The Liberal Party in Alberta: A History of Politics in the Province of Alberta 1905–1921 9781487575007

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THE LIBERAL PARTY IN ALBERTA

SOCIAL CREDIT IN ALBER TA Its Background and Development

A series of studies sponsored by the Canadian Social Science Research Council, directed and edited by S. D. Clark. l. The Progressive Party in Canada. By W. L. MORTON

2. The Winnipeg General Strike. By D. C. MASTERS 3. Next-Year Country. By JEAN BURNET

4. Democracy in Alberta. By C. B. MACPHERSON 5. Social Credit and the Federal Power in Canada. By J. R.

MALLORY

6. Sect, Cult, and Church in Alberta. By W. E. MANN 1. The National Policy and the Wheat Economy. By V. C. FoWKE

8. The Liberal Party in Alberta: A History of Politics in the Province of Alberta, 1905-1921. By L. G. THOMAS

THE LIBERAL PARTY IN ALBERTA A History of Politics in the Province of Alberta

1905-1921

L. G. THOMAS Professor of History, University of Alberta

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS Toronto, 1959

Copyright, Canada, 1959, by University of Toronto Press Printed in Canada London: Oxford University Press Reprinted in 2018 ISBN 978-1-4875-8505-1 (paper)

Foreword A NATIVE of Alberta whose awareness of political happenings developed just about the time the Liberals fell from power in the province has perhaps a particular reason to be grateful to Professor Thomas for this study of the political history of Alberta from its founding in 1905 to 1921. Much has been said and written about the non-party tradition which early became established in the politics of the North-West Territories, and, in general terms, it can be shown that the collapse of the Liberal party in Alberta in 1921 was a result of the strength of this tradition. But the Liberals ruled in Alberta for sixteen years and their hold upon the province of Saskatchewan was not broken for several more, and then only by a movement which fully accepted the principles of party government. It was no easy task to establish rule by political party in Alberta in the years after 1905, but the Liberals almost succeeded and the reason why in the end they failed can only be understood in terms of the particular kind of political developments which took place in the province. The future political history of Alberta was shaped by the issues, the personalities, and the political forces of the 1905-21 period. Given a slightly different course of events, the party system might well have survived the political upheaval after the First World War and there would not have been in Alberta a United Farmers government or, fourteen years later, a Social Credit. A word on my part thus seems scarcely necessary to justify the inclusion of this study as one of a series relating to the background and development of the Social Credit movement in Alberta. The people of Alberta turned against the old parties in 1921, and, with the conditions of the 1930's breeding even a greater distrust of things connected with Ottawa and the East, they were not likely to reverse their position in 1935. What happened in 1935 can be traced back to events and developments occurring in the years before the First World War which had the effect of seriously weakening the position in Alberta of the old parties. The examination of these events and developments is the task which Professor Thomas has so ably performed in this study. There

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FOREWORD

are too few provincial political histories in Canadian literature. Professor Thomas has set an example, and a standard, which it is to be hoped will be followed by many other scholars. S.D.CLARK

Preface her sisters in the Canadian federation, Alberta has achieved a reputation for political eccentricity. For nearly forty years her governments have been of a political shade unfashionable in most of the rest of Canada. This study examines the earlier years of Alberta's political history, when at least the outward appearance of her governments was more in accord with the accepted Canadian conventions. It is particularly concerned with the fortunes of what was, in those formative years between 1905 and 1921, the dominant Liberal party. Alberta was among the first of the provinces to reject the conventional parties of Canadian federal politics; she rejected them more decisively than some of the others. Her behaviour, this study suggests, was at least in part the result of her experience, under three premiers, of the rule of one of the older parties. I am much indebted to Professor F. Merk, to Professor S. D. Oark, and to those necessarily anonymous readers, who so greatly assisted in the reduction of the manuscript to its present form. It is a pleasure to acknowledge my obligation to the Social Science Research Council of Canada and the Publications Fund of the University of Toronto Press, which have made publication possible. My sincere thanks also go to the editorial staff of the University of Toronto Press and to the Provincial Librarian of Alberta, Mrs. Gostick, and to her patient staff. AMONG

L.G. THOMAS

Contents FOREWORD

by

s. D. Clark

PREFACE

INTRODUCTION

I

The Autonomy Terms and Party Politics in the North-West Territories

II The First Alberta Provincial Election, 1905

Ill The First Legislature of Alberta, 1906-9

IV V VI VII VIII

V

vii

xi

3 21 34

Alberta and the Waterways Railway, 1909-10

58

The Sifton Government and the Railway Problem, 1910-13

95

The Election of 1913 and the Sifton Government, 1913-14 134 Alberta Politics and the War of 1914-18

154

Post-War Alberta and the Liberal Collapse, 1918-21

188

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

208

NOTES

211

INDEX

225

Introduction IN SEPTEMBER, 1905, a Liberal government headed by Alexander Cameron Rutherford won a sweeping victory in the election that inaugurated Alberta's political life. For sixteen years thereafter, under three successive premiers, the Liberals remained the dominant party in the province. Then in 1921 the United Farmers of Alberta inflicted upon the Liberals an overwhelming defeat and maintained for fourteen years a mastery of the provincial legislature unimpaired by successive elections. The U.F.A. extended its success into the federal constituencies of the province, where, except in the larger cities, the older parties offered it no effective challenge. Finally, late in the summer of 1935, an even more spectacular landslide in Alberta caught the attention of the Canadian public. Social Credit, until this time known only as an obscure political sect of English origin, with unconventional theories of monetary reform and social and political organization, had, under the leadership of a Calgary school teacher named William Aberhart, carried all but seven of the sixty-three provincial seats. It would be rash to suggest that from these events there may be discerned a pattern in the life of Alberta governments. But a pattern does suggest itself, a pattern of sweeping victory, succeeded by long tenure of office with only ineffective opposition. Then follows virtual annihilation at the hands of a young rival of unexpected vigour and a sudden decline into political obscurity, if not complete extinction. The nature of the opposition, as much as that of the governments, may help to explain the course of events. When the Liberal and Farmer governments fell, they fell, not before the attacks of the official opposition, but before the impact of new grass-roots movements they were unable to contain. The official parties of the opposition were as ineffective as the government party in the general elections of both 1921 and 1935. The opposition was an opposition only; the electors did not see it as an alternative government. The Liberal government of 1921, and the Farmer government of 1935, fell, not because the opposition parties offered an attractive alternative, but because the voters had lost confidence in all the parties in the legislature. The U.F.A. in 1921 and Social Credit in 1935 did not think of themselves as political parties in the

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INTRODUCTION

accepted sense, and those who gave them support did so because they accepted them as non-partisan. In both elections the Alberta voters rejected the older parties. This study, however, is concerned with Alberta politics and politicians and with the behaviour of the Alberta voter at an earlier date. Why, after a period of conspicuously successful non-partisan administration under Haultain as a part of the North-West Territories, did the new province give such an overwhelming victory to a partisan Liberal government? Why did this government survive for sixteen years? Why, when it fell, was its fall so great? Partial answers at least may be found in the circumstances under which the first provincial government was formed and under which the first provincial election was fought in 1905. Some of the weaknesses of the Liberal government, and of the Conservative opposition, were revealed by the Alberta and Great Waterways Railway episode of 1910, which laid bare the factional and sectional cleavages within the government. The Liberal party survived this crisis, but the Rutherford government did not. The impact of the war of 1914-18 had its effects, and the rise of the United Farmers of Alberta, as the provincial phase of a regional and national and even continental movement, was clearly of great importance. But again we must ask why the U.F.A. succeeded where the Conservatives failed, and why the Liberals of Alberta were unable to follow the same courses in relation to the farmers' movement as the Liberals in Saskatchewan. Political power in Alberta, it would appear, is difficult to obtain, but the first election is always the hardest. Once in office, it has been comparatively easy for a party to stay there. This immediately raises questions relating to the structure of parties and the means by which political power is consolidated and maintained. It also involves some consideration of the process of decay. Why did the Liberal machine break down? Why were the Conservatives never able to evolve a machine of comparable efficiency? To such questions there are no certain answers. Yet a study of the Liberal regime in Alberta may at least cast some useful light upon them.

THE LIBERAL PARTY IN ALBERTA

._ CHAPTER ONE «CE-

The Autonomy Terms and Party Politics in the North-West Territories THE PROVINCE of Alberta and her sister province of Saskatchewan were created in 1905 by the Liberal administration of Sir Wilfrid Laurier. They did not, however, come into being in a political void. The settled part of the North-West Territories, of which they were a part, had at least a generation of political history behind it, and the struggle for representative and responsible government, and then for provincial autonomy, paralleled and synopsized the course of events in the older provinces. F. W. G. Haultain accomplished for the further west what Louis Riel and Adams G. Archibald did for Manitoba, and the territorial premier was almost as much of an embarrassment to Laurier and his cabinet as the Metis leader to Macdonald and the Conservatives. And Haultain was perhaps also a martyr of the North-West, even though his life ended, not upon the scaffold, but upon the bench of the Saskatchewan Supreme Court. When the legislation creating the new provinces was passed, there were Liberals in Alberta, but there was no provincial Liberal party. Such an organization had, like the new provinces, to be created; and, in spite of Liberal predominance at Ottawa, this was not an easy task. The difficulties arose out of the history of territorial administration and the circumstances in which the autonomy legislation was passed. From the first election of territorial members to the federal parliament the candidates assumed traditional party labels. In the territorial legislature, however, no clear party lines were drawn. Haultain, as territorial premier, strongly opposed their introduction and, although in federal politics he himself was a Conservative, his administrative colleagues might be either Liberal or Conservative. 1 This state of affairs seems to have been satisfactory to the majority of territorial voters, for they gave Haultain steady support. There were, of course, some who felt otherwise, and in 1903 a convention of territorial Conservatives carried by a large majority, and over Haultain's opposition, a resolution to fight the next election on party lines. 2 Haultain's Liberal colleagues, 1 Numbered

footnotes are to be found in a section at the back of the book.

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THE LIBERAL PARTY IN ALBERTA

however, accepted his assurances that he would oppose the introduction of party lines into territorial affairs. The temptations of partisan politics were difficult to resist, but the maintenance of a united front had won responsible government and might yet win further concessions. In 1891 the federal government had conceded to the territorial assembly control of the expenditure of federal grants, and in 1897 it had recognized that the territorial premier must have the confidence of the majority in the Assembly. But territorial status involved restrictions on the power of the territorial government to borrow money and to charter railways, and the control of natural resources remained in federal hands. The accelerated settlement of the West in the later nineties and in the opening years of the twentieth century called for more vigorous policies of development than the territorial administration could pursue in the face of these limitations. At the same time, the financial resources of the Regina government were very limited. The growth of population, especially after the tum of the century, involved heavy demands for expenditure, particularly on education and public works, which would have taxed the capacity of the territorial purse, no matter what the powers of its government. The Territories, government and people alike, regarded the development of the West as a national necessity and resented federal control of natural resources. The central government accepted in principle the view that the natural resources should be used to further western development, but its practice, involving the alienation of Crown lands to railways, colonization companies, and cattle barons, seemed to the westerner a negation of all the word "National" stood for. After 1896 the immigration policies of Clifford Sitton, Lauder's Minister of the Interior, proved an embarrassment to the territorial government, for territorial revenues and federal grants did not keep pace with the needs of the increasing population. Even if revenues had expanded more rapidly, the territorial government's inability to borrow money on the public credit for capital expenditure would have made its position hopelessly difficult. "A study of the correspondence between the federal and territorial governments ... ," Lingard observes in his study of the autonomy movement, "brings to light a mass of evidence in support of the belief that financial considerations were paramount in creating the demand for provincial status. " 8 Financial considerations such as these know no party boundaries. Territorial Liberal and territorial Conservative alike supported the Haultain government in its autonomy policy, as they had supported Haultain in the struggle for responsible government. The demand for

AUTONOMY TERMS AND PARTY POLITICS

5

provincial autonomy made its first appearance in the territorial Assembly in 1896, when Dr. R. G. Brett, a prominent Alberta Conservative, proposed that the Districts of Alberta and Athabasca become a separate province. The suggestion received little support, largely as a result of the opposition of the Premier, always a one-province man, but in 1900 Haultain secured the unanimous passage by the Assembly of a resolution asking the federal government to make full inquiry into the terms upon which provincial status might be granted. In 1901 Haultain as Premier and Arthur L. Sifton, brother of the Minister of the Interior and himself a future Liberal Premier of Alberta, conferred with a committee of the federal cabinet, and at the end of the year Haultain submitted a draft constitution for a new province in the North-West. The federal government was not yet prepared to act, but the territorial general election of 1902 gave Haultain's government a large majority. Ottawa's lame excuses for postponing action, and the reluctance of some western members of parliament, notably Frank Oliver, to press for it, may be explained by the desire of Laurier and the Liberals to avoid raising, until after a general election, the difficult questions of education and the use of the public domain involved in the grant of autonomy.4 Haultain and his associates on the other hand, strengthened by the verdict of the territorial electors in 1902, and plagued by a financial problem that became more pressing as the tide of immigration rose ever higher, continued to urge their demands on the central government. At this point Borden and the federal Conservatives took up the cause, chilling the enthusiasm of territorial Liberals. Even Walter Scott, the future Liberal Premier of Saskatchewan and the only federal member from the Territories who had given autonomy much support, began to find reasons for postponement. It was now that the territorial Conservatives decided, over Haultain's opposition, to fight the next territorial election on party lines. Haultain, strongly in favour of non-partisan government, at least at the local level, managed nevertheless to maintain in the assembly a measure of agreement in favour of autonomy. Differences of opinion did emerge as to the form autonomy should take, but although Ottawa made financial concessions and substantially inc.ceased future territorial representation in the House of Commons, the men of Regina stood firm in their demand for provincial status. Prior to the federal election of 1904, Laurier promised to deal with the autonomy question if his government were sustained.15 Haultain nevertheless deserted his non~partisan position and campaigned vigorously for the Conservatives, apparently regarding their promises of autonomy as more reliable. This led some Liberals to link the demand

6

THE LIBERAL PARTY IN ALBERTA

for autonomy with a Conservative desire to destroy the Grand Trunk Pacific project.6 When on his campaign trip through Alberta, Haultain accepted the Canadian Pacific's offer of Private Car No. 33, the Liberal press drew sinister conclusions and No. 33 was abandoned at Red Deer.7 His claim that provincial status would mean an annual revenue of over two million dollars Oliver promptly denied, asking whether the other provinces would permit the Dominion to pay compensation for the territorial lands it had given away. 8 Undoubtedly Haultain's support of the Conservative party in the federal election of 1904 lessened his influence among territorial Liberals. In spite of Haultain's considerable influence the Territories followed the rest of the country in giving the Liberals a decisive majority, probably because the West liked their grandiose railway policy. Only three of the ten territorial constituencies returned Conservative members, two in southern Alberta and the third in southern Saskatchewan, at Qu'Appelle, long a Conservative stronghold. This was rather less of a disaster for the Conservatives than the triumphant Liberals proclaimed it. Indeed, it really represented an improvement in the Conservative position for in the general election of 1900 all four territorial constituencies had returned Liberals and in 1896 the sole Conservative victory had been the result of the vote of the returning officer. On the other hand, in the general elections of 1887 and 1891 the Conservatives had carried every territorial seat. The influence of the federal government and that of the Canadian Pacific were perhaps the chief factors in determining territorial elections to the federal house, with dislike of the great railway corporation almost as potent in some areas as its patronage was in others. Constituencies within the orbit of the C.P.R. were likely to be Conservative; those which hoped for better things from another transcontinental were likely to be Liberal. Thus in Alberta Calgary was a recognized Conservative stronghold, Edmonton almost as reliably in the other camp. Personalities also played a powerful part: Edmonton produced Frank Oliver; Calgary had R. B. Bennett. The election of 1896 was clearly an exception; the trend of politics adverse to the Conservatives was too strong to be resisted. By 1904 the situation had to some extent reversed itself; at least in southern Alberta the Liberals could expect some Conservative opposition. It may also be suspected that the interplay of governmental and railway influence had a considerable effect on the elections to the territorial assembly. In what was to become the province of Alberta as well as in the Territories as a whole, the members elected in 1888, 1891 and 1894, were predominantly Conservative, though Oliver held

AUTONOMY TERMS AND PARTY POLITICS

7

Edmonton as an independent. In the election of 1898, however, the Conservatives lost Banf'f, High River, Lethbridge and the new riding of Wetaskiwin, and in 1902, though they retained the two Calgary seats, and Haultain held Macleod, the Liberals carried the new ridings of Cardston, Lacombe, and Strathcona. It is not surprising that Conservative soul-searching at the Moose Jaw convention in 1903 produced a decision to fight the next election on party lines. Non-partisan administration, even with the Conservative Haultain at its bead, had been accompanied by a steady decline in the number of Conservatives elected. The Liberals, on the other hand, could afford to view the situation with some complacency. After their victory in 1904 the territorial Liberal members of the House of Commons continued lukewarm in the cause of autonomy; Oliver's influential Bulletin expressed their doubt of the value of autonomy unless the Territories could obtain more favourable financial terms than Manitoba. A fixed subsidy and an increasing population would lead to financial difficulties like those of Manitoba and British Columbia. "The public interests lie in opposing autonomy except on terms suitable to our special condition."9 But Laurier's pre-election promise made further postponement impossible and early in 1905 the speech from the throne committed bis government to action. Haultain and G. H . V. Bulyea, his Liberal colleague in the Regina ministry, represented the territorial government in negotiations with the cabinet, but Laurier also consulted territorial Liberals in the House of Commons. Of these Oliver was one of the most influential and his coolness towards autonomy was expressed in his newspaper. It is but fair at the outset to say that the people of the Territories are by no means unanimously in favour of the immediate granting of provincial autonomy . • .. [In territorial elections] no clear cut policy on autonomy or any subject of similar breadth has been made the general issue. In recent Dominion elections an attempt was made to secure a pronouncement of the Northwest electors in favour of the immediate granting of autonomy.... The measure of the popular interest •.. was best shown by the election returns when seven supporters of the Federal Government were elected. • . • The attitude of the Northwest .•. is eminently practical, that if autonomy means a betterment of our conditions it should be urged; otherwise it should be deferred.• • . The people of the West care little for prestige.• .. It cannot be reasonably asserted that anything approaching an unanimous opinion, favourable or hostile to the movement, now exists.10

The shaping of the bill that would give form to the autonomy proposals was of the utmost importance for the political future of Liberalism

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THE LIBERAL PARTY IN ALBERTA

in the Territories. If Haultain's views triumphed, and be became the first prime minister of a single vast province, his views on provincial administration might also prevail, and he would be, as he had been in the Territories, bead of a non-partisan ministry, or, at best, of a coalition. If this were to fall apart in the future, Haultain might be expected to uphold the Conservative party in the provincial field. There was, when the year 1905 opened, a real question whether for all practical purposes there was to be in the new province any provincial Liberal party at all. To this question the key was the political future of Haultain. The bill as it emerged from consultation and as Laurier presented it must have grievously disappointed Haultain. It directly contradicted his views on two all-important points, for it provided for the establishment of two provinces and the retention by the Dominion of the public lands. The financial terms were not ungenerous, but even as staunch a Liberal as Peter Talbot, the federal member from Strathcona, regarded them, in confidence, as only "fairly satisfactory." 11 Certainly, in the eyes of Haultain, they did not go far enough to compensate for the withholding of the natural resources. The educational clauses were, however, to provoke the liveliest opposition to the bill. They sought, in Laurier's words, to provide "that the minority shall have the power to establish their own schools and that they shall have the right to share in public monies." 12 To opponents of separate schools the bill placed a severe restriction upon the power of the new provinces to decide for themselves what their school system should be, and the immediate protests from Liberal as well as Conservative quarters amply justified Laurier's earlier reluctance to deal with the autonomy question prior to the general election. The territorial government had been engaged, long prior to 1905, in a progressive reduction of the minority privileges in the school system of the North-West. By 1905 only eleven separate schools were in operation, for "the Haultain government bad legislated for uniformity and had 'administered' most of the separation out of the school law." 18 The educational clauses in the autonomy bill were taken as an attempt to reverse the process and opposition to them extended to the cabinet. Clifford Sifton, western representative in the cabinet and as Minister of the Interior the cabinet member most concerned with the Territories, had been absent from Ottawa during the preliminary discussions of the bill. As the vigorous and successful opponent of separate schools in Manitoba, he could not accept the educational clauses and he returned to Ottawa only to resign his portfolio. W. S. Fielding, the Minister of Finance, was known to be opposed and was said to be about to follow

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his colleague's example. Influential English-speaking Liberal newspapers attacked the clauses. Liberal opposition was strongest in Ontario, but it was so widespread as to arouse fears for Liberal unity. Meanwhile the region most affected by the clauses remained comparatively calm. The territorial members did not like the legislation and hoped that a way would be found to maintain the existing system. H The Bulletin reprinted with approving comment an editorial from the Red Deer Advocate defending the territorial educational system and condemning the appeal by eastern papers, especially by those of Toronto, to religious prejudice.Hi The Toronto Globe's special correspondent found the people of the West more interested in the location of the capitals, the drawing of the Alberta-Saskatchewan boundary line, and the question of the public lands.16 The westerners in Ottawa were chiefly concerned, according to another observer, in angling for office as senators and lieutenant-governors for the new provinces, 17 an impression amply confirmed by the letters written at this time to Dr. Rutherford. Where opposition to the educational clauses was voiced in the Territories, it expressed not racial or religious ill-feeling but disapproval of an improper restriction upon provincial powers. The threat to Liberal unity, as well as the danger to the country of rousing to new life the ever-present racial and religious discords, brought a compromise which, while maintaining the right of the minority to separate schools, ensured that they would be under provincial control. This did not satisfy extremists, but it secured the unenthusiastic assent of Sifton and the support of the territorial members. Had Laurier been able to force through the original clauses, the Liberals might have found themselves considerably embarrassed in the new provinces. Although the people of the Territories showed little disposition to become excited about the educational clauses, the Conservatives might have been able to work up a good deal of feeling by the time provincial elections took place. With the original clauses they would have been in a strong position for attack, for the Liberals could have been accused, not only of undue subservience to Quebec and to Rome, but also of betraying the cause of provincial rights. Laurier and the Liberals, it could have been held, had undone in the Territories what they had done in Manitoba in 1896. As it was, the territorial public accepted the compromise without demur and the Liberals could when necessary pose, in the eyes of all save the most extreme, as the defenders of the Roman Catholic church and the French language. The compromise certainly saved the Liberals, though whether the controversy need ever have arisen may be questioned.18

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The autonomy movement in the Territories had grown very largely out of the financial difficulties confronting the territorial government. Without adequate powers of taxation, without the right to borrow on the public credit, and without the control of the natural resources, the territorial government still had to provide for the expanding needs of a constantly growing population in a region devoid of the most rudimentary public services. It was almost wholly dependent on the subsidies granted by the federal government. In these circumstances the dogged fight by the territorial legislature and its leaders for full control over the expenditure of the subsidies is the more remarkable. That control was won, but control of the purse did not mean that the purse was as full as those who held the purse strings thought it should be. Haultain and his fellows constantly pressed upon the senior government the need for increased subsidies, but not always with success. Not until 1904 did the federal grant even begin to approximate to the estimate of territorial needs arrived at in Regina, and it was only in 1905 that the full amount asked was conceded. 18 The chief interest of the financial terms lies in the fact that they gave the Liberals an answer to those critics, of whom Haultain was probably the most effective and certainly the most dangerous, who objected to federal retention of the natural resources. In the first place the new provinces were compensated for the right of levying customs duties that the older provinces had possessed before entering confederation. An allowance was also made in lieu of the debts other provinces had incurred before entry. In these respects there was no discrimination against Alberta and Saskatchewan. In the second place, as compensation for the withholding of control over their natural resources, the provinces were each to receive the sum of $375,000 annually, with provision for increase as population grew. There was a further grant, for five years only, to provide for the construction of public buildings. The Liberal defenders of the financial terms based their case upon the contention that Alberta and Saskatchewan would be better off in their status as second-class provinces than some of their older sisters. Opinion tended, as the debate on the terms went on, increasingly to divide along party lines,20 and among the staunchest defenders of the financial provisions was the Liberal G. H. V. Bulyea. His arguments have a sadly ironic ring in view of the subsequent history of the financial relations of the Dominion and the provinces. The big advantage of the financial terms is that they last forever, and the provinces will have ample revenue placed to their credit, half-yearly in advance, from which to look after the development of this country and meet all demands which are made on their treasury.

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British Columbia • • • is now practically condemned to resort to direct taxation in order to obtain sufficient money to carry on . . • while on the contrary the new provinces have provided for them a yearly revenue of $2,200,000 which should be ample . • • if ordinary economy is exercised by the local authorities. Besides the Dominion Government retaining the lands, it naturally devolves upon them the Dominion to assume the responsibility of opening up and developing the country and railways will have to go to them for assistance. The lands should be administered for immigration purposes rather than for revenue. . .. I do not think we should have received the same assistance for one province as we are receiving for the two.21

A recent writer is less eulogistic: "The new provinces were being committed to a settlement, in lieu of their lands still unalienated, of considerably less than fifty cents on the dollar, and . . . the graduated interest payment on the arbitrarily fixed 'compensation' fund . . . did not include any 'compensation' whatever for the 65,623,531 acres already disposed of for the purposes of the Dominion. " 22 Although Haultain's criticism of the financial terms, and more particularly of the decision as to the natural resources, did not endear him to the Liberals generally, and helped to alienate him from his Liberal colleagues, he had plenty of support among territorial Conservatives, especially in the district of Alberta. The Calgary Liberals, including the influential C. A. Stuart, had earlier used much the same arguments for provincial control of resources, but as time went on loyalty to their party seems to have overcome their objections. 23 Provincial Rights, the formula which had won the election of 1896 for the Liberals, by a curious inversion of circumstances became the battle cry of the territorial Conservatives. No decision, even that on the natural resources, was more important for the future of the prairie West than that to divide the existing administrative unit of the North-West Territories into two. From the moment the possibility of provincial status was first canvassed the questions which aroused the widest and deepest interest were those concerning the number and the boundaries of the new provinces. Out of several proposals, some of them fanciful, three main possibilities emerged. The first was the creation of a single province comprising the whole of the Territories south of the sixtieth parallel or thereabouts. The second was the establishment of a single smaller province with the eastern part of the existing districts of Assiniboia and Saskatchewan annexed to Manitoba. The third was the erection of two new provinces. The first alternative was that advocated by Haultain and many of his

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supporters. The second was popular in Manitoba and very unpopular among her immediate neighbours, though a few people ventured to think that a single government would suffice for the whole prairie region. The third alternative was particularly attractive to those who hoped their town or city might become a provincial capital. Although Manitoba was in the first years of the twentieth century pressing for the adjustment of her western boundary, the general sentiment of the adjacent region was so opposed that the federal government took no action. The question of the number of new provinces was more serious, for though the majority of the territorial assembly supported Haultain's view that a single province should be created, that body was by no means unanimous and, as Haultain himself admitted, a similar division existed in the public mind. 24 The strongest arguments advanced by T. A. Patrick and R. B. Bennett, the most active opponents of the idea of a single province, were that its size would be disproportionate to that of other provinces and that diversity of interests would lead to internal stress and strain. The real pressure for division into two provinces seems, however, to have come from the rivalries existing between the ambitious towns and between the various regions in the Territories. The advocates of the single province argued that economy and efficiency of administration could best be promoted within the larger unit and that diversity of interest did not necessarily mean a lack of harmony in govemment. 25 The most lively public interest was taken in the location of the provincial capitals and in the scheduling of the constituencies for the first provincial elections. Focussing as they did every sectional rivalry and animosity, these questions generated more heat than any others raised by the autonomy proposals. For future political alignments they were of the utmost importance. Parallel controversies raged in the two prospective provinces and cut across party lines. Although the capitals were supposed to be "provisional," the public believed, rightly as events proved, that "provisional" meant "provincial." In Alberta the chief claimants were Edmonton and Calgary, though the claims of Red Deer got as far as the Prime Minister, and were the subject of "a pretty strong argument" before Sir Wilfrid.26 The rivalry between the two largest centres of population was an old one, extending into every sphere, but so far Calgary had had the advantage. She had, in spite of Edmonton's assertions to the contrary, a slightly larger population and was much closer to what was then the population centre of the province. Edmonton was nearly at the geographical centre of the proposed province and could hope for transportation facilities at least as good as those possessed by her southern rival. Calgary, Edmonton, and Red

AUTONOMY TERMS AND PARTY POLITICS

13

Deer were not the only contenders. Calgary at one point pressed for the choice of a neutral as provisional capital; the mountain resort of Banff was suggested and the suggestion ridiculed in Edmonton. 27 The rest of the prospective province probably did not take the claims of either centre too seriously-an ironical letter to the Bulletin28 urged the claim of the tiny settlement of Vegreville-but feeling between the two cities reached heights of bitterness previously unattained. Peter Talbot, the federal member for Strathcona, assured his friend Rutherford that he would "fight to the finish" to ensure that the temporary capital was fixed at either Edmonton or Strathcona, then separate municipalities. 211 The Bulletin, not without justification, accused Calgary of neglecting the other terms of the autonomy bill in its anxiety to become capita130 while the Liberal organ in the south, the Calgary Albertan, denounced Edmonton's behaviour as "cowardly," "unfair," "traitorous," "unpatriotic," and "despicable."31 When the bill named Edmonton as capital, Calgary pinned its hopes on the belief that the decison was merely "provisional,"32 and the controversy subsided for the time being, to break out again when the first provincial legislature met. Sectional animosities were further stimulated by the quarrel over the boundaries of the constituencies for the first provincial election. As laid down in the bill these quite clearly favoured the north. Even Talbot admitted privately that he and Oliver had been unable to find any flaw in the figures placed before Laurier and the cabinet to show that over a thousand more votes had been cast in the election of 1904 in the part of the province south of the Red Deer River than in the part to the north. 88 Yet the latter region was to have one more seat in the Legislative Assembly of Alberta. The Calgary Liberals strongly urged the selection of a non-political commission to fix the constituency boundaries. As C. A. Stuart, one of their leaders, put it: •.. If the government should do the dividing themselves then no matter how fair in fact it might be the people of this city and district would be bound to think that, having been done practically by Mr. Oliver it was unfair and fixed for the purpose of increasing Edmonton's chances for the capital. The government turned down one very fair proposition of the Calgary people as to the provisional capital and if there is any belief in further favour in the direction I mention it will, I believe, from what our strong Liberal friends are saying, simply put the Liberal party out of business in this district for all time to come. . . . If the government can avoid even the suspicion of favor by naming a non-political commission, we would have a good chance of redeeming this riding both in Dominion and local politics. On the other hand, if the Northern Liberals with their 2000 majorities cannot afford to join in our representations to Oliver to have a commission appointed so as to help the party in the south then all we can conclude down here is that with our northern friends city comes before

14

THE LIBERAL PARTY IN ALBERTA

party. You must not then be surprised if you find city coming before party among the Calgary Liberals.34

Stuart also wanted the Liberals to make it their policy to leave the capital question to a popular vote at the first election. He threatened to abstain from participation in arrangements for a Liberal convention, but Oliver was unmoved. 35 On second thought Stuart decided to toe the line though he reported that he and the Calgary Liberals generally were "very sore." He was not hopeful about Liberal prospects in the city, but did not think that the capital question would diminish party enthusiasm anywhere outside its limits. 36 The outcry from the Calgary Liberals and the dogged opposition of the Conservatives seem to have induced in Laurier a tendency to waver in the matter of the constituencies. Oliver stubbornly declined any concession and Talbot thought he had been able to convince the Prime Minister that Calgary "had not a leg to stand on." Talbot, heartily behind the north, whence had come his majority in 1904, was shocked by the behaviour of his Liberal brethren in the south. "Our friends in Calgary are no good." "The Calgary papers and even Calgary Liberals are so bitter and have cried so loud that I fear many people think it is a gerrymander."37 Whether or not Talbot was responsible, Sir Wilfrid's fears appear to have been set at rest for the constituency boundaries stood as originally scheduled. The decision to establish two provinces, with which may be linked the selection of the capitals and the delineation of the constituency boundaries, was profoundly important for the political future and can only be understood in its relation to the part played by Haultain. Although the weight of argument as to the number of provinces may, in the light of subsequent developments, seem to lie with Haultain and his followers, it was the view of the minority of the territorial representatives that found favour with Laurier and the federal cabinet. Curiously enough, most of the leaders of this minority in the territorial Assembly were strongly partisan Conservatives. The reason Laurier gave for the decision, that the area was too large to be a single province, seems scarcely adequate and others may be suggested. First, those who wished for two provinces were very much better organized for the purpose of exerting pressure. In the second place the western press generally, which began by advocating a single province, gave the idea no vigorous support during the critical negotiations preceding the introduction of the autonomy bills.3 8 Even more influential, and probably decisive, were certain political considerations. Haultain, although the most effective advocate and

AUTONOMY TERMS AND PARTY POLITICS

15

practitioner of non-partisanship in territorial affairs, was in federal politics a Conservative. His campaign in the Conservative interest in 1904 had given considerable offence to the Liberals. Haultain's prestige in a single province would have stood very high and his claim to the office of premier would have been difficult to dismiss. In the opening months of 1905 his political future was of acute interest to all who were angling for office. The Liberal Member of Parliament for Strathcona, Peter Talbot, writing to his friend and fellow Liberal, A. C. Rutherford, representative of Strathcona in the territorial Assembly, in February, 1905, still regarded a coalition, with Haultain as premier, as a possibility in Alberta, but there were other alternatives. "Who will be called on by the Lieutenant-Governor to form a government? Some say that by following precedent it will have to be Haultain. Oliver and I have named you .. . . No Liberal," continued Talbot, rather tactlessly, "stands out prominently." If Haultain became premier, Rutherford would be asked to join his ministry since Haultain was "opposed to the introduction of party politics into Albertan affairs." Not all Liberals were as friendly to Haultain as Talbot or as ready to accept a coalition, and the young Edmonton lawyer, Charles Wilson Cross, who was already a power in Edmonton Liberalism, was "bitterly opposed to Haultain and will fight any such arrangement. " 39 In southern Alberta the Liberal member for High River, R. A. Wallace, was willing to put up with Haultain but not with a coalition containing either of the two Calgary Conservatives in the territorial Assembly, R. B. Bennett and I. I. Young. 40 I. W. Woolf of Cardston, an influential Mormon Liberal, was strongly in favour of party lines. 41 A few weeks later Talbot still thought a coalition possible, but in the interval he had, like a good Liberal, cooled towards Haultain. "I am not sure but we will be in for a coalition. If Haultain were running it would be difficult to get rid of him." Haultain's stand in 1904 and his position in relation to the Autonomy Bill would make it difficult for Laurier to call him to office; he was "certainly in league with the Conservatives here to embarrass the government."t2 Talbot's views may be taken as reflecting those of many Alberta Liberals, who had collaborated with Haultain, who liked and admired him personally but who felt that he was now "in all the secrets of the enemy and helping them."48 Another prominent territorial politician who was a potentially strong contender for office as the first premier of Alberta was Frank Oliver. Talbot argued that if he became premier the capital would certainly come to Edmonton. But Oliver was non-committal. "So far I can make nothing out of Oliver. He has told me that he would not take the

16

THE LIBERAL PARTY IN ALBERTA

premiership."0 As late as March 22, he still professed not to have made up his mind even as to the introduction of party lines. 45 When Talbot once more pressed upon him the arguments for acceptance of the premiership of Alberta, thus provoking what was "almost a quarrel," Oliver, vigorous in temper and violent in speech, disclosed that what he wanted was the federal Ministry of the Interior, vacant since Clifford Sifton's resignation on February 27.46 Talbot thought Walter Scott, Oliver's rival for the cabinet seat, the more favoured in the highest circles, where many considered that Oliver was "an impossibility because of the stand he took on some former occasions." Talbot himself supported Oliver but feared that, if he were disappointed, "there may be a row."47 Scott, he thought, "would get the job but the Government is afraid he could not win the election. When I was asked if Oliver could win an election now, I replied that he could with as large a majority as he got before. " 48 On April 8, the day after Talbot wrote in this vein, Oliver's appointment was announced. When he stood for election, he was returned by acclamation. Oliver's ambition thus achieved, he was no longer a prospective premier of Alberta. He now seems to have given his support to Rutherford. Writing only ten days after his appointment as Minister of the Interior, he said: "The idea expressed [that Rutherford be premier] has been in my mind. I am sorry to say that I understand Mr. Sifton is favourable to Mr. Haultain being called upon, but my own view would be for you, and I hope after consultation with my friends to succeed."49 Rutherford thus could count upon the support of the most influential Liberal in the new province, and one who, as a cabinet minister, presumably had the ear of Sir Wilfrid. Talbot could, of course, have been the first premier of Alberta had he so desired, and if party lines were introduced. Laurier, once he had committed himself on the latter point, wrote to tell him that "the opinion of our friends, as you know, was very strong in favor of you accepting the position of Prime Minister of your province. I still believe that they are right." 60 But it is clear that Talbot had other plans. He was not a wealthy man and he professed to find the hurlyburly of politics beyond not only his means but his strength. He hoped for an appointment to the Senate-provision had been made for an increase in the number of western senators-but, if this failed-"My claims are I think a little better than those of anyone else but it may be that the Govt. will not look at it in that way"-he wanted Rutherford to keep a position open for him in Alberta. He suggested that of Sheriff for Red Deer, conveniently near his home at Lacombe. 51 As it turned out Talbot was

AUTONOMY TERMS AND PARTY POLITICS

17

appointed to the Senate, though not until 1906. Meanwhile he remained active in the political affairs of the province, but it is clear he was never a serious contender for the office of premier. With Oliver and Talbot out of the running, Rutherford was the strongest Liberal candidate, but there was still the question of Haultain. Were the first provincial government to be constituted along party lines at all? Sir Wilfrid was maddeningly non-committal. Haultain also kept his own counsel. Talbot inclined more and more towards Rutherford and the introduction of party lines. "You are the man. You may have to fight Haultain. I cannot find out what he is going to do. . . . I am awfully sorry that he has made it perhaps impossible to work in unison with him. From letters I have got from many sources or parts of Alberta the election will be run on party lines. I think we can win with a good majority. " 52 Talbot's confidence was partly based on his belief that Haultain would lead the Conservatives in Saskatchewan and R. B. Bennett those in Alberta. "If I am right . . . and Bennett leads the Tories in Alberta you have a snap."53 The Prime Minister however was still uncertain even at the end of June. "Sir Wilfrid is inclined to favor a coalition in Alberta but I don't think the boys will stand for it. They have lost confidence in Haultain."54 Talbot's personal liking for Haultain seems to have made him reluctant to abandon the idea of coalition, but be did not blame his fellow Liberals for opposing it. The Prime Minister kept his party on tenterhooks through most of July, though by this time the parties were organizing in both provinces. The critical appointments were of course those of the lieutenantgovernors of the new provinces, for from them would go out the summons to form the first governments. It could be assumed that A. E. Forget, Lieutenant-Governor of the Territories since 1898, would continue his office in one of the provinces. Rutherford evidently feared that he might choose the more westerly. "Rest assured," wrote Talbot, "that Forget will not come to Alberta. Sir Wilfrid told me so. . . . It may be Bulyea. I think an effort is being made to get Walter Scott to take the Liberal leadership in Saskatchewan. H it succeeds, we will get Bulyea, if not it may be Dr. Douglas."H Yet as late as July 18 Bulyea does not seem to have been quite sure of his position.56 Laurier wrote to him on July 25 and the next day it was being taken for granted by informed Liberals that he would be the first lieutenant-governor of Alberta. 51 His appointment was formally gazetted on August 25. Bulyea had already taken an important part in the autonomy negotiations and as Lieutenant-Governor for two terms he was to exert some

18

THE LIBERAL PARTY IN ALBERTA

influence on the course of Alberta politics. Born at Gagetown, New Brunswick, in 1859 and educated at the University of New Brunswick, he came to the West in 1882. By profession a surveyor, Bulyea, a versatile man, had at one time or another occupied himself as a teacher and an undertaker. He held various offices with the territorial government, served as Yukon Commissioner in 1898 and was re-elected to the North-West assembly in 1902. His appointment as LieutenantGovernor was by no means a surprise, for his political activity and known Liberalism made him a natural choice. Rutherford meanwhile was more and more widely regarded as likely to be the first premier of Alberta. His colleague from Wetaskiwin in the assembly, A. S. Rosenroll, wrote of reports that mentioned him as a possible premier, which suggests that the idea had spread beyond the innermost circles of Liberalism. 118 In July a Red Deer Liberal spoke of "pleasant rumors." 59 L. G. DeVeber, a leading Liberal in Lethbridge and a member of the assembly thought, as late as July 12, that with Oliver, Talbot, and Haultain out of the picture, "it practically came down to you and I, both of us weak enough God knows but we have the sense to see it."60 DeVeber, by reason of his close association with Haultain, was suspect to some of his fellow Liberals,61 and they were not inclined to take him too seriously.62 Elsewhere in the country Rutherford was expected to be premier and had received at least one request for appointment as a deputy minister in the new provincial administration.63 Yet as long as Sir Wilfrid and Haultain kept their own counsel, rumours remained rumours. However, on August 13, the Alberta Liberals in convention at Calgary chose Rutherford as their leader. To the last, Laurier thought Talbot should take the premiership, but Talbot, for personal reasons, wanted Rutherford. He thought he was himself perhaps the stronger in the south, but Rutherford was preferred in the north where "the great question . . . is the location of the capital." "Rutherford and I are the best of friends. . . . I spoke to him of the Senatorship but I think he is too fully committed to his own constituents for the position of Premier.... When I found this ... I thought it best to try to induce my warmest friends to give him their loyal support."64 A few days after Rutherford's selection as Liberal leader in Alberta, Haultain announced that he had decided to stay in Saskatchewan and that he would continue the defence of provincial rights as he understood them as a non-partisan in provincial politics. On the same day the Alberta Conservatives in convention at Red Deer chose as their leader R. B. Bennett. It was clear that the struggle in Alberta would be conducted along traditional party lines and that the non-partisan adminis-

AUTONOMY TERMS AND PARTY POLITICS

19

tration advocated by Haultain and favoured by many of his supporters would have no chance of trial in the new province. It was scarcely a surprise when, on September 2, Lieutenant-Governor Bulyea, who had been sworn in the day before, made it his first official act to name Alexander Cameron Rutherford the first prime minister of Alberta. 611 Early in 1905, before the Autonomy Bill was introduced, it had been taken for granted that Haultain would be the premier of the new province, or of one of the new provinces. There was a widespread willingness to accept the continuance of his non-partisan administration and his views of the shape autonomy should take were widely, even generally, accepted. Nine months later Haultain was leader only of a forlorn opposition in Saskatchewan, party government was entrenched in both provinces, and the measure of autonomy achieved bore little resemblance to that Haultain had so long advocated. How did this reversal of affairs come about? It is difficult not to conclude that party considerations had an important influence. Haultain, non-partisan though his administration of the Territories had been, was a Conservative in federal politics, and in the election of 1904 and subsequently he had moved into what was, in Liberal opinion, an offensively close relationship with the federal Conservatives. To give autonomy in the form that Haultain had advocated it would only have added to his prestige and strengthened his claim to office. It must have been at least a temptation, so to disregard his proposals in detail, while at the same time accepting the great principle, as to diminish the influence of a potentially dangerous political opponent. It is also conceivable that Laurier and his associates, as well as prominent western Liberals, were not blind to the possibilities of patronage in two provinces where administrations would have to be built from t.be very foundations, as compared with those in one with an established civil service at least infected with Haultain's dangerous idea of non-partisanship. Laurier's continued refusal to commit himself finally as to the rejection of coalition may be held to argue against the view that he excluded Haultain in the interests of the Liberal party, but Laurier had nothing to lose by keeping silence. He certainly appeared to his fellow Liberals to be exceedingly reluctant to abandon Haultain,66 but if he had revealed his plans earlier it would only have strengthened Haultain in his protest against the policy of the central government. The exclusion of Haultain from office was the symbol of the rejection of his concept of non-partisan administration just as the appointment of the Liberals Bulyea and Forget as lieutenant-governors was the symbol of the introduction of party lines into the new provinces. These appointments, the summons of the Liberals Ruthedord and Scott as premiers,

20

THE LIBERAL PARTY IN ALBERTA

the formation of avowedly Liberal administrations prior to the provincial elections, the selection of Liberal-minded Edmonton rather than the Conservative stronghold of Calgary as the provisional capital of Alberta, and the obvious weighting of the vote in the northern region against the less reliably Liberal south in the drawing of constituency boundaries, all lend colour to the view that party interest played an important part in determining the form that autonomy took and the future of some of its protagonists. Furthermore, it was natural that after nearly ten years of power in Ottawa, Laurier and the Liberals should have grown less enthusiastic in their support of provincial rights, but the arguments with which they sought to justify the consignment of the two new provinces to that second-class status which at an earlier date Macdonald and the Conservatives had thought suitable for Manitoba are not altogether convincing. Haultain and the Conservatives advocated the transfer of the natural resources to the provinces and it was as much the immediate interest of partisan Liberalism as consideration of the national welfare that determined the decision on this important point. In any case, when Laurier at last decided that it was safe to exclude Haultain and announced the appointments of Forget and Bulyea, it was evident that the Liberal party had every intention of seeking the support of the voters of the new provinces for governments that would follow the conventional paths of Canadian party politics.

-»> CHAPTER TWO~

The First Alberta Provincial Election, 1905 THE GOVERNMENTS of the new provinces had been constituted along party lines. What was still to be determined was the view that the voters would take. In Alberta Liberal prospects were good, but Liberal partisans were not without misgivings. Haultain had, it is true, chosen to fight it out in Saskatchewan, but he had excellent connections in southern Alberta and high prestige in the Territories at large, as well as many sympathizers in the western province where he had first established himself. Southern Alberta Liberals generally, and Calgary Liberals in particular, were still disgruntled over the way in which the north had been favoured in the establishment of constituencies and the selection of Edmonton as provisional capital. Southern Alberta had always shown itself inclined to return men of Conservative leanings to the territorial legislature and in the federal election of 1904 both southern constituencies had elected Conservative members. The influence of the Canadian Pacific, which was commonly regarded as wholly exercised on the behalf of the Conservative party, was not to be underestimated. Although the Alberta public had not shown itself unduly concerned about the school clauses in the Autonomy Act, the issue was potentially a dangerous one from the Liberal point of view and the Conservative espousal of provincial rights might prove almost as embarrassing. In R. B. Bennett the Conservatives had a vigorous leader who, in spite of his admitted weaknesses, might be more effective on the platform than the less flamboyant Rutherford. Rutherford's immediate problem was the selection of a cabinet and he made his announcement shortly after the inauguration ceremonies and celebrations had taken place in Edmonton on September 1. There was no doubt that it was a Liberal cabinet. The Premier was also Minister of Education and Provincial Treasurer. His Attorney-General was the thirty-two-year-old Charles Wilson Cross, who was already recognized in the councils of Edmonton Liberalism as second only to the Honourable Frank Oliver. Calgary was represented in the cabinet by William Henry Cushing, who held the portfolio of Public Works, a most important one in a province entering upon a phase of rapid development. Reputedly wealthy, the owner of a flourishing lumber manufacturing concern, and as devout a Methodist as the Premier was

22

THE LIBERAL PARTY IN ALBERTA

a Baptist, Cushing had some experience in municipal affairs in Calgary as Mayor and President of the Board of Trade, 1 but politically he was otherwise a novice. William Thomas Finlay, the Minister of Agriculture and Provincial Secretary, was an Ulsterman who had settled at Medicine Hat, where he had engaged in the lumber business, been interested in the Medicine Hat Ranching Company, acted as Mayor, and been a member of the territorial legislature. 2 When the Autonomy Bill first appeared, Finlay had so disliked the original school clause that he thought of running as an Independent rather than as a Liberal,3 but what he saw as Haultain's uncompromising attitude had persuaded him that the first election should be run on party lines.• His nomination was followed by strong pressure on Rutherford from Medicine Hat Liberals for his inclusion in the cabinet as a recognition, not only of Finlay's virtues, but also of the importance of Medicine Hat and its tributary district. 5 The cabinet was completed by George DeVeber of Lethbridge as Minister without Portfolio. Like Finlay and the Premier, DeVeber had been a member of the territorial Assembly, where since 1899 he had been chief Liberal whip. He had spent a period in the North-West Mounted Police, and he had practised medicine in Macleod and Lethbridge. DeVeber thought of himself as a potential premier but, although a prominent Liberal, he had been a consistent supporter of Haultain and an opponent of the introduction of party lines into Alberta politics. It appears that, although not exactly in the highest favour with his fellow Liberals, he was too influential to be overlooked altogether. What he really wanted was a seat in the Senate, but he was prepared to accept a portfolio until such a time as "we will be able to ascertain who of the new blood will rise to the surface and one of them may step into my shoes."6 He went to the Senate on March 8, 1906. The southern part of the province was thus, numerically at least, preponderant in the cabinet, perhaps as compensation for the treatment it received in the matter of constituencies and capital. However, Rutherford appears in 1905 to have paid little attention to the cabinet-making principle, dear to federal and provincial prime ministers alike, of having regard to sectional and minority interests. All the cabinet members were Protestant, all were English-speaking. All but one, the Ulsterman Finlay, were of Canadian birth; three of the five were from Ontario. All but one, Cushing, had some political experience, and all were good Liberals, although three had been able to co-operate with Haultain on a non-partisan basis while DeVeber had favoured Haultain as premier. 7 Of the five cabinet ministers only the youngest, Cross, was lNumbered footnotes are to be found in a section at the back of the book.

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long to remain at the centre of Alberta politics. DeVeber went almost immediately to the Senate, Finlay was incapacitated by illness, and Cushing and Rutherford were to quarrel over the Alberta and Great Waterways Railway question and to withdraw from active political life. Cross, stormy figure though he was, was destined to serve under all three Liberal premiers and to survive as a member of the legislature the disaster that overtook the Liberals in the election of 1921. Long before Rutherford announced the composition of his cabinet, Liberals and Conservatives alike were active in organization for the first election campaign. Though it was clear that the election would be fought on party lines, the strength of non-partisan sentiment may be inferred from the considerable pains each party took to blame its rival for the infusion of partyism into Alberta politics. A similar inference may indeed be drawn from the inclusion in the cabinet of such former friends and supporters of Haultain as Finlay and DeVeber. The Liberal press accused the Conservatives, especially Haultain and Bennett, of forcing party upon the reluctant Liberals;8 but, although some Conservatives had disliked the non-partisan policies of Haultain, it would seem, as has earlier been argued, that the abandonment of those policies was calculated to promote Liberal prospects in the new provinces. Liberals had little reason for dissatisfaction. Federal patronage was in their hands and their control of the machinery of the new provincial government offered gratifying possibilities. The Conservatives on the contrary entered the campaign with all the disadvantages of opposition and none of its advantages; they could not attack the record of the Rutherford government because there was as yet no record to attack. The Aberta election of 1905 was thus a campaign of promises and personalities; the staples of provincial elections, scandals and complaints of ministerial incompetence, were lacking. Before the summer of 1905 was out both Liberals and Conservatives had put forward their platforms. This, together with their respective conventions, signalized their public recognition that party lines would prevail in the politics of Alberta. The Edmonton Conservatives, meeting to nominate W. A. Griesbach as their candidate, demanded that Edmonton become the provincial capital, instructed their candidate, if elected, to work for the abolition of separate public schools and state-aided separate schools in the province, protested against federal retention of the public domain, resolved in favour of government ownership of public utilities, especially long-distance telephone lines, and advocated provincial construction and maintenance of trunk wagon roads and necessary bridges.9

24

THE LIBERAL PARTY IN ALBERTA

Later, at their provincial convention in Red Deer in August, the Conservatives produced a platform that followed very much the same lines although they naturally did not commit themselves on the question of a permanent capital. A more important omission was any reference to the contentious educational clauses of the autonomy legislation. Griesbach, the Edmonton Conservative candidate, who fought his losing battle largely on the school question, was later to suggest that the absence of any direct reference to this matter was the result of the influence of R. B. Bennett and James Lougheed, the latter a Senator from Calgary and a power in Alberta Conservatism.10 However, in his opening campaign speech Bennett condemned the educational clauses as a breach of provincial rights. 11 Liberals such as Talbot were aware of the difficulty of their own position on this question. "We will have to fight it out on the school clause. I think we have the best of the argument but our opponents can arouse the passions of a considerable section of the people and may make it hot for us." 12 In Saskatchewan the Conservatives showed no such diffidence in attacking the school clause, which was one of the liveliest issues in the campaign. In Alberta the Conservatives seem to have been on the defensive; they had lost the initiative to the Liberals and their platform lacked vigour and definiteness. Indeed, it looked very much like a non-partisan platform and the stress it laid upon provincial rights and public ownership was a curious emphasis for the party of John A. Macdonald and, unkind opponents added, of the C.P.R. The Liberals, the platform charged, had forced party lines on the reluctant Conservatives and the implication was that the Conservatives were genuine non-partisans in provincial affairs, forced to behave as Conservatives only by Liberal trickery. How completely the individual Alberta Conservative believed in this part of the injured iMocent may be questioned, but he does appear to have believed in the existence of a strong, non-partisan sentiment in the province upon which it was worthwhile to capitalize. The nature of their platform was to prove a serious Conservative handicap. In Saskatchewan Haultain, with Conservative support, succeeded in oganizing a Provincial Rights Association which fought the election with more vigour and attained a much greater measure of success than the Alberta Conservatives. 13 A Liberal statement of policy appeared in August and was adopted as the party platform at a provincial convention in Calgary in October. Its general principles reflected the demands and aspirations of a western province; its application of those principles reflected a degree of caution induced by the responsibilities of office. The convention resolved:

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( 1) That the intelligent opinion of the people is the true and just source of all political powers. (2) That the administration of public affairs should be under continued responsibility to the electorate. ( 3) That the true end of government is the promotion of the welfare of the masses of the people by the creation and preservation, as far as it is possible by the action of the state, of equal opportunities in life for every individual, by the vigorous repression of all encroachments on the rights of the people on the part of monopolistic corporations, by amelioration of the conditions of life and the redress of injustice, by a steady, orderly and progressive administration of affairs, and by watchful and continued attention to the wants of those new settlers whose courage, industry and thrift are creating the prosperity of the west. 14

This was the Liberalism of the frontier, but the resolutions of the convention were milder than the principles upon which they purported to be based. With the cares of office already on their shoulders, and a congenial government in power at Ottawa, the Liberals approached the warmest issues even more circumspectly than their opponents. Toe dangerous subjects of natural resources and the school system were skirted in an expression of the convention's adherence to "the principle of Provincial rights" and its determination "to maintain intact and unimpaired the full legislative and executive authority of the Province of Alberta under the constitution of Canada." While some Conservatives demanded the elimination of the separate school, the Liberals resolved in favour of "an efficient system of common schools" and "equal opportunity to obtain a good primary education" in schools that, if supported by taxation, should be subject to "the direct and continuous supervision, regulation and control of the Provincial department of education." In reply to the Conservative demand for public ownership of utilities, the Liberals merely suggested that "the desirability of retaining or acquiring control of all provincial franchises should be kept steadily in view." They stressed the need for every possible encouragement to the all-important agricultural industry and particularly for "every legitimate assistance" in reaching markets "with the least possible loss of profit through excessive freight rates or the intervention of middlemen." For the moment they saw "no immediate necessity to incur any provincial public debt or to pledge, alienate, or hypothecate the assets of the province." Here was an assertion of Liberal confidence in those financial arrangements for autonomy that their opponents attacked as rather less than generous. 16 Altogether the Liberal platform was a very moderate statement of the party's intentions and it was clear that the provincial party had

26

THE LIBERAL PARTY IN ALBERTA

wholeheartedly, for public purposes at least, accepted the autonomy terms. The Liberals sought to convince the electorate that acceptance of the terms would bring greater benefit to the province than the Conservatives could hope to win by their demand for better terms. On such issues as provincial rights and public ownership the Liberals were really claiming, not that they disagreed with the Conservatives on principle, but rather that they would gain what the Conservatives would lose by their intransigent attitude. The issue in the election thus tended to resolve itself into a question, not of measures, but of men. Could Rutherford and his government carry out their promises more effectively than Bennett and the Conservatives? In a contest "of announced rather than applied policy, of proposal rather than performance"16 personalities were certain to count for a great deal. As Rutherford had already chosen his cabinet and selected a skeleton civil service, largely recruited from the territorial civil service at Regina, 17 the Liberals were, by circumstances, presented with their leaders and organization ready made. The Conservatives, at their August convention,18 had chosen as their leader Richard Bedford Bennett of Calgary. The new leader had a distinguished political future before him; he was to be Prime Minister of Canada in a period of great difficulty and ultimately become a peer of the United Kingdom, but in 1905 he was young and politically untried. The personality of the new Conservative leader became one of the central issues of the campaign. Few men in Canadian public life have been more admired or more disliked than Bennett. The Liberal press immediately made him the symbol of the "corporation connection" for which they consistently berated the Conservative party. He was, the Bulletin pointed out, not only the solicitor for the Canadian Pacific Railway Company, but also for the Bell Telephone Company and the Calgary Water Power Company. But it was his connection with the hated C.P.R. that the Liberals stressed most. That railway, they charged, supported the Conservatives because the Liberals were bringing the Grand Trunk Pacific into the West. The alliance between the C.P.R. and the Conservatives was, they said, an old one: in British Columbia the Conservatives had opposed the building of lines that would compete with the C.P.R., and they had attempted to delay the building of the Hudson Bay line. The Conservatives really approved of the C.P.R.'s tax exemptions and their demand that Alberta should control her natural resources sprang from the C.P.R.'s desire that its lands should not have to compete with the free homesteads of Liberalism. Even the reopening of the separate schools question was held to be subtly calcu-

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lated to weaken the Liberals and so hamper the westward progress of the Grand Trunk. 19 The Liberals' reduction of the election issues to the single question of the subservience of Bennett and the Conservatives to the Canadian Pacific proved sound strategy. Most of the people of Alberta could find some reason for disliking the great corporation. Those remote from its services resented that remoteness as unfair discrimination against their part of the province. Those who lived near its lines found its freight rates too high, its compensation for stock killed on its tracks too low, its officials too brusque, or its service too infrequent. The Canadian Pacific, in the age of trust-busting and muck-raking, could not expect to be popular in the agrarian West. As the campaign continued, it grew more bitter and more personal. At a joint meeting in Calgary Bennett accused Cushing of distributing road money among certain Liberal candidates to bribe electors. 20 When this assertion was challenged from the floor, he went on to explain that "he did not say that Liberal candidates were going round the country with road money in their pockets, but he did say that they had gone to several people and asserted that they had several amounts of road money to spend. " 21 The Liberals retaliated by accusing the Conservatives of using C.P.R. money for election purposes, for instance, "the twenty crisp $50 bills" which W. L. Walsh, the Conservative organizer, was alleged to have offered David Maloney of St. Albert if he would run in that constituency. 22 Frank Oliver, the new Minister of the Interior, chose the eve of the election to inform the Edmonton Board of Trade's council that the federal government was prepared to erect a new post office. 23 At the same time his newspaper, the Edmonton Bulletin, gave its readers instruction in the technique of voting: The Ballot used at this election is blank. The names of the candidates do not appear.... An elector desiring to vote presents himself at the poll, and is handed two pencils, a blue and Red and a ballot. He then retires to the compartment used for marking ballots and selects the pencil of the color assigned to the candidate for whom he desires to vote, which in this election should be red, and makes a cross on the blank side of the ballot. He will then fold the ballot, wet the gummed edges, and hand same to the deputy returning officer. Vote for Cross and use the red pencil. 24

Their sweeping victory in the election of November 9, 1905, more than justified the optimism of the Liberals and suggested the efficiency of the party organization that had been so hurriedly contrived.

28

THE LIBERAL PARTY IN ALBERTA

Immediately after the election the government claimed twenty-one of the twenty-five seats, conceding one to the Conservatives and one to Labour and calling two doubtful. Ultimately the government won all but two seats, both of which went to Conservatives. The final results were slow to come in; in High River, a comparatively long-settled constituency, the Conservative candidate, A. J. Robertson, was first conceded victory with a majority of fifteen,2 11 ten days later the Liberal candidate was credited with a majority of sixty, but in December Cushing expected Robertson to be leader of the opposition, and it was Robertson who finally took the seat. In spite of local uncertainties there was no question of the government's overwhelming success. In Edmonton and Strathcona, Cross and Rutherford had majorities large enough to cause their opponents to lose their deposits. In Calgary, a Labour candidate, said to be running to divide the Conservative vote, received three hundred and six votes, 26 and Cushing headed the poll with a small majority over Bennett. The Liberal majorities were on the whole larger in the north than in the south. In the south the largest Liberal majority was that of J. W. Woolf in Cardston, the smallest was in Innisfail, where John A. Simpson had a majority of only a single vote over his Conservative opponent. In the constituencies south of and including Red Deer the average total of votes cast was substantially higher than in those to the north. (The only acclamation was that of the Liberal W. F. Bredin in the remote riding of Athabasca.) This lent colour to the Conservative suggestion that the federal government had gerrymandered the province, especially as in the southern constituencies, where there had been a number of Independent, Socialist, and Labour candidates, considerably more votes had been cast against the government than for it. 27 However, the Liberal success was so general that any favouritism to the north did not affect the outcome. Though the Liberals had been confident of success, and the experienced and cautious Talbot had counted on eighteen out of the twenty-five seats,28 they had not expected such a landslide. Nor had the Conservatives expected such an overwhelming defeat for they had candidates in all but two constituencies and their chances had seemed excellent in the south, where they had been strongly entrenched in territorial days. 29 They attributed their defeat largely to the effect of the votes of the Roman Catholics, who had reason to be grateful to the party of Laurier, and of those of the new settlers of non-Anglo-Saxon origin, whom the Conservatives held to be under the influence of the agents of the federal government. Bennett, for example, attributed his

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defeat in Calgary to Roman Catholic infl.uence.30 No doubt these Conservative rationalizations had some foundation, though in Rosebud the Conservative candidate, Cornelius Hiebert, whose victory over Dr. Michael Clark was one of the surprises of the election, was a Mennonite of Russian birth. Hiebert's triumph may however have been due to the government's refusal of separate schools to the substantial Mennonite element in that riding and in any case his Conservatism did not prove durable. 31 The Rosebud electors seem to have voted against the government rather than for the Conservatives. In High River, the other seat won by the Conservatives, A. J. Robertson defeated R. A. Wallace, who had been a Liberal member of the territorial Assembly and a strong supporter of Oliver for the Alberta leadership. 32 Here a third candidate attracted a good many votes and perhaps there was some disaffection among local Liberals, who had wanted Wallace to be made a member of the cabinet.33 The emphasis the opposition placed upon the provincial right to control the school system and the public lands did not make the impression on the electorate the Conservative leadership thought it should and would. The Liberal government was a government in being, with all the advantages this implied in the field of patronage, and at the same time, as it had not been tested in the field of action, it was almost immune from effective criticism. Where, as in Rosebud, a concrete grievance existed, the voters turned against the government. Elsewhere there had been neither time nor opportunity for such grievances to develop and the people were unmoved by what seemed to them the insubstantial and totally theoretical issues put before them by the Conservatives. What perhaps was the decisive factor in the outcome of the election was the Liberal possession of the machinery of provincial and federal administration. The Conservatives had fared well in the Territories when a Conservative government had been in power in Ottawa and the Liberals recognized the danger that non-party government in the new provinces might be used to create a Conservative machine. "If J. J. Young, [a prominent Calgary Conservative] is now in favour of nonparty lines it is with the view of getting a Conservative at the head of the big spending Department and paving the way to fix things solidly for the Conservatives. "3 t What they had feared the Conservatives might do the Liberals saw no shame in doing. "I have thought," wrote Talbot to Rutherford, "that of all the officials we will have to appoint we should be able to raise considerable funds. " 811 It is evident that Talbot was innocent of any thought of impropriety in such a suggestion; he

30

THE LIBERAL PARTY IN ALBERTA

clearly assumed that this was the natural way in which to raise campaign funds. From the moment it was clear that Rutherford was to be premier, and indeed even while the possibility was only a rumour, he was importuned for appointment to the civil service of the new province. A few such letters have survived; verbal approaches were presumably more numerous. The applicants made no attempt to disguise the political nature of such appointments. Even as eminent a figure in the counsels of Liberalism as Talbot had asked, if the senatorship for which he hoped was not available, that Rutherford reserve for him the post of sheriff at Red Deer,36 and he did not disdain to urge civil service appointments for his relatives. 37 Rutherford himself asked Talbot to use his good offices to secure him a K.C., though the Minister of Justice demurred until such time as Rutherford was actually chosen Liberal leader.38 A well-qualified applicant for the important post of Deputy Commissioner of Education, already holding a responsible position, thought it proper to observe, "I am and always have been an ardent Grit. There is no one, in Northern Alberta at least, who will deny the truth of this statement. Of course, if the Conservatives or the Non-Partisans as they now call themselves are in the majority in the new Legislature, I hope for no favours." 39 The Executive Committee of the Strathcona Liberal Association passed resolutions naming those of the faithful whom it regarded as "suitable candidates for positions for which they are qualified in the service of the government of the Province of Alberta." 40 Those who opposed the Liberal policies were equally frank in their recognition of the principle that to the victor belong the spoils. As one civil servant wrote: "I herewith tender you my resignation as Inspector of Stock under your government. I could not consistently hold any office which would put me under any obligation to you or your government. I consider that the people of Alberta and in fact the people of the whole of Canada have been sold by Laurier and his tools. I do not consider this a Province at all in the sense that are the other parts of Canada. I voted, talked and took an active part in trying to defeat you. I consider this my duty." 41 It would be ridiculous to suggest that the exercise of such pressures was peculiar to Alberta or to the West, or that such adjustments are not of the essence of politics everywhere. What does seem clear is that the control of administration, at both the federal and the provincial level, was of critical importance in determining the outcome of the Alberta election of 1905. The Liberals made full use of their advantage; Rutherford's correspondence makes it plain that in most constituencies they were well organized, with vigorous local associations, adequate

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funds, and plenty of campaign literature. Wherever and whenever danger to the Liberal cause developed, as happened not infrequently, for many Liberals were evidently reluctant to abandon Haultain and non-partisan administration, the difficulty was quickly reported and someone despatched to deal with the situation. The intimate knowledge of the region possessed by party stalwarts such as Talbot was used to the full; he was, it would appear, one of the most effective of Rutherford's advisers in the campaign. Indeed it may even be suspected that it was he, rather than the Premier, who in the last resort determined Liberal strategy. In such a campaign personalities played a large part, for the ridings, if sometimes gigantic in area, were small in population. Even in Calgary fewer than 2,500 votes were cast; in most of the rural ridings there were less than 1,000. In such circumstances an active candidate could be expected to be well known to his prospective constituents. The general level of political ability and acceptability was perhaps higher among the Liberals. In Medicine Hat and Lethbridge, where two very able lawyers stood in the Conservative interest against two cabinet members, the contest was very close. Although R. B. Bennett was to achieve higher distinction in law and politics than Rutherford, the Liberals were perhaps not entirely wrong in regarding his leadership in this election as a Conservative liability. Alberta in 1905 was changing, had indeed greatly changed, and the Liberals were perhaps more representative of the new Alberta. Alberta was undergoing a process of change not unlike that which Manitoba experienced after 1870, when the old order of Red River days gave place to the new Manitoba, so markedly assimilated to Eastern Canada.42 The old Alberta of the rancher and the fur-trader, the remittance man and the adventurous who were always on the fringe of the frontier, was giving place to a more sedate and more settled community, more Canadian in the sense that it was more like Ontario. The boundless open range that had made southern Alberta a rancher's paradise was giving way to the plough of the settler from Eastern Canada or the central United States. The rancher had often been, by inheritance or disposition, Conservative; he had every reason to be well satisfied with the Conservative policies with regard to the public domain that had left him undisturbed in his grazing leases. But once the land was opened to homestead he was bound to be outnumbered by the newcomers, farmers to whom the settlement and tariff policies of the Laurier administration were likely to be attractive. In the southwest comer of the province the Mormon settlers, from their base in Utah, were using their experience

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THE LfflERAL PARTY IN ALBERTA

in the techniques of irrigation as the pioneers of a new kind of agricultural economy. The Mormon community, with its church-based social and economic life, was closely knit and the Mormon vote was said to be in the pocket of astute politicians such as John W. Woolf, who had so far assimilated himself to the politics of his adopted country as to be among the most outspoken Liberal supporters of the introduction of party lines into provincial politics.43 In the central parkland areas Clifford Sifton's men in sheepskin coats were outstripping as a factor of political importance the population of mixed white and Indian blood that had formed the oldest settlements in the province, though in French-speaking settlements such as St. Albert the French and Roman Catholic interest was strong. The ancient centre of the fur trade at Edmonton, after languishing for years just beyond the end of a Canadian Pacific branch line from Calgary, had recently welcomed the arrival of the Canadian Northern and was eagerly anticipating that of the Grand Trunk Pacific. She was indeed beginning a period of extremely rapid growth which threatened to overtake that of her southern rival Calgary, the favoured daughter of the Canadian Pacific. Edmonton was still close to the northern fringe of the populated area, but tales were told of the immense fertility of the Peace River country area where some hardy pioneers had already penetrated. Although Alberta was overwhelmingly an agricultural province, the towns were growing rapidly and new ones sprang up along the railway lines. Here again a new leadership was afforded by the newcomers from Eastern Canada and the north central states, settlers far more aggressive and perhaps much more alert to opportunity than the easy-going traders and professional men of the days when Alberta was a remote frontier. The old-timers accepted their relegation to a minor place in the community without undue concern, but the change in the tempo of life, in the towns and villages as well as in the country at large, had political implications. The basis, more emotional than intellectual, for the Conservative outlook ceased to exist; to the progressive newcomer the Conservative party was vulnerable to attack as the party of privilege and big business, of restrictions on settlement and high tariffs. The Conservatives had little to offer to the newcomer, whether it was the Mormon in the southwest, the Ukrainian in the east central region, or the shopkeeper or professional man from Eastern Canada in the towns. It was the Liberals who attracted their support, and they were quick to seize upon the opportunities offered by Liberal control of the administration. Yet skilful political organization alone could not have won the sweeping

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victory of 1905; at the root of the Liberal triumph lies this change in the human geography of the province. It was not merely a victory of the party politician over the non-partisan, or of the Liberal over the Conservative; it also marked the triumph of the new men over the oldtimers.

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CHAPTER THREE«