also see Mohsen Saboorian and Hamid Parsania, The Conditions for Establishment of Shi’ite’s marja'iyyat Taqlid Institution, 32-35. The dichotomy of mujtahid-muqallid—the jurist (faqih) who deduces law from four sources, the Quran, the Sunnah, consensus, and intellect, versus an individual who follows that model respectively—came into existence later on. Previously, mufti-mustafti—respectively one who issues fatwa (upholding verdict) and seeker of legal onion—was common. Even Muqaddas Ardabili used the term iqtida as an alternative to taqlid. For an English translation of a primary text about the dichotomy of mujtahid-muqallid, its justification, the Quranic context, and the distinction between knowledge (ilm) and verified conjecture (zann) see: “The Muqaddas al-Ardabili on Taqlid,” in Authority and Political Culture in Shi’ism, Said Amir Arjomand (ed.) (State University of New York Press, 1988), pp. 263-266. To see Allama Hilli’s text on ijtihad, see the same source, pages 240-249. To read an exchange of letters between a mujtahid and a layperson on ijtihad, see the same volume, pages 329-333. 8. Mousavi, Ibid. Mulla Ahmad Naraqi introduced the doctrine of jurist guardianship to Shia jurisprudence. He used traditions, consensus, and reason to justify this concept. In another work, Mousavi writes of 19 traditions used by Naraqi, mostly from Imam Sadiq. The only relevant Prophetic tradition, which is recorded by both Sunni and Shia, is cited as follows: "O God, bless those who succeed me." The Prophet repeated this twice and was then asked who would be his successors. He answered, "Those who come after me, transmit my traditions and practices, and teach them to the people." Sunni considers this hadith to be void and false, but Naraqi and later Khomeini used it extensively (Ahmad Kazemi Mousavi, “The Establishment of the Position of Marja’iyyat-i Taqlid in the Twelver-Shi’i Community,” in Iranian Studies (Winter, 1985) Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 41-42); also see, Moojan Momen, An Introduction to Shi’i Islam (Yale University Press, 1985), pp. 197-199. To learn about Mulla Ahmad Naraqi’s life documented by his contemporary Murza Muhammad Tunikabuni (1819-1885), see “Lives of Prominent Nineteenth-Century Ulama from Tunikabuni’s Qisas al-Ulama,” in Authority and Political Culture in Shi’ism, Said Amir Arjomand (ed.) (State University of New York, 1988), pp. 305-309. 9. They are considered holy because they are homes to the shrines of six Imams: Imam Ali is buried in Najaf, Imam Husayn in Karbala, Imam Musa al-Kadhim and Imam Muhammad al-Jawad in Khadhimiya, and Imams al-Hadi and Hassan Askari in Samarra. Also see Juan R. Cole, “Imami Jurisprudence and the Role of the Ulama: Mortaza Ansari on Emulating the Supreme Exemplar,” in Religion and Politics in

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Iran: Shi’ism from Quietism to Revolution, Nikki R. Keddie (ed.), (Yale University Press, 1983), pp. 33-46. 10. Muhaqqiq al-Hilli (1205-1277) was the maternal uncle of the well-known Allama Hilli (1250-1325). 11. Cited by Mohsen Saboorian and Hamid Parsania, “The Conditions for Establishment of Shi’ite’s marja'iyyat Taqlid Institution,” p. 36. To read an English translation of the Allama Hilli’s primary text on ijtihad see, John Cooper, “Allama al-Hilli on the Imamate and Ijtihad,” in Authority and Political Culture in Shi’ism,” Said Amir Arjomand (ed.) (State University of New York Press, 1988), pp. 240-249. To read an original exchange of letters between a mujtahid and a layperson on ijtihad, see the same source pages 329-333. 12. Ibid, p. 137. 13. As Mousavi explains, the previous references to the most knowledgeable individual meant the most precise in reporting traditions (Mousavi, The Establishment. p. 39). To read an English translation of a primary text about the dichotomy of mujtahid-muqallid, its justification, the Quranic context, and the distinction between knowledge (ilm) and verified conjecture (zann) see: “The Muqaddas al-Ardabili on Taqlid,” in Authority and Political Culture in Shi’ism, Said Amir Arjomand (ed.) (State University of New York Press, 1988), pp. 263-266. 14. To read details about Mulla Ahmad Naraqi’s life from his contemporary Murza Muhammad Tunikabuni (1819-1885) see, “Lives of Prominent NineteenthCentury Ulama from Tunikabuni’s Qisas al-Ulama,” in Authority and Political Culture in Shi’ism, Said Amir Arjomand (ed.) (State University of New York, 1988), pp. 305-309. 15. Wahid Bihbahani (1706–1791), who defeated the Akhbaris, had already initiated discussion of the faqih as the Prophet’s caliph, but he did not elaborate on it. His disciple, Mirza Abul Qasim Qummi (1737–1816), known as the owner of al-Qawanin, also wrote “the choice of marja and resort (miladh) during the absence of the Imam is verily a topic of kalam (theology) as is the certainty in the Imam. It's not a problem of fiqh or usul al-fiqh” (cited by Mousavi, “The Institutionalization,” p. 285). So, the concept of the jurist guardianship for specific cases (wilayat al-khassa) appeared as an occasional deputyship and was scattered throughout different sections of jurisprudence like judgment, jihad, khums, and ijtihad, but Naraqi expanded it to the wilayat al-amma, dealt with the subject as an independent topic, and used 19 traditions, ijma, and aql to justify it (Mousavi, The Establishment, pp. 40-41). 16. Mousavi, The Establishment, pp. 39–41. 17. This book put an end to the dominance of Najafi’s Najat al-Ibad. Al-Urwa has been annotated by approximately 30 contemporary ayatollahs. 18. Mousavi, Ibid, 39. 19. A small but significant Iraqi hawza that helped shape Shia theology and produced influential figures called “Hilli,” such as Ayatollah Allama Hilli. 20. Jawahir al-Kalam combined Akhbari achievements in new traditionalist interpretations with Usuli rational arguments. 21. Mousavi, 280.

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22. This is the same year of the fatal Shaykhi and Babi clashes over the true representation of the Imam’s authority. Although Shaykh Ahmad al-Ahsa’i (1753–1826), the founder of Shaykhism, was his teacher, Najafi didn't hesitate to condemn Shaykhis, particularly after the death of Ahsa’i. Najafi issued a fatwa against Shaykhis and also fought against any dubious interpretation of the religious texts. He even ordered the temporary removal of a special prayer for visitation (ziyarat) posted on the gate of the shrine in Najaf. This prayer addresses Imam Ali as: “O, he who is the station of grace and consolation.” Najafi evidently didn't want to leave room for any statement concerning the stages for inspiration. According to Babi, Najafi contributed greatly to the expulsion of the Bab’s messenger from Najaf in the summer of 1844 (Mousavi, “The Institutionalization,” 289-290). To learn about the Shaykhi school and its potential impact on the Babi movement and the Baha’i religion see, Moojan Momen, An Introduction to Shi’i Islam (Yale University Press, 1985), pp. 225-232. 23. There is a link between the opinion of superior mujtahids and other Ulama who are guided by the conscious following (mutaba’ah) of the prevalent opinion (al-qawl al-mashhur). This link reflects a modern form of the concept of ijma (consensus), which was a matter of conflict with Sunni jurisprudence. See Mousavi, “The Institutionalization,” 282-283. 24. See Mousavi, “The Institutionalization,” 281. 25. This book appears to be a summary of Jawahir al-Kalam. Nijat al-Ibad was translated into Persian during its author’s lifetime. 26. Shaykh Ansari was cautious about khums. He rejected the notion that ibaha (no need to pay during occultation) meant payments must go to the mujtahid. A layperson can spend the Imam’s share in the way he or she is sure the Imam is satisfied with. Paying it to mujtahid is allowed (Mohsen Saboorian and Hamid Parsania, 40). 27. Mohsen Saboorian and Hamid Parsania, 39-41. 28. If the payment was irregular, it was called musa’ida (lit. help), and if regular, shahriya (lit. monthly). 29. Muharram is the first month of the Islamic lunar calendar. Imam Husayn and his companions were brutally killed on the 10th of muharram. Shia hold various congregations and mourning programs during this month. 30. Mousavi, “The Institutionalization,” p. 293. 31. Michael Fischer, Iran from Religious Dispute to Revolution, (Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 88. 32. Shubairi Zanjani, Sayed Musa, Jor’a-e az darya (A Drop of the Sea), (Qum: Muassisa-e Kitabshinasi-e Shi'a, 1389/2010), Vol. 2, pp. 524. There are examples of pious maraji' who receive funds from imitators that they in turn send to another marja to support his reputation (Ibid, Vol. 2, p. 680). 33. Ibid, Vol. 3, p. 315. 34. Zanjani cites the Persian term “ashkhas-e huchi” (lit. rumormonger, demagogue). There are people in the atabat who receive money from maraji' to avoid defaming them (Ibid, Vol. 3, p. 389 footnote). 35. Ibid, Vol. 3, p. 389. 36. Indeed, modern politics in general and the need to respond to colonialism in particular was among the major factors in the emerging office of maraja’iyat.

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Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr divides the history of marja'iyyah into four stages. The last and most developed form is called “popular marja'iyyah,” which begun during Western colonization of the Muslim world and involved marja'iyyah in the political affairs of Muslims in order to defend their rights and faith. According to al-Sadr, the previous forms were: individual (from the beginning until the time of Hilli it was focused on promoting religious laws among the Shia masses); formal (established by al-Shahid al-Awwal, who sent representatives to various areas to preach and collect religious taxes); and grand marja'iyyah (consolidation of power in one marja) (Talib Aziz, “Baqir al-Sadr’s Quest for the marja'iyyah,” in The Most Learned of Shia The Institution of Marja al-Taqlid, Linda S. Walbridge ed. (Oxford, 2001), pp. 143-144). See also Rula Jurdi Abisaab “Lebanese Shi’ites and the Marja’iyya: Polemic in the Late Twentieth Century” for the Lebanese maraji' (in British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, August 2009, Vol. 36. No. 2, pp. 251-239). 37. Mohsen Saboorian and Hamid Parsania, p. 43. 38. Sayed Muhammad Husayn Hussaini Tabataba’i et  al. Bahthi darbare Marjai’yat va Ruhaniyat (A discussion on marja'iyyah and clergies) (Tehran: Shirkate Sahami Intishar, 1341/1962) pp. 180-181. 39. Mousavi, “The Institutionalization,” pp. 293-4. 40. Cited by Tabarar’iyan, Nihad Marji’ayat Shia, p. 12. 41. See Sayed Muhammad Husayn Hussaini Tabataba’i et  al. Bahthi darbare Marjai’yat va Ruhaniyat (A discussion on marja'iyyah and clergies). 42. Jora, 1:531. 43. Jora, 2:532. 44. Shubairi Zanjani, Sayed Ahmad, al-Kalam yajurro al-kalam (Qum: Haqbin, 1396/2017), Vo.1, p. 121. 45. Shubairi Zanjani, Jor’a-e az darya, Vol. 2, p. 285, also about Haeri see Vol. 2, p. 288. 46. Shubairi Zanjani, al-Kalam yajurro al-kalam, Vo.1, p. 232. 47. Shubairi Zanjani, Jor’a-e az darya, Vol. 2, p. 490. 48. Shubairi Zanjani, Jor’a-e az darya, Vol. 3, p. 273 & 528; Vol. 4, p. 561. 49. Shubairi Zanjani, Jor’a-e az darya, Vol. 4, p. 641-2, also see Vol. 4, p. 592. 50. Shubairi Zanjani, al-Kalam yajurro al-kalam, Vo.1, pp. 121 & 232. 51. Shubairi Zanjani, Jor’a-e az darya, Vol. 4, p. 504. 52. Safa-al-din Tabarra’iyan, “Nihad-e marja'iyyat-e Shia” (Aban 1325—Khurdad 1349), in Tarikh-e Ma’asir-e Iran (Tehran: Muassis-e mutali’at-e Tarikh-e ma’asir-e Iran, 1387/2008), Vol. 12, No. 45, pp, 45-46 53. Ruhollah Khomeini, Sahifeh Imam (A collection of Imam Khomeini’s Work), (Tehran: Moassisa-e tanzim va nashr-e athar Imam Khomeini, 1378/1999), Vol. 22. pp. 177-178, also see page 292. 54. The Prophet receives, delivers, and applies the divine message. The Imam is the divinely chosen interpreter of the message, while the marja channels the message through his own deduction (Talib Aziz, Baqir al-Sadr’s Quest for the Marja’iy, p. 144. See also chapter 10 “Politics and Government” below in the second part of this text). 55. Talib Aziz, Baqir al-Sadr’s Quest for the Marja’iy, pp. 141-148.

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56. Rula Jurdi Abisaab, Lebanese Shi’ites and the Marja’iyya: Polemic in the Late Twentieth Century, p. 232. 57. Salim al-Hasani, al-Ma’alim al-jadida lil- marja'iyyah al-Shia (Dirasat wa hawar ma Ayatollah al-Sayed Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah), (Beirut: Dar al-milak, 1993), pp. 95-96. Bill and Williams conclude eight areas of similarities between Catholicism and Shia: relation of reason and revelation; politics and law derived from divine precepts; harmony between unity and community; rejecting Western liberal and Eastern Marxist models; coexistence of religious authority with people’s participatory interests in order; caring for the downtrodden and oppressed; institutionalizing alms and charity; and the failure to integrate women into the authority structure of faith (James A. Bill & John Alden Williams, Roman Catholics and Shi’i Muslims, (The University of North Carolina Press, 2002), pp. 135-6). They also hold that faqihstatesman implies a stronger model of authoritarianism than that of centralized papal control (Ibid. 137). While there is substance in these insightful comparisons, they do not reflect the diversity and dynamism within Shia Islam. 58. Al-Hasani, Ibid, 97. 59. Rula Jurdi Abisaab, Lebanese Shi’ites and the Marja’iyya: Polemic in the Late Twentieth Century, p. 236. 60. When the Iranian government began promoting Ayatollah Khamenei as a marja, grand Ayatollah Muntazeri wrote a letter to Khamenei saying he would never attain the level of Khomeini’s famed scholarship regardless of how hard governmental agents promoted his image. According to the testimony of one ayatollah to Muntazeri, Khamenei was determined to claim the position of marja'iyyah regardless of the consequences (‌ Bakhshi az khatirat faqih va marja aliqadr hazrat ayatollah al-uzma Muntazeri, Vol. 1, pp. 757-761 available at https://amontazeri​.com​/static​/books​/Khaterat​-1​.pdf). 61. Revolutionary Ulama in Iran offered two pieces of advice to defuse the tension. Ayatollahs Rafsanjani and Khamenei said that a distinction should be made between being a marja inside Iran versus a marja outside Iran, and Ayatollah Muhammad Yazdi added that abolishing the institution of marja’iyya because of the existence of multiple maraji' does not serve its own objective of “guarding the sovereignty of Islam is in an incumbent necessity” (see Said Amir Arjmand, After Khomeini: Iran Under His Successors (Oxford, 2009), 174-176). 62. See for comparison Safa-al-din Tabarra’iyan, Nihad-e marja'iyyat-e Shia, pp. 15-21. 63. Fischer, p. 88. 64. Tabarra’iyan, p. 31; also see p. 42. 65. Shubairi Zanjani, Jor’a-e az darya, Vol. 3, p. 528. 66. Except for Isfahan, where there was a charismatic local marja (Ibid, Vol. 2, pp. 497-498). 67. Ibid, Vol. 3, p. 528. 68. Tabarra’iyan, Nihad-e marja'iyyat-e Shia, p. 36. 69. Ibid. 39; also see Shubairi Zanjani, Jor’a-e az darya, Vol. 3, pp. 528-532; Fischer, pp. 88-91. 70. Fischer, p. 91. 71. Tabarra’iyan, p. 31; also see p. 40.

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72. Fischer, 42. Momen also mentions that the theoretical freedom of ijtihad is, in practice, negated by the restrictions imposed on mujtahids by their basis of financial support (An Introduction to Shi’i Islam), p. 207. 73. Shubairi Zanjani, Jor’a-e az darya, Vol. 4, p. 517. 74. Shubairi Zanjani, Jor’a-e az darya, Vol. 1, pp. 564-565. 75. Murtaza Mutahhari, Majmo’e athar ustad shahid mutahhari. (Tehran: Sadra, 1374/1995), Vol. 20, p. 182. 76. Sayed Muhammad Muhsin Husayni Tihrani, Fiqahat dar Tashayyu: Negereshi dar mabani ijtihad va sharayet ifta (Tehran: Maktab-e wahy, 1395/2016), p. 20. 77. Shubairi Zanjani, Jor’a-e az darya, Vol. 4, pp. 497-498. 78. Ibid, Vol. 3, p. 493. 79. Ibid, Vol. 3, p. 451. 80. Ibid, Vol. 3, p. 652. 81. Ibid, Vol. 4, p. 574. 82. Ibid, Vol. 3, p. 345. 83. Husayni Tihrani, Fiqahat dar tashyyu, p. 60, footnote 2. 84. Shubairi Zanjani, Jor’a-e az darya, Vol. 3, p. 444. 85. Sayed Muhammad Husayn Husayni Tihrani, Mihr-e Tabnak, p. 73. 86. Sayed Muhammad Husayn Husayni Tihrani, Tawhid-e ilmi va Ayni, (Mashhad: Allama Tabataba’i publication, 1419/1998) p. 25. 87. Ibid, p. 26. 88. Shubairi Zanjani, Jor’a-e az darya, Vol. 3, p. 532. 89. Shubairi Zanjani, Jor’a-e az darya, Vol. 3, p. 528. 90. Ibid. 91. Shubairi Zanjani, Jor’a-e az darya, Vol. 2, p. 528. 92. Ibid, Vol. 3, p. 482. 93. Ibid. Vol. 2, p. 366. 94. Leonard Binder writes of small groups of some 30 or 40 individuals in major hawzas such as Qum acting like the College of Cardinals to establish a new marja. In Qum, they are called marja-dorostkun (creators of marja), consisting of the descendants and relatives of one famous marja, the office of deceased marja, the leading teachers in hawza, and the propagandists and preachers (muballighin) (Leonard Binder, “Ijtihad and Marja’iyyat,” in Shi’ism: Doctrines, Thought, and Spirituality, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Hamd Dadashi, and Seyyed Vali Nasr (ed.) (State University of New York Press, 1988), pp. 241-2). 95. Abdullah F. Alrebh, “Will Sistani Be the Last Legend?” (The Middle East Institute, September 2021).

Part 2

DYNAMISM AND DIVERSITY

Chapter 6

Sect-Centrism and Ecumenism

In the fall of 1997, I was walking on the street around the Holy Shrine of Lady Fatima al-Masuma. Passing a madrassa, I saw seminarians gathered reading a statement issued by Grand Ayatollah Vahid Khurasani against Grand Ayatollah Allama Fadlallah. Allama Fadlallah had denied the dominant view that the Lady Fatima Zahra was attacked and subsequently killed. Vahid Khurasani called Fadlallah misguided. The same issue had already caused Ayatollah Mirza Javad Tabrizi to issue a fatwa saying that since Fadlallah is misguided, he is not a qualified marja and people shouldn’t follow him. When I returned to Mashhad, I told my father what I had seen. My father was an expert and author of several books on the history of the Infallible Imams. He responded that those ayatollahs in Qum have no direct encounters with Sunnis and do not understand an ayatollah like Fadlallah who lives in a majority Sunni country. That got me thinking about how being in the majority or minority and exposure to opposing views can shape the fatwas a mujtahid issue. Of course, time and space really matter. Shaykh Baha’i, who wrote the first ritual manual for the masses in Shia, has been known for his excessive leniency in this treatment of other faiths, particularly Sunni Islam. Baha’i wrote two glosses on well-known Sunni commentaries on the Quran by Zamakhshari and Baydawi, the second of which is described by some as the best of the glosses written on this exegesis. One of his works, Kitab al-Mikhlat, is seemingly an Arabic version of his Persian book Kashkul, a collection of stories, hadiths, quotes, poems, prose, and proverbs. On the very last page of the book, which was published in Egypt, Baha’i quotes the Prophet saying, “Abu Bakr, Umar, and Uthman are the people of God and Ali, Hassan, Husayn, and Fatima are people of Him. God will gather His people and mine in a garden of many gardens of paradise.”1 125

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This anecdote includes many significant notes on sect-centrism and ecumenism among ayatollahs. While pro-ecumenism Ulama like Baha’i consider the family of the Prophet and the Infallible Imams to hold absolute superiority over the first three caliphs, they show respect to the fairness of the first caliphs, particularly Umar ibn Khattab. In contrast, sect-centric Ulama highlight how those caliphs, particularly the second one, were unjust and absolute oppressors. Ecumenist Ulama equally honor the Quran in their practices and reflections alongside the family of the Prophet, while the opposing group concentrates on preaching the virtues and teachings of the family of the Prophet. The founder of Qum Hawza, Ayatollah Haeri, was upset that the Quran was not receiving the same respect from Shias as it was from Sunnis. He had the habit of saying the Prophet left two outstanding heritages among Muslims: the Quran and his family. Shias and Sunnis in practice demolished these heritages by choosing sides in a way: Sunnis ignored his family while Shias ignored the Quran. However, his concerns did not change these long traditions.2 Sect-centric Ulama are most obsessed with history. In their view, what happened after the life of the Prophet changed the history of salvation. Since Ali’s right to govern was not acknowledged and his generations have not achieved power, the nature of Shi’ism is a remembrance of this history and a denunciation of the people who created it. The ecumenists, on the other hand, focus on the core message of Islam and wish to release the future from the shackles of the past. And finally, textualism versus reasoning has its own role in forming these two inclinations. The ecumenists prioritize rational theology while the sect-oriented prioritize scriptural theology. These are merely signposts to help us see the big picture and begin a deeper discovery. These distinctions and categories are not fixed and exclusive, because theology in its historical trajectory is dynamic and fluid, adapting seemingly contradictory facets to respond to the ontological and psychological needs of the believer rather than to intellectual curiosity. As a matter of fact, the multiplicity of perspectives moves between these two extreme poles and depicts the dynamism of the subject. In his recent seminal book Understanding “Sectarianism”: Sunni-Shia Relations in the Modern Arab World, Fanar Haddad argues that modern sectarian identity and relevance in the contemporary Arab world are shaped by a dynamic and context-dependent exchange among four elements: doctrinal, national, subnational, and transnational.3 His emphasis on the fluidity, multidimensionality, and context-dependency is applicable throughout the course of history of sect-centrism or ecumenism among Shia Ulama. The doctrinal aspect, which is central to Ulama, is susceptible to many other internal and external factors including their degree of knowledge, domestic and regional circumstances, Shia demography, the relevance of established powers, and

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the reception of Sunni Ulama. There has always been a constant inner tension between the ideal of unity and the facts of sect-specificity; the former sees umma as a large spectrum to be desired, while the latter divides the umma in the interest of elevating one denomination over the other. In this chapter I will discuss the issue in three sections: the context in which the inner tension of specificity and unity is formed and defined; examples of Ulama who display a high concentration of specificity and sect-centrism; and an elaboration of Ulama who contributed to ecumenism.

THE INNER TENSION OF SPECIFICITY AND UNITY As Seyyed Hossein Nasr argues, the dominant tendency among both later Muslim historians and modern scholars to trace the clear distinction between Sunni and Shia back to the first two centuries is wrong simply because it was established only later. In his words, “the hard-and-fast division of later centuries are not discernible in the earlier period.” There were Sunni elements with definite Shia tendencies and vice versa, both intellectually and socially. In certain cases, it is in fact difficult to judge whether a particular author or alim was Shia or Sunni, especially before the fourth or tenth century—although even in this stage each Shia and Sunni possessed his own particular perfume and color in spiritualism.4 I would like to argue that this amalgamation and overlap did not end at a particular time. Whenever the opportunity arose and the context was supportive, this amalgamation emerged in a new form. Shia identity worked as a call to reconciliation between being a common Muslim and searching for an inner aspect of faith,5 seeking the unity of the community along with diversity while enjoying the specificity of being lovers or partisans of Ali. No one can clarify an insider view on this issue better than the prominent Shia muhaddith Mohsin Fayz Kashani. At the very end of his writing on the virtues of the Imams in his masterpiece al-Mahajjat al-Bayza fi Tahzib alIhya, he empathetically quoted Shia scholars who said the love of Ali, at the core of Shia, means knowing Ali and his spiritual position. It concludes, “the aim is not loving an individual who physically lived in this world for a limited period of time. But it means loving the divine reality and his universal intellectual position (maqamahu al-aqli al-kulli) possessed before the creation.”6 Transcending the common understanding of Imamate and the Imam provides a new scope for the subject and helps us to understand its fluidity. An earlier overlap between Shia and Sunni can be traced back to that between Shia and Mutazilite. The Mutazilites, whose name means “those who stand aside,” were the first systematic theological school in Islam. They were also trailblazing in their priority of reason over revelation. They emerged in

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the middle of the eighth century and lasted as an independent school until the end of the twelfth century. Despite being a highly heterogeneous group, they were successful in attracting rationalist Muslims to their ideology. Mutazilite theology shares both method and content with Shia. Beginning from selfsufficient reason, both emphasized the concept of divine justice to develop their doctrines of human free will and thus communal responsibility.7 When Mutazilite moved from Basra to Baghdad, Bishr ibn al-Mu’tamir (d. 825) began a trend in the school known as Alawi’s al-Ray, or pro-Alawid in its political form. Some called them Mutazilite Shia, a pro-Alawid group who did not like Uthman, the third caliph, and hated Mu’awiya. While these Mutazilites kept their distance from Shia, partisans of Ali, and opponents of the institution of the caliphate, they bridged the gap between those who favored the family of the Prophet (who wanted to establish the institution of Imamate around them) and those who favored the companions of the Prophet (who had already established the institution of caliphate around them). Positively approaching Ali ibn Abitalib led to a new trend which prioritized Ali over the other three caliphs, a move contradicting the previous Mutazilite position. Later, some adherents of this approach such as Ibn al-Rawandi (827–911) and Abu ‘Isa al-Warraq (889–994) moved to a kind of Shi’ism. Rasul Jafariyyan names more Ulama with Mutazilite background becoming Shia theologians.8 This overlap did not appear only among scholars. The intellectual Abbasid caliph al-Ma’mun (786–833), a Mutazilite Shia, proclaimed Mutazilite understanding of the nature of the Quran as the official doctrine of the caliphate and created the unpreceded period in Islam known as the mihna (“test” or “inquisition”).9 Again, this intersection between Sunni and Shia went further than a particular theologian or caliph. The scholar al-Hakim al-Nishapuri (933–1014), known as the “Imam of the muhaddithin,” is famous as a Shialike alim, because of his love of Ali and the family of the Prophet combined with his hatred of Mu’awiya. It is said that the jurist and giant of Islamic history Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari (839–923) was accused by his opponents of being Shia, and because of this was buried at night to avoid disturbance. Leaning toward the Shia idea of the virtue of the family of the Prophet was more visible among Hanafi jurists, so that being a Hanafi-Shia was not an odd position to take.10 However, the greatest overlap happened between Shia and Mutazilite in the tenth and eleventh centuries, the so-called “Shia century.” Baghdad provided them with the opportunity to meet each other, participate in each other’s classes, exchange ideas, criticize, and respond to each other’s work.11 It was an exceptional opportunity to grow together and highlight their shared and distinct teachings. Shia and Mutazilite scholars produced many books dedicated to refuting their counterparts’ ideas. Abul Qasim al-Balkhi (d. 931), the head of the Baghdad Mutazilite, represents a key convergence between

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Shia and Mutazilite. In his classification of Mutazilite, al-Balkhi attempts to underline the theological lineage of Ali ibn Abitalib rather than that of the other caliphs. The position of al-Balkhi as a Zaidi Shia reminds us of the claims that the Zaidi rebels against the caliphs were themselves Mutazilites.12 He also cites an African Shia link with Mutazilite. The erudite Mutazilite writer, scholar, and statesman Sahib ibn Abbad (938–995) is considered an icon of the overlap between Shia and Mutazilite. In one verse he writes, “I was asked about my religion which saves me. I replied that I am Shia and Mutazilite.” Ibn Abbad was so close to Shia that well-known Shia scholar Shaykh Saduq gifted his book on Imam Rida to him. Because of his poems about the family of the Prophet, some consider him as a Shia scholar. In contrast, some eminent Shia scholars including Shaykh Mufid and Sayed Murtada wrote against him. The medieval Arab geographer al-Maqdasi (945– 991) reported many areas in which Shias were Mutazilite. Later, al-Maqrizi (1364–1442) the Egyptian historian wrote, “It is rare to find a Mutazilite who is not Shia.” Indeed, the impact of their common enemy, the textualists (ahl al-hadith) and the Hanbalis, can’t be ignored. Having a common enemy brought these two groups closer, which in turn made them appear identical in their enemy’s eyes. Thus, the term Shia-Mutazilite was used to describe many Ulama including Ibn Abbad, Hasan Nawbakhti, and Sayed Murtada (418–425). There are other renowned figures who were attributed equally to Shia and to Mutazilite. Many consider the bibliographer and biographer of Baghdad Ibn Nadim (d. 990) as Shia-Mutazilite. The same is true with the eleventh-century Quranic exegete and Arabic linguist Raghib Isfahani (d. 1108). He is variously called a Mutazilite, an Asharite, and a Shia. In his work he takes an independent position and doesn’t hesitate to reject ideas inconsistent with his views, regardless of the theological background of these opposing ideas. This means that equal rejections of Shia, Mutazilite, and Asharite concepts appear in his works. However, there are many references showing his attachment to those theological traditions as well. He demonstrates a high level of respect to all righteous caliphs, with specific respect shown to Ali. Another interesting case is the prominent Shia scholar, linguist, and poet al-Sharif al-Radi (970–1015), who collected Imam Ali’s sayings and letters in Nahj al-Balaghah.13 He studied before Shaykh Mufid,14 the Maliki jurist Abu Ishaq al-Tabari, and many Mutazilite teachers, most notably alQadi ‘Abd al-Jabbar. He is known as Mutazilite. In some of his poems, Radi claimed he is a true caliph. This caused some scholars to count him a Zaidi Shia. Radi is the first Shia scholar who adopted justice and Oneness of God as his motto. Indeed, the critical position of justice (adl) and Oneness of God (tawhid) in Shia doctrines is the result of a coalition between Mutazilite and Shia.15 Nowadays, Shia view five concepts as the pillars of the faith: Oneness

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of God, justice, the prophecy (nubuwwa), the Imamate, and the resurrection day. Justice and the Imamate are considered as principles of the denomination (usul al-madhab), while the others are principles of the religion (usul al-din). The Oneness of God and justice were articulated by Sharif al-Radi and were shared with the five principles of Mutazilite.16 As a disciple of Qadi ‘Abd al-Jabbar, al-Radi was among many other Shia students. In Qadi’s historical account Tabaqat al-Mutazila, he attempts to show both that the family of the Prophet loved Mutazilite and that Mutazilites love them in return. Many Shia Imams including Ali, Hassan, Husayn, and Ali ibn Husayn Sajjad are counted among Mutazilites. Far from theological traditions, philosophy and Sufism also played a role in moving beyond sectarian identity and offering a compromise. The most apparent example in Islamic philosophy can be seen in Ibn Sina’s masterpiece al-Shifa (The Healing). According to Ibn Sina, the ruler (the Prophet) must require people to obey his successor (caliph). This caliph can be appointed by the Prophet or by a consensus of qualified people. This perspective equally covers Shia and Sunni positions of Imamate and caliphate, respectively. The Sufi concept of walayat (guardianship) provides the same bridge between Shia and Sunni. While the majority of Sunni Ulama put the hadith Ghadir Khumm at the margins, Sufis place it at the heart of their theory and make it consistent with their school of thought. For example, Rumi interprets the hadith in harmony with the Sufi worldview as follows: For this reason the Prophet, who labored with the utmost zeal (in devotion), applied the name “protector” (mawla) to himself and Ali. He said, “my cousin Ali is the protector and friend of everyone who is under my protection.” Who is the “protector”? He that sets you free and removes the fetters of servitude from your feet. Since prophethood is the guide to freedom, freedom is bestowed on true believers by the prophets. Rejoice, O community of the true believers: show yourselves to be “free” (pure and noble) as the cypress and the Lily.17

Emphasizing Ali and his specific rank in the hierarchy of spirituality redirects the tension between specificity and unity and adds to the fluidity of sectarian identity. However, this overlap did not remain only among elites. It impacted the masses as well, particularly when the hegemony of jurists (fuqaha) was weakened. As a result of the Mongol conquest and rule of Iran in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, fuqaha lost their strong leadership positions, and Sufis replaced them in the public mind. Some argue this paved the path toward a new phenomenon called “Twelver Sunnis.”18 These

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Muslims collected both Sunni and Shia views by honoring the four righteous caliphs (which is common among Sunni, but not Shia) and the twelve Imams as divine saints (wali, plural awliya). Previously the Sufi Attar admired the four caliphs and the twelve Imams. There are poems attributed to Sufi writer Shaykh Ahmad Jami (1048–1141) showing a harmony between Shia and Sunni.19 Ala al-Dawla Simnani (1261–1336) also tried to stay away from two extremes: radicalism in loving the family of the Prophet, whose adherents were labeled Rafidi, and radicalism in the love of the Prophet’s companions, which was promoted by Kharijites. The same path was followed by his disciple Mir Sayed Ali Hamadani (1312–1384). In spite of any controversies, both figures are counted as Shia by the eminent Shia faqih Qadi Nurullah Shushtari.20 The Sufi Khawja Muhammad Parsa (1348–1420) wrote on Imams and discussed many verses of the Quran, similar to the way that Shias relate those verses to the family of the Prophet. The prolific scholar and Sufi writer Mawlana Abd al-Rahman Jami (1414–1492) acknowledged twelve Imams alongside three caliphs and attributed many miracles to Imams. The religious scholar, historian, and political writer Fazlallah Khunji Isfahani (1455–1521) wrote a book on salawat, dedicating a specific prayer to every single one of the Fourteen Infallible Figures (chahardah masum), which include twelve Imams plus the Prophet and the Lady Fatima. This amalgamation enjoyed the support of Amir Timur Gurkani (1336– 1405), who founded the Timurid Empire. He ordered daily food, lamps, and carpets for the shrines of Ali ibn Abitalib, Husayn ibn Ali, Abu Hanifa, Musa al-Kadhim, Ali al-Rida, and Muhammad al-Taqi. Timur advised his son and successor to regard the family of the Prophet highly, since there is no transgression in loving them for the sake of God. His son visited Imam Rida’s shrine twice, and his daughter-in-law built a mosque neighboring Imam Reda’s shrine. His great-grandson Abul-Qasim Babur Mirza (1422–1457) put the names of the twelve Imams on official coins without feeling it contradicted his Hanafi sect. He also added a porch to the shrine of Imam Rida, where he would ultimately be buried. Sultan Husayn Bayqara Mirza (1438– 1506) ordered that Khutba be recited in the names of the twelve Imams in Herat’s Central Blue Mosque and admired the day of Ashura every year. In this context, the encyclopedic writer and traditionalist theologian alSharif al-Jurjani (1339–1414) wrote and debated with his contemporary, the polymath theologian al-Taftazani (1322–1390). Al-Jurjani promoted his own version of Islam consistent with Twelver Sunni. Both Sunni and Shia scholars counted him as a member of their communities. No one can ignore the prolific writer and Quran exegete Mulla Husayn Waiz Kashifi (1426–1504). A few scholars believe he was Shia, although a majority believe he was a Sunni Hanafi scholar. Among the Sunnis of Herat, he was attributed to be Shia, and

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among the Shias of Sabzavar, a Sunni.21 His most influential book, Rawzat al-Shuhada, is a martyrology focused mainly on Imam Husayn and the tragic events at Karbala. This work acquired such a pluralistic following that the mourning program for Imam Husayn was titled Rawza-Khani (reciting the book of Rawzat al-Shuhada), and the reciter Rawza-khan. His son, Fakhr alDin Ali, continued his father’s path in gathering Sunni and Shia teachings. He wrote a book on the Quran, consisting of 5 sections and 12 chapters to match the holy numbers among Shia (meaning the five people around the Prophet— Muhammad, Ali, Fatima, Hassan, and Husayn—and the twelve Imams). There were several Shia Ulama who contributed to this phenomenon. Sayed Amir Jamal al-Din Hussaini (d. 1521) wrote a book on the life and virtue of the Prophet, his companions, and the Imams.22 The Persian official, historian, and poet Hamdallah Mustawfi (1281–1340) in his Tarikh-i guzida (Excerpt from History) wrote on three caliphs and twelve Imams saying, “Thus a summary of their lives will be mentioned to get blessed.”23 Rasul Jafariyan listed many authors, poets, and volumes reflecting Twelver Sunnis theory. The list covers Ulama with a variety of jurisprudential backgrounds including Shafi’i and Maliki, some known for their criticism of established Shia.24 These accounts illustrate how being Shia, namely having specific love for the Infallible Imams, demonstrates an attempt to prove this is not completely distinct from Islamic orthodoxy. In other words, there is a fluidity and overlap that avoids any oversimplification to divide Islam into two fixed and clear denominations, Sunni and Shia. Thus, many Ulama, as the developers and representatives of this fluidity and flexibility, can’t be fully categorized into one of these groups. Fanar Haddad’s case study of the Ottoman Empire in his book Understanding Sectarianism concisely addresses the inconsistent policy and pragmatic ambiguity shown toward Shia under the empire, and also the professional fluidity and lack of scholarly consensus among Ulama.25 This applies not only to the Ottoman empire. It is more or less applicable throughout Islamic history. The reason for this is that scholars could not reach agreement on the central issue of how to be a Muslim and a Shia. Nevertheless, since jurisprudence deals with daily practices while our study focuses on mujtahids specialized in jurisprudence, we can move on and deliberate over two groups: those who concentrated on specificity and thus were active in sect-centric propaganda, and those who concentrated on unity among Muslims, thus promoting ecumenism.

SECT-CENTRISM While the ambiguity of faith identity works for many, others prefer clarity. There is a strong trend among Ulama to focus on the unique characteristics of

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Shia. In their view, these unique characteristics make Shia Shia and provide the seeker with the true meaning of Islam. All unique characteristics of Shia center on walaya of Ali.26 An inseparable aspect of it is love that works as a way to practice faith, purify the soul, approach religious teachings, and build community. In other words, love as emotional reality runs the risk of mutating into hate. When one only looks at a subject through the lens of love, there is a tendency to focus on the desirable aspects of the subject and to avoid or even condescend to what is conflictual or in contradiction with that love. This double reality is called tawalli (making friendship) and tabarri (separating and avoiding) in Shia. Tawalli encourages followers to concentrate on group connection and friendship. In contrast, tabarri discourages intra-faith friendship and is suspicious of ecumenical activism. How to strike the right balance between tawalli and tabarri leads a scholar toward sect-centrism or ecumenism. The tension arises when the first three caliphs and the Ladies Aisha and Hafsa, the wives of the Prophet, might be considered as blocking Ali’s path to becoming the first caliph. Before going any further, it is worth mentioning that this dichotomy does not cover a separate but related group known for ghuluww (exaggeration), meaning attributing divinity to the Infallible Imams. It is separate because none of the established Twelver Shia mujtahids claim to be part of this group. Yet, it is also related, because there are many Ulama who attribute shared qualities between God and the Infallible Imams, with the caveat that the degree of those qualities differs; God possesses the absolute and original, while the Infallible Imams display limited and banal characteristics. However, even those who believe in a degree of parity still reject people of ghuluww and acknowledge the binary of the lord (rab) and the servant (abd), or that of creator and creation.27 Another factor that plays a role is the degree to which a mujtahid is textualist or rationalist. Since ahadith are a matter of interpretation, any conclusion as to their meaning depends entirely on whether the interpreter puts hadith before reasoning or vice versa. Akhbarite Ulama are more prone to sectcentrism. A controversial instance is Allama Majlisi’s book Bihar al-Anwar. This extensive collection of hadith also includes a section known as Mata’in, which denounces the first three caliphs and the Ladies Aisha and Hafsa. Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi prohibited its publication to promote intra-faith dialogue. Though much of it is not allowed to be published in Iran today, it was published in Beirut. The book attributed to Muqaddas-e Ardabili, Hadiqa al-Shia, also consists of four parts Mata’in denouncing the first three caliphs. Finally, reactions to political and social situations also had the effect of redefining tawalli and tabarri. Scholars like Rasul Jafariyan and Mustafa Mu’allimi argued that politics and passivism led many Shia toward ghuluww and la’an (cursing), two interconnected concepts.28 La’an is a ritual exercised by extremist Shia cursing the first three caliphs and the Ladies Aisha and

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Hafsa. The majority of current maraji' do not allow this ritual. Shaykh Saduq, in his pivotal book al-Itiqadat, dedicates a chapter (chapter 38) to evildoers. It begins by saying, “old belief concerning them (zalimun) is that they are accursed and dissociation from them is necessary.” To identify the evildoers, using verses of the Quran and several hadiths, Saduq concludes they are those who wronged Ali with regard to successorship after the Prophet’s death. Since dulm (wrongdoing) means the placing of a thing where it doesn’t belong, “he who claims the Imamate, not being an Imam, is an accursed wrongdoer (dalim). And he who ascribes Imamate to those who are not entitled to it, he too is an accursed wrongdoer.” Saduq continues, equating the denial of the Imamate to Ali and the Imams after him is like denying the apostleship of all the prophets. Moreover, whoever fought Ali was an unbeliever (kafir)29 according to the Prophet’s saying. The same is true of anyone who wronged the Lady Fatima and usurped her rights by denying her the inheritance left by her father.30 However, before this section, Saduq pronounces people of ghuluww as kafir and committed to bid’a (innovation in faith), and the following chapter discusses dissimulation (taqiyya), considering it as obligatory as prayer.31 This line of thought leads to Mulla Tahir Qumi, who wrote that all 73 sects in Islam, except Twelver Shia, are people of bid’a and thus went astray.32 So while Shia Ulama divorce themselves from people of ghuluww, they still leave room for ambiguity. Far from mata’in and la’an, which are not dominant among current Shia, the concept of tabarri plays an undeniable role in terms of ecumenism. We can highlight the distinction made by Twelver theologian Abd al-Jali al-Qazwini al-Razi in the twelfth century. He wrote a well-known book al-Naqd to reject a rebuttal against Shia faith. Al-Razi distinguishes between two groups of Shia: Hashawiyyah, or ghali, or Akhbarite and Usuli (principilists). He denounces the former and defends the latter. Hashawiyyah is a derogatory term attributed mostly by rational theologians in both Sunni and Shia referring to their opponents because of their satisfaction with ahadith. Shaykh Mufid used it to condemn textualist Shia,33 and Sayed Murtada considered all Ulama of Qum, with the exception of Shaykh Saduq, part of this trend.34 In al-Razi’s view, the Usuli Shia do not curse, but critically evaluate the companions of the Prophet and give each of the companions his own position. Conflating fair criticism with cursing is the product of ghali Shia and the enemies of the family of the Prophet (nawasib). We will return to al-Razi’s explanation in the next section. Among the current maraji', the Shirazi network (named after the late Muhammad al-Hussaini Shirazi) is often regarded as the most polemical in their approach to Sunnis.35 While they unashamedly exhibit their extremist devotion to the family of the Infallible Imams approaching ghuluww, they do not exhibit animosity toward the caliphs. Yet, as Fanar Haddad expresses,

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their hard line in sectarian doctrines of Shia does not prevent them from political cooperation and pragmatism at the national level.36 However, their case is a proper bridge to another set of ayatollahs who are known for their obsession with Shia ritualistic identity. A clear example of this type of ayatollah was Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Taqi Tabatabaei Qumi (1923–2016), a disciple of al-Khoei. Although he was among the very few Ulama to receive written permission from al-Khoei to become a mujtahid, he did not publish a risala. Qumi had the habit of holding weekly programs in memory of Imam Husayn for the entire year, not just during the month of Muharram, which is common among Shia. He is known for mourning for the Imam Husayn on the Day of Ashura by removing his shirt and beating his chest. He was named the “chest-beating jurist” (faqih-e sinazanan). Qumi was among a few grand ayatollahs supporting tatbir and qama zani, an act of ritual bloodletting to mourn Imam Husayn. In Qumi’s view, it is collectively obligatory (wajib kifa’i), and doubting its necessity is haram. He takes the same strong position about historical facts surrounding the Lady Fatima’s final month. As a robust advocate of doctrinal specificity in Shia like wilayat-e takvini (the Prophets and Imams enjoy creational authority and can intervene, change, and control creation), essential and absolute isma (infallibility) and shafa’a (intercession), Qumi spoke publicly against modernizing Islamic thinkers like Ali Shari'ati. However, the dynamic of faith can offer sect-centrism the opportunity to constructively contribute to intra-faith dialogue. The work of Allamah Amini exemplifies this mode. Allama Abd al-Hussain Amini (1902–1970) was a mujtahid who dedicated himself to promoting Shia faith through history and Sunni literature. His magnum opus, al-Ghadir fil-Kitab wa-l-Sunnah wa’l-Adab (Ghadir in the Quran, the Sunnah, and Literature) is devoted to discussing the hadith of Ghadir Khumm according to Sunni documents. In Amini’s view, Shia specificity is justified through Sunni texts. From this perspective, a Shia does not conceal or compromise his teachings for the sake of ecumenism, but neither does he insult non-Shia sacred figures. Rather, he interacts with non-Shia empathetically. Thus, one can conclude that tawalli dominates tabarri, and specificity takes on new dimensions. Here the distinct features of Shia are highlighted inclusively. Allama Amini did not like ecumenism associated with compromise. Such ecumenism considers the faithful as leading and deciding how and when to make one denomination closer to another. The hidden logic behind this trend is a human supervision of religion that contradicts the spirit of faith. In other words, love (tawalli) and avoidance (tabarri) are two faces of the same coin in Amini’s view: both loving Ali’s virtues and avoiding the vices of the other caliphs in accordance with Sunni sources in order to justify Shia doctrinal identity. We can’t leave or degrade someone in order to promote

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the human-chosen policy of ecumenism. Sect-centrism is an exercise in demonstrating self-confidence. A great Shia alim once denied the existence of valid advice on la’an in Shia texts, upsetting Amini who condemned him for this denial. When given the chance to give a talk in al-Azhar, Amini did not moderate his speech to make it audience-friendly. Some scholars distinguish between two different kinds of sect-centric trends. Accordingly, Amini’s method is a path toward recognizing Shia identity justified by Sunni theological sources. In this view, a marginalized and discriminated minority group can underscore its specific characteristics to demonstrate it is an authentic group rooted in original literature. This approach leads to ecumenism by receiving validation through opposing literature. Another example of this method is found in Grand Ayatollah Mar’ashi Najafi, who is known for his scholarship in rijal (biographies of transmitted hadith), Shia literature and references, and exchange of ijazat (certifications) with numerous religious leaders—Sunni, Shia, Zaydi, and Ismaili alike. He ran a small institute, Lajna-i Ihqaq al-Haqq, which collected and published Sunni hadith and writings favorable to Shia.37 Thus, readers must not confuse this kind of sect-specificity with one that ignores Sunnis and develops its ideology regardless of opposing views, which is a self-centered sectarian identity open to extremism in denominational aspects. That extremism in union with populism can lead to conflict within the group. One case in point is the hatred directed at Lebanese Grand Ayatollah al-Sayed Musin al-Amin (1867–1952), author of the encyclopedia A’yan al-Shi'a, filled with biographies of great Shia figures, who wrote against some forms of mourning for Imam Husayn including tatbir or qama zani (self-flagellation). Many Shia practiced tabarri and la’an against him. He did receive some support among maraji', though most of them opposed him.38

ECUMENICISM In contrast to the two trends we’ve just identified, there is a third group of Shia who attempt to combine specificity and unity by giving space to each of these values and offering a balance. How to preserve this balance depends on place, time, sociopolitical climate, and the intellectual inclinations and scholarship of a mujtahid. For example, the study of Nahj al-Balaghah played a role in making Ulama more pro-ecumenism. Nahj al-Balaghah was edited by Sayed Radi, who had an ecumenist character and an eye toward including Sunni sense. The book contains few jurisprudential and denominational points. A great number of Ulama who commented on it contributed to ecumenism. However, a famous criticism of the first three righteous caliphs comes in the sermon al-Shiqshiqiyah, in which Ali ibn Abitalib complains

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about what happened with the caliphate and how he endured it with patience. Ibn Maythan al-Bahrani (1239–1289) holds that it is not a mutawatir sermon. Mutawatir is a religious quote certified by a multiplicity of the reporting sources to indeed be true. In al-Bahrani’s view it is a partially verified sermon, but one should ignore it for the unity of Muslims and the honor of the companions of the Prophet. The same approach is taken by another commentary on Nahj al-Balaghah a century later. The author is not known, but there is evidence showing his Shia denomination. He argues that no one should speak against the companions of the Prophet because they were honored to accompany the Prophet. Moreover, insulting the companions opens the gate to insulting the family of the Prophet and finally leads to fitna. This is why the Infallible Imams made taqiyyah39 and silence obligatory. Therefore, he joins al-Bahrani in allowing Shia to ignore the sermon in the interest of the umma.40 A very recent example of ecumenist Ulama based on Nahj al-Balaghah is Grand Ayatollah HussainAli Muntazeri, who in 1981 recommended that Ayatollah Khomeini announce a period of one week between Rabi al-awwal 12–17 as Islamic unity week. The twelfth day of this lunar month in the Islamic calendar is considered the birthday of the Prophet by Sunni and the seventeenth by Shia. Muntazeri was the only grand ayatollah who taught and produced a detailed commentary on Nahj al-Balaghah.41 He warned that Nahj al-Balaghah is ignored by Shia, including by its Ulama.42 As a matter of fact, Nahj al-Balaghah paid less attention to jurisprudence. Rather, ethical and social values such as justice, egalitarianism, the deconsecration of power, and human rights are highlighted. Thus, many Iranian religious intellectuals describe the 1979 Islamic Revolution as beginning with protests against the Shah under the banner of the Quran and Nahj al-Balaghah, but when the ayatollahs consolidated power they switched to Tawzih al-masail and Mafatih al-jinan—the former being a manual on jurisprudence and the latter a liturgical and prayer text. Let’s now look at some other ayatollahs who contributed greatly to ecumenism. One prominent contributor to ecumenism was Shaykh Tusi (995–1067), also known as Shaykh al-Ta’ifah. He was a student of Sayed Murtada and belonged to the camp of doctrinal rationalists begun by Shaykh Mufid. Attacking the textualist trend in Shia, Tusi extended his rationalism to ecumenism. He founded the great seminary of Najaf and published many works that gained so much currency in Shia that until past century, the term Shaykh in Shia jurisprudence referred solely to him, with the term Shaykhayn (meaning two Shaykhs) referred to him and Mufid. In his commentary on the Quran, al-Tibyan, Tusi elaborates a variety of Sunni and Shia views on a verse, not always sharing his own view. He is known as the founder of comparative jurisprudence (al-fiqh al-muqarin). In his masterpiece al-Khalaf, al-Tusi places Shia jurisprudential views alongside many Sunni views. While

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Shia jurists do not use qiyas (analogical reasoning) and istihsan (juristic preference43) to conclude new law, Tusi uses them to prove his school’s view is correct in comparison with its opponents.44 One of Tusi’s great-grandsons, Sayed ibn Tawus (1193–1266), put his spiritual focus on promoting ecumenism. Sayed ibn Tawus is important because of his milestone book Lohoof (Sighs of Sorrow) on the tragic events of Karbala. This book is very important not only because of a distinct understanding of Imam Husayn but also because it changed the course of Shia treatment of Karbala, as Salihi NajafAbadi claims.45 According to Sayed ibn Tawus, Imam Husayn was motivated to sacrifice himself in order to approach God because of his specific status before God. His book changed Shia understanding of Husayn’s cause in Karbala from his intention to establish a government to his real objective of inspiring a tradition of spirituality around sacrifice. Sayed also was among the teachers of Allama Hilli, the first mujtahid to be called Ayatollah in Shia. Sayed lived an isolated life, dedicating many of his works on supplications, prayers, and rituals and wrote on the love of the Prophet’s family. His few works on jurisprudence also centered on prayers. Sayed disliked issuing fatwas and promoting fiqh. He argued that major parts of jurisprudence are simply repeating previous ideas. In fact, he rejected several calls by the Abbasid caliph to join him and occupy the position of mufti or participate in the administration. However, he accepted an offer to work with Halagu Khan (d. 1265), the Mongol ruler.46 Sayed considered the Islamic order of enjoining good and forbidding wrong as spiritual advice to work on oneself, rather than a community obligation to recommend changes in others. Speaking of people’s bad deeds, even to help them, creates hate in them and splits the community. He preferred rulings by a just infidel over an unjust believer. Sayed also studied before, befriended, and taught some Sunni scholars. Ibn al-Najjar al-Baghdadi (1183–1246) gave him the permission to narrate hadith. Sayed relied on many Sunni texts and spoke of them very respectfully. Some of his books have only references to Sunni sources, while others feature more references to Sunni than Shia. His library included many Sunni works. Moreover, it is said his citations of texts were much more numerous than his contemporaries’ citations, regardless of whether they were Sunni or Shia. Sayed was open to putting humanity before religion, and of course before denomination, as he believed one can trust reports delivered by honest non-Muslims if there is not a specific hadith prohibiting it. He said a believer shouldn’t be rude or insult others if there is no clear statement in the faith that addresses it. In Sayed’s view, ecumenism means learning about the family of the Prophet through sources common to Sunni and Shia.47 This ecumenism through coexistence with Sunnis would be revived centuries later by Mirza Shirazi (1815–1895).

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Shirazi is well known as the mujaddid (renewer of the religion) in addition to his 1891 fatwa against the usage of tobacco in the Qajar era. While serving as the head of Shia marja'iyyah, Shirazi was living and teaching in Najaf. In October 1874 he moved to Samarra, which was more populated by Sunni Muslims. Though his discontent with the conservative atmosphere of Najaf is mentioned among the reasons that caused this move, Shirazi’s enthusiasm for ecumenism is observed as the main driver of his relocation. Shirazi hoped that not only could he himself interact with Iraqi Sunni tribal leaders and the Ottoman Sunni governor, but his seminarians too could grow up in a culture of exchange of social and scholarly affairs with their Sunni peers. Samarra put him in contact with the rest of the world and with new developments in politics and the sciences. Shirazi paved the path for the next generation of Ulama who, like Akhund Khurasani and Naini, promoted Iranian constitutionalism; or encyclopedists like Muhsim Amin and Shaykh Zabih Allah Askari, who penned the six-volume Rayahin al-Shari'a on female Shia scholars. For Shirazi, ecumenism meant constructive coexistence in order to avoid hate and revenge, show forgiveness, learn how to independently overcome tensions, tackle prejudice, and try to understand the other. There are several stories that describe tensions between Sunni and Shia individuals—even Shirazi himself and his son were targeted for attack by Sunnis, but Shirazi did not interpret these as sectarian attacks. Occasionally British and Russian agents wished to intervene in instances of communal strife, but Shirazi did not allow them to do so. Shirazi would advise his students to read the part of Nahj al-Balaghah which emphasizes treating others equally regardless of their faith. Coexistence with Sunni seminarians affected the style and approach of Samarra Hawza. For example, in comparison to Najaf, Samarra Hawza promoted common sense, custom (urf),48 and texts, while Najaf loved abstract intellectualism and rational axioms. Samarra learned this from its Sunni counterparts, because encountering real-life problems made Sunni jurists more accessible and textual. Samarra Hawza also became notable for its simple writing style, encyclopedism, praise of literary works, increased involvement with sociopolitical change, and an emphasis on open-mindedness and polite debates, as discussed in the first part of this book.49 It is said that Sayed Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838–1897),50 the great Muslim reformer, was among critical figures active in the Iranian resistance to the Tobacco Concession in 1891–1892.51 He wrote a letter to Shirazi demanding that he weigh in against the Concession. In addition, al-Afghani’s passion for unity among Muslims was his intellectual link to Shirazi, though al-Afghani was considered a political figure. Al-Afghani, the father of modernist thinking in Islam, gave communal ecumenism a new dimension. Previously there were only two models of ecumenism: political and intellectual. The outstanding example of political ecumenism, which was a top-down approach, came from

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Nadir Shah Afshar (1688–1747). For his political ambitions—like establishing his rule over the entire Islamic world in order to meet the expectations of a majority of his Sunni Afghan soldiers—Nadir initiated his ecumenism with the Ottoman caliphate by suggesting Twelver Shia as an additional madhhab (doctrinal law school) alongside the four already established schools. In turn, Shia were expected not to curse the three caliphs anymore and to accept them as legitimate rulers. The practice of temporary marriage was to cease as well.52 It’s said that some Shia Ulama accepted Nadir’s approach out of fear and taqiyya, while others rejected it and paid the price with their lives.53 Ulama, indeed, wanted to lead the movement and keep it under their control. They considered the intellectual aspects to be their domain. Their conservative nature was effective in contributing to ecumenism. However, both approaches resulted in the same consequence: leaving politics to the politicians and faith to the mujtahids. Al-Afghani embodied both aims, political and intellectual, but transformed and redirected them toward colonialism and dictatorship. Al-Afghani hid his own jurisprudential and denominational facets. Sunni alAzhar welcomed him as a Sunni, and Qum Hawza called him the “beauty of hawzas.” Al-Afghani attributed the grievances and pain resulting from division and sectarian emphasis to internal despotism and external imperialism. He wrote many letters to Ulama and maraji' and political leaders. He visited and presented ideas from Kolkata in India to Kabul, Tehran, Najaf, and Cairo to spread his words. Although he was not successful in persuading them to abandon denominational motives, he did succeed in making them aware that critical changes in how they saw and approached the other were required to meet the challenges of the modern world. His voice can be traced among the effective elements that contributed to later ecumenism. Ecumenism in the context of modernization by mujtahids took on multiple dimensions. Many emphasized, like al-Afghani, the beneficial aspects of ecumenism in uniting Muslims around the world. Some, like Abd al-Husayn Sharaf al-Din al-Musawi (1872–1957), Shaykh Muhammad Husayn Kashif al-Ghita (1877–1954), Sayed Muhsin Amin, and Shaykh Muhammad Rida al-Muzaffar (1904–1964), approached ecumenism by explaining Shia doctrines and practices consistent with Sunni sources. They believed that if misconceptions were removed, Sunnis and Shias could view each other sympathetically. The public can benefit from learning from each other, and respectful debates can enhance this mutual education. Other mujtahids sought to redefine the concept of the Imamate. Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi held that Shia’s responsibility is not to emphasize the political and historical rights of Infallible Imams because doing so does not effect change today.54 Rather, they ought to focus on the scholarly and spiritual authority of the progeny of the Prophet55,56 Ayatollah Khomeini combined

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this idea with his political and mystical passion, saying, “Today, disputing over the wilayat of the commander of faithful [Ali ibn Abitalib] is betraying Islam. Do not suggest this kind of topic nowadays.” Khomeini began his will with the hadith of al-Thaqalayn rather than Ghadir.57 While the latter recalls the political successorship of the Prophet, the former emphasizes the spiritual excellency of the progeny of the Prophet. Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr further developed the concept by distinguishing two elements in the Imamate: intellectual authority and political leadership. Intellectual authority is not limited to when the Imam is alive and is based on hadith al-Thaqalayn. Political leadership is temporary and is based on the hadith of Ghadir. Murtaza Mutahhari also held that the major mistake of Shia theologians was that they reduced Imamate to hukumah (government). He stated that the foundation of Imamate is its spiritual aspect. In this view, Shia is influenced by Sunni when the concept of Imamate is reduced to that of governance.58 I would like to end this section by touching on three reformist ayatollahs: the Iranian Nimatullah Salihi NajafAbadi (1923–2006), the Afghan Asif Muhsini (1935–2019), and the Lebanese Musa al-Sadr (1928–?). Salihi NajafAbadi was a student of Borujerdi. He published many books that bridged the gap between Islam and politics and reformed Shia understanding of hadiths, the Infallible Imams, and Imam Husayn’s Karbala. Thus, he criticized many stereotypes in Shia, including on the knowledge of the unseen world by Infallible Imams, and debated with contemporary established scholars like Allama Tabataba’i, Murtaza Mutahhari, and Safi Gulpayegani. He made his name with the controversial volume Shahid-e Javid (The Eternal Martyr), published in Qum in 1968 and later banned after the Islamic Revolution. In 1985, Salihi published a small treatise on Islamic unity, Vahdat-e Islami. Salihi believes that Shia mujtahids must issue fatwas stating that Sunni schools of jurisprudence are equally valid in the faith as those of Shia. Otherwise, it is hypocritical to say that Sunnis are the brothers of Shia but that they will go to hell because of wrongly practicing Islam. Solidarity and brotherhood among Muslims are impossible if they do not consider each other’s practice valid. In 1959, Shaykh Mahmud Shaltut, the Rector of al-Azhar, one of the main centers of Sunni religious learning, issued his famous statement declaring the legitimacy of Twelver Shia as an Islamic school of jurisprudence. He added that a Sunni can practice in accordance with Shia jurisprudence. Salihi did not expect all Shia mujtahids to be brave like Shaltut in allowing Shia practice with regard to schools of Sunni jurisprudence, but he did expect them to issue fatwa acknowledging the legitimacy of Sunni schools. This step, yet untaken, is available. Salihi steps forward to issue this fatwa, offering his reasons as follows. Quranic verses refer to Muslims as brothers (49:10) and say they must unite (3:103). This call for brotherhood means it must be possible. If it were not

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possible, then the Quran would be demanding an impossible action, which makes no sense. As a matter of fact, Muslims do not feel they are brothers. Brotherhood is a desired situation rather than the reality. Muslims must move toward brotherhood, and mujtahids should pave the path. Shia mujtahids, like Shaltut in a Sunni context, should acknowledge Sunni jurisprudence. When Shias finally see their Sunni brothers, and vice versa, on the same path of salvation, only then will they experience true brotherhood. How can a Shia mujtahid conclude Sunni ijtihad is legitimate? Salihi uses five jurisprudential arguments to justify his fatwa that Sunni jurisprudence is equally legitimate. First, he employs a hadith of Imam Baqir’s Statement. Accordingly, a fair (muhsin) Muslim who does not follow walayat can still go to paradise (jannah) because of God’s mercy. Salihi is saying here that the acceptance of walaya, which Shia is centered around, is not required in order to go to paradise. Another example is Imam Ali’s practice. Ali prayed and begged God’s mercy for the people of Kufa after the Battle of the Camel. The people of Kufa were Sunnis. Further, Ali allowed the people of Kufa to continue practicing salat tarawih, which was Umar’s ijtihad. Ali disagreed with that ijtihad but permitted people to exercise it. Salihi’s third argument stems from the Quranic verses: 2:62 and 5:69. Sunni and Shia are both considered as faithful (mumin), mentioned separately from Jews and Christians in those verses. If, as the verses state, the good deeds of Jews and Christians can save them from hell, Salihi asks why the same is not true with regard to Sunni Muslims? His fourth argument rests on God’s Justice. If a Muslim jurist is bound to a justified methodology and a lay Muslim practices Islam sincerely, why would either be punished for possibly arriving at the wrong conclusion? The deduction is not under the jurist’s control. Finally, many Quranic verses, including verse 37 chapter 22, view religious duties and commands as tools to be used and paths to be traveled, giving God reason to save the practitioner. Therefore, it matters not if they are the true commands of God. Salihi also notes that the Quran cites the sacrifice of Abraham to show how a believer is required to reasonably learn the will of God, not His true intention. Prioritizing the methodology and process of ijtihad over the outcome of ijtihad, Salihi asked his fellow mujtahids to develop this mechanism to contribute to interdenominational solidarity among Muslims.59 Shaykh Asif Muhsini was born in Qandahar, Afghanistan, and was a student of Khoei in Najaf. He was also a member of the mujahidin who fought against the Soviet invaders of Afghanistan. Thus, his major contribution to jurisprudence was a treatise on the laws of Jihad in Islam. He is probably the first Shia marja to write a specific treatise or manual of jihad (tawzih alMasa’il jangi). Muhsini was eager to contribute to the study of the reporters of hadiths (ilm al-rijal) and classical theology (kalam). In public, his political activities are more known. They include the following: founding a jihadi

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party, Harakat-e Islami; giving the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan the title “Islamic;” and drafting the Shia family law in Afghanistan. Muhsini built the largest nongovernmental madrassa in Kabul and gained a positive reputation for ecumenism. As a reformist, he published a critical review of Shia hadith collections and evaluated the greater portion of a very popular collection of hadiths, Bihar al-Anwar. He concluded that only 283 of the 5764 hadiths (less than 5 percent) included in the volume are reliable. Muhsini argues in “What are the differences between Shia and Sunni?” that diversity and tension among Muslims are the result of historical events and earlier intellectual interpretations of the Quran and Sunnah. Since present-day Muslims have no control over these factors, they should treat them as phenomena of the past rather than guideposts for the future. Regarding interpretations, they should avoid bigotry and bias and emotional scholarship. He stresses that Muslims must see how imperialism and divide-andconquer policies exploit diversity. He then discusses the commonalities between Sunni and Shia, identifying 40 doctrines (aqida) and 19 practices (furu’a). The pursuing chapter highlights nine distinctions and examines them as follows: (I) The meaning of God’s Word: Muhsini says this is a scholarly issue that should not split Muslims into sectarian identity. (II) Whether people will see God in the Hereafter: Muhsini suggests leaving the issue for the Hereafter. (III) The Relationship of God’s Attributes to His Nature: this is yet another scholarly issue that Muhsini believes should not divide Muslims into sectarian identity. (IV) Distortion (Alteration/tahrif) of the Quran: Muhsini states that the majority of Shia Ulama reject distortion and the current Quran is common among all Shia. (V) Hadiths: Muhsini sees the major difference lying in the ways of narration, not in the content, so disputes over hadiths ought not lead to an unbridgeable split. He further suggests initiating an ecumenical hadith and jurisprudence scholarship. (VI) Prophet’s Companions: Sunnis consider all of them to be just, while Shia discriminate among them. Here Muhsini offers a couple of suggestions. First, there is a way to accommodate Sunni ideas about the first immigrants and view those companions as just (adl). He suggests a practical compromise: Shia must respect the famous companions, and Sunni must show respect to the progeny of the Prophet and not consider people like Yazid better than Husayn ibn Ali. (VII) The Prophet’s Successor: Muhsini argues that since Sunni counts the caliphate as a secondary element (furu) of Islam, they are not

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required to excommunicate Shia for disagreeing. Indeed, Muhsini says, Shia acknowledge the historical facts that Muslims chose Abu Bakr as the first caliph. Nobody can be certain of historical details, especially when religious emotions are involved. So, Shia have to give Sunnis the benefit of the doubt that they sought to understand but didn’t find Shia’s evidence sufficient to change their ideas. Muhsini clearly rejects a conspiracy theory and asks both denominations to consider each other in the same way as an unsuccessful mujtahid is still rewarded before God for his efforts. (VIII) Free will/taqdir, which leads Shia toward free will and Sunni toward predestination: Muhsini highlights the diversity of viewpoints within both denominations and concludes their perspectives are very similar, though filtered through different terminologies. (IX) Four Schools of Jurisprudence: Muhsini explains there is no logical reason to limit legitimate schools of jurisprudence to four. Imam Sadiq was a teacher of imam Abu Hanifa and earned his respect; thus, it is not unreasonable to expect Sunnis to acknowledge Sadiq’s school. He cites Shaltut here. Muhsini concludes that solidarity among Muslims is possible and useful for development and progress. He closes the work with a suggestion to build shared madrassas in order to communicate and learn together through the study of comparative doctrines, exegeses, hadiths, and jurisprudences.60 Therefore, we see that Salihi’s and Muhsini’s ecumenism emphasize commonalities and advise ignoring the differences found in some practical details because they are outcomes of different law deduction (ijtihad). Regardless of which paths these conclusions take, the important point is that scholarly deduction is justified and accepted by God. This leads us to the last figure who shared in political Islam and reform of traditional scholarship with Salihi and Muhsini. However, as an activist, he was averse to ignoring the details in practices and arrived at a different set of recommendations. Imam Musa al-Sadr founded the Amal Movement and gave Lebanese Shia a sense of community. He studied in Tehran, Qum, and Najaf, and worked as an emissary of both Borujerdi and Hakim. He was involved in both interand intra-faith dialogues, and in 1960 became the first head of the Supreme Islamic Shia Council in Lebanon. As the head of this Council, he wrote a letter to the supreme mufti of Lebanon promoting ecumenism. Solidarity in words alone, he believed, was not enough; it must enter into people’s hearts and minds and appear in their actions to build a better future. He suggested first moving from universal ideas to concrete and specific actions through contributions to comparative jurisprudence (fiqh muqaran) in order to learn about and from one another. Ecumenical concepts translated into jurists’

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fatwas can make jurisprudential solidarity real. Secondly, he proposed initiating collective efforts, ranging from religious activities such as celebrating Eids and having common words in the call to prayer, to joint approaches to social affairs like education, housing, guardianship of orphans, and improving the quality of laborers’ lives. Imam al-Sadr was heavily involved in humanitarianism and charitable activities. He particularly emphasized Sunni and Shia performing rituals together, even compromising on the call to prayer (adhan) and the wording of the prayers (salat).61

CONCLUSION Shia mujtahids, like other religious leaders, took diverse approaches in terms of ecumenism in order to be true to their understating of Islam, namely Shia, as well as to Sunni. The dynamic of self and the other moved in many directions: from self-defense to self-criticism, from understating the other to accusing the other, from working with the other to separating from the other, and from intellectual to sociopolitical concerns. In the courses I teach, I draw two squares side by side, representing Sunni and Shia. There are figures on the border whom both denominations claim as their members. There are mujtahids some distance from each other, and there are many more farther yet. Finally, there are Ulama in each denomination who sit at the farthest ends of the squares. Their life experiences, their level of scholarship, the time and place in which they lived and worked, the publicity, and the way they expressed themselves all play a role in shaping their positions on ecumenism. There is a famous hadith narrated by both Sunni and Shia in which the Prophet once said his ummah will divide into 73 sects, and all of them shall go to hell except one. Al-Sadr once said that current Sunni and Shia can’t be sure they’re the secure sect because both added new elements to the original basis of their faiths.62 A positive version of the same idea can be seen in the motto which Grand Ayatollah Sistani, the highest Shia authority during the rise of sectarian conflict in the past decade in Iraq, announced in advising his followers: “do not say, ‘Our brothers, the Sunnis,’ but say, ‘Ourselves.’” Both Sunni and Shia are trying to understand and practice Islam to the best of their abilities. If the aim is struggling to understand and practice Islam carefully, and not to judge the other, then what traditionally is assumed as the point of tension can be viewed as the point of harmony. There is huge controversy among Shia and Sunni over the Lady Fatima’s inheritance from the Prophet. Mostly Sunni rejects it based on a hadith quoted by the first caliph in which the Prophet said, “We, prophets, do not leave any inheritance.” Shia rejects this hadith, arguing it contradicts the Quranic verses about some prophets. Ayatollah Khomeini used this hadith in his ethical book, saying that if it is an

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authentic hadith, then it means the legacy of the prophets by virtue of their prophetic function and spiritual inheritance is not wealth and treasure; rather, it is knowledge.63 A more concise example is the concept of walayat, on which Shia place great emphasis. In their view, walayat is related to scholarly and spiritual guidance and support, but it works like prophecy without the revelation. The Infallible Imams are agents of walayat. The hadith Ghadir is the related capstone where the Prophet said, “He whose mawla I am, Ali is his mawla.” The concept of walayat is co-rooted with mawla in root letters w-l-i. Allama Tabataba’i, who wrote several books to elaborate Shia faith and whose commentary on the Quran Shias view with pride, wrote an Arabic book called Walayat. The book is organized into five chapters and includes philosophical discussions followed by textual confirmations. The first chapter explains how religious ideas consist of exoteric and esoteric teachings. The second chapter discusses how everything originated from God in graded steps and will return to Him as an arc becomes a full circle. This descent and ascent lead to a hierarchy of beings and the multiplicity of humanity. The next chapter proves that humanity can achieve even the most challenging esoteric teachings through self-discipline and meditation. Chapter 4 studies the annihilation in God, which is called walayat, and finally, the last chapter elaborates on three levels of tawhid. As one can see, although the title and the author are tied to fundamental Shia concepts, the volume itself has no denominational content.64 If the reader knows nothing about the author, the book itself does not say anything about sect-centric features of Shia, though it represents the critical ideas of a Shia commentator. This example illustrates how naive and simplistic are the claims which sharply distinguish Shia and Sunni or project sectarianism on the long history of Islam. NOTES 1. al-Amili, Baha al-Din Muhammad ibn Hussain, Kitab al-Mikhlat (Egypt: alMatba’a al-maymana, 1900), p. 228. 2. Shubairi Zanjani, Sayed Ahmad, al-Kalam yajurro al-kalam (Words lead to more words) (Qum: Haqbin, 1396/2017), Vol.1, p. 423. 3. Fanar Haddad, Understanding ‘Sectarianism’ Sunni-Shia Relations in the Modern Arab World (Oxford University Press, 2020). 4. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “Shi’ism and Sufism,” in Shi’ism Doctrines, Thought, and Spirituality, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Hamid Dadashi, and Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr eds. (State University of New York Press, 1988), pp. 102-103. 5. Seeking the inner aspect of faith is what makes Shia align with rational theology (like Mutazilite), philosophy, and Sufism in Islam. In this viewpoint, faith consists of both an outer and inner aspect, a husk and a kernel. While the outer aspect

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encourages dedication to rituals and practices (orthopraxy), the inner inspires love and annihilation in walayat and orthodoxy. The idea of tawil is the bridge between them, and Ulama are responsible for orchestrating it in their areas of expertise. 6. Muhsin Fayz Kashani, al-Mahajjat al-Bayza fi Tahdib al-Iyha, Ali Akbar alGhaffari ed. (Tehran: Maktabat al-Saduq, 1339/1960), Vol. 4, p. 376. 7. For a concise account of shared Shia-Mutazilite concepts see Najam Haider, Shi’i Islam An Introduction (Cambridge, 2014), pp. 13-30. Also see Allamha Hilli’s excerpt on theology with Mutazilite inclinations: “Hilli’s Twelver Shi’i/Mutazili Creed” in Islamic Theological Themes: A Primary Source Reader, John Renard (ed.) (University of California Press, 2014), pp. 116-120. 8. Rasul Jafariyan, The History of Shiism in Iran From the Beginning to the Establishment of the Safavid Rule (Tehran: Ilm, 1388/2009), pp. 283-288. 9. Ibid, pp. 290-293. 10. Ibid, 380-382 and 424. 11. For example, a couple of times Ibn Qiba al-Razi (d. 929) and Abul Qasim Balkhi (d. 931) wrote against and responded to each other’s work directly. The former was Shia and the latter Mutazilite. 12. For more information on the overlap between Mutazilite and Zaidi, see Najam Haidar, Shi’i Islam: An Introduction (Cambridge University Press, 2014). 13. To read an introduction to Nahj al-Balaghah, see Syed Hussein M. Jafry, “The Nahj al-Balaghah and the Teachings of the Imams,” in Shi’ism: Doctrines, Thought, and Spirituality (State University of New York Press, 1988), pp. 44-53; “Ruler and Society,” in Expectation of the Millennium: Shi’ism in History, Syyed Hossein Nasr, Hamid Dadashi, and Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr (State University of New York Press, 1989), pp. 73-91; For an English translation of the volume see: Imam Ali ibn Abu Talib, Nahjul Balagha: Peak of Eloquence Sayed Ali Reza (trans.), (New York: Tahrike Tarsile Quran, 1985). 14. Shaykh Mufid also studied before Mutazilite Ulama Abu Abdallah Basri and Ali b Isa Ramani Mutazili (Jafariyan, 434-435). 15. Jafariyan, pp. 425-429. 16. The five principles of Mutazilite include Oneness of God; divine justice; the promise and the threat (meaning God will keep His promise of rewarding those who do good and punishing evil-doers); the intermediate position (meaning a sinful Muslim is a “fasiq” Muslim, not a non-Muslim); and the enjoining of good and forbidding wrong. See Haider, Shi’i Islam: An Introduction, p. 14. 17. Rumi, The Mathnawi of Jalal ud-din Rumi, Reynold Alleyne Nicholson, trans and ed. (Tehran: Booteh, 2002), 6:4538-4542. 18. Moojan Momen called them “tashayyu hasan” (good or moderate leaning towards Shia), meaning extolling the virtues of Ali and condemning Mu’awiya and Yazid but without going as far as what was considered the extreme of Twelver Shia and rejecting the first three caliphs and exaggerating the position of Ali and the Imams (Moojam Momen, An Introduction to Shi’i Islam (Yale University Press, 1985), p. 96). For a very brief review of the history of Shia jurisprudence with regard to ecumenism see Karim Crow and Ahmad Kazemi Mousavi, Facing One Qiblah (Pustaka Nasional Pte Ltd, 2005), pp. 1-29.

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19. Rasul Jafariyan, The History of Shiism in Iran From the Beginning to the Establishment of the Safavid Rule, p. 763. 20. Ibid, Ibid, 765-767. 21. Ibid, 844. 22. Ali Aminizadeh and MuhammadAli Ranjbar, “Tasannun-e Dawazda Imami Khurasan: Zamineha va Illal,” in A Quarterly for Shi’ite Studies (Qum: The Institute of Shia Studies, 2017), Vol. 15, No. 57, p. 83. 23. Rasul Jafariyan, The History of Shiism in Iran From the Beginning to the Establishment of the Safavid Rule, p. 842-843. 24. Ibid, 840-850. 25. 141–151. 26. Walayat is a core concept for Shia which takes its significance from the famous saying of the Prophet, “Whoever I am his mawla, Ali is his mawla” in Ghadir Khumm (see, Moojan Momen, An Introduction to Shi’i Islam (Yale University Press, 1985), p. 15). The term mawla was interpreted as “friend” by Sunni and “leader” by Shia. Walayat (literally “support”) is spiritual connection with or charismatic loyalty to the Wali, which in Shia context applies to Ali and his qualified descendants as Imams. A related term is wilayat, which denotes its political and leadership aspect. This term received its contemporary widespread notoriety from the theory of wilayat al-faqih (the jurist guardianship), which will be discussed in Chapter 10 on Politics and Government. Although wilayat and walayat are sometimes used interchangeably, there is a small but important distinction. (For a short introduction see Najm Haidar, Shi’i Islam: An Introduction (Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 31-35; for greater detail see, Hamid Mavani, Religious Authority and Political Thought in Twelver Shi’ism: From Ali to Post-Khomeini (Routledge, 2013), pp. 40-65). 27. For a brief overview of the historical context of ghuluww and its evolution in Shia history, see Moojan Momen, An Introduction to Shi’i Islam, (Yale University Press, 1985) particularly pages 65-68; to read a modernist response to ghuluww by a current Shia ayaollah, see Ayatollah Salehi NajafAbadi, Religious Extremism: Intellectual and Doctrinal Deviance in Islam, Hamid Mavani (trans.) (Montreal: Organization for the Advancement of Islamic Knowledge, 2009). 28. Mustafa Mu’alemi, “The founders and promoters of the theory of insulting and cursing somebody by name and specifications in the Islam,” in The History of Islamic Culture and Civilization: Quarterly Journal of Research (Qum: Islamic Knowledge University, Vol. 2, No. 4, 2011), pp. 191-201; Rasul Jafariyan, The History of Shiism in Iran From the Beginning to the Establishment of the Safavid Rule (Tehran: Ilm, 1388/2009), 51 and 772-774. 29. One has to keep in mind that this is a theological, not jurisprudential kafir, meaning Shia can treat them as a Muslim, for example, in terms of halal market, but they are not considered a full believer (mu’min). 30. A Shi’ite Creed: A translation of Risalatul-Itiqadat of Muhammad b. Ali Ibn Babawayhi al-Qummi known as Shaykh Saduq, Asaf A. A. Fyzee (trans.) (Oxford University Press, 1942), pp. 144-148. 31. Ibid, 148.

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32. Mulla Muhammad Qumi, Tuhfat al-Akhyar, Davud Ilhami ed. (Qum: Madrasa al-Imam Amir al-Mumenin, 1369/1991), p. 204. 33. Shaykh Mufid, Muhammad ibn Muhammad, Tashih al-itiqad, Husayn Dargahi (ed.) (Qum: 1000th Anniversary International Congress of Shaykh Mufid, 1371/1992), pp. 81-82. 34. Al-Rasail al-Sharif al-Murtada, Sayed Mahdi al-Rija’i (ed.) (Qum: Dar alQuran al-Karim, 1405/1985), Vol. 3, p. 310. 35. The Shirazi network is accused of supporting several polemical Shia freelance preachers like Yassir al-Habib and Hassan Allahyari, who are estranged from their native countries and from the traditional structures of religious authorities. 36. Fanar Haddad, Understanding ‘Sectarianism:’ Sunni-Shia Relations in the Modern Arab World, (Oxford University Press, 2020), p. 180. I am not referring to anti-ecumenism Ulama like Mir Sayed Ahmad Rawzati (1929-2002) and Yasub alDin Rastigar Juybari (b. 1941). The first author did not hold the position of mujtahid (ayatollah). He edited a polemical treatise debating Sunnis, the preface of which claimed Sunni Ulama promote ecumenism to ban the spread of Shia voice. In Rawzati’s view, Imam Shafi’ (767-820), founder of the Shafi’i school of jurisprudence, was the first scholar who initiated ecumenism in Islam. Yasub al-Din Rastigar wrote Haqiqate-e vahdat dar din va hikmat’e eid al-Zahra (The Reality of Religious Unity and the Wisdom of Eid al-Zahra) in 2002 in Qum, which didn’t receive official publication. The book considers ecumenism a satanic plot and does not follow a scholarly structure (Mehdi Mehrizi, “Approaches to Proximity Among the Islamic Sects,” in Journal of Seven Heavens (Qum: University of Islamic Denominations, Vol. 12, No. 47, 2010), p. 14). 37. Michael M. Fischer, Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution (Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 94. 38. Shubairi Zanjani, Jor’a-e az darya, Vol. 1, pp. 564-565. 39. For more details about taqiyyah (dissimulation), see Allamah Tabataba’i and Hamid Enayat, “Taqiyyah,” in Shi’ism: Doctrines, Thought, and Spirituality, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Hamid Dadashi, and Seyyed Vali Nasr (ed.) (State University of New York, 1988), pp. 203-212. 40. Rasul Jafariyan, The History of Shiism in Iran From the Beginning to the Establishment of the Safavid Rule, (Tehran: Ilm, 1388/2009), pp. 677-682. Rasul Jafariyan considers the Sufi master, ‘Ala al-Dawla Simnani (1261-1366) among scholars who tried to introduce ecumenism between Sunni and Shia using Nahj alBalaghah, though he was a Shafi’i Sunni. Emphasizing the hadith of Ghadir, Simnani attempted to introduce a Middle Path (namat al-awsat) between six forms of extremism. The extremist lovers of Ali consider him as Divine, or an associate (sharik) of the Prophet, or say that Ali’s love implies hating the majority of companions of the Prophet. The three remaining extremist groups consider Ali an infidel, a Muslim who went astray, or no better than Mu’awiya (Jafariyan, 682-686; also see: Ala alDawla al-Simnani, Manazir al-muhadir lil-manazir al-hadir, Maktabat al-thiqafat aldiniyyah, Cairo, Egypt, [No Date]). Jafariyan also mentions a fascinating Shia scholar who had an ecumenical approach despite his hadithi inclination. Ali b. Isa al-Arbili (1223-1228) received permission to narrate hadith from Sayed ibn Tawus (d. 1266)

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and wrote his notable work Kashf al-ghumma fi ma’rifat al-a’imma to provide a collection of narrations about the history, personality, and virtues of the Prophet and his family as the Middle Path requires, namely avoiding extremism in love (by ghalis) or hate (by nawasib). In his discussion of the Lady Fatima and her sermon, he excises a portion which includes her complaint that she was viewed unfairly by some companions. The author’s rationale is that he wants to address the virtues of the Prophet and his family, not the vices of the others, so he avoids that section of the sermon (Ibid, pp. 676-687). 41. Allama Muhammad Taqi Jafari (1925-1998) was another ayatollah who published a 27-volume commentary on Nahj al-Balaghah. He was also a philosopher and expert on Sufism and produced a 15-volume critical commentary on Rumi’s Mathnawi. Yet, he was not dedicated to jurisprudence and did not achieve the position of grand ayatollah. 42. HosseinAli Muntazeri, Darshaye az Nahj al-Balaghah (Qum: Saraye, 1395), Vol.1, p. 67. 43. When enforcement of the normal rules in a particular case fails to provide a satisfactory solution, the judge or jury should attempt to provide a preferable or equitable solution, called istihsan (Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Shari'a Law: An Introduction (Oxford: Oneworld, 2010), p. 265). 44. Tusi’s mastery of Sunni jurisprudence caused famous Sunni jurist Taqi al-Din al-Subki (1284-1355) in Tabaqat al-Shafi’i al-Kubra to count him as a Shafi’i jurist (Ali Asqar Ahmadi, “Gozari bar zaminehaye taqrib dar andishye Shaykh Tusi,” in Andishe Taqrib (Tehran: The World Forum for Proximity of Islamic Schools of Thought, No. 21, 1388/2009), p. 104). 45. Sahili NajafAbadi, Yik Tahqiq-i `Amiq dar Mawzu`-i Qiyam-i Shahid-i Jawid, Husayn ibn Ali. The book became famous as Shahid-i Jawid (The Eternal Martyr). The first edition was published in October-November 1970, by an unnamed publisher. To read details about the book and its reception in Western literature see: Evan Siegel, “The Politics of Shahid-e Jawid,” in The Twelver Shia in Modern Times: Social, Economic and Political Studies of the Middle East and Asia (Brill, 2001), Vol. 72. pp. 150-177. 46. Sayed ibn Tawus had a well-known saying: “A just infidel king is better than an unjust Muslim king.” (Rahim AbulHussaini, “Sayed Ibn Tawus (589-664H) The Green Flag of Hilla,” in Andishe Taqrib (Tehran: The World Forum for Proximity of Islamic Schools of Thought, Vol. 7, No. 28, 2012), p.114). 47. AbulHussaini, ibid. pp. 106-130. 48. To learn about the role of custom (urf) in forming religious law (Shari'a) in Islamic jurisprudence, see: Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (Cambridge: The Islamic Text Society, 2003), pp. 366-383. 49. Behnam Darabi, “Proximity Seminary of Samera and the Role of Mirzaye Shirazi,” in Mutaleat-e Taghribi-e Mazaheb-e Eslami (Tehran: University of Islamic Denominations), Vol. 8, Issues 31, pp. 39-49. 50. Al-Afghani’s book Refutation of the Materialists along with some other works are translated into English and included in the following publication: Nikki

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R. Keddie, An Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamal ad-Din “al-Afghani,” (University of California Press, 1983). 51. See Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Hamid Dadashi, and Seyyed Vali Nasr (eds.), Expectation of the Millennium: Shi’ism in History (State University of New York Press, 1989), pp. 301-309. 52. John McHugo, A Concise History of Sunnis & Shi’is (Georgetown University Press, 2017), pp. 158-164. 53. Shubairi Zanjani, Jor’a, Vol. 2, pp. 326-327. 54. Some trace Borujerdi’s ecumenism to the philosophical tradition of Isfahan. They pose this tradition in contrast to the textualist tradition of Isfahan and the rationalist approach of Najaf (Mirlawhi Musavi Sabzawari, Kifayat al-muhtadi fi marifat al-Mahdi, Mustafa Shari'at Musavi intro. (Qum: Dar al-tafsir, 1384/1999), p. 90). Moreover, Borujerdi hated the exaggeration of virtues in the progeny of the Prophet. If a preacher employed hadith involving exaggeration (ghuluww) and Borujerdi was there, he would reject that hadith (Shubairi Zanjani, Jor’a, 4: 550). 55. Jora, 3:502–3. 56. Grand Ayatollah Ha’eri, the founder of Faiziyyah, also disliked highlighting controversial topics like the caliphate, because they have no applicability in a modern context and serve only to drive Muslims further apart. Textualist Shia believe in Raj’at (the Return), meaning that after the reappearance of Imam Mahdi and prior to the day of judgment, some of the Infallible Imams will return to this world. Ha’eri considered these kinds of popular doctrines as part of neither religious nor denominational creeds and suggested avoiding their discussion for the sake of solidarity among Muslims (Jora, 3: 414-415). 57. Hadith al-Thaqalayn (hadith of the two weighty things) is a famous hadith among both Sunni and Shia in which the Prophet says he is leaving two things among his people: the book of God and his progeny. These two weighty things will never separate from each other until people meet the Prophet on the day of judgment. 58. Iqbali, Muhammad Tahir, Different Understandings of Islamic Proximity (Bardashthae mukhtalif as taqrib-e mazahib-e islami), in “Bi-quarterly Journal of Hikmat & Islamic Philosophy,” (al-Mustafa International University, Qum, 1387/2008), Vol. 7, No. 26. Scholar Sayed Mustafa Hussaini Tabatabaii adduces a new type of distinction between political and spiritual authority in his book on the issue published in Damascus, Syria, in 2002. In his view, Shia emphasis on the texts (nass) on the Imamate and Sunni focus on the virtue of the companions merely intensifies tensions. He recommends distinguishing spirituality from political aspects. He uses the Quranic verses 2:246-247 to explain the issue. In his view, Ali’s pledge of allegiance to the first two caliphs justifies their political leadership. Finally, in accordance with Shia ahadith, an individual will not go to hell merely for denying the Imamate. The same ahadith from Sunni sources illustrate that a Shia can be saved too (Marrizi, “Approaches to Proximity Among the Islamic Sects,” 19-20). 59. Nimatullah Salihi NajafAbadi, Majmoe maqalat-e siyasi, tarikhi, wa ijtima’i (Tehran: Omid-e frada, 2014 (3rd edition)), pp. 159-189.

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60. Muhammad Asif Muhsini, Shi'a wa Sunni che farqi darand?, (Kabul: Harakat-e Islami Afghanistan, 1390 (3rd edition)). 61. Imam Musa al-Sadr, “Taqrib mazahib-e Islami: gami be pish,” in Journal of Seven Heavens, Qum: University of Islamic Denominations, Vol. 2, No. 7, 1379/2010, pp. 129-134; to learn details about Sadr’s perspective on Shia history and ethos see: Fouad Ajami, “Imam Musa Sadr,” in Expectation of the Millennium: Shi’ism in History (State University of New York Press, 1989), pp. 425-453. 62. Abdulwahab Furati, Niza’e muzzir miyan-e du-qutbi-e Hashemi-Misbah dar hawza-e inqilabi, in Mubahithat (Qum, 1395/2017), No. 10, p. 12. 63. Ruhollah Khomeini, Forty Hadith: An Exposition of Ethical and Mystical ­Traditions, Mahliqa Qarai and Ali Quli-Qarai (trans.) (Tehran: The Institute for ­Compilation and Publication of Imam Khomeini’s Works, 2003), p. 487. 64. For a concise survey of the connection between this perspective and e­ stablished Shia, see another book by Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabataba’i: Shi’ite Islam (State University of New York, 1977).

Chapter 7

Sufism and Spirituality

There is no knowledge except knowing loving Others are deceptions of evil Iblis Science of fiqh, of tafsir, and of hadith Are deceptions of wicked Iblis They never reveal the secret to you Even hundreds of Fakhr Razi become your disciples Whoever is not captivated by a moon-like face Wash his name from the list of humanity Shaykh Baha ad-Din al-Amili (1547–1621), Nan va Halva (Breads and Sweets)

This poet, al-Amili, was not merely a great mujtahid but also a masterful architect. When I was a child in Mashhad, Iran, I used to visit the Shrine of Imam Rida, the eighth Imam. The hexagonal courtyard of the shrine and the associated historical mosque were designed by al-Amili. It is a place both sacred and artful. Jurisprudence, engineering, politics, and ethics join together in Baha’i, but I was most fascinated with his Sufism, poetry, and architecture. I would go to his grave in the shrine and read his gravestone. But he was not the only mujtahid who practiced and celebrated Sufism. Once I was debating with my father on the priority of Sufis over fuqaha (Shari’a scholars), considering the spirit of faith and tawhid (Oneness of God). I reminded him of Ayatollah Khomeini’s letter to Mikhail Gorbachev, the leader of the Soviet Union, in January of 1989. Khomeini suggested that Gorbachev read Muhyi ad-Din Ibn Arabi’s work, among many other Muslim philosophers, not fuqaha’s work to learn the true nature of faith. My father’s response was that Khomeini made the recommendation because of 153

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his interest in the maslaha (interest/expediency) of Islam, not because of the truthfulness of Ibn Arabi’s thought. Ayatollah Khomeini’s leadership brought the title of Ayatollah to the wide world of Shias and Sunnis, of Muslims and non-Muslims. Before Khomeini, most devout Shias used the term Aqa, meaning sir. But this was just one evolution in religious terminology caused by Khomeini. He also challenged the established relationships between many concepts including maslaha (public interest) and haqiqa (truth), public pronouncement and individual understanding, and zahir (exoteric) and batin (esoteric) aspects of faith. There are many great occasions in the history of Islam when seemingly conflicting values join together, but Khomeini’s thought represented a new milestone of conceptual synthesis. Throughout most of Islamic history, these opposing aspects have developed separately. In his collection of ayatollahs’ bibliographies, Ayatollah Shubairi Zanjani mentions two ayatollahs’ lifestyles: one luxurious and another ascetic. When the former was asked about the reason for his lifestyle and its accordance with religious life, he answered: I guard the external aspects of Islam and the other ayatollah the internal.1 In Rumi’s words, the conflict between external and internal aspects of Islam comes from these two qualities in the Prophet. He writes, Its outward (appearance) has come to be at war with its inward (reality): its inward is like a jewel and its outward like a (common) stone. It’s outward says, “we are this, and no more”; its inward says, “Look well before and behind!” Its outward is denying (and says) that the inward is naught; its inward says, “We will show (thee the truth); wait (and see)!” Its outward and its inward are in strife: necessarily they are drawing (Divine) aid from his patient endurance.2

After the Prophet, this conflict developed in two extreme directions: fiqh and Sufism. Each school routinely passed judgment on the other. But sometimes they converge in one individual. Thus, he contemplates their meaning as an intellectual tension within himself. Shaykh Baha’i’s poem expresses the tension resulting from Sufism meeting Shari’a scholars, where these fuqaha are challenged by the views and feelings of Sufis who substitute the orthodox God-humanity relationship with one of creator-creature, then further transforming it to lover and beloved, sharing the same nature as the sun and its rays.3 This challenge takes us to the heart of the making of ayatollahs when we recall that Shaykh Baha’i wrote the first Persian Tawzih al-Masail called Jami-i Abbasi. He was a great ayatollah celebrated as Khatam al-mujtahidun (the seal of all mujtahids), and his book not only initiated a new method of

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propagating Shari’a among laypeople but also received many annotations by future mujtahids.4 Specifically in a Shia theological context, we can refer to two dominant perspectives on the Twelve Imams. Indeed, recent decades have seen two books published in Western academia in favor of each one: Le Guide Divine Dans le Shi’ism Originel (1992) by Mohammad Ali AmirMoezzi, an Islamologist at the Sorbonne;5 and Crisis and Consolidation in the Formative Period of Sh’ite Islam by Princeton University professor Hossein Modarressi.6 Both volumes received critical receptions in the Shia world, including in Iran. The latter proposes a rational and historical evolution at the core of Shia theology, while the former suggests a mystical and meta-historical perspective at Shi’ism’s center. Both volumes illustrate the complexity and multifaceted nature of Shi’ism. However, we shall focus here on jurisprudential aspects to remain within the limits of this study.7 FIQH, SUFISM, OR BOTH? There are three groups of ayatollahs: those dedicated to fiqh, who consider Sufism as bid’a (innovation) and non-Islamic; those dedicated to Sufism, considering it as representing the true nature of faith; and those dedicated to both considering Sufism as the true and desired kernel of faith and Shari’a as its external and necessary husk.8 ANTI-SUFISM Mulla Muhammad Tahir Qumi (d. 1686), a Shaykh al-Islam and the imam of jum’a prayer in Qum, was a zealous faqih against Sufism. Well-known Shia muhaddithun like Allama Majlisi and Al-Hurr al-Amili received permission from him to narrate hadiths. Qumi was very pious and determined against Sufism. He could not tolerate any favor for Sufism no matter how knowledgeable he found an opposing mujtahid. There are two reports of his radicalism against Sufism, which he would even wield against his fellow ayatollahs if they were inclined toward Sufism. Both stories are about Mulla Muhsin Fayz Kashani (1598–1679), a prolific and versatile mujtahid and muhaddith, who was leading Friday prayer in Isfahan. Aside from his book of ethics, alMahajjat-al-Bayza (a rewritten version of Ghazzali’s famous Ihya’ ulum aldin [Revival of Religious Sciences]), and two commentaries on the Quran, all that survives of his work are his Sufi poems, which are tuneful and imaginative. Qumi was frustrated by Fayz’s taste for Sufism. He referred to Fayz as a majus/magus, a derogatory term referring to Zoroastrians.9 However, the two stories passed down depict their encounters and highlight Fayz’s adaptability.

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The first story relates that Qumi visited Kashan, the city where Kashani lived and received the name for which he was known. Fayz went to Qumi’s residence to meet him, but Qumi refused to let the Sufi in. Fayz stood outside the closed door and said, “I am announcing my creeds here. Listen, and if they are as you’ve heard, I’ll leave. Otherwise, let me in.” Fayz then pronounced his view of tawhid (Oneness of God). Qumi found it consistent with Shia, so he opened the door, welcomed Fayz, apologized, and finally issued ijaza (the permission to narrate hadith).10 The second tale similarly reports Qumi’s opposition to Fayz based on the latter’s interest in Sufism. But when Qumi learned that what he’d heard about Fayz’s beliefs was not correct,11 Qumi went from his home city of Qum to Fayz’s Kashan, 55 miles on foot to apologize. When he arrived at Fayz’s house he said loudly, “Ya Muhsin qad ataka al-Musi.” This is a supplication which a praying individual recites before prayer. It means, “O benevolent muhsin (referring to God), a sinful (musi) one comes to you [to ask forgiveness].” However, Muhsin was also Fayz’s first name. Upon hearing this, Fayz emerged from his house, and they hugged and forgave each other. Qumi then immediately returned to Qum. Reflecting his jurisprudential piety, Qumi wrote a couple of treatises to discredit Sufism. In his book Radd-e Sufiyah (Rejecting Sufis), he addresses great Sufis like Hallaj, Abu Saed, Rabi’a, Sheibli, Bayazid, Ain al-Quzzat, Ghazzali, Rumi, Shams Tabrizi, Mahmud Shabeistari, and Ibn Arabi to illustrate how their views contradicted Islam.12 Qumi here provides us with a literature review of Shia Ulama against Sufism, though the book is centered mostly on refuting Mansour Hallaj (860–922), Sufism’s most famous martyr. Hallaj, a most eloquent preacher and an icon of Sufism, traveled around the Muslim world and acquired a great public followers. Because of his ecstatic faith, he is known for some blasphemous pronouncements including saying “I am the Truth,” thus applying to himself one of the titles of God. For a mixture of political and religious reasons, he was charged in Abbasid court, then imprisoned, tortured, and crucified in Baghdad. Qumi quotes many earlier Shia Ulama notables who condemned Hallaj and uses those quotes to refute Hallaj’s Sufism.13 Ibn Babawayh, known as al-Shaykh al-Saduq (d. 991), the author of Man La Yahduruhu al-Faqih (He Who is Not in the Presence of a Jurist), one of four major books of hadiths in Shia, attacks Hallaj’s sect as a false religion in his seminal work E’teqadataIEmamiya (Creeds of Shia). Saduq’s legendary disciple, Al-Shaykh Mufid (948–1022) also wrote a book refuting Hallaj’s sect. Mufid’s fabulous disciple, Shaykh Tusi (995–1067), known as Shaykh al-Ta’ifah, also refutes Hallaj in a couple of books. Here two extra pieces of information appear: Hallaj claimed to be a depute (wakil) of Imam Mahdi, the Infallible Twelfth Imam, and some Shia scholars contributed to the condemnation of Hallaj. Shaykh

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Tabarsi (1073–1154), writer of two outstanding commentaries on the Quran, accused Hallaj of being only a layman while claiming wrongly to be a deputy of the Twelfth Imam. The great Shia theologian and mujtahid Allama Hilli (1250–1325) also cursed Hallaj.14 Broadly speaking, Qumi’s anti-Sufism centered on Hallaj creating a dualism of followers of himself and followers of Ahl al-Bayt.15 The reader will readily see how this refutation slips into reductionism, reducing all Sufis to followers of Hallaj, while in Hallaj’s time sober Sufis like Junayd of Baghdad (830–910) condemned him and assiduously distanced themselves from intoxicated Sufism.16 However, Hilli, in his well-known book Nahj al-Haq va kashf al-Sidq (The Path to the Truth and Discovery of the Right), goes further in addressing more Sufis, saying some Sufi conceptions of the Oneness of God (tawhid) are like kufr (infidelity) and ilhad (disbelief).17 In another book, Tuhafat al-Akhyar, Qumi charges Sufis with bid’a, meaning innovation, novelty, and heretical doctrines and practices. He argues that since Sufis “do not judge by what God has revealed” they are “infidels,” “wrongdoers,” and “sinful” in accordance with the Quran, chapter 5, verses 44, 45, and 47, respectively. According to Qumi, hadiths teach that no one can accept the repentance of people of bid’a. Rather, the faithful are commanded to fight against them because of the Islamic consensus on amr-bil maruf wa nahy ‘anil munkar (enjoining good and forbidding wrong). Thus, Qumi encourages cursing Sufis and Sufism.18 I will return to Qumi after a brief review of other substantial anti-Sufi works. Hadiqat al-Shi'a (The Shia Garden), a book attributed to the grand Ayatollah Ahmad ibn Muhammad Ardabili (1500–1585), known as Muqaddas (“the holy”) for his asceticism and piety in Najaf, offers that earlier Shia Ulama countered Sufis openly, including with hadiths from Imams. For example, Shaykh al-Kulayni (864–941) dedicated a chapter in his epoch-making book Kitab al-Kafi on the debate between Imams and Sufis.19 This volume, containing 16,199 hadiths, is the most prestigious collection of Twelver Shia hadith. It is certainly the most important of The Four Books (al-Kutub al-Arba’ah), the four best-known hadith collections in Shia.20 In Hadiqat’s report of earlier Ulama’s view on Sufism, the practices of Sufis are criticized.21 The book also tackles the fundamental concepts of Sufism, like the unity of being (wahdat al-wujud) and its contradiction of orthodox Islam. It includes two fascinating pieces of information. First, alHusayn ibn Ruh Nawbakhti (d. 938), the third of the Four Deputies of the twelfth Imam, was among the fuqaha who sentenced Hallaj to death.22 And second, a statement on two groups of exaggerators (ghullat, singular ghali) in Islam: Shia ghullat who ascribe divinity to some infallible Imams, and Sunni ghullat, who are Sufis who believe God unites humanity. The book concludes that both groups share this idea with Christianity.23 Being very radical and sharp, the book declares that only a minority of Sufis are merely sinful, while

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the majority are “kafir, zindiq, Satans in the face of humanity, rubbery in the way of faith, and ruining of Shari'a’s principles.”24 This extreme refutation did not happen in monologue only. There was a heated debate between Qumi and Muhammad Taqi Majlisi (1594–1660), known as the First Majlisi (to be distinguished from his son, Allama alMajlisi [1628–1699], or the Second Majlisi). The first Majlisi was a prolific author and studied before Shaykh Baha’i and Mir Damad. He led Friday prayer in Isfahan and was the first major scholar to spread Shia hadith during Safavid times. He is considered a moderate Akhbari praising Astarabadi. However, the first Majlisi responded sharply to Qumi’s refutation of Sufism. His response reached Qumi, who replied in turn. Another anti-Sufi faqih by the name of Sayed Muhammad Mirlawhi25 gathered all three treatises (two by Qumi and one by Majlisi) and added his own view on the issue, called Muhakema (Judgment), and published all in one volume titled Tawzih alMashribayn (Explaining Two Paths). It has not survived, but a summary of the three treatises has: Usul Fusul al-Tawzih (Principles [of different] Chapters of al-Tawzih). Like pro-Sufi Ulama, Majlisi argues that many Sufis, including Ibrahim Adham, Bayazid, Attar, Ibn Arabi, and Rumi were Shia. Sufism is a high-level subject and suitable for those who have already studied Shari’a; its origin is the Quran and the family of the Prophet. Difficult ideas like oneness of being appear as disbelief, but one needs to understand their deeper meaning through asceticism and under supervision of a pir (master). Majlisi calls the actions of Shia Ulama who excommunicated Hallaj and likeminded Sufis “false accusation of divinely Ulama by the unknowledgeable.”26 Both accuse each other of being unknowledgeable and biased. When Qumi supports his criticism by quoting previous Ulama, Majlisi disqualifies them as unknowledgeable (jahala), offering only meaningless ideas.27 In return, Qumi accuses Majlisi of lacking attention and saying “improper” things.28 Acknowledging each other’s scholarship, however, Qumi calls Majlisi Akhund, and Majlisi calls him Mawlana in return. This heavy-duty passion for Sufism transforms into thorough negation by his son, the second Majlisi. Described as one of the most powerful and influential Shia Ulama of all time, Allama Majlisi developed Twelvers in a new direction, particularly through his cooperation with the Safavids as well as in producing Bihar al-Anwar (Seas of Lights), the most comprehensive Shia hadith collection, published in 110 volumes. He believed his father’s passion for Sufism was strategic, not authentic, in order to attract Sufis and guide them to the right path. The strategy to conceal one’s faith and affirm the conventional faith is called taqiyya in Shia. So, the first Majlesi did taqiyya in terms of Sufism.29 This strategy was not more effective. As much as he was humble toward the infallible Imams, he was harsh toward Sufis. In his view, Sufis fell into unbelief because of the doctrine of oneness of being (wahdat al-wujud), meaning the

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true nature of everything is God and one, while their outward manifestation is diverse and many. He argues this is a pantheism shared with Indian, not Islamic thought. The second Majlisi vehemently criticizes Muhyi al-Din Ibn Arabi (1165–1240) and his masterpiece Fusus al-Hikam (The Bezels of Wisdom), the peak of theoretical Sufism. According to Majlisi, monism is mixed up with pantheism; walayat is preferred over nabuwwat (prophethood) (Ibn Arabi considered himself the seal of the awliya, thus above all prophets); and a misinterpretation of the story of Noah in the Quran30,31 Shia expansion in Iran under the Safavids spurred polemics against and persecution of Sufism and Sunnism.32 It’s not unfair to conclude these attacks reached their peak with the second Majlisi. But condemnation of Sufism reached even more feverish heights at the hands of one of Majlisi’s friends. Al-Hurr al-Amili (1624–1693) was an eminent scholar. He met the second Majlesi in Isfahan, which left an impression on both and led to a mutual issuance of ijaza to transmit hadiths. The second Majlisi introduced al-Amili to Shah Sulayman of the Safavids. Al-Amili wrote the comprehensive hadith compilation known as Wasa’il al-Shi'a (Means of Shia). This huge volume of jurisprudential hadiths remains so celebrated by Shia Ulama that no ayatollah is able to do ijtihad without considering its contents. Al-Amili also wrote Risala ithna’ashariya fi al-radd ‘ala al-sufiya (The Twelver Shia Treatise Against Sufism). The impetus for this book was a meditation on music and singing. The preface states that Al-Amili was first asked by friends to explain a hadith that appeared to allow tarji’ (singing in an elaborate manner and playing with one’s voice) and thus music and singing. So, he penned a book on this Sufi practice, and his approval of it became a widespread and prominent religious view.33 His friends then requested that he expand his work to expound on further subjects of religious import. He wrote his next book in 12 chapters to meet 12 objectives. The chapters focus on Sufism, the doctrine of oneness of being, the validity of intuition, the necessity of religious observation, Sufi rituals and practices, the prohibition of ghana (music and singing), and friendship and enmity based on faith. He gives critical attention to bid’a (innovation), enjoining good and avoiding evil, and encouraging selective friendship to support the Shia community. Kufr, bid’a, and sin are attributed to celebrated Sufis including Hallaj, Bayazid, and Ibn Arabi. The volume ends by concluding that the faithful must cut ties with Sufis and curse them as a matter of religious obligation. At this stage, a powerful tradition against Sufism was established by a group of scholars of Shari'a. The Safavid dynasty was established through a vigorous assertion of Sufism. As Algar writes, Shah Ismail, the first Safavid ruler (1501–1524), commanded obedience both as qutb (pole) and as descendent of the seventh Imam, Musa al-Kadhim, while in his poetry he regarded his rank even higher. In his poems,

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Ismail identified himself with a range of Muslim, Shia, and Christian figures, and even personalities from Tajik literary history including Abu Muslim (d. 755), the Iranian agent of the Abbasid movement in Khurasan.34 Given that, the ruler was presumed to be the representative of the twelfth Imam, and even attributes of the Imams tended to be transferred to him.35 But this association of state and religion led to a crucial crisis: the transition of Shia “from a purely religious community to a national state.”36 This also totally changed the position of Sufism in society, to the point that it became unimaginable that such a political system originally stemmed from the Sufi order of Shaykh Safi (d. 1334). Attacks on Sufis reached extremes, as in the destruction of the convent of Mulla Muhsin Fayz Kashani and the massacre of the dervishes inhabiting it. When later a Safavid prince, Tahmasp Mirza, tried to regain the throne, the Shahsavan tribes did not assist him due to their continuing attachment to Sufism.37 Attacks such as these continued through the following dynasties. At the instigation of the Ulama, Ali Murad Khan Zand (d. 1785) gave orders that the noses and ears of the dervishes be cut off. On Ramadan 21, 1790, Mullah Abdullah Mujtahid issued a fatwa against Mushtaq Ali Shah, a Nimatullahi Sufi, sentencing him to death.38 Extreme anti-Sufism continued during the Qajar dynasty, especially at the hands of Muhammad Ali Bihbahani (1731–1801), a mujtahid with a ferocious hatred of Sufism. Receiving the highest respect and confidence of King Fath Ali Shah (1772–1834) provided Bihbahani the freedom to persecute Sufis. The Sufi order Nimatullahi was at the center of his hatred. Bihbahani was responsible for the execution of Masum Ali Shah. Bihbahani’s role in the death of Nur Ali Shah is discussed in various sources. Eventually he persuaded Fath Ali Shah to expel all the dervishes from Tehran.39 In a letter to Fath Ali Shah, Bihbahani states that if it were not for the king, all Iranians would become Sufis.40 However, Bihbahani was not alone. He had the support of several mujtahids. When Nur Ali Shah entered the Shrine of Imam Ali in Najaf, the renowned mujtahid Al-Sayyid Bahr al-Ulum (1742–1797) ordered that he be removed. When no one stepped forward to do so, Shaykh Jafar Khashif al-Ghita (1743–1812) took it upon himself to eject the Sufi.41 In the killing of Masum Ali Shah, Bihbahani requested and received support from mujtahids in Iraq, including Bahr al-Ulum, in branding the Shah a kafir.42 Many Ulama of the early nineteenth century wrote refutations of Sufism, and Fath Ali Shah’s successor, Muhammad Shah (1808–1848), continued this persecution with the support of the Ulama.43 These clashes between the religious state and the Sufis orders have continued to different degrees until recent times. During the last two decades of Ayatollah Khamenei’s rule, many places of worship of the Gonabadi order, an offshoot of Nematullahi Sufism, were destroyed in Qum, Borujerd,

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Isfahan, and Karaj. However, this tension did not continue only on the ground but in the intellectual sphere too, even among mujtahids themselves. One clear example is Ayatollah Mirza Mahdi Gharawi Isfahani (1885– 1945), the founder of a new school of Shia theology, Maktab-e Tafkik (the school of separation). Isfahani was a vibrant opponent of Sufism in Mashhad who had received his permission for ijtihad from Allama Muhammad Husayn Naini (1862–1937) in Najaf. Naini was the greatest marja of his time and was very conservative in giving permission for ijtihad. In his certificate, Naini highly praised Isfahani for his intellect, knowledge, and piety. The later grand ayatollahs, including Aqa Ziya al-Din Iraqi, Sayed Abul-Hasan Isfahani, and Shaykh Abd al-Karim Haeri Yazdi confirmed that permission. Early in his career Mirza practiced Sufism, following Sayid Ahmad Karbala’i and Sayed Jam al-Din Gulpayegani. There are some stories about Mirza’s accomplishments in Sufism. However, due to a dream he had one night, he changed his mind and became a fierce opponent of Sufism. Isfahani was an outstanding orator and would radically criticize Sufism and curse Sufis publicly from the mosque pulpit. Sometimes his curses touched on Sufis and ayatollahs with Sufi interest, such as Ayatollah Ali Qazi, to the extent that his own disciples would become upset and nervous. Once, one of them even asked Isfahani to repent (istighfar) before he went to lead prayer. Isfahani considered Muslim philosophers and Sufis polytheists, fans of Satan, brothers of Jews, and enemies of the prophets.44 To date, three generations of Ulama have represented the school of tafkik, criticizing Sufism to varying degrees. Among the current generation is Ayatollah Sayed Jafar Sayyedan (b. 1934), who is very active in public talks in Mashhad and Qum. He debated Grand Ayatollah Jawadi Amuli (b. 1933) on physical resurrection as described by Transcendental Wisdom. We will return to the tafkik school in the next chapter in discussion of ayatollahs and philosophy. The Islamic Revolution overthrew the secular Pahlavi dynasty and brought Ayatollah Khomeini (1902–1989) to power. Because of his Sufi leanings and his charisma and authority, fewer fatwas were publicized against Sufism. Nevertheless, his fellow grand Ayatollah Shahab al-Din Mar’ashi Najafi (1897–1990) critiqued Sufis harshly. Mar’ashi is known for his piety and simple life. Though he was a distinguished grand ayatollah who would have been expected to adhere to the major rituals of the faith, ironically, like a radical Sufi, he never performed hajj during his lifetime. When he was asked about it, Mar’ashi would repeat that he was not mustati’a (able). An individual is religiously considered able and thus required to do prescribed pilgrimage (hajj al-tamattu) if (a) can pay for the expenses of the journey to Mecca and back; (b) the funds needed to meet such expenses must come out of the surplus after paying one’s debts, after arranging for one's family’s livelihood, meeting the requirements of one’s source of income (such as land for a farmer, tools for a

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craftsman, capital for tradesman, and so on), and without compromising the security of his life, property, and honor.45 Mar’ashi also is known for his eagerness and many sacrifices to collect Islamic manuscripts at risk of displacement and destruction. This effort led to the foundation of his unique library in Qum. He held that Sufism was one of the severest disasters Islam faced in its history, claiming that it targeted the pillars and foundations of the faith.46 After Khomeini’s death, more ayatollahs felt free to openly criticize Sufism. The grand Ayatollah Vahid Khurasani (b. 1921), currently considered to be the most learned Shia religious authority in Qum, calls Sufi ideas kashk (worthless), encouraging students of Islam to focus instead on the Quran and Sunnah. Grand Ayatollah Lotfollah Safi Gulpayegani (1919– 2022) said that it was the fuquha who kept Islam alive throughout its history, not Sufis and philosophers. He explicitly criticized appealing to ta’wil (interpretation), encouraging a literal understanding of the Quran and Sunnah, and emphasized the obligation (wajib) to repent and return to the Quran and Ahl al-Bayt. He accused Sufis of misleading and distorted ideas. Grand Ayatollah Hossein Noori-Hamedani (b. 1925) declared that attending a Sufi congregation and supporting Sufis, even by buying or selling their books and studying their texts, to be haram. The prolific writer and exegete of the Quran, grand Ayatollah Nasir Makarim Shirazi (d. 1927), wrote Jilweye Haq dar Naqd-e Tasawwuf wa Irfan (Demonstration of the Truth to Criticize Sufism and Gnosticism) specifically to refute Sufism. In his collection of fatwas he declares anyone who adheres to wahdat-e wujud a kafir and najis (religiously unclean).47 SUFISM AS TRUE NATURE OF SHIA Some scholars accuse orientalists of making a priori assumptions in treating Sufism and Shi’ism as peripheral to true Islam. Rather, these scholars argue, Shi’ism and Sufism should be considered “in different ways and on different levels, intrinsic aspects of Islamic orthodoxy.”48 Dr. Hajj Ali Tabandeh, Majdub Alishah (1927–2019), the qutb of the Nimatullahi dervishes, argued that based on the common concept of walayah, Sufism and Shi’ism are two different names for one faith. He concludes, Sufism is the very essence and meaning of Shi’ism. [. . .] The basis and spirit of Islam is in Shi’ism and the spirit of Shi’ism is in Sufism. Sufism is nothing other than Shi’ism, and real Shi’ism is nothing other than Sufism.49

Regardless of their connections to the true nature of Islam, across history many have seen a close correlation between Sufism and Shia faith. Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406), the famous medieval philosopher, noted how the core

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concepts of Sufism including walayat (sainthood), wali, hierarchy of the leaders, and the union with God, as well as their custom of wearing cloaks, are identical to or impacted by Shia’s theology.50 An extreme example of this perspective among Shia ayatollahs is Shaykh Sayed Haydar Amuli (1320–1385). Mostly in Shia hawza, the title Shaykh parallels Sayed. The former is used for a non-sayed alim and the latter for a sayed alim. The combination in Amuli is rare and highlights a unique case. Shaykh preceding Sayed here refers to his order status.51 In his most famous work, Jame’ al-asrar wa manba’ al-anwar, Amuli clearly argues that Sufism and Shia are two names for one worldview, an idea that originates with him among Shia Ulama. Although Amuli is known for his Sufi advocacy and commentaries, he is celebrated as an example of the type of alim who had mastered both intellectual and transmitted sciences of Islam (in Arabic, a jame’ ma’qul wa manqul). Fakhr al-Din Hilli (1283–1370), the son of Allama Hilli (1250–1325), who was the first alim called Ayatollah in Shia, gave Amuli the certificate to narrate hadith, calling Sayid Haydar the second Zayn’al Abidin. Zayn’al Abidin is the title of the fourth Imam in Shia, Ali ibn Husayn (680–712), meaning Adornment of the Worshippers. Again, Amuli received that title because of his mystical and pious characteristics. Amuli’s work on jurisprudence, theology, and Sufim led some Shia scholars to consider him as a comprehensive figure in Shia, and he was praised by great muhaddiths as al-Alim, al-Arif, and al-Mutabahhir (scholar, gnosis, and the depth of knowledge) and among the most outstanding and noblest of Shia scholars.52 Amuli’s aim in his seminal work Jame’ al-asrar was to “make Shia Sufism and make Sufism Shia.”53 In his view, most Shia Ulama of the time demonstrated the external aspect of Islam, meaning Shari'a, and Sufism as the internal aspect, meaning haqiqa. He acknowledges an existing hatred among Shia and Sufi fellows in his time, despite his belief that they share the same root, the same path, and the same end. This is because they do not look closely and deeply, or they consider the wrong Sufis and Shias.54 Sufis and Shias inherited the secrets of the Imams. They also took the tradition of the cloak from Ali and his children through Kumayl bin Ziyad in Shia, and Hasan al-Basri in Sunni.55 Amuli does not hesitate to declare, “The Qutb, and Masum (infallible, the attribute of Imams in Shia theology), or the Qutb and Imam are synonyms, applicable to the one individual who is the caliph of God in His earth.”56 Commonalities between the two faith groups extend from fundamental concepts and roots to some key figures. Since Sufis attempt to reach truths through an existential journey, without rejecting Shari'a, thus the truths are transmitted to them by Imams. Many Sufis who accomplished that spiritual journey are considered by Amuli to be Shia. They include Hassan Basri, Fakhr Razi,57 and Imam Ghazzali.58 Here Amuli gives a new direction to the concept of taqiyya

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(concealment) in Shia. In orthodox Shia, taqiyya means concealment in the face of political and social discrimination. Shia faithful can conceal their true belief before an oppressor to save their lives. But Amuli reads it as hiding the innermost aspect of the faith before the common faithful because they are not able to comprehend the innermost levels of the faith. Amuli uses many hadiths to argue for this perspective.59 Amuli followed Ibn Arabi, the peak of theoretical Sufism in Islamic history, closely in a Shia context. Introducing a Shia perception of Ibn Arabi’s Sufism, Amuli identified most of it with the prophetic hadiths and Shia Imams’ narrations. Though Amuli disagreed with Ibn Arabi on the concept of the seal of the walayat and who is the seal of the saints (awliya), he is one of the devout advocates of Ibn Arabi’s Sufism and created a trend among Shia Ulama to study and comment on Ibn Arabi. In the following century, Amuli’s ingenuity experienced a renaissance thanks to the mujtahid, mutakallim, and muhaddith Ibn Abi Jumhur al-Ahsa’i (1434–1496). Born into a learned religious family in Ahsa, Bahrain, Ibn Abi Jumhur studied under Bahraini Ulama. He moved to Najaf and finally settled in Mashhad. In this new direction of Shia kalaam (theology), hadith joins philosophy and suggests a fresh interpretation of Amuli. Ibn Abi Jumhur wrote on kalaam and debated in public with a certain Sunni theologian, al-Fadil alHarawi, who, along with their audiences, provided Ibn Abi Jumhur with the unofficial title al-mutakallim al-arabi (Arab theologian). Ibn Abi Jumhur attempted to bring together the Mutazilites and Asharites. For example, the Mutazilites believed creatures are created for a purpose, while the Asharites held that the creature itself has no purpose beyond itself. In Jumhur’s compromise, creation is an act “driving beings to their perfections in accordance with their abilities that exist in their essence” to reconcile a move toward purpose with self-directed creation. He also had a great interest in hadiths and wrote ‘Awali al-La’ali with an ecumenical approach to Sunni. This approach caused some later Shia Ulama to forbid relying on it, though some still used it and even commented on it. His most important work relevant to our subject is al-Mujalli (The Exile), which he expanded, revised, and commented on several times. While this book relied less on already established Shia theologians, it highly celebrates Haydar al-Amuli as late lord, polymath, possessor of intuition and the truth, and pole of poles. Ibn Abi Jumhur also considers the law and the path synonymous with the truth. He quotes Bayazid, Hallaj, Ghazzali, and Ibn Arabi alongside Plato, Aristotle, Porphyry, al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, Fakh al-Din Razi, Nasir al-Din Tusi, and Qutb al-Din al-Shirazi. He pays particular attention to Shahab al-Din Yahya Suhrawardi, the founder of the illuminative philosophy in Islam, which combined Ancient Persian wisdom with Greek and Islamic philosophies.60 In his view, the philosophical concept of abstraction in Islamic philosophy, a union between the mind and the active intellect, is the same as the Sufi idea

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of leaving one’s identity and annihilating in God. Both echo the same verse of the Quran, when God says to the Prophet, “and when you threw dust at them, it was not you that threw, but God who threw.” Its hadith version, according to Ibn Abi Jumhur, is the Prophet’s mention of Ali “as being selected by God.” Therefore, Ibn Jumhur expanded the Unity of Being, which Sayed Haydar claimed was limited to being, to also include knowledge and belief. In his view, philosophers (hukama) and prophets represent the same reality: they are means of God’s providence in organizing people. The Imam is the philosophical king. Adding the concept of the sainthood of the Imams, he concludes that the Twelve Imams are a successive chain of Sufi Shaykhs, the last of whom was the Mahdi as “the Pole, the Imam, the Caliph of the time and seal of the Muhammadan Sainthood.” The identical nature of Shi’ism, Sufism, and philosophy is thus adduced.61 While Ibn Abi Jumhur’s synthesis looks like deconstructionism, his veneration of hadiths and Imams caused many anti-Sufi Ulama to, in a seeming contradiction, praise him. For example, the grand Ayatollah Mar’ashi Najafi acknowledges him as “the noble scholar, muhadith and mutakallim, divine arif (gnostic), the pious ascetic who gathers between revelational and rational sciences.”62 In distinguishing Sufism from irfan (gnosticism, mysticism), Mar’ashi attempted to both celebrate Ibn Abi Jumhur and reject Sufism.63 This thread can be tracked to present times in figures like Allama Muhammad Husayn Tabataba’i (1904–1981) and Ayatollah Khomeini. In his dialogues with the French philosopher Henry Corbin, Tabataba’i expressed a belief in a specific link between a religion, regardless of which one, and Sufism, because both believe in a transcendental world and the necessity of humility before it. Sufism is not a sect among other sects; rather each single sect has its own Sufis. Sufism within a sect searches for truths through asceticism and self-reform. The Sufi concept of qutb (pole) is compatible particularly with Shia’s Imam.64 Doubtless, there is a compatibility between Sufism and Shia. Tabataba’i, like Khomeini, however, acknowledges the other forms of being a Shia; the outwardness of faith is its own merit regardless of its inwardness. His exegesis of the Quran is not a Sufi commentary, however, and sometimes he attacks Sufis who do not observe Shari'a. Because of their multifaceted work, I will discuss Tabataba’i and Khomeini further in the following section after a glance at their backgrounds. A reminiscence on Allama Tabataba’i’s master in Sufism, Ali Qazi Tabataba’i, can take us to the heart of the issue and a figure on the border between two groups of mujtahids: those who consider Sufism as the true nature of Shia, and those who suggest a multifaceted identity of Shi’ism through compromise. Ali Qazi Tabataba’i (1867–1947), known also as Allama Qazi and Ayatollah Qazi, studied the highest level of jurisprudence before grand ayatollahs

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such as Shaykh Murtaza Ansari, Muhammad Kazim Khurasani (Akhund Khurasani), and Shaykh Muhammad Kazem Yazdi, and studied Sufism before Sayed Ahmad Karbala’i (d. 1913). Among his renowned students are Allama Tabataba’i, Allama Muhamda Rida Muzaffar, grand Ayatollah Mar’ashi Najafi, grand Ayatollah Abd al-Qasim Khoei, and grand Ayatollah Muhammad Taqi Bihjat. It is believed Qazi became a mujtahid when he was 27 years old. However, he did not like to act as an authority on matters of Shari'a or to issue fatwas. Focusing on jurisprudence and the principles of jurisprudence was a waste of time in Qazi’s view.65 Once, some faithful came from Iran to Najaf and met with him. When they revealed their intention of following Qazi’s jurisprudential opinions, he raised his hand toward the sky as in prayer and with great emotion said, “God, I’m not whom they are looking for!” and then turned his face to them saying, “Go and follow in Shari'a Sayed Abu al-Hasan Isfahani.” Grand Ayatollah Isfahani (1860–1946) was a leading marja of his time. Isfahani was not favorable toward Sufism, but Qazi didn’t care. For those interested in pursuing Shari'a, Isfahani authorized only Shari'a. But Qazi himself was on a different path. Isfahani once proclaimed to one of Qazi’s disciples that teaching philosophy and Sufism was haram (forbidden). Instead, Isfahani asked him to return to his hometown of Musqat, Oman, and preach his faith publicly (Sufi teaching was always an elitist course among Shia Ulama). Qazi advised the disciple to follow Isfahani’s command and change his career to public preaching since tawhid and walayat do not care about locality.66 Nevertheless, even in front of his fellow fuqaha Qazi would say clearly, “The best man is a Sufi Faqih.67” Therefore, Qazi’s popularity is due to his Sufism and dedication to tawhid. Ayatollah Khomeini once called him “a mountain of majesty of Tawhid.”68 Qazi’s influential disciple Sayed Hashim Haddad (1900–1984) believed that Qazi was most learned than any previous figure in Islam; he knew jurisprudence, hadith, exegesis, and comprehended Arabic literature at the highest level.69 He was master of both the exoteric and esoteric aspects of faith.70 Allama Tabataba’i called him “the sign of God, unique in time, faqih muhhadith.”71 Believing Sufism to be the true nature of Shia, Qazi declared the great Sufis including Ibn Arabi, Rumi, Ibn Farid,72 and even Hafiz as examples of perfect humans (kamilin). They were true Shia since they were annihilated in tawhid, which here means the same as walayat, the central concept of Shia.73 Sufism solely seeks the divine, unconcerned with worldly pursuits and the afterlife. One of his disciples used to make fun of Qazi’s approach, saying Qazi caused us to lose both this world and the next because we lack the benefits of both.74 This is a satirical reference to the famous Quranic verse 11 chapter 22, which speaks of untrue believers who lose both this world (dunya) and the hereafter (akhira). However, in Qazi’s case the meaning is reversed, saying that Qazi taught his disciples to overlook both worlds for the sake of

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God Himself. Many Ulama found this radical dedication to divinity intolerable. Qazi’s dedication to Sufi teachings and practices could be an obstacle on the path toward becoming a mujtahid due to a lack of focus on jurisprudence and external aspects of the faith. The primary aim in Najaf is to become a mujtahid, not a Sufi. Thus, many spread negative news and rumors about Qazi and his teachings, causing the established maraji' in Najaf to view Qazi pessimistically. Some maraji', including Isfahani, cut off the stipend (shahriya) for seminarians in Qazi’s network. Others even forced Qazi’s students to leave Najaf. Several Ulama threw little stones at Qazi’s house, while others broke the lights in the mosque where Qazi taught. Even his prayer rug was stolen. Qazi’s opponents claimed his extra prayers and asceticism were hypocritical, as Sufis are not supposed to care about rituals. He was accused of being a dervish.75 Negative views of him were widespread; it’s even said that in Mashhad Ayatollah Gharawi Isfahani cursed Qazi from the pulpit.76 Upon Qazi’s death, his burial was attended by two groups, both very emotional. The first group, comprised of students and supporters, wept while his enemies, who had previously excommunicated him, hurled curses and insults.77 The hostility against this ayatollah can be grasped better if we briefly consider his mystical disciple Sayed Hashim Haddad. Haddad is the only close disciple of Qazi who left hawza at the very beginning of his studies. Instead, he focused on Sufism and studied before Qazi for almost three decades. Yet even before studying Sufism under Qazi, Haddad was visited by many Ulama, including his classmates, future mujtahids, for his spiritual accomplishments. This most detailed document of his study was published by Ayatollah Allama Sayed Muhammad Husayn Husayni Tihrani (1926–1995) titled Roh-e Mujjarrad (The Transcendent Mind). In Tihrani’s view, nobody can comprehend and then explain the true spiritual status of Haddad.78 Being annihilated in God and filled with divine attributes and names, no human characteristic was left for Haddad, an insan-e kamil (perfect human).79 Haddad was popular among Ulama, students, and the public in Najaf, Kadhimiya Karbala, and Baghdad. However, a heated controversy formed around him. Two of his students with hawza backgrounds accused Haddad of the following: a belief in wahdat-e wujud, which meant considering everything, even a dog, as God; leaving walayat by dedicating to tawhid, that is, paying attention to the Quran and du’a (supplication) more than Rawza (reciting Imam Husayn’s tragedy) and Shia-specific rituals; great respect for the works of Ibn Arabi and Rumi; and an extraordinary reverence of Qazi, even more so than of the Infallible Imams. As Tihrani writes, the spirit of debate was pitting people of tawhid against people of walayat.80 The essence of reducing Shia to Sufism was at issue. If the true meaning of Shia is Oneness of God, then what is the status of the Imams? If Shia’s focus is the Infallible Imams, what does it mean to become annihilated in God and to consider all creation

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as various manifestations of God? What is the role of Shari’a in acquiring the true substance of faith? Is Shari'a a means or an objective? How can a layperson who abandoned his Shari'a studies resemble a perfect human, a true sign of God, in Shia? Do the roles of hawza and ayatollahs not perish? In May 2019, many Ulama gathered in Mashhad to pay tribute to Haddad and celebrate a pure Shia irfan (mysticism). Others harshly criticized the gathering as a mystical and gnostical exaggeration: a danger to Shari'a and rationality in hawza ilmiyahs.81

INNER HARMONY BETWEEN SHARI'A AND SUFISM In a third approach between the strongly pro- and anti-Sufi orientations, Shia Ulama promoted rapprochement more than a union between Sufism and Twelver Shia. This was because they considered both jurisprudence and Sufism valuable. Either one of these may pursue its own religious truth. But the Ulama advised acknowledging the limits of each path. However, regardless of their personal tendencies, none of these Ulama encouraged the masses to think of Sufism as the core of faith. They kept their advanced jurisprudential work separated so as to keep their jurisprudential authority effective, while Ulama who were very sympathetic to Sufism did not take jurisprudential study seriously. Mathieu Terrier calls this the tradition of reconciliation and elaborates it through development of a threefold argument: (a) a conceptual argumentation which suggest a triad of Shari’a (religious law), tariqa (spiritual path), and haqiqa (essential reality of truth) within faith; (b) a mytho-historical argumentation which claims the masters of Sufism were disciples of the Shia infallible Imams; and (c) a linguistic and phenomenological argumentation which illustrates an analogy of language-games between Shia Imams and Sufis. These intellectual systems are offered to serve a peaceable and fertile coexistence between Shia, Sufism, and gnostic philosophy.82 This gnostic philosophy was presented by Mulla Sadra (1572–1640).83 Therefore, simultaneously, both competition and cooperation continue after Mulla Sadra among Shia Sufis, called arif (gnostic/mystic) and Shia philosophers, mostly called hakim (wise). They cooperated against their common rival, scholars of Shari’a who consider Sufism and philosophy un-Islamic, yet they also disapproved of each other’s fundamental concepts, methodology, and objectives. The marriage of Sufism and philosophy in Shia after the sixteenth century produced professionals in theoretical Sufism who had no background in any established orders. They included Mulla Sadra, Mulla Muhsin Fayz Kashani, Qazi Sa’id Qumi (1933–1692), Aqa Muhammad Reza Hakim Qumshei

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(1819–1889), and Aqa Mirza Hashim Rashti Ishkawari (1833–1914). They developed their own concept of oneness of being different from Ibn Arabi’s. Ibn Arabi believed only the manifestation of Being is layered, but the ShiaSufi philosophers promoted layers within Being itself. Another phenomenon was arif dedication to Sufi practices while specializing in Shari’a study, seen in figures such as Sayed Muhammad Mahdi Bahr al-Ulum (1742–1797), Mirza Jawad Maleki Tabrizi (1857–1925), and his well-known disciple Sayed Ahmad Karbala’i (d. 1914). I would like to talk about two of these mujtahids who went toward completely opposing poles: Karbala’i, who hated becoming a marja, and Khomeini, who joined marja and Sufism with politics. But first, let’s take a brief look at one of Karbala’i’s masters, Ayatollah Shaykh Ali Muhammad NajafAbadi (d. 1914). NajafAbadi studied before Grand Ayatollah Mujaddid Mirza al-Shirazi (1815–1896), known for his celebrated 1891 verdict against the usage of tobacco in the Qajar era. NajafAbadi loved reading and possessed a large library. He taught both rational sciences and revealed sciences in Najaf. He was known for piety, always performing ablutions, and fasting throughout most of the year. He did not marry and lived alone. NajafAbadi loved two things most: knowledge and his cat. It’s said that when his cat died, he buried it with a specific ceremony. There is an impressive story about his love of knowledge. On the day he said he believed he would die, NajafAbadi met with an alim who told him of a new book published by Akhund Khurasani called Kifaya.84 Even in the last hours of his life, NajafAbadi was eager to pursue learning. He died that day, never having the chance to read Khurasani’s work. Reflecting on this story, Ayatollah Zanjani has expressed nostalgia for an earlier era of hawza when Ulama desired knowledge for knowledge’s sake, and NajafAbadi’s truly lifelong pursuit of learning offers an example of this quality. Zanjani believes contemporary jurisprudence has suffered from its lack.85 Returning to Karbala’i, many Ulama considered him one of the most knowledgeable faqihs of his time. When he was only 40 years old, Karbala’i was presented with the opportunity to become a marja, which traditionally comes only when a mujtahid is much older. Once he heard that the religious imitators (muqallids) of the leading marja of his time—the second Mirza, Mirza Muhammad Taqi Shirazi (1843–192186), who issued fatwa encouraging jihad against the British for their declaration of war on the Ottoman empire and invasion of Iraq during World War II—asked Mirza to whom he should turn if Mirza were to pass away or if he had no certain fatwa on an issue. Mirza replied that they should follow Karbala’i. This angered Karbala’i, and he sent a message to Mirza that he would complain before God against him.87 When businesspeople came to him and encouraged him to become a marja, Karbala’i refused and said he was ready to go to hell on

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behalf of anybody but refused to act as marja.88 He refused to issue fatwa or even to lead prayer. However, Karbala’i would go to al-Sahlah Mosque in Kufa, Iraq—a very great Shia mosque known as a future home of the Twelfth Imam—and pray passionately, reciting Arabic and Persian poems, including lyric poems by Hafiz.89 None of Karbala’i’s books have survived; however, there is a record of a debate between him and a philosophical mujtahid on the true meaning of tawhid and oneness of being. Once a curious alim in Najaf asked Akhund Khurasani, the author of Kifayat al-Usul, to clarify the meaning of the following verse by Sufi Farid al-Din Attar of Nishapur (1164–1221). “He is the sovran lord and is bathed in the perfection of his majesty. He does not manifest himself completely even in the place of his dwelling, and to this no knowledge or intelligence can attain.”90 Akhund Khurasani replied with an orthodox interpretation of tawhid. The alim was not satisfied, so he sent the same question to Karbala’i and another mujtahid named Ayatollah Shaykh Muhammad Hussaini Gharavi (1879–1942). The responses were different: Karbala’i offered a Sufi understanding of the issue, and Gharavi a philosophical one. The inquisitive alim sent each response to the opposing mujtahid to counter his rival. The exchange of responses continued, ultimately producing seven replies from each mujtahid. The final response is from Karbala’i, who expresses disappointment in the philosopher mujtahid’s inability to understand a Sufi reading of tawhid. Like all Sufis, he accused his opponent of lacking the inner eye, or insight; so, there was no need to continue the debate.91 This lively and momentous exchange was gathered by Ayatollah Allama Tihrani and titled Tawhid-e ilmi wa amali (Tawhid in Theory and Practice), and includes his own annotations as well as some from his master Allama Tabataba’i. It’s an awe-inspiring examination of oneness of being through the lenses of Mulla Sadra’s graded nature of being and ibn Arabi’s individual oneness of being. However, Karbala’i ends the exchange of ideas simultaneously with a curse (“it seems God made him blind, and might yet make him blinder!”) and peace (salam), illustrating how in this view the priority is Sufism, but the opposing views still have their valid limit. This tradition highly celebrates Ibn Arabi. A saying from Allama Tabataba’i exemplifies the view that “nobody in Islam was able to write a single [quality] line like Ibn Arabi,”92 although the people of Shari'a are acknowledged; they do not totally lack the truth. Tihrani explicitly urges readers to bear those limits in mind in his volume on the above-mentioned debate. The Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1978 became what it was under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini. Khomeini was a mujtahid with a strong background and inclination toward Sufism. Subsequently, Sufism received a warm reception in hawzas. Allama Tihrani tells this story, which touches

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the heart of the issue. A delegate from a hawza in Qum came to Tihrani asking him to write two textbooks on Sufism for a different level of seminarians. He replied that a theoretical mysticism wouldn’t be of much use, so they should accept that the most effective path is a practical mysticism taught by mystical Ulama. After a while the delegate returned to Tihrani, stating that practical Sufism has no fixed structure and limited insights to meet the requirements of a syllabus, and so, for educational purposes they were choosing to pursue theoretical mysticism and philosophy. Tihrani was not happy with their response, because he believed that for an authentic individual everything has its limit—including jurisprudence, the principles of jurisprudence, the study of logic, ethics, and Sufism.93 No one should become lost in knowledge, no matter what kind. Though the ultimate truth is revealed by Sufism, other religious disciplines are verified (mutabar) in their context. Khomeini was a Sufi mujtahid who knew very well how to use a variety of Islamic sciences to promote his faith. David Pinault in The Shiites Ritual and Popular Piety in a Muslim Community uses a story from Shaykh Sam’an in The Conference of the Birds to explain some of Khomeini’s Sufi poems. Shaykh Sam’an was a pious orthodox Muslim with a rich background in religious scholarship and mysticism. Once he fell in love with a Christian girl. She said she would welcome his love if the Shaykh would prostrate before the Christian idol, burn his Quran, drink the communion wine, and leave his faith—all of which were denounced in Islam. The Shaykh accepted all these conditions and even went further by offering to take care of pigs for one year. No attempts by religious disciples of the Shaykh could save him. However, this failure happened because he had never experienced love on a personal level. Finally, Sam’an returned to orthodoxy and the girl converted to Islam. But this time the familiar actions of his faith were different; performing religious rituals produced a new depth of feeling. Then Pinault relates the story to the twofold nature of Shari’a in Shia; batin (external) and zahir (inner), which opens the path for ta’wil—meaning the external prescriptions of the Quran and Sunnah are ultimately upheld at the same time as the inner significance of these regulations is explored. This helps Pinault to illuminate in Ayatollah Khomeini’s poetry how he wishes to abandon the mosque and the role of Zahid (ascetic).94 Several times in his public speeches, Khomeini complained about pious Ulama who did not share his political ideology. He called them marha-e khush khat va khal, meaning beautiful snakes: stupid and backward Ulama who appear pious but are no less than enemies of Islam.95 This is the link between Shia and Sufism. Khomeini, along with dominant courses of study in Shia hawza including jurisprudence and the principles of jurisprudence, studied Sufism for more

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than six years before Ayatollah Muhmmad Ali ShahAbadi (1876–1950). He learned from his master to spread Sufi words to the public. Once he asked his master why he shared these unorthodox ideas with the laypeople. ShahAbadi replied, “let them hear these unorthodoxies.” Khomeini uses the term Kufriyat, meaning the Sufi expressions which were seen as anti-Islamic by orthodox Islam.96 Thus Khomeini developed his passion for bringing Sufism to the public. His first publications focus more on Sufism than jurisprudence. They include Sharh-e Du’a-e Sahar, Misbah al-Hidaya ela al-Khilafat wa alWilayah, Serr al-Salat (Secrets of Prayers), Ta’liqa ala Sharh al-Fusus alHikam, Ta’liqa ala Misbah al-uns, Adab-e Salat (The Disciplines of Prayers), and Sharh-e Chihl Hadith (Forty Traditions). In one of his public speeches on the occasion of Workers Day on state radio, he said, “Haq-e Ta’ala [. . .] kargar ast,” meaning God is a laborer/worker.97 Khomeini justified his unorthodox talk using the Sufi perspective that labor/work is like existence that is present everywhere. The different levels of existence—before matter, with matter and physics, and with metaphysics—each consists of labor and laborer.98 Yet Khomeini’s adherents found his mystic charisma more meaningful than his speeches and writing. Khomeini loved Sufism and applied his Sufi inclination toward studying hadith and Shia theology. For example, there is a long controversy among Shia Ulama on the last part of the du’a Arafa. The second part of the du’a (supplication), attributed to Imam Husayn, has many Sufi concepts. Many Ulama believe this part comes from a Sufi. But Khomeini strongly held that the du’a was from Imam Husayn because of its high mystical content.99 One of Khomeini’s books is an annotation of Ibn Arabi’s masterpiece and another an annotation of the book of a major disciple of Ibn Arabi. Hamid Mavani in Religious Authority and Political Thought in Twelver Shi’ism shows how Khomeini not only tolerated texts and hadiths in Ibn Arabi praising Abu Bakr and Umar, the first and second caliphs, but also relied on them in his work.100 All were contradictory with regard to Shia orthodoxy to the point that one of Khomeini’s disciples could not bear it.101 Khomeini’s commentary on the Quran on state TV received much criticism from mujtahids who disapproved of his Sufi interpretations. Khomeini actually stopped these lectures, as he understood the limits of his power. This love of Ibn Arabi remained throughout Khomeini’s life. In his famous letter to Mikhail Gorbachev, the General Secretary of the Soviet Union, Khomeini encouraged him to read Ibn Arabi’s work: I won’t tire you further by mentioning the works of mystics, in particular Muhyi’d-Din ibn al-‘Arabi. If you wish to make yourself acquainted with the doctrines of this celebrated mystic, send a number of your brilliant scholars,

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who are well-versed in this field, to Qum so that, by reliance on God, they may, after a couple of years, glimpse the depth of the delicate stages of gnosis, which will be impossible for them to acquire without making such a journey.

This passage helps illuminate how Khomeini marries Sufism with jurisprudence. The innovative theory of wilayat al-faqih (jurist guardianship) is the child of this marriage. Interestingly enough, Mulla Ahmad Naraqi (1771– 1829), the first mujtahid who justified and developed this theory, had a Sufi leaning. Both theories emphasize the absolute authority of the faqih over the umma as exercised by the Prophet. Without the Sufi concept of pir (master) and his absolute power over his disciples, the theory could not find its justification. Ayatollah Khomeini’s poems were published after his death. If the poet’s name were removed, no one could imagine that many of them were written by an ayatollah. Rigid dedication to the mosque, hawza, and religious rituals is condemned, and Mansur Hallaj and his unorthodox ecstatic saying “I am the Truth” is celebrated. Let’s close this chapter with one of these poems called “Languid Eyes:” O Friend, I have become captivated by the mole over your lip. I have seen your languid eyes and I have become sick. I have departed from myself, beating the drum of “I am the Truth!” I have become like Mansur, a buyer of a hanging rope. Grieving for the sweetheart Has cast fire in my soul, Angry enough to die from, and in the bazaar I am known. Open the door of the tavern before me night and day, for I have become weary of the mosque and seminary. I took off the clothing of asceticism And of pretentiousness, And put on the robe of the tavern’s pir, And I gained consciousness The sermonizer in city Bothered me with advice, Until came to my aid the breath Of the wine drunk rouge. Let us speak then of the temple Of where I was awakened, And of the idol of the tavern By whose hand I was shaken102

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NOTES 1. Shubairi Zanjani, Sayed Musa, Jor’a-e az darya (A Drop of the Sea) (Qum: Muassisa-e Kitabshinasi-e Shi'a, 1389/2010), Vol. 3, p. 344. 2. Rumi, The Mathnawi of Jalal ud-din Rumi, Reynold Alleyne Nicholson, trans & ed. (Tehran: Booteh, 2002), 4:1008-1011. 3. See, Sayed Hassan Akhlaq Hussaini, “Looking Inside the Heart: The Universal Appeal of God and Humanity as Reflected in Ibn-Arabi’s Fusus al-Hikam and Maulana Rumi’s Mathnawi Manawi,” in Sufism, Pluralism and Democracy, Clinton Bennett and Sarwar Alam eds. (Equinox, 2017), pp 201-222. 4. Muhammad Nakhi, “Nigahi be kitab-e jame Abbasi,” in Motaleat-e Taghribi Mazaheb-e Eslami (Qum: University of Islamic Denomination, Winter 2010), Vol. 18. 5. Appeared in English translation in 1994 courtesy of David Streight as The Divine Guide in Early Shi’ism: The Sources of Esotericism in Islam, published by State University of New York. 6. The Darwin Press, Princeton, 1993. 7. For a brief review of tense exchanges and the convergence of ideas and practices between Sufism and popular religion in Shia, see Moojan Momen, An Introduction to Shi’i Islam (Yale University Press, 1985), particularly pages 96-97; 99-109; 208-216. For an analysis of the legal-mindedness of revolutionary Iranian Ulama versus popular Shia piety in Iran and even Pakistan, see The Shia Revival, Norton, 2006, pp. 134-137. While Nasr’s analysis is valuable, I disagree with his radical conclusion that ignores Khomeini’s background in Sufism. An extensive study has been done and greater wisdom is dispensed by Michael M. Fischer, Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution (Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 136-180. 8. For greater detail and an insider’s view of the concept of kernel and husk in Shia spirituality see, Kernel of the Kernel: Concerning the Wayfaring and Spiritual Journey of the People of Intellect (Risala-yi Lubb al-Lubab dar Sayr wa Suluk-i Ulu'l Albab): A Shi'i Approach to Sufism, translated by Mohammad H. Faghfoory (State University of New York Press, 2003). 9. Mulla Muhammad Tahir Qumi, Radd’e Sufiya, Reza Mukhtari Khu’I ed. (Mashhad, Itiqad-e ma, 1397/2018), p. 40, footnote 1. 10. Mulla Muhammad Qumi, Tuhfat al-Akhyar, Davud Ilhami ed. (Qum: Madrasa il-Imam Amir al-Mumenin, 1369/1991), pp. 98-99 11. Some believe Fayz repented in the last years of his life, turning against Sufism, but there is little evidence to support this assertion. Plus, Qumi held that Sufis’ repentance will not be accepted, as we will discuss soon. So, these stories highlight Fayz’s adaptation more than a change in his perspective. 12. To read an English translation of some sayings from classical Sufis—some of whom are referred to in this chapter, including Rabia, Bayazid, Junayd, and Hallaj—see: Early Islamic Mysticism: Sufi, Quran, Miraj, Poetic and the Theological Writings, Michael A. Sells (tran. and ed.) (Paulist Press, 1996); also see scripts from Bastami, al-Sullami, Ghazzali, Ibn Arabi, and Rumi: Jane Dammen McAuliffe, The Norton Anthology of World Religion: Islam (W.W. Norton & Company, 2015), pp.

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388-445. To read about Rumi and Ibn Arabi’s perspectives on life, humanity, and religious pluralism see my works: “Looking Inside the Heart: The Universal Appeal of God and Humanity as Reflected in Ibn al-Arabi’s Fusus al-Hikam and Maulana Rumi’s Mathnawi Manavi,” in Sufism, Pluralism and Democracy, Clinton Bennett and Sarwar Alam (eds.) (Equinox, 2017), pp. 201-222; “The Theoretical Foundations of Tolerance in Rumi,” in Philosophy, Culture, & Traditions (A Journal of the World Union of Catholic Philosophical Societies) (St. Francis Xavier University, 2012), Vol. 8, pp. 165-187. 13. Davud Ilhami, the editor of Tuhfat al-Akhyar, surveyed many classical texts of Shia Ulama on Hallaj and his unique journey of divine claim, denouncement, and death. It’s a concise narrative of Hallaj’s ups and downs with Shia doctrines and authorities. Ilhami cites the role of the Twelfth Imam in their condemnation. He counts 30 Ulama who considered Hallaj a kafir (infidel). His narration illustrates how Shia Ulama appealed to Sunni Ulama to denounce Hallaj (Mulla Muhammad Qumi, Tuhfat al-Akhyar, Davud Ilhami ed., footnotes, p. 409-415). 14. Mulla Muhammad Qumi, Tuhfat al-Akhyar, pp. 56-58; regarding Hallaj’s claim of depute also see, Ahmad Muqqaddas Aldabili, Hadiqat al-Shia, Sadiq Hasannezad and AliAkbar Zamaninezad eds. (Qum: Ansariyan, 1378/2000) p. 758. 15. Mulla Muhammad Qumi, Tuhfat al-Akhyar, pp. 131. 16. In his debate with Qumi, Muhammad Taqi Majlisi is also shocked that Qumi considered all Sufis as followers of Hallaj (Usul fusul al-tawzih, Rasul Jafariyan ed., ([no place] [no date]. p. 19) (available at https://archive​.org​/details​/osole​-fosool​ -tozih). 17. Mirza Javad Aqa Tihrani, Arif va Sufi che Miguyand, (Tehran: Afaq, 1390/2013), p. 325. However, there are contradictory reports as well. Majlisi quotes Allama Hilli’s report on Bayazid Bastami which states that Bayazid was working in Imam Sadiq’s house. Moreover, Majlisi tells a story from his master Shaykh Baha’i about how a son of Imam Sadiq was taken by Bayazid to the city of Bastam, in Iran (Usul fusul al-tawzih. p. 27). Likely the earliest extant mystical commentary on the Quran by Mumammad b. al-Husayn al-Sulami (d. 1021) frequently cited Ja’far al-Sadiq (Spiritual Gems: The Mystical Qur’an Commentary, Ascribed to Ja’ far alSadiq as contained in Sulami’s Haqa’iq al-Tafsir from the text of Paul Nwyia, translated and annotated by Farhana Mayer, Louisville: Fons Vitae, 2011). Moreover, there is a book attributed to both Imam Sadiq and some Sufis including Al-Fudayl ibn 'Iyad (d. 803) and al-Shaqīq al-Balkhī (d. 810). It is called Misbah al-Shari'a wa-miftah al-haqiqa (The Lantern of the Path and the Key to the Truth). Great Shia Ulama are divided into two groups in terms of ascribing it to Imam Sadiq. To access a bilingual version of the book along with a brief commentary, see Allamah Hasan Mustafawi, Misbah al-Shari'a: A Commentary on Misbah al-Shari'a (Lantern of the Path) Attributed to Imam Ja‘far al-Sadiq (‘a), trans. Mansoor Limba (ElziStyle​.co​m, 2020). 18. Mulla Muhammad Qumi, Tuhfat al-Akhyar, pp. 198-204. 19. Also see, Muqaddas Ardabili, Ibid, pp. 743-745 & 747-748. 20. The other three are the aforementioned Man La Yahduruhu al-Faqih (He Who is Not in the Presence of a Jurist) as well as Shaykh Tusi’s Tahdhib al-Ahkam (The Refinement of the Laws) and Al-Istibsar (The Insight).

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21. Ibid. p. 757. 22. Muqaddas Ardabili, p. 745. 23. Ibid, 752. 24. Ibid, 797. 25. Mirlawhi studied before Shaykh Baha’i and Mir Damad. Though he preferred philosophy over theology, Mirlawhi wrote against Sufism, despite also opposing sectarianism in Shia’s jurisprudence. The grand Ayatollah Borujerdi was influenced by Mirlawhi’s ecumenical approach through his educational background in Isfahan (Mirlawhi Musavi Sabzawari, Kifayat al-muhtadi fi marifat al-Mahdi, Mustafa Shari'at Musavi intro. (Qum: Dar al-tafsir, 1384/1999), p. 90). Mirlawhi has a short treatise called Munazerat al-Sayyid wa al-a’lim (A Debate Between the Sayed and the A’lim). By sayyid he means himself, being from the lineage of the Prophet. By a’lim he means Allama Majlisi, the second Majlisi. However, Mirlawhi harshly criticizes both Majlisis, father and son alike. Mirlawhi complains that believers do not acknowledge scholars, preferring an unknowledgeable layperson over a knowledgeable Sayyid. He accuses the first Majlisi of loving music and singing, and the second Majlisi of spreading weak hadiths because of their popularity (see Qumi, Radd-e Sufiyah, pp. 33-35). 26. Usul fusul al-tawzih. p. 27, also see p. 23. 27. Ibid, pp. 22-23 & 27. 28. Usul fusul al-tawzih. p. 33. 29. Qumi, Radd’e Sufiya, pp. 46-47. 30. Ain al-Hayat, 50–52. 31. Cited by Seyed Yahya Yasrebi, An Inquiry Concerning the Relationship between Religion and Mysticism (Tehran: Pazuheshga farhang va andishe Islami, 1384/2004), pp. 46-47. Also, see Muhammad Baqir Majlisi, Ayn al-hayat (Qum: Anwar al-huda, 1382/2002), Vol. 2, pp. 454-465. 32. Hamid Alagr, Religion and State in Iran 1785-1906 (The Role of the Ulama in the Qajar Period) (University of California Press, 1980), p. 29. 33. Even some Ulama allowed ghana and music in salat (prayer); some even recommended it. Others held it is haram only if associated with other forbidden actions (Qumi, Radd’e Sufiya. p. 93). 34. There was also a Sufi tendency toward Abu Muslim. To learn more about Anti-Abu Muslim polemics in the seventeenth century, see Mirlawhi Musavi Sabzawari, Kifayat al-muhtadi fi marifat al-Mahdi, preface and the appendices; Andrew Newman, “The Limits of ‘Orthodoxy’? Notes on the Anti-Muslim Polemic of Early 11th/17th Century Iran” in Shi’i Islam and Sufism Classical Views and Modern Perspectives, Denis Hermann and Mathieu Terrier (ed.) (I.B. Tauris, 2020), pp. 65-122. 35. Algar, Religion and State in Iran 1785-1906, p. 27. 36. Algar, Ibid, p. 29. 37. Ibid. 38. Ibid, p. 38. 39. Ibid, p. 39. 40. Shubairi Zanjani, Sayed Musa, Jor’a-e az darya (A Drop of the Sea) (Qum: Muassisa-e Kitabshinasi-e Shi'a, 1389/2010), Vol. 3, p. 263.

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41. Shubairi Zanjani, Jor’a-e az darya, Vol. 3, p. 264 42. Ibid. Bahr al-Ulum’s fatwa is cited in the footnote. 43. Algar 38-39; see Alireza Abazari, “Se risala-e naqd-e sufiya az dure Qajar” in Payam-e Baharistan (Tehran: Kitabkhane, muze va markaz-e asnad-e majlis-e shurae islami, 1387/2009), Vol. 4. No. 15, pp. 33-107. 44. Hadi Vakili, “Tarikhche Maktab-e Tafkik,” in Kitab-e Naqd (Tehran: Pazuheshga farhang va andishe Islami, 1392/2013), No. 65&66, pp. 15-50. 45. All schools of law in Islam are in agreement except for the Malikis, (named for imam Malik ibn Anas [711-795]) who say that the duty of a pilgrim is obligatory for anyone who can walk (Encyclopedia of Islamic Law A Compendium of the Major School, Laleh Bakhtiar adapted (ABC International Group, 1996), p. 157). 46. Mirza Javad Aqa Tihrani, Arif va Sufi che Miguyand (Tehran: Afaq, 1390/2013), pp. 56-67. 47. Mahmud Shaykh, “Muwafiqan va mukhalifan-e Irfan dar hawza-e ilmiya-e Qum,” in Religions and Mysticism (Tehran University, Autumn & Winter 2020/2021), Vol. 53, No. 2, pp. 340-369. 48. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “Shi’ism and Sufism,” in Shi’ism Doctrines, Thought, and Spirituality, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Hamid Dadashi, and Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr eds. (State University of New York Press, 1988), p. 101. 49. Hajj Nor Ali Tabandeh, “Shi’ism, Sufism and Gnosticism,” in Rumi’s Spiritual Shi’ism, Seyed Ghahreman Safavi ed. (Xlibris, 2008), p. 25. 50. Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimah, Abdulllah Muhammd al-Darwish ed. (Damascus: Dar al-Balkhi, 2004), Vol. 2, 229, 238-239. 51. Rasul Jafariyan, The History of Shiism in Iran: From the Beginning to the Establishment of the Safavid Rule (Tehran: Nashr-e Ilm, 1388/2009), p. 762. 52. Qumi, and see Asghari, 68. 53. Sayed Haydar Amuli, Jami al-asrar wa manb’a al-anwar, Henry Corbin and Uthman Ismail Yahya eds. (Tehran, 1347/1969), p. 611. 54. Ibid, p. 5-6 & 221. 55. Ibid, 4 & 526. 56. Ibid, p. 223. 57. Ibid, p. 488. 58. Ibid, pp. 493-494. 59. Ibid, p. 33-35. 60. To learn details about Suhrawardi’s philosophy, see Lambertus Willem Cornelis van Lit, Eschatology and the World of Image in Suhrawardi and His Commentators, (Quaestiones Infinitae, 2014). Page 284 discusses Ibn Abi Jumhur’s faithful production of Suhrawardi’s wisdom. 61. Kamil Mustafa al-Shaibi, Sufism and Shi’ism, (Great Britain, 1991), pp. 266-271. 62. Muhammad al-Ihasa’Ii Ibn Abi Jumhur, Awali al-la’ali aal-aziziyya, Sayed Shahab dl-Din Mar’ashi Najafi into. (Qum: Sayyed al-Shuhada, 1403/1983), p. 2. 63. Ibid. p. 10. 64. Muhammad Husayn Tabataba’i, Shia: muzakerat va mukatibat ba professor Henry Corbin (Tehran: Iranian Institute of Philosophy, 1382/2003), pp. 69-71. For a more detailed view see, Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabataba’i, Shi’ite

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Islam, Seyyed Hossein Nast trans. (State University of New York Press, 1977), p. 112-117. 65. Sayed Muhammad Husayn Husayni Tihrani, Mihr-e Tabnak (Tehran: Maktabe Wahy, 1392/2013), pp. 293-294. 66. Ibid, 100–101, Mihr 94. 67. MIhr 283. 68. Sayed Muhammad Husayn Husayni Tihrani, Ruh-e Mujjarrad (Mashhad: Allama Tabataba’i publication, 1425/2004), p. 285. 69. Ibid, pages 462 & 501. 70. Husayni Tihrani, Mihr-e Tabnak, p. 12. 71. Husayni Tihrani, Mihr-e Tabnak, p. 72. 72. Ibn Farid (1181-1234) was an Egyptian Sufi and poet who penned a renowned poem called Ta’iyyah. Qazi said that anyone who memorizes the great Ta’iyyah will become a lover of God, and subsequently this love will lead him to the ultimate destination (Husayni Tihrani, Mihr-e Tabnak, p. 273). 73. Husayni Tihrani, Mihr-e Tabnak, pp. 342-343; Astan Quds Razawi, Ustad: 100 riwayat az zandegi-e ayatollah Sayed Ali Qazi, Muhammad Javad Miri ed. (Mashhad: Institute for Youth Counseling Services and Social Research, 1399/2020), p. 76. 74. Astan Quds Razawi, Ustad: 100 riwayat az zandegi-e ayatollah Sayed Ali Qazi, Muhammad Javad Miri ed. (Mashhad: Institute for Youth Counseling Services and Social Research, 1399/2020), p. 44. 75. Ibid, pp. 89-90 & 92; for Isfahani’s opposition to mystical teaching also see Shubairi Zanjani, Jor’a-e az darya, Vol. 2, p. 561. 76. Astan Quds Razawi, Ustad: 100 riwayat az zandegi-e ayatollah Sayed Ali Qazi, p. 94; Hadi Vakili, Tarikhche Maktab-e Tafkik, p. 26. 77. Ibid, Ustad: 100 riwayat az zandegi-e ayatollah Sayed Ali Qazi, p. 110. 78. Sayed Muhammad Husayn Husayni Tihrani, Ruh-e Mujjarrad (Mashhad: Allama Tabataba’i publication, 1425/2004) p. 12. 79. Ibid, pp. 134-139. 80. Ibid, pp. 541-552. 81. To clarify, this chapter does not intend to discuss Shia Sufis belonging to regular Sufi orders like the Namatullahi and the Zahabi. Rather, it briefly discusses Shia Sufis within the hawza institution and among ayatollahs. These are two distinct groups. A majority of Sufi ayatollahs follow a particular pir (master). Tihrani says both Hallaj and Shaykh Ahmad al-Ahsa’i (1753-1826) strayed from the path, though in different directions and extensions, because they lacked a spiritual master (Husayni Tihrani, Ruh-e Mujjarrad, 428 & 462). However, these Sufi ayatollahs do not constitute an organized and institutionalized Sufi order and established center (khaniqah). Finally, there is a third group of Sufis among Shia who receive a gnostic and mystical achievement, not through a human master, but through a hidden master, like khadir, mostly the Imam (see, Seyyed Hussein Nasr, “Shiism and Sufism,” in Shi’ism ­Doctrines, Thought, and Spirituality, p. 107). 82. Mathieu Terrier, “The Defense of Sufism among Twelver Shi’i Scholars of Early Modern and Modern Times: Topics and Arguments,” in Shi’i Islam and Sufism

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Classical Views and Modern Perspectives, Denis Hermann and Mathieu Terrier eds. (I.B. Tauris, 2020), pp. 26-63. 83. To see English excerpts from Mulla Sadra’s philosophical text see: “Mulla Sadra on Divine Speech and Attributes” in Islamic Theological Themes: A Primary Source Reader, John Renard (ed.) (University of California Press, 2014), pp. 205209; “Mulla Sadra on Forgiveness,” ibid, pp. 395-399; Jane Dammen McAuliffe, The Norton Anthology of World Religion: Islam (W.W. Norton & Company, 2015), pp. 453-457. 84. Kifayat al-Usul is the advanced textbook for the Principles of Jurisprudence in the current curriculum of most hawza ilmiyyas. Many grand ayatollahs also use it as a central text in advanced lectures on the subject. Around 200 commentaries and annotations have been written on it. 85. Shubairi Zanjani, Jor’a-e az darya, Vol. 3, pp. 373-374. Also see, Sayed Muhammad Husayn Husayni Tihrani, Tawhid-e ilmi va Ayni (Mashhad: Allama Tabataba’i publication, 1419/1998), p. 29. 86. Mirza Muhammad Taqi Shirazi was the successor of the sole marja Kazim Yazdi (d. 1918). Yazdi was against the Constitutional movement in Iran “and unlike the other mujtahids, was friendly towards the British after their occupation of Iraq.” Moojan Momen, An Introduction to Shi’i Islam (Yale University Press, 1985), 247. 87. Husayni Tihrani, Tawhid-e ilmi va Ayni, p. 25. 88. Ibid, p. 26. 89. Ibid, pp. 21-23. To see scripts from Hafiz see: Jane Dammen McAuliffe, The Norton Anthology of World Religion: Islam (W.W. Norton & Company, 2015), pp. 475-480. 90. Farid ud-Din Attar, The Conference of the Birds: Mantiq ut-Tair, (Berkeley: Shambala, 1971), p. 12. 91. Ibid, p. 156. 92. Sayed Yahya Yasrebi, Erfane Nazari (Theoretical Gnosis: a Research on Sufism’s Development Principles and Matters) (Qum: Bustan-e Ketab, 1384/2006), p.181. 93. Husayni Tihrani, Ruh-e Mujjarrad, pp. 680-1. 94. David Pinault, The Shiites Ritual and Popular Piety in a Muslim Community (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), pp. 47-50. Pinault suggests a wiser view when he observes that Khomeini's thought was influenced by the writings of the theosopher Shahab al-Din Yahya al-Suhrawardi (d. 1191). Suhrawardi, the founder of the Illuminative Wisdom in Islam, was charged with heterodoxy: refusing the finality of Muhammad’s prophethood (pp. 50-52). In the introduction of his masterpiece Hikmat al-ishraq, Suhrawardi claims that a theosopher can achieve the ultimate truths through intuition and thus he deserves to be recognized as a divine caliph on the earth. He goes on to say that he himself has received the contents of his book, as the ultimate truths, through intuition and divine grace. In addition, as I discuss above, Khomeini was an advocate of Ibn Arabi’s Sufism. Thus, the Sufi concept of Perfect Human and theosophical wisdom played a greater role in Khomeini’s absolutist politics, elevated self-image with a messianic aura, and his downplaying of passionate Shia rituals and traditions, than did his legal-mindedness, as is suggested by Vali Nasr. According to

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Nasr, Khomeini did not deny being the Twelfth Imam when he was asked twice in an interview session (Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival (W.W. Norton & Company, 2006), pp. 131-137). See my paper “When Sufism Meets Politics (the Pluses and Minuses of Nasafi’s Perspective,” in Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies (Villanova University, Vol. 43, No. 4, Summer 2020) pp. 74-80, to learn more about the political implications of Sufism. 95. Ruhollah Khomeini, Sahifeh Imam (A collection of Imam Khomeini’s Work) (Tehran: Moassisa-e Tanzim va nashr-e athar Imam Khomeini, 1378/1999), Vol 2. pp. 278. 96. Ruhollah Khomeini, Tafsir-e Sure Hamd (Tehran: Moassisa-e Tanzim va nashr-e athar Imam Khomeini, 1375/1997), p. 193. 97. Ruhollah Khomeini, Sahifeh Imam, Vol. 7, p. 172. 98. Ibid. 99. Shubairi Zanjani, Jor’a-e az darya, Vol. 3, pp. 257. 100. Ruhollah Khomeini, Taliqat ala sharh Fusus al-Hikam wa Misbah al-Uns, (Tehran: Moassisa-e pasdar-e Islam, 1410/1990), pp. 37 & 111 & 310. 101. Hamid Mavani, Religious Authority and Political Thought in Twelver Shi’ism: from Ali to Post Khomeini (Routledge, 2013), pp. 179-180. 102. Ruhollah Khoemini, The Wine of Love: Mystical Poetry of Imam Khomeini, Ghulam Rida Awani and Muhammad Legenhausen trans. (Tehran: The Institute for Compilation and Publications of Imam Khomeini’s Works (International Affairs Department), [no date]), p. 53.

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One semester when I was a Ph.D. student and refugee living in Iran, I was assigned to teach philosophy to devotee seminarians with different citizenship backgrounds. Most students were dressed in traditional Ulama garb— turban, long beard, cloak, and long garment—while I was not. They resonated with piety, and they were mostly older than me. This posed a challenge to building a constructive student-teacher setting. To build a setting of mutual respect, I introduced a textbook which I felt could be helpful to reconcile philosophy with their pious love of the Prophet and his family. It was Allama Tabatabai’s Ali and Divine Philosophy. In this book, Allama discusses many of the first Infallible Imam’s metaphysical statements at length. Accordingly, it argues for harmony between philosophy and faith. This work is a recent example of the meeting between reason and revelation among Shia Ulama. There is a long tradition of philosophizing among Ulama. These Ulama are often called hukama (wisemen). Because they were steeped in Islamic classic studies as well, a particular term was coined for them: Jame-e Ma’qul va Manqul (the collector of both rational and revealed knowledge). While the word Sufism is an Anglicized version of the Arabic Tasawwuf, the word falsafah is the Arabicized form of philosophy (hence filsuf, meaning philosopher). Classical Islam acknowledges three sources for fundamental knowledge of reality, the here and hereafter, God, and humanity. They are revelation, reasoning, and intuition, respectively, flourishing in theology (kalaam), philosophy (falsafah), and mysticism (Sufism). The history of Islamic scholarship has witnessed a constant struggle among these branches of knowledge. However, this conjunction of politics and faith transformed orthodoxy to orthopraxy in Islam, and the conflict between fuqaha responsible for practicing faith on one hand and Sufis and philosophers on the other 181

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became dominant. Fuqaha attained such power that some even rejected Islamic theology. This section deliberates on Shia fuqaha and Shia philosophers. Hikmat (wisdom) was another name for philosophy in Islam, and hakim for philosopher. Using hikmat and hakim was a way to domesticize philosophy. Al-Hakim is a name for God in Islam, who knows all in their true natures. Hakim also denotes at once physician, scientist, and philosopher, highlighting an inner link among all branches of knowledge. Moreover, the term hakim for philosophers resonates well with the crucial meaning of Greek philosophy as assimilation to God. While the first trends of philosophy in Islam, including peripatetic and illuminative philosophy, were targets of theology, Nasir al-Din al-Tusi (1201–1274), in his theological masterpiece Tajrid al-I’tiqad (Summation of Belief), proposed a synthesis between Shia theology and peripatetic philosophy. This book still serves as the critical source of theology in hawzas. Neither synthetic approach stops at this juncture nor do the attacks by anti-hikmat mujtahids. Both approaches have their own theories. Since Islam focuses so much on knowledge and looks to revelation as the true source, means, and criterion of knowledge, the nature of philosophy was a controversial issue from its earliest emergence in Islam. In addition to its Greek roots, its nature and self-sufficient reasoning posed the main conflict. However, there are verses of the Quran and hadiths emphasizing the significance of reasoning, learning from other nations, and employing critical thought.1 These two sides of the faith presented mujtahids with the opportunity to orient themselves in opposing directions, for or against philosophy.

HUKAMA MUJTAHIDS Today’s mujtahids spend many years studying, discussing, teaching, and ruminating on the principles of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh). There is much overlap between philosophy and the principles of jurisprudence, including on the self-sufficiency of reason (mustaqillat-e aqliyyah) and linguistic analysis. Some mujtahids have commented on how the interaction between these two disciplines promotes the advanced study of religion. Wahid Bihbahani, in this context, could defeat Akhbarism and promote the Usuli school. However, reasoning in classical philosophy is more abstract and speculative, while in the principles of jurisprudence it is concrete and common-sense. Therefore, opposing philosophies were more dominant before the latest developments in Shia principles of jurisprudence. The synthetic approach of Nasir al-Din Tusi in theology played a role in this ecumenism. Thus, the latest criticism from the anti-hikmat current among fuqaha mainly targets the Transcendental Wisdom (Hikmat al-Muta’aliya) of Mulla Sadra (1572–1640).2

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Transcendental Wisdom is a dominant trend of classical philosophy in Shia hawza. It is the peak of the synthetic approach with a new direction initiated by the School of Isfahan, aiming to reconcile theology (kalaam), peripatetic philosophy (masha’i), illuminative philosophy (ishraqi), and Sufism. This school was established by Mir Damad (1561–1631) and reached its final form with his student Mulla Sadra. Sadra’s monumental work al-Asfar al-arba’ah (The Four Journeys) asserts that revelation, intuition, and ratiocination lead ultimately to the same goal, and so he built his new philosophy on all three. In the nineteenth century, prominent figures like Mulla Ali Nuri (d. 1830), Aqa Ali Mudarris (1818–1889), and Haji Mulla Hadi Sabazavari (1797–1873) resurrected Sadra’s teachings and made them the dominant school of philosophy in hawzas.3 Composed in Arabic verses in 1845, Sharh al-manzuma is Sabzavari’s most notable work and illustrates the summary of Sadra’s philosophy. It is still taught in many hawzas with numerous later commentaries. All these great Ulama were mujtahids as well. In this same lineage is a wonderful mujtahid named Jahangir Khan Qashqa’i (1827–1906). He studied and taught in Isfahan and Tehran hawzas. When he was young, he loved music and learned string instruments. He went to Isfahan to complete his studies in music but fell in love with madrasa and was guided by a Sufi to study there. Qashqa’i studied revealed and rational sciences and became master of both. Many later grand ayatollahs studied before him, including Sayyid Husayn Tabataba’i Borujerdi (1875–1961), Mirza Husayn Naini (1860–1936), and Abul-hasan Isfahani (1937–1946). Quashqa’i did not dress in the traditional turban and cloak and long garment of the Ulama, but rather wore Qashqai attire his whole life, including the hat, which he wore over his uncommonly long hair. He is one of the Ulama who preferred to dress in the clothes of laypeople. This group is called mukallah (wearer of kulah, meaning hat) versus mu’ammam (wearer of imameh, meaning turban). He followed his favorite master Aqa Muhammad Reza Qumshei (1819–1899), who also avoided the appearance of the Ulama.4 Quashqa’i never married and died in a madrasa. The only book he wrote is a commentary on Najh al-Balaghah (The Peak of Eloquence), a collection of Imam Ali’s sermons, letters, and quotes.5 Quashqa’i changed the position of philosophy in hawzas. Prior to his efforts, it was considered taboo and a sign of infidelity, but he gave it a good reputation. His routine was to teach jurisprudence first, then philosophy, and finally ethics, including philosophy among the more appealing courses. He was tolerant and forgiving toward the violators of Shari’a. It’s said that if a drinker or other transgressor of Shari’a was caught and brought to his madrasa to receive jurisprudential punishment (had), Quashqa’i asked that the aggressor be kept under arrest, not performing the punishment until he was fully sober. Then, in the middle of the night, Quashqa’i would go to him and release him, sharing a word of wise advice.6

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Another example of the mukallah philosopher mujtahid is Abdoljavad Falaturi (1926–1996). He was a disciple of Rahim Arbab and also received permission for ijtihad from grand Ayatollah Shaykh Muhammad Reza Kalbasi (1878–1964), also known as Shaykh al-Islam. Kalbasi was a student of Quashqa’i and Akhund Khurasani. After finishing his study in revealed and rational sciences in Iran, Falaturi moved to Germany and studied a wide range of subjects including philosophy, psychology, comparative religion, Greek, and Latin. He received his PhD in Kantian Ethics from the University of Bonn in 1962. Falaturi did not like Transcendental Wisdom because of its conciliating approach. Before his move to Germany, he engaged in some debates on the issue with Allama Tabataba’i. Falaturi taught Islamic philosophy and jurisprudence at Cologne University from 1974 to 1996, and starting in 1965 he was instrumental in building the Shia collection in the university’s Oriental Department. He was a founding member of the Central Council of Muslims in Germany in 1986 and the cofounder of the Islamische Wissenschaftliche Akademie zur Erforschung der Wechselbeziehungen zur abendländischen Geistesgeschichte und Kultur in Cologne. He was also a member of the Islamic council of the Azhar University in Cairo, the Majlis al-ala li-oyun al-alam al-Islami. He was very active in dialogue among civilizations as well as inter- and intra-faith studies. One example is his editorship of Der Islam in den Schulbüchern der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (7 vols., Cologne, 1986–1988), a series of studies on the depiction of Islam and Muslims in German textbooks used in primary education.7 Another interesting example of these mujtahids is Mahdi Elahi Qumshei (1901–1973). Born in Isfahan, educated in Mashhad, and an instructor at Tehran University, he was originally from Bahrain’s Sayeds, generations of the Prophet, who immigrated to Iran during the rule of Nadir Shah. Traditionally Sayeds wear a black turban versus non-Sayeds, also called Shaykhs, wearing white turbans in Shia culture. However, Qumshei chose to keep his white turban. Some of his better-known students include Ayatollah Hassan Hassanzade Amuli (1928–2021) and grand Ayatollah Abdullah Jawadi Amuli (b. 1933).8 Qumshei wrote a simple Persian translation of the Quran. In his masterpiece Hikmat Elahi (Divine Wisdom), he attempts to show the harmony between revelation and reason. In it he narrates a captivating hadith. Amr ul-As (d. 664) went to the Prophet after his trip to Egypt. The Prophet asked him about Egyptian religions. He answered that they are based on the religion of Aristotle. Then he cursed Aristotle. But the Prophet responded by warning him, saying Aristotle was a prophet among all prophets.9 His disciples, both Amulis, published multiple books which demonstrated that there are no contradictions among revelation (the Quran), intuition (irfan), and reasoning (burhan). The Amulis also studied before Allama Tabataba’i, a reviver of the tradition of Quranic exegesis in Shia hawza. He

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wrote three philosophical textbooks for seminaries: Bidayat al-Hikmah (The Beginning of Philosophy, translated into English as The Elements of Islamic Metaphysics), Nihayat al-Hikmah (The End of Philosophy), and Usul-e falsafeh va ravesh-e realism (The Principles of Philosophy and the Method of Realism). The first two are written in Arabic and the third in Persian. The Arabic texts suggest a new didactic structure of Sadra’s philosophy for both beginning and advanced seminarians. The Persian volume was the result of biweekly classes held in the 1950s and 1960s on challenges that Islam faced from modern philosophy in the West, particularly dialectical materialism. His standout student, Murtaza Mutahhari (1919–1979), an abiding ideologue of the Islamic Republic of Iran, provided an introduction and detailed notes on 14 essays written by Allama. Besides his writing, he was a great teacher. In Qum, Allama began teaching Sadra’s Asfar in private, but high demand forced him to make the class public. The popularity and publicity around the course caused a stir among anti-philosophy Ulama. Though grand Ayatollah Borujerdi personally had a philosophical background and bent, he believed that public teaching could harm unsophisticated seminarians (tullab) and so suspended the monthly payment (shahriya) to Allama’s students. Allama objected to this decision in a letter, saying he came to Qum only to teach philosophy and thereby help the tullab overcome their intellectual objections and concerns. He stated he would not stop teaching it unless Borujerdi released a religious order (hukm-e shar’i). Ayatollah HusainAli Muntazeri, a student of both mujtahids, intervened and persuaded Allama (who was considering leaving Qum over the issue) to compromise and instead teach peripatetic philosophy, which was relatively less objectionable. One further issue intensified the challenges Allama faced in Qum. He published an annotation (ta’liqat) to Majlisi’s Bahar al-anwar. Admiring Majlisi as an eminent transmitter of hadith (muhaddith) and his care in organizing this huge volume, Allama rejected the simplistic interpretations of theological hadiths, specifically in terms of the meaning and nature of ‘aql (intellect). He also criticized Majlisi for disregarding philosophy and philosophers. Again, a wave of attacks from traditionalist Ulama encouraged Tabataba’i to at least tone down his criticism. Allama responded boldly, “in Shi’ism [Imam] Ja’far b. Muhammad al-Sadiq is more esteemed than Allama Majlisi . . . I will not change one word.” He stopped writing annotations with the seventh volume.10 Nonetheless, Tabataba’i did not wish to be involved in jurisprudential considerations. He also was not ready to lead a congregation in prayer in spite of persistent requests.11 This was an Ayatollah who was not very passionate about philosophy but rather taught philosophy to break the proscriptive atmosphere. Sayed Reza Zanjani (1902–1984), a trusted student of Haeri Yazdi, the founder of Qum Hawza, started teaching Manzuma though he had

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not studied it before. He taught until the atmosphere of censorship became stifling.12 From the same camp of mujtahids, another grand ayatollah acted differently. Khomeini, the first supreme leader of Iran, was a world figure. His Sufi inclination, which is discussed in the previous chapter, allowed him to grasp the Transcendental Wisdom easily. It is said Khomeini studied only Sabzwari’s Sharh Manzuma but somehow obtained the ability to teach Sadra’s al-Asfar al-arba’ah, which is more sophisticated. Khomeini’s sympathy for the kind of enlightenment found in the intuitive part of Sufism and the Transcendental Wisdom made him suspicious of peripatetic philosophy, which does not harmonize with these former tendencies. His disciple, then later his opponent in political philosophy, Ayatollah Mahdi Haeri Yazdi (1923–1999), lamented that Khomeini taught al-Asfar with a Sufi perspective. Khomeini once said to Mahdi Haeri that he needs to cleanse himself of some of Avicenna’s ideas using a jurisprudential term “istibra’a”, like an individual who washes his private parts after using the restroom.13 Khomeini remained a lover of Sadra and praised him highly whenever given the chance in his books and speeches. Considering Sadra the head of the people of tawhid, he once said, “Mulla Sadra wa ma Adraka ma Mulla Sadra” (“Mulla Sadra! And what will explain to you what Mulla Sadra is?”). This is a play on words with the Quranic verse 12 (chapter 97), which asks “The Night of Power, and what will explain to you what the Night of Power is?” by likening the majesty of Mulla Sadra to the uniqueness and majesty of the Night of Power, the night that the Quran was revealed to the Prophet. Here we see a coalition between philosopher mujtahid and Sufi mujtahid. However, this is not the case at all times. Moving to Najaf we see Muhammad Hossein Gharavi Isfahani, also known as Kampani (1979–1942), who debated his fellow mujtahid Karbala’i on the Oneness of God (see chapter 7, “Sufism and Spirituality”). The significance of this debate can be grasped better if we consider the weight of piety and holiness associated with Sufi mujtahids against philosopher mujtahids. Recall that such an authority as grand Ayatollah Mirza Abd al-Hadi al-Husayni al-Shirazi (1888–1962) counted one student of Karbala’i as two students in terms of testimony.14 In Shari’a the testimony of two just people is important in many court cases. In Najaf, Kampani studied before great ayatollahs like Akhund Khurasani. His students include major mujtahids such as Muhmmad Ali Araki (1894–1994), Abd al-Hussain Amini (1902–1970), Muhammad Taqi Bahjat, Muhammad Rida al-Muzaffar (1904–1964), Hadi Milani (1895–1975), Abul al-Qasim Khoei (1899–1992), and Allama Tabataba’i. Kampani grew up in a rich family. His father was a successful businessman who built the first train company running between Baghdad and Kadhimiya in Iraq. The title “Kampani” comes from this “company.” However, his

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father did not want him to pursue religious studies. Instead, he wanted his only son to become a businessman like himself. After many debates, the son made a solemn vow to the seventh Infallible Imam in the shrine, and suddenly his father announced he was in agreement with Kampani’s desire to become a seminarian. Later Kampani became the leading marja after Akhund Khurasani, though he did not live long. He changed the classification of the principles of jurisprudence with regard to philosophy and created a link between the two disciplines. His disciple, the reformist ayatollah Muhammad Rida Muzaffar believed that had he lived longer, he could have changed the course of history of hawza.15 However, Kampani’s reputation suffered in the eyes of some Ulama because of his philosophical inclination; his risala (religious manual) was even burned in the publishing house.16 This leads us to consider another grand ayatollah in Najaf who offered a fresh approach to Islamic philosophy in response to developments in twentieth-century Western philosophical thought. Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (1935– 1980) was born into a family with an historical lineage of Ulama tracing back to the seventh Infallible Imam Musa al-Kadhim in Khadhimiya, Iraq. He was the ideological founder of the Islamic Dawa Party and also father-in-law to Muqtada al-Sadr, the leader of Sadrist Movement. Al-Sadr completed his religious studies under grand Ayatollah Khoei, who promoted his scholarship. Al-Sadr is unique among maraji' because he announced his authority while his master Khoei was alive and still dominant. The authority of many previous maraji' was established by their followers, organizational support, and admirers’ propaganda, and al-Sadr appeared too young to claim it for himself. But as grand Ayatollah Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah (1935–2010) observed, al-Sadr received acceptance because of his scholarly accomplishment, innovative method of developing his teachings, his talent and dynamism, his involvement with new challenges and intellectual concerns, and his appeal to modernizing intellectuals. In Fadlallah’s view, al-Sadr’s authority was in some ways established by people who did not like the traditional way of acknowledging authority. Let us focus on his contribution to philosophy. Baqir al-Sadr published two groundbreaking books on philosophy that changed the course of Islamic philosophy. They are Falsafatuna (Our Philosophy) and al-Usus al-mantaqiya lil-istiqra (The Logical Foundations of Induction). The first book begins by discussing four major schools of thought: capitalism, communism, socialism, and Islam. He rejects capitalism for its materialistic culture, marked-based nature, and negative individualism. He believed Marxist philosophy shared this materialistic perspective and additionally suffers from unjust distribution of wealth clashing with actual human nature. He offers his Islamic reconciliation of personal motivations and social interest through morality. He then moves to the theory of knowledge. Refuting the Platonic theory of recollection and empiricism, al-Sadr promotes

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nationalism in accordance with Islam. He treats positivism as an extension of empiricism. This first book can be compared to similar volumes by Iranian ayatollahs responding to Western philosophies on the grounds of classical Islamic philosophy.17 The Logical Foundations of Induction, however, was completely innovative in Shia hawzas up to that point in examining a crucial problem in the philosophy of science and scientific methodology. Here, al-Sadr attempts to solve the problem of induction to prove that faith in God is based on the same rational principles as science. The book rejects solutions provided by the Aristotelian and empiricist philosophers. It introduces a new epistemological theory distinguishing between an objective and a subjective axis along which knowledge can grow, based on an analysis of knowledge with both objective content and subjective attitude. Objective growth relies on the theory of probability, while subjective growth is a matter of increasing certainty. He discusses three forms of certainty. Al-Sadr promotes the subjective level and delicately criticizes Bertrand Russell, Pierre-Simon Laplace, and John Maynard Keynes. His broad understanding of different aspects of Islamic civilization, his popularity among a younger generation, and his political activism attracted the wrath of Saddam Hussein. Al-Sadr was severely tortured and executed along with his sister Bint al-Huda Sadr by Saddam’s regime in 1980.

ANTI-HUKAMA MUJTAHIDS Religious authorities treat philosophy with suspicion for two reasons. First, philosophy relies on self-sufficient reasoning to uncover fundamental principles of the world and the knowledge necessary for happiness. In contrast, religion insists that people lack this substantial knowledge and can’t rely on their reasoning. And second, the founders of religion are privileged by revelation or a specific Divine connection which distinguishes them from laypeople and their reasoning potential. As Rumi wrote, philosophy takes the seeker beyond the truth: The philosopher killed (exhausted) himself with thinking: let him run on (in vain), for his back is turned towards the treasure. Let him run on: the more he runs, the more remote does he become from the object of his heart's desire. That (Divine) King said, “(those who) have striven in (for) Us”: he did not say, “(those who) have striven away from us” O restless one.18

This suspicion only increases in a Shia mujtahid who believes the true meaning and application of religious teachings can be grasped only through an

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Infallible Imam, whom any true Shia must follow. However, a contradictory position arises when many verses of the Quran and hadiths of the Imams are viewed as praising high reasoning as the inner prophecy. Also, the process of understanding in the time of presence and of ijtihad in the time of occultation can’t unfold while ignoring the human aspects of deduction, which links the sacred to the secular in Islam. This unique characteristic of Shia works as a double-edged sword, with the potential for both textualism and philosophical hermeneutics. Because in the Shia view, the course of life and activity of the Infallible Imams for 250 years, from the death of the Prophet to the occultation, depicts a long history of the same entity: an uninterrupted single tradition of guidance addressing opposing and diverse situations which offers its adherents multiple options to fit varied and distinct patterns of actions. This long history is important in itself for its richness and as a roadmap to finding unity in diversity.19 Oliver Roy, comparing the Shia Ulama to their Sunni counterparts, concludes that the former is surely more open to non-Islamic sources. “The ayatollahs are great readers (including of Marx and Feuerbach): there is something of the Jesuit or Dominican in them,” Roy continues, “hence they combine clear philosophical syncretism with an exacting casuistic legalism.” He then refers to the fact that the opening of the Shia madrasa to a non-Islamic corpus dates from far earlier than that of the Sunni madrasa. The culture of the Shia clergy is strikingly twofold: extremely traditionalist, and yet very open to the other world.20 All mujtahids in practice chose one of these directions, either a literal understanding of the Quran and hadith or interpreting them in terms of human reasoning. Both groups can be tracked to the very beginning of hawza scholarship in Shia, but our focus now turns to the literalist mujtahids, with a very brief review of the recorded and available history, especially in the contemporary era. The prolific scholar Jamal al-Din al-Hassan al-Hilli (1250–1325), generally known as Allama Hilli, was the first to be called ayatollah because of his knowledge and piety.21 He was also the first to use the term mujtahid. Some of his theological books, including al-Bab al-hadi ‘ashar (The Eleventh Chapter) and Kashf al-murad (Discovering the Purpose) are still standard hawza texts, for beginners and advanced studies, respectively. Ibn Taymiyyah, the controversial thinker and spiritual father of ultra-conservative Salafism, criticized al-Hilli’s book to rebut the Shia faith. Al-Hilli’s significant jurisprudential book Tadhkirat al-Fuqaha (Memorandum for Jurists) put philosophy among the disciplines forbidden to be studied, except for the purpose of rejecting it. More shockingly, he believed that jihad against philosophers was obligatory. Zayn al-Din al-Juba’i al-Amili (1506–1558) known as al-Shahid al-Thani, the author of the enduring hawza textbook Ar-rawda-l-bahiyah fi sharh allum’a-d-dimishqiya (The Beautiful Garden in Interpreting the Damascene

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Glitter), in his ethical book Muyat al-Murid (Desire of the Aspirant) proclaims reading some topics in philosophy haram. He concludes that every discipline that promotes skepticism is haram. A book attributed to Muqaddas Ardabili, Hadiqat al-Shia,22 accused Sufis of taking their fundamental ideas from philosophers. It concludes philosophers are responsible for the confusion of many different peoples. Quoting another scholar, the text explains how philosophy negates religion. Philosophers basically suppose prophecy and religion as a means to reform social and individual life in this world. Accordingly, Shari’a consists of rational obligations for the betterment of the community. They appear to confirm the prophecy, but in fact they destroy the faith. It also refers to Ghazzali’s pivotal work opposing philosophy and praises him.23 Imam Ghazzali (1056–1111) is known for his integration of Sufism into mainstream Islam. In his work, Sufism joins textualism and jurisprudence to defeat philosophy. Muqaddas Ardabili praises Ghazzali without knowing the price he paid. In another work, al-Qistas al-Mustaqim (The Correct Balance), Ghazzali not only introduces a new logic based on the Quran but also argues deliberately that the main concept of Shia (meaning imamah) contradicts logical thought. The first Majlisi, who was inclined to Sufism, also criticized philosophers in his introduction to provide a commentary on Sahifa Sajjadiya, a collection of prayers by the fourth Infallible Imam.24 This criticism is published separately as a treatise named Radd-e Madhab-e Hukama (A Rebuttal Against the School of Philosophers). Cursing philosophers, the first Majlisi writes that their ideas of world and time as eternal, of the necessary attributes of God, of rejecting the physical journey of the Prophet to heaven (miraj), of Greek roots, of rejecting bodily resurrection in the hereafter, and of rejecting Divine arbitrary will are all opposed to the necessary teachings of Islam and thus deserve excommunication. Since philosophical books are misleading, he denotes anyone who reads them or believes them as a kafir (infidel) and murtad (apostate) who will fall in the fire for eternity. Almost the entire book shares the same refutations of philosophers made by Ghazzali; however, there are two points worth considering. First, he comments positively on the order attributed to the second caliph Umar ibn al-Khattab (585–644) to burn philosophical texts in the Alexandria library out of fear they will mislead people. This endorsement of Umar is uncommon among textual conservative Shia Ulama. Second, Majlisi claims that the translation movement by the House of Wisdom during the Abbasid era in the ninth and tenth centuries intended to confuse Muslims through the distribution of philosophical texts.25 This theory was later developed by many Shia Ulama throughout history to say specifically that philosophical texts were translated intentionally to discredit the Infallible Imams. The second Majlisi too, in his compendium Bihar al-Anwar, writes that philosophical explanations of the eternal and transcendental substance or

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originated intellects imply rejecting the established and necessary teachings of Islam. Allama Tabataba’i in his annotation on Bihar accused Majlisi of falling into contradiction: Majlisi accepted reasoning in the principles of religion (usul al-din) but rejected rational achievement because it’s contradicted by a hadith. This contradictory position of Majlisi, Tabataba’i concludes, leads him to reject philosophers’ belief in incorporeal beings while accepting the incorporeal qualities of the Prophet and Imams.26 This background can help us understand the modern attacks against hukama, including by their fellow conservative mujtahids. As a leading marja, Abul-Hasan Isfahani’s opposition to philosophy created a tradition in hawza and marked the Najaf hawza in particular as an anti-philosophy madrasa, though it was not alone. Isfahani declared teaching philosophy and Sufism haram in Najaf,27 and thus cut the monthly stipend for seminarians who participate in courses other than jurisprudence and the principles of jurisprudence.28 Attending a philosophy course taught by a hakim mujtahid was problematic. Addressing the Ulama in Najaf, Isfahani once stated, “Najaf is the factory of ijtihad; whoever looks after philosophy and Sufism, leave it for Qum.”29 More Ulama joined Isfahani, and buying theosophical texts became difficult. Even booksellers avoided touching the forbidden texts they carried, using tongs instead.30 The position in Mashhad and Qum, meanwhile, was not always pro-philosophy. Mirza Mahdi Gharawi Isfahani in Mashhad was extremely anti-philosophy. Muslims must announce their intention as approaching God (niyyat al-qurbah) in order for their act of worship to be valid with regard to Shari’a. Mirza Mahdi would perform the same ritual in cursing philosophers.31 The charisma of Mirza Mahdi had a lasting shadow on Mashhad even after his death. The grand Ayatollah Muhammad Hadi al-Milani (1895–1975) moved from Karbala to Mashhad and gave it new life by way of great development and modern training programs. However, because of his philosophical inclination, he was somewhat marginalized in the city by Mirza Mahdi’s students, who still retain great power in Mashhad Hawza.32 The leading Marja’ in Iran during 1947–1961, grand Ayatollah Borujerdi, received many letters from Mashhad Ulama warning of the spread of philosophy as a threat to the future of hawza. So, he challenged the teaching of the Transcendental Wisdom by Allama Tabataba’i. Khomeini came up with a compromise to continue teaching the course, but doing so privately.33 Another story says Khomeini stopped teaching philosophy seriously. Even when Khomeini was in exile in Najaf, he did not answer a question on Sufism from a former student because of the ban by Borujerdi.34 Khomeini revealed the intense pressure when he said, “Learning foreign languages, kufr (atheism), and Sufism and philosophy were considered sin and shirk (polytheism).”35 He narrated on one occasion that his young son drank a cup of water

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from a jar in Fayziyyah, the central madrasa in Qum, and Ulama washed the jar because the boy’s father was teaching philosophy.36,37 Khomeini earned a poor reputation among many Ulama for his teaching of philosophy.38 However, the case of Ayatollah Khomeini was different from Allama Tabataba’i because Khomeini also was teaching jurisprudence and the principles of jurisprudence. It illustrates the significance of these two majors in hawza, since teaching the Quran did not provide the same protection to Allama. Allama taught tafsir before Transcendental Wisdom.39 It’s said Mirza Mahdi once kissed the hand of Ayatollah Khomeini out of respect, despite belonging to an older generation of mujtahids and being radically opposed to philosophy. He performed the act upon learning that Khomeini wrote a book, Kashf al-Asrar (Unveiling of Secrets),40 defending the established and popular Shia teachings and marja’iyyah against a pamphlet published by a puritanical and reformist Shia scholar Ali Akbar HakamiZadeh (d. 1987). However, people who continued philosophical discussions in Qum also needed to be careful. I heard from professor Gholam Hoseyn Ibrahimi Dinani (b. 1934), a student of Allama Tabataba’i that he and his classmates needed to hide philosophical texts among non-philosophical hawza textbooks as they walked the streets on their way to the private course. Yet, there were lesser-known hakim mujtahids who were persistent in not surrendering to their rivals. Grand Ayatollah Zanjani narrates a wonderful story of a meeting between two mujtahids with opposing views in Qum. Shaykh Mahdi Mazendarani taught philosophy, while Sayed Muhammad Baqir Qazvini considered it haram. The Sayed’s house was on the way to the Shaykh’s home. One day, while the Sayed was talking with a friend in front of his house, the Shaykh passed by. The Sayed closed his door to avoid encountering the Shaykh, but in his haste his cloak stuck in the door. The Shaykh, seeing what had happened, approached and removed the cloak. The Sayed had no choice but to open the door and meet the Shaykh. Shaykh engaged Sayed in a hot debate and forced him to repent before God for his sin, announcing philosophy haram. The Shaykh then allowed the Sayed to go about his business.41 By the time of the revolution in 1979, the position in Iran totally changed because Khomeini was a big admirer of philosophy. Many Islamic theoreticians of the new Islamic regime like Ayatollah Murteza Mutahhari and Ayatollah Muhammad Hussayn Beheshi were also pro-philosophy. The opposition of those like grand Ayatollah like Mar’ashi Najafi, who believed philosophers were misleading people from the path of prophets and Imams, was quieted. After Khomeini’s death, however, the anti-philosophy position became resurgent. Grand Ayatollah Bihjat stated that reading philosophy is dangerous for anyone who hasn’t already achieved the level of ijtihad in kalaam. Safi Gulpayegani warned about involving philosophy and Sufism in hawzas’

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syllabi. Grand Ayatollah Vahid Khurasani said that “if we knew Imam Sadiq closely, we could not learn from the vomit of Greek philosophers.” To conclude, anti-hikmah mujtahids mostly attack their peers when they are dedicated to philosophy per se, predominantly the Transcendental Wisdom. But when philosophy, particularly peripatetic philosophy, is used to enhance kalaam, the anti-hikma mujtahids are flexible. This is because the classic Shia theology finds its maturity in Khwaja Nasir al-Din Tusi, who used peripatetic philosophy to serve theology and helped theology flourish accordingly. His text Tajrid al-I’tiqad (Summation of Belief) is still the most famous scholastic text in Shia theology, and many of the commentaries by other Shia Ulama it inspired are also current hawza texts. Anti-hikma mujtahids do not attack this kind of work. But there is a new school trying to write a fresh theology by cleansing theology of philosophy completely. THE SCHOOL OF SEPARATION (TAFKIK) As we learned in the previous chapter, the Tafkik school is dedicated to separating Islamic teachings from philosophical and Sufi inclinations. Ali Paya correctly tracks its path to earlier Islam and in classic and premodern Islamic thought. He also discusses their shared concepts with modern fundamentalists. They all do not acknowledge the authority or validity of any universal norms of rationality; maintain that there are other authorities higher than universal norms of rationality; or claim their own model of rationality is superior to all other possible models of rationality.42 This division occurs because of the dynamism among all these tendencies and the determined approach of each one. Tafkik traces its genealogy to anti-rational or nonrational trends, tendencies, and approaches in the history of Islam that reject reason and insist upon the validity of a literal reading or of the apparent meaning of texts. Acquiring true knowledge of the divine teachings requires guidance and instruction from true and genuine teachers, namely God’s messengers and the Infallible Imams. Interpretation (ta’wil) is a distorting process and therefore must be avoided. However, the Tafkikis distinguish themselves from the Akhbaris in two directions: the former uses the tool of the principles of jurisprudence and shows respect to marja’ taqlid while the latter rejects these approaches.43 As Paya cites, Muhammad Reza Hakimi (1935–2021) coined the name Tafkik in this way: Although the terms “Tafkik” and “the Tafkik School” are new, the idea of “Tafkik” is old and goes back to the beginning of Islam. It compromises the belief that the truths about religion and the correct knowledge of it are the ones stated in the Quran and have been taught by the Prophet and afterwards

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by his appointed successors, who have inherited his knowledge. These truths and knowledge all correspond to reality and are superior to whatever is told by others, even other Divine religions. They are not in need of any other system of thought and are self-sufficient, capable of providing answers to all the cognitive needs of humankind.44

Mirza Mahdi, who moved from Najaf to Mashhad, is widely considered the founding father of this school. Along with the principles of jurisprudence, he gave a series of lectures on the fundamental concepts of Islam from a tafkiki point of view. Later he switched his focus to teaching the doctrinal teachings and published his book Ma’arif al-Quran (The Knowledge Embedded in the Quran). This course consists of two distinct features: a radical emphasis on hadiths and a puritanical attempt to cleanse Islamic teachings of non-infallible (masum) references including philosophy and Sufism. It is said that in the last years of his life, Mirza expressed that the standard and dominant studies of jurisprudence and the principles of jurisprudence in hawzas are useless, encouraging tullab to look higher to doctrinal teachings.45 In his view, philosophers and Sufis were worse than kuffar (infidels), because the former promote falsehoods about God while the latter do not believe in God and therefore do not attribute false attributes to Him.46 His most devoted disciple was Shaykh Mahmud Halabi (1900–1998), who published a compilation of the teachings of Mirza Mahdi on the principles of jurisprudence, doctrinal principles, and understanding the Quran. Like his master, Halabi had the habit of cursing philosophers and Sufis publicly.47 Halabi moved to Tehran and launched a highly disciplined lay organization known as Anjoman-e Hojjatiya, aiming primarily to challenge the Baha’i faith. It also promoted quietism, which positioned it in direct opposition to Khomeini’s Islamic Revolution. After the revolution, Khomeini made a public speech against quietism in 1983, leading Halabi to announce the disbanding of the organization. He moved to Mashhad, but some believe the association continued its activities and networks underground. Ali Akbar Mohtashamipur (1947–2021), one of Khomeini’s devotees who held many positions in Iran after the revolution, publicly accused the association of not only continuing its function but also penetrating into many critical institutions of power in Iran and displacing Khomeini’s true supporters. There is significant figure among the third generation of Tafkik scholars: Muhammad Reza Hakimi. In 1969, Grand Ayatollah Shaykh MohammedMuhsin Razi (1876–1969), popularly known as Aqa Bozorg-e Tihrani, qualified Hakimi to exercise ijtihad, but he never wore the common Ulama’s attire. He continued his professional life as a writer and researcher rather than a traditional seminary teacher. A prolific writer, Hakimi wrote extensively on the Tafkik school, hadiths, and biographies of great Shia scholars, relating

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Islamic teachings to society, politics, culture, and history, and Persian and Arabic poetry. This introduced the school to broader audiences including secular readers. As we have seen, the journey of philosophy in hawza has experienced highs and lows. There have been mujtahids promoting philosophy in one or more schools, while there were others equating philosophy with antireligionism. Although the advocates of textualism attack philosophy and Sufism equally, there have been historical moments when Sufi mujtahids join textualists to denounce philosophy. The varieties of approaches are not just in different cities and hawzas but also within particular hawzas. I had a teacher who once said that Allama Majlisi’s magnum opus Bihar al-Anwar (Seas of Lights) includes many species of poisonous snakes. The same is true with regard to hawza and philosophy: there exist many enlightened and liberal Ulama along with many dangerous textualists and anti-rationalists. Being a qualified mujtahid does not entail any essentialism or any single identification with any established and lasting tradition. Regarding hukama mujtahids, this principle extends to attire, which may vary. If dynamism is associated with ijtihad, it is compatible with regard to philosophy and Sufism too. NOTES 1. See Sayed Hassan Akhlaq, “The Tradition of Rationality in Islamic Culture,” in The Secular and The Sacred: Complementary and/or Conflictual?, John P. Hogan and Sayed Hassan Akhlaq eds. (The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2017), pp. 761-776. 2. To see English excerpts from Mulla Sadra’s philosophical text, see “Mulla Sadra on Divine Speech and Attributes” in Islamic Theological Themes: A Primary Source Reader, John Renard (ed.) (University of California Press, 2014), pp. 205-209; “Mulla Sadra on Forgiveness,” ibid, pp. 395-399; Jane Dammen McAuliffe, The Norton Anthology of World Religion: Islam (W.W. Norton & Company, 2015), pp. 453-456. 3. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Islam: Religion, History and Civilization (Lahore: Suhail Academy, 2005), pp. 170-172. 4. Manuchihr Saduqi Saha, Tarikh Hukama va Urafa-e Muta’akhir (Tahrir-e Sani) (Tehran: Hikmat, 1381/2002), p. 286. 5. Interestingly, a tradition of moderate Shia can be traced through the history of Ulama who dedicated their scholarship around Nahj al-Balaghah. Rasul Jafarian tackled this tradition among Ulama across Iraq and Iran during the tenth to thirteenth centuries (Rasul Jafariyan, The History of Shiism in Iran: From the Beginning to the Establishment of the Safavid Rule (Tehran: Nashr-e Ilm, 1388/2009), pp. 677-688). The renowned disciple of Quashqa’i, Haj Aqa Rahim Arbab, continued the tradition of commentary on Nahj al-Balaghah and moderate Shi’ism. His student HussainAli Muntazeri (1922–2009), one of the leaders of the Iranian Revolution, represented the same tradition of commentary and moderate Shi’ism.

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6. Saduqi Saha, Ibid, 323-346. 7. Judith Pfeiffer, “Abd-al-jawad Falaturi,” in Iranica (available at https://www​ .iranicaonline​.org​/articles​/falaturi). 8. To learn about him, see “The Islamic traditionalist position of Abdullah Jawadi-Amuli” in Islamic Law, Epistemology and Modernity Legal Philosophy in Contemporary Iran, by Ashk Dahlen (Routledge, 2015), pp. 126-142. 9. Mahdi Elahi Qumshei, Hikmat Elahi: Am va Khas, (Tehran: Islami, 1363/1985), Vol. 2, p. 322. Different versions of this hadith are narrated by multiple hukama. According to grand Ayatollah Fayz Kashani, someone spoke about Aristotle before the Prophet. The Prophet said if Aristotle lived until the Prophet’s time and learned his teachings, he would follow the religion of the Prophet (see all hadiths collected by Shahram Pazuki, “Arastuye Musalman,” in Nameh Mufid. (Qum: Mufid University, 1386/2008), Vol. 3, No. 2, p. 141). 10. Louis Medoff, “Mohammad-Hosayn Tabataba’i,” in Iranica (Available at https://www​.iranicaonline​.org​/articles​/tabatabai​-mohammad​-hosayn). 11. Sayed Musa Shubairi Zanjani, Jor’a-e az darya (A Drop of the Sea) (Qum: Muassisa-e Kitabshinasi-e Shi'a, 1389/2010), Vol. 3, pp. 608-9. 12. Shubairi Zanjani, Jor’a-e az darya, Vol. 3, p. 612. 13. See Mahdi Haeri’s interview available at The Centre for The Great Islamic Encyclopedia’s website, https://www.cgie.org.ir/fa/news/129771/‫فلسفه‬-‫درباره‬-‫یزدی‬-‫حائری‬-‫مهدی‬-‫دیدگاه‬. 14. Sayed Muhammad Husayn Husayni Tihrani, Mihr-e Tabnak (Tehran: Maktabe Wahy, 1392/2013) p. 105. 15. Muhammad Husayn Gharawi Kampani, Divan-e Kampani (Tehran: Dal alKutub al-Islamiyyah, 1367), p.7. 16. Sayed Muhammad Husayn Husayni Tihrani, Ruh-e Mujjarrad (Mashhad: Allama Tabataba’i publication, 1425/2004), p. 126. 17. To read an excerpt from Falsafatuna, see Shi’ism: Doctrines, Thought, and Spirituality, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Hamid Dadashi, and Seyyed Vali Nasr (eds.) (State Univeristy of New York Press, 1988), pp. 380-386. Another piece of his philosophical thought appears in: Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Hamid Dadashi, and Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr (eds.), Expectation of the Millennium: Shi’ism in History (State University of New York Press, 1989), pp. 407-424. 18. Rumi, The Mathnawi of Jalal ud-din Rumi, Reynold Alleyne Nicholson, trans & ed. (Tehran: Booteh, 2002), 6:2356-8. 19. Sayed Ali Khamene’i, Pishvaye Sadiq (Tehran: Daftar-e Nashr-e Farhang-e Islami, 1386). 20. Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, Carol Volk trans., (Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 172. He also says, “the distinction between mullahs and intellectuals was not as sharp in Iran as in the Sunni world” (Ibid, p. 174). 21. Muhammad Ali Mawlawi, “Ayatullah,” in The Great Islamic Encyclopedia (Tehran: The Center for the Great Islamic Encyclopedia, 1367). Vol. 1. 22. Andrew Newman in Sufism and anti-Sufism in Safavid Iran: the Authorship of the Ḥadīqat al-Shi'a revisited, Iran 37 (1999) pp. 95-108, holds the text (or at the very least the anti-Sufi part) was actually written by the famous anti-Sufi polemicist Muḥammad Tahir Qummi (d. 1098/1687), who may well have used the prestige of

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Ardabili to author the text. Regardless, its inclusion here does not disrupt our discussion of the anti-philosophy arguments among mujtahids. 23. Ahmad Muqqaddas Aldabili, Hadiqat al-Shia, Sadiq Hasannezad and Aliakbar Zamaninezad eds. (Qum: Ansariyan, 1378/2000) pp. 752-754. 24. To read scripts from Imam Sajjad and Sahifa Sajjadiya see: Jane ­Dammen McAuliffe, The Norton Anthology of World Religion: Islam (W.W. Norton & ­Company, 2015), pp. 382-388. 25. Muhammad Taqi Majlisi, Radd-e Mazhab-e Hukama (Mashhad: Itiqad-e ma, 1397/2018), pp. 52-53. 26. Mulla Muhammad Tahir Qumi, Radd’e Sufiya, Reza Mukhtari Khu’i ed. (Mashhad: Itiqad-e ma, 1397/2018), pp. 6-7. 27. Sayed Muhammad Husayn Husayni Tihrani, Mihr-e Tabnak (Tehran: Maktabe Wahy, 1392/2013), p. 94. 28. Husayni Tihrani, Mihr-e Tabnak, pp. 342-343; Astan Quds Razawi, Ustad: 100 riwayat az zandegi-e ayatollah Sayed Ali Qazi, Muhammad Javad Miri ed. (Mashhad: Institute for Youth Counseling Services and Social Research, 1399/2020), p. 92. 29. Murtaza Miraji, “Setiz-e bi-payan-e fuqaha va fulasifa bar bastar-e da’waye naql va aql (Unending fight between jurists and philosophers in the context of revelation and reason,” in Mubahithat (Qum, 1397/2018), No. 18, p.43. 30. Husayni Tihrani, Ruh-e Mujjarrad (Mashhad: Allama Tabataba’i publication, 1425/2004) p. 679. 31. Shubairi Zanjani, Jor’a-e az darya, Vol. 2, p. 541. 32. Sayed Abul Fazl Musaviyan, “Both Revolutionary and Khurasani Tafkiki school Ignored Him,” in Mubahithat (Qum, 1395/2016), No. 9, p. 30. 33. Shubairi Zanjani, Jor’a-e az darya, Vol. 2, p. 669. 34. Ibid, Vol. 4, p. 633. 35. Ruhollah Khomeini, Sahifeh Imam (A collection of Imam Khomeini’s Work) (Tehran: Moassisa-e Tanzim va nashr-e athar Imam Khomeini, 1378/1999), Vol. 21, p. 279. 36. Ibid. 37. Ibid. 38. Shubairi Zanjani, Jor’a-e az darya, Vol. 3, p. 644. 39. Shubairi Zanjani, Jor’a-e az darya, Vol. 2, p. 667. 40. Although this book attacks the Shah’s government on the grounds of its injustice, tyranny, and secularization, Khomeini does not reject monarchy. Also, see Moojan Momen, An Introduction to Shi’i Islam (Yale University Press, 1985), p. 195. 41. Shubairi Zanjani, Jor’a-e az darya, Vol. 3, p. 481. 42. Paya, Islam, Modernity, and a New Millennium, 124. 43. Ali Paya, Islam, Modernity and a New Millennium: Themes from a Critical Rationalist Reading of Islam (Routledge, 2018), pp. 130-132. 44. Quoted in Ibid, 125. 45. Hadi Vakili, “Tarikhche Maktab-e Tafkik,” in Kitab-e Naqd (Tehran: ­Pazuheshgah-e farhang va andishe Islami, 1392/2013), No. 65 & 66, p. 11.

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46. To learn more about how this school challenges the current theological tradition of Qum Hawza, see Sajjad H. Rizvi, “‘Only the Imam Knows Best:’ The Maktabe Tafkik’s Attack on the Legitimacy of Philosophy in Iran,” in Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (Cambridge University Press, 2012), Vol. 22, No. ¾, pp. 487-503. 47. Hadi Vakili, Ibid, 18.

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Modernization and the West

I knew an Afghan Iranian ayatollah who ran multiple madrasas and did not allow his seminarians to study in adult public schools, or even to do homeschooling with the regular public school curriculum. He had the habit of condemning his seminarians, even in public, if they put on a collared shirt. Once he held the collar of a talaba’s shirt, crying, “why has he put a fox’s tale on his shirt?” Despite this staunch traditionalism, he drove a car and used a loudspeaker to preach. To him, a nonreligious school curriculum and collared shirts were incompatible with seminarian etiquette because they echo Western styles. Driving a car and using a loudspeaker, however, was not, because these were new technologies. The same ambiguity appeared when in madrasa I heard the chancellor warning tullab not to wear watches on their wrists. He produced his own watch from his pocket and advised his students to follow in this fashion. Turning one’s hand to look at a watch was contradictory to a seminarian’s style; it echoes the Western style. Watches should not be decorations or distractions, only timekeeping devices. What appears under critical scrutiny to be a double standard was harmonious in the common sense of the masses. Mujtahids are proud of studying and developing fiqh, and fiqh takes pride in its common sense, for and with the masses. Fiqh, the vital source of ijtihad, has a double dimension: it is both sacred and secular. It is sacred because it originates from and is centered on divine laws. But it is also secular, not just because human reasoning leaves its mark on the deduced law, but because the mechanism of deduction and application is subject to common sense.1 In other words, it is much less abstract than philosophy, less absolutist and sublime than Sufism, more concrete and down to earth than theology (kalaam), and less merciful than ethics (akhlaq), though more present in the life of common Muslims. This dynamism provides fiqh with great opportunities and challenges. All of these opportunities and 199

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challenges appear with regard to modernization. Modernization is not just using modern technologies, the scientific method, and lifestyle. It involves reflecting on modernity and making accommodations with modernity’s intellectual, societal, political, and economic aspects. But modernity was not perceived first of all as something familiar or vital. Modernity was associated with the West, the other, the stranger. Thus, modernization was echoing Westernization. In most Islamic countries, it was viewed as copying and following the Western, non-Muslim world. For mujtahids who considered themselves the guardians of the faith and religious identity, this was challenging. They doubted whether it fit with religious life. What motivates people to welcome it, and what does it do to sacred history? In contrast, there were always mujtahids who wanted to overcome the dichotomy of the self and the other. Believing in pluralism or inclusivism, they were eager to discover the beauty in others and see divinity everywhere. They celebrated people anywhere and everywhere who were created with a nature inclined toward goodness and divinity (fitra). For example, Qazi loved the Gospel of Barnabas and recommended his students read it.2 His disciple Allama Tabataba’i held the inspiring belief that the Upanishads include teachings of tawhid and were written in part by the friends of God who had their share of the walayat of God.3 Borujerdi once said that Akhbaris were influenced by empiricist philosophers, so their fight against Usulis was a sort of fight between empiricists and rationalists in an Islamic context. Olivier Roy asserts that ayatollahs “are great readers, including of Marx and Feuerbach.” Comparing Shia clergy with their Sunni peers, he concludes, “There is something of the Jesuit or Dominican in them.” Ayatollahs are “incontestably more open to the non-Islamic corpus” and opened their madrasas to these external works far earlier than did Sunnis. Their twofold culture is striking: highly traditionalist, and yet very open to the modern world; behind the legalism lies philosophical thought.4 This gives them flexibility, if circumstances permit. For example, grand Ayatollah Kashif al-Ghita (1743–1812), during the time that Nicolaus Copernicus’ model of the universe was being introduced in Islamic societies, wrote al-Fard fi Ithbat Sukun al-Ard (Proving the Theory of Fixed Earth). When the Copernican theory became dominant, he wrote a new volume, al-Fard fi Ithbat Harakat al-Ard (Proving the Theory of Moving Earth). He based both these works on the Quran and Sunnah.5 However, grappling with modernity was linked to engaging with the West and modernization. In other words, the question of modernism was a question of Westernization. Many factors including the following determined the position of a mujtahid on the West and modernization: the philosophical and theological background of the mujtahid; when and how he learned about the West; his regional context; and his degree of direct exposure to Western thought, systems, or policies. Thus, mujtahids in Iraq, Iran, and India, for

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example, made differing contributions to the topic.6 I have limited this study to Iranian mujtahids to provide a window into the subject.

FOUR PHASES OF MEETING Many scholars, including Faridun Adamiyat, Dr. Ali Shari'ati, Abd alHadi Haeri, and Hamid Algar, have argued that Iranian mujtahids had no clear understanding of modernity and the West until the twentieth century. Although this is a generalization, it makes an important point about the first phase of encounters. I have modeled this section on a considerable elaboration done by Hassan Yusufi Ishkavari. He distinguishes four phases of approaches to the West and modernization by mujtahids: before al-Afghani; from al-Afghani to constitutionalism; after constitutionalism up to the Islamic Revolution; and after the Islamic Revolution. Starting in the Safavid period, Iranians became familiar with the West via political and economic exchanges, including tourism. Safavid kings were eager to receive European support in their competition with the Ottomans. This paved the first path to mujtahids’ approach to the West. In this phase, mujtahids looked at the West and their culture and science and technology through the lens of evangelism. In their view, the West was an “other” committed to spreading Christianity. Since they had no concept of imperialism, Ulama did not even link evangelism with imperialism. A clear reductionism was dominant, and their approach to the West was entirely reactionary. Subsequently, their works were focused on defending Islam before Christianity and proving that the opposing faith is wrong. The growth of Akhbarism is seen as a reaction to the West.7 This other was suspicious, potentially a thief looking to steal Muslims’ faith and identity. This other’s culture, technology, and science are equally untrustworthy. This reductionism and passive approach continued after the Safavids and the Akhbaris as well. The wars between Iran and Russia in the Qajar era introduced the political aspect.8 They inspired some mujtahids to issue the fatwa of jihad and even to personally participate in jihad, or issue fatwas on using the new technology of war. Still, the core concern was evangelism, and well-known mujtahids like Mirza Qumi and Ahmad Naraqi wrote about it. Many treatises referred to nowadays as “jihadiyya” (“On Jihad”) were published. In Religion and State in Iran 1785–1906, Algar argues that in approaching political aims, Ulama had some trivial success in achieving their short-term goals, but no lasting achievements due to a lack of bravery and refusal to make major decisions involving predicting the future and the consequences of their actions. The Russo-Persian Wars and the Tobacco Protest of 1891 are clear examples of this. This religious suspicion followed by military confrontation made an

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impact on subsequent approaches to the West and modernity. For example, for more than a century, learning foreign languages has been viewed negatively, as an assimilation of Muslims to infidel cultures, even in seminaries.9 In addition, condemning the use of new and modern devices or traditions became part of the haram list promoted particularly by middle- and lower-level Ulama. Mizan Online New Agency, media outlet of the Iranian judiciary, once published many humorous fatwas issued from Qajar times forward. All shared in fighting against things new and strange. The list includes the use of tap water, taking showers, electric lights, sugarloaf, washing machines, and sturgeon. Eventually, it spread to more public affairs like vaccination, quarantine, conscription, and registration for a national ID, which required releasing the names of female household members. Mulla Ali Kani,10 the greatest mujtahid of Tehran, issued a fatwa against Belgians building a railroad in Tehran due to the fear that foreigners will come and harm the faith.11 This skepticism of new phenomena could include new or even opposing ideas. As Algar argues, Takfir (declaring an opponent or enemy to be an infidel) was a coercive weapon used not only in the controversies that pitted the main body of the mujtahids against the Akhbaris and the Shaykhis, but also in the nineteenth century against reformers and innovators such as Fath Ali Akhundzada and Mirza Rushdiya, though its implication was not always clear.12 This tradition of Takfir against modernists and innovators has continued to the present time. The second phase of encounters is centered on al-Afghani and the Iranian constitutional movement. In this phase, the meeting of Islam and the West transforms into a creative dialogue with a focus on political modernity. While the previous Ulama had a holistic, skeptical, and reductionist perspective, mujtahids in this phase were more creative and eager to better understand the West and not confuse its diverse aspects. Differentiating imperialism from other dimensions of Western civilization gave these Ulama the chance to engage in some self-reflection. They acknowledged that Muslim societies are in crisis due to a lack of self-realization, though imperialism deepened this crisis. While earlier Ulama either did not acknowledge the crisis or attributed it to foreigners, these Ulama, including Naini and Akhund Khurasani, admitted it and recommended a religious enlightenment or self-reform. Their path was linked to constitutionalism to limit despotism. These Ulama went even further, arguing that political modernity and elements like the rule of law, parliament, liberty, and equality had roots in Islam, as we have seen. They thought that acquiring modern sciences was a great way to fight against imperialism. However, there were opposing mujtahids like Nuri, who considered all these ideas heresies and tools of Western hegemony. The failure of constitutionalism isolated the progressive mujtahids. Not only did Naini lose the chance to become a prominent marja

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after Akhund Khurasani, it is said he gathered his books and threw them into the sea. However, his ideas persisted, and many later Ulama up to the present day continued to seek the Islamic roots of the modern institutions of politics. A scholar once asked Ayatollah Khamenei about his support of democracy (mardumsalari). Was it introducing a new idea, reacting to the modern West, or reviving an old concept in Islam? Khamenei replied it is a revival of the old Islamic concept of enjoining good and avoiding evil.13 Scholars have tracked the impact of Naini on many current Ulama on the subject of republicanism.14 Another of Naini’s lasting impacts was inspiring mujtahids to ponder modern developments in the social sciences and humanities. He taught that Ulama needed not only to consider new developments in scholarship but also to communicate, review, and respond to a new phenomenon called “intellectuals” (roshanfikran or monawwarulfikran). This tradition of responding to intellectuals developed in the past century and went in three directions: cooperation between Ulama and intellectuals; opposing intellectuals as a Westernized group; and the appearance of a new phenomenon Nawandishan-e Dini (religious new thinkers). In the next phase, we will see Ulama who embraced new theories in biology, astronomy, economics, sociology, and psychology and accordingly reintroduced religious concepts. There were of course also anti-constitutionalists, including Fazlullah Nuri, who tried to maintain a bulwark against strangers and foreign ideas and campaigned aggressively against constitutionalism and political modernization. After the failure of constitutionalism and related heated debates, Ulama mostly sat by silently for three decades and took a passive position toward modernization. This third phase began with reticence but later turned to activism. Many mujtahids were simply dedicated to religious conservatism and did not pay attention to modernization. But others did. Ayatollahs Kashani and Taliqani, although they did not suggest new theories or ideologies, were often sympathetic to the West and did not promote anti-West beliefs. In addition, they remained opposed to imperialism and international interventionism, no matter from Eastern Marxism or Western capitalism. Later this moderate political modernization within Ulama led to a revolutionary and anti-Western movement in the following generation under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini, leading to the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Reza Shah’s indifference15 to religious sensitivities, his failure to support democracy, and the rise of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are considered the main engines that drove moderate political Ulama in an anti-West direction. This cause was marshaled by Khomeini, who declared that Ulama accept the positive aspects of Western civilization (science and technology) but fight against the intellectual, political, economic, and military hegemony of the West. Therefore, the intellectual aspects of the West were condemned as Westernization, and modernists were decried as Westernized. Instead, Ulama are to promote

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Islamic government, which replaces all humanistic ideologies with a perfect and pure Islam. Here, modernization means Islamization—taking Western hardware (e.g., science, technology, and political structure) but adding Islamic software, filling it with Islamic content. However, some clergy contributed to legal and social modernization. They wrote books on the compatibility of Islam and human rights. Murtaza Mutahhari wrote on hijab to address modern concerns about wearing hijab while existing as a social being.16 Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr suggested an Islamic economic system.17 Allama Tabatabai’i, Mutahhari, Jafar Subhani, and Nasir Makarim Shirazi responded to Western philosophies and paved the path for a modern theology in Islam. This last mujtahid acted as editor-in-chief of a huge volume of commentary on the Quran written in simple language. Grand Ayatollah Shari’at Madari founded Dar al-Tabligh Islami (House of Spreading Islam) to modernize tullab.18 This center taught seminarians foreign languages and modern sciences, funded international travel, translated European texts into Persian, invited foreign scholars, and supported international cultural exchange. Ayatollah Muhammad Hosseini Beheshti (1928–1981), who possessed outstanding organizational skills, built Haqqani madrasa to modernize hawza, and a few grand ayatollahs supported him. Ayatollah Ali Mishkini (1921–2007) wrote a book to demonstrate that Darwinian evolution does not contradict the Quran. Ayatollah Muhammad Taqi Falsafi (1908–1998) used psychological references in his preaching. Others tried to illustrate how compatible Islam is with modern science. A sophisticated area of controversy was public education. Maraji' took different positions in terms of modern public schools. Most maraji' in Najaf including Naini reacted negatively. Although grand Ayatollah Abul-Hasan Isfahani did not join in this pessimism, the climate was sufficiently fraught that a great mujtahid like Muhammad Kazim Shirazi became isolated for sending his children to a modern school.19 Mirza Hassan Rashidiyyah (1851– 1944) was a seminarian who introduced some modern teaching methods in Iran and also founded the first modern school in Tabriz and the second in Tehran. He was denounced as an infidel by the Ulama in these cities, and at least one of his schools was destroyed by a mob of tullab, arguing that it would bring about a weakening of religious faith. They angrily called the school’s bell a “church bell.” Algar considers the opposition of many of the Ulama to his school as a defense of their traditional privileges and functions.20 Nevertheless, for the past decade of his life, Rashidiyyah moved to Qum and enjoyed the support of the head of Qum Hawza, grand Ayatollah Haeri, to build a modern school and continue his educational activity there. Rashidiyyah was the only talaba who attended Haeri’s course wearing a hat.21 Haeri’s attitude toward Rashidiyya reveals the multifaceted aspects of how the institution of marja’iyya works.

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Although fiqh has an adjustable nature, the real adjustment comes from the mujtahid or marja who leads the scholarship or the hawza at any given time. This individual-centric rather than institution-oriented nature collides with the dynamism of the discipline itself. One can imagine that in the long history of Shia, being a marginalized minority contributed to the internalization of conservatism in fiqh and the institution of marja’iyyah. Thus, our survey of ayatollahs and modernization is limited to a few individuals. Even still, sometimes the brave ayatollahs who faced modernization did not share their reasons for advocating or rejecting a concept. Their common reply is that they do not see it as beneficial (maslahat). Haeri did not agree with Ulama who called for cancellation of conscription into the armed forces introduced by Reza Shah in 1925. The Shah’s regime was secular. Two years of obligatory service in the armed forces could impact the future and faith of Shia youth coming from villages and small cities. It was believed some Ulama lost their lives because of their protests against conscription.22 Reza Shah also mandated that hawza administer an annual exam to all tullab to clarify who is qualified to dress like Ulama and is exempt from conscription. Haeri saw the exam as a reform to examine who is qualified to receive a stipend and who is not. The tradition remained after Haeri and still operates in hawza. Borujerdi tried to institute the tradition in Najaf Hawza to determine the seminarians qualified for the stipend. But the seminarians did not like the exams and went to a marja in Najaf, arguing that exams changed the nature of hawza. In their view, administering exams means making hawza into a bureaucratic institution that churns out bureaucrats to serve in offices, not Ulama to serve the faith. The marja was convinced by their argument and announced that attending Borujerdi’s exam was haram. Borujerdi canceled the exam out of concern for maslaha.23 Borujerdi also did not protest against the execution of the head and members of the Fada’iyan-e Islam (Self-Sacrificers of Islam) in 1955. This was an Iranian Shia Islamist group that aimed to purify Islam by assassinating certain corrupt leading intellectuals and political figures. Borujerdi stood for the law, believing that violating the law, even secular law, causes the country to drift away from order. He also viewed Islamism among tullab as an obstacle to educational focus.24 Borujerdi had moved from Borujerd to Qum and did not know many people in the new city. It happened that there were several corrupt Ulama in his office whom he did not know well. Ayatollah Zanjani believed that while Borujerdi wanted to make some reforms in hawza, he ultimately gave up because of backstabbing within his office against Ulama who recommended the reforms. The same thing happened with regard to a great alim from Hamadan.25 However, a few madarasas did introduce their own style of reform. A well-known example is the Haqqani Seminary founded in 1964 in Qum by

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modernist ayatollahs including Taliqani, Misbah Yazdi, Mishkini, Qoddosi, and Beheshti. After these last two ayatollahs were assassinated in 1981, the seminary changed its name to Shahidain (Two Martyrs) Seminary. It had the support of grand Ayatollah Milani as well. Its aim was to reform the curriculum of hawza, specifically to give increased attention to philosophy. Thus, Allama Tabataba’i wrote two volumes of Islamic Philosophy as textbooks, Bidayat al-Hikmah (The Beginning of Wisdom) in 1970 and Nihayat al-Hikmah (The End of Wisdom) in 1975. The seminary is described as “a kind of Ecole Nationale d’Administration for the Islamic Republic” whose alumni constitute the backbone of the clerical management class that runs Iran’s critical political, legal, and even security institutions.26 Dealing with nonreligious sciences and problems including philosophy, the humanities, and the social sciences put schools like Haqqani in the position to be able to deal with intellectuals, even religious ones outside of the hawza context. Dr. Ali Shari’ati illustrates this case. Ali Shari’ati’s (1933–1977) case represents a triple position: disliked by traditionalist Ulama, admired by modernist Ulama, and influential across the spectrum of Ulama in his time and beyond. Shari’ati, the son of a reformist alim was a sociologist who wanted to modernize Islam to allow it to respond to dominant ideologies like Marxism, capitalism, and existentialism. He reviewed Islamic history, teachings, and rituals and reframed them as tools to fight imperialism, despotism, prejudice, and poverty. As much as his modernizing project (which involved examining the history of Islam and undertaking modernizing efforts in Islam) appealed to reformist Ulama, including many in the Haqqani circle, his radical criticism of established Islam was a bitter pill for traditionalist mujtahids to swallow. The most controversial issue was Shari’ati’s sharp criticism of hawza ilmiya. He praised Ulama for living humbly and gaining broad respect from the masses, the critical debates they undertake, their life-long dedication to scholarship and social service, their historical independence from governments, their anti-imperialist character, and their service to poor and underprivileged peoples. But his criticisms were stark and harsh. In his view, Ulama made themselves into an illegal medium between God and the people—an imitation of Catholicism that has no root in Islam. This problem emerged when the alim (scholar) transformed into holy man (ruhani) and a scholar of Islam became primarily an expert in jurisprudence (faqih). Shari’ati also believed the curriculum of hawza did not meet the needs of time, ignoring the spirt of Islam, Islamic history, the objectives of Shari'a, and the Muslim community. It led to dogmatism and a preference for ritual over function and objectives. Shari’ati called out mujtahids for their quietism. They travel among Najaf, Qum, and Mashhad to do their business under the shadow of dictatorial regimes. Ulama’s link to the people turned them into populists, he said, and their link

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to the market (bazar) made them tradesmen. Many traditional but established maraji' like Khoei, Najafi Mar’ashi, Shahrudi, Abdullah Shirazi, Hassan Qumi, and Sadiq Ruhani declared Shari’ati’s books misleading, and their circulation was haram. But reformist Ulama in Haqqani did not denounce Shari’ati harshly. Although there were those who hated him, they did not say so out of expediency (maslahat). Despite many requests to do so, Khomeini did not give voice to a negative perspective about Shari’ati. Algar suggests a synthesis offered by Khomeini: a mujtahid must consider that statements by previous mujtahids are not perfect, and that Shari’ati’s followers must study traditional Islam in depth. Subsequently, the modernist mujtahids took the example of Shari’ati to explore their path of modernizing Islam from within. They took two core ideas from Shari’ati: Islam is a religion of revolution and politics,27 and Islam can replace all other ideologies. Thus, their modernizing paradigm went in the direction of Islamization and exclusivism after the Islamic Revolution. The small gap between this paradigm and totalitarianism was bridged when moderate Haqqanis like Beheshti were assassinated and extremists like Misbah Yazdi dominated the discourse after Ayatollah Khomeini.

TRANSFORMING FIQH Khomeini was an amalgamation of two trends who aligned one aspect of each type with an opposing quality and thus created an unprecedented phenomenon: being a traditionalist mujtahid but promoting modernization in both hawza and society. Khomeini was a member of a small committee of Ulama who asked Borujerdi to reform hawza.28 Khomeini also disapproved of Nawab Safawi, the head of Fada’iyan-e Islam.29 Simultaneously, Khomeini was a modernist mujtahid who emphasized studying the old curriculum of jurisprudence and calling its opponent “Americanized lslam.” Khomeini did not just tolerate Shari’ati but took great advantage of the passion Shari’ati created among urban white-collar Muslim intellectuals and then linked it to rural and blue-collar workers. Khomeini aligned two paths of modernizing: individual and institutional. The opportunity to lead the government gave Khomeini the chance to initiate them through political power. As a marja, Khomeini coined the term Jawahiri fiqh (jurisprudence based on Jawahir). It refers to a distinguished volume, Jawahir al-kalam, used in hawza. Jawahir is a comprehensive jurisprudential encyclopedia written by Shaykh Muhammad Hassan Najafi (1787–1850), known as Sahib al-Jawahir, as a commentary on Muhaqqiq Hilli’s (d. 1277) Shari’a al-Islam, a long-time textbook in fiqh. Khomeini’s reference to the volume illustrates his desire to run the country based on classic fiqh. Yet, Khomeini stressed the need to

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observe expediency (maslahat) and to take into consideration the time and environment. Said Hajjariyan calls Khomeini a transition jurist who evolved from a classic (jawaheri) stance on fiqh to an expedient jurisprudence. Two factors made this transition possible: Khomeini’s charisma and his merger of Shia jurisprudence with politics. The state system projects its requirements onto the system of jurisprudence. In particular, the modern state is associated with secularization, which translates into maslahat in jurisprudential terminology. Under the theory of absolute jurist guardianship, wilayat reflects sovereignty which has no conflict with the modern state. When fiqh is transformed into law, the jurist guardianship changes to sovereignty of law and the jurisprudential system to a system of secular law. Khomeini considered maslaha like a commonwealth,30 and the first priority of the commonwealth was protecting the Islamic system. Khomeini said that protecting the Islamic government is the highest obligation (awjab al-wajibat). Hajjariyan believes that Khomeini, as a mujtahid who undertook the establishment of an Islamic government, had three options when he took power. He could stress the classical fiqh, which leads to ignoring real-life circumstances; he could limit fiqh to the sphere of personal and private life, rather than only public life which was not constant with Khomeini’s perspective; or he could introduce a commonwealth jurisprudence. Hajjariyan examines five cases to underscore the transition. Khomeini, like other Shia mujtahids, left it to judges how to apply ta’zir (punishment for offenses) in his jurisprudential work before the establishment of the revolutionary government. But he changed his mind when he came to power, because he saw that law could not remain unspecified. The traditional jurists in the Council of Guardians disagreed with him and engaged in debate. After some exchanges of ideas, Khomeini referred them to another mujtahid, grand Ayatollah Muntazeri. In doing so, he highlighted the pluralism in fiqh to say the commonwealth is more important than a jurisprudential concept. Another example of changing his fatwa after the revolution regards the game of chess. Like the majority of Shia mujtahids, Khomeini had considered it haram, but he came to allow it if it is not a form of gambling. When criticized for this change, Khomeini cited an obscure concept in jurisprudence to justify his new fatwa. Khomeini also spread the power of the state over individual businesses, which received criticism from traditional mujtahids. However, Khomeini justified it with his commonwealth jurisprudence. He once said that classical jurisprudence is capable of responding constructively to suit current needs, and mujtahids must consider the requirements of time and environment. Many mujtahids of his time, including grand Ayatollah Gulpayegani, tried to convey to Khomeini that some of his positions were not consistent with classical or Jawahiri fiqh. But Khomeini did not change

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his ways, and to further institutionalize his commonwealth jurisprudence he initiated the Expediency Discernment Council in 1988, charged with the task of negotiating between classical jurists and the Iranian parliament in terms of the interests of the state.31 As will be addressed in the next chapter on politics and government, Khomeini’s modernized jurisprudence even led him to temporarily ban the hajj pilgrimage because it did not meet the needs of the commonwealth. His erstwhile like-minded mujtahids paid less attention to maslaha, considering it a practice of the Companions not endorsed by the Imams. Thus, as Moussavi concludes, the function of the Expediency Council may be regarded in effect as another type of ijtihad.32 Moussavi also argues Khomeini’s theory of jurist guardianship itself is a departure from classic fiqh. In the classic view, there is no role for the community in choosing their ruler, but under Khomeini’s theory an assembly of experts is authorized to determine the leader’s qualifications.33 One of Khomeini’s students, Ayatollah Salihi Najafabadi, also contributed to the modernization of fiqh. He was not afraid to express that the Islamic Revolution brought with it a slew of new social and legal challenges, requiring mujtahids to revise their views and introduce new ijtihad.34 He called for a brave ijtihad that addressed the real problems in the sociopolitical lives of Muslims.35 He suggested a concept of wilayat-e faqih consistent with elections, in which the jurist does not need to be the most knowledgeable. During the Iran-Iraq war, he discussed the issue of jihad in Islam and rejected the accepted idea that Muslims can initiate a jihad to spread the word of the faith.36 He wrote a letter to Khomeini encouraging him to accept peace with Iraq. He also wrote about freedom of expression and how an Islamic government is responsible for securing the freedom of dissent. In his view, universal and rational principles cannot be short-circuited by religious command. Ideals such as qualified leadership of the community and goodness of justice are absolute like mathematical maxims. In that spirit, Salihi reviewed the history of jurisprudence and assessed that jurisprudential arguments can’t ban women from the position of judge.37 But an even greater modernization in fiqh was driven by two other ayatollahs: HussainAli Muntazeri and Yusuf Saanei. Muntazeri’s turning point came with the publication of his Risala Huquq (Treatise of Rights). Traditional jurisprudence is focused on obligations and responsibilities of the faithful in terms of acts of worship (ibadat) and acts of interaction (mu’amilat). This means a good Muslim is one who is careful not to violate divine law. Because modern times focus on rights, Muntazeri wrote this seminal book to align fiqh with this reality and show that Islam can be in harmony with many modern laws. He added that observing human rights can improve both the individual and the society.38 Moreover, he argued

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that secular government can’t be counted as infidel government (hukumat-e kufr) or part of the House of Infidelity (Dar al-Kufr) as long as religious ideas are not discriminated against. In the jurisprudential view, a land is within the House of Islam (Dar al-Islam) as long as majority of the population is Muslim, regardless of whether the government is religious or nonreligious. The same is true regarding the House of Infidelity: if a majority of that land’s residents are non-Muslim, it is included in Dar al-Kufr regardless of the state’s religious posture. Muslim countries must maintain peaceful relations with non-Muslim countries, subject to considerations of the commonwealth of Islam and Muslims. If the commonwealth of Muslims requires, a Muslim country can even enter into a mutual defense treaty with infidels, as the Prophet did with some Jews. Keeping a promise in international contracts is wajib.39 Grand Ayatollah Sayed Ali Sistani, though he did not live in Qum or study before Khomeini, also addressed the dignity of humanity and the social contract. He proposed changing the jurisprudential principle of “rule of ilzam” (qaidata al-ilzam) to the “rule of respect” (qaidata ihtiram). The first principle assumes people locked in a Hobbesian state of conflict and war, which can only be addressed through a cold, formal legalism. The second says that mutual respect provides an alternative pathway to building a better society. In light of this revision, we can reframe jurisprudence on matters of human relations like marriage and divorce, as well as humanity’s balance with nonhuman animals and the natural world. The same is true with regard to government. Social peace comes through rational principles of maintaining public order. The constitution applies them through three branches of government, and it is a binding contract on all parties and thus religiously binding. Sistani looks at international relations in the same way and considers the United Nations religiously binding.40 With Sistani’s contributions, we can see that another form of modernizing jurisprudence came out of Najaf. But Khomeini’s disciples in Qum had more opportunities to modernize jurisprudence and respond constructively to modern achievements in the West. A loud and brave voice was grand Ayatollah Yusuf Saanei (1937–2020), whom Khomeini praised. He issued many new fatwas on inheritance, betting, races and gambling, halal meat, adoption, women’s issues, usury, music, and equal diya (blood money) between infidels and Muslims. However, attempts to modernize jurisprudence and hawza were not limited to individual ijtihad. Many modern institutions were built to administer these needs. Razavi University in Mashhad, Imam Sadiq University in Tehran, and Mufid University in Qum were established with the goal of making seminarians familiar with modern achievements in social sciences and humanities and to relate them to their society. While the first two universities have a more

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conservative character and the third a liberal character, all share in combining secular and sacred teachings to modernize jurisprudence and its students. Moreover, both Qum and Mashad Hawzas adapted their curriculum and educational system to meet modern needs in both content and structure. They also established an accreditation system to offer degrees to seminarians. The Iranian government also founded al-Mustafa University for non-Iranian seminarians to meet the specific desires of the native lands of these tullab. However, this process is not going smoothly. Many traditional mujtahids view these updates as destroying the nature of hawza, leaving it with neither future nor past. Grand Ayatollah Vahid once criticized the new system, saying that graduation from the school of Imam Sadiq (i.e., hawza) is meaningless. Some believed that the new era of seminarians merely pass through school, not understanding the textbooks. Trying to study large traditional textbooks in a couple of semesters, asking seminarians to write a thesis, navigating the credit system in education, and the like do not meet the historical and substantial goals of hawza to produce in-depth scholars dedicated to scholarship and deducing new law (exercising ijtihad).41 Some Ulama have expressed that hawza is suffering from a crisis of identity due to Iranian Islamic modernization. What seminarians learn in hawza does not fit with what the broader society desires. Even modern hawza can’t keep up with a rapidly modernizing society. The clash of values is manifested when the seminarian attempts to accommodate modernity while also nourishing tradition. We can see this ambiguity when we consider the confusion in intention when Ayatollah Khamenei referred to Daftar-e Tablighat, a new structure of Dar al-Tabligh after the Islamic Revolution, as a symbol of modern religious intellectualism (roshanfikri dini). Many understood it as a positive, but some found it negative.42 No one is really sure what he meant, since the nature of modernization remains enigmatic, though it is constantly encroaching. The concept of an Islamic modernization adds to the confusion. As Islamists, they want attempt to keep Islam as it is, though as modernists they also want to change and adapt to new developments. There are moments that the traditionalist and modernist play opposing roles in the course of developing their thought. For example, a traditional mujtahid welcomes science regardless of its outcome, but a modernist mujtahid remains skeptical of its ideology and warns against welcoming it uncritically. Grand Ayatollah Jawadi Amuli, a figure with a rich philosophical and mystical background, holds that scientific truths are not less true than revealed ones. Scientific achievements are as valid as the Quranic ones; both are divine, while neither enjoys more divinity. If there is a contradiction between a scientific finding and a Quranic statement, a believer must take the same approach as when they are faced with a superficial contradiction between two verses of the Quran.43 In contrast, a modernist like Ayatollah Mir Baqiri, the head of the

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Qum Academy of Islamic Studies, argues that Western experimental science in the West is ideological and projects a secularizing globalization with the aim of making people less religious. Finally, the issue of modernization is intertwined with many other forces that amplify its complexity. In addition to a mujtahid’s educational and political background as well as his personal experiences, there are very specific aspects to modernization. In one way or another it touches Westernization and secularization. On the one hand, it gives the process of modernization a political flavor, but on the other, it becomes controversial in an Islamic context. It also suggests a holistic approach to accepting or rejecting modernization entirely. In the end, there are two groups of mujtahids: minimalists and maximalists. The modernization minimalists focus their concern on madrasa curriculum, education structure and technology, preaching Islam, and communicating with the faithful. The maximalist approach modernizes hawza by taking into account the needs of the ummah in the current times and dealing with metanarratives. NOTES 1. To learn about the combination of secular and sacred in Shari'a law, see my work: “The Hermeneutic of Sacred and Secular in Shari'a,” in The Secular and the Sacred: Complementary and/or Conflictual?, John P. Hogan and Sayed Hassan Akhlaq eds. (The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2017), pp. 383-406. 2. Sayed Muhammad Husayn Husayni Tihrani, Mihr-e Tabnak (Tehran: Maktabe Wahy, 1392/2013) p. 313. 3. Allaama Sayed Muhammad Husayn al-Tabataba’i, Al-Mizan fi Tafsir al-Quran (Beirut: Moassisa al-alami lil-matbu’at, 1417/1997), Vol. 10, P. 280. Several volumes of English translation of Tabataba’i’s exegesis are available on The Internet Archive website. 4. Oliver Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, Carol Volk (trans.) (Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 172. 5. Sayed Yahya Yasrebi and Sayed Hassan Akhlaq, “Irfan wa Inkishaf,” in Siraj (Qum: Social and Cultural Center of Siraj), Vol. 14, No. 27, p. 264. 6. Even in the first phase of Ulama encountering the West, mujtahids who moved from Iran to India had a direct relationship with British people there and got a better understanding of the West. Their approach is more critical and constructive and sometimes positive (Hassan Yusufi Ishkawari, “Ruhaniyyat-e Shi’i wa Gharb,” in Kiyan, 1375, No. 35, p. 47). 7. Ishkawari, Ibid, p. 46. 8. Both the Russian occupation of some Iranian towns and al-Afghani were responsible for leading the Shia Ulama toward Pan-Islamism. It’s said “the mujtahids of Najaf addressed several telegrams to the Ottoman Sultan addressing him as Caliph of the Muslims and asking him to intervene in Iran against Muhammad Ali Shah and

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the Russains.” (Mojan Momen, An Introudction to Shi’i Islam (Yale University Press, 1985), p. 247). 9. Muhammad Rezai, “Riwayat-e Namayande Ayatullah Subhani az muwajihe ba nawandishan (The representative of Ayatullah Subhani’s account of encountering new-thinkers,” in Mubahithat (Qum, 1398/2019), No. 23, p. 53. 10. To read more about and from Mulla Ali Kani, see Hamid Dadashi (trans.), “An Exchange Between a Mujtahid and a Qajar Official,” in Authority and Political Culture in Shi’ism (State University of New York Press, 1988), pp. 320-333. 11. Jora, 3:308. 12. Hamid Algar, Religion and State in Iran 1785-1906: The Role of the Ulama Qajar Period (University of California Press, 1980), pp. 19-20. 13. Sayed abd al-Majid Ishkawari, “Mafhum-e ‘naw-andishi’ baraye jariyanhai hawzawi goya nist (The meaning of ‘new-thinking’ is not clear to the existing currents in hawza,” in Mubahithat (Qum, 1398/2019), No. 23, p. 62. 14. Ibid, 26 & 41. 15. While many Ulama, accused the Shah of indifference, there are scholars arguing he had his own plan to introduce a version of Islam constant with his ideology. See, Mojan Momen, An Introduction to Shi’i Islam, p. 256. 16. To review an excerpt from Mutahhari’s “Hijab” in English, see Murtaza Mutahhari, “On the Islamic Hijab,” in Contemporary debates in Islam: an anthology of modernist and fundamentalist thought, Mansoor Moaddel and Kamran Talattof (eds.) (Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp. 360-372. From his writings on Islamic Movements in the Twentieth Century, see Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Hamid Dadashi, and Seyyed Vali Nasr (eds.), Expectation of the Millennium: Shi’ism in History (State University of New York Press, 1989), pp. 402-408. 17. To review an excerpt from it, see Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Hamid Dadashi, and Seyyed Vali Nasr (eds.), Expectation of the Millennium: Shi’ism in History (State University of New York Press, 1989), pp. 117-125. 18. See Dar al-Tabligh class schedule (1974-75) in: Michael M. Fischer, Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution (Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 251. 19. Ali Ashraf Fathi, “Nukte-ye maghful-e modenizasiyun-e amuzeshi dar iran (The ignored subject in terms of educational modernization in Iran)” in Mubahithat (Qum, 1396/2017), No. 17, pp. 6. 20. Hamid Algar, Religion and State in Iran 1785-1906: The Role of the Ulama Qajar Period (University of California Press, 1980) p. 224. 21. Ali Ashraf Fathi, “Nukte-ye maghful-e modenizasiyun-e amuzeshi dar iran (The ignored subject in terms of educational modernization in Iran)” in Mubahithat (Qum, 1396/2017), No. 17, pp. 6-7. 22. Shubairi Zanjani, Jor’a, Vol. 2, pp. 497-498. 23. Ibid, Vol. 2, pp. 569-570. 24. Jora, 2:556. 25. Ibid, Vpl. 1, pp. 589-590. 26. Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival (W. W. Norton & Company, 2006), p. 215. Oliver Roy also suggests calling the Iranian Revolution a revolution of “hujjat al-islams, middle-ranking Ulama, rather than of ayatollahs, backed up by young Islamists of

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secular origin.” (Oliver Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, Carol Volk (trans.), (Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 174). Roy, in another book, explains the similar ­degradation of religious study in Sunni Islam, from Egypt to Pakistan and Afghanistan (Oliver Roy, Globalized Islam: the search for a new ummah (Columbia ­University Press, 2004), p. 158-166). 27. To learn details about Shari’ati’s project to transform the concept of Imamate and the event of Karbala into revolutionary ideas, see Najm Haider, Shi’i Islam An Introduction (Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 200-208; Michael M. Fischer, Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution (Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 164-170. This last source also includes a response from Ulama to Shari’ati. To read one of his works translated into English, see: Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Hamid Dadashi, and Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, Expectation of the Millennium: Shi’ism in History (State University of New York Press, 1989), pp. 388-401; Ali Shari'ati, “Critical Attitude toward the West and the Idea of Western Decadence” in Contemporary debates in Islam: an anthology of modernist and fundamentalist thought, Mansoor Moaddel and Kamran Talattof (eds.) (Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp. 315-324; Jane Dammen McAuliffe, The Norton Anthology of World Religion: Islam (W.W. Norton & Company, 2015), pp. 607-618. 28. Shubairi Zanjani, Jor’a, Vol. 1, p. 589. 29. Ibid, Vol. 2, p. 554. 30. Based on the political context of this chapter, I borrowed the term “commonwealth” from Said Hajjariyan as a synonym of maslaha. In other contexts, I have used the common translation of “public interest.” 31. Said Hajjariyan, Imam Khomeini: “Faqih-e dawran-e guzar az fiqh-e jawaheri to fiqh al-maslaha (Imam Khomeini: a jurist for transitional period from the fiqh of al-Jawahir to the fiqh of the public interests),” in Kiyan, 1378, No. 46, 26-37. 32. Crow and Moussavi, 20. 33. Ibid. 34. Nimatullah Salihi NajafAbadi, Qizawat-e zan dar fiqh-e islami hamrah ba chand maqala-e digar (Tehran: Omid-e frada, 1386), (2nd edition), p. 14. 35. Nimatullah Salihi NajafAbadi, Majmoe maqalat-e siyasi, tarikhi, wa ijtima’i (Tehran: Omid-e frada, 2014), (3rd edition), pp. 169-170. 36. Ayatullah Nematollah Salehi NajafAbadi, Jihad in Islam, Hamid Mavani (trans.) (Montreal: Organization for the Advancement of Islamic Knowledge and Humanitarian Services, 2012). 37. Nimatullah Salihi NajafAbadi, Qizawat-e zan dar fiqh-e islami hamrah ba chand maqala-e digar (Tehran: Omid-e frada, 1386), (2nd edition), pp. 17-18 & 44-45. 38. HussainAli Muntazeri, Risala Huquq, (Tehran: Saraei, 1394). Also see: Hoseyn Ali Montazari, “Religious Government and Human Rights (Hokumat-e dini va hoquq-e ensan),” Simon Wolfgang Fuchs (trans.), in Die Welt des Islams (Brill, 2012), Vol. 52, Issue 1, pp. 69-102. 39. HussainAli Muntazeri, Hukumat-e Dini (Tehran: Saraei, 1387), pp. 71-73. Also see: Hoseyn Ali Montazari, “Religious Government and Human Rights (Hokumat-e dini va hoquq-e ensan),” Simon Wolfgang Fuchs (trans.), in Die Welt

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des Islams (Brill, 2012), Vol. 52, Issue 1, pp. 69-102. To read about Muntazeri’s thoughts in English, see The Dissident Mullah: Ayatollah Muntazeri and the Struggle for Reform in Revolutionary Iran, by Ulrich von Schwerin (I. B. Tauris & Company, 2015). 40. Sayyid M. B. Kashmiri, The thought and methodology of grand ayatollah Sayyid Sistani, presented at the 36th annual meeting of the American Council for the study of Islamic Societies, Villanova, PA, March 20, 2021. Also, see, Amirhassan Boozari, “Concept of state in Shi’i jurisprudence,” in Routledge Handbook of Islamic Law, Khalid Aboy El Fadl, Ahmad Atif Ahmad, and Said Fares Hassan (eds.) (Routledge, 2019), pp. 374-388. 41. Mihrab Sadiqnia, “Rushanfikri be ma’anaye amash nawie gortabardari az gharb ast (Modern intellectualism is borrowed from the West),” in Mubahithat (Qum, 1398/2019), No. 23, pp 15-18. 42. Ibid, pp. 5 & 25-26. 43. Ibid, pp. 19-20.

Chapter 10

Politics and Government

My father, a religious leader and writer, was a muqallid (imitator) of Ayatollah Abu al-Qasim Khoei (1899–1992), a peer and rival of Ayatollah Khomeini. When I was young, he taught my sister and me Khoei’s Shari’a manual Minhaj-us-Salihin (The Path of the Righteous). But my father also loved Ayatollah Khomeini and taught another sister and brother Khomeini’s Shari’a manual Tahrir al-Wasilah (Exegesis of the Means [of Salvation]). We grew up learning different opinions on religious rituals through a comparison of these two grand ayatollahs. My father heard from students of both ayatollahs and many Ulama in Najaf that Ayatollah Khomeini was more pious (atqa) and Ayatollah Khoei the most learned (a’alam). Thus, he loved Khomeini for his piety and Khoei for his knowledge. As I grew older I came to understand that Iranian Islamic revolutionaries were not sympathetic toward Ayatollah Khoei because of his political views. This led me to explore the opposing ends in politics among the contemporary Shia mujtahids. The deeper one goes into the subject, the more one encounters a variety of overlapping and opposing viewpoints even within the ideas of a certain mujtahid during his span of scholarly production. Thus, the vital question emerges: why so many variations in these points of view? As we have seen, during the 250-year span of the Infallible Imams it is apparent that they gave Shia a vast dynamic of interpretations of the relationship between revelation and politics. On one hand, in addition to the Medinan period of the Prophet’s career, the life of Imams Ali, Hassan, Husayn, and Rida touched politics of their times in one way or another. Mahdi, in bringing peace and justice to the world, demonstrates a political idealism. This links five of twelve Imams closely with politics. However, most Imams did not participate in politics—a vital foundation for quietism. On the other hand, the political participation or lack of participation on the part of the Imams is still 216

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vulnerable to opposing interpretations. Econo-sociopolitical circumstances as well as the development of jurisprudence motivated mujtahids to orient themselves in one direction or another. As this study focuses on the jurisprudential aspect of intellectual Islam, which is the domain of ayatollahs, I’m not reviewing the theological (kalami), philosophical, and ethical (akhlaqi) dimensions of the issue in Shia.1 Surveying the history of jurisprudence and politics, we encounter five dominant responses to the issue.2 There is no consensus among mujtahids on which view is best.

SECLUSION AND QUIETISM The vital difference between Sunni and Shia Islam originates from their respective understanding of the nature of the faith. While the former approaches an egalitarian religiosity, the latter welcomes hierarchy. The egalitarian perspective of Sunnism resulted in the belief that all companions of the Prophet were just (adil) and paved the way for the idea that the Prophet did not appoint a successor but rather left it to the people to choose their leader—because the faithful ought to equally have the right to determine their leadership. This explains why philosophy and Sufism were less welcomed by the orthodoxy of Sunnism, because these two disciplines promote diversity and multiple layers of faith. The political aspect of the Sunni approach is a tilt toward secularism. Since this secularism occurs within the boundaries of Shari’a, it is at the same time sacred. This is why some scholars rightly call Islam an “egalitarian secular theocracy.”3 In contrast, the hierarchical nature of Shi’ism motivated Shias to divide the companions into just and unjust ones. Since the true level of spirituality and faith is unknown to the public, God left it to the Prophet to announce the most pious individual as his successor. These multiple layers of faith inspired the Shia to welcome philosophy and Sufism to help understand the various aspects of faith. The political aspect of this approach is a theocracy under rule of the Infallible Imam. But what if the Imam is in occultation? While the huge development of jurisprudence in later Shi’ism moved this denomination toward Islamic secularism, the earlier Shia fuqaha were more inclined toward seclusion and quietism. They tried to keep away from politics as much as possible. Their basic response to the established government and political systems was suspicious, since the Infallible Imam who deserves the right to rule is absent and the ruling authority is part of the reason why he is in occultation. Plus, these Ulama justified their position by appealing to verses of the Quran such as “Do not be inclined towards the unjust ones lest you will be afflicted by the hellfire. Besides God, no one can be your protector nor will anyone

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be able to help you (11:113).” There is a famous hadith reporting that Imam Sadiq said, “every flag that is risen before the appearance of Mahdi is raised by the taghut (evil) who do not worship God.” Problems like receiving gifts from kings, accepting ruling positions offered by kings, and supporting unjust rulers are addressed by many classic jurists. All problems were centered on protecting Shia life and identity. This political suspicion continued in relation to Ulama and Shia-like rulers as well. They did not justify their government but worked with them occasionally to guarantee the interests of the Shia population. Indeed, the element of interest and expediency (maslaha) inspired them to make accommodations rather than pursue solutions. For example, the outstanding earlier Shia Ulama like Shaykh Tusi, Shaykh Saduq, Shaykh Mufid, Sayed Murtada, and Sayed Radi had the same approach toward the Buyid dynasty (934–1062); or Khawja Nasir al-Din Tusi, Allama Hilli, and Sayed ibn Tawus toward Ilkhanids (1256–1335). Some Ulama took the same approach toward the Safavid dynasty (1501–1736).4 Despite a long and diverse journey of marrying politics and jurisprudence, there still are mujtahids who maintain the same approach of seclusion toward the modern state. Some scholars believe these mujtahids pay insufficient attention to the world of politics to consider the state and its meeting with jurisprudence. When the Infallible Imam is in occultation, the faithful must be sufficiently worried about their faith, leaving no time to concern themselves with the political order. They want only to save their faith without entering politics. If they discuss politics, they describe the time that the Imam appears and brings peace, security, and justice to the world. The Infallible Imam alone can implant the holy order where worldly and otherworldly happiness meet. Thus, these Ulama preferred to avoid dealings with different forms of de facto governments, regardless of claims of religiosity. The lack of interest in political order neither leads these Ulama to oppose the established political order nor encourages them to promote a particular structure of polity. Therefore, while they are equally neutral toward monarchy or republic, they care more about the function of the state with regard to Shari’a. Since they are concerned with religious practice, they ask the state, regardless of its nature and structure, to protect religious rights and if possible, to promote Shi’ism. Some religious rituals and practices were very significant for these ayatollahs including guarding the reputation of Muslims, fighting against anti-hijab currents, discouraging women’s work in public, promoting public safety, and preventing anti-Shia movements like Wahhabism. However, the faithful have no duty to establish a state or promote a particular structure when the Infallible Imam is in occultation. Surprisingly the greatest living ayatollah in Qum, Husain Vahid Khurasani, is in this camp along with his loyal students and some textualists.5

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COOPERATION WITH SHIA KINGS/SULTANS There is a long history of Shia mujtahids cooperating with the Shah/king in two different directions: to establish an Islamic government and to reap benefits from this cooperation for the interests of fellow Shias. The major difference is that the first approach attempts to justify the kingdom religiously and so strengthens the realms of power along with increase in religious function, while the second group desires a minimal relationship with the government. Some scholars went further, claiming that mujtahids like Allama Majlisi used an ancient Iranian concept of Divine glory (Khvarenah or Farre Izadi) to domesticize the justification. A study examining the position of Ulama during the Safavid period elaborated them into three groups with regard to their original base as follows: those who joined the Safavids from Jabl Amil, Lebanon, justifying the sultanate by jurisprudence (like Karaki); those who looked at the Safavids from Najaf and Bahrain and saw a government in the time of occultation as illegal and remained in seclusion (like Muqaddas Ardabili and Shaykh Ibrahim Sulaiman Qatifi, [d. 1543]);6 and those who originated in Iran, justifying the sultanate and considering the king as the shadow of God (like Muhammad Baqir Majlisi). In his Persian book of hadith, Ayn al-Hayat (Essence of Life), Allama Majlisi equated obeying kings with obeying God and included unjust kings as well. Majlisi quoted a hadith from the fourth Imam that God gave the king the power to test him and his people. This led Majlisi to conclude that God provided the sultanate (kingship). He concluded kings have many rights over their subjects because their subjects’ religion, life, property, and honor are secured through the protection of the kings.7 As Black states, Majlisi’s writings enjoyed tremendous popularity through the 19th century to the present time in every aspect of Shi’ism.8 Majlisi also paved the path to power for fuqaha. He used a version of a hadith that met his agenda. The prophet said, “if two groups in my community are righteous . . . my community will also be righteous; and if they are corrupt my community will also be corrupt; those are the jurists and the amirs.” The traditional version was the Ulama and the amirs.9 Ironically Majlisi is known more for his huge volumes of hadiths rather than for his jurisprudence. His life’s work was dedicated to giving everyone access to the textual sources of religious revelation. Reflecting the dualism of the Akhbarite and the Principled schools, Majlisi, like previous Ulama, divided public affairs into two sections: Shar’iyyat (religious) and Urfiyyat (secular). The mujtahid rules over religious affairs by issuing fatwas, propagating the faith, leading prayers, making judgments, managing religious donations, and helping orphans and the vulnerable; the king rules over nonreligious affairs such as public law, foreign affairs, and functions relevant to public security and order. Majlisi even quoted many hadiths including

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apocalyptic ones to state that the Safavid dynasty is referred to and revered in holy texts.10 There are other mujtahids who spent more energy and time to justify or discredit the sultanate jurisprudentially at the same time worth mentioning. They were from the Principled mujtahids and promulgated the mujtahid’s position on secular and nonreligious affairs. Two mujtahids I am discussing here, Majlisi and al-Karaki, were appointed by Safavid kings as Shaykh al-Islam. This was a title for an office and for a mujtahid created in Shi’ism in the Safavid era. A Shaykh al-Islam was appointed for every big city, and the Shaykh al-Islam of the Safavid capital assumed the rule of the primus inter pares. As the main function of this office was to enforce all matters of Shari’a’, especially to enjoin the good and prohibit the bad, a Shaykh al-Islam could wield considerable power.11 The Shia ideology of the Safavid dynasty pushed Shia jurisprudence to move away from quietism toward a political theology of clerical activism. Al-Muhaqqiq al-Karaki (d. 1534), the most influential faqih with regard to the polity of the Safavids, was invited from Jabal Amil by Shah Isma’il to mastermind the propagation of Shi’ism which was previously politically committed to dissimulation (taqiyyah). He was trained in Iraq and Egypt in both Shia and Sunni jurisprudence. His book Jami al-Maqasid fi Sharh alQawa’id is still one of the most important textbooks of Shia jurisprudence. He also gave new life to issuing fatwa and expanding the role of fuquha in public life in Shi’ism. He was successful in replacing the dominant theological and philosophical courses in Islamic madrasa with jurisprudence. Al-Karaki gave a public face to Shi’ism by pronouncing Friday prayer obligatory. Prior to this, most Shia Ulama did not consider Friday prayer obligatory when the Infallible Imam was in occultation. Some even considered it haram.12 This was a source of tension between Sunni and Shia. The Ottoman empire accused Shia of ignoring such an important ritual. In his treatise on Friday prayer, Al-Karaki claimed a consensus among Shia Ulama that a mujtahid is deputy of the Imam in occultation in all affairs and can be deputed. He confesses that some Ulama excluded ordering killing and hudud (the penal rulings of the Quran). Al-Karaki referenced a famous hadith13 to justify his position.14 In addition, he wrote a treatise on Kharaj (land tax), laying the jurisprudential justification to pay tax to a fallible ruler, which had been considered haram. He also pronounced receiving land and gifts from the government halal. In his jurisprudential work, he cited many hadiths allowing Shias to receive money and gifts from the Sultan even if he is unjust. Previous Ulama did not allow this exchange, fearing it justified kingship religiously (like the issue with Friday prayer). It also made it possible for Shia Ulama to become state employees.

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These innovative ideas on Friday prayer and Kharaj related to the third, vital concept al-Karaki developed: the deputyship (niyaba) theory. Accordingly, the mujtahid is deputy of the hidden twelfth Imam with the same privileges the Prophet and Infallible Imams enjoy. The mujtahid could undertake many practical activities previously reserved for the Imam. He was given the status of Just Leader (al-Imam al-Adil) and Just Ruler (Sultan al-Adil), titles previously assigned to the Imam.15 Therefore, this idea can be viewed as a preview of the theory of the Jurist Guardianship (Wilayat-e Faqih). While the old Ulama allowed only the Imam himself to use coercive force, al-Karaki extended this to the mujtahid, qua Deputy, when he was delivering judgment and imposing legal penalties. The second Safavid Shah Tahmasp I (1514–1576), the oldest son of Ismail, recognized al-Karaki as the hidden Imam’s Deputy, addressing him as the Jurist who has all the qualifications for giving authoritative opinion . . . the highly positioned seal of the mujtahids . . . the exemplar of expert Ulama, the proof of Islam . . . who has clarified the difficulties of the rules of the Community of believers and the rightful laws.16

The Shah’s statement stresses that opposing a mujtahid’s verdict equates to polytheism (shirk), deserving of curses, rejection, exclusion, and finally prosecution.17 However, there were mujtahids who suggested both ideas: as Majlisi separates the kingdom of the Ulama from the kings, al-Karaki expands the realm of the Ulama’s rule. A great example is Mirza-ye Qumi (1739–1815) during the Qajar period. Mirza-ye Qumi, known as the “owner of the Laws”’ in hawzas because of his masterwork in the Disciplined school, Qawanin al-Usul (Laws of Principles), which was one of the most important textbooks in seminaries in the field for a long time. In his Irshad Name, addressing a Qajar king he explains how the king and the jurist complete each other’s business in order to protect worldly and religious affairs respectively. Accordingly, Ulama protect faith through issuing proper fatwa, judgment, promoting Shari’a, and leading prayers. In turn, kings are privileged by Divine will to protect the worldly affairs of people, including against their enemies. Thus, people are obliged to obey kings.18 Sayed Jafar Kashfi (1776–1851) was a mujtahid who developed this perspective in Tuhfat al-Muluk (The Gift offered to the Sovereigns) in response to a request from a Qajar prince. In addition to jurisprudence and political theory, Kashfi is known for his mastery of rational sciences including Sufism and hadith. Since he claimed to receive a kind of revelation (kashf), he became famous as Kashfi. He wrote that mujtahids and kings share one position—the position of Imamate—through the deputy of the Infallible Imam. This position consists of two parts: knowing the status of the Prophet, which is called religion; and implanting that status through bringing order to

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the world, which is called the sultanate. The pen represents the former and the sword the latter. The combination of both aspects is called hikmah. Since mujtahids are limited to the pen and the sultans to the sword, they dedicate themselves to their special focus; but they need to acknowledge each other’s specific business and work together.19 Kashfi was a disciple of a mystic marja al-Sayyid Muhmmad Mahdi Bahr al-Ulum (1742–1797),20 who had general religious leadership of Shia in the eighteenth century. Bahr al-Ulum’s two other disciples, mujtahids then, Shaykh Jafar Kashif al-Ghita (1743–1812) and Mulla Ahmad Naraqi (1772–1829), moved in opposing directions: one in practice and another in theory. Fath Ali Shah Qajar (1772–1834), the second Shah of Qajar Iran, asked Kashif al-Ghita at the beginning of his reign to announce him as his deputy in his kingship. This shows that the Shah believed the mujtahid was the deputy of the hidden Infallible Imam. Kashif al-Ghita announced the Shah as his deputy and the permission (ijaza) to govern.21 Naraqi is known as the first mujtahid who detailed the theory of jurist guardianship using rational and scriptural arguments. Naraqi believed fuqaha are responsible for worldly affairs too. However, his notable disciple al-Shaykh Murtaza al-Ansari (1800–1864) rejected his master’s ideas. Al-Ansari, also called the Seal of Mujtahids, transformed the principles of jurisprudence into their current form in seminaries, and his works remain as textbooks in hawzas all over the world. Later in this chapter we’ll discuss this theory in its modern iteration as invented by Ayatollah Khomeini, although this controversial idea had its origins with Naraqi a century earlier. Ayatollah Shaykh Fazlullah Nuri (1843–1909) was a disciple of grand Ayatollah Mirza Shirazi (1815–1896), who issued a famous fatwa against the Tobacco Concession.22 Nuri began by advocating for the Iranian Constitutional Revolution (1906–1909), with its opposition to tyranny and support for rule of law. But he turned against it radically in favor of the supremacy of Shari’a and was publicly hanged for treason by the Constitutionalists. Nuri considered the worldly and religious affairs of Muslims represented respectively by sultans and Ulama as complementary, not conflictual. He believed that both groups are obliged by God to help each other to protect secular and sacred aspects of Muslim life in the era of occultation, and noted that his master Mirza Shirazi concurred.23 Nuri expressed that since Islam already introduced law in all aspects of faithful life, which mujtahids can update with regard to modern demands, making new laws or introducing new constitutions through popular vote is bid’a (innovation) in religion and haram. Accordingly, modern virtues like egalitarianism (musawat) and liberty (hurriyat) are non-Islamic; the foundation of faith is obeying God, not self; and also that guided and misguided people, faithful and unfaithful, are not equal before Shari’a. Constitutionalism contradicts Islam, a heresy.24 However,

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Shaykh limited the jurist’s reign to religious affairs, supporting a powerful king who represents the glory of Islam. This pro-kingship theory survived through the founder of the new Hawza Ilmiyyah in Qum, grand Ayatollah Haeri, and even after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini. A disciple of both Mirza Shirazi and Nuri, grand Ayatollah Shaykh Abd al-Karim Haeri Yazdi (1859–1937) moved from Najaf to Qum in 1921 and made it an epicenter of Shia learning. Sometimes he is referred to by the honorary Ayatollah al-Mo’asses (the founding ayatollah), praising his touchstone achievements in Qum. Haeri is known for his quietism, which enabled him to warmly meet both Shah Ahmad Shah Qajar and Prime Minister Reza Khan. As later promoted by his disciple grand Ayatollah Muhammad Ali Araki (1894–1994), Haeri limited the position of a qualified mujtahid to religious affairs, warning not to extend it to worldly concerns including political affairs. Protecting Islam and Muslim life, reputation, and property is obligatory (wajib), but these obligations are not up to a particular class of faithful called Ulama. Any Muslim who is able must do so. There is no reason to refer these responsibilities to Ulama or the jurists in the era of occultation. Thus, if a Shia Shah is ready to take this position, then there is no religious obstacle to his rule. However, in the view of Haeri and Araki, no particular political system can be concluded from jurisprudential arguments.25 This supportive approach toward the king can be seen in the fact that many Safavid sultans and two Qajar sultans are buried in the holy shrine of Fatima al-Masumah in Qum.26 Fatima al-Masuma (790–816) was the daughter of the seventh Shia Imam, Musa al-Kadhim (745–799), and is buried in Qum. This shrine is located in the second most sacred city in Iran after Mashhad. Haeri established the great seminary of Qum around this shrine. Haeri’s son Mahdi Haeri also made original contributions to the political theory of Islam. Controversially, Haeri’s famous disciple Ayatollah Khomeini promoted an opposing theory and practice.27 Before moving on to them, it is worth pausing and reviewing some ayatollahs who parted ways with Shia kings and shahs.

SUPPORTING CONSTITUTIONALISM AND ANTI-ABSOLUTISM While the previous theories respond to the question of politics in the premodern political order, some mujtahids appeared attempting to examine the new order of politics—democratic systems—and study their relevance to Shia jurisprudence. Modern concepts like individual rights, political liberty, separation of powers, egalitarianism, elections, and constitutions presented a challenge to mujtahids. While mujtahids like Nuri aligned with the old pattern of the kingdom—namely a division of power between Shah and

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mujtahid to protect Shari’a’s inclusivity—another group came to suggest a new structure: Constitutionalism. These two groups were named respectively Mashruya-khah (advocating inclusive/comprehensive Shari’a) and Mashrutah-khah (Constitutionalism). Multiple mujtahids from each side developed and explained their views fervently and attacked their opponents directly so that they considered the other side in the camp of enemies against the Twelver Imam.28 Being a vibrant antagonist of Constitutionalism, Nuri was not in the position of a grand ayatollah. So, it was easier for Constitutionalist grand ayatollahs to attack him. He was called fasiq (sinful), deserving to be sent into exile, by grand ayatollahs like Khurasani.29 Yet Nuri was fortunate to receive the support of one grand ayatollah. Muhammad Kazem Tabataba’i Yazdi (1831– 1919) was a supreme mujtahid in Najaf who authored al-Urwah al-Wuthqa (The Firmest Bond),30 a compilation of jurisprudential statements consisting of 3,260 articles to address legal opinions on acts of worship and acts of interactions. Originally a quietist, Tabataba’i Yazdi became angered by the negative reactions of the Constitutionalists against Nuri and wrote letters in his support equating Constitutionalism with atheism. His support for the sultanate and Mashruya along with his peer marja Akhund Khurasani’s strong support of Constitutionalism divided Najaf’s Shias into two bitterly opposed factions.31 This division spread around the country, trickling down to houses and families. There is a story of two brothers in Tehran, both mujtahids; one intentionally supported Constitutionalism while the other opposed it in order to prevent either side from getting power.32 Tabataba’i Yazdi prohibited stipends involving bread portions for Constitutionalist seminarians. This included then Ayatollah Abul-Hasan Isfahani, which had an impact on Isfahani’s emphasis on giving bread to the seminarians later.33 Tabataba’i Yazdi did not produce a particular work on his political views. Nonetheless, in practice he hurt Constitutionalism severely. Because of his clear opposition to Constitutionalism, Naini and Isfahani were not able to acquire the position of marja’iyyah until after Tabataba’i Yazdi’s death.34 Now that we’ve discussed the most influential figure from the pro-Shari’a group, namely Nuri, we can turn to two grand ayatollahs from the Constitutionalist mujtahids: Naini and Akhund Khurasani. Allama Muhammad-Husayn Naini Gharavi (1860–1936) suggested the first dedicated study in Shia jurisprudence to reconcile the religious duty of Ulama and the rights of people. He studied before Jahangir Khan Qashqa’i, Mirza Shirazi, and Akhund Khurasani. Naini became the head of Najaf Hawza along with Abul-Hasan Isfahani. Many later mujtahids, including grand Ayatollah Khoei, studied before him. His milestone volume in political jurisprudence is Tanbih al-Ummah wa Tanzih al-Milla (The Awakening of the Community and Refinement of the Nations) in which he presents his groundbreaking theory

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to justify Constitutionalism. He argues that all fundamental concepts of Constitutionalism stem from the Quran, Sunnah, and particularly Imam Ali, claiming Constitutionalism as a return to the original Islam (“haza beza’atuna roddat ilayna,” “it is our commodity returned to us!”). The government has crucial responsibilities: rule of law, order, and defense against foreign invasion. These aspects of the social order are stated clearly by Shari’a (mansus). They are fixed and must be applied as a matter of worship. But another crucial piece is not explained clearly in Shari’a; this is the space for parliament and introducing laws. There is no doubt that fuqaha are deputies of the Imam in public order, but a mujtahid does not need to manage them directly; his permission to elect parliamentary members works just as well. Naini argues that a constitutional government stands on two foundations: constitution and supervision. In Naini’s view, the constitution equates to the Risala Amaliya (the treatise on practical law); the former is about civil and political life and the latter about religious practices. Supervision prevents an Islamic sultanate from becoming an absolute monarchy and dictatorship. The public officers are trustees, not the lords. This supervision happens through parliament and separation of powers. An Islamic sultanate rests on consultation (shura). The principle of liberty frees people to serve the Sultan. The principle of egalitarianism/equality explains how people are equal before law. Naini warns against religious dictatorship: what could be worse than Yazid, who killed the third Imam, Husayn?35 Two grand ayatollahs, including Akhund Khurasani, endorsed Naini’s book.36 Again, this is a milestone in turning the view from king to people as the source of order in modern life and Shari’a paving the path toward democracy. Many aspects of modern life are not covered by Shari’a (mantaqat al-faraq al-tashri’i), which opens the door to connecting Islam and democracy and gives people the choice of their desired political system.37 Another disciple of Mirza Shirazi was Akhund Khurasani (1839–1911), who had the largest course and number of attending students in Najaf; there are reports saying 600–700 students would attend his highest level of jurisprudence course (kharij fiqh) and roughly 1,000 in the principles of jurisprudence (kharij Usul). It’s claimed that approximately 500 of his students reached or approached the level of ijtihad. Among his most notable students, who are referred to in this volume, are Naini, Sayed Abul-Hasan Isfahani, Borurjerdi, Gharawi Isfahani, Sayed Ahmad Karbala’i, Sayed Ali Qazi, Muhammad Ali Shahabadi, Haeri Yazdi, Sayed Muhsin Hakim (1889–1970), and Khoei. Khurasani’s outstanding work on the principles of jurisprudence is Kifayat al-Usul (Sufficiency of the Principles), which is a very important textbook in hawza worldwide. Around 200 commentaries and expositions are written on Kifaya, and no student can reach the level of ayatollah if he can’t prove he is able to teach Kifaya and comment on it.

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There is a poem common among Ulama saying, “Salaathatun laysa laha nihaya Rasailun, Maksibun, Kifaya” (“there are three textbooks that have no end: Rassail, Makasib, and Kifaya”). The first two texts are written by Shaykh Ansari. In Makasib, Ansari accepts a strict form of wilayat-e faqih, meaning the jurist enjoys guardianship rights over necessary public affairs (hisbiyyah) like religious donation, helping orphans, and assisting the vulnerable. These responsibilities can be carried out by lay believers if a mujtahid is not available. So, this is a very limited privilege which is agreed upon by the majority of fuqaha. But Shaykh Ansari does not believe the jurist has a political guardianship. Ansari’s pupil Akhund Khurasani contributed to political theory in jurisprudence, considering the modern concept of Constitutionalism and his own rationalist approach. In his letters, Khurasani advocated rational obligation (wajib) of a national parliament; universal common sense to address new demands and changes; developing science and technology as a rational and religious responsibility (like defensive jihad); the religious priority of Constitutionalism over dictatorship; and the priority of communal reasoning over individual reasoning. In a very revolutionary way, Akhund took two steps toward guardianship. First, he said that God has absolute authority and guardianship over humanity; the Prophet and Infallible Imams do not share this privilege. Therefore, the Prophet and Imams have no rights over personal property, life, or family. This idea rejects the orthodox understanding of Shia, which assigns this right to the Prophet and Imams.38 Second, while defending Constitutionalism, Khurasani does not call it a religious (Mashru’a) system. The Mashru’a/Islamic system is ruled by the Imam. So, he distinguishes between the religious and the legal. Constitutionalism is legal, not religious. The only religious (Mashru’a) government is the ruling of the Infallible Imam in Shia, but it is legal because it paves the path toward rational choice and a just system, while absolutism leads to oppression and dictatorship. In other words, Khurasani does not promote any privilege for the jurists even with regard to necessary public affairs (umur hisbiyyah). These necessary public affairs are up to rational Muslims and the trustees of the faithful in the form of parliament.39 Khurasani’s perspective is at the extreme opposite end of the spectrum from Ayatollah Khomeini, who believed in the broadest concept of jurist guardianship.40 Grand Ayatollah Isfahani (1861–1946) strongly supported Constitutionalism.41 He became the leading marja of the Shia world after the death of Naini and ran the office of marja’iyyah for ten years. The concentration of Shia marja’iyyah around him is exceptional in the history of Shia. Among his most important works is a collection of his judicial opinions, Wasila alNajat (The Means of Salvation). Ayatollah Khomeini would later publish his

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judicial opinions as an annotation to this book, Tahrir al-Wasila (Exegesis of the Means of Salvation). To help understand the multidimensionality of jurisprudential politics and the gap between theory and practice, let us consider the story of grand Ayatollah Husayn Tabataba’i Borujerdi (1875–1961) as he returned from a pilgrimage to Mecca. Studying before both Akhund Khurasani and Kazim Yazdi, Borujerdi became a leading Iranian marja from 1947 to 1961. Theoretically, he believed in jurist guardianship like Naraqi but practiced quietism. Returning from Mecca, Borujerdi met Naini and Abul-Hasan Isfahani. They pressed him to deliver their message to Iranian Ulama to oppose Reza Shah (1878–1944), the founder of the Pahlavi dynasty. Borujerdi refused. Even Abul Hassan wrote a letter to him warning that they would incite Iraqi Shias against him if Borujerdi continued his quietism. He accused Borujerdi of avoiding protests out of fear of losing his position, something that should not concern a pious mujtahid. Borujerdi replied that he cares about his position because his stature and popularity are gifts from God, and a Muslim shouldn’t waste this gift as he must not waste his property.42 Here we see the intersection of pragmatism and jurisprudential politics. The following section will address further entanglements of political theory and jurisprudence which produce a new scheme of Shi’ism. One interesting point is that while the majority of established supreme maraji’ like Khurasani, Abul-Hasan Isfahani, and Naini were pro-Constitutionalism, the pro-Shari’a faction won over the population because of their sentimentalism.

INTRODUCING THE JURIST GUARDIANSHIP (WILAYAT-E FAQIH) While historically Shia believed in following the path of Infallible Imams through the guidance of Ulama, no Shia scholar clearly introduced a theory of government and state until the Safavid era. Karaki was the first mujtahid who claimed the right for mujtahids to govern based on a hadith known as Maqbula Hanzala. Later Akhund Khurasani argued this hadith and a couple of similar hadiths in no way sanction the jurist guardianship, since they merely encourage the faithful to ask jurists to resolve their jurisprudential questions and disputes. Additionally, the knowledge they offer is supported by scripture and tradition, which is different from their act of guardianship.43 However, centuries of discussion since Karaki’s time along with major societal changes and new developments in jurisprudence added a modern dimension to the theory and isolated it from its scriptural justification. The theory of jurist guardianship developed in three areas:

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(a) Specific area (Umur Hisbiyyah). With regard to this version of wilayat-e faqih, jurists rule only on very specific areas which are clearly covered by Shari’a. These affairs are not part of the cumulative obligation (wajib kifa’i) that can be addressed by all. Since non-jurists are not allowed to intervene, those affairs are left to jurists. Although mujtahids have no consensus on the examples of these affairs, very common examples are providing for orphans and assisting the mentally disabled. Accordingly, the guardianship of mujtahids does not relate to leading a community and governing a nation. If there is not a living mujtahid, the faithful are responsible to care for these people or umur hisbiyyah. Most mujtahids subscribe to this theory, including Shaykh Ansari and Grand Ayatollah Khoei, who had more students than Khomeini in Najaf. Khoei stressed that guardianship is for God, the Prophet, and the Infallible Imams. According to hadiths, mujtahids are authorized only in the following scenarios: administrating jurisprudential judgment (qizawat) and issuing fatwa. They are not permitted to intervene in the property of people including the disabled (qasirs) because they require wilayat, which they lack. The jurists hold wilayat over umur hisbiyya. But this guardianship is just a name, because this authority resides in God only. Mujtahids receive permission from God to enter this realm.44 (b) Public affairs (Umur Ammah). Regarding this theory, qualified jurists are endowed with wilaya in terms of sociopolitical issues. Some scholars justify this endowment based on Divine designation (like Naraqi, Borujerdi, and in some of Khomeini’s works) and others based on the people’s public vote (like Murtaza Mutahhari, Jafar Subhani, Salihi NajafAbadi, and particularly grand Ayatollah Hussain Ali Muntazeri). The latter group limits this guardianship over public affairs to the constitution. When citizens elect their leader, they create a contract and the constitution functions as the contract’s conditions. This wilaya can be called strict (muqayyida), for it limits the mujtahid to the constitution.45 (c) Absolute guardianship (Mutlaqa). This theory holds that the jurist is endowed with the same all-encompassing and absolute authority enjoyed by the Prophet and the Imams, meaning further than what is already established by Shari’a law. The ruling jurist can introduce new Shari’a law or change or overrule an old law if he decides it’s in the best interest of the people and the state. This theory was both introduced and practiced by Ayatollah Khomeini. He added three crucial elements to the theory of Umur Ammah. First, the government is considered prior to the acts of worship like prayer, fasting, and pilgrimage to Mecca, because it paves the way for those acts. Government is not bound by Shari’a, so it can violate its religious contact with people if it finds they are harming Islam or the state. The jurist

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guardian is above Shari’a, though in harmony with the soul of Shari’a. Governmental law is obligatory, not just Shari’a, and governmental law holds sway in the case of a contradiction between these two authorities. Second, as the jurist guardian is above superficial Shari’a, he is also above the constitution. The constitution receives its validity from this jurist. So, if it is needed, the ruling mujtahid can violate the constitution. This violation is superficial, because the true law is Islam which gave the jurist this right. Finally, this guardian jurist is a new kind of mujtahid. He updates Shari’a with time, considers the interests of government and people, and is able to guide humanity in all aspects of life worldwide; jurisprudence transforms into a theory of management, and politics becomes part of religion and jurisprudence.46 This new concept of jurisprudence and Khomeini’s pragmatism initiated a new entity under Khomeini’s ruling called Majma’e Tashkhis-e Maslahat-e Nizam, The Expediency Discernment Council of the System. The supreme leader appoints members of this assembly to resolve conflicts between the parliament and The Guardian Council (consisting respectively of laypeople and jurists). The focus of this assembly is to consider the interest and expediency of the governmental system if there is a contradiction between the system and Shari’a. It’s a technique to privilege secular over sacred law because of the system’s interests. Ayatollah Khomeini’s version was supported by a new perspective on Islam. Khomeini’s innovative view is encapsulated by Mohsen Kadivar as follows: (a) Islam needs to run a government to apply the major part of its law; (b) preparing society and establishing government is an obligation of the just mujtahid, and laypeople must follow him; (c) Islamic government means the jurist guardianship endowed by God with the same extension of the Prophet and Imams’ power; (d) Islamic government and governmental laws are part of the primitive law (ahkam-e awwaliyyah) of Islam. They come prior to secondary laws, including acts of worship.47 Khomeini’s idea was so innovative and radical that Ayatollah Khamenei, who served as president under Khomeini from 1981 to 1989 and succeeded him as supreme leader, could not digest it.48 Five months before Khomeini’s death, Khamenei, as an imam leading Friday prayer in Tehran, said the government can change the law within Shari’a and attributed this idea to Khomeini. Khomeini published an open letter addressing and accusing Khamenei of ignorance of the true meaning of absolute guardianship. Khomeini declared that limiting government to secondary religious law (Shari’a) contradicts the Prophet’s right to govern absolutely. He stressed that government comes before secondary law like prayer, fasting, and hajj as follows:

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I should state that the government which is a part of the absolute viceregency of the Prophet of God . . . is one of the primary injunctions of Islam and has priority over all other secondary injunctions, even prayers, fasting and Hajj. . . . The ruler can close down mosques if need be, or can even demolish a mosque which is a source of harm. . . . The government is empowered to unilaterally revoke any Shari’a agreements which it has concluded with the people when those agreements are contrary to the interests of the country or of Islam. It can also prevent any devotional or non-devotional affair if it is opposed to the inner interests of Islam and for so long as it is so. The government can prevent hajj, which is one of the important divine obligations, on a temporary basis, in cases when it is contrary to the interests of the Islamic country.49

It was not a small misunderstanding. As Qasim argues, it was a radical departure from Khomeini’s lectures on the topic in 1970 when he promulgated his theory and bonded jurists’ acts to Shari’a.50 Khomeini’s theoretical combination of Sufism and jurisprudence as well as his activism as a leader made his idea of jurist guardianship vulnerable to opposing interpretations from a traditional absolutist perspective to a modern democratic one. This division occurred in Khomeini’s time. Two factions of his clergy followers could not agree on their understanding of Khomeini’s ideas. They went to Khomeini and received his permission to formally split into two groups. These two groups continue to operate today. They are Majma-e rowhaniyun-e mobarez (Association of Combatant Clerics) and Jame-e-ye rowhaniyat-e mobarez (Combatant Clergy Association). However, Ayatollah Khamenei belonged to the latter group and upon succeeding Khomeini marginalized the former. Khamenei was a model of the new kind of mujtahid Khomeini promoted who did not arrive at the level of mujtahid traditionally but was very familiar with sociopolitics. When Khamenei established his leadership, he fully applied Khomeini’s theory of jurist above superficial Shari’a and the constitution. After they were out of power, Khomeini’s most fervent supporters gathered in the Majma and proposed a reformist version of wilayat-e faqih and asked Ayatollah Khamenei to conform to this position. The reformist interpretation limits the authority of the jurist by acknowledging the modern structure of the state and peoples’ role in the political arena as long as it does not contradict the fundamental commands of Shari’a. The most elaborated and professional form of this theory comes from grand Ayatollah Hussain-Ali Muntazeri (1922–2009). As one of Khomeini’s outstanding pupils and one of the leaders of the Iranian Revolution, for a time he was Khomeini’s designated successor. But just prior to Khomeini’s death, they parted ways and Muntazeri lost his position due to their dispute over how to harmonize the rights of people and the government. Muntazeri argues there are no satisfactory rational or scriptural reasons to claim that mujtahids are

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appointed by God as the guardians of the ummah since people should be able to elect their leader. Those reasons, rational and scriptural, only consider the qualifications of the jurist or the ruler. It’s a cumulative obligation of mujtahids to nominate themselves to run the government according to Shari’a, and it’s the people’s obligation to elect the qualified ones. However, the structure of the state, the process of elections—all the mechanisms of application are left to the people. There is not a fixed form in Shari’a. Modern voting implements the Islamic concept of bay’a and makes the guardianship function. However, bay’a means a mutual contract sanctioned by God. Since this is merely a contract, the constitution works as conditions for the deal and binds both sides. Yet, this government cannot interfere in private aspects of life.51 While this reformist version of jurist guardianship democratizes the theory, the conflicting version tends toward totalitarianism. This rival view translates the idea into a traditional frame of sultanate/kingdom and consequently replaces king/sultan with the jurist. No political order and modern structure of state matter; the jurist, having absolute power, decides which order and structure are needed. Ayatollahs Muhammad Mu’min Qumi (1938–2019), Muhammad Taqi Misbah Yazdi (1935–2021), and Sayed Kazim Haeri (b. 1938) developed this reading. Some scholars structure this dualism of reformist versus conservative as a tension between Ayatollah Misbah Yazdi and Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1934–2017).52 It’s remarkable that neither of these ayatollahs is known for his jurisprudential work or teachings. Rafsanjani was known for his economic and sociopolitical pragmatism. He published a commentary on the Quran. Misbah was known for his philosophical works and has a confusing background with regard to Khomeini’s political activism. But with regard to major ayatollahs with a focus on jurisprudence, Furati, an expert on politics at Qum Hawza, categorized three forms of relationships between maraji’ and the theory of wilayat-e faqih: ignoring it because they have no political intentions; opposing it; and Rodarbasi (preventing the refusal of a request in the presence of the individual who makes it out of politeness) because of societal norms.53

SEARCH FOR NEW IDEAS Learning about modernity, responding to colonialism,54 considering Shari’a as a comprehensive system, and observing theoretically or/and practically the theory of the jurist guardianship all inspired modern ayatollahs to move in different directions while contributing to the jurisprudential theory of politics. Here I will briefly introduce those ideas which became widespread. Ayatollah Sayed Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr was born on February 24, 1935, in Kadhimiya, a Shi’ite shrine town that is a suburb of Baghdad. He came

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from a prominent Shia clerical family. One of his cousins was Musa al-Sadr, who was to become the leader of the Lebanese Shias. Another cousin, Sadiq al-Sadr, was leader of the Shias of Iraq for a time in the 1990s. Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr came to Najaf at age 12 to study and immediately gained a reputation for brilliance. He quickly became an established instructor, teaching the advanced course in the principles of jurisprudence to students who were for the most part older than he. al-Sadr also became a key figure in the so-called Islamic movement in Iraq in the 1950s, which aimed to revive Islam as a serious ideological alternative to Marxism and Western capitalism. He was arrested several times during the 1970s for his opposition to the Ba’athist regime. After the Iranian Revolution, he was arrested and imprisoned. Briefly released after popular demonstrations, he was again arrested in June 1979 and subsequently executed in April 1980. al-Sadr introduced a couple of theories on government, but I will focus on the final one presented in 1979. In a treatise responding to six clergies from Lebanon who asked him to express his thoughts on Khomeini’s Islamic Republic, al-Sadr wrote Preliminary Legal Note on the Project of a Constitution for the Islamic Republic in Iran to contribute his ideas on the people’s caliphate and Islamic history to the process of the Islamic Revolution. Mallat shows that this Note was written on February 4, 1979, before the final victory of the Iranian revolutionaries and was translated immediately and widely circulated in Iran in both Arabic and Persian translation. Its contents are reflected in the Iranian Constitution, which attempts to present a democratic image of Khomeini’s wilayat-e faqih.55 al-Sadr developed his theory of the caliphate of people under the supervision of maraji’ with two critical elements: humanity is the viceregent (caliph) of God, and maraji’ have a supervisory role. The comprehensive picture of the Islamic state can be perceived within the dynamic of these two ends. alSadr attempts to fill in the gaps. Original sovereignty (al-wilaya bil-asl) rests only with God. Kings have no sovereignty over people. God’s sovereignty applies through two means: caliphate and shahada (witness). God created humanity as His caliph and trustee, so people must apply Divine will—meaning justice and truth, not their own personal desires. There are two Quranic principles that pave the path for the people to implement their caliph authority: consultation (parliament) and equality among people (a president elected directly by the people). However, the consultative body (Shura) makes laws for subjects who have no concise ideas of Shari’a. al-Sadr uses verse 44 of the fifth chapter of the Quran to explain how God introduced three witnesses (shahada) to guard the caliphate of humanity: the Prophets (anbiya’), Imams (rabbani), and marja’iyyah (rashid). They spread God’s words, supervise humanity’s application of the caliphate, and guide them on the straight path. While these three groups are equal as witnesses,

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the first two are appointed by God and are infallible; in contrast, maraji’ do ijtihad and have to be just, not infallible. Therefore, only in the time of the prophets and Imams, the caliphate and witnesses gather in them, but in the time of occultation, the caliphate goes to the people, and the maraji’ become the witnesses. Because the people determine their life in this system it is a republic, and since it is under the supervision of maraji’ it is Islamic. al-Sadr transforms individual marja into institutional marja’iyyah and political rights are recognized by the people. Women have equality to apply the caliphate the same as men. Although judicial power remains under the control of marja’iyyah, the jurist is not absolute. The system of law (Shari’a) is binding for all including the marja; the Shari’a rules over governors and governed alike. As John Esposito illustrated the ideal Islamic state is nomocracy, neither autocracy nor theocracy.56,57 Sadr’s teacher Muhammad Jawad Mughniyya (1904–1979) developed another aspect of the theory of jurist guardianship. This pioneering Lebanese mujtahid studied before Khoei, returned to Beirut, and became a judge, and from 1950 to 1955 served as the head of the Lebanese Shiite judiciary. He is known for his reformist ideas about hawza textbooks, ijtihad and jurisprudence, Islamic ecumenism, and the sociopolitical life of Muslims. Mughniyya was the first mujtahid who propounded that social understanding of religious texts is distinct from their literal meaning in developing jurisprudence. On the eve of the victory of the Iranian Revolution, he wrote Khomeini and Islamic State to promote the cause. In the introduction, Mughniyya expresses how much Khomeini’s text impressed him; he agrees with all of Khomeini’s theory except for two elements: that the jurist enjoys all the prerogatives the Prophet and the Infallible Imams, and that Islamic economic obligations target more than just the poor. In Khomeini’s view, an Islamic economy addresses the whole system of government, but to Mughniyya it is meant only to help the poor and needy. Regarding an Islamic state, Mughniyya writes that rational argument convinces us that society needs a government. When the Prophet and Imams are present, they lead both worldly and religious affairs. But in the time of occultation, the just jurists enjoy the prerogative to issue fatwas, to judge, and to run the umur hisbiyya. Since these jurists lack the knowledge of the unseen and are fallible, they have no sovereignty (wilayat) over political affairs. Although administrating some Islamic law requires a government, a government is not limited to implementing religious law. There are many social laws that are not addressed by Shari’a, so people can make laws as long as they do not violate halal and haram. When Shari’a law is dominant, the associated state is Islamic no matter who runs the government. If the government violates Islamic law, it is non-Islamic even if graduates from Najaf or al-Azhar run it. People elect the head of state. Jurists have no priority over laypeople

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in understanding and administering political issues. The specific business of the jurists is deducing new Islamic law (ijtihad), judging in accordance with Shari’a, and preaching the faith. Finally, the fixed religious laws (Thawabit Shariyyah) are acts of worship and family issues. Others, including acts of interaction (mu’amilat) are subject to change in Shari’a.58 This distinction between fixed and flexible laws in Shari’a was developed by another Lebanese mujtahid in terms of political jurisprudence. Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din (1936–2001) held that the fixed law of Shari’a consists of only four parts: acts of worship, family, sexuality, and usury. The remainder is flexible and mutable in terms of social life. Shams al-Din was the chairman of the Supreme Islamic Shia Council in Lebanon and another disciple of Khoei who insisted on the independent identity of Lebanese and Arabic Shias from Iranians. Delegitimizing the discourse of Hezbollah, Shams al-Din introduced a rival political theory against Khomeini’s jurist guardianship to serve two aims: to counter quietism and apolitical withdrawal, which provides an opening for Khomeini’s theory, and contributing to the debates surrounding the state’s nature, legitimacy, and goals through jurisprudence. In his book Nizam al-Hukm wa al-Idara fi al-Islam (The Governmental System and Administration in Islam) in 2000, Shams alDin contrasted wilayat umma with wilayat-e faqih by shifting the form of the state to the umma (community) as the core institution of Islam—a concept which aims to protect the umma and Shari’a without establishing absolute powers in the hands of the government. Contrary to the jurist guardianship, the community guardianship allocate a central role to the umma, while giving a limited one to the jurists: the legislative power through the practice of ijtihad, which is a powerful authority. Despite his strong criticism of the jurist guardianship, he considers it a legitimate system because it has been constructed by jurists according to Shari’a principles. However, he levels two types of criticisms against it: first, the absolute powers in the hands of the jurist that ignore the separation of the powers; and second, its claim of universal sovereignty and citizen compliance with the alternate authority. The government of the jurist is not identical to the government of the Infallible Imam, and it fails to establish absolute political authority for the jurist over all Muslims who live in other countries. Regarding textual proof for the jurist guardianship, the Maqbula Umar b. Hanzala, Shams al-Din argues it confers only an extent of authority that is confined to the group of people who specifically seek the establishment of this authority; further, the judge is not appointed upon all Muslims, but only upon those who seek judgment (fa lā wilaya lahu alayhim fi halat adam al-naẓar). Moreover, the proof of sovereignty (wilaya) of the Prophet and Imams is imperative and categorical (qat’i), whereas the authority of jurists is speculative (zanni).

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While the theory of the jurist guardianship according to its own theoretical construct claims to be a version of the Infallible Imams in the occultation era and requires universal application over all Muslims, the theory of the community guardianship doesn’t disrupt the general order of the independent nation states, which avoids any form of absolute power. Shams al-Din believes administrative authority is defined as the mechanism and rules of command, authorization, restriction, and prohibition through which a government manages and administers the public affairs of humans in political society, and their relationships to and claims over nature. The areas covered by administrative authority fall either under the rubric of the public interest (maslaha amma) of any political society or in what is classified as the area of the legislative void (mantiqat al-faraq al-tashri’i); that is, they do not constitute legal matters and fall outside the domain of Shari’a obligation (taklif shar’i). These areas are usually governed by two primary principles: no human being has authority over another, and human beings have unrestricted authority over natural resources. Shams al-Din adds that it is preferable for the government to be Islamic, but its Islamic identity doesn’t require the direct rule of jurists. Rather they can supervise the laws that govern the state and ensure that these laws conform to the injunction of the Shari’a. He recommends delegating the task of a council of expert jurists rather than to a single jurist, in order to adduce legal rules related to governance in the modern state. In this view the judicial authority falls under the prerogatives and rights of the umma, not the guardian jurist, and is to be carried out through election and consultation (shura). Shams al-Din interprets hadiths as proving that the matter of appointing and selecting a judge is the exclusive right of the legislators, namely the exclusive prerogative of the people to choose a judge from the pool of jurists who meet the qualifications for judgeship as defined by the Imam.59 The last ayatollah worth mentioning was a disciple of Ayatollah Khomeini who received permission of ijtihad from grand Ayatollah Borujerdi. He was also the first ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the United States. Dr. Shaykh Mehdi Haeri Yazdi (1923–1999) was the son of Shaykh Abd alKarim Haeri Yazdi, the founder of Qum Hawza. In his masterpiece Hekmat va Hokumat (Wisdom and Government, London 1994), Haeri introduces a fresh political theory in jurisprudence. For the first time in Shia jurisprudence, he discusses the fundamental rights of people under the concept of an indivisible share of personal property (Malikiyyat-e Shakhsi musha). Haeri argues that a government leading a country is part of wisdom and practical reasoning, not falling under wilayat. Governing is an empirical phenomenon that happens through coexistence and mutual benefits and cooperation. A place which many people inhabit is shared indivisibly by all inhabitants. They need rule of order and safety to coexist, leading them to elect an agent who can manage affairs. The individuals are real, and the society is abstract.

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Government can’t be built on a social contract, because each generation always wants to make its own contract. Therefore, government is based on property—not social or arbitrary contacts, but natural property. Owning one’s environment is part of one’s natural rights. Haeri calls it personal property. This personal property overlaps, creating shared space. The owners of this shared space delegate an individual or a team to do their best for the betterment of those people in that place. When they can’t agree on a delegate, they prefer a majority over a minority. Government is based on shared personal property that works on their behalf (wakil) through a contract. The nature of government is agency (wikalat), and people can change their agents when they desire. The agent has to administrate what is required by the client (muwakkil). A government ceases to be an agent when it acts independently. Governmental issues thus are changeable and empirical outside of the fixed laws of God. Haeri believes that politics is our version of the field of Divine law, because the former pertains to particular and variable affairs and the latter to universal laws. Jurists lack the status to address particular cases related to personal affairs of citizens and states. Haeri continues the Quranic emphasis on consultation (Shura) as a process involving all people in order to see justice done. Politics and doing justice can’t be inferred from the nature of the prophethood or Imamate. The Prophets and Imams are higher than these secondary affairs; they are neither public nor private agents of people in these matters. If the Prophet and Imam Ali practiced polity it was in response to a request by the people, not a religious requirement. Yet, if people are mature in theoretical and practical reasoning, they will choose to elect Imams as the best option.60 These examples illustrate the diversity, evolution, and context-based nature of the political theory in jurisprudence. Mujtahids moved toward opposing poles, from those like Khurasani who removed religious titles from the government to Mirza Mahdi Isfahani who considered the jurist guardianship equivalent to the rule of the prophet and Imams. He even believed a jurist could establish a separate government when the Imam was present.61 Also, the application and reception of a theory impacted the social position of the theoretician mujtahid. For example, when Constitutionalism failed in Iran, the authority of grand Ayatollah Akhund Khurasani lost popularity, or when Muhammad Reza Shah sent to Ayatollah Sayed Muhsin Hakim a telegraph that became public, it cost Hakim some social status.62 An extreme case is that of Ayatollah Abdul-Qasem Kashani (1882–1962), the Iranian mujahid who acted as the 14th chairman of the Parliament of Iran. Once he was welcomed very warmly by the population, but later he was ignored even in a small minority party.63 Moreover, many mujtahids distinguished theory from practice regardless of political theory, advising Ulama to avoid involvement in politics. The prominent Shia authority Grand Ayatollah Muhsin Hakim, teacher of then-grand ayatollahs like Shams al-Din, Vahid Khurasani,

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Makarim Shirazi, and Baqir al-Sadr, did not support Iran’s Islamic Revolution.64 Grand Ayatollah Zanjani cited medieval Muslim philosopher Ibn Khaldun in arguing that Ulama are not knowledgeable about politics, because politics attempts to consider links between particular events while Ulama should be dedicated only to universal concepts and fundamental ideals. So, Ulama who are also skilled in politics are exceptional.65 Haeri, also known as Ayatullah al-Mo’asses (literally “the founder Ayatollah” for founding Qum Hawza), went to Karbala, not Najaf, during tension between Constitutionalists and their enemies, to keep him away from political disputes and remain neutral. “We did not study politics,” he said. “We will be deceived and abused [if we enter into politics].”66 Besides the external elements (text and contextual dynamics), this diversity and evolution among ayatollahs teach us that the personal temperament of the jurist, his jurisprudential inclination, and his pragmatism converge to shape his theory and practice concerning politics. A clear example of temperament was Ayatollah Ahmad Azari Qumi (1925–1999), disciple of Borujerdi, Khoei, and Khomeini, and a founding member of the Society of Seminary Teachers of Qum. Azari Qumi served as a judge on the Special Clerical Court in Iran. He was active in disqualifying grand Ayatollah Shari’at-Madari (1906–1986) from marja’iyyah, in convincing Ayatollah Khamenei to accept the supreme leadership of Iran, and finally by publishing a public criticism against Khamenei for abandoning pragmatic leadership for the marja’iyyah position. Azari Qumi believed that the leadership can be justified for pragmatic reasons, but marja’iyyah is a holy institution. He had previously held that the Islamic regime can defame major Ulama who don’t support the government, such defamation being in the interest of protecting Islamic governance. As his friend of 60 years and intellectual sparring partner, grand Ayatollah Zanjani wrote, his strong sentiment and change of temperament caused him to move toward opposing political ends and to his scholarship being ignored.

NOTES 1. To grasp three methods of religious thought in Shia theology, see Allamah Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabataba’i’s Shi’ite Islam (trans. by Seyyed Hossein Nasr, State University of New York Press, 1977), pp. 89-122 and 172-214; to take a broader look at the theological, philosophical, and mystical approaches to the Imamate, see Religious Authority and Political Thought in Twelver Shi’ism, by Hamid Mavani (Routledge, 2013), pp. 66-105. 2. In a very rapid summary, Moojan Momen lists three patterns suggesting Ulama’s way of relating to the state: political cooperation, political activism, and

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political aloofness, which do not offer any coherent Shia theory of political legitimacy (An Introduction to Shi’i Islam (Yale University Press, 1985), pp. 191-196). 3. In L. Masingnon’s words, “une theocratie laique egalitaire.” Erwin I. J. Rosenthal, Political Thought in Medieval Islam: An Introductory Outline (Cambridge, 1958), p, 8. 4. See Hossein Abadian and Mohammad Bitarafan, “Analysis of the Basis of Legitimacy and Illegitimacy of Kingship Institution through the Lens of Religious Scholars (Ulama) in Safavid Era,” in Quarterly Research Journal of Islamic History (Pajoohesh Name-ye Tarikhe Islam) (Tehran: Iranian Society of Islamic History, 2013), Vol. 1, pp. 12-15. 5. Abdulwahab Furati, “Boundaries of political thinking in the seminary of Qom,” in The Quarterly Journal of Political Thought in Islam (Tehran: Research Institute of Imam Khomeini & Islamic Revolution, September 2020), Vol. 5, Issue 22, pp. 66-67; Abdulwahab Furati, “Niza’e muzzir miyan-e du-qutbi-e Hashemi-Misbah dar hawza-e inqilabi,” in Mubahithat (Qum, 1395/2017), No. 10, p. 6. 6. He wrote the treatise Risala Kharajiyyah to refute Karaki’s jurisprudential justification of Safavid rule. Qatifi quoted the Prophet warning Ulama not to approach kings. He believed the Safavid king to be illegal in the eyes of the faith and did not accept gifts from the Sultan. 7. Hossein Abadian and Mohammad Bitarafan, Analysis of the Basis of Legitimacy and Illegitimacy of Kingship Institution through the Lens of Religious Scholars (Ulama) in Safavid Era, pp. 14-16. 8. Antony Black, The History of Islamic Political Thought from the Prophet to the Present (Edinburgh University Press, 2011), pp. 236-238. 9. Ibid, 237. 10. Muhsin Kadivar, Nazariyaha-e dawlat dar fiqh-e Shia (Tehran: Nashr-e Nay, 1377/1998), pp. 64-65. 11. Rainer Brunner, “Hierarchy in the Imamiyya,” in Iranica (Available at https:// iranicaonline​.org​/articles​/shiite​-doctrine​-ii​-hierarchy​-emamiya). 12. However, al-Karaki considered the Friday prayer a voluntary obligation, meaning a believer has the option to choose performing either the regular noon prayer or Friday prayer. But his disciple Shahid Thani went further and published a criticism against al-Karaki’s perspective. Shahid Thani held that Friday prayer, a determined obligation, can’t be replaced by the regular noon prayer. He argued that the common perspective among Shia Ulama on the non-obligatory status of Friday prayer was a response to their sociopolitical situations. Since they wanted to protect their denominational identity and show their opposition to unjust rulers, they considered the Friday prayer voluntary. There were other Ulama supporting the obligation of Friday prayer to counter accusations by Sunni Ulama. 13. It is known as Maqbulat Umar b. Hanzala, who narrated from Imam Sadiq what a faithful should do when encountering a conflict among hadiths and the judicial authority to whom he should refer. Sadiq elaborated certain principles according to which some of these hadiths should be preferred over others. Regarding judicial authority, Sadiq referred to a religious alim, commonly translated as mujtahid. This paved the path for some to conclude that the jurist is a deputy of the Imam since Sadiq

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expressed, “fa inni qad ja’altahu alaikum hakima” (“I have made him a ruler for you’’). This hadith is reported in all Four Books. To read the entire hadith and a critial analysis of it in English, see Joseph Eliash, Misconceptions regarding the Juridiical Status of the Iranian Ulama, in International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1 (1979), pp. 9-25. 14. Cited by Kadivar, Nazariyaha-e dawlat dar fiqh-e Shia, 15-16. 15. Black, The History of Islamic Political Thought from the Prophet to the ­Present, pp. 231-232. 16. Ibid. 17. Mahdi Farhani Munfarid, Muhajirat-e Ulama-e Shia az Jabal-e Amil be Iran dar asr-e Safavi (Tehran: Amir Kabir, 1377/1999), pp. 107-110. To read an English translation of Shah Tahmasp’s decrees on the authority of Karaki see, “Two Decrees of Shah Tahmasp Concerning Statecraft and the Authority of Shaykh Ali Al-Karaki,” in Authority and Political Culture in Shi’ism, Said Amir Arjomand (ed.) (State University of New York Press, 1988), pp. 250-262. 18. Kadivar, Nazariyaha-e dawlat dar fiqh-e Shia, p. 69-71. 19. Kadivar, Nazariyaha-e dawlat dar fiqh-e Shia, pp. 71-73. 20. Bahr al-Ulum was a disciple of al-Wahid al-Bihbahani (1706-1791), who replaced the Akhbarite with the Principled school. In the last years of his life, ­Bihbahani asked Bahr al-Ulum to issue verdicts on jurisprudential problems due to his great knowledge and piety. 21. Alireza Abazari, “Se risala-e naqd-e sufiya az dure Qajar,” in Payam-e Baharistan (Tehran: Kitabkhane, muze va markaz-e asnad-e majlis-e shura-e islami, 1387/2009), Vol. 4. No. 15, p. 40. 22. This was the monopoly over production, sale, and export of tobacco granted by Nasir al-Din Shah to the British Regie Company in 1890–1891 (see, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Hamid Dadashi, and Seyyed Vali Nasr (eds.), Expectation of the Millennium: Shi’ism in History (State University of New York Press, 1989), pp. 301-308). The fatwa banned tobacco smoking and canceled the Concession. It’s said Mirza was not happy with his fatwa, saying “we had a Shia Shah versus Ottoman. We were forced to act against him, weakening him.” He was worried a weak Shia Shah would pave the path for Ottoman colonization of Shia Iran (Shubairi Zanjani, Sayed Musa, Jor’a-e az darya (A Drop of the Sea) (Qum: Muassisa-e Kitabshinasi-e Shi’a, 1389/2010), Vol. 2, p. 363). 23. Kadivar, Nazariyaha-e dawlat dar fiqh-e Shia, p. 74. 24. Ibid, p. 77. To read an English translation of the primary text of Nuri’s Kitab Tadhkirat al-Ghafil va Irshad al-Jahil (Book of Admonition to the Headless and Guidance for the Ignorant) see Authority and Political Culture in Shi’ism, Said Amir Arjomand (ed.) (State University of New York, 1988), pp. 354-370. Another excerpt from Nuri’s publication against Constitutionalism appears in: Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Hamid Dadashi, and Seyyed Vali Nasr (eds.), Expectation of the Millennium: Shi’ism in History (State University of New York Press, 1989), pp. 324-330. 25. Kadivar, Nazariyaha-e dawlat dar fiqh-e Shia, p. 77-79. 26. Shubairi Zanjani, Sayed Ahmad, al-Kalam yajurro al-kalam (Words lead to more words) (Qum: Haqbin, 1396/2017), Vo.1, p. 195-6.

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27. However, in his first political work, Kashf al-Asrar (Unveiling of Secrets) in 1943, Khomeini attacked the Shah’s government on the grounds of its injustice, tyranny, and secularization, but he justified monarchy by citing eminent Ulama including Allama Hilli, Khawja Nasir al-Din Tusi, Shaykh Baha’i, and Allama Majlisi. Also, see Moojan Momen, An Introduction to Shi’i Islam (Yale University Press, 1985), p. 195. 28. Kadivar, Nazariyaha-e dawlat dar fiqh-e Shia, p. 115. 29. Muhsim Kadivar, Siyasatname-e Khurasani: Qataate siyasi dar asar-e Akhund Mullah Muhammad Kazim Khurasani (Tehran: Kavir, 1387/2009), p. 181. 30. The philosopher al-Afghani has a journal with the same name, so we must take care not to confuse these two works. 31. This division spread throughout Iran. Grand Ayatollah Janzani tells the story of a religious man who had a copy of the textbook Makasib. He wanted to donate his book to a library on the condition that Constitutionalists not be allowed to read it (Shubairi Zanjani, Jor’a-e az darya, Vol. 4, p. 570). There were also ­Constitutionalists who physically attacked opposing groups (Ibid, Vol. 4, p. 474). 32. Shubairi Zanjani, Jor’a-e az darya, Vol. 3, p, 384. However, there were a few mujtahids who took neither side. When they were asked about their position, they shared their reluctance. For example, see Shubairi Zanjani, Vol. 3, p. 359. 33. Ibid, Vol. 4, p. 651. 34. Ibid, Vol. 4, p. 472. 35. Kadivar, Nazariyaha-e dawlat dar fiqh-e Shia, pp. 119-126. To review an excerpt from Naini’s text in English, see Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Hamid Dadashi, and Seyyed Vali Nasr (eds.), Expectation of the Millennium: Shi’ism in History (State University of New York Press, 1989), pp. 314-318. 36. When Akhund Khurasani was the sole marja al-taqlid in the Shia world, it is said, all mujtahids in Najaf supported the Constitutional movement in Iran. In 1909, in protest against both Muhammad Ali Shah and the continued presence of Russian troops in Iran, maraji’ left Najaf and retired to Karbala, but the success of the Constitutionalists forces in Tehran caused them to return. They had the same plan for returning to Iran after 1911, which the sudden death of Akhund Khurasani interrupted (Moojan Momen, An Introduction to Shi’i Islam (Yale University Press, 1985), p. 246-247). 37. Abdulwahab Furati, Boundaries of political thinking in the seminary of Qom, in The Quarterly Journal of Political Thought in Islam (Tehran: Research Institute of Imam Khomeini & Islamic Revolution, September 2020), Vol. 5, Issue 22, p. 69. 38. Later, his disciple Naini criticized this idea to defend the orthodoxy of Shia. 39. Muhsim Kadivar, Siyasatname-e Khurasani, pp. 11-19. Also see, Denis ­Hermann, “Akhund Khurasani and the Iranian Constitutional Movement,” in Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 49, No. 3, 2013, pp. 430-453. 40. To learn detail about Ulama’s responses to Constitutionalism, see Abdol Karim Lahidji, “Constitutionalism and Clerical Authority,” in Authority and Political Culture in Shi’ism, Said Amir Arjomand (ed.) (State University of New York Press, 1988), pp. 133-158. Also see: Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Hamid Dadashi, and Seyyed Vali Nasr (eds.), Expectation of the Millennium: Shi’ism in History (State University

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of New York Press, 1989), pp. 309-331. Two diametrically opposed jurisprudential tracts, pro-Constitutionalism and anti-Constitutionalism, are available in English translation in the above-mentioned volume, Authority and Political Culture in Shi’ism. The first tract is Sayyid Adb al-Azim Imad al-Ulama Khalkhali’s Ma’na-ye Mashruta (A Treatise on the Meaning of Constitutional Government), pp. 335-354. The second, Nuri’s Kitab Tadhkirat al-Ghafil va Irshad al-Jahil (Book of Admonition to the Headless and Guidance for the Ignorant), pp. 355-370. For more study, see Said Amir Arjomand, “The Ulama’s Traditionalist Opposition to Parliamentarianism: 1970-1909,” in Middle Eastern Studies (Taylor & Francis, Ltd., 1981), Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 174-190. 41. Shubairi Zanjani, Jor’a-e az darya, Vol. 4, p. 472. 42. Shubairi Zanjani, Jor’a-e az darya, Vol. 1, pp. 581-582. 43. Muhsim Kadivar, Siyasatname-e Khurasani, pp. 61-63. 44. Cited by Kadivar, Nazariyaha-e dawlat dar fiqh-e Shia, pp. 36-37; see also Hamid Mavani, Religious Authority and Political Thought in Twelver Shi’ism: from Ali to Post Khomeini (Routledge, 2013), pp. 141-144. 45. Kadivar, Nazariyaha-e dawlat dar fiqh-e Shia, pp. 140-158. 46. Kadivar, Nazariyaha-e dawlat dar fiqh-e Shia, pp. 108-111. 47. Kadivar, Nazariyaha-e dawlat dar fiqh-e Shia, p. 22. Also, see, Gregory Rose, “Velayat-e Faqih and the Recovery of Islamic Identity in the Thought of Ayatollah Khomeini,” in Religion and Politics In Iran: Shi’ism from Quietism to Revolution, Nikki R. Keddie (ed.) (Yale University Press, 1983), 166-190. To read English version of Khomeini’s political work, see Ruhollah Khomeini, Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini, Ahmid Algar (trans.) (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981). 48. To learn more about Ayatollah Khamenei’s political ideology, see The Political Ideology of Ayatollah Khamenei Out of the Mouth of the Supreme Leader of Iran, by Yvette Hovsepian-Bearce (Routledge, 2017). 49. Cited by Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change (Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 106; also see Ruhollah Khomeini, Sahifeh Imam (A collection of Imam Khomeini’s Work) (Tehran: Moassisa-e Tanzim va nashr-e athar Imam Khomeini, 1378/1999), Vol. 20 pp. 451452. Ayatollah Khamenei replied to Khomeini and expressed his agreement. Then Khomeini wrote a second letter and praised him as familiar with and committed to jurisprudential subjects. 50. Qasim sees this idea parallel to the Pakistani Islamist’s ideologue Mawdudi. In both views, the state “is not just a means to an end, viz., to live according to norms and in pursuit of goals intended by God; it becomes an end in itself (Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change, p. 104).” This is an idea that classic juristic tradition, in both Sunni and Shia, could not tolerate (Ibid, p. 107). Also, see Roy’s account of the same degradation of religious study in Sunni Islam, from Egypt to Pakistan and Afghanistan (Oliver Roy, Globalized Islam: the search for a new ummah (Columbia University Press, 2004), pp. 158-166). Moreover, Roy highlights another important aspect of Khomeini’s radical idea. The political order does not efface itself before the implementation of Shari’a. The result appears as an Islamic

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Constitutionalism, but it is in fact a new secularity. On key questions, Iranian law remains fairly un-Islamic: for example, a Muslim foreigner has the same status as a Christian foreigner; non-Shari’a concerns are addressed by the Council of Guardians of the Constitution and the Expediency Discernment Council of the System; opposing maraji’ could be defrocked; and clerics get promoted based on their allegiance, not their religious studies. The flow creates an Islamic symbolism and runs in the direction of secularization, rather than Shia universalism (Oliver Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, Carol Volk (trans.) (Harvard University Press, 1994), 171-182). In another text, Roy named it “Islamization as a factor of secularization” (Oliver Roy, Globalized Islam: the search for a new ummah (Columbia University Press, 2004), pp. 83-92). However, Khomeini unleashed a hidden potential in classic fiqh. See the concept of maslaha throughout the text (particularly the sections “Maslaha, Diversity, and the Future” in Chapter 5 and “Transforming Fiqh” in Chapter 9) and how it establishes a connection between fiqh and secularity. 51. Kadivar, Nazariyaha-e dawlat dar fiqh-e Shia, pp. 149-156. 52. Abdulwahab Furati, “Niza’e muzzir miyan-e du-qutbi-e Hashemi-Misbah dar hawza-e inqilabi,” in Mubahithat (Qum, 1395/2017), No. 10, p. 9. 53. Ibid, p. 13. 54. As John Walbridge argues, Napoleon invading Egypt in 1789 began two centuries of Western challenge to Muslim states and cultures: military and political disasters including Navarino, the loss of the Balkans, the British occupation of Egypt and India, the French conquest of Northwest Africa, the Russian conquest of Central Asia and Transcaucasia, the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire, and the establishment of Israel; and more fundamentally the intellectual challenge to Islam (John Walbridge, “Muhhamd Baqir al-Sadr: The Search for New Foundation,” in The Most Learned of the Shi’a (Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 131). Also, Chibli Mallat shows how the protection of “the welfare of Islam in general” by the “ulama were voiced at critical junctures in the encounter with colonialism in Persian and Arab Muslims (Mallat, The Renewal of Islamic Law: Muhammad Baqer as-Sadr, Najaf and the Shi’i International (Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 59).” 55. Mallat, The Renewal of Islamic Law: Muhammad Baqer as-Sadr, Najaf and the Shi’i International, pp. 69-79. By 1979, al-Sadr was viewed as the “Khomeini of Iraq’’ (Ibid, p. 65). His famous student, Ayatollah Sayyid Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi (1948–2018), later returned to Iran and occupied very important positions including Chief Justice (1999–2009) and Chairman of the Expediency Discernment Council (2017–2018). It’s believed he was among one of the top potential successors of the supreme leader of Iran. 56. John Esposito, “Islamic State,” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World, Online, 2009. 57. Kadivar, Nazariyaha-e dawlat dar fiqh-e Shia, 127-140; Mallat, 59-78. 58. Kadivar, Nazariyaha-e dawlat dar fiqh-e Shia, pp. 167-171. 59. Farah W. Kawtharani, Political Thought in Contemporary Shia Islam: Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), pp. 103-126. 60. Kadivar, Nazariyaha-e dawlat dar fiqh-e Shia, pp. 175-186.

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61. Reza Berenjkar, “Comparing with fiqh the rational sciences are not in good situation in hawza,” in Mubahithat, (Qum, 1397/2018), No.18, p. 23. 62. Shubairi Zanjani, Jor’a-e az darya, Vol. 3, pp. 529-530. 63. Ibid, Vol. 1, p. 565. 64. Reza Berenjkar, Ibid. Willem M. Floor correctly argues that there is an exaggeration in attributing the opposition to tyranny from Shia Ulama because of a critical and pervasive characteristic of Shia Islam. Ulama were more reformers than revolutionaries (see, Willem M Floor, “The Revolutionary Character of the Ulama: Wishful Thinking of Reality?” in Religion and Politics in Iran: Shi’ism from ­Quietism to Revolution (Yale University Press, 1983), pp. 73-97). Fischer also argues against “the Orientalists’ facile generalization that Shi’ism doctrinally denies legitimacy to all temporal governments” by offering both political and cultural objections. See Michael M. J. Fischer, Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution (Harvard ­University Press, 1980), pp. 6-7. 65. Shubairi Zanjani, Jor’a-e az darya, Vol. 4, pp. 439-440. 66. Ibid, Vol. 3, p. 421.

Chapter 11

Women

My father was a religious leader, hujjat al-Islam. He was born in a remote village in Bamyan, Afghanistan, and as an orphan he met much hardship including lack of educational tools and financial support. He left his home and his country when he learned he was on the blacklist of the Communist government of Afghanistan for his religious activities and thus moved and settled in Mashhad, Iran. Recalling the lack of libraries and educational institutions in his hometown, particularly for girls, my father built three libraries in Mashhad, Qum, and Bamyan, all named after the granddaughter of the Prophet, the Lady Zainab. He hoped to build a new branch in Kabul before he died. He once told me he wanted to change the name of the Bamyan location to the Library of the Lady Zainab and the Lady Aisha in order to facilitate an intrafaith dialogue in the era of proxy and sectarian tension in the Middle East. His dedication to the Lady Zainab was identical to his devotion to educating girls. He was known for preaching Shari’a in our neighborhood, yet he was unique among his peers in encouraging female members of his extended family to become highly educated. Accordingly, Shari’a was both a source of liberation and restriction for women. My father knew the diversity of views among Shari’a scholars and respected all equally. Regardless of his own perspective, he was open to modern interpretations as long as they were presented by an expert; scholarship in Shari’a was much more important to him than any one scholar’s conclusions. His Shia perspective on the Quran, and the Household of the Prophet (Ahl al-Bayt)—and particularly the Lady Fatima and the Lady Zainab—was among the reasons for this approach. The Quran stimulates discussion on women in two directions: the personal and the social. The first covers the spiritual sphere, the personal relationship with God, both in this world and the next. Socially, the Quran contains many prescriptions on daily conduct and 244

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social issues like marriage, divorce, dress, property, inheritance, and civic liberty and rights. Regarding the personal dimension, women are considered unambiguously equal to men. But the place of women in society, as Carole Hillenbrand argues, is susceptible to many readings and interpretations which are apt to vary from age to age.1 To grasp the sophistication of the Quran on the topic, consider the following verses: God sets forth, for an example to the unfaithful, the wife of Noah and the wife of Lut: they were married to two of our righteous servants, but they were unfaithful to them. Nothing could protect them from the (wrath) of God and they were told to enter hell fire with the others. And God sets forth, as an example to those who have faith, the wife of Pharaoh: Behold she said: “Lord, establish for me a house in Paradise in your presence. Rescue me from Pharaoh and his deeds and save me from the unjust people.” And Mary the daughter of ‘Imran, who guarded her chastity; and We breathed into (her body) of Our spirit; and she testified to the truth of the words of her Lord and of His Revelations, and was one of the devout (servants). (66:10–12)

These verses exhort Muslims, both male and female, to look to four women as the role models of guided and misguided people. The wives of two Prophets serve as examples of the misguided, while Pharaoh’s wife and Mary are rightly guided. The use of female figures to demonstrate ideal fidelity and infidelity highlights the equal responsibility of both sexes. We also see how females can be role models for faithful men. The fact that both unfaithful women were married to Prophets underlines the importance of individual choice and spiritual connection more than social or even family life in terms of faith. More importantly, none of the four had a secluded life. Rather, all were involved in leadership, missionary environments, and the social aspects of life. This connection between spiritual and social spheres reaches an elevated level in Shia Islam if we consider the lives of Fatima and Zainab. Fatima alZahra (d. 632), the most beloved daughter of the Prophet, married Ali, the first Imam, and gave birth to Hassan and Husayn and Zainab, thus earning the name “Mother of the Imams.” Fatima too is highly venerated among Shias, both because of her own unique spirituality, which granted her “a heavenly intercession with untold power before God’s throne,” to use Christopher Paul Clohessy’s words,2 and because of her historic sermon of Fadak against the first Caliph to defend her rights of property and inheritance. There is a common motto in Shia that if Husayn made the heroic sacrifice at Karbala, Zainab kept it alive throughout history. Her steadfastness in accompanying Husayn from Medina to Karbala and Damascus, and her brave speeches to the public

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and in governmental and caliphal castles are sources of social and political imagination for women in Islam. The powerful Fatimid dynasty (909–1171) honored Fatima by taking her name, and the name of the chief center of Islamic and Arabic learning in the world, al-Azhar University (Jami’at alAzhar), alludes to Fatima al-Zahra. Thus, one can conclude that while Shia theology puts women at the center of faith to some extent, Shia jurisprudence operates more within the classical jurisprudence shared with Sunnis, in which women are expected to conform to conservative societal norms, primarily through raising children, keeping house, and pleasing their husbands. Therefore, a similar diversity of jurisprudential perspectives emerged throughout history. To remain within the scope of this study and so as not to overburden the reader, I will elaborate jurisprudential views of mujtahids into two divisions: premodern concepts and modern ideas.

PREMODERN SCHOLARSHIP The most significant areas of women’s social lives addressed in jurisprudence are those related to family life, with a particular attention paid to the issue of modest dress. Also covered are marriage contracts and dowries, rulings on divorce and the custody of children, life expenses, and inheritances. All are bound up with the traditional Islamic image of the family, which emphasizes the domestic roles of females and the activities of men outside of the home. Local customs,3 masculine understanding of feminine nature, and a presupposition-loaded view of female sexuality4 joined with ambivalent Quranic texts and hadiths played a large role in introducing legal ambivalence with regard to women’s treatment as objects versus as persons.5 Premodern Ulama issued fatwas in this context on different aspects of women’s life. Economic and financial issues are an exception, since the Quran clearly recognizes women’s ownership of their properties and the fruits of their labors (4:32) as well as their share of inheritances (4:7 and 11–12 and 176). However, I will limit my discussion to questions of the public sphere, including judgments, administration, and religious leadership. It appears that the first time maleness is asserted as a condition for a qualified mujtahid to issue a fatwa appears in al-Shahid al-Thani’s (1505–1558) magnum opus The Beautiful Garden in Interpreting the Damascene Glitter. He writes, “The conditions to issue fatwa are: maturity, intellect, and maleness.” However, Muhammad Kazem Tabataba’i Yazdi (1831–1919), known for his anti-constitutionalist stance and for his masterpiece in jurisprudence Urwa al-Wuthqa, established a tradition among grand ayatollahs considering maleness as a necessary condition for the authority of imitation (marja’). This book served as a primary text for the next generations of mujtahids to

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write their risala and clearly influenced them on this point. These mujtahids include Abul-Hasan Isfahani, Haeri Yazdi, Khomeini, Araki, and Khoei. One notable exception was Sayed Muhsin Hakim, who argued there is no specific scriptural reason to limit this position to men. If the word “man” is used in some hadiths, it is simply due to the Arabic culture of using male nouns to refer to both sexes. The majority of premodern mujtahids agreed that women cannot work as judges or justices. Shaykh Tusi, known as Shaykh al-Ta’ifah (995–1067), in his book on comparative jurisprudence al-Khilaf fi l-Ahkam (The Compendium on the Law) distinctly declares that no female can act as a judge with regard to religious law. His strong statement indicates he did not see any contesting views among Shia fuquha. He declares that fundamentally there is no right for a person to judge the disputes of others. The privilege to judge can only arise from an acute specific need, and there is no valid argument that women can hold this position. Rather, there is a hadith from the Prophet saying that the people who are led by a female will not reach salvation. Tusi, indeed, expanded the term leadership (wilayat) to judgment (qizawat). Later mujtahids, including Shahid Awwal, Muhaqqiq Hilli, Allama Hilli, Shahid Thani, Fayz Kashani, the author of Jawahir,6 and Khoei all concurred that maleness is a necessary condition for judges and justices. Many claim there is a consensus among Shia Ulama on the issue. However, a few mujtahids decided differently. While Mirza Qumi, the author of Qaqanin, and Muqaddas Aldabili did not reject the consensus, they distinguished between the position of judge and the act of judging. They believed the former is forbidden for females, but the latter is not. Ironically, while Shia highly honor the Lady Fatima and the Lady Zainab for their involvement in leading political opposition, the premodern mujtahids pay less attention to women’s political rights and their leadership in society and ummah; rather it is viewed negatively. By premodern jurisprudence, I refer to social-intellectual dimensions more than time: meaning that if a mujtahid acknowledges crucial changes in modern sociopolitical life and updates his jurisprudence to subscribe to modern scholarship, I count him as modern. So, many living ayatollahs including Vahid Khurasani can be included among the premodern mujtahids, while deceased ayatollahs such as Taliqani7 and Salihi NajafAbadi represented modern jurisprudence. A potent example of premodern scholarship in current times is Risala Badi’a (An Innovative Treatise) written by Allama Ayatollah Sayed Muhammad Husain Husayni Tihrani (1925–1995),8 which rejects the modern tendency toward egalitarianism on women’s rights in political leadership, judgeship, and participation in jihad. The book cites many verses of the Quran and hadiths and uses linguistic, philosophical, and jurisprudential

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arguments to justify the premodern perspective that women are fit only for housekeeping roles: their emotions are stronger than their critical thinking, and their physiques are unsuited to waging war.9 As noted in the book’s subtitle, its focus is to interpret verse 34, chapter 4 of the Quran, surveying the long history and vast exegetical literature of both Sunni and Shia to infer that men must run public affairs, including leadership and judgeship. Men possess power (qudra), dominance (ihata), and sovereignty (sulta), and women are obliged to follow them just as the commanded one (ma’mur) follows the commander (amir).10 In a detailed account, Husayni Tihrani cites all great mujtahids as disqualifying women from the position of judgeship.11 Regarding participation in jihad, in addition to claiming a consensus he highlights hadiths saying that jihad for women means staying home and taking care of their family12—though he does not disapprove of women helping soldiers logistically or medically. Finally, he gathers historical and hadith literature from both Sunni and Shia sources showing that many people in the time of Aisha, the wife of the Prophet, condemned her for participating in battle against Ali, the fourth Caliph. This condemnation was not because of her opposition to Ali but because a lady was not permitted to go into battle.13 This shows how Shia becomes closer to Sunni when the focus is on jurisprudence and distances itself from its theological promotion of Fatima and Zainab. Other severe restrictions on women’s rights in classical jurisprudence include the following list, though they have their own justification with regard to jurisprudence’s overarching image of family and faith. Mostly the qisas (retaliation in kind or retributive justice) and diya (financial compensation) for women are considered less than for men, both for injuries and for deaths.14 There is a long discussion among mujtahids to reconcile verse 12, chapter 4 of the Quran and many hadiths regarding a widow’s share of her husband’s inheritance if she has not given birth. The Quranic verse considers the woman’s share of all her late husband’s properties, but many hadiths limit it to some particular properties excluding land. The dominant conclusion is that a widow in this situation should not inherit land (including farmland) or buildings but instead receive payment. A married female can’t leave home without prior permission from her husband, though Naini and Khoei did not share this idea. Only the husband has the right to grant a divorce on his own initiative (rij’i). Divorce through mutual agreement (mubarat) is also possible, but only if the husband announces it. Finally, a wife’s request to divorce against her husband’s will may only proceed if she meets his conditions by forfeiting her dowry (khula’). Temporary marriage is allowed for males, whether married or unmarried, but not for married females. A majority of Shia fuqaha consider a nine-year-old female mature (baligh), a subject of prescribed obligations

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and rights for female Muslims. Only Fayz Kashani reasoned that different obligations require different age qualifications. For example, fasting by age 13, adopting hijab by age 10, and being a subject of the fixed jurisprudential punishment (hudud) by age 9. Mujtahids also tackle the issue of hijab (covering)15 in two contexts: prayer (women must cover themselves for prayer) and marriage (through the dating process). Accordingly, a free mature female Muslim must cover herself before a mature non-mahram male (mahram is a person to whom marriage is prohibited because of lineage). However, an enslaved female Muslim and an elderly female Muslim who does not wish to marry are not obliged to wear hijab. Most mujtahids hold that hijab consists of covering the whole body except the face and hands. They also recommend the faithful to limit conversation with non-mahram to necessary talks. Muslim females are not allowed to touch or be touched by non-mahram except in a setting where it is required, although touching through a cloth or glove is acceptable. Finally, because of premodern conditions and the marginalized status of Shias in Islamic politics and government, democratic activities such as elections, public demonstrations, and the political participation of women are not discussed in major classic jurisprudence. Like all other aspects of jurisprudence, one can talk of dominant ideas in premodern jurisprudence on women’s rights and obligations but not of an established uniformity. The change of jurisprudential ideas throughout a mujtahid’s life was and is common among fuqaha as they encounter new arguments and evidence. This is one reason that many mujtahids expressed different opinions on the same issue in their various treatises. The transformation from premodern to modern society only enhanced that trend. Besides ontological and epistemological challenges, modernity extended the socioeconomic-political fields for both the individual and the community. Ayatollah Khomeini can be seen as a transitional mujtahid, half in the classic lineage and half in the modern. Regarding individual rights and obligations of women, Khomeini appears premodern in his outlook. His religious manual Tahrir al-Wasila is indistinguishable from premodern jurisprudence in terms of women. But viewed through his political activism, a different portrait emerges. Before the Iranian Revolution and his rise to power, he spoke clearly against a woman’s right to vote,16 to be elected to parliament or city council,17 and even to work in public offices.18 In 1967, Khomeini proclaimed a divorce based on Family Protection Law to be void, denouncing it as contrary to Islam.19 After the revolution, however, Khomeini insisted that women enjoy the same rights as men in education, work, voting, and holding office,20 even going so far as to encourage women to participate in elections as both voters and candidates.21

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REFORMIST SCHOLARSHIP Considering the scope of this study, I’ve limited this section to a small number of influential mujtahids from different parts of Shia majority populations in Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon. In Iran, there are two figures worth mentioning who introduced reformist ideas on women’s rights within the limits of classical jurisprudence. Ayatollah Nematollah Salihi NajafAbadi (1923–2006) was a brave and innovative ayatollah who dedicated himself to criticizing the dominant perspective in Shia jurisprudence by prioritizing rationalism. He studied before Rahim Arbab and Borujerdi. He published fresh ideas on religious ghuluww (religious extremism) in Shia faith,22 jihad in Islam,23 a radically new understanding of the events at Karbala, and a rethinking of Islamic ecumenism. Several of Salehi’s students and readers, including Hashemi Rafsanjani, later became leading members of the Iranian Islamic regime, though Salihi himself was not received warmly because of the boldness of his ideas and character. In his treatise Qizavat-e Zan dar Fiqh-e Islami (Women’s Judgeship in Islamic Jurisprudence), Salihi called for updating jurisprudence in accordance with new developments in various aspects of life. As our time and space change, our way of seeing a topic changes too, allowing the same topic to be subject to two different laws (hukm). Salihi gives the example of women participating in politics; it was considered haram before the Iranian Revolution but allowed (ja’iz) and even required (wajib) after. Accordingly, he endeavors to reexamine jurisprudential perspectives on women’s judgeship. Why have traditional jurists not permitted it? Was gender the reason? Salihi says the universal principle is to give people responsibilities that match their abilities. Universal and rational principles are like mathematical axioms, neither accepting exceptions nor requiring religious confirmation. He also believes men and women have differing physical, mental, and emotional traits. Considering both points, Salihi questions whether they are compatible with the position of women’s judgeship. He scrutinizes the arguments offered by premodern mujtahids to disqualify women for the position of judge. By his account, the premodern jurists emphasize three verses of the Quran: Men are in charge of women, because God has made one of them to excel over the other, and because they spend their wealth on them. (4:34) And they (women) have rights similar to those (of men) over them in kindness, and men are a degree above them. (2:228) And stay quietly in your houses, and make not a dazzling display, like that of the former Times of Ignorance. (33:22)

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Salihi holds that the first verse does not disqualify women from public positions including judgeship, leadership positions, and combat because the text addresses family life rather than public affairs, noting the stress on family life expenses. The same is true of the second verse, because it discusses the issue of divorce and refers to physical and psychological privileges irrelevant to judgeship. Finally, Salihi argues that the last verse addresses the wives of the Prophet, asking them not to appear in public without proper covering. In great detail, Salihi scrutinizes several hadiths narrated in both Sunni and Shia sources to show they do not meet the necessary criteria to support the traditional view. After criticizing Ibn Qudamah’s (1147–1223) view on the issue from Sunni jurisprudence, Salihi wrestles with arguments by two Shia mujtahids on the issue. Shaykh Tusi argued that occupying the position of judgeship is a religious status and thus needs a religious justification. Since we lack a religious justification, women can’t occupy this position. In contrast, Salihi argues that judgeship is not an act of worship (ibada) requiring religious imprimatur. In general, all matters unrelated to worship are permitted as long as there is no particular religious objection, which is missing here. Salihi also criticizes another mujtahid who cites the consensus among jurists opposing women’s judgeship. Salihi writes that a consensus based on jurisprudential argument (dalil-e ijtihadi) is valid only if the argument per se is valid, not because of the consensus. He finds the dominant argument to be invalid on this point. Salihi finally concludes that there are no verses in the Quran or valid hadiths that block women from holding the position of judge. Therefore, there is no reason to disallow women to become judges; in general, women can acquire the same positions as men if they possess the necessary qualifications. In other words, gender by itself does not disqualify them. However, Salehi’s last point is that judgeship is very stressful and might distract women from concentrating on family issues. Though he believes Shari’a permits it, he concludes that women aren’t a good fit for the position.24 While Ayatollah Salihi initiated a reformist, modern erudition in jurisprudence in terms of women’s rights, he was not a grand ayatollah with the status of marja’iyyah, a source of imitation for lay people. This position was achieved by Ayatollah Saanei. Grand Ayatollah Yusuf Saanei (1937–2020) studied in Qum before Borujerdi, Araki, and Khomeini. After the Iranian Revolution, he served for a couple of years as a fighi member of the Guardian Council, but he eventually moved to Qum and dedicated himself to jurisprudence, publishing his risala in 1993. Saanei was known as a brave ayatollah who issued innovative fatwas to promote women’s rights, democracy, and pluralism. His modern fatwas and political positions motivated the Qum Seminary Scholar’s Community to announce on January 2, 2010, that Saanei was not qualified for marja’iyyah, a statement which was rejected by many

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grand ayatollahs in Najaf and Qum. Extracting the maximum potential from classical jurisprudence, Saanei revolutionized women’s rights and extended his reformism to acts of worship. While the dominant view in Shia considers the age of 9 as a condition of religious puberty for girls, Saanei chose age 13. He believed women can become maraji’, arguing that considering masculinity as a condition requires discrimination which contradicts the spirit of Islam. Similarly, he found no religious justification for banning women from judgeship. While the majority of Shi’a jurists assign custody of an underage child in the absence of the father to the grandfather, Saanei elevated mothers over grandfathers. He contended that diya (blood money) for infliction by mistake or quasi-deliberate infliction should be the same for men and women. He believed in egalitarianism in terms of qisas (retaliatory justice). His revolutionary fatwas touched on a range of topics including inheritance, witness, adoption, wives leaving home without prior permission from their husbands, divorce, polygamy, and temporary marriage. Understanding that his rulings represented minority perspectives, Saanei often articulated his reasoning in his fatwas. Surveying his thought process, one can conclude that Saanei prioritized rationalism over literal understanding of the holy texts, believed in the principle of justice and fairness, and, when confronted with contradictory hadiths on a given subject, preferred the one which offers more free choice and liberty without fear that the hadith opposes the established jurisprudence.25 Similar reforms on public subjects like political leadership, religious authority, and judgeship were made in Najaf by grand Ayatollah Muhammad Is’haq al-Fayadh (b. 1930). The second marja after Ali al-Sistani in Najaf Seminary, Al-Fayadh was born in Ghazni, Afghanistan, and moved to Iraq when he was ten years old. He studied before Khoei and supported al-Sistani’s chairmanship of Najaf seminary after the death of Khoei in 1992. In 2008, al-Fayadh published a treatise responding to 25 questions by a PhD candidate on women’s position and rights in the polity of Islam. Distinguishing between family and public spheres, he writes that apparent inequality is acceptable in the former but not in the latter. He argues that a jurist can acknowledge distinct rights for males and females if there is a clear religious text (nass or zuhur). Otherwise, it is a mantaqat-ul-faraq (literally “open space,” a contestable area in terms of law); the faith has no certain law addressing it, leaving it to the government to make law considering local requirements. Al-Fayadh states that a woman can take any public position—government, police, military, or intelligence—so long as she dresses properly. He considers these roles no different than other public jobs such as bus driver or airline pilot. There is no reason to limit political leadership, religious leadership,26 and judgeship to male members of society, and women’s testimony on cultural, social, economic, and political issues should be equal to men’s.

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Al-Fayadh disapproves of hadiths attributed to the Prophet saying women fail in faith and intellect, arguing these sayings contradict our daily life experience and common sense. In contrast, other hadiths and Quranic passages imply there is no difference between the two sexes. He takes the same rational approach to disqualify another hadith attributed to the Prophet, which says a community will not arrive at salvation if it is led by a woman. Al-Fayadh also rejects the existence of a valid consensus (ijma) on banning women from leading a community. A consensus is valid only when it ensures us that it includes the concurrence of an infallible Imam, and according to al-Fayadh this certainty can’t be reached. Al-Fayadh holds that verses 33 and 53 of chapter 33 of the Quran address only the wives of the Prophet, not limiting other faithful females. Moreover, a woman can put some restrictions on her husband with regard to family issues before marriage if she wishes.27 These progressive ideas echo the beliefs of two more disciples of Khoei in Lebanon who supported reformism as well. Ayatollahs Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah and Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din published works on women’s issues responding to a nascent gender discourse in Lebanon and parting from the post-Khomeini Iranian portrait of women’s role in society.28 While Shams al-Din wrote mainly for lay intellectuals and Shia Ulama, Fadlallah addressed simple believers to guide them in their daily lives, with both approaches creating what some authors termed “authenticated” Shia. Fadlallah returned to the Lady Fatima, the daughter of the Prophet, to portray the ideal Muslim woman, not just to reject the historical school of his opponents but to promote his own rationalistic school. His book Al-Zahra al-Qudwa cited the life of Fatima to exemplify how a Muslim woman can be culturally responsible and fight against injustice; to be a person, not just a female. Fatima gives Fadlallah the opportunity to criticize the Western notion of “gender equality,” in order to promote a “humane equality,” an equality that means men and women’s parity in their humanity. Fatima’s participation in the discussion of the caliphate upon the death of the Prophet and her defense of her right to the property she inherited from him paint a picture of a political activist who used all available opportunities without losing any of her Muslim virtues. This makes a strong case for the legitimization of women’s participation in political life. Both Lebanese ayatollahs are clear about their position that women should be allowed to run for and be elected to high public office. Shams al-Din argues that in our time the ruler cannot govern alone, as he is accountable to other branches of power freely elected by the people, so women and men are equal to run the government. If there is valid hadith saying women are not allowed to run the government, it is about tyranny. Fadlallah maintains this particular hadith is not mentioned in Twelver Shia books. In contrast, he says governing today is not a form of absolute rule as it was in the past because of the system of checks and balances. Also, this

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hadith contradicts the Quranic example of the Queen of Sheba (27:33–35) as a woman of greater rationality, balance, and long-term planning capacity than her male counterparts. There is nothing in the Quran and the Sunnah that disapproves of a woman’s right to work—whether for income or volunteering. In contrast, citing many Quranic verses and hadiths he concludes women are allowed to work in all fields even if work entails mingling with men as colleagues, supervisors, or clients in the public sphere. Fadlallah argues the weakness and backwardness of women in Muslim societies are not innate but come as the result of societal negligence in building their minds and personalities. While Fadlallah remains a traditionalist by saying that women are psychologically and physically weaker than men, he makes a modernist turn when he affirms that this weakness can be transformed into a strength if “we strengthen women’s minds with knowledge, their reason with logic and their bodies with activities.” Society can make women less emotive by teaching them how to be rational and “how to face problems in an objective manner.” Fadlallah encourages women to pursue professions that prepare them financially and intellectually to face the difficulties of life and not be left at the mercy of others. A woman can go out to work without her husband’s permission or even against her husband’s will if doing so doesn’t interfere with his marital (i.e., sexual) rights. However, both ayatollahs agree with the traditional argument that veiling (hijab) except for the face, the hands, and the feet is mandatory for all Muslim women. Shams al-Din made a distinction concerning the meaning of the word hijab itself. The first is segregation, a ruling which concerns only the wives of the Prophet and not Muslim women in general, who are allowed to meet with non-relative males whether in a social or a political setting. The second meaning is hiding the body and hair from any non-relative male who has reached puberty and concealing her genital organs from anyone except her husband. However, Shams al-Din discourages calling women ‘awra, something common in popular religious language. Linguistically ‘awra means a hidden or secret place. Therefore, a person’s ‘awra is the part of his or her body that must be kept hidden. It also refers to anything that causes shame when exposed. In the terminology of this Islamic jurisprudence, ‘awra refers to the area of the body that must be covered with appropriate clothing (i.e., the genital organs). Sham al-Din states that as it is for males, a female’s ‘awra is from her navel to her knees. Fadlallah argues that the true hijab is both physical and moral: physically a woman should conceal her body, and the moral aspect appears in women’s public behavior. She should enter the public sphere as a person, not as a woman, meaning avoiding drawing attention to herself as a female. He concludes that abandoning the physical hijab threatens the hijab’s moral

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aspect; the hijab is not only a personal choice, it is also a social issue. Nonetheless, a society must reinforce a woman’s capacity for logical thinking and rationality, not only through education but also through the experience of real life. This experience can only be obtained when a woman ventures outside the confines of her home. Finally, the veil’s purpose is to neutralize the perception of the woman as a female in order to prioritize her status as a person.29 To end this section with the women’s veil in classical jurisprudence, one needs to notice there are a couple of sentences in the Quran referring to hijab, most importantly chapter 24 verse 31, though the same chapter verse 60 exempts some women, widely interpreted as those who are past childbearing age. In premodern jurisprudence, mujtahids briefly addressed the issue of hijab in two settings: clothing during prayer and meeting a non-relative male to marry. Modern life brought new attention to the hijab, giving it a new direction and meaning. The story of grand Ayatollah Sayed Muhammad Kazem Shari’at Madari (1906–1986) reveals the multilayered nature of hijab in the modern era. Shari’at Madari was among the first three to reach the rank of maraji’ in Qum (alongside Gulpayegani and Mar’ashi-Najafi) before the Iranian Revolution. He did not support the revolution and afterward was accused of being part of a plot to bomb Khomeini’s home and overthrow the Islamic republic. On April 21, 1982, the Qum Seminary Scholar’s Community released a statement disqualifying Shari’at Madari from marja’iyyah, an unprecedented phenomenon in the history of Shia seminaries. Years later on February 22, 1989, Khomeini acknowledged that decision as a sign of the alliance between the Scholar’s Community and the revolution. It’s said that two grand ayatollahs, Gulpayegani and Haeri, once asked Shari’at Madari to make a joint announcement that “hijab is among the fundamentals (zaruriyyat) of Islam.” Shari’at Madari refused, arguing that Farah Pahlavi, the queen of Iran from 1959 to 1979, does not wear hijab, and we don’t want to imply that she contradicts the fundamentals of Islam.30 Grand Ayatollah Muntazeri also wrote in his last fatwas that shaking hands with non-Muslims or non-practicing Muslim females is not haram if it’s not for lust and will be considered impolite if it’s not done.31 Recently grand Ayatollah Nasir Mkarim Shirazi (b. 1927) issued a controversial fatwa that if a secular university makes enrollment in a course subject to removing hijab, Muslim females can accept this condition for the future of the community. All of these cases illustrate how mujtahids attempt to discover new meanings and provide new guidance when a rule related to prayer in a premodern society encounters the realities of modern life, highlighting both the dynamism and limits of these Ulama.

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NOTES 1. Carole Hillenbrand, Introduction to Islam: Beliefs and Practices in Historical Perspective (Thames & Hudson, 2015), pp. 247-273. 2. Christopher Paul Clohessy recently published two fresh studies on Fatima and Zainab focusing on some classic texts. They are: Fatima, Daughter of Muhammad (Gorgias press, 2013); and Half of My Heart: the Narratives of Zaynab, Daughter of Ali (Gorgias, 2018). Though both studies focus on spiritual aspects and some classic texts and particular viewpoints, they depict how big a role these figures play in shaping Shia faith and practice. To directly read a text in English about Fatima and her sinlessness by Shaykh Tabarsi see: “A Shi’i Narrative on the Spiritual Status of Fatima az-Zahra,” in Islamic Theological Themes: A Primary Source Reader, John Renard (ed.), (University of California Press, 2014), pp. 309-313. To read a modernized and revolutionary image of Fatima suggested by Dr. Ali Shari’ati see the scripts in: Jane Dammen McAuliffe, The Norton Anthology of World Religion: Islam (W.W. Norton & Company, 2015), pp. 607-618. 3. Hillenbrand, pp. 253-4. 4. Shahla Haeri, Law of Desire: Temporary Marriage in Shi’i Iran (revised ­edition) (Syracuse University Press, 2014), p. 203. 5. Ibid, p. 200; Shahla Haeri developed this idea in her study of temporary marriage (mut’ah), a controversial tradition specific to Shias. Although the book is focused on this kind of marriage in Iran, it presents the broad legal and sociocultural aspects of the topic to demonstrate jurisprudential approaches to femininity. To learn an insider’s view of mut’ah see: Allamah Tabataba’i and Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “Mut’ah or Temporary Marriage,” in Allamah Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabataba’i, Shi’ite Islam, Seyyed Hossein Nasr (trans.) (State University of New York Press, 1977), 227-230. Carole Hillenbrand argues that both Sunnis and Shias agree that mut’ah was allowed by the Prophet, but later on Sunnis banned it due to fear that it does not provide the man with legitimate offspring (Carole Hillenbrand, Introduction to Islam (Thames & Hudson, 2015), pp. 164-165). 6. In Arabic authors are often described as the sahib (literally “owner”) of their works. 7. To read excerpts from Ayatollah Sayyid Mahmud Taliqani on Shia conception of Islamic economics and ownership see: Expectation of the Millennium: Shi’ism in ­History (State University of New York Press, 1989), pp. 126-129. To learn about Taliqani see: Mangol Bayat, “Mahmud Taleqani and the Iranian Revolution,” in Shi’ism, Resistance, and Revolution, Martin Kramer (ed.) (Routledge, 2019), pp. 67-94. 8. To learn about his life and mystical theology, see Allamah Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Husayni Tihrani, Life After Death: Resurrection, Judgment and the Final Destiny of the Soul, translated, annotated and introduced by Mohammad H. Faghfoory, Vol. 1&2 (Chicago: Kazi publication, 2015 & 2017). 9. Sayed Muhammad Husayn Husayni Tihrani, Risala Badi’a (Mashhad: Allama Tabataba’i publication, 1418/1997), p. 34-41. 10. Ibid, p. 48-88. 11. Ibid, pp. 127-133. 12. Ibid, pp. 121-124.

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13. Ibid, pp. 219-222. 14. Ayatollah Hussiani Tabataba’i claimed there is a consensus among mujtahids. He points out how this idea is connected to verse 34 chapter 4 that considers men above women in sociopolitical affairs. In his historical account, the Prophet changed his first verdict on the equal right of qisas when he received the later revelation (Ibid, 81-82). 15. Hijab is a modern term in Shia jurisprudence. The traditional term is satr (cover). 16. Ruhollah Khomeini, Sahifeh Imam (A collection of Imam Khomeini’s Work) (Tehran: Moassisa-e tanzim va nashr-e athar Imam Khomeini, 1378/1999), Vol. 1, pp. 78 & 191. 17. Ibid, Vol. 1, pp. 180 & 191. 18. Ibid, Vol. 1, p. 117. 19. Nikki R. Keddie ed., Religion and Politics in Iran: Shi’ism from Quietism to Revolution (Yale University Press, 1983), pp. 14 & 17. 20. Khomeini, Sahifeh Imam, Vol. 5. p. 189. 21. Khomeini, Sahifeh Imam, Vol. 18. p. 403. 22. Ayatollah Salehi Najafabadi, Religious Extremism: Intellectual and ­Doctrinal Deviance in Islam, Hamid Mavani (trans.) (Montreal: Organization for the ­Advancement of Islamic Knowledge, 2009). 23. Ayatollah Salehi Najafabadi, Jihad in Islam, Hamid Mavani trans., (Montreal: Organization for the Advancement of Islamic Knowledge, 2012). 24. Nimatullah Salihi NajafAbadi, Qizawat-e zan dar fiqh-e islami hamrah ba chand maqala-e digar (Tehran: Omid-e frada, 1386 (2nd edition)), p. 13-51. 25. Ruykardi be huquq-e zanan (be hamrah-e mururi kutah bar zendegi, mabani, va fatawa-e hazrat ayatollah al-uzma Sanei) (Qum: Intisharat fiqh al-thaqalain, 1397/2018), pp. 259-285. 26. Though historically, no female marja appeared in Shia communities, there were a few female mujtahids (technical Arabic term: mujtahida). There is a chapter on two current female mujtahids for English readers: Mirjam Kunkler and Roja Fazaeli, “The Life of Two Mujtahidahs: Female Religious Authority in 20th Century Iran,” in Women, Leadership, and Mosques: Changes in Contemporary Islamic Authority (Brill, 2022), pp. 127-160. 27. Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Ishaq Al-Fayadh, Namuzaj lil-majmua asila hawl muqa’ al-mira fi al-nidam al-siyasi al-Islami (Najaf: Dar al-Budra, 2100). 28. Rola el-Husseini, “Women, Work, and Political Participation in Lebanese Shi’a Contemporary Thought: The Writings of Ayatollahs Fadlallah and Shams al-Din,” in Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East (Duke University Press, 2008), Vo. 28, No. 2, pp. 273-282. 29. Rola el-Husseini, Women, Work, and Political Participation in Lebanese Shi’a Contemporary Thought: The Writings of Ayatollahs Fadlallah and Shams al-Din, pp. 273-282. 30. Muhammad Sadiq Sadiqi Givi, Khaterat Ayatollah Khalkhali (Tehran: Sayed, 1379/2000), p. 416. 31. Ahmad Ghabel (1954-2012) who received a permission for Ijtihad from his teacher grand ayatollah Muntazeri authored a treatise arguing the obligatory hijab does not include hair and neck.

Appendix 1 The Geneaology of the Prophet, of the Twelve Imams, and Major Adjacent Hawzas

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Appendix 2 Prominent Shia Ulama Since the Twelfth Imam and Their Major Contributions to Shi’a Islam

Nayib-i Khass (Special deputies appointed by the Twelfth Imam)—261/874– 329/941 (The Minor Occultation) I. II. III. IV.

Uthman ibn Sa’id al-Amri Muhammad ibn Uthman (son of Uthman ibn Said) Abul al-Qasim Husayn ibn Ruh (Nawbakhti) Ali ibn Muhammad Thimmari (d. 941)

Well-known Nayib-i Amm (General deputies to the Twelfth Imam)—941–? (The Major Occultation) 1. Shaykh Kulayni (Abu Ja'far Muhammad) (d. 939, buried in Baghdad), author of al-Kafi, the greatest Shi’a collection of hadith 2. Shaykh al- Saduq Muhammad ibn 'All ibn Babawayh (d. 991, buried in Rey)—author of Man La Yahduruhu al-Faqih 3. Shaykh Mufid, Muhammad ibn Nu' man (d. 1022, buried in Kadhimiya)—theologian and rationalist jurist 4. Sayed Murtada ibn Abu al-Qasim ibn (d. 1044, buried in Kadhimiya)—rationalist jurist; brother of Sharif al-Radi, collector of the Nahj al-Balagha 5. Shaykh al-Ta'ifa Abu Ja'far Muhammad in Hasan Shaykh Tusi (d. 1067, buried in Najaf), founder of Najaf Hawza and author of Tahdhib al-Ahkam and al-Istibsar 6. Shaykh Tabarsi (Abu 'Ali Fadl) (d. 1153, buried in Mashhad)—exegete of the Quran 7. Ibn Shahrashub (Shaykh Rashiduddin Abu Ja'far Muhammad in 'Ali) (d. 1192, buried in Aleppo), author of Ma'alim al-Ulama and Manaqib 261

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8. Ibn Idris Hilli (Shaykh Muhammad ibn Ahmad) (d. 1201, buried in Hillah)—author of al-Sara’ir 9. Sayed Ibn Tawus al-Hasani al-Husayni (d. 1266, buried in Hillah)— author of al-Luhoof 10. Khwaja Nasiruddin Tusi (1201–1274, buried in Kadhimiya)—Polymath, philosopher and theologian—prime minister under Hulagu Khan—mixed Peripatetic Philosophy and Theology (kalam) 11. Muhaqqiq-i Hilli (Muhaqqiq al-Awwal) (Shaykh Jafar ibn Hasan) (d. 1277, buried in Hillah)—author of Sha’rai al-Islam fi masa’il al-halal wal-haram 12. Ibn Maytham al-Bahrani (d. 1280, buried in Manama)—wrote a Sufi interpretation on Nahj al-Balagha 13. Allama Hilli (Shaykh Jamaluddin Abu Mansur Hasan ibn Yusuf ibn Mutahhar) (d. 1325, buried in Najaf)—converted Sultan Muhammad-Khuda-banda 14. Sayed Haydar Amuli (1319–1385, buried in Amol)—proposed the union of Sufism and Shia faith 15. Shahid-i Awwal (Abu Abdullah Muhammad ibn Jamaluddin al-Amili (killed in 1374), author of Lum'a) 16. Shaykh Nuruddin Ali ibn Abd al-Ali al-Amili (Muhaqqiq Karaki and Muhaqqiq Thani) (d. 1529, buried in Najaf)—author of Jami almaqasid fi sharh al-qawa’id 17. Shahid-i Thani (Shaykh Zaynuddin), author of Sharh al-Lum'a (killed in 1558) 18. Ahmad ibn Muhammad Muqaddas Ardabili (d. 1526, buried in Najaf) 19. Shaykh Baha'i (Muhammad ibn Husayn al-Jubba'i al-Amili) (d. 1621, buried in Mashhad)—polymath and the first writer of jurisprudential manual (risala) 20. Majlisi Awwal (Muhammad Taqi) (d. 1659, buried in Isfahan)—Sufi-oriented 21. Majlisi Thani (Allama Majlisi) (Muhammad-Baqir ibn MuhammadTaqi) (d. 1699, buried in Isfahan)—anti-Sufism—author of Bihar al-Anwar 22. Sadr al-Din Muhammad Shirazi (Mulla Sadra) (1572–1641, buried in Basra)—Founder of Transcendental Wisdom 23. Muhammad Amin Astarabadi (d. 1626, buried in Mecca)—Founder of Akhbarism 24. Muhsin Fayz Kashani (1598–1680, buried in Kashan)—theosophist and exegete of the Quran 25. Muhammad al-Hurr al-Amili (1624–1693, buried in Mashhad)— author of Wasa’il al-Shia

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26. Muhammad ibn Hasan (Muhammad Isfahani Fadil Hindi) (d. 1724, buried in Isfahan), author of Kashf al-Lisan 27. Shaykh Ahmad Jazayiri al-Najafi (d. 1737, buried in Najaf) 28. Vahid Bihbahani (Muhammad-Baqir) (d. 1793, buried in Karbala)— defeated Akhbarism and established Usuli school 29. Bahr al-Ulum (Sayyid Muhammad-Mahdi) (d. 1797, buried in Najaf) 30. Shaykh Ja'far Kashif al-Qita (d. 1812, buried in Najaf) 31. Mirza Oumi (Mulla Abu'l-Qasim ibn Muhammad-Hasan) (d. 1815, buried in Qum), author of Qawanin 32. Mulla Ahmad Naraqi (ibn Mulla Mahdi) (d. 1828, buried in Najaf)— the first theoretician of Wilayat-e Faqih 33. Shaykh Muhammad-Hasan al-Najafi (d. 1849, buried in Najaf), author of Jawahir al-Kalam 34. Shaykh Murtada Ansari (1864, buried in Najaf), author of Rasa'il and Makasib 35. Mujaddid/Mirza-e Shirazi (Mirza Hasan) (d. 1894, buried in Najaf), of Tobacco Protest fame 36. Shaykh Mirza Husayn Nuri (Muhaddith Nuri) (1839–1902, buried in Najaf)—the author of Mustadrak al-Wasa’il 37. Shaykh Fazlullah Nuri (1843–1909, buried in Qum)—anti-constitutionalist 38. Akhund Khurasani (Shaykh Muhammad-Kazim Hirati) (d. 1911, buried in Najaf), author of Kifayat al-Usul 39. Sayed Ahmad Karbala’i (d. 1913, buried in Najaf)—Sufi 40. Sayyid Muhammad-Kazim Yazdi (d. 1918, buried in Najaf) author of Urwat al-Wuthqa 41. Mirza Muhammad-Taqi Shirazi (d. 1920, buried in Karbala) leader of the Iraqi opposition to the British 42. Shaykh Mirza Husayn Naini (d. 1936, buried in Najaf) pro-constitutionalist author 43. Muhammad Hussain Gharavi Isfahani Kumpany (1879–1942, buried in Najaf) 44. Shaykh Aqa Ziya al-din al-Iraqi (d. 1945, buried in Najaf) 45. Sayyid Abul-Hasan Isfahani (d. 1945, buried in Najaf) 46. Aqa Husayn Borujerdi (1961, buried in Qum) 47. Mirza Mahdi Isfahani (1885–1946, buried in Mashhad)—founder of Tafkik school in Mashhad 48. Ali Qazi Tabataba’i (1866–1937, buried in Najaf)—Sufi 49. Sayyid Muhsin Hakim (d. 1390/1970, buried in Najaf) 50. Abd al-Karim Haeri Yazdi, (Buried in Qum)—The founder of Qum Hawza 51. Allama Sharaf al-Din Amili (1873–1957, buried in Najaf)—proecumenism and intra-faith dialogue

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52. Agha Rahim Arbab (1875–1975, buried in Isfahan)—never wore a turban 53. Allama Abd al-Hussain Amini (1902–1970, buried in Najaf)—author of al-Ghadir 54. Abu al-Qasim Khoei (1899–1992, buried in Qum) 55. Allama Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabataba’i (1904–1981, buried in Qum)—author of Tafsir al-Mizan 56. Sayyid Mahmoud Taliqani (1911–1979, buried in Tehran) reformer and democracy advocate 57. Muhammad Kazim ShariatMadari (1906–1986, buried in Qum)— founder of Dar al-Tabligh 58. Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (al-Shahid al-Khamis) (1935–1980, buried in Najaf)—modernist and philosopher 59. Nimatullah Salihi NajafAbadi (1923–2006, buried in NajafAbad), author of The Eternal Martyr 60. Shaykh Muhammad Asif Muhsini (1935–2019, buried in Kabul)— Islamist, pro-ecumenism, and critic of Bihar al-Anwar 61. Murtaza Mutahhari (1919–1979, buried in Qum), the theoretician of the Islamic Republic of Iran 62. Shahab al-Din Mar’ashi Najafi (1897–1990, buried in Qum)—founder of one of the major libraries in the Islamic world 63. Imam Ruhollah Khomeini (1902–1989, buried in Tehran) The first supreme leader of Iran—put the theory “wilayat-e faqih” into practice 64. Sayyid Muhammad al-Shirazi (1928–2001, buried in Qum)—prolific writer 65. HussainAli Muntazeri (1922–2009, buried in Qum)—Human rights activist 66. Yusuf Saanei (1937–2020, buried in Qum)—modernizing marja 67. Allama Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah (1935–2010, buried in Beirut)—exegete of the Quran and modernist faqih 68. Muhammad Taqi Bahjat (1916–2009, buried in Qum)—Sufi jurist 69. Sayyid Ali Hussaini Khamenei (1939–?)—supreme leader of Iran 70. Nasir Makarim Shirazi, (1927–?)—exegete of the Quran and theologian 71. Abdullah Jawadi Amuli (1933–?)—Philosopher and Sufi jurist 72. Jafar Subhani (1929–?)—theologian (mutakallim) 73. Shaykh Hussain Vahid Khurasani (1921–?) traditionalist 74. Sayyid Ali Sistani (1930–?) met with Pope Francis in 2021 75. Muhammad al-Fayaz (1930–?) Believes women can assert religious, political, and judicial authority

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Index

Note: Page references for figures are italicized Abu Bakr, the first caliph, 125-126, 133, 144-145, 172, 245. Also see the first three caliphs Abu Hanifa, Imam Numan ibn Thabit, 131, 144; Hanafi, 56n41, 131; Hanafi-Shia, 128 adl (=adalat) (justice), 12-13, 102, 111, 129, 143; adil (just), 17, 217, 221 Al-Afghani, Sayed Jamal al-Din, 139140, 202, 212n8 Ahsa’i, Shaykh Ahmad, 118n20, 178n74 Aisha bint Abu Bakr, 133, 244, 248 Ali ibn Abitalib, (the first Imam, the fourth caliph), 126-127, 133, 245, 259; Aisha 248; al-Balkhi, 129; cloak 163; constitutionalism 225; ecumenism 136, 151n56; extremists 149n39; to al-Mahdi, 24, 165, 216; mawla, 130, 146, 148n25, 163; Mu’awiya, 100, 147n18, 149n39; Mutazilite, 128; salat tarawih, 142; shrine 131, 160; wilaya 141, 151n54, 236. See also Nahj al-balagha Ali ibn Husayn, Zayn al-Abidin (the fourth Imam), 130, 99, 163, 190, 259

al-amr bil ma’ruf wa al-nahy an al-mukar (enjoining good and forbidding wrong), 80, 88, 157 al-Amin-Sayed Muhsin, 48, 51-52, 136, 139-140 alim (pl. ulama) (traditionally educated Muslim scholars), 14, 34, 36, 38, 52, 108, 127-128, 136, 163, 169-170, 176n24, 205-206, 236; sayed and shaykh, 54n18, 105, 163 a’alam (the most learned one, most knowledgeable) 13, 36, 39, 41, 60, 100, 102-103, 110, 216; alamiya, 103, 111; challenges, 20, 108-109, 111, 113, 115-116; ignore 110-111; ijma 103; most pious, 13, 60, 103, 216 akhbar al-ahad. See khabar wahid allama, the title (polymath), 40-41, 118n18, 262-264​ Amini, Allama Abd al-Hussain, 135136, 186, 264 Amuli, Sayed Haydar, 163-165, 262 Ansari, Shaykh Murtaza, 43-45, 63, 70, 72, 93, 103-104, 108, 112, 119, 263; disciples, 45, 166, 226; al-Maksib, 29, 44-45, 50, 70, 226, 240, 263;

277

278

Index

politics, 103, 222, 226, 228; al-Rasa’il, 45, 50, 226, 263 Aqa Ziya al-Din Iraqi, 115, 161, 263 Araki, Muhammad Ali, 47, 99, 186, 223, 247, 251 Arbab, Rahim, 34, 47, 184, 195n5, 250, 264 Aristotle, 164, 184, 196n9 Astrababadi, Muhammad Amin, 65-66, 73n11, 76n47, 93, 158, 262 atabat (al-tabat al-muqaddasa, al-atabat al-aliyat), (the lofty thresholds) 46, 48, 78, 102, 105-106, 119 Attar of Nishapur, Farid al-Din, 131, 158, 170-171 Azari Qumi, Ahmad, 71, 237 Al-Azhar University (Jami’at al-Azhar), 55n27, 136, 140-141, 184, 233, 246 ayatollah, the title, 39, 63-64. See also ijtihad Ayatollah al-uzma (grand ayatollah), the title, 39-41, 63-64, 150. Also see Marja al-Balkhi, Abul Qasim, 128-129, 147 Baghdad, (capital of Iraq), 37, 43-44, 46, 49, 51, 104, 128-129, 156, 167, 186, 231, 251 Baha al-din al-Ami disciples, 175n17, 176n24 Bahrain, 164, 184, 219 Bahr al-Ulum, Sayyid Muhammad Mahdi, 63, 74n18, 106, 160, 169, 222, 239n19, 263 Basri, Hasan, 163-164 Bayazid Bastami, 156, 158-159, 164, 175n17 Beheshti, Muhammad Husseini, 34, 204, 206-207 Bihjat, Muhammad Taqi, 41, 99, 166, 192 Bihbahani, Wahid Muhammah Baqir, 43, 51, 67, 72, 93, 118n15, 160, 263; akhbari 43, 66, 74n16; disciples, 74n18, 106, 118n15, 239n19. See also hawza Karbala

Borujerdi, aqa Husayn, 35, 39, 112-114, 183, 205, 227, 263; death 47, 94, 107; disciples, 235, 237, 250-251; ecumenism 133, 140, 144, 151n53, 176n24; philosophy and Sufism, 185, 191, 200; politics, 47, 205, 225, 227228; sole marja, 47, 57n61, 75n30, 112 bid’a (heretical innovation), 79, 134, 155, 79, 157, 159, 222 Bihar al-anwar, 82, 133, 143, 158, 190191, 195, 262, 264. See also Majlisi, Muhammad Baqir caliphate, 18, 37, 45, 100, 137, 140, 143, 151n54, 232-233, 253; and Imamate 128, 130; Abbasid, 51, 128, 138, 156, 160, 190; first three caliphs 128, 131-133, 140, 147n18. See also Ottoman capitalism, 187, 203, 206, 232 colonialism, 119n34, 140, 231 consensus (ijma), 29, 83-84, 103, 117n8, 119n21, 130, 132, 157, 217, 220, 228, 247-248, 251, 253, 257n14 Council of Guardians, 208, 241n49 constitutionalism, 5, 25, 51, 57n59, 58n66, 63, 202-203, 222-227, 236, 241n49 Dar al-Islam versus dar al-kufr, 210 Dars al-kharij (=kharij al-fiqh, kahrij al-susul), 27, 30, 39, 50, 68, 225. See also fiqh democracy, 203, 225, 230-231, 249, 251, 264 diya (blood-money), 90, 210, 252, 248 dictatory 100, 140, 206, 225-226 du’a (supplication), 63, 156, 167, 172 egalitarianism (musawat), 1, 137, 217, 222-223, 225, 247, 252 emulation. See taqlid Expediency Discernment Council (Majma’e tashkhis-e maslahat-e nizam), 209, 229, 241n49, 242n54. See also maslaha

Index

Fadlallah, Muhammad Husayn, 110, 125, 187, 264; politics 110; women, 75n35, 113, 253-254 falsafa (=hikma) (philosophy), 14, 30, 78, 95n2, 146n5, 165, 168, 181, 176n24, 181-195, 262; antihukama mujtahids, 166, 188-193, 195; Muhammad taqi Jafari, 40; ecumenism, 130, 164; fiqh 95, 199; Greek 164, 182, 184, 190, 193; Hukama mujtahids, 40, 182-188, 206; Illuminative (ishraqi), 164, 179n86, 182-183; Jame-e ma’qul va manqul, 163, 181; marriage with Sufism, 164, 169, 183-184; Qum versus Najaf, 47-48; Sunnism, 217; Usul al-fiqh, 84, 184; Western philosophers, 184, 187-188, 200. See also Ali ibn Abitalib, Nahj al-balagha, hakim, Mulla Sadra Fatima (= Fatima Zahra), (the daughter of the Prophet) 125, 131-132, 134-135, 145, 149n40, 244-248, 253, 259; Fatimid, 54n27, 246; Fatimiyyah 56n43 faqih (jurist) (p. Fuqaha), 15, 18, 24, 64, 79, 87, 92, 130, 135, 153-154, 157, 166, 169, 173, 181-182, 206, 217, 219, 220, 222, 225, 226, 248, 249; Akhbarsim 65-66, 118n15; faqih and mujtahid versus mufti and qazi 65-66; Ra’is al-fuqaha, 41; secular 15-16, 19, 51-53, 86, 189, 199, 205, 208, 211, 217, 219, 229, 241n49; Shaykh al-fuqaha, 99; Sufi faqih, 166; traditionalist versus rationalist/ textualist 43-44, 46, 64, 91-92, 100, 133, 137, 151n53, 195, 200, 261; Tadhkirat al-Fuqaha, 189. See also fiqh; wilayat-e faqih Fatima Masuma. See Masuma fatwa (legal opinion), 16, 29, 35, 62, 64, 66-68, 73, 76n47, 94, 102, 105106, 115, 117n7, 125, 138, 141-142, 145, 166, 169, 170, 201, 208, 210, 220-222, 228, 233, 246, 251-252,

279

255; circumstances 113-14, 125, 161, 239; the companions 17; excommunication (takfir), 36, 66-67, 74n16, 95, 118, 157, 160, 162, 191, 202, 224; humorous 202; tobacco 43, 139, 239. See also maslaha; mufti Al-Fayadh, Muhammad Is’haq, 252253. See also women Fayz Kashani, Mulla Muhsin, 16-18, 20, 82, 155-156, 169, 247, 249, 262; Akhbarism, 65, 93; on Aristotle, 196n9; being accused of heresy, 155-156, 160, 174n11; criticism of Ghazzali, 14, 16-18; knowing Ali’s spiritual position, 127; Shia version of Ghazzali’s work, 17 Fayziyyah (= Faiziyyah), 25, 151, 192 fiqh, 14-19, 40, 63, 78-79, 138, 199, 205, 207; acts of interaction (mu’amilat) 85, 88-90, 93, 108, 110, 209, 224, 234; acts of worship (ibadat) 85, 87-88, 209; classification 85-86; comparative jurisprudence 144; the historical evolution 90-95; kharij fiqh 30, 39, 50, 68, 225; moving toward Sunnis 67; Fayz Kashani versus Ghazzali 16-18; in the Quran, 14, 16, 18, 81; and sharia, 15, 77; and Sufism, 154-155; sutuh and kharij 27, 74n24; ten qualities of, 86n5; transforming fiqh, 207-212. See also usul al-fiqh Friday prayer, 39, 67, 87, 92, 155, 158, 220-221, 229, 238n12. See also al-Karaki Ghadir-e Khumm, 33, 130, 141, 146, 148n25, 149n39; Al-Ghadir, 135, 264 ghana (music and singing), 88, 159, 176n24, 176n31, 183, 210 ghayba. See Occultation Ghazzali, imam Abu Hamid, 156, 164, 190, 21n13, 21n15; Fayz Kashani

280

Index

Criticizing Ghazzali 14, 16-20. See also Fayz Kashani ghulluww (exaggeration), 133-134, 151n53, 250; ghali (pl. ghullat) (extremist), 134, 149n39, 157 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 153, 173-174 Guardian Council, 229, 251 hadd (pl. hudud) (prescribed punishment), 90, 183, 220, 249 Haddad, Sayed Hashim, 166-168 Haeri Yazdi, Abdul-Karim, 46, 57, 71, 161, 225, 247, 255, 263; founder of Hawza qum, 41, 45-46, 107, 237; Khomeini, 223; most knowledgeable, 109; only ayatollah 41, 46, 64, 112; politics, 47, 51, 58, 106, 113, 205, 223; public school 204; the Quran, 126; the term of Hawza ilmiyyah, 25 Haeri Yazde, Mahdi, 186; Khomeini 186, 235; political theory 235-236 Hafiz (=Hafez-e Shirazi), Khawja Shams al-Din Muhammad, 166, 170 hakim (wise, philosopher), 168, 182, 191-192 Hakim, Sayed Muhsin, 39, 48, 225, 247, 263; disciples, 48, 236; Imam, 39; politics, 236 Hakimi, Muhammad Reza, 193-194. See also tafkik haram (religiously prohibited) 5, 62, 64, 72, 74n16, 84, 94, 114-115, 135, 162, 166, 176n31, 189-192, 202, 205, 207-208, 220, 222, 250, 255; and haram 13, 17, 233; initiating government in the time of occultation 109; jurisprudential categories 81, 83; self-flagellation 112. See also halal; excommunication halal, 86, 148n28, 210, 220, 233; becomes haram 62, 115; and haram 13, 17 Hallaj, Mansur, 156-159, 164, 173, 175n13, 175n16, 178n74

Hashemi Rafsanjani, Akbar, 40, 231, 250 Hassan al-Askari (the eleventh Imam), 51, 117. See also Samarra Hassan ibn Ali, (the second Imam), 125, 130, 132, 245 Hawza, 23-25, 52-53, 63-64, 67-68, 70, 77, 94, 96n4, 109, 111, 118, 167168, 178n74, 189, 195, 211; change and reform, 48-49, 55n28, 57n61, 58n75, 93, 173, 187, 204-207, 210, 212, 233; criticism of, 104, 206; collapse, 113, 169, 211; curriculum 28-30; hierarchy and titles, 19, 3642, 56n42, 56n48, 163; Karbala, 32, 43, 46, 51, 74, 106, 167, 191, 237, 240n35; major hawzas, 42-43; Mashhad (=Khurasan), 26, 51, 191, 194, 211; Najaf, 26, 43-45, 47-50, 51, 57n61, 58n66, 56n75, 94, 104, 106, 112, 139, 167, 191-192, 205, 224, 261; professionalism 19, 94, 107; Qum, 26, 45-50, 57n59, 59n93, 94, 106, 122n90, 211, 231, 237, 263; Samarra, 51-52, 57n52, 59n93, 139, 52; structure and organization 25-36, 182-183, 189, 193, 225. See also madarsa Herat (city in Afghanistan), 45, 131 Hillah (city in iraq), 43, 118, 262 Hilli (=allama Hilli), Jamal al-din al-Hassan, 39-40, 75, 92, 102, 105, 113, 119n34, 138, 189, 247, 262; anti-akhabari, 64-65; Fakhr al-Din, 163; first ayatollah 39, 63, 189; Muhaqqiq, 118n11, 207, 247, 262; politics 218, 239n26, 262; sufism, 157, 175n17; Sunni 92, 189; sufism, 157, 175n17 hujjat al-Islam (proof of Islam), 19, 38, 40-41, 56, 64, 213 hujjat al-Islam wal-muslimin 19, 39, 41 al-Hurr al-Amili, Muhammad, 31, 65, 82, 93, 155, 159, 262

Index

Husayn ibn Ali (the third Imam), 45, 132, 172, 216, 245; Ashura and mourning, 33, 112, 119n27, 132, 224, 135-136, 138; Ecuminism 125, 130, 143; Husayniyyah, 29, 40, 56n43; Karbalaa, 42, 46, 131, 141. See also hawza Karbala Ibn Abi Jumhur al-Ahsa’i, 164-165 Ibn Arabi, Muhyi ad-Din, 153-154, 156, 158-159, 164, 166-167, 169-170, 172, 179. See also Khomeini Ibn Babawayh. See Saduq Ibn Farid, 166, 178n66 Ibn Khaldun, 163, 237 Ibn Sina, 130, 164 Ibn Tawus, Sayed, 37, 43, 138, 150n45, 218, 262; ecumenism 138, 149n39 Ibn Taymiyya, 56n41, 189 Ihya ulum ad-din (the revival of the religious sciences), 16, 155. See also Ghazzali ijaza (permission), 106, 136, 222; hadith, 31, 67-71, 74, 156, 163, 159. See also ijtihad ijtihad (independent reasoning on Islamic law), 15, 29-31, 39, 44, 51, 61-77; and ayatollah, 39, 60-64, 67, 72, 75n30, 108, 113-115, 121n68, 144, 159, 191, 194-195, 199, 209, 225, 233-234; etymology, 61, 102103, 117; Imams, 97n19, 100; in kalam, 192; modern, 74n15, 97n15, 98n27, 109, 209-211; mutlaq and mutajazzi, 71; permission (ijaza) for, 51, 68-70, 104, 113, 161, 184, 235; Sunni, 62-63, 65, 67, 73n5, 74n22, 92, 98n23, 101, 119n21, 137, 141-142, 144, 150; Takhta’a (fallibilism) 12, 112-113. See also Usuli school, Usulism versus Akhbarism ilm (knowledge, science), 3, 11-13, 21n13, 65, 67, 110; classification,

281

95n2; and fiqh, 101; ilm al-diraya[t], 30, 82; ilm al-rijal 30, 58n75, 73n13, 82, 142; and zann, 117n7 Imam (leader), the title, 39 Imamate, 15, 18, 24, 39, 130, 134; Borujerdi 140; caliphate 18, 128, 130, 151n56; Fayz Kashani, 127; fiqh, 18, 95; kings, 221; Mahdi Haeri, 236; Sadr 141; Saduq 134; Usul al-madhab, 130 imitation. See Taqlid infallibility (isma of the Imams), 91, 100, 135 infallible Imam, 11-16, 18, 20, 24, 37, 91, 126, 134, 140, 151, 158, 163, 167-168, 181, 189-190, 193-194, 216-218, 220-222, 226, 227-228, 232-234, 253; ayatollah 63; divinity, 133, 157; ijtihad, 62; rights over personal property, life, or family, 226; love for, 132, 146; ma’sum, 131, 163, 194; omniscient, 11-12, 21n4, 141 Iranian Revolution. See Islamic Revolution in Iran Irfan (=Sufism=tasawwuf) (mysticism/ Gnosticism), 30, 47, 78, 95-95n2, 96n3, 153-180, 181, 190, 199, 217, 230, 262; anti-sufi fuqaha, 155162, 191-192, 194-195, 196n22; arif (gnostic), 163, 165, 168-169, 175n17; celebrated Sufis 156, 159, 164; ecumenism 130-132; inner harmony between Shari’a and Sufism, 168-174, 221-222; the Quran and reasoning, 184; sufism as true nature of Shia 162-168; rrders 160, 162, 178n74 Isfahan (city in Iran), 37, 43, 47, 112, 155, 158-159, 161, 184, 262, 263, 264; school, 151n53, 176, 183 Isfahani, Abul-Hasan, 43, 47, 93-94, 105, 108, 112-115, 166-167, 224, 247, 263; philosophy, 183, 191; politics, 204, 226-227

282

Index

Isfahani, Mirza Mahdi Gharawi, 161, 167, 191-192, 194, 236, 263. See also Tafkik Islamic Revolution in Iran, 71, 112, 137, 141, 161, 171, 194, 201, 203, 207, 209, 211, 216, 232, 236; revolution versus reform 242n62 islamization, 204, 207, 241n49 Jabal Amil (in Southern Lebanon), 43, 220 Jawadi Amuli, Abdullah, 56n38, 161, 184, 211, 264 jihad, 44, 61, 88, 104, 118n15, 142-143, 169, 189, 201, 209, 226, 247-248, 250 kalam (=kalaam) (theology), 14, 30, 78, 142, 164, 181-183, 193, 262; fiqh 118n15, 192, 199; mutakallim 164165, 264 Kabul (capital of Afghanistan), 140, 143, 244, 264 Kampani, Muhammad Hossein Gharavi Isfahani, 186-187, 263 Al-Karaki, Ali, 92, 220, 238n12, 262; politics 38, 219-221, 227, 238; titles, 38, 41. See also Friday prayer Karbala (city in Iraq), 19, 46, 48, 102, 106, 114, 132, 138, 191, 237, 240n35, 245, 250, 263. See also Husayn ibn Ali; hawza; atabat Karbala’i, Sayed Ahmad, 115, 161, 166, 169-170, 186, 225, 263 Kafir (infidel), 134, 148n28, 157-158, 160, 162, 175n13, 190, 194. See also fatwa, excommunication Kashani, Abul-Qasim, 64, 203 Kashif al-ghita, Imam Muhammad Husayn, 39, 200; ccumenism, 52, 140 Kashif al-ghita, Shaykh Jafar, 32, 55n29, 67; anti-akhbari, 44, 67, 74n22; anti-sufi, 160; politics, 44, 222

king, 150n45, 160, 201, 218, 231-232, 238n6; cooperating with Shia kings/ sultans 219-223; shadow of God, 219. See also sultanate khabar al-wahid (pl. akhbar al-ahad), 65, 67, 82, 91-92 Khamenei, Sayyid Ali (the supreme leader), 40, 49, 54n16, 108, 110-111, 121n56, 121n57, 203, 211, 229-230, 237, 241n48, 264 Khomeini, Imam (ayatollah) Sayed Ruhollah, 7n2, 264; Akhund Khurasani, 225; Allama Tabataba’i, 165, 191-192; amalgamation 20, 207; Anjoman-e Hojjatiya, 194; Ibn Arabi, 172-173; Ayatollah 154; Azari Qumi, 237; carrying the title of imam 40, 42; changing hawza 49, 55n28, 207-209; complaining about ulama, 20, 171; disciples, 45, 135, 142, 187, 233-234, 237, 252253; emergence 47; Fadlallah, 110; Gorbachev, 153; hadith 117; hijab 114; Imam Khoei Foundation, 40, 116; Jawahiri fiqh, 207; justifying monarchy 239n26; Khamenei, 108, 230, 241n48; Khoei, 23, 45, 60, 114, 216, 228; Khoei, Abul al-Qasim, 70, 107, 264; Khomeini, 23, 45, 60, 216, 114, 228; Mahdi Haeri, 235; Mihaj al-Salihin, 216; Mughniyyah, 233; Mulla Sadra, 186; Muntazeri, 40, 137, 230; Naini, 224; Najaf hawza, 45, 47-48; Nawab Safawi, 207; new ijtihad 109; Qazi Tabataba’i, 166; Reza Shah 72; Saanei, 210, 251; Shari’ati, 207; Shari’atMadari, 255; Sufi interpretation of the Quran 172; Sufi leaning 141, 161, 169, 171173, 179n86, 186; Tahrir al-wasila, 23, 114, 227, 249; transcendental wisdom 186, 192; transitional mujtahid, 249; Wilayat-e faqih, 228230; women, 247-248

Index

khums (one-fifth), 31-32, 35, 80, 87, 102, 104-105, 118n15, 119n24 Khurasani, Akhund Muhammad Kazim, 45, 170, 225, 236, 263; constitutionalism, 51-52, 139, 202, 224, 226, 240n35; decibels, 47, 166, 184, 186, 227; hawza ilmiyyah 25; Kifayat al-usul (=kifaya), 29, 169, 225-226; maqbula Hanzala, 227; the prophet and the Imams lack rights over personal property and life, 226 Khurasani, Husain Vahid, 125, 218, 236, 247, 264; criticism, 56n42, 94, 94, 211 Al-Kulayni, Muhammad b. Yaqub, 38, 82, 261; Kitab al-Kafi, 82, 157; Qum traditionalism 43, 46, 64, 91 Al-kutub al-arba’ah (the four books), 57n57, 82 La’an (cursing), 5, 89, 112, 133-134, 136, 140, 157, 159, 161, 170, 190191, 194 Madrasa, 19, 24-27, 52, 56n48, 74n16, 183, 189, 191-192, 220; curriculum, 14, 19, 25, 28-30, 35-36, 45-49, 59n91, 93, 199, 206-207, 211212; Faiziyyah, 25, 151n54, 192; Haqqani, 48, 204, 207; Jewish yeshiva, 36, 53n9, 54n27, 55n29; the spirit of, 19, 94. Also see hawza Mahajjat al-bayza fo tahdib al-ihya (the clear path on refinement of the revival), 17, 127, 155 Al-Mahdi, (the twelfth Imam), 259; from Ali, 24, 216; flag before 218; Hallaj 156; major occultation (ghaybat al-kubra), 24, 64, 101, 105, 109, 119n24, 189, 217-220, 222-223, 233-234, 261; minor occultation (ghaybat al-sughra), 24, 91, 261; nayib-e khass and ambassadors, 24, 53n1, 261; the return (raj’at), 151n54; Sufi shaykhs, 165

283

Majlisi, Muhammad Baqir, 82, 158, 158, 176n24, 185, 190-191, 262; against Sufism, 155, 158-159; Akhabri, 65, 93; politics, 37, 159, 219-220, 239. See also Bihar al-anwar Majlisi, Muhammad Taqi, 82, 158, 176n24, 190, 262; pro-Sufism, 158, 175n16, 175n17, 158; titles, 41, 63; Majma’e tashkhis-e maslahat-e nizam. See Expediency Discernment Council Makarim Shirazi, Nasir, 162, 204, 236, 255, 264 Marxism, 203, 206, 232 Mataqat la-faraq (contestable area), 225, 235, 252 Mar’ashi Najafi, Shahab al-Din, 46-47, 115, 136, 161-162, 165-166, 192, 207, 255, 264 marja al-taqlid (pl. maraji’) (source of emulation), 31, 39, 42, 47, 49, 51, 60, 99-123, 246, di marja a’ala (the highest source), 39; aqa, 22n23, 41, 60, 72n1, 154, 161, 169, 183, 194195, 263; avoiding the position, 115, 169-170; conceptual development, 103, 105, 110, 119n34, 233; disqualify, 125, 237, 251, 255; from mujtahid to, 101-108; fund, 105-106, 108; Imam 40, 145; jurist versus authority 109-110, 116; practice and reception 108-113, 119n30, 122n90; regional and linguistic diversity, 111-112; return to the status of muqallid, 72; sole marja, 47, 57n61, 100, 103-104, 107, 112, 114-115, 161, 166, 169, 179n79, 187, 191, 202, 226, 240; substitute mujtahid, 114; theological, no jurisprudential subject 118n15. See also a’alam marja’iyyah (=maja’iyyat), the institution of, 99-123, 192, 224, 226, 232-233, 237; abolishing 121n57. See also marja al-taqlid

284

Index

maqasid al-shari’a (the objetcives of shari’a), 15-16, 67, 58n73, 85-86, 206 maslaha (public interest), 18, 52, 70, 75n35, 111, 113-115, 154, 205, 207-209, 214n27, 216, 235. See also Expediency Discernment Council ma’sum. See infallibility Masuma, Fatima (the daughter of Imam Musa Kadhim), 45, 223, 259. See also Qum hawza Millani, Muhammad Hadi, 47, 186, 191, 206. See also hawza Mashhad Mir Damad, 158, 176n24, 183 Musa al-Kadhim (the seventh Imam), 131, 159, 187, 223; Kadhimiya, 167, 186-187, 231, 261, 262​ Mirlawhi, Sayed Muhammad, 151n53, 158, 176n24 Misbah Yazdi, Muhammad Taqi, 206207, 231 Misbah al-Shari’a, 175n17 Mu’awiya ibn Abi Sufyan (=Mu’awiya I), 100, 128, 147n18, 149n39 muballigh (p. muballighin) (preacher), 23, 38, 55n38, 114, 122n90 Mufid, Muhammad ibn Nu’man (=Shaykh Mufid), 75, 105, 113, 129, 156, 261; Mutazilite 129, 147n14; Rationalist school, 43, 64, 92, 134, 13 Mufti (jurisconsult), 64, 66, 79, 102, 105, 117, 138, 144. See also fatwa; faqih Mughniyyah, Muhammad Jawad, 233 Muhammad (the prophet), 17-20, 24, 32, 33, 61, 69, 79-81, 91, 100-101, 110, 115, 117, 145, 165, 190-191, 210, 217, 221, 226, 238n6, 247, 253, 257n14; Aristotle, 184, 196n9; the companions (al-Sahaba) 17, 128, 131-132, 134, 137, 143, 149n39, 151n56, 209, 217; on companions and Imams, 125, 128; fatwa 17; genealogy 34, 37, 54n14, 176n24,

184; Imam, 100, 120n50; progeny/ family (ahl al-bayt) 41, 55n38, 81, 105, 126, 128-129, 131-132, 134, 137-138, 141, 151n53, 181, 244, also see khums; Rumi, 130, 154; sovereignty and Wilaya 229-230, 232-234, 236; wife 133, 248, 251, 253-254 Muhsini, shaykh Muhammad Asif, 141144, 264 mujtahid (pl. mujtahidun), the title, 12, 23, 30-33, 36, 39, 41-42, 54, 60-61, 65-69, 154; ayatollah 63-64; and Imam 12-13; lifestyles, 72, 154, 169; mukalla vs. muammam, 34, 183184; muqallid, 54n15, 61, 72, 100, 112, 117n7. See also ijtihad; hawza; a’alam; Akhabrism mulla (=mullah), 19, 22, 57n60, 196n20; Mulla-bashi, 37 Mulla Sadra, Sadr al-Din Muhammad Shirazi, 168-169, 186, 202, 262; Asfar al-arba’ah, 183, 185-186; transcendental wisdom, 161, 165, 182-184, 186, 191-193. See also Tabataba’i, Sayed Muhhamd Hussain; Khomeini Muntazeri, HussainAli, 96n5, 255; Borujerdi, 185; human rights, 209, 264; Khamenei, 121n56; Khomeini, 40, 208; Nahj al-balagha, 137, 196n5; wilayat-e faqih, 228, 230231 Muqaddas Ardabili, Ahmad ibn Muhammad, 43, 117, 219, 247, 262; Hadiqat al-Shia 133, 157, 190 al-Mustafa International university, 26, 49-50, 211 Mutahhari, Murtaza, 41, 94, 113, 141, 185, 204, 228, 264 Mutazila (=mutazilite) 127-130, 146n5, 147n14, 147n16, 164 mutawatir (successive hadith), 82, 92, 137 mut’a (temporary marriage), 256n5

Index

Muzaffar, Muhammad Reda, 28, 48, 140, 166, 186-187 Nahj al-Balagha, 129, 136-137, 150n40, 195n5, 261, 262; ecumenism 136139, 149n39. See also Ali ibn Abitalib Naini, Allama Muhammad Husain Gharavi, 47, 52, 70, 72, 108-109, 114,183, 202-204, 224-227, 240n37, 248, 263. See also constitutionalism Najaf (city in Iraq), 42, 44, 106, 112, 119, 139, 157, 160, 167, 191, 212, 225, 261-264. See also Ali ibn Abitalib; hawza; atabat naqib, 37-38 Naraqi, Mullah Ahmad, 173, 222 nass, 61, 151n56, 252 Nuri, Fazlullah, 41, 222-224, 263 occultation (ghayba[t]). See al-Mahdi orthodoxy, 132, 162, 171-172, 217, 240; transforming to orthopraxy 1, 3, 14, 77, 94, 181; wilayat and 147 Ottoman, 37, 46, 106, 132, 139-140, 169, 201, 220; Shia addressing as caliph, 212n8 Plato, 47, 164, 187 preacher. See Muballigh Prophet, the. See Muhammad prophethood (nubuwwa), 12, 18, 130 Qajar dynasty, 25, 44, 67, 103, 105, 139, 160, 201-202, 221-223 Qashqa’i, Jahangir Khan, 183-184, 195n5, 224. See also nahjol balagha qazi (=al-qadi) (judge), 37, 66, 68, 101; al-quzzat, 37-38 Qazi Tabataba’i, Sayed Ali, 115, 161, 165-167, 178, 200, 225, 263 qiyas (analogical reasoning), 62, 91, 97n19, 98n23, 102, 138, quietism, 100, 194, 206, 216-218, 220, 223, 227, 234

285

Quran, 24, 28, 31, 40, 52, 60, 77-84, 86-87, 92, 96n4, 99-100, 112-113, 125-126, 131-132, 137, 141-143, 145, 151, 157-159, 162, 165, 157, 172, 184, 186, 189-190, 194, 204, 211, 217, 220, 225, 232, 236, 261, 262, 264; akhbarism, 73n14, 96n7; fiqh 18, 20, 48, 61-65, 67; khums 31, 97n14, 104; women 244-248, 250251, 253-255, Qum Seminary Scholar’s Community (Jame’eh modarresin-e hawza-e ilmiya-e Qum), 49, 71, 251, 255 Qumi, Mulla Tahir, 134, 155-157, 196n22 Qumshei, Muhammad Reza, 169, 183 Qumshei, Mahdi Elahi, 154 Qutb (pole), 159, 162-163, 165 rahbar-e inqelab, 41-42 rawi (pl. rowat) (transmitter of hadith), 45, 66, 100. See also al-rijal Ray (city in Tehran, Iran), 37, 43, 128 rawza 132, 167 Al-Razi, imam Fakhr al-Din, 153, 164 rawda-khwan (=raza-khan) (reciter of the events pf Karbala), 38, 132, 167 Reza Shah (=Reza khan), 46, 70, 72, 203, 205, 223, al-Rida (=Reza), Ali, (the eighth Imam), 51, 129, 131, 153. See also Mashhad hawza al-rijal, ilm (the science of hadith transmitters), 30, 58n75, 73n14, 82, 136, 142; al-diraya (comprehension of hadith), 30, 82 risala al-amaliyyah (=tawzih al-masail), 28, 36, 41, 104, 108, 137, 216, 247, 262; burn, 187; collecting, 72; first manual, 125, 142, 154; equate, 225; denoting marja’iyyah, 39, 102, 135, ruhani (clergy) (pl. ruhaniyun), 38, 56n37, 189, 204; alim, 38; corrupt, 20; fractions, 230; imam, 40, 42; Sunni 200

286

Index

Rumi, Jalal al-din Muhammad, 2, 130, 150, 154, 156, 158, 166-167, 188 Saanei, Yusuf, 251-252, 264 Sabzawari, mulla Hadi, 183, 186 Sadr, Musa, 48, 57n59, 144-145, 168, 232 sadr, the title, 37 Al-Sadiq, Jafar ibn Muhammad (the fifth Imam), 144, 175n17, 185, 193, 211; hadith, 117n8, 218, 238n13 Al-Sadr, Muhammad Baqir, 29, 48-50, 53n11, 109-110, 119n34, 141, 187188, 204, 231-233, 236, 242n54, 264 Saduq (=Shaykh Saduq) (Ibn Babawayh), Abu Jafar Muhammad, 218, 261; Hallaj, 156; Ibn abbad, 129; Man la yahzuruhi al-faqih, 46, 82; Qum traditionalism 43, 46, 64, 91; Risalatu-I’tiqadat, 134, 156 Safavid, 37-39, 43-44, 92, 105, 112, 158-160, 201, 218-221, 223, 227, 238n6; Ismail, 159-160, 221; Tahmasp I, 36, 160, 221 Safi Gulpayegani, Lotfollah, 141, 162, 191-192 Sahib Jawahir (Shaykh Muhammad Hassan Najafi), 43, 103, 247, 263; Jawahir al-kalam 31, 44, 118n19, 119n23, 207; Jawahiri fiqh, 207-208; Nijat al-Ibad, 104, 119n23 shahriya (the stipend), 27, 31-32, 46, 105-106, 119n26, 167, 185, 191, 205, 224 Salihi NajafAbadi, Nimatullah, 138, 141-142, 264; Ismail, 159-160, 221; Shahid-i Javid, 138, 150n44; women 209, 250-251 Samarra. See hawza sectarian, 44, 126, 130, 132, 135-136, 139-140, 143, 145-146, 176n24, secularity, 3, 11-13, 15-16, 19-20, 5152, 199, 205, 208, 210, 213n23, 217, 239n26, 241n49; secular theocracy 217. See also urf; maslaha

secularization, 197n39, 208, 212, 239n26, 241n49 shafa’a (intercession), 135, 245 ShahAbadi, Muhammad Ali, 172, 225 Shahid al-awwal, 43, 92, 103, 120n34, 247, 262 Shahid al-thani, Zayn al-Din al-Juba’i al-Amili, 29, 43, 189, 238n12, 246247, 262 Shams al-Din, Muhammad Mahdi, 110111, 234-236; women, 253-254 Shari’a, 12, 14-15, 67, 77, 79, 81, 102, 154-155, 166, 168, 186, 190, 216, 222, 224-225, 227-231, 233-235, 241, 244, 251; comprehensive, 61, 80, 85-87, 224, 231; inner harmony with Sufism, 154, 168-170; objectives (maqasid) 15-16, 58n73, 67, 85-86, 206 Shari’ati, Ali, 135, 206-207 Shari’atmadari, Sayed Muhammad Kazim, 46-47, 53n13, 204, 237, 255, 264; Dar al-tabligh, 48, 204, 211, 264 Sharif (=Sayed) Murtada, 37, 43, 92, 102, 105, 129, 134, 137, 261 Sharif Radi, 37, 129-130, 261 Shaykh vesus Sayyid 34, 54n14, 176n24, 192 Shaykh al-Islam, 37-38, 41, 56n41, 155, 184, 220, Sharara, Muhsin, 49-50, 58n75 Shubairi Zanjani, Sayed Musa, 41, 58n66, 59n89, 59n93, 70-72, 75n32, 95, 106, 108, 114, 119n32, 151, 152, 192, 205, 237, 240; nostalgia, 19, 70, 75n32, 169 Shirazi, Mirza Hasan, 43, 51, 106107, 112, 115, 138, 263; disciples, 169, 222-225; ecumenism 138-139; tobacco edict, 43, 115, 139, 239n21. See also hawza Samarra Shirazi network, 40, 134, 149n34, 264 shura (consultation), 80, 225, 232, 235236

Index

Simnani, Ala al-dawla, 131, 149n39 Sistani, Sayed Ali, 41, 45, 107-108, 115, 145, 210, 252, 264 Subhani, Jafar, 204, 228, 264 sultanate, 219-225, 231, 238, 262. Also see king Sufism. See Irfan Sunni: division of Islam between Shia and 1, 127, 145, 217; ecumenism 136-145, 164; Twelver Sunnis, 130132, 147n18; overlap 127-132, 145 Supreme Islamic Shia Council (SISC) (al-Majlis al-Islami al-Shi’i al-Ala), 110, 144, 234 Tabarri (dissociation), 104, 133-136 Tabataba’i, Allama Sayed Muhammad Hussain, 48, 100, 115, 165-166, 170, 181, 185, 191-192, 206, 264; Upanishads, 200 Tabataba’i Yazdi, Muhammad Kazem, 52, 105, 161, 166, 179n79, 224, 227, 246, 263; Al-Urwah al-Wuthq 31, 103, 224, Taftazani, Sa’d al-Din, 28, 131 Tafkik (the school of separation), 51, 161, 193-195, 263. See also Isfahani, Mirza Mahdi; Hakimi Tafsir (Quran commentaries, exegeses), 30, 52, 153, 192, 264 Taligani, Sayed Mahmud, 203, 206 taqiyya (self-protection through dissimulation), 66, 134, 140, 158, 164, 220 taqlid (imitation/emulation), 101-103, 117n7; dead 66. See also mujtahid muqallid; marja al-taqlid ta’wil, 81, 147n5, 162, 171, 193; zahir and batin 154, 171 tawalli (making friendship), 104, 133135 Tawzih al-masail. See Risala amaliyyah talaba (seminarian) (pl. tullab), 26-27, 30, 34, 46, 52, 58n75, 94, 185, 199, 204-205

287

taghut (tyrannical ruler, evil), 101, 218 tawhid (oneness of Gid), 11-12, 15, 21n13, 129, 146, 153, 156-157, 166168, 170, 186, 200 al-Thaqalayn (the hadith), 141, 151n55 Thiqat al-Islam (=thiqa) 38 Transcendental Wisdom (hikmat al-muta’aliya). See Mulla Sadra Tusi, Khwaja Nasir ad-Din, 164, 182, 193, 218, 239n26, 262 Tusi, Abu Ja’far Muhammad (=Shaykh al-Ta’ifa=Shaykh Tusi), 21n4, 75, 92, 113, 117, 156, 218, 247, 251, 261; ecumenism 137-138, 150n43; Al-Istibsar 57n57, 82; Najaf hawza 44; rationalist 44, 64, 97n21; Tahdhib al-ahkam 57n57, 82, 176 turban (imameh) 33-34, 183, 264; black and white, 54n14, 54n18, 54n21, 184 Twelve Imams, 24, 33, 131-132, 155, 165, 216, 259. See also Infallible Imams Umar ibn al-Khattab, the second caliph, 125-126, 142, 172, 190. See also the first three caliphs Umar ibn Hanzala (=maqbula Hanzala), 66, 101, 234, 227, 234, 238n13 urf (custom) 51, 52, 67, 139; urfiyyat (secular) 219 umma (=ummah) (Islamic society), 24, 95, 109, 212, 214, 231, 234-235; division and solidarity 127, 137, 141-145 umur ammah (public affair), 68, 228, 248, 251. See also wilayat-e faqih umur hisbiyyah (specific affairs) 68, 226, 228, 233. See also wilayat-e faqih Uthman ibn Affan, the third caliph, 125, 128 Uthman ibn Sa’id, 53n1, 261 Usuli school (=usulism) (the principled school), 43-44, 51, 64-67, 69, 103, 116, 134, 200, 263

288

Index

Usuli versus akhbari (= usulism versus akhbarism), 44, 64-68, 73n14, 74n22, 93, 98n23, 106; Wahid Bihbahani, the founder of, 51 al-usul versus al-furu, 69 usul al-din (the fundamental elements of the religion), 7n2, 191; usul al-din versus usul al-madhhab 130 Usul al-fiqh (the principles of jurisprudence), 18, 29, 74n24, 77-78, 81-85, 94, 118; and hikma, 182 al-usul al-amaliyya (procedural principles), 84, 93 Wahhabi, 114, 218 walaya (=walayat) (love), 130, 133, 142, 146, 148n25, 159, 164, 166-168, 200 wilayat (sovereignty), 121n57, 148n25, 208, 232-234, 248. See also wilayat-e faqih wilayat-e faqih (= wilayat al-faqih) (the jurist guardianship) 42, 68, 88, 103, 118n15, 121n53, 173, 208209, 221, 226-235, 263, 264; amma versus khassa, 103, 118n15; the development of, 227-231; mutlaq versus muqayyad 42, 228-231; virus qizawat, 228, 234, 247 wajib (religious obligation), 5, 84, 103, 109, 114, 210, 223, 226, 250; al-waajib al-kifaii (= wajib kifa’i),

75n32, 135, 162, 228; jurisprudential categories, 81, 83; muqaddamot al-wajib 83; rational, 83, 190, 226, 230 wahdat al-wujud (the unity of being), 157-158, 162, 167 Waiz Kashifi, Mulla Husayn, 131-132 Wasa’il al-Shi’a. See al-Hurr al-Amili Westernization, 42, 200, 203, 212. See also secularization women, 5, 120n53, 244-246, 264; hijab, 43, 46, 80, 114, 218, 204, 249, 254255, 257n15; inheritance, 35, 80, 90, 92, 134, 145-146, 245-246, 248, 252; judgeship 247, 250, 252; politics 249, 251-253; public life, 46, 75n35, 204, 209, 233, 246-249, 253255; religious leadership, 246- 248, 252. See also Salihi NajafAbadi; al-Fayadh Yazid ibn Mu’awiya, 143, 147n18, 225 al-Zahra. See Fatima (the daughter of the Prophet) Zainjani. See Shubairi Zanjani zann (probable opinion) (p. Zunun), 62, 65-67, 75n35, 113, 117n5, 1117n7, 234 Zainab (the daughter of Ali), 244-245, 247-248, 259; Zainabiyyah, 56n42

About the Author

Sayed Hassan Akhlaq received his PhD in Philosophy (2009, Allameh Tabataba’i University, Tehran) and graduated from Hawza Ilmiya of Khurasan (2009) in the highest stage of learning Islamic studies (dars al-kharij). Currently, he teaches Religion as a Professorial Lecturer at The George Washington University and Philosophy at both Marymount University and Coppin State University. Akhlaq has worked as a visiting research fellow at Boston University (2017–2018), Princeton University (2017), and McLean Center for the Study of Culture and Values at The Catholic University of America (2012–2017). As a philosopher and scholar of Islam, Akhlaq contributes to comparative study, dialogue among civilizations, and inter- and intra-faith dialogues and is a passionate advocate of human rights, women’s rights, and environmental theology. He published five books in Iran and Afghanistan. He coedited The Secular and The Sacred: Complementary and/or Conflictual? (2017). In addition to research papers in The Ecumenical Review (World Council of Churches), Philosophy, Culture, & Traditions (World Union of Catholic Philosophical Societies), and Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies (Villanova University), his published works have appeared in such volumes as: Religion, Sustainability, and Education (2021); Community and Tradition in Global Times (2021); Conflict in the Modern Middle East (2020); Justice & Responsibility Cultural and Philosophical Foundations (2018); Sufism, Pluralism and Democracy (2017); Nostra Aetate (2016); Global Studies and Encyclopedic Dictionary (2014); Building Community in a Mobile/Global Age Migration and Hospitality (2013); and Philosophy Emerging from Culture (2013).

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