The Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP): A Method for Predictive Intelligence Analysis 9781623562335, 9781623562403, 9781501301223, 9781623567828

Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
BLOOMSBURY INTELLIGENCE STUDIES
Title
Copyright
Contents
FOREWORD
LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES
INTRODUCTION The development of the LAMP
PART ONE The LAMP in theory
CHAPTER ONE The philosophy and steps of the LAMP
CHAPTER TWO A comparison of the LAMP with other techniques
CHAPTER THREE The initial use of the LAMP : Case study of the former Soviet nuclear republics and nuclear weapons
CHAPTER FOUR Limitations and potential applications of the LAMP
PART TWO The LAMP in practice
CHAPTER FIVE The future of Afghanistan : Democracy, Islamic Caliphate, or warlord principalities? A predictive study on possible Afghanistan, United States, and Taliban responses
CHAPTER SIX Candidate moves in the Levant : An analysis of the region’s geostrategic future using the LAMP method
CHAPTER SEVEN The adaptability of the FARC and ELN and the prediction of their future actions
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY
INDEX

Citation preview

The Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP)

BLOOMSBURY INTELLIGENCE STUDIES Open Source Intelligence in a Networked World By Anthony Olcott Sociocultural Intelligence: A New Discipline in Intelligence Studies By Kerry Patton

BLOOMSBURY INTELLIGENCE STUDIES

The Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP) A Method for Predictive Intelligence Analysis

JONATHAN S. LOCKWOOD

Bloomsbury Academic An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 1385 Broadway New York NY 10018 USA

50 Bedford Square London WC1B 3DP UK

www.bloomsbury.com Bloomsbury is a registered trademark of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc First published 2013 © Jonathan S. Lockwood, 2013 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. No responsibility for loss caused to any individual or organization acting on or refraining from action as a result of the material in this publication can be accepted by Bloomsbury Academic or the author. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Lockwood, Jonathan Samuel, 1955The Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP) : a method for predictive intelligence analysis / Jonathan S. Lockwood. pages cm. -- (Continuum intelligence studies) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Intelligence service--Methodology. 2. International relations--Forecasting. 3. Terrorism-Forecasting. 4. World politics--Forecasting. I. Title. JF1525.I6L63 2013 327.12--dc23 2013012216 ISBN: ePDF: 978-1-6235-6782-8 Typeset by Fakenham Prepress Solutions, Fakenham, Norfolk NR21 8NN

CONTENTS

Foreword by Dr Mark M. Lowenthal  vi List of figures and tables  ix Introduction: The development of the LAMP  xi

PART ONE  The LAMP in theory 1 1 The philosophy and steps of the LAMP  3 2 A comparison of the LAMP with other techniques  23 3 The initial use of the LAMP: Case study of the former Soviet nuclear republics and nuclear weapons  39 4 Limitations and potential applications of the LAMP  59

PART TWO  The LAMP in practice 67 5 The future of Afghanistan: Democracy, Islamic Caliphate, or warlord principalities? A predictive study on possible Afghanistan, United States, and Taliban responses  69 6 Candidate moves in the Levant: An analysis of the region’s geostrategic future using the LAMP method  129 7 The adaptability of the FARC and ELN and the prediction of their future actions  209 Select bibliography  321 Index  323

FOREWORD Dr Mark M. Lowenthal

Few professions are beset by as many “flavors of the month” as is intelligence analysis. New techniques come and go, many of which are ephemeral, and many more of which are chimerical—all claiming that they can improve intelligence analysis. That word itself, “improve,” is somewhat problematic. If we were being honest about what is commonly meant by the use of this term with regard to analysis, it would mean getting it right more often than we do now. But given that we have no substantive sense of an analyst’s batting average—or of the batting average of the larger analytic community—we would be hard pressed to describe how much improved analysis should be. What it really comes down to is not making analytic errors even as we recognize that errors in analysis are part of the price of being an intelligence analyst. We do not hand out omniscience pills in the cafeteria. As I write this Foreword in the spring of 2013, the latest analytic flavor of the month is big data. Without any substantive proof, big data advocates— most of whom are IT specialists and not analysts—claim that big data, that is, the slicing, dicing and parsing of reams of data, will provide answers we did not even know we were looking for. This is problematic on several counts. First, although this may be true on Wall Street and in business where data do drive many decisions, it is much less true in intelligence analysis where the key questions are not going to be found in the data—big or small. The questions that most bother policy makers are about the plans, intentions, and capabilities of other actors. What will Kim Jong Un do next? Will Iran decide to weaponize its nuclear program? Few would argue against the centrality of these questions; few should be able to argue that the answers lie in data. The second problem with our current data-mania is this is exactly not what policy makers want. When you talk to senior civilian or military policy makers about this they will be both frank and consistent: they want knowledge and expertise, not data. Which brings us to Jonathan Lockwood’s book, The Lockwood Analytic Method for Prediction (LAMP). This book is appealing on many levels. First, Jonathan Lockwood has worked as an intelligence analyst, always a plus when trying to create a new analytic tool or technique and much more

Foreword

vii

rare than many would suppose. Second, he recognizes some of the perils of the field into which he is entering and, unlike many of his predecessors who make exaggerated claims for what their technique will do, Dr Lockwood approaches his with a charming degree of modesty. He states quite clearly that the LAMP is not the be all and end all and that it is an analytic starting point, not an all inclusive solution. In that same vein, there is something to be said for a book that forthrightly compares its technique with others in the field (offering very good explanations for each of them) and that includes an entire chapter on the limitations of the technique. Three cheers for intellectual honesty! One of the most difficult aspects of intelligence analysis is that we are dealing with other human beings—flawed, deceptive, uncertain, mercurial— and trying to discern what they will do next. As I have written elsewhere, our goal as intelligence analysts is to study and write about these difficult creatures in such a way that we can reduce the uncertainty that our policy makers face as they both react to these other players and as they try to craft initiatives of their own. That is where the LAMP comes in. The LAMP is a 12-step analytical process clearly focused on potential political outcomes. The “P” in the LAMP (prediction) is a bit misleading because the LAMP will not come up with the one answer. But the LAMP is a very logical series of analytic steps that will allow an analyst to come up with rank orders of scenarios of possible outcomes. This is in essence what good intelligence is about, laying out for policy makers which outcomes are more or less likely, so that they can focus their attention on these as they see fit. This is a crucial service as it avoids the “single threading” of analysis that too often is so narrow that it tends to have a deadening effect on ongoing analysis. It also recognizes that the most likely scenario may not be the one that actually happens. The “scenario race” is full of successful dark horses. I will not go through all 12 steps in the LAMP, which Dr Lockwood lays out very neatly in Chapter 1. But there are several steps that are worth noting. Step 4 has the analyst lay out all possible courses of action by the actors in question. This is a key step as it does not assume that the actor is rational, only that he can and will act. The assumption of rationality is one of the biggest flaws in too much intelligence analysis, especially in a world inhabited by such actors as the Kim family in North Korea. Now, they may be rational by their own light, but if we only try to analyze the actions that we find rational then we have committed the analytic sin of “mirror imaging” and are likely to omit scenarios that may prove to be important only because “we would never do that.” We might not but they might. Step 10 requires the analyst to come up with focal events that would have to occur for our alternate future outcomes to happen. This is crucial as it creates a list of indicators that will allow the analyst or policy maker to continue narrowing the field of likely outcomes as events unfold.

viii Foreword

One of the other appealing aspects of the LAMP is that it is not, as Dr Lockwood notes, a quantitative system. He lists this as a limitation; I see it as a plus. When I teach analysis I often point out that the best analytic tool is a knowledgeable analyst who can think and write and who needs little more than pencil and paper. Admittedly, as one gets into the more complex permutations and combinations of various LAMP scenarios, some sort of IT assistance may be in order, but the bulk of the LAMP can be done in the simplest ways imaginable. This is definitely a plus. A great deal of the book is a series of well written essays by three of Dr Lockwood’s students showing the LAMP in action. Most readers will probably dip in and out of these chapters but they are useful guides to how the LAMP works and of the range, subtlety, and sophistication of analysis that the LAMP can support. A word of praise is also in order for the authors of these chapters, Nicholas Lusas, Mary Boyle, and Drew Lasater. Dr Lockwood appropriately gives them credit in his Introduction and I wish to do the same. So, let us welcome the LAMP into the lists of analytic tools and techniques. As I have written elsewhere, good intelligence analysis is competitive. I know that Dr Lockwood does not shrink from this competition and has offered up a worthy entrant. The proof will be in the doing but I do hope that serious analysts will take the time to experiment with the LAMP, to which this book is a useful guide.

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

Figures 1.1 Relationships between the analytic steps of the LAMP 1.2 The analytic map 5.1 Afghanistan’s ethnic diversity 6.1 72 month average retail price chart 7.1–7.3 Evolution of FARC actions 7.4–7.6 Evolution of ELN actions

8 20 76 131 240 258

Tables 1.1 3.1 3.2 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7 7.1 7.2

Scenario 1 – Yeltsin stays in power (status quo) Scenario 1 – Yeltsin stays in power (status quo) Scenario 2 – Russian ultra-nationalists seize power Alternate future permutations Alternate futures, Scenario 1 – democratic government (DG) Alternate futures, Scenario 2 – tribal warlord (TW) Alternate futures, Scenario 3 – Islamic Caliphate (IC) Alternate futures, Scenario 1 – democratic government (DG) Alternate futures, Scenario 2 – tribal warlord (TW) Alternate futures, Scenario 3 – Islamic Caliphate (IC) Alternate future permutations Alternate futures pair-wise comparison – Scenario 1 Alternate futures pair-wise comparison – Scenario 2 Alternate futures pair-wise comparison – Scenario 3 Alternate future probabilities by rank – Scenario 1 Alternate future probabilities by rank – Scenario 2 Alternate future probabilities by rank – Scenario 3 Matrix diagram and analysis (FARC) Matrix diagram and analysis (ELN)

10 42 50 88 89 91 92 94 95 96 158 159 161 162 163 165 166 238 257

x

List of Figures and Tables

7.3 Possible futures 273 7.4 Scenario 1 – The Colombian government withdraws from fighting 274 7.5 Scenario 2 – The Colombian government imposes a containment strategy 281 7.6 Scenario 3 – The Colombian government employs a “victory” strategy 289

INTRODUCTION The development of the LAMP When I initially proposed in the Fall of 1991 to undertake a study of the perceptions of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) nuclear republics under the aegis of the DCI Exceptional Intelligence Analyst program, the Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP) was nowhere near the form to be presented in this book. The methodology has gradually taken shape over a period of years since I first began my doctoral dissertation research back in 1977 at the University of Miami’s Center for Advanced International Studies. My emphasis then was on studying the perceptions of the now former Soviet Union regarding US strategy, using those perceptions as a basis for determining what were the primary factors influencing their perception of it.1 In my 1983 book, The Soviet View of US Strategic Doctrine: Implications for Decisionmaking, I took the process one step further by predicting what would be the best US strategy for deterring Soviet aggression based on their past perceptions. I had recommended US adoption of a “three-tiered” strategic defense system consisting of civil defense, ground-based antiaircraft and antiballistic missile defense, and space-based defense, predicting that this would be what the Soviets feared most. The subsequent Soviet reaction to the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) proved these predictions accurate.2 In our 1993 book, The Russian View of US Strategy: Its Past, Its Future, we were confronted with a new problem. While the past Russian perception of US strategy was easy enough to document and analyze from open sources, the collapse of the former Soviet Union forced us to consider the likely future effects the previous Russian perception would have on their relations with the other independent republics of the CIS, and particularly those which had inherited portions of the former Soviet nuclear arsenal (i.e., Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan). Our solution was to construct four scenarios (or alternate futures, if you will) which reflected the interaction of two main factors with two basic alternatives: 1) economic recovery versus economic collapse, and 2) reunified republics versus independent republics. We then discussed the consequences of each scenario’s occurrence, as well as their relative likelihood.3 This particular approach is also called

xii Introduction

Alternative Futures or Hypothesized Scenarios, and is currently used within the intelligence community. The collapse of the former Soviet Union had not, despite the expectations of most observers, made the problems of arms control and disarmament easier to overcome. Nor had it lessened the problem of preventing nuclear proliferation among the former Soviet republics, particularly Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. The diverging perceptions of these four “nuclear republics” of the CIS concerning the political utility of nuclear weapons had become a source of political conflict among these republics, and particularly between Russia and Ukraine. My research on the perceptions of the CIS “nuclear republics” concerning the nuclear weapons issue began in February 1992, shortly after The Russian View of US Strategy had been cleared by the Defense Intelligence Agency and submitted to Transaction Publishers for publication. Since I was performing my research under the nominal supervision of what was then the Defense Intelligence College (now the National Intelligence University), the DCI project would also simultaneously fulfill the thesis requirements for the Masters of Science of Strategic Intelligence (MSSI). Its focus necessarily would be the perceptions of the “nuclear republics” of the former Soviet Union (that is, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan) concerning the political utility of nuclear weapons and how it affected relationships not only among themselves, but between each of them individually and the West. The period to be covered dated from immediately after the August 1991 coup attempt to the end of February 1993.4 Because of the rapidly changing nature of the situation within the nuclear republics, however, I decided that it was necessary to create a new “hybrid” methodology for predictive analysis, which is now known as the Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP).5 It was a hybrid because it borrowed some of its elements from other analytical and planning methodologies, but combined them in a unique way to produce a different approach to the problem of predictive analysis. Although the LAMP was utilized only for the first time in the DCI study/MSSI thesis, the Commandant of the Defense Intelligence College, Dr James G. Cunningham (Lieutenant General, US Air Force, Retired), deemed the LAMP to have wider potential applicability for the field of intelligence analysis, and encouraged me to pursue its development. In the intervening years, from 1993 to the present, the LAMP started to take on a life of its own. As an adjunct professor at the National Intelligence University from 1993 to 1998, I taught the LAMP initially as the centerpiece of a graduate elective course on Advanced Analytic Methods. Over 40 graduate students at the university found the LAMP sufficiently attractive as a predictive methodology that they used it as the central method for their Masters theses for the MSSI degree. In 1995, I also joined the faculty of American Military University (AMU), where I taught for the next 16 years

Introduction

xiii

as a graduate professor in their online Intelligence Studies degree program. One of the first courses I developed for them was a graduate level course in Analytic Methods, which covered several analytic methods, but which emphasized the LAMP as the most potentially useful. In this way I was able to reach thousands of students with the LAMP through the online medium. One of my earliest LAMP enthusiasts was Mr Niklas Oxeltoft, a British graduate of AMU who not only developed my first LAMP website but also created an early prototype of LAMP software. He was succeeded as the LAMP webmaster by Mr Mark Theby, another LAMP advocate and graduate of AMU who refined the LAMP website into its current state (www.lamp-method.org). More important was his contribution to the development of the LAMP software you are now able to use. He obtained the voluntary services of a programmer who created the LAMP software prototype at no cost. My newest LAMP webmaster is Mr Gary Gallichio, a highly skilled and experienced IT specialist who currently works for Reading Is Fundamental (RIF). He has taken charge of uploading and testing the LAMP software and further updating its host LAMP website. It is to these gentlemen that I am deeply in debt for the service they have provided in developing the LAMP and promoting awareness of it as a methodology. I am also indebted to the three students from American Military University, Nicholas Lusas, Mary Boyle, and Drew Lasater, whose LAMP papers appear in Part II of this textbook as practical applications of the LAMP. Their papers survived a long winnowing process in which dozens of LAMP papers were considered for inclusion in this first edition. They should be justifiably proud of their selection. Those who take the time to examine the LAMP website will notice a number of papers in the LAMP library that cover a wide range of topics. The LAMP library is not all-inclusive but is meant to demonstrate that the LAMP can be applied to a wide range of topics, and not just those for intelligence prediction. Three of the best LAMP papers have been selected for this book, and were produced by my former students at AMU. The book itself is organized into two main parts. Part I deals with the theory of the LAMP itself, explaining the steps in the process in detail. Chapter 1 discusses the 12 steps of the LAMP and how it is used. Chapter 2 compares the LAMP with several other analytic techniques, and shows how the LAMP either differs or has elements in common with these methods. Chapter 3 discusses how the LAMP was initially used in the case study of the nuclear republics of the former Soviet Union. It has been updated to show how the nature of LAMP analysis changes over time. Chapter 4 concludes the theory portion of the book, and discusses the limitations and potential applications. Part II focuses on the use of the LAMP in practice. Chapters 5 through 7 discuss the application of the LAMP to three different intelligence problems. The last chapter is especially noteworthy, as Drew Lasater demonstrates how

xiv Introduction

the LAMP can be integrated successfully with the Analyses of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) method. It is hoped that this book will serve as a starting point for the analyst who wishes to test this predictive analytical method on other existing world situations. While I make no claim that LAMP is an infallible predictive method, I do argue that it is a fundamentally different and potentially more powerful way of analyzing and utilizing existing information to make realistic assessments of the possible alternate futures of any given situation. This introduction would not be complete without two final acknowledgments. The first is to Dr Mark Lowenthal, who graciously agreed to write the Foreword to this first LAMP textbook. His expression of confidence in the utility of the LAMP for the intelligence community is deeply appreciated. And last but by no means least, I am deeply grateful to my beloved wife of 24 years, Kathleen, who was instrumental in the review and selection of the final LAMP papers for this textbook, as well as in the editing and presentation of the LAMP. I am very glad that I married her.

Notes 1 See May, 1980 University of Miami doctoral dissertation by Jonathan Samuel Lockwood, The Evolution of the Soviet View of US Strategic Doctrine (1954– 1976): Its Implications for Future US Strategic Policy Decisionmaking (Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms, 1981). 2 See Jonathan Samuel Lockwood, The Soviet View of US Strategic Doctrine: Implications for Decisionmaking (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1983), 179–83. 3 See Jonathan Samuel Lockwood & Kathleen O’Brien Lockwood, The Russian View of US Strategy: its Past, Its Future (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1993), 193–7. 4 See Jonathan Samuel Lockwood, “The Nuclear CIS Republics and Nuclear Weapons: Chess Game or Armageddon?” (unpublished Masters of Science of Strategic Intelligence (MSSI) thesis, National Intelligence University, Washington, DC, 1993). 5 The first article on the LAMP was published in Volume 3, No. 2 of the Defense Intelligence Journal (the publication of the Defense Intelligence College, now the National Intelligence University) in the Fall of 1994. See Jonathan S. Lockwood, “The Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP),” Defense Intelligence Journal, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Fall 1994), 47–73.

PART ONE

The LAMP in theory

CHAPTER ONE

The philosophy and steps of the LAMP The LAMP assumes that the future is really nothing more than the sum total of all possible interactions of “free will,” both on an individual as well as on an international scale. In this paradigm, every action that is taken by any free will actor has the power to affect the futures of all those around it in ways both subtle and dramatic. Even a decision to “do nothing” has its own unique impact on the future, since others around you are aware of your existence, regardless of whether you interact or not. At the individual level, in theory, this means that each one of us has a nearly infinite array of possible alternate futures that lie before us during the course of our lives. Every decision we make during each moment has either a subtle or a decisive effect on which alternate future we eventually experience, just as the actions of others each have their own subtle or decisive influence on which alternate future we will eventually experience. As we progress through our lives, the number of alternate futures before us gradually diminishes, as the decisions we and others make forever close off certain futures to us. This process continues, gradually in the majority of cases, until we finally reach our one inescapable future, death.1 When we transfer this philosophy to the international arena, attempting to predict future events using traditional quantitative methods or qualitative methods is a losing proposition; the potential array of possible alternate futures based on the interactions of sovereign nations, each with their own unique perspectives and political agendas, makes the process of quantitative prediction almost as unreliable as assigning probabilities to future weather conditions. For instance, when the weatherman says that there is a 75 percent chance of rain occurring this afternoon, does he really mean that he has managed to foresee all possible alternate futures that lie before him that day concerning the interactions of the earth’s weather systems? Has he been able to calculate how many of these potential

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THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

alternate futures, out of all that are theoretically possible, actually have rain occurring in them? More often than not, his is a subjective judgment, to which he has assigned a percentage probability for the sake of quantification. In fact, when someone tells you that something has a 50 percent (or 50/50) chance of happening, he is really telling you that he doesn’t have a clue as to how likely it is to happen, and that you might as well flip a coin. This is why predictive methods which attempt to quantify their results in terms of percentages or probabilities have not been entirely successful. Traditional probability theory assumes that you know the entire potential universe of events, such as all possible ways that three coins can come up either heads or tails. Such an approach is not possible in international affairs; the potential interactions, even at the national level, are too chaotic. The “coins” all have minds of their own. The LAMP asserts that we can only know the probability of a given alternate future relative to all other possible alternate futures. These alternate futures are defined as the total of all possible interactions between national actors on a given issue. Because an alternate future is based on the sum total of interactions of free will, the relative probability of the alternate futures will be constantly changing based on how each national actor behaves as we move through history. In order to make more accurate predictions, therefore, it is necessary to study each predictive issue from the viewpoint of the national or organizational actor, since it is that actor’s “free will” that will alter the future. While not an infallible method for predicting the future, the LAMP is designed to give the analyst a more powerful method for organizing all available information based on the perceptions of the actors and using it to make relevant predictions about which alternate future is most likely to occur at a given moment in time. In going through the 12 steps of the LAMP below, it is recommended that the reader choose one of the three LAMP studies from Part II of this book and use it as a guideline for loading the various steps into the LAMP software.2

The 12 steps of the LAMP Determine the issue for which you are trying to predict the most likely future This initial step is of crucial importance in the LAMP. If the issue chosen is too broad, the analysts will have too many actors and courses



The philosophy and steps of the LAMP

5

of action to consider, thus causing the number of alternate futures to explode exponentially. If the issue is vaguely defined, then analysts will have difficulty focusing their perceptual study of each actor, and will end up conducting too general an analysis, thus rendering his subsequent comparison of alternate futures less reliable. Examples of specific intelligence questions/scenarios which could lend themselves to the LAMP are:  1 How will North Korea’s emergence as a nuclear power affect  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 10

nuclear proliferation in Southeast Asia? What are the consequences of low-intensity conflict in Eastern Europe? What are the consequences for nuclear proliferation in the Middle East should Israel declare itself a nuclear power? What are the potential consequences if Iran becomes a declared nuclear power? Analysis of cyber threats in the United States. Agroterrorism: a predictive study of America’s future food supply. A predictive study on possible al-Qaeda terrorist attacks in the United States. A predictive analysis of the terrorist threat posed by collaboration between al-Qaeda and South American theft groups. What is the likelihood of Iran providing nuclear capability to terrorist groups? What are the potential future actions of the Mexican drug cartels against the Mexican and US governments?3

Intelligence questions are not the only type of questions that can lend themselves to the use of the LAMP. Virtually any question that can be framed in terms of actors with potential courses of action in response to it can apply the LAMP. For example, a corporation planning to introduce a new product might ask the following question: “What are the most likely responses of corporations X, Y, and Z (its competitors) in response to our new product?” Or a corporation might ask: “What are the most likely responses of our competitors to our business model over the next five years?” This potential use of the LAMP will be addressed at greater length in the final chapter. As can be seen by the above examples, the issue question is always framed in terms of “What are the consequences of X?”, “What is the potential impact of X?”, or “What is the likelihood of X?” The issue question should always be asked in such a way that the analyst can identify the national actors that can directly affect this issue.

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THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

Specify the national “actors” involved The student should then determine the number of “actors” who can directly affect this issue. I am deliberately making a distinction between “actors” at the national level and organizational level because not all nations or organizations that are affected by an issue are necessarily going to have courses of action available to them to do something about it. If the student has been careful enough to limit the scope of his initial question, the number of actors involved should be no more than five or six. If it is more than this, the number of possible “alternate futures” to be examined may become unmanageable, depending upon the number of courses of action open to each actor. Unless the analysts are using the LAMP software, they will not easily be able to handle the large number of permutations that will arise.

Perform an in-depth study of how each actor perceives the issue in question This step involves the greatest amount of historical as well as current research on the part of the analyst, and is obviously the most timeconsuming. Not only should the analyst examine “current history” from the perspective of the national actor, but he should also look for historical events, cultural factors, and even nuances of language that might have an impact on a given nation’s view of an issue. Failure to conduct an adequate perceptual study of each national actor simply increases the danger that the analyst will fall into the “mirror-imaging” trap: that of substituting his own logic for that of the national actor. If analysts mistakenly substitute their own logic for that of any national actor, this will naturally skew their calculations when they begin comparing the likelihood of the various “alternate futures,” and their predictions will have less reliability. In my earlier books on the subject, I examined the Soviet/Russian viewpoint concerning US strategic doctrine and the factors they believed were responsible for influencing its development.4 As might be expected, the Russians themselves projected their own logic, their own cultural biases, and their own strategic objectives onto US planners and policymakers. With this in mind, the analyst should always be careful to avoid the “mirrorimaging” fallacy himself. Using the nuclear republics of the former Soviet Union as an illustrative example, analysts should center their perceptual study of the national actors on the issue they are trying to predict. An example of how this would be organized is given below.



The philosophy and steps of the LAMP

7

The primary hypothesis of this paper is that the perceptions of the nuclear republics of the CIS regarding the political utility of nuclear weapons differ significantly enough to adversely affect arms control and nonproliferation negotiations, and will eventually lead to armed conflict. In the process of validating such a hypothesis, the following questions must he addressed: 1 What is the Russian perception of the political utility of nuclear 2

3 4 5 6 7 8

weapons since the August 1991 coup attempt? Does the Russian perception differ significantly from the previous (that is, from 1954 to the August 1991 coup attempt) unified “Soviet” perception of the political utility of nuclear weapons? What is the Ukrainian perception of the political utility of nuclear weapons since the August 1991 coup attempt? What is the Belarusian perception of the political utility of nuclear weapons since the August 1991 coup attempt? What is the Kazakh perception of the political utility of nuclear weapons since the August 1991 coup attempt? How have these perceptions influenced the behavior of the republics vis-à-vis one another and the US? To what extent do the republics view nuclear weapons as “bargaining chips” having little other value? What are the implications of these interacting perceptions for the future of arms control negotiations, nuclear nonproliferation, or the likelihood of armed conflict between the republics?6

Note that the final question in the perceptual study is one which is most likely to be answered during the course of comparing and analyzing “alternate futures.” Once the perceptual study of each actor has been completed, the analysts are then ready to proceed to the next step.

Specify all possible courses of action for each actor After completing the perceptual study for each actor, it should become apparent to the analysts what the possible range of courses of action are for each actor. The analysts should not exclude a course of action merely because it seems unlikely to them that an actor will choose it, although they should exclude choices that are clearly impossible or beyond the strength of the actor in question.

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THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

Determine the major scenarios within which you will compare the alternate futures A scenario provides the major assumptions that will influence the actions of all national actors concerned for that predictive issue. Often it will be based on the actions of a major power outside the scope of an analyst’s initial study. The second purpose of a scenario is to account for an additional actor without having to calculate it as part of the permutations for the alternate futures. For example, an analyst is studying the implications of a change in Israel’s nuclear doctrine for nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. The national actors are Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran. The scenarios would be based on the likely courses of action of Israel, which could be as follows. 1 Continue ambiguous policy. Israel continues neither to confirm or

deny its nuclear capability. 2 Declared nuclear capability, but no nuclear weapons. Israel acknowledges that it has the capability to produce nuclear weapons, but does not declare itself a nuclear power. 3 Become a declared nuclear power. Israel both declares nuclear capability and actual nuclear weapons possession with associated delivery systems.

Scenarios Alternative futures Focal events

Indicators

FIGURE 1.1  Relationships between the analytic steps of the LAMP



The philosophy and steps of the LAMP

9

Calculate the total number of permutations of possible “alternate futures” for each scenario This is where the necessity of limiting the number of actors and choices becomes most apparent. The general formula for computing the number of alternate futures is Xy=Z, where X equals the number of courses of action open to each actor, and y equals the number of national actors involved (assuming that each actor has the same number of courses of action open to it). Z will equal the total number of alternate futures to be compared. For example, if the analysts are looking at five actors with two courses of action open to each, then they are looking at only 25, or 32 alternate futures. If they include the US as a national actor with its three courses of action, however, then the number of alternate futures becomes 25 X 31, or 96 possible alternate futures. The same result would apply to our Israeli nuclear problem above. However, if there were three courses of action open to all five national actors, then the number of possible alternate futures explodes to 35, or 243 alternate futures! Obviously, the use of a scenario helps the analysts keep the problem within manageable bounds.

Perform a “pair-wise comparison” of all alternate futures within the scenario to determine their relative probability The formula for computing the number of pair-wise comparisons is shown below. X=

n (n–1) 2

Here, n equals the total number of alternate futures to be compared, and X equals the total number of pair-wise comparison votes that must be conducted. A pair-wise comparison analyzes the alternate futures two at a time, always assuming that the two futures being compared at the moment are the only ones that exist. For example, in a problem with 27 alternate futures, the alternate futures are numbered 1 through 27. Future number 1 is compared to future number 2. Based on all of the information that the analyst is aware of at that moment, whichever future is deemed “more likely to occur” is given one vote. Future number 1 is then compared to future number 3, number 4, and so on in the same way until it has been compared to all futures within the scenario. The analysts then begin the process again with future number 2. But since you have already compared

10

THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

it to future number 1, you will only be comparing it to futures 3 through 27. This process continues until you have compared and voted on the last possible pairing of futures, numbers 26 and 27. This pair-wise comparison of futures is then repeated for the other scenarios.5 Although analysts may be tempted to rule out certain alternate futures as wholly implausible without voting on them, they must avoid this temptation. The strength of the LAMP lies in forcing the analysts to make a series of “either-or” decisions for the entire range of possibilities rather than arbitrarily deciding beforehand which are plausible and which are not.

Rank the alternate futures for each scenario from highest relative probability to the lowest based on the number of “votes” received What you have at the end of the pair-wise comparison is a series of futures which have received different numbers of votes based upon their relative probability. They are then rank-ordered from “most likely” to “least likely” based upon the number of votes that each future received.6 An illustration of this rank ordering is shown in Table 1.1 below using the example of the 1993 CIS nuclear republics case study. Advocates of more “traditional” approaches to probability will argue that if the 27 alternate futures equal the whole potential range of alternate futures, then their combined probabilities must equal 100 percent. They argue that it should then be possible to assign percentage probabilities to each of these alternate futures. The problem with this is that it is ultimately meaningless. Since these futures represent all of the estimated permutations of free will choices open to the national actors, any assigned percentage, even if it were accurate, would only be true for that snapshot in time. Free will makes such precise quantification impossible.

Table 1.1 Scenario 1 – Yeltsin stays in power (status quo)7 Possible future #

Ukraine

Belarus

Kazakhstan

# Votes

24

IN

CD

CD

26

14

IN

CD

IN

25

9

CD

CD

CD

23

25

SN

CD

CD

23



The philosophy and steps of the LAMP

11

Possible future #

Ukraine

Belarus

Kazakhstan

# Votes

16

SN

CD

IN

22

22

CD

CD

IN

20

1

IN

IN

IN

20

15

IN

CD

SN

20

18

IN

IN

CD

18

17

SN

CD

SN

16

5

SN

IN

IN

16

2

IN

IN

SN

15

20

SH

IN

CD

13

7

SN

IN

SN

13

26

CD

IN

CD

11

6

SN

SN

IN

10

10

CD

IN

IN

9

23

CD

CD

SN

9

4

SN

SN

SN

8

8

IN

SN

IN

8

19

IN

SN

CD

7

21

SN

SN

CD

7

3

IN

SN

SN

5

12

CD

IN

SN

4

27

CD

SN

CD

2

11

CD

SN

IN

1

13

CD

SN

SN

0

CD = Continue Disarmament; do not try to retain nuclear weapons IN = Pursue Independent Nuclear Capability SN = Preemptive Seizure of Soviet Nuclear Weapons

12

THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

Because of the dynamic, constantly changing nature of the universe of alternate futures, analysts using the LAMP must periodically “revote” the alternate futures in order to accurately account for new information they receive. How often this should be done depends on several things: how many analysts are working the problem; whether or not one has computer software support available for the LAMP; and how quickly the situation itself appears to be changing based on new information being received. Once the futures have been ranked, the analyst is ready to analyze the alternate futures themselves in more detail.

Assuming that each future occurs, analyze each alternate future in terms of its consequences for the issue in question This step does require some imagination on the part of the analysts, since they are writing what could be considered a “future history” of things that might be, assuming that the actors take the courses of action of a particular alternate future. Depending on the prediction issue and the degree of research the analysts are willing to undertake, the analysis of the consequences of a given alternate future often will take longer than one or two paragraphs.8

Determine the “focal events” that must occur in our present in order to bring about a given alternate future This step is not addressed in the consequences paragraph, since it cannot really be accomplished until the analysts have thoroughly examined the consequences of an alternate future. A “focal event” is an occurrence of sufficient magnitude that it changes the relative probability of the universe of alternate futures. If we were to “draw a line in time,” so to speak, from our present into the future, a focal event would resemble an intersection with two or more branches into other futures. Once the path is taken, our sojourner in time soon would be confronted with a different array of possible futures and branching-off points. The most likely future would have the fewest (or most plausible) focal events leading into it; it would be the alternate future offering the line of least resistance. In fact, our present might so closely resemble that alternate future that no focal events need occur.9 The more “bizarre” futures, on the other hand, would have more focal events leading to them, since more such events would be required in order to change our present into those futures. For the analysts, these will be the alternate futures that received the fewest votes during their pair-wise



The philosophy and steps of the LAMP

13

comparison in step 7. A good illustration of the use of “focal events” is shown below in this excerpt from a LAMP paper by Erick J. Wallman.10 SCENARIO 1: Cuban Style Autocracy Future #15 Cuba maintains a friendly diplomatic relationship with Venezuela, the U.S. is openly hostile to the Venezuelan government and Colombian government military forces engage Venezuelan military forces. (63 votes) FOCAL EVENT – Autocratic Control of Venezuela Achieved, viable democratic institutions dissolved completely FOCAL EVENT – Cuba openly expresses support for “new” Venezuelan government FOCAL EVENT – U.S. openly expresses displeasure with the demise of democracy in Venezuela FOCAL EVENT – Colombian and Venezuelan regular military forces engage in combat Future #9 Cuba maintains friendly diplomatic relationship with Venezuela and both the United States and Colombia are openly hostile to the Venezuelan government. (62 votes) FOCAL EVENT – Autocratic Control of Venezuela Achieved, viable democratic institutions dissolved completely FOCAL EVENT – Cuba openly expresses support for “new” Venezuelan government FOCAL EVENT – U.S. openly expresses displeasure with the demise of democracy in Venezuela FOCAL EVENT – Colombia openly expresses displeasure with the demise of democracy in Venezuela Future #31 Cuba maintains a neutral stance towards Venezuela, the United States maintains a hostile diplomatic response and Colombian government military forces engage Venezuelan military forces. (60.5 votes) FOCAL EVENT – Autocratic Control of Venezuela Achieved, viable democratic institutions dissolved completely FOCAL EVENT – U.S. openly expresses displeasure with the demise of democracy in Venezuela FOCAL EVENT – Colombian and Venezuelan regular military forces engage in combat Future #25 Cuba maintains a neutral stance towards Venezuela, the United States and Colombia maintain hostile diplomatic stances. (60 votes)

14

THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

FOCAL EVENT – Autocratic Control of Venezuela Achieved, viable democratic institutions dissolved completely FOCAL EVENT – U.S. openly expresses displeasure with the demise of democracy in Venezuela FOCAL EVENT – Colombia openly expresses displeasure with the demise of democracy in Venezuela Future #12 Cuba maintains a friendly diplomatic relationship with Venezuela, the U.S. is openly hostile to the Venezuelan government and Colombian government attempts to find some neutral ground. (60 votes) FOCAL EVENT – Autocratic Control of Venezuela Achieved, viable democratic institutions dissolved completely FOCAL EVENT – Cuba openly expresses support for “new” Venezuelan government FOCAL EVENT – U.S. openly expresses displeasure with the demise of democracy in Venezuela SCENARIO 2: Functioning Multiparty System Future #33 Cuba is openly hostile to developments of a functioning “U.S. style” democratic system in Venezuela and Colombia and the U.S. are openly enthusiastic and supportive. (63 votes) FOCAL EVENT – Viable democracy established in Venezuela FOCAL EVENT – Cuba openly expresses displeasure with “new” Venezuelan government FOCAL EVENT – U.S. openly expresses support for democracy in Venezuela FOCAL EVENT – Colombia openly expresses support for democracy in Venezuela Future #34 Cuba is openly hostile to developments of a functioning “U.S. style” democratic system in Venezuela, the U.S. is openly enthusiastic and supportive, and Colombia attempts to remain neutral. (62 votes) FOCAL EVENT – Viable democracy established in Venezuela FOCAL EVENT – Cuba openly expresses displeasure with “new” Venezuelan government FOCAL EVENT – U.S. openly expresses support for democracy in Venezuela Future #17 Cuba is hostile to developments of a functioning “U.S. style” democratic system in Venezuela, but maintains an officially neutral stance because of fears of potential repercussions for not doing so. Colombia and the U.S. are openly enthusiastic and supportive. (60 votes)



The philosophy and steps of the LAMP

15

FOCAL EVENT – Viable democracy established in Venezuela FOCAL EVENT – U.S. openly expresses support for democracy in Venezuela FOCAL EVENT – Colombia openly expresses support for democracy in Venezuela Future #38 Cuba is hostile to developments of a functioning “U.S. style” democratic system in Venezuela, the U.S. is openly enthusiastic and supportive, but border tensions escalate between Colombia and Venezuela resulting in some level of military force engagement. (59 votes) FOCAL EVENT – Viable democracy established in Venezuela FOCAL EVENT – Cuba openly expresses displeasure with “new” Venezuelan government FOCAL EVENT – U.S. openly expresses support for democracy in Venezuela FOCAL EVENT – Colombian and Venezuelan regular military forces engage in combat Future #40 Cuba is hostile to developments of a functioning “U.S. style” democratic system in Venezuela, the U.S. and Colombia maintain an officially neutral position, leaving the internal politics of Venezuela up to Venezuelans to decide. (59 votes) FOCAL EVENT – Viable democracy established in Venezuela FOCAL EVENT – Cuba openly expresses displeasure with “new” Venezuelan government

Develop indicators for the focal events This step links the LAMP with the more traditional “Indications and Warning” function.11 For each focal event associated with an alternate future, it should be possible to develop a list of indicators that such an event either has occurred or is about to occur. Once these indicators are entered into an automated database along with the focal events and alternate futures, the analysts have completed the basic 12-step LAMP process. Subsequent activity consists of periodic “revoting” of the alternate futures as new information is acquired, refinement of the indicators associated with particular focal events, as well as the identification of additional focal events for the more exotic alternate futures. Ideally, the occurrence of a single indicator would not only alert the analysts to the possible occurrence of a focal event, but would enable them to check all alternate futures associated with that focal event, since its occurrence could increase their relative probability as well. A further illustration of this step is shown below, once again using the Wallman paper as an exemplar.12

16

THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

FOCAL EVENT – Autocratic Control of Venezuela Achieved, viable democratic institutions dissolved completely KEY INDICATOR – Failure of a peaceful transition of power, political power seized or maintained through military force (declaration of martial law, violent coup d’état) KEY INDICATOR – Loss of freedom of the press, newspapers and political voices hostile to the political group in power are silenced or noticeably censored KEY INDICATOR – Amnesty International and other humanitarian groups report gross repressions of individual freedom KEY INDICATOR – Government takes control of key aspects of free market economy KEY INDICATOR – Prison population increases dramatically as dissident groups are jailed FOCAL EVENT – Cuba openly expresses support for “new” Venezuelan government KEY INDICATORS – Open signs of amicable relationship continue (Chavez/Castro baseball games, fatherly chats, red carpet state visits, favorable economic arrangements maintained) FOCAL EVENT – U.S. openly expresses displeasure with the demise of democracy in Venezuela KEY INDICATOR – U.S. utilizes Organization of American States as a forum to officially protest developments in Venezuela KEY INDICATOR – U.S. openly considers and perhaps implements economic sanctions against Venezuela POSSIBLE INDICATOR – U.S. looks for alternate sources of oil and reduces Venezuelan imports KEY INDICATOR – U.S. places Venezuela on several “bad boy lists” (refuses to consider most favored nation status, state declared sponsor of terrorism, etc.) KEY INDICATOR – U.S. severs diplomatic relations with Venezuela (spectrum from evacuating most of embassy personnel, to closing U.S. embassy in Caracas) KEY INDICATOR – U.S. offers asylum to political refugees from Venezuela FOCAL EVENT – Colombia openly expresses displeasure with the demise of democracy in Venezuela KEY INDICATOR – Colombia voices concern at Organization of American States (OAS), utilizing forum to express concern about developments in Venezuela KEY INDICATOR – Colombia backs out of free trade agreement with Venezuela



The philosophy and steps of the LAMP

17

KEY INDICATOR – Colombia severs or scales back diplomatic relations with Venezuela (less likely to occur than with the United States, especially in the absence of open military conflict, the simple proximity of Venezuela to Colombia dictates that they maintain a diplomatic dialogue, but this is a valid indicator which would contribute to this focal event) KEY INDICATOR – Colombia offers asylum to political refugees from Venezuela FOCAL EVENT – Viable democracy established in Venezuela KEY INDICATOR – Successful peaceful transition of power, political power transfers to opposite party without significant violence or the use of military force (i.e. Chavez steps down on the 15 Aug 04 if the results of the referendum dictate) KEY INDICATOR – Toleration of opposing viewpoints in free press, sample of Nations’ newspapers yields a balanced and variety of political positions KEY INDICATOR – Decreasing trend in accusations of violations of human rights and government corruption KEY INDICATOR – Laissez Faire economy and economic growth instead of a trend toward total state control of the economy (privatization of the oil industry) KEY INDICATOR – Venezuelan military officers who protested at Plaza Altamira, declare that current government is following the Constitution FOCAL EVENT – Cuba openly expresses displeasure with “new” Venezuelan government KEY INDICATOR – Dramatic increase in political rhetoric blaming U.S. interference for the demise the current Venezuelan executive administration (note – Chavez need not fall out of power for a viable democracy to exist, simply allow opposition a voice and respect the country’s constitution … most likely however, a viable democracy will only be created with Chavez out of power) FOCAL EVENT – U.S. openly expresses support for democracy in Venezuela KEY INDICATOR – Obvious effort to improve economic situation in Venezuela (increased trade, economic and military aid) KEY INDICATOR – Most favored nation status granted, open praise for people of Venezuela in diplomatic settings (state department press briefings), official statements of support given in diplomatic forums like the OAS or UN. FOCAL EVENT – Colombia openly expresses support for democracy in Venezuela

18

THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

KEY INDICATOR – Effort to increase cooperation towards solving conflicts and common problems of border security KEY INDICATOR – Open praise for people of Venezuela in diplomatic settings (state department press briefings); official statements of support given in diplomatic forums like the OAS or UN FOCAL EVENT – Colombian and Venezuelan regular military forces engage in combat KEY INDICATOR – Press reporting of military hostilities KEY INDICATOR – Flurry of diplomatic activity to try to cast blame and or perform “damage control” KEY INDICATOR – Increase of military logistics activities KEY INDICATOR – Depending on scale of conflict, possible refugees from region at crisis levels What the steps of the LAMP are collectively designed to do is to help the analyst avoid a range of analytic fallacies. These are what I call the “Four Sources of Error” in the intelligence process.13 These sources of error are each difficult enough to avoid by themselves, and it is practically impossible to avoid all of them on anything approaching a consistent basis. They are: 1 The Enemy (who can create error through either successful

deception or concealment of his intentions and capabilities). 2 The Analyst (who can fall victim to one or more analytical fallacies in an attempt to derive actionable intelligence). 3 The System (which can create the conditions for strategic surprise through either impeding the process of timely warning or rendering the conclusions of analysts so vague as to be useless to the policymaker). 4 The Policymaker (who can become a source of error by unduly influencing the intelligence process in an effort to find support for his or her chosen policy). It is this last source of error that can be so problematic for the intelligence analyst. For the policymaker is the wielder of power, with the luxury of being able to choose to ignore or disregard intelligence assessments that do not support, or even contradict, the desired policy course. And the intelligence analysts, who are without power, must rely on the strength and credibility of their analytic judgments in order to properly fulfill their professional responsibility. It cannot really be otherwise, since the intelligence analysts cannot become partisans of a given policy course based on their analysis, for then they risk being perceived by the policymaker as a nuisance at best, and a political adversary at worst.



The philosophy and steps of the LAMP

19

What makes this even more problematic for the intelligence analyst is the fact that, when assessments are presented to a policymaker, four things can happen, and only one of them is good. 1 The intelligence analyst is correct, and the policymaker acts on the

assessment (the “good guys” win, and surprise is averted).

2 The intelligence analyst is wrong, but the policymaker acts on the

assessment (the “cry wolf” syndrome, which can erode credibility over time if repeated). 3 The intelligence analyst is wrong, but the policymaker ignores the assessment (technically nothing bad has happened, but this is the result of the analyst having lost credibility over time). 4 The intelligence analyst is correct, but the policymaker ignores the assessment (this is what can result in strategic surprise). The foregoing discussion is not intended to discourage you, but is simply intended to foster the recognition that the sources of error discussed above are the occupational hazards of the intelligence profession.

State the potential of a given alternate future to “transpose” into another alternate future The concept of “transposition” is familiar to chess theorists as it pertains to chess openings and their many continuations. Simply stated, transposition occurs when one chess opening’s line of play leads into a line of play resembling a different (and more familiar) chess opening. For example, a chess player may use a chess opening he believes is unfamiliar to his opponent in order to gain an advantage. But his opponent may find a move or series of moves which leads the game back into lines that are more familiar to him. Transposition is said to have occurred in this case, since the continuation of one chess opening has been replaced by that of another.14 Much the same thing can occur in our array of alternate futures. Since every act of free will has the potential to change the future, it has virtually the same effect as transposition does in chess. Transposition does not have to occur in every alternate future; some alternate futures have assumptions which make them unique. In any case, once the analysts have described the consequences of an alternate future, they should note concisely the potential for transposition into another alternate future, since this may affect the relative probability of these futures as events unfold. The transposition step is discussed in both the CIS nuclear republics case study and the LAMP papers in Part Two.

20

THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

Scenario – Status quo Indicator

Indicator

Indicator

Indicator

Indicator

Indicator

Focal event

Indicator Indicator

Indicator Focal event

Indicator

Indicator

Focal event

Indicator Indicator

Focal event

Focal event

Alternative Future 1

Indicator

Indicator

Indicator

Focal event

Focal event

Alternative Future 2

Alternative Future 3

FIGURE 1.2  The analytic map In conclusion, the LAMP is not an infallible method, nor will it grant intelligence analysts the gift of prophecy by doing their thinking for them. Judiciously used, however, the LAMP offers a powerful method for examining the future’s many possible paths, and offers intelligence analysts a new tool for assessing potential threats to the United States.

Notes  1 I was once asked by a student if I accounted for God in my philosophy of the LAMP. My response was that, as a Christian, I considered God to be the ultimate “Free Will Actor,” with the ability to intervene at any place or time in history that He chooses. But attempting to predict the potential actions of God with respect to any issue would require one to know the Mind of God. Because finite human minds cannot begin to comprehend, let alone predict, the most likely actions of an Infinite God, the future is, in the absolute sense, inherently unpredictable. The LAMP must therefore operate on the assumption that God will choose not to intervene actively with respect to any given issue.  2 The LAMP website is at www.lamp-method.org  3 These topics have all been carried out as graduate term papers in the Masters of Intelligence Studies degree program at American Military University.



The philosophy and steps of the LAMP

21

 4 See Jonathan Samuel Lockwood, The Soviet View of US Strategic Doctrine: Implications for Decisionmaking (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Press, 1983). See also Jonathan Samuel Lockwood and Kathleen O’Brien Lockwood, The Russian View of US Strategy: Its Past, Its Future (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1993), 194–7.  5 The pair-wise comparison voting can be performed by either a single analyst or a group of analysts voting through a computer network. This latter approach is more likely to avoid the “groupthink” fallacy that can occur with face-to-face deliberations. The introduction of LAMP software makes this process easier.  6 If a “tie vote” exists in the number of votes received, the simple tiebreaker is to check the individual results of the pair-wise comparison voting to see which alternate future was deemed more likely in the head-to-head comparison.  7 For example, the alternate futures depicted in Scenario 1 represent an assessment based on all information available as of the end of February 1993. While one could still have made a good case at the time of this writing (December 1993) for Alternate Future #24 staying at the top, other analysts might argue that the evidence since then has further decreased the relative probability of Alternate Future #9 (Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan all continue disarmament), while Alternate Futures #25 and #16, involving Ukrainian seizure of its nuclear weapons, have further increased in relative probability. Indeed, such analysts would be correct. Because of the dynamic, constantly changing nature of the universe of alternate futures, analysts using the LAMP approach must periodically “revote” the alternate futures in order to accurately account for new information they receive. How often this should be done depends on several things: how many analysts are working the problem; whether or not one has computer software support available for the LAMP approach; and how quickly the situation itself appears to be changing in terms of new information being received.  8 Examples of this type of consequence analysis are show in the case study chapter of the CIS nuclear republics, as well as in the LAMP papers in Part Two of this book.  9 Lockwood discusses this in more detail with his concept of the Analytic Map at www.lamp-method.org [accessed 15 January 2013]. 10 Erick J. Wallman, “How will the US, Columbia, and Cuba respond to the development of a Cuban Style Socialist Government in Venezuela?” (Unpublished term paper for American Military University course INTL504 (Analytic Methods), Spring 2004). 11 The designation of indicators for the various focal events can be derived by the same methods used in “traditional” Indications and Warning scenarios. See “Indicators and Signposts of Change” in A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques for Improving Intelligence Analysis (US Government publication, March 2009), 12–13. 12 Wallman, “How will the US, Columbia, and Cuba respond”, 30–1.

22

THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

13 The original version of this concept appeared in the Spring 1994 issue of the Defense Intelligence Journal (Vol. 3, No. 1) (Spring 1994) in Jonathan S. Lockwood, “Sources of Error in Indications and Warning.” 14 For the chess enthusiast, transposition is explained further in Siegbert Tarrasch, The Game of Chess (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 1988).

CHAPTER TWO

A comparison of the LAMP with other techniques When the student first examines the LAMP method, the first question that usually comes to mind is: “Why use this particular predictive analytical method when there are other established analytical techniques that have demonstrated merit?” In order to answer this question satisfactorily, one has to look at related analytical techniques that have been used for prediction. The LAMP will then be compared with these alternate methods to show how it differs from these techniques.

The analytic hierarchy process (AHP) The AHP technique was originally developed by Thomas L. Saaty as a decision-making and conflict-resolution tool.1 As a starting point for the analyst, the basic steps of the AHP are provided as stated in Saaty’s original work: 1 Define the problem and specify the solution desired. 2 Structure the hierarchy from the overall managerial viewpoint (from

top levels to the level at which intervention to solve the problem is possible). 3 Construct a pair-wise comparison matrix of the relevant contributions of the impact of each element on each governing criterion in the next higher level. In this matrix, pairs of elements are compared with respective criterion in the superior level. In comparing two elements most people prefer to give a judgment that indicates the dominance as a whole number. The matrix has one position to enter that number and another to enter its reciprocal.

24

THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

4

5

6 7

8

Thus if one element does not contribute more than another, the other must contribute more than it. This number is entered in the appropriate position in the matrix and its reciprocal entered in the other position. An element on the left is by convention examined regarding its dominance over an element at the top of the matrix. Obtain all judgments required to develop the set of matrices in step 3. If there are many people participating, the task for each person can be made simple by appropriate allocation of effort, which we describe in a later chapter. Multiple judgments can be synthesized by using the geometric mean. Having collected all the pair-wise comparison data and entered their reciprocals together with unit entries down the main diagonal, the priorities are obtained and consistency is tested. Perform steps 3, 4, and 5 for all levels and clusters in the hierarchy. Use hierarchical composition (synthesis) to weight the vectors of priorities by the weights of the criteria, and take the sum over all weighted priority entries corresponding to those in the next lower level and sum. The result is an overall priority vector for the lowest level of the hierarchy. If there are several outcomes, their arithmetic average may be taken. Evaluate consistency for the entire hierarchy by multiplying each consistency index by the priority of the corresponding criterion and adding the products. The result is divided by the same type of expression using the random consistency index corresponding to the dimensions of each matrix weighted by the priorities as before. The consistency ratio of the hierarchy should be 10 percent or less. If it is not, the quality of information should be improved—perhaps by revising the manner in which questions are posed to make the pair-wise comparisons. If this measure fails to improve consistency, it is likely that the problem has not been adequately structured— that is, similar elements have not been grouped under a meaningful criterion. A return to step 2 is then required, although only the problematic parts of the hierarchy may need revision.2

The most obvious feature of the AHP is its heavy reliance on quantitative methods. Even though both the LAMP and AHP refer to “pair-wise comparisons” as part of the process, they are used in radically different ways in both methods. The other obvious characteristic of AHP is that it is designed for use as a decision-making tool. For instance, Saaty proposes four examples to illustrate how the AHP method may be applied to “real world” situations. The first is an analysis of the decision-making process involved in the Iranian hostage rescue operation. The second example “challenges us to select the best product to manufacture from three



A comparison of the LAMP with other techniques

25

alternatives by using six criteria.” The third example shows how AHP might be used “to estimate the impact of energy, recession, and inflation on a company’s sales.” Finally, Saaty’s fourth example shows how AHP would be used “to set priorities for stocks using several criteria.”3 In a later version of the AHP by Saaty and Alexander, the method is employed in a number of case studies involving conflict resolution between national actors. This application of AHP also bears brief examination, since the casual reader might mistakenly assume there to be significant similarity between the LAMP and AHP. In fact, since AHP purports to be a model for resolving conflicts, this in itself distinguishes it in yet another way from the LAMP, which is intended only to be a predictive model. Saaty and Alexander sum up the essence of the AHP as a conflict resolution tool thus: The Analytic Hierarchy process is an interactive process combining the intuitive mental rationality of human beings without undue insistence upon perfect consistency with equally human institutions of conflicting groups. By utilizing the process, conflicting groups can trade off their differences in a rational procedure that does not sacrifice individuality but does produce a realistic solution. By requiring agreement upon goals and subgoals by the participants in a dispute, from the very beginning the process sets the stage for possible success in group dynamics. Because none of the participants can envision the outcome of a vector of preferences derived from a matrix, the process also ensures that the weighted preferences are honest and not given merely to produce a certain result, when the outcome is achieved, the opponents feel that a fair and rational solution has been reached.4

LAMP versus AHP The foregoing overview of the Analytic Hierarchy Process is not intended as a disparagement of the technique in any way. The intent is to show how the LAMP differs in kind from the AHP, even though there is some superficial similarity in some of the terms used. For example, although both the LAMP and AHP use “pair-wise comparisons” of projected outcomes, AHP assigns a nine-point value scale to the probability of these outcomes for the purpose of selecting the most desirable outcome for decision-making purposes, while the LAMP emphasizes prediction of the relative probability of alternate futures. LAMP deliberately eschews the assignment of any numerical values to the relative probability of these alternate futures, since it assumes that the probability of any given future will be constantly changing due to the potentially infinite possibilities for free will of the national actors to affect

26

THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

events. In practice, this means that the kind of quantification called for by the AHP is not only impossible, but meaningless within the context of the LAMP. Additionally, the LAMP emphasizes analysis of the consequences for each one of the alternate futures themselves, while the AHP looks at the “desirability” of an outcome for decision making. LAMP looks at the potential of an alternate future for transposition into other alternate futures, while the AHP does not. Finally, the LAMP looks at potential “focal events” which can lead from our present into a particular alternate future, and subsequently uses these focal events as a basis for deriving indicators. AHP was not designed to address these aspects. In its later applications, in fact, it diverges even more significantly from the LAMP in that the AHP attempts to become a prescriptive model for resolving conflict. Other methods of forecasting attempt to make optimum use of “expert opinion” in formulating predictions about the future. We will now look at one of the best-known examples of this approach, the Delphi technique.

The Delphi technique The Delphi technique is a method for systematically eliciting a set of informed judgments from a group of experts about the timing, probability, and implications of designated trends and events. Although its purpose is often aimed at generating a consensus of opinion from the group, it also identifies and clarifies divergences of opinion with respect to the majority forecast—which is sometimes more important than getting the consensus of opinion. The Delphi method is best suited for situations in which historical objective information is lacking. The Delphi technique is designed to overcome the disadvantages of a traditional panel forecast: specious persuasion by the panel member with the greatest authority or verbal agility; unwillingness to abandon publicly expressed opinions; and the bandwagon effect of majority opinion. Instead of using open discussion, the Delphi technique uses a carefully designed program of sequential individual interrogations. These interrogations are usually performed via questionnaires: a series of rounds, with opinion and information feedback from the earlier rounds being used in the later rounds. Respondents are able to revise their opinions, based on the feedback from each round. The inquiry and feedback tend to stimulate the panel members to consider factors not thought of previously. Results of a Delphi forecast are presented in teams of median and quartile responses. In this way each opinion within the group is taken into account in the median response, not the “optimistic” and “pessimistic” extremes of the responses shown by the size of the interquartile responses.5



A comparison of the LAMP with other techniques

27

A typical Delphi “prediction session” consists of four rounds of estimates, with the ultimate aim being the creation of a “median” prediction on the part of the group. A typical sequence of rounds might go as follows:

Round 1 Each expert estimates the year by which a certain projected event will occur during the time interval, 2010–40. The interquartile range (IQR)—that is, the interval containing 50 percent of the responses—and the median are determined for each question. Round 2 Summarized information is fed back to the panelists, who are then asked to reconsider their previous estimates in light of the IQR and the median. If a panelist desires, the previous answer can be revised. If the revised answer lies outside the IQR, the panelist is asked to give the reason why the answer is different from the majority consensus of the group. At the end of the round, the Delphi monitor summarizes the arguments and revises the IQR and median. The necessity of justifying relatively extreme responses has the effect of causing panelists without strong convictions to move their estimates closer to the median. On the other hand, those respondents who feel they have a good argument for a deviant opinion tend to retain the original estimate and defend it. Round 3 Panelists are given the revised summary of arguments and IQR and median estimates. They are then asked to review and revise, if necessary, the responses in light of the new information. Again, if the revised response falls outside the IQR, the panelist is asked to provide a justification for that response. The responses are collected by the Delphi monitor, who prepares a concise summary of any new arguments and re-evaluates the IQR and median. Round 4 In this final round, panelists are given the summarized and evaluated responses from Round 3. They are again asked to reconsider the IQR, median, and extreme position arguments, and are given the chance to revise their estimates, if they so desire. The median of this final round can then be taken as representative of the group consensus. Results from the round are then presented in table form with a list of the forecast events and their associated IQR and median estimates for date of occurrence. A variation of the procedure above would be to ask for probability ranges (that is, 50 percent and 90 percent) for each estimated date of occurrence.6 According to authors Linstone and Turoff,7 the Delphi technique is particularly useful in the following types of situations: 1 When subjective judgments on a collective basis can better benefit

the nature of the problem than using precise analytical techniques.

28

THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP) 2 When the problem is complex and has no history of adequate

historical information. 3 When the individuals needed to contribute to the examination of the problem have diverse backgrounds and expertise and have no history of communication with each other. 4 When more individuals are needed than can effectively interact in a 5 6 7

8

face-to-face exchange. When time and cost make frequent group meetings infeasible. When the efficiency of face-to-face meetings can be increased by a supplemental group communication process. When individuals have disagreements so severe or politically unpalatable that the communication process must be referred and/ or anonymously assured. When the heterogeneity of the panelists must be preserved in order to preserve validity and avoid the “bandwagon” effect.

LAMP versus Delphi When the reader compares the characteristics of the Delphi technique to that of the LAMP in Chapter 1, there are a couple of broad similarities, but otherwise the methods are quite different. Like the LAMP, Delphi eschews strict adherence to quantitative techniques, although not to the extent that the LAMP does. Like Delphi, the LAMP can be used by a group of analysts, although the LAMP can be used by just one analyst if necessary. And while both techniques attempt to make predictions about possible future events, the LAMP is designed to focus on the relative probability of alternate futures for a more narrowly focused issue than the Delphi technique. Delphi and the LAMP both share the virtue of minimizing the “groupthink” syndrome to which groups of analysts are prone when they meet to discuss a problem or engage in prediction. There are other salient differences between the LAMP and Delphi as well. Delphi attempts to assign fixed probability ranges to future events, while the LAMP emphasizes relative probability of alternate futures. While Delphi assumes that a problem may not have adequate historical information, this is precluded under the LAMP approach, since it involves perceptual study of all of the national actors concerning a particular issue, to include historical as well as contemporary perceptions. Finally, Delphi strives for group consensus, while the LAMP compels the analyst or group of analysts to make a series of “either-or” choices when conducting a pair-wise comparison of alternate futures. While there will be agreement, it will be by majority vote, with provision made to record the votes of the individual analysts for later reference.



A comparison of the LAMP with other techniques

29

Again, while the Delphi technique shares some characteristics in common with the LAMP, the foregoing overview of the Delphi technique, when compared with the 12-step LAMP process in Chapter 1, demonstrates that the LAMP differs both in kind and intent from the Delphi approach. For our final comparison, we shall look at yet another predictive method that should be familiar to every intelligence analyst, and which also shares certain characteristics in common with the LAMP.

Hypothesized Futures and Scenarios The use of Hypothesized Futures (also called Alternative Futures) and Scenario analysis, while somewhat less structured than the LAMP, nevertheless have their place in predictive analysis, mainly when you are dealing with predictive problems that are very broad in scope or that involve a large number of actors, conditions that would overwhelm the LAMP (even with the use of specialized computer software to augment the LAMP and facilitate voting by a group of analysts), which is designed more for examining a narrower “slice” of the future rather than trying to encompass its totality.

Alternative Futures analysis8 Alternative Futures analysis is most useful when a situation is viewed as too complex or the outcomes as too uncertain to trust a single outcome assessment. First, analysts must recognize that there is high uncertainty surrounding the topic in question. Second, they, and often their customers, recognize that they need to consider a wide range of factors that might bear on the question. And third, they are prepared to explore a range of outcomes and are not wedded to any preconceived result. Depending on how elaborate the futures project, the effort can amount to considerable investment in time, analytic resources, and money. A team of analysts can spend several hours or days organizing, brainstorming, and developing multiple futures; alternatively, a larger-scale effort can require preparing a multi-day workshop that brings together participants (including outside experts). Such an undertaking often demands the special skills of trained scenario-development facilitators and conferencing facilities. This technique is a sharp contrast to contrarian techniques, which try to challenge the analysts’ high confidence and relative certitude about an event or trend. Instead, multiple futures development is a divergent thinking technique that tries to use the complexity and uncertainty of a situation to describe multiple outcomes or futures that the analyst and policymaker should consider, rather than to predict one outcome.

30

THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

Alternative Futures analysis is extremely useful in highly ambiguous situations, when analysts confront not only a lot of “known unknowns” but also “unknown unknowns.” What this means is that analysts recognize that there are factors, forces, and dynamics among key actors that are difficult to identify without the use of some structured technique that can model how they would interact or behave. As the outcomes are not known prior to the futures exercise, analysts must be prepared for the unexpected, and willing to engage in a more free-wheeling exchange of views than typically occurs in order to “imagine the future.” Given the time and resources involved, Scenario Analysis is best reserved for situations that could potentially pose grave threats or otherwise have significant consequences. From past experience, analysts have found that involving policymakers in the Alternative Futures exercise is the most effective way to communicate the results of this exploration of alternative outcomes and sensitize them to key uncertainties. Most participants find the process of developing such scenarios as useful as any finished product that attempts to capture the results of the exercise. Analysts and policymakers can benefit from this technique in several ways: MM

It provides an effective means of weighing multiple unknown or unknowable factors and presenting a set of plausible outcomes.

MM

It can help to delimit a problem by identifying plausible combinations of uncertain factors.

MM

It provides a broader analytic framework for calculating the costs, risks, and opportunities presented to policymakers by different outcomes.

MM

It aids analysts and policymakers in anticipating what otherwise would be surprising developments by forcing them to challenge assumptions and consider possible “wild cards” or discontinuous events.

MM

It generates indicators to monitor for signs that a particular future is becoming more or less likely, so that policies can be reassessed.

Although there are a variety of ways to develop Alternative Futures, the most common approach used in both the public and private sectors involves the following steps: MM

Develop the “focal issue” by systematically interviewing experts and officials who are examining the general topic.

MM

Convene a group of experts (both internal and external) to brainstorm about the forces and factors that could affect the focal issue.



A comparison of the LAMP with other techniques

31

MM

Select by consensus the two most critical and uncertain forces and convert these into axes or continua with the most relevant endpoints assigned.

MM

Establish the most relevant endpoints for each factor; for example, if economic growth were the most critical, uncertain force, the endpoints could be “fast” and “slow” or “transformative” and “stabilizing” depending on the type of issue addressed.

MM

Form a futures matrix by crossing the two chosen axes. The four resulting quadrants provide the basis for characterizing alternative future worlds.

MM

Generate colorful stories that describe these futures and how they could plausibly come about. Signposts or indicators can then be developed.

Participants, especially policymakers, can then consider how current decisions or strategies would fare in each of the four worlds and identify alternative policies that might work better either across all the futures or in specific ones. By anticipating alternative outcomes, policymakers have a better chance of either devising strategies flexible enough to accommodate multiple outcomes or of being prepared and agile in the face of change. A closely related technique to the Alternative Futures method is the use of scenarios. Scenarios are essentially “stories” about the future that describe hypothetical developments and conditions in a relatively holistic manner. In traditional scenario theory, a scenario or set of alternative scenarios always has some point of focus. That focus might be as narrow as tactical developments in a single theater of operations, or as broad as descriptions of possible future societies. Although there are such things as “single-scenario” forecasts, these are not really “forecasts” in the predictive sense, although they are often used as a starting point for examining the consequences of a particular set of assumptions about the future. Scenarios have proven advantageous in a number of situations where prediction has been required. Among the sort of problems that scenarios address are the success, failure, or unanticipated effects of a particular decision or strategy; different lines or rates of development; various technologies; future demands for natural resources; and different patterns of social and political change. Scenarios can reflect different and often competing points of view about the future held by different experts in an area. Finally, scenarios work well in spanning and encompassing a range of significant alternatives when the future is highly uncertain. The approach generally seeks to clarify genuinely uncertain situations rather than to predict where it is not possible to so. In effect, scenario analysts develop alternative

32

THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

forecasts based on explicit, significantly different, but nevertheless plausible sets of assumptions and logics about the future.9. Scenario advocates recommend using this approach under the following circumstances: 1 If many different plausible contingencies must be identified and 2

3 4 5

analyzed. When forecasting topics are so complex and so interconnected with other factors that no formal models will adequately satisfy the requirements of analysis. Where no satisfactory formal models or quantitative methods exist. When uncertainty is believed to be high. When the time span of concern is very long.10.

The scenario approach requires interlinked descriptions of many different factors. Scenario advocates warn that, although there is potential interest in estimating the likelihood or probability of one scenario versus another, attempting to do so can be misleading, asserting that only the analyst’s or client’s judgments serve as the basis for assigning subjective probabilities. Each scenario is seen as only one point in an infinite field of possibilities, with no one scenario likely to describe the future that will actually occur. In fact, one scenario specialist has gone so far as to say that “the most likely scenario is very unlikely.” Instead, it is claimed that a “well done” set of Alternative Futures scenarios will encompass and include the “most likely” future.11. At the same time, however, scenario advocates claim that although the Alternative Futures should encompass the range of future uncertainties, fewer scenarios are considered better than more, and that the longer the time span involved, the better it is to develop as few as possible significant alternatives.12. An example follows of how this scenario approach was applied to force planning for US defense requirements in the Pacific for the 1990s. The underlying geopolitical forces for generating these scenarios included such factors as economic trends and interests, traditional alliance relationships, ideological orientation, and military capability. Each scenario was then based on different “plausible” patterns of change among such factors and ultimately on the projected great power alignment for the 1990s (projections below were made in the early 1980s).

Scenario 1: East–West polarization This scenario would assume inertia in the trends of the past 10 to 20 years. Major nations or blocs in or concerned with East Asia would continue to



A comparison of the LAMP with other techniques

33

view their individual and shared interests as they have in the recent past. This scenario, which represents something of an extrapolation from the present, projects the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and North Korea opposed by the United States, Japan, South Korea, and an informal community of countries including Australia, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines—and the Peoples Republic of China (PRC).

Scenario 2: Triangular power politics This scenario assumes gradual US–Chinese alienation over the issue of Taiwan’s security. By the early 1990s, East Asian politics is dominated by three powers. The United States remains allied to South Korea and the Philippines. Japan ends its Mutual Security Treaty with the United States and embarks on a neutralist course with no significant expansion of selfdefense forces. China extends its influence to Burma and North Korea. The Soviet Union maintains a lower profile in Asia to avoid a rapprochement between Washington and Beijing.

Scenario 3: Four-power politics The logic of this scenario is similar to that in Scenario 2, except that Japan, sensing increasing regional tension and diverging interests with the United States, adopts a policy of armed neutrality. It expands its self-defense forces and extends its defensive perimeter in north-east Asia. A new fleet of surface combatants is launched to protect Japan’s vulnerable sea lanes as far south as the Indonesian Straits. The result is a four-power balance in Asia with the United States, Japan, and China in an informal alliance to contain the Soviet–Vietnamese alignment.

Scenario 4: Sino–Soviet rapprochement This scenario reverses a major trend that has been under way since the 1950s. The scenario logic is that economic disappointment in the PRC leads to another dramatic shift in Chinese leadership politics, Sino– American differences over Taiwan push Beijing and Washington further apart, and the Soviet Union, beset by political and economic pressures at home and in Eastern Europe, pursues detente with the PRC. The result is a scenario in which polarization is sharp between the reborn Sino–Soviet coalition on the one hand and the US and Asia’s market economies on the other.

34

THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

All of the above scenarios assumed no major conflicts in Europe or the Middle East. Supposedly these scenarios were to have bounded regional geopolitical uncertainty in the 1990s sufficiently so that US force planners could begin identifying US defense requirements for the Pacific in that decade. As we have seen, however, this scenario approach did not account for the seemingly implausible future which in fact became the most likely future.13. In fact, the above example points out one of the main criticisms of the scenario approach. Because there is no commonly accepted “grand theory” of long-range change in existence, scenarios are invariably found to be hazy, vague, too sweeping in the subjects they cover, and made up of overly speculative rather than rigorous analysis. Scenarios are further criticized as being more the product of inventive minds rather than the results of established and proven “scientific methods.”

LAMP versus Alternative Futures and Scenarios Unlike the above approaches, the LAMP is based on one key assumption about the future: that it is the sum total of the interaction of free will of the national actors involved. By taking all possible permutations of the actors and courses of action involved, the LAMP develops a full range of possible “alternate futures” based on this single hypothesis. It then goes one step further than the scenario approach in that all alternate futures are then matched against each other in a pair-wise comparison to determine which alternate future has the highest relative probability. The LAMP is similar to the scenario approach in that both methods speak of events that might lead to alternate scenarios or futures. The scenario approach, however, assumes that these events are singular “branching-off” points which each result in a different future, while the LAMP treats such “focal events” as merely changing the relative probability of the universe of alternate futures that still exist. Moreover, these focal events are then used by the LAMP as the basis for developing indicators for the I &W process, while the scenario approach does not do this.14.

The Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) Heuer’s Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) methodology has become one of the most widely used structured methodologies in the intelligence community. It is also one of the most highly structured methodological approaches to analysis, with only the LAMP arguably being even more structured than ACH.



A comparison of the LAMP with other techniques

35

Most of you may think that you have never encountered a method quite like ACH before in your experience. In fact, practically all of you have encountered a form of ACH at one time or another. One of the distinguishing features of ACH is that it seeks to use evidence to eliminate various hypotheses rather than simply see which hypothesis is supported best by the available evidence. The danger of the latter approach is that an analyst may fall into the analytical trap known as “satisficing,” in which the analyst decides on an initial hypothesis, then looks for evidence to support it, disregarding evidence that may in fact contradict that initial hypothesis. For those of you who have ever read the Sherlock Holmes novels by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, you may recall Holmes famous saying (paraphrased here) that “when you have eliminated all other possible explanations, that which remains, however improbable, must be the truth.” ACH works in a similar manner, except that analysts must ensure that they have included ALL possible hypotheses pertaining to their problem in order not to inadvertently leave out the one hypothesis that may be the truth. Looking at it another way, how many of you have ever played the game of Clue  (Colonel Mustard with the Knife in the Library)? When you play the game of Clue, you are actually employing a rudimentary form of ACH by gathering evidence that eliminates the various suspects, locations, and means, until you arrive at the one true suspect by process of elimination. Or for those of you who have watched such television crime shows as CSI: Crime Scene Investigation, NCIS, or Law and Order, you will see the central principle of ACH being used (albeit in an artificially accelerated manner) to eliminate other explanations and suspects for a given crime.15 ACH has proved to be a highly effective technique when there is a large amount of data to absorb and evaluate. While a single analyst can use ACH, it is most effective with a small team that can challenge each other’s evaluation of the evidence. Developing a matrix of hypotheses and loading already collected information into the matrix can be accomplished in a day or less. If the data must be reassembled, the initial phases of the ACH process may require additional time. Sometimes a facilitator or someone familiar with the technique can lead new analysts through this process for the first time. ACH is particularly appropriate for controversial issues when analysts want to develop a clear record that shows what theories they have considered and how they arrived at their judgments. Developing the ACH matrix allows other analysts (or even policymakers) to review their analysis and identify areas of agreement and disagreement. Evidence can also be examined more systematically, and analysts have found that this makes the technique ideal for considering the possibility of deception and denial. ACH demands that analysts explicitly identify all the reasonable alternative hypotheses, then array the evidence against each hypothesis—rather

36

THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

than evaluating the plausibility of each hypothesis one at a time. To create a level playing field, the process must: MM

Ensure that all the information and argumentation is evaluated and given equal treatment or weight when considering each hypothesis.

MM

Prevent the analyst from premature closure on a particular explanation or hypothesis.

MM

Protect the analyst against innate tendencies to ignore or discount information that does not fit comfortably with the preferred explanation at the time.

To accomplish this, the process should follow these steps: MM

Brainstorm among analysts with different perspectives to identify all possible hypotheses.

MM

List all significant evidence and arguments relevant to all the hypotheses.

MM

Prepare a matrix with hypotheses across the top and each piece of evidence on the side. Determine whether each piece of evidence is consistent, inconsistent, or not applicable to each hypothesis.

MM

Refine the matrix and reconsider the hypotheses—in some cases, analysts will need to add new hypotheses and re-examine the information available.

MM

Focus on disproving hypotheses rather than proving one. Tally the pieces of evidence that are inconsistent and consistent with each hypothesis to see which explanations are the weakest and strongest.

MM

Analyze how sensitive the ACH results are to a few critical items of evidence. Should those pieces prove to be wrong, misleading, or subject to deception, how would it impact an explanation’s validity?

MM

Ask what evidence is not being seen but would be expected for a given hypothesis to be true. Is denial and deception a possibility?

MM

Report all the conclusions, including the weaker hypotheses that should still be monitored as new information becomes available.

MM

Establish the relative likelihood for the hypotheses and report all the conclusions, including the weaker hypotheses that should still be monitored as new information becomes available.

MM

Identify and monitor indicators that would be both consistent and inconsistent with the full set of hypotheses. In the latter case, explore what could account for inconsistent data.16



A comparison of the LAMP with other techniques

37

LAMP versus ACH Like ACH, the LAMP is more effective when performed by a group of analysts as opposed to a single analyst. Also like ACH, the LAMP has computer software available to both document the process and make working of larger problems possible. For all of its strengths, however, ACH has its shortcomings as well. For example, while the ACH method is known for its thoroughness, an analyst who is using it as his or her sole instrument has to contend with the difficulty in understanding the mental and bureaucratic processes of distant adversaries. Furthermore, the ACH method fails to exploit the theoretical knowledge derived from the study of similar phenomena in other places and other time periods. The principal concern is that if analysts focus mainly on trying to confirm one hypothesis, which they think is probably true, they can easily be led astray by the fact that there is so much evidence to support their point of view. They fail to recognize that most of this evidence may also be consistent with other explanations or conclusions, and that those other alternatives have not been refuted.17

Conclusions What the foregoing overview of four analytical techniques commonly used for prediction should illustrate is the fact that the LAMP, if anything, is a unique “hybrid” methodology that combines isolated elements from other analytical techniques and utilizes them in a new and innovative way. While all four of the examined methods can claim some resemblance to one element or another of the LAMP, none treat the construction, prediction, and analysis of alternate futures in the same way as the LAMP. As will be demonstrated in succeeding chapters, the LAMP offers a fundamentally different way of thinking about and analyzing the future’s different possible paths.

Notes  1 See Thomas L. Saaty, Decision Making for Leaders: The Analytic Hierarchy Process for Decisions in a Complex World (Belmont, CA: Lifetime Learning Publications, 1982), and Thomas L. Saaty and Joyce M. Alexander, Conflict Resolution: The Analytic Hierarchy Approach (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1987).  2 Thomas L. Saaty, Decision Making For Leaders: The Analytic Hierarchy Process, 94–5.

38

THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

 3 Ibid., 95.  4 Saaty and Alexander, Conflict Resolution: The Analytic Hierarchy Approach, 11.  5 See Methodology Catalog: An Aid to Intelligence Analysts and Forecasters DDE-2200-227-83 (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, 1983), III-9.  6 Methodology Catalog, III-10.  7 See H.A. Linstone and Murray Turoff, The Delphi Method: Techniques and Applications (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Co., 1975), 4. Cited in Methodology Catalog, III-13.  8 The description of the Alternative Futures method is taken from A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques for Improving Intelligence Analysis, 34–6 (US Government publication, March 2009).  9 The foregoing description of scenario theory is taken from Methodology Catalog, III-21. 10 Ibid., III-22. 11 Ibid., III-23. 12 Ibid., III-25. 13 Ibid., III-28, 29. 14 Ibid., III-26. 15 When I was teaching the INTL506 (Analytics II) course at American Military University, I had my students all work the same subject for their course term paper: A Critical Analysis of the Jon Benet Ramsey Murder Case. What was important was that I was having them work on a case that was still considered “unsolved.” Most of the students chose ACH as their methodology of choice in analyzing the available evidence. Most of these students reached the conclusion that an “unknown intruder” was responsible for the murder, which differed widely from the conventional wisdom at the time that Patsy Ramsey was the most likely suspect. 16 The explanation of the ACH method is taken from A Tradecraft Primer: Structuring Analytic Techniques for Improving Intelligence Analysis, 14–15 (US Government publication, March 2009). 17 See discussion by Nwankama Nwankama at All Hands Business Solutions website: http://allhandsmgt.com/intelligence-analysis-lamp.htm [accessed 16 January 2013].

CHAPTER THREE

The initial use of the LAMP: Case study of the former Soviet nuclear republics and nuclear weapons This chapter examines the original application of the LAMP within the context of a case study of the perceptions of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) nuclear republics concerning the nuclear weapons issue.1 In order to show the evolution of the alternate futures, the original four hypothesized scenarios from The Russian View of US Strategy: Its Past, Its Future are presented in abbreviated format here. This will be followed by a detailed examination of two LAMP scenarios for the CIS nuclear republics, and conclude with a retrospective analysis of how the alternate futures in these scenarios changed with the passage of time since the case study was concluded in 1993.

The future of the CIS republics: Four scenarios The four scenarios are derived from the interaction of two primary factors: the success or failure of the Russian government to attain reunification of the republics under its leadership by gaining complete control of its nuclear arsenal, and the collapse or recovery of the economies of the CIS. Each scenario is outlined below.2

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THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

Scenario 1: Reunified republics and economic recovery This is the “best case” scenario from the standpoint of both the Commonwealth republics and the rest of the world. It presupposes that the republics are able to resolve the question of nuclear weapons control without fear of sacrificing their own autonomy from Moscow. Moreover, an economic recovery, or at least stabilization, within the republics would go a long way towards preventing the return of authoritarian or extremist regimes and give the peoples of the republics the best chance to establish democratic traditions. It is practically a given that democracies have a difficult time surviving, let alone flourishing, in a situation involving significant external threats and internal economic collapse. The prospects for arms control and disarmament would be the best of all possible scenarios, since the political objectives of a stable and prosperous CIS with democratic governments would have the least use for a large strategic nuclear arsenal. The CIS could join the US in progressively paring back such forces to virtually symbolic levels, even while building up or improving their respective strategic defenses in a collective effort to discourage emerging Third World nuclear powers from engaging in political adventurism or blackmail.

Scenario 2: Independent republics and economic recovery This scenario constitutes the next best case of the four possible scenarios, and is at least somewhat more likely than the admittedly utopian first scenario. This scenario presupposes that the independent republics are able to gain control of their own nuclear forces (or at least prevent unified control by one authority), and that the Russian republic does not resort to armed force in an effort to gain control of the individual arsenals. The likely make-up of these independent republics will be a mixture of democratic and authoritarian regimes, depending on the cultural proclivities of the individual republics and how well their individual economies fare in the recovery. Just as likely, however, will be the rise of several independent nuclear states of widely varying strengths and technological capability for research and development. Depending on the perceptions of the individual republics concerning the utility of nuclear forces, this will greatly complicate arms control negotiations. For even if the individual republics do not perceive the US as the main threat, they will still wish to maintain, if not improve, their individual nuclear arsenals and conventional forces as their guarantor of sovereignty against a would-be “empire builder” among the republics,



The initial use of the LAMP

41

the Russian republic being the most obvious candidate. This will lead to a period of the most byzantine “divide and conquer” diplomatic maneuvering in the history of Russia, as the independent republics strive to maintain their sovereignty versus one another by forming alliances with each other as well as with outside powers.

Scenario 3: Reunified republics and economic collapse This is the next-to-worst case scenario, which assumes that the Russian republic has been able to re-establish unified control over the breakaway republics, which in turn presupposes that unified control over the entire former Soviet nuclear arsenal has been regained. Unfortunately, the economic collapse envisioned in this scenario also heralds the rise of a hostile extremist regime which blames the West in general, and the US in particular, for its economic woes. While such a regime would not necessarily herald a return to the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary ethos, neither would it preclude a resurgence in influence and prestige for the former Soviet military and KGB, who have been convinced all along that the US has been poised to exploit their weakness, just as they themselves would have done if roles had been reversed. The effect of this scenario on arms control will be far from salutary; in fact, arms control efforts will all but disappear, since the military hardliners will re-emphasize the strategic and political importance of strategic nuclear weapons. The principal concern for the US will be to avoid being stampeded into another costly arms race while safeguarding US security. This will prove a difficult, but somewhat familiar, diplomatic balancing act for the US; so much so that this scenario could be dubbed “Cold War II.”

Scenario 4: Independent republics and economic collapse This is the worst-case scenario of the four projected outcomes for the former Soviet republics. This scenario presupposes either that the West fails to provide sufficient economic aid to avert widespread economic collapse, or that the aid provided will prove ineffectual. It also assumes that the Russian republic will be unable to regain full control over the remainder of the Soviet nuclear arsenal now situated within the “breakaway” republics, and that these republics will be able to more firmly establish their sovereignty as a result. Under these conditions, democracy is unlikely to survive for long, if at all. The economic deprivation within the republics will foster the rise of a number of extremist regimes, some armed with nuclear weapons, all

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THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

striving to maintain their independence or expand their influence vis-à-vis one another, and all seeking to get the maximum diplomatic, economic, and military support from outside powers. Of major concern here is the possibility that some of the republics with large Moslem populations, such as Kazakhstan, once in firm possession of even a few nuclear weapons might use them as bargaining chips with other Moslem nations such as Iraq or Iran, who could certainly provide much-needed expertise in nuclear weapons development and production. Worse still, the exchange could also take place in reverse, as many former Soviet nuclear researchers attempt to seek gainful employment outside of Russia or the other CIS republics. This will only accelerate nuclear proliferation.3 The implications for the US are obviously the most profound and dangerous of any possible scenario. Additional arms control agreements in this situation will be not only be impossible to negotiate, but irrelevant. And without a credible strategic defense to discourage nuclear coercion by an unknown number of independent nuclear powers, it will be virtually impossible for the US to remain neutral in a conflict that it would best avoid.

Scenario 1: Yeltsin stays in power (status quo) The following discussion utilizes the final four steps of the LAMP outlined in Chapter 1. For the purposes of this textbook, it will not be necessary to discuss each of the alternate futures that are theoretically possible; these alternate futures have been rank-ordered in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 for the curious reader. What follows is an analysis of each of the ten most likely futures within two of the major scenarios for the CIS nuclear republics. Looking now at Scenario 1 in our CIS nuclear republics problem, we see an example of how these steps might be carried out in practice. The

Table 3.1  Scenario 1 – Yeltsin stays in power (status quo) Possible future #

Ukraine

Belarus

Kazakhstan

# Votes

24

IN

CD

CD

26

14

IN

CD

IN

25

9

CD

CD

CD

23

25

SN

CD

CD

23



The initial use of the LAMP

43

Possible future #

Ukraine

Belarus

Kazakhstan

# Votes

16

SN

CD

IN

22

22

CD

CD

IN

20

1

IN

IN

IN

20

15

IN

CD

SN

20

18

IN

IN

CD

18

17

SN

CD

SN

16

5

SN

IN

IN

16

2

IN

IN

SN

15

20

SH

IN

CD

13

7

SN

IN

SN

13

26

CD

IN

CD

11

6

SN

SN

IN

10

10

CD

IN

IN

9

23

CD

CD

SN

9

4

SN

SN

SN

8

8

IN

SN

IN

8

19

IN

SN

CD

7

21

SN

SN

CD

7

3

IN

SN

SN

5

12

CD

IN

SN

4

27

CD

SN

CD

2

11

CD

SN

IN

1

13

CD

SN

SN

0

CD = Continue Disarmament; do not try to retain nuclear weapons IN = Pursue Independent Nuclear Capability SN = Preemptive Seizure of Soviet Nuclear Weapons

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THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

following are the ten alternate futures deemed most likely to occur (see Table 3.1 above), given the information available as of the end of February 1993.

Alternate Future #24: Ukraine pursues independent nuclear capability, while Belarus and Kazakhstan continue disarmament process This alternate future is the line of least resistance, the future which bears the closest resemblance to the present “state of nature” among the CIS republics. So long as Russia does not attempt to force the issue itself with military action, and so long as Ukraine perceives Russia as its main long-term enemy, Ukraine will seek to develop an independent nuclear capability as its best guarantor of independence and sovereignty. By the same token, Belarus and Kazakhstan, barring a radical change in their own or Russia’s internal leadership, will not have an overriding incentive to upset the current status quo until they see the resolution of the Russian– Ukrainian conflict. The likelihood of armed conflict in this alternate future is low, particularly if Ukraine makes its independent nuclear capability an accomplished fact before Russia can react effectively. This alternate future will lead to increased nuclear proliferation, however, with a high potential for transposing into Alternate Future #14, below.

Alternate Future #14: Ukraine and Kazakhstan develop their independent nuclear capabilities, while Belarus continues its disarmament process As mentioned above, Alternate Future #24 could easily transpose into this alternate future if Ukraine succeeds in establishing itself as an independent nuclear power. Emboldened by Ukraine’s example, Kazakhstan would become even more loath to surrender its newly won prestige for the sake of an abstract principle such as nonproliferation, particularly if the internal political situation within Russia confirms its continuing trend back toward its old imperial ways. This future also assumes that Belarus would remain sufficiently intimidated by Russia and its own Chernobyl experience to still choose appeasement through continued disarmament over the bolder course of asserting its nationalism via nuclear weapons. If both Ukraine and Kazakhstan successfully establish nuclear independence, it will have the paradoxical effect of lowering the likelihood of decisive armed conflict in general, even while exacerbating the problem of nuclear proliferation. In this alternate future, Russia would realize that any attempt to reunify the



The initial use of the LAMP

45

empire by armed force would be suicidal in the face of two new nuclear powers on its immediate border. It also assumes that Yeltsin had become reconciled to the loss of empire and still managed to remain in power to pursue economic reform.

Alternate Future #9: Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan all continue to pursue disarmament This alternate future is not as unlikely as it seems. The critical focal point which would distinguish it from Alternate Future #14 above is the Ukrainian leadership’s recognition that the pursuit of independence could be achieved through peaceful integration into European economic and political organizations. Ukraine’s leadership would have to be convinced that the US and Europe could offer credible security guarantees sufficient to deter a potential Russian empire builder. Such a decision on Ukraine’s part would be helped immeasurably by credible evidence that Russia had reconciled itself to the loss of Ukraine as part of its former empire, evidence which unfortunately does not currently appear to exist. The salutary effect which this future ostensibly would have for nonproliferation and arms control is somewhat debatable. Although the creation of three additional nuclear powers within the former Soviet Union would be prevented, the resulting dominance of Russia as the sole nuclear power would make disarmament of Russia itself all the more difficult. This alternate future does not have the potential for transposition into other alternate futures, as its assumptions are unique.

Alternate Future #25: Ukraine preemptively seizes the nuclear weapons on its territory, while Belarus and Kazakhstan continue disarmament This alternate future is highly similar to Alternate Future #14 above. Its critical divergence lies in the perception of the Ukrainian leadership that its nuclear weapons are in imminent danger of seizure or destruction by Russian military action; therefore Ukraine decides to forestall such action by forcibly taking possession themselves and deporting the associated Russian personnel. This would occur regardless of whether or not Ukraine had actually managed to crack the computer codes for controlling and firing the missiles themselves; indeed, such seizure would help reinforce any Russian impression that the Ukrainians had already succeeded in breaking the codes. The possibility of armed conflict rises sharply in this scenario, since Russian ultra-nationalists would be putting maximum pressure on Yeltsin to take decisive action to prevent the irretrievable loss of empire which would be

46

THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

imminent at that point. The consequences of this future for nuclear proliferation would obviously be more detrimental than those above; nations outside the CIS would be emboldened to pursue nuclear capability more aggressively than ever, particularly if Ukraine could get away with it and still deter armed conflict with Russia. Belarus is still assumed in this future to be sufficiently intimidated so as not to pursue a nuclear capability. In the case of Kazakhstan, however, the likelihood of its continuing disarmament in this alternate future for a prolonged period is uncertain. The potential for transposition into Alternate Future #16 below is therefore high.

Alternate Future #16: Ukraine preemptively seizes the nuclear weapons on its territory, Belarus continues disarmament, and Kazakhstan pursues an independent nuclear capability Of the five most probable alternate futures examined thus far under this first scenario, this future has the greatest potential for armed conflict. In fact, this scenario could itself trigger the overthrow of Boris Yeltsin by Russian ultra-nationalists, resulting in an even more unstable set of alternate futures. The key point of divergence from Alternate Future #25 would be the Kazakh perception of its chances for successfully achieving independent nuclear capability as covertly as possible without drawing Russian military intervention directly against itself. This future assumes that Russia would be so weakened by internal political divisions and economic collapse that it could not intervene effectively to prevent Ukraine and Kazakhstan from following their respective courses. The process of nuclear proliferation has gone further in this alternate future than in #25 above; there is even the potential for transposition of this alternate future into #17 if Kazakhstan perceives an opportunity to take advantage of what would undoubtedly have to be a critically weakened Russia.

Alternate Future #22: Ukraine and Belarus continue disarmament, while Kazakhstan pursues an independent nuclear capability This alternate future, as we can see from the 20/20 hindsight of a December 1993 perspective, depends on the Ukrainian leadership accepting whatever “security guarantees” and financial compensation it can get in exchange for continuing disarmament. At the same time, however, Kazakhstan (already showing signs of reluctance to surrender its physical control of strategic



The initial use of the LAMP

47

nuclear weapons to Russia) feels sufficiently threatened by the nuclear powers on its border to undertake steps to acquire independent nuclear capability. Since Ukraine has been the linchpin of resistance to disarmament thus far, it is unlikely that Kazakhstan could pursue this course for long without also giving in to pressure from Russia and the US. The likelihood of armed conflict in this future is therefore low. Likewise, the consequences of this alternate future for nuclear proliferation are negative, but not nearly so much as would be the case with an independent nuclear Ukraine. This alternate future, barring either the emergence of a fascist dictatorship in Russia or a more nationalistic and authoritarian one in Kazakhstan, therefore has potential to transpose into Alternate Future #9 above.

Alternate Future #1: Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan all pursue independent nuclear capability This future assumes that Yeltsin has been unsuccessful in his attempts to coerce Ukraine into surrendering its nuclear weapons, and that Belarus and Kazakhstan have become emboldened sufficiently to develop an independent nuclear capability themselves. Ukraine has managed to crack the operational codes to the nuclear warheads, and decides to share this information with Belarus and Kazakhstan. Alarmed by the political situation in Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan decide to take advantage of Ukraine’s successful attainment of independent nuclear power status and do so themselves. Obviously the consequences for nuclear proliferation are highly negative, but the likelihood of armed conflict in this alternate future is relatively low, since Russia would be much more restrained by the presence of three additional independent nuclear powers on her borders than would be the case if it were a single isolated power like Ukraine or Kazakhstan. The potential for transposition into several other alternate futures is definitely higher in this alternate future. The potential is greatest for futures which involve going from independent nuclear capability to actually seizing the nuclear weapons themselves. This would include a range of seven alternate futures from #2 through #8, all with varying degrees of relative probability.

Alternate Future #15: Ukraine pursues independent nuclear capability, Belarus continues disarmament, and Kazakhstan seizes the nuclear weapons on its territory This future assumes that Yeltsin’s policies, combined with the deteriorating political and economic situation within Russia and the republics,

48

THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

have led to the emergence of a more nationalistic Kazakh leadership. This leadership, emboldened by the apparent success of Ukraine’s pursuit of independent nuclear capability, but anxious for its own autonomy, takes advantage of Russia’s internal weaknesses to seize the nuclear weapons on its territory. Ukraine, having its own motivations for retaining nuclear weapons, but still desiring to avoid decisive confrontation, continues with a variation of Kravchuk’s ambiguous diplomatic strategy.4 Once again, the consequences for nuclear proliferation and arms control are highly negative for this scenario. Russian compliance with START 1, let alone START 2, would go out the window at this point. Other aspiring nuclear powers within the Islamic community would be encouraged by Kazakhstan’s action. This would have negative political repercussions within Russia as well, since the ultra-nationalists would be demanding Yeltsin’s head on a platter if he continued to take no action under these circumstances. So not only does this future have the potential to transpose into more radical ones such as Alternate Future #17 (described below), but also to transpose into a scenario in which Russia takes military action to seize the nuclear weapons.

Alternate Future #18: Ukraine and Belarus pursue independent nuclear capability, while Kazakhstan continues disarmament This future assumes the rise of a stronger “pro-nuclear” faction within the Belarusian parliament, one that is able to compel the Belarusian leadership to reconsider its accommodating stance with Russia regarding nuclear weapons on its territory. At the same time, it assumes that the Kazakh leadership has decided the risks of nuclear power status outweigh any conceivable gain, and so it decides to seek security by accommodation, adopting the strategy that Belarus abandons. Ukraine’s perception of the threat remains largely unchanged from other futures in which it pursues independent capability, with the exception that it has succeeded in convincing Belarus of the need for combined action to achieve greater security. While not as disastrous as those futures in which nuclear weapons are seized, any move by Belarus to attain independent nuclear capability would be a significant setback for arms control and nuclear nonproliferation, particularly since this would be a dramatic reversal from its previous behavior. Joint cooperation between Ukraine and Belarus would not only anger the Russian leadership but further strengthen the hand of the extremists and ultra-nationalists who desire reunification of the empire. This future has definite potential for transposition into one of the ostensibly



The initial use of the LAMP

49

more “bizarre” futures, Alternate Future #21, particularly if the ultranationalists should overthrow Yeltsin or achieve victory in an election.

Alternate Future #17: Ukraine and Kazakhstan seize the nuclear weapons on their territories, while Belarus continues disarmament This future is a potential continuation of Alternate Futures #14 and #15, described above. In this future the threat perception by Ukraine and Kazakhstan of Russia is much higher than in other scenarios. Indeed, the assumption here is that they perceive Russia as being ready to take military action to seize their nuclear weapons, and so they have decided to run the risk of becoming de facto nuclear powers by seizing the nuclear weapons on their territory. This scenario also presupposes that Ukraine and Kazakhstan anticipate being able to break the operational codes and retarget their nuclear weapons; in fact, the possibility of active collusion between Ukraine and Kazakhstan is not precluded in this future. This has obviously negative consequences for arms control and nuclear nonproliferation, even more so than in Alternate Future #18 above. Just as obviously, unless Russia is absolutely prostrate from economic collapse and internal disorder, this situation is bound to provoke the extremist factions within Russia, and could easily lead to the overthrow of Yeltsin or the election of an extremist candidate such as Zhirinovsky. Although we leave analysis of the consequences, focal events, and indicators for the remaining alternate futures within this scenario as an independent exercise for the student, it is self-evident that the number of focal events necessary to bring about the various alternate futures has the potential to increase as we progress through the spectrum of alternate futures from highest relative probability to least. Next, we will see how the alteration of a major assumption for a scenario can affect the relative probability of the alternate futures.

Scenario 2: Russian ultra-nationalists seize power The following discussion covers the five alternate futures deemed most likely to occur if Russian ultra-nationalists overthrow Boris Yeltsin. It is assumed in this scenario that an ultra-nationalist government would utilize increased diplomatic pressure, threats, economic blackmail, but not military force, in an effort to intimidate the other nuclear republics

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THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

Table 3.2  Scenario 2 – Russian ultra-nationalists seize power Possible future #

Ukraine

Belarus

Kazakhstan

#Votes

14

IN

CD

IN

26

24

IN

CD

CD

24

16

SN

CD

IN

24

17

SN

CD

SN

22

5

SN

IN

IN

21

15

IN

CD

SN

21

1

IN

IN

IN

21

25

SN

CD

CD

20

2

IN

IN

SN

17

7

SN

IN

SN

17

18

IN

IN

CD

16

6

SN

SN

IN

14

20

SN

IN

CD

13

4

SN

SN

SN

13

9

CD

CD

CD

12

8

IN

SN

IN

11

22

CD

CD

IN

10

21

SN

SN

CD

10

3

IN

SN

SN

9

23

CD

CD

SN

7

19

IN

SN

CD

7

10

CD

IN

IN

6

12

CD

IN

SN

4

26

CD

IN

CD

3



The initial use of the LAMP

51

Possible future #

Ukraine

Belarus

Kazakhstan

#Votes

11

CD

SN

IN

2

13

CD

SN

SN

1

27

CD

SN

CD

0

CD = Continue Disarmament; do not try to retain nuclear weapons IN = Pursue Independent Nuclear Capability SN = Preemptive Seizure of Soviet Nuclear Weapons

into surrendering their nuclear weapons promptly without preconditions. Admittedly, given the potential rise of fascists such as Zhirinovsky, any scenario which involves the ultra-nationalists seizing power but taking no military action may well prove to be a transitory one. It should also be noted that, given the success of extremists in the recent Russian parliamentary elections in December, the differences in the governing assumptions in this scenario from Scenario 1 will lessen as conditions within Russia worsen under Yeltsin.

Alternate Future #14: Ukraine and Kazakhstan pursue independent nuclear capabilities, while Belarus continues to disarm The alert reader will immediately notice that the difference in the governing assumption of this scenario has altered the relative probability of the alternate futures. Specifically, Alternate Futures #14 and #24 are still the two most likely alternate futures; they have simply switched places. This is because Kazakhstan would be more likely to take its chances in pursuit of an independent nuclear capability along with Ukraine if it perceived that accommodation by disarmament would not achieve its political goals. And an ultra-nationalist Russian government would be more likely to inflame Kazakh nationalism by its very aggressiveness. The consequences for nuclear proliferation are the same as described for these futures in Scenario  1. However, the potential for armed conflict is greater in this alternate future than under the first scenario, simply because an ultra-nationalist Russian government will be more tempted to force the issue through military action rather than allow Ukraine and Kazakhstan to consolidate their status as nuclear powers.

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THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

Alternate Future #24: Ukraine pursues independent nuclear capability, while Belarus and Kazakhstan continue to disarm As mentioned above, the key point of divergence in this alternate future lies in a different Kazakh perception of the immediate threat from an ultra-nationalist Russian government. In this alternate future, the Kazakh leadership perceives less of an immediate threat to its interests, or thinks that accommodation ought to be tried a little longer rather than run the risks of pursuing nuclear capability. There is still a greater risk of armed conflict in this future than under Scenario I, but less than that in Alternate Future #14 above. As mentioned previously, this alternate future also has the potential for transposition into Alternate Future #14 should the Kazakh threat perception change.

Alternate Future #16: Ukraine preemptively seizes the nuclear weapons on its territory, Belarus continues to disarm, and Kazakhstan pursues an independent nuclear capability For this alternate future, the relative probability has risen to make it the third most likely within this scenario, as compared with its fifth place ranking under Scenario 1. Like the first scenario, the focal point in this future would be the Ukrainian perception of an imminent Russian action to seize nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory, a perception which would be more likely with an ultra-nationalist Russian government in power. The presence of a more aggressive Russia makes this alternate future a highly unstable one, with strong potential for transposition into Alternate Future #17 or #7, or even into another set of alternate futures altogether if Russia were to undertake military action. The consequences for nuclear proliferation and arms control efforts are obviously negative, with a high probability that Ukraine and Kazakhstan would be collaborating with aspiring Third World nuclear powers if they perceive little help forthcoming from the US.

Alternate Future #17: Ukraine and Kazakhstan preemptively seize the nuclear weapons on their respective territories, while Belarus continues to disarm As mentioned above, this alternate future can easily transpose from #16 because of the instability resulting from the presence of an ultra-nationalist



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53

Russia that is making threats and applying pressure, but not yet taking decisive military action. Kazakhstan would be sufficiently emboldened by both the Ukrainian example and the imminence of the threat to its north and east to seize its nuclear weapons rather than covertly pursue a nuclear capability as in #16 above. Arms control in general, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in particular, would be rendered ineffective. Belarus, although increasingly nervous about its prospects, would still be clinging to an accommodationist policy as its best hope for security.

Alternate Future #5: Ukraine preemptively seizes the nuclear weapons on its territory, while Belarus and Kazakhstan each pursue an independent nuclear capability This alternate future is the first one in which we see Belarus finally move away from its accommodationist policy (albeit very quietly) and take steps to become a nuclear power in its own right. The key points of divergence in this alternate future are: a The “pro-nuclear” faction within Belarus, like the one within

Ukraine, finally gains sufficient political strength within the Belarusian parliament to force the leadership to reconsider its nuclear policy. b Relations between Belarus and Ukraine are sufficiently strengthened by the presence of an ultra-nationalist Russian threat that they perceive the need for a united effort to achieve nuclear capability. c Kazakhstan, emboldened by Ukraine’s example but not wishing to draw a Russian attack directly upon itself, increases its collaboration with the aspiring nuclear nations to its sooth. It doesn’t take much reflection to conclude that arms control and nuclear nonproliferation are a dead letter in this alternate future. There is also significant potential for this alternate future to transpose into Alternate Future #7, in which Kazakhstan decides to seize its nuclear weapons rather than covertly pursue an independent nuclear capability.

Alternate Future #15: Ukraine pursues independent nuclear capability, Belarus continues disarmament, and Kazakhstan seizes the nuclear weapons on its territory This future assumes that the rise of an ultra-nationalist government, due to the deteriorating political and economic situation within Russia, has led

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THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

to the emergence of a more nationalistic Kazakh leadership in response. This leadership, emboldened by the apparent success of Ukraine’s pursuit of independent nuclear capability, but anxious for its own autonomy, takes advantage of Russia’s internal weaknesses to seize the nuclear weapons on its territory. Ukraine, having its own motivations for retaining nuclear weapons, but still desiring to avoid decisive confrontation, continues with a variation of Kravchuk’s ambiguous diplomatic strategy. Once again, the consequences for nuclear proliferation and arms control are highly negative for this scenario. Assuming that a Russian ultra-nationalist government had not already repudiated existing arms control agreements, any remaining possibility for Russian compliance with START 1, let alone START 2, would go out the window at this point. Other aspiring nuclear powers within the Islamic community would be encouraged by Kazakhstan’s action. This would have negative political repercussions within Russia, as well, since the ultra-nationalists would be sorely tempted to take decisive military action under these circumstances.

Alternate Future #1: Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan all pursue independent nuclear capability This future assumes that the ultra-nationalists have been unsuccessful in their attempts to coerce Ukraine into surrendering its nuclear weapons, and that Belarus and Kazakhstan have become sufficiently alarmed by the rise of ultra-nationalists to power to develop independent nuclear capability themselves. Ukraine has managed to crack the operational codes to the nuclear warheads, and decides to share this information with Belarus and Kazakhstan. Alarmed by the political situation in Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan decide to take advantage of Ukraine’s successful attainment of independent nuclear power status and do so themselves. In addition to the consequences for nuclear proliferation being highly negative, the likelihood of armed conflict in this alternate future is relatively higher than its equivalent future under Scenario I, since Russian ultra-nationalists would consider the presence of three additional independent nuclear powers on her borders an intolerable threat to Russian “great power” status. The potential for transposition into several other alternate futures is definitely higher in this alternate future. The potential is greatest for futures which involve going from independent nuclear capability to actually seizing the nuclear weapons themselves. This would include a range of seven alternate futures from #2 through #8, all with varying degrees of relative probability.



The initial use of the LAMP

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Alternate Future #25: Ukraine preemptively seizes the nuclear weapons on its territory, while Belarus and Kazakhstan continue disarmament This alternate future is highly similar to Alternate Future #14 above. Its critical divergence lies in the perception of the Ukrainian leadership that its nuclear weapons are in imminent danger of seizure or destruction by Russian military action; therefore Ukraine decides to forestall such action by forcibly taking possession themselves and deporting the associated Russian personnel. This would occur regardless of whether or not Ukraine had actually managed to crack the computer codes for controlling and firing the missiles themselves; indeed, such seizure would help reinforce any Russian impression that the Ukrainians had already succeeded in breaking the codes. The possibility of armed conflict rises sharply in this scenario, since Russian ultra-nationalists would be putting maximum pressure on Yeltsin to take decisive action to prevent the irretrievable loss of empire which would be imminent at that point. The consequences of this future for nuclear proliferation would obviously be more detrimental than those futures in which Ukraine simply pursues independent capability without undertaking physical seizure of the weapons; aspiring nuclear powers outside the CIS would be emboldened to pursue nuclear capability more aggressively than ever, particularly if Ukraine could get away with it and still deter armed attack by Russia. Belarus is still assumed in this future to be sufficiently intimidated so as not to pursue a nuclear capability. In the case of Kazakhstan, however, the likelihood of its continuing disarmament in this alternate future for a prolonged period is uncertain. The potential for transposition into Alternate Future #16 is therefore high.

Alternate Future #2: Ukraine and Belarus pursue independent nuclear capability, while Kazakhstan seizes the nuclear weapons on its territory This is an alternate future which could be a continuation from Alternate Future #1, particularly within the context of the highly unstable political situation that would exist under this scenario. This alternate future assumes that a more nationalistic Kazakh government is in place, and that it has concluded that it cannot safeguard its own independence with an ultranationalist Russia to its north and two other nuclear powers on its borders. As mentioned in Alternate Future #1 above, this future also has the further potential for transposition into Alternate Futures #3 through #8 within this scenario.

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THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

As with virtually all futures involving seizure of nuclear weapons, this would virtually torpedo arms control and disarmament agreements from the Russian perspective, and could only exacerbate nuclear proliferation within the Islamic nations.

Alternate Future #7: Ukraine and Kazakhstan seize the nuclear weapons on their territories, while Belarus pursues independent nuclear capability A possible continuation from Alternate Futures #1 and #2 above, the consequences and potential for transposition into the more violent alternate futures of Scenario 3 is even greater here than for those previously discussed, since such simultaneous seizure of nuclear weapons would be an intolerable provocation to an ultra-nationalist Russian government. The transposition potential into other alternate futures within this scenario is the same as for Alternate Future #2 above. As can be concluded from the previous discussion, the array of relative probabilities can be significantly altered by the changing of a major assumption governing a scenario, as this must exert a significant effect on the perceptions of the national actors involved.

A retrospective on the CIS nuclear republics case study Looking back at this initial LAMP case study from a 20-year perspective, we can see that a LAMP problem has a tendency to simplify itself over time as the occurrence of certain events reduce the number of potential alternate futures through the elimination of one or more courses of action for the actors involved. If we were to examine this same problem with today’s perspective and information, our table of potential alternate futures would be reduced from 27 to 8, as shown opposite. Russia’s establishment of complete control over the former Soviet nuclear arsenal has greatly simplified this LAMP problem by permanently removing one potential course of action by the republics. If we were to revote the alternate futures in this simplified LAMP problem, the alternate future that would be deemed most likely would be one in which all three republics continue disarmament and make no effort to become independent nuclear powers. We can expect the same simplification process to occur in other LAMP problems, including the ones to be presented in Part Two.



The initial use of the LAMP

57

Possible future #

Ukraine

Belarus

Kazakhstan

14

IN

CD

IN

24

IN

CD

CD

1

IN

IN

IN

18

IN

IN

CD

9

CD

CD

CD

22

CD

CD

IN

10

CD

IN

IN

26

CD

IN

CD

Notes 1 This case study is not presented in its entirety, instead focusing on that portion dealing with the application of the LAMP. The entire case study was originally the author’s MSSI thesis, “The CIS Nuclear Republics and Nuclear Weapons: Chess Game or Armageddon?” (unpublished MSSI thesis, National Intelligence University, July 1993). 2 These four scenarios are also found in Lockwood and Lockwood, The Russian View of US Strategy: Its Past, Its Future (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1993), 193–7. 3 Viktor N. Mikhaylov, Russian deputy minister for nuclear power and industry, and Yevgeny Primakov, chief of Soviet foreign intelligence, had voiced this worry, and it had already become a major issue of concern for the West. See Fred Hiatt, “Third World Woos Soviet Arms Experts,” Washington Post, November 28, 1991, A61, A66. 4 This strategy is described in Jonathan S. Lockwood, “The View From Ukraine: The Aspiring Nuclear Power,” Strategic Review 21, 4 (Fall 1993), 27–8.

CHAPTER FOUR

Limitations and potential applications of the LAMP Having learned the 12-step process of the LAMP technique, and having walked through a basic application of the method in a case study of the CIS nuclear republics, the analyst should by now be aware not only of the potential of the LAMP, but of its limitations as well.

Limitations of the LAMP LAMP cannot easily handle a large number of actors and courses of action This criticism is valid, but only to the extent that the analysts are unable to limit the scope of his predictive issue. If an issue is so complex and so broad in scope that the LAMP generates an astronomical number of alternate futures, the analyst might be well advised to break the problem down into smaller issues. This criticism is also valid only if the analyst is using the LAMP without computer support; that is, using the old “stubby pencil” method. With the LAMP integrated into a computer software program and tied into an existing intelligence database, then the process becomes much easier to handle. It is also recommended that the LAMP analyses be done with a group of analysts over a computer network. This minimizes the potential for “groupthink” or dominance of the analytic group by a single strong personality that might otherwise occur in faceto-face meetings.

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THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

LAMP does not easily lend itself to quantitative analysis This criticism is based on the fact that the LAMP differs in kind from traditional approaches to probability theory in that it assumes one can never know the absolute probability of a given future. This is because only the past is fixed and immutable; the present is transient, and the future is infinitely fluid and dynamic. The LAMP, if you will, is probability theory’s answer to “chaos theory.” Since the future can only be altered by the sum total of interactions of free will, each actor is a potential random element. This is not to say that the LAMP absolutely cannot be quantified. Certainly its formulas for calculating the permutations of actors and courses of action are simple enough, and lend themselves easily to computer programming. But in order for the LAMP to be meaningful, the probabilities of its alternate futures can only be relative to each other, never as an absolute probability expressed as a percentage. Since the interactions of “free will” result in subtle changes to the probabilities of the alternate futures, any percentage probability would be rendered irrelevant by subsequent events shortly after you assigned it to a particular future. Furthermore, because traditional probability theory assumes that you know the entire universe of potential outcomes beforehand, that all outcomes within that universe are equally likely to occur, and that all such events are inherently random, it is entirely incompatible with the LAMP. The LAMP assumes that the existence of free will actors makes it impossible to know the entire universe of potential outcomes. Because free will is inherently both unquantifiable and nonrandom, each alternate future outcome will not have the same absolute probability of occurring relative to the others in that universe. This is the fatal flaw in such methods as Bayesian analysis, which asks the analyst to assign subjectively the probabilities of individual outcomes in order to determine the overall probability of an event.1 As long as the actors in a problem possess free will, Bayesian analysis is essentially worthless, and even misleading, since it may cause analysts to have false confidence in conclusions that are derived from subjective determinations of probability.

LAMP does not allow for ambiguity By this I mean that the LAMP forces the analyst to make a series of “either-or” choices during the pair-wise comparison of alternate futures. The analyst cannot press the “waffle” button, so to speak, and refuse to choose between alternate futures, no matter how bizarre or implausible they may appear to be. This leads to a corollary criticism that the LAMP



Limitations and potential applications of the LAMP

61

compels the analyst to examine a range of alternate futures that may seem wildly improbable. The analyst may well be tempted to “discard” the alternate futures at the lower end of the relative probability scale, rather than engage in the additional effort required to analyze their consequences and potential for transposition. Analysts should reject such a temptation. The reason for this is that they have no way of knowing how future focal events will affect the relative probability of their spectrum of alternate futures until they are revoted. If they have not done a complete analysis to begin with, they may find an alternate future emerging near the higher end of their relative probability scale, the consequences of which they have not analyzed. This can be embarrassing, not to mention potentially dangerous.

Potential applications for LAMP Even with the limitations described above, the LAMP has a number of applications beyond its uses in our initial case study. As we have seen, the LAMP certainly has its uses for both the Indications and Warning (I&W) function as well as for conducting long-range intelligence estimates. When tied into existing computer databases, LAMP could alert the analyst when either a minor indicator or a major focal event has occurred, call up the calculated range of alternate futures with their effective date of entry, and cue the analyst to which alternate futures the indicator or focal event applies. The analyst could then examine the previous estimates of the various consequences of these alternate futures, and thus render a more comprehensive and useful report. If, in the analyst’s determination, the alternate futures require revoting, a group of analysts could then meet, review the available data, and revote the futures. In this application, a majority of the analysts present would be required to give a vote to an alternate future during the pair-wise comparison step. The thinking here is that the combined knowledge of the analysts would make the LAMP predictions more valid than would be the case if only one analyst was doing the voting. Of course, the assumption here also is that the LAMP has been programmed into the computer database, so that the analysts can participate in a network, each voting from their individual terminals. Although the analysts can never be replaced completely in the LAMP process (nor should they be), advances in AI (Artificial Intelligence) hold promise for further enhancing the effectiveness of the LAMP. Not only could it make the link between ongoing events and alternate futures with more efficiency and timeliness, but AI could also eventually aid in the construction of alternate futures and their consequences, given a sufficiently large historical database from which to draw.

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The LAMP has a potential diagnostic and evaluative application as well. Looking back at our group of analysts, their votes on the alternate futures could be archived in the computer data base. There would thus be an historical record for seeing how well the analytic group performed using the LAMP technique by comparing their predictions with eventual results. If an analytic group’s predictions are significantly out of line with eventual occurrences, the LAMP provides the means for identifying it and determining the cause, such as lack of access to data available to other analysts. Because of its highly structured nature, the LAMP has the virtue of rendering one’s analysis transparent to an outside observer, making it possible to see how the group got from Point A to Point B in drawing their conclusions. This should greatly enhance the accuracy of predictive analysis at not only the operational/theater level for I&W, but also the strategic/national policymaker level for long-range intelligence estimates. The LAMP could be incorporated into strategic intelligence training for use as a predictive technique in courses involving I&W as well as estimative intelligence or political-military analysis. The students could either use the LAMP against “real-world” situations, with information made available to the students for their background research, or they could be given a hypothetical world situation and asked to apply the LAMP to it. In either case, the LAMP would enable intelligence analysts to integrate both their research and intelligence skills into a single technique. Along these same lines, the LAMP has significant potential for use in the academic community. Since the LAMP is an unclassified methodology, any college or university with a program in intelligence studies, international affairs, or even political science can use the LAMP technique as an integral part of its research into the uncertainties involved in prediction. It would be especially useful in a university setting, since the LAMP emphasizes the necessity for a thorough study of the cultural and historical (as well as contemporary) perceptions of the national actors regarding a specific issue. The LAMP could thus provide additional common ground for cooperative analysis of national security issues by both the academic and intelligence communities, certainly a worthwhile consideration during a period of austerity in intelligence budgets and resources. The LAMP can even be used to refine other structured analytic methods such as “What If” Analysis2 and Red Team Analysis.3 Related analytic methods such as Alternative Futures Analysis would be strengthened by integrating it with the LAMP.4 By combining various LAMP studies of related predictive issues within a broad general subject, it should be possible to produce a more rigorous study of the future than would otherwise be possible with the more traditional and less structured techniques. Finally, is there the potential for the LAMP to be utilized at the tactical level as well? When a young captain in the US Army’s Military Intelligence Branch raised this question to me in one of my classes at the Joint Military



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Intelligence College in 1994,5 I was very dubious at the time about the LAMP’s practicality at the tactical (or even operational) level. On the one hand, it would seem that the relatively fewer number of actors (friendly force versus enemy force) might make the LAMP’s application easier. On the other hand, we are talking about a much shorter time line for prediction (e.g. “What is the enemy’s likely course of action within the next 24–48 hours?”), a much greater level of detail (potentially down to battalion level), and therefore a much greater potential for “random events” to complicate the predictive process. Carl von Clausewitz, in his book On War, actually stated the essence of the problem best in his discussion of the concept of “friction” in war: Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war … Countless minor incidents – the kind you can never really foresee – combine to lower the general level of performance, so that one always falls short of the intended goal. (Emphasis added.)6 Even with this admonition of Clausewitz’s in mind, it is conceivable that the LAMP could be integrated into the predictive process at the tactical level by integrating its functions into computer databases. This would involve a significant amount of “pre-war” LAMP analysis of the selected issue to minimize the need to create one “from scratch,” and would be most effective if integrated with the existing Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) method, which was first developed and taught at the US Army Intelligence Center and School (USAICS) in February 1981.7 However, subsequent events have caused me to reconsider my earlier doubts about the utility of the LAMP at the tactical and operational levels. One of my students at American Military University, Paul Croom, wrote what is arguably the best application of the LAMP to the tactical level, “Shielding the Lion: A Predictive Study on the Prospects of Kinetic Attacks against Al Asad Air Base through January 2010.” His predictive analysis was designed to enable the tactical planner to anticipate the most likely enemy against an American base and devise the best defense against it.8 And in the only known application of the LAMP at the operational level, the III Marine Expeditionary Force G2 used it extensively to focus on issues of operational-level concern within Western Pacific Command in 2006.9 Finally, there is a new field of application for the LAMP that has the potential to broaden its use into the civilian arena, that of competitive business intelligence. Mr Nwankama, one of my former students at American Military University, was the first to explore the potential of the LAMP in this area. In his discussion of the application of the LAMP to this area, Nwankama argues that using the LAMP would enable business

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organizational leaders to foresee the various possible permutations of responses by competitors for each alternate future. He uses the LAMP as the basis for developing their Competitive Intelligence and Predictive Analytics (CIPA) process.10 It is hoped that the reader of this book will come away with a new way of thinking about the process of predictive analysis as it is applied to intelligence in both the military and corporate arenas. The LAMP obviously will not grant the gift of prophecy to its users, nor will it foretell the future with infallible accuracy. With judicious application, however, the LAMP does offer a logical method for illuminating the future’s many possible paths.

Notes 1

See the explanation of Bayesian probability at http://explorable.com/bayesianprobability.html [accessed 24 January 2013].

2

The LAMP predates the “What If” technique by a number of years, since it was developed in 1993 and first published in the Fall 1994 issue of Defense Intelligence Journal (Vol. 3, No. 2), while the What If” method was published considerably later. See A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques for Improving Intelligence Analysis (US Government publication, March 2009), 24–6.

3

This author’s doctoral dissertation (“The Evolution of the Soviet View of US Strategic Doctrine (1954–1976): Its Implications for Future US Strategic Policy Decisionmaking,” University of Miami, 1980) and subsequent book, The Soviet View of US Strategic Doctrine: Implications for Decisionmaking (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1983) represent the earliest openly published examples of what is now known as Red Team Analysis. See Red Team Analysis in A Tradecraft Primer, 31–3.

4

A Tradecraft Primer, 34–7.

5

The Joint Military Intelligence College is now the National Intelligence University.

6

See Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 119.

7

This author was part of the first class to be taught the IPB method at the USAICS Tactical Intelligence Staff Officer course at Fort Huachuca in February 1981. For a detailed portrayal of how IPB is used, see FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (US Army publication, July 1, 1993).

8

See Paul Croom, “Shielding the Lion: A Predictive Study on the Prospects of Kinetic Attacks against Al Asad Air Base through January 2010.” His paper can be found in the LAMP E-Commons section of the LAMP website at www.lamp-method.org

9

Interview with Eric Walters (Colonel, US Marine Corps, Retired). Colonel



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Walters also cites this use of the LAMP in one of his in-class student handouts, Intelligence Structured Analytical Techniques and Methods: A Critical Examination, for his course at the Marine Corps Intelligence School’s Intelligence Training Enhancement Program. 10 See Mr Nwankama’s complete discussion of this at http://allhandsmgt.com/ intelligence-analysis-lamp.htm [accessed 16 January 2013].

PART TWO

The LAMP in practice

CHAPTER FIVE

The future of Afghanistan: Democracy, Islamic Caliphate, or warlord principalities? A predictive study on possible Afghanistan, United States, and Taliban responses “We are content with discord, we are content with alarms, we are content with blood, but we will never be content with a master.” ELDERLY AFGHAN TRIBAL LEADER

“The pious Caliphate will start from Afghanistan.” OSAMA BIN LADEN

“This has to be a point in time in which we begin to write a new chapter on improved governance, a much more serious effort to eradicate corruption, joint efforts to accelerate the training of Afghan security forces so that the Afghan people can provide for their own security.” PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA

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Author’s Note:  This LAMP paper was written by Mary Boyle as her term paper for my Analytic Methods course at American Military University. It has been edited in order to focus more on her application of the LAMP than on her depth of research, which was quite considerable.

Introduction Afghanistan is based on a tribal society; it has never been completely conquered by any outside force, nor has it ever fully been made into a confederation of tribes. This is due to the numerous ethnic groups that make up the tapestry of people who call themselves Afghan; with Pashtuns being in the majority followed by Tajiks, Hazari, Uzbeki, Turkmeni, and Nuristani. These varying ethnicities shed light on the differing interpretations of Islam and the blending of local customs. Afghanistan’s unique terrain along with its tribal customs and social structure has prevented the Afghan people from unifying into a stable government, just as it has prevented Afghanistan from being overrun by an invading force. The current efforts by the United States and NATO forces aim to have Afghanistan transition from a corrupt oligarchy into a stable democracy; at the same time, religious fundamentalists, al-Qaeda and the Taliban view Afghanistan as the first step in recreating the Islamic Caliphate. The Afghan population has dealt with war for over two centuries; the vast majority of the public is looking for security, and the removal of corrupt rulers. Prior to the US invasion, the Taliban had begun to lose some of its Pashtuni-majority support due to corruption within their movement. The Taliban controlled Afghanistan through fear tactics, but was ill-prepared to govern administratively the entire nation (Rasanayagam 2005, 197). The Taliban had started out as an Islamic reform movement, but has no real connection to the Islamic ideas in Afghanistan (Rashid 2000, 87). Refusal to recognize other forms of Islam isolated it from the rest of the Islamic world. As Afghanistan is at the crossroads of the Islamic expansion, this isolation does not benefit the country or its people. A longer-term view of regional stability was needed. The Bonn Agreement was signed in December 2001, and placed a transition government in place with Hamid Karzai as the President. The new government was unable to prevent warlords and regional leaders from reemerging. The United States Institute of Peace published a special report in 2003 entitled “Unfinished Business in Afghanistan, Warlordism, Reconstruction, and Ethnic Harmony.” The report estimated that warlords controlled 75 percent of Afghanistan. This lack of unity hinders the chances of Afghanistan ever becoming a strong enough country to withstand



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attempts by the Taliban to regain power. The porous border between Pakistan and Afghanistan has allowed the Taliban and al-Qaeda to regroup, just as the Mujahideen did during the Soviet–Afghan war in the not so distant past. Afghanistan’s neighboring nations have offered limited assistance to Afghanistan as a developing nation. Pakistan has in the past favored the concept of a pure Islamic state in Afghanistan; this allows for the continuation of jihadist training to continue the fight in Kashmir as well as neutralize Pashtun irredentism (Weinbaum 2006, 6). Iran on the other hand is strongly opposed to the Taliban regaining control of Afghanistan and persecuting the Hazaras. Iran’s government is rapidly devolving into a police state, so the best that the Iranians could offer the Afghan government is funding and infrastructure development assistance. The post-Soviet states to Afghanistan’s north follow a similar policy to Russia, trying to contain Islamic radicalism. Many of these countries will not admit additional refugees and are placing requirements on current refugees to learn the local language if they wish to be employed. There has recently been an increase in debate “back at home” among the citizens of countries currently fighting in Afghanistan, as to how much longer they will continue providing troops to Afghanistan. After eight years of fighting against al-Qaeda and the Taliban, the Allied forces are no closer to capturing Mullah Omar or Osama bin Laden. The lack of new information on the whereabouts of these two individuals, combined with the rising number of causalities and the increasing cost has led to greater public awareness and opposition to the war. These new voices speaking out against the war are forcing the governments of the Allied forces to reexamine their objectives and goals for the near future in Afghanistan. The British government has recently suffered heavy causalities due to their patrolling of the opium fields in Helmand and Kandahar, which were traditionally heavily Taliban. President Obama has faced the same pressure from the United States public. The presence of Allied forces has not prevented continued attacks from Afghanistan, however, and as a result of the war in Afghanistan many of the Taliban are based in the Northwest Frontier in Pakistan. This surplus of Taliban insurgents has placed Pakistan in a dire situation; there is a strong need to eliminate the risk of the Taliban before Pakistan, a nuclear armed country, is seen by the Taliban and al-Qaeda as the next potential center for an Islamic Caliphate. The Pakistani government has begun to fight back against the insurgency. Prior to this new initiative, the Taliban moved their militants from the Swat Valley, which was controlled under Sharia law, to Buner, which is 97 kilometers from the capital of Pakistan, Islamabad. This kind of threat to the stability of a state, especially one that has nuclear capability, is not allowable for the safety of the rest of the world.

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Throughout Afghanistan’s history, there has been a lack of unity among the ethnic groups that has hindered their ability to live peacefully under one government. The current international focus on Afghanistan has removed any chance of it becoming the starting place for the next Caliphate. The Afghan population has suffered greatly throughout history from heavy handed usage by foreign nations. Adam Khan from Jalalabad stated the Afghan belief best when he said that “we want democracy in the country but not at the expense of our culture and religion. I believe they all could be reconciled and that is what should happen” (Army Press 2004, 194). The people of Afghanistan have shown that they are looking for an environment free of war that will allow them to rebuild their country. The ethnic divisions and inability of a central democratic government to gain control of a majority of Afghanistan has led many Afghanis to deal with their judicial, military, and economic needs on a local level. The inability of the current central government to control the majority of Afghanistan has led to the continuation of the practice of Afghans reverting to their local traditional leaders to deal with and punish local criminals; this process is all done outside of the criminal justice system (Stewart 2008, 33). Afghanistan has never been conquered by a foreign power. In August 2009, Major-General Zahir Azimi, the Afghan Army spokesmen stated that “where international forces are fighting, people think it is incumbent on them to resist the occupiers and infidels. This feeling is strong in the South and East and it may spread to other places” (Anonymous 2009, 22). As long as the Afghan central government is unable to maintain control and extend their control beyond the capital, local tribal communities will look for protection and leadership from proven leaders and heroes in their communities. Despite past history with warlords and corruption, the Afghan people are tired of war. Ghafoor, from the Ahmadkhei village in Paktia, captured this best by stating “We’re caught in the middle and we’re sick of it. We need security. But the Americans are just making trouble for us. They cannot bring peace, not if they stay for 50 years” (Anonymous 2009, 21). This is quickly becoming the consensus across Afghanistan. This study examines the potential scenarios that could occur in Afghanistan. The main actors for this study include the United States, the Taliban and the Afghan population as a whole. This study will focus on the ability of Afghanistan to stand on its own, and the questions arising. Will the attempted democratic government being supported by the United States and NATO forces remain in control? Will al-Qaeda and the Taliban regain their control over the country and continue toward their goal of the new center for the Islamic Caliphate? Or will the Afghan people turn to their tribal traditions and resort back to warlords? The majority of the available literature on Afghanistan’s current state and history is written by Western or American authors. The biases of the authors must be taken into consideration when reading their literature



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regarding Afghanistan and al-Qaeda. With the advent of the war on terror, authors from Central Asia have begun to write on Afghanistan giving a different perspective on the events and conditions in that country.

Literature review Michael Scheuer is the former head of the CIA’s Bin Laden Unit. Mr Scheuer spent nearly two decades in the CIA focusing on national security issues related to Afghanistan and South Asia, as well as authoring three books and more than ten articles concerning al-Qaeda and terrorism. His book, Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the war on terror, was mentioned by bin Laden in his September 2007 video, where bin Laden stated, “If you want to understand what’s going on and if you would like to get to know some of the reasons for you losing the war against us, then read the book by Michael Scheuer” (Kelly and Block 2007). Mr Scheuer’s article “‘The Pious Caliphate Will Start From Afghanistan’: Is al-Qaeda’s Long-Held Strategy Now Unfolding?” (2005) focuses on Osama bin Laden and the message he released concerning his visions for Afghanistan’s future. Mr Scheuer also touches on the foreign conspiracies as to Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar’s locations, and the connection Pakistan might have. Mr Scheuer closes with the need for a country-wide military initiative and a massive increase in economic aid to the Afghan people. Throughout Mr Scheuer’s books and articles he brings forward his experience as a CIA agent. He does not shy away from disagreeing with the mainstream theories on how the current war is going, or how the search for bin Laden is going. Seth Jones is an adjunct professor of Security Studies at Georgetown and a political scientist at the RAND Corporation. He is viewed as an expert on Afghanistan, and has written 11 books and more than 15 articles. His book, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan (2008), is the fourth volume in the RAND Counterinsurgency Study. Mr Jones focuses on the counterinsurgency operations within Afghanistan, and relied on primary sources and personal fieldwork for his writing. Within this book, Mr Jones focuses on the misleading notions of trying to use the same counterinsurgency strategies in Afghanistan as used in Malaya. Seth Jones states that the current war effort needs to transition from winning the hearts and minds to redirecting efforts to the military and political strategy to ensure state building and security within Afghanistan. Mr Jones’ chapter on the “Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare,” highlights the impact from external actors (US military), indigenous leaders (insurgents), and the indigenous government. Ahmed Rashid is considered an expert on Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia. With over 20 years of experience as a correspondent and

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three best-seller books, he has travelled the world addressing universities, think tanks and international meetings on Afghanistan and Pakistan. Mr Rashid’s Taliban (2000) focuses on the rise of the Taliban to power, and their ideologies. Included in this book is the connection between al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Al-Qaeda’s monetary, political and ideological influence over the Taliban led to the eventual invasion of Afghanistan. Prior to the invasion, the Taliban had gained control over 90 percent of Afghanistan, following their downfall, they have regrouped their forces in Pakistan and continue to recruit and attack United States and NATO forces in an effort to regain control of their territory. Stephen Tanner is a military historian who has written several pieces on Afghanistan. One of his most well known is Afghanistan: A Military History From Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban (2002). Unlike the other authors, Mr Tanner not only highlights the war on terror in Afghanistan, but also focuses on the other armies that have entered the Afghan borders. This work covers the period of history from the time of Alexander the Great through the British and Russian Empires. Afghanistan is located in the crossroads of Central Asia, and holds the distinction of having “superpowers” of their day, including those of Alexander the Great and the Mongols, the British Empire, Soviet Union and the United States and NATO forces invade their borders, but never conquer and control the entire country. Mr Tanner also focuses on the Afghan people: with the constant state of war the Afghan people have learned to adapt to changes in locations and security. Mr Tanner also validates the importance of the Afghan tribal system. Unlike much of the world, Afghanistan’s society and government are still heavily affected by their tribal traditions and customs. The final author is Marvin Weinbaum, whose United States Institute of Peace Special Report focused on Afghanistan and Its Neighbors: An Ever Dangerous Neighborhood (2006). This report focuses on countries that surround Afghanistan and their political and economic stability and their interest in Afghanistan’s stability. Mr Weinbaum points out that external interference has much to do with Afghanistan’s inability to become a thriving industrial country, but he also points out that the internal wars between tribes and warlords has affected their ability to industrialize the nation. While Afghanistan has attempted to remain isolated, their lives are heavily influenced by both Pakistan and Iran. Both are connected through various religious and social ties. Pakistan heavily influences Afghanistan through the Pashtu tribe, as well as through the large refugee camps on the Pakistan– Afghanistan border. Iran, similarly supports the small Shiite population inside Afghanistan, and continues to work to maintain safety for their people. The five authors above encompass a diverse amount of information on Afghanistan as it currently stands, and what it could potentially become in



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the future. Some of these authors differ on what Afghanistan will become once the Untied States and the NATO forces retreat, but they all agree that there is a need to train the Afghan security forces so they can take over for themselves. In addition, the need to eliminate corruption as a governance strategy, and get aid to the remote tribal areas of Afghanistan, is critical to prevent the Taliban and al-Qaeda from sweeping back into the vacuum left by the departing Coalition forces.

Actors and perceptions Following the attacks on September 11, 2001, Afghanistan once again gained international attention. There are few states that were not affected in some way by the attacks on September 11. Nine years later, the international community of leaders, and the general public have seen little progress in capturing Osama bin Laden or Mullah Omar. The mounting deaths of state soldiers in Afghanistan have caused the public to rethink their involvement in direct combat in the war on terror. While Afghanistan’s neighboring states are interested in the outcome of the war on terror, there are three actors that play the largest roles in the outcome of Afghanistan: the United States, the Taliban, and the Afghan people. Each of these actors has their own interests in the outcome of the current war in Afghanistan, and has their own viewpoints on the key issues. To facilitate this predictive study on Afghanistan it is imperative that an analysis is performed on each of the critical actors.

Afghanistan The Afghanis are at the center of this predictive analysis. The Afghan population as a whole plays a key role in the predictive outcome of Afghanistan’s political stability as a state. When evaluating the Afghan perspectives on Afghanistan’s future state, a number of issues impact the decision-making process, including public perceptions, culture, history, economics, politics, and national security concerns. In order to perform this predictive study it is critical that every factor is carefully evaluated.

Culture Afghanistan is a country deeply steeped in tradition. The Pashtun people are the dominant ethnic group in Afghanistan, and the world’s largest remaining tribal-based society (Tanner 2009, 26). The Pashun community follows the philosophy of pashtunwali. Robin Ashby, Director General of the UK Defence Forum, defined pashtunwali as the Pashtun code of honor

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which has nine key principles: melmastia (hospitality), nang (solidarity among the clan), isteqamat (persistence), turah (bravery), ghayrat (honor), sabat (steadfastness), namuz (defense of one’s honor and women), nanawatai (right of a fugitive to seek refuge), imandari (righteousness), and badal (right of blood feuds). It is thought that through an appeal to the principles of melmastia, sabat, nanawatai and turah, al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden were able to gain and maintain asylum within Afghanistan. The other key ethnic groups are the Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Turkmens, and Nuristanis. The Afghanis’ ethnic identity is a critical piece of who they are. While the Taliban made an effort to transplant Pashtuns throughout Afghanistan to further their agenda, in reviewing Figure 5.1, it is clear that the Taliban understood the need to infiltrate the diverse ethnic territories in order to maintain control over them. The Afghan people are deeply connected not only to their customs, but also to their religious beliefs. Islam was introduced to the Afghan population in the tenth century (Ewans 2002, 22). Sunni Muslims make up about 80 percent of the Afghan population, while Shiites make up about 19 percent and the remaining 1 percent consists of Hindus, Sikhs, Jews, and Parsis (CIA 2010). Afghanis remain weary (or wary) of outsider involvement in their country. The strong ties to religion and traditional customs hinder the progress that Afghanistan has made in creating a stable country.

History Afghanistan has a rich and violent history. Over the past two centuries, Afghanistan has been a crossroad for Central and Southern Asia. It is because of its geographic location that Afghanistan has been invaded by Uzbekistan

Tajikistan

Turkmenistan

Fayzabad Mazari Sharit

Kunduz

Maymana Jalalabad Herat

Kabul

Afghanistan

Ghazni Farah

Iran

Kahandar

+

Pakistan

FIGURE 5.1  Afghanistan’s ethnic diversity

38% 25% 19% 8% 10%

Pashtun Talik Hazara Uzbek Other

China



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various armies, including Persians, Greeks, Mongols, British, Russians, and most recently American and NATO forces (Tanner 2002, 22). While Afghanistan has never been conquered by an outside force, this does not mean that invading forces did not leave their mark on Afghanistan. Alexander the Great’s imperialist desire did not seem to have been deterred by tribal warfare. He crossed Afghanistan and founded Alexandria-Eschate (Alexandria-at-the-end-of-the-world) on the Sri Darya before moving on to India (Ewan 2002, 18). The ruler Mahmud, of the Ghaznavids dynasty, advocated the conversion to Islam (Ewan 2002, 22). The Mongol invasion of Afghanistan began in 1221. Many of the towns and farms in the Mongols’ warpath have still not recovered. The nomadic and many of the non-nomadic Afghan tribes moved into the hills to escape the Mongols’ destruction (Tanner 2002, 81). These conquering people and the technologies they brought with them, like gunpowder, created the modern day Afghan man. Stephen Tanner states that “into this mix of former steppe warriors turned kings and sedentary peoples simply trying to get along, emerged the Afghans, who combined the tribal instincts of nomads with the technology of civilization” (Tanner 2002, 110). In the sixteenth century, the Safavid and Moghul dynasties once again brought Afghanistan into the land power game. The struggle for control between these dynasties continued until the eighteenth century. During this time, Islam continued to spread throughout Afghanistan. The converts brought local customs into their Islamic faith, which allowed for divisions to continue within Afghanistan’s ethnic tribes. From an external view, Afghanistan was unified under one religious faith, Islam; however, from an internal view, Islam had different practices depending on the tribe you were in (Goodson 2001, 12). It is also important to note that the Hazaras constitute the majority of the Shiite Muslims in Afghanistan. By the end of the eighteenth century, the British Empire had begun to show an interest in Afghanistan. As a result of the fall of the Safavid and Moghul Empires, the Afghanis returned to isolationism. The terrain of Afghanistan as well as the diverse ethnicity of the Afghanis created a sense of separateness for the smaller tribes; the lack of resources returned the Afghan attention to internal disputes (Goodson 2001, 26). The British Empire made its first official contact with Afghanistan in 1809 on a treatymaking mission (Ewan 2002, 41). This was the era of the “Great Game,” the term given to the imperialistic competition between the Russian and British Empires. The Russian Empire’s continuous expansion had led the British Empire to fear that the Cossacks would continue on to conquer India, the “jewel in the crown” of the British Empire (Hopkirk 1990, 5). The Russian Empire had two imperialistic goals: to weaken the British Empire, both in India as well as the rest of the world, and to conquer the Central Asian khanates, while the British Empire’s focus was on annexing and pacifying the princely states of India (Goodson 2001, 33). The British

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Empire’s Russophobia resulted in Afghanistan becoming a buffer zone between the two empires. During this time Afghanistan gained its national boundaries, Afghan ethnic consciousness continued to flourish, and internally Afghanistan began to see an increase in skirmishes brought on by tribal leaders looking to extend their territory and exert their strength through firearms (Goodson 2001, 27). Despite the anarchy in Afghanistan as a result of Zaman Shah’s death, Dost Mohammed Khan claimed the title of Amire ul-Mominin (Commander of the Faithful) and presented the fighting as a jihad against the Sikhs (Tanner 2002, 127). In 1838, tensions were running high in the British Empire over Russia’s continued attempts to expand their borders. As a result, the British Empire sent Alexander Burnes to Dost Mohammed’s court giving Afghanistan the ultimatum: “desist from all correspondence with Persia and Russia … never receive agents from them” (Ewan 2002, 57). This level of distrust led to the first of three Anglo-Afghan Wars. The first Anglo-Afghan War was an attempt by the British to remove Dost Mohammed from power and reinstate Shah Shuja. In a manifesto published prior to the war beginning, the British promised that “when once he shall be secured in power, and the independence and integrity of Afghanistan established, the British army will be withdrawn.” Similar words were used 140 years later when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan (Ewan 2002, 61–2). The invasion and occupation of Afghanistan did not sit well with Mohammed Akbar Khan, the son of imprisoned Dost Mohammed Khan. Internal opposition forced the British to retreat. Mohammed Akbar Khan promised the British safe passage out of Afghanistan, but this was not to be. On January 6, 1842, the British garrison left Shah Shuja to defend himself against the Afghan people. In all, some 16,000 British left for the Khyber Pass and the safety of India (Hopkirk 1990, 259–61). Mohammed Akbar Khan joined with the ghazis, religious warriors, who temporarily put aside tribal disputes to remove the infidel from Afghan soil (Tanner 2002, 140). The majority of the 16,000 people, which included women, children, camp followers, servants, sepoys, and soldiers, were slaughtered by the ghazis. The British Empire responded to this devastating loses with the “Army of Retribution” which destroyed the Kabul bazaar and sent smaller forces to cities like Istalif, which had not been involved in the massacre of the British, where the males were killed, the women raped and murdered, and the city destroyed (Ewan 2002, 78). These acts of retribution on the part of the British left a lasting mark on the Afghan population. The Afghan people became xenophobic, and they still view foreigners as aggressors, infidels, and immoral. Following the first Anglo-Afghan War, the British Empire determined that Afghanistan would be able to serve as a buffer state between the British and Russian Empires. Afghanistan returned to a period of isolationism between



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each of the Anglo-Afghan Wars. Under the leadership of Yakub Khan, Afghanistan signed over foreign policy rights to the British and allowed the British to have a permanent mission in Kabul in 1879. In response, the Ghazni tribe’s elderly mullah, Mushk-i-Alam, proclaimed a jihad against the infidel and thousands flocked to the call (Tanner 2002, 209). Amir Abdur Rahman returned to tradition by being selected as Amir by a tribal jirga. He also came to power with the backing of the British Empire. The Amir Abdur Rahman took control of the waqf (religious trusts) and the judicial processes, which included a unified system of Sharia courts, and reserved the right to declare jihad for himself. Amir Abdur Rahman was given the title Zia al-MIllat-I wa al-Din (Light of the Nation and Religion) (Ewans 2002, 101–2). The third Anglo-Afghan War was a result of the Great War (World War I) occurring in Europe. Habibullah initially declared neutrality, but this changed when the Caliph called for jihad. Many tribal and religious leaders believed that Afghanistan betrayed its Islamic faith by not gaining its independence following the Bolshevik Revolution. Following Habibullah’s assassination, Afghanistan, under the leadership of Amanullah, declared itself independent (Ewans 2002, 115–17). Amanullah was forced to agree to the Durand Line and to release any claim he had to the tribal territories in British India. The Durand Line, which was established to create an official buffer between Afghanistan and British India (current day Pakistan) thus divided the Pashtun ethnic tribal territory between the two countries (Curtis and Phillips 2007). Nonetheless, modern Afghanistan had now been formed. For the next 50 years, Afghanistan maintained the claim of neutrality. However, they remained economically dependent on the Soviet Union, who bought the majority of their exports. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was an attempt to maintain communist control in Kabul, installing Babrak Karmal as their puppet Prime Minister. The Afghan population declared jihad against the Soviet infidel shortly after Babrak Karmal was brought to Kabul. The Afghan resistance to the Soviet invasion was organized in the name of Islam; this was a shift from the tribal affiliations. The United States collaborated with Pakistan to provide arms to the Mujahideen in Afghanistan. Prior to this arrangement, Pakistan had already selected seven main groups based in Peshawar with Sunni religious ideologies to support. The Islamist organizations included Hekmatyar’s Hezb-i-Islami, Yuni Khalis’ Hezb-iIslami, Rabbini’s Jamiat-i-Islami, which included Ahmed Shah Massoud, and Addal-Rab al-Rasul Sayyaf’s Ittihad-i-Islami Bara-I Azadi Afghanistan (Islamic Union for the Freedom of Afghanistan). The traditionalist organizations included Maulvi Nabi Mohammedi’s Harakat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami (Islamic Revolution Movement), Sayyid Ahmad Gailani’s (who traced his descent from the Prophet Mohammed) Mahaz-i-Melli-i-Islami (National

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THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

Islamic Front), and Sebghatullah Mjadidi’s Jabha-i-Nejat-i-Melli (National Liberation Front) (Ewans 2002, 213–15). These organizations differed in their essential beliefs, Hekmatyar and his followers were more extreme in their beliefs than Rabbani and Massoud; as a result of their differences, they were unable to come together under the banner of jihad to expel the Soviets from Afghanistan. Each Mujihadeen group took the weapons and money given to them through the Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence and waged their own war against the Soviet Union. In conjunction with the funds and weapons that were distributed, there was an initiative for Muslims from around the world to fly to Afghanistan and help fight the infidel. Osama bin Laden took up the call and began his lifelong jihad at that time. The Mujahideen waged unconventional guerilla warfare against the Soviet forces, attacking and then disappearing into society or the mountains; this made the Soviet tactical style of warfare impossible. The Soviets acknowledged defeat on February 15, 1989, following the last Soviet tank crossing the Friendship Bridge on the Amu Darya (Rasanayagam 2005, 125). The Communist party continued to rule over Afghanistan until 1992, and during this time, the majority of financial aid was used by the Communist government to buy support from the tribal and Mujahideen leaders (Ewans 2002, 238). The Mujahideen forces finally captured Kabul and proclaimed Afghanistan to be an Islamic State (Gohari 1999, 9). This transition brought Afghanistan into a period of civil war among the Mujahideen factions. The Islamic Jihad Council named Majadid, head of one of the moderate parties, as President; Massoud as Defense Minister; Gailani, another moderate, as Foreign Minister; and Sayyaf as the Minister of Interior, Hekmatyar was given the role of Prime Minister which he refused to hold with Massoud as Defense Minister (Tanner 2002, 276). The idea of minorities holding the majority of seats was unacceptable to Hekmatyar and many other Pashtun mujihadeen. The Afghans reverted back to the policy they had followed throughout their history. The common threat was gone, and so was the short-term alliance that had existed between traditional tribal enemies and rivals—chaos ensued. The civil war enabled ethnic warlords to emerge and flourish. Mujahideen fighters like Hekmatyar began turf wars to gain control over the most territory in the vicinity of Kabul. The first three years of Mujahideen rule was ineffective because of the scale of the infighting. The infighting was a result of the leaders’ personal ambitions clashing, as well as ethnic, tribal, and religious disputes (Ewans 2002, 249). Hekmatyar and the majority of other Pashtuns were strongly opposed to ethnic minorities— represented by the likes of Dostum, an Uzbek, or Rabbani and Massoud, both Tajiks—having a say in the future development of Afghanistan. Throughout Afghanistan’s history, ethnic leaders have allied themselves to



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fight against a common enemy, but it could not work in the government of the Mujahideen. Although these tribal leaders had done their country a great service in removing the Soviet Union armed threat, they could not allow a tribal rival to be awarded a role in the newly formed Afghanistan Mujahideen government. This anarchy of indecision existed not only in the capital, but in other regions including Kandahar. But the power vacuum would not exist for long. The Taliban originated from the madrassas, or religious schools, in the North-West Frontier Province. These madrassas were attended by mostly Pashtun Afghan refugees from the Soviet–Afghan War. The Taliban emerged in Afghanistan as a result of the Pashtun Afghan refugees who had become disillusioned with the fractious political wrangling of the Mujahideen parties and their practices. These young men had no real employment prospects following the completion of their schooling at the madrassas, but they did get their dose of Taliban learning and propaganda. Under the leadership of Mullah Maulvi Mohammad Omar, the Taliban declared jihad against anyone who had betrayed Afghanistan (Ewans 2002, 253). Massoud, Dostum and Ismail Khan made a concerted effort against the Taliban, but despite these attempts they were unsuccessful in stopping the Taliban from gaining control. As the Taliban conquered territory, beginning with Kandahar, they implemented the strictest interpretations of Sharia law (Rashid 2000, 29). By April 4, 1996, the Taliban had almost complete control of Afghanistan. Mullah Omar removed the kherqa (piece of cloak claimed to have been worn by the Prophet Mohammed) and wrapped it over his shoulders and proclaimed himself commander of the faithful and leader of all Islam (Weiner 2001). Despite the Taliban having control of the majority of Afghanistan, on June 13, 1997, a new alliance called the United National and Islamic Front for the Salvation of the Homeland was founded between Massoud, Kalili, and Malik (Rasanayagam 2005, 155). This new movement proposed a government that would include tribal leaders, Islamic leaders, and technocrats. It was also in 1996 that Mullah Omar gave Osama bin Laden asylum. The Taliban’s alliance with al-Qaeda has added further substance to the rumors of Mullah Omar as the new Caliph, bin Laden telling the Muslim media that “the Taliban have established the rule of Allah in Afghanistan … the pious caliphate will start from Afghanistan” (Scheuer 2006, 171). Some Muslims believe that the recreation of the Islamic Caliphate will liberate Muslims and non-Muslims from the oppression of those who are interested only in international imperialism like the United States and its European allies (Gohari 1999, 111). The Taliban’s relationship with Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda has given them money and resources from people and countries around the world. In 1998, however, the Taliban lost the support of Saudi Arabia when

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THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

it refused to turn Osama bin Laden over to the United States to face charges in connection with the terrorist attacks on US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya. This enabled bin Laden to plan and carry out further international attacks, including those on September 11, 2001. Following these attacks, the United States along with NATO forces invaded Afghanistan with help from the Northern Alliance. The Taliban and al-Qaeda forces quickly fell beneath the technologically advanced armies of the West, Kabul being captured by Western forces on November 13, 2001. Despite the initial success, the United States and NATO forces have had difficulty capturing the leader of al-Qaeda or the Taliban. The continued civilian casualties have led to an increase in insurgency fighters. In August 2009, Major- General Zahir Azimi, the Afghan Army spokesman stated that “where international forces are fighting, people think it is incumbent on them to resist the occupiers and infidels. This feeling is strong in the South and East and it may spread to other places” (Anonymous 2009, 22). The ethnic divisions and inability for a central democratic government to gain control of all of Afghanistan has led many Afghanis to return to their local leaders for their judicial, economic and security needs.

Economics The economic stability of Afghanistan is almost non-existent. After decades of conflict, Afghanistan’s economy has begun to recover. This is largely due to the influx of international aid. Despite this international aid, widespread corruption has prevented the Afghan people from being given the basic necessities: security, food, and shelter. Afghanistan has also begun to see small amounts of recovery in their service and agricultural sectors. Afghanistan remains an agricultural country, representing 78.6 percent of the labor force (CIA 2010). Opium remains the key crop of Afghanistan, and the country produces the largest quantities of opium in the world. Despite initiatives from the United States, NATO forces and the Afghan government, the transition from opium to wheat is still in its infancy. In 2010, the US Geological Services and USAID announced that Afghanistan has trillions of dollars worth of untapped mineral deposits. This money source continues to go untapped due to the lack of infrastructure, including roads, railroads, electricity, and water. Afghanistan’s lack of an established infrastructure prevents its economy from becoming self-sufficient. This also prevents the Afghanis from transitioning from a rural cultural setting to the cities where they would be able to benefit from regular medical care and potentially profit from a more stable environment.



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Politics Afghanistan’s current political situation is unstable. The current government has been accused of corruption, and Afghanistan is now rated as the second most corrupt country in the world. In 2009, an unattributed statement made at The First Annual Bertelsmann Foundation conference, in Washington DC, declared that “the government is imbued by patronage and corruption.” The patronage within the tribes has prevented a unified government from making progress within the rural areas of Afghanistan. Afghanistan’s corruption is spread throughout the political system, from public offices for sale, bribes to gain access to government services, to the police and judiciary systems. This corrupt network that is woven throughout the Afghan government and its security apparatus hinders the Afghan people’s capability to stand alone once the foreign forces have left the country. The Taliban came to power as a result of the Afghan people looking for a force that would remove the corrupt government and warlords. The Afghan people’s key focus is on their security and livelihoods. They are concerned about stability and safety for themselves, their children, their tribes, and villages. Developments in the large cities and even the capital are of no value if they cannot promote protection of the citizenry.

National security concerns The Afghan population has suffered from decades of war and poverty. The Afghan people have shown that they are looking for an environment free of war that will allow them to rebuild their country. The ethnic divisions and inability of the central government to control the rural areas of Afghanistan has led many Afghanis to deal with their judicial, security, and economic needs at local levels through their local tribal elders, or through warlords. This reemergence of the warlord offers Afghanis protection on a local level. With the resurgence of the Taliban, the withdrawal of the United States and NATO forces could allow the Taliban to regain control over Afghanistan. This could potentially lead to a backlash by the Taliban for the Afghan support of the United States and NATO forces. The Afghan people want the removal of the foreign fighters, but there is an understanding that they need to have the capability to maintain their country’s security. Currently they are not in a position to do this.

The United States The United States and NATO forces first entered Afghanistan to begin the war on terror following the attacks of September 11, 2001. Nine years

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THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

later, the United States and NATO forces are concerned about the future of Afghanistan after the withdrawal of foreign troops. The concerns stem from the Afghan government being able to maintain power, and offer national security to the Afghan people. The unresolved issues and fighting with the Taliban and al-Qaeda is another concern. The United States has openly stated that it will begin to withdraw troops from Afghanistan by July 2014. According to the BBC News, Prime Minister Cameron of the United Kingdom has stated that its armed forces’ combat role in Afghanistan will end in 2015.

Economics The primary economic concern for the United States regarding Afghanistan’s future state is in relation to the $29 billion worth of international aid that has been disbursed on projects within Afghanistan. Despite the current recession, the United States and NATO countries have continued to give financial aid to Afghanistan in the hopes of building an infrastructure that will prevent al-Qaeda and the Taliban from regaining control after Afghanistan is left to itself.

Politics The United States and the NATO forces are the leading forces behind the current war on terror in Afghanistan. Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the eradication of terrorism has been at the top of the United States’ agenda. The United States and NATO forces continue to help foster and grow the democratic government in Afghanistan. One of the most systemic issues the Afghan government is facing is corruption. The United States and NATO leaders have made their views on this subject clear, and President Karzai has promised to work to eliminate corruption within the government. Another concern is the ability to expand the Afghan government’s reach throughout Afghanistan’s rural area. The United States and NATO forces have allied themselves with Pakistan in an effort to eradicate the Taliban presence in the North-West Frontier Province.

National security concerns The United States and NATO nations’ prime concern is the potential reemergence of al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. The purpose of the current war and financial aid is to prevent Afghanistan from again becoming a safe haven for terrorism. As a result of the war, al-Qaeda has not been able to carry out another large-scale attack like that of September 11, 2001. The United States and NATO forces need only look back 20 years to the Soviet Union’s withdrawal from Afghanistan. Despite the puppet



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85

government the Soviet Union continued to fund, it had collapsed by 1992. At this time the Afghan fighters had gained control of Kabul, and internal fights commenced between the different ethnicities. This is one reason why the United States and the NATO forces understand the need for a strong, trusted Afghan government, as well as a stable, well-trained security apparatus that is a respected part of the government.

Taliban The Taliban and their ally al-Qaeda continue to collaborate and work towards common goals, principally the removal of the infidel from their country, and regaining control of Afghanistan. To some observers, the war in Afghanistan is this century’s Vietnam, and al-Qaeda and the Taliban see it as their right to bleed the foreign troops. The inability of the current Afghan government to gain control over all of Afghanistan politically, and create a security force that will be able to stand on its own, bodes well for the Taliban and al-Qaeda.

Economics The main financial resource for the Taliban’s has been the opium trade. The Kandahar district was the birthplace of the Taliban and is also one of the provinces that produce the most opium. This has not changed since the war in Afghanistan began. It is estimated that through te drug trade, protecting processing labs, and collecting payoffs, the Taliban generates anywhere from $70 million to $500 million a year (Collins and Ali 2010). The reemergence of the Taliban in the Pakistan North-West Frontier Province included the take-over of the SWAT emerald mines. The Taliban now collects one-third of each miner’s yield to fund their guerilla attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The introduction of al-Qaeda in 1996 brought with it large amounts of monetary funds. But al-Qaeda’s funds have decreased since the attacks on September 11, 2001, and they no longer fund the Taliban. Despite the disruption to al-Qaeda’s operations, they still maintain financial solubility through financial facilitators in the Middle East, benefiting through the transfer of funds via an untraceable means known as hawala.

Politics The Taliban began to take control of Afghanistan in 1994, under the leadership of Mullah Omar, and were originally seen as saviors. The story that circulated about their emergence had to do with a corrupt warlord that the Taliban killed. The Taliban enforced their ideology on all of

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THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

Afghanistan. This ideology was strict and anti-modern, comprised of pashutunwali (Pashtun tribal codes) and Wahhabism (conservative Sunni Islam from Saudi Arabia), and was influenced by Osama bin Laden’s jihadist movement. The Taliban forces throughout the country enforced the Sharia law, anti-modernity restrictions (no televisions, music, kites), and restrictions on women (no school, no employment, wearing of burqas). The Taliban is also known to have connections with the Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence Agency as well as the Pakistani military. The al-Qaeda organization still maintains its goals of bringing down the United States, but the organization has changed as a result of the war on terror. Osama bin Laden still views Afghanistan as the potential starting point for the pious Caliphate (Scheuer 2006, 171). It is the hope of the Taliban and al-Qaeda that following the withdrawal of the foreign forces, Afghanistan will once again fall off the radar for many international nations, enabling the Taliban and al-Qaeda to regain political control.

National security concerns The Taliban and al-Qaeda’s prime concern is their ability to regain control of Afghanistan after the United States and NATO forces have withdrawn. In conjunction with this vision, they must be careful not to draw attention to their actions. For the Taliban, the withdrawal of the foreign forces will be a sign of victory by the Afghan Taliban. Al-Qaeda will also claim this as a victory, just as Osama bin Laden claimed success with the Soviet Union withdrawing from Afghanistan in 1989. In order to follow the ideologies of both non-state actors, it is imperative that they be successful in returning Islamic rule to Afghanistan.

Methodology For this predictive study, the three actors are Afghanistan (people), the United States, and the Taliban. The issue is the future stability of Afghanistan as a result of the involvement of Western armies. Through the LAMP process, the analyst will be able to take into consideration Afghanistan, the United States, and the Taliban’s perceptions and potential behaviors. Like any predictive study, the future scenarios are based on the perceptions, which is only as good as the analysts’ understanding of the actors’ perceptions. Despite the LAMP concept of free will, it is impossible to cover every actor’s perception. With most of the literature having a Western perspective, the analyst may infuse some of those thought processes in the analysis unconsciously. It is the responsibility of the analysts to verify their analysis and eliminate any biases.



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Potential courses of action for interested actors In this predictive study, there are three actors that have an impact on the future stability of Afghanistan: Afghanistan, the United States, and the Taliban. Based on the issue of the future of Afghanistan, there are three actions: 1 Political influence used to reach agreement. The actor in question

uses political influence and clout in an effort to achieve agreements. 2 Continue to fight. The actor in question will continue to push forward with their agenda and continue to fight against opponents until their goal is achieved. There is no opportunity for negotiations. 3 Withdraw forces. The actor in question will withdraw their fighters.

Major scenarios LAMP analysis enables the analyst to review multiple future scenarios to determine the most likely future. 1 Democratic government. Afghanistan continues to exist with the

current government; and with Western backing continues to work on removing corruption and expanding their influence throughout Afghanistan. 2 Tribal warlords. Afghanistan’s current government fails to extend its control beyond Kabul. The Afghan people opt to follow their tribal elders and warlords who offer security and a means of living. 3 Islamic Caliphate. The Taliban along with their ally al-Qaeda regain control through religion and the promise of a security. According to the LAMP methodology, it is imperative that the analyst analyze all potential actions by the three actors.

Permutations of behavior Step 6 in the LAMP process calculates the total number of alternate futures from the actors in this predictive study (United States, the Taliban, and Afghanistan), which is XY = Z. For this equation, X is equivalent to the number of actions offered to each actor, Y equals the number of actors involved, and Z is equivalent to the total number of alternate futures to be compared.1 For this analysis there are two available courses of action for

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THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

each of the three actors. The equation for this predictive study is as follows: 33 = 27. This means that there are 27 possible alternate futures to compare for each of the actors in each of the three scenarios. The abbreviations below are used to identify the courses of action: PA = Political Influence used to reach agreement CF = Continue to Fight WF = Withdraw Forces The three scenarios will likewise be identified by abbreviations: DG = Democratic Government (Scenario 1) TW = Tribal Warlords (Scenario 2) IC = Islamic Caliphate (Scenario 3)

Table 5.1  Alternate future permutations Possible future #

United States

Taliban

Afghanistan

1

PA

PA

PA

2

PA

PA

CF

3

PA

CF

PA

4

CF

PA

PA

5

PA

CF

CF

6

CF

PA

CF

7

CF

CF

PA

8

CF

CF

CF

9

PA

PA

WF

10

PA

WF

PA

11

WF

PA

PA

12

PA

WF

WF

13

WF

PA

WF

14

WF

WF

PA

15

WF

WF

WF



The future of Afghanistan

89

Possible future #

United States

Taliban

Afghanistan

16

CF

CF

WF

17

CF

WF

CF

18

WF

CF

CF

19

WF

WF

CF

20

CF

WF

WF

21

WF

CF

WF

22

PA

WF

CF

23

PA

CF

WF

24

CF

WF

PA

25

CF

PA

WF

26

WF

CF

PA

27

WF

PA

CF

Pair-wise comparisons for each scenario Tables 2 through 4 below represent the alternate futures table and a votes column which is a tally of the pair-wise comparison votes.

Table 5.2  Alternate futures, Scenario 1 – democratic government (DG) Possible future #

United States

Taliban

Afghanistan

Votes

1

PA

PA

PA

0

2

PA

PA

CF

1

3

PA

CF

PA

12

4

CF

PA

PA

9

5

PA

CF

CF

22

6

CF

PA

CF

9

90

THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

Possible future #

United States

Taliban

Afghanistan

Votes

7

CF

CF

PA

13

8

CF

CF

CF

6

9

PA

PA

WF

8

10

PA

WF

PA

15

11

WF

PA

PA

18

12

PA

WF

WF

22

13

WF

PA

WF

10

14

WF

WF

PA

17

15

WF

WF

WF

19

16

CF

CF

WF

22

17

CF

WF

CF

22

18

WF

CF

CF

21

19

WF

WF

CF

6

20

CF

WF

WF

16

21

WF

CF

WF

15

22

PA

WF

CF

8

23

PA

CF

WF

18

24

CF

WF

PA

18

25

CF

PA

WF

10

26

WF

CF

PA

13

27

WF

PA

CF

1 351

PA = Political Influence used to reach agreement CF = Continue to Fight WF = Withdraw Forces



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Table 5.3  Alternate futures, Scenario 2 – tribal warlord (TW) Possible future #

United States

Taliban

Afghanistan

Votes

1

PA

PA

PA

0

2

PA

PA

CF

14

3

PA

CF

PA

11

4

CF

PA

PA

14

5

PA

CF

CF

15

6

CF

PA

CF

17

7

CF

CF

PA

16

8

CF

CF

CF

20

9

PA

PA

WF

12

10

PA

WF

PA

15

11

WF

PA

PA

22

12

PA

WF

WF

13

13

WF

PA

WF

9

14

WF

WF

PA

21

15

WF

WF

WF

2

16

CF

CF

WF

9

17

CF

WF

CF

18

18

WF

CF

CF

26

19

WF

WF

CF

25

20

CF

WF

WF

5

21

WF

CF

WF

10

22

PA

WF

CF

19

23

PA

CF

WF

6

24

CF

WF

PA

5

92

THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

Possible future #

United States

Taliban

Afghanistan

Votes

25

CF

PA

WF

5

26

WF

CF

PA

3

27

WF

PA

CF

19 351

PA = Political Influence used to reach agreement CF = Continue to Fight WF = Withdraw Forces

Table 5.4  Alternate futures, Scenario 3 – Islamic Caliphate (IC) Possible future #

United States

Taliban

Afghanistan

Votes

1

PA

PA

PA

0

2

PA

PA

CF

11

3

PA

CF

PA

16

4

CF

PA

PA

13

5

PA

CF

CF

20

6

CF

PA

CF

18

7

CF

CF

PA

20

8

CF

CF

CF

24

9

PA

PA

WF

14

10

PA

WF

PA

10

11

WF

PA

PA

21

12

PA

WF

WF

7

13

WF

PA

WF

10

14

WF

WF

PA

6

15

WF

WF

WF

4

16

CF

CF

WF

9



The future of Afghanistan

93

Possible future #

United States

Taliban

Afghanistan

Votes

17

CF

WF

CF

11

18

WF

CF

CF

20

19

WF

WF

CF

15

20

CF

WF

WF

3

21

WF

CF

WF

22

22

PA

WF

CF

13

23

PA

CF

WF

15

24

CF

WF

PA

2

25

CF

PA

WF

1

26

WF

CF

PA

22

27

WF

PA

CF

24 351

PA = Political Influence used to reach agreement CF = Continue to Fight WF = Withdraw Forces

Using the results from step 7 (pair-wise comparisons) from the tables above (Table 5.2 through Table 5.4), the analyst now moves to step 8. Step 8 ranks the alternate futures, based on the voting scores, in order of probability (highest to lowest). This will give the analyst the most likely actions to occur specific to each scenario.

Ranking the alternate futures The tables (5.2–5.4) from step 7 show the total number of permutations of alternate future for each scenario, as well as the correlating number of votes received during the pair-wise comparison. Step 8 in the LAMP process is to rank the alternate futures for each scenario from highest to lowest, thus showing the most likely to least likely to occur. The alternate future tables 5.5 through 5.7 represent each scenario and are arranged according to their rank.

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THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

Table 5.5  Alternate futures, Scenario 1 – democratic government (DG) Possible future #

United States

Taliban

Afghanistan

Votes

5

PA

CF

CF

22

12

PA

WF

WF

22

16

CF

CF

WF

22

17

CF

WF

CF

22

18

WF

CF

CF

21

15

WF

WF

WF

19

11

WF

PA

PA

18

23

PA

CF

WF

18

24

CF

WF

PA

18

14

WF

WF

PA

17

20

CF

WF

WF

16

10

PA

WF

PA

15

21

WF

CF

WF

15

7

CF

CF

PA

13

26

WF

CF

PA

13

3

PA

CF

PA

12

13

WF

PA

WF

10

25

CF

PA

WF

10

4

CF

PA

PA

9

6

CF

PA

CF

9

9

PA

PA

WF

8

22

PA

WF

CF

8

8

CF

CF

CF

6

19

WF

WF

CF

6



The future of Afghanistan

95

Possible future #

United States

Taliban

Afghanistan

Votes

2

PA

PA

CF

1

27

WF

PA

CF

1

1

PA

PA

PA

0 351

PA = Political Influence used to reach agreement CF = Continue to Fight WF = Withdraw Forces

Table 5.6  Alternate futures, Scenario 2 – tribal warlord (TW) Possible future #

United States

Taliban

Afghanistan

Votes

18

WF

CF

CF

26

19

WF

WF

CF

25

11

WF

PA

PA

22

14

WF

WF

PA

21

8

CF

CF

CF

20

22

PA

WF

CF

19

27

WF

PA

CF

19

17

CF

WF

CF

18

6

CF

PA

CF

17

7

CF

CF

PA

16

5

PA

CF

CF

15

10

PA

WF

PA

15

2

PA

PA

CF

14

4

CF

PA

PA

14

12

PA

WF

WF

13

9

PA

PA

WF

12

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THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

Possible future #

United States

Taliban

Afghanistan

Votes

3

PA

CF

PA

11

21

WF

CF

WF

10

13

WF

PA

WF

9

16

CF

CF

WF

9

23

PA

CF

WF

6

20

CF

WF

WF

5

24

CF

WF

PA

5

25

CF

PA

WF

5

26

WF

CF

PA

3

15

WF

WF

WF

2

1

PA

PA

PA

0 351

PA = Political Influence used to reach agreement CF = Continue to Fight WF = Withdraw Forces

Table 5.7  Alternate futures, Scenario 3 – Islamic Caliphate (IC) Possible future #

United States

Taliban

Afghanistan

Votes

8

CF

CF

CF

24

27

WF

PA

CF

24

21

WF

CF

WF

22

26

WF

CF

PA

22

11

WF

PA

PA

21

5

PA

CF

CF

20

7

CF

CF

PA

20



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Possible future #

United States

Taliban

Afghanistan

Votes

18

WF

CF

CF

20

6

CF

PA

CF

18

3

PA

CF

PA

16

19

WF

WF

CF

15

23

PA

CF

WF

15

9

PA

PA

WF

14

4

CF

PA

PA

13

22

PA

WF

CF

13

2

PA

PA

CF

11

17

CF

WF

CF

11

10

PA

WF

PA

10

13

WF

PA

WF

10

16

CF

CF

WF

9

12

PA

WF

WF

7

14

WF

WF

PA

6

15

WF

WF

WF

4

20

CF

WF

WF

3

24

CF

WF

PA

2

25

CF

PA

WF

1

1

PA

PA

PA

0 351

PA = Political Influence used to reach agreement CF = Continue to Fight WF = Withdraw Forces

98

THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

Analysis of alternate futures Scenario 1: Democratic government In Scenario 1, Afghanistan would continue to exist with a democratic government. Afghanistan will continue to receive financial aid and backing from Western governments. The democratic government will continue to make headway in removing corruption from the government as well as the security and justice systems. As the Afghan government continues to mature, it will expand its influence throughout Afghanistan. Through the use of the pair-wise comparison, these five alternate futures received the highest votes out of the 27 alternate futures. The five alternate futures received at least 21 votes. These five alternate futures are considered to be the most likely to occur. This section includes both the analysis of the alternate future as well as potential consequences for this particular alternate future.

Alternate Future #5: The United States pursues an agreement through political influence with the Taliban while the Taliban and Afghanistan continue to fight Alternate Future #5 received 22 votes during the pair-wise comparison. Four of the five alternate futures discussed in this section received 22 votes. For this alternate future, the Taliban and Afghanistan continue to fight against each other, while the Untied States attempts to use its political influence to reach an agreement. It is likely that part of the continued fights will be between ethnic groups within Afghanistan. This could happen as a result of an ethnic group, most likely the Uzbeks or the Tajiks, feeling that the Afghan government is not doing all that was possible to protect the Afghan people. The Afghan government has to be able to prove to the Afghan people, as well as their international peers, that they have the power behind them to continue to fight the Taliban insurgency. If they have any hope of gaining countrywide support and confidence, the government has to prove they can keep the Afghanis safe. National security will remain an issue for Afghanistan’s near future. This also proves to the international community that the Afghan government is working to eliminate radicalism from its society. The Taliban will most likely continue to fight because of the weakness and corruption within the government. To date, the Afghan government is still lacking in national security capabilities as well as in their fight against corruption. These are two key areas that need to be worked on in order to maintain and expand the power and control they currently have. The



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United States’ attempt to use political influence to reach an agreement with the Taliban would also be seen by the Taliban as a weakness. This would guarantee that the Taliban would not withdraw its forces from the Afghan battlefield. One consequence the United States could face from this initiative is the perception that they are willing to negotiate with terrorists/insurgents. Up till this point the United States has maintained a strict policy of no negotiations. There is also the potential for pockets of fighting between the Afghan government and the Taliban. This would cause unrest among the affected provinces and could potentially lead to the men in those provinces rearming themselves in order to protect their families and ways of life.

Alternate Future #12: The United States pursues an agreement through political influence with Taliban while the Taliban and Afghanistan withdraws their forces Alternate Future #12 also received 22 votes. This alternate future is very similar to Alternate Future #5, except in this instance the Taliban and Afghanistan withdraw their troops rather than continue to fight. The justification for the Taliban withdrawing could be as simple as needing to resupply its fighters with food and weapons, to having the fighters return to the Pakistani border to recruit new fighters. The Taliban could also withdraw in order to plan their next attack, most likely against Kabul, while they wait to see what progresses from the United States negotiations. Afghanistan’s withdrawal could be for the same reasons as the Taliban: resupplying its troops, or seeing how the negotiations turn out. In addition, the Afghan government could also withdraw in order to refortify key areas like Kabul and the Bagram Air Base. It is imperative that the Afghan government maintain an image of being both competent and able to defend Afghanistan from enemies, both foreign and domestic. The attempt by the United States to carry out politically influenced agreements shows the dedication of the United States in attempting to end the war in Afghanistan. It would also prove to the Taliban, Afghan government and many critics from around the world that the United States is not trying to create their own empire in Central Asia. As previously stated in Alternate Future #5, the United States runs the risk of opening themselves up to a loss of face for negotiating with a known terrorist/insurgence group. This would set a new precedent for the American negotiation system. This withdrawal of both the Taliban and Afghan government forces could potentially lead the Afghans to feel as though the security forces are focused on centralized cities instead of dispersed among the people of Afghanistan. As a result, the Afghan government might lose support from the Afghanis who are not located in a city.

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Alternate Future #16: The Taliban and the United States continue to fight both in Afghanistan and along the Pakistani/Afghan border, while Afghanistan withdraws their forces Alternate Future #16 showcases an interesting dynamic. In this alternate future, the Taliban and the United States use their political influence to reach an agreement between each other while Afghanistan withdraws its forces. The negotiations to reach an agreement between the United States and the Taliban would be a long process. It is unlikely that the public would ever receive full disclosure on the terms and conditions of the agreement. This agreement would set a precedent for future dealings with insurgency/ terrorist organizations. While these two actors are negotiating their agreement, the Afghanis and their government would need to focus on building the security forces and infrastructure and dealing with their internal corruption. When and if the negotiations between the United States and the Taliban were ratified, the Afghans would still have a radical organization to deal with. The Afghan government has an uphill battle ahead of it for creating an environment where the Afghan people feel secure and can see an improvement in their lives. This does not mean that Afghanistan should become isolated and try to ignore the potential problems that the Taliban and al-Qaeda represent. The United States faces similar complications to those which the Soviet Army encountered in the 1980s. The Taliban has an amorphous capability to melt into their surroundings and then emerge to carry out another guerilla attack against the United States and NATO forces. While the United States has begun to deploy new technologies that assist in tracking these guerilla attacks, they still have not perfected a method to prevent I.E.Ds (improvised explosive devices). The United States and NATO death tolls will continue to rise against the Taliban. Continued fighting between the Taliban and the United States could also end in the United States pushing the Taliban back into Pakistan, thus causing the Taliban to focus its attacks on Pakistan instead of Afghanistan. Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities multiply the risks associated with this possibility.

Alternate Future #17: The United States and Afghanistan continue to fight against Taliban insurgency, while the Taliban is withdrawing its fighters Alternate Future #17 has two of the three actors continuing to fight the war on terror in Afghanistan. While the Afghan government and the United



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States embroil themselves in warfare, the Taliban withdraws its forces back to the Afghan–Pakistani border. The terrain along the Afghan/Pakistani border is difficult to traverse; the Taliban and Afghanis have the benefit of traveling through and living in the mountainous region. The Taliban’s withdrawal of its forces could be for gathering new supplies or recruits, or for planning the next large scale attack against Afghanistan, the United States, and NATO forces. This withdrawal should not be regarded as a quiet exit from the attempt to regain control of Afghanistan. It is the responsibility of the United States, its NATO forces allies, and the Afghan government to be prepared for these potential attacks. The need to ensure that Afghanistan has a strong security force is essential to deterring attacks by the Taliban. The strengthening of the Afghan security forces will also increase the Afghan opinion of both the Afghan government and the stability and security of their country. After decades of war, the Afghanis need to see their Afghan government as a valid system of power. The main consequence of this alternate future would be the failure of the United States and Afghanistan to utilize the withdrawal of the Taliban fighters to eliminate the single cells that have remained behind. This is also an opportunity for the Afghan government to attempt to begin to rebuild some of the destroyed infrastructure. If the Afghan government fails to make the most out of this opportunity, where they are the hunter and not the hunted, then they run the risk of the Afghanis looking to warlords and local tribal elders for security and support.

Alternate Future #18: The United States begins its withdrawal process, and the Taliban turn their focus to Kabul and the current government. Afghanistan in turn begins to fight against the Taliban After reviewing the first four alternate futures, Alternate Future #18 might seem out of place, but it is not. Throughout history, Afghanis have fought against a common enemy or invader (such as the Soviet Union during the Soviet–Afghan War). Immediately after the enemy’s withdrawal, the Afghan tribes and fighters return to internal skirmishes. In this instance, the Taliban has been primarily focused on eliminating the risk the United States and the NATO forces present. When the United States and NATO forces withdraw from Afghanistan, an opportunity will present itself to the Taliban to turn its forces against the Afghan government. If this alternate future were to occur it would be almost identical to the fall of the Afghan government supported by an outside country, and ensuing

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tribal warfare would determine who has the power to maintain control of Kabul and Afghanistan. If the United States and the NATO forces can succeed in creating a stable and robust security council to maintain control, the fledgling Afghan government would have a better chance of maintaining control. This alternate future would have serious consequences for Afghanistan. The nations that were withdrawing from the country would potentially be leaving Afghanistan open again for terrorist activities. The potential infighting would prevent the Afghan government from improving its national security. The Afghan people would have a sense of status quo, constant warfare with no opportunity to better their lives. Reviewing the five alternate futures above, the analyst can deduce that the United States’ change in mindset to enable political influence to achieve an agreement has significant consequences. While half of Afghanistan may be in agreement with this option, the northern half of the country is violently opposed to the Taliban reentering Afghanistan under any terms. In each of these alternate futures, Afghanistan needs to see a united front on the part of the government. Potential corruption, lack of security or negotiations with the Taliban could potentially doom the democratic government. The Afghanis and their government are currently navigating a fine path between a democratic government, which is supported by the international community, and traditional tribal elders, warlords, and rural societies. The lack of infrastructure increases difficulties faced by the Afghan democracy.

Scenario 2: Tribal warlords Scenario 2 of this predictive study draws from Afghanistan’s tribal population. The isolated nature of the country and various geographical features have prevented the different ethnic populations from having to associate and assimilate with each other, except in large cities. Throughout Afghanistan’s history, there are few central governments that have succeeded in extending their control across Afghanistan. The current Afghan government is no exception. The strong tribal and ethnic connections and lack of national security have enabled the Afghanis to opt to follow their tribal elders and warlords who are able to offer both security and a means for living. If this scenario were to occur, Afghanistan’s economy would come to a standstill, with opium being their key export. Their national security would devolve from a nationwide focus to rural territories. Afghan tribal warlords would reappear. While these warlords would offer the Afghanis security they desire, they would hurt the overall progress of the country. Afghanistan would begin to lose the advances it has made.



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Alternate Future #18: The United States begins its withdrawal process, and the Taliban turn their focus to Kabul and the current government. Afghanistan in turn begins to fight against the Taliban Alternate Future #18 received 26 votes, the highest score from the pair-wise comparison. For Scenario 2’s analysis, this is the most likely alternate future to occur. As previously mentioned under Scenario 1, Afghan history is filled with different instances where Afghan tribal enemies would form a limited confederacy to eliminate a common external enemy. The Afghan government does not view the United States and the NATO forces as the enemy. The Afghan government’s perspective views the role of United States and NATO forces as assistance in increasing the overall security of Afghanistan, while working to eliminate a terrorist group and an Islamic fundamentalist group. Once the United States has withdrawn, the Afghan government will receive financial assistance from its allies, but will essentially be left to defend itself. This is the primary reason for the push towards increasing Afghanistan’s security capabilities. The Taliban is currently aligned with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a Mujahideen fighter from the Soviet–Afghan War. Hekmatyar has lived and fought through this alternate future before, following the end of the Soviet–Afghan War. If this alternate future were to occur, there are two key consequences. First, the attempts to create a secure and stable Afghanistan will be gone. The return of turf wars drawn upon tribal-based lines, in hopes of gaining territory and funds, would spread across Afghanistan, causing migration issues for the already stressed surrounding nations. Second, there is the potential for the reintroduction of al-Qaeda and terrorist training camps to Afghanistan. With internal disputes taking place, it would not be difficult for al-Qaeda to cross the Afghan border and establish a new training facility.

Alternate Future #19: The United States and the Taliban withdraw from Afghanistan, and Afghanistan continues to fight with remaining Taliban insurgents and between ethnic groups Alternate Future #19 would begin with the withdrawal of the United States and NATO forces from Afghanistan. The Taliban would then withdraw its forces. The Taliban’s withdrawal may be an attempt to regroup its forces, replenish its supplies and add recruits to the ranks. Without the constant warfare between

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the United States, NATO forces, and the Taliban or insurgents, the lack of infrastructure could lead ethnic groups to return to in-fighting to gain control over prosperous territories. Afghanistan currently does not have the infrastructure, national security or economic prosperity to ensure the long-term survival of the Afghanis without economic aid from other nations. The consequences of Alternate Future #19 could be as bleak as the elimination of the Afghan government that was founded and nurtured over the last six years. If Afghanistan were to continue to fight against enemy forces, either new or old, Mujahideen fighters with experience, including major figures like Ismail Khan, Hekmatyar and Rashid Dostum, would again take control of large sections of Afghanistan.

Alternate Future #11: Afghanistan and the Taliban work through their political influences to reach an agreement and the United States withdraw its troops from Afghanistan This alternate future seems to cover the ultimate objectives of the three actors. While Alternate Future #11 would seem to allow peace through negotiation, it would in fact lead Afghanistan back into a civil war. In this alternate future, the Afghan government and the Taliban would work together to reintegrate the Taliban insurgents into Afghan society. It is anticipated that this reintegration could work much like the denazification policy in Germany following World War II, with major leaders being put on trial, and lesser participants being given amnesty. The Afghanis in the northern half of the country have already stated that if this occurs, they will rearm. The two main ethnic groups in northern Afghanistan are the Tajiks and Uzbeks, under Taliban rule; both ethnicities were punished and treated like second-class citizens. They will not allow this to occur again. Some may fear that the reintegration of the Taliban into Afghan society and government will lead to the minority ethnic groups being removed from their positions of power. Through this alternate future the Afghan government would take steps towards reintegrating the Taliban into society and reaching an agreement with the Taliban to eliminate the insurgency, thus increasing national and regional security. The Taliban insurgents would benefit by returning to their home provinces within Afghanistan, and could potentially be used as a security detail. The northern half of Afghanistan would rearm and rebel against the negotiations and any resulting agreement that is reached between the two parties. The withdrawal of the United States and the NATO forces would reduce security within Afghanistan. If Afghanistan’s government security forces haven’t improved, this would give the northern Afghanis further justification for rearming. Potential consequences of this would be the Taliban regaining a majority of the government and reenacting Sharia law. Another potential concern



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would be the treatment of women and girls, both in terms of their education and human rights. The roles of women is one area the Taliban feels very strongly about, and could potentially cause tension. This could also cause another civil war in Afghanistan; this would be very similar to the aftermath of the Soviet–Afghan War. This could also potentially cause mass migration of the Afghan people to neighboring countries due to the fear of potential civil war. If a civil war were to break out it, is reasonable to assume that warlords would once again emerge. Rashid Dostum, an Uzbek warlord, would undoubtedly be the prime leader for the Uzbek tribe. It is also reasonable, based on historical data, to assume that the Uzbeks and Tajiks would ally themselves against the Pashtu fighters.

Alternate Future #14: The United States and the Taliban withdraw their forces while Afghanistan uses political influence to try to achieve an agreement between the Taliban and the Afghan government Alternate Future #14 focuses on two of the actors removing themselves from the equation. If the United States and the Taliban were both to withdraw their forces from Afghanistan, despite the support that the Afghan government would still receive from the international community, they would be without forces to prove to the Afghan people that they were capable of providing security. The Afghan government’s attempt to use political influence to reach an agreement with the Taliban would be seen by many in southern Afghanistan as a move to ensure peace and increase the overall security of the southern provinces. The ethnic groups in northern Afghanistan would not feel that their security had been increased; if anything, they would feel more vulnerable as a result of the agreement. This alternate future could very quickly turn into the next civil war. If this were to occur, it is unlikely that the democratic government would be able to sustain control over any of the country. If civil war broke out in Afghanistan, Kabul would most likely be one of the first places to be attacked. A civil war would cause mass migration as well as destruction of much of the infrastructure created over the last nine years. Civil war would ultimately turn into a battle for power, and this could potentially allow the Taliban to return to reclaim the southern provinces before attempting to retake the northern provinces.

Alternate Future #8: The United States, Afghanistan and the Taliban continue to fight Alternate Future #8 appears as the fifth possible future for Scenario 2. This alternate future would consist of continuous warfare between

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the Taliban and the United States and Afghanistan. This would cause a lack of stability within Afghanistan and lead to lower approval ratings not only for the Afghan government, but for the United States government as well. Alternate Future #8 would force the Afghanis to align themselves with a strong local force that could offer protection against insurgents. The United States would most likely be forced to eventually withdraw, much like the Soviets did during the Soviet– Afghan War. This alternate future would lead to a quagmire in Afghanistan. The resulting long-term devastation would cause massive migration as refugees flee to the surrounding nations, much like during the Soviet–Afghan War. The opium trade would remain one of the key sources of funds within Afghanistan, and production would most likely increase to fund the insurgent fighters as well as local warlords. Reviewing Scenario 2’s five alternate futures above, a trend appears for Afghanistan. In order for Scenario 2 (tribal warlords) to potentially occur, Afghanistan has two options: continue to fight or attempt to publicly negotiate with the Taliban. The continued fighting can come in two ways: either Afghanistan remains embroiled in warfare with the Taliban and the United States, or internal skirmishes break out within Afghanistan’s tribes as a result of the lack of infrastructure, economic development, and stability. While many view the potential negotiations as the solution to the current situation in Afghanistan, it is important that the United States and the Afghan government take into account the entire Afghan population, not just southern Afghanistan. It is unlikely that the northern Afghanis will be willing to agree to any negotiations that include the Taliban reentering the government or gaining power in southern Afghanistan.

Scenario 3: Islamic Caliphate Scenario 3 would cause international instability as well as damage the success Afghanistan has made to date. Scenario 3 entails the Taliban and their ally al-Qaeda regaining control of Afghanistan through religious propaganda and the promise of security. By reinstating Sharia law, all of the progress made by women will be reversed. Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar proclaiming Afghanistan to be the birthplace of the next Caliphate will give credence to both the Taliban and al-Qaeda’s causes and could potentially lead to additional large- and small-scale terrorist attacks around the world. Scenario 2 and Scenario 3 share two alternate futures. In order for this scenario to come to fruition, the Taliban and its ally al-Qaeda need the United States and the NATO forces to withdraw from Afghanistan.



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Alternate Future #8: The United States, Afghanistan, and the Taliban continue to fight Unlike Scenario 2, Alternate Future #8 ties for first place with 24 votes in Scenario 3. This is the most likely alternate future to occur for Scenario 3. Alternate Future #8 tied for first place primarily due to Afghanistan’s history. As previously stated in Scenario 2, if all three actors continued to fight, it would eventually turn into a deadlock. Afghanistan’s economy, democracy, infrastructure, and morale would suffer. With critics are already comparing the war in Afghanistan to the Vietnam War, if the United States were to continue down that path, with no way to withdraw while securing victory, the American public would most likely demand the evacuation of Afghanistan. If this were to occur, the Afghan government would not be able to survive without external financial and security support. This could potentially allow the Taliban and al-Qaeda to offer the Afghan people security, while allowing them to practice their religious beliefs without restriction. If this future alternate were to occur, Afghanistan could once again become a haven for terrorism. This would not only affect the three actors discussed in this predictive study, but also the majority of the western hemisphere. The ability to offer protection and economic security to the Afghanis is important to ensuring their support.

Alternate Future #27: The United States withdraws from Afghanistan while the Taliban uses political influence to reach an agreement with the Afghan government. Meanwhile, the Afghanis continue to fight Alternate Future #27 focuses on the tendency for the Afghan population to fight among themselves once the external enemy is gone. In this analysis, the United States will withdraw from Afghanistan, and the Taliban will use its political influence (in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan) to negotiate an agreement with the Afghan government. While this is occurring, the Afghan population will resort back to skirmishes to gain food, water, money, and weapons. Afghanistan’s current government is incapable of impacting all of Afghanistan. The vast majority of settlements in Afghanistan are rural, and lack of infrastructure adds to the inability of the governmental to extend its influence across all the geographic area of Afghanistan. As a result, the current Afghan government is incapable of providing even the bare necessities to the Afghan people. Through pointed and deliberate negotiations, the Taliban could gain control over potentially important areas within the government. The ethnic

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connections of the Pashtun tribe could potentially assist the Taliban in gaining control of important territories and funds. The internal skirmishes would enable the Taliban once again to take over territory and remove corrupt warlords and government officials. As is the case for the five alternate futures in this scenario, if an Islamic Caliphate were to begin in Afghanistan, the influence of Islamic extremists would increase as they would now have a haven in which to operate. Concerns would also be raised over the current state of security regarding Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and the stability of their government and security apparatus to ensure that nuclear weapons aren’t mishandled or easily accessible.

Alternate Future #21: The United States and Afghan fighters withdraw from the war on terror, while the Taliban continues to fight In this alternate future, the withdrawal of both the United States and Afghan fighters provides the Taliban with an opportunity to move into strategic, unoccupied territory. This also opens the possibility for the Taliban and its ally al-Qaeda to surround Kabul in an attempt to gain control of the current government. The Taliban does not have the same economic clout that it had in the early 1990s. However, they have been able to maintain and expand their recruitment base in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. If the United States were to withdraw from Afghanistan without first preparing the Afghan government with a security force that could protect it, and without eliminating a percentage of the corruption within the government, it is unlikely that the current Afghan government would be able to survive for an extended period of time without intervention or defense from abroad. By both the United States and the Afghan fighters withdrawing, it leaves the Afghan people vulnerable to the Taliban forces. If the Taliban decides to continue to fight, there is the potential for greater infiltration of Pakistan and its various government apparatuses. This not only puts another nation at risk, but a nation with nuclear capabilities.

Alternate Future #26: While the United States withdraws from Afghanistan, the Afghan government attempts to use political influence to reach an agreement with the Taliban. At the same time, the Taliban continues to fight against the current Afghan government Alternate Future #26 consists of the United States withdrawing from Afghanistan while the Taliban continues to fight against the Afghan



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government, and the Afghan government uses political influence to reach an agreement with the Taliban. Alternate Future #21 and Alternate Future #26 are similar in the consequences and analysis, with one main exception. Alternate Future #21 has the Afghan government withdrawing its forces, while in alternate future #26, the Afghan government is using its political influence to achieve an agreement with the Taliban. Again, the Taliban is on the attack, while the Afghan government appears to be on the defensive. The attempt to work with and accommodate the Taliban forces does nothing to divert the Taliban from their ultimate goal of retaking Afghanistan: it only delays the takeover.

Alternate Future #11: The United States withdraws from Afghanistan while the Taliban and Afghan government both use their political influence to reach an agreement Alternate Future #11 appears in both Scenario 2 and Scenario 3. This alternate future offers the Taliban the opportunity to negotiate directly with the Afghan government for a position of power without interference from the United States. While the Afghan government would not be willing to transform the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan into an Islamic Caliphate, the Taliban would most likely be able to gain seats of power within the government. This would be true for two reasons. First, the Taliban members come primarily from the Pashtun tribe, and second, the common occurrence of corruption within the government would make it relatively easy for the Taliban representatives to bribe their way into possession of either information or supplies. If these agreements are conducted in secrecy, the Afghan government runs the risk of upsetting the international aid organizations and nations providing economic aid and relief to the Afghan people. In addition to international repercussions, the Afghan government also runs the risk of the ethnic groups from the northern provinces, primarily the Uzbeks and Tajiks, rearming in preparation for a civil war. Negotiations between the current Afghan government, which is run by Karzai, a Pashtun, and the Taliban, which is a predominantly Pashtun organization, could be seen by the northern provinces as a security risk to their way of life. After suffering from Taliban rule, most Afghans are unwilling to entertain the idea of the Taliban in the government. The most likely consequence of this would be a civil war in Afghanistan. This does provide the Taliban with the opportunity to emerge the victor against the northern provinces, as they did in the civil war in the 1992. In reviewing Scenario 3, in order for the Islamic Caliphate to stand a chance of developing and taking root, the United States needs to be

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removed from the equation. The only alternate future that has the United States involved was the first alternate future where all three actors continue to fight, thus resulting in a draw in Afghanistan.

Focal events and indicators Steps 9 and 10 determine the focal events and develop the indicators for the focal events. This analysis is different from the consequence analysis in the previous section. A focal event is an event that affects the alternate future enough that it changes the relative probability. The indicators are associated with each of the alternate futures and focal events. The analyst should produce a list of possible indicators that work as a checklist for whether an event is about to occur or has already occurred. This checklist allows the analyst to periodically review and revote on the alternate futures as new information becomes available. In addition, it allows the analyst to refine indicators that are associated with certain focal events and identify new focal events for more extreme alternate futures.2 This predictive study focuses on Afghanistan, the United States, and the Taliban in relation to the Afghanistan’s government. During this analysis it is important to determine the options Afghanistan has, and understand both what is currently going on, and what could potentially occur in the future, and how Afghanistan would likely respond. It is important, as the analyst, to keep in mind that not all the focal events need occur at the same time in order to change the current future to an alternate future; however, at least one focal point must occur to change the alternate futures. The current status of Afghanistan is Alternate Future #8: the United States, Afghanistan, and the Taliban continue to fight. The United States has approved a surge of US soldiers in an effort to disrupt and destroy the Taliban insurgency in southern Afghanistan. The United States and NATO forces have stated earlier this year that they do not plan to begin to withdraw from Afghanistan until 2011.

Alternate Future #5: The United States pursues an agreement through political influence with the Taliban, while the Taliban and Afghanistan continue to fight Until the press release on July 19, 2010, the United States had been opposed to participating in negotiations with the Taliban. While these issues are not completely resolved, the United States and the Taliban have moved one step closer to having an open dialog concerning a peace agreement.3



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Focal events United States The United States population’s opposition to the war in Afghanistan continues to grow. President Obama changes the United States strategy on talking with and negotiating with the Taliban. The United States reduces the Department of Defense budget. MM

Policy change. The United States makes an official statement on their stance on negotiating with the Taliban.

MM

The United States opens up diplomatic discussions with Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan concerning Afghanistan and Taliban.

MM

WikiLeaks releases 92,000 classified military documents on the war in Afghanistan.

MM

Statistics on military suicide rates and military personnel suffering from combat stress disorders released to the public.

International NATO countries that are participating in the war in Afghanistan hold elections, and new leaders are elected into office. MM

David Cameron was elected as the new Prime Minister of the United Kingdom on May 11, 2010. His view regarding the war in Afghanistan is that “is not a war of choice, it is a war of necessity.”4

Central Asia The Taliban openly discusses with the media the possibility of negotiating with the United States.5 The Afghans in northern Afghanistan begin to rearm and strategically position themselves for military action if necessary. MM

President Karzai issues a press release to the Afghan people informing them of negotiations with the Taliban.

Alternate Future #11: Afghanistan and the Taliban work through their political influences to reach an agreement and the United States withdraw its troops from Afghanistan The United States and NATO forces have made it clear that they have no intention of leaving Afghanistan before it is capable of maintaining its own security and governance.

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Focal Events United States President Obama changes the United States Strategy on talking to and negotiating with the Taliban. MM

Policy change. The United States “okays” Karzai taking the lead in Taliban discussions.

MM

The United States opens up diplomatic discussions with Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan concerning Afghanistan and Taliban negotiations.

International Pakistan and Saudi Arabia agree to facilitate the negotiations between the Taliban and Afghanistan. MM

The United States changes their strategy on dealing with the Taliban.

MM

Pakistan and the United Kingdom have openly commented on their willingness to support discussions with the Taliban.

Central Asia The Taliban openly discusses with the media the possibility of negotiating with the United States. The Afghans in northern Afghanistan begin to rearm and strategically position themselves for military action if necessary. The 9th International Conference on Afghanistan is held in Kabul. At the conference, President Karzai states that Afghanistan should have full control of its own security by 2014. MM

Media discussion on open negotiations escalates. President Karzai gives a press release to the Afghan people informing them that that they are close to a settlement with the Taliban.

MM

Statistics released involving the Afghan Army and their completed training.

MM

Transition plan for Afghan provinces to be handed over to Afghan security forces.

Alternate Future #12: The United States pursues an agreement through political influence with Taliban while the Taliban and Afghanistan withdraw their forces There have been news articles recently about President Obama and the government considering changing the strategy in Afghanistan in relation to negotiating with the Taliban. Up to this point, the United States has been



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against negotiations, despite support for the idea from the United Kingdom, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and President Karzai. The United States has not released an official statement to change their strategy. Until that happens, some of the future analyses, including this one, cannot occur.

Focal Events United States President Obama changes the United States strategy on talking to and negotiating with the Taliban. The United States’ deploys the soldier surge. MM

There is a significant reduction in insurgency attacks and an increase in detainments.

MM

The United States announces its willingness to consider talks with the Taliban through a third party (Saudi Arabia or Pakistan).

International The 9th Annual Afghanistan Conference highlights Afghanistan’s current state and the strategies in place to gain their independence from foreign security by 2014. MM

50 percent of the financial aid that goes to Afghanistan is funded through the Afghan government.

Central Asia Afghanistan focuses on the initiative to remove opium production from southern Afghanistan, the bad weather contributing to the loss of opium fields. Northern Afghans begin to rearm after word of potential peace talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government circulate. MM

Northern Afghans (Uzbeks and the Tajiks) begin to rearm and stockpile weapons and supplies.

MM

Ceasefire between Afghanistan and the Taliban.

MM

Karzai’s government along with help from aid organizations begins to distribute hexaploid wheat seed to farmers affected by the loss of their opium plants along with financial aid as an incentive to transition their crops.

Alternate Future #16: The Taliban and the United States continue to fight both in Afghanistan and along the Pakistani– Afghan border, while Afghanistan withdraws its forces The withdrawal of the Afghan forces would coincide with the training regime currently run by the United States military. President Karzai has laid

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out very aggressive security targets which will require intense training. This would not be a permanent withdrawal.

Focal Events United States The United States and Pakistan begin a joint operation to close in on the Taliban from both sides. Pakistan gives the United States permission to enter the North-West Frontier Province. A portion of the United States soldier surge is to increase the Afghan security training. The United States and its allies gain valid intelligence on the location of Mullah Omar. MM

The United States releases the date for the transition from combat to supporting the Afghan forces.

MM

The United States increases the number of contracts for civilian security agents for training purposes in Afghanistan.

MM

Defection of key Taliban members to Afghanistan.

International NATO states that until the Afghan government has a capable security force, NATO forces will not be leaving. MM

NATO nations increase aid to Afghanistan.

MM

NATO nations increase their training regiments with the Afghan security recruits.

Central Asia Afghanistan vows to have control of their country’s security by 2014. This is done through increasing their recruiting numbers and allowing insurgents to reintegrate into Afghan society. Unrest emerges in northern Afghanistan. MM

Troops drawn back to increase their training.

MM

President Karzai issues a press release vowing to allow insurgents and dissidents back into the Afghan society, and allow them to participate in the future security of Afghanistan.

MM

Influx of insurgents returning to Afghanistan and joining the security recruits.

MM

Uzbeks and Tajiks begin to rearm due to fear of an influx of insurgents reintegrating into Afghan society and the security sector.



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Alternate Future #17: The United States and Afghanistan continue to fight against Taliban insurgency, while the Taliban withdraws its fighters The Taliban withdrawal from direct confrontation from the United States and Afghanistan is not a permanent move. Based on the Taliban’s strategies, it is most likely a move to preserve their forces while attacking in another area. There is also the possibility that they are resupplying the forces in the field.

Focal Events United States A drone attack in the North-West Frontier Province kills a key Taliban leader. The United States and Pakistan agree to a joint military operation to squeeze the Taliban hideout in the North-West Frontier Province. MM

Surge of troops is moved along the Afghan–Pakistan border.

MM

Intelligence on meeting of Taliban leaders is leaked.

International NATO forces participate in a military operation to eradicate the Taliban. The agricultural initiative to transition from opium to wheat is rejuvenated as a result of poor weather conditions. MM

Redistribution of troops along the Afghan–Pakistan border.

MM

Importation of wheat seeds. Increase of economic aid to the agricultural communities for changing crops.

Central Asia The Taliban receives the lowest profits in its history from opium production. The Afghan government distributes 50 percent of the economic aid coming into the country, resulting in noticeable changes within Afghanistan, and a larger support base for the Afghan government. MM

Bad weather and reemergence of the initiative to transition from opium to wheat.

MM

Guarantee from the international community to purchase the wheat produced in Afghanistan.

MM

At the 9th Annual Afghanistan conference the international community promises to allow 50 percent of the aid to flow through the Afghan government.

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Alternate Future #18: The United States begins its withdrawal process, and the Taliban turn their focus to Kabul and the current government. The Afghan government in turn begins to fight against the Taliban The United States and NATO forces complete their promises to train the Afghan forces. The United States and NATO forces are reduced to supporting roles.

Focal Events United States The United States population’s opposition to the war in Afghanistan continues to grow. The United States reduces the Department of Defense budget. MM

Increase in death toll of United States soldiers.

MM

Study completed and released on the amount of aid given to Afghanistan and the impact/infrastructure it has created.

MM

Change in leadership, which promises change in the war in Afghanistan.

MM

WikiLeaks releases 92,000 classified military documents on the war in Afghanistan.

International NATO nations populations’ opposition to the War in Afghanistan grows. MM

NATO soldiers’ death toll rises.

MM

Opposition movements within the NATO nations press for withdrawal from the war in Afghanistan.

Central Asia The Afghan government states that they are in control of the country’s security operations. Insurgents attack from within Afghanistan’s security forces. The Taliban attempts to undermine the Afghan government and regain control of southern Afghanistan. MM

The United States and NATO forces increase the security training of new Afghan recruits.

MM

The United States and NATO forces transition from full scale forces to smaller support forces.

MM

Taliban insurgents reintegrate into Afghan society and join the security forces.

MM

Reemergence of Taliban forces in southern Afghanistan.



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Alternate Future #19: The United States and the Taliban withdraw from Afghanistan, and Afghanistan continues to fight with remaining Taliban insurgents and between ethnic groups The United States and NATO forces complete their training and security obligations to Afghanistan. Afghanistan has resumed control of the country’s security forces.

Focal Events United States The United States population’s opposition to the war in Afghanistan continues to grow. President Obama changes the United States strategy on talking to and negotiating with the Taliban. MM

Policy change. The United States makes an official statement on their stance on negotiating with the Taliban.

MM

The United States opens up diplomatic discussions with Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan concerning Afghanistan and Taliban.

MM

WikiLeaks releases 92,000 classified military documents on the war in Afghanistan.

MM

Statistics on military suicide rates and military personnel suffering from combat stress disorders released to the public.

International NATO countries have transitioned to a support role. MM

NATO forces increase their training of Afghan troops for security details.

MM

Opposition to continued involvement in Afghanistan begins in NATO countries.

Central Asia The Taliban openly discusses with the media the possibility of negotiating with the United States. The Afghans in northern Afghanistan begin to rearm and strategically position themselves for military action if necessary. MM

President Karzai hints to the Afghan people that he would be willing to negotiate with the Taliban.

MM

The Uzbeks and Tajiks in northern Afghanistan begin to align themselves under warlords for protection.

MM

Taliban reintegration increases.

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Alternate Future #21: The United States and Afghan fighters withdraw from the war on terror while the Taliban continues to fight This alternate future would be the complete opposite of the current conditions in Afghanistan. It would give the Taliban an advantage and allow them to reclaim lost territory.

Focal Events United States The United States transitions from combat to support. The United States reduces its total troop force. MM

The United States begins to withdraw troops.

MM

The United States government promises its population a reduced role in the war.

MM

The United States trains the Afghan security forces.

International The UN declares Afghanistan ready to have control over its security. MM

NATO forces and the United States increase training regiments for Afghan security forces.

MM

UN inspections for Afghan security forces.

MM

UN reviews the Afghan government’s overall security.

Central Asia The Taliban carries out a surge, and there are increasing attacks on remote locations in southern Afghanistan. The Taliban carries out attacks from within the newly installed security forces. Afghan security forces withdraw from remote locations. MM

Increase in Pakistani Taliban recruits.

MM

Taliban insurgents reintegrate and join the security branches of the Afghan government.

MM

Taliban carry out a surge of attacks along the fringe of the Afghan government’s control. Gain control of several outposts.



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Alternate Future #26: While the United States withdraws from Afghanistan, the Afghan government attempts to use political influence to reach an agreement with the Taliban. At the same time the Taliban continues to fight against the current Afghan government The attempt by the Afghan government to negotiate with the Taliban and end the fighting is a realistic goal for President Karzai.

Focal Events United States The United States transitions from combat to support. The United States reduces its total troop force. MM

The United States begins to withdraw troops.

MM

The United States government promises its population a reduced role in the war.

MM

The United States trains the Afghan security forces.

International The UN declares Afghanistan ready to have control over its security. MM

NATO forces and the United States increase training regiments for Afghan security forces.

MM

UN inspections of Afghan security forces.

MM

UN reviews the Afghan government’s overall security.

Central Asia The Afghan government begins peace talks with the Taliban. The Taliban infiltrates the Afghan security forces. The Taliban regains territory in southern Afghanistan and surrounds Kabul. Northern Afghan tribes rearm. MM

President Karzai receives support from international governments including the United States to begin discussions with the Taliban.

MM

Northern Afghans rearm themselves and begin skirmishes with local insurgents.

MM

The Taliban plans strategic attacks from within Afghanistan’s security forces.

MM

Taliban insurgents join the Afghan security forces.

MM

The Taliban take control of territories that are sympathetic to the Taliban.

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MM

The Taliban create a strategy to procure positions around Kabul. Showcase their strength.

Alternate Future #27: The United States withdraws from Afghanistan while the Taliban uses political influence to reach an agreement with the Afghan government. Meanwhile the Afghans continue to fight Based on the current conditions and open discussions, if the United States were to agree to allow negotiations with the Taliban, this would be the most likely future.

Focal Events United States President Obama changes the United States strategy on talking to and negotiating with the Taliban. The United States transitions its armed forces role from combat to support. The United States reduces its total troop force. MM

The United States announces its willingness to consider talks with the Taliban through a third party (Saudi Arabia or Pakistan).

MM

The United States trains the Afghan security forces.

MM

The United States begins to withdraw troops.

International The UN declares Afghanistan ready to have control over its security. NATO forces transition to a role of support instead of combat and begin to withdraw troops. MM

NATO forces and the United States increase training regiments for Afghan security forces.

MM

UN inspections of Afghan security forces.

MM

UN reviews the Afghan government’s overall security.

MM

NATO forces are drastically reduced as a result of Afghan security taking control.

Central Asia The Afghan government begins peace talks with the Taliban. Northern Afghan tribes rearm. Civil war breaks out between northern Afghanistan and southern Afghanistan. The Afghan government loses control of the Afghan population.



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MM

President Karzai receives support from international governments including the United States to begin discussions with the Taliban.

MM

Discussions begin between the Taliban and the Afghan government with a third party mediator.

MM

Northern Afghans rearm themselves and begin skirmishes with local insurgents and security forces.

MM

Northern Afghans ally themselves with strong warlords.

MM

Old warlords like Rashid Dostum (an Uzbek) begin to gain popularity and worldwide attention.

Transposition of alternate futures Step 12 in the LAMP process is concerned with the transposition of alternate futures. In this step the analyst reviews each scenario and the corresponding top future alternates from the pair-wise comparison and determines the possibility of transposition between them. Potential transposition between alternate futures occurs when one actor’s actions change the perception of another actor. When this occurs, the actor whose perception has been altered has the opportunity to transpose another alternate future. It is important to keep in mind the actors’ historical backgrounds and perceptions when reviewing the potential for transposition of alternate futures. The analysis below will focus on the top five alternate futures for each scenario as determined by the pair-wise comparison.

Scenario 1: Democratic government The first four alternate futures (5, 12, 16, and 17) gained 22 votes and would be considered the most likely to occur in order for Afghanistan to be able to obtain its democratic government. For this analysis, the focus is on alternate futures #5 and #12 which share the concept of the United States changing its policy and opening negotiations with the Taliban; this provides an opportunity for transposition between the two alternate futures. Afghanistan holds the key to whether transposition may occur. Based on current commentary on negotiating with the Taliban, the northern Afghans have vocally opposed the idea, and commented on their commitment to rearm if such discussions take place. This would lead to a transposition from #12 to #5. The United States’ change in policy and willingness to enter into discussions with the Taliban would first hinder the ability of the two organizations to come to terms, which would most likely be a ceasefire

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during negotiations. This ceasefire would originally include the Afghan government, as they would have a significant role during the negotiations. The northern Afghans, including the Uzbeks and Tajiks, have already stated that they will not support negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban. This is partly due to the historical relationship between the northern Afghans and the Taliban and partly due to the Pashtun majority in the country. The northern Afghans have a perception that the reintegration of the Taliban will lead to a Pashtun government that will once again exclude the minority ethnic groups. Alternate Future #12 could also transpose into #16 if the attempted negotiations fall through. The United States would again go on the offensive against the Taliban. The withdrawal of Afghanistan would be a necessary step to rebuild the broken connections with northern Afghanistan. The Afghan government would need to dedicate a significant amount of energy to regain the trust of nborthern Afghanistan. Alternate Future #16 does not appear to have a link between the other top future alternates. As a result, it has not been included in the analysis above. The two possible transpositions above have the highest probability of affecting the alternate futures, based on the perceptions of Afghanistan and its people.

Scenario 2: Tribal warlords Scenario 2 offers the clearest transposition between the top three alternate futures (11, 19, and 18). The fifth alternate future (#8) in this scenario is the closest to the current situation in Afghanistan. The three alternate futures listed above would be possible in Afghanistan due to the preconceived perceptions that the Afghan population has formed over the last three decades of war. In Alternate Future #11, the Taliban and Afghanistan use political influence to work towards an agreement while the United States begins to withdraw. While these negotiations are taking place, a ceasefire would likely be in place. The actions of the Afghan government in entering into discussions with the Taliban would immediately cause the Northern Afghans (Uzbeks and Tajiks) to rearm and begin to align themselves with powerful leaders (warlords) like Rashid Dostum the Uzbek. This would lead to the transposition between Alternate Future #11 and Alternate Future #19. In Alternate Future #19, the United States would not change its withdrawal strategies, but in addition to the United States, the Taliban would also withdraw, in order to regroup and strategize. The Afghan government’s battle to subdue and regain the trust of northern Afghanistan’s population would enable the Taliban to develop a revised military strategy against Afghanistan. In addition, the Afghan government’s attention would be on northern Afghanistan, and skeleton forces would be left to protect



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southern Afghanistan. The Afghan government’s perception of regaining power in the north by focusing its attention there would enable Alternate Future #18 to occur. Alternate Future #18 continues the United States strategy of continuing to withdraw from Afghanistan. The Afghan government’s focus on reabsorbing and quelling the skirmishes in the north would leave southern Afghanistan, and potentially Kabul, open to Taliban attacks. If the Taliban uses its knowledge of the terrain, and its support networks through southern Afghanistan and Pakistan, they would be able to catch the Afghan government by surprise in Kabul and force the Afghan government to fight on two fronts. Under this scenario, many Afghanis would revert back to the protection of tribal warlords. The Afghanis’ perception would be that the central government has failed, by not providing the necessary protection that the Afghans have received from their ethnically affiliated tribal warlords.

Scenario 3: Islamic Caliphate Scenario 3, similar to Scenario 2, has Alternate Future #8, which is most similar to the current state in Afghanistan. The top three alternate futures that could lead to transposition are 11, 27, and 26. Much like Scenario 2, Alternate Future #11, the Taliban and Afghanistan would use political influence to work towards an agreement while the United States would begin to withdraw its troops. The withdrawal of United States troops would also be accompanied by the withdrawal of NATO forces. Both parties have agreed that a smaller portion of troops would remain to support the Afghan security forces. By this point, the Afghans would have been given control over all of Afghanistan. With this ongoing negotiation, there would be an agreement on a ceasefire between the Taliban and Afghanistan. The Afghan government’s disregard for the statements made by the tribal leaders in northern Afghanistan concerning entering into negotiations with the Taliban would lead the northern Afghans to rearm due to their perception of being ignored and potentially shut-out from the democratic government system. The ethnic tribes who rearmed would most likely break the ceasefire, which they would not feel they were party to. This would transpose the alternate future from 11 to 27. Alternate Future #27 would have the Taliban continue to participate in the peace negotiations, while the Afghan government attempts to subdue the northern Afghanistan insurgency (Uzbeks and Tajiks). This effort would require personnel and funds. It would draw attention away from southern Afghanistan and embroil northern Afghanistan and the Afghan government in a civil war. The Taliban’s perception of a weakening Afghan government would transpose the alternate future from 27 to 26.

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Alternate Future #26 would see the United States still withdrawing, while Afghanistan is dealing with the civil war between northern Afghanistan and the central government. The Afghan government would push to continue the peace negotiations with the Taliban. This is due to their desire to eventually bring peace to Afghanistan and prevent the government from having to fight on two fronts. The Taliban perceive this as a weakness within the Afghan government, and would exploit this weakness by reentering the fight against Afghanistan.

Conclusion Based on the above analysis, and through the LAMP process, it is clear that Afghanistan has a long road ahead of it before it can truly exist peacefully and create the national security its people crave. While Afghanistan is currently a democratic nation, this is largely due to the large presence of NATO and United States soldiers patrolling and keeping the Taliban at bay. The Afghan government continues to deal with corruption issues throughout both the government and security branches. In addition, it has been unable to garner either the support or the endorsement of the rural Afghan communities. The continued focus on tribal connection and ethnic prioritization hinders the Afghan government from presenting a truly unified front against the Taliban and its ally al-Qaeda, as well as to the United Nations. The people of Afghanistan have dealt with many years of war, and have suffered from the destruction of their economy and basic infrastructure. To the majority of Afghans, the international aid that has flowed into Afghanistan over the past nine years has made little to no impact on their daily lives. The United States continues to deal with opposition at home, as well as in Afghanistan, to their presence. The recent release of classified military documents highlighting civilian deaths and operations only reinforces the Afghan belief that the United States soldiers are not bringing peace but instead more death. In the United States, the recent news release on the rise of military suicides only drives home the need to bring United States soldiers back from Afghanistan. Both the United States and the international community, including its NATO allies, are focused on training Afghan security personnel to ensure there is an indigenous protection of the Afghans and to create a security force independent of the United States and NATO. Despite the aggressive strategies that are currently in place, this will take years and a significant amount of effort from both the international community and the Afghans themselves. The Taliban continue to cause tension inside Afghanistan because of their ethnic connections to the majority of the population, as well as their



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alliance and protection of al-Qaeda. This connection has prevented peace negotiations from taking place. As the war is close to entering its ninth year, rumors have begun to circulate about a potential change in strategy by the United States. This change in strategy would enable such discussions. The Taliban still has reservations on the terms of such negotiations with the United States, but they have not ruled out the principle of negotiation. The Taliban’s ability to draw in the North-West Frontier Province, and expand its ideology and recruiting throughout Pakistan, reintroduces the concept of “Pashtunistan,” a nation-state that was abandoned following the third Anglo-Afghan War. It is unlikely that the Taliban will be willing to allow the current Afghan government to stay in control indefinitely. Even if the Taliban was reintegrated into Afghan society, they would still achieve their goal of upsetting the current Afghan dynamic. As a result of this reintegration, it is logical to estimate that the northern Afghan tribes will rebel and rearm. This will send Afghanistan back into a state of civil war. This civil war would destroy the current democratic society and for a time plunge the nation back under the control of tribal warlords. After studying Afghanistan’s history, this is the timeline that has been repeated after almost every international invasion of the country. This civil war provides the Taliban with the opportunity to reinstate their control over Afghanistan, if they can find the necessary funds to procure the weapons. This could potentially lead to the rebirth of the Islamic Caliphate. The other alternative would be the Afghan tribes once again breaking into ethnic sectors, and each tribe having a council of elders to dispense justice while warlords offer protection to the tribe. Afghanistan’s cultural structure and social structure are not like those of most modern countries. These distinct differences need to be taken into consideration when viewing potential scenarios for Afghanistan’s future.

Afterthought The Taliban has begun to recover some of its lost strength while remaining in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Despite this reemergence of the Taliban, they do not have the same following in Afghanistan they previously held. The current government has been unable to perform to the levels suggested, and is suffering from the same issues as previous governments, including corruption. The majority of the Afghan population is unhappy with the current conditions in Afghanistan, militarily, politically, economically, and socially. The current administration has been unable to establish a sense of authority or credibility among the Afghan population. In a recent poll, Afghanis across the country expressed a sense of resentment towards President Karzai’s foreign-funded government, as

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well as the NATO-led forces and the Western employees (Anonymous 2009, 21). There may also be a perception by the Afghanis that the current Karzai government is only in place through the funding of the infidels and is therefore no better than the foreign endorsed governments who attempted to rule Afghanistan in the past. Perhaps the Afghanis could learn from the oblast style of governance that is currently used in Russia. There are local judicial, military, and economic outposts in each oblast that report to the centralized oblast in Moscow. However, each of the local leaders in the oblast comes from that community. It is in this way that Russia has largely been able to weather the instability of the post-Soviet collapse and continue to provide education and health care for its people, as well as stability. As an observer, this much is clear, Afghanistan cannot be allowed to descend into a Taliban-run safe haven for terrorism again. It is this author’s sincerest desire that diplomacy and postWorld War II Marshall-style state assistance be given their fullest chance to come to fruition and bring Afghanistan into the twenty-first century with all the amenities that Afghanistan’s neighbors have and more of the stability that the Afghan people deserve after almost two centuries at war.

Notes 1 http://www.lamp-method.org/2.html [accessed 28 July 2008]. 2 http://www.lamp-method.org/ [accessed 28 July 2008]. 3 MacAskill, Ewen and Simon Tisdall, “White House shifts Afghanistan strategy towards talks with Taliban.” The Guardian. July 19, 2010. http://www. guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/19/obama-afghanistan-strategy-taliban-negotiate [accessed July 24, 2010]. 4 Watt, Nicholas, “This is a war of necessity, David Cameron tells troops in Afghanistan.” The Guardian. June 11, 2010. http://www.guardian.co.uk/ politics/2010/jun/11/david-cameron-troops-afghanistan [accessed July 28, 2010]. 5 Boone, Jon, “Taliban talks: the obstacles to a peace deal in Afghanistan.” July 19, 2010. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/19/taliban-talks-obstaclespeace-deal-aghanistan [accessed July 24, 2010].

Sources Army Press (2004), Afghanistan National Human Development Report 2004. Security with a Human Face: Challenges and Responsibilities. Islamabad: Army Press. Anonymous (2009), “From insurgency to insurrection.” The Economist, Vol. 392, No. 8645.



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Ashby, Robin (2009), Pushtunwali – Afghanistan’s cultural background. http:// ukdf.blogspot.com/2009/03/pusthunwali-afghanistans-cultural.html [accessed July 19, 2010]. CIA (2010), The World Factbook, Afghanistan. CIA. https://www.cia.gov/library/ publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html [accessed July 22, 2010]. CNN.com. Afghanistan’s ethnic diversity. http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/ asiapcf/08/17/afghanistan.ethnic.groups/index.html [accessed June 2, 2010]. Collins, Catherine and Ashraf Ali (2010), “Financing the Taliban.” New America Foundation. http://www.newamerica.net/publications/policy/financing_the_ taliban [accessed July 20, 2010]. Curtis, Lisa and James Phillips (2007), “Revitalizing U.S. Efforts in Afghanistan.” The Heritage Foundation, 15 (October). http://www.heritage.org/research/ middleeast/bg2076.cfm [accessed June 10, 2010]. Ewans, Martin (2002), Afghanistan: A Short History of Its People and Politics. New York: Harper Perennial. Gohari, M.J., (1999), The Taliban Ascent to Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Goodson, Larry (2001), Afghanistan’s Endless War. Washington, DC: University of Washington Press. Hopkirk, Peter (1990), The Great Game. New York: Kodansha International. Jones, Seth (2008), Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation. Kelly, Mary Louis and Melissa Block (2007), “CIA Chief Says Al-Qaida is Plotting Attack on U.S.” NPR. 7, September 7. http://www.npr.org/templates/ story/story.php?storyId=14248784 [accessed July 18, 2010]. Lockwood, Jonathan S (2010), LAMP. http://www.lamp-method.org [accessed July 10, 2010]. Rasanayagam, Angelo (2005), Afghanistan. London: I.B. Tauris. Rashid, Ahmed (2000), Taliban. New Haven, CO: Yale University Press. Scheuer, Michael. 2005. “‘The Pious Caliphate Will Start From Afghanistan’: Is al-Qaeda’s Long-Held Afghan Strategy Now Unfolding?” Unmasking Terror: A Global Review of Terrorist Activities. The Jamestown Foundation. 24 June. —2006. Through Our Enemies’ Eyes. Washington, DC: Potomac Books Inc. Stewart, Rory (2008), “How to Save Afghanistan.” TIME, July 28, 33. Tanner, Stephen. 2009. “Indomitable Afghanistan.” Military History, August/ September, 26–35. Tanner, Stephen (2002), Afghanistan: A Military History From Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban. Cambridge, MA.: Da Capo Press. “Unfinished Business in Afghanistan Warlordism, Reconstruction, and Ethnic Harmony.” United States Institute of Peace. Special Report 105. April 2003. http://www.usip.org [accessed June 10, 2010]. Weinbaum, Marvin G (2006), Afghanistan and Its Neighbors: An Ever Dangerous Neighborhood. United States Institute of Peace Special Report 162, June. Weiner, Tim (2001), “A Nation Challenged: The Leader – Man in the News, Seizing the Prophet’s Mantle: Muhammad Omar.” New York Times, 7 December. http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/07/world/nation-challengedleader-man-seizing-prophet-s-mantle-muhammad-omar.html [accessed June 10, 2010].

CHAPTER SIX

Candidate moves in the Levant: An analysis of the region’s geostrategic future using the LAMP method “Our primary assumption in our fight against Israel states that the Zionist entity is aggressive from its inception, and built on lands wrested from their owners, at the expense of the rights of the Muslim people. Therefore our struggle will end only when this entity is obliterated. We recognize no treaty with it, no cease fire, and no peace agreements, whether separate or consolidated.” “HEZBOLLAH PROGRAM,” 1988 (SHEIKH FADLALLAH?)

Author’s Note:  This paper by Mr Nicholas Lusas was originally written as his term paper requirement for my course in Analytic Methods at American Military University. It has been edited to remove duplicative discussion of the LAMP.

Introduction The conflict between Israel and its neighbors has been one of the defining conflicts of the last 70 years. The history of the state of Israel began inauspiciously in 1948 as the fledgling nation’s Arab neighbors declared war

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and invaded on the very date of the nation’s formation. Since then, the relationship between Israel and its neighbors has been contentious, and tens of thousands have been killed in the wars that ensued after 1948. The first stages of the conflict were carried out by nation-states. Nations such as Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Morocco participated in a series of wars in an attempt to destroy the Israeli government. These wars against Israel proved disastrous for the Arab states, despite Soviet sponsorship, superior numbers, and even tactical surprise in 1973. The war in June 1967 resulted in Israel obtaining the entire Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. It also marked the beginning of a shift in the Arab strategy against the Jewish state. The Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, in particular, gave prominence to the Palestinian Liberation Organization, founded in 1964 by the Arab League. Yasser Arafat’s chairmanship of the PLO defined the movement as the chief non-state opposition to Israel, bolstered by Arafat’s Fatah militia. As the PLO softened its stance vis-à-vis Israel in the years preceding the Oslo Accords, other Palestinian groups emerged to take on a more militant role against Israel, such as Gaza-based Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Fatah’s operations moved from Jordan to Lebanon during the 1970s. The frequent attacks from Lebanon sparked an Israeli invasion in 1982, the repercussions of which are still felt today. Fatah and the PLO were successfully driven out of southern Lebanon, but a host of new militias emerged, the most significant of which is Hezbollah. Hezbollah was founded in the years following the Israeli invasion with the stated goal of driving Israel from Lebanon and establishing a stronger Islamic voice within Lebanon ([Sheikh Fadlallah?] 1988, under “The Necessity for the Destruction of Israel”). The Israeli government authorized a partial withdrawal from Lebanon but maintained forces in a “security zone” that spread out across southern Lebanon. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) found themselves constantly besieged by Hezbollah forces throughout the duration of their deployment, and in 2000, Prime Minister Ehud Barak authorized full Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. After Israeli withdrawal and UN certification, Hezbollah’s primary raison d’être vanished. Israel had successfully been driven out of Lebanon. It was at this time that a focus on “liberating Palestine” became a focus of Hezbollah rhetoric against Israel, and Hezbollah continued to amass arms for a future conflict with Israel (Wachter 2002, 2). That conflict erupted in 2006 after a Hezbollah cross-border raid resulted in the capture of two IDF soldiers. The Israeli response followed quickly, and produced devastating effects on southern Lebanon, but the 33-day war against Hezbollah failed to recover the soldiers. Despite sentiments that Israel lost the war, Hezbollah suffered significant losses in both manpower and goodwill among the Lebanese public. Extensive recovery



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efforts revealed significant damage to the Lebanese infrastructure, for which many Lebanese held Hezbollah responsible (Amnesty International 2006). Hezbollah’s struggle against Israel and its allies has not been limited to the battlefield. The FBI has named Hezbollah as the chief suspect in the 1983 Marine Barracks bombing in Beirut that left 283 Marines dead (Federal Bureau of Investigation 2005). The Argentine government has accused Hezbollah of a series of bombings against Israeli and Jewish targets in Buenos Aires in 1992 and 1994 that left 114 dead (BBC News B 2006). This conflict has a great deal of significance to the world at large. Of Israel’s adversaries in the Arab world, only Hezbollah has both the willingness and ability to fight Israel for a protracted length of time. The conflict acts as perhaps the most destabilizing element in the Middle East, owing to the high probability of renewed hostilities. The 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah drove gas and oil prices up to record highs as speculators grew concerned that the conflict might entice oil suppliers in the Arab world to crimp output in an attempt to pressure the United States to reign in Israel (see Figure 6.1 below). The conflict is disruptive to American efforts at rapprochement with Iran, who uses Hezbollah as a means to expand its influence in the Middle East and remains the group’s chief sponsor. Renewed conflict between Hezbollah and Israel could further galvanize Arab opinion against Israel and the United States, the latter of which is still perceived as the enabler of the former. During the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, crude oil prices rose to then-record highs and finally abated in the days following the end of hostilities in August. Average prices for a gallon of unleaded gasoline also reached highs that were just shy of the record high prices set in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005.

72 Month avarage retail price chart

Regular Gas Price (US $/G) 8.72 7.99 7.26 6.53 6.81 6.08 4.35 3.62 2.89 2.16 1.43

Crude oil USA Average

7/16 5/2 2/15 12/2 9/16 7/3 4/18 2/2 11/19 9/4 6/21 4/8 1/20 11/6 8/22 6/8 3/24 1/8 10/24 8/9 5/26 3/11 12/26 10/11 7/27 5/13 2/27 12/14 9/29 7/15

Crude oil $US/barrel 146.39 134.15 121.91 109.67 97.43 85.19 72.96 60.72 48.48 36.24 24.00

2003

2004

2005

2006 Date (Month/Day)

FIGURE 6.1  72 month average retail price chart

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The possibility of war between Hezbollah and Israel is of keen interest to the global community, but Israel, the United States, and Lebanon in particular. These three nations are more significantly impacted by the prospects for another war than any other nation. Predicting possible responses by these nations to Hezbollah’s actions serves as a capable predictor of the actions that Hezbollah might take and should give an indication of the designs that Hezbollah may have within Lebanon itself after its March 8 Coalition failed to win a parliamentary majority during the June 2009 election (Dickey 2009).

Literature review There is a wealth of current information about Hezbollah and Israel’s conflict, owing in large part to the dramatic nature of the 2006 conflict. The vast majority of the English-language literature is written from the perspective of Western authors, and Israelis in particular. Despite the Western authorship, there is useful literature that addresses the conflict from the Hezbollah perspective, which is no doubt a result of Hezbollah’s extensive media efforts to legitimize its existence as a counterbalance to Israel’s power in the Levant. Literature that addresses the prospects for war between Israel and Hezbollah is abundant, but out of date in some respects. Much of this kind of literature was written in the aftermath of the assassination of Imad Mugniyeh, with the prediction that his death might be the kind of watershed event that would lead to imminent war between Hezbollah and Israel. Despite Hezbollah threats for revenge, there have been no retaliatory attacks. Rather, Hezbollah and Israel negotiated an exchange of prisoners and bodies in 2008, apparently diffusing the pressure that had existed in the aftermath of the Mugniyeh killing. The amount of literature regarding Hezbollah’s relationship with the Lebanese government is not as abundant as the literature addressing the conflict with Israel. Hezbollah’s attempts to legitimize itself as a member of the recognized Lebanese government are a relatively recent development, the future of which is uncertain. This development is regarded as tertiary to the group’s conflict with Israel and relationship with Iran, which explains the relative paucity of literature on the topic. The relationship between the United States and Hezbollah is scarcely documented. The United States regards the group as a terror group and has no official lines of communication open to them. While the United States shares a history with Hezbollah because of the 1983 bombing, the relationship between the two exists only through American influence on Israeli decision-making regarding potential conflict with the group. The



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United States has supported the March 14 Alliance, a political opponent of Hezbollah. Augustus Richard Norton (2007) takes perhaps one of the most comprehensive looks at Hezbollah. He argues that Hezbollah has become a fixture in Lebanon, and that the future of the country is irrevocably connected to the group. His extensively researched work chronicles the formation of Hezbollah during the tumultuous Lebanese civil war in the 1980s, and relates the developments within the group through the months following the end of the 2006 war with Israel. A new afterword comments on the events of early 2008, including the assassination of Imad Mugniyeh, the May 2008 clashes between Hezbollah and the Lebanese government, and the implications of the Doha Agreement. He uses primarily qualitative research methods including personal interviews with members of Hezbollah, its supporters, and other key figures within Lebanon, which is complimented by research from other scholarly sources. Norton states that “the threat of a new war cannot be ignored, even if either Israel nor Hezbollah seem particularly anxious for it to erupt” (Norton 2007, 172). Norton’s work is remarkably balanced despite the Western origin of the author, and his experience as a military observer in Lebanon and frequent visitor to Lebanon, when combined with his extensive research, lend his work a considerable amount of authority. Paul Salem elucidates the situation in the weeks following the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah. He argues that the probability for renewed war is predicated on the extent of Lebanon’s recovery from the war in 2006. Interestingly, he notes that this war ended with the signing of a diplomatic resolution rather than simple military disengagement, which is a contrast to the two previous Israeli actions in Lebanon. Salem addresses the perceptions of regional players Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Iran, and also the United States. In his analysis, he chooses to frame the 2006 war and prospects for future hostilities through the lens of the destruction caused to Lebanon during a fullscale invasion. In doing so, he is strongly implying that Lebanon’s recovery from this destruction will play a significant role in the potential for new war to erupt. Despite the extensive damage to Lebanon, Salem is optimistic in his article that Lebanon will be able to overcome its predicament. Antony T. Sullivan (2008) writes an article that aspires to provide a picture of the geostrategic condition in the Levant. He argues that Hezbollah is a key destabilizing factor in the region and that the group’s rearmament bodes ill for prospects of peace in the future, stating that the group has surpassed the capabilities it possessed during the 2006 war with Israel (Sullivan 2008, 126). Sullivan argues that renewed hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah will destabilize the Middle East, potentially to the point where the war takes on wider, regional dimensions (Sullivan 2008, 132). Sullivan’s article is the result of research and interviews with “geostrategic players inside and outside of Lebanon” (Sullivan 2008, 132).

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Shmuel Bar (2007) focuses his analysis of the conflict on the role that deterrence will play in the strategic decision-making of Israel and Hezbollah. Bar asserts that the 2006 war erupted due to a failure, or negligence, by Israel to effectively communicate the “rules of the game” (Bar 2007, 487). He argues that Hezbollah received no signals that would have alerted them to the fact that the scope of the July 12, 2006 raid was beyond that which Israel would tolerate. He mentions Hassan Nasrallah’s now well-known position that he would not have authorized the attack had he been aware of the potential consequences. He argues that the 2006 war represented an unusual level of escalation in the conflict and implies low probability to the occurrence of another conflict on such a massive scale. Bar’s article is the result of scholarly research and intuitive analysis, and provides a perspective on the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah that is uncommon in the existing literature on this topic. Or Honig (2007) addresses the Israeli policy of deterrence. He gives a brief history of the concept as developed by David Ben-Gurion, and chronicles the changes in the doctrine as the Israeli defense establishment learned from the experiences of decades of both large-scale conventional war and low-intensity conflict. He divides the evolution of Israel’s deterrence doctrine into three distinct periods, which are demarcated by the founding of the state of Israel, the signing of the Oslo Accords, and the 2006 war with Hezbollah. He argues that the Israeli policy of restraint during the 1990s while pursuing a peace settlement with the Palestinians ultimately failed. He characterizes the Israeli response that led to the 2006 war as a watershed moment, signifying a shift in Israeli strategy back to the classic deterrence doctrine that exemplified Israeli military action before the 1990s. He calls Hezbollah’s attack that precipitated the 2006 war a “miscalculation” by Nasrallah (Honig 2007, 70). Honig insists that both Israel and the United States have lessons to learn from the “failure of Western restraint on Hezbollah,” essentially endorsing strong responses by Israel and the United States to Hezbollah’s provocations (Honig 2007, 71). He recommends that Israel continue its policy of deterrence, but warns that, If deterrence is to work, though, Israeli politicians must make a sustained rather than episodic commitment to the doctrine. A disproportionate response to terror should be the rule, not the exception. (Honig 2007, 71) Honig’s article is unique among the majority of literature on this topic because of its relatively unflinching advocacy of a strategic stance that is likely to result in another large-scale conflict. Much of the literature on this topic makes the rather grim prediction that renewed hostilities are inevitable. Though much of the literature on the topic makes general predictions of imminent war between Israel and



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Hezbollah, predictions about how a new war would come about are scarce. Moreover, predictions about exactly what a new war might look like and the consequences of such a war are also very scarce. For this reason, this analysis will focus on the potential causes for war and also seek to analyze the consequences of the future decisions by Hezbollah, Israel, the United States, and Lebanon. This type of analysis will require a methodology that emphasizes the analysis of the decisions that these actors make and their consequences for not only the future but also the decision-making process of other actors. This use of the LAMP to mitigate bias will affect the author’s choice of terms when referring to past conflicts. One dynamic of the polarities that exist within the Middle East is the frequent practice of both sides in using a different name for a given conflict. For example, the war in 2006 between Israel and Hezbollah is called by different names in Lebanon and Israel. In Lebanon, this war is referred to as the “July War,” and in Israel it is called the “Second Lebanon War.” Similar naming discrepancies occur when referring to the Israeli–Arab wars in 1948, 1967, and 1973. In an effort to demonstrate impartiality, these wars will simply be referred to by the year in which the war occurred. For example, the war in 2006 will simply be referred to as such or as “the 2006 war.” Fortunately, there are no cases in this analysis during which there were two relevant wars in a given year. However, the context of the war will be made apparent regardless of this and all efforts have been made to ensure clarity while maintaining impartiality in the terminology used in this analysis.

Actors and perceptions While the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah is of interest to the world as a whole due to the wide repercussions of the conflict, there are four actors that are most affected by the course the conflict may take in the future. Hezbollah, Israel, the United States, and Lebanon are the actors whose perceptions and decisions will directly affect the future of the conflict. Studying and understanding the perceptions of each actor will provide insight into how the prospects for war or peace affect them and how their decision-making process is shaped by these perceptions and the events that unfold. Each actor’s perceptions will be analyzed through the lens of three areas of consideration, which in this analysis are derived from each actor’s political, economic, and security situation. Social considerations directly affect the politics and security of each actor and the implications of social sentiment will be addressed as it relates to those considerations. Including social considerations as a separate element would provide little additional

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utility to the study. The same applies to religious considerations, which are obviously of immense importance in its own regard in the Middle East, but merely an element, no matter how significant, in the wider political and security considerations already outlined. Despite the intense media and anecdotal focus on the religious background of the conflict, this study has resisted the impulse to include these as individual considerations that override or share equal an equal level of consideration with the more pragmatic political, economic, and security considerations of each actor.

Hezbollah The LAMP method specifically calls for national actors in its analysis. Hezbollah presents an interesting dilemma in this regard because it is not recognized by any organization as a national entity. However, Hezbollah does possess many of the elements of a national actor. The group maintains a standing military, with many times more that number of reserves available for combat if required (Global Security A). The group has administrative divisions that provide social programs, health facilities, and education facilities for significant portions of the Lebanese population, particularly in the southern part of the country. The group has also taken a proactive posture in rebuilding parts of Lebanon devastated by the 2006 war with Israel. In these regards, Hezbollah actually provides many services to the people of Lebanon that the Lebanese government has difficulty providing, including security in the southern and Bekaa Valley regions of Lebanon. These characteristics have led observers in Israel and the United States to call Hezbollah a “state within a state,” and serve to separate the group from other groups that are merely military in nature, such as al-Qaeda, Abu Sayyaf, and Islamic Jihad (Magouirk 2008, 358). It is for this reason that Hezbollah represents a viable group for consideration as a national actor for the purposes of the LAMP method.

Political situation Despite Hezbollah’s perception as a military group first and foremost, the group has struggled to attain and maintain political legitimacy within Lebanon. The group first participated in Lebanese elections in 1992, winning 12 seats out of 128 in the parliament (Norton 2007, 101). Hezbollah has participated in each election since and currently holds 12 seats within the parliament following the June 2009 elections, having lost two seats since the 2005 elections. Despite the relatively low percentage of seats within the parliament, Hezbollah is a very powerful group in Lebanese politics. This is partly



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a result of the group’s military power and because the group enjoys popularity that transcends the traditional sectarian divides in Lebanon. The group’s participation in the Lebanese political process has not precipitated a move to disarm its militia as the rival Amal movement has done. Hezbollah regards itself as the defender of Lebanon against Israel, and has used this pretense to maintain its vast arsenal of weapons. Hezbollah is a leading member of the March 8 Coalition, which is the antagonist to the Western-leaning March 14 Alliance. The March 8 Coalition was formed during the Cedar Revolution to counteract the rising anti-Syrian sentiment in Lebanon following the assassination of outspoken Syrian critic Rafik Hariri. The Coalition supports greater Syrian influence in Lebanon, and despite winning the popular vote in Lebanon, did not obtain a majority in the Lebanese parliament in the June 2009 elections. This development has been perceived as a victory for the March 14 Alliance in Western circles, but the results support the idea that popular sentiment in Lebanon resides with Hezbollah and the March 8 Coalition. Hezbollah was founded with aid from Iran, and retains strong connections to Tehran. The group’s initial membership trained under Iranian auspices (Nasr 2007, 115). The Hezbollah chain of command recognizes the Supreme Leader of Iran as the ultimate leader of the group, though the Lebanon-based Shura oversees the group’s day-to-day activities. Few decisions are actually made or approved by the Iranian Supreme Leader and these are generally limited to military decisions regarding Hezbollah engagement with Israel (Hamzeh 1993). Iran supplies Hezbollah with financial and military support in the form of advanced weaponry. Hezbollah maintains strong ties to Syria, a relationship that dates to the days of heavy Syrian influence in Lebanon during the 1980s. Since the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005, the balance of power in the relationship has tipped in favor of Hezbollah. This development stems in part from Syria’s inability to directly affect Lebanese affairs as effectively as it had in the past. The close relationship between Damascus and Hezbollah allows the former to wield greater influence in Lebanon through the increasing power of the latter. Hezbollah’s upper hand in the relationship stems perhaps more poignantly from the insecurity of Bashar al-Assad, whose hold on power is more tenuous than that of his late father, Hafez. His support of Hezbollah enables him to retain legitimacy as the ruler of Syria through the perception that he is supporting Islamist causes (Bar 2007, 471). Hezbollah’s status as a Shia party with a well-known connection to Iran and Syria has not stymied the group’s popularity with other religious groups in Lebanon, the Christians and Druze in particular. This is the result of the group’s more inclusive outlook that mirrors that of Khomeini rather closely, but is also the result of a pragmatic approach by the group that reflects the reality of Lebanese pluralism (Nasr 2007, 137). The group’s

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steadfast devotion to protecting Lebanese territorial integrity in the face of Israeli occupation before 2000, and invasion in 2006, has endeared them to a significant and growing portion of the Lebanese population.

Economic situation Hezbollah receives the lion’s share of its funding from Iran. The developments in Iran following the June 2009 elections could threaten the flow of money and military support, particularly if the developments in Iran lead to the eventual overthrow of the Islamic regime. Despite Tehran’s success in quelling the protests in the streets, popular sentiment appears to have irrevocably turned against the regime in a scene reminiscent of the months preceding the overthrow of the Shah. However, despite these developments, the flow of aid from Iran to Hezbollah remains steady as of July 2009. Hezbollah has invested the aid in diverse ways, such as in social programs and health facilities for Lebanese citizens who would otherwise not have access to the level of care that Hezbollah’s facilities provide. The group followed through on its promise after the 2006 war to take on a lion’s share of the financial burden for the rebuilding and recovery process (Siegel and Watson 2006). The greatest threat to Hezbollah’s economic position would be a cut-off in the flow of aid from Iran. While this development is not currently in the offing, growing revolutionary sentiment in Iran poses a significant threat to Hezbollah’s economic interest. While donations from wealthy sympathizers in the Muslim world can fill some of the gap that would be left without Iranian funding, it is likely to fall far short of meeting Hezbollah’s needs for retention of its growing social responsibilities and military expansion.

Security situation The most visible aspect of Hezbollah to observers outside Lebanon is its military wing, Al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya, or “The Islamic Resistance.” The name of the military underscores its raison d’être. The group’s founding purpose and continued mission is to confront and defeat the nation of Israel in a bid to “liberate Palestine” in accordance with its mission statement released in 1988 ([Sheikh Fadlallah?] “The Necessity for the Destruction of Israel” ). To this end, Hezbollah has obtained a significant arsenal of weapons. The group allegedly maintains an arsenal of rockets, including tens of thousands of Katyusha rockets, as well as Iranian mid- and long-range missiles such as the Fajr-3 and Zelzal missiles, the latter of which are capable of striking deep into Israeli territory, including urban centers such as Tel Aviv (Rao 2006). The group has significant anti-tank capabilities, possessing anti-tank



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weaponry such as the AT-3 Sagger and Kornet anti-tank rockets, which performed relatively well against the state-of-the-art Merkava IV (MkIV) Israeli Main Battle Tank (MBT) during the 2006 war (Stratfor 2006). Hezbollah relies on a strategy of mutual deterrence with Israel. Israel’s immense military power and ability to deliver a punishing blow to Lebanon represents the chief method of deterrence for Israel. Hezbollah’s deterrence resides primarily in its ability to threaten Israeli population centers with its vast rocket arsenal. This strategy proved dramatically successful during the 2006 war, as Hezbollah’s rocket barrage against Israel effectively shut down the northern third of the country throughout the duration of the 33-day conflict. Hezbollah’s other avenue for deterrence lies in the group’s threats to carry out terror attacks against Israeli and Jewish targets around the world. The successful bombing of Jewish targets in Argentina in 1992 and 1994 enhances these threats and provides the locus for this kind of deterrence. Hezbollah’s military strategy against Israel is best determined by the actions the group has taken in the past to successfully engage Israel. The theory is that the group would again use the methods that have proven successful until the IDF can demonstrate the ability to defeat these measures. Hezbollah’s engagement of Israeli forces in the years preceding the Israeli withdrawal in 2000 and in 2006 provides the greatest insight into the group’s methods for conducting future wars against Israel. Hezbollah retains a two-tiered strategy for engaging Israel. One tier of the strategy is applied to fighting within Lebanon, and the other is applied to Hezbollah’s media strategy. The strategy for engaging IDF forces within Lebanon appears to focus on drawing IDF soldiers into urban areas where the potential for IDF casualties increases dramatically. Urban areas further provide Hezbollah with an opportunity to kidnap IDF soldiers to use as bargaining chips in prisoner exchanges not unlike the exchange that occurred in 2008. As IDF casualties mount, the hope is that the war would become less popular among the Israeli public who would demand a quick end to the conflict. The media strategy against Israel during a war is controversial and hotly disputed. This is a topic with ample possibility to introduce bias. Despite this, there are strong indications that Hezbollah’s strategy is to pursue a media strategy in an attempt to turn global opinion against Israeli action and put pressure on Israel to abandon its assault on Hezbollah. The strategy involves placing fighters and targets in urban areas in an effort to either deter Israeli engagement or invite Israeli fire that might inadvertently result in civilian casualties, producing a media victory for Hezbollah by way of Israeli culpability in the death of innocent civilians. While this strategy appears to have been successful in turning global sentiment against Israel, there is potential that such a strategy could backfire on Hezbollah if incontrovertible proof of the group’s intentions were to come to light. Israel’s

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often-ineffective attempts to defend its actions have yet to mitigate the effectiveness of this strategy. Hezbollah does not have illusions that its military power can surpass or even match that of Israel. Instead, the group operates on the premise that it has sufficient military power to suppress Israel’s appetite for a protracted war in such a way as to make Israeli action against Hezbollah unlikely (Bar 2007, 471). The group’s steadfast refusal to disarm stems from the perception that only with a well-armed militia in southern Lebanon can the nation hope to retain its territorial integrity against the powerful IDF.

Israel Israel is an obvious choice for inclusion in this analysis. Israel is Hezbollah’s primary adversary, and Hezbollah represents a significant strategic threat to Israel. The nation’s very existence provides Hezbollah with the grounds for the maintenance of its military wing. Israel and Hezbollah have fought each other for more than 15 years in a low-intensity combat situation until the IDF withdrawal from Israel’s self-described Security Zone in southern Lebanon in 2000. The war in 2006 with Hezbollah represents one of the largest Israeli military operations in the last 25 years. No predictive analysis of Hezbollah’s decision-making process would be considered valid without a study of Israel’s perceptions and reactions to Hezbollah’s strategic and tactical maneuvers.

Political situation Israel’s political leadership has undergone significant change over the last ten years as Israelis struggle to find the appropriate response to the changing security situation in the country. The optimistic attitudes that prevailed in the 1990s as the nation seemingly moved toward a peaceful coexistence with its Palestinian neighbors was shattered in 2000 after the Camp David summit ended with no agreement and triggered the second Palestinian Intifada. The political fallout from this development was the marginalization of the Labor party, which had advocated a dovish approach toward the Palestinians, in favor of the right-leaning and more hawkish Likud party. In the 2009 general elections, the Labor party finished fourth among all parties, while the right-wing Likud and Yisrael Beitenu parties achieved significant gains in the Knesset (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009). Israeli commentator Gil Troy attributes this shift in attitude to growing Israeli cynicism regarding Palestinian and Hezbollah provocations, which instead of softening Israeli resolve have had the reverse effect, pushing Israelis toward the right (Troy 2009).



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The 2006 war with Lebanon had profound effects on the political make-up of the Israeli leadership, which at the time was dominated by the center-right Kadima party. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, who enjoyed support for his decision to go to war, achieved anemic approval ratings that hovered near 3 percent in the months following the war (Time 2007). The Winograd Report, which provided a critique of the Israeli leadership during the war, placed the blame for the war’s shortcomings on the shoulders of Olmert, IDF Chief of Staff General Dan Halutz, and Defense Minister Amir Peretz (Haaretz 2007). All found their political careers utterly derelict. Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni attempted to distance herself from the other maligned members of the government, with limited success. Her run for Prime Minister in 2009 fell short, narrowly losing to Likud candidate and former Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu. Her association with the 2006 war and the Kadima party undermined her defense credentials at a time when Israel was looking for a solution to the many threats to Israel’s security. The voting pattern of the 2009 election appears to indicate that the Israeli populace would support a harder line on the Israeli security posture. Israel has official relations with only two Arab nations: Jordan and Egypt. Even the relationship between Israel and these two nations have proved tumultuous at times, and neither head of state has visited Israel. Some Arab nations have maintained communications with Israel on unofficial channels, but normalization of relations between Israel and the Arab world has not yet occurred. Israel’s relationship with the European Union is cordial but, at times, contentious. France and Spain are frequent critics of Israeli policy, while nations such as Germany and Great Britain are not nearly as critical of Israel. The concerns of European nations stem chiefly from perceptions that Israel employs “disproportionate response” when responding to Palestinian or Hezbollah provocations. The European Union firmly objects to the Israeli blockade of Gaza, and the issue has become a stumbling block to warmer relations between the two. Israel’s chief allies are the United States and India. Of these two, Israel has enjoyed a fuller and more fruitful relationship with the United States, who has supplied aid, military supplies, and moral support at a higher level than any other nation since the war in June 1967. Despite these close relations, Israeli perceptions of the alliance with the United States have grown pessimistic during the first months of the administration of President Barack Obama. Contention centers on growing American insistence that Israel abandon further construction of settlements in the West Bank. The Israeli perception is that the United States is demanding that Israel take more steps toward peace than it is willing to ask of the Palestinians. Obama’s trip to the Middle East involved a keynote speech in Cairo but no visit to Israel, which has annoyed and disturbed Israeli observers. Members of the Likud party called on members of their party to boycott a traditional

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July 4 celebration in Jerusalem as a show of frustration with American policy. Israel’s relationship with India existed only in an informal capacity until 1992. Since then, Israel has surpassed Russia as the chief arms supplier to India, and the two nations have cooperated on a joint space program (BBC News C 2008). India and Israel share a common enemy in the Islamist threat, and have cooperated on counter-terror training and the sharing of intelligence (India Defence 2008). The relationship between the two nations should continue to solidify in the future, particularly if Israeli perceptions regarding the alliance with the United States continue to sour.

Economic situation Israel’s economy is strongly tied to the Western markets and has suffered as a result of the global recession. Israel’s tourism industry, a key pillar of the Israeli economy, has suffered since the start of the second Intifada in 2000 and has never fully recovered. The 2006 war with Hezbollah only exacerbated concerns that tourists could be trapped in a dangerous situation in what is perceived as a volatile region. As of the summer 2009, Israel remains embroiled in a water crisis due to a severe drought. Desalination plants along the Mediterranean now account for 15 percent of Israel’s drinking water production and this number is expected to increase as the water levels decrease in the Sea of Galilee (Mizroch 2008). The population of Israel is projected to increase due to both immigration and the growing Arab population, compounding the problem for the foreseeable future. The water crisis underscores the Israeli presence on the Golan Heights, which prevents Syria from damming off the run-off from Mount Hermon, which supplies the water for the Sea of Galilee (Eshel 2008). As long as the water crisis remains a priority in Israel, the country is unlikely to consider any peace deal with Syria that includes the hand-over of the disputed territory. Israel receives financial aid from the United States. The aid amount is significant and constitutes 3 percent of the Israeli GDP (Feith 2003). During his first term as Prime Minister during the late 1990s, Netanyahu attempted to push through legislation to reduce the American contribution and steadily phase it out (Feith 2003). However, this initiative did not survive his term as Prime Minister, and Olmert actually pushed for increased aid during his term as Prime Minister (Reuters UK 2007). Approximately $2 billion of the American aid to Israel is earmarked for expenditure on weapons manufactured within the United States (Feith 2003). Israel still retains its reputation as a high-tech center. Israeli economic connections with the United States have been further strengthened by Israeli–American cooperation on high-tech projects in the computer science



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field and medical profession in particular. Israeli exports of high-tech equipment and knowledge are a significant boon to the Israeli economy. Israeli dependence on foreign oil remains high, but the nation is taking steps to curb its dependence on foreign energy. Renault and Nissan have partnered a project to introduce an all-electric-powered car into the Israeli market by 2010. The plan calls for the introduction of the vehicle as well as infrastructure to make the vehicle viable for widespread use throughout the country, including battery depots and charging stations at various locations throughout Israel. The project’s development is in the intermediate stages (Nissan 2008). If Israel is able to implement this vision, it will lend the nation considerably more flexibility in its decision-making process on matters of national security.

Security situation Israel possesses the most powerful indigenous military in the Middle East. The military has held the reputation of invincibility when facing conventional Arab armies due, in large part, to Israel’s stunning victory over several Arab armies in 1967. Arab attempts to surprise Israel in 1973 achieved small gains that were later mitigated by the IDF counter-offensive. The IDF possesses state-of-the-art equipment, the majority of which is either indigenous or comes from the United States. The Israel Air Force (IAF) consists primarily of United States-produced aircraft augmented with Israeli targeting and navigation systems (Global Security B). IAF pilots are highly regarded internationally and enjoy the perception of invincibility, a perception that also has roots in the 1967 war. IAF pilots are widely regarded as being among the best in the world. The IDF armored corps largely consists of indigenous tanks or retro-fitted tanks that were captured in previous wars with Soviet-sponsored Arab states. The current Israeli MBT is the MkIV, an indigenous design that emphasizes crew survivability in the event that the tank is hit by rocket fire (Hughes 2006). The performance of the MkIV in 2006 was generally good despite some stiff Hezbollah resistance, with a few MkIV tanks lost to Hezbollah rocket fire. In a country that cannot tolerate excessive attrition, the survivability of the MkIV provides commanders, soldiers, and the Israeli public with assurance that casualties will be further decreased in future designs. Israel possesses extensive collections capability through its airborne and satellite reconnaissance programs. This capability affords IDF commanders the capability of being able to spot enemy positions and accurately allocate IDF resources on the battlefield. This collections capability affords IAF planners the ability to plan out air missions and campaign strategy well in advance of the actual renewal of hostilities, permitting the IAF to spring into action quickly. The IAF demonstrated this ability in the early hours of

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the 2006 war, hitting key targets in Lebanon within hours of the Hezbollah ambush on and kidnapping of IDF soldiers. Despite the IDF’s extensive capabilities, the military has not found a satisfactory way to address indiscriminate rocket fire. Hezbollah fired rockets indiscriminately into Israel during each day of the 33-day conflict, inflicting minimal damage, but having a tremendous psychological impact on Israeli residents in the northern part of the country. Hamas has made use of indigenously produced Qassam rockets to achieve the same affect on Israeli towns near Gaza, particularly Sderot. The IDF’s inability to halt the rocket fire coming from either group has unnerved the Israeli public and provides both Hezbollah and Hamas with a way of attacking Israel that is effective and inexpensive. The rocket fire notwithstanding, the IDF performance in the 2006 war against Hezbollah was lackluster. While Israel formed the Winograd Commission to investigate the war, Hezbollah claimed to have shattered the myth of IDF invincibility through its self-described “divine victory” (MSNBC 2006). The psychological impact of this development has had a lasting effect on the Israeli public, though the generally solid performance of the IDF in the war against Hamas in December 2008 and January 2009 mitigated many concerns about the IDF’s fighting capability. Though the IDF suffered a blow to its reputation, the Israeli public remains confident that the IDF has been able to correct its shortcomings. The election of Netanyahu, who would ostensibly be more apt to put the IDF into action, underscores the renewed confidence that the Israeli public places in the IDF. Israel’s intelligence establishment has a reputation for excellence in both its collections and operations capabilities. While there is debate on the true nature of Israel’s intelligence capabilities, the counter-terror record is generally good. Recently, Azerbaijani intelligence helped uncover a Hezbollah plot to carry out a terror attack against a Jewish target in Baku, Azerbaijan (Trend News). The 2007 operation to destroy an alleged Syrian nuclear facility surprised many observers and is regarded as a success for Israeli intelligence and special forces (Sanger and Mazzetti 2007). Hezbollah has attributed the assassination of its commander Imad Mugniyeh to the Israeli intelligence agency Mossad. Despite the fact that Mossad has not claimed responsibility for the killing, the perception that Israeli intelligence is capable of carrying out such an operation demonstrates the confidence that both Israel and its adversaries place in the capabilities of Israeli intelligence. Israel depends on a policy of strategic deterrence. David Ben-Gurion, who believed that Israel could not survive a war of attrition on its own soil, formulated this strategy in the days following the first Israeli–Arab war in 1948. He postulated that the best way to prevent a constant barrage of Arab assaults was to retaliate for attacks in such a way as to discourage further assaults against the Jewish state (Honig 2007, 63). To implement this strategy, the IDF has relied on a policy of disproportionate response to



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Arab attacks and provocations in an effort to reduce their likelihood in the future. Israel’s policy of nuclear ambiguity adds another dimension to its deterrence posture. Israel’s strategic deterrence doctrine has enjoyed a degree of success. The 2006 war’s affect on Israeli deterrence is difficult to determine. While the IDF’s performance in the war was lacking, the scope of the Israeli response surprised Hezbollah, and the group’s Secretary General, Hassan Nasrallah, commented that had he foreseen the response, he would not have authorized the attack that triggered the war (Naharnet 2006). Hezbollah’s disinclination to attack IDF forces in the first three years after the end of hostilities, coupled with the IDF’s show of force in Gaza in January 2009, indicate that Israel enjoys a at least a modicum of strategic deterrence.

United States The United States has retained a keen interest in the Middle East and Israel in particular since the Suez Canal crisis of 1956. The Soviet Union’s support for Arab governments during the 1960s compelled the United States to support Israel, as the lone democracy in the region. Since the 1960s, Israel has been the United States’ chief ally in the region, and American influence on the Israeli decision-making process has been significant, even if not always consistent. The United States and Hezbollah have a limited but bloody history. The 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, blamed on Hezbollah, spurred the departure of American forces from Lebanon. Hezbollah occupies a spot on the American list of terror groups, chiefly as a result of the 1983 bombing and 1994 bombings of Jewish targets in Argentina. American perceptions of the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah are significant. Because the United States designates Hezbollah as a terror group and enjoys a strong alliance with Israel, the United States naturally supports Israeli efforts to combat Hezbollah, but traditionally stops short of taking part in the action itself. Whether or not the United States supports Israeli action or is of the opinion that Hezbollah’s actions warrant a response plays a large role in whether or not Israel will go to war with Hezbollah. Hezbollah is likely to consider heavily the effect that their provocations and attacks have on American opinion, and are likely to carefully toe the line that determines American calls for restraint versus American endorsement of Israeli action.

Economic situation As of the summer of 2009, the United States is enduring the worst economic crisis in the nation’s history since the Great Depression. Unemployment

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numbers in July 2009 indicate that the recession is likely to continue for a lengthy amount of time. The American government has approved two separate stimulus packages since the start of the economic collapse in September 2008, with a total investment of over $1 trillion (Recovery. gov). The success of these measures is still unclear, but there is justifiable concern that if these stimulus packages fail to jumpstart the economy, then the American economy could fall farther into recession, perhaps sparking a prolonged economic depression. Exacerbating concerns about the economy are the unstable oil prices. Since reaching a high of $147 a barrel in July 2008, oil prices tumbled to lows of $33 a barrel in December 2008. However, between December and July 2009, oil prices have jumped back up to over $60 a barrel (see Figure 6.1 above). Instability in Iran failed to push prices higher, but a new war in the Middle East may put irresistible upward pressure on oil prices, which could further cripple the American economy and crimp any attempt at economic recovery. The United States has spent billions of dollars on wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and while there is a planned withdrawal from Iraq, American government investment in that country will probably continue. As the war in Afghanistan intensifies, the financial burden of conducting the war in Iraq may simply shift to Afghanistan rather than abate. As the American economy continues to decline, economic concerns are likely to weigh ever more heavily on American foreign policy decisions.

Political situation The American political scene has undergone significant changes in the last six years. Republican gains in the House and Senate in the 2002 mid-term elections have been reversed by the 2006 mid-term and 2008 general elections. The Democratic party enjoys a “filibuster-proof” majority in the Senate and a significant majority in Congress, and also control of the White House with the victory of Obama over Republican opponent John McCain in the presidential election. Obama set out his Middle East policy, which entails an emphasis on reconciliation with the Muslim world, whose perception of the United States has soured because of the Iraqi invasion and stalwart support for Israel. Naturally, Obama’s overtures to the Muslim world have alienated the nation’s Israeli allies, and Obama has had to find a way to strike a balance of reconciliation with the Muslim world and ensuring that Israel’s security needs are understood and met. Arab states and Muslims in general responded positively to Obama’s speech in Cairo on June 4, 2009 (Asharq Alawsat 2009). The American alliance with Israel, recent Israeli cynicism notwithstanding, has been strong for over 40 years. The United States and Israel



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share not only a common enemy in violent Islamism, but more importantly a shared democratic vision and tradition. In response to Israeli criticism that the United States is favoring Palestinian demands, Obama has reiterated that the United States takes interest in the security and well-being of Israel. Despite the small shift in American policy toward Israel, American perceptions of the Israeli–Arab conflict will continue to be shaped by what Israel and the United States have in common. In the event of a threat to Israeli security, Vice President Joe Biden has expressed the opinion that Israel has the “sovereign right” to act in the best interests of its national security, indicating at least tacit American support for a more assertive Israeli strategic posture, particularly with regard to Iran (Benhorin 2009). The United States’ strong support for Israel has enabled it to act as a mediator in the Middle East peace process. Though the United States is perceived across the Muslim world as having a strong bias toward Israel, the Palestinians recognize that the United States also has an interest in catering to its Arab allies and the ability to strongly influence Israeli decision-making to this end. As a result, the United States has taken the lead in trying to push for a settlement in the conflict between the Israelis and Arabs. Despite sometimes intense effort from the United States, peace has remained elusive, and doubts have emerged about the United States’ ability to broker agreements in the Middle East. Obama had indicated willingness to begin a process of rapprochement with Iran during the presidential campaign, and Iran may feel compelled to take advantage of the softer line from the United States and encourage Hezbollah to take a more aggressive stance against Israel, especially if it might deflect attention away from Iran’s continuing nuclear program. However, prospects for rapprochement with Iran dimmed in the aftermath of Iran’s controversial June 12 elections, during which Mahmoud Ahmadinejad won by an apparent two-to-one margin over reformist candidate Mir Hussein Mousavi (Al-Jazeera 2009). The regime’s brutal suppression of postelection protests and accusations of American interference sparked a war of words between Obama and Ahmadinejad (Kreiger and Amidi 2009). The perception that Obama is a dove is not necessarily accurate. During the presidential campaign, he expressed a willingness to take the fight against al-Qaeda and the Taliban into Pakistan if necessary, and American missile attacks on Pakistani territory in early 2009 confirmed his position (Mazzetti and Sanger 2009). While Obama is willing to withdraw from Iraq, he appears, at the same time, rather willing to use force to ensure the national security and interests of the United States. Despite the many concerns that the United States has in its foreign policy, the economy has captured the focus of the American public and its government. This development was a crucial factor in pushing the American vote away from Republican candidates, who are perceived as possessing stronger national security priorities. The Obama administration has passed

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a stimulus package, but worries that the administration is faltering in its handling of the economy have driven Obama’s approval ratings below 60 percent according to a Gallup poll (Gallup 2009).

Security situation As of July 2009, the United States is entangled in two wars, in Iraq and Afghanistan. While the United States military is in the midst of a phased withdrawal from Iraq, those resources may be allocated to the intensifying conflict in Afghanistan with a resurgent Taliban. The ability of the United States to withdraw from Iraq on a timely basis and confront the Taliban will determine the degree to which American forces are free to pursue action elsewhere to further the national security and interests of the United States. The conflict in Afghanistan has spilled into Pakistan, and Obama has made clear that Afghanistan must be a priority for allocation of the military (Cooper and Schmitt 2009). The American national security interest in the conflict with the Taliban is a result of the possibility that a Taliban take-over in Pakistan will result in nuclear weapons falling into the hands of an Islamist faction. The revival of al-Qaeda in the region is another major concern for the United States, amid fears that the revitalized group may attempt another attack on the continental United States, possibly with the use of a weapon of mass destruction (WMD). For this reason, this conflict will likely be considered a priority over any other conflict until the threat to American national security is mitigated. The United States possesses a military that is capable of meeting a variety of challenges. The American military remains the most potent in the world and is capable of quick deployment due, in large part, to the ability of naval carrier groups to move quickly to trouble spots around the world. The United States possesses many options to have military forces ready to respond to a Middle East crisis between Israel and Hezbollah, if necessary. The intelligence collection capabilities of the United States are unsurpassed. This affords American strategists the ability to detect indicators of enemy action quickly and either take appropriate action or alert allies to these developments as needed. American collection capabilities, image intelligence (IMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) in particular, provide the United States with the ability to logistically support any military action undertaken by an ally in a manner that is both significant and deniable. In the Middle East, such a capability is extremely useful if the United States wanted to aid Israel without utterly destroying its credibility as a mediator of negotiations. Following the 9/11 attacks, the United States has shifted many of its intelligence assets toward countering the terror threat to the country. The continued American pursuit of Osama Bin Laden and al-Qaeda underscores



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the American focus on mitigating the terror threat. Though Hezbollah has yet to attack American targets on American soil, the 1983 Marine barracks bombing remains etched in the minds of Americans. Any Hezbollah attack that directly affects Americans or American interests is sure to draw some kind of response from Washington. The United States would certainly have doubts about committing to another military operation while still deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan. The sheer costs of those operations make the opening of another war prohibitive, if not politically suicidal, in the current economic climate. As the Iraqi withdrawal draws toward completion, and if the military can make headway against the Taliban in Afghanistan, American options for engagement open up significantly. However, given the amount of war fatigue among the American public, it would likely have to take a direct attack against the United States or American interest to draw American into a full-scale attack against Hezbollah. Despite this, the United States may be enticed to assist Israel on some logistical level in the event of renewed hostilities, especially if there is an indication that Iran ordered Hezbollah to initiate hostilities.

Lebanon Lebanon will host any new conflict between Israel and Hezbollah. The nation certainly warrants analysis for this predictive study. However, Lebanon, as defined by this study, is not necessarily limited to within the borders of the state, or the entirety of the government, but rather the ruling coalition of the government, the March 14 Alliance and other parties that are not aligned with Hezbollah. Hezbollah is a member of the Lebanese government and, as such, would ostensibly be part of any analysis of the Lebanese government as a whole. Despite their presence in the government, Hezbollah does not act in concert with, or even with the tacit approval of, the Lebanese government. The decision-making processes of the two groups differ widely and each answer to a considerably different constituency, with Hezbollah answering primarily to Shias and Iran, and the government to a wide cross-section of Lebanese society as a whole. Simply analyzing the March 14 Alliance alone is not sufficient for the study, because the decision-making process of the government vis-à-vis Hezbollah also involve parties not aligned with the Alliance. For the purposes of this study, Lebanon includes the parts of the Lebanese government that include the March 14 Alliance, parties that are non-aligned with the March 8 Coalition, and the Lebanese public as a whole. This group is a valid choice for this analysis because their perceptions and decisions will have a profound impact on Hezbollah’s decision-making. Though Hezbollah is arguably the most powerful party within Lebanon, the group cannot ignore the aggregate voice and will of the various crosssections of Lebanese society and aspire to retain wide support. Hezbollah

150 THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

demonstrated their consideration for the wider Lebanese opinion in the weeks and months following the 2006 war by implementing an intense media campaign promoting their case for retaining arms and promoting their promise to aid in the rebuilding and recovery efforts in the country. Lebanon plays a significant part in Hezbollah’s decision-making process and is certainly worth studying and understanding for this analysis.

Economic situation Lebanon’s economy has faced significant obstacles in recent years. After a steady recovery following the end of the civil war in 1990, the Lebanese economy was dealt a severe blow by the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah. The IAF followed through on Halutz’s promise to set Lebanon back 20 years through an extensive bombing campaign that targeted key parts of the Lebanese infrastructure (BBC News A 2006). The economy has yet to fully recover from the devastation of the war, due to the slow timetable and high cost of recovery and rebuilding, despite Hezbollah’s efforts to foot some of the bill. Lebanon is considered a significant financial center in the Middle East even with the recent turmoil within the country. However, yet another war between Hezbollah and Israel could prove very devastating to Lebanon’s recovery efforts, and the Lebanese government has tried to take steps to ensure that it is complying with UN Resolution 1701 with as much vigor as the government can politically afford. The fragile state of the Lebanese economy has made avoidance of a new war between Hezbollah and Israel a key goal for the Lebanese government. The degree to which the Lebanese government can influence Hezbollah is not significant, except through appealing to the Lebanese people about the dangers of a new war to the state of the national economy.

Political situation Lebanon is governed according to the provisions of the Taif Agreement. The Taif Agreement is the result of a compromise following the civil war between Lebanon’s major religious groups—the Christians, Sunni Muslims, and Shia Muslims—which divided government authority in a way that was more proportional to the size of each group. However, representation in government is still retain based on a census taken in 1932 (United Nations 2006). No census has been taken in the intervening years, amid Christian fears that they will lose the high percentage of the share in power that they currently enjoy. The CIA estimates that the Shias are the largest faith group in Lebanon (Central Intelligence Agency). Hezbollah and the Amal movement have been pushing for Shia power in proportion to their population, but have faced significant opposition in Beirut.



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From 1975 through 2005, Syrian troops and intelligence officers were a significant presence in Lebanon, and significantly influenced Lebanese politics. Lebanese resentment over Syrian interference grew until, after Hariri’s assassination, it reached fever pitch. The killing was blamed on Syria, who maintained innocence. Nevertheless, Lebanese citizens turned out for massive protests that resulted in the Syrian government deciding to pull its troops and intelligence agents out of Lebanon in 2005. This watershed event is now known as the Cedar Revolution, and the political bloc that formed from this event is known as the March 14 Alliance, a reference to the date of the protest. Though Syria pulled out of Lebanon in 2005, accusations of Syrian interference in Lebanon continued. The 2007 assassination of Pierre Gemayel was widely attributed to Syria or Syrian-aligned elements in Lebanon. The March 8 Coalition formed in opposition to the March 14 Alliance, and supported a greater role for Syria within Lebanon. Hezbollah is a leading member of this Coalition. Lebanon recently enjoyed the second general elections held since the Syrian withdrawal from the country. Despite losing the popular vote to the March 8 Coalition, the Western-leaning March 14 Alliance obtained a majority of seats in the parliament, which has been perceived as a victory among their supporters within Lebanon and in Western circles. However, the victory rings hollow as the March 8 Coalition proved that it has wide support from the Lebanese public, giving Hezbollah greater leverage against the Lebanese government. Politically, the Lebanese government has a legal advantage over Hezbollah. This is not altogether insignificant, since Hezbollah has demonstrated willingness to work within the Lebanese legal framework to achieve its goals. However, Hezbollah wields the power that comes with the support of the Lebanese public. The March 14 Alliance can claim the majority of seats in parliament, but cannot claim a mandate from the Lebanese people. The Lebanese government has limited political options to reign in Hezbollah in the event that the government feels threatened by Hezbollah’s provocative behavior toward Israel.

Security situation The Lebanese army is notoriously anemic. It still suffers from internal division along sectarian lines, and an attempt by the government to use the army to quell a Lebanese militia could cause a great deal of dissension among the ranks of soldiers in the military. Without a mandate, or even unity within its own ranks, the Lebanese armed forces lack the political capacity to maintain peace among the various Lebanese militias.

152 THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

Compounding the problem presented by sectarian divide is the paucity of modern military equipment. The Lebanese military lacks an effective air force, relying on helicopters to provide limited support for its ground forces (Lebanese Air Force). The Lebanese navy is also ineffective, with limited equipment and training. Lebanese armor is limited to second-generation MBTs such as the M60 Patton (Defense News 2008). Lebanon is currently in negotiations with Russia to obtain the advanced T-90 MBT, but no deals have been concluded as of July 2009 (An-Nahar 2008). The Lebanese are impotent against not only the IDF, but even Hezbollah and other Lebanese militias. The army fought a protracted war with the Palestinian Fatah-al-Islam in May 2007, which was poorly conducted, but resulted in a Pyrrhic victory for the Lebanese military (YaLibnan 2007). In May 2008 clashes between Hezbollah and the government, the army proved unwilling and unable to confront the group, instead acting as an executor of Hezbollah’s will in restoring the group’s communications that had been shut down by the government (France 24 2008). The Lebanese army has a limited presence in southern Lebanon, where its mandate is semi-officially supplanted by the UNFIL (United Nations Interim Force In Lebanon) mandate as part of UN Resolution 1701, and unofficially by a rejuvenated Hezbollah presence in the region. The army did not play a role in confronting Israel during the war in 2006, and is not likely to confront Israel in the case of a new war. Meanwhile, the military has limited capability to suppress Hezbollah and demonstrated no willingness to attempt such engagement of the group. The leverage that the Lebanese government holds over Hezbollah is legal and moral in nature. If Hezbollah wishes to make inroads into the Lebanese government through legal means, the group will have to submit to legal authority, even if only as a pretense. While the government does have a standing army that has a larger number of soldiers than Hezbollah, the military is poorly equipped, of divided loyalty, and of low morale. The military cannot be trusted or used to confront Hezbollah militarily, and any attempt by the Lebanese government to do so could likely trigger a new civil war.

Possible courses of action Each actor can have a significant impact on the prospects for war between Hezbollah and Israel. The next part of the LAMP method is to determine all possible courses of action for each actor. While there is an infinite set of possible courses of action for each actor, a deeper study of the situation reveals that there are a limited number of actions that are available to the actors in this study. There are four possible courses of action for each actor. One of the four possible courses of action is for each party to do nothing. While this is



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always a possibility, it is a very low probability in this scenario. Hezbollah, by virtue of its charter and vision and by virtue of its need to maintain a pretense for its status as an armed militia, will continue to seek out avenues to engage Israel. Israel is extremely unlikely to do nothing in the face of a Hezbollah attack or provocation. Because of Hezbollah’s inclination to act and Israel’s inclination to react, the United States and Lebanon are extremely unlikely to do nothing in response to the continued development of a new conflict. While the latter two actors could simply ignore the growing indicators of a new war, decisions made by Israel and Hezbollah are very likely to transpose inactivity by the United States and Lebanon into activity of some kind, even if it is a condemnation issued through diplomatic channels. It is for these reasons that the course of inactivity was omitted from this analysis. In an effort to make the analysis more palatable for both the analyst and for the reader, courses of action were adjusted to fit into a paradigm of three choices. The initial analysis called for five courses of action, including the option to do nothing. This made the analysis unwieldy, and courses of action were merged to create a new course of action that represents levels of response. The limited response course of action is the result of the convergence of two courses of action that were previously independent: these were represented by a limited military option and a limited covert option. Because both of these represented a limited response, these are presented in this analysis as two possibilities within the scope of limited response. Hezbollah is the catalyst for a renewed conflict. While it is possible that Israel may take the initiative to attack Hezbollah in Lebanon, this scenario is highly unlikely. The political cost of starting a war without clear reason with as powerful an enemy as Hezbollah, which can rain rockets down upon Israel with alarming frequency, would undoubtedly prove so unpopular domestically as to make the option prohibitive and politically suicidal. Moreover, the Israeli operation in 2006 was carried out in response to a Hezbollah attack and was still roundly condemned internationally and eventually domestically as it began to bog down. If Israel is going to war with Hezbollah, it is most likely that it will require either a strong provocation or attack of some kind from Hezbollah. It is for this reason that Hezbollah’s decisions will serve as the major scenarios to which the other actors respond. While not all possible courses of action may necessarily make sense for each actor, it is important to consider it as a possible future in an effort to mitigate bias in the study. Considering the seemingly illogical alternate futures is an important manifestation of the divergent thinking that is required to ensure that the study has considered all possibilities, even if they may be dismissed on logical grounds. It is noteworthy that each actor according to its capabilities and perceptions manifests each possible course of action differently. The manner in

154 THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

which the United States would execute a full assault is drastically different from the manner in which the Lebanese government would undertake the same course of action. In light of this, clarifications on what each course of action entails for each actor will be included in the analysis.

Diplomatic engagement Israel Israeli diplomatic engagement of Hezbollah would not be direct because Israel will not negotiate with the group, nor will Hezbollah negotiate with Israel. Rather, Israeli options for diplomatic engagement would take the form either of condemnations or threats issued against Hezbollah in the media, or against Lebanon on the pretext that Lebanon holds ultimate responsibility for the actions of one of its member parties. Depending on the circumstances, Israel may offer an arbitration option through a third party. Because Israel has no official relations with Lebanon and does not trade with the nation, the option of political or economic sanctions is moot. Israel could choose to place a formal complaint with the United Nations. Lastly, Israel could mass troops near the Lebanese border in an effort to intimidate Hezbollah or the Lebanese government.

United States The United States wields considerable diplomatic power in the Middle East and has the option to pursue diplomatic sanctions against the Lebanese government, or economic sanctions in a bid to pressure the Lebanese government to take a harder line with Hezbollah. The United States, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, wields influence within the United Nations and may choose to pursue other legal actions against Lebanon. It can also choose to condemn Hezbollah for its actions. The United States could choose to deploy a carrier group into the eastern Mediterranean in a show of force to intimidate Hezbollah or the Lebanese government.

Lebanon The Lebanese government has limited options for diplomatic engagement. The government could issue a condemnation of Hezbollah’s actions on the pretense that their actions recklessly endanger the territorial and economic integrity of the nation. The government could also choose to withhold or otherwise restrict Hezbollah’s legislative ability in the parliament, but risks raising the stakes in the situation by doing so.



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Limited response Israel This course of action affords Israel a great degree of flexibility in their response to Hezbollah’s actions. Israel’s options in a limited response include a singular or small amount of bombing missions against key Hezbollah targets within Lebanon. Israel could embark on a targeted killing campaign, focusing on top Hezbollah political or military leaders. It could likewise opt for a special forces raid into Lebanon to either kill or abduct key members of Hezbollah’s leadership. Israel could focus its intelligence operations capabilities on attempting to kill or abduct Hezbollah agents and operatives outside the Middle East.

United States The United States can either offer logistical support for Israeli action, or logistical and moral support for wider Lebanese action. The United States could choose to bomb key Hezbollah targets within Lebanon, or provide assistance to the Israeli military in blocking Iranian attempts to ship or transport arms to Hezbollah. The United States could choose to turn its counter-terror operations focus toward Hezbollah, pursuing Hezbollah operatives not only in Lebanon but elsewhere around the world.

Lebanon The Lebanese government has limited options for this course of action. The government could choose to conduct covert operations against Hezbollah leadership, particularly in the form of assassinations of Hezbollah leadership. The government may opt to cut Hezbollah’s communications in Beirut again, but runs the risk of repeating the unrest of May 2008. The government could also take the risky action of logistically supporting an Israeli or American action against Hezbollah.

Full assault Israel A full assault from Israel entails a comprehensive bombing campaign and eventual ground invasion of Lebanon, in conjunction with a blockade around Lebanon.

156 THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

United States An American full assault would entail an extensive bombing campaign and a possible deployment of American troops within Lebanon. The extent of the deployment would be subject to the status of American operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Lebanon A full assault would entail an attempt by the Lebanese army to push Hezbollah’s military wing from strategic footholds in Lebanon, such as the Bekaa Valley, south Beirut, and southern Lebanon. The government may also choose to expel Hezbollah from the Lebanese Parliament, though the legality of such a move is highly questionable.

Major scenarios For the purposes of this study, the actions of Hezbollah will serve as the baseline and provide the major scenarios according to which the other actors will respond with one of the three courses of action outlined above. The fourth option of inaction is not applicable to this analysis. If Hezbollah were to do nothing, the level of interaction between the three nations and Hezbollah would be dramatically altered in such a way as to be irrelevant to this study. Further, it is highly unlikely that Hezbollah would not continue its struggle with Israel. Such an idea runs counter to the organization’s mission statement issued in 1988, and to the group’s claims that its arms are necessary for the struggle to “liberate Palestine.” Hezbollah is also motivated by the assassination of Imad Mugniyeh to seek an avenue of revenge against Israel, whom Hezbollah holds responsible for the killing. There are three courses of action that Hezbollah could pursue, producing three distinct major scenarios to which the actors will respond. 1 Hezbollah conducts terror attack against Israeli or Jewish targets

outside Israel.

2 Hezbollah launches a direct military attack against Israel. 3 Hezbollah provokes Israel to attack.

The first two scenarios require little explanation, but the third scenario requires clarification. Hezbollah’s provocation of Israel could involve a variety of actions, ranging from issuing threats against Israel or the IDF, staging exercises near the Israeli border, moving troops and equipment close



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to the Israeli border, and even launching a very small number of Katyusha rockets across the border into Israel. The latter example would constitute an attack in the strictest sense of the word, but falls short of the premeditation and planning behind the operation that triggered the 2006 war.

Calculation of total alternate futures Each action by Hezbollah is likely to elicit a very different response from each actor. In order to predict the most probable alternate future, one must analyze all possible permutations of the actions taken by Israel, the United States, and Lebanon to each of the possible scenarios that are created by Hezbollah’s decisions. The equation for calculating the total number of alternate futures in a LAMP analysis is XY = Z, where X equals the number of actions available to each actor, Y equals the number of actors, and Z equals the total number of alternate futures to be compared (Lockwood 2008). When calculating this formula, Hezbollah’s choices are not counted among the actions available, nor is the group counted among the total number of actors, since the group and its actions represent the catalyst and three scenarios respectively. There are three possible courses of action for each actor, and three actors in the analysis, which renders the equation as 33 = 27. This means that there are 27 possible futures between Israel, the United States, and Lebanon when responding to any one of the scenarios that results from Hezbollah’s own courses of action. Each of the 27 alternate futures will be submitted to a pair-wise comparison for each scenario and ranked according to the results. In an effort to render the comparison charts more easily decipherable, the following abbreviations for each course of action will be used: DIP = Diplomatic Engagement LIM = Limited Response FUL = Full Assault.

Pair-wise comparison of alternate futures for each scenario Using Table 6.1 as a template, the alternate futures will be submitted to a pair-wise comparison for each scenario. The method behind this type of comparison is simple and involves comparing each alternate future against each other alternate future in an effort to determine the most likely scenarios. To provide an illustration of the process, Table 6.1 will be utilized. Using alternate future #1, the analyst will compare that alternate

158 THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

Table 6.1  Alternate future permutations Possible future #

Israel

United States

Lebanon

1

FUL

FUL

FUL

2

FUL

FUL

LIM

3

FUL

FUL

DIP

4

FUL

LIM

FUL

5

FUL

LIM

LIM

6

FUL

LIM

DIP

7

FUL

DIP

FUL

8

FUL

DIP

LIM

9

FUL

DIP

DIP

10

LIM

FUL

FUL

11

LIM

FUL

LIM

12

LIM

FUL

DIP

13

LIM

LIM

FUL

14

LIM

LIM

LIM

15

LIM

LIM

DIP

16

LIM

DIP

FUL

17

LIM

DIP

LIM

18

LIM

DIP

DIP

19

DIP

FUL

FUL

20

DIP

FUL

LIM

21

DIP

FUL

DIP

22

DIP

LIM

FUL

23

DIP

LIM

LIM

24

DIP

LIM

DIP



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Possible future #

Israel

United States

Lebanon

25

DIP

DIP

FUL

26

DIP

DIP

LIM

27

DIP

DIP

DIP

future to alternate future #2 and assign a vote to the more probable future. Then, the analyst will compare alternate future #1 against alternate future #3 and assign a point to the more probable scenario. Alternate future #1 will be likewise compared with each of the remaining futures. Once alternate future #1 has been compared to each other future, the analyst will start with alternate future #2 and compare to alternate future #3, since futures #1 and #2 have already been compared. Alternate future #2 will be compared with each other future until it has been compared with each future. This process will continue for each alternate future until all futures have been compared. At the end of the pair-wise comparison, the more probable futures will be apparent due to the larger number of votes in relation to the other less probable futures. The equation used to determine the total number of pair-wise comparisons for each scenario is X = n(n-1)/2, where n equals the number of alternate futures to be analyzed, and X equals the total number of pair-wise comparisons for each scenario (Lockwood 2008). In the case of this analysis, the equation is rendered as 351 = 27(27-1)/2, meaning there are a total of 351 pair-wise comparisons to be made for each scenario, which are represented as votes in the tables below. The following tables present the results of the pair-wise comparisons of each alternate future for each scenario.

Table 6.2  Alternate futures pair-wise comparison – Scenario 1 Hezbollah Conducts Terror Attack Possible futures

Israel

United States

Lebanon

Votes

1

FUL

FUL

FUL

6

2

FUL

FUL

LIM

16

3

FUL

FUL

DIP

20

4

FUL

LIM

FUL

12

160 THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

Hezbollah Conducts Terror Attack Possible futures

Israel

United States

Lebanon

Votes

5

FUL

LIM

LIM

18

6

FUL

LIM

DIP

22

7

FUL

DIP

FUL

15

8

FUL

DIP

LIM

19

9

FUL

DIP

DIP

25

10

LIM

FUL

FUL

7

11

LIM

FUL

LIM

13

12

LIM

FUL

DIP

15

13

LIM

LIM

FUL

4

14

LIM

LIM

LIM

19

15

LIM

LIM

DIP

24

16

LIM

DIP

FUL

2

17

LIM

DIP

LIM

16

18

LIM

DIP

DIP

26

19

DIP

FUL

FUL

3

20

DIP

FUL

LIM

6

21

DIP

FUL

DIP

7

22

DIP

LIM

FUL

2

23

DIP

LIM

LIM

11

24

DIP

LIM

DIP

11

25

DIP

DIP

FUL

26

DIP

DIP

LIM

9

27

DIP

DIP

DIP

23

Total

351



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Table 6.3  Alternate futures pair-wise comparison – Scenario 2 Hezbollah Military Attack on Israel Possible futures

Israel

United States

Lebanon

Votes

1

FUL

FUL

FUL

15

2

FUL

FUL

LIM

20

3

FUL

FUL

DIP

22

4

FUL

LIM

FUL

16

5

FUL

LIM

LIM

20

6

FUL

LIM

DIP

23

7

FUL

DIP

FUL

15

8

FUL

DIP

LIM

24

9

FUL

DIP

DIP

26

10

LIM

FUL

FUL

2

11

LIM

FUL

LIM

10

12

LIM

FUL

DIP

12

13

LIM

LIM

FUL

9

14

LIM

LIM

LIM

15

15

LIM

LIM

DIP

20

16

LIM

DIP

FUL

7

17

LIM

DIP

LIM

19

18

LIM

DIP

DIP

24

19

DIP

FUL

FUL

4

20

DIP

FUL

LIM

5

21

DIP

FUL

DIP

6

22

DIP

LIM

FUL

3

23

DIP

LIM

LIM

7

162 THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

Hezbollah Military Attack on Israel Possible futures

Israel

United States

Lebanon

Votes

24

DIP

LIM

DIP

8

25

DIP

DIP

FUL

1

26

DIP

DIP

LIM

3

27

DIP

DIP

DIP

15

Total

351

Table 6.4  Alternate futures pair-wise comparison – Scenario 3 Hezbollah Provokes Israel Possible futures

Israel

United States

Lebanon

Votes

1

FUL

FUL

FUL

8

2

FUL

FUL

LIM

11

3

FUL

FUL

DIP

19

4

FUL

LIM

FUL

8

5

FUL

LIM

LIM

12

6

FUL

LIM

DIP

20

7

FUL

DIP

FUL

12

8

FUL

DIP

LIM

18

9

FUL

DIP

DIP

23

10

LIM

FUL

FUL

6

11

LIM

FUL

LIM

12

12

LIM

FUL

DIP

15

13

LIM

LIM

FUL

3

14

LIM

LIM

LIM

16

15

LIM

LIM

DIP

24



Candidate moves in the Levant

163

Hezbollah Provokes Israel Possible futures

Israel

United States

Lebanon

Votes

16

LIM

DIP

FUL

4

17

LIM

DIP

LIM

20

18

LIM

DIP

DIP

25

19

DIP

FUL

FUL

1

20

DIP

FUL

LIM

8

21

DIP

FUL

DIP

10

22

DIP

LIM

FUL

2

23

DIP

LIM

LIM

12

24

DIP

LIM

DIP

16

25

DIP

DIP

FUL

2

26

DIP

DIP

LIM

18

27

DIP

DIP

DIP

24

Total

351

Ranking the alternate futures Using the results from Tables 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4, the futures for each scenario will be ranked in order of probability with the highest probability futures at the top and the lowest probability futures at the bottom. The following tables illustrate the ranked pair-wise comparison of alternate futures for each scenario.

Table 6.5  Alternate future probabilities by rank – Scenario 1 Hezbollah Conducts Terror Attack Possible futures

Israel

United States

Lebanon

Votes

18

LIM

DIP

DIP

26

9

FUL

DIP

DIP

25

164 THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

Hezbollah Conducts Terror Attack Possible futures

Israel

United States

Lebanon

Votes

15

LIM

LIM

DIP

24

27

DIP

DIP

DIP

23

6

FUL

LIM

DIP

22

3

FUL

FUL

DIP

20

8

FUL

DIP

LIM

19

14

LIM

LIM

LIM

19

5

FUL

LIM

LIM

18

2

FUL

FUL

LIM

16

17

LIM

DIP

LIM

16

7

FUL

DIP

FUL

15

12

LIM

FUL

DIP

15

11

LIM

FUL

LIM

13

4

FUL

LIM

FUL

12

23

DIP

LIM

LIM

11

24

DIP

LIM

DIP

11

26

DIP

DIP

LIM

9

10

LIM

FUL

FUL

8

21

DIP

FUL

DIP

8

1

FUL

FUL

FUL

6

20

DIP

FUL

LIM

6

13

LIM

LIM

FUL

4

19

DIP

FUL

FUL

3

16

LIM

DIP

FUL

2

22

DIP

LIM

FUL

2



Candidate moves in the Levant

165

Hezbollah Conducts Terror Attack Possible futures

Israel

United States

Lebanon

Votes

25

DIP

DIP

FUL

0

Total

351

Table 6.6  Alternate future probabilities by rank – Scenario 2 Hezbollah Military Attack on Israel Possible futures

Israel

United States

Lebanon

Votes

9

FUL

DIP

DIP

26

8

FUL

DIP

LIM

24

18

LIM

DIP

DIP

24

6

FUL

LIM

DIP

23

3

FUL

FUL

DIP

22

2

FUL

FUL

LIM

20

5

FUL

LIM

LIM

20

15

LIM

LIM

DIP

20

17

LIOM

DIP

LIM

19

4

FUL

LIM

FUL

16

1

FUL

FUL

FUL

15

7

FUL

DIP

FUL

15

14

LIM

LIM

LIM

15

27

DIP

DIP

DIP

15

12

LIM

FUL

DIP

12

11

LIM

FUL

LIM

10

13

LIM

LIM

FUL

9

24

DIP

LIM

DIP

8

166 THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

Hezbollah Military Attack on Israel Possible futures

Israel

United States

Lebanon

Votes

16

LIM

DIP

FUL

7

23

DIP

LIM

LIM

7

21

DIP

FUL

DIP

6

20

DIP

FUL

LIM

5

19

DIP

FUL

FUL

4

22

DIP

LIM

FUL

3

26

DIP

DIP

LIM

3

10

LIM

FUL

FUL

2

25

DIP

DIP

FUL

1

Total

351

Table 6.7  Alternate future probabilities by rank – Scenario 3 Hezbollah Provokes Israel Possible futures

Israel

United States

Lebanon

Votes

27

DIP

DIP

DIP

26

18

LIM

DIP

DIP

25

15

LIM

LIM

DIP

24

9

FUL

DIP

DIP

23

6

FUL

LIM

DIP

20

17

LIM

DIP

LIM

20

3

FUL

FUL

DIP

19

8

FUL

DIP

LIM

18

26

DIP

DIP

LIM

18

14

LIM

LIM

LIM

16



Candidate moves in the Levant

167

Hezbollah Provokes Israel Possible futures

Israel

United States

Lebanon

Votes

24

DIP

LIM

DIP

16

12

LIM

FUL

DIP

15

5

FUL

LIM

LIM

12

7

FUL

DIP

FUL

12

11

LIM

FUL

LIM

12

23

DIP

LIM

LIM

12

2

FUL

FUL

LIM

11

21

DIP

FUL

DIP

10

1

FUL

FUL

FUL

8

4

FUL

LIM

FUL

8

20

DIP

FUL

LIM

8

10

LIM

FUL

FUL

6

16

LIM

DIP

FUL

4

13

LIM

LIM

FUL

3

22

DIP

LIM

FUL

2

25

DIP

DIP

FUL

2

19

DIP

FUL

FUL

1

Total

351

Analysis of alternate futures Tables 6.5, 6.6, and 6.7 show a clear demarcation in the behavior patterns of Israel and the United States in response to Hezbollah’s decisions. The next part of the LAMP method calls for an analysis of the alternate futures within each scenario, how these futures will affect Hezbollah’s

168 THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

decision-making process, and a prediction of how these alternate futures will affect each scenario. In order to make this analysis more concise, palatable, and relevant for the reader, only the five most likely futures in each scenario will be analyzed.

Scenario 1: Hezbollah terror attack against Israeli or Jewish target abroad In this scenario, Hezbollah will choose to conduct an attack against an Israeli or Jewish target in a country other than Israel. The potential targets are varied. Israeli embassies, Jewish recreation centers, synagogues, and other places where Israelis or Jews may congregate are all possibilities for targeting by Hezbollah. Hezbollah has shown a willingness to conduct attacks against “soft targets” like these in the past, most notably in 1992 and 1994 when the group allegedly carried out a series of bombings against Jewish targets in Argentina. Recently, Azerbaijani counter-terror efforts uncovered a Hezbollah plot to bomb a Jewish center in Baku, Azerbaijan. While the targeting of Hezbollah attacks may appear random to the casual observer, there are two distinct characteristics that Baku and Buenos Aires share. They are both significant areas of Jewish population, and are located in countries that lack the willingness or capacity to strike Hezbollah in retaliation for the attacks. Both of these characteristics are advantageous to Hezbollah. It ensures a higher number of casualties and provides Hezbollah with reasonable assurance that the group will not have to suffer existential consequences as a result of the attack. Assuming that these two factors are of high importance to the group in planning an attack, certain sites that don’t meet one of the criteria can be regarded as having a diminished threat. International outcry would likely follow after a successful Hezbollah attack, and it is highly likely that the group would go to some length to conceal its involvement. Because of Hezbollah’s call for revenge in the death of Imad Mugniyeh, any sophisticated terror attack against a Jewish target would be potentially regarded in Jerusalem as a Hezbollah operation, and blame would be fixed accordingly. American reaction to the attack would depend on the scope of the attack and the location of the attack. An attack in a Western allied city would likely draw stronger condemnation than an attack in a city that lay in a non-aligned nation. In the case of a Hezbollah terror attack, the group runs the risk of inviting a wide international response of some kind and could potentially throw the Middle East into a perilous state of instability.



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Alternate Future #18: Israel conducts a limited response to the terror attack, while the United States and Lebanon choose to handle the situation through diplomatic channels This future received 26 votes, making it the most likely future to occur within this scenario. This future has played out with frequency over the course of Israeli history, as Israeli responses to terror attacks within Israel tend to focus on small attacks and assassination attempts. Israel did not immediately retaliate for the pair of bombings that occurred in Argentina during the early 1990s, but the Mossad has been blamed for the assassination of Imad Mugniyeh, named by the Argentine government as the architect of two bombings (Norton 2007, 79). In this future, Israel pursues a targeted killing strategy and assassinates a ranking member of Hezbollah. Between the options of a limited military strike or an assassination, the former is less likely to elicit a response from Hezbollah, but is also likely to have less impact on Hezbollah’s operations. Hezbollah would likely be prepared for the eventuality of a limited military strike and would take precautions to ensure that any exposed targets are clear of key Hezbollah leaders or equipment before the execution of the terror attack. An Israeli attack on these “empty targets” would be a best-case scenario for Hezbollah, who would lose little in such an attack. If an Israeli strike on empty targets represents a best-case scenario, the assassination of a key member of Hezbollah’s leadership might be a worstcase scenario for the group. Israel’s targeted killing strategy has proven rather effective at reaching key leaders of the targeted groups. Israel has proven that it has the capabilities to carry out such attacks through its successful operations against Hamas leaders such as Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi and founder Ahmed Yassin, as well as Hezbollah leaders Imad Mugniyeh and Sayed Abbas al-Musawi. However, such actions introduce greater instability and the danger that the situation could spiral further out of control. Hezbollah would be highly unlikely to permit such an attack to go unanswered. The potential for the conflict to grow in its scope could increase significantly in the event of a successful Israeli operation to assassinate a member of Hezbollah’s leadership. In this future, the American and Lebanese responses would be diplomatic in nature. The United States issues a statement condemning the attack. The strength of the language in such a statement will depend on the degree to which Hezbollah culpability could be proven. The higher the likelihood of Hezbollah involvement, the more likely the United States would be to issue a strongly worded statement against the action. The United States looks the other way in the case of a limited response from Israel, only urging caution in the event that Israel’s actions appear to further destabilize the region.

170 THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

The Lebanese government issues a condemnation of the attack, but it is not strongly worded. Public statements from Lebanon would extol the virtues of dialogue. However, in private the Lebanese government communicates with Hezbollah its concerns that Hezbollah’s actions could threaten the national security of Lebanon.

Alternate Future #9: Israel launches a full military assault against Hezbollah, while the United States and Lebanon choose to handle the situation through diplomatic channels In this scenario, this alternate future received 25 votes, meaning that this future is the second most likely future compared to the other alternate futures. This future has been made more likely with the election of the hawkish Likud party in February 2009. This future represents a significant escalation of the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah. In this future, Israel attacks Hezbollah with the full might of the IDF. The reasoning behind such an undertaking by Israel in this future is to further bolster its strategic deterrence against Hezbollah. This reaction has precedent in Israeli history, dating to the 1982 invasion of Lebanon that was launched after the attempted assassination of Shlomo Argov (Guardian 2003). The operation begins in the same manner as the 2006 war, with a full complement of IAF sorties over Lebanon in an effort to destroy key points in the Lebanese and Hezbollah infrastructure. Unlike 2006, the ground invasion is undertaken sooner in the campaign and more forcefully, with clear objectives from the IDF Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi. Hezbollah’s response to this invasion mirrors the group’s response in 2006, with a regular volley of Katyusha rockets being fired into Israel. The IDF’s ability to limit or halt these attacks altogether will be a major determining factor in both the length of the war and perceptions of the IDF’s performance. In this future, the IDF is unable to stem the flow of Katyushas falling on Israel, and the army is forced to quit the operation early due to a jaded Israeli public. The war results in a diminished military capability for Hezbollah. However, the group retains popularity among the Lebanese most affected by the Israeli operation, and more importantly, bolsters its case for retaining its arms. The war increases Israel’s deterrence posture against Hezbollah and quells Hezbollah’s appetite to engage Israel so blatantly in the future. The American response to the terror attack is to issue a condemnation, the language of which would be crafted to the situation. If Hezbollah’s culpability were proven, the language of an American condemnation would be markedly stronger. The American response to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon is ambivalent. The United States urges Israel to show restraint,



Candidate moves in the Levant

171

and there are calls from within the Senate and House to issue a condemnation of Israel’s escalation, citing Israel for its “disproportionate response” to the terror attack. While the Obama administration does not heed those calls, such sentiment prompts the administration to take a tougher line with Israel and pressure the nation to recall its forces from Lebanon. The Lebanese government issues a thinly worded condemnation of the Hezbollah attacks at the outset. However, as Israeli aircraft begin flying sorties over Lebanon and Israeli tanks cross into the south, the government becomes inclined to chide Hezbollah for its reckless behavior, while condemning Israel for its “disproportionate response.” The government complains to the United Nations and pushes for a condemnation from the UN Security Council, which does not pass unanimously due to the United States. However, the United Nations begins to put pressure on Israel as the operation begins to move beyond the first week. The Lebanese government issues warnings to the Israeli government that the Lebanese army may be used to engage the IDF if the latter pushes too far into Lebanon.

Alternate Future #15: Israel and the United States pursue a limited response to the terror attack, while Lebanon chooses to handle the situation through diplomatic channels This future received 24 votes and is the third most likely future to occur in this scenario. This future represents a major departure from the two more probable scenarios in that the United States is taking a more active role against Hezbollah. Lebanon, unsurprisingly, retains the use of diplomatic channels to engage Hezbollah. In this future, Israel has the option to pursue either the option of a limited military strike or an assassination attempt against a key member of Hezbollah’s leadership. The latter could further destabilize the region, while the former is unlikely to seriously affect Hezbollah. Israel’s inclination in recent years has been to pursue targeted killing campaigns against hostile non-state entities, as has been demonstrated with its assassinations of key leaders in both Hamas and Hezbollah. Thus, Israel elects to assassinate a key member of Hezbollah’s leadership. The United States, in this future, pursues the option of a limited response. However, unlike Israel, the options that the United States pursues in this future are less overt, with the avoidance of international condemnation in mind. The United States takes a two-pronged approach in this future that entails logistical support for Israeli action against Hezbollah, and a boost to counterterror efforts against Hezbollah around the world as part of the general American strategy against global terrorism. Both of these options afford the United States an ability to engage Hezbollah below the surface, therefore less likely to be reported in the media but still effective in engaging Hezbollah.

172 THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

Hezbollah’s response to these actions by the United States and Israel depends on two factors: the degree to which the action is successful against Hezbollah, and whether or not Hezbollah is able to detect American assistance to Israel. Because the action is successful, Hezbollah becomes inclined to respond with either another terror attack or an escalation of the conflict by striking Israel directly. If American assistance to Israel is detected, Hezbollah may exercise options it has to confront the United States. These include targeting American troops in Iraq and conducting terror attacks on American interests abroad or perhaps even within the continental United States. The Lebanese government’s response is very similar to the response in Alternate Future #18. While the Lebanese government perceives Israeli action against Hezbollah, American involvement remains outside its view.

Alternate Future #27: Israel, the United States, and Lebanon all pursue diplomatic options to respond to Hezbollah’s terror attack This future received 23 votes and is the fourth most likely future to occur in this scenario. This future is perhaps the most beneficial to prospects for peace in the Middle East, due primarily to Israel’s decision to eschew a forceful response in deference to a diplomatic and peaceful alternate. Despite this fact, there are three futures that are more likely to occur than this one. In this future, Israel issues a strongly worded condemnation of the attack. The government feels compelled to put the IDF on high alert in an effort to demonstrate the degree to which Israel is displeased with the attack and in an effort to intimidate Hezbollah. Israel issues threats to attack Hezbollah targets or even Lebanese targets in an effort to pressure Beirut to either likewise condemn Hezbollah or work harder to reign in the group. Israel pursues this option in a bid to demonstrate to the United States and the wider global community that it is dedicated to peace, even in the face of concerted provocation. The United States issues a condemnation of the attack, the language of which is determined by the degree to which Hezbollah is found culpable for the attack. The Obama administration lauds Israel for its restraint and encourages further restraint in its dealings with Hezbollah and likewise with Hamas and other Palestinian factions. This is coupled with a warning to the Lebanese government that unless the government takes steps to put pressure on Hezbollah, the risk of escalation in the region runs high. The United States sends signals to all parties in the Middle East that while it supports Israel’s restraint in this scenario, that it will be less apt to do so if Israel is further provoked.



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173

The Lebanese government issues a condemnation for the attack and behaves similarly to the way it might in Alternate Futures #18 and #15. In private, the government expresses to Hezbollah that the nation is fortunate that Israel did not respond more forcefully and encourages Hezbollah to refrain from such continued provocation. While such a future portends a more peaceful Middle East, it is also a best-case scenario for Hezbollah. The group is unlikely to be moved by condemnations or even troop build-ups within Israel. The lack of response will be perceived by Hezbollah as a victory against Israel, which the group sees as having a weakening resolve. This development may open doors to further Hezbollah aggression.

Alternate Future #6: Israel launches a full assault against Hezbollah in response to the terror attack, while the United States pursues a limited response, and Lebanon pursues diplomatic channels to address the situation This future received 22 votes and is the fifth most likely future within this scenario. The scenario represents the most intense level of response that Hezbollah is likely to receive in the wake of a terror attack according to the pair-wise comparison. As such, this future is the most likely among the five most probable futures to destabilize the region. In this future, Israel launches a full assault that resembles that of Alternate Future #9 almost exactly. The key change in this scenario is that Israel’s response would be in concert with a limited American response. In this future, the United States lends Israel overt logistical support for its war against Hezbollah under the pretense that this war is an extension of the global strategy against Islamist terrorism. The logistical support takes the form of the sharing of intelligence on Hezbollah’s movements and American support in crimping Hezbollah’s supply line of weapons and resources from Iran. The United States Navy is deployed to the eastern Mediterranean to assist in an Israeli blockade of Lebanon, under the pretense of cutting off a source of Hezbollah’s weapons. The United States goes to some length to assure the Lebanese government that its actions are aimed only at confronting Hezbollah. To this end, the United States takes steps to discourage Israeli targeting of Lebanese civilian infrastructure and encourages an easing of the blockade to allow all vessels through after a search to ensure that no weapons are aboard. In this future, the Lebanese government issues a stronger condemnation of the attacks, though still weak in comparison to condemnation from other nations. The Lebanese government privately expresses extreme displeasure with Hezbollah for provoking not only a full Israeli assault, but also American assistance. Meanwhile, the government publicly condemns

174 THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

the Israeli aggression and “disproportionate response” while calling on the United States to halt its assistance and complicity in the unwarranted aggression. The United States counters that its only mission is to confront Hezbollah, and that it would strive to preserve Lebanese territorial integrity to the extent possible under the circumstances. Hezbollah’s reaction to this response is to express surprise that a terror attack could warrant such a response. This would no doubt be an attempt by Hezbollah to obtain sympathy and perhaps even establish a moral high ground by citing a “disproportionate response.” As the United States proves unrelenting in its material support for the Israeli invasion, Hezbollah looks to frame the conflict as a clash of civilizations, and evokes the imagery of the Crusades in an attempt to rally the Arab street to its banner. The diplomatic pressure created by such a strategy tempers American support for the mission, and further destabilizes the Middle East, while threatening remaining American troops in Iraq. The war results in a diminished military capability for Hezbollah. However, the group retains popularity among the Lebanese most affected by the Israeli operation, and more importantly, bolsters its case for retaining its arms. The war increases Israel’s deterrence posture against Hezbollah and quells Hezbollah’s appetite to engage Israel so blatantly in the future. In this scenario, among the five most probable futures, there is an 80 percent chance that Israel would respond violently to a Hezbollah terror attack, and a 40 percent chance that such a response would entail a full-scale Israeli invasion of Lebanon. There is a 40 percent chance that the United States might provide some sort of response to the attack, the degree of which would be determined by the level of Israeli response. Unsurprisingly, the Lebanese government is 100 percent certain to do nothing more than issue a weak condemnation and express dissatisfaction to Hezbollah through private channels. According to the futures in this scenario, there is an incredibly high chance that a Hezbollah terror attack against an Israeli or Jewish target would elicit the type of response from Israel that could bring serious instability to the Middle East.

Scenario 2: Hezbollah conducts direct military attack against Israel Scenario 2 resembles the events of July 12, 2006, when Hezbollah members crossed the border into Israel and ambushed an IDF patrol, taking IDF soldiers Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser with them back to Lebanon. The event triggered a massive Israeli operation that lasted for 33 days and devastated southern Lebanon and parts of the southern suburbs of Beirut. As a result of this recent historical precedent, the reactions of Israel, the United States, and



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Lebanon are perhaps more easily analyzed and predicted, based not only on previous courses of action but the lessons learned from the events in 2006. The top five most probable alternate futures for this scenario contain three alternate futures that are also present in Scenario 1. Not surprisingly, those three alternate futures represent the strongest probable responses from each of the three actors in that scenario.

Alternate Future #9: Israel launches a full military assault against Hezbollah, while the United States and Lebanon choose to handle the situation through diplomatic channels This future received 26 votes, making it the most likely of the 27 alternate futures to occur in this scenario. This future is among the five most probable futures in each of the three scenarios. This future is also identical to the situation that occurred in 2006. This future is a prediction that if Hezbollah were to carry out another military attack directly against Israel, that Israel would respond in the same manner that it did in 2006. In this future, Israel launches a full-scale invasion of Lebanon, starting with a heavy aerial bombing campaign, followed quickly by a ground invasion. The IDF will have learned lessons from the war in 2006 and does not make the same mistakes that the army did in the previous round of hostilities. Despite the increased efficiency and level of performance, the IDF will be unable to completely stem the rain of rockets falling on Israel, evoking memories of the 2006 conflict in the eyes of the Israeli public. The United States will condemn Hezbollah’s attack on Israel, while extolling the virtue of Israel’s right to defend itself. However, as international pressure builds amid the rising civilian casualty count in Lebanon, the Obama administration will begin to change its tune, urging the IDF to wrap up its operation quickly. Israel will test the limits of American patience and support, eventually leading to calls from Washington for Israel to show restraint, with the more vociferous critics calling Israel’s operation an example of “disproportionate response.” The United States will also chide the Lebanese government for failing to abide by UN Resolution 1701 and disarming Hezbollah, which would be characterized as a step that could have prevented the war. The Lebanese government will criticize Hezbollah’s decision to launch an attack against Israel, citing the grave threat that Lebanon faces in the midst of the Israeli onslaught. However, the Lebanese government will issue threats to the IDF that if the operation tarries for too long or if IDF troops push too deep into Lebanon, that it will reserve the right to defend itself by sending the Lebanese army into action. The chief differences in this future from the scenario that played out in 2006 are twofold. The IDF is unlikely to repeat the mistakes of 2006,

176 THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

and as a result, will increase the measure of deterrence that Israel enjoys in the Middle East. However, support from the Obama administration will be more tepid than that given by the Bush administration. Israel will not have the leeway to let the operation extend to the protracted 33-day length of the 2006 operation. Without such American support, Israel will feel compelled to shorten the operation, lest the political cost of the war become prohibitive. The war will result in a diminished military capability for Hezbollah. However, the group will retain popularity among the Lebanese most affected by the Israeli operation, and more importantly, will bolster its case for retaining its arms. The war will increase Israel’s deterrence posture against Hezbollah and likely quell Hezbollah’s appetite to engage Israel so blatantly in the future.

Alternate Future #8: Israel launches a full-scale invasion of Lebanon, the United States pursues a diplomatic option, and Lebanon pursues a limited response to Hezbollah’s attack on Israel This future received 24 votes, tying with Alternate Future #18 as the second most likely future in this scenario. This future and future #3 are the only futures not among the five most probable futures in the other two scenarios. The striking element in this future is the introduction of action from the Lebanese government as a result of Hezbollah’s decision to attack Israel. This is the only of the five most probable alternate futures in any of the three scenarios that features Lebanese action beyond the scope of diplomacy. In this future, Israel launches a full-scale invasion of Lebanon akin to Alternate Future #9. The chief difference in this future is found in the actions of the Lebanese government, who would conduct a limited response of their own. In this future, the Lebanese government decides that Hezbollah’s reckless “adventurism” against Israel represents a constant and existential threat to the national security and territorial integrity of Lebanon. While the government cannot engage in overt action for fear of Hezbollah reprisals, the government elects to provide Israel with logistical support. This action involves the government covertly passing information on Hezbollah’s key military positions and known locations where Hezbollah’s leadership may be hiding. Whatever action the Lebanese government takes will be unilateral to the parties that execute the action. In other words, the government knows that any decision to engage Hezbollah will not enjoy broad support and will only use agents that can be completely trusted to conduct the operation with utmost secrecy. The overriding concern is that if the government is



Candidate moves in the Levant

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implicated in efforts to fight Hezbollah, particularly if aiding Israel, the country could slide into civil war. This concern is enhanced by American pressure on the Israelis to shorten the duration of the operation, enhancing the possibility that Hezbollah will emerge from the conflict largely capable of waging war with the government. Thus, the severe risk of this course of action is mitigated in the minds of the Lebanese government only by the concern that Hezbollah’s continued provocations against Israel will lead to the ultimate demise of the Lebanese state. The war will result in a diminished military capability for Hezbollah. However, the group will retain popularity among the Lebanese most affected by the Israeli operation, and more importantly, will bolster its case for retaining its arms. The war will increase Israel’s deterrence posture against Hezbollah and likely quell Hezbollah’s appetite to engage Israel so blatantly in the future.

Alternate Future #18: Israel conducts a limited response to Hezbollah’s direct military attack, while the United States and Lebanon choose to handle the situation through diplomatic channels This future received 24 votes, tying it with Alternate Future #8 as the second most likely future in this scenario. This future is included among the five most probable futures in each of the three scenarios. This represents the best-case scenario for peace in the Middle East, as Israel’s response is limited in its scope. In this future, Israel responds to Hezbollah’s attack by launching a counterattack against the specific Hezbollah unit that is responsible for the attack. This will take the form of an IDF helicopter attack, coupled with a limited number of sorties over Lebanon, which target Hezbollah weapons depots and communication centers in the southern part of Lebanon. All Israeli action is limited to targets south of the Litani River. Israel follows these attacks with a warning to Hezbollah that if the group responds further, it could escalate the conflict and potentially trigger a full-scare war. The United States will strongly condemn the Hezbollah provocation, while advocating the Israeli response on the pretense that Israel has a right to self-defense. The Obama administration will contact Netanyahu and Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak, expressing satisfaction with the Israeli response, which they will call “balanced” and “proportionate.” The United States will publicly urge both sides to take steps to prevent further escalation in the conflict, while reminding Lebanon of its duty to disarm Hezbollah according to UN Resolution 1701. The Lebanese government will publicly express disappointment with Hezbollah’s attack on Israel, calling it a “reckless provocation.” In private,

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the government will express the desire that Hezbollah refrain from such attacks in the future, and mention the potential for extensive damage to the Lebanese nation. The government will try to entreat Hezbollah to consider the welfare of the Lebanese public before undertaking such an action in the future. Lebanese comments on the Israeli counterstrikes will be limited to a desultory condemnation without further comment, in an effort to avoid fanning the flames of Israeli resentment over Hezbollah’s actions.

Alternate Future #6: Israel launches a full assault against Hezbollah in response to the group’s direct military attack on Israel, while the United States pursues a limited response, and Lebanon pursues diplomatic channels to address the situation This future received 23 votes, making it the fourth most likely future in this scenario. This future is among the five most probable futures in each of the other three scenarios. This future is nearly identical to Alternate Future #9 except that the United States is taking a course of limited response. In this future, Israel launches a full-scale invasion of Lebanon identical to that in Alternate Future #9. However, in this future, the United States takes part in the effort with a limited response. Due to Hezbollah’s brazen attack against Israel, the United States will feel less reservation about providing logistical support to the Israelis. The logistical support takes the form of the sharing of intelligence on Hezbollah’s movements and crimping Hezbollah’s supply line of weapons and resources from Iran. The United States Navy will be deployed to the eastern Mediterranean to assist in an Israeli blockade of Lebanon, under the pretense of cutting off a source of Hezbollah’s weapons. The United States will go to some length to ensure the Lebanese government that its actions are aimed only at confronting Hezbollah. To this end, the United States will take steps to discourage Israeli targeting of Lebanese civilian infrastructure and encourage an easing of the blockade to allow all vessels through after a search to ensure that no weapons are aboard. In this future, the Lebanese government issues a stronger condemnation of the attack, though still weak in comparison to condemnation from other nations. The Lebanese government will privately express extreme displeasure with Hezbollah for provoking not only a full Israeli assault, but also American assistance. Meanwhile, the government will publicly condemn the Israeli aggression and “disproportionate response” while calling on the United States to halt its assistance and complicity in the



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unwarranted aggression. The United States will counter that its only mission is to confront Hezbollah, and that it will strive to preserve Lebanese territorial integrity to the extent possible under the circumstances. The war will result in a diminished military capability for Hezbollah. However, the group will retain popularity among the Lebanese most affected by the Israeli operation, and more importantly, will bolster its case for retaining its arms. The war will increase Israel’s deterrence posture against Hezbollah and likely quell Hezbollah’s appetite to engage Israel so blatantly in the future. Hezbollah’s reaction to this response would likely be to express regret that their attack could warrant such a response. This would no doubt be an attempt by Hezbollah to obtain sympathy and perhaps even establish a moral high ground by citing “disproportionate response” at the hands of two of the world’s most powerful militaries. The United States will prove reliable in its material support for the Israeli invasion, and Hezbollah will surely look to frame the conflict as a clash of civilizations, evoking the imagery of the Crusades in an attempt to rally the Arab street to its banner. The diplomatic pressure created by such a strategy will certainly temper American support for the mission, and further destabilize the Middle East, while threatening remaining American troops in Iraq.

Alternate Future #3: Israel and the United States launch a full-scale assault against Hezbollah in response to the group’s attack on Israel, while Lebanon engages Hezbollah through diplomatic channels This future received 22 votes, making it the fifth most likely future in this scenario. This future and Alternate Future #8 are the only futures not among the five most probable futures in the other two scenarios. This is no doubt the result of this future being among the direst results of any Hezbollah action, as both Israel and the United States would bring the full brunt of their militaries down on Hezbollah. In this future, Israel launches a full-scale invasion of Lebanon. Unlike the other futures, the United States joins Israel in this full-scale assault. The tactical ramifications become immediately apparent as the two nations struggle to decide which nation should take the lead in such matters as bombing sorties, troop deployment, and command of the combined force. The two nations agree to allow the IAF to conduct sorties over Lebanon, while IDF and American troops share the burden of conducting the ground operation under joint control of Israeli and American generals. The United States Navy takes the lead in forming the blockade around Lebanon, while the United States Air Force takes the lead in patrolling the eastern border of Lebanon in an effort to halt the flow of weapons

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into Lebanon. The plan is made that after the offensive is completed, the American troops will withdraw and the IDF troops will remain to conduct clean-up operations within southern Lebanon. The United States will insist that the timetable for the operation is less than two weeks. Israel reluctantly agrees. The operation proves successful at dislodging Hezbollah’s main elements in southern Lebanon, but armed militias make life difficult for the IDF troops deployed there. Hezbollah’s stronghold in the Bekaa Valley is devastated, and Hezbollah’s offices in Beirut are destroyed. However, Hezbollah’s leadership evades the bombs and raids of the IDF and American troops. The two-week deadline expires and the American troops begin their withdrawal as pressure mounts on the IDF to do the same. After a few days of lingering in Lebanon to find remaining elements of Hezbollah, the IDF withdraws under heavy international pressure and condemnation for the “disproportionate response” to Hezbollah’s attack. By virtue of the group’s survival against the onslaught of the world’s two most powerful militaries, Nasrallah will claim victory for Hezbollah. However, unlike 2006, the group sustains major damage and possesses only a fraction of its military power from before the war. The political cost of the operation is extremely high for Israel and the United States, who are both roundly condemned in the Middle East and by many other countries around the world. The United States loses its credibility as an arbitrator in the Middle East peace process, and Iran gains credibility across the Muslim world as the only Islamic nation-state willing to confront American and Israeli “imperialism.” The Lebanese government condemns Hezbollah’s attack on Israel as well as the Israeli and American response, calling it “exceedingly disproportionate.” The government cuts off communications with Hezbollah for fear of being linked with the group during the intense onslaught. The economic effect of the war in Lebanon proves too much for the government, and the government is eventually ousted in the next general election, as Hezbollah and the March 8 Coalition are swept into power amid a tide of antiWestern sentiment in Lebanon. In this scenario, among the five most probable futures, there is a 100 percent chance of an Israeli military response to the Hezbollah attack on Israel, with an 80 percent chance that the response will involve a full-scale invasion of Lebanon. There is a 40 percent chance that the United States will respond with at least logistical support for an Israeli attack, and a 20 percent chance that the American response will be a full-scale assault in concert with Israel. There is a 20 percent chance that Lebanon might pursue a cautious limited response against Hezbollah if the group directly attacks Israel. According to the most probable futures in this scenario, a Hezbollah attack against Israel nearly assures that a full-scale war will erupt between the two actors.



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Scenario 3: Hezbollah provokes Israel to attack In this scenario, Hezbollah attempts to actually provoke an Israeli attack. The reasons for Hezbollah to provoke an attack are varied and include a desire to reinforce their raison d’être by reminding the Lebanese of the threat that Israel poses, a desire to lure the IDF into well-laid traps in southern Lebanon, or at the insistence of Iran to deflect international attention from their nuclear program or other contentious issue. Hezbollah’s provocation of Israel is made with the group holding three assumptions about a conflict with Israel: 1 The IDF cannot destroy Hezbollah. 2 The IDF cannot sustain an operation against Hezbollah

without eventually running up an ever-increasing political cost. 3 The group’s resistance against the IDF will endear it to a wider population within Lebanon and the Muslim world. This understanding is necessary in order to consider the act of provocation to be one that is rational and entirely probable. Hezbollah’s options for provoking Israel to attack are multifaceted. The group can provoke an Israeli attack through either provocative statements or provocative actions. Provocative statements would include threats to attack Israeli or Jewish targets abroad, threats to launch longer-range missiles toward Tel Aviv, or loudly declaring the capability to launch rockets at Israel’s primary population centers. More significant than statements, Hezbollah could elect to perform provocative actions such as approaching the border with heavily armed units, taking shots at IDF border patrols, or even launching a limited number of Katyusha rockets into Israel through a proxy group. While all of these examples are provocative, the provocative actions, more so than provocative statements, are much more likely to elicit a strong Israeli response that reaches beyond the scope of diplomacy. This scenario is unique compared to the previous two scenarios. In the other two scenarios, one would be hard-pressed to make an argument against Hezbollah as the aggressor, despite the level of proportionate response offered by Israel. However, in this case, the international community will perceive any Israeli response beyond the realm of diplomacy as unwarranted Israeli aggression in the face of ostensibly harmless saber rattling from Hezbollah. This scenario’s five most probable futures are all present in either one of the two other scenarios. However, the context of these responses is considerably different given the lack of substantial aggression from Hezbollah.

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Alternate Future #27: Israel, the United States, and Lebanon all pursue diplomatic options to respond to Hezbollah’s provocations This future received 26 votes, making it the most likely future in this scenario. This future more or less represents the status quo as of July 2009, and the calmest state of relations between Israel and Hezbollah. Hezbollah frequently issues provocative statements, which are either ignored by Israel or responded to with provocative statements from Jerusalem. This future is also among the top five most probable futures in Scenario 1. In this future, Israel chooses to give little heed to Hezbollah’s provocations. The decision is a calculated one on the part of Israel, as an Israeli response would likely garner widespread condemnation from the international community. Instead of responding to Hezbollah threats, Israel chooses to issue threats of its own and wait for Hezbollah to provide a more substantive reason to pursue military action against the group. The United States issues a statement calling on Israel to continue its display of restraint, while chiding Hezbollah for its provocations and accusing the group of being the primary catalyst for instability in the Middle East. Washington uses the opportunity to remind Beirut of the responsibility that it has to disarm Hezbollah under the provisions in UN Resolution 1701. The Lebanese government dismisses the American statement but otherwise remains publicly silent on the issue. However, the government expresses reservations to Hezbollah in private about the dangers of escalating the conflict. While this future appears to avert war, the degree to which Hezbollah is willing to pursue a wider conflict with Israel will determine whether or not the group will continue to provoke Israel. In this future, Hezbollah continues to provoke Israel to attack using increasingly provocative methods, until Israel begins considering action beyond the scope of diplomacy to address the situation. This future represents the greatest potential of any future to be “transposed” into a scenario that represents an escalation of the conflict.

Alternate Future #18: Israel conducts a limited response to provocations, while the United States and Lebanon choose to handle the situation through diplomatic channels This future received 25 votes, making it the second most likely future in this scenario. This scenario is among the top five futures in the other two scenarios. This future represents an escalation of the situation on the part of Israel, but only on a limited basis. The United States and Lebanon retain their distance from the conflict and attempt to address the issue through diplomatic channels only.



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In this future, Israel issues a limited response in the form of an assassination attempt on a key Hezbollah military commander. The attempt is successful, and while Israel remains silent on its culpability, Hezbollah publicly blames Israel for the killing and vows revenge. Israel warns that any Hezbollah attack against Israel or Jewish targets abroad will draw a sharp Israeli response. The situation threatens to spiral out of control. The United States chides Hezbollah for its rhetoric and criticizes its role as a destabilizing element in the Middle East. After the assassination of the key Hezbollah commander, the United States remains silent on the issue, choosing to withhold judgment until the facts of the case come to light, but expresses disappointment that such an event will further destabilize the region. Washington warns both sides against escalating the conflict, and warns Lebanon and Hezbollah to abide by UN Resolution 1701. The Lebanese government refuses to address Hezbollah’s provocations publicly, but privately expresses reservations about Hezbollah’s actions. The government joins in the condemnation of the assassination, but stops short of blaming Israel directly for the killing.

Alternate Future #15: Israel and the United States pursue a limited response to the provocation, while Lebanon chooses to handle the situation through diplomatic channels This future received 24 votes, making it the third most likely future in this scenario. This future is among the five most probable futures in Scenario 1, and represents a deepening of the response to Hezbollah’s provocations as the United States joins Israel in the limited response. In this future, Israel elects to pursue a limited response nearly identical to that of Alternate Future #18 in this scenario. The chief difference in this scenario is that the United States also elects to pursue a limited response. The two nations work in concert to elicit the response. Because of the prohibition in American law against American intelligence agencies partaking in assassination attempts, the United States elects to provide Israel with intelligence on Hezbollah operatives in Europe. Israel proceeds to target a key member of Hezbollah’s intelligence apparatus in Europe, successfully assassinating the operative. Hezbollah issues a strong condemnation of the assassination and publicly accuses Israel of the killing, vowing revenge. However, the group is not aware of the connection that the United States has to the operation, and mentions the United States only as an enabler of Israeli “malfeasance.” The Lebanese government remains silent on the issue publicly, only confronting Hezbollah in a private setting and expressing its reservation about the group’s provocative actions.

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Alternate Future #9: Israel launches a full military assault against Hezbollah, while the United States and Lebanon choose to handle the situation through diplomatic channels This future received 23 votes, making it the fourth most likely future in this scenario. This future is present in the five most probable futures in each of the other two scenarios and represents a significant escalation of the conflict by Israel. In this future, Israel launches a full-scale invasion of Lebanon, completely taking Hezbollah and the world by surprise. The surprise attack causes Hezbollah to be caught off-guard, having left key targets vulnerable to sorties by the IAF, and the damage to Hezbollah’s military capability is substantial during the first 48 hours of the conflict. The Israeli ground invasion begins within 72 hours of the first bombs falling on Lebanon, and the IDF is able to overwhelm and drive back the underequipped Hezbollah forces in southern Lebanon, chasing elements of Hezbollah across the Litani River. Within the first five days of the conflict, the IDF has dealt a severe blow to Hezbollah’s forces in southern Lebanon. However, Hezbollah uses the time it takes the IDF to advance in the south to firm its defenses in the Bekaa Valley and in positions north of the Litani River. The United States chides Hezbollah for its provocation, but urges Israel to show restraint. As the operation drags into its fifth day, the Obama administration expresses disappointment that Israel is responding “disproportionately” to the Hezbollah provocation and begins to exert significant pressure on Israel to withdraw its troops back across the border. Due to intense international and American pressure, the IDF withdraws from Lebanon seven days after the start of the conflict, never having capitalized on the initial momentum of the campaign. The war proves unpopular in Israel and is seen as “adventurism” by a wide cross-section of Israeli society, which is embarrassed by the level of international condemnation of the Israeli invasion. Hezbollah and Iran strongly condemn Israeli “aggression” and express the need for Israel to be removed from the Middle East. Hezbollah pledges to redouble its efforts to recover from the onslaught and continue its fight against Israel. The Lebanese government condemns the Israeli invasion and files a complaint with the United Nations. Beirut threatens to deploy the Lebanese army on the border.

Alternate Future #6: Israel launches a full assault against Hezbollah in response to the group’s provocations, while the United States pursues a limited response, and Lebanon pursues diplomatic channels to address the situation This future received 20 votes, tying it with Alternate Future #17 for the fifth most likely future in this scenario. This analysis will only examine the



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effects of Alternate Future #6, rather than both futures. The reasons for this are twofold. With only 20 votes, both futures are significantly below the four more probable futures in this scenario, and an examination of two futures that are so much less likely is not likely to contribute to the analysis in a meaningful way. More importantly, when performing the pair-wise comparison, Alternate Future #6 was chosen as more probable than Alternate Future #17. In this future, Israel launches a surprise full-scale invasion of Lebanon in a manner identical to Alternate Future #9. The key difference in this future is that the United States is pursuing the course of limited response by providing Israel with covert logistical support. The United States provides Israel with its satellite imagery as well as SIGINT in an effort to bolster Israel’s capability to conduct a quick and effective campaign against Hezbollah. The United States provides this assistance on the condition that the operation will last less than seven days, and Israel reluctantly agrees. Publicly the United States urges both sides to show restraint and calls on Israel to limit its operation to Hezbollah targets. During the fifth day of fighting, the United States and Israel publicly declare that the Israeli operation will be over within 48 hours. Israel expresses a desire to have an additional 48 hours to conduct operations but is rebuffed by the United States. Hezbollah suffers extensive damage to its military capability. The group publicly condemns the Israeli invasion with the strongest possible language. The group is unaware of the American involvement in the conflict but criticizes the United States for failing to reign in their ally sooner. Hezbollah pledges to redouble its efforts to rearm and further pledges to continue the fight against Israel. The Lebanese government condemns the Israeli invasion and files a complaint with the United Nations. Beirut threatens to deploy the Lebanese army on the border. In this scenario, among the five most probable futures, there is an 80 percent chance that Hezbollah’s provocations will elicit something stronger than diplomatic engagement from Israel. There is a 40 percent chance that Israel will launch a full-scale invasion of Lebanon, and a 40 percent chance that Israel will provide a limited response. The scope of the limited response will be covert and unlikely to result in an immediate escalation of the conflict. There is only a 40 percent chance that the United States will respond with something stronger than diplomatic engagement, and a 20 percent chance that the American response would be limited to covert logistical support, provided on condition of a quick Israeli withdrawal. Lebanon is 100 percent certain to keep its responses completely within the realm of diplomacy. While Hezbollah provocations represent a threat to Middle East stability, the threat is substantially smaller than in other scenarios, but could quickly escalate depending on the responses of the other actors. This scenario most closely resembles the current situation in the Middle East.

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Focal events Focal events are occurrences that are significant enough to alter the relative probability of alternate futures (Lockwood 2008). Determining focal events is an important step in determining the probability of a possible future occurring. This step helps the analyst understand the present and the impact that future events will have on the responses of the affected actors. Generally, the alternate futures that differ the least from the status quo will require the fewest focal events to bring about the future (Lockwood 2008). The future that most resembles the status quo is Alternate Future #6, in which Israel, the United States, and Lebanon all pursue diplomatic avenues to address the actions of Hezbollah. The scenario that most resembles the present is Scenario 3, where Hezbollah is issuing provocative statements and threats against Israel. In this case, the focal events will address the events that could change the probability of the alternate future for which the least resistance is needed to occur—in this case, Alternate Future #6 in Scenario 3. Only one of these events may be necessary to change the probability of an alternate future, but more of these events may be required to occur before some of the less likely futures occur. The focal events are listed below and the indicators for these events are italicized and listed beneath each focal event.

Focal events and indicators Hezbollah attacks Israeli or Jewish targets outside Israel MM

Hezbollah moves vital targets and personnel in Lebanon to safety in anticipation of Israeli response.

MM

Hezbollah issues a threat to attack Israeli or Jewish targets.

MM

Hezbollah operatives are spotted or arrested in a city with a large Jewish population.

MM

Allusions to “coming victory” or “imminent good news” are present in Nasrallah’s speeches.

MM

Nasrallah makes extensive mention of Imad Mugniyeh’s assassination in his speeches.

Hezbollah directly attacks Israel with premeditation and in force MM

There is increased Hezbollah reconnaissance activity near the Israel– Lebanon border.



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MM

Hezbollah moves vital targets and personnel in Lebanon to safety in anticipation of Israeli response.

MM

UNFIL personnel report increased Hezbollah activity in southern Lebanon.

MM

Iran is involved in domestic or international controversy.

Hezbollah launches a small number of rockets into Israel through a proxy group MM

Hezbollah issues threats to Israel.

MM

Hezbollah moves vital targets and personnel in Lebanon to safety in anticipation of Israeli response.

Hezbollah harasses IDF border patrols or kidnaps IDF personnel MM

Increased Hezbollah reconnaissance activity near the Israel– Lebanon border.

MM

Nasrallah makes extensive mention of the Shebaa Farms in his speeches.

MM

Nasrallah praises 2008 prisoner exchange or makes mention of Lebanese and Hezbollah prisoners being held in Israel.

Hezbollah attacks Jewish targets in the United States, killing American Jews MM

Hezbollah moves vital targets and personnel in Lebanon to safety in anticipation of Israeli response.

MM

Hezbollah issues a threat to attack Israeli or Jewish targets.

MM

Hezbollah operatives are spotted or arrested in an American city with a large Jewish population.

MM

The United States intelligence community issues an alert that a terror attack is either imminent or of increased probability.

MM

Allusions to “coming victory” or “imminent good news” are present in Nasrallah’s speeches.

MM

Nasrallah makes extensive mention of Imad Mugniyeh’s assassination in his speeches.

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The United States completes withdrawal from Iraq MM

Troop deployments continue on schedule.

MM

The Iraqi security apparatus performs adequately.

The United States successfully crushes rising Taliban threat in Afghanistan MM

Taliban forced to retreat from Pakistan.

MM

Obama makes less mention of the Taliban threat when discussing matters of national security.

The Lebanese government adopts an assertive course of action against Hezbollah MM

The Lebanese government perceives an existential threat to Lebanon due to Hezbollah’s actions and the threat of Israeli response.

MM

The Lebanese government becomes more outspoken in its criticism of Hezbollah.

MM

Hezbollah’s actions draw strong indications of far-reaching Israeli response.

Iran orders Hezbollah to provoke hostilities with Israel MM

Iran is involved in domestic or international controversy.

MM

Ahmadinejad makes frequent reference to his skepticism over Holocaust and his desire to see Israel erased from the map.

MM

Iran is nearing completion of a crucial stage in its nuclear program.

MM

Iran achieves capability to build and deliver nuclear weapons as far as Israel.

Hezbollah threatens American personnel in the Middle East MM

The United States becomes more outspoken in its criticism of Hezbollah.



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MM

The United States is involved in a battle with Shia militants in Iraq.

MM

Security for American personnel remaining in Iraq is diminished due to troop withdrawal.

Hezbollah kidnaps or kills American personnel MM

Hezbollah issues threat to American personnel.

MM

The United States becomes more outspoken in its criticism of Hezbollah.

MM

The United States is involved in a battle with Shia militants in Iraq.

MM

Security for American personnel remaining in Iraq is diminished due to troop withdrawal.

MM

Nasrallah makes extensive mention of American culpability with regard to Israeli actions.

Hezbollah kills Lebanese politicians or members of the Lebanese armed forces MM

The Lebanese government becomes more outspoken in its criticism of Hezbollah.

MM

Hezbollah and Lebanese armed forces clash.

MM

Members of the Lebanese government become outspoken critics of Syria or Iran.

MM

The Lebanese government attempts to stifle Hezbollah attempts to organize protests.

Israel launches full-scale assault on Hezbollah MM

The IDF is placed on high alert.

MM

Heavy IDF mobilization begins in northern Israel.

MM

IDF patrols on the Lebanese border cease.

MM

Weapons, food, and medical supplies are moved toward the Lebanese border.

MM

IDF units in training are recalled from exercises.

MM

The IDF calls up reserve units.

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MM

IAF pilots’ leave is cancelled.

MM

Preparations for Jewish Shabbat or other High Holiday are eschewed (if applicable).

MM

The IAF increases the number of reconnaissance missions over Lebanon.

MM

The Israeli Navy moves toward Lebanese waters.

MM

Israeli residents in the north are advised to remain near protective bunkers.

MM

The United States upholds Israeli right to self-defense.

Israel carries out limited military strikes MM

The IAF increases the number of reconnaissance missions over Lebanon.

MM

Moderate IDF mobilization begins in northern Israel.

MM

IDF patrols on the Lebanese border decrease.

MM

The IDF is placed on high alert.

MM

The United States upholds Israeli right to self-defense.

Israel carries out targeted killing operations MM

Israel issues threats and warnings to Hezbollah leadership.

MM

The IAF begins reconnaissance flights over the homes and known hideouts of Hezbollah leaders.

MM

Hezbollah leaders are killed under suspicious or violent circumstances.

Israel limits its response or withholds from attacking Hezbollah at all MM

Israel declares a willingness to work as equal partners with the United States toward a general settlement with the Arab world.

MM

The United States indicates a willingness to reduce the level of economic aid going to Israel.

MM

The United States agrees to fund the building of more desalination plants in Israel.



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MM

The United States supports Israel’s claim on the Golan Heights.

MM

The United States agrees to deemphasize opposition to Israel’s program of building settlements in the West Bank.

MM

Israeli public opinion is strongly against another war.

MM

The IDF does not mobilize its troops.

MM

The IDF is engaged in another war.

MM

The ruling center–right coalition falls apart and Netanyahu government fails to secure support in the Knesset for major policy decisions.

The United States pursues a military option against Hezbollah MM

Hezbollah attacks Jewish targets in the United States, killing American citizens.

MM

The Obama administration gains Congressional support for action against Hezbollah.

MM

The United States Navy deploys in the eastern Mediterranean.

MM

The United States has completed the withdrawal from Iraq.

MM

The United States successfully crushes rising Taliban threat, freeing resources for use against Hezbollah.

MM

The United States pledges to support the integrity of Israeli security.

MM

Obama makes reference to Hezbollah as a catalyst for instability in the Middle East.

The United States tones down its response MM

The Obama administration fails to gain Congressional support for action against Hezbollah.

MM

The timetable for the Iraq withdrawal is extended.

MM

The war in Afghanistan takes a turn for the worse, occupying more resources.

MM

The Obama administration and Democratic Congress suffer from low approval ratings during either the 2010 mid-term or 2012 presidential election year.

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MM

Oil prices begin to spike as a result of the increasingly volatile situation.

The number of focal events and indicators associated with this situation are vast and potentially infinite. Only the most probable focal events and indicators have been included here in an effort to make this analysis more concise, palatable, and relevant. However, as events continue to unfold in the future, this list of focal events and indicators will undoubtedly need to be updated, and so this list should be considered as nothing more than a snapshot of the situation in late July 2009.

Transposition of alternate futures The final step of the LAMP method involves analyzing the possibility of the transposition of one alternate future into another alternate future. Transposition occurs when the events of one future change the perceptions and courses of action for the actors, transposing the original alternate future into another alternate future. After a possible future has transposed into another, the probabilities for each possible future change. The opportunities for transposition between any two alternate futures may not necessarily be as abundant as the opportunities for transposition among a separate pair of futures. The opportunities for transposition among the five most probable futures in each scenario will be analyzed.

Scenario 1: Hezbollah terror attack against Israeli or Jewish target abroad Alternate Future #18: Israel conducts a limited response to the terror attack, while the United States and Lebanon choose to handle the situation through diplomatic channels This future is the most likely future in this scenario. This future provides ample opportunity to transpose into Alternate Future #9 if Hezbollah chooses to escalate the conflict by retaliating against Israel’s limited response by either launching a military attack or conducting another terror attack against an Israeli or Jewish target abroad. Israel chooses in this future to escalate the level of its response accordingly and launch a full-scale invasion of Lebanon. Meanwhile, the United States condemns the escalation by Hezbollah, while urging restraint and a speedy operation by Israel. The Lebanese government will publicly chastise Hezbollah for its “reckless adventurism,” and will condemn the Israeli response as “disproportionate.”



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Conversely, this future could transpose into Alternate Future #27 if Hezbollah were to refrain from retaliating for the limited Israeli response. In this future, Hezbollah publicly condemns the Israeli action and threatens revenge. Israel responds by warning Hezbollah that further provocations will draw another Israeli response, the degree of which will be determined later. The United States will urge both sides to exercise restraint, and the Lebanese government will remain silent publicly, while privately expressing reservations to Hezbollah about the group’s provocative behavior.

Alternate Future #9: Israel launches a full military assault against Hezbollah, while the United States and Lebanon choose to handle the situation through diplomatic channels The second most likely future in this scenario does not have as much potential to transpose into another future. This is due in large part to the nature of Israel’s response, which represents the highest level of escalation in the conflict. Therefore the only possibility in this conflict is for both sides to tone down the level of aggression, transposing into Alternate Future #27. In this future, Israel faces immense pressure from the international community to put an end to the operation. Eventually, the Obama administration will feel intense pressure to urge Israel to withdraw its forces from Lebanon. Israel reluctantly agrees, phasing the withdrawal out over a 72-hour period. Hezbollah, trying to recover from the onslaught, makes no effort to engage or provoke the IDF further. Once the IDF has returned to Israel, Hezbollah and the Israeli government will exchange warnings and threats, as both sides seek to frame the conflict in a manner that portrays their side in a better light to the international community.

Alternate Future #15: Israel and the United States pursue a limited response to the terror attack, while Lebanon chooses to handle the situation through diplomatic channels This future provides some opportunity to transpose into either Alternate Future #9 or Alternate Future #27. The potential for transposition stems from the response that Hezbollah provides to the limited response of Israel and the United States. Due to the covert nature of American participation, Hezbollah will not be aware of the role that the United States played in the assassination of one of its operatives. Hezbollah can elect to respond with another terror attack abroad or with a direct military attack on Israel. In this future, Israel responds to the escalation with a full-scale assault on Hezbollah, transposing this future into Alternate Future #9. If Hezbollah chooses not to retaliate for

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the limited response, this future will transpose into Alternate Future #27, as Hezbollah will issue a condemnation and threaten revenge. Israel will respond with threats and warnings of its own.

Alternate Future #27: Israel, the United States, and Lebanon all pursue diplomatic options to respond to Hezbollah’s terror attack This future, due to its low level of escalation, provides ample opportunity for transposition. If Hezbollah wishes to provoke Israel to attack, the group can escalate the conflict by either taking more provocative courses of action, conducting a terror attack abroad, or directly attacking Israel. Israel’s responses to these actions will determine the degree of transposition. If Israel elects to provide a limited response, the future will transpose to Alternate Future #18. If Israel decides to launch a full-scale invasion of Lebanon, this future will transpose to Alternate Future #9.

Alternate Future #6: Israel launches a full assault against Hezbollah in response to the terror attack, while the United States pursues a limited response, and Lebanon pursues diplomatic channels to address the situation This future provides ample opportunity for transposition despite the high state of escalation that this future represents. The United States can either further its involvement in the conflict, transposing this future into Alternate Future #3, or withdraw from the conflict, transposing this future into Alternate Future #9. In Alternate Future #3, Hezbollah will decide to engage American forces in Iraq, killing several in ambushes. The United States responds by escalating its involvement in the Lebanese conflict, in essence declaring all-out war against Hezbollah. The United States decides to coordinate the invasion with Israel, providing naval security and aerial monitoring of eastern Lebanon in an effort to stem the flow of weapons from Syria and Iran. After enduring significant international pressure to halt the operation, the United States and Israel withdraw. Hezbollah’s leadership survives the war, but the group sustains a severe blow to its military capacity. However, the United States and Israel pay a significant political cost to achieve this objective. In Alternate Future #9, the United States begins to suffer higher-thanexpected casualties in Lebanon. This development sours the American public and government on the merits of continued American involvement in Lebanon, and the United States withdraws from the country. The IDF continues the fight, but the confusion caused by the sudden American



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withdrawal stalls the IDF operation, and Israel withdraws its military from Lebanon. Hezbollah suffers damage to its military capabilities, but is able to claim a victory, pointing to the haphazard nature of the American and Israeli withdrawals. The last opportunity for transposition stems from an Israeli decision to halt its operation in Lebanon, transforming this future into Alternate Future #27. In this future, Israel begins to suffer higher-than-expected casualties and pressure mounts among the Israeli public to end the war. The government, afraid of its tenuous hold on power, acquiesces to the public demand and withdraws from Lebanon. The United States, which limited its response to logistical support, no longer has a mission in Lebanon and leaves the region. Hezbollah claims a victory despite the extensive damage done to Lebanon, while Israel begins the process of examining its shortcomings in yet another flawed invasion of Lebanon. In addition to the analysis of each of the top five most likely futures in this scenario, there is a special consideration for transposition. If Hezbollah attacks an Israeli or Jewish target within the United States, and American citizens are killed, any of the given alternate futures could transpose into Alternate Future #3, which is a joint full-scale invasion of Lebanon by the United States and Israel, or Alternate Future #6, in which the United States provides a limited response in the form of support for an Israeli invasion. Alternate Future #15, a joint limited response by the United States and Israel is possible, but it is likely that, if given the free reign and overt moral support by the United States to pursue a full-scale invasion of Lebanon, Israel will adopt this course of action. The same opportunities for transposition exist in the event that Hezbollah kidnaps, kills, or otherwise overtly engages American forces or personnel in the Middle East.

Scenario 2: Hezbollah conducts direct military attack against Israel Alternate Future #9: Israel launches a full military assault against Hezbollah, while the United States and Lebanon choose to handle the situation through diplomatic channels The most likely future in this scenario does not have as much potential to transpose into another future. This is due in large part to the nature of Israel’s response, which represents the highest level of escalation in the conflict. Therefore the only possibility in this conflict is for both sides to tone down the level of aggression, transposing into Alternate Future #27. This possibility exists primarily because a state of war between Israel and Hezbollah is unsustainable for either side and cannot last indefinitely.

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In this future, Israel faces limited but increasing pressure from the international community to put an end to the operation as it begins to drag out into its fourth week. Despite supporting Israel’s right to self-defense, the Obama administration will eventually feel intense pressure to urge Israel to withdraw its forces from Lebanon. Israel reluctantly agrees, phasing the withdrawal out over a 72-hour period. Hezbollah, trying to recover from the onslaught, makes no effort to engage or provoke the IDF further. Once the IDF has returned to Israel, Hezbollah and the Israeli government will exchange warnings and threats, as both sides seek to frame the conflict in a manner that portrays their side in a better light to the international community.

Alternate Future #8: Israel launches a full-scale invasion of Lebanon, the United States pursues a diplomatic option, and Lebanon pursues a limited response to Hezbollah’s attack on Israel This future presents limited opportunity for transposition. Like Alternate Future #9 above, this future has the potential to transpose to Alternate Future #27. The unique case of transposition for this future will emerge out of Lebanon’s hesitancy to involve itself in a struggle against Hezbollah. In this future, Lebanon regrets its decision to take the course of limited response by cooperating with Israel. Spurred on by regret and fear of reprisal by Hezbollah, the Lebanese government cuts off communication with the IDF, and instead encourages Hezbollah to take steps to end the war with Israel. The IDF does not suffer as a result of Lebanon’s decision and continues with the operation until it is pressured by the United States to withdraw its forces from Lebanon. Hezbollah’s military capability will be diminished, but the group will retain the popularity it has achieved in Lebanon. Israel, having evidence of Lebanon’s cooperation with the IDF, explores options to blackmail the Lebanese government by threatening to release the evidence of its collusion with Israel during the invasion.

Alternate Future #18: Israel conducts a limited response to Hezbollah’s direct military attack, while the United States and Lebanon choose to handle the situation through diplomatic channels This future provides ample opportunity to transpose into Alternate Future #9 if Hezbollah chooses to escalate the conflict by retaliating against Israel’s limited response. Because Israel will perceive its initial response



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as one defined by its restraint, retaliation by Hezbollah will decrease Israeli inhibitions about expanding its response. Israel chooses in this future to escalate the level of its response accordingly and launch a fullscale invasion of Lebanon. Meanwhile, the United States condemns the escalation by Hezbollah, while urging restraint and a speedy operation by Israel. The Lebanese government will publicly chastise Hezbollah for its “reckless adventurism,” and will condemn the Israeli response as “disproportionate.” Conversely, this future could transpose into Alternate Future #27 if Hezbollah were to refrain from retaliating for the limited Israeli response. In this future, Hezbollah threatens revenge but also claims that Israel’s limited response was proof of the nation’s “lack of resolve.” Israel responds by warning Hezbollah that further provocations will draw another stronger Israeli response, the degree of which will be determined later. The United States will urge both sides to exercise restraint, and the Lebanese government will remain silent publicly, while privately expressing reservations to Hezbollah about the group’s provocative behavior.

Alternate Future #6: Israel launches a full assault against Hezbollah in response to the group’s direct military attack on Israel, while the United States pursues a limited response, and Lebanon pursues diplomatic channels to address the situation This future provides ample opportunity for transposition despite the high state of escalation that this future represents. The United States can either further its involvement in the conflict, transposing this future into Alternate Future #3, or withdraw from the conflict, transposing this future into Alternate Future #9. In Alternate Future #3, Hezbollah will decide to engage American forces in Iraq, killing several in ambushes. The United States responds by escalating its involvement in the Lebanese conflict, in essence declaring all-out war against Hezbollah. The United States decides to coordinate the invasion with Israel, providing naval security and aerial monitoring of eastern Lebanon in an effort to stem the flow of weapons from Syria and Iran. Despite a strong casus belli for both Israel and the United States, significant international pressure builds to halt the operation as it enters its third week. After brief negotiations between the United States, Israel, Lebanon, Hezbollah, and the United Nations, the United States and Israel withdraw. Hezbollah’s leadership survives the war, but the group sustains a debilitating blow to its military capacity. The United States and Israel pay a significant political cost for the operation, but enjoy a modicum of private

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support from world leaders who perceive that both nations had reasonable cause to invade Lebanon. In Alternate Future #9, the United States begins to suffer higher-thanexpected casualties in Lebanon. This development sours the American public and government on the merits of continued American involvement in Lebanon, and the United States withdraws from the country. The IDF continues the fight without American assistance, but international pressure builds more quickly as a result of the American pull-out. The IDF halts the advance of its ground invasion and focuses on destroying Hezbollah’s military infrastructure in southern Lebanon. After the conflict enters its fourth week, the United States begins to join the chorus of nations that are urging Israel to wrap up its operation. Israel unilaterally withdraws from Lebanon less than five weeks after the start of hostilities. The last opportunity for transposition stems from an Israeli decision to halt its operation in Lebanon, transforming this future into Alternate Future #27. In this future, Israel begins to suffer higher-than-expected casualties and pressure mounts among the Israeli public to end the war. The government, afraid of its tenuous hold on power, acquiesces to the public demand and withdraws from Lebanon. The United States, which limited its response to logistical support, no longer has a mission in Lebanon and leaves the region. Hezbollah claims a victory despite the extensive damage done to Lebanon, while Israel begins the process of examining its shortcomings in yet another flawed invasion of Lebanon.

Alternate Future #3: Israel and the United States launch a full-scale assault against Hezbollah in response to the group’s attack on Israel, while Lebanon engages Hezbollah through diplomatic channels This future provides little room for transposition into another probable future. The only reasonable transposition is into Alternate Future #27. This possibility exists primarily because a state of war between Israel and Hezbollah is unsustainable for either side and cannot last indefinitely. However, there are opportunities for a premature end to the hostilities that results in Alternate Future #27. In this future, the United States and Israel launch a devastating invasion of Lebanon. The combined forces of the United States and Israel quickly overwhelm Hezbollah forces in the south, and the operation begins to spread toward the Bekaa Valley and the southern outskirts of Beirut. The alarming rate of the advance stuns the Lebanese government. The government condemns the invasion, calling it “exceedingly disproportionate,” and threatens to put the Lebanese army between the combined



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American–Israeli force and further advancement into Lebanon. The United States and Israel halt their advance, unwilling to directly challenge Lebanese sovereignty and trigger a regional war by engaging the national army. With little recourse to expand the operation, the United States and Israel begin preparations to wrap up the operation amid growing international pressure on the two nations to quit Lebanon. Within three weeks of invading Lebanon, the United States and Israel withdraw their forces, leaving a battered country. Hezbollah sustains considerable damage to its military apparatus, and pledges to redouble its efforts at rearmament and to continue its struggle against Israel. As with Scenario 1, any Hezbollah attack that directly affects American citizens or personnel is likely to steel the American resolve to confront Hezbollah. However, because a Hezbollah terror attack is off the table in this scenario, the strong sentiment and conviction that such an event would stir among the American public and government is absent.

Scenario 3: Hezbollah provokes Israel to attack Alternate Future #27: Israel, the United States, and Lebanon all pursue diplomatic options to respond to Hezbollah’s provocations This future, due to its low level of escalation, ostensibly provides ample opportunity for transposition. However, upon closer inspection, this scenario constricts Hezbollah’s inciting course of action to mere provocation. If Hezbollah wishes to provoke Israel to attack, the group can escalate the conflict only by taking more provocative courses of action until Israel finally responds with force, transposing this future into Alternate Future #18. In this future, Hezbollah’s provocations continue until the group finally launches a small number of Katyushas that fall near the northern Israeli town of Nahariya. Israel responds with a short series of bombing sorties, targeting Hezbollah communications and command centers in southern Lebanon. Alternate Future #27 can transpose into Alternate Future #9, but only incrementally, through a series of escalations during which the future is first transposed into Alternate Future #18, as demonstrated in the previous paragraph. Hezbollah’s reaction to this response escalates the conflict. A group of Hezbollah members crosses the border into Israel and ambushes an IDF patrol, killing several IDF personnel. Israel decides to pursue a more expansive response and launches a full-scale assault on Hezbollah, transposing this future in Alternate Future #9.

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Alternate Future #18: Israel conducts a limited response to provocations, while the United States and Lebanon choose to handle the situation through diplomatic channels This future provides ample opportunity to transpose into Alternate Future #9 if Hezbollah chooses to escalate the conflict by retaliating against Israel’s limited response. Israel chooses in this future to escalate the level of its response and launches a full-scale invasion of Lebanon. Meanwhile, the United States condemns the escalation by Hezbollah, while expressing disappointment with the operation by Israel. The Lebanese government will publicly chide Hezbollah for its provocations, and will condemn the Israeli response as “disproportionate.” Conversely, this future could transpose into Alternate Future #27 if Hezbollah were to refrain from retaliating for the limited Israeli response. In this future, Hezbollah threatens revenge but also claims that Israel’s limited response was proof of the nation’s “lack of resolve.” Israel responds by warning Hezbollah that further provocations will draw another stronger Israeli response, the degree of which will be determined later. The United States will urge both sides to exercise restraint, and the Lebanese government will remain silent publicly, while privately expressing reservations to Hezbollah about the group’s provocative behavior.

Alternate Future #15: Israel and the United States pursue a limited response to the provocation, while Lebanon chooses to handle the situation through diplomatic channels This future provides some opportunity to transpose into either Alternate Future #9 or Alternate Future #27. The potential for transposition stems from the response that Hezbollah provides to the limited response of Israel and the United States. Due to the covert nature of American participation, Hezbollah will not be aware of the role that the United States played in the assassination of one of its operatives. Hezbollah can elect to respond with a terror attack abroad or with a direct military attack on Israel. In this future, Israel responds to the escalation with a full-scale assault on Hezbollah, transposing this future into Alternate Future #9. If Hezbollah chooses not to retaliate for the limited response, this future will transpose into Alternate Future #27, as Hezbollah will issue a condemnation and threaten revenge. Israel will respond with threats and warnings of its own.



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Alternate Future #9: Israel launches a full military assault against Hezbollah, while the United States and Lebanon choose to handle the situation through diplomatic channels This future does not have as much potential to transpose into another future in this scenario. This is due in large part to the nature of Israel’s response, which represents the highest level of escalation in the conflict. Therefore the only possibility in this conflict is for both sides to tone down the level of aggression, transposing into Alternate Future #27. In this future, Israel faces immense pressure from the international community to put an end to the operation, and is widely condemned for its “disproportionate response” to Hezbollah saber rattling. Eventually, the Obama administration will feel intense pressure to urge Israel to withdraw its forces from Lebanon. Israel reluctantly agrees, phasing the withdrawal out over a 72-hour period. Hezbollah, trying to recover from the onslaught, makes no effort to engage or provoke the IDF further. Once the IDF has returned to Israel, Hezbollah and the Israeli government will exchange warnings and threats, as both sides seek to frame the conflict in a manner that portrays their side in a better light to the international community. However, Israel will suffer a significant political cost for carrying out the operation, because of global perceptions that Israel “overreacted” to the threat posed by Hezbollah.

Alternate Future #6: Israel launches a full assault against Hezbollah in response to the group’s provocations, while the United States pursues a limited response, and Lebanon pursues diplomatic channels to address the situation This future provides ample opportunity for transposition despite the high state of escalation that this future represents. The United States can either further its involvement in the conflict, transposing this future into Alternate Future #3, or withdraw from the conflict, transposing this future into Alternate Future #9. In Alternate Future #3, Hezbollah will decide to engage American forces in Iraq, killing several in ambushes. The United States responds by escalating its involvement in the Lebanese conflict, in essence declaring all-out war against Hezbollah. The United States decides to coordinate the invasion with Israel, providing naval security and aerial monitoring of eastern Lebanon in an effort to stem the flow of weapons from Syria and Iran. After enduring international condemnation for the “irresponsible escalation” of the conflict and facing significant pressure to halt the operation, the United States and Israel withdraw. Hezbollah’s leadership survives the war, but the

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group sustains a severe blow to its military capacity. However, the United States and Israel pay a significant political cost to achieve this objective. In Alternate Future #9, the United States begins to suffer higher-thanexpected casualties in Lebanon. This development sours the American public and government on the merits of continued American involvement in Lebanon given the weak casus belli, and the United States withdraws from the country. The IDF continues the fight, but the confusion caused by the sudden American withdrawal stalls the IDF operation, and Israel withdraws its military from Lebanon. Hezbollah suffers damage to its military capabilities, but is able to claim a victory, pointing to the haphazard nature of the American and Israeli withdrawals. The last opportunity for transposition stems from an Israeli decision to halt its operation in Lebanon, transforming this future into Alternate Future #27. In this future, Israel begins to suffer higher-than-expected casualties and pressure mounts among the Israeli public to end the war especially in light of the weak casus belli. The government, afraid of its tenuous hold on power, acquiesces to the public demand and withdraws from Lebanon. The United States, which limited its response to logistical support, no longer has a mission in Lebanon and leaves the region. Hezbollah claims a victory despite the extensive damage done to Lebanon, while Israel begins the process of examining its shortcomings in yet another flawed invasion of Lebanon. Unlike in the aftermath of the 2006 war, Israel will determine that there was not sufficient reason to initiate such an ill-fated operation, and the Likud party will suffer significantly during the next general election.

Conclusion It is extremely unlikely that Hezbollah will abandon its mission to struggle against Israel. The struggle against Israel was a fundamental element behind the group’s formation and has come to define the group’s role within Lebanon and, increasingly, within the Muslim world as a whole. Unlike the nation-state militaries that marched on Israel under the banner of Pan-Arabism during the 1960s and 1970s, Hezbollah has enjoyed a reasonable level of success against the IDF. Hezbollah’s provocations are likely to draw an Israeli response of some kind in the future. In 2006, Hezbollah failed to recognize the proverbial “line in the sand” that Israel had drawn, and the group’s seemingly innocuous provocation prompted a staggering Israeli response. There is potential that the group could cross this line again by attacking an Israeli or Jewish target, particularly if the attack results in a high casualty count. Hezbollah has issued threats that it would conduct such an attack, and a thwarted attack in Baku earlier in 2009 is an ominous indicator that the



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group is pursuing a line of engagement that could push it and Israel to the brink of war. Israel’s utter unwillingness to define what action would warrant a limited response or a full-scale assault is a principled decision that is made in an effort to enhance strategic deterrence. Hezbollah, by virtue of its mission to confront Israel, is likely to try and strike a balance between a level of provocation that weakens Israeli resolve to resist concessions in the peace process and avoids provoking Israel to a full-scale assault. The chances that Hezbollah will succeed in this effort in the long term are almost non-existent. The analysis of alternate futures and the potential for transposition eventually points to a full-scale Israeli operation against Hezbollah at some time in the future. The United States is likely to exercise a degree of patience when confronting the prospects for war between Israel and Hezbollah. The potential for war in the Middle East is a concern for the United States as it begins a phased withdrawal from Iraq, and attempts to regain legitimacy as an arbitrator in the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians. A spike in oil prices that would accompany renewed hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah would adversely affect the deep recession that the United States is facing. In the event of a strong Hezbollah provocation, the Obama administration will find itself in the unenviable position of trying to coerce an increasingly suspicious and cynical ally to show restraint. If Israel launches a full-scale invasion, the United States would find itself in the position of trying to balance its promises to respect Israel’s right to self-defense with its efforts to regain the goodwill of the Muslim world and the European Union, who would surely condemn any far-reaching Israeli response. The Lebanese government is not enamored of Hezbollah’s attempts to confront Israel, but is essentially powerless to confront the group in any meaningful way. The Lebanese government is likely to be spurred to action only if it senses an existential threat to its existence or if it enjoys the full support of the United States. The latter is extremely unlikely, and Hezbollah will take steps to ensure that the government does not perceive the former to be the case. The greatest asset of the Lebanese government is its ability to put its army between an invading force and Hezbollah positions. Such a move is extremely risky, but likely to impair efforts to further engage Hezbollah, as an attack against the Lebanese army would draw round condemnation from across the world. Because of the prospect for American retaliation in concert with Israel, Hezbollah is extremely unlikely to conduct a terror attack against a Jewish target in the United States, or attack American interests overseas. The group apparently recognizes this truism and has attempted attacks in cities of countries such as Argentina and Azerbaijan, which lack the willingness or capacity to retaliate. Due to the international distribution of the Jewish

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population, Hezbollah’s potential list of targets is long, and while the Baku attack was thwarted, a determined campaign to conduct such an attack is likely to achieve success eventually. Such an attack is likely to be Hezbollah’s best chance to inflict a significant wound on Israel while avoiding a significant Israeli response. Whether Hezbollah intends to simply maintain its current level of rhetoric and provocation, or whether the group decides to take more aggressive actions, such as conducting a terror attack or launching a military attack of some kind against Israel, the group will continue to hold the world’s interest. In particular, Israel, the United States, and Lebanon will be significantly affected, and the courses of action of each actor will have a direct effect on Hezbollah. The conflict between Israel and Hezbollah is of vital strategic interest to all four actors, and represents the most significant threat to stability in the Middle East. Instability in the Middle East has global repercussions. The sharp divide in world opinion notwithstanding, conflicts in the Middle East put significant upward pressure on crude oil prices. This makes the promotion of peace a high priority among the world’s leading consumers of oil, especially the United States, which remains the world’s leading oil consumer. As long as Hezbollah retains its core mission of struggle against Israel, that peace is likely to remain elusive.

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Mazzetti, Mark and David E. Sanger (2009), “Obama Expands Missile Strikes Inside Pakistan.” NYTimes.com. February 20, 2009. http://www.nytimes. com/2009/02/21/washington/21policy.html [accessed June 24, 2009]. Mizroch, Amir (2008), “Ministry: Desalination can’t meet water needs.” JPost. com. May 14, 2008. http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=121066862892 5&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull [accessed June 17, 2009]. Mohamad, Husam (1998), “The PLO’s search for a peace strategy.” Peace Review 10, no. 2 (June), 173–9. MSNBC (2006), “Hezbollah chief hails ‘divine victory’.” MSNBC.com. http:// www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14953453/ [accessed June 10, 2009]. Naharnet (2006), “Nasrallah: If We Had Known … We Wouldn’t Have Captured Israeli Soldiers.” Naharnet. http://www.naharnet.com/domino/tn/Newsdesk.nsf/ Story/208AF7D7155AC5F2C22571D700634BB0?OpenDocument&PRINT [accessed June 20, 2009]. Nasr, Vali (2007), The Shia Revival. New York: W.W. Norton & Company. Nissan (2008), “Renault-Nissan and Project Better Place prepare for first mass marketed electric vehicles.” Renault-Nissan Better Place. http://www.nissanglobal.com/EN/NEWS/2008/_STORY/080121-02-e.html [accessed June 13, 2009]. Norton, Augustus Richard (2007), Hezbollah: A Short History. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Passner, Deborah (2006), “Hassan Nasrallah: In His Own Words.” Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting in America. http://www.camera.org/index. asp?x_print=1&x_context=7&x_issue=11&x_article=1158 [accessed July 18, 2009]. Ranstorp, Magnus (1997), Hizb’allah in Lebanon: the politics of the western hostage crisis. New York: Palgrave MacMillan. Rao, Prashant (2006), “Analysis: Hezbollah a force to be reckoned with.” Agence France Presse. July 18. http://www.iiss.org/whats-new/iiss-in-the-press/presscoverage-2006/july-2006/hezbollah-a-force-to-be-reckoned-with/ [accessed June 16, 2009]. Recovery.gov. “Where is your money going?” Recovery.gov. http://www.recovery. gov/?q=content/investments [accessed June 24, 2009]. Reuters UK (2007), “Israel voices satisfaction over U.S. aid increase.” Reuters UK. http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKL2931674820070729 [accessed June 24, 2009]. Salem, Paul (2006), “The Future of Lebanon.” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 6, 13–17. —(2008), “The after-effects of the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war.” Contemporary Arab Affairs 1, no. 1, 15–24. Sanger, David E. and Mark Mazzetti (2007), “Israel Struck Syrian Nuclear Project, Analysts Say.” NYTimes.com. October 14, 2007. http://www.nytimes. com/2007/10/14/washington/14weapons.html [accessed June 23, 2009]. Siegel, Robert and Ivan Watson (2006), “Lebanon Begins Post-War Recovery Effort.” NPR.org. http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript. php?storyId=5671702 [accessed June 14, 2009]. Spyer, Jonathan (2008), “Lebanon 2006: Unfinished War.” Middle East Review of International Affairs 12, no. 1 (March). http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2008/ issue1/jv12no1a1.asp [accessed June 9, 2009].

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Stratfor (2006), “Israeli Tanks and Hezbollah Countermeasures.” Stratfor.com http://www.stratfor.com/israeli_tanks_and_hezbollah_countermeasures [accessed June 13, 2009]. Sullivan, Antony T (2008), “War and Rumors of War: The Levantine Tinderbox.” Middle East Policy 15, no. 1 (Spring), 125–32. Time (2007), “Olmert Under Fire.” Time. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/ article/0,9171,1617518,00.html [accessed July 2, 2009]. Trend News (2007), “Those charged with an attempt to [sic] Israeli embassy, Gabala radar station in Azerbaijan to have closed trial.” Trend News. June 10, 2009. http://news-en.trend.az/azerbaijan/1485862.html [accessed June 10, 2009]. Troy, Gil (2009), “Center Field: Yom Kippur for the Left.” JPost.com. February 11, 2009. http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1233304754348&pagena me=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull [accessed June 14, 2009]. United Nations (2006), World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision. United Nations: Department of Economic and Social Affairs – Population Division. No. ESA/P/WP.202. Wachter, Paul (2002), “Hezbollah: Lebanon’s paper tiger.” Salon.com. http://dir. salon.com/story/news/feature/2002/04/10/lebanon/index.html [accessed June 3, 2009]. YaLibnan (2007), “Jumblatt: Lebanon’s Fatah al Islam was made in Syria.” YaLibnan. May 28, 2007. http://yalibnan.com/site/archives/2007/05/jumblatt_ lebano_3.php [accessed June 10, 2009].

CHAPTER SEVEN

The adaptability of the FARC and ELNand the prediction of their future actions

Author’s Note: This comprehensive predictive study by Mr Drew Lasater was originally his independent Capstone thesis for his Masters of Strategic Intelligence degree from American Military University, for which I served as his thesis chair. What is especially noteworthy about this study is its successful integration of the Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) with the LAMP, thus demonstrating that the two methods are not contradictory, but complementary.

Introduction Colombia is Latin America’s oldest democracy yet the nation has faced continual violence and a guerrilla war that has made the nation weak and fragmented. This violent foundation of the Colombian state made it open to a new wave of political ideologies in the twentieth century. The movement of Marxism-Leninism spread across Latin America, especially among the intellectuals, peasants, and priests in Colombia. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an analysis of the two main guerrilla factions in the country—the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) and the ELN (Ejército de Liberación Nacional)—and predict the future of these groups. Studying the history of these organizations and their adaptability within the Colombian context provides insight into the emergence of guerrilla warfare and the problems for the state.

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Colombia has been in social and political turmoil since independence. Like most Latin American countries, Colombia developed a political system based on an oligarchy between the political and landed elite, with the working poor and peasantry at the bottom. As Colombia began interacting with international markets and businesses it produced economic growth and prosperity for the elite while leaving the impoverished and marginalized populace open to the spread of revolutionary political ideologies. The FARC and ELN emerged as the masses at the bottom of the social strata were alienated by the ruling elite and their political system. While Colombia is a popularly elected democracy there was little participation or reward for those outside of the Liberal and Conservative parties. With the spread of revolutionary ideals across Latin America due to the success of the Cuban Revolution, the FARC and ELN found within Colombia the political and social context necessary to employ revolutionary strategies that continue today. Looking at these two revolutionary groups, their emergences, capacities for change, and durability, provides insights on revolutionary groups and their survival. The FARC and ELN have faced incredible odds due to the rejection of the local people, lack of external support, or weak organizations in general. But these two organizations have been able to strengthen, adapt, and expand even as public support has waned. They have survived with little or no external support and they have learned to become selfsufficient over time. Not only are these groups a model for the study of modern revolutionary movements but of the prevention of revolutionaries and counterinsurgency tactics as well. Very few revolutionary movements in history have been able to achieve the level of success and adaptability of these two organizations over nearly half a century. In the process of studying these groups, the political environment of Colombia and the twentieth-century background are also of great importance. The movement of Marxism throughout the world created hope for a utopian ideal which spoke to the disenfranchised and sparked the belief that the revolution was possible. The workers of the world only needed a cohesive leadership structure. In Colombia, the revolution was based on land redistribution and an equitable sharing of wealth. These ideals, coupled with the lack of social change in Colombia, have led to a long-standing revolutionary climate. Beginning in Part One, the chapter looks at the emergence of Marxism as a political ideology in the late 1800s. By 1917, Lenin interpreted Marxism to create what would be the first socialist country, Russia, after the Bolshevik Revolution. Part One then moves on to Stalinism and the spread of socialist ideology all over the world. After an overview of Stalin and Mao, the analysis takes up the Soviet and Mao influence in Latin America and the Cuban Revolution. This moves the work through the influence of the Cuban Revolution and the emergence of revolutionary ideology in Colombia. Part Two focuses on the FARC and the origins of the revolutionary group. Using liberalism as the theoretical approach and through rational choice



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modeling, the work will test hypotheses using a matrix diagram. The purpose of Part Two is to show the adaptability of the FARC as an explanation for their survival and ability to compete with the Colombian government. This also explains the ideology that formed the FARC and how that ideology has changed with the evolution of the revolutionary group. This research and framework will be the basis for the next part on the ELN as well. Part Three discusses the ELN and its origins as a revolutionary movement. This part also uses liberalism as its theoretical approach with the testing of hypotheses completed through rational choice modeling and a matrix diagram. The purpose of Part Three is to show the origins and ideology of the ELN and how that ideology changed as the political and social dynamic changed in Colombia. The ELN’s adaptability for survival and its ability to stay a strong revolutionary group is also discussed. This leads into the final part of the chapter on predicting the future of these groups. Part Four is a LAMP (Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction) study conducted on both the FARC and ELN using the actions of the government as a backdrop. Beginning with the political history of the government, Part Four explains how the government acts in Colombia and its motivations. By utilizing the liberalism theoretical approach that acknowledges the importance of non-state actors, the LAMP study focuses on the FARC and ELN actions and predicts the future actions and behaviors of these groups vis-à-vis actions by the state of Colombia. The study will outline the scenarios possible and provide a prediction of how the FARC and ELN will act based on past behaviors. This chapter sets out to present a chronological and historical analysis of the FARC and ELN and their effectiveness as revolutionary organizations. Through this process, the political and ideological events during the life spans of these groups will be considered and used to predict their possible futures. One cannot revolutionary activity in Colombia without considering the FARC and ELN. By studying the emergence and adaptability of both guerrilla groups, insights are to be gained in understanding the role of the revolutionaries in the Latin American social and political climate. It is the intent of this chapter to add to the literature on Colombia revolutionaries and through the use of new methods, offer new insights to the conflict in Colombia.

Part One: Marxist roots of the FARC and ELN Introduction In post-World War II Latin America, Marxist-inspired insurgency groups formed in response to the unequal distribution of land ownership and wealth,

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and ongoing state-sponsored violence. This part forms the background necessary to trace the Marxist influence from the 1800s through Lenin, Stalin, and Mao, as applicable to Latin America, particularly in Colombia’s FARC and ELN. Karl Marx planted the seeds of revolution in his creation of a comprehensive social and political philosophy that would become known as classical Marxism. While the creation of what became Marxism was the result of many philosophers, Marx was the dominating philosophy from which the political form of communism from Lenin, Stalin, and Mao was created. Marxism was never applied during his lifetime, but Marx’s writings became the root system for the practical applications of communism by nations and revolutionaries throughout the world. These communist/socialist ideologies were similar in that they stemmed from Marx’s ideas of class struggle and class equity. With Marxism providing the philosophical side of the communist movement, Lenin and Stalin interpreted Marx’s ideology through the application of his principles and ideals in Russia. While the actual result of the Soviet experience was far from what Marx had hoped for or predicted, the Russian Revolution became the springboard for the expansion of communist and socialist ideologies around the globe, where they were employed especially in the Third World. Once communism reached China and Latin America, revolutionary movements began that are still active today.

Marxism Marx’s social and political philosophy was a grand narrative, a critique of modern capitalism in European industrial society. One looking at Karl Marx and his work must understand that “Marx was not an academic writer but a humanist in the Renaissance sense of the term: his mind was concerned with the totality of human affairs, and his vision of social liberation embraced as an interdependent whole, all of the major problems with which humanity is faced.”1 This explains how the writings of Marx were more romantic and less practical, where his works tended to follow general ideas rather than practical means for attaining social and political goals. As editor of Rheinische Zeitung, Marx focused on political abuses and socio-economic inequality.2 He decried the monopolization of wealth and property, declaring the poor “the elemental class of human society.”3 The works of Marx follow “three fields of speculation—basic philosophic anthropology, socialist doctrine, and economic analysis—and point to three corresponding sources in German dialectics, French socialist thought, and British political economy.”4 Marx was introduced to Hegelianism which “was the interpretation of history as a progressive rationalization of the world in accordance with the ineluctable laws of the spirit; the chief purpose of philosophical thought was to observe this evolution, in which empirical



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reality was seen gradually to conform to universal reason.”5 Hegel’s “idea” of the state was turned by Marx into the “reality” of the “crass pursuit of self-interest and slavish service to aristocratic and bourgeois interests” by the Prussian bureaucracy.6 Marx took from Hegel the notion of history unfolding, but rather than by “laws of the spirit” the unfolding was a function of historically material processes. Marx’s criticism of religion is evident in his Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right on man and religion as they pertain to politics: Man is the world of man, the state, and society. This state, this society produce religion’s inverted attitude to the world, because they are an inverted world themselves. Religion is … the imaginary realization of human being, because human being possesses no true reality. Thus the struggle against religion is indirectly the struggle against that world whose spiritual aroma is religion … Religion is the opium of the people. The real happiness of the people requires the abolition of religion, which is their illusory happiness. In demanding that they give up illusions about their condition, we demand that they give up a condition that requires illusion … Once the holy form of human self-alienation has been unmasked, the first task of philosophy, in the service of history, is to unmask self-alienation in its unholy forms. The criticism of heaven is thus transformed into criticism of earth, the criticism of religion into the criticism of law, and the criticism of theology into the criticism of politics.7 Marx looked at the state of Germany for example and discussed its liberation: We must make the actual oppression even more oppressive by making people conscious of it, and the insult even more insulting by publicizing it … We must force these petrified relationships to dance by playing their own tune to them. To give people courage, we must teach them to be alarmed by themselves.”8 For Marx, it was necessary for the oppressed classes to be relieved of their religion as an opiate, which kept them from acting on their collective alienation. Marx explains how the “social revolution can only be carried out by a class whose particular interests coincide with that of all society, and whose claims represent universal needs.”9 With that, Marx portrays the liberation of the proletariat and its abolition as a separate class resulting in the subsequent destruction of class distinctions by abolishing private property.10 Marx first discussed socialism not as a substitution of one political life by another but as the “abolition of politics altogether.”11 He looked at

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socialism as the “full emancipation of the individual by the destruction of the web of mystification which turned community life into a world of estrangement presided over by an alienated bureaucracy.”12 According to Marx, capitalism separates the individual from their means of production, concentrates production and its means in the hands of capitalists, and achieves cooperative activity through coercion.13 This unrestrained pursuit of self-interest generates tension between the individual activity and cooperation.14 These ideas make the assumption that there can be a perfect union between collective and individual interests and that a society where all sources of conflict, aggression, and evil have been removed was thinkable and historically imminent.15 Marx held that the bourgeois “freedom dissolves feudal ties and extends formal rights, but neither sustains community nor provides adequate opportunities for those below the middle class.”16 Marx intended a “practical philosophy” over the “contemplative” attitudes of his predecessors and peers: “The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it”17 Marx believed that the primary source of social conflict lies within the division of labor and the resulting class antagonisms.18 Since this division of labor is the primary cause of social inequality and private property, the chief goal of communism is to abolish the division of labor and allow men to take part in all types of work and thus achieve all-round development.19 Leveling social divisions by abolishing property ownership and class distinctions promotes the conditions for revolution. “First, the state of servitude must become intolerable and the masses must be deprived of possessions totally opposed to the existing order20… Second, technical development must have reached an advanced stage: communism in a premature state would only be generalized poverty.”21 Communism must also occur on the global stage where each county is economically interdependent on each other, which is brought about by simultaneous revolution in the most dominant and advanced countries.22 While “previous revolutions have altered the division of labor and distribution of social activity,” communism as a revolution will abolish labor and class divisions in the human race.23 Thus it will “bring about a universal transformation in the terms of production and exchange.”24 Marx’s materialist analyses stress class struggles over the forms of property and his focus was on the social relationships associated with material factors rather than material conditions “per se.”25 Materialism, according to Marx, points to productive forces as the “ultimate causal agent” of major change but class struggle is the immediate “motor.”26 Marxist ideas of historical materialism give rise to class antagonism; against which Marx encourages the proletariat to resist, but Marx also realized that as production yields surpluses capable of freeing a significant portion of the populace from labor a fundamental “class split” arises into the “ruling classes” and “direct producers.”27 This “split” is



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the foundation for “class struggle” which creates new class structures and reshapes social life.28 The problem is that complex splits between fragments in single classes and cross-class alliances through legal “orders” and status groups causes “internecine” conflict.29 For that reason, Marx’s portrayal of extremely fragmented class relations through ethnic, racial, gender, religious, and other socio-cultural divisions hinder class struggles.30 While it was not until years after Marx that Latin America adopted his revolutionary ideology, there are distinct class fragmentations in the region that epitomize the problems Marx saw in class struggles. In 1847–48, Marx and Engels31 were asked to join a League of Communist bodies from many European nations.32 On the advice of Marx and Engels, the name was changed to The Communist League and coined the motto ‘Proletarians of all countries, unite!’33 It was at this time that the league created the “Principles of Communism.”34 These principles “dealt with capitalist exploitation and the inevitability of crises and described the future society based on community of goods, political democracy, equal wages, and planned industrial production” and also explained the necessity of simultaneous revolution in civilized countries.35 In 1848, the first Manifesto of the Communist Party was published, where relationships “between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, between the communists and the proletariat, and between communism and existing socialist doctrines” are dealt with.36 The Communist Manifesto makes the call for global communism in a proletarian “conquest of political power” through the abolition of private property and social classes.37 The Manifesto also anticipated critiques of communism with these rebuttals38 [in italics, added]: 1 The abolition of private property will lead to general idleness and

the collapse of production. But private property does not exist today for the masses, yet society exists and maintains itself. 2 Communism is the denial of individuality. Yes—of such individuals as are enabled by the system to use their own property as an instrument for the enslavement of others. 3 Communism destroys the family. It destroys the bourgeois family, based on property-ownership on the one hand and on prostitution and hypocrisy on the other. Big business has destroyed the family life of the proletariat. 4 Communism is against nationality. But the working man has no fatherland, so how can he be deprived of one? In any case the world market is effacing national differences, and the victory of the proletariat will intensify this process. When the exploitation of man by man is abolished we shall also see an end of exploitation, oppression, and enmity among nations. National oppression is the outcome of social oppression.

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5 Communism seeks to destroy the eternal truths and sublime ideas

of religion, ethics, and philosophy. But all the ideas bequeathed by history are absolute only in so far as exploitation and oppression have persisted despite all changes in political systems. The spiritual output of mankind is as changeable as the conditions of human existence; ideas are permanent in so far as particular relations have hitherto been permanent. Communism overthrows “eternal” ideas by destroying the class system which, by existing from time immemorial, gave them the appearance of eternity.39

Marxism focused on the domain of social philosophy and while Marxism was being used as an ideology for a political movement, the philosophy required interpretation and specification which caused tensions and contradictions within Marxism previously unnoticed.40 Even more difficult was the application of Marx’s prophecies concerning the nature of communism.41 Since Marx explained that “socialism deposes objective economic laws and enables men to control the conditions of their lives, it is easy to infer that a socialist society can do anything it likes,” and thus Marx’s dream of unity could “take the form of a despotic party oligarchy.”42 Marx asserted that the “first phase of communist society would carry the defects of capitalism’s limited economic and cultural development.”43 He contended that the “first step in the revolution … is to raise the proletariat to the position of ruling class to win the battle for democracy.”44 However, Marx realized that in this first phase the “state can be nothing but the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat” and that the political wing of the proletariat would “expropriate the bourgeoisie and centralize primary means of production and infrastructure.”45 On another occasion, Marx used the term “dictatorship of the proletariat” and never explained what it meant but he “had in mind the class content of the power system and not, as Lenin did, the liquidation of democratic institutions.”46 The implication of the first phase was a total centralization of power which would employ “despotic” force to implement its modernization plan.47 According to Marx, the communist state authorities had to monopolize power and ignore calls for “freedom for the communities” or “self government” in order to create a productive and socio-cultural infrastructure for a break with bourgeois society.48 “The Leninist-Stalinist version of Marxism was no more than a version, i.e. one attempt to put into practice the ideas that Marx expressed in a philosophical form without any clear principles of political interpretation.”49

Leninism By the 1890s Marxism came into public debate in Russia but was used mainly to denounce capitalism and its effects, and to support Russia



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choosing a path of its own.50 It was through the October Revolution that Lenin’s presence and activity in forming the Bolshevik Party was an indispensable condition of the revolution’s outbreak and success.51 Leninism has been disputed as a variant of Marxism; some see it as “a ‘revisionist’ ideology in relation to the Marxist tradition,” and others see it as a “faithful application of the general principles of Marxism to a new political situation.”52 Lenin looked only at the singular aim of the revolution “and the meaning of all human affairs, ideas, institutions, and values resided exclusively in their bearing on the class struggle.”53 While Marx and Engels supported these ideas, their focus was much broader than the Lenin focus: “Is this good or bad for the revolution?”54 There are three specific points that call into question the fidelity of Lenin to the Marxist tradition.55 First, Lenin “advocated an alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry as the basic strategies for the ‘bourgeois revolution,’ while his opponents contended that an alliance with the bourgeoisie would be more in accordance with the doctrine in this case.”56 “Secondly, Lenin was the first to see the national question as a powerful reservoir of energy that social democrats could and should use to further their cause, instead of merely an awkward hindrance.”57 Third, Lenin created his own organizational rules and his own version of the party attitude towards resistance by the workers.58 As critical as his opponents were about these policies, they were necessary to the success of the Bolshevik Revolution.59 Lenin’s ideas of the party were considered despotic and are considered by some historians as the beginning of the entire “hierarchical, totalitarian structure in which the socialist system was subsequently embodied.”60 Lenin was accused of elitism; he desired to substitute a revolutionary organization for the working class and that the power should reside with the intelligentsia rather than proletariat.61 It was understood that socialism’s theoretical foundations had to be laid by intellectuals and it was also accepted that the workers’ party differed from the working class since nothing in the writings of Marx showed the two as one and the same.62 To Lenin, the workingclass movement in the true sense of the term was a movement of the right ideology, not a movement of workers.63 While it was important for Lenin to have as many workers in the party as possible, he looked at the party as an entity where the distinction of intellectuals and workers disappeared if provided with the correct theoretical consciousness.64 The “consciousness of the proletariat” would be embodied despite what the general proletariat thought of the party.65 Hence, it was the premise of Lenin that “requires us to believe that the interests and aims of the social class, the proletariat, can and indeed must be determined without that class having any say in the matter.”66 This hegemonic idea developed into an authoritative party role, which was a “despotism” based on the idea that the “party always knows better the interests, needs, and even desires” of the community than do the

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“backward people” themselves.67 “In this way Lenin laid the foundation of what was to become the Communist Party—a party distinguished by ideological unity, efficiency, a hierarchic and centralized structure, and the conviction that it represents the interest of the proletariat whatever the proletariat itself may think.”68 This party deems its own interests to be that of the working class and of “universal progress” due to its “scientific knowledge” that entitles it to ignore the “actual wishes and aspirations of the people it appointed itself to represent.”69 Lenin was the first and only important social democrat in Europe to invoke the idea that the proletariat would militarily overthrow the government to turn the war from imperialist to civil.70 Lenin believed that the Russian Revolution would spark an international or at least a European revolution based on the “rising tide of revolution and the outbreaks in Bavaria, Hungary, and Estonia, but also on Lenin’s conviction that the European war could only be stopped by overthrowing capitalism.”71 When it became clear that the greater European proletariat would not follow Lenin or “would fail trying” and that the end of the war could be brought about by alternative means there was the question of what the party was to do with their new found power.72 Thus began the dispute with Stalin and Trotsky over socialism in one state and “whether the building of socialism in Russia should be subordinated to the cause of the world revolution or vice versa.”73 It is evident, however, that after Russia’s Revolution Lenin’s attention was dedicated to policy as the head of state and not the leader of a worldwide revolution.74 While the Russian Revolution was a communist revolution in the sense that it transferred power to the Communist Party, it did not follow the Marxist predictions for the downfall of capitalist society.75

Stalinism This brings the final phase of communism in Russia to the forefront since the era of Stalin was significant in the international scene with both the expansion of Soviet influence and the onset of the Cold War. The rule of Stalin was horrific but largely accidental in its application.76 For many communists, the emergence of Stalinism occurred as a result of the circumstances of the era, such as the cultural and industrial backwardness in Russia, the failure of an anticipated European revolution, external threats to Russia, and the political exhaustion of the Soviet state after the revolution, rather than the despotism of Stalin himself.77 Many observers see the Soviet system under Stalin as the continuation of Marxism and Leninism, which can be best described as an “all-powerful authority competent to declare at any given moment what Marxism was and what it was not.”78 Marxism meant nothing more or less than what Stalin currently pronounced and



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unlike Lenin, the regime of Stalin was unique in that it became an international phenomenon.79 Stalin used pieces of work from Marx, Engels, and Lenin to support his ideology, which seemed to change frequently. Upon Stalin’s rise to power it became clear that the Russians needed to set forth a socialist transformation in their own country first before they could inspire revolutions around the world.80 This was very similar to the circumstances Lenin found after the revolution when he realized his efforts had to be directed to head the state. Essentially, Marxism under Stalin differed from Leninism by adding the two main tenets: 1) socialism could be built in one country alone; and 2) “that the class struggle must become fiercer as the building of socialism progressed.”81 These tenets were unique in that Stalin was the first to realize the importance of Soviet support for communism around the world rather than waiting for world support of communism. Stalin’s ideology made exportation of Marxist-inspired revolutionary ideas possible. Stalinism subsequently began spreading throughout the international communist movement and revolutionary groups began forming in Europe.82 These international ties were fueled in the Second Communist International when Lenin stated that colonial and backward countries needed communists to enter into alliances with national revolutionary movements, yet remain separate and keep the bourgeoisie from controlling the revolutionary movement.83 This would support a Soviet republic from the outset, and under the Soviet leadership, these backward countries would not have to go through a capitalist phase.84 A document called the Twenty-One Conditions was also created to make joining communist parties adhere to the forms of Leninist organization of the movement.85 These conditions stated that communist parties must subordinate their propaganda activities to the decisions of the Communist International (Comintern), the communist press was under party control, and the “sections” must combat reformists by removing reformists and centralists from workers’ parties.86 Within their country’s armed forces, the “sections” must carry out systematic propaganda.87 “They must combat pacifism, support colonial liberation movements, be active in workers’ organizations and especially trade unions, and make efforts to win peasant support.”88 In parliament, communist agents must make revolutionary propaganda their primary concern and “parties must be centralized to the maximum, observe iron discipline, and periodically purge their ranks of petty-bourgeois elements.”89 All parties had to unquestioningly support Soviet republics, their programs had to be endorsed by a congress of the Comintern or its Executive Committee, and such decisions were binding on all sections.90 Finally, all parties must call themselves communist and those in countries where they can operate openly must also maintain clandestine organizations for actions at the “decisive moment.”91 This document underpinned international support for the movement of communism from Soviet Russia to Europe and beyond.

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Third World By the end of World War II, Marxism-Leninism became the ideology of the Soviet state, which meant little more than Stalin’s version of the two with the characteristic feature of “the interests of the governing stratum of a totalitarian state” and “its combination of extreme rigidity and extreme flexibility.”92 After Stalin, the “New Left” could be characterized by European and North American student organizations that believed that the concept of a society ready for revolution is a “bourgeois deceit and that any properly organized group can make a revolution” and bring social change to any country.93 For the “New Left,” the ideology reverted to classical Marxism and renewed attacks on the imperialism of the West, the arms race, and colonialism.94 “The revolution must be worldwide, total, absolute, unlimited, and all embracing.”95 For the New Left, the working class could not be relied on since they had been co-opted by the bourgeoisie under what Marx would call “false consciousness.” Finally, the patterns for total revolution were to be found in the Third World where the heroes of the New Left were Asian and Latin American revolutionaries.96 Due to imperialism, colonialism, poverty, and oppression, the Third World Marxian ideology resonated with the social and political struggles of the area. Shortly after World War II, Maoism began influencing the communists of Latin America and in many respects transported ideologies. Traditional communist parties borrowed Maoist ideology due to the movement of Chinese “franchises” into Latin America and the idea of a prolonged revolution.97 Another reason for the movement of Maoism into the region was as a result of the appeal to those of the far left that were disillusioned by the pro-Soviet communist parties, an example being “Castroism.”98 The guerrilla warfare of the Chinese Maoists became the guidebook for Ernest “Che” Guevara and Fidel Castro in Cuba. Even though the revolution in Cuba did not begin as a communist revolution, by 1961 Cuba was firmly a socialist country.99 It would be the Castro shift to Soviet socialist ideology that would eventually force Guevara to leave Cuba and spread his own revolutionary ideology. The 1960s brought acute global problems into view that needed to be solved on a widespread basis: overpopulation, environmental pollution, and the poverty, backwardness, and economic failures of the Third World.100 These structural deformities gave rise to guerilla movements throughout Latin America. But the many failures of Latin American movements paralleled the failures of Lenin in his experience with the Bolshevik Revolution. The failure of guerrilla movements in Latin America was attributed not to the “objective and subjective” conditions that were central to early Marxists but a failure of organization and an inability to “act intelligently and cohesively in mobilizing the population” for the struggle.101



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This thinking directly parallels the problems Lenin faced in the Russian Revolution and as a result Latin American guerrilla activity is simply a “latter-day, rurally oriented union of Leninist theory and praxis.”102 The emphasis on intelligent organization proposed by Lenin fueled the debate between the followers of Che Guevara and Mao.103 Che developed his revolutionary ideology from the Mao example of prolonged revolution, but he would later diverge into his own revolutionary ideology. Despite differences, both schools of thought believed that the “masses are there, waiting to be mobilized” and revolutionaries simply have to “push the right buttons” to create a revolution.104 Upon the rise of the New Left in the Third World, two new major communist forces would be established—in the form of Maoism in China, and its influence on Guevara and Castro in revolutionary Cuba. At the beginning of Castro’s rise to power, support for the region was coming from both the Chinese and the Soviets.105 Since Castro’s emergence was based on the use of guerrilla warfare, Maoist support seemed evident.106 However, shortly after the Cuban missile crisis, Castro developed a deep dependency on the political, military, diplomatic, and economic aid from the Soviet Union due to the conflict with the United States.107 By 1966, Castro publicly split from the Chinese over their refusal to aid Cuba, and through 1968, Castro began rallying revolutionary parties in the Third World, organizing a rough equivalent to the Comintern.108 It would be the reliance of Castro on the Soviets and his shift in ideology that drove Che to create his own revolutionary ideology. In Latin America the Cuban Revolution set the model for revolutionary groups, as well as throughout the Third World.109 Guevara had synthesized the lessons of the Cuban Revolution into three principles: “1) popular forces can win a war against the army; 2) it is not necessary to wait until all the conditions for revolution exist; the insurrection can create them; 3) in underdeveloped America the countryside is the basic area for armed fighting.”110 Throughout his works, Guevara explained how the necessary elements for revolution existed across Latin America including poverty, oppression, and class conflict.111 Bypassing the possibilities for peaceful insurrection, Guevara declared that the subjective conditions to the belief in revolution and the will to revolt could be created by the “insurrectional foco.”112 As Guevara set his guerrilla ideals into motion, many revolutionary groups throughout Latin America began taking up arms. Colombia was not exempt from the spread of revolutionary uprisings.

Colombia In “The Possibility of Nonviolent Revolution,” an 1872 essay, Marx asserted that the proletariat can attain goals by peaceful means but for

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most countries this is not the case and the “lever of our revolution must be force.”113 This is more applicable to Colombia than any other country today. In 1917 the Bolshevik Revolution engineered by Lenin was watched closely in Colombia.114 By 1924 a Marxist study group which called itself a “Communist Party” was formed with the help of Vicente Staviskya, a Russian immigrant, and was related to the Liberal Party, which by 1926 became the Revolutionary Socialist Party (PSR) of the Third Communist International.115 After ideological divisions, the PSR became the Communist Party of Colombia (PCC), a pro-Soviet party with the intention of improving workers’ rights and organizing “peasant leagues” in rural areas and “popular fronts” in urban areas.116 PCC members watched the Castro takeover of Cuba and the division that was caused by the USSR–China split over Maoism.117 This disrupted the unity of the PCC and it divided into various factions following different ideologies of the time.118 As a result of the “Sino-Soviet crisis,” two leading divisions emerged from the PCC: the pro-Moscow or mainstream PCC, and the pro-Peking Marxist-Leninist Communist Party (PCML).119 It was the radical, militant members of the PCML that split into the Marxist “Southern Block” in the late 1940s which became the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) less than 15 years later.120 During the time of the Cuban Revolution, Colombia was in an era known as La Violencia. This era is important because of the changes in Colombia during and after the period due to the loss of over 200,000 lives in 15 to 20 years.121 This era can be broken into four periods. The first period witnessed the 1948 assassination of Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, leader of the Liberal Party, which was the galvanizing moment of political tension.122 The second period was marked by the quick spread of guerrilla warfare throughout the country as revolutionary groups armed themselves against partisan attack.123 To make matters worse the conservative controlled government used the national police and the army for partisan ends which further mobilized the liberal peasantry.124 It was at this point that General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla overthrew the government and installed a military dictatorship to regain control of the country.125 In the third period of La Violencia, this dictatorship started to see a downward trend as progress stalled, corruption increased, pockets of violence were met with repression, and guerrilla warfare began to spread again.126 The fourth period of La Violencia saw the first “split” National Front government (a two-party, four-year alternating power system) which, with the help of the United States, instituted the best counter-guerrilla operations in the Western hemisphere.127 This marked the end of La Violencia but with the Cold War in full swing, the Marxist/Stalinist/Soviet-inspired FARC and Castro/Che Guevara-inspired ELN represented a new era in Colombian revolutionary activity. The new era of Colombian revolutionary activity began in earnest in the 1960s, when communism was fully operable in Russia and China. During



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this time the first nuclei of the FARC formed which followed a Sovietcommunist ideology.128 The ELN, which followed a Che Guevara-type of communist ideology, built their support among the marginalized campesinos due to the failure of agrarian reforms and the political exclusion imposed by the bi-party system of the National Front.129 Shortly after the Cuban Revolution, the Movimiento Obero-Estudiantil-Campensino (MOEC) was formed using Fidelista teachings by setting up a guerrilla “foco” in Vichada, Colombia.130 There is no doubt that the MOEC was the ideological and organizational base for the ELN.131 A number of Latin American radicals made the trip to Cuba, which became a revolutionary “Mecca” where revolutionaries were spiritually prepared and militarily trained for the struggle.132 This was especially effective when groups of revolutionaries such as the ELN went to train together and returned to follow “The Cuban Road.”133 Like many revolutionary groups of the era, the FARC and ELN had similar goals even though their means differed greatly. Aside from some middle-class leaders and a priest who joined the ELN, both the FARC and ELN have remained isolated from the urban social currents of Colombia and have remained distant from the political leadership.134 Due to the lack of “stable and systematic alliances with the urban sectors of the trade unions or university fronts” the guerrillas have been politically weak on the national scale.135 On the local scale the guerrillas have been able to form networks of supporters and sympathizers.136 For the FARC, their agrarian tradition and ties to the Communist Party are a testament to their pro-Soviet/Stalinist ideals, but their rural origins puts them closer to “secular caciquismo” and clientelism.137 The FARC has survived the years due to the Leninist “Democratic Centralism” inherited from the Communist Party, which maintains the unity of command even though the combatants are scattered over a fragmented geography.138 The ELN has adopted a more federalist approach.139 For the FARC, the focus is on a clear chain of command that requires cohesion, while the ELN leaders on their respective fronts have more autonomy. It is the organization, culture, and behavior of these two organizations that make them so unique. Having traced the Marxist inspired trajectories of the Colombian FARC and ELN from classical Marxism through the model Latin American Marxist revolutionaries, Che Guevara and Fidel Castro, the focus now turns to an analysis of the development of the FARC (Part Two) and the ELN (Part Three). Marxism is at the core of both organizations but their differing ideologies and revolutionary styles created very different outcomes for these organizations. After the Cold War and the fall of Marxist communist ideologies around the world in the late twentieth century, both of these groups were faced with the question of viability. The problems of adaptation in the post-Cold War era produced very different outcomes for the FARC and ELN as they exist today.

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Part Two: The FARC’s adaptability Introduction The history of Colombia has been fraught with violent conflict and an unstable political system. The peasants in the country have been impoverished, marginalized, and oppressed by the military and the government to the point that they have banded together to defend themselves against their enemies. The galvanizing point for revolution was reached during the period of La Violencia, when in 1947 Manuel Marulanda Velez began the nucleus of liberal guerrilla units that would become the FARC.140 This occurred as communism was fully operable worldwide, as the Chinese revolution emerged and the Soviet Union became a global superpower.141 The Cuban Revolution served as a great inspiration to the FARC because the war was based on land reform and redistribution of wealth.142 It was at this point the FARC was founded in 1966 within the peasantry to create a parallel state that could provide basic services to the rural areas where the Colombian government had been failing. The FARC was founded upon pro-Soviet communist principles and slowly expanded into new territories as their ranks swelled with those that had lost faith in the Colombian state. Areas of quasi-independence were soon under the influence of the Colombian Communist Party and bases of “peasant republics” were created.143 As the organization grew it was forced to change in many ways to survive at a time when the government and military were determined to eradicate the group and its followers. These changes within the FARC and its structure allowed it to grow in size and strength, enabling it to create a power struggle with the government for control of the rural areas and the people residing in them. As the FARC gained strength in numbers while increasing control of land and resources, their ability to branch out into illicit commerce and trade created a state within a state. The FARC has succeeded where many failed in the sense of survival because of this ability to adapt and change. Due to flexibility in their structure, political, and economic ties, the organization has been able to thrive over the years where hundreds of other guerrilla groups have dwindled away. But along with adaptation the group has also changed its goals. After gaining strength in numbers and land, their ability to wage war against the national government has increased and they have been able to create partnerships with other criminal and political entities that have expanded the reach of the organization.144 As a result of their flexibility, the group has become increasingly independent despite some support derived from the communist nations during the Cold War. The FARC has separated its cause from the international communist movement and forced the world to treat it as an independent entity.145 Also, since



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the Cold War illicit crop production has become an increasing part of the funding and capabilities of the regional guerrilla groups thus furthering their independence. Together with the US government, the Colombian government has fostered an extensive effort to contain and eradicate the FARC insurgency, of which Plan Colombia is the latest incarnation. The US involvement in fighting the FARC has foreign policy implications for the region which makes the study of the organization an imperative. By looking into the history of the organization and its structure, the adaptive strategies can be analyzed. By understanding these fundamentals of the organization there is a better understanding of the FARC and how to use that knowledge against the organization for the purpose of negotiations and possible eradication. For the purpose of this part of the chapter, the focus will be on the organizational structure of the FARC and how it has changed since the Cold War. More specifically, the focus will be on how the organization has adapted its structure to survive and thrive in Colombia.

Literature review The following works represent an important portion of the literature on the FARC and their evolution in Colombia over the years. The literature demonstrates the history of the FARC and their growth as a guerrilla group. The literature will also show the changes in the operations of the FARC over the years and their ability to adapt and survive where other groups have been dissolved. In Colombia: A Brutal History, Geoff Simons gives a thorough history of the violence from the historical roots to modern times as a result of government and non-governmental actors. Simons positions the emergence of the FARC in the struggle for the state to become stable and secure after the La Violencia era from 1948 to 1965.146 The guerrilla group expanded and gained in stature during the early years,147 while it played a role in subversion as the government was preoccupied with cartels and the war on drugs.148 At this point the FARC and their actions were described in the context of the beginning of the Ernesto Samper administration and how the group used kidnapping and military action to influence political actions.149 The work moves to 1996–7 where the government was dealing with the onset of a full guerrilla war and the ties between the illicit drug trade and the guerrillas.150 Throughout these years in Colombia the US had tremendous influence in the military and political aspects of Colombia’s wars and the author shows how even with the help of the US the multifront battle was becoming too much for the Colombian government to handle.151 The next portion of the Colombian timeline is represented by the Pastrana administration (1998–2001) and the beginnings of the long

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attempts to negotiate peace with the FARC.152 This period really marked a turning point where the guerrilla groups demanded recognition as political entities within the country and the government was forced to negotiate. These peace talks with the Pastrana administration and the US involvement brought on by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 are detailed, as are the subsequent changes in US–Colombia relations.153 While this work gives some great insight to the history of the conflict in Colombia, it is a broad look at all of the conflicting groups and focuses on the Colombian and US governments. The following three works establish the effect of the Cold War and its end on the revolutionaries in Colombia. In “Insurgent Strategies in the Post-Cold War: The Case of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia,” Roman D. Ortiz discusses the adaptation of the guerrillas in Colombia to begin a new style of armed conflict.154 The work begins with a look at the insurgent groups as they developed during the Cold War.155 The ineffectiveness of the groups during these years and their strong ideological foundations necessitated the evolution of the FARC movement with their political ideology into a position as an alternative public manager.156 Ortiz looks at the growth and expansion of the FARC and discusses their split from the Communist Party thus giving the organization a unique identity.157 At this point the FARC changed their model of military action and increased their capabilities as they were able to build up their arsenal to a size unseen in guerrilla groups and increase the income of the organization to hundreds of millions of dollars.158 Finally, Ortiz covers the current problems the large organization is now facing and their emerging vulnerabilities.159 This work provides an in-depth look at the changes in the ideology of the group and their emergence as a military force in Colombia. In the article “Why the end of the Cold War doesn’t matter: The US war of terror in Colombia,” Doug Stokes discusses US involvement in the region and the Cold War style of intervention that came to Colombia as a result.160 Stokes establishes the links between the guerrillas and the illicit drug trade after the Cold War and how these organizations support the illicit activities.161 The author concludes with a look at how the new US war on terror has produced a dual purpose battle in Colombia where fighting the illicit drug trade has become a tactic in counterinsurgency.162 While the work focuses on US–Colombian relations, it also explains the past and current methods to combat both the guerrilla war and the drug war at the same time. “A Shift in the Paradigm of Violence: Non-Governmental Terrorism in Latin America since the end of the Cold War,” by Andreas Feldmann, demonstrates how terrorism is currently used by guerrilla groups to exert influence on governments.163 The work focuses on terrorism alone and thus the content is subject to the author’s interpretation of terrorism. While the study looks at Latin America as a whole, Feldmann points out



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that the FARC repeatedly uses terrorist actions in their overall strategy to their advantage.164 He outlines the use of bombings and massacres by the FARC as a method of control and spreading fear among the populace in Colombia.165 This work helps to explain the evolution of the group’s tactics from military actions to terrorist actions since the Cold War. The next four works focus on the increasing criminality of the armed rebel groups in Colombia and their ability to combat the government and military. In “The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Illicit Drug Trade,” by Ricardo Vargas, the author attempts to explain how the cartels have become anti-guerrilla yet since the farmers of coca plants are in guerrilla areas they have been assumed to be one and the same.166 The dynamic between the farmers, the guerrillas, the cartels, and the military is a result of these intertwining operations.167 In “The role of the state in the international illicit drug trade: the case of Colombia and external intervention,” Julius Walker explains the roles the guerrilla forces play in this dynamic and their actions in the country.168 It is imperative for understanding how these organizations are operating in this new climate to compare their more ideological beginnings. That brings up the next work, “Criminal Rebels? A Discussion of war and criminality from the Colombian experience” by Francisco Gutierrez Sanin. The author discusses the beginnings of the guerrilla organizations in Colombia and how they turned to criminal activities for profit.169 Sanin breaks down the beginning activities of the FARC and how the new enterprises of drugs, kidnapping, and extortion have turned the organization into a thriving money-maker.170 The author concludes the study by applying ten tenets for being a member of the guerrilla organizations and how these apply to the debate about whether these groups are rebels or criminals.171 Finally, Colombian Army Adaptation to FARC Insurgency by Thomas Marks describes the beginning of the FARC as a military force, its dynamic as a rebel group, and how it was able to combat the military as it expanded in operational capability and scope.172 At this point, the military and police response to combating the FARC is discussed but more importantly the adaptability of the FARC in their actions in order to thwart military and police attempts to recapture guerrilla zones.173 While the military or police portions of the work are not relevant to this study, his work provides invaluable information on how the FARC has developed financially, operationally, and militarily. In “Non-State Actors in Colombia: Threats to the State and the Hemisphere” Max G. Manwaring describes the war in Colombia being fought on three fronts. Manwaring breaks down and discusses each of the three groups and focuses on how the FARC has taken control of rural land and populations, along with the linking factors within these groups that make them so difficult to combat.174 This research is useful in terms of the goals and objectives of the FARC and how their growth is possible despite the factors competing against the organization.

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In the final work, “A Subnational Study of Insurgency: FARC Violence in the 1990s,” Jennifer S. Holmes, Sheila Amin Gutierrez de Pineres, and Kevin M. Curtin use the scientific method to test theories of insurgencies.175 Using a Poisson model, the authors look to examine traditional factors purported to explain insurgencies and then “extend the analysis to reveal the role of coordination and contagion using spatial econometric techniques.”176 The study begins with the origins and growth of the FARC and all of the contributing factors to the insurgency.177 Through a subnational level analysis, the increase in violence with the advent of the drug trade is discussed while looking at the underlying factors that continue to support the explanation of violence within the country.178 The study concludes with the preliminary spatial analysis that tests the hypotheses against the fixed factors of the insurgency, thus determining the insignificant effects of the drug trade against the violent actions of the FARC.179 The scientific methods used in this study test the factors contributing to the FARC violence and through this it is easier to understand the guerrilla group and their actions. The literature collected all has points interlinking with the questions to be evaluated in this study but are lacking in answers to the specific research question. Looking at the individual studies above, there is a useful amount of information concerning the changes within the FARC as an organization and the variables surrounding those changes. The links that are missing are the bureaucratic structure and organizational culture of the FARC and how these two features have changed, as well as the major factors that produced these changes. Many of the studies look at the end of the Cold War and its effects on the FARC, and the beginnings of the drug trade and its effects. But what is missing is how these factors as well as changes in the populace, government, and militaries have all culminated to affect the FARC and their structure and culture collectively. While all of these works attempt to single out factors affecting all of the competing groups in Colombia, this study is going to focus on how these factors affected one group, the FARC.

Methodology To explain the factors involved and their effect on the FARC, the chapter will use liberalism as the theoretical approach. The FARC is a non-state actor and has proven to have both military and economic strengths that make it a formidable opponent to the state. It is also important to understand that the actions of the state directly affect the FARC as an organization and its culture. Taking that into account, the focus on the state, the populace, the military, and the other organizations competing for power all play into the liberal cobweb approach to social science theory. This will be a more effective approach for explaining how the independent



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variables, such as the international drugs trade, the actions of the state, and the end of the Cold War, affect the organization, whereas in the above literature the focus is on the FARC as an independent variable and how it affects the state. Since the changes within the FARC as an organization is the focus of the study, all of the surrounding factors of the government, military, populace, and competing organizations will be treated as independent variables. Through rational choice models this chapter proposes competing hypotheses which will individually be major contributing variables to the organizational and structural changes to the FARC.

Hypothesis 1: The changes to the organizational culture and bureaucratic structure of the FARC are a direct result of the end of the Cold War Since the Cold War ended it is possible that the FARC has changed its identity and structure to turn the organization into a successful offensive operation that is completely self-sufficient. This is important to this study since many other cases of insurgencies immediately failed after the end of the Cold War.

Hypothesis 2: The FARC adapts itself to the policies of the government It is an interesting dynamic where the government can change its mind on military action or inaction and whether or not to participate in peace talks. As a result, the years of FARC actions appear to have a direct correlation with the government and military actions in regard to the FARC.

Hypothesis 3: The FARC changed its organizational culture and behavior to take advantage of the drug trade The advent of the drug trade in Colombia and its affect on the FARC has been widely debated. This study will look at this variable and discuss what effect it has had on the organization if any. Through the analysis of these hypotheses using liberalism as the theoretical approach the goal will be to understand the importance of the independent variables on the FARC. By treating the FARC as the dependent variable, this part of the chapter will look at the Cold War, the state, and the drug trade. The goal is to show what affect these variables have on the FARC individually and then show the links between the independent variables. This analysis will show the most definitive variables contributing

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to the organization’s structural and cultural changes over time and how effective these changes were in the survival of the organization. As a result of the readings, it is realistic to say that the organizational behavior, structure, and culture of the FARC changed over time. The variables will be considered to determine the time and severity of the changes. For some of the organizational adaptations outlined in the hypotheses, the change was gradual and took place over periods of time while in other cases the changes were dramatic and fast. Pursuant to the literature, part of this research will be conducted in order to determine why some instances or variables caused immediate change whereas the impact of other variables caused a more gradual change over time. Since the focus of the research is based on one organization, the changes will be measured by the independent variables and how their increase or decrease of influence on the FARC caused or did not cause change to the organization. The importance of this research lies in the organizational changes to the FARC created by internal and external factors. For the sake of eradication of the group or to provide for an advantage in negotiations, understanding the effects these variables have on the group may prove insightful. It is likely that through understanding how independent variables affect the organization these independent variables could be manipulated to direct or control the organizational changes of the FARC in the future. To help the discussion of the variables in the study some secondary sources will be used that focus on the data side of the hypothesis testing. Three of the secondary sources used for the study focus on statistical, geographical, and operational data. Systems of Violence covers the gender and demographic composition of the FARC, the state-making capabilities of the organization, and the economic and military assets of the organization.180 This data provides changes in these elements of the organization from the mid-1960s to the late-1990s.181 A more recent version of the statistical and geographic data set comes from “Conflict, Decentralization, and Local Governance in Colombia, 1974–2004” by Fabio Sanchez and Maria del Mar Palau. This covers the geographic and operational capabilities of the FARC over the 30-year window and how that has changed over time.182 Finally, Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and its Implications for Regional Stability by Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk also covers the economic and geographic expansion of the FARC and looks at the involvement of the illicit drug trade and arms trade with the organization.183 These secondary sources represent the statistical compilations of the activity of Colombian guerrilla groups and the geographic expansion of FARC operations over the years. Since these sources encompass all guerrilla activity they will only be used for their limited portions that focus on the FARC alone and any data that is compared to past and present FARC operational abilities.



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For the analysis portion of this research, the data and competing hypotheses will be constructed into a matrix diagram to analyze the “diagnosticity” of the data and its effect on the hypotheses. The study will be completed with an analysis of the sensitivity of the data to each hypothesis. The analysis will consist of an explanation of each hypothesis and all of the factors that are consistent and inconsistent with each hypothesis. Through a systematic approach, each of the factors will be described in detail and the effect of each factor will be explained. The end of each section will include a summation of whether the hypothesis is consistent with the data or if the data produced inconclusive results. The section will finish with a matrix diagram focusing on the major themes of evidence as compared to each hypothesis. The data will be coded as consistent (C), inconsistent (I), and not applicable (N/A). The diagram will be discussed as the evidence is weighed for diagnosticity, which will lead to the conclusions. Aside from limitations, the biases involved in the study arise in looking at the competing hypotheses where the subject (FARC) is discussed based on the presumed actions the organization will take in each hypothetical scenario. While this is counteracted by the data and actions known and documented about the group, there is still some question of certainty when estimating how the organization reacted to specific variables. For the purpose of this research it will be assumed that the organizational actions are true to the studies used in the analysis. The limitations result from missing first-hand information from the guerrillas and the civilians involved or directly affected by the guerrillas. Most of the works used in this particular research were compiled by military sources, government, and non-governmental organizations. While some of the works incorporate data collected from former guerrillas and civilians in the region, this data is very limited. There are new works coming out of the region from “inside” sources, but they have yet to be translated and are beyond the limits of this chapter.

First hypothesis and analysis: The changes to the organizational culture and bureaucratic structure of the FARC are a direct result of the end of the Cold War Since the 1959 Cuban Revolution until a 1992 truce in El Salvador the armed groups of Latin America were founded on a revolutionary doctrine based on Marxist-Leninist ideology and a military strategy combining guerrilla and terrorist activities.184 The Cuban Revolution inspired these rebel groups that revolution was possible, but one difference for the FARC is their long and endogenous process of accumulating peasants for armed resistance.185 Since its beginnings as a self-defense peasantry organization,

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the FARC reached a point of radicalization and became close to the pro-Soviet Communist Party.186 Within these communist ideologies there was little room for the armed groups to adapt to a changing environment, and militarily they relied on the support of communist states for logistical needs.187 As a result of the alienation of the public, the Marxist-Leninist group formed a military organization to achieve “armed colonization” and took an approach to dominate “human terrain” much like the strategy of the Viet Cong.188 The FARC broke from these limitations and with considerably flexible politics, military sophistication, and increasing logistic autonomy the organization increased its chances for survival.189 After adopting a less rigid political ideology, the FARC increased its complaints that the government was incompetent in dealing with social inequality, crime, and deficient public services, and presented the organization as a “good alternative.”190 As a result, the FARC expanded its administrative capacity and its ability to provide services such as health care, education, and public order.191 While this type of parallel state creation is common for guerrilla groups, the FARC achieved a balance by “sidelining any dogma that promises the achievement of some utopia, and giving way to a purely pragmatic strategy for gaining power.”192 Through this change, the insurgents have overcome the crisis arising from the collapse of the Soviet bloc and have created an ideology that is simply more efficient, thus increasing the political appeal of their message.193 Since the foundations of the FARC were establised during the period of La Violencia (1948–65), with its organization focused on armed insurrection, the FARC was “defined by a pragmatic ideological evolution and complex relationships with the Communist Party.”194 While the FARC did follow Marxist rhetoric in its analytical texts, its publicly stated political aims were designed to gain support from the rural community at the cost of distancing themselves from communist orthodoxy.195 The awkward relationship with the communist parties of Colombia led to the rise of a communist leader of the FARC, Jacobo Arenas, and as a result, communist leaders stated that the leadership of the FARC followed the party line in public statements.196 By this time, however, the leadership of the FARC was not in line with the communist orthodoxy, and the Colombian Communist Party preferred not to link itself to the FARC because it did not have complete control, and proximity to the FARC could affect the communists in the legal political arena.197 In the mid-1980s the FARC joined the electoral alliance Union Patriotica (UP) and appeared to be bolstering their relationship with the Communist Party but their continued military actions created a division, so the organizations kept their distance and looked at the situation as two independent groups that shared some political ideology.198 By this time the FARC considered itself an armed guerrilla organization that “opens its doors to all political, philosophical, religious, and ideological tendencies, and which



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brings together people with the common ideal of liberating this country.”199 The final division of the FARC with the Communist Party occurred with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the death of Jacobo Arenas in 1990.200 As a result of these occurrences, the FARC was no longer led by an ideologue with a vision close to communist orthodoxy hence the loss of control of the FARC by the Communist Party.201 The organization was able to offer a light ideological payload and an advance toward a highly pragmatic program.202 The collapse of the Soviet Union also discredited the guerrillas’ ideology and as a result the dialogue with the leftist intellectuals in urban centers was severed, limiting their mobility within cities.203 After the end of the Cold War, officials expected guerrillas to face a diminished capacity. However, a degree of financial autonomy was achieved, with the impact of anti-drugs policies on the peasantry offering unexpected bases of support and political legitimacy to the guerrillas.204 For studies looking at violence in the form of terrorism, the expectation that the end of the Cold War would have a positive effect in terms of reducing terrorism proved overly simplistic.205 While in many countries there appeared to be a decline in non-governmental terrorism between 1968 and 1992, in Colombia the trend proved equivocal—between 1993 and 1999 the country accounted for more than 50 percent of the total terrorist incidents in the region.206 As a result of the peasant and self-defense foundations of the FARC, it appears that the organization was very different from the common communist revolutionaries in Latin America. With no evidence to conclude that the bureaucratic structure changed outside of the militaristic foundations of the organization, the data suggests that the end of the Cold War had no effect. Aside from the change in leadership from Jacobo Arenas to a more ideologically open leadership, there is no evidence to suggest that at any time did the structure of the organization change. While some of the data collected points to the end of the Cold War as a turning point in the organizational culture as a political ideological group, the majority of the data suggests that the FARC split from these parameters before the end of the Cold War. Since its foundations were based on land reform and the peasantry, the data suggests that the FARC alignment with communist ideology was beneficial, but as soon as that benefit no longer existed, there was no need to keep the FARC attached to a rigid ideology. Since the FARC preferred an armed movement to a political movement, the data suggests that the military drive of the organization alienated the group from the other ideological organizations and thus it was forced to develop its own ideology and organizational culture. The data does suggest that with end of the Cold War the FARC made the final split from exclusive communist ideology by accepting members of all ideologies, religions, and social classes in public statements, but the roots of this development had existed in the group since its beginning. All of the data seems to bring

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inconsistency to the hypothesis, and the information studied suggests that the organizational culture change of the FARC was not a result of the end of the Cold War.

Second hypothesis and analysis: The FARC adapts itself to the policies of the government Since its beginnings the FARC developed as a defensive organization that was militarily weak and had no offensive capabilities.207 By the mid-1960s, President Guillermo Leon Valencia transferred judicial and other powers to the military, and “suspect” civilians were tried in secret hearings, with their legal and political rights suspended.208 In spite of this, by the 1970s the FARC was expanding and was adjudicating legal disputes, overseeing public works, and carrying out police functions.209 By the mid-1980s, the “long lasting social and political exclusion, an uneven distribution of wealth, corruption, and a culture of impunity” all played a role in the expansion of the guerrilla groups.210 Colombia has been notoriously weak and has low defense spending, with only 3.1 percent of GDP spent on the military in 1998.211 Homicides, used as an indicator of weak governmental control, are associated with high levels of FARC violence, and higher levels of state repression are linked to higher levels of insurgent violence.212 When President Cesar Gaviria declared a state of emergency in 1992, the government cracked down by banning ransom payments or protection payments and seized land and bank accounts associated with guerrilla money laundering.213 Within three days, three of the top commanders of the Colombian armed forces resigned, leading to speculation that the new crackdown generated only further dissent and turmoil.214 With the onset of presidential and congressional elections in 1994 the FARC stepped up their kidnapping and terrorist acts to affect the elections, and while Rafael Pardo the Colombian defense minister tried to downplay the actions, around 70 percent of the electorate would not vote.215 This is important due to the higher electoral participation and mayoral support having a negative effect on FARC armed activity.216 The higher electoral participation and government support indicate the legitimacy of local government and to an extent hamper the illegal activities of armed groups.217 Over the next few years, corruption in the political system began receiving attention as a survey by Semana magazine indicated that corruption cost Colombia $40,000 a day in public funds.218 By 1996, Colombia was in pieces. As the guerrilla war raged on, President Samper was absolved by congress on corruption charges and the military and guerrillas were fighting a tit-for-tat battle.219 By late 1996 the FARC and other guerrilla groups tried to take control of major cities and towns by burning trucks, creating



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physical obstructions, and creating roadblocks, which affected food prices, that rose by 10 percent, with the impact reaching the Caribbean coast and northern provinces.220 Samper tried to bring the FARC to negotiations and ended up publicly stating that the government was willing to concede demilitarized zones in order to begin talks.221 The FARC “acknowledged the offer as ‘a substantial’ first step” but many other conditions would also have to be met.222 In the late 1990s the FARC demanded a demilitarized zone and while this was conceded by President Andres Pastrana it has done little to curb FARC actions as now the organization has earned recognition for its sovereign power, affirmation of the FARC as a parallel state.223 By 1998, as the FARC descended on its newly acquired demilitarized zone, five mayors were fired for embezzlement, helping to end corruption.224 A local priest declared the previos five months to be a “paradise of peace.”225 The FARC was “showing the government we can run our own state.”226 Since that time, FARC and government actions against one another have increased, while attempts at peaceful resolution have dissolved.227 By the end of 1999, President Pastrana and the US were under criticism for allowing priorities to get sidelined while continuing the war, even though the government was preparing for peace negotiations.228 Upon the kidnapping of Senator Jorge Gechem Turbay, President Pastrana halted all peace talks with the FARC and began “Operation Death,” a full scale military war on the FARC.229 With no breaks in the carnage and increased US support, President Alvaro Uribe was elected, and after 9/11, Colombia’s “George W. Bush” was warned with a prophecy of “Blood, blood, and more blood … maybe even some gringo blood.”230 All the data seems to support the hypothesis. The overall actions of the government in terms of repression and violence in turn seem to provoke more actions from the FARC. Yet according to some examples in the data, there were instances where the government was attempting peace negotiations or was committing to peace negotiations while the FARC was not. The difficulty here is the limited information. While on the one hand the government claims it has stopped all military actions, there is no guarantee as in the case of the FARC. The majority of the data supports the idea that as the government has increased its actions the FARC in turn has increased theirs. The other specific problem when looking at this data is trying to ignore the paramilitary and cartel effects on the situation. What might be considered an act of violence toward the government may in fact not be as a result of government action, but rather their failure to fight the paramilitaries, and it is possibilities like this that make the cause–effect data unclear. In some cases it seems clear that actions by the government dictate the frequency or severity of FARC actions; however, the other variables of narcos and paramilitaries make the overall picture less than definitive.

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Final hypothesis and analysis: The FARC changed its organizational culture and behavior to take advantage of the drug trade Over the last few decades the FARC has evolved from a small peasant organization to an organization of unprecedented military strength as a result of the illicit drug trade.231 There is little evidence to support the idea that the FARC is directly involved in coca growing or refining but since their areas of control are also the main coca cultivation areas, the FARC does tax the various stages of production and export.232 The FARC did not become a major actor through mobilization of an alienated base; they became major actors through the power that came from the cultivation of drugs by a marginalized population.233 While illicit crop cultivation and protection was originally forbidden by the FARC, the movement of paramilitaries into the area to support the now dominant economic activity forced the FARC to protect and support coca cultivation in order to keep their social base from working with their political enemies.234 In the early 1980s the FARC reached an impasse where no matter how much the ideological message changed there was no increased support for the organization, and though the negative aspects of involvement in the drug trade were known, the offsetting advantages of involvement were too great.235 The FARC went from ten fronts to 26 during the first three years of the 1980s, in large part as a result of their now stable and lucrative sources of financing through the illicit drug tax system.236 This involvement between the FARC and the drug cartels has also helped establish a unique framework where the FARC is not only acquiring income but also connections to the international black market for arms since it is closely related to the drug market.237 This connection has created instances of drugs for guns swaps and has bolstered the FARC logistical framework through building arms supply sources in neighboring countries.238 The FARC established a stable economic base for the colonos (colonizing migrants) and small peasants by regulating market prices, and providing financial and technical assistance and protection.239 This forces the narco traffickers to pay the peasants and wage laborers raspachines—the market price of coca leaves and labor.240 The FARC “made it possible for the sustenance economy to incorporate into the international markets with minimum ‘structural adjustment.’”241 As a result of this policy of protection and regulation between peasants, narco traffickers, and merchant intermediaries, the FARC has faced the changing dynamics of the armed conflict among guerrillas, the state, and organized crime.242 The FARC was able to use the illicit drug platform to increase its state-making capabilities as well, and through a tax of 7 to 10 percent



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per kilo of coca paste the group had an estimated annual income of $60 million to $100 million by the early 1990s.243 This additional income not only assisted in the expansion of the FARC militarily but also in terms of commerce, providing means of transportation, adjudicating and arbitrating social and personal conflicts, constructing landing strips, and providing health, education, and essential public services.244 As of 2000, of the 61 FARC fronts, 32 are linked to the drug trade through income or protection.245 Some analysts believe that it would be prudent to assume a substantial part of their income is in a reserve for combat escalation, but even without that, the development of these incomes have “broadened the range of strategic options available to the guerrillas.”246 Analysts look to the strategic objective of the FARC to consolidate its coca growing regions in order to build up their military capabilities and push into other regions, such as its establishment of seven new fronts near Bogotá which provide a new source of income from the cultivation of poppy fields on the eastern side of the Andes.247 As early as the mid-1990s the FARC could take on the military in a pitched battle and prevail.248 It is important to note that in 1999 the FARC cooperated in a $6 million UN project to convert coca plantations to legal alternatives.249 While it is true that fronts of the FARC are involved in taxation of the illicit drug trade, the organization has minimal connections to the cultivation, refinement, and transshipment to the US250 According to the data, the conclusion can be drawn that the organizational behavior and culture were changed with the involvement of the FARC in illicit crop production. With increased funding, the operational military functions were better supplied and became more expansive, giving the FARC access to areas they were unable to infiltrate before. The FARC was also able to present more of a challenge to the military than previously, thus changing their behavior as an organization. Along with the increased military capacity, the data shows that with the income from the drugs trade the FARC began to run their own state more effectively and provide more services to their base. Perhaps the greatest organizational change emerged within the culture of the FARC where originally the view was that working with drugs was not consistent with the group’s political goals. However, the organization was forced to adapt to the threat of losing their marginalized masses to competing groups. The data provided indicates that the organizational changes to the FARC are linked to their entrance into the protection and taxation of illicit crops. With the completion of the matrix diagram the evidence for each hypothesis is demonstrated. This supplements the above discussion of each hypothesis and the data collected. For the sake of brevity, the major points of evidence are broken into four major themes and the conclusions drawn on their consistency or inconsistency when compared to the hypothesis. The first hypothesis citing the end of the Cold War as the main factor in

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Table 7.1  Matrix diagram and analysis (FARC) Evidence

Hypothesis 1

Hypothesis 2

Hypothesis 3

Corruption in the government

N/A

I

N/A

Broad government suppression

N/A

C

N/A

People supporting the government

N/A

I

N/A

Weak government

N/A

C

N/A

Loss of international support

I

N/A

N/A

Breaking from communist ideologies

C

N/A

N/A

Losing support from the public base

I

N/A

N/A

Changing leadership

I

N/A

N/A

Increased income

I

N/A

C

Increased ability to build and support a parallel state

I

N/A

C

Increased size and capabilities of military

I

N/A

C

Movement into international criminal activity

I

N/A

C

C = consistent I = inconsistent N/A = not applicable

the FARC change of structure and culture was proved inconsistent. While the end of the Cold War did help push the change in ideology in different directions, none of the evidence complied in the rest of the data supported the hypothesis. The second hypothesis looking at government actions as the main factor in FARC change produced similar results. While there was some correlation between a weak government and the behavioral changes of the FARC, there was a lack of examples to securely link the data to the hypothesis. For the other factors there was inconsistent data on whether the corruption of the government or public support would change FARC



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behavior. The final hypothesis looks at the involvement of the FARC in the illicit drugs trade. This change in the organizational culture and behavior of the group was conclusively supported by all of the categories looked at in this research. According to the data, with increased income the group was able to change its military tactics due to greater numbers and better, more abundant equipment. The data also supported the thesis that the FARC was able to provide better services on a greater scale in their function as a parallel state. Their change in organizational culture was also supported by the data since the founding of the FARC’s interest in the illicit drug trade was a result of the changing economic situation with their marginalized base. That coupled with the FARC desire to ensure the loyalty of their base in competition with their political enemies was all supported by the data.

Conclusion The survival of the FARC in Colombia has depended on the organization’s ability to adapt to its surroundings through cultural, behavioral, and structural changes. In this research the attempt was made to compile data for three possible contributing factors to this development, namely the end of the Cold War, the role of the state, and the impact of the illicit drugs trade. While there are inconclusive results in relation to the end of the Cold War and the role of the state, the research supports the attempt to explain the organizational changes of the FARC arising from involvement in the illicit drugs trade. This part of the chapter analyzed the FARC as the dependent variable with the end of the Cold War, the role of the state, and involvement in the illicit drugs trade as independent variables. For each of the factors, it would be beneficial to look at each of the independent variables as major themes for the purpose of a more in-depth study. Increasing US involvement and the role of paramilitaries could also be looked at as variables in the attempt to explain the FARC organizational changes. The next part of this chapter will focus on the ELN, analyzing that organization’s ability to adapt. The ELN will be analyzed using the same techniques and theoretical guidelines to support the comparison of the two groups in following parts of this chapter. This leads to the LAMP analysis (Part Four) to predict the future behaviors of the FARC and ELN. In addition to the LAMP study, Part Four will update the current situation of the FARC thanks to the publication of a new document. This will demonstrate the continual adaptability of the FARC in more recent situations. The next part of this chapter will illuminate both the similarities and differences in the adaptation of the ELN with the intention of exploring these factors in the LAMP study (Part Four).

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1985

1990

2000

FIGURES 7.1–7.3  Evolution of FARC actions (Sanchez and Palau 2006, 8)

Part Four: The ELN’s adaptability Introduction From independence until the present day, Colombia has been characterized by constant warfare and a fragmented political climate due to unequal land distribution, poverty, and oppression. Many revolutionary arms of rural and urban Latin America have used the Cuban Revolution and the ideology of Che Guevara and Castro as their example to follow; the ELN (Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional) was one of these organizations. The ELN has remained as a small but persistent guerrilla group in Colombia since the 1960s. Based on the Cuban Revolution, a workers’, students’, and peasants’ movement, Movimiento Obrero Estudiantil Campesino (MOEC) was started in 1961 in rural Colombia.251 By 1964 the MOEC had divided into factions, and one group in particular, led by Fabio Vasquez, went to Havana for training and returned to Colombia to establish the ELN.252 Due to their Havana ties, the ELN tried to adhere to the “foquista ideology as propounded in the works of Che Guevara.”253 Along with the “Che” ideology, the group took on a Robin Hood persona by “stealing from the rich to give to the poor” and followed a Christian moral ideology.254 One of the ELN’s most influential members, the priest Camilo Torres, committed the group to implement a moral component in its revolutionary actions.255 This style of conflicting ideology has caused a quandary between



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the teachings of “Clausewitz and Guevara, on one hand, and the Christian view of murder as the ultimate sin, on the other.”256 Through their mix of Christianity and political realism the ELN focused on gaining support from the campesinos with their argument that the state is an enemy to the people.257 The ELN mixture of moral and intellectual ideology gained support from the “middle-class students and professionals alienated by the exclusionary politics of the National Front” since even moderate leftist behavior was not tolerated.258 This unique set of ideologies created an identity for the ELN and its members but also caused many internal problems in the organization. The ELN has been considered a marginal player in the Colombian conflict; however, it has been the organization’s ability to adapt and change its culture, ideology, and behavior that has made the ELN a persistent guerrilla organization. The ELN as a guerrilla organization has had to adapt to the changing social and political climate but their refusal to change in other areas has been the reason the organization has limited membership and success. The ELN was faced with a difficult start as its leaders were killed or exiled on more than one occasion causing their near demise at the hands of the Colombian army in the 1970s. Re-emergence after these hardships required major changes in the leadership, ideology, and actions of the revolutionary group. This also included the ELN’s financial expansion into new criminal enterprises. Thus changes were imperative not only for the survival of the remaining members, but also in terms of increasinf the organization’s strength and effectiveness in the 1980s up to the present. Among these changes, the ELN was forced to expand their economic opportunities and their modes of operation in order to survive. While in some cases the organization benefited from increased income and expanded territorial control, they were forced to stray from their core ideology, reducing their appeal to the people. As one of the longest-running revolutionary organizations, the ELN has proven their ability to adapt and increase their effectiveness even after the assistance from Cuba had dwindled after the end of the Cold War. It has only been in the last decade that the ELN has proven itself a strong adversary for the Colombian government. As the ELN has strengthened it has become a more effective federation of fighters, improving their bargaining position with the government. With other organizations having taken precedence at the negotiation table, the ELN has a renewed sense of purpose and some new forms of income to help their negotiating positions. In spite of the difficulties within the organization, the ELN has been able to adapt its behavior, structure, and ideology to make it one of the only surviving revolutionary groups in Colombia. Since their re-emergence as a strong fighting force, the Colombian government can no longer afford to ignore the ELN. It is important to understand how this force was able to return from almost complete annihilation to become an effective guerrilla organization. Analysis of these changes and

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capabilities will shed light on government mistakes in stopping the organization and give insight to future negotiations. Due to the implications for US and Colombian relations, studying the ELN is imperative if there is ever to be peace in the region.

Literature review The main research for this chapter has been focused on revolutionary groups in Latin America and Colombia. The literature provides information on the creation of the ELN and their long history. These works will demonstrate the mistakes the ELN made in their early years as well as their ability to adapt and return as an effective force a decade later. This research also provides insight on the structure, organization, and behavior of the ELN and how these have changed over time. Each author adds information on the origins, ideology, economic changes, and actions of the ELN. In Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America, James F Rochlin discusses the revolutionary groups of Peru, Colombia, and Mexico. Rochlin begins with the four most powerful guerrilla movements, one of which is the ELN.259 The work gives a brief history of Colombia from independence to the era of La Violencia when the ELN began.260 Rochlin then focuses on the ELN and their origins as a unique mix of Christianity and political realism.261 The work gives a timeline for the organization and their actions from their creation in the 1960s and their decimation in the 1970s to their re-emergence in the 1980s.262 Rochlin points out the areas of operation for the ELN and the strategy behind their choices for areas of operation and recruitment.263 This work is thorough in its explanation of the ELN’s birth and transformation into their modern version. In the following two works, the focus is on the history of Colombia and its wars. In Colombia: A Brutal History, by Geoff Simons focuses on the social and political history of Colombia from the pre-colonial era to post-9/11. The work touches briefly on the formation of the ELN, but the focus is on the actions of the ELN and their interaction with the government.264 Simons explains the terrorist actions, kidnappings, and negotiations with the Colombian government over the course of multiple administrations.265 While this work provides little in the way of a thorough study of the ELN, it does provide a timeline throughout the life of the organization, accounting for their actions during these periods. In The Colombian Civil War, Bert Ruiz focuses on both the actions of the ELN and their combatants. The ELN portion of the book begins with the US and Colombian government working toward peace agreements.266 The work explains the force the ELN has at its disposal and the mentality of the leadership at the time.267 Ruiz covers a series of talks between the Pastrana administration and the ELN and explains the ideological make-up of the



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ELN and its leaders.268 The work goes back in time to the era of the Cuban Revolution and the beginnings of what would become the ELN.269 Camilo Torres is discussed in depth since this Catholic priest was considered one of the “best and brightest minds in Colombia” and went on to join the ELN.270 Ruiz then looks at the ties between the ELN and Cuba and explains the founding Marxist ideology of the organization.271 The end of the work returns to the failure of the talks between the ELN and Pastrana administration where Pablo Beltran, an ELN leader, proclaimed “our fight will grow, and we will not disarm.”272 This work gives a better insight into the leadership of the ELN and how its organization operates. The following two works focus exclusively on the ELN. “Colombia: Moving Forward with the ELN?”—an International Crisis Group paper— focuses on the modern ELN and their capabilities. This paper begins with the military capabilities of the organization and their interaction with other armed groups.273 The political and social bases are discussed as the ELN has a very diverse membership.274 Economics and finances are the last topic of the section focusing on the ELN, which gives a look at the evolution of their moneymaking activities since the 1980s.275 The next section of the paper considers the recent talks with the government and their interaction with organizations in Cuba and Mexico.276 This section also looks at the negotiations between the ELN and the Uribe administration, as well as the involvement of the international community.277 The paper ends with the participation of peace organizations in the negotiating process and these highlight the difficulties facing the government and populace in ending ELN hostilities.278 The paper offers some insight into governmental and non-governmental roles in the negotiations, but the focus is too narrow in time and scope. In “Colombia: Prospects for Peace with the ELN,” the International Crisis Group offers a much broader and in-depth study of the ELN and their actions. The report begins with an overview of the successes and failures of negotiations with the ELN and “evaluates the prospects for the constructive advancement and conclusion of peace negotiations.”279 The history of the ELN is discussed in detail as the report moves from the founding of the organization through the decline of the 1970s.280 The report then briefly looks at the re-emergence of the organization in the 1980s and the changes within the organization and in negotiations with the government.281 The next section of the report is a detailed timeline of the interactions of the ELN with the government during the Pastrana administration.282 The details of the Pastrana administration transitions the paper into the Uribe administration and how negotiations can commence based on the lessons learned from the past.283 The report concludes with a detailed set of negotiating actions which the government needs to follow in order to get the ELN into peace talks because “without peace, the fight against drugs will never be won and the fight against poverty will never succeed.”284 This paper is thorough in its discussion of negotiations between the ELN and the

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government but barely considers the changes in behavior and ideology that have made the ELN of today so durable. Moving into the economics side of the ELN conflict, the next three works consider the actions of the ELN and their economic strategies. In Systems of Violence: The Political Economy of War and Peace in Colombia, Nazih Richani offers a quantitative study on the ELN. After a brief history of the ELN, Richani studies the class and gender composition of the organization.285 The author then focuses on the extortion portion of the ELN income and their capabilities as fighters within their areas of geographic control.286 Even though the work is limited to economic, geographic, and statistical data, it is very thorough in these aspects of the ELN. In “Criminal Rebels? A discussion of war and criminality from the Colombian experience,” Francisco Gutierrez Sanin focuses on quantitative data on the FARC and ELN actions in Colombia. Sanin tests the research on economic causes of civil war as stated by Paul Collier,287 and specifically tests Collier’s “criminal rebels” thesis against his own data for the ELN, at the same time analyzing organizational behavior.288 The author explains his points of critique when comparing the ELN to Collier’s ideas and gives a thorough accounting of the ELN actions and their income from those actions.289 After analyzing the data, Sanin refutes the assumptions made by Collier in his “criminal rebels” thesis and states his conclusions on the opportunities and motivations of the organization.290 Sanin does a good job in using data to explain the actions of the ELN, but he treats the ELN like a secondary player since the FARC has more data to its credit for the purpose of this study. The final work, “Parasites and Predators: Guerrillas and the Insurrection Economy of Colombia” by Alfredo Rangel Suarez, looks at “Colombia’s guerrilla groups [and] places them among the most outstanding examples … of successfully self-financed insurgent groups.”291 Suarez begins with an overview of the insurgent groups in Colombia and gives a general picture of their behavior.292 The work describes the guerrilla economy as it exists by “how it relates to the territory and the people it controls, as well as by the state’s governing capability.”293 Suarez breaks this into income, extortion, kidnapping, drugs trade, and cattle theft, and gives incomes and percentages that the ELN derives from these activities.294 The expenses and investments of the guerrillas are also discussed before Suarez completes his study with a look at the overall microeconomic effect of the guerrilla economies in Colombia.295 Two papers focus on the Colombian conflict orientation. In “Colombia – Thinking Clearly about the Conflict,” Philip McLean studies the type of conflict in Colombia between all of the major players.296 The author breaks down the individual groups and considers the ELN conflict as the only one that could be described as “a classic guerrilla war.”297 McLean looks at the actions of the guerrillas and compares them to their stated purpose and summarizes peace talks between the guerrillas and the



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government.298 In “Conflict, Decentralization, and Local Governance in Colombia, 1974–2004,” Fabio Sanchez and Maria del Mar Palau discuss the contributing factors to the geographical expansion of the armed factions in Colombia.299 After a brief overview of the Colombian conflict, the work focuses on each of the individual groups including the ELN.300 The look at the ELN provides factors that have contributed to the organization’s survival and geographic expansion.301 Sanchez and Palau show the role that government decentralization reforms played in the expansion of the armed groups in Colombia through testing the variables in econometric models and a contiguous matrix.302 This means that the work can “analyze the contagious effects of illegal armed activity in one municipality or another … [and] the influence of independent variables … on local dependant variables.”303 The study breaks the data into time periods and groups which gives data sets for illegal actions and graphs representing the change in probability of the actions for each group.304 Finally, Sanchez and Palau provide similar data sets and graphs for the effect of the conflict on the local governments.305 This work is very specific to the actions of the organizations in relation to the independent variables tested and their effect on their geographical region. This work is well planned but is limited to decentralization factors and political implications. The final work, “War and Drugs in Colombia” by the International Crisis Group, rounds out the literature as it focuses on the drugs trade in Colombia. Since the ELN had a rigid ideology, the organization resisted the drugs trade for a long time.306 However, it is particularly interesting to note the organizational/ideological change within the ELN on this matter.307 Even though their role in the drugs trade is marginal, the ELN is still an important actor within the region.308 The work discusses the unexpected partnership and expected conflict that has risen between the ELN and the FARC and the changes that have given the ELN strength in drug-producing regions.309 The paper concludes with the current attempts to curtail the drugs trade in Colombia and the future options available to the country to control and possibly end the drugs war.310 This literature helps in understanding how the ELN has changed and adapted over the years to be the second-largest and important revolutionary group in Colombia. None of the authors give a clear overview of the ELN exclusively and many cover all of the illegal armed groups in Colombia. While many works look at single factors for change, the purpose of this part of the chapter is to apply the individual factors to the ELN.

Methodology To explain the multiple factors involved and their effect on the ELN, this research will use liberalism as the theoretical approach. The ELN is

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a non-state actor that has proven to have both military and economic strengths that make it a formidable opponent to the state. It is also important to understand that the actions of the state directly affect the ELN as an organization and its culture. Taking that into account, the focus on the state, the populace, the military, and the other organizations competing for power all play into the liberal cobweb approach to social science theory. This will be a more effective approach for explaining how the independent variables, such as the international drugs trade, the actions of the state, and the near annihilation in the 1970s, affect the organization. In the above literature, the focus is on the ELN as in independent variable and how it affects the state. Through the liberalist approach, the ELN will be the focus of the study as the dependent variable, and the state will be considered one of the independent variables. Since the changes within the ELN as an organization is the focus of the study, all of the surrounding factors of the government, military, populace, and competing organizations will be treated as independent variables. Through rational choice models the study will propose competing hypotheses which will individually be major contributing variables to the organizational and structural changes to the ELN.

Hypothesis 1: The changes to the organizational culture and structure of the ELN are a direct result of their near annihilation in the 1970s The ELN was ideologically strong during their creation but their military, organization, and leadership were weak, which, combined with attacks from the government and competing organizations, led to the near demise of the ELN. A Catholic-Marxist mix of ideologies could be the main deterrent for popular support, due to the contradiction of murder being an unforgivable sin in Catholicism, in the rural communities the ELN controls. It stands to reason that the ELN has purposely changed their ideology and behavior in order to garner support within the regions they control. It is possible that this single era of rebuilding between the 1970s and 1980s is responsible for the strong leadership, military, and structure that the ELN seems to have today.

Hypothesis 2: Through organizational changes the ELN was more successful at procuring funding and expanding influence It is understood that the conflicting ideology of Marxism and Catholicism has dictated some of the actions of the ELN. In order to survive, and



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obtain greater financial rewards and geographic expansion, the ELN has de-emphasized their ideology.

Hypothesis 3: The ELN is reactive to the government and populace and changes the frequency, severity, and type of attacks accordingly The second largest guerrilla group in Colombia is not happy with the government treating the ELN as second-place or unimportant. The behavior of the government and populace toward the ELN could directly change the behavior and actions of the organization. The government’s relative strength or weakness in an area could explain the severity, frequency, and type of actions carried out by the ELN. Through the analysis of these hypotheses using liberalism as the theoretical approach the goal will be to understand the importance of the variables on the ELN. By treating the ELN as the dependent variable, the study will look at the near destruction of the organization and their ideology, their economic capabilities, the populace and the state. The aim is to show what affect these variables have on the ELN individually and then show the links between the independent variables. This analysis will show the most definitive variables contributing to the organization’s structural, cultural, and behavioral changes over time and how effective these changes were in the survival of the organization. As a result of the readings, it is realistic to say that the organizational behavior, structure, and culture of the ELN changed over time. The variables will be looked at to determine the time and severity of the changes. Some of the organizational changes outlined in the hypotheses were gradual and took place over periods of time, whereas other changes were dramatic and fast. In looking at the literature, part of the research will be conducted to determine why some instances or variables caused immediate change whereas the impact of other variables caused a more gradual change over time. Since the focus of this chapter is on one organization, the changes will be measured by the independent variables in the research and how their increase or decrease of influence on the ELN caused or did not cause change to the organization. The significance of this study lies is its focus on the organizational changes to the ELN created by internal and external factors. Whether the goal is to eradicate the group or to provide for an advantage in negotiations, understanding the effects these variables have on the ELN is important. By understanding how independent variables affect the organization, these independent variables could be manipulated to direct or control the organizational changes of the ELN in the future. This study will also show just how strong the organization is and where its greatest weaknesses lie.

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There will be two secondary sources to support the data side of the hypothesis-testing. These studies focus on statistical, geographical, and operational data. Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and its Implications for Regional Stability, by Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, gives a detailed account of the ELN, its geographic expansion, and involvement in the drug trade.311 The work also covers the political, economic, and social complications by organizations like the ELN in Colombia.312 In Guns, Drugs, and Development in Colombia by Jennifer S. Holmes, Sheila Amin Gutierrez de Pineres, and Kevin M. Curtin, the focus is on illicit activities. The main portions of the book to be used are the sections on guerrilla violence hypothesis-testing and the resulting data.313 The section on illicit crops and their effect on the Colombian economy will also be used.314 For the analysis portion of the study, the data and competing hypotheses are constructed into a matrix diagram to analyze the “diagnosticity” of the data and its effect on the hypotheses. The study will be completed with an analysis of the sensitivity of the data to each hypothesis. The analysis will consist of an explanation of each hypothesis and all of the factors that are consistent and inconsistent with each hypothesis. Through a systematic approach, each of the factors will be described in detail and the effect of each factor will be explained. The end of each section will include a summation of whether the hypothesis is consistent with the data or if the data produced inconclusive results. The section will finish with a matrix diagram focusing on the major themes of evidence as compared to each hypothesis. The data will be coded as consistent (C), inconsistent (I), and not applicable (N/A). The diagram will be discussed as the evidence is weighed for diagnosticity, which will lead to the conclusions. Aside from limitations, the biases involved in the study arise in looking at the competing hypotheses where the subject (ELN) is discussed based on the presumed actions the organization will take in each hypothetical scenario. While this is counteracted by the data and actions known and documented about the group, there is still some question of certainty when estimating how the organization reacted to specific variables. For the purpose of the study it will be assumed that the organizational actions are true to the studies used in the analysis. The limitations of the study result from missing first-hand information from the guerrillas and the civilians involved or directly affected by the guerrillas. Most of the works used in this particular study were compiled by military sources, government, and non-governmental organizations. While some of the works incorporate data collected from former guerrillas and civilians in the region, this data is very limited. There is also a lack of information due to the relative size of the organization compared to other illegal groups in the region. There are new works coming out of the region from “inside” sources, but they have yet to be translated and are beyond the limitations of this chapter.



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First hypothesis and analysis: The changes to the organizational culture and structure of the ELN are a direct result of their near annihilation in the 1970s In 1962 a group of 16 Colombian students visited Cuba on scholarships at the time of the Cuban Missile crisis.315 Around 60 students would travel to Cuba by the end of 1962.316 The students asked for military training to transplant the Che Guevara “foquista” to Colombia to target “militant petroleum workers and peasant land colonizers.”317 The Santander area was chosen for the ELN camp because the region had experienced a communist uprising in 1929 and the formation of a liberal guerrilla force during La Violencia: the area had a history of armed opposition.318 The area was also known for the Industrial University and the Port of Barrancabermeja on the Magdalena River; the former provided left-wing student agitators and the latter provided radicalized trade unionists.319 These target groups were successful in operating among angry petroleum workers and peasants.320 As a result of these ties, the leaders of the ELN trace their origins to the 1929 uprising and unions of Barrancabermeja.321 In spite of initial success, the ELN soon encountered a string of problems that lasted through the 1970s.322 Considerable infighting began in the group.323 This infighting resulted from the diversity of the members with no strong leadership, and purges under the accusation of treason. The ELN ideology supported nationalism and “popular democracy” with aversion to foreign investment.324 The ELN’s declared aim was to “take power and establish a democratic and popular movement capable of liberating Colombia from the international monopolies and the crillo oligarchy.”325 The ELN proposed equality, “full democratic liberties to the popular sectors,” giving women their legitimate rights, and “assuring respect for human dignity and the free development of all Colombians.”326 By focusing on the energy sector of Colombia, the ELN distinguished itself from the other organizations in the region.327 During the period of tension between Moscow and Cuba over revolutionary ideology, the ELN became favored by Havana and adopted the Castroite revolutionary ideology.328 While this ideology worked for the ELN at the time, they were on a path to great difficulty. After their first actions in Simacota, the ELN gained attention from clergymen, most notably Camilo Torres.329 Torres tried to organize his own movement called the United Front and failed.330 His decision to join the ELN changed the organization and Colombia forever by uniting Marxist ideology and Christian morality.331 Torres was able to bring new membership to the ELN with his call for “popular unity.”332 After the death of Torres, his charisma and commitment turned him into a martyr for the organization.333 By the 1970s the first generation of ELN leaders

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had died in combat, were exiled, or were executed by their own men for treason.334 Information provided by deserters of the organization “enabled the army to kill and capture most of the ELN leadership” during this time.335 The ELN had a habit of purging their ranks and making the organization naturally weak as a result.336 This purging weakened the organization to the point that the remaining leaders focused on military action and the application of the foquista doctrine.337 However, this focus would only last for a few years before more threats to the ELN’s survival arose. By the 1970s the ELN was further weakened by continued desertion and infighting that caused an abandonment of the foquista philosophy and retraction from political work to focus all of their attention on the militaristic side of the ELN.338 In 1977–8 the ELN suffered more losses at the hands of the military and through desertion to the point where the organization had no more than 30 people.339 This near-demise ignited a serious rethinking of the ELN’s goals and strategy, marking an era of reorientation and soul-searching for the organization.340 This marked the end of the old ELN and its ideology and made way for the rebirth of the organization in culture and structure. By the 1980s the ELN began its resurgence due to three main factors: 1) “[t]he ELN was able to strengthen its links with existing social movements and trade unions”;341 2) “alongside its increasingly decentralized individual guerrilla fronts a more complex organizational structure was put into place, composed of the National Congress, the High Command, the National Directorate, and the National General Staff”;342 and 3) “the development of the oilfields in areas where the ELN enjoyed relative strength, provided unexpected financial windfalls through extortion of domestic and international oil companies.”343 The first national conference held by the ELN dictated the division and expansion of its two fronts.344 Their strategy included a multi-class recruitment directive that would bring unity to the Catholics, students, and middle-class professionals.345 The addition of Manuel Perez saw the implementation of key military strategies and ideologies by the ELN.346 Perez brought the various factions of the ELN together and developed new forms of income for the organization, especially through extortion of oil companies.347 The ELN works through a federation of units and in some cases pays their men as professional revolutionaries.348 These changes in their structure were but a portion of the organizational change coming to the ELN. During this time of structural change, the ideology and goals of the ELN went through gradual transformation as well. In practice, the ELN “original aim of ‘national liberation’ was replaced by an ‘emphasis on the control and exercise of power at the regional level … which has been denominated by some as a kind of armed local co-government.’”349 These developments have earned the ELN the reputation of being the most politically developed guerrilla movement in Colombia.350 The ELN moved to



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maximize its power through its Christian-Marxist ideology and refrained from politics, stating that it would “ultimately mean the corruption and ideological sellout of the group.”351 In its second international conference in 1989 the ELN still supported the movement toward a socialist Colombia, a commitment which has not changed since the 1970s.352 The ELN leader Nicholas Rodriguez Bautista (“Gabino”) called the “socialist system … an extremely young project” and called on the ELN to become a successful “pioneer” of the revolution.353 Another point that has not changed in the life of the ELN is their continued support from Havana even though it has become minimal recently.354 However, it has been the ability of the ELN to remain financially independent from external sources that has left them unhurt by the end of the Cold War.355 These ideological consistencies and changes were the backbone of the renewed ELN. These facts definitively support the hypothesis that the ELN changed its culture and structure in response to their near-demise. The organization could not have survived without changing their ideology, structure, and behavior. The end of the old leadership and the changing environment for the ELN forced the group to restructure and broaden their appeal. In many ways the data that supports this hypothesis appears to be the only reason the organization survived. Without these drastic changes the ELN would have died out in the late 1970s. As much as these factors support the hypothesis, it is important to note other factors that created change within the ELN. In the 1990s, changes to the international community forced the ELN to alter its culture and structure for survival again. “The capitalist restructuring demanded by neoliberalism through global institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF” became points of threat to the ideology of the ELN.356 For Perez the onset of this global reality would bring human rights’ violations, and a concentration of wealth that would further embed economic misery in the region.357 The ELN rose as “moral and ethical combatants poised against the threat of creeping neoliberalism” and pledged their fight against this emerging economic order imposed on the world via the “North American ‘monocultural parameter.”358 This brought the ELN view of economic redistribution back to the forefront since they see the revolutionary actions in Colombia to be a result of economic “misery and exploitation.”359 The 1990s also brought a change in the ELN view on foreign investment, stating that they simply want a better deal for Colombia from transnational corporations (TNCs).360 This improved deal has to include a larger profit share and the “human, material, scientific, and technological infrastructure” support Colombia needs to end its dependence.361 These changes to their organization are a direct result of the changes in global economics and politics. While these points do not support the hypothesis, they do outline other shifts in environment that have forced the organization to change and adapt.

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Second hypothesis and analysis: Through organizational changes the ELN was more successful at procuring funding and expanding influence An insurgencies support base is directly related to the support of the regions and people they control.362 During their rise in the 1960s the ELN survived from contributions from the peasants, theft of local payrolls, and bank raids.363 The major income breakdown for the ELN is 60 percent extortion, 28 percent from kidnapping, 6 percent from the drugs trade, and 4 percent from cattle theft.364 Since the 1970s, confrontations between the ELN and the Colombian army produced such disastrous results that the ELN has avoided military confrontations and has pursued an “economic strategy.”365 The ELN “developed an organizational structure capable of collecting and investing the enormous economic resources that would allow the movement to recover and expand.”366 A major reason for the growth of the ELN came in the 1980s with the building of the Cano–Limon–Covenas oil pipeline, which became a nationalist issue and source of funding for the ELN.367 Oil production in Arauca has provided the ELN with an exceptional source of rent from petroleum companies.368 The north-east front covers an area that the center of the country needs for transit and communication via railroads and roads, and the corporations pay the ELN for protection of mining and transit.369 Along with the Barrancabermeja region, the ELN moved into the Carmen and San Vicente coal regions, northern Antioquia, and southern Cauca which has strategic highways and agricultural production.370 This expansion of the 1980s also included the Norte de Santander region and Uraba, a banana-producing area.371 The ELN controls a number of corporations and invests both domestically and in foreign markets.372 This Gabino extortion expansion plan of in the 1980s was the linchpin for the growth and sustainability of the ELN. This expansion of extortion—with the emergence of both international and national companies in the region seeking to exploit its natural resources—has given the ELN a unique form of income. During the early years of the organization, it fought the movement of foreign companies into the region—but now such companies provide the ELN with its largest source of income. The processes of globalization and foreign direct investment now add more opportunities for income than any other avenue outside of kidnapping. The ELN has greatly expanded its income through the use of kidnapping. In Colombia, the ELN is responsible for more than twice the number of kidnappings of any other armed group.373 The technological advances in kidnapping developed by the ELN have caused the socio-economic status of the victims to drop and have resulted in a near-perfect, automated operation that is highly profitable.374 The ELN has specialists who select the victim, study their financial situation for the purpose of ransom



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amount and ability to pay, study their security, study their routines, plan the capture and captivity, and negotiate the ransom.375 This operation has become technologically advanced due to the increasing financial stability of the ELN.376 Through the use of computer technology, the process has been greatly streamlined and while this is not the newest form of income for the ELN it has definitely expanded since the 1980s. The final change to the financial status of the ELN came in the form of the drugs trade. For a time the ELN refused to participate in the drugs trade since the Catholic and Christian members and leaders objected to the trade on moral grounds.377 With the death of Perez in 1998, his successor, Gabino, has allowed more participation in the drugs trade.378 While ELN participation in the drugs trade is less than other armed organizations, their fronts are active in almost every opium/poppy region.379 The relationship between the ELN and drug-producing areas is complex.380 The ELN is active in almost ten regions, five of which are coca-producing areas.381 In some areas the ELN would not tax the farmers for illicit crop production but would allow chosen drug dealers into the area to buy.382 In other areas, such as the Magdalena River, Bolivar, and Serrania de San Lucas, the ELN taxed the cultivation of coca.383 Some areas, which the ELN was contesting with the FARC, witnessed an order to peasants to eliminate crops being promoted by the FARC.384 The increased pressure of a paramilitary presence in areas shared with the FARC has hindered the ability of the ELN to gain substantial amounts of drugs revenue.385 There is more recent evidence that shows that ELN income from drug trafficking has increased, and in some regions the organization is involved in the whole chain of production.386 The evidence supports the hypothesis that changes in the procurement of funds for the organization have enabled their survival. Economic diversity and expansion have been important to the ELN and its ability to survive. While the major component of ELN finances is extortion and increased kidnappings, it is not possible to discount their involvement in the drugs trade. The decision in the 1980s by Gabino to extort natural resource companies and their transit was and is the most significant economic change in the ELN’s organization. While the drugs trade income is still relatively small, it has been an important addition to the ELN since it allows them to control regions that would otherwise be taken over by the FARC or paramilitaries.

Final hypothesis and analysis: The ELN is reactive to the government and populace, and changes the frequency, severity, and type of attacks accordingly The military capabilities of the ELN have waned due to many factors.387 Some analysts see the reduction as a conscious movement into a political

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strategy, while others contend that the increased mobility of government forces is a key factor.388 There is the expected correlation between “state presence and political development, [and] both judicial efficiency and electoral participation have a negative effect on ELN activity.”389 As stated, this is expected since the stronger and better the government presence, the less likely there are to be ELN attacks. With the death of Manuel Perez Martinez, the ELN leader Nicholas Rodriguez declared: “On Father Perez’s grave, the ELN swears it will never abandon the oppressed and exploited. It will never give up the revolution.”390 Five days before the death of Perez, the ELN agreed to peace talks with the government but withdrew, calling the government “opportunistic” due to upcoming elections.391 By July 1998 the government met the ELN for peace talks in Germany, and Pastrana offered a withdrawal of troops and a prisoner exchange program.392 The ELN agreed to free congressmen and mayors and called for a unilateral halt of hostilities while negotiating “a national convention to introduce wideranging political reforms, [and] the creation of a constituent assembly.”393 Subsequent talks with the government included Francisco Galan and Felipe Torres, two ELN leaders, who were temporarily released from jail to participate, and coupled with upcoming negotiations between the government and FARC, the incentive existed to “agree a favorable accommodation with the government.”394 The ELN was annoyed with the government’s hard line in their negotiations while giving concessions to the FARC.395 As a result of this insult, the ELN intended to begin a “bold new guerrilla campaign designed to enhance the bargaining power” of the organization.396 This new campaign was designed to prove that the ELN was a worthy military force, including hijacking an Avianca plane and taking 41 passengers as hostages.397 Pastrana immediately called the action a “blatant terrorist act” and refused any political demands of the ELN; essentially the plan backfired.398 By 1999 the political tide turned against Pastrana, as “14 of the country’s 30 generals and 200 officers [were] all opposed to the government’s moves to negotiate peace with the rebel groups.”399 Within four days the ELN kidnapped some 100 people at a Cali church.400 Negative public outcry and an immediate military response prompted the ELN to release 30 hostages in return for a 48-hour moratorium on troop movements from the government.401 Upon public outcry, the ELN begged for forgiveness from the Catholic community while secretly soliciting ransoms for the wealthy church-goers, but made it clear they “had to finance a war.”402 The ELN ended the debacle by giving 33 hostages over to an international commission in mid-June 1999.403 By April of 2000 the government was finally willing to cede a zone to the ELN; however, negative public sentiment and a paralyzing wave of roadblocks throughout the country caused the government to rescind the offer.404 This retraction caused the ELN to unleash a wave of “sensational



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sabotage and kidnappings.”405 In December of 2000 the ELN released 45 captive officers as a show of goodwill for both Christmas and for prospective peace talks.406 These actions all follow the ELN “broad strategy of attracting the attention of the government and the global media through non-murderous extravaganzas.”407 This characteristic of avoiding carnage has been effective in getting the attention of the state and increases the government’s willingness to engage the ELN in peace talks.408 This example also presented itself when the ELN protested the Pastrana admninstration’s sale of the ISAGEN (a state power generator), ISA (a power grid company), and Carbocol (the region’s coal producer) as mandated by the IMF.409 The ELN wanted to gain Pastrana’s attention and blew up 22 electricity producing sites.410 ELN leader Gabino stated that the “the popular revolution has the responsibility of protesting how the government is managing policy-making” and that the “Pastrana clan has always benefited with privatizations, as well as Colombia’s oligarchy. We want that to stop.”411 However, in 2001 the ELN was losing its negotiation for a cease-fire zone and in a fit of frustration unleashed attacks that summer in which civilians were slaughtered.412 This ended the ELN talks for their own zone. By 2001 the effectiveness of the paramilitaries caused the ELN bargaining position to become increasingly weaker.413 Even with their diminished position, the ELN scheduled peace talks in 2002 and observers did not foresee an agreeable outcome nor did they believe the ELN would honor a holiday truce.414 With only 22 active fronts in 2006, the ELN has reduced its military actions from an average of 195 a year to just 19 a year.415 Army offensives resulting in demobilizations and captures have hindered the effectiveness of the ELN. The ELN has survived in many regions due to their mobility, but the importance of their presence has been reduced.416 While the ELN and the Uribe administration have tried peace talks both in Mexico and Cuba, there seems to be no end in sight.417 The ELN has noted three issues in particular that have led to the failure of negotiations: 1) “the government’s persistent denial that an internal conflict existed”; 2) “its bias in favor of the paramilitaries”; and 3) “it’s reluctance to resolve the humanitarian crisis.”418 The ceasefire bottleneck remains the principal problem as the ELN sees their mobility as their only defense against the other armed groups.419 This also causes issues of concentrating fighters which would not only expose the ELN’s strengths and weaknesses to the government (thus losing negotiating power) but would also mean “military suicide” if negotiations ended.420 The data supports the assertion that the government’s actions directly affect the frequency and severity of ELN actions. Where the data deviate is when looking at the actions themselves. The ELN has always supported minimal or no innocent deaths as a result of their actions.

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While this is not true in all cases, the few outliers containing civilian deaths are the exception, not the rule of the ELN. The data are not supportive of the ELN rhetoric of minimal fatalities because this has not always been the case, but compared to the other armed groups in the country, the ELN is the least murderous. In conclusion, the data do not support the hypothesis that the ELN changes the type of military based on the government’s actions. Their actions follow the same lines regardless of the specific motivations, although there are exceptions. But in many cases of ELN and government negotiations, the ELN has used their small number of innocent killings as a point of leverage against the government, and each time this is violated the ELN loses negotiating power. The ELN does not change its actions or their severity in response to public sentiment. While the leadership has asked the public for forgiveness in certain cases, ELN operations have not been changed or deterred. The matrix diagram presents the evidence for each hypothesis, supplementing the discussion of hypotheses and the data collected. The major points of evidence are broken into four major themes of change, new international orders, government, and public, and the conclusions drawn on their consistency or inconsistency when compared to the hypothesis. These themes emerge in the hypothesis analysis portion of the work. In the first hypothesis the change in ideology overlapped multiple areas. Their change in ideology ensured their survival and opened new forms of economic gain throughout the life of the organization. It never changed its tactics in attacking the government or negotiating peace. The change in leadership of the organization played a large role in changing the organization’s structure and the geographic utilization of their areas of control for economic gain. Diversity in membership seemed to be the cause of many changes within the organization, as it expanded and created a hybrid force that was truly unique to revolutionary movements in many ways. The rise of neoliberal capitalism and the IMF was originally an area the ELN refused to accommodate, but as its inevitability became apparent the ELN used it to their economic advantage and changed their culture to fit the new economic order. In the second hypothesis the economic expansion of the ELN in the 1980s is supported as one of the most important points of organizational change. Involvement in the drugs trade is a direct result of economic factors in that some areas of control require the ELN to fight other armed groups, and a change in later ideology also supported this economic venture. Acceptance of foreign investment opened new opportunities for the ELN financially through extortion but it also changed the interaction between the ELN and the government. The data shows that during the time of privatization and foreign sale of resources the ELN was most active in terrorist attacks in these areas. Technological advancements made



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Table 7.2  Matrix diagram and analysis (ELN) Evidence

Hypothesis 1

Hypothesis 2

Hypothesis 3

Change in ideology

C

C

I

Change in leadership

C

C

N/A

Diversity in membership

C

N/A

N/A

Rise of new international political and economic policies

C

C

N/A

Economic expansion

N/A

C

N/A

Involvement in drugs trade

N/A

C

N/A

Acceptance of foreign investment

N/A

C

C

Technological advancements

N/A

C

N/A

Government actions dictate frequency and severity of attacks

N/A

N/A

C

Government actions dictate type of attacks

N/A

N/A

I

Popular sentiment dictates frequency and severity of attacks

N/A

N/A

I

Popular sentiment dictates type of attacks

N/A

N/A

I

C = consistent I = inconsistent N/A = not applicable

the ELN proficient kidnappers in Colombia. The data shows that these advancements made the kidnapping processes systematic and much more profitable. In the third hypothesis, the data did support the assertion that government actions dictated the severity and frequency of attacks perpetrated by the ELN, but that their actions followed the same minimal casualty or no casualty type of action. In view of these findings, the data did not support the hypothesis considering the change in the type of actions pursued.

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In relation to public sentiment, the data shows that while apologetic on occasion, the ELN does not change the frequency, severity, or type of attacks.

Conclusion The ELN has depended on their ability to change their organizational culture, structure, and behavior in order to survive. This part of the chapter has highlighted the major factors contributing to these changes through the near demise, expansion of funding, and influence in a new economic order, and through the actions of the government and populace. The data supported the hypothesis of annihilation, funding, and influence. This showed that the near-decimation of the ELN changed their ideology, structure, and leadership. The data also demonstrated that the expansion of funding opportunities and influence played integral roles in the survival and in the changes in the organizational behavior and structure. When considering the final hypothesis, the data supports the change in frequency and severity of ELN attacks based on the actions of the government, but the types of actions were not changed, and the popular view changed nothing. Having studied the FARC and ELN changes, the next part of the chapter is a LAMP (Lockwood Analytical Method of Prediction) analysis of the FARC and the ELN. Part Four pulls together the individual studies of the FARC and the ELN for the purpose of predicting their futures in Colombia.

1985

1990

FIGURES 7.4–7.6  Evolution of ELN actions (Sanchez and Palau 2006, 11)

2000



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Part Four: The future of the FARC and ELN Introduction For a nation with abundant natural resources and extensive area, Colombia is the second oldest democracy in Latin America, yet remains one of the most unstable democracies, with a long legacy of violence. The violence has stemmed from political divisions which are a result of economic structural inequalities, giving rise to such guerrilla groups as the FARC and the ELN, which offer redress of social ills. Although the international community has tried to help the government of Colombia, its socio-economic problems are considered of their own making and thus must be handled by the Colombian government via the military, the police, or diplomacy. These problems have become international issues as globalization has made Colombia a major trading partner of the US and other countries, and has also opened up the country to direct foreign investment. Unfortunately, this international assistance will all be brought to an end if the government cannot regain and maintain control of the insurgent forces within the country. This part of the chapter will begin with a brief history of Colombia and its democratically elected government for context. Next, we will discuss each actor and their roots and ideologies, and how these groups interact with each other and with the Colombian government. Research earlier in this chapter focused on the ELN and FARC individually. With the addition of the government, this part will show the likely futures of these actors. This will be followed by the “pair-wise comparison” and an explanation of the findings.421 The research will then explain focal events and indicators that will present themselves in the event tat the futures predicted become reality.

Predictive issue: Within the range of adaptations probable, what are the most likely predictions for future FARC and ELN behavior? Actors The purpose of this part of the chapter is to fill some of the gaps in the prediction theories surrounding the future of Colombia in its battle against insurgencies. This question involves an evaluation of the three major actors in the battle between the insurgencies and the state. This study focuses on the FARC and the ELN with the state as a constant, and all of the choices and interactions therein. These two actors and their options are considered under the scenarios of Colombian state involvement. Colombia’s state

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options include taking a neutral stance, a containment stance, or a “victory” stance in its battle with the FARC and the ELN.

Colombia

When looking at the history of the Colombian state it is important to focus on the political divisions within the country. As noted in previous chapters, the FARC and the ELN are militant, radical wings of political movements. Since independence in the 1830s from Gran Colombia,422 the Liberal and Conservative parties would determine or influence every aspect of politics, nation building, and Colombian society.423 With their roots in the Wars of Independence, the two parties were comprised of land owners and merchants who had a “considerable degree of autonomy” and could mobilize their supporters for elections and civil conflicts.424 This bipartisan system was used by the elites as a framework “to channel, promote, and protect their interests.”425 Elite interests became indistinguishable from party ideology and this, coupled with the hereditary nature of the political factions, led to a polarized Colombia where party affiliation became the main social cleavage in the country.426 Violence occurred as a result of competition for state power and distribution of resources.427 In the early Colombian republic one of the most important and often only sources of wealth was the “ability to award contracts, control political and public service appointments, and make policy decisions related to the economy.”428 This was because the “state budget was the only industry in a country without industries,” and this lack of a private sector meant that the government offered the only opportunities for advancement.429 The political parties were “subcultures” and operated on an “attack and revenge” basis since the membership was passed on from generation to generation.430 However, the minority party was never excluded from participation in the government and a system of elite pacts was used as a “mechanism for accommodation, power sharing, mediation, and resolving conflict.”431 Elite pacts were ways of sharing power and making sure that no significant political faction was left out so that a “political truce” or gradual exchange of power between parties could happen without instigating violence.432 This was the basis for the clientelismo, or clientelist, form of government that came to define Colombian politics. Clientelist politics was discussed earlier with regard to the FARC and the ELN, but in this part of the chapter to the focus is on the modern state of Colombian politics. Clientelismo is a reward system “in the form of patronage, in exchange for support.”433 This reward could mean government contracts, licences, positions in local or regional government, or even the giving of a title of public land to private interest.434 This clientelism occurred between the Liberals and Conservatives (state representatives) and elite groups, and between the elites of the parties and their



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supporters.435 For peasants, this form of patronage could mean “relief from military conscription for a son to effective police protection from belligerent neighbors to a favorable resolution of legal disputes.”436 For landowners, this could mean “access to government jobs, advanced education for children, a favorable decision on the location of a road or any of a hundred other political or legal favors.”437 This system unified parties from the top elites through the bottom of society and “replaced the state as a source of identity.”438 Clientelism was critical in the polarization of the country and the polarization of the two parties.439 Now that the foundations of Colombian political polarization are clear, it is important to recap on the era of La Violencia. The next major event in the history of Colombia was an era known as La Violencia. This era is important due to the changes in Colombia during and after the period between 1940 and 1960. Two distinct levels of conflict started in this era and at first look, this was the same type conflict as in the past between the Liberal and Conservative parties.440 During this period the “old bipartisan hegemony” conflicted with the new political ideologies that fell “outside of the traditional political order.”441 These new political groups formed as a result of the political and social changes that spread throughout Latin America in the twentieth century, as discussed in Part One of this chapter. These groups were categorized as “silent revolutions,” and while their political and social divisions were previously discussed, it is helpful to recall the changes that resulted from this period. First came the influx of foreign investment, economic growth due to exports, industrial and manufacturing growth, and the state becoming a supporting rather than driving force.442 Rapid growth in the population included massive migration from agricultural lands to industrial urban centers.443 The expansion and growth of this era created almost no downward distribution of wealth and the “majority of Colombians experienced either a stagnation or relative decline in their standard of living.”444 This created a period where government income increased some 400 percent yet the social expenditures in the country were stagnant.445 These conditions, coupled with the general increase in education of the public and relative loss of influence of the Catholic Church, set the stage for te “silent revolutions.”446 The formation of new political groups added new powers and opportunities and new “loads to the political system.”447 The expansion of these groups allowed them to channel and satisfy the demands of their constituents thus eclipsing the traditional parties and eroding the clientelist system.448 This led to immediate attempts by both the Conservatives and Liberals to integrate these new parties into their bipartisan system; for example, the Liberals integrating the labor unions and interest groups arising from the urbanization of the work force.449 These issues of political and social divisions led to the rise of a new political leader that would change the face of Colombian politics.

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Jorge Eliecer Gaitan was the face of the “reformist wing of the Liberal party,” focusing his efforts on uniting the politically marginalized people against the “oligarchy, the real country against the political country, ceaselessly attacking the corruption and bankruptcy of the old system.”450 Gaitan mobilized the populace by Gaitanismo where the traditional Liberal–Conservative divisions were realigned to transform the traditional system into “a new class oriented axis of political confrontation.”451 For the oligarchy, “Gaitanismo equaled a revolution which threatened the foundation of their interests” and so these traditional parties tried to continue their previous path of integrating the new political forces into their pre-existing vertical party divisions.452 It was this attempt to change the face of Colombian politics that appealed to so many and brought the full weight of the hard-line Conservatives to bear on Gaitan. This would mark the beginning of La Violencia. La Violencia can be broken into four periods. The first was the galvanizing moment of political tension, the assassination of Gaitan on April 9, 1948.453 This led to the Bogotazo which was a spontaneous riot that began the “multifaceted insurrection” reflecting “the demands of the new challengers.”454 The traditional party leaders acted quickly to stop the violence but as Conservative violence increased, the Liberals withdrew from the political alignments and the killing escalated.455 The second period of La Violencia was marked by the quick spread of guerrilla warfare throughout the country, as guerrilla groups armed themselves against partisan attack.456 To make matters worse, the Conservative-controlled government used the National Police and the army for partisan ends that further mobilized the Liberal peasantry.457 This use of police and military in “scorched-earth” tactics and terror would mark itself in the minds of Colombian society.458 In 1952 the guerrillas met with the Liberal leadership and gave them the ultimatum of either leading the revolt or the guerrillas would.459 The Liberal response was a public parting from the guerrilla organizations and the people they represented.460This growing independence of the guerrilla groups and the inability of the Liberal elite to control them led to “an irreversible social and political crisis.”461 The final break between the Liberals and the guerrillas came with the increasing radicalism of the guerrillas and their announcement that the Llanos region of Colombia was to be an autonomous area under a popular democracy.462 Land reform would entail “land for the people who work it,” which directly challenged the Liberal land owners.463 It was at this point that General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla overthrew the government in a military coup at the behest of the political parties.464 The Conservative and Liberal moderates “essentially thrust” Pinilla into power while the two parties “worked out a new governing pact.”465 The General preferred a civilian solution to the problem and preferred the past military stance of not getting politically involved since he believed that “we the military do not have sufficient capacity to govern the country.”466



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In the third period of La Violencia, progress stalled, corruption increased, pockets of violence were met with repression, and guerrilla warfare began to spread again.467 Rojas Pinilla alienated the businessmen through his economic policies, and in incidents where students were fired upon and crowded churches were tear-gassed he alienated the Catholic Church.468 The Rojas Pinilla blend of populism with corporatism alienated the military and “threatened the institutional unity,” and finally he was unable to demobilize the guerrillas or bring alliances together with new movements like the trade unions.469 The fourth period of La Violencia saw the creation of the National Front government (a two-party, four-year alternating power system).470 Due to the threats to the traditional parties, the Liberals and Conservatives created the National Front to combat the rise of new political challengers and the attempt by Rojas Pinilla to unite the people in a Gaitanista fashion.471 Through a series of constitutional amendments the Liberals and Conservatives reached agreements to ensure neither party was excluded or repressed by the other.472 This legitimized inter-elite arrangements and along with a four-year alternating presidency, each party was given half of the legislative seats regardless of their number of votes.473 All cabinet positions, Supreme Court appointments, public service appointments, governorships, and mayoralties “were made on the basis of parity between the two parties,” and “ordinary legislation required a two-thirds majority vote to be ratified.”474 The National Front also marked the first time the military became involved in political negotiations. The removal of Pinilla in 1957 began the transition of the government from military back to civilian control.475 The military was given three concessions upon its return to civilian control.476 First, the excesses and/or failings were placed at the feet of Pinilla exclusively.477 Second, the “professionalization” of the military in their national security role was redefined.478 They were given modern equipment, professional training abroad, a large budget increase, and complete autonomy over these resources.479 Third, the military was given the role of advisor on public order and security decision-making.480 The final part of the National Front system dealt with the emergence of new political participants and restrictions to be imposed on them.481 There were four principal restrictions: 1) none of the new political entities were involved in the National Front system; 2) all parties other than Liberals and Conservatives were excluded from the electoral process; 3) there was no provision for the expansion of political participation in the National Front agreement; and 4) the agreement was purely political and addressed no social or historical issues.482 This power-sharing program was the source of diminishing party loyalty, which eroded the political relationship between the state and the people even further.483 The National Front was effective as a power-sharing and control mechanism for the Liberal and Conservative parties, but the system further

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repressed new political entities in Colombia and strengthened the resolve of the guerrillas. The Colombian crisis is a result of political violence that goes almost completely uncontrolled by the state.484 There are four main elements in the Colombian crisis.485 First, 40 years after the National Front, the Liberals and Conservatives still run the political scene.486 The system is closed to any other potential participants, and membership of the traditional parties has become extremely narrow. Where the system is fragmented beyond the control of any actor, the democratic institutions have neither been a channel for concerns of the public nor a mechanism for broad debate, and these institutions cannot mediate or resolve conflict.487 Second, the expanding poverty gap, despite economic growth, has increased social protest and given rise to new organizations that “are creating politics without the government or the guerrillas.”488 Third, all social conflict resolution has been militarized due to the dependence of the elite on military support to stop new political opposition.489 The military has gained influence in “defining the ideological rationale and implementing policy related to public order, social conflict, and the ongoing war with the various guerrilla groups.”490 Fourth, the justice system is breaking down since the system has been politicized through state repression, agents responsible for human rights’ violations have absolute impunity, and the system cannot effectively deal with escalating crime.491 These problems have permeated the political climate in Colombia to the point where most of the social conflict can be traced to these core issues. Colombia has become a tangled web of groups that have evolved into part of the culture where each fight for individual ideals rather than the common good.492 The desire for power and easy wealth has tainted the vision of these groups, and their self-serving behavior has produced the “Loop Effect” that the country is currently entangled in.493 The social condition of Colombia is dominated by the uneven distribution of wealth, the inability to meet human needs, lack of free speech, weak ethics, poor leadership, mishandling of the country and resources, and electorate indifference.494 The political forces in Colombia obtain their profits and power from the chaotic state of the country.495 This produced new ideological leaders in Colombia that followed the tradition of Gaitan. Gaitan was followed by Luis Carlos Galan Sarimento, the founder of the New Liberalism political party, who supported the extradition of criminals to the US and was killed for his efforts in 1989.496 Guillermo Cano Isaza was a defender of free speech and human rights and his protest against violence, rights violations, authoritarianism, and corruption led to his assassination in 1986.497 Jamie Garzon was a journalist, comedian, and political satirist but his human rights activism led to his assassination in 1999.498 During the 1990s over 250,000 Colombians were killed in social conflict.499 In 2006 the National University of Colombia’s faculty was threatened due to their scholarly approaches to the Colombian social and political situation



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and their research into certain topics.500 Ideologues and their families are often kidnapped or assassinated. Senator Ingrid Betancourt is an example of this.501 She demanded a change in all aspects of the system, involving society in general, the rebels, politics, and government, and was kidnapped by the FARC because of her efforts to change the old ways.502 The efforts of Uribe Velez, who is the president elect from 2006 to 2010, started the improvement of Colombia.503 It will be the actions and improvements of the Uribe administration that will support the scenario portion of this study. While violence in Colombia has been endemic, it has not been until recently that the conflict spillover into neighboring nations has created a new set of problems for the Colombian government. These extenuating circumstances beyond the state of Colombia warrant far more discussion than can be included here. However, this part of the chapter focuses on the Colombian state and its impact on the actions of the FARC and the ELN. The short-term and long-term goals of each group are considered next, followed by the goals of the government, which are discussed in relation to the scenarios that will come later in the study.

The FARC

To date there have been numerous political guerrilla groups in Colombia but the most commonly known which still presents a threat to the Colombian government is the FARC (“Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia”). This group adopted a revolutionary doctrine based on Marxist-Leninist ideology and a military strategy following other guerrilla and terrorist activities.504 The ideological discourse these groups pursued in the decision-making process “diminished their intellectual flexibility in developing strategies and their ability to adapt to the political and social environment.”505 This deeply imbedded doctrine forced the group to “adopt political and military behavior that on many occasions was not suited to the real conditions in which the struggle was to take place.”506 The evolution of the FARC began with the shift from the Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy to a less rigid “Bolivarian” ideological path.507 This new ideological vision combines nationalist with left-wing ideas and sidelines ultimate ideological goals for the establishment of a socialist model.508 This has evolved into competition with the state through a heightened critique of government incompetence when dealing with social inequality, crime, and deficient public services.509 The FARC has presented themselves as a credible alternative for “good government.”510 The FARC has moved from “criticizing the legitimacy of the origin of the state to questioning its functional legitimacy.”511 The group has since pushed to gain a share of power within the state at the municipal level so as to be visible in an administrative capacity.512 The guerrillas have also increased their ability to provide public services such as health, education, and public order.513 New governmental forms of the FARC were derived from

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a narrow set of ideologies that clashed with the culture of the population and as a result diminished the group’s operational flexibility as well as their lobby for support from local social coalitions. What makes this group unique is their pragmatic strategy for gaining power.514 This difference has been crucial to the survival of the FARC where their support within the rural areas remains strong from those who have been neglected by the government. In 2008 the FARC was dealt two serious blows to its leadership. Secondin-command Raul Reyes died in a bombing raid in Ecuador in March, and founder Pedro Marin died in May, after which the new leader Alfonso Cano (Guillermo Saenz) rose to power.515 The Colombian military continued its strategy of military neutralization through “deepening internal fissures and splintering the organization,” leaving the FARC no choice but to surrender, be captured, or die.516 But the government failed to recognize that the organization is still a durable political-military force with an ideology that contains remnants of Marxism-Leninism.517 The government estimates that there are around 7,000 to 10,000 troops left and while the numbers vary due to the replenishment capabilities of the FARC, the authorities have been particularly effective in using FARC defectors to hunt down and infiltrate remaining FARC units.518 This increase in fighting has decimated the FARC ranks, with 10,806 killed and 26,648 captured between 2003 and 2009. To make matters worse, individual demobilization has also been a problem, with 11,615 fighters leaving the FARC ranks.519 The FARC has maintained its assertion that their struggle is legitimate but there is a lack of education among its recruits.520 The fighters are simply told that the state elites are responsible for their hardships which leave the majority of fighters unaware of the political and military structures and objectives of the FARC.521 This lack of political savvy and the waning morale coupled with unrelenting military pressure has created a “culture of distrust” leading the FARC to adopt a policy of child recruitment to replenish its forces.522 These problems have added further strain to the rural fronts where the FARC has retreated to the high ground border regions of Venezuela, Panama, Ecuador, and Brazil.523 These units have merged with stronger “inter-fronts” and have reduced their unit size to avoid air attacks and increase their ability to use hit-and-run methods of attack with “triads” (three-man cells).524 This has hindered the ability of the FARC to launch offensives but that has not reduced their capacity to take over new territory in these deeper rural areas.525 On the urban fronts the FARC still could gain strength against the government since the security policy of the government is not supported in these areas and an increase in attacks would discredit this policy.526 A new goal of the FARC is to gain attention through assassinations, sabotage, and recruitment of students.527 Several attacks have already taken place in the cities of Bogotá, Cali, Buenaventura, and Neiva.528 The FARC has shown



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resolve in these areas.529 While kidnapping and extortion remain important sources of income, the FARC has changed its methods by keeping kidnapped victims in various places and by demanding smaller ransoms.530 Illicit activities remain at the top of the list for income, and the FARC has responded to the government offensive by strengthening its units in cocaproducing areas.531 The FARC’s goals for the short term include property acquisition in drug-cultivating regions and domination of communication across Colombia. In 1999, the Colombian government conceded a piece of land the size of Switzerland to as a demilitarized zone after which the military and police withdrew from the area.532 For three years the FARC increased their effective presence in the areas around the zone, thus expanding the territory they controlled and ensuring southern lines of communication.533 They were able to use the area to hide and manage their inventory of hostages, accelerate their terrorist training, and manufacture bombs and mines.534 The FARC is trying to consolidate its control of coca-growing regions in the south and east, thus allowing them to expand their operations and gain military capabilities.535 Subsequently, new goals included extending their theatre of operations to envelope the entire country, to be accomplished through the control of corridors to the coastal, border, and mountain regions of Colombia.536 The FARC and the ELN in separate actions both plan to isolate Bogotá and other major cities by cutting communications between the cities and the rest of the country.537 Finally, through networking in the urban areas, the FARC plan a large-scale attack that will result in a general uprising.538 However, these goals have taken a back seat to the more important goals of leadership replacement and survival since 2008. A pressing issue is the effect of the military on the ability of the FARC to continue to support their base. FARC support has been reduced to almost nothing in rural communities and their support nationally and internationally has been greatly diminished.539 The ability of the FARC to mobilize populations against the government has diminished since they have been unable to protect those involved from the reprisals of security forces and new armed organizations.540 The rural communities have also taken advantage of the weakened state of the FARC to combat the extortion and recruitment tactics of the group.541 This all hinges on the upcoming 2010 elections in Colombia when the new FARC leader Cano hopes that the organization will be able to restructure its political side.542 The FARC is infiltrating the left wing and government opposition through universities and protests which are strengthening links with urban militias.543 This has led to a return to their Bolivarian interpretation and continuing their antiimperialist ideals with a focus on uniting Latin America.544 Since the 2002 shock of being placed on the European and Canadian terrorist lists, the FARC has shifted some of its focus to regaining international support, and

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while this has met with limited success, the organization has increased its prisoners-for-hostages swaps with the government.545 This, coupled with the FARC request to increase the involvement of the international community, has not only improved their international image but has proven their ability to act with political cohesion.546

The ELN

The Marxist-based ELN, by comparison, has never strayed from their rigid communist ideology. A smaller group, numbering around 3,500, the ELN believes in removing the current government and replacing it with a socialist system.547 Heavily inspired by the Cuban Revolution, the group evolved from urban radicals (MOEC—“Movement for Workers, Students, and Peasants”) who were inspired by Castro and Che Guevara in their call for the removal of all Latin American governments.548 At this time, another group, the United Front for Revolutionary Action (FUAR), solicited Castro for financial support, and the FUAR would eventually become part of the ELN.549 Soon peasants and farmers supported the group for protection from the right-wing paramilitaries, and even radical Roman Catholic priests joined the movement due to its call for “popular unity” against a government that neglects its poor.550 The ELN has also shown that for the right reasons it will ally itself with other guerrilla groups like the FARC, as they did in the 1990s for the “Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Coordination.”551 For most of their existence the ELN has followed a strict separation from the drugs trade, freedom of religion, and a separation from Maoist communist ideology.552 Foundational differences aside, the ELN and the FARC have different goals for the short term, yet have similar long-term goals. The ELN avoids direct military confrontation and uses an “economic strategy” consisting of attacks on the power grid and communications, including “armed propaganda,” kidnappings, and airplane hijackings.553 This strategy has been a result of the smaller size of the ELN and their lack of military strength. Currently, the FARC and the ELN have similar long-term goals, which include but are not limited to complete destruction of the state as it exists; the ELN still has the short-term goal of negotiating its own demilitarized zone.554 Although the talks concerning this demilitarized zone ended with the Pastrana administration, the ELN remains an effective force involved in kidnappings, hijackings, extortion, and the drugs trade.555 Under the Uribe administration the ELN changed their strategy by presenting their political demands to parliament, giving the government hope that the rebels might “reconcile their revolutionary demands with Uribe’s mandate to strengthen the state, enhance citizen security and combat poverty.”556 It is important to note that the ELN has the unique “capacity for reflection and political assessment” that is more developed than in the other armed groups.557 This is reflected in a more pragmatic



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approach by the ELN leadership, recognizing that there might be more to be gained from negotiations than armed conflict.558 The Uribe administration’s rounds of peace negotiations shared a similar fate to those of the Pastrana administration. One of the focus points of the ELN negotiations has been the humanitarian crisis, and while the government refused to focus on this issue they demanded that the ELN cease all hostilities and criminal acts as a precondition to participating in negotiations.559 With the advent of the Cuban rounds in 2007 the ELN and government could not even agree on whether to discuss the ceasefire or agenda first.560 Upon the agreement of the government to release ELN prisoners, the ELN was prepared to release all hostages and stop kidnapping.561 However, when talks resumed in June the government demanded that the ELN identify its combatants and move them to a “special zone.”562 The government then accused the ELN of changing its requests every time the negotiations seemed to be nearing a conclusion.563 The main points of argument for the ELN are legitimate in that they fear the government will use the identification and concentration of their troops to wipe out the organization. On the other hand, the government feels that the ELN will continue their illegal acts if the government cannot identify and locate ELN combatants. There is a level of uncertainty when looking at the preferred outcome and goals of the ELN in the current negotiations. As an armed group, the goals of the ELN are relatively unchanged from the goals the group set out to achieve at its foundation. With the new negotiations it is unclear whether the ELN has the desire to become a legitimate political party and build on its base and represent its goals through legal channels.564 The most challenging aspect of this transition is the ELN’s desire to retain its structure.565 Two points of difficulty seem to be that those close to ELN leadership are of the opinion that the group does not want to create a political party, and the FARC seems to be thwarting the efforts of the ELN and the government to reach peace agreements.566 The ELN and FARC goals and recent actions against the backdrop of the political climate in Colombia and the actions of the government are the subjects of the following methodology and analyses.

Methodology To explain the factors involved and their effect on the FARC and ELN future actions, this research uses liberalism as the theoretical approach which allows for the actions of non-state actors. The FARC and ELN are non-state actors and in this work have proven to have both military and economic strengths that make them formidable opponents to the state. It is also important to understand that the actions of the state directly affect the FARC and ELN future actions and adaptations. The focus on the state

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competing for power and control of the country plays into the liberal cobweb approach to social science theory. This is an effective approach for explaining how the independent variables such as the actions of the state affect the organizations, while in the literature review the focus is on the FARC and the ELN as independent variables and how they affect the state. Through the liberalist approach the FARC and the ELN is the focus of the study as the dependent variables, and the state will be considered the independent variable. Since the future actions and changes within the FARC and the ELN are the focus of this study, the government and its actions will be treated as the independent variable within each scenario. This study will be using the Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP) as its methodology. The LAMP technique is the sum of the possible interactions between the FARC, the ELN, and the state.567 This technique looks at the probability of an alternate future in relation to all possible futures.568 Using this method will improve the organization of available information based on the perceptions of the actors and make predictions on which alternate future is likely at a given point in time.569 The LAMP method is broken into twelve steps: 1) “Determine the issue for which you are trying to predict the most likely future”; 2) “Specify the national ‘actors’ involved”; 3) “Perform an in-depth study of how each national actor perceives the issue in question”; 4) “Specify all possible courses of action for each actor”; 5) “Determine the major scenarios within which you will compare the alternate futures”; 6) “Calculate the total number of permutations of possible “alternate futures” for each scenario”; 7) “Perform a ‘pairwise comparison’ of all alternate futures to determine their relative probability”; 8) “Rank the alternate futures for each scenario from highest relative probability to the lowest based on the number of votes received:” 9) “Assuming that each future occurs, analyze each alternate future in terms of its consequences for the issue in question”; 10) “State the potential of a given alternate future to ‘transpose’ into another alternate future”; 11) “Determine the ‘focal events’ that must occur in our present in order to bring about a given alternate future”; and 12) “Develop indicators for the focal events.”570 Since only the past is fixed and since the analyst cannot know how the future focal events of the study will change, the LAMP method is a qualitative method of study where the outcomes can always be revoted and all of the possibilities are analyzed, not just the probable ones.571

Courses of action These are the four courses of action that are available to the FARC and the ELN based on past and current behaviors. Continue Fighting (CONT): The option remains for each of the actors to continue the violence both against each other and against the state. This



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means that the FARC can continue fighting the government and/or other illegal armed groups (ELN). The ELN can continue fighting against the government or other illegal armed groups (FARC). Negotiate Peace (NEGO): Each of the armed groups has the chance to negotiate peace with the government or with each other. Withdrawal (WITH): It is possible for each of the actors to disarm and/ or withdraw from the fighting altogether. Form Alliances (ALLI): The FARC and the ELN have worked together in the past and if faced with destruction, they may join forces. Both the FARC and the ELN have shown their desire to continue fighting against the government. Even with the recent offensives by the government, the FARC and the ELN have moved toward more remote areas and strengthened their forces in areas from which they derive income, such as drug-producing areas. Another similarity is the international legitimacy desired by both organizations. Since the FARC and the ELN were placed on international terrorist lists there has been pressure within both groups to return to their political ideological roots and expand their recruitment to bring in students and ideologues. Neither the FARC nor the ELN have shown any desire to become legitimate political parties and while it could happen, there are no indications that these groups will change their positions. The government continues to look to negotiations to end the violence of the FARC and the ELN. In both cases the history of adaptation and survival has shown that they are not going away by themselves and that government eradication is unlikely. The only way the Colombian government will end the violence is through negotiations. The FARC has shown their desire for international legitimacy and control of territory as important goals in the negotiations. The ELN’s goals are more political, seeking an international platform for their political movement to bring their issues with the government to international attention. The ELN has been trying to get the government to take them seriously since it has ignored them in discussions with the FARC. The FARC’s actions seem to be interfering with government negotiations with the ELN, and the state has accused the FARC of tampering with the ELN–government negotiations. In the current situation it appears that the government or the FARC or ELN can initiate negotiations. Under the scenario of government withdrawal, the FARC and the ELN can negotiate with each other. In the face of fighting until a winner emerges, the two organizations have the option of negotiating a truce among themselves. The only way the FARC or the ELN would withdraw from the conflict is if it was the only option left to them. The recent loss of support by the FARC and ELN has not changed this position. The FARC and the ELN have only attained limited support from the general populations and since much of the support is forced it is easy to see why the organizations have not been

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swayed by public opinion. Much like the discussion of the Marxist-Leninist ideology before, the FARC and the ELN feel they are the best option for the people and their best hope for prosperity, even if the people themselves do not agree. The public appears to be siding with the government, and with the government’s recent advances the FARC and the ELN have lost most of their ability to provide for their base, which has directly affected their support from local communities. However, the groups are still intent on fighting for the cause even if the general public is no longer interested. As this support dwindles, it is possible for the FARC and the ELN to join forces to increase their effectiveness against the government. In the past these alliances have been very short lived and have only occurred between one or two fronts of both the FARC and the ELN. Differences over ideology and economic activities were the major points of disagreement. In addition to these differences, the current fighting between the organizations for control over common drug-producing areas has further soured relations between them. But the FARC and the ELN have also shown no limitations to their adaptability in the face of annihilation. Because of this resolve, if either force is facing destruction in a region there is a good chance that the two will join forces for the sake of survival.

Scenarios 1 The Colombian government adopts a stance of neutrality in

Colombia. They withdraw from the conflict. 2 Colombia follows a containment strategy in Colombia. They commit enough forces to contain the conflict to Colombia and restrict the spread of violence within the country and outside. 3 Colombia employs a “victory” strategy in Colombia. They commit significant military forces and funding in an all-out offensive against the FARC and the ELN to achieve a permanent end to the conflict. The government has gained public support with the Uribe administration. The hard line against the FARC and the ELN has produced success in fighting the groups and when coupled with the economic improvements in Colombia in the last few years, the government has a better standing with the people. It is this support that will keep the government from withdrawing from the conflict. The advances made against the FARC and the ELN have been significant and the government does not want to lose the favor of its people. This leads to the issue of containment, since 2008 saw serious international problems as the FARC and the ELN have shown their ability to move across borders into neighboring countries. The Colombian government cannot continue a program that follows guerrillas



The adaptability of the FARC and ELN

273

into neighboring countries without those countries’ support since this will cause an international incident. The government has to contain the violence to Colombia. While the role of the international community is beyond the scope of this work, the assumption is that the Colombian government could take on this containment strategy by itself. If the Colombian government continues its current strategy it would follow a complete victory method of dealing with the FARC and the ELN. The government has imposed few limitations on itself in recent years in its attempts to eradicate the FARC and ELN by force. While the methods have produced positive results, the reality is that total eradication has been and will be impossible without negotiations and the support of the international community. In moving on to the scenarios this research will use a pair-wise comparison to determine the most likely alternate futures for each scenario. Since the discussion of the adaptations of the FARC and the ELN were analyzed in Parts Two and Three, the focus will now be on prediction of the futures of these groups, with the top five outcomes for each scenario discussed.

Alternate futures calculations y X=Z X= courses Scenario 1: Scenario 2: Scenario 3:

of action (4) y= national actors (2) Z= 16 alternate futures 120 votes 120 votes 120 votes

Table 7.3  Possible futures Possible future #

FARC

ELN

Remarks

1

CONT

CONT

This is the FARC and ELN desired position

2

CONT

NEGO

Recently this is a common occurrence

3

CONT

WITH

4

CONT

ALLI

5

NEGO

CONT

6

NEGO

NEGO

This has been a common scenario historically

274 THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

Possible future #

FARC

ELN

7

NEGO

WITH

8

NEGO

ALLI

9

WITH

CONT

10

WITH

NEGO

11

WITH

WITH

12

WITH

ALLI

13

ALLI

CONT

14

ALLI

NEGO

15

ALLI

WITH

16

ALLI

ALLI

Remarks

This has happened and failed in the past

CONT: Each group continues fighting. NEGO: Each group negotiates with the government or each other. WITH: Each group withdraws. ALLI: ELN and FARC try to form alliance.

Table 7.4  Scenario 1 – The Colombian government withdraws from fighting Possible future #

FARC

ELN

Votes

1

CONT

CONT

15

2

CONT

NEGO

14

4

CONT

ALLI

13

3

CONT

WITH

12

6

NEGO

NEGO

10

5

NEGO

CONT

9

13

ALLI

CONT

9

8

NEGO

ALLI

8



The adaptability of the FARC and ELN

275

Possible future #

FARC

ELN

Votes

14

ALLI

NEGO

8

7

NEGO

WITH

6

16

ALLI

ALLI

6

9

WITH

CONT

4

15

ALLI

WITH

3

10

WITH

NEGO

2

12

WITH

ALLI

1

11

WITH

WITH

0 Total:

120

Alternate futures: Scenario 1 – Colombian government withdraws Alternate Future #1: The FARC and ELN continue fighting (15 votes)

This is the most likely outcome in this scenario due to the fact that government withdrawal will remove all restraint from the guerrillas. History has proven that when the government is on the offensive, the guerrillas have larger losses inflicted on them than they can inflict on the government.572 There are also the points discussed in earlier in the chapter to consider: where the FARC and the ELN are focused on the fight with or without the support of the masses, and these groups have continually expressed their refusal to become legitimate political parties and disarm. Under President Pastrana’s administration the government essentially withdrew from the zona de despeje, an area conceded to the FARC during peace talks, in return for their promise to disarm.573 The FARC used this area to traffic arms, money, supplies, troops, and drugs to their other fronts.574 They also launched attacks against the government from this region and held prisoners and hostages there.575 Since this is the outcome of government withdrawal on a small scale there is no evidence to suggest that this will not happen on a large scale. It is because of this track record that the first four of the top five alternate futures indicate that the FARC will follow the same lines. The ELN’s attempts to retain a zone of encounter (ZOE) during peace talks proved less successful than the FARC since the government was soured

276 THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

by the FARC exploitation of the agreement.576 Based on history it is hard to see how the ELN will react upon government withdrawal but their historical tenacity and desire to continue fighting makes the case for this alternate future.

Alternate Future #2: The ELN will try to negotiate with the powers left in the conflict (14 votes)

While negotiating with the government will no longer be necessary in this scenario, the ELN will have to work out deals with the FARC over contested regions. Since the FARC is a larger and stronger military force, the ELN will try to negotiate its survival and control of their portions of the country. In the last few years the ELN have shown their resistance to the expansion of the FARC into their territory in areas like Arauca and Norte de Santander, where the two groups have engaged in armed conflict.577 Based on occurrences like these it would be the ELN who would initiate negotiations with their competitors since they are the smaller force. Without pressure from other sources the FARC could focus its efforts on taking ELN territory, and in doing so the ELN would not be able to sustain a prolonged conflict, leading them to negotiate.

Alternate Future #4: The ELN would align itself with the FARC (13 votes)

While this is unlikely due to the core differences in ideology, the two groups are fighting for the same general goals. With the government no longer in the picture, the ELN may look to align itself with the FARC rather than risk fighting and losing the battle. The ELN has shown in the past their willingness to join other revolutionary movements including the FARC. For a time, the two partnered up with other smaller revolutionary groups in the late 1980s creating the National Guerrilla Coordinating Instance (CNG).578 Later the ELN formed the Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Coordinating Group, but the ideological differences were too great and the organization fell apart.579 The FARC and the ELN do have similarities in terms of their interests and goals but historically seem to only tolerate each other.580 The FARC recognizes the ELN as a revolutionary force, but the relationship is complex since in some areas the ELN inhabit some higher regions with the FARC and even work together in regions where the ELN has the weaker position.581 It has only been the movement of the FARC into the Venezuelan border regions that has caused armed conflict between the groups.582 The withdrawal of the government could relieve some of the tension that exists between these groups since they would no longer fight over peace negotiations in which one group is participating while the other is not. There have been instances of ELN frustration during government and FARC talks, and FARC frustration during ELN and government talks, but this point of friction would be removed.



The adaptability of the FARC and ELN

277

Alternate Future #3: The ELN would withdraw from the conflict based on the withdrawal of the government (12 votes)

This is a relatively remote option, since the ELN has proven to be very resilient. The ELN has shown its desire to establish a socialist government both in its ideology and in its attempts to join revolutionary groups together. This alternate future would suggest that the ELN would see the FARC as the leading force and, with the government gone, realize that its ability to compete for control is nonexistent. Based on the superior strength and size of the FARC, the ELN would have no choice but to be annihilated by the FARC or disarm and withdraw.

Alternate Future #6: The FARC and ELN would negotiate for control of the country (10 votes)

This is a remote possibility due to the power vacuum left with the withdrawal of the government. Neither organization is prepared to, or has the capability to, take over the country. There is a possibility that the two organizations would come to an agreement eventually, but their focus would be on expanding as fast as possible to gain the upper hand and ultimately power. Both would expand rapidly and since their concentrations of military strength are in different regions there would be bursts of armed conflict throughout important economic regions. Since the ideologies of the FARC and the ELN differ so much, there would never be a consensus but probably a division of land and control. This is assuming that the two organizations will not decide to declare all-out war in a winner-takes-all conflict. This leads into the second scenario where the government focuses on containment.

Focal events Scenario 1: Colombian government withdraws Alternate Future #1: The FARC and ELN continue fighting (15 votes)

Focal event: Colombian government loss of popular support from the populace. Focal event: Government would lose territory to the FARC and ELN on a large scale. Focal event: Government loss of personnel too great to continue fighting. Focal event: The FARC and ELN begin major offensives in urban areas and government strongholds.

Alternate Future #2: The ELN will try to negotiate with the powers left in the conflict (14 votes) Focal event: Colombian government loss of popular support from the populace.

278 THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

Focal event: Government would lose territory to the FARC and ELN on a large scale. Focal event: Government loss of personnel too great to continue fighting. Focal event: ELN forces lose the battle for the support of the populace to the FARC.

Alternate Future #4: The ELN would align itself with the FARC (13 votes)

Focal event: Colombian government loss of popular support from the populace. Focal event: Government would lose territory to the FARC and ELN on a large scale. Focal event: Government loss of personnel too great to continue fighting. Focal event: ELN forces are too weak to fight the FARC.

Alternate Future #3: The ELN would withdraw from the conflict based on the withdrawal of the government (12 votes)

Focal event: Colombian government loss of popular support from the populace. Focal event: Government would lose territory to the FARC and ELN on a large scale. Focal event: Government loss of personnel too great to continue fighting. Focal event: Left to the FARC and the ELN, the ELN forces are too weak and fail to gain public support.

Alternate Future #6: The FARC and ELN would negotiate for control of the country (10 votes) Focal event: Colombian government loss of popular support from the populace. Focal event: Government would lose territory to the FARC and ELN on a large scale. Focal event: Government loss of personnel too great to continue fighting. Focal event: FARC and ELN gain sufficient support and strength and divide the country rather than continue fighting.

Indicators Focal event: Colombian government loss of popular support from the populace Key indicator: Refusal to enter into elections, protesting and rioting by the public at large. Key indicator: The humanitarian status of government actions would



The adaptability of the FARC and ELN

279

worsen since in the past as people are killed by the government their support moves to the revolutionaries. Key indicator: Overall repression of the populace by the government socially and politically. Key indicator: Increase in jailed or “disappeared” opponents of the government. Key indicator: Number of refugees and displaced people increases greatly.

Focal event: Government would lose territory to the FARC and ELN on a large scale Key indicator: Government negotiations lead to large demilitarized zones for the FARC and the ELN. Key indicator: Military and police forces are forced out of regions when faced with large columns of FARC and ELN combatants. Key indicator: Government supply and communication lines are cut by the FARC and the ELN, isolating government forces and cities.

Focal event: Government loss of personnel too great to continue fighting Key indicator: Assassinations of government officials increase sharply. Key indicator: Government forces suffer major defeats on fronts controlled by the FARC and the ELN.

Focal event: The FARC and ELN begin major offensives in urban areas and government strongholds Key indicator: College campuses begin forming radical political groups that carry out terrorist actions. Key indicator: FARC and ELN fronts begin isolating cities from government communications, supplies, and control. Key indicator: Strikes and protests against the government by unions and students increase in frequency and violence. Key indicator: The government is no longer able to protect the citizens and declares martial law.

Focal event: ELN forces lose the battle for the support of the populace to the FARC Key indicator: Public support favors the FARC and their fronts through taxes and recruitment.

280 THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

Key indicator: The ELN continues to push a socialist/communist ideology in the areas it controls, alienating the peasantry. Key indicator: The ELN is unable to provide public works and support to local populations.

Focal event: ELN forces are too weak to fight the FARC Key indicator: The ELN will withdraw from areas where control is contested with the FARC. Key indicator: The ELN will not be able to recruit new combatants. Key indicator: The FARC is able to take over vast drug-producing areas and increase their size and strength faster than the ELN.

Focal event: FARC and ELN gain sufficient support and strength and divide the country rather than continue fighting Key indicator: The FARC and the ELN will have successes in gaining public support after the government withdraws. Key indicator: Both groups will move to take over major incomeproducing areas, increasing their ability to support their ranks financially. Key indicator: The FARC and ELN will begin working together in contested areas or divide the fronts among each other. Key indicator: Hostilities between the groups will cease.

Transposition Scenario 1: Colombian government withdraws When looking at Alternate Future #1 in which the FARC and the ELN continue to fight, this future could easily transpose into Alternate Futures #2, 3, 4, and 6. It seems impossible for Alternate Future #1 not to take place to some degree. It would be this initial fighting that would determine transposition into other futures. If the groups expand militarily and economically at similar rates then the conflict could be sustained by both sides. If the FARC grew larger and stronger than the ELN, which has been the case historically, then the ELN would be faced with negotiation or withdrawal which would transpose Alternate Future #1 into Alternate Futures #2, 3, or 4. It would be the FARC and ELN adherence to political and ideological goals on top of the FARC’s



The adaptability of the FARC and ELN

281

larger and stronger force that would mean the military end of the ELN. If the ELN is pushed into a corner, it could be flexible on goals and ideology, as in the past, prepared to align themselves with the FARC in order to survive . Finally, Alternate Future #1 could transpose into Alternate Future #6 since the build-up of forces and territory could lead to negotiations by both groups who see each other as legitimate and no longer need to continue the conflict with a government out of the picture.

Table 7.5  Scenario 2 – The Colombian government imposes a containment strategy Possible future #

FARC

ELN

Votes

1

CONT

CONT

14

16

ALLI

ALLI

14

2

CONT

NEGO

13

4

CONT

ALLI

11

5

NEGO

CONT

11

6

NEGO

NEGO

10

13

ALLI

CONT

10

8

NEGO

ALLI

8

14

ALLI

NEGO

8

7

NEGO

WITH

6

3

CONT

WITH

5

9

WITH

CONT

4

15

ALLI

WITH

3

10

WITH

NEGO

2

12

WITH

ALLI

1

11

WITH

WITH

0 Total:

120

282 THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

Alternate futures Scenario 2: The Colombian government imposes a containment strategy Alternate Future #1: The FARC and ELN continue fighting the government (14 votes)

With the government following a containment strategy, the FARC and the ELN would not be deterred from fighting. As the FARC and the ELN are conscious of their abilities to retreat, resupply, and train across the Colombian border in the remote areas of neighboring countries, the hostilities will increase. The FARC and the ELN will attempt to take over all the areas and supplies of opposing groups, including the government, to continue their fight. The FARC and the ELN are dependent on their use of the borders and international corridors for many reasons. Drugs and guns routinely cross the borders of Colombia and neighboring countries as a result of the ineffective Colombian border patrols and the corrupt and compliant local officials in neighboring countries.583 While the extent of FARC and ELN trafficking in narcotics is not clear, it is understood that the corridors most involved in the shipment of drugs and guns in and out of Colombia are controlled by the FARC and the ELN. The FARC in particular found a sympathetic ear in Hugo Chavez, the president of neighboring Venezuela.584 This is problematic due to the need for international support for Colombia to have an effective containment strategy. The main point of the containment strategy will keep the domestic fight from becoming an international one. Without the ability to resupply or cross borders freely, the abilities of the FARC and the ELN will be reduced.

Alternate Future #16: The containment of the country would lead the FARC and ELN to positions of ineffectiveness and they will group together (14 votes)

With the supply lines for drugs and weapons cut off, the FARC will have some difficulty drawing new income but still have significant stores of weapons and money. The ELN’s primary forms of income from kidnapping and extortion will be untouched by the containment strategy, but their resources of weapons and men are small. The two organizations will find that their ideological differences will fall secondary to their desire to continue the fight. By this point the increased manpower and supplies of the FARC coupled with the local income opportunities of the ELN will make the two organizations far more effective as a singular force.

Alternate Future #2: The FARC will continue to fight while the ELN negotiates (13 votes)

Alternate Future #4 is similar in that the FARC will continue to fight while the ELN will form an alliance with the FARC. These two alternatives fit



The adaptability of the FARC and ELN

283

well together since they both hinge on the position of the ELN if their corridors to other countries are cut off. It is understood that the ELN is a smaller and weaker force, and due to the containment policy of the government the ELN will be limited in its economic and supply options. In regions where the FARC is stronger, the ELN uses the FARC forces as a shield for protection, as in the Cesar and Magdalena highlands.585 While both groups have established bases in the Venezuelan states of Apure and Bolivar, the ELN presence is stronger and more vital to their operations.586 The ELN’s struggle has been more political than military and their organization both avoids direct military confrontations and has asked its militants at conferences to focus their efforts on a broader social movement, more “in tune” with other Latin American movements.587 Based on their flexibility in working with other revolutionary movements and their need for the border regions, the ELN will have to negotiate to be able to survive. As the weaker force, if the ELN is cut off from their greatest areas of strength in the Venezuelan corridor, the organization will be forced to seek protection from the FARC through government negotiations or by forming an alliance with the FARC.

Alternate Future #4: The FARC continues to fight while the ELN aligns with the FARC (11 votes)

In this future the ELN is the smaller and weaker force, and due to the containment strategy of the government it cannot survive alone. Negotiations may not be an option if the ELN has no strength or income left with which to negotiate. This future sees the ELN as too weak to resist advancement of the FARC into their territory and is faced with the choice of military defeat or cooperation with the FARC and concession of their fighting forces and fronts to FARC control. In some of the higher regions of the country and the areas where drug production has expanded into ELN territory, this problem already exists. This reduced ability to fight and collect income coupled with their aversion to direct confrontation would lead the ELN to form an alliance.

Alternate Future #5: The FARC will negotiate and the ELN will continue fighting (11 votes)

This is the most remote possibility when looking at the outcomes of the top five alternate futures. This future assumes that since the majority of the FARC’s income is drug-related, the organization will face force and supply payments they can no longer afford, thus diminishing their size and strength. Unlike the ELN, the FARC has been known for direct confrontations with the military, which actions require funding and supplies.588 FARC support is also at a serious low in recent times and with the people refusing to pay extortion or “taxes” to the FARC, the organization may have trouble finding enough income.589 With the FARC losing sources of

284 THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

support and income, the fighters will defect to the government, further weakening the FARC position. Perhaps the FARC may see the negotiating table as a way to minimize defection while maximizing what little bargaining power they have left. This scenario would be different for the ELN since the containment policy has not affected their ability to derive income from local companies and resources and from kidnapping. This will be an opportunity for the ELN to expand their territory and absorb deserting FARC militants to increase their military capabilities.

Focal events Scenario 2: The Colombian government imposes a containment strategy Alternate Future #1: The FARC and ELN continue fighting the government (14 votes) Focal event: Colombia gains the help of Panama, Venezuela, Peru, Brazil, and Ecuador to contain the guerrillas. Focal event: Neighboring countries are too weak and corrupt to help the Colombian government. Focal event: The FARC and ELN appeal to the international community for support against the government. Focal event: The FARC and the ELN launch offensives against the government in border regions.

Alternate Future #16: The containment of the country would lead the FARC and the ELN to positions of ineffectiveness and will group together (14 votes)

Focal event: Neighboring countries strengthen their border security and remove the corrupt officials from the area. Focal event: Leaders in Latin America publicly denounce the legitimacy of the FARC and the ELN. Focal event: Neighboring countries engage the guerrillas with the Colombian government.

Alternate Future #2: The FARC will continue to fight while the ELN negotiates (13 votes)

Focal event: Neighboring countries strengthen their border security and remove the corrupt officials from the area. Focal event: Leaders in Latin America publicly denounce the legitimacy of the FARC and the ELN. Focal event: Neighboring countries engage the guerrillas with the Colombian government



The adaptability of the FARC and ELN

285

Focal event: The ELN is unable to gain public support or funding and is forced into a corner.

Alternate Future #4: The FARC continues to fight while the ELN aligns with the FARC (11 votes)

Focal event: Neighboring countries strengthen their border security and remove the corrupt officials from the area. Focal event: Leaders in Latin America publicly denounce the legitimacy of the FARC and the ELN. Focal event: Neighboring countries engage the guerrillas with the Colombian government. Focal event: The ELN is unable to gain public support or funding and is forced into a corner.

Alternate Future #5: The FARC will negotiate and the ELN will continue fighting (11 votes)

Focal event: Neighboring countries strengthen their border security and remove the corrupt officials from the area. Focal event: Leaders in Latin America publicly denounce the legitimacy of the FARC and the ELN. Focal event: Neighboring countries engage the guerrillas with the Colombian government. Focal event: The FARC is unable to gain funding and supplies and their larger force weakens quickly.

Indicators Focal event: Colombia gains the help of Panama, Venezuela, Peru, Brazil, and Ecuador to contain the guerrillas Key indicator: Organization of American States (OAS) work to make agreements between Colombia and its neighbors to combat the guerrillas. Key indicator: International states and organizations publicly support the cooperation between the nations. Key indicator: Colombia begins working to support neighboring countries’ militaries.

Focal event: Neighboring countries are too weak and corrupt to help the Colombian government Key indicator: Borders are controlled on the Colombian side but not on neighboring nations’ sides.

286 THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

Key indicator: Guerrilla support and camps in bordering countries are able to stage offensives against government forces from inside and outside Colombia. Key indicator: The movement of drugs, guns, and chemicals in the border regions of neighboring countries increases as Colombia’s borders are closed tighter. Key indicator: Guerrilla forces are uncontested or easily defeat government forces in the border regions of Colombia’s neighbors.

Focal event: The FARC and ELN appeal to the international community for support against the government Key indicator: FARC and ELN forces try to make deals with governments not heavily aligned with Colombia. Key indicator: Kidnap victims will all be released unconditionally. Key indicator: The FARC and the ELN will work with humanitarian organizations.

Focal event: The FARC and the ELN form offensives against the government in border regions Key indicator: The FARC and the ELN will move out of the urban areas and into the border areas with difficult terrain. Key indicator: Indigenous people of border regions will move out of the region and/or report increases in attacks. Key indicator: Reports of fighting spilling over into neighboring countries will increase.

Focal event: Neighboring countries strengthen their border security and remove the corrupt officials from the area Key indicator: Neighboring countries will build up their military presence at the Colombian border. Key indicator: Officials will be increasingly jailed and tried on corruption charges. Key indicator: Drug, weapons, and chemical seizures along the border will increase. Key indicator: Reporting on displaced persons and refugees will increase in border regions.



The adaptability of the FARC and ELN

287

Focal event: Leaders in Latin America publicly denounce the legitimacy of the FARC and the ELN Key indicator: Leaders will denounce the human rights violations of the FARC and the ELN and their refusal to allow humanitarian groups to work in regions under their control. Key indicator: This has already begun as of 2008, with President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, President Rafael Correa of Ecuador, and Fidel Castro of Cuba calling for the FARC to release all hostages unconditionally.590

Focal event: Neighboring countries engage the guerrillas with the Colombian government Key indicator: FARC and ELN actions will slow or become nonexistent in the border areas. Key indicator: FARC and ELN actions will increase frequency and severity in urban areas. Key indicator: Neighboring countries to Colombia will face an increase in jailed guerrillas and trials.

Focal event: The ELN is unable to gain public support or funding and is forced into a corner Key indicator: FARC combatant ranks will grow quickly. Key indicator: The local populations will fight the ELN and refuse to give them money or support. Key indicator: The ELN and the FARC will stop fighting each other and the ELN will attempt to hold a conference with FARC leaders. Key indicator: The ELN proposes peace negotiations to the government before their negotiating position is too weak.

Focal event: The FARC is unable to gain funding and supplies and their larger force weakens quickly Key indicator: Combatants dissert their fronts or defect to the government. Key indicator: FARC units retreat from government controlled areas. Key indicator: Local populations report more activity relating to taxes and theft of supplies from towns by the FARC.

288 THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

Transposition Scenario 2: The Colombian government imposes a containment strategy When looking at Alternate Futures #1 and #16, the FARC and the ELN will continue fighting and while that has been a historical guarantee there remains uncertainty about how these organizations supply themselves. If the FARC loses its main source of income and the ELN is faced with waning supplies and troops, then they should easily move into the realm of alliances envisaged in Alternate Future #16. In many regions the two organizations have a symbiotic relationship and there is nothing to suggest that if the advantages of one group complement the other they will not join forces. When considering Alternate Futures #2 and #4, the FARC continuing to fight remains a constant but the position of the ELN will change based on the actions of the FARC. If the FARC sees this as an opportunity to go to war with the ELN to take their territory, supplies, and forms of income, the ELN may not be able to stop this incursion and thus negotiate with the government, as in Alternate Future #2. It is also possible that they will make the move to align themselves with the FARC, Alternate Future #4, since the relations of the two groups have soured when the ELN tried to negotiate with the government alone. Alternate Future #5 would transpose from Alternate Future #1 as a result of the FARC being economically decimated by the loss of the drugs and trafficking income and their ability to fight gone. Thus they would negotiate, but only as a last option when fighting and surviving are no longer possible.

Alternate futures Scenario 3: The Colombian government employs a “victory” strategy Alternate Future #6: The FARC and the ELN both negotiate with the government (14 votes)

With the government employing a constant barrage of troops and munitions on the guerrillas and their fronts, the ability of the guerrillas to fight will be eroded. This scenario has similarities with the current tactics of the Uribe administration. Looking at how the past few years have changed the dynamic between the government and the guerrillas provides a valuable insight to this scenario and its alternate futures. In Alternate Future #6, the FARC and ELN will negotiate with the government. The current Uribe administration’s offensive against the FARC presents a challenge the like of which the organization has never faced. Several FARC units have



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Table 7.6  Scenario 3 – The Colombian government employs a “victory” strategy Possible future #

FARC

ELN

Votes

6

NEGO

NEGO

14

16

ALLI

ALLI

14

8

NEGO

ALLI

13

14

ALLI

NEGO

11

7

NEGO

WITH

11

4

CONT

ALLI

10

5

NEGO

CONT

9

15

ALLI

WITH

8

2

CONT

NEGO

7

13

ALLI

CONT

7

3

CONT

WITH

5

10

WITH

NEGO

4

9

WITH

CONT

3

12

WITH

ALLI

3

11

WITH

WITH

1

1

CONT

CONT

0 Total:

120

been wiped out, morale is falling and soldiers are deserting their units, commanders have been killed or deserted, and three of the top FARC leaders have died or were killed.591 This all came at a time when public support for the government was at a high, while support for the FARC was at a low.592 This has effectively left the FARC fragmented. While the organization has adapted to the new situation, the objective for Uribe’s administration was to force the FARC into peace talks. This future looks to the administration to continue its onslaught and drive the FARC to the point where they have

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no option but to negotiate, by which time the organization will be so weak that it will have little to offer beyond disarming. Meanwhile, the Uribe administration saw the ELN as a low priority in peace negotiations.593 After multiple rounds of peace talks, the absence of mutual trust and the harder-line nature of the government demands produced little in the way of progress.594 With this rigid attitude, the ELN cannot afford to take on the government as directly as the FARC has done. Once the government shifts its focus off the FARC and toward a more complete strategy for fighting both groups, the ELN will be in grave danger. Since the organization is smaller and less militant than the FARC, their ability to recover from direct armed actions with the government is also smaller. With the government following this system of eradication, the FARC and the ELN they will have no choice but to negotiate or die fighting.

Alternate Future #16: The FARC and ELN form alliances with each other (14 votes)

As noted before in the history of these groups, alliances have formed when needed. Due to the recent offensive of the Uribe administration, the ELN and the FARC are cooperating more than ever. After the death of one of the FARC’s founding leaders, the ELN called for an alliance between the two groups, but divisions in regions where the groups have traditionally fought resisted this measure.595 In most other regions the FARC has helped weaker ELN units, while stronger ELN units have helped the FARC.596 The main differences—the ELN establishing a social base and having limited involvement in the drugs trade while the FARC’s focus is on imposing its presence locally and heavy reliance on the drugs trade—have hindered alliances between the two.597 The FARC and the ELN will have no choice but to form alliances as the government continues to press the groups closer together. Since the regions traditionally controlled by the FARC and the ELN have been geographically close, the movement of the government to drive these forces closer together will force a bond of survival. This will give the organizations better defenses against government attacks and better positioning in future negotiations.

Alternate Future #8: The FARC negotiates with the government while the ELN tries to form alliances with the FARC (13 votes)

The FARC will negotiate while the ELN form alliances, and in Alternate Future #14 the ELN will negotiate while the FARC form alliances. This future outcome is close due to the nature of these organizations when one tries to negotiate with the government and the other is left out of the process. The FARC negotiating is higher in probability due to the track record of the groups. The FARC has shown repeatedly that they are willing to negotiate with the government without the ELN. At the same time it has always been the ELN that has instigated talks and attempts at alliances



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between the organizations. Based on historical patterns, the FARC will enter negotiations to stall or gain a respite from government attacks while the ELN, feeling ignored, will try to bolster its ranks with the help of the FARC.

Alternate Future #14: The FARC calls for an alliance while the ELN negotiates with the government (11 votes)

While it is less likely that the FARC would call for an alliance as the ELN negotiated with the government, the change in FARC abilities due to the government offensives could alter their thinking. In this future the FARC have no power left for peace talks and through aligning themselves with the ELN they gain some of the political legitimacy they have lost, adding new combatants to their ranks. The ELN’s preferred forum has always been political and if there is something to be gained they will negotiate with the government without the FARC.

Alternate Future #7: The FARC negotiates with the government while the ELN withdraws from the conflict (11 votes)

The ELN has avoided direct confrontation with the government and since that has been their mode of operation they are a militarily weaker force than the FARC. This future assumes that the ELN will be faced with destruction from both sides, the government on one and the FARC on the other. With the pressing of these two offensively capable groups, the ELN will be forced to withdraw from the conflict. That withdrawal, coupled with government offensives on FARC fronts, forces the FARC into negotiations with the government but gives them more power at the negotiating table since they are the only revolutionary group left to deal with. Looking for a resolution, the government and the FARC have a good chance of ending the conflict in this scenario.

Focal events Scenario 3: The Colombian government employs a “victory” strategy Alternate Future #6: The FARC and ELN both negotiate with the government (14 votes)

Focal event: Government approval is at an all-time high while guerrilla support is falling rapidly. Focal event: The general populace fights the FARC and the ELN with the government and refuses to allow the guerrillas sanctuary. Focal event: The FARC and the ELN are forced from their territories and suffer heavy losses in fighting with the government.

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Focal event: The FARC and the ELN are listed as terrorist organizations by the international community thus removing the legitimacy of the fight. Focal event: The FARC and the ELN reach out to the international community to make their fight legitimate and force the government into negotiations through international pressure.

Alternate Future #16: The FARC and ELN form alliances with each other (14 votes)

Focal event: Peace negotiations fail between the government and the FARC and the ELN. Focal event: Government approval is at an all-time high while guerrilla support is falling rapidly. Focal event: The general populace fights the FARC and the ELN with the government and refuses to allow the guerrillas sanctuary. Focal event: The FARC and the ELN are forced from their territories and suffer heavy losses in fighting with the government. Focal event: The FARC and the ELN are listed as terrorist organizations by the international community thus removing the legitimacy of the fight.

Alternate Future #8: The FARC negotiates with the government while the ELN tries to form alliances with the FARC (13 votes)

Focal event: Peace negotiations fail between the government and the FARC and the ELN. Focal event: Government approval is at an all-time high while guerrilla support is falling rapidly. Focal event: The general populace fights the FARC and the ELN with the government and refuses to allow the guerrillas sanctuary. Focal event: The FARC and the ELN are forced from their territories and suffer heavy losses in fighting with the government. Focal event: The FARC and the ELN are listed as terrorist organizations by the international community thus removing the legitimacy of the fight. Focal event: The FARC tries to negotiate while they have some power left in the negotiations, and the ELN will be excluded making them push for an alliance with the FARC.

Alternate Future #14: The FARC calls for an alliance while the ELN negotiates with the government (11 votes)

Focal event: Peace negotiations fail between the government and the FARC and the ELN. Focal event: Government approval is at an all-time high while guerrilla support is falling rapidly.



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Focal event: The general populace fights the FARC and the ELN with the government and refuses to allow the guerrillas sanctuary. Focal event: The FARC and the ELN are forced from their territories and suffer heavy losses in fighting with the government. Focal event: The FARC and the ELN are listed as terrorist organizations by the international community thus removing the legitimacy of the fight. Focal event: The government starts negotiations with the ELN while excluding the FARC and the FARC calls for an alliance against the government.

Alternate Future #7: The FARC negotiates with the government while the ELN withdraws from the conflict (11 votes)

Focal event: Peace negotiations fail between the government and the FARC and the ELN. Focal event: Government approval is at an all-time high while guerrilla support is falling rapidly. Focal event: The general populace fights the FARC and the ELN with the government and refuses to allow the guerrillas sanctuary. Focal event: The FARC and the ELN are forced from their territories and suffer heavy losses in fighting with the government. Focal event: The FARC and the ELN are listed as terrorist organizations by the international community thus removing the legitimacy of the fight. Focal event: The government offensive is too great and the ELN troops are decimated or desert their fronts.

Indicators Focal event: Peace negotiations fail between the government and the FARC and the ELN Key indicator: Talks stall for days and months at a time, with calls for the addition of international arbitrators to get the talks out of a stalemate. Key indicator: Benchmark agreements throughout negotiations are not honored by the government or the guerrillas. Key indicator: The hostilities by the guerrillas and government do not stop for the negotiations.

Focal event: Government approval is at an all-time high while guerrilla support is falling rapidly Key indicator: Public demonstrations show support for the government. Key indicator: Public demonstrations are against the guerrillas.

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Key indicator: The general public turns out in large numbers for government events, such as voting. Key indicator: The free media supports the government. Key indicator: Humanitarian issues are positive, and government suppression or disappearances are no longer key factors.

Focal event: The general populace fights the FARC and the ELN with the government and refuses to allow the guerrillas sanctuary Key indicator: The FARC and the ELN are refused taxes and supplies from the fronts they control. Key indicator: The public informs on the guerrillas to the government. Key indicator: The public refuses to join the guerrilla groups and resists forced recruitment.

Focal event: The FARC and the ELN are forced from their territories and suffer heavy losses in fighting with the government Key indicator: Forced recruitment of peasantry into combat ranks. Key indicator: Actions against the guerrillas move into higher and more remote parts of the country as the guerrillas retreat. Key indicator: The government has more and more combatants from the FARC and the ELN defect and inform on the organizations.

Focal event: The FARC and ELN are listed as terrorist organizations by the international community thus removing the legitimacy of the fight Key indicator: International terrorist organization lists are formed in each country and international organization containing the FARC and the ELN. Key indicator: The Colombian government outlines the actions of the FARC and the ELN as terrorist actions to international organizations. Key indicator: The international community denounces the actions of the FARC and the ELN as no longer in the interests of the people and therefore terrorist, not revolutionary.



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Focal event: The FARC and ELN reach out to the international community to make their fight legitimate and force the government into negotiations through international pressure Key indicator: The FARC and the ELN will request the involvement of humanitarian and non-government organizations in negotiations. Key indicator: Both groups will offer to release all hostages unconditionally. Key indicator: Both organizations will stress their political goals on the international stage. Key indicator: Both organizations will try to improve their human rights records.

Focal event: The FARC tries to negotiate while they have some power left in the negotiations and the ELN will be excluded, making them push for an alliance with the FARC Key indicator: The FARC will try to negotiate with the government quickly using everything they have as leverage. Key indicator: The ELN will realize their weak position and lack of government attention in negotiations through increased actions and attacks. Key indicator: The ELN will call for a conference with the FARC leadership. Key indicator: The ELN will stop fighting FARC fronts in contested areas.

Focal event: The government starts negotiations with the ELN while excluding the FARC and the FARC calls for an alliance against the government Key indicator: The government will convince the ELN to enter negotiations without the FARC. Key indicator: The FARC will attempt to interfere with the negotiations between the government and the ELN. Key indicator: The FARC will contact the ELN leadership for a conference. Key indicator: The FARC will stop fighting ELN fronts in contested areas.

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Transposition Scenario 3: The Colombian government employs a “victory” strategy Alternate Future #6 would be very similar to past patterns of government negotiations with the guerrillas, with the failure of talks with both the FARC and the ELN transposing into the two forming alliances, as in Alternate Future #16. Trying to negotiate with the government and failing to come to an agreement would be consistent with the history of the guerrilla groups’ talks with the government, as in Alternate Future #6. With the government resuming an offensive after talks, the FARC and the ELN would begin to form alliances for survival. When considering Alternate Futures #8 and #14, the transposition would be the government negotiating with only the FARC or the ELN. While the government negotiates with the FARC, the ELN will see forming an alliance with the FARC as a necessity both for a better position in negotiations and for a stronger united front against a government offensive. The transposition into the future where the ELN negotiates while the FARC moves to form an alliance (Alternate Future #14) will be a result of the FARC trying to end ELN talks with the government and strengthen their position in vital regions where the ELN is strong. In Alternate Future #7, the ELN negotiations fail and the organization is forced to withdraw or be annihilated, or the negotiations are a success and the ELN withdraws as part of the agreement. Any of these future scenarios can transpose into each other since it has been shown in the past that when the guerrillas face continuous armed action from the government they will eventually begin to negotiate. Knowing this, it is simply a matter of how the negotiations go with each group that will determine the transposition into alternate futures.

Conclusion This LAMP study set out to predict the future actions of the FARC and the ELN based on the actions of the Colombian government. The study was able to identify the most likely future actions for both the FARC and the ELN through the scenarios; the most likely government actions were also analyzed. Through the discussion of the transpositions, focal points, and indicators, this work will help mark the progression and future actions of these groups. The LAMP study indicates that the third scenario—the negotiation between the government and guerrillas—is the most likely. If this path is continued after the 2010 elections, this is the most likely future. In this



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research the Marxist-Leninist ideology takes a back seat to survival for the FARC and the ELN. The more these organizations adapt to survive, the more their ideology changes. On the one hand, if the two groups had followed their ideologies closer to the letter, they may have developed a much stronger social base. On the other hand, rigid ideologies would have led to the defeat of the FARC and the ELN long ago.

Afterthought This research focused on the Colombian revolutionary armed groups of the FARC and the ELN, tracing the emergence of Marxism and the communist movement through history, its applications in Russia and China, and its profound effect on the revolutionary movements in Latin America, particularly the FARC and the ELN in Colombia. In studying the formation of these revolutionary groups, their origins and adaptability are as important as their futures. As this research provides the histories, structures, and adaptations of these groups, the end result is a better understanding of the actors in the Colombian conflict and a consideration of the best possible resolutions to this conflict. The matrices relevant to the FARC and the ELN demonstrate that their Marxist ideologies are subordinated to the economic realities of survival. Further, based on this LAMP study, and based on the current status of the FARC and the ELN, I have argued that the most likely outcomes are a negotiated end to the conflict, where the FARC and the ELN are compelled to the bargaining table. Looking at the evolution of the FARC and the ELN, the irony of their actions has become evident. Marx’s utopian project united the workers of the world under a revolutionary strategy and hope that social equality was attainable. Unfortunately, this ideal fell far short in application. Lenin and Stalin found the dark reality of absolute power that comes with the communist ideology, and eventually the systems became a victim of global isolation and internal destruction. While the revolutionary path nevertheless seemed plausible to Third World revolutionaries, adaptation necessarily kept the movements alive. The FARC and the ELN ultimately became players in the global capitalist system their movements sought to critique and wanted to destroy. Now their economic livelihoods depend on the capitalist system, and their ideologies take a back seat to the material conditions of survival. The FARC and the ELN continually maintain and promote their position as the resistance in Colombia against elite exploitation and structural inequalities. While the Colombian government and the elite have tried to improve their image with the public, there are still those who believe that the guerrillas have their best interests at heart. The only constant in

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all of these scenarios and conflicts over the years in Colombia is that the peasantry and agrarian areas of the country are faced with the violent realities of the conflict between the government and the guerrillas. The tragic reality is that the people philosophically motivated to join the FARC and the ELN in support of the revolutionary cause now see these groups as mere parallel versions of a corrupt government that delivers the rhetoric of equality but not the social remedies. In this way, the FARC and the ELN are seen as poor alternatives to the state and have lost significant popular support. Finally, the necessity of survival has altered the ideologies of the FARC and the ELN to the point where the world sees them as little more than terrorist organizations who exploit the people they claim to be fighting for. But that does not seem to deter the revolutionary fighters that believe in their cause. This research seeks to discern the path to resolution of the conflict through understanding the FARC and the ELN. The only way to strengthen the relationship between the Colombian government and its people is through control of the state and social redress of inequalities for the impoverished masses. That can never happen with two armed revolutionary groups within Colombia’s borders. The basic goal is to end the conflict, which will also enrich the scholarship on revolutionary groups for the purpose of better understanding how to prevent and or deal with them. As seen in this research, the reality of a resolution can be attained if the parties involved in the negotiations hold up their end of the agreement. By looking at the adaptations of the FARC and the ELN, this research was able to provide possible alternatives to the futures of the FARC and the ELN, in the hopes of working toward a viable resolution to the Colombian conflict. This research also helps advance the understanding of Marxist revolutionary movements in general and how the ideas of an important nineteenth-century philosopher continues to impact the contemporary world.

Notes  1 Kolakowski, Leszek (2005), Main Currents of Marxism: The Founders – The Golden Age – The Breakdown (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 8.  2 Ritzer, George (ed.) (2000), The Blackwell Companion to Major Social Theorists. Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 107.  3 Ibid.  4 Kolakowski, Leszek (2005), Main Currents of Marxism, 9.  5 Ibid., 80.  6 Ritzer, George (ed.) (2000), The Blackwell Companion, 107.  7 Kolakowski, Leszek (2005), Main Currents of Marxism, 106.



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 8 Ibid.  9 Ibid., 107. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid., 108. 13 Ritzer, George (ed.) (2000), The Blackwell Companion, 115. 14 Ibid. 15 Kolakowski, Leszek (2005), Main Currents of Marxism, 108. 16 Ritzer, George (ed.) (2000), The Blackwell Companion, 108. 17 Kolakowski, Leszek (2005), Main Currents of Marxism, 118. 18 Ibid., 130. 19 Ibid., 131. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid., 132. 24 Ibid. 25 Ritzer, George (ed.) (2000), The Blackwell Companion, 119. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid., 117. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid. 31 Frederick Engels was part of the young Hegelian movement of the 1840s and, after critically addressing the political economy, became a communist. Marx followed this path and Engels became a lifelong collaborator with Marx and contributed substantially to Marx’s thought (Ritzer, 109). 32 Kolakowski, Leszek (2005), Main Currents of Marxism, 186. 33 Ibid., 187. 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid., 188. 38 Ibid., 189. 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid., 341. 41 Ibid., 342. 42 Ibid.

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43 Ritzer, George (ed.) (2000), The Blackwell Companion, 130. 44 Ibid. 45 Ibid., 130–1. 46 Kolakowski, Leszek (2005), Main Currents of Marxism, 343. 47 Ritzer, George (ed.) (2000), The Blackwell Companion, 131. 48 Ibid. 49 Kolakowski, Leszek (2005), Main Currents of Marxism, 343. 50 Ibid., 640. 51 Ibid., 641. 52 Ibid., 661. 53 Ibid., 662. 54 Ibid., 663. 55 Ibid. 56 Ibid. 57 Ibid. 58 Ibid. 59 Ibid., 664. 60 Ibid., 667. 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid., 668. 64 Ibid. 65 Ibid. 66 Ibid., 669. 67 Ibid. 68 Ibid., 673. 69 Ibid. 70 Ibid., 732. 71 Ibid., 737–8. 72 Ibid., 738. 73 Ibid. 74 Ibid., 739. 75 Ibid., 741. 76 Ibid., 789. 77 Ibid. 78 Ibid., 791. 79 Ibid., 792.



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 80 Ibid., 806.  81 Ibid., 867.  82 Ibid., 871–2.  83 Ibid., 872.  84 Ibid.  85 Ibid., 873.  86 Ibid.  87 Ibid.  88 Ibid.  89 Ibid.  90 Ibid.  91 Ibid.  92 Ibid., 881.  93 Ibid., 1178.  94 Ibid.  95 Ibid., 1179.  96 Ibid.  97 Alexander, Robert J. (1991), International Maoism in the Developing World (Westport: Praeger), 41.  98 Ibid.  99 Ibid., 42. 100 Ibid., 1180. 101 Wickham-Crowley, Timothy P. (1991), Exploring Revolution: Essays on Latin American Insurgency and Revolutionary Theory (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, Inc.), 5. 102 Ibid. 103 Ibid. 104 Ibid., 6. 105 Ibid. 106 Ibid. 107 Ibid. 108 Ibid., 43. 109 Wright, Thomas C. (2000), “Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution.” Praeger Security International. Internet. Available from: http:// psi.praeger.com.ezproxy.apus.edu/doc.aspx?d=/books/questia/b78112/ b78112-sect24.xml [accessed March 2009], 1. 110 Ibid. 111 Ibid., 2. 112 Ibid.

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113 Brittain, James J. (2005), “The FARC-EP in Colombia A Revolutionary Exception in an Age of Imperialist Expansion.” Monthly Review (September). Internet. Available from: http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy. apus.edu/ehost/pdf?vid=4&hid=108&sid=de2d9d2d-80a6-4b2b-bb780e26c4201452%40sessionmgr103 [accessed 27 April 2009], 21. 114 Osterling, George P. (1989), Democracy in Colombia: Clientelist Politics and Guerrilla Warfare (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers), 185. 115 Ibid. 116 Ibid. 117 Ibid., 186. 118 Ibid. 119 Ibid., 187. 120 Ibid. 121 Wickham-Crowley, Timothy P. (1992), Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study of Insurgencies and Regimes Since 1956 (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 17. 122 Rempe, Dennis (2002), Implementing Plan Colombia: The Past as a Prologue? A History of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in Colombia 1958–66 (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute), 3. 123 Ibid. 124 Ibid. 125 Ibid. 126 Ibid. 127 Ibid., 4. 128 Palacios, Marco (2002), “Understanding Colombia: History and Background.” Aspen Institute. Internet. Available from: http://www.ciaonet. org.ezproxy.apus.edu/wps/pam04/index.html [accessed March 2009], 19. 129 Ibid. 130 Wickham-Crowley, Timothy P. 1992. Guerrillas and Revolution, 40. 131 Ibid. 132 Ibid., 31. 133 Ibid. 134 Palacios, Marco (2002), “Understanding Colombia,” 19. 135 Ibid. 136 Ibid. 137 Ibid. 138 Ibid. 139 Ibid. 140 Rochlin, James F. (2003), Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers), 96.



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141 Ibid., 97. 142 Ibid., 98. 143 Wickham-Crowley, Timothy P. (1991), Exploring Revolution, 135. 144 Ortiz, Ramon D. (2002), “Insurgent Strategies in the Post-Cold War: The Case of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 01 (April), 137. 145 Ibid., 130–1. 146 Simons, Geoff (2004), Colombia: A Brutal History (London: SAQI), 35–43. 147 Ibid., 46–52. 148 Ibid., 75–89. 149 Ibid., 91–113. 150 Ibid., 114. 151 Ibid., 169–81. 152 Ibid., 182. 153 Ibid., 282. 154 Ortiz, Ramon D. (2002), “Insurgent Strategies,” 127. 155 Ibid., 128. 156 Ibid., 129–31. 157 Ibid., 134. 158 Ibid., 136–8. 159 Ibid., 140. 160 Stokes, Doug (2003), “Why the end of the Cold War doesn’t matter: The US war of terror in Colombia.” Review of International Studies 29, 569–71. 161 Ibid., 578. 162 Ibid., 581. 163 Feldmann, Andreas (2005), “A Shift in the Paradigm of Violence: Non-Governmental Terrorism in Latin America since the end of the Cold War.” Revista de Ciencia Politica 25, 11. 164 Ibid., 28. 165 Ibid., 29–30. 166 Vargas, Ricardo (1999), “The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Illicit Drug Trade.” Transnational Insitute (June). Internet. Available from: http://www.tni.org/detail_page.phtml?page=archives_vargas_ farc [accessed 14 November, 2009], 4. 167 Ibid., 5–7. 168 Walker, Julius (2002), “The role of the state in the international illicit drugs trade: the case of Colombia and external intervention.” Global Politics Network. Internet. Available from: http://www.globalpolitics.net [accessed 14 November, 2008], 10. 169 Sanin, Francisco Gutierrez. 2003. “Criminal Rebels? A discussion of war

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and criminality from the Colombian experience.” Crisis States Programme (April), 7–10. 170 Ibid., 10. 171 Ibid., 11. 172 Marks, Thomas. 2002. Colombian Army Adaptation to FARC Insurgency (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute), 1–9. 173 Ibid., 9–21. 174 Manwaring, Max G. (2002), “Non-State Actors in Colombia: Threats to the State and to the Hemisphere.” Small Wars & Insurgencies 01 (August), 71–73. 175 Holmes, Jennifer S., Sheila Amin Gutierrez de Pineres, and Kevin M. Curtin (2007), “A Subnational Study of Insurgency: FARC Violence in the 1990s.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (March), 1. 176 Ibid. 177 Ibid., 2–12. 178 Ibid., 12. 179 Ibid., 17. 180 Richani, Nazih (2002), Systems of Violence: The Political Economy of War and Peace In Colombia (Albany: State University of New York), 60–81. 181 Ibid., 60. 182 Sanchez, Fabio and Maria del Mar Palau (2006), “Conflict, Decentralization and Local Governance in Colombia, 1974–2004.” CEDE (May), 7–9. 183 Rabasa, Angel and Peter Chalk (2001), Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and its Implications for Regional Stability (Santa Monica: RAND), 23–51. 184 Ortiz, Ramon D. (2002), “Insurgent Strategies,” 128. 185 Sanin, Francisco Gutierrez (2003), “Criminal Rebels?” 5. 186 Ibid. 187 Ortiz, Ramon D. (2002), “Insurgent Strategies,” 130. 188 Manwaring, Max G. (2002), “Non-State Actors in Colombia,” 71. 189 Ortiz, Ramon D. (2002), “Insurgent Strategies,” 130. 190 Ibid. 191 Ibid., 131. 192 Ibid. 193 Ibid. 194 Ibid., 132. 195 Ibid. 196 Ibid. 197 Ibid., 133. 198 Ibid., 134.



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199 Ibid. 200 Ibid., 135. 201 Ibid. 202 Ibid. 203 Richani, Nazih (2002), Systems of Violence, 65. 204 Begerquist, Charles., Ricardo Penaranda, and Gonzaol Sanchez G. (2001), Violence in Colombia 1990–2000 Waging War and Negotiating Peace (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc.), 31–2. 205 Feldmann, Andreas (2005), “A Shift in the Paradigm of Violence,” 13. 206 Ibid., 15. 207 Simons, Geoff (2004), Colombia: A Brutal History, 43. 208 Ibid. 209 Ibid., 44. 210 Feldmann, Andreas (2005), “A Shift in the Paradigm of Violence,” 24. 211 Holmes, Pineres, Curtin (2007), “A Subnational Study of Insurgency,” 7. 212 Ibid., 16. 213 Simons, Geoff (2004), Colombia: A Brutal History, 75–6. 214 Ibid., 76. 215 Ibid., 90–1. 216 Sanchez, Fabio and Maria del Mar Palau (2006), “Conflict,” 22. 217 Ibid. 218 Simons, Geoff (2004), Colombia: A Brutal History, 96. 219 Ibid., 110–13. 220 Ibid., 115. 221 Ibid., 130. 222 Ibid. 223 Ortiz, Ramon D. (2002), “Insurgent Strategies,” 136. 224 Simons, Geoff (2004), Colombia: A Brutal History, 201. 225 Ibid. 226 Ibid. 227 Ibid., 248. 228 Ibid. 229 Ibid., 305. 230 Ibid., 314–15. 231 Vargas, Ricardo (1999), “The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia,” 1. 232 Walker, Julius (2002), “The role of the state,” 11. 233 Marks, Thomas (2002), Colombian Army Adaptation, 3. 234 Rabasa, Angel and Peter Chalk (2001), Colombian Labyrinth, 26.

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235 Walker, Julius (2002), “The role of the state,” 7. 236 Sanchez, Fabio and Maria del Mar Palau (2006), “Conflict,” 7–8. 237 Ortiz, Ramon D. (2002), “Insurgent Strategies,” 138. 238 Ibid. 239 Richani, Nazih (2002), Systems of Violence, 70. 240 Ibid. 241 Ibid., 71. 242 Ibid., 72. 243 Ibid., 75. 244 Ibid., 78. 245 Rabasa, Angel and Peter Chalk (2001), Colombian Labyrinth, 32. 246 Ibid., 33. 247 Ibid., 40. 248 Green, John W. (2005), “Guerrillas, Soldiers, Paramilitaries, Assassins, Narcos, and Gringos: The Unhappy Prospects for Peace and Democracy in Colombia.” Latin American Research Review (June), 40. 145. 249 Stokes, Doug (2003), “Why the end of the Cold War doesn’t matter,” 579. 250 Ibid. 251 Pearce, Jenny (1990), Colombia: Inside the Labyrinth (New York: Monthly Review Press), 165. 252 Ibid. 253 Rochlin, James F. (2003), Vanguard Revolutionaries, 102. 254 Ibid., 103. 255 Ibid. 256 Ibid. 257 Ibid. 258 Ibid. 259 Ibid., 1. 260 Ibid., 87–102. 261 Ibid., 102–3. 262 Ibid., 103–4. 263 Ibid., 104–6. 264 Simons, Geoff (2004), Colombia: A Brutal History, 144–5. 265 Ibid., 156–267. 266 Ruiz, Bert (2001), The Colombian Civil War (Jefferson: McFarland & Company Inc. Publishers), 86. 267 Ibid., 87. 268 Ibid., 89–91.



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307

269 Ibid., 109–12. 270 Ibid., 112–16. 271 Ibid., 119–29. 272 Ibid., 245–8. 273 International Crisis Group (2007), “Colombia: Moving Forward with the ELN?” Latin America Briefing No. 16 (October). Internet. Available from: http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/latin_america/b16_colombia_ eln.pdf [accessed 18 March 2009], 2–6. 274 Ibid., 6–7. 275 Ibid., 7–8. 276 Ibid., 8–12. 277 Ibid., 12. 278 Ibid., 13–17. 279 International Crisis Group (2002), “Colombia: Prospects for Peace with the ELN.” ICG Latin America Report No. 2 (October). Internet. Available from: http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/report_archive/ A400790_04102002.pdf [accessed 18 March 2009], 1–4. 280 Ibid., 5–6. 281 Ibid., 7–8. 282 Ibid., 11–20. 283 Ibid., 20–3. 284 Ibid., 23–6. 285 Richani, Nazih (2002), Systems of Violence, 81–5. 286 Ibid., 85–91. 287 Sanin, Francisco Gutierrez (2003), “Criminal Rebels?” 1. 288 Ibid., 2–5. 289 Ibid., 6–13. 290 Ibid., 14–22. 291 Suarez, Alfredo Rangel (2000), “Parasites and Predators: Guerrillas and the Insurrection Economy of Colombia.” Journal of International Affairs (Spring), Vol. 53, no. 2, 577–8. 292 Ibid., 580–1. 293 Ibid., 582–5. 294 Ibid., 585–95. 295 Ibid., 596–601. 296 McLean, Phillip (2002), “Colombia – Thinking Clearly about the Conflict.” Center for Strategic and International Studies (October). Internet. Available from: http://www.csis.org/index.php?option=com_csis_ pubs&task=view&id=729 [accessed 21 November 2008], 1. 297 Ibid., 3.

308 THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

298 Ibid., 7–10. 299 Sanchez, Fabio and Maria del Mar Palau (2006), “Conflict,” 1. 300 Ibid., 9. 301 Ibid., 10–11. 302 Ibid., 12–18. 303 Ibid., 18–20. 304 Ibid., 21–6. 305 Ibid., 26–32. 306 International Crisis Group (2005), “War and Drugs in Colombia.” Latin America Report No. 11 (January). Internet. Available from: http://www. crisisgroup.org/library/documents/latin_america/11_war_and_drugs_in_ colombia.pdf [accessed 29 January 2009], 17–18. 307 Ibid., 18. 308 Ibid. 309 Ibid., 19–20. 310 Ibid., 21–34. 311 Rabasa, Angel and Peter Chalk (2001), Colombian Labyrinth, 23–52. 312 Ibid., 61–84. 313 Holmes, Jennifer S., Shiela Amin Gutierrez de Pineres, and Kevin M. Curtin (2008), Guns, Drugs, and Development in Colombia (Austin: University of Texas Press), 73–101. 314 Ibid., 103–60. 315 Holmes, Jennifer S. (2008), Guns, Drugs, and Development, 50. 316 International Crisis Group (2002), “Colombia: Prospects for Peace,” 5. 317 Holmes, Jennifer S. (2008), Guns, Drugs, and Development, 50. 318 International Crisis Group (2002), “Colombia: Prospects for Peace,” 5. 319 Ibid. 320 Holmes, Jennifer S. (2008), Guns, Drugs, and Development, 50. 321 International Crisis Group (2002), “Colombia: Prospects for Peace,” 5. 322 Rochlin, James F. (2003), Vanguard Revolutionaries, 103. 323 Ibid. 324 International Crisis Group (2002), “Colombia: Prospects for Peace,” 6. 325 Ibid. 326 Ibid. 327 Ibid. 328 Rabasa, Angel and Peter Chalk (2001), Colombian Labyrinth, 30. 329 International Crisis Group (2002), “Colombia: Prospects for Peace,” 6. 330 Ibid. 331 Ibid.



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332 Harper, Liz (2002), “Colombia’s Civil War: National Liberation Army (ELN).” Online News Hour. Internet. Available from: http://www.pbs.org/ newshour/bb/latin_america/colombia/players_eln [accessed April 2009], 2. 333 International Crisis Group (2002), “Colombia: Prospects for Peace,” 6. 334 Ibid. 335 Rabasa, Angel and Peter Chalk (2001), Colombian Labyrinth, 34. 336 Sanin, Francisco Gutierrez (2003), “Criminal Rebels?” 6. 337 International Crisis Group (2002), “Colombia: Prospects for Peace,” 6. 338 Rochlin, James F. (2003), Vanguard Revolutionaries, 104. 339 Ibid. 340 Ibid. 341 International Crisis Group (2002), “Colombia: Prospects for Peace,” 7. 342 Ibid. 343 Ibid. 344 Ibid. 345 Rochlin, James F. (2003), Vanguard Revolutionaries, 104. 346 Ruiz, Bert (2001), The Colombian Civil War, 116. 347 Rabasa, Angel and Peter Chalk (2001), Colombian Labyrinth, 31. 348 Sanin, Francisco Gutierrez (2003), “Criminal Rebels?” 6. 349 International Crisis Group (2002), “Colombia: Prospects for Peace,” 7. 350 Rochlin, James F. (2003), Vanguard Revolutionaries, 122. 351 Ibid. 352 International Crisis Group (2002), “Colombia: Prospects for Peace,” 7. 353 Rochlin, James F. (2003), Vanguard Revolutionaries, 122. 354 McLean, Phillip (2002), “Colombia – Thinking Clearly,” 3. 355 Rochlin, James F. (2003), Vanguard Revolutionaries, 122. 356 Ibid., 123. 357 Ibid. 358 Ibid. 359 Ibid. 360 Ibid. 361 Ibid. 362 Suarez, Alfredo Rangel (2000), “Parasites and Predators,” 582. 363 Sanchez, Fabio and Maria del Mar Palau (2006), “Conflict,” 10. 364 Suarez, Alfredo Rangel (2000), “Parasites and Predators,” 585. 365 Rabasa, Angel and Peter Chalk (2001), Colombian Labyrinth, 45. 366 Sanchez, Fabio and Maria del Mar Palau (2006), “Conflict,” 10. 367 McLean, Phillip (2002), “Colombia – Thinking Clearly,” 3.

310 THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

368 Richani, Nazih (2002), Systems of Violence, 86. 369 Ibid. 370 Rochlin, James F. (2003), Vanguard Revolutionaries, 104. 371 Ibid. 372 Richani, Nazih (2002), Systems of Violence, 86. 373 Suarez, Alfredo Rangel (2000), “Parasites and Predators,” 592. 374 Ibid. 375 Ibid. 376 Ibid. 377 Harper, Liz (2002), “Colombia’s Civil War,” 2. 378 Ibid., 3. 379 International Crisis Group (2005), “War and Drugs in Colombia,” 18. 380 Ibid. 381 Ibid. 382 Ibid. 383 Ibid. 384 Ibid. 385 Ibid. 386 Ibid. 387 International Crisis Group (2007), “Colombia: Moving Forward,” 2. 388 Ibid. 389 Sanchez, Fabio and Maria del Mar Palau (2006), “Conflict,” 22. 390 Simons, Geoff (2004), Colombia: A Brutal History, 178. 391 Ibid. 392 Ibid., 188–89. 393 Ibid., 189. 394 Ibid. 395 Ruiz, Bert (2001), The Colombian Civil War, 87. 396 Ibid. 397 Ibid., 88. 398 Ibid., 89. 399 Simons, Geoff (2004), Colombia: A Brutal History, 202. 400 Ibid. 401 Ibid. 402 Ruiz, Bert (2001), The Colombian Civil War, 91. 403 Simons, Geoff (2004), Colombia: A Brutal History, 202. 404 Rochlin, James F. (2003), Vanguard Revolutionaries, 127.



The adaptability of the FARC and ELN

405 Ibid. 406 Simons, Geoff (2004), Colombia: A Brutal History, 267. 407 Rochlin, James F. (2003), Vanguard Revolutionaries, 126. 408 Ibid. 409 Ruiz, Bert (2001), The Colombian Civil War, 245. 410 Ibid. 411 Ibid., 246. 412 Rochlin, James F. (2003), Vanguard Revolutionaries, 128. 413 Simons, Geoff (2004), Colombia: A Brutal History, 286. 414 Ibid., 295. 415 International Crisis Group (2007), “Colombia: Moving Forward,” 2. 416 Ibid. 417 Ibid., 10. 418 Ibid. 419 Ibid., 12. 420 Ibid. 421 Lockwood Johnathan S. and Kathleen O’Brien Lockwood (1994), The Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP) (MBS: American Military University), 28–9. 422 CIA (2009), World Factbook. “Colombia.” Central Intelligence Agency (April). Internet. Available from: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/ the-world-factbook/geos/co.html [accessed April 2009], 1. 423 Tuft, Eva Irene (1997), “Democracy and Violence: The Colombian Paradox.” Chr.Michelsen Institute Report Series. Internet. Available from: http://bora.cmi.no/dspace/bitstream/10202/307/1/R%201997.%201.%20 Eva%20I.%20Tuft-07092007_1.pdf [accessed 18 March 2009], 29. 424 Ibid. 425 Ibid., 30. 426 Ibid. 427 Ibid., 31. 428 Ibid. 429 Ibid. 430 Ibid., 32. 431 Ibid., 33–4. 432 Ibid., 33. 433 Ibid., 34. 434 Ibid. 435 Ibid., 35. 436 Ibid.

311

312 THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

437 Ibid. 438 Ibid., 36. 439 Ibid. 440 Ibid., 38. 441 Ibid. 442 Ibid., 40. 443 Ibid. 444 Ibid. 445 Ibid. 446 Ibid., 41. 447 Ibid. 448 Ibid. 449 Ibid. 450 Ibid., 44. 451 Ibid. 452 Ibid. 453 Rempe, Dennis (2002), Implementing Plan Colombia. 3. 454 Tuft, Eva Irene (1997), “Democracy and Violence,” 45. 455 Ibid., 46. 456 Rempe, Dennis (2002), Implementing Plan Colombia, 3. 457 Ibid. 458 Tuft, Eva Irene (1997), “Democracy and Violence,” 47. 459 Ibid., 48. 460 Ibid. 461 Ibid., 49. 462 Ibid. 463 Ibid. 464 Rempe, Dennis (2002), Implementing Plan Colombia, 3. 465 Tuft, Eva Irene (1997), “Democracy and Violence,” 49. 466 Ibid., 50. 467 Rempe, Dennis (2002), Implementing Plan Colombia, 3. 468 Tuft, Eva Irene (1997), “Democracy and Violence,” 51. 469 Ibid. 470 Rempe, Dennis (2002), Implementing Plan Colombia, 4. 471 Tuft, Eva Irene (1997), “Democracy and Violence,” 53. 472 Ibid. 473 Ibid., 54.



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313

474 Ibid. 475 Ibid. 476 Ibid., 55. 477 Ibid. 478 Ibid. 479 Ibid. 480 Ibid. 481 Ibid., 56. 482 Ibid. 483 Ibid. 484 Ibid., 58. 485 Ibid., 59. 486 Ibid. 487 Ibid. 488 Ibid. 489 Ibid. 490 Ibid. 491 Ibid. 492 Zambrano, Jair Cortazar and Lynn L. Adams (2008), “Colombia: Indications of a Never-Ending Conflict in Relation to the Adams Revolutionary Model.” Utah Valley University. Internet. Available from: http://law.creighton.edu/ wernerInstitute/complexityconference/speaker_materials/Table%20Topic%20 Paper%20Presentations/Colombia%20-%20Lynn%20Adams%20&%20 Jair%20Cortazar.pdf [accessed 18 March 2009], 13. 493 Ibid. 494 Ibid. 495 Ibid., 14. 496 Ibid., 12. 497 Ibid. 498 Ibid., 13. 499 Ibid., 12. 500 Ibid. 501 Ibid. 502 Ibid. 503 Ibid., 14. 504 Ortiz, Roman D. (2002), “Insurgent Strategies,” 128. 505 Ibid. 506 Ibid. 507 Ibid., 130.

314 THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

508 Ibid. 509 Ibid. 510 Ibid. 511 Ibid. 512 Ibid., 131. 513 Ibid. 514 Ibid. 515 International Crisis Group (2009), “Ending Colombia’s FARC Conflict: Dealing the Right Card.” Latin America Report No. 30 (March). Internet. Available from: http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6016 [accessed 27 April 2009], 1. This work is the most current publication on the FARC and was published while this chapter was being written. 516 Ibid. 517 Ibid., 1–2. 518 Ibid., 7. 519 Ibid. 520 Ibid., 9. 521 Ibid. 522 Ibid. 523 Ibid., 10. 524 Ibid. 525 Ibid. 526 Ibid., 11. 527 Ibid. 528 Ibid., 12. 529 Ibid. 530 Ibid. 531 Ibid. 532 Demarest, Geoffrey (2003), Mapping Colombia: The Correlation Between Land Data and Strategy (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute), 16. 533 Ibid. 534 Ibid. 535 Rabasa, Angel and Peter Chalk (2001), Colombian Labyrinth, 39. 536 Ibid., 40. 537 Ibid. 538 Ibid. 539 International Crisis Group (2009), “Ending Colombia’s FARC Conflict,” 15. 540 Ibid. 541 Ibid., 17.



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315

542 Ibid. 543 Ibid. 544 Ibid. 545 Ibid., 18–19. 546 Ibid., 19. 547 Harper, Liz (2002), “Colombia’s Civil War,” 1. 548 Ibid. 549 Ibid., 2. 550 Ibid. 551 Ibid. 552 Ibid., 3. 553 Rabasa, Angel and Peter Chalk (2001), Colombian Labyrinth, 45. 554 Ibid., 46. 555 International Crisis Group (2002), “Colombia: Prospects for Peace,” 20. 556 Ibid., 21. 557 Ibid., 23. 558 Ibid. 559 International Crisis Group (2007), “Colombia: Moving Forward,” 10. 560 Ibid., 11. 561 Ibid. 562 Ibid. 563 Ibid. 564 Ibid., 16. 565 Ibid. 566 Ibid. 567 Lockwood, Johnathan S. and Kathleen O’Brien Lockwood. The Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP), 25. 568 Ibid., 26. 569 Ibid., 27. 570 Ibid., 27–8. 571 Ibid., 91–3. 572 Restrepo, Jorge, Michael Spagat and Juan F. Vargas. 2003. “The Dynamics of the Colombian Civil Conflict: A New Data Set.” Center for Economic Policy Research No. 4108 (November). Internet: Available from: www.cepr. org/pubs/dps/DP4108.asp [accessed 17 March 2009], 19. 573 Rabasa, Angel and Peter Chalk. 2001. Colombian Labyrinth, 43. 574 Ibid. 575 Ibid.

316 THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)

576 International Crisis Group (2002), “Colombia: Prospects for Peace,” 16. 577 Ibid. 578 Ibid., 7. 579 Ibid. 580 International Crisis Group (2007), “Colombia: Moving Forward,” 4. 581 Ibid., 5. 582 Ibid. 583 International Crisis Group (2003), “Colombia and its Neighbors: The Tentacles of Instability.” Latin America No. 3 (April). Internet. Available from: http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1534&l=1 [accessed 18 March 2009], 3. 584 Ibid., 5. 585 International Crisis Group (2007), “Colombia: Moving Forward,” 5. 586 Ibid. 587 Ibid., 6. 588 International Crisis Group (2009), “Ending Colombia’s FARC Conflict,” 3. 589 Ibid., 5. 590 Ibid., 18. 591 Ibid., 5. 592 Ibid. 593 International Crisis Group (2007), “Colombia: Moving Forward,” 8. 594 Ibid., 12. 595 International Crisis Group (2009), “Ending Colombia’s FARC Conflict,” 13. 596 Ibid. 597 Ibid.

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INDEX

ACH see Analyses of Competing Hypotheses actors 8, 9, 21, 22, 23, 25–7, 29, 42, 45–7, 51, 73, 76, 77, 79, 80, 90, 91, 93, 104, 105, 106, 122, 126, 127, 129, 132, 143, 157–8, 174, 175, 178, 179, 199, 204, 209, 210, 216, 228, 235, 249, 260, 283, 293, 294, 295, 297, 321 alternate future 11, 13, 16, 20, 21, 22–7, 29, 32, 36, 38, 42, 43, 45, 51, 54, 56, 59, 61, 62, 63, 64, 66, 68, 69, 71, 73, 76–9, 105, 106, 107, 109, 111, 113, 114, 116, 118, 120, 123, 124, 128, 130, 132, 143, 144, 145, 175, 179, 181, 183, 185, 187, 191, 192, 194, 199, 200, 210, 216, 219, 227, 294, 297, 299, 307, 312, 320 Alternative Futures 14, 46, 47, 48, 49, 51, 55, 79 American Military University (AMU) 14 Analyses of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) 16, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 233 analytic hierarchy process (AHP) 40 Bayesian analysis 77 chaos theory 77 competitive business intelligence 80 consequences 13, 22, 29, 36, 43, 47, 48, 63, 64, 65, 66, 68, 69, 71, 72, 73, 78, 120, 124, 125, 126, 131, 156, 157, 192, 294 corporation 22

courses of action 9, 22–6, 29, 51, 73, 76–7, 105, 106, 174, 175, 178–9, 199, 216, 218, 223, 228, 294, 297 Defense Intelligence College 14, 16 Defense Intelligence Journal 16, 39, 81, 345 Delphi 43, 44, 45, 46, 55 doctoral dissertation 13, 16, 81 Drew Lasater 10, 15, 233 focal event 29, 32, 34, 78, 132, 210 focal issue 47 free will 19, 21, 27, 36, 42, 51, 77, 104 hypothesized scenarios 14 indicators 9, 32, 38, 43, 47, 48, 51, 53, 66, 132, 170, 175, 210, 216, 283, 294, 320 intelligence training 79 key indicator 33, 34, 35 LAMP’s practicality at the tactical 80 limitations 9, 15, 76, 78, 255, 256, 272, 296, 297 Mary Boyle 10, 15, 88 mirror-imaging 23 MSSI degree 14 Nicholas Lusas 10, 15, 151 pair-wise comparison 11, 26–7, 38, 40, 41, 45, 51, 77–8, 107, 113, 120, 125, 143, 179, 181, 183, 185, 187, 197, 209, 283, 297

324 Index

Paul Croom 80, 81 perceptions 13, 14, 21, 24, 45, 56–7, 73, 79, 93, 104, 143, 144, 155, 157, 162, 163, 164, 167, 169, 171, 175, 194, 216, 225, 294 perceptual study 22, 23, 24, 45 permutations 10, 11, 23, 25, 26, 27, 51, 77, 81, 106, 113, 179, 180, 294 policymaker 35, 36, 46, 79 probability theory 21, 77 qualitative methods 20 quantitative methods 20, 41, 49 Russian View of US Strategy 13, 14, 16, 38, 56, 74, 345

scenario 9, 10, 13, 22, 25, 26–7, 38, 46, 47–9, 50–1, 55–9, 62, 63, 65, 66, 68, 69, 71, 72, 73, 74, 90, 104, 105, 106, 107, 113, 124, 128, 130, 143–5, 147, 175, 178, 179, 181, 187, 195, 199, 200–10, 216, 217, 219, 223, 225, 235, 255, 272, 283, 289, 294, 295, 297, 299, 300, 301, 308, 312, 315, 320, 322 sources of error 35, 39, 345 transposition 36, 39, 43, 62, 63, 64, 65, 69, 71, 72, 73, 78, 143, 144, 145, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220–7, 304, 320 Wallman 30, 32, 38, 346